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***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78
2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154
3 of 154
Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that
the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast
approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.
China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in
we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed. and Joseph. Third. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. Necessity . our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes.4 of 154 defense expenditures.fpif. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. retrenchment can be successful. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise. Based on the empirical record. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. rather than conflict. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.) AK In this article. increase reliance on allies or adversaries.S. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. "These aren't the golden 1990s. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Vol. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. In this first decade of the 21st century. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. but necessity is the mother of invention. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment." Faced with these hard decisions.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. Further. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. the absolute size of U. International Security Spring 2011. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. 4. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. and cutting defense spending. First. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Far from being a hazardous policy. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. a range of 61–83 percent. In these ways. 35.S." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Faced with diminishing resources. No. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. even over short time spans. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. choices must be made between raising taxes. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Pages 7-44. When borrowing becomes more difficult. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. cutting non-defense spending. In fact. states renounce risky ties. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. power was at its zenith. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. draw down their military obligations. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. when U.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. When international conditions demand it. Second. As Kirshner puts it. In contrast. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank.S. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending.
the stimulus package. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains.S. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. the red ink is mounting. Brazil. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. meanwhile. With the bank bailout. economy.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. The global recession is hammering the U. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? . Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. Over here. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction.
6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .
http://www. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. Given America's own protectionist record. When you're winning. In this context.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. France. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell.nytimes. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place.guardian. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. The official line. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict. 2011. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel. 2011. you can afford to laugh. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. To confuse matters further. In Damascus. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. not leadership. http://www.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. staff writer. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. June 24th. for example. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. militarily and in other ways. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. if anything. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. Italy and Russia. the Israeli prime minister. British journalist. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. Like the Greeks. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. promulgated by France. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. which. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. July 14th. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. to back up its Nato partners. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. has grown more belligerent. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. But paradoxically. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. there is little more the US can do other than complain. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. The Guardian UK. has so far hedged its bets. in effect.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. All three issues speak to American impotence. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict.co.S. chairman of Doha Debates. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. power — just look at events in the Middle East. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. But Washington.
2011. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. There really is a new world. America is in decline – education. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. the European Union. http://timesoftexas. energy. Don’t assume the worst. and post-crisis Russia. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world. Competitive Workforce. stumble.0. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. is a natural and logical process. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. The world is rapidly changing.modations with them. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. to paraphrase President Clinton. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. Bush. But history took a different turn. to find new friends. instead of just searching out its enemies. Far from stopping conflicts. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. the United States dominated the world politically. competitiveness.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. power may be good for the Middle East. Digital Infrastructure”. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. economically and scientifically. promised to restore America’s popularity. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. the biggest factory in the world is in China. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine. there is no peace at all. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. “And … more troublingly. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. With Washington’s power diminished.S.” notes Fareed Zakaria. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth.N. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. Security Council — was. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the . where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe. India. But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO. and the rise of other power centers. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U. http://www. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. primarily China. So the decline of U. We are living in an interesting time. during his election campaign.” Zakaria. June 24th. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. Only this time it’s not called America. and Barack Obama. including Russia — and in the entire world. July 1st. It needs. perhaps.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. After decades of American engagement in the peace process. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2.nytimes. Israel will have to make new accom. 2011. The term of the third post-Soviet president. George W. America will buy you a ticket. New energy. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. Brazil. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. the largest oil refinery is in India.S.
the economic connections of a global market.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross. if Congress were to do nothing. consuming.” he says. investing. “To put it in perspective. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. loaning money. building a competitive workforce. “That by itself would yield $3. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. “In economic terms.” America. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. the more people there are producing. whose role is diminishing? Of course. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. Zakaria says. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win. the technological connection into this market. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. saving. Zakaria says.” America’s political system. the established power — the United States. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world.” he says. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time.” he says.” .” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. “So as China expands its role in Asia. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term.
Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. industrial and financial dominance. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. http://findarticles. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. Those days are gone forever. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. Faced with these hard choices. the U. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. recovers from the recession.S. primacy will endure for years to come. In coming years the U. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. After all. primacy.S. Still. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. trade surpluses. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. military and economic preponderance. not the biggest borrower. It seemed the sun would never set on the U.S. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. supplying liquidity for the world economy. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. and sustained high growth rates.S. May 2010. Professor and Robert M. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role. Externally. If so. “Bye bye. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Even in the best case. they say. the United States no longer fits the part. Indeed. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue.S. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end.W. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. the U. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. The American people are .S. Economically. not cause them. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states.S. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises. Militarily. and providing the reserve currency. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. empire. Bush School of Government & Public Service.S.S. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons. will incur for at least a decade.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. The American Conservative.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. created after World War II.S. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles.S. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945.
you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. others--notably China." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. we believe. And because the U. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. U. Mr. is different. . and morally superior to the rest of the world.S. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. and norms of emerging powers. non-democratic forms of governance. But when your power declines. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests.W. all would be well. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. Because that U. the belief. just 27 percent chose the United States. values.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U.S. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle.S. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. that the U. dating back to the Puritans. According to a December 2009 Pew survey. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. hold about the world. and Russia--are rising." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States." In the same Pew study.S.S. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. imperialism. India. (That is. used to tell us about American foreign policy." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. strong.S. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.S. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. most notably China. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. All these bad things. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. and terrorism. but as the U.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. militarism. as a nation. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. As the Financial Times observed. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. May 2010. and powerful.) But as my graduate school mentor. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. "When you are big. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world. imperialist. is facing enormous difficulties.S. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers.11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. the current era of globalization will end. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. http://findarticles.S. decline means that in the 21st century. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics. come from "over there. Kenneth Waltz. Bush School of Government & Public Service. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes. and latterly totalitarianism. Professor and Robert M." U. None of these propositions is self-evident. better. religious intolerance. The American Conservative. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. if you discount the 58.S. looks through this prism. Indeed. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. genocide. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. stumbles.
said one U. Russia. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. In mid-2009. so powerful. great and regional. In 2008.S." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy. the U.S. and cyberspace. provocatively challenge U. and other powers.S." Simultaneously. as economist Michael Hudson has argued. are now foreigners. the U. Iran. in other words. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. the decline of American technological innovation. Rogoff. “How America will collapse”. in 2020. 09 [“The Waning of U. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. http://www.S. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. India.W. Washington slowly pulls U. Vol. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U. has been falling behind its competitors. most of whom will be heading home." observed Kenneth S. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Treasury notes. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U. knows best on economic policy. the U. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. expert.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. 1 machine" in America. Suddenly. Similarly. 34. that it "blows away the existing No.S.S. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay. and a continuing decline in real wages. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. it is far too late. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. Adding substance to these statistics. space. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. By 2025. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. Take these as signposts of a world to come. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. not staying here as once would have happened. amid soaring prices. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. however. that source of future scientists and innovators. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. After leading the world for decades in 25. dominion over the oceans. China. Its key geopolitical .S. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. dollar). domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates.S. but China was closing fast at 195.R. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. and of a possible attempt. the cost of imports soars.S.S. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. 1. By 2008. 12/6/10. ever-rising unemployment.” International Security. By now. financial-military world order.S. Add to this clear evidence that the U. as long expected.salon.html) Today. education system. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. 10 (Alfred.000.000. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade. No.S. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair. J. the Tianhe-1A.S. Meanwhile. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills. Under pressure at home and abroad.
Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. 97). 09 – Mary Julia and George R. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. but a growing number of analysts disagree. domestic governance issues. 93). Thus. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. 29).).). Vol. In particular. military. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. Galileo. hegemony. p. 93). U. Yet. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. Although at the time this issue went to press. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. At home. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. in addition to relative decline. China.D. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. 3. 13–14). 30). 82).D. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. financial.76 The warning signs with respect to U.18 Between 2009 and 2025. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.S. 1. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". India. from USC. 34.77 Optimists . the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. Moreover. 8–9.M. 30). the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. 94.S.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. No. By 2025. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. 31–32). 23–24. economic power to wane. India.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. J. 12.S. 32. even before the meltdown.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. Nevertheless. LL. in Political Science from the University of California. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic.S. According to the NIC. economic and political constraints may undermine U. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. power. International Security. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. and especially demography.17] Because of uncertainties about economics.S. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. Ultimately. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. in International Law from Virginia Law. energy prices. 97).S. and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S.S. "The Waning of U. Summer 2009. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. 7). both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery.13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. Ph. 32).). the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. July 6th 2010. however. and economic. global dominance” (p.S.S. capabilities. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.
S. current account deficit." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. To rule mankind. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. and sustained high growth rates. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. however. industrial and financial dominance. 2009. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region.S. with awful sway. Moreover. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect.co.S. 83 First. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. Second. Because of these two factors. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring . as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. as Eric Helleiner notes.S. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering. The postwar era. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. January 19. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. dominance. was a golden age of U.80 The CBO states. trade surpluses. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. however. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown.guardian. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. Like Rome.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. 't is thine alone. and make the world obey. "Rome. the entitlements overhang. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. and the cost of two ongoing wars.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U. http://www. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it. protection from the Soviet threat. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. to Russia's show of force in Georgia. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.
seems more bound. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States.” http://www. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.S. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. For example. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.S. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense.45 Out of Balance U. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First. International Security. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. After all. but one that. consumption. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. Similarly. know-how. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. “The Waning of U. US hegemony is unsustainable. however. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. military overstretch. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. It is unclear how long this formula will work. everyone is getting hit. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. Snyder.all realists agree Snyder PhD. or provides benefits.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. Vol.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity.umd. The US may still be a giant.economic problems. In this respect. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. hegemony.bsos. technology. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers.bsos. and rising powers Snyder PhD.pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things.With its armed forces over-extended. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. which is not very long at all. and Robert M. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . Of course. 34.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. If it suppresses consumption.S hegemony is unsustainable. like all hegemonic systems. and resources stretched. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities.umd.43 A Superficially.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing.15 of 154 Layne. hegemony will endure well into the future.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. Over time. for now at least.” http://www. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. 09 Professor. According to the theory of hegemonic stability. Relative power is important. however.S. No. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. they do not engage the argument that. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U. which allows other states to catch up. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were. Snyder. 1. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. Because all are suffering.
losses in relative power. all good things must come to an end. and inevitable overextension. and third. expansion. second. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.16 of 154 trade and payments. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. and eventual decline. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable. .”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely.25 Sadly. Challengers will arise. it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis.
China. U. 97). domestic governance issues. 94. financial. 29). 7). hegemony. Vol.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. 97). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come.18 Between 2009 and 2025. power. in addition to relative decline. India. erosion of public support. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. No. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. although the United States . 34. At home. 93). 82). China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. In particular. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades.S. capabilities. however. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. and rising challengers Layne. Ultimately. International Security. 93). military.17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 09 Professor.). Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. 31–32). and especially demography. and economic.). Moreover. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports.S. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p.S. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. 8–9. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. 3. By 2025. 30). 32). 1.S.17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. According to the NIC. economic and political constraints may undermine U. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. Thus. global dominance” (p. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). energy prices. 23–24. 30). “The Waning of U.S. 12. Although at the time this issue went to press. 32. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.S. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. 13–14).15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. India.S.S. and Robert M. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless.
. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. Not that this era is yet upon us. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. India and Brazil will all bid for a role. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. http://www. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region. A new cold war is unlikely. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. should it desire.).co. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. whether through arms deals. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. As ever. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. but China. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. In such circumstances.guardian. However. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. the region's international relations are changing. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will. US power is waning. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come.
essentially for three reasons. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . First. “American Power in the 21st Century”. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements . the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order.will increase and not decrease. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department.even and perhaps especially by the United States . social. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. "As interdependence rises. . as global economic interdependence grows. Over the postwar era.. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. "American Power in the 21st Century".. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. If this remains true in the years ahead." Robert Keohane argues. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase.in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. Finally. Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows.19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G. Second.
Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order.and the search for rule-based agreements . multilateralism . It predicts that the existing multilateral order.and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism. should rein in the Bush administration .should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century . He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department." . "American Power in the 21st Century".20 of 154 Heg Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G. From this perspective. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states.and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order.
Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. http://www. by contrast. http://www. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. even Germany -. America's traditional allies in Europe -. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case.foreignpolicy. Brazil. New powers are on the rise: India. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. Japan.are slipping down the economic ranks. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. Foreign Policy Magazine. In the 1990s. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No.Britain. That was never going to happen. Italy. and it is sitting on more than $2. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. doubling in size roughly every seven years. That is just a taste of things to come. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. former U. such as Brazil and South Africa. and inflation is on the rise. In 1989. 1 well before then. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. This Time It`s For Real”. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. Over the long term. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. This Time It`s For Real”.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy.4) AK In the end. At the current pace. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. 1. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. for roughly three decades. of course. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. of course. February 2011. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing.and China is the wolf. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. "I do. By contrast. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. Foreign Policy Magazine. Turkey. China. such as Greece and Portugal. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. on average.5 trillion of foreign reserves. President George W. In a recent interview with the Times of London. Of course. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage.foreignpolicy. China could be No. they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. it would be a big . The wolf did arrive -. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. February 2011. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. France. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. In the short term." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. Chinese goods compete all over the world.S.
but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. power will simply disappear. Foreign Policy Magazine. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs.S." But whatever they say in formal speeches. have explicitly welcomed China's rise.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. February 2011. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. Larry Summers. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war. We are on a collision course with China – military. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. In fact. hyperinflation. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. sanctions on Iran.4) AK Successive U. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. which is driving up global prices. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said.-China standoff. in particular oil. it takes a great deal to throw them off course. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. In a nuclear age. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners. Leading economists. So much for the win-win world. foreign policy. Its economy will eventually recover. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders. but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons. the Great Depression. The United States still has formidable strengths. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime.S. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war.S.S.foreignpolicy. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. troops. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. in Political Science from the University of California. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies. Fred Bergsten. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese.D. The U. then Obama's chief economic advisor. At the G-20 summit in November.M. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. http://www.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. This Time It`s For Real”. the collapse of democracy. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. have taken a similar line. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. and rightly so. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. Those days are over. in . Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum.S. And yet by the end of the 1950s. and nations need not fear the success of another. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. the U. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. Ph. presidents. from the first Bush to Obama. Just before his first visit to China.S. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game.N. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. LL. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U.
]. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea.49 Their analysis. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay".S. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. of course." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021. International Security." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried.aspx?id=20484) .org/Article.nationalinterest. unmanned aerial vehicles." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. http://www. hegemony. "The Waning of U. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. Khanna. electromagnetic weapons. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. 1. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. Vol. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP.D. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. J. however. the trend lines appear to favor China. http://oilprice. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition. 1-2209. Mahbubani. perhaps to prohibitive levels. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. p. 34. spaced-based reconnaissance. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U. China. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup.S.50 Looking ahead. surveillance and target acquisition. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. there is evidence that as the NIC. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons.23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. 17-18. No. advanced radar systems. then.S military strength Buxbaum.53 Empirically. (Peter A. is static.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific.” National Interest Online. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia. and many analysts— including the NIC. how-ever. July 6th 2010. Galileo. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships.. Summer 2009. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise. a conservative Washington think tank. and. For sure..S. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame. Khanna.46 Here. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." said Admiral Gary Roughead. China’s already challenging U. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. in early 2009. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. from USC. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. and much sooner than many expect[. is the poster child for Asia’s rise. advanced fighter aircraft.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. Zakaria contend.52 And. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. “Empire Falls.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization.48 Unsurprisingly. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. to a point. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. and ballistic and cruise missiles.. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. chief of US naval operations.
Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. relative decline has been. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. further decline in the foreseeable future. fairly short. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. For nearly two decades. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Russia. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. In international politics. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. the more international commitments a state has. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. our own hubris may be our downfall. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. Venice. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War.S. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. FROM ROME. growing government debt. France. power does not ensure success. Since the cold war. Spain. those convinced of U.S. For the past eight years. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. Over time. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. without deliberate action. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. There is also good reason to think that. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. But. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. if not rectify. Imperial China.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. A successful grand strategy.S. thus far. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. This is simply no longer realistic. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. To be sure. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. however. U. Most important. Although scholars have long debated its nuances. the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. Still. . Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today. the period of U. power certainly helps. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. both at home and abroad.S. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. France. At any given moment. If present trends continue. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices.S.
25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,
single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see
(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications
for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,
China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As
the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced
applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States
remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more
than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.
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Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.
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U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)
There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.
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policymakers are discounting real future threats. such as China. Foreign Affairs. U. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. combined with the continued rise of new powers. the U. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. However. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. military. http://www. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U.D.S.S.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. such as Iran. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. . assure the safety of the homeland.. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets. Meanwhile.S. 09 -.accessmylibrary. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University.S. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. he also cautioned. U. Ph. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide.S. For the past several decades. Recently. In fact.S." in the language of defense strategists.S.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. they are already starting to disappear. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. This has allowed it to guarantee U. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. July 1st 2009. and hostile states." Despite this admonition. access to the global commons. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U.
org/publications/index.S. the current trend is toward closer cooperation. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -.carnegieendowment. 06 – PhD from American University. meaningful number of troops. http://www. 11 and the Iraq war. January 15th 2006. For Eastern and Central Europe. On the contrary. Germany's Afghanistan. Western Europe will not new government. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. The Washington Post. Bush's United States. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. the growing threat is Russia. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. policy in Iraq. even with an administration they allegedly despise. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled.30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. not America.has simply not occurred. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. while still dissenting from U. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. Nevertheless. in German terms.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? . “Still the Colossus”. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. But if they really feared American power. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics.
Kuwait and Qatar. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. . Abu Dhabi." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk.to end dollar dealings for oil. Qatar and Russia. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time. The Independent. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future. the euro. And finally. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. Russia. UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month. "Secondly. Russia. analysts said." Even so. http://rawstory.along with China. The Raw Story. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. including Kuwait. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar". The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse. together with China. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan." added Juckes." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. Japan and France. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. October 11th 2009." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. The report was denied by a host of countries. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”. Gulf Arabs are planning -. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. Following the summit. Japan and France -. the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. gold and a new. unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council." added Fisk. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar. Firstly. including Saudi Arabia." said Kit Juckes. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. Sha Zukang. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history.
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Vol 24. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Beloit College. Yale University. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally.harvard. in Political Science. Ph. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.S. No.harvard.A. M. http://belfercenter. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.D. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U. Yale University M.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. regional integration. Wohlforth.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. Wohlforth. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. Yale University M. but also those of its other great power allies. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the . “The Stability of a Unipolar World. pp. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume.pdf) The key. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. Wohlforth. 28. 1. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. B. Summer 1999. 29-30.” MIT Press. Ph. many scholars expect bi. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. Yale University. however. Ph. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Ph. bandwagon. B. Beloit College. political science.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. in International Relations. No. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. Wohlforth.A.A. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Yale University. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography.A. Similarly. or the differential growth in power.D. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada.S.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. the U. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. The second pillar—geography—is just as important. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. As a result.. International Security. in International Relations. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects. in International Relations. Summer 1999.. M. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. 99 (William C. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France.Phil. Yale University. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors.ksg. and the Pacific. Location matters . They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states.D.D.ksg. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. p. Mexico. the Atlantic. If things go poorly. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. in Political Science. in International Relations. International Security. 99 (William C. Vol 24. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. 1.Phil. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. Germany. political science.” MIT Press. http://belfercenter.or multipolarity to reappear quickly.
Indeed.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges.S. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War. . In addition. in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U. allies against an aspiring regional power.S.
Summer 1999.A.. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s.35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. political science. Ph.harvard. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. Beloit College.A. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. position circa 1946. In the bipolarity debate. In each case. power. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U. Wohlforth. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. in Political Science. Yale University. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. If unipolarity is so robust.Phil. International Security. In the 1980s.S. .pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. Yale University. Ph.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. http://belfercenter. 99 (William C. As a result. Yale University M.D. new forms of interdependence. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. Vol 24. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system. 37-38. B. pp.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. No. in International Relations.ksg.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies.D. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.S. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships.” MIT Press. in International Relations. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. M. And unipolarity is not a “moment. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. Wohlforth. 1.
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“The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. and relations with enemies and neutrals. Spring 2011. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. The concept must be understood in a relative sense. In the meantime. which acquire new energy. on the other. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. because they thought in terms of absolute. power. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics. leaving them with little choice but submission. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. At some point.30 Obviously. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11.org/doi/pdf/10. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. . When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations.mitpressjournals. Beyond that threshold. Institutions. Meanwhile.” International Security. History at the University of Bologna. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point. especially if one side should defeat the other. and some will leave the alliance. (Davide. on the one hand. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts.) http://www. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. not relative. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security.
China now was a nuclear power. . both Koreas. of course.S. Beijing.S. other countries will not be considered in this study. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. hollow. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. including Japan. which increases the chances for conflict. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing. Moreover. however. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. Beijing's 1996 threat was.S. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan.pdf) A war between China. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. it is becoming quite real. as well as the Pacific and even into India. Australia. China. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking. today. and the U. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways.lampmethod.27ln contrast. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome. therefore. However. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client.S. during the cold war the respective U. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. In a showdown over Taiwan.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. In any case. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict. if they were drawn into the war. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence. In addition.officials than does Taipei). and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly.” http://www. 09 – American Military University (Lee. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario. For one thing.S. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. India and Great Britain. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic.39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. therefore. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. Russia. because U.
however. ISBN 0415952034. not peace. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing." American Empire: A Debate. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. p. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. On this score. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. After all. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. 73-74 ] To be sure.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. Still. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict. however. Published by Routledge. .
will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers.S. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne.amconmag. suffers setbacks in future conflicts.html] As for the argument that the U. on its present course. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. regional powers (Iran. for example in a war with China over Taiwan. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. Don’t bet on it. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. http://www.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash. . 2003 [The American Conservative. North Korea). is too mighty to be counter-balanced. and elsewhere).S.com/10_06_03/cover. The Cost of Empire. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation. Indeed. October 6 2003. and thereby overreach themselves.S. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U. possibly in a failed Pakistan. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. they are tempted to use it repeatedly. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. Over time. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines.
As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu. (Steven. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Ely Ratner. we’re not likely to get any help. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. SARS. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. or other Western agencies in. Even after HIV. that feel threatened by American power. because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. including the World Health Organization. Humans cannot outsmart disease. January-February 2007. . Matthew Kroenig. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. Foreign Policy. al 7.) The same is true for global public health. “How Globalization Went Bad”. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Naazneen Barma. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. These are often the same countries. America can’t change that alone.S.
has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. Secretary of State Colin L.S. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. Recently. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Still. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. History Should Give Us Pause”. part or all of eight of the 10 U.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -.S. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy.commondreams. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. however. but its obligations look even larger. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition.at least not now. should national security interests demand it. http://www. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. These are reflected in current U. including its boss. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. S.org/views03/0420-02. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad.S. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. the U. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. Successful in our Iraq military campaign.43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. The clear victor of the Cold War. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919).S. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. as President George W. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul. and gaining U. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. of course.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. however. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. "Big stick" . And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. foreign service. With all that is crying out for attention -. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. the U. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures.” Beyond nuclear weapons. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. In a real sense. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. ISBN 0415952034. dominance over that region. p. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable. ambassador to Iraq. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come." American Empire: A Debate. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Zalmay Khalilzad. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. Scared.S. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. Chief among these is Iraq. Most countries in the world. Since 9/11. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. Powell. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone. The Dutch. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. language. Published by Routledge. The second is that. In this respect. April 20. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. Washington Post. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. Washington’s policy. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia.
but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war. however.S. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. dominance over that region. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East." American Empire: A Debate. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. as President George W. In this respect. Recently. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. In a real sense. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. . Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. however. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. 64-65. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. "The Case Against the American Empire. Washington’s policy. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. and gaining U. ambassador to Iraq.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. Zalmay Khalilzad. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy.S. Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. the U. p. Chief among these is Iraq.” Beyond nuclear weapons. These are reflected in current U. Review of International Studies (2009). not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization.S. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis.
The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms. both governments and NGOs. including the United Nations and European nations. the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. This. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. coupled with a stronger international presence. Whatever the changes. http://www. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration.html. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. .nautilus. coordinator of Japan Focus. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure.
2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. In short. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine.particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. May 24 2010. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups . .huffingtonpost. Germany. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast. England.and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium . the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East.com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222.html It's official. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . We have been rendered irrelevant.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. capabilities and reason. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. let alone push through a negotiated solution .Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. France. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. http://www. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Russia and China could not.
North Korea’s founder. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury.” Foreign Policy. Matthew Kroenig. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER. conventional military power. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. and many other capitals. for 40 years. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. however. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand.S. military could. Today. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. It didn’t need to. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. to the detriment of U. It’s often forgotten now that. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Matthew Kroenig. And the best deterrent yet invented is the . Consider the case of nuclear proliferation.S. national security. troops on its border. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It has become fashionable. January/February.S. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. In Tehran. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. But much of this analysis is overblown. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. When push comes to shove. (Steven. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad.S. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. January-February 2007. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. in the wake of the Iraq war.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve.Q. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. Khan.S. barely flinched when former U. But much of this analysis is overblown. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. the bottom line is simple: The U. Now. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. Ph.D. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. Naazneen Barma. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. with conventional force. Kim Il Sung. In Tehran. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. That brinkmanship paid off. It has become fashionable. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. ET AL. they turn to people like A. including Beijing. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. to comment on the limits of conventional military force.S. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Issue 158. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation. in the wake of the Iraq war. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). with Naazneen Barma. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. Ely Ratner. conventional military power.. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. national security.S. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. the bottom line is simple: The U.S. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. with conventional force. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. it is fast becoming a necessity. and many other capitals. But. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. during the Cold War. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. Pyongyang. military could. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. and Ely Ratner. Before 1989.S. Pyongyang. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. to the detriment of U. al 7. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. “How Globalization Went Bad”. U. including Beijing. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so.
North Korea was surrounded by feuding. however. Kim Il Sung. troops on its border. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. they turn to people like A. Khan. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Today.Q. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. It didn’t need to. barely flinched when former U. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. North Korea’s founder. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. nuclear-armed communist neighbors.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation.S. Now.S. That brinkmanship paid off. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. Before 1989. . But. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. North Korea is the clearest example. it is fast becoming a necessity. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. for 40 years. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.
the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson.N.. heady days of American unilateral supremacy.'' This time. India.” Korea Times. At the nuclear summit in Washington. We are not.S. “Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms. the traditional standing members of the U. though. 4/19. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. Security Council. nuclear weapons policy. China. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. angered over the new U. Even Iran's supreme leader. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy.49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue. Ayatollah Ali Khameini. Pakistan.K. In the early.html] In the same context. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. The U. relevant materials. reflecting these kinds of complaints. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics.koreatimes. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons. http://www. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons.S. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable . The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. Of course. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. programs and facilities. Russia.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).co. mounted on at least a regional basis.. France and the U. and early formulation of a program including both incentives.
50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future. .
of any illegal activities.presstv." he stressed. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures.ir/detail.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country. suppression of rights and freedoms -. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'"." he added. . The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday.” Sept 15 http://www. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries.aspx? id=106209§ionid=351020602.51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. have the potential to lead to international conflict. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.
such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. but know nothing about it. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. read by Russians and Chinese. Yet. . Today. he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In another thrust at US unilateralism. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. not to their militaries.china The new president of China.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world.co. In a mere 6. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts. Russia. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula. if not counterbalance. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. and Kazakstan are participating. Significantly. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". Thus. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. http://www. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. where China has been given observer status for the first time.guardian.antiwar. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. at least in the medium term. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. However. Hu Jintao. Neocons are people who desire war. for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. like Bush and Cheney.and shocked . The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Kyrgkyzstan. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US.
We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. including Canada.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. so they’re going to react to it. deployment. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. allies. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. You are asking for a disaster.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. raising the threat to survival. p. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. and Georgia abstained. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. These moves are deliberately. June 21. in 1968. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. In recent years. So have a number of U. that no one can challenge our total domination. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. India responds.org/April2004/Mars0424. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. that’s important. That sets off a new cycle. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara.dissidentvoice. highly destructive weapons. . Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. and use of such capabilities. you can find them. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. the United States. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. for more than twenty straight years. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. These things are going to misfire. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space.” http://www. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. well that’s OK. Israel. if you increase the threat of terror. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. as do strategic analysts. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity.: Brookings Institution. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. by American calculation it might have tripled. a small ABM system around Moscow. India increases it and Pakistan responds. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world. Micronesia. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. it’s a first strike weapon. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. that's the way the cookie crumbles.C. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. it just doesn’t matter much to them. You get a ripple effect. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. Now others react to that threat. consciously. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. China increases its missile capacity. O’Hanlon. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. U. the Russian systems are worse. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments.S. opposing the weaponization of space. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. Washington D. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important.S. This is extraordinarily dangerous. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans.
54 of 154 .
meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. do hate the US for cultural. In fact. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. to a hegemon.tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. not terrorism . The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. Scheurer observes that.43 Specifically. senseless. and widely popular foreign policy goals . Instead it lasted well into 2008. Cambridge Journals. ‘irrational’ act of violence. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. religious. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. even when the surge itself has ended. . moreover.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. . they are not. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. The Bush administration. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power.45 In other words. Despicable and brutal though it was. or resistance. Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random.47 Here. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. balancing also signifies opposition.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. . For sure. at best. and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. the acquisition of power. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs.’.51 In fact.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. Yet. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. there are Islamic radicals who. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. . hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour).39 From this perspective. During 2008. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.40 Here. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are. Pakistan.41 In a similar vein. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. the Shah of Iran. of course. focused. And. strictly speaking.ism.38 Terrorism. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. tenuous. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. As Bruce Hoffman says. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt. the Bush adminis.50 General David Petraeus. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.49 When it first announced the surge. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. To make this point. and the use of power to achieve political change’. Of course. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. and Jordan. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. 5/25/9. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’. Review of International Studies (2009). and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. at the same time. and ideological reasons. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’. In his study of suicide terrorist groups. indeed. and as such. After all. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. Underscoring this point. the administration said it would last through 2007. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. Richard K. limited. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US .
emerge victorious.ahram.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment. Instead of solving this problem. staying in Iraq will exacerbate it. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups.eg/2004/705/op5.” Al Ahram Weekly. 705. Societies would close in on themselves. Ill. No. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war.org. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights. military presence in Iraq for some time to come.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails.) and Senator John McCain (R. “Extinction!. Ariz. this . But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. http://weekly. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. The admin. August/September 1. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions.53 What the new US admin.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. we will all be losers. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue.
Al-Ahram Weekly Online.” http://weekly. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions.ahram.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism. “Collapse of Empire. Arab Thought Forum.org. Nafaa. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. 08 (Hassan Nafaa. Jordan. Amman. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. Secretary General. with imperial ambitions.57 of 154 Heg Fails . Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. 9/24/08.eg/2008/915/op1. In the future. . which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.
foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance.independent. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Review of International Studies (2009).D. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U. Cambridge Journals. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. technology. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”. May 5. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U. empirical studies have linked U.S.S. http://www. Ph. political and economic freedoms. 5/25/9. and even culture are popular in these countries. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. It is too bad that Rev.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. targets. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas.) In addition to soft balancing. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne. but U.S. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. however. asymmetric strategies are another type of non. the facts are on his side. henhouse. The upshot of Rev.S. .traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. Because they are threatened by the US. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan.org/newsroom/article. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Finally.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U.asp?id=2182.S. When employed by states.S.
59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. practicing military restraint. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. . at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. Number 3. Summer 2008. technology. Naturally. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. rather than interventionism. Specifically. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. in the short term. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. it sabotages it. But the Cold War is long over. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. would make Americans safer at home. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Thus. Empire does not equal security — in fact. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11.
Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. 45 no. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. not cold-war ideology .and keeping the Europeans apart. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. Steinberg. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all. vol. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods. Survival.org/pub_display. Foreign Policy Studies. and preserving our freedom and prosperity.play an increasingly influential role. http://www. Vice President and Director. . the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. After the second world war. b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B. 2003 [Cato Reports.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. money. the Germans down and the Americans in. Non-state actors . people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . 2. America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers .60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. If we can work together. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out. August 13. Summer. p. than if we try to achieve these goals alone.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . In the place of geopolitics.cato. During the 20th century. Transnational threats. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. in almost every case.
August 13. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. August 13.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon. http://www. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create. During the 20th century. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose. .cato.cato. 2003 [Cato Reports. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. America's strategic ambitions .cato. August 13. 2003 [Cato Reports.based primarily on economic self-interest. http://www. 2003 [Cato Reports.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne. http://www. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency.61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. More generally.org/pub_display. through the European Security and Defence Policy. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. not cold-war ideology .php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. After the second world war.org/pub_display.
21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned.S. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. despite the prevailing cliche. But acting together-with the threat of U. organized and financed in Europe. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”.S. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. The National Interest.S. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. In our new security environment. Winter. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. iss. the United States is not the world’s only superpower. NYU Law School Professor. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. In other words. In other words. p. for the European Union. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. As daily press reports also reveal. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. . security.S. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. given divergent American and European perspectives. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. 75.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. That may not be easy to achieve. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. These risks could be lessened by closer U. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. military power reinforced by the EU's political. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing.S. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. infiltration. political and military presence in Central Asia.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. For the United States.
Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. A number continue to do so today. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The United States may continue to act its own way. and in the security of their respective regions. Professor of Government at Dartmouth. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. and forever will be. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. Western Political Science Association. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. military. but from the life of civil society. draw down its military power. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. notwithstanding its preponderant power. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. of the universe. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. The United States. 1. and the very success of the U. Some scholars. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. Social Movements. http://depaul. logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. No. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. International Political Economy (Michael. and other capabilities. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed.S. U. Military Power: Preeminence for however. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. Islamic extremists are scary. while their eruptions into the political sphere. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary.cato-at-liberty.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. April 21.S.academia. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. were put down with a brutality that frequently .org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is. World Politics 61. specializing in Critical IR Theory. the international economy is complex and resilient.S. not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power. the world’s indispensable nation. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. 2011. and indeed. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. Ebsco.
the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). In India. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. But the proof is in the pudding.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. is one response to subordination. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. And it wrecked. World Focus. and changing. our relationship with Russia. then. fluid. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. where some members of the I. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement.S. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. Criminal activity. as was its implicit goal. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). fixed margin. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made.C. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation. In the end. It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. with Moscow’s help. however. though some common features can be found in both contexts. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. http://worldfocus. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose." subject to group sanction. In the end. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations.S. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. 77-83). both British and Hindu (Guha 1983. rather than fights. the decline of American power. The Next American Century: How the U. January 22. Not so. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. it was Gandhi.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. but also localized and evanescent. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. however restrictively defined. not the British. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. says Robert Kagan. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. 2010. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. Brazil. a poor vagrant steals to survive. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance.
any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. but of seeking common cause. nuclear proliferation. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. for the first time last year. and pandemics. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. It’s still early days. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. economic crises. Russia. global warming. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. China not only voted for tough U. as Kagan would imply.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. sanctions . “Our power alone cannot protect us. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. Fortunately. to say the least. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. And America needs India to help track extremists. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. saying. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. And. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. http://worldfocus. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. Kagan barely mentions these threats. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. but to keep its own people safe. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. In fact. January 22. economic crises. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. in Moscow. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. World Focus. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. India. including with other major powers.65 of 154 America did have. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings.” Later. Nevertheless. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. How can we get these big. More importantly. and other pivotal powers. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. Moreover.N. 2010. nuclear proliferation. global warming. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. On the one-year mark of his presidency.
roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up.htm) The results. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . Iran Review. Finally. to terrorize their citizens. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Of course. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators.” They have. To make matters worse. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. http://www. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies.66 of 154 against Pyongyang. governments which serve only their own power do not.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. And in our own history. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. for example. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. And the United States. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. but it’s on the way. rendition and torture over the past decade. Governments that promote the rule of law. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the war began in March 2003. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. shows that their fears were justified. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. subject their actions to oversight.C. D. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. is up and running again. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington.. just not in a grandstanding. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989.7 million more have been internally displaced. co-chaired by the United States and Russia. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. Moreover. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners. it also enforced them. including on human rights and democracy. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. December 22. Iran remains a challenge.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination.iranreview. Here. or to wage war on others. The Founding Fathers understood this problem. Hegemony fails—resistance. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. and there is no end in sight. however. 2010. in fruitless pursuit of victory. What Others Think. have been disastrous. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive.
2008.S. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. climate change.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. or proliferation.” In this vein. on foreign policy issues. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. so the more the better. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. not less. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. Iran. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. interests. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen.” John warns that the Obama Administration. before it developed hegemonic hubris. and threatened its position in the world. after 9/11. for all its talk of “change”. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun. It was also a dismal failure. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. as John points out. Iraq. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. in effect. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. Bush administrations. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. making the world over in America’s image. From the Clinton administration on. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. Of course. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. of course. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. and spreading democracy across the globe. because they are virtually limitless. instead pursuing global dominance. The alternative. If America makes primacy the main goal of . the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. But. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. p. 168-9 In practice. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. The Next American Century. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance. Stanford Center for International Security. disease. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. which was not just doomed to fail.
Bush has not alienated other nations.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity. is not perceived as a threat. energy. investment.68 of 154 its national security strategy. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. services. foreign policy are pervasive. But it has not. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods. acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. They do not. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. President. . American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military. accordingly. people. Council on Foreign Relations. for the most part.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. it surely has. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S.foreignaffairs. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. and technology -. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. May/June 2008 . Foreign Affairs .flows in which the United States plays a critical role. U. http://www.S.S. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. Haass. which has not stimulated such a response.
in turn. contrary to my 1993 prediction. U. it is even more doubtful that U. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. understandable doubts about the credibility of U. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. which. . America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States.S.S. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul.at best. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time. At the same time. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy. Although the United States.S. In this changing geopolitical context.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia.S. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. efforts to prolong it. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish).
they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. First. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter. closure. 118. not just the hegemon."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system. Most of these will not culminate in war. power. distilled to its essence. interests. Summer 2003. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. forces in Eurasia. to disguise ulterior motives for U.70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided.S. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i.e.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon.S. and East Asia. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. and manipulated. America's Changing Internationalism. as well as economic. involvement in a big Eurasian war.S.S. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system.S.S. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. Political Science Quarterly. Finally. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. 00323195. or even benefit somewhat. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. Mere. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. but it's a good bet that some will. Vol. Hence. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. and the End of U. The ultimate vision that should guide U. several points need to be made. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. Second. As this transition proceeds. This threat is easily exaggerated. a struggle that will require patience and . military intervention in Eurasia. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U. Kupchan.. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. Europe. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods.
71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. for reasons of both proximity and culture. and Africa. long accustomed to passing the buck. Neither American leaders. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. the Middle East. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Strong and vibrant regional centers. It will take a decade. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. for a new international system to evolve. will find the transition an easy one. focus on Latin America. therefore. and values. information.[*] . often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. long accustomed to calling the shots. if not two. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. North America might. Europe on Russia.
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. In particular. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. No. Pages 7-44. Moreover. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half . we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. and three are debatable. even if retrenchment was not successful. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. seven retrenched. 35. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Short of a miracle. France. Of the twelve democracies.) AK Based on our universe of cases. in six of fifteen cases. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. There are only three cases of autocracy. preventive or otherwise. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. there are few restorative solutions available.) AK With regard to militarized disputes. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. International Security Spring 2011. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound.61 In many cases of decline. which makes comparison among groups difficult. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. producing a range of 67–100 percent. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. No. and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. two did not. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1. By any accounting. Further. International Security Spring 2011.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers. In the five years following an ordinal transition. two retrenched and one case is arguable. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Vol. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers.59 In short. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. 4. and Joseph. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. Vol. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. or 72 percent. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Wars. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. Moreover. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2).60 In addition. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. but of these. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35. a range of 61–83 percent. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. and Joseph. 4. even with the benefit of hindsight.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. Pages 7-44.
and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. 35. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. No. 35. 4. Vol.S. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. and Joseph. credibility.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. shift burdens to its allies. almost by definition. Third. No. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. and work to decrease costly international commitments. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. First. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. possess more extensive overseas commitments. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. Pages 7-44. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. International Security Spring 2011. 4. Theoretically. relatively secure continental great powers. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. In the next few years. In addition.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. including strains among rival regions. the rate of relative Second and related. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. Further. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. and Joseph. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. Far from encouraging further predation. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. In the high- . Pages 7-44. International Security Spring 2011. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. In particular. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. more defensible frontiers. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. Vol. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Both are large. stakes world of great power politics. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions.) AK Contrary to these predictions. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. fearing the steady erosion of U. hegemonic powers. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.
declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. The faster the rate of decline.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. Taken together. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. interest groups controlled. and if done intelligently this makes states better. And there is a fair chance of rebound. spending can be curbed. increase reliance on allies. . and refrain from using force in international disputes. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything. and innovation fostered. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. Of course. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. Retrenchment has a bad reputation. but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. The historical record gives little cause for despair.
Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. Professor of International Affairs.S. US dominance causes terrorism. For the rest of the world. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom . with the market share of U. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. that you are the president of France.pdf) U. The time to worry is now. Basic security is at issue. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. Professor of International Affairs.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. 05 (Stephen M.jstor. Harvard University. To be sure. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. Consider Kim Jong I1. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. Walt. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. given U. So is the health of the U..S. dominance. Can you take advantage of parallel U.S.S. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U.jstor.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U. most important of all.75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. You regard U.S. Taming American Power. influence. some more daunting than others.S. Harvard University.S. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. much less improve his position. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment.S. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. So how can Kim stay in power.S.S. by rebuilding its crumbling international image. as the September 11. the debate is over how best to deal with it. power is something Americans must care about as well. and. in the world . POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. http://www.S. Many countries fear U. economy. He rules a country that George W." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U.S. Walt.S. Professor of International Affairs. Walt. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. 2001. Taming American Power. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. foreign policy as often naive and overweening. Harvard University. http://www. And the response of other states to U. September 05. 05 (Stephen M. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting. for a moment. Harvard University. many governments still value U. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon.S. Professor of International Affairs. terrorist attacks demonstrated. September 05. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine." He . opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum.S. presidents. defense budget.
"Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease. stated. They were protesting our existence." . 2001. were not protesting our policies. a degree of resentment. and resistance." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy. "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. issued in March.76 of 154 later explained.
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Heg Turns (2/3)
Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.
Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)
Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also
to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.
Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.
Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.
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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.
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The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. .81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. 2006. p. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported. China. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. In India. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. Ferguson argues. he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. say. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed. Mexico. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. San Diego." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. The nations that avoided the fates of India. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China.
82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. April 17. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington.counterpunch. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues.org/issam04172003. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. not the last policy option.counterpunch. Nashashibi." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. however. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”." said Anatol Lieven. April 17. "he would have been sacked long ago. http://www. Counterpunch. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. He tends to look at military solutions as the first. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. http://www. Nashashibi.html] His many critics point out. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia.org/issam04172003. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban." .html] More importantly." his former associate stressed. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. "If he was in private business rather than government. perhaps. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. Counterpunch.
Summer 2009. 1.S. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. China. reinforced by nuclear deterrence.S. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid.D. "The Waning of U. and the combination of the European Union. former president of the International Studies Association. Over time. Instead. Japan. Similarly. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter. July 6th 2009. hegemony will endure well into the future. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities.harvard. 15. from USC. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s.ksg. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. J. in Political Science from the University of California. which allows other states to catch up. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. After all. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. Vol. and Russia. hegemony. technology. LL. Galileo.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially. p. like all hegemonic systems.pdf In addition.D.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. know-how. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. No.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Ph. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. they do not engage the argument that. in International Law from Virginia Law. however. when such behavior would not have been so risky. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. Thompson (Donald A. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. which is not very long at all. International Security. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War. In this respect.S.77 . and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. 34. not from the United States. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise.M.
84 of 154 ***Multipolarity Good .
is America's next grand strategy. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. Paradoxically. Consequently. Rather than risking these outcomes.S.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. as an insular great power. indeed.S. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. Unilateral offshore balancing. have to fight to uphold its primacy. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity.S. Number 2. it probably will. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. especially given that U. For the United States." International Security. exercise a free hand strategically. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. attempting to sustain U. Fall. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. Maintaining U. Volume 31. To reduce the fear of U. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. 131 Thus. which is a potentially dangerous strategy.S. allies. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. As an offshore balancer.S. interests.S. 2006 (Christopher. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. . withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars.S. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. at some point. power.
tracing financial flows. Harvard. For example. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. July. which retains cells in some 60 countries. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. 2003. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point.S.S. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient. and border controls. U. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. police work.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible. Issue 4. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. . And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. Volume 82. Foreign Affairs.
war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. both nuclear and conventional. But the week passed and there was no assault. In a game of carrot and stick. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. The U. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. such is the multi-polar world. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr.411mania. the highest since October 2008. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best. Latin America. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world.S. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. U. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war.2 billion in June. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. 8/23/10 (Mark. this is indeed the New Normal. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. Now. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. for example.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated. they didn't have to.S. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. professional blogger on global events since 2004. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. In short. So the question is. the times they have a-changed. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”.7 billion in US treasury securities. Of course. http://www. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. etc. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. In addition. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. Russia. trade deficit with China widened to $26. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply .htm) Prior to this event former U. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. if either the US or China. it needed to do it before the 21st. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. In fact. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. global interconnected markets. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. holds roughly $843. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. tread lightly. Besides war.S. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially. mental health. as of June 2010. China. As I stated earlier. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. Russia and at least a third of Latin America.
etc. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. Military action isn't a viable option. Welcome to the real New World Order. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. trade wars. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. embargoes. sanctions. aren't a viable option either. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent. with no checkmate in sight. . civilized world.88 of 154 nothing. we're all locked into an eternal state of check. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane.
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Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the inﬂuence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most
important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial ﬁnancial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and inﬂuence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of ﬁerce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conﬂict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more conﬁdent in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad
are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even
larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade ﬂows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufﬁcient for a state to become a ﬁrst rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufﬁcient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7
Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus
from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the
US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).
100 Should these trends continue.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. 10 Plus. Hegemony”. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. Although his popularity has dipped. Dustin. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning. which claims that . The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures.S. Nonetheless. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. Rory Medcalf.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10. Raoul Heinrichs.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged. with a particular focus on missile. By the end of the decade. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. space. especially Asian powers Japan and China. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. As of September 2009. Absent a change in national priorities. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. particularly in Asia. Protectionist sentiment is growing. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. China held $790 billion of U. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite.S. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. Andrew Shearer. The economy is showing signs of a recovery.” http://asiasecurity. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. albeit gradual. “Huge Deficits Altering U.macfound.” The Times writes. high deficits. The Economy in Crisis.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. Ensinger ’10. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. This represents 11. in which each Times.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. Perhaps even more worrying.6 trillion. http://economyincrisis.expected to be 1. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. The CBO estimates that public debt. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. Even worse. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001.
the period of U. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. Still. This is simply no longer realistic.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A. there needs to be a combination of both. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world. For nearly two decades. As of 2009.S. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan. economy is still by far the largest.S. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. The next closest was China at just eight percent. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. An extremely low savings rate.S. further decline in the foreseeable future. Heg is unsustainable -.93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. 2009. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. France. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. relative decline has been. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. If present trends continue. Still. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself.S. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). others see America’s imminent demise.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources.S. There are some analysts and experts. believe that China..S. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. solutions to each of them individually and all of them . unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. “Empire Falls. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. To be sure. and that the U. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. without deliberate action. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. as the world’s largest economy. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. In reality. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. There is also good reason to think that. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. Russia. For the past eight years.” http://findarticles. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. Since the cold war. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. fairly short. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. the U. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. thus far. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. growing government debt. followed by Russia at five percent. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. if not rectify.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle.S. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. those convinced of U. however. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology.
the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. much was done. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. economic influence. and. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. are now both more open to serious question. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. In terms of economic liberalism. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. It has neither the economic resources. 2011. both European social markets. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. cannot lead the world out of it. At this point. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were.94 of 154 Most important. and. the Obama inheritance is even worse. our own hubris may be our downfall. yet. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway. and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. Heg is unsustainable -. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own.S. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. With the Washington consensus discredited. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights. it will have to be done collectively (e. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. and the Beijing consensus. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. giving bigger voices to other players. even if he is. badly damaged itself. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. however. or are too protracted and costly. Under Clinton and Bush. at the financial mess. even so. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. . Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. March 2011 vol.” International Relations. The EU model looks more attractive to some. nor. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. On trade. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. 25 no. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. the ideological authority to do so. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. Even before the current economic crisis. The US led the world into this recession. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. On the political side.international legitimacy.g. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later).
dollars. with more than four times the U. but look at the trajectory of the data over time.S. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. 2009.S. “Empire Falls. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia.. Whereas in 2000. China. (2) By this metric. let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis. Its religiosity. share of world product. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. For the sake of argument. However.S. Looks pretty good for America. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy.S. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe.S. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. Pape 9 – Robert A. population. 2009. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U. right? Alas. US heg not sustainable -. “Empire Falls.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U. had 6 percent. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. The US is much more culturally conservative.” http://findarticles.S.relative economic decline. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For instance. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. many of the deeper issues are structural. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China. the United States had three times the computer sales. The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. Pape 9 – Robert A. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first .. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Post-American World.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content.col1 originally from The National Interest) True. religious.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. To measure gross domestic product. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. According to GDP figures in current U. in 2008. and is being turned around by Obama. The basic notion is simple: take U. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world.” http://findarticles. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. reached its apogee in 2000. Indeed.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content.
" Still. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. over the past two decades. Again using IMF figures. U. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1.S.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. the average rate of U. China and other states in the world. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory. although all major countries are suffering economically. power. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. decline. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). decline due to the global diffusion of technology.3 percent. “Empire Falls. the trend is the same. Worse. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. The answers are pretty straightforward. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000.S. the state many consider America's most likely future rival. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity..S.S. how much is U. The erosion of the underpinnings of U.2 percent.1 percent. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7.S. Simply put. has grown consistently.S. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000.S. If so. As Table 3 shows. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. the United States is now a declining power. or 1. decline. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. growth has fallen considerably. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U. And regardless of the metric.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. Pape 9 – Robert A. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to . America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown. 2009. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. U. the fact is that since 2000.” http://findarticles. these are merely thought experiments. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible.2 percent more than today. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy.S. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline.96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time. but substantially weaker. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course.2 percent instead of its actual 23. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. which is likely to only further weaken U. At the same time. the relative power of China.
the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark. China. Indeed. Economic collapse and debt. Issue 2) However. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. tax cuts. holds so much of the US debt. one which is fraught with difficulties. downfall is indeed extraordinary. no matter how well supported. etc. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. along with a number of oil exporting countries. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world.S. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. during this election. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University.97 of 154 U. For the USA. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. rescuing private finance with public finance.). economically and politically. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.S. For once. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. In other words. and the . self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. it becomes clear both that the U. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. Given this. and the U. From this perspective. 2010. The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. Something fundamental has changed. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. It is difficult to see how one man. (February 18. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. predominantly Japan and China. Finn 2008). it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. UK. current-account deficits. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. the previous administration. in size. And when one examines past declines and their consequences. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War.S. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. Watson 10 – Allan. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000).” AntipodeVolume 42. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II.
The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation.” http://lahaine. 49 Propaganda. employer servitude. China will push ahead with double digit growth. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. The world continues to watch hopefully. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. China rising and domestic issues. militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. Over the long run. something will have to break. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact.pdf) As in the past. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances.98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). was finally having an effect. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay. Petras 10 – James. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. . Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. Empires do not die peacefully. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. unlike Japan. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. China. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times.
to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. 2011. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism.” International Relations. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet . with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so.unpopularity isolates the US -.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. not only feeding the terrorist problem. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. March 2011 vol. 25 no. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq. 2011. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. 1 3-25) The US. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. and limited nuclear war. and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. March 2011 vol. of course. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. 25 no. and to an extent in the 1990s. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. 16 and. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. a. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. Vietnam and Chile. From Cuba.” International Relations. and this seems set to continue. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. as a consequence. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. But during the Cold War.
and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. China Buzan 11 – Barry. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. underneath their formal political correctness. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. shared by few. March 2011 vol. however. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. bad and. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. on the level of society and pubic opinion. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. b. 2011. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. 1 3-25) US policy on China. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. however. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. If it stays with the US. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. Europe will not care much about its rise. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. Union. Russia. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. aggressive and militarist. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. In the absence of any common cause. which are often in competition with those of the US. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. its alliance with the US. must appear threatening to the US.” International Relations. this US concern will be a parochial one. Japan will face very difficult choices. The nature of the China that rises. 23 The big question mark is Japan. but somewhat strengthened. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. and its effective fragmentation by the West. China. getting worse. then a rising China. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. but the US securitizes it anyway. might welcome China’s rise. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. with both governments in different ways to blame. 25 no. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. if at all. What is now in prospect. of the other great . But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. During the Cold War. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. whether peaceful or not. 24 If China’s rise is benign. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. and will not feel threatened by it. possibly none. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US.
This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. March 2011 vol. and even denial that there was a problem. If China plays its hand cleverly. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. 25 no. whether domestic or international. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. 2011. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25.101 of 154 powers. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. if not impossible. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem . Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. However. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. c. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences.” International Relations.
rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. I believe that a complex. it has been shunned by the E. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. It isn’t worth it.U. agrarian and feudal.nytimes. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. America’s spirit is weakened. as the world’s sole leader. Western imperialism united the globe. The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti.U. South Korea. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. 08 (Parag Khanna. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems.S. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. Instead. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and. Australia and Thailand. “Accidental empire” or not. The web of globalization now has three spiders. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. Neither China nor the E. will replace the U. the most money of any region in the world. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. and Turkey. proliferation.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography.102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. It already has. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. With or without America. and climate change Khanna. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. The E. and as Toynbee also pithily noted. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. and history promises the effort will fail. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . because the answer is unfolding before our eyes.U. America is isolated. whether the United States or the United Nations. by certain measures. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago.
The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. .103 of 154 among the Big Three. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves. Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices. a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill.
Senior Fellow. IEET. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers. 08 (Jamais Cascio. It weakens the powerful. It triggers conflict. setting the mighty against the mighty. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse.104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse. Right now. degree in Political Science. Most importantly.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. and opens up new niches of influence. 4/8/08. but it’s an important driver. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. It reveals vulnerabilities. Cascio.” http://ieet.org/index. .
. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. however.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order.Democrat and Republican.still find extremely difficult to think about. prove inescapable in a generation's time. can present US strategy against Iran -. this process may occur through disastrous defeats. Not just a direct military presence.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. Future historians may. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". when possible. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. however. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. is unsustainable. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. When. such as in Iraq. some at least of these moves may. with potentially awful consequences for the world.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. http://www. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. global power. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. Impossible today. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. establishment. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U. In theory. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. 05 (Anatol Lieven. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. unlike in 1917 or 1941. In Asia. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression.S. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. In the former Soviet Union. however. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore.S. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation.realisticforeignpolicy. really serious war risks US economic disaster.supported by both parties -. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. civilian and military -. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. given the nature of the Middle East. the relative decline in US economic independence means that. this is something that American policymakers -.org/archives/2005/11/index.php) U. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. In the Middle East. For that matter. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. Like so many of their predecessors. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy.but fiscally equally damaging -. In an equally classical fashion. My fear though is that. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible. regional consensuses in support of order and stability. the results would not have been significantly less awful. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. Despite the lessons of Iraq.
but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. now enjoys a diplomatic. In Africa. Across the globe. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. In America’s own hemisphere. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. economic or strategic lifeline from China. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. Like Europeans.S.nytimes. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. aid workers.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. To the Western eye. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. into its orbit.” . pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. At the same time. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. 08 (Parag Khanna.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. Without firing a shot. Under Japanese sponsorship. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. Iran being the most prominent example. China is not only securing energy supplies. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. dam-builders and covert military personnel. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors.
no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. and transition from U.38 For sure.S. the leading primacists acknowledge. The real issue is not if American primacy will end. that American primacy could end much sooner than that. Indeed. however. Nevertheless. p. There are indications. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute." American Empire: A Debate. . new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. technological advance. In a similar vein. For example. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. In terms of hard power. But China isn’t the only factor in play. at some point within the next decade or two. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. To put it slightly differently. Christopher LAYNE 2007. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. Thus. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. not static. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. as Paul Kennedy has observed. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own."The Case Against the American Empire. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. the primacists are correct. but how soon it will end.
p. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). Unilateral offshore balancing. Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. Fall http://findarticles. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close. To reduce the fear of U. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational.S.S. Real realists like Lippmann. to reduce others' concerns about its power. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. . Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy. Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure.S. Kennan. Hans Morgenthau. Rather than risking these outcomes. America's real realists--George F. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography." American Empire: A Debate. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. provoke opposition to it. 131 Thus. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Paradoxically. indeed. attempting to sustain U. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). Most of all. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. power. is America's next grand strategy. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. at some point. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. Kennan."The Case Against the American Empire. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. National Interest.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. especially given that U.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. have to fight to uphold its primacy. Maintaining U. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. it probably will.
“The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”.” adds Mearsheimer. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy.” From this perspective. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. for example. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. [its] military strengths beyond challenge. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. It will also increase the likelihood of war. What’s more.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may .” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. if other nations. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. however. such as India and Pakistan. I think it would be better not to do that. The echo of Rome is clear. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. including war. . 2002.” 95 The strategy of empire. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. and intends to keep. “is that we all expect certain rules. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. obtains them. before a nation working on WMD. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests.” What’s more.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire.” 91 In his June 2. such as Iraq. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. In other words. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. 93 Indeed. in preserving a balance of power. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. . is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. adopted preemption as their official policy. .109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. proximity matters. never was interested . In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize. In its National Security Strategy. But the “$64.18) The answer is probably no. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. or appears to undermine. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. . As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . Certainly.000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Nov 26. . The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States.” said Bush. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. . speech to West Point’s graduating class. we will have waited too long. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that . offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. p. the security of the offense-minded state.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary.
The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. 97 For example. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States.110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. which could in turn spur even more U. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. as China’s economy grows.S. . 98 Hence there is a paradox. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them.
Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. In coming years. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents.S. M. in short. Similarly. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . the Middle East and Mediterranean. even now.S. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. or deeply buried facilities. garrisoning myriad outposts. today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. southwest Asia and the Sinai. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. In fact. still relied on her for protection. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. Thus.) The unintended consequence of interventionism.S. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. though asserting their independence of the mother country. . the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. has revealed that. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. in other words.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. Accordingly. policy or assuming a lower profile. . The very problem of failed states. 104 In 1937. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. Thus . the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. that is. that is.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. The Dominions. economic aid. According to the New York Times. Nevertheless. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland. preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. code named Prominent Hammer. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. . (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. H.111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption.” says Bell. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. that is. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. Australia and New Zealand. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. in other words. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. for ramping up U. not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. Malaya and Singapore. 103 According to British historian P. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany.S. could be more interventionism.” 105 Empire. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. . “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. Instead. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. shows. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. forces in Somalia. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons.
these others were allies dependent on American military protection. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. to date. During the Cold War. If credit from China is restricted. together with American consumption and investment. Given the growing protectionism against its exports. with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. however. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. Director of the European Studies Program. for example. p. subsidises its own imports. Today. and prepared for high casualties. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. trained for intimate contact with the enemy.with more and cheaper troops. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. has not been very good at it. credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. Instead. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. Yet. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . American power counts for less than expected. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. China. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. Survival. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . Put to the test. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo.
dominance. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. in trade wars with the United States.S. Second. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. Iran.S. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism. The EU can thus engage. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. economic policy or wants to resist U. win recruits.harvard.S.conventional weapons. recent events in Iraq. They may hope to sway the American public . The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U. Fourth.S. perhaps the most dominant great power in history.S. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. for example. states can resist by withholding cooperation. and build support for anti-U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U. economic dictates.ksg. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. “If Not Balancing. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. violence. symbols. Even the U nited States. chemical. the war of words. then.S.html) What. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities.S. hegemony. First. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. http://belfercenter. In projecting American military power around the globe. Third. anti-American resentment. . policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad.
certain nearby real estate became very important.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. On cooperation more generally. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.cooperation. and NATO involvement in getting ready.S. but Turkey held out for much more. or suspects. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.S.S. . interest. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive. By virtue of geography. In other words.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. financial support for reconstruction. approach. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. preferences. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U.ksg. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U. They may judge and prioritize threats differently. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. policy. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.harvard. interests.harvard.ksg.S. For instance. the door was open for meaningful non. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. Yet even close U. Iraqi policy contributed to non. Longtime U.S. Syria. when they share the U. allies like France or Germany. To some extent. Kuwait was quick to support the U. For counter-terrorism.S.html) When other countries disapprove of U. and Uzbekistan. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions.S. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U. http://belfercenter. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. evidence. Spain. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns. http://belfercenter.S. Vetoing UNSC resolutions. Pakistan. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. Although the United States is dominant in many realms. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.S. “If Not Balancing. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain.S. “If Not Balancing. or. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war.S.cooperation by standard U. allies sometimes have different objectives. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests. some states have unique assets that the United States covets. efforts.compliance. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. effort.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. bases are not immune to opposition either. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate.
and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U. As became clear with Iraq. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media. any bit player can lambaste the United States.S.S. At the end of the day.S.S. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. With the right message. support. The open American system. policies. or. . policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas. public as well as non. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. http://belfercenter. Iraq.U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. In hindsight. asymmetric warfare. peoples. policy are trying to convince the U.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. Words. as we see in the next section. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war.harvard. “If Not Balancing. international media. for example.S. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U. foreign opponents of U.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U.ksg.S.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. supporters in other countries.S. stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction.
"What ever happens will be for the worse. The changing distribution of power in the inter. the relative decline of U.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. 15 iss.able to Soviet domination. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is.S. As Paul Kennedy has observed. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. International politics is dynamic. that is only half of the argument.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. however. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal. . 2. events will force it to do so.national system-specifically. Indeed. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be.ers.. Simply put. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth.S... "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. they may. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. their cost. Over time. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century." Salisbury said. The other half. This is unsurprising. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels.S. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. whether they are sustainable. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol." However. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998. Summer. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. the degree of risk they entail. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. not static. Any serious debate about U. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse. without the Cold War. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly.
No. In February 1992. Jr. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. Over time. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. Over time. not yet.S. Fall. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. however. is illustrative. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony. hegemony and. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically.S. Vol. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. p. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. Harvard professor Joseph S. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. unipolarity persists. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline. As a consequence." But there is more to it than that. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. Nye. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. a strategy of preponderance will fail. For example. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. which followed such a strategy. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. International Security. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. primacy. 31 To be sure. . No doubt. However. if it ends. Moreover. 124 Several weeks later. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. 17. Other states underpay for security.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school.4 1993) Inevitably. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. so will U. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least.
Relative decline has internal and external causes. International Security. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. (4) in a multipolar system. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes.S. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . 17. which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. . the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. Vol.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. without pro voking others. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . and probably much sooner. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States." A policy that concentrates U. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. No. No doubt. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. Vol. No. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. and multipolar systems .118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. bipolar. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. Fifty years from now. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. International Security. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. not too weak. we will know who was right and who was wrong. 17. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. too. In coming years. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power.
“and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. As George F. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. “What ever happens will be for the worse. U. in fact. And it should do so.” Salisbury said. In fact. nation over empire. I have attempted to demonstrate that. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. not the maximum. As Paul Kennedy has observed. International Security. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. is dynamic not static. in these circumstances. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is.119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school.S. America First is an imperative.S. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. should it wish to do so. it could choose to restraint over intervention. Vol. . The United States is secure enough from external threat that.” International politics. In this sense. not abroad. is about more than strategy.22 Issue. however. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. U. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. of external involvement. is the minimum.” No doubt. it is also about values. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. however. Kennan says.
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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)
The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.
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Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)
Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.
the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. rooted in a strong patriotism. including those referred to above. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. ed. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. terror. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony.) . As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. Of course.A. or threat of force. expansive scope.123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. and global society. Planetary Politics: human rights. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. .
not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. Russia and the Caspian Sea. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. in fact. What we have today. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. too. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism.. European and Chinese worldviews. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. It is 2016. they mean little. despite them.gov. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. Bush. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button.” http://www. multicivilizational. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. That new global order has arrived. is a global. was not truly an “East-West” struggle.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. Iran is nuclear. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed.124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. they were signs of imperial overstretch. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. but that was also a decade adrift. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. multipolar battle. Not Russia. but either way. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China.> . as well as substantial nuclear energy.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. This essay is adapted from his book. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go.nytimes. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. and not India. both because of his policies and. and should. Afghanistan is stable. rather than bestriding the globe. The cold war. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. for the first time in history. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead.” to be published by Random House in March.” but it has no permanent friends either. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. more significant. on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. So now. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999.
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the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. Raghavan ‘10. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. China will overtake the US by 2020 -. Sreekumar. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed.7% recording $4. China.” http://lahaine. six times the projected growth of the US 37 .demographic trends. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. for example.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in . publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . China merely protested at US human rights attacks.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists. despite pressure from Washington. the most dynamic countries. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. China went on the offensive. http://www. Most strikingly in Asia. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade. namely to its low level of savings. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. however.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion.html. More recently in April 2010. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor. By 2010. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion. China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire.commodityonline. Initially. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. Commodity Online. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. Given the overall growth of China.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable .
China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. In 2003. physical activity. The Diplomat. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. USA which states that during the past 15 years. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years. China will overtake naval heg -. however. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped.Howard S. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. which were operating in the East China Sea. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. and again in 2002.S. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology. James. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. Kraska ’10. Beginning in 2000. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China.key to overall global primacy. In 1953. “U. In 2001." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. All of it will be lost if indeed. At the same time. Russia and India. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. The US Navy is the main target. In each of these cases. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island. natural resources. married women who didn't smoke. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. debatable. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”. China . capitalism and innovative spirit. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. such as trends in mothers' diets. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island.S. on March 7 of 2009. In response. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise.127 of 154 2012. analyzed data on birth weight. innovation. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. The greater issue. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services.’ In 1974. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. knowledge capital. of course. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. If China or India emerges stronger. Soon after the Impeccable incident. Today. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. Harvard researchers say. The researchers looked at data from 36. stress and exposure to environmental toxins. maternal and neonatal characteristics. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. well-educated. the Yuzheng 311.S. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. stopping directly in front of the ship. http://thediplomat. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship. the USNS Victorious was harassed.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea. The study.827. for example. also found white. In the summer of 2001.828 U.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists." Instead. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable.
The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. But in March. Chinese ground . raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. The US fleet will be absence. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. Second. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. In one incident in October 2006. For each of these conflicts. which will include aircraft carriers. and particularly maritime mobility. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. is a force multiplier. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. Last year. This isn’t new. The Chinese Navy. So accustomed to being militarily superior. on the other hand. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. In February. 31 amphibious warfare ships. By comparison. Ironically. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims. it was Steinberg. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. For the first time. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. Then. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. another Okinawa Prefecture island. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. with short and secure internal lines of communication. Fourth.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. Third. On April 10 of this year. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. Beijing’s maritime bullying. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. the Philippines. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. First. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. In 1988. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. Taiwan. farther north. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities. which included two submarines. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. the Vietnam War. in the Gulf of Tonkin. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. a longtime Clinton associate. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. China’s geographic position. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. Ironically. all spread thinly throughout the world. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. Malaysia and Brunei. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. the US Navy battle force. Likewise. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority.
hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. Spiegel International. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. Fifth. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. gaining more favorable terms as a result. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”.741303. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes.00. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam. China would have to give up all of this. Today the renminbi -. with the US dollar as its reserve currency. Until now. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. in its global shopping spree. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. strategically listless and brooding. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism.the official name in China for the "people's money. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt. As of last week.html. China has a lot on its plate.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. Wagner ’11. For four weeks. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies. dominant not only on land. Dollar heg -.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University . clumsily begins to throw around his weight.yuan will overtake it. Moreover. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. In order to have a reserve currency. 68. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.de/international/business/0. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power. je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. Wieland. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low.spiegel.1518. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. Even before he left Beijing. During these sessions. with US President Barack Obama. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power. This suggests two outcomes. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions. was a "product of the past. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. such as in the commodities markets. Nevertheless. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia. but in the Western Pacific. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. If that happens. the dollar and the euro. http://www.
pdf) Established empires in decline. Oil Price. In other words. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 . opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons.]. the two determining powers in the world.. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. like the US today. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. surveillance and target acquisition. unmanned aerial vehicles. Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. US . Peter. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. perhaps to prohibitive levels. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10. By discrediting China internal politics. spaced-based reconnaissance.html.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 . Likewise. seduce. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”. For example. electromagnetic weapons. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 .130 of 154 (4/28/10. and much sooner than many expect[. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10.freelance journalist based near Washington. http://oilprice. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. D." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. and ballistic and cruise missiles.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply.C. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea." In response to the Chinese challenge. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2). advanced fighter aircraft. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup." said Admiral Gary Roughead. chief of US naval operations. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures. on climate.” http://lahaine. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power.. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. at the expense of China’s economic interests. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. a conservative Washington think tank. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. advanced radar systems. highlighting China’s human rights violations.
AirSea Battle." A key objective of AirSea Battle. In a speech earlier this month.. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world.]. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. short-range over than long-range strike systems. is a complex set of concepts. multifaceted defense posture. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. as outlined in the CSBA report. particularly the Japanese." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.[R]ealistically. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch. for example. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. at a recent Washington gathering. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot." . Gates has displayed a proclivity. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. and operating concepts.. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for." he said. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. As Sun Tzu said in his classic. involving the development of specific military capabilities. that would offset the Chinese buildup. a new capability for them." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese." he added.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. "and will stay off for a good period of time[. In fact. "The gusher has been turned off. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last." he said. real or perceived. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. towards developing a balanced. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. such as long-range strike systems. including coercion or aggression. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. The Art of War. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies. then.' the subject of the new CSBA report. US inability. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. "It took us 70 years to get where we are." said Krepinevich. according to the CSBA report. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail. "Carrier operations are very complex. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. "Besides. emphasizing. especially in light of the budget squeeze. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman. Japan's current government. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. an independent from Connecticut.
Reuters News. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U. human rights." writes Liu. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe.S. Chris." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10. . 100 warships. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency.. which trains rising officers. je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion." writes Liu. the U. “China PLA officer urges challenging U. http://bigpeace. Big Peace. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301.000 new helicopters. Analysts say Russia." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions. Valentin Rudenko. will still be determined to contain it.. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. cannot become the top power. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter. Jim. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over.reuters. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/. http://www. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower. "The China Dream.S. including a $650 billion program to procure 1. 600 combat planes.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. Tibet. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent. says it could create “a whole new ballgame.. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11.S. Now as much as I like spending cuts. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade. Liu Mingfu. dominance”.132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance. Buckley ’10.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. a professor at the elite National Defense University. the top power." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. and arms sales to Taiwan. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one . the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise.
The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds. particularly in the Arab world. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. sometimes as a bloc). For now. like Libya. notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest.pitt. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. On the other hand. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape.” http://aei. Thus. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. independently from the US. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges. . But from Brasilia to Beijing. Yet. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. America still feels pretty safe. let alone to lead. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. Global interdependence per se is not new. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. at the moment. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder.
During the 1990s. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. Enduring Danger”. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. investment abroad. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. Together. two German).S. compared with 47 percent in 1960. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976.S. the share of U. had forty. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. And since 1990. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. Germany. insurance. royalties.S. Japan had sixteen. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British.S. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. the United Kingdom. twenty-three were American. interest. Richard.S. telecommunications. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. the fastest growing part of the world economy. During 1996–2001. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. six of ten telecommunications companies. exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975. dividends. and the like). je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. only two were U. and the Netherlands. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. The U.S. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. share of exports of commercial services. Volume 55. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany. But the U. irregularly and with periodic revivals. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001.2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. together. companies dominated major industries in 2002. Between 1981 and 1995.S.S. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. (General Electric and Citigroup). Non-U. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. regulating. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment). the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975).S.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. The U. stood at 24 percent in 2001. “U. Issue 07 (December). but vulnerable. Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999. http://monthlyreview. Monthly Review. four of seven airlines.S. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. France. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests. capital has in it.S. U.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. is now deteriorating sharply. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. Since 1971. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. banks. In 2002. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. against 21 percent at present. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their .S. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent. 25 percent in 1999. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. four of six chemical producers. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. the United States is not only less dominant. The weak link is the dollar. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years. In global finance. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. and stabilizing the world political economy. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted. nineteen were non-U.
foreigners owned 41 percent of U.” Thus. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. concluded Yarjani. “China. In the ﬁrst tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. stocks and bonds.’ 3 China’s rise is not . arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit.S.S. 24 percent of all U. and real estate). By contrast. companies. The EU.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only.S. the EU. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. companies are continuing to invest abroad. corporate bonds and stocks. Brazil.vub. 19. Like most gaps between income and expenses. political system and stage of development. governments). Yet their weight is such that it is key for the ﬁrst tier players to take them in account.ac. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. borrowing money would become harder. Javad Yarjani. and 13 percent of corporate stock. so why go to the United States. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar. Russia. Treasury bonds. As the dollar declines in value.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits. 57–67. ceasing to invest in U. political competence and military strength. No.S. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. 1. sending Wall Street into a dive. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus.S. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. Treasury marketable debt. companies. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense. residents (individuals. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. Multipolarity now -. German investments in choice office properties in New York. they can use them to buy American assets (U. and the New Multipolarity.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. San Francisco. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. the integration of Japan a generation ago. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. a record 4. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). In 2002.S.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers.8 percent of GDP. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a ﬁrst tier actor. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. Swiss franc). All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status.S. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difﬁcult than was. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. Vol. industries or selling off their dollar holdings.5 trillion more than U. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. Therefore. say. economy. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. By mid-2003. sterling. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls. Japan. Interest rates in the United States might surge. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China.S. South Africa. U. 2011. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power. but it may not be forever. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. the dollar would start falling faster. history.rising powers. Norway and Britain.-owned assets abroad. corporate bonds.” http://www.
Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing inﬂuence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. Multipolarity coming -. 19. No. Some point out that. “China. leadership. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. 10 As China is already ﬁrmly integrated in the current international regimes and beneﬁts from their smooth functioning.it will foster cooperation and stability -. 1. In previous decades.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system.” http://www. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively.S. as did Britain in the 19th century.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon. for example. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions. Understandably. There is .ac. 2010.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin. In the early and middle 19th century. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. the EU.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250. 2011. and Iranian nuclear ambitions. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy. the creation of spheres of inﬂuence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures. hegemony is on the wane. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains. regional rivalries may turn nasty.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U. Vol.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia.S. 10 Heg is on the decline -. and the New Multipolarity. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. precisely during critical power transitions. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. hegemony. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon.S. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. 57–67. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism.vub.S.Europe and China are filling in. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent.
com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation. tackle non-traditional security threats. and others. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. to support effective governance. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. Global Hegemony . and Barbara M. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner.S.S. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. je) The U. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive. All along the "foundation" of U.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. no game plans. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09. Just politicians being politicians. As the unipolar moment fades. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. Associate Director of the Frederick A. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversiﬁed multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism. Midas Letter. Africa. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs. Andy. To be effective. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. China.The Beginning and the End”. and enhance maritime security. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. global hegemony was its manufacturing base.S. and South-Central Asia.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. http://www. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding.php. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert inﬂuence. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual beneﬁt and understanding will be indispensable.midasletter. multilateral organizations need to reﬂect the emerging new international order. doing what it takes to get reelected. to guarantee that our policies beneﬁt lasting stability and development. with the hope that things will get better. . and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. draining wars. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. nothing.137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. “U. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy.
S. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22.S. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process. hegemony in the Middle East is over. the U. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U. Obama not only recognizes that the U. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak.S. 2011.S. He also the continuing U.S. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions.org/pub_display. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled. and the diverging U.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -." And without the U. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region. understands that . And there is not much that the U. are at stake. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya.S.S. Indeed.S. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan.S. strategic interests. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S.cato.S.S. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear military program. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya." as Obama stressed over the weekend. In fact.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). can do to reverse this process. is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U.” http://www.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon. or by taking a tougher line against Iran.
What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. inequalities. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite.” http://lahaine.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts.5 billion muslim world. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. Substituting trade missions for military bases. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. industry would have to lower its profits. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. uneven regional development. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new. China’s class. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. Fundamental . The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. To expand overseas markets. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. Petras 10 – James. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. deepens the domestic market and expands social services. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel. Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. which would reduce charges to industry and state. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy.
but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests. .140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential.
deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. that he is no pacifist. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. Nevertheless. As part of such a project. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. given the likely political reaction at home. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions. not for the first time. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. University of Birmingham (July 1. within the confines of the mainstream. Adam Quinn. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. Lecturer in International Studies. He is. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. President Obama’s approach. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’.” International Affairs Volume 87. his predecessor was not.’ he declared. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment. the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas. to cite one example. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. in short.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. 2011. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. it can. “The Art of Declining Politely.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. this is a president who. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. Facing this incipient period of decline. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism.
or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It may well be. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. on reflection. fill any westerner with glee. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. it may result in conflict. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. .142 of 154 global power. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. Alternatively.
negotiations are impossible under these conditions. because "talks in an environment of pressure." he further explained." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying. "Based on its hegemonic attitude. 2010. therefore. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US. the Leader added. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone. threats and intimidation are not talks. a top Iranian lawmaker has said.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them. .143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24. On 18 August. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. The University of North Carolina Press. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord. such as India.S. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available. “Nuclear Apartheid”. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. . even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living.144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. Since the dawn of the nuclear age. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. American hegemony. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence. North Korea. Pakistan. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. and the PRC. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations.
but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Europe or the Persian Gulf. As an oﬀshore balancer. American troops should go back over the horizon. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. online at http://journals. The National Interest. including Europe and the Middle East. not military force. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the ﬂow of oil upon which the US economy. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. Europe and the Gulf. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US.R.cambridge. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: oﬀshore balancing. Once the potential hegemon is checked. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. 3 Its proponents believe that oﬀshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. This behavior. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves.” Review of International Studies (2009). “Imperial by Design”. to the world. 35: 5-25. This is the best way to ensure American primacy. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. The driving factor behind oﬀshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. Oﬀshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. Mearsheimer ’11. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. Robert M. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. but also gets us involved in nation building.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. he R. In general terms. An oﬀshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- . Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. not only generates resentment toward the United States. John.
they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. the security of the others is threatened. Another example is the eﬀort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. balances ends and means. on one hand. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. 7 In addition to soft balancing. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. on the other hand. oﬀshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing eﬀorts of the other major powers in the international system. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. Spain under Philip II. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. Oﬀshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. The attempt by France. Regional powers – . believe for an insular great power like the US. First. and policies must be judged on their consequences. of course. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. Most of all it is a strategy that ﬁts within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the diﬀerence between. 4 Yet. First. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. Germany. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. including so-called soft balancing. Failure is the fate of hegemons. deﬁnes US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. 5 And. A second point upon which oﬀshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. When employed by states. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. they are important for two reasons. multiple poles of power. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. some would argue. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world aﬀairs are numbered. the ethic of responsibility. Second. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. Oﬀshore balancers. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. as well as economic. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V.146 of 154 horizon military posture. growing apprehensions about the military. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. Although there are some nuanced diﬀerences among oﬀshore balancing’s proponents. soft balancing eﬀorts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. not on the intentions that underlie them. Oﬀshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to ﬁght an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. Oﬀshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. recent studies by the CIA oﬀer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. Even if soft balancing eﬀorts fail. and Germany under Hitler (and. on the other hand.
Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. however. these states seek other methods of oﬀsetting American power. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Because they are threatened by the US. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing ﬁeld and deter the US from attacking them. .147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces.
Offshore balancing. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. he R. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China.R. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. in contrast. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. Offshore balancing. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. . America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. For starters. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. on the other hand. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. The National Interest. however. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Global dominators. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. Mearsheimer ’11.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. je) Of course. “Imperial by Design”. John. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. is better suited to the task. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. especially if war breaks out. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great.
primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China. As Robert Pape argues. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. 35: 5-25. covert operations. As this debate gathers steam.” Review of International Studies (2009). As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of oﬀshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an oﬀshore balancing strategy. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. And. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. online at http://journals. the best way to do so is to adopt an oﬀshore balancing strategy and ﬁght terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as eﬀective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. outside of the Middle East. not increase. . A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. an oﬀshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability. America’s military presence overseas’.cambridge. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. unlike primacists. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military proﬁle in the region. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. there are signs that Americans already accept oﬀshore balancing’s key premises. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. Indeed. Robert M. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US oﬀshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. a recent 32 per cent margin. For example. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. oﬀshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’. In the Middle East.149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. 54 Similarly. and globally.
As a result. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. Certainly. John. The National Interest. Furthermore. and even then. je) Specifically. “Imperial by Design”.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. It has two main virtues.S.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. attack. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. Mearsheimer ’11. offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check.R. only as a matter of last resort. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. But all things considered. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Europe and the Gulf. he R. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. . He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. killing 241 service members.
And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11. and the prospects for future casualties. Christopher. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways. erroneously.S.cato. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. while others see a hot one with China in the offing. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs.” http://www. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. Preble 9 – Christopher. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. But the true strength of the United States. the true source of U.structure of the international system checks. Our spirit. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20. Both are ideological struggles. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. that military power keeps us safe. Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly.S. It always has been. This is neither naive nor utopian. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination.151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. the president has taken . fought chiefly by non-military means.org/pub_display. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy.cato. and that more power will keep us safer. 2001. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit.php?pub_id=10228) For too long. or Soviet (or Chinese. power. 2009. and again between September 1939 and August 1945. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine.org/pub_display. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war. is its people. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. perhaps over Taiwan. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute.” http://www. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II). The world is a dangerous place. no. We have come to believe. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant. what of war between peoples. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war.
Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety).S. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. The resulting force would be more elite. security threats. military deployments. because it could enhance security. it is counterproductive. along with advances in strike technology.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Geography. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. however. they are not. . Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. In most cases.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. In nearly all cases.S. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members.S. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel. forces. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. less strained and far less expensive. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. ambitions. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. for example — as major U. Fewer missions.S. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. Citing the need for austerity. If our military had less to do. By shedding missions. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them.S. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. security.
should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. apart from the U. At the same time. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. “Policy Change for East Asia. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. is losing its financial ability to do so.” http://www. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. will remain engaged in East Asia. That the U.S. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. Bandow 9 – Doug. called the East Asian Community. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea. The U. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. And at a time of economic crisis the U. 2009. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. policies regarding Pyongyang. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. a transformational agenda. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. engagement with the North.S. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens.multilateral cooperation solves.S. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged.S. foreign policy. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. However. As the U. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. However. .S. Moreover. and Russia as well. In Washington.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains.org/pub_display. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability.S.S.S. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. that means proposing a free trade agreement. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. senior fellow at the Cato Institute.S. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions.S. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington. promote respect for human rights. and U. steps back from its dominant military role.S. such instability would pose little threat to the U. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. The U.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. The U. The U. Japanese.S. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies.cato. Japan.S. the U. In economics. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29.S. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. China. At the same time. On defense. America still has a major economic role to play.
compared to the U. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems. and China. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. and with the possible exception of Pakistan. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. not to dominate. as a global superpower. “U. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States.S. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. In addition. In terms of military power.S.S.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U. in terms of global power or learn from U. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. and Pakistan could become the same. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. from effectively defending Taiwan. In Africa.3 Secondly. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now.newamerica.S.S. 2011. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. In fact. . Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances.S. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. let alone the dollar or the euro. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages.S. American Strategy Program. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U.S. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid. interests. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension. Finally. but so far these are for commercial use. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. Senior Research Fellow. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time.. mistakes.S. Indeed. Moreover.” http://www.
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