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***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78
2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154
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Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that
the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast
approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.
China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in
Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. states renounce risky ties. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. Based on the empirical record. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Further. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response.S. draw down their military obligations. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers.) AK In this article. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. First." Faced with these hard decisions. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 4. when U. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. 35. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed. and Joseph. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. Far from being a hazardous policy. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. a range of 61–83 percent. retrenchment can be successful. Third. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics.S. Second. No. In fact. In contrast. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. International Security Spring 2011. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. When international conditions demand it. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Faced with diminishing resources. In these ways.S." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. power was at its zenith. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. and cutting defense spending. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years. Pages 7-44. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. even over short time spans. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. As Kirshner puts it. In this first decade of the 21st century. When borrowing becomes more difficult. "These aren't the golden 1990s. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. increase reliance on allies or adversaries. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise. but necessity is the mother of invention. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. Necessity .4 of 154 defense expenditures. the absolute size of U.fpif. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. rather than conflict. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. cutting non-defense spending. choices must be made between raising taxes. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. Vol.
and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. Over here. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. the stimulus package. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. the red ink is mounting." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. economy. meanwhile. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. Brazil. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism. With the bank bailout. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? .S. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. The global recession is hammering the U. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India.
6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .
What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. has so far hedged its bets. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. France. has grown more belligerent. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. there is little more the US can do other than complain. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. power — just look at events in the Middle East. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. if anything.nytimes. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is. http://www. The official line. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. British journalist. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. June 24th. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. Italy and Russia. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim.co. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. Given America's own protectionist record. the Israeli prime minister.guardian. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. In Damascus. In this context.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. in effect. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. chairman of Doha Debates.S. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. 2011. To confuse matters further. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict. All three issues speak to American impotence. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. The Guardian UK. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports. promulgated by France. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . 2011. When you're winning. July 14th. http://www. But Washington. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. But paradoxically. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. militarily and in other ways. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near. you can afford to laugh. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. Like the Greeks. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. not leadership. staff writer. which. for example. to back up its Nato partners. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising.
[the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. competitiveness. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. including Russia — and in the entire world.” notes Fareed Zakaria. The world is rapidly changing. http://www. Israel will have to make new accom. Don’t assume the worst. There really is a new world. and post-crisis Russia. India.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region. during his election campaign. and the rise of other power centers. the biggest factory in the world is in China. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world.nytimes. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. George W. June 24th. Brazil. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. promised to restore America’s popularity. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. New energy.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. July 1st. is a natural and logical process. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. instead of just searching out its enemies. Bush. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2. So the decline of U. America is in decline – education. economically and scientifically.S. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. 2011. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. But history took a different turn. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. 2011. Digital Infrastructure”. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine. http://timesoftexas. the European Union. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. the United States dominated the world politically. It needs.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U. there is no peace at all. energy. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria.” Zakaria. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. to find new friends. With Washington’s power diminished.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. America will buy you a ticket. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. We are living in an interesting time. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. Only this time it’s not called America. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. The term of the third post-Soviet president. and Barack Obama.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. stumble. Far from stopping conflicts. perhaps. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. primarily China. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future. Competitive Workforce.0. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. “And … more troublingly. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. the largest oil refinery is in India. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO. Security Council — was. where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe.S.N. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. to paraphrase President Clinton. power may be good for the Middle East.modations with them. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. After decades of American engagement in the peace process. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the .
” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena.” he says. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. consuming. investing. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. loaning money. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today.” . “To put it in perspective. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time. the technological connection into this market. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. Zakaria says.” he says. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. “That by itself would yield $3. whose role is diminishing? Of course.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world. the economic connections of a global market.” he says. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years. the established power — the United States. “In economic terms. “So as China expands its role in Asia. saving. if Congress were to do nothing. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world.” America’s political system. the more people there are producing. building a competitive workforce. Zakaria says.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence.” America. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term.
Indeed. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. Still. the U. Professor and Robert M. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. Economically. they say. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable.S. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. industrial and financial dominance. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states. supplying liquidity for the world economy.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. The American Conservative. empire. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role. The decline of American power means the end of U. It seemed the sun would never set on the U. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. military and economic preponderance.S. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. primacy will endure for years to come. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945.S. not cause them. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. Those days are gone forever. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. Faced with these hard choices. The American people are . It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. recovers from the recession.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. Externally. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts.S. not the biggest borrower. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". trade surpluses. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. “Bye bye. http://findarticles.S.W.S. the United States no longer fits the part. In coming years the U.S. If so. created after World War II. the U. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises. and providing the reserve currency. Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue. primacy. will incur for at least a decade. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons. May 2010.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. Bush School of Government & Public Service.S. Even in the best case. Militarily. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service.S. After all.
is different.S. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests.S. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. imperialist. The American Conservative. Because that U. is facing enormous difficulties. decline means that in the 21st century. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. others--notably China. and powerful. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. Professor and Robert M. May 2010. come from "over there. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. genocide. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism.W. dating back to the Puritans. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. looks through this prism. and morally superior to the rest of the world. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. and terrorism. all would be well. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. values. militarism. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes." U. India. strong. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. as a nation.S. stumbles. Indeed. "When you are big. hold about the world.11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. (That is. 41 percent of the public believes that the U.) But as my graduate school mentor.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U. and latterly totalitarianism. and Russia--are rising. ." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. imperialism. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. most notably China. But when your power declines. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes." In the same Pew study. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. Bush School of Government & Public Service. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible.S. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. but as the U. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. the belief.S. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. the current era of globalization will end. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". that the U.S. if you discount the 58. religious intolerance. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. As the Financial Times observed. we believe. just 27 percent chose the United States. U. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase.S. Kenneth Waltz. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. According to a December 2009 Pew survey." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States. used to tell us about American foreign policy.S. And because the U.S. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other. and norms of emerging powers. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy.S. All these bad things. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. better. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. None of these propositions is self-evident. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. Mr. non-democratic forms of governance.
No. provocatively challenge U. it is far too late. the U. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates.S. http://www.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy.S. Suddenly. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. that it "blows away the existing No.S.S. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports." observed Kenneth S. the U. the Tianhe-1A. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. so powerful.S. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. Vol. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. India. “How America will collapse”. Similarly. education system. Rogoff. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair. 12/6/10. In 2008. knows best on economic policy. After leading the world for decades in 25.S. dominion over the oceans. Take these as signposts of a world to come. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. By now. In mid-2009.000. By 2025. Iran. and cyberspace. J. however. Washington slowly pulls U. 09 [“The Waning of U. are now foreigners. and a continuing decline in real wages. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. as long expected. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232.S. By 2008. space. 10 (Alfred." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself.html) Today. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer. not staying here as once would have happened.to 34-year-olds with university degrees.000.salon. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. said one U. in other words. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. has been falling behind its competitors.S.” International Security. great and regional.S. as economist Michael Hudson has argued.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. amid soaring prices. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. Under pressure at home and abroad. China. the cost of imports soars. but China was closing fast at 195. 34. financial-military world order. 1.S. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U.S. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade. Treasury notes. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. most of whom will be heading home. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union.R. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 1 machine" in America. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. dollar). in 2020.S. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay. Russia. Adding substance to these statistics. Add to this clear evidence that the U. the U.W.S. that source of future scientists and innovators. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. the decline of American technological innovation." Simultaneously. expert. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. Its key geopolitical . and other powers. Meanwhile. and of a possible attempt. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U. ever-rising unemployment.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading.
Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. India. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. Although at the time this issue went to press.D.M. from USC. 30). 13–14). the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.18 Between 2009 and 2025. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. "The Waning of U. in addition to relative decline. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. Yet. Vol. In particular. U. 3. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode.S. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus.). Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Galileo. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p.76 The warning signs with respect to U. 8–9. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. LL. 93). Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay".S.S.S. Ultimately. 7). China. 82). According to the NIC.S. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. Summer 2009. and especially demography. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. global dominance” (p. At home. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. 12. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. 93). in International Law from Virginia Law.S. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery. Nevertheless. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. International Security.S. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II.S.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. in Political Science from the University of California. 1. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. No. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. By 2025. financial. capabilities. 97). and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. India. economic and political constraints may undermine U. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. July 6th 2010. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. however. power. Thus.17] Because of uncertainties about economics.). 29). Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades.13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. 94. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. 34. but a growing number of analysts disagree. J. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.D. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. hegemony.S. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24. Moreover. 30).16 As Global Trends 2025 points out.77 Optimists .S.). military. 31–32). 97). 32.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. energy prices. domestic governance issues. economic power to wane. and economic. p. even before the meltdown. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. 32).-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. Ph.
and make the world obey. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring . America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. current account deficit. http://www. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats.S. the entitlements overhang.co. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers.S. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. was a golden age of U." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. to Russia's show of force in Georgia.S.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power. with awful sway. however. industrial and financial dominance. "Rome.S. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. and sustained high growth rates. however. 83 First. January 19.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). 2009. Moreover. protection from the Soviet threat. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. Because of these two factors.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. dominance. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. The postwar era. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown.guardian. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case.80 The CBO states. trade surpluses. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years. as Eric Helleiner notes. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. Second. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. To rule mankind. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. Like Rome. 't is thine alone. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U. and the cost of two ongoing wars.
for now at least. or provides benefits. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. Similarly. Because all are suffering. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. technology.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. US hegemony is unsustainable. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. 09 Professor. hegemony. however. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First. 34. like all hegemonic systems.pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things. and Robert M. they do not engage the argument that. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system.umd. The US may still be a giant. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. After all. however. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. know-how. If it suppresses consumption. Vol. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society.” http://www.bsos. which is not very long at all. and rising powers Snyder PhD.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing.S hegemony is unsustainable.all realists agree Snyder PhD.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. Of course.S. For example. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U. “The Waning of U.43 A Superficially. International Security. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. According to the theory of hegemonic stability.With its armed forces over-extended. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z.bsos. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. but one that. seems more bound. In this respect. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . 1. Snyder. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn.45 Out of Balance U.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. which allows other states to catch up. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. Snyder. consumption. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age. Over time. and resources stretched. It is unclear how long this formula will work. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture.15 of 154 Layne. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were. everyone is getting hit.S. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things.umd. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. military overstretch. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials.economic problems.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. Relative power is important. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. hegemony will endure well into the future.” http://www. No.
and third. and eventual decline. second. expansion. .16 of 154 trade and payments.25 Sadly. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable. losses in relative power. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. Challengers will arise. all good things must come to an end. and inevitable overextension. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis.”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.
31–32).S.). Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. military.18 Between 2009 and 2025. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. Thus.17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics. Vol. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 12. however. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. and especially demography. Nevertheless.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). 30). In particular. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. 09 Professor. 34.S. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. and Robert M. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. economic and political constraints may undermine U. 93). will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. According to the NIC. 32.S. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.).15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. energy prices. India. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately. 32). Moreover. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate.S. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. 23–24.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. International Security.S. financial. At home. 82). 3. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. 94. By 2025. 8–9. although the United States .S. 97). in addition to relative decline. and economic. No. U. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. domestic governance issues. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. 1. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. “The Waning of U. hegemony. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. China. India. 7). Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. capabilities.17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. 29). the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. 13–14). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. power. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. and rising challengers Layne. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. Although at the time this issue went to press. global dominance” (p.S. 30). erosion of public support. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.
However. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. A new cold war is unlikely. As ever.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. whether through arms deals. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. . with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. should it desire. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. http://www. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. Not that this era is yet upon us. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. India and Brazil will all bid for a role.guardian. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. In such circumstances. the region's international relations are changing. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global.). too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. but China. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending.co. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will. US power is waning.
First. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. essentially for three reasons. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows. Finally.will increase and not decrease.even and perhaps especially by the United States . Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. social.19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power.. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. "American Power in the 21st Century". it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. Over the postwar era. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation. . "As interdependence rises. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order.. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy." Robert Keohane argues. the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. Second. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements .in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. If this remains true in the years ahead.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. as global economic interdependence grows. “American Power in the 21st Century”.
He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states.and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order. From this perspective.should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department.20 of 154 Heg Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G. multilateralism .and the search for rule-based agreements ." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century . American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G." . should rein in the Bush administration . It predicts that the existing multilateral order. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. "American Power in the 21st Century".
China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. 1. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. of course. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. China. February 2011. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. doubling in size roughly every seven years. France. This Time It`s For Real”. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences. http://www. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever.Britain. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. of course.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. Chinese goods compete all over the world. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. Foreign Policy Magazine. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers.4) AK In the end. Brazil. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. America's traditional allies in Europe -. That is just a taste of things to come. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. even Germany -. such as Greece and Portugal. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. By contrast.5 trillion of foreign reserves. "I do. In the 1990s. former U. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. Italy. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. February 2011. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. China could be No. Japan.are slipping down the economic ranks. In 1989. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. In the short term. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. That was never going to happen.S. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. Turkey. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. This Time It`s For Real”. it would be a big . 1 well before then. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. President George W. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. Of course. they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival.foreignpolicy.foreignpolicy. by contrast." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. In a recent interview with the Times of London.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. At the current pace. for roughly three decades. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. such as Brazil and South Africa. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. Foreign Policy Magazine. on average. New powers are on the rise: India. Over the long term. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. The wolf did arrive -. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises.and China is the wolf. and inflation is on the rise.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. http://www. and it is sitting on more than $2. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy.
but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. Its economy will eventually recover. which is driving up global prices. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. foreign policy. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners. in particular oil. sanctions on Iran. then Obama's chief economic advisor.D. February 2011.4) AK Successive U. it takes a great deal to throw them off course. Fred Bergsten. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. In fact. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged.S.S. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources. from the first Bush to Obama. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war.S. LL. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders. The United States still has formidable strengths. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. in . presidents. Leading economists. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U. the U. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. the Great Depression.S. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. This Time It`s For Real”. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. troops. the collapse of democracy. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies. and rightly so.M. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. We are on a collision course with China – military. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. 09 – Mary Julia and George R.S. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. At the G-20 summit in November. Larry Summers. http://www. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. power will simply disappear. hyperinflation. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game." But whatever they say in formal speeches. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. Those days are over. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. And yet by the end of the 1950s. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match.S. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. Ph. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. and nations need not fear the success of another.-China standoff. in Political Science from the University of California. Foreign Policy Magazine. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum. Just before his first visit to China.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. So much for the win-win world.N. have taken a similar line. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. In a nuclear age. The U.foreignpolicy.
the trend lines appear to favor China. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U. however. and much sooner than many expect[. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. there is evidence that as the NIC." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. China. hegemony.52 And. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean." said Admiral Gary Roughead. July 6th 2010.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. 1-2209. International Security. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. 17-18. of course.50 Looking ahead." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. spaced-based reconnaissance.]. is the poster child for Asia’s rise.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. then. is static. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. advanced radar systems.. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise.nationalinterest. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. (Peter A.S military strength Buxbaum. a conservative Washington think tank. Zakaria contend.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific. Khanna.48 Unsurprisingly.53 Empirically.. Vol. and ballistic and cruise missiles.23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. http://www. Galileo. Khanna. 1. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. "The Waning of U. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years.org/Article. J. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. China’s already challenging U. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. chief of US naval operations. No. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. how-ever. perhaps to prohibitive levels. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. 34.49 Their analysis. in early 2009. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup.S. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close. Mahbubani." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. from USC. and. p. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons. unmanned aerial vehicles. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean.46 Here. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.. and many analysts— including the NIC. http://oilprice.S. For sure. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships.aspx?id=20484) . Summer 2009. “Empire Falls. electromagnetic weapons.D. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. advanced fighter aircraft. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.” National Interest Online. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. surveillance and target acquisition.S. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. to a point.
the more international commitments a state has. our own hubris may be our downfall. without deliberate action. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. relative decline has been. Spain. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. U. In international politics. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. both at home and abroad. For nearly two decades. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Russia. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Most important. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. There is also good reason to think that. FROM ROME. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. Over time. Still. A successful grand strategy.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. But. fairly short. France. Imperial China. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. Since the cold war. if not rectify. further decline in the foreseeable future. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. growing government debt. At any given moment.S. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. Although scholars have long debated its nuances.S. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan.S. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. those convinced of U. power certainly helps. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. To be sure. France. Venice. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy.S. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world.S. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today. thus far. For the past eight years. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments.S. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. the period of U. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. . however. power does not ensure success. If present trends continue. This is simply no longer realistic. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future.
25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,
single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see
(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications
for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,
China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As
the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced
applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States
remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more
than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.
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American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.
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U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)
There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.
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" in the language of defense strategists. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”. July 1st 2009. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F. In fact.S. combined with the continued rise of new powers. Foreign Affairs.accessmylibrary. Meanwhile. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. . an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U. policymakers are discounting real future threats.S. the U. such as Iran.S. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. For the past several decades. 09 -. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. access to the global commons. Recently. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. assure the safety of the homeland. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U." Despite this admonition. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. such as China. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises..com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. military. he also cautioned. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. and hostile states. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U. Ph.S. However. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. U. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. they are already starting to disappear.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich.S. http://www.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding.S.S. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. This has allowed it to guarantee U.D. U.
06 – PhD from American University.org/publications/index. Western Europe will not new government. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. Nevertheless. On the contrary. Germany's Afghanistan. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -.30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. For Eastern and Central Europe. The Washington Post. not America.has simply not occurred.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. But if they really feared American power. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. Bush's United States. http://www. 11 and the Iraq war. the growing threat is Russia.carnegieendowment.S. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -. in German terms. policy in Iraq. January 15th 2006.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline. even with an administration they allegedly despise. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. “Still the Colossus”. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. the current trend is toward closer cooperation. meaningful number of troops." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. while still dissenting from U. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? . the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept.
an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month." Even so.along with China. The Raw Story. analysts said. the euro. Abu Dhabi. gold and a new. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. Kuwait and Qatar. "Secondly. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history. together with China. The Independent. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time. Following the summit. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. Russia. October 11th 2009.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar.to end dollar dealings for oil." added Fisk. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. including Saudi Arabia. with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies"." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. http://rawstory. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council. Qatar and Russia. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”. And finally. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. Firstly. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. Japan and France. Japan and France -." said Kit Juckes. Sha Zukang. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar". the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China." added Juckes. ." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. The report was denied by a host of countries." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Russia. including Kuwait.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. Gulf Arabs are planning -.
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They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states. in International Relations. http://belfercenter. regional integration. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.D. M. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. p. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. in International Relations. Ph. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors.A. M. but also those of its other great power allies. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. B. Wohlforth. many scholars expect bi. Yale University. and the Pacific.A. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. in Political Science. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada.ksg. Ph.D. in Political Science. 28.S. As a result. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.” MIT Press.pdf) The key. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. The second pillar—geography—is just as important. B. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state.D. Beloit College.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. in International Relations. pp. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects. 99 (William C. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Wohlforth. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. Wohlforth. Summer 1999.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars.A. bandwagon. International Security. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. 1. Yale University M.Phil. or the differential growth in power. however.Phil. political science. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the .A.harvard. Ph.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.harvard. 29-30.” MIT Press. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity..or multipolarity to reappear quickly.. Similarly. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U. Germany. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. Yale University. No. 99 (William C. Beloit College. http://belfercenter. Location matters . the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France. Yale University. Yale University. in International Relations. Summer 1999. No.S. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. Vol 24.ksg. 1. political science.D. International Security. the U. Vol 24. Mexico. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. Yale University M. If things go poorly. Wohlforth. Ph. the Atlantic.
the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. Indeed.S. allies against an aspiring regional power. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges. In addition. . in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U.S.
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. political science. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. B. new forms of interdependence.S. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. Wohlforth. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. Summer 1999.35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U.D. . and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples.A.S.ksg. in Political Science. in International Relations. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. Beloit College.Phil. pp. Wohlforth. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. Ph.” MIT Press. In the bipolarity debate. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s. International Security. http://belfercenter. Yale University. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. And unipolarity is not a “moment. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships. in International Relations.A. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. If unipolarity is so robust. As a result.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Ph. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world.harvard. 37-38. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. 1. No.D. Vol 24. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. In each case. power. position circa 1946.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades. Yale University.. In the 1980s. Yale University M. M. 99 (William C.
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The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals.mitpressjournals. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. (Davide.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point. . History at the University of Bologna. and some will leave the alliance.” International Security. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system.) http://www. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals.org/doi/pdf/10. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. which acquire new energy. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. leaving them with little choice but submission. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. Institutions. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold.30 Obviously. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts. on the one hand. power. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. because they thought in terms of absolute. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. Meanwhile. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The concept must be understood in a relative sense. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. especially if one side should defeat the other. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. In the meantime. At some point. and relations with enemies and neutrals. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. Beyond that threshold. on the other. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. Spring 2011. not relative.
nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. today. In addition. Moreover. of course. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. China now was a nuclear power. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. In any case. China. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. For one thing. hollow. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing.39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war. including Japan. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. it is becoming quite real. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. as well as the Pacific and even into India. However. Russia. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar.S. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. however.officials than does Taipei). if they were drawn into the war. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan.” http://www.S. because U."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence. during the cold war the respective U. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario. which increases the chances for conflict.S. therefore. and the U. Beijing. India and Great Britain.S.27ln contrast. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. . “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. In a showdown over Taiwan. therefore. Beijing's 1996 threat was. Australia.S.lampmethod. other countries will not be considered in this study. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome.pdf) A war between China. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan. both Koreas. 09 – American Military University (Lee.
the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. however. Still. p. 73-74 ] To be sure. ISBN 0415952034. Published by Routledge. however. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power." American Empire: A Debate. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. . not peace. After all. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. On this score.
and thereby overreach themselves. Don’t bet on it.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. 2003 [The American Conservative. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.amconmag. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation. they are tempted to use it repeatedly. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. regional powers (Iran. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. and elsewhere). North Korea). for example in a war with China over Taiwan. Indeed. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. on its present course. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne. is too mighty to be counter-balanced. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. Over time.html] As for the argument that the U. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. October 6 2003. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.S. possibly in a failed Pakistan. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines. .com/10_06_03/cover. The Cost of Empire.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash.S. http://www.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts.
S. January-February 2007. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. including the World Health Organization. perhaps not entirely coincidentally.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. al 7. “How Globalization Went Bad”. because it just evolves too quickly. Ely Ratner. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. Matthew Kroenig. or other Western agencies in. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower. that feel threatened by American power. (Steven. SARS. Even after HIV. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. America can’t change that alone. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference.) The same is true for global public health. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. Foreign Policy. . Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. we’re not likely to get any help. Naazneen Barma. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Humans cannot outsmart disease. These are often the same countries. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu.
"Big stick" .43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE.S. Most countries in the world. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. http://www. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. Still. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone.” Beyond nuclear weapons.commondreams. and gaining U. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -. The clear victor of the Cold War. ISBN 0415952034. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Chief among these is Iraq. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. Zalmay Khalilzad. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia. including its boss. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. foreign service. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. History Should Give Us Pause”. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. the U. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U.S. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. part or all of eight of the 10 U. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. however.S. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919)." American Empire: A Debate. Published by Routledge. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. With all that is crying out for attention -. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. should national security interests demand it. but its obligations look even larger. Powell. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. the U. In a real sense. ambassador to Iraq. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. The second is that. The Dutch. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. In this respect. Secretary of State Colin L. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization.S. of course. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy.S. language. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. S. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. p. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. These are reflected in current U. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. dominance over that region. Recently. Scared.S. Washington’s policy.org/views03/0420-02. however. Since 9/11. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. as President George W. Washington Post. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. April 20.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. Yet it has taken little comfort from this.at least not now. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable.
however. the U. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. . Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Washington’s policy. 64-65.” Beyond nuclear weapons.S.S. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. dominance over that region. however. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. Recently. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. "The Case Against the American Empire. In this respect. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. as President George W. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. Review of International Studies (2009). These are reflected in current U. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war. and gaining U. p." American Empire: A Debate. In a real sense. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Zalmay Khalilzad. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. Chief among these is Iraq. ambassador to Iraq.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire.S.
reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged.nautilus. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure. both governments and NGOs. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. . http://www. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. coordinator of Japan Focus. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. Whatever the changes. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms.html. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. This. including the United Nations and European nations. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. coupled with a stronger international presence.
. http://www. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. let alone push through a negotiated solution . We have been rendered irrelevant. capabilities and reason. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. May 24 2010. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups . And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. In short. Russia and China could not.huffingtonpost.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”.particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. France. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians.html It's official.and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium . England. Germany. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast.com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222.
because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters.S. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. however. That brinkmanship paid off.Q. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Ph.S. ET AL. and many other capitals. It has become fashionable. It’s often forgotten now that. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. January-February 2007. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. including Beijing. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). with Naazneen Barma.S. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. al 7. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. (Steven.S. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. But much of this analysis is overblown. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER.” Foreign Policy.. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. in the wake of the Iraq war. they turn to people like A. to the detriment of U. When push comes to shove. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. with conventional force. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. In Tehran. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. troops on its border. for 40 years. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. national security. Matthew Kroenig. military could. in the wake of the Iraq war. national security. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. But much of this analysis is overblown. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so.S. Pyongyang. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. including Beijing.S. In Tehran.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. Before 1989. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. It has become fashionable. And the best deterrent yet invented is the . Naazneen Barma. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). Now. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. military could. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. Matthew Kroenig. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. Today. the bottom line is simple: The U. it is fast becoming a necessity. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. Kim Il Sung. and Ely Ratner. during the Cold War. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. North Korea is the clearest example. Pyongyang. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. Issue 158. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. with conventional force. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. to the detriment of U. U. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. conventional military power.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. It didn’t need to. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. “How Globalization Went Bad”. But. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. and many other capitals. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so.D. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley. North Korea’s founder. barely flinched when former U. the bottom line is simple: The U. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons.S. conventional military power. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. January/February. Ely Ratner. Khan.
and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War.Q. Khan. Before 1989. Kim Il Sung. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor.S. troops on its border. barely flinched when former U. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. however. it is fast becoming a necessity. for 40 years. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. Now. . nuclear-armed communist neighbors. Today. North Korea’s founder. North Korea is the clearest example. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. It didn’t need to. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.S. That brinkmanship paid off. But. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. they turn to people like A.
programs and facilities. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world. 4/19. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. At the nuclear summit in Washington. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. mounted on at least a regional basis. though. http://www. nuclear weapons policy.html] In the same context.” Korea Times. reflecting these kinds of complaints.K.. relevant materials.S. Even Iran's supreme leader. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable .N. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. In the early.koreatimes. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons.co. We are not. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. heady days of American unilateral supremacy. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue. The U. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. angered over the new U. “Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. Security Council. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo.49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself. Pakistan. Ayatollah Ali Khameini. the traditional standing members of the U. France and the U. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. China. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations.. Russia. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy. and early formulation of a program including both incentives. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson.'' This time. Of course.S.
.50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future.
Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. suppression of rights and freedoms -.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.presstv. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures. have the potential to lead to international conflict. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas." he stressed.aspx? id=106209§ionid=351020602. . Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country.of any illegal activities. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications.51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony.” Sept 15 http://www." he added.ir/detail. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down.
they said that they stood for "a multipolar. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. In another thrust at US unilateralism. read by Russians and Chinese.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Neocons are people who desire war. and Kazakstan are participating. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts. Kyrgkyzstan. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. However. http://www. Today. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Russia. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China.and shocked . Yet. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted.antiwar. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". Significantly. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. at least in the medium term. Hu Jintao. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. not to their militaries. like Bush and Cheney.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed .guardian. where China has been given observer status for the first time. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. Thus. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US. . he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach.china The new president of China. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. but know nothing about it. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. In a mere 6. for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. if not counterbalance.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig.co.
p. You get a ripple effect. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense.: Brookings Institution. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. Israel. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. by American calculation it might have tripled. that's the way the cookie crumbles. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. you can find them. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. including Canada. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. India responds. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. In recent years. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. India increases it and Pakistan responds. China increases its missile capacity. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. a small ABM system around Moscow. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. it’s a first strike weapon. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. O’Hanlon. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. raising the threat to survival. Washington D. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. as do strategic analysts. consciously. You are asking for a disaster. These moves are deliberately. for more than twenty straight years. . In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. so they’re going to react to it.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. highly destructive weapons.C. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. allies. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. the Russian systems are worse. in 1968. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world.dissidentvoice. it just doesn’t matter much to them. and Georgia abstained. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. These things are going to misfire. if you increase the threat of terror. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate.S. well that’s OK. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. U. So have a number of U. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. This is extraordinarily dangerous. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. Micronesia.org/April2004/Mars0424. that’s important. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. that no one can challenge our total domination.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. the United States. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. Now others react to that threat.S. That sets off a new cycle. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. and use of such capabilities. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. June 21. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. deployment. opposing the weaponization of space.” http://www. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation.
54 of 154 .
and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are. Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs. to a hegemon. Of course. strictly speaking.41 In a similar vein.43 Specifically. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War.ism.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. the Bush adminis. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US .tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. Pakistan. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. In fact. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments. balancing also signifies opposition. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. After all. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. senseless. And. Review of International Studies (2009). at the same time. Instead it lasted well into 2008. Cambridge Journals. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. religious. Richard K.’. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. Underscoring this point. tenuous. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. As Bruce Hoffman says.50 General David Petraeus. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. Yet. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. . because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong.49 When it first announced the surge. and ideological reasons. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. there are Islamic radicals who. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. and the use of power to achieve political change’. . the acquisition of power. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. even when the surge itself has ended. and Jordan. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’. To make this point. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. 5/25/9. Despicable and brutal though it was. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’. . Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. of course. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. ‘irrational’ act of violence. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. limited. not terrorism . at best. . and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. Scheurer observes that. and widely popular foreign policy goals . The Bush administration.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. For sure.51 In fact. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. or resistance. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. indeed. they are not.39 From this perspective. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. the administration said it would last through 2007.47 Here.40 Here. In his study of suicide terrorist groups. focused. moreover. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy. do hate the US for cultural. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. and as such.38 Terrorism. During 2008. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. the Shah of Iran. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power.45 In other words. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and.
staying in Iraq will exacerbate it. Ariz.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. emerge victorious.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. Societies would close in on themselves. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed. http://weekly. Instead of solving this problem.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is. Ill.eg/2004/705/op5. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. we will all be losers. 705.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. The admin. No. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds.ahram.” Al Ahram Weekly.org. August/September 1. this . tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed. military presence in Iraq for some time to come. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living.53 What the new US admin. “Extinction!. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism.) and Senator John McCain (R. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights.
9/24/08. Al-Ahram Weekly Online.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. with imperial ambitions. “Collapse of Empire. Nafaa.” http://weekly. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism. Secretary General. 08 (Hassan Nafaa. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism.ahram. Arab Thought Forum. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. In the future. Amman.eg/2008/915/op1. Jordan. .org. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread.57 of 154 Heg Fails . which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.
political and economic freedoms.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. The upshot of Rev. empirical studies have linked U. Finally. .asp?id=2182. the facts are on his side. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan.S. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute.independent. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.S. however.D.S.) In addition to soft balancing. and even culture are popular in these countries. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas. Ph.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne. henhouse. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. but U. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments.S. technology. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.org/newsroom/article. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. literary and national editor of the Atlantic.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. May 5. Cambridge Journals. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. When employed by states. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S. Because they are threatened by the US. asymmetric strategies are another type of non.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. targets. 5/25/9. It is too bad that Rev. Review of International Studies (2009). http://www. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings.
but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. in the short term. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. it sabotages it. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. Number 3. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. rather than interventionism.59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. practicing military restraint. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. But the Cold War is long over. Summer 2008. Empire does not equal security — in fact. Specifically. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. technology. Thus. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War. . Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. Naturally. would make Americans safer at home. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed.
45 no. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods. money. and preserving our freedom and prosperity.60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest. people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . August 13. vol. not cold-war ideology . in almost every case. the Germans down and the Americans in. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. In the place of geopolitics. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. Non-state actors .play an increasingly influential role. If we can work together. Transnational threats. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. Vice President and Director. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. After the second world war. p. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. http://www. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. Foreign Policy Studies. 2.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed.org/pub_display. Survival.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers . can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. During the 20th century.and keeping the Europeans apart. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that.cato. than if we try to achieve these goals alone. b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. Summer. 2003 [Cato Reports. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. . a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all. Steinberg.
one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. http://www. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne. America's strategic ambitions . 2003 [Cato Reports.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe.based primarily on economic self-interest. http://www. August 13.org/pub_display. . Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly.cato. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose. August 13.cato. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne.org/pub_display. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. 2003 [Cato Reports. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. August 13. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create. During the 20th century. More generally. After the second world war.cato. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon. through the European Security and Defence Policy.61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. not cold-war ideology . and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. http://www. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. 2003 [Cato Reports.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century.
Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. organized and financed in Europe. For the United States. infiltration.S. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner. As daily press reports also reveal.S. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing. In other words. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. security. The National Interest. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. political and military presence in Central Asia. But acting together-with the threat of U. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. That may not be easy to achieve. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. . disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. NYU Law School Professor. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. military power reinforced by the EU's political.S. iss. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. In other words.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. given divergent American and European perspectives. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. for the European Union. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. These risks could be lessened by closer U. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. Winter. p. the United States is not the world’s only superpower. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. despite the prevailing cliche. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. 75. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U.S. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. In our new security environment. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U.S. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq.
not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power. 2011.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University. and forever will be. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. World Politics 61. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. and indeed. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. Professor of Government at Dartmouth. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. http://depaul. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. Military Power: Preeminence for however. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power. military. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. 1. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. Some scholars. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. specializing in Critical IR Theory. Western Political Science Association.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. the world’s indispensable nation. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. of the universe.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. the international economy is complex and resilient. Islamic extremists are scary. The United States. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. Social Movements. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. were put down with a brutality that frequently . but from the life of civil society. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. and other capabilities. while their eruptions into the political sphere. A number continue to do so today. The United States may continue to act its own way.academia. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. and the very success of the U. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. Ebsco. and in the security of their respective regions. draw down its military power. April 21. No. notwithstanding its preponderant power. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena.S. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. International Political Economy (Michael.S.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is. U. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment.S. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.cato-at-liberty.
in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. rather than fights. And it wrecked. with Moscow’s help. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. Not so. It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. our relationship with Russia. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. World Focus. though some common features can be found in both contexts." subject to group sanction. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. In the end. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). 77-83). says Robert Kagan. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic. it was Gandhi. is one response to subordination. In the end. and changing. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. fixed margin. the decline of American power. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. however. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . both British and Hindu (Guha 1983. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades.S. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. Brazil. 2010. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. But the proof is in the pudding. In India. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. fluid.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework. January 22.C. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. Criminal activity. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. however restrictively defined. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. but also localized and evanescent. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion. http://worldfocus. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. where some members of the I. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. not the British. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. The Next American Century: How the U. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. a poor vagrant steals to survive. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. National Security Council at the White House (Nina.S. then. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation. as was its implicit goal. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”.
January 22. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. India.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. for the first time last year. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. 2010. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. http://worldfocus. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. including with other major powers. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. as Kagan would imply. but to keep its own people safe. On the one-year mark of his presidency. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. Kagan barely mentions these threats. China not only voted for tough U. Russia. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. sanctions . International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. Nevertheless. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. but of seeking common cause. and pandemics. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. Fortunately.65 of 154 America did have. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. World Focus. and other pivotal powers. to say the least. nuclear proliferation. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. economic crises.N. “Our power alone cannot protect us. economic crises. More importantly. global warming. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. Moreover.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. And. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. In fact. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed.” Later. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. saying. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. It’s still early days. in Moscow. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. And America needs India to help track extremists. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. global warming. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. How can we get these big. nuclear proliferation.
What Others Think. Here. And in our own history. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. rendition and torture over the past decade. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties.. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. subject their actions to oversight. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . 2010. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. or to wage war on others. Iran remains a challenge. but it’s on the way. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination. including on human rights and democracy. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior.iranreview. Iran Review. for example. and there is no end in sight. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. shows that their fears were justified. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons.C. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive.7 million more have been internally displaced. Of course. Finally. in fruitless pursuit of victory. And the United States. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. To make matters worse. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Hegemony fails—resistance. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. just not in a grandstanding. however. Moreover. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. governments which serve only their own power do not. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies.htm) The results. is up and running again. it also enforced them. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. co-chaired by the United States and Russia. http://www. D. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. have been disastrous. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. Governments that promote the rule of law. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary.66 of 154 against Pyongyang. to terrorize their citizens. The Founding Fathers understood this problem.” They have. Since the war began in March 2003. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1. December 22.
which was not just doomed to fail. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. for all its talk of “change”. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. p.” In this vein. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. in effect. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. or proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy. The alternative. before it developed hegemonic hubris. as John points out.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War.” John warns that the Obama Administration.S. making the world over in America’s image. John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. so the more the better. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. Stanford Center for International Security. With global dominance. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. If America makes primacy the main goal of . Iraq. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. From the Clinton administration on. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. disease. 168-9 In practice. of course. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. not less. climate change. Bush administrations. 2008. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. because they are virtually limitless. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. The Next American Century. on foreign policy issues. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. and threatened its position in the world. and spreading democracy across the globe. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. But. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. Iran. Of course. instead pursuing global dominance. interests. after 9/11. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. It was also a dismal failure.
acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods. foreign policy are pervasive. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N.S.S. people. accordingly. which has not stimulated such a response. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. Haass. services. energy. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military. Foreign Affairs .68 of 154 its national security strategy. Bush has not alienated other nations.foreignaffairs. http://www. Council on Foreign Relations. and technology -. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.S. May/June 2008 .org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. for the most part. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. is not perceived as a threat. it surely has. They do not. U.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. President.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. . decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. But it has not. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. investment.
The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing.S.S. U. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. In this changing geopolitical context. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U. understandable doubts about the credibility of U. it is even more doubtful that U. contrary to my 1993 prediction. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap. which.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010.S. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy. it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. efforts to prolong it. . and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. Although the United States.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s.at best. At the same time. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. in turn.S.
There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. or even benefit somewhat. America's Changing Internationalism. interests. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. First. As this transition proceeds. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. Hence. Finally. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. to disguise ulterior motives for U. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. and East Asia.S. Political Science Quarterly. several points need to be made.S. Kupchan.. Most of these will not culminate in war. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. closure. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. and the End of U. a struggle that will require patience and . Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods. as well as economic. but it's a good bet that some will.S. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines. forces in Eurasia. military intervention in Eurasia. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. Vol. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U. Europe. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological. Mere. This threat is easily exaggerated. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. power. distilled to its essence. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U. 00323195. 118. Second. The ultimate vision that should guide U.70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U. involvement in a big Eurasian war.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America.e. and manipulated.S. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system. Summer 2003.S.S. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). not just the hegemon.
Neither American leaders. It will take a decade.71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. information. North America might. and Africa. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Strong and vibrant regional centers. and values. the Middle East. long accustomed to calling the shots. for a new international system to evolve. therefore. if not two. focus on Latin America. long accustomed to passing the buck. Europe on Russia. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[*] . often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. for reasons of both proximity and culture. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. will find the transition an easy one. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task.
preventive or otherwise. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.61 In many cases of decline. 4. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. In particular. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Vol. producing a range of 67–100 percent. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. 35. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. International Security Spring 2011. 35. and Joseph. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft.) AK Based on our universe of cases. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. By any accounting. 4. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound.) AK With regard to militarized disputes.59 In short. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. Moreover.60 In addition. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. and three are debatable. a range of 61–83 percent. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. Pages 7-44. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. which makes comparison among groups difficult. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. Moreover. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. France. but of these. two did not.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. even if retrenchment was not successful.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically. No. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. and Joseph. or 72 percent. Wars. Further. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half . two retrenched and one case is arguable. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. even with the benefit of hindsight. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. seven retrenched. there are few restorative solutions available. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. There are only three cases of autocracy. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. International Security Spring 2011. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. In the five years following an ordinal transition. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. Short of a miracle. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. Pages 7-44. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). Of the twelve democracies. Vol.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. No. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. in six of fifteen cases. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami.
hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. almost by definition. 4. International Security Spring 2011. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. 35. No. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. stakes world of great power politics. Both are large. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. and Joseph. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. Further. Pages 7-44. 35. Far from encouraging further predation. Pages 7-44. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. fearing the steady erosion of U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. International Security Spring 2011. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. No. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. First. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. shift burdens to its allies. and Joseph. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. the rate of relative Second and related.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. relatively secure continental great powers. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. more defensible frontiers. including strains among rival regions.S. hegemonic powers. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul.73 of 154 times less than the average great power.) AK Contrary to these predictions. Third. credibility. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Theoretically. In particular. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. possess more extensive overseas commitments. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. 4. Vol. In the high- . Vol. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. In the next few years. and work to decrease costly international commitments. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. In addition. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires.
Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything. The historical record gives little cause for despair. Retrenchment has a bad reputation. And there is a fair chance of rebound. but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. and refrain from using force in international disputes. and innovation fostered. Of course. interest groups controlled. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. spending can be curbed. and if done intelligently this makes states better. . declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. increase reliance on allies. Taken together. The faster the rate of decline.
You regard U. power is something Americans must care about as well. Professor of International Affairs. 05 (Stephen M." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U. Basic security is at issue.S." He .S. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine. Professor of International Affairs. September 05. Harvard University. http://www. as the September 11. the debate is over how best to deal with it. Consider Kim Jong I1. The time to worry is now. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. Harvard University.. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. foreign policy as often naive and overweening. 2001.S. Walt. Taming American Power. So how can Kim stay in power. US dominance causes terrorism. And the response of other states to U. economy.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. Walt. So is the health of the U. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly.S.S. Harvard University. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. with the market share of U. given U. Professor of International Affairs.S. many governments still value U.S. and. that you are the president of France. Taming American Power.S. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council.S. Many countries fear U. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. for a moment. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon.jstor.S. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. most important of all. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom .S. To be sure. 05 (Stephen M.75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. Harvard University. Professor of International Affairs. He rules a country that George W. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt. in the world ..S.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U. Walt. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia.S. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. terrorist attacks demonstrated. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U.S. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. defense budget.pdf) U. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it.S. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. some more daunting than others.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.jstor. presidents. http://www. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. Can you take advantage of parallel U. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting. influence. For the rest of the world. much less improve his position. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. by rebuilding its crumbling international image. September 05. dominance.
2001." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy." . a degree of resentment. They were protesting our existence. issued in March.76 of 154 later explained. were not protesting our policies. stated. "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease. "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. and resistance.
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Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.
Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)
Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also
to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.
Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.
Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.
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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.
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he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. The nations that avoided the fates of India. Mexico. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. 2006. San Diego. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported.81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson. In India. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. p. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. say. Ferguson argues. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. . China. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results.
Frequent Writer on Arab Issues.82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M." said Anatol Lieven. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. however.counterpunch.html] His many critics point out. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy." his former associate stressed. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Nashashibi.html] More importantly. not the last policy option. "If he was in private business rather than government." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Counterpunch. http://www. April 17. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia. perhaps. Counterpunch.counterpunch. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. http://www. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. April 17. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else." . that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. "he would have been sacked long ago. He tends to look at military solutions as the first. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington.org/issam04172003. Nashashibi.org/issam04172003.
reinforced by nuclear deterrence. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. former president of the International Studies Association. hegemony will endure well into the future. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially. and the combination of the European Union. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. Thompson (Donald A. Japan. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter. like all hegemonic systems.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. and Russia.M. 09 – Mary Julia and George R.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S. which is not very long at all. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Summer 2009.D. International Security. Galileo. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. J. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. July 6th 2009. know-how.S. Vol. however. LL.D. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. Over time.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. Ph. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. in International Law from Virginia Law.S. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. No. which allows other states to catch up.pdf In addition. when such behavior would not have been so risky. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.harvard.ksg. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. China. In this respect. 34. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. After all. p. in Political Science from the University of California. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s. 15. not from the United States. 1. they do not engage the argument that. from USC. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay".S. technology. "The Waning of U. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities. Instead. Similarly. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. hegemony.77 .
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"The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. For the United States. . primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Volume 31. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. 131 Thus. Paradoxically. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity. Number 2. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again.S. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers.S. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself.S. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. Unilateral offshore balancing. Rather than risking these outcomes. at some point. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. have to fight to uphold its primacy. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. to reduce others' concerns about its power. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. Fall. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle.S. As an offshore balancer. indeed. it probably will. as an insular great power. Consequently. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. is America's next grand strategy. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. 2006 (Christopher. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. exercise a free hand strategically. power. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack.S." International Security.S. To reduce the fear of U. attempting to sustain U. interests.S. Maintaining U. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. especially given that U. allies.
Issue 4. Harvard. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone.S. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing. Volume 82. tracing financial flows.S. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. U. July. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. police work. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. and border controls. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. For example. Foreign Affairs. which retains cells in some 60 countries. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. . 2003.
if either the US or China. global interconnected markets. tread lightly.2 billion in June. Besides war. The U. Russia.411mania. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. But the week passed and there was no assault. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there.7 billion in US treasury securities. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world. Now. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. both nuclear and conventional. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. trade deficit with China widened to $26. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. In addition. So the question is. such is the multi-polar world. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. as of June 2010. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. holds roughly $843. etc. professional blogger on global events since 2004. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. http://www. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. the highest since October 2008. As I stated earlier. U. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. it needed to do it before the 21st. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply . In a game of carrot and stick. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. for example. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. the times they have a-changed. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best. this is indeed the New Normal. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran.S. In fact. mental health. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war. In short. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. China. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. Latin America.S. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. they didn't have to.S. 8/23/10 (Mark.htm) Prior to this event former U. Of course. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in.
We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. sanctions. aren't a viable option either. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent. civilized world. with no checkmate in sight.88 of 154 nothing. Military action isn't a viable option. we're all locked into an eternal state of check. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. etc. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. Welcome to the real New World Order. embargoes. trade wars. .
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Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the inﬂuence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most
important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial ﬁnancial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and inﬂuence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of ﬁerce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conﬂict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more conﬁdent in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad
are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even
larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade ﬂows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufﬁcient for a state to become a ﬁrst rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufﬁcient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7
Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus
from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the
US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).
3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . Dustin. which claims that . 10 Plus. space.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony. This represents 11.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. By the end of the decade. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. Protectionist sentiment is growing. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. with a particular focus on missile. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. Perhaps even more worrying. Raoul Heinrichs. The CBO estimates that public debt. Andrew Shearer.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG.” http://asiasecurity. especially Asian powers Japan and China. Rory Medcalf. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period. according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. China held $790 billion of U. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. Nonetheless.” The Times writes. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. http://economyincrisis. “Huge Deficits Altering U. Although his popularity has dipped.S. Absent a change in national priorities. The economy is showing signs of a recovery.expected to be 1. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. particularly in Asia. Hegemony”.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. Ensinger ’10. 100 Should these trends continue. Even worse. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon. in which each Times. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. high deficits.S. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. As of September 2009. albeit gradual. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019.6 trillion.macfound. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Economy in Crisis. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite.
Still.S. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. relative decline has been. An extremely low savings rate. as the world’s largest economy. Still. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. without deliberate action. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. growing government debt. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. The next closest was China at just eight percent. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo.S. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology.S. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. if not rectify. further decline in the foreseeable future.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. the U. For the past eight years. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. France. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. others see America’s imminent demise. For nearly two decades. thus far. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. Russia. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. believe that China. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan. followed by Russia at five percent. In reality. 2009. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. there needs to be a combination of both. Since the cold war.93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. To be sure.. the period of U.S. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. Heg is unsustainable -. As of 2009. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. economy is still by far the largest. fairly short.” http://findarticles. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. solutions to each of them individually and all of them . those convinced of U. and that the U. There are some analysts and experts. If present trends continue. “Empire Falls.S.S. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. however. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). There is also good reason to think that. This is simply no longer realistic. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan.S. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues.
and the Beijing consensus. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. On trade. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). even if he is. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). but whether it has become a serious part of the problem.S. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. are now both more open to serious question. our own hubris may be our downfall. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. and. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument.94 of 154 Most important. 2011. The EU model looks more attractive to some. giving bigger voices to other players. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. at the financial mess. even so. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. yet. badly damaged itself. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were. economic influence. however. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. The US led the world into this recession. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. the Obama inheritance is even worse. With the Washington consensus discredited. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies.g. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. Heg is unsustainable -. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. and.” International Relations. Under Clinton and Bush. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. the ideological authority to do so. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. nor. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. .international legitimacy. it will have to be done collectively (e. March 2011 vol. It has neither the economic resources. cannot lead the world out of it. much was done. both European social markets. 25 no. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. Even before the current economic crisis. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. or are too protracted and costly. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. On the political side. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. In terms of economic liberalism. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. with the collapse of the Washington consensus.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. At this point. If the world economy can be managed globally at all.
technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. Its religiosity. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U. To measure gross domestic product. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia.S. with more than four times the U. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first .S. religious. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. dollars. “Empire Falls.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. The Post-American World. “Empire Falls. right? Alas.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China..col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. Looks pretty good for America.” http://findarticles. the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. reached its apogee in 2000. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. the United States had three times the computer sales. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. For the sake of argument. 2009. share of world product. Pape 9 – Robert A. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. US heg not sustainable -. However.S.relative economic decline. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. The US is much more culturally conservative.. had 6 percent. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. China. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. The basic notion is simple: take U. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis. For instance. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. Pape 9 – Robert A. population. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony.” http://findarticles. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries.S.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others. According to GDP figures in current U.col1 originally from The National Interest) True. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. and is being turned around by Obama. 2009. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Indeed.S.S. in 2008. (2) By this metric. Whereas in 2000. but look at the trajectory of the data over time. many of the deeper issues are structural.
Pape 9 – Robert A. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth.3 percent.. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. has grown consistently. which is likely to only further weaken U.S.S. the trend is the same. U. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. Worse.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. Again using IMF figures. over the past two decades. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. U. Simply put. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible. the state many consider America's most likely future rival. how much is U.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. 2009. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000.” http://findarticles. but substantially weaker.S. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. decline. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. growth has fallen considerably. these are merely thought experiments. As Table 3 shows. the United States is now a declining power. At the same time. China and other states in the world. And regardless of the metric. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity. although all major countries are suffering economically.2 percent. If so. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. power. the average rate of U.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2.S.96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3. the relative power of China. decline due to the global diffusion of technology. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to . Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2." Still.S.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. decline. the fact is that since 2000.2 percent instead of its actual 23.S. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000.S. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others.1 percent. The answers are pretty straightforward. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States.2 percent more than today.S. “Empire Falls. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. or 1. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory. At the same time.
The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. Something fundamental has changed. Indeed. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. predominantly Japan and China. 2010. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. For once. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. and the .S. tax cuts.S. holds so much of the US debt. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. Economic collapse and debt.” AntipodeVolume 42. For the USA. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. during this election. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history.97 of 154 U. rescuing private finance with public finance. economically and politically. China. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. UK. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is difficult to see how one man. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?.). UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. downfall is indeed extraordinary. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. Watson 10 – Allan. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. Given this. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000). a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. and the U. The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. etc.S. one which is fraught with difficulties. Finn 2008). When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. In other words. in size. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). From this perspective. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. along with a number of oil exporting countries. (February 18. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. And when one examines past declines and their consequences. Issue 2) However. it becomes clear both that the U. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. the previous administration. no matter how well supported. current-account deficits.
They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. something will have to break. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay. Petras 10 – James. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. China rising and domestic issues. Empires do not die peacefully. The world continues to watch hopefully. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.” http://lahaine. militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. China. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. Over the long run. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan.98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances. 49 Propaganda. unlike Japan. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact.pdf) As in the past. The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. employer servitude. China will push ahead with double digit growth. was finally having an effect. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. . systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies.
The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. of course. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. But during the Cold War. 25 no. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq. and to an extent in the 1990s. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. and this seems set to continue. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. March 2011 vol. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents. Vietnam and Chile. and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. 16 and. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. 2011.” International Relations. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. 2011. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. 25 no. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. a. From Cuba. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism.” International Relations. not only feeding the terrorist problem. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25.unpopularity isolates the US -. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. as a consequence. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. and limited nuclear war. 1 3-25) The US. March 2011 vol. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet .
China Buzan 11 – Barry. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. however. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. During the Cold War. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. Japan will face very difficult choices. of the other great . But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. on the level of society and pubic opinion. and its effective fragmentation by the West. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. which are often in competition with those of the US. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. In the absence of any common cause. China. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. however. getting worse. its alliance with the US. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. March 2011 vol. bad and.” International Relations. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. then a rising China. aggressive and militarist. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. 25 no. this US concern will be a parochial one. Union. with both governments in different ways to blame. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. Europe will not care much about its rise. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. The nature of the China that rises. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. might welcome China’s rise. 2011. If it stays with the US. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. if at all. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. b. What is now in prospect. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. 24 If China’s rise is benign. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. 23 The big question mark is Japan. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. Russia. possibly none. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. shared by few. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. 1 3-25) US policy on China. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. must appear threatening to the US. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. but somewhat strengthened. underneath their formal political correctness. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. and will not feel threatened by it. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. whether peaceful or not. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. but the US securitizes it anyway.
101 of 154 powers. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem . if not impossible. March 2011 vol. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. c. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. 25 no. whether domestic or international. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. If China plays its hand cleverly. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. and even denial that there was a problem. 2011. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution.” International Relations. This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry. However. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled.
102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict. 08 (Parag Khanna. agrarian and feudal. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes.U. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. America is isolated. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. The E. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. whether the United States or the United Nations.U. will replace the U. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. the most money of any region in the world. It already has. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. Instead. America’s spirit is weakened. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. it has been shunned by the E. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . “Accidental empire” or not. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. Australia and Thailand. The web of globalization now has three spiders.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. proliferation. and history promises the effort will fail. I believe that a complex.U. Neither China nor the E. It isn’t worth it. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. and as Toynbee also pithily noted.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. With or without America. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. South Korea. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. as the world’s sole leader.S. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. Western imperialism united the globe. and climate change Khanna. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. by certain measures. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory).nytimes. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. and Turkey.
The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves.103 of 154 among the Big Three. . Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices.
Senior Fellow. as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. . 4/8/08. It triggers conflict. but it’s an important driver. 08 (Jamais Cascio. setting the mighty against the mighty.org/index.104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). degree in Political Science. Right now. IEET. It reveals vulnerabilities.” http://ieet. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models. and opens up new niches of influence. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. Most importantly. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. It weakens the powerful. Cascio.
supported by both parties -. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. some at least of these moves may.Democrat and Republican.still find extremely difficult to think about. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing".php) U. unlike in 1917 or 1941. however.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. In the Middle East. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. When.realisticforeignpolicy. http://www. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. Not just a direct military presence.S. when possible.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. civilian and military -.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. In an equally classical fashion. My fear though is that. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. the results would not have been significantly less awful. this process may occur through disastrous defeats. global power. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U.org/archives/2005/11/index. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. Like so many of their predecessors. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. can present US strategy against Iran -. the relative decline in US economic independence means that. Impossible today. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible. really serious war risks US economic disaster. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. however. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. with potentially awful consequences for the world. this is something that American policymakers -. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. Future historians may. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. regional consensuses in support of order and stability. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore. In theory. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. given the nature of the Middle East. .S. Despite the lessons of Iraq. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. such as in Iraq. In the former Soviet Union. prove inescapable in a generation's time. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. In Asia. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and.but fiscally equally damaging -. is unsustainable. For that matter. establishment. 05 (Anatol Lieven. however.
a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. In America’s own hemisphere. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. now enjoys a diplomatic. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. dam-builders and covert military personnel. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. into its orbit. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. Across the globe.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. Without firing a shot. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. To the Western eye.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. In Africa. economic or strategic lifeline from China. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. aid workers. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals.” . Like Europeans. At the same time.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.nytimes. China is not only securing energy supplies. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Iran being the most prominent example.S. Under Japanese sponsorship. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. 08 (Parag Khanna. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific.
not static. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. as Paul Kennedy has observed. Christopher LAYNE 2007. at some point within the next decade or two. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.S.107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. however. In terms of hard power. Thus. and transition from U. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. technological advance. In a similar vein. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. the primacists are correct. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. the leading primacists acknowledge.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power)."The Case Against the American Empire. There are indications." American Empire: A Debate. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. . but how soon it will end. new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. The real issue is not if American primacy will end. Indeed. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. that American primacy could end much sooner than that. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. But China isn’t the only factor in play. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point.38 For sure. For example. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century. p. To put it slightly differently. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . Nevertheless.
but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. Rather than risking these outcomes. attempting to sustain U. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. especially given that U. Real realists like Lippmann. at some point. Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. Fall http://findarticles. have to fight to uphold its primacy. indeed. Maintaining U. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. Kennan. Hans Morgenthau. Most of all. To reduce the fear of U. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Kennan. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. . by asserting its power heavy-handedly. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power."The Case Against the American Empire. provoke opposition to it.S. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). it probably will. which is a potentially dangerous strategy.S.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. National Interest. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. Unilateral offshore balancing. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. Paradoxically. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. 131 Thus. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. power. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. America's real realists--George F. is America's next grand strategy. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography.S." American Empire: A Debate. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. p.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state.
the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. in preserving a balance of power.109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. for example. It will also increase the likelihood of war. is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. The echo of Rome is clear. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. obtains them.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. . such as Iraq. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas.” 95 The strategy of empire. Nov 26. the security of the offense-minded state. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . such as India and Pakistan. if other nations. 93 Indeed. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize.” adds Mearsheimer.” 91 In his June 2. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. . In other words. [its] military strengths beyond challenge. .000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. or appears to undermine. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may .” What’s more. adopted preemption as their official policy. What’s more. . however.18) The answer is probably no. and intends to keep. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. I think it would be better not to do that. Certainly.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. But the “$64.” From this perspective. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that . proximity matters. before a nation working on WMD.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary.” said Bush. p. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. speech to West Point’s graduating class. including war. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one.” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. never was interested . In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. we will have waited too long. In its National Security Strategy.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. . “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. . That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive. “is that we all expect certain rules. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. 2002.
S. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. which could in turn spur even more U. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. 98 Hence there is a paradox. . which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. as China’s economy grows. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward.110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. 97 For example.
In coming years. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. forces in Somalia. The Dominions. though asserting their independence of the mother country.S. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. southwest Asia and the Sinai. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. policy or assuming a lower profile. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se.111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. Instead. . could be more interventionism.S. economic aid. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. . even now. or deeply buried facilities. has revealed that. .S. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. The very problem of failed states. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. shows.” says Bell.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. for ramping up U.S. preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. 104 In 1937. that is. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. . in short. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. In fact. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. Similarly. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland. garrisoning myriad outposts. Thus . 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. in other words. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. Nevertheless.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. Thus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. still relied on her for protection. today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. H. According to the New York Times. Australia and New Zealand.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. that is. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. in other words.” 105 Empire. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. Accordingly. code named Prominent Hammer. Malaya and Singapore. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. 103 According to British historian P. the Middle East and Mediterranean.) The unintended consequence of interventionism. that is. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. M. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects.
While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. Instead. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. however. together with American consumption and investment. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. China. for example. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. Given the growing protectionism against its exports. with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. p. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. Yet. and prepared for high casualties. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. If credit from China is restricted. Put to the test. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. subsidises its own imports. Survival. During the Cold War. Director of the European Studies Program. Today.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. American power counts for less than expected. to date. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations.with more and cheaper troops. has not been very good at it.
hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. In projecting American military power around the globe. economic dictates. violence. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism.S. and build support for anti-U. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements. and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.harvard. Fourth. states can resist by withholding cooperation. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. http://belfercenter. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations.S. The EU can thus engage. Second. dominance. . a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. then.S. symbols. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. perhaps the most dominant great power in history.conventional weapons. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U. win recruits. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U.S. “If Not Balancing.S. anti-American resentment. First. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. Even the U nited States. Iran. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. in trade wars with the United States. the war of words. Third.S. economic policy or wants to resist U.html) What. recent events in Iraq. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. hegemony. for example. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak.ksg. They may hope to sway the American public .S. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. chemical.
approach. Although the United States is dominant in many realms.harvard. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. or suspects. interest. the door was open for meaningful non. and Uzbekistan. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. efforts. some states have unique assets that the United States covets.S. Pakistan. financial support for reconstruction. Yet even close U. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.S. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate.S. By virtue of geography. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.S. allies sometimes have different objectives. They may judge and prioritize threats differently. policy.cooperation. http://belfercenter. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U. or.S.S.S. preferences. http://belfercenter. On cooperation more generally. “If Not Balancing. Vetoing UNSC resolutions.S.ksg. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq.harvard. For instance. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. and NATO involvement in getting ready. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. To some extent.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. but Turkey held out for much more. Kuwait was quick to support the U. Longtime U. when they share the U. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing.S. Iraqi policy contributed to non. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative.S. “If Not Balancing. Syria. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non.ksg.html) When other countries disapprove of U. allies like France or Germany. In other words. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U.S. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas.cooperation by standard U. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. . Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. bases are not immune to opposition either. Spain. effort. certain nearby real estate became very important. evidence.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. interests. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U. For counter-terrorism.compliance. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U.
peoples.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U.S.S. http://belfercenter. any bit player can lambaste the United States. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media. public as well as non. In hindsight. policies.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.S. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U.S.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U.S. “If Not Balancing. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Words. foreign opponents of U.S. as we see in the next section. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests. international media.S. With the right message. policy are trying to convince the U.harvard. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. for example. asymmetric warfare.U. Iraq. or. As became clear with Iraq. At the end of the day. stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. supporters in other countries.ksg. . The open American system. support.
This is unsurprising. As Paul Kennedy has observed.. Indeed.. however. they may. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance." However. Any serious debate about U.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998.S.S. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade. The changing distribution of power in the inter. 15 iss. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy.ers. that is only half of the argument. their cost.S." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. Over time. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. Summer. without the Cold War. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. . Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. not static. events will force it to do so.. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy." Salisbury said. "What ever happens will be for the worse. the degree of risk they entail. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. Simply put. International politics is dynamic. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. whether they are sustainable. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels.national system-specifically. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be. The other half. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal.able to Soviet domination. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities. 2. the relative decline of U.
International Security. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. As a consequence. Moreover. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain.S. Unipolarity is the foundation of U." But there is more to it than that. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. No doubt. Nye. if it ends. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. p. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. is illustrative. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals.4 1993) Inevitably. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. In February 1992. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. Fall. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat.S. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. Jr. However. primacy. 124 Several weeks later. a strategy of preponderance will fail. Other states underpay for security. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. however. unipolarity persists. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. Over time. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. No. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. which followed such a strategy. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. Harvard professor Joseph S. For example. not yet. 31 To be sure. . hegemony and. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. Vol. Over time. so will U. 17.
which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. without pro voking others. (4) in a multipolar system. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. International Security. Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. Relative decline has internal and external causes. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. International Security. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. 17. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. we will know who was right and who was wrong. Vol. and multipolar systems . No. too. but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. not too weak. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . Vol. 17. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance." A policy that concentrates U. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . No. bipolar. and probably much sooner. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic.S. Fifty years from now.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . In coming years. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. No doubt. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States.118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. .
And it should do so. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values.S.” No doubt. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. of external involvement. it is also about values. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. not abroad. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. In fact. is the minimum.” Salisbury said. Vol. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. however. it could choose to restraint over intervention.” International politics. not the maximum. As Paul Kennedy has observed. International Security. “What ever happens will be for the worse. . U. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. Kennan says. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. is dynamic not static.22 Issue. America First is an imperative. is about more than strategy. The United States is secure enough from external threat that. nation over empire. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. in these circumstances. In this sense.S. As George F. I have attempted to demonstrate that. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. U. should it wish to do so.119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. in fact. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is. however.
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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)
The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.
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Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.
As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. expansive scope. rooted in a strong patriotism.A. or threat of force. terror.123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. . the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. Planetary Politics: human rights. and global society. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. Of course.) . Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony. ed. including those referred to above.
improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. in fact. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. Russia and the Caspian Sea. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. is a global. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. Iran is nuclear. and should..> .com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button. European and Chinese worldviews. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. more significant. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. That new global order has arrived. This essay is adapted from his book. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s. on the Arabian Sea.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. Afghanistan is stable. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. was not truly an “East-West” struggle. both because of his policies and.gov. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. What we have today. as well as substantial nuclear energy. multipolar battle. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar.” to be published by Random House in March. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. but that was also a decade adrift. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa.nytimes. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. despite them. It is 2016. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. they mean little. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. too. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20. it remained essentially a contest over Europe.” http://www. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order.124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. but either way. and not India. rather than bestriding the globe. Bush. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999.” but it has no permanent friends either. multicivilizational. for the first time in history. The cold war. they were signs of imperial overstretch. Not Russia. So now.
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“Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”. Raghavan ‘10. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets.” http://lahaine. the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. China went on the offensive. despite pressure from Washington. Given the overall growth of China.7% recording $4. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. however. six times the projected growth of the US 37 .commodityonline. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. namely to its low level of savings. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy. More recently in April 2010. By 2010. China will overtake the US by 2020 -.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. Sreekumar. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 .html. Commodity Online.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. the most dynamic countries. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in . http://www. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. Most strikingly in Asia.demographic trends. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. Initially. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. China. for example.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable .
resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot.S. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. the USNS Victorious was harassed. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight. James. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. Beginning in 2000. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”.127 of 154 2012. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. The greater issue. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. well-educated. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship. At the same time. maternal and neonatal characteristics. physical activity. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. natural resources. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. the Yuzheng 311. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. In the summer of 2001. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise. China . Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. “U.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. USA which states that during the past 15 years.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. In 2001. The Diplomat.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years. Today. In 1953.’ In 1974. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1.828 U. The US Navy is the main target.S.Howard S." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. stopping directly in front of the ship. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped. stress and exposure to environmental toxins. capitalism and innovative spirit. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. http://thediplomat. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. of course.key to overall global primacy. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. for example.S. and again in 2002. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. such as trends in mothers' diets. however. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. analyzed data on birth weight. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. Kraska ’10. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal.827. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. innovation. If China or India emerges stronger. Harvard researchers say. Russia and India. The researchers looked at data from 36. China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. The study. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. knowledge capital. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. In each of these cases.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. on March 7 of 2009. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island. All of it will be lost if indeed. Soon after the Impeccable incident. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. China will overtake naval heg -. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. debatable. which were operating in the East China Sea." Instead. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island. also found white. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology. married women who didn't smoke. In response. In 2003. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy.
’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. all spread thinly throughout the world. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. it was Steinberg. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. farther north. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. which included two submarines. First. with short and secure internal lines of communication. on the other hand. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. Second. Likewise. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. Last year. raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. Taiwan. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. in the Gulf of Tonkin. a longtime Clinton associate. and particularly maritime mobility. Third. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. which will include aircraft carriers. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. Malaysia and Brunei. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. The US fleet will be absence. In February.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. Chinese ground . on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. Then. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. the US Navy battle force. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. the Philippines. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. In one incident in October 2006. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. the Vietnam War. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. This isn’t new. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. is a force multiplier. On April 10 of this year. In 1988. another Okinawa Prefecture island. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. Beijing’s maritime bullying.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. Ironically. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. So accustomed to being militarily superior. China’s geographic position. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. Fourth. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. 31 amphibious warfare ships. For each of these conflicts. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims. The Chinese Navy. But in March. By comparison. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. For the first time. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. Ironically. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius.
with the US dollar as its reserve currency. but in the Western Pacific. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. Even before he left Beijing. If that happens. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. 68. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt.de/international/business/0. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”. http://www. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. As of last week. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. Fifth. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University .Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. in its global shopping spree. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. In order to have a reserve currency. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent. strategically listless and brooding. Spiegel International." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -.00. Today the renminbi -. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power.1518. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. China would have to give up all of this. such as in the commodities markets. Until now.741303. This suggests two outcomes.html. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. Wieland. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. with US President Barack Obama. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency.the official name in China for the "people's money. clumsily begins to throw around his weight.spiegel. Dollar heg -. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. Nevertheless. Wagner ’11. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. During these sessions. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia.yuan will overtake it. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. Moreover. China has a lot on its plate. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes. For four weeks. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. the dollar and the euro. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. was a "product of the past. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low. dominant not only on land. gaining more favorable terms as a result. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency.
have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. on climate. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 .com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power. chief of US naval operations. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. Oil Price. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”.” http://lahaine." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments.130 of 154 (4/28/10. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. http://oilprice. D." said Admiral Gary Roughead. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. advanced fighter aircraft. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. like the US today. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2). "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. and much sooner than many expect[. advanced radar systems. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. For example. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 . specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. spaced-based reconnaissance. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup.. Likewise." In response to the Chinese challenge. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures.html. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it.pdf) Established empires in decline. unmanned aerial vehicles.C. By discrediting China internal politics. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. electromagnetic weapons." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme. highlighting China’s human rights violations. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth..freelance journalist based near Washington. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. seduce. Peter. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner.]. surveillance and target acquisition. at the expense of China’s economic interests. the two determining powers in the world. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. and ballistic and cruise missiles. perhaps to prohibitive levels. a conservative Washington think tank. US . Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10. In other words.
The Art of War. "and will stay off for a good period of time[. multifaceted defense posture. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. including coercion or aggression. As Sun Tzu said in his classic. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies. an independent from Connecticut. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. "It took us 70 years to get where we are.. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force." he said." he added. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. especially in light of the budget squeeze. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch. In fact. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. real or perceived. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. a new capability for them." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. such as long-range strike systems. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. then. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon." A key objective of AirSea Battle. "Besides. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill." said Krepinevich. for example. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. "The gusher has been turned off. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. Gates has displayed a proclivity." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. Japan's current government.]. "Carrier operations are very complex. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies.' the subject of the new CSBA report.[R]ealistically. as outlined in the CSBA report. towards developing a balanced. US inability. at a recent Washington gathering. emphasizing. short-range over than long-range strike systems. is a complex set of concepts. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon.. that would offset the Chinese buildup." he said. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese. AirSea Battle. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. according to the CSBA report. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats. In a speech earlier this month. particularly the Japanese." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. and operating concepts. involving the development of specific military capabilities." ." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world.
S. cannot become the top power. http://www. Chris.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. the top power. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency. http://bigpeace. “China PLA officer urges challenging U. Analysts say Russia. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe. says it could create “a whole new ballgame." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions. a professor at the elite National Defense University. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside. the U. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one . je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion.. 600 combat planes. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times.reuters.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11." writes Liu..com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. Valentin Rudenko. Reuters News. Big Peace. Jim. 100 warships. and arms sales to Taiwan.S. Buckley ’10. will still be determined to contain it. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower.. dominance”.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one.000 new helicopters. Tibet. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. which trains rising officers. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too. "The China Dream. human rights.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us. Liu Mingfu.132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book." writes Liu. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. including a $650 billion program to procure 1.S. Now as much as I like spending cuts. . then even if China is even more capitalist than the U.
they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. But from Brasilia to Beijing. independently from the US. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general.” http://aei. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures. particularly in the Arab world. .pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly.pitt. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. Thus. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. On the other hand. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. at the moment. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. Yet. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation. Global interdependence per se is not new. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. like Libya. let alone to lead. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. For now. sometimes as a bloc). Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. America still feels pretty safe. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front.
seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners.S. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. the share of U. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. irregularly and with periodic revivals. During the 1990s. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British. four of six chemical producers. and the like). Issue 07 (December). Monthly Review.S.2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. companies dominated major industries in 2002.S. In global finance. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach.S. France. and the Netherlands. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. investment abroad. Japan had sixteen.S. “U. http://monthlyreview. four of seven airlines. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years. Germany. Since 1971. twenty-three were American. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. share of exports of commercial services. interest. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits. banks.S. the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. two German). A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries.S. compared with 47 percent in 1960. regulating. and stabilizing the world political economy. U. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their . is now deteriorating sharply. against 21 percent at present. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. the United States is not only less dominant. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. The U. insurance. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. had forty. but vulnerable. nineteen were non-U. The U. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. six of ten telecommunications companies. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). the fastest growing part of the world economy. dividends. The weak link is the dollar. Volume 55. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment). 25 percent in 1999. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. royalties. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States.S. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners. But the U. In 2002. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics.S. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. Enduring Danger”. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. (General Electric and Citigroup). Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. Non-U.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. together. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. capital has in it. the United Kingdom. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. Richard. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. During 1996–2001. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad.S. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits.S. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. only two were U. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. telecommunications. Together. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests.S. stood at 24 percent in 2001. Between 1981 and 1995. And since 1990. exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975.
Brazil. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. a record 4. ceasing to invest in U.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999. companies. but it may not be forever.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits. Like most gaps between income and expenses.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only.S. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. In 2002. corporate bonds. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. and 13 percent of corporate stock. Therefore. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difﬁcult than was. political competence and military strength. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the ﬁrst tier players to take them in account. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. U. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad.S.-owned assets abroad. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a ﬁrst tier actor. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad.S. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. and real estate). By mid-2003.rising powers. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. As the dollar declines in value. 24 percent of all U.S. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. stocks and bonds. sending Wall Street into a dive.S.8 percent of GDP.S. so why go to the United States. 57–67. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. governments).” http://www. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game. Treasury marketable debt. Treasury bonds. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future. sterling.’ 3 China’s rise is not . 1. say.5 trillion more than U. Japan. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). the dollar would start falling faster.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). and the New Multipolarity.S. Multipolarity now -. German investments in choice office properties in New York. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. the integration of Japan a generation ago. In the ﬁrst tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China.S.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers.ac.vub. The EU. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. economy. foreigners owned 41 percent of U. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. Norway and Britain.” Thus. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power. San Francisco. concluded Yarjani. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. borrowing money would become harder.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. history. 2011. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. companies are continuing to invest abroad. corporate bonds and stocks. 19. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. they can use them to buy American assets (U. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. the EU. Swiss franc). In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. residents (individuals.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. Russia. No. South Africa. companies. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. Javad Yarjani. By contrast. Interest rates in the United States might surge. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. political system and stage of development. Vol. “China. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries.
Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. hegemony is on the wane.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing inﬂuence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. Multipolarity coming -. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. Some point out that. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy.” http://www. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250. the creation of spheres of inﬂuence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital.Europe and China are filling in. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response.S. leadership. for example.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions.S. 10 As China is already ﬁrmly integrated in the current international regimes and beneﬁts from their smooth functioning. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system. 19.S. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. Vol. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains. 2011. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline.S. In the early and middle 19th century. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism. There is . while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin. Understandably. In previous decades.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. 2010.ac. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon. hegemony. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. 57–67. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. 1. No. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. regional rivalries may turn nasty. the EU.it will foster cooperation and stability -. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U.vub. precisely during critical power transitions. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent. as did Britain in the 19th century. and the New Multipolarity. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. 10 Heg is on the decline -. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia. “China. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. and Iranian nuclear ambitions.
China. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. and others. Africa. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. with the hope that things will get better. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. http://www. to guarantee that our policies beneﬁt lasting stability and development. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. Midas Letter. draining wars. tackle non-traditional security threats. To be effective. multilateral organizations need to reﬂect the emerging new international order. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order. and Barbara M. to support effective governance. doing what it takes to get reelected. Associate Director of the Frederick A. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs.midasletter. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. and South-Central Asia. and enhance maritime security.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. All along the "foundation" of U. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert inﬂuence.137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. Global Hegemony . Andy. no game plans. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. As the unipolar moment fades. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual beneﬁt and understanding will be indispensable.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner.S.S. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. “U. global hegemony was its manufacturing base.S. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversiﬁed multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism. nothing. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive. Just politicians being politicians. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances.The Beginning and the End”. je) The U.php. . Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation.
research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22. Indeed. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere. are at stake. the U. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.S.S. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions.S. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya.S.S. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. Obama not only recognizes that the U.S. or by taking a tougher line against Iran. And there is not much that the U. 2011. strategic interests. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -. understands that . Iran's nuclear military program. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U.S. In fact.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon.S. and the diverging U. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East. He also the continuing U.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled.S.cato. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process. can do to reverse this process.S. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U. hegemony in the Middle East is over. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region.org/pub_display.S.S. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting." And without the U.” http://www." as Obama stressed over the weekend. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945.
Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts. Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . To expand overseas markets. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. Fundamental .org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. industry would have to lower its profits. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies.5 billion muslim world. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. inequalities. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. which would reduce charges to industry and state. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. China’s class. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. Substituting trade missions for military bases. uneven regional development. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite. will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change.” http://lahaine. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. Petras 10 – James. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. deepens the domestic market and expands social services.
but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests. .140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential.
confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. in short. Adam Quinn. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights.’ he declared. to cite one example. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. These are not just American ideas. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. 100 No doubt sensibly. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment.” International Affairs Volume 87. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. the freedom to live as you choose.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. “The Art of Declining Politely. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. President Obama’s approach. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. Lecturer in International Studies. He is. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. this is a president who. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. within the confines of the mainstream. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. As part of such a project. Facing this incipient period of decline. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. it can. 2011. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. that he is no pacifist. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. Nevertheless. his predecessor was not. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. University of Birmingham (July 1. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. given the likely political reaction at home. not for the first time. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam.
It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. fill any westerner with glee. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. it may result in conflict. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. It may well be.142 of 154 global power. on reflection. . it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. Alternatively. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them.
" There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. the Leader added. On 18 August. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. 2010." he further explained. because "talks in an environment of pressure. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran. . therefore. "Based on its hegemonic attitude. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone. negotiations are impossible under these conditions. threats and intimidation are not talks." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying.143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them.
Pakistan. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. “Nuclear Apartheid”. found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. such as India. The University of North Carolina Press. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system.S. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. American hegemony. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence. North Korea. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. . From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. and the PRC. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord.144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. Since the dawn of the nuclear age.
and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft.” Review of International Studies (2009). or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. 35: 5-25. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. This behavior. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves. The driving factor behind oﬀshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. In general terms. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. including Europe and the Middle East. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions.R. Oﬀshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. to the world. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. Europe or the Persian Gulf. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. Once the potential hegemon is checked. 3 Its proponents believe that oﬀshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. not military force. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia. This is the best way to ensure American primacy.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show.cambridge. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the ﬂow of oil upon which the US economy. John. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. “Imperial by Design”. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. An oﬀshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- . He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. but also gets us involved in nation building. American troops should go back over the horizon. Europe and the Gulf. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. Mearsheimer ’11. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: oﬀshore balancing. As an oﬀshore balancer. he R. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. not only generates resentment toward the United States. Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. online at http://journals. Robert M. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. The National Interest.
Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. deﬁnes US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. believe for an insular great power like the US. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. Oﬀshore balancers. 7 In addition to soft balancing. growing apprehensions about the military. on the other hand. Oﬀshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to ﬁght an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. some would argue. recent studies by the CIA oﬀer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. First. multiple poles of power. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. A second point upon which oﬀshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. Most of all it is a strategy that ﬁts within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the diﬀerence between. Failure is the fate of hegemons. and policies must be judged on their consequences. balances ends and means. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. The attempt by France. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. as well as economic. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. 5 And. the security of the others is threatened. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. they are important for two reasons. Oﬀshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. soft balancing eﬀorts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world aﬀairs are numbered. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system.146 of 154 horizon military posture. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. Even if soft balancing eﬀorts fail. including so-called soft balancing. on the other hand. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. of course. Another example is the eﬀort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. not on the intentions that underlie them. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. and Germany under Hitler (and. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. Regional powers – . Although there are some nuanced diﬀerences among oﬀshore balancing’s proponents. 4 Yet. First. Oﬀshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. Second. Germany. oﬀshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing eﬀorts of the other major powers in the international system. When employed by states. Spain under Philip II. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). the ethic of responsibility. on one hand.
these states seek other methods of oﬀsetting American power. Because they are threatened by the US. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. however. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing ﬁeld and deter the US from attacking them. . and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them.147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces.
is better suited to the task. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. je) Of course. “Imperial by Design”. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. Global dominators. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. John. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. For starters. especially if war breaks out. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show.R. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. Offshore balancing. The National Interest. . in contrast. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. he R. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. Mearsheimer ’11. on the other hand. however. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. Offshore balancing.
online at http://journals. Robert M. oﬀshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’.149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. covert operations. Indeed. outside of the Middle East. an oﬀshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. And. In the Middle East. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of oﬀshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as eﬀective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009.cambridge. unlike primacists. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. not increase. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an oﬀshore balancing strategy. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. 54 Similarly. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US oﬀshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. the best way to do so is to adopt an oﬀshore balancing strategy and ﬁght terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. America’s military presence overseas’. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. . As Robert Pape argues. the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. For example. and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. As this debate gathers steam. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. a recent 32 per cent margin. there are signs that Americans already accept oﬀshore balancing’s key premises. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. and globally. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China.” Review of International Studies (2009).org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military proﬁle in the region. 35: 5-25. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived.
Europe and the Gulf. offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. and even then. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. But all things considered. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. he R. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif. only as a matter of last resort. “Imperial by Design”. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. attack. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. John. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. Certainly.R. je) Specifically. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. It has two main virtues. . Furthermore. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.S. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. killing 241 service members.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. The National Interest. As a result. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. Mearsheimer ’11. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew.
Christopher.php?pub_id=10228) For too long. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 2001. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II). Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. This is neither naive nor utopian. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. while others see a hot one with China in the offing.S. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. no.151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -.cato. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. We have come to believe. that military power keeps us safe. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess.” http://www. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. is its people. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. erroneously.cato.org/pub_display. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. perhaps over Taiwan. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20.org/pub_display. and again between September 1939 and August 1945. Both are ideological struggles. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. the true source of U. the president has taken . It always has been. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. fought chiefly by non-military means.structure of the international system checks. what of war between peoples.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill.S. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant. power. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit. But the true strength of the United States. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. and the prospects for future casualties. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918. Our spirit. 2009. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy. Preble 9 – Christopher. The world is a dangerous place. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U.” http://www. or Soviet (or Chinese. and that more power will keep us safer. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war.
because it could enhance security. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. along with advances in strike technology. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. If our military had less to do. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits.S. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. it is counterproductive.S. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. however. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. security threats. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U.S. less strained and far less expensive. they are not. for example — as major U. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. ambitions. military deployments.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. . But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U. Citing the need for austerity.S. security. In nearly all cases. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. forces. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. In most cases. Geography.S. The resulting force would be more elite. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. Fewer missions. By shedding missions. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending.
rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement.S. The U. Japan.S.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. On defense. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. In economics. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. foreign policy. a transformational agenda. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions.S. that means proposing a free trade agreement. The U. Moreover. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula.S. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. called the East Asian Community. At the same time.” http://www. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. As the U. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. However. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. and U. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. America still has a major economic role to play. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U. such instability would pose little threat to the U.S.cato. will remain engaged in East Asia. However. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. . And at a time of economic crisis the U. “Policy Change for East Asia. apart from the U.S. engagement with the North. The U.S. senior fellow at the Cato Institute. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U.S. Japanese.S. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea.multilateral cooperation solves. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. Bandow 9 – Doug. That the U. 2009.S.S. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. steps back from its dominant military role. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. the U.org/pub_display. and Russia as well. policies regarding Pyongyang. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. The U. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems.S. is losing its financial ability to do so. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach.S. At the same time. China. In Washington. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted.S. promote respect for human rights. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower.
Moreover. Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas.S.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. but so far these are for commercial use. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. American Strategy Program.3 Secondly. In addition.. mistakes. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems.newamerica.S. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension. Senior Research Fellow. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. and Pakistan could become the same. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. compared to the U. In fact.S. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. “U. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U. interests.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. . from effectively defending Taiwan. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U.S. Indeed. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. In terms of military power. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. 2011. In Africa.” http://www. Finally. and with the possible exception of Pakistan.S. and China. not to dominate.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States. in terms of global power or learn from U. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances. let alone the dollar or the euro.S.S. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done.S. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U. as a global superpower.S. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely.
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