Table of Contents

Acronyms…………………………………………………………………………………………..i Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………iii Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Past and Present U.S. Policy Towards Africa………………………………………………….….2 Africa’s Security Challenges and U.S. Security Interests…..…………...……………………….16 Security Challenges in Africa……………………………………………………………16 U.S. Security Interests…………………………………………………………………… 25

Nature of the Problem………….………………………………………………………………...31 Consequences……………………………………………………………………….……31 Causes……………………………………………………………………………………40 Conditions and Trends…………………………………………………………………...40

Analysis of Policy Options………………………...…………………………………………….43 Criteria for Analyzing Policy Options……………………………………………...……44 Major Issues…………………………………………………………………………..….44

Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………..48 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….……52 References………………………………………………………………………………..………55 Figures…………………………………………………………………………………....……… 61 Figure 1: Non-Food Economic Aid to Africa (1996-2006)……………………………...61 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup  New Command Setup…………………….…62

2 Figure 3: Current and Potential Effects of Environmental Degradation…………………63 Figure 4: Countries Requiring Food Assistance…………………………………………64 Figure 5: Effects of Weak Governance…………………………………………………..65 Figure 6: HIV Prevalence……………………………………………………………..…66 Figure 7: Malaria Prevalence…………………………………………………………….67 Figure 8: Youth Bulge Density…………………………………………………………..68 Figure 9: African Standby Force (Brigade Setup)………………………………...……..69

Appendix A: The Unified Combatant Command System……………………………………….70

Introduction On February 6, 2007 military organization, U.S. departmental interaction, and U.S. policy towards Africa took a controversial turn. Former President George W. Bush announced the creation of a new Unified Command, AFRICOM. He stated that the command’s purpose was to “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa…enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa”1. What appeared to be reorganization within the Department of Defense ushered in a new era of debate, focus, and
1

McFate, Sean. 2008. “U.S. Africa Command: A New Security Paradigm?” Military Review. JanuaryFebruary: 10.

3 analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards the African continent. On March 11, 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman, Senator Russ Feingold, stated in a hearing that, “This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies, or half-hearted ad-hoc measures.”2 The policies and measures Feingold spoke of were components of past U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. The policy was and still is in serious need of reevaluation. The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U.S. has operated in is no longer a viable option for the strategic areas of importance the African continent plays in U.S. security interests. Africa has become strategically important to not just the United States, but to other countries around the world. This level of importance will continue to increase in the future. AFRICOM has encountered a two-front battle hindering its potential success. The first is the reception of AFRICOM within the United States. From Congress to non-profit organizations, AFRICOM has been vehemently opposed, reluctantly accepted, or heralded as an innovative approach to Africa. The second is the African response to AFRICOM. In Africa, mixed reactions from governments, institutions, and communities have created a public image and logistical nightmare for AFRICOM. The purpose of this paper is to better understand, as well as find solutions for AFRICOM’s strained reception on the continent of Africa. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs and Chairman, Senator Feingold, have been instrumental in holding hearings and drafting
2

Feingold, Russell. 2008. “Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa.” March 11. <http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=305904

Retrieved March 1. Senator Feingold has held and been a part of hearings structured to understand AFRICOM’s present and future role and effectiveness in U. Policy Towards Africa For half a century. 1998.S.9545404.S. Dan.-Africa Relations Chronology. 2009 from Department of State website: http://www.pdf>.” Regional Series. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War. Past and Present U. Feingold has visited the continent of Africa and met with leaders and officials a number of times.S.-African relations. the inner workings of the U. foreign policy towards Africa.”4 3 “U.S. has a deep history of engagement on the African continent. the complexities of AFRICOM can be better understood. .usafa. The Subcommittee is also accepting of innovative ideas to strengthen U.S. His understanding of Africa.” 2008.S. “Unchartered Paths. The U. which indicate the level of inconsistency that has existed in U. 4 Henk.S. USAF Institute for National Security Studies. policy from the Cold War to the present will be given a brusque overview.america.4 proposals related to U. policies towards Africa. policy towards the African continent. Broader changing policies.S.-African relations. Uncertain Vision: U.S. ix. are defined by the perception each presidential administration held of the role of the U. For the purposes of this paper.S.af. and his influential role as Subcommittee Chairman enable him to be an effective force in implementing solutions for AFRICOM’s shortcomings.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp18. government. Since the creation of AFRICOM.S. Such policy towards Africa has typically been reactive as opposed to proactive and “driven by events rather than to shape events. the United States has maintained official ties with many African countries3.html. U. <www.S. towards Africa and the state of the international system at the time. Through the framework of past U.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2008/February/20080206163314dmslahrellek0.

The inclusion of more countries in Africa was due to the growing concerns the U.-Africa Relations Chronology.S. 2008. Strategic Studies Quarterly. 196111.S.” 8 Esterhuyse 113 9 Ibid.S. . President Kennedy established USAID in order to promote development in developing countries and increase U.S. Spring: 113. such as Africa10. Foreign Affairs. 6 Ibid. The first Peace Corps volunteers to work on the African continent were received in Ghana on June 4. 12 Esterhuyse 115 13 Chege. Michael. 71(1).S. The U. North Africa was integrated in to the AOR of EUCOM5. Other countries in Africa were integrated into perceived relevant U. administrations to support and ally themselves with African leaders they knew opposed communist ideology and reform. containment strategy for the Soviet Union and Communist ideology during the Cold War led U. interests13. The U. SSA was fully placed under the AOR of STRICOM in 196212. 159.S. with some countries in SSA included in LANTCOM in 19608. influence in areas around the world. Much to the chagrin of many inside and outside of the African continent. Abel. This was due to the colonial history and connection between European and the African countries included in the Command6.S.” 11 Ibid. most leaders backed by the United States led corrupt regimes. Command structures. “Remembering Africa”.S.113 7 “U. had over increasing Soviet Influence on the African continent9. which were typically autocratic and violated the 5 Esterhuyse.. 1992.114 10 “U. “The Iraqization of Africa: Looking at AFRICOM From a South African Perspective”.-Africa Relations Chronology. further enlarged its focus on Africa through the establishment of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs in 19587. In 1961.5 Cold War Policy In 1952.S. and could be swayed to lean towards U.

S.. Mobutu was crucial in ensuring that the Soviet as well as Cuban sponsored government in Angola was strategically countered by a Western ally in the same region16.S. Kenyan authoritarian leader. Daniel Moi. Doe. In the 1970’s.S. policy of backing pro-American and anti-Soviet leaders continued well into the eighties. 18 Chege 160 19 Ibid. which was subsequently embezzled21.S.-African Communications network stationed in Monrovia during the 80’s19. CENTCOM and PACOM. Somali leader Mohamed Siad Barre. and the interests of the U. Furthermore.S. not much was said of his rigging of elections in 1985. Samuel K.17 The U. the ending of the Cold War decreased the geostrategic importance Africa held as an ideological and strategic battleground. Daniel. Ethiopia. Due to his strategic importance to the U. to counter Soviet ally. One of the most notorious leaders to have U.S. The Journal of Modern African Studies. containment strategy on the continent18. 21 Ibid.. there remained few reasons as to why Africa would gain absolute importance at the top of the “global economic agenda” or strategic interests of 14 15 Ibid. he was consistently given aid. support was Zairian15 dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko.22 However. 22 Esterhuyse 115 23 Chege 156 . 31:5. Somalia became an ally to the U. Due to the Cold War. in 1983 President Reagan divided AOR for Africa between three Commands: EUCOM. 20 Ibid. which totaled to approximately $550 million.6 rights of many14. 1993. was entrusted with ensuring the safety of the U. “Africa and the New World Order”. were two other African leaders who fit into the U.S. Former president of Liberia.23 Essentially. and many of his human rights violations20. and consistent human rights violator. Now the Democratic Republic of Congo 16 Chege 159 17 Volman.

in a manner that was contrary to past Cold War involvement and interference.28 One of the first steps was an international partnership conducted by the U. policy towards Africa alongside a changing perception of the nature of the relationship the U. since most of the countries involved in working to end the civil war had previously engaged in the country and perpetuated the civil war for their own gains. spreading weaponry. national rivalries. Cuba and South Africa to mediate in the Angolan civil war.S.29 This was surprising. it was essential that the U.S. 28 Lawson 1 29 Ibid.25 Bush claimed that the ending of the Cold War had given way to an international system where the U. “U. and help reach a settlement.W.S. Bush:” New World Order” Former President George H. religious tensions. for all our hope. African Policy Since the Cold War.S.. 2007. Portugal.” Strategic Insights. 30 Chege 156 .30 24 25 Ibid.S. Lawson.7 influential powers in the international system. personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism. was threatened by “turmoil and dangers in the developing world. “be prepared ‘to deal with a world that. the U.”27 Bush’s “New World Order” philosophy consisted of a need to positively engage with African countries. Democratic movements in Africa strengthened in 1991. and France tied potential aid to African countries with conditions of democratization.24 President George H.S. remains a dangerous place.a world of ethnic antagonism.S.W. in 1990.S.”26 Therefore. should have with African countries. Letitia. 6(1): 1 26 Volman 1 27 Ibid. Bush ushered in a change of U. Furthermore. Great Britain. which led to a shift in U.. Policy. Russia.

the U. 32 In 1991.S. is to have stability in these regions.S. Marine Corps Commandant. Zaire released a statement from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. “Mobutu has lost legitimacy and should hand over the government to an opposition-led transition.146 Lawson 1 33 Chege 160 34 Volman 1 35 Volman 2 . this time from domestic tyranny. maintain our access to their resources. crowds yearning for freedom. The American embassy in Kinshasa. interests in the democratization of African countries.S. ended their support of one tine much-courted ally. summarized the various levels of interest Africa held to the U. by stating.. and deter conflict…we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection. all of who were Cold War allies. State Department as it distanced itself from the autocratic and unpopular leaders it once supported. cheered statements from the U. Herman Cohen. energy security was a second motivating factor for increased engagement on the continent. which were strengthening their democracies continued to increase. stating. Sudan and Zaire. the U. protect our citizens abroad. energy interests in unstable African countries had become.”31 From 1990 to 1992. the Bush administration realized how extensive U.S.8 “For the first time since the Kennedy administration's support for anti-colonial African nationalism.S.S. Mobutu. “if the U. there 31 32 Ibid. adhered to its policy change by cutting off aid to Liberia. Former U.34 Therefore. defend our vital installations.S. Gray. In addition to U.”35 As the situation in Somalia began to deteriorate in the late ‘80’s and early ‘90’s. General Alfred M.S.”33 Resources towards countries.

the U.42 News networks were saturated with images of Somali rebel forces dragging the corpse of an American soldier through the streets and holding a U. the U. 2001.S. President William Clinton: “Assertive Multilateralism”. President William J. On August 15. helicopter pilot hostage.S.38 By December. On December 5.S.N. he sought a reduction in the number of U. Peter J..html#timeline. 38 Snyder.S.N. the U. Ibid. 1998. “Guest Editor’s Introduction: Trends and Transformation in the Clinton Administrations Foreign Policy Towards Africa (1993-1999)”. as the country continued to fall apart. Issue: A Journal of Opinion.S. 1992 the U.9 was pressure on the U. as one of his final acts as President of the United States. 2009 from http://novaonline. and “Virtual Engagement” Though President Clinton continued Bush’s engagement in the African continent early on. 26:2.000 U.S. which was intended to ensure that food aid was delivered to civilians in need. PDD-25. R. due to the difficulty of delivering aid in Somalia and establishing secure roads. the U.” Retrieved on February 15. Marines in Somalia in December. and other western states “adopted a hands-off attitude towards the chaos that began to engulf the country. troops positioned in Somalia. 6 Ibid. “Operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu. .43 Finally in the spring of 1994.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93. Clinton. 42 43 Ibid. 36 37 Ibid. the number of civilian casualties and the starving Somali population could not be ignored.S. 41 Schraeder. 1992.41 In October of 1993.40 “Operation Restore Hope” was the immediate African legacy Bush left for his predecessor. troops to “Operation Provide Relief”.36 However. to intervene.nvcc. Bush committed 25.S. launched “Operation Provide Relief” (UNOSOM-I). 39 With the landing of the first U.”37 Soon. requested aid from the U. soldiers were wounded and killed in Mogadishu. named the mission “Operation Restore Hope”. Ibid.S.S. 39 40 Ibid. eighteen U.

as the policy states. .htm.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25. 10. Donovan C.48 A CIA official stated. We went into Africa as part of the covert activity of the Cold War. foreign policy.S.S. involvement in U. . 49 Ibid. and sometimes North Korean officials under circumstances that were easier to operate under than in their home countries. involvement in peace operations as well as the reforming of U.S.10 withdrew from Somalia completely.N.S. “We have never been in Africa to report on Africa. which led to disengagement from the African continent. but to also limit U. President Clinton issued PDD-25. . therefore restricting U. the Directive did allow for the U.S.N.N. Culture and Conflicts. Retrieved on March 2. 48 Chau. Six guidelines for U. properly conceived and well-executed peace operations can be a useful element in serving America's interests.” Strategic Studies Institute.strategicstudiesinstitute.45 PDD-25 served as a an attempt to not only limit future U. Eastern European. Presidential Decision Directives.” 1994. “U. However.S. involvement in peace operations. 44 45 Snyder Lawson 2 46 Ibid. to recruit (as spies) Soviet. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs. to improve U. However. As the PDD-25 was released in May of 1994. and UN management of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such operations is selective and more effective. missions.S.mil>. peace operations were established. The directive prescribes a number of specific steps.46 The PDD-25 Executive Summary stated the following: Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.”49 The release of PDD-25 also met with a worsening situation in Rwanda. to participate in peace operations that served to advance the interests of the United States around the world. .44 In light of the Somali debacle.S. the CIA released plans to shut down fifteen CIA stations located in Africa. Due to the new Directive.S. missions. the U.47 PDD-25 sought to ensure that peacekeeping would no longer remain a vital component of U. foreign policy.army. 2009 from http://www. 47 “PDD 25: Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. <http://www.fas. Chinese.

“The Rise of Africa in the International Geopolitical Landscape. and soon U.Politik . however.50 Commander of the U. were apprehensive about designating the situation in Rwanda as genocide.000. Christina Y. .ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=211C11FE1366-4429-1CD2-8D88BA4C4565&lng=en.S. 55 Lin. From the perspective of the U. sufficient evidence and cause did not exist for U. and the newly implemented Directive. which was led by France. forces in Rwanda. troops were pulled off the ground.51 The requests.S.. which were established to bring an end to the civil war between the government and the Rwanda Patriot Front. or increased military engagement in all areas of the African continent.. gave its approval for an intervention.und Wirtschaftsberatung. to step in to Rwanda and suppress what was now an evident genocide. including the U. were denied. “Ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa. 4 53 Ibid. 2007.” Institut Fur Strategie .54 In 1995.N. intervention in Rwanda.S. had requested numerous times for the monitoring of the Abuja Accords. The U. the Pentagon released the report. He also requested the presence of reinforcements on the ground to circumvent a situation that appeared to be turning into genocide.Sicherheits .isn. US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.11 advocated for alternative forms of intervention in Rwanda. 50 51 Lawson 2 Ibid.”55 Hence. it became imperative that the world intervene. 54 Ibid.a U. 2009 from http://se1. General Romeo Dallaire.52 Other powers..N. Retrieved on February 2.S. 3 52 Ibid.N. Energy Perspective. stating. there was no immediate need to place much traditional security emphasis on Africa through the creation of a unified command. as opposed to sending in a peacekeeping force.53 After reports came from Rwanda placing the death toll of Tutsis and moderate Hutus at a total of close to 800.

President George W.57 As with most U.62 The aid for combating the pandemic was delivered through Bush’s PEPFAR.56 The purpose of the ACRI was to create partnerships with African countries in order to strengthen the capability of African peacekeeping as well as humanitarian relief capabilities. as opposed to proactive initiatives. 699 . and lead to the highest level of foreign aid the U. as an effort to focus on capacity building on the continent Clinton launched the ACRI in 1996.S. Bush’s increase of aid to Africa contradicted his campaign stances. he acknowledged that Africa was a continent “with many problems”.S. which was a five billion dollar fund “designated for developing the world's poorest.12 However.. 61 Ibid. had ever given to the African continent. yet best economic and political 'performers'”.60 In March of 2002 at a Conference on Financing Development. 31(102): 698 59 Ibid. Bush’s promised aid defied the stigma of impossibility that had plagued many who had attempted to significantly increase aid to Africa 56 57 Chau 10 Ibid. Bush presented the creation of the MCA. he stated that Africa’s strategic role in America’s overall foreign policy objectives was limited. 62 Ibid.61 In his State of the Union Address the very same year.59 September 11. Bush was running for president. Bush: Aid Increase and AFRICOM As Former President George W. policy towards Africa.58 However. 2004. 58 Smith.S. Review of African Political Economy. spent on combating the global AIDS pandemic.S. 60 Ibid. 2001 led to a change in the evaluation of U. Gayle. strategic objectives and interests. ACRI focused more on reactive operations. Bush surprised many by stating that he would triple the amount of aid the U.

2009 from http://www. 63 64 Ibid.13 post Cold War63.S. 2007. with the exception of Egypt.68 Africa would fall into the AOR of the new command. which would remain under the AOR of CENTCOM. it creates an easier organization of UCC AOR in Africa. First. Second.66 Defense Secretary Gates described the preexisting command structure67 for Africa as being an “outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War”. towards Africa through an interagency and proactive approach.africom. foreign policy. which simplifies the DOD’s approach towards Africa. military-sponsored activities.S. Prior to the creation of AFRICOM. “69 AFRICOM serves two purposes.mil/. and reorganization within the UCP. .64 Former President George W. AFRICOM’s mission statement describes itself as a Command “in concert with other U. AFRICOM. AFRICOM’s creation allows for more seamless operations. conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs.. Bush significantly increased non-food economic aid to Africa from what the previous Clinton administration had given..113 69 Retrieved on March 2.S. and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U. Bush announced plans for the creation of a UCC65 entirely focused on Africa on February 6. government agencies and international partners. Figure 1: Non-Food Economic Aid 65 For an explanation of the Unified Combatant Command System please see Appendix A 66 Esterhuyse 117 67 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup and New Command Setup 68 Ibid. it addresses the security interests of the U.

army. Retrieved March 2. and America’s perception of its role and threats within the new framework.cfm?q=827.” Congressional Research Service.S.70 This was a significant amount of area to cover for one command and former EUCOM Commander General James Jones stated that in 2006 “EUCOM’s staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues.gov/pdf/library/national %20security%20strategy%20sept%202002.S.”71 There was also difficulty in conducting smooth and clear operations between the three UCCs.pdf.> 7 73 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism. taught us that weak states.mil/pubs/download.’ ‘Capacity Building. security interests expanded on the African continent post 9/11.’ Humanitarianism and the Future of U.S. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Central and Southern Africa). can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. 71 Ploch 2 72 Berschinski.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.72 U. Lauren. and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. Yet poverty. Military in Africa. Robert G. According to the 2002 NSS: The events of September 11.73 70 Ploch. ii. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U. like Afghanistan. Retrieved on March 2. EUCOM’s total AOR consisted of 93 countries and territories in Europe and Africa. This was largely due to the change within the global security framework.2001.S.cngr.strategicstudiesinstitute. <http://www. 2007.pdf. 2002. and PACOM’s AOR covered the islands off the Eastern coast of Africa. CENTCOM’s AOR included the seven countries in the Horn of Africa. 2009 from The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves website: http://www.14 the three UCCs that had various African countries within their AOR began to feel overextended. up from almost none three years prior.fas. 2009 from http://www. 2. Security Policy in Africa. 2008. weak institutions. .” Strategic Studies Institute. EUCOM’s African AOR consisted of 42 countries (located in Western. “Africa Command: U.

September 11 had brought about a shift in how the U.05 affirmed that “stability operations are a core U. Retrieved on March 2. military mission” and would be “given priority comparable to combat operations and the be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine.”74 In 2005. 2005. and planning.defenselink. materiel. 2009 from www.” The 2002 NSS.pdf.pdf. 76 Quadrennial Defense Review. Department of Defense. facilities. Department of Defense. exercises. The documents represented a change in the Bush administration’s view of simply maintaining a heavily aid based and military to military policy towards Africa. personnel.mil/whs/directive/corres/pdf/300005p. Preventative and proactive action would be the best policy course to maintain the security of Americans at home and abroad. training.05 and the 2006 QDR.S. DoD Directive 3000..dtic. Following Bush’s 2007 announcement. organizations. DoD Directive 3000. leadership.S.”75 The 2006 QDR added on to the change in thinking and stressed the importance of “shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves76. 2009 from www. Retrieved on March 2. viewed security and the maintenance of U.05. Germany under 74 75 Ibid. security and stability around the world. and global security. all laid the framework for the type of thinking that went in to the creation of AFRICOM. education.S.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203. . the command commenced as a sub-unified command at the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart. There was a realization that it was necessary the United States begin to look at places such as Africa as more of a strategic interest in maintaining U. 2006. 1 Department of Defense Directive: 3000.15 The 2002 NSS went on to state that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.S.

81 The Obama administration has inherited AFRICOM. 2009 from Department of State website: http://www. Thus. 77 78 Ploch 8 Ibid. AFRICOM’s purpose is to prevent war and conflict.77 In October of 2008. Yates).state. Due to the amount of criticism and controversy caused by the potential placement of AFRICOM in Africa.80 Through an interagency approach with the Department of State and USAID. While the Commander is a General (General Ward) one of his two deputies is from the DOS (Ambassador Mary C. placing an emphasis on working “with” Africa as opposed to working “on” Africa.S. with the intent of maintaining an environment that will not be a breeding ground for combat or security threats. as opposed to engaging in war and conflict. AFRICOM was finally launched as a fully operation UCC. and serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities. and not much has been explicitly stated by the Obama administration to indicate concrete policy towards Africa. programs conducted with or through AFRICOM include all aspects of the three D’s: Defense. Retrieved March 1.79 The organization of AFRICOM focused more on an interagency approach imbedded within the functions of each office.htm. 80 Chau 17 81 Ibid.78 AFRICOM altered much of the vocabulary towards Africa. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in November of 2008 that no decision regarding headquarters would be made until at least 2012. However. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century”. which focus on combat prevention and developmental initiatives.16 EUCOM. Development and Diplomacy. Much of the work would be done through “Phase Zero” operations. 79 “U. much policy towards Africa has existed mainly on a military and developmental level. 2009.giv/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326. .

2008.csis. Africa is the site of many humanitarian crises and security challenges. Retrieved on February 15. Africa is a massive and complex continent.84 Filled with resources such as oil.85 Despite a burgeoning population. underlying causes of insecurity on the continent. the African continent is very resource rich. subregional organizations. 2008. Jennifer G.S. Understanding the source of security challenges and underdevelopment on the continent of Africa is a “Chicken-Egg” question. “A New U. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 84 Harlow. “Hap”. many of the countries on the continent share similar broad challenges.”86 In light of Africa’s diversity.7 million miles (75% of which are uninhabited). Quite diverse.php? option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4208. 2009 from http://www. “Africa is on the front burner with its humanitarian crises. and a vast amount of land and resources. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century. diamonds and coltan.africom. 86 Chau 10 . Plans and Programming division of AFRICOM. The continent spans an impressive 11. which has driven much security and developmental related debate about the continent for decades. Security Interests Security Challenges in Africa.mil/getArticle. Command for Africa. and member states as they work to stand up the Africa Standby Force.org/index. Does 82 83 “U.” Regional Priorities.S.”82 Through its interagency and preventative approach. “AFRICOM: Scenesetter .” Cooke. caused by nature and man.Prospects and Challenges.17 Through AFRICOM. AFRICOM is considered “a testing ground for a more integrated military-civilian approach to address some of the long-term.” AFRICOM presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Harlow. the Obama administration plans to “continue to work with the AU. more than 1000 languages are spoken by over 3000 ethnic groups. gold.S. 39.>. 85 Ibid.asp?art=1793. <http://www. and Kathleen Hicks.”83 Africa’s Security Challenges and U. As stated by journalist James Crawley. representing the Strategy.

Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report. 2007. 2009 from http://www. 5.oxfam. and affect the stability of all regions. More so. Debbie. health. .uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp107_africa_missin g_billions. community and political security. personal. environmental.18 underdevelopment increase the likelihood of insecurity and instability? Or. food. Oxfam.”88 All are forms of security. “Transnational Security Threats in Asia: Conference Report.html. Retrieved on February 15. does insecurity and instability allow for underdevelopment? It is not the purpose of this paper to form an argument for one side of the debate. 90 Hillier.oxfam. Don and Paul J. achieving peace and security on the continent would produce increased development and stability. Since 1990.pdf>. These security issues affect the continent as a whole.” Asia-Pacific Center.90 Such a large sum shrinks the economy of African states experiencing conflict by fifteen percent.” 2008. The majority of these threats can be described as “nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants. This is detrimental to African states that are incapable of providing their citizens with the least amount of public and civil services.87 In 1994. which present security challenges on the African continent. Smith.apcss. and cross boundaries. June 8-10. an estimated $300 billion has been 87 “Security and Development in Southern Africa. the connection between security and development is evident. Africa’s many security challenges range from transnational challenges to internal and regional challenges. the UNDP released the annual Human Development Report. thus making them difficult to control and diminish. Africa’s Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict.”89 Conflicts An estimated eighteen billion dollars a year goes towards armed conflict in African states.org. <http://www.. 8.org/Publications/Transnational%20Report%20version%2020%20Dec%202000. 9 89 Berlin.uk/download/? download=http://www.org. 88 Ibid. wherein the term “human security” was which encompassed “economic. 2000. however.

“UN Program Finds Environment Degradation Triggers Conflict in Sudan. such as Sudan. conflict typically ensues.91 Armed conflicts have a significant impact on the economical expansion of African states. In worst-case scenarios. placing a strain on them either due to illicit trading or damage caused by the fighting.com/english/archive/2007-06/2007-06-22-voa50. <http://www. Lisa. Achim Steiner.” Voice of America. or their being forced to work to makeup for lost family income due to the conflict’s effects.cfm. June 22.voanews. Massive flows of civilian populations attempting to flee conflicts increase the number of IDPs and refugees. Young people are affected by the shutting down of schools. See Figure 3 for Map of current and potential effects of environmental degradation/climate change 93 Schlein.”94 When the demand of scarce resources exceeds the available supply. Environmental Degradation92 Executive Director of the UNEP. Rainfall decline over the past 91 92 Ibid. 2007. and diminishes the ability of social mechanisms to provide for the population.19 spent on armed conflicts alone in Africa by African states. Armed conflict causes societies to disintegrate.>. 94 Ibid. the young are forced to become child soldiers. noted that there existed a strong “inescapable linkage between environmental degradation and worsening economic and social conditions. Environmental degradation has led to conflict in many African countries and regions. and institutional systems are not able to adapt. economic. . Conflicts also have a devastating effect on natural resources.”93 Steiner went on to state "conflicts ultimately become inevitable if systems become so pressurized and social.

which constituted of 1/3 of the total number of people going hungry worldwide. 99 “Millions Face Food Crisis in Africa.98 The United Nations considers the following to be three sources of food security issues in Africa: “poor harvest due to erratic rainfall.uk/2/hi/africa/4662232. 100 See Figure 5 for diagram of effects of weak governance . 2009 from http://www.95 Food Security/Crisis 2006 was one of the worst years for food security around the world. “Africa’s Hunger-A Systemic Crisis. Particularly in Africa96. which pushed many pastoralists and farming communities southward where conflict erupted between the new migrants and settled communities. Retrieved on April 3. Martin.bbc.97 A total of 27 countries were in need of external food aid.co. 2006.stm>.20 30 years in Darfur led to land degradation. CARE. which require further assistance. nepotism and 95 96 Ibid. January 31.asp? source=170740270000&WT. Good Governance/Accountability100 Many of the security challenges confronting the African continent can be traced to poor governance and a lack of accountability in governments across the continent. growing impact of the AIDS epidemic. Challenges combined with other challenges create more challenges. See Figure 4 for map of countries requiring food assistanc 97 Plaut.srch=1. there is more than one source of the problem.” 2005. Poor governance and a lack of accountability or transparency in government leads to “corruption.”99 Like so many security challenges on the continent.care. close to 300 million experienced a food crisis of disastrous proportions.” BBC News Online. 98 Ibid. <http://news.org/newsroom/articles/2005/10/20051006_africahunger. weakening ability of governments to respond.

Maritime Security in Africa. 2008. May 2.ndu.com/stories/200805010790. Retrieved on February 15. Kwesi. Paul. and impacts the ability of countries to do business.105 In describing the extent of the problem. 105 Ibid. 12.7 billion a year in revenue. 104 Ibid. 107 Aning. February 19. 2008 presentation. 2009. Jennifer Borchard and Jessica Piombo.21 patronage systems that are fragile and often the target of insurgencies. African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon. <http://allafrica. 2007.103 Due to illegal fishing.” however.104 Also of concern are the effects of illegal dumping off the coastlines of Africa. “Africa: Illegal Fishing Costs Continent Sh62 Billion.edu/ctnsp/NCW_course/Bittrick_20080219_MarSec_NDU. 106 Redfern. “Africa: Confronting Complex Threats. “they are not able to give to their family. Gareth Thomas stated that fisherman were once able to “get money…send their children to school. Proliferation of SA/LW The proliferation of SA/LW is a major security challenge in Africa that is difficult to control and prevent. 2008. and account for $2.”101 Maritime Security Maritime Security consists of issues ranging from illegal fishing to piracy. Jennifer.107 Generating an exact number of the amount 101 Perry. 102 Harlow 103 Bittrick. Mike. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: January 2009 Workshop Report. . which diminishes food supply for over 200 million and recedes the income of more than ten million.html>."106 The prevalence of piracy (discussed further on in this paper) affects global trade.” The Nation (Nairobi). and the impact on ecosystems and the health of surrounding communities.” International Peace Academy.pdf. British Trade and Development Minister. 102 Fisheries are a major exporting commodity for many African countries. approximately $1 Billion in revenue is lost each year. however. 2009 from www.

Retrieved on March 1. political and economic mechanisms.ipaacademy. 2009 from <http://www. 111 “Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century.” 2001. while only 28% of the affected population has access to the medicines needed.org/global_news/full_article. “The availability of [SA/LW] is now so widespread throughout Africa that the price for an AK-47 is less than $20 in Somalia.109 The larger part of victims killed by violent acts in Africa are killed by SA/LW. 114 Ibid. the DRC. 110 Ibid.htm>. May 29-30.” Global Ministries: The United Methodist Church.africaunion. World Health Organization.111 HIV prevalence in Africa112 poses various threats to the security and development of seriously afflicted regions and countries. Of the 33 million living with HIV around the world. 30. 2008. 30-62. . Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report. 109 Zihindula . 2000. Retrieved on February 15.” 2007.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global>. 2009 from http://gbgmumc.cfm?articleid=4542.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Small_Arms.22 of SA/LW in circulation around the world is near impossible. 67% are located in SSA. 10. Mulegwa.”110 Public Health Crises Major public health challenges such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria affect various social systems and the infrastructural capabilities of social. African Union: Peace and Security Council.108 SA/LW constitute for the majority of weapons utilized in ongoing conflicts in countries such as Sudan. 1. it is estimated that out of roughly 500 million SA/LW in circulation. Retrieved on February 15. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferating in Africa. However.114 The sheer number of those infected with HIV/AIDS place a heavy strain on public <http://www. 108 “Small Arms and Light Weapons. 112 See Figure 6 for map of HIV prevalence map 113 Status of the Global HIV Epidemic: 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic.113 75% of all AIDS related deaths occurred in SSA.unaids. and Somalia. 100 million are located in Africa. 2009 from <http://www.org/publications/policy-papers>.

the activities conducted by various groups to voice grievances are of concern.115 GDP is strained as well.” 2009. Approximately 90% of all Malaria deaths occur in Africa. 119 Ibid.23 healthcare and resources as well as lowering the potential number of healthcare workers and peacekeepers that could be working. Retrieved on February 15.6% loss in GDP is experienced. provided support for the “democratic and secular 115 116 Harlow Ibid.119 Political Islam/Radical Islam Political and radical Islam has been an increasing national and regional security challenge in Africa. While serving “as a medium for political activism and/or mobilization”. 118 “Malaria Statistics.org/malaria/malaria-statistics>. 2009 from <http://www. and it is estimated that in the next two years GDP loss might rise to 17%.118 Accounting for 40% of total public health expenditure in Africa. specifically Malaria is the leading cause of mortality for children under the age of five. 117 See Figure 7 for Malaria prevalence map. Nets For Life. 120 Aning 5 . In nations with an HIV prevalence rate of 20% or more.116 The highest prevalence of Malaria infections and deaths occur in Africa117. For example. the Senegalese organization. Sufi Brotherhood. close to $12 billion in productivity is lost due to the impact of Malaria on the workforce and social structure.netsforlifeafrica. a 2.120 Political Islam is not always negative and can produce positive results.

125 Eastern and Southern Africa have also joined the counterterrorism periphery.124 Increasingly. for example.127 Security Capacity The capacity of countries and regions to encounter security threats and challenges is lacking in many cases.” In Africa in World Politics.24 government. Ibid. Weak procedures and resources have stalled the ability of “mediators and other actors to prevent 121 122 Ibid. 125 Lyman.122 Political Islam is also altering the landscape of various localities. Along the coast of East and Southern Africa (Tanzania. Wahhabism has become more popular. In 2007.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism. In Nigeria.pdf >.126 Though not much action has been seen from the cells. organizations adverse to the interests of many in Africa are gaining a foothold in local areas. “The War on Terrorism in Africa. as well as confronting rising and ongoing violent threats. shari’a law has been adopted in one-third of the states.14 126 Ibid. Algeria and Morocco experienced terrorist attacks. 124 Ibid.”121 Contrarily. specifically in the Horn of Africa. Security capacity is essential for the development of programs to enhance peace and security in Africa. . radical Islam and anti-Americanism that has developed in Africa. Princeton N. 2008. 123 Ibid. <http://www. Zambia and Comoros) there appears to be a network of terrorist cells. there exists a fear that the unchecked cells could potentially harbor international terrorists. 127 Ibid.123 Further complicating the ability to generate a clear distinction between moderate and extreme organizations is the complex mixture of political Islam.cfr.

134 Shinn.. is smuggled “from South Asia across Africa to Europe and North America. Jakaya Kikwete.”128 Transnational Crime (TNC) Transnational Crime (TNC) in Africa is a growing threat to security and stability. 2 132 Kikwete. 32% of who are African. “Comment: Transnational Organised Crime a Major Threat To Our Security. Ibid. July 16.2 million humans are victims of human trafficking.129 These groups mainly engage in the trafficking of drugs.133 Many countries in Africa also serve as transit points for drug trafficking. therefore presenting continental wide challenges in confronting TNC. 2007.”132 Tanzanian President.” 1. <http://www. 129 130 Ibid. other human beings. Bush .25 manage and resolve conflicts. David H.”134 128 “Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century.131 Other activities perpetrated by these groups consist of illegal smuggling of refugees and aliens. credit card fraud…cyber crime. and money laundering.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=1930&Itemid=5821. The activities engaged in by various illicit organizations and groups not only destabilize affected regions. commented in an Op-Ed that the “structures and institutions” in African governments are “grossly inadequate”. “China’s Engagement in Africa. Jakaya. but also aid in the financing of ongoing and future operations.” In Africa Policy in the George W.130 According to estimates from the International Labor Organization (ILO) around 1. as well as points of origin for drug production.bdafrica. motor vehicle theft. for example. Heroin.com/index.> 133 Ibid.” Business Daily. 2009. 131 Ibid. and SA/LW. “illegal trade in human organs.

26 Youth Bulge135 As of early 2009, Africa has an estimated population of 1 billion (14.8% of the world population) and an annual population growth rate of 2.2%.136 Africa is predicted to have the “highest long term population growth”.137 Societies experiencing “youth bulge” share high birth rates and a high proportion of the population between 15 and 29 years of age. According to demographers, many countries with high birthrates tend to be more prone to conflict.138 From 1970 to 1990, an estimated 80% of all the world’s civil conflicts took place in states where the total population of those less than 30 years of age was 60%.139 In SSA, 15-29 year olds make up an average of 40% of the population.140 Some countries have more extreme cases of youth bulge. In Zimbabwe, for example, 70% of the population is under the age of 30.141 In the U.S. the same demographic makes up for 21.1% of the population and less so in Germany where youth make up 14.8% of the population.142 Considering that Africa has the highest predicted long term growth trend, the “youth bulge” suggests an increased labor workforce in the future.

Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_pub/task,view/is,5217/type,1/.> 11. 135 See Figure 8 for map of youth bulge density 136 World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database. 2009. <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp> 137 Ibid. 138 Beehner, Lionel. 2007. “The Battle of the ‘Youth Bulge’.”CFR: Daily Analysis. April 27. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/13094/battle_of_the_youth_bulge.html? breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublication_list3%Fid%3D129. 139 Ibid. 140 Gavin, Michelle D. 2007. “Africa’s Restless Youth.” Current History. May: 220-226. 141 Ibid. 142 Harlow

27 Therefore, Africa needs to be capable of generating a sufficient number of jobs for the expanding labor force.143 Most SSA countries are predicted to experience a growth in their labor force of 100% to 157% between 2005 and 2030.144 “Large populations of young people can act as engines for economic growth, but only in contexts in which they have access to education and labor markets are able to absorb them.”145 Hence, if current trends continue in the development of educational infrastructure and capacity and job creation, there is a fear that the mechanisms needed to support the expanding labor force will not be present. U.S. Security Interests. As previously stated, Africa has never been the center of U.S. foreign policy or defense policy.146 Yet, Africa is now a continent of more importance to U.S. foreign and defense policy goals. Why? China, global trade and oil, and terrorism are three main areas of concern to the United States where Africa concerned. China’s engagement with Africa, while not new, has increased over the past three to four years and affects the role of the U.S. in Africa and around the world. Global trade between the U.S. and Africa is increasing. The U.S. has an interest in ensuring that trade routes are secure, and partners are sufficiently stable in order to maintain or increase trading potential. As the U.S. begins to import more oil from African countries, it is in the interest of the U.S. that access to the markets remain stable as well as open and not too affected by competition.

143

Gavin, Michelle D. 2009. “Africa’s Looming Mega-Challenges.” In Africa Policy in the George W. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090127_africa_review_megachallenges_draft.pdf.> 2. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Chau 2

28 China Chinese engagement on the continent of Africa is not a new occurrence. In 1956, China launched bilateral assistance programs to African countries.147 From 1957 to 2008, over 800 projects on the African continent were financed by the PRC.148 However, the PRC has aggressively expanded its level of engagement and influence on the continent in the past three to four years, which has impacted African countries and the United States of America. It is estimated that Chinese development assistance to Africa in this current decade has been $1-2 Billion a year.149 Chinese businesses have diversified their “economic and commercial engagements” in Africa significantly, in the past three to four years.150 In 2000, bilateral trade totaled $10 Billion, however, 2007 estimates indicated an increase to around $70 Billion.151 Such growth has propelled China into becoming Africa’s second largest trading partner, with the U.S. being the largest.152 China’s increased presence on the African continent has impacted both the United States and Africa. For both, there have been positive and negative consequences. Due to the level of strategic importance that the continent holds for the United States, it is to be expected that a more engaged China would have some impact on U.S. -African policy and relations. This should come as no surprise considering the areas where the political and economic philosophies of the U.S. and the PRC conflict. In Africa, while there are economic benefits to strengthened engagement on the behalf of the PRC, there are economic, governmental and social consequences as well.
147

Christensen, Thomas J. 2008. “China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1786. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.

com/apps/news? pid=20601072&sid=a2UbRX_oHs4Q&refer=energy>. <http://ngm.156 In 2007.157 Every year. thus strategically dismantling official recognition of Taiwan. demand for gasoline grows by at least one percent. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration.160 According to the CIA.161 Africa already supplies the U. Direct consequences consist of the “dumping of low priced goods in Africa.S.S.” National Geographic Magazine. China requires African countries to agree to the “One-China” policy. “World Oil. June.1/>.158 Though the U.com/print/2008/06/world-oil/roberts-text>. 158 Gismatullin.S.159 Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States. have led to indirect consequences for U. 154 Lin 6 155 Ibid. trade between the U.” Bloomberg. will be Africa.view/id. 157 Ibid.S. “The United States’ Big Leap on HIV/AIDS in Africa: What’s the Next Act?” In Africa Policy in the George W.S.org/component/option.. the IEA released a study forecasting a daily global demand of 116 million barrels by 2030. Center for Strategic and International Studies. U. by 2015 the source of 25% of all oil imports to the U. J.154 Global Trade and Oil Through AGOA. lax attention to environmental and workers rights standards. and China’s willingness to look the other way in dealing with non-democratic regimes with poor human rights records. strategic interests.nationalgeorgraphic. the majority of the natural resources imported are energy resources.5217/type. <http://www. Stephen and Phillip Nieburg.csis. 2008. <http://www. Eduard. “Oil Trades Near $64 in New York on Rising Demand for Gasoline.”153 As part of its conditions for economic aid and investment. imports many natural resources from Africa. and Africa has increased. 159 Ploch 63 160 Lin 3 161 McFate 12 . Paul.29 Direct negative consequences of Chinese engagement on the African continent.bloomberg. 2007. with 18% of its oil 153 Morrison. little technology transfer of job creation in Africa.com_csis_pubs/task. 2009. 2 156 Roberts.S.155 The global output of oil is approximately 85 million barrels a day.

which would come from potential deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea.html 170 Ibid. Former President George W.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/01/pirate. highlighted “freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities. to ensure that sea and trade routes are off the coasts of Africa are stable and secure.166 One month later.S.163 In 2006. David. the increase in oil. According to the IMB. as well. stability in oil exporting countries is in the interest of the U. push the price to over $70 a barrel. Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean. Bush pledged a reduction of oil imports from the Middle East by 75%.S.”168 Piracy mainly occurs in the Gulf of Aden.167 It is in the interest of the U.cnn. “No Way to Stop Us. Moses Wetangula.30 imports. .162 There exists.S. 2009 from http://edition. released by the Bush administration in 2005. It is estimated that output of oil from Nigeria has been reduced by as much as 25% due to instability. The 162 163 Lin 3 Ploch 63 164 Roberts 165 Ploch 63 166 Lin 3 167 Ibid. the contested national elections in Nigeria caused the price of oil around the world to rise above $60 a barrel.165 In April of 2007. estimates the pirates have been paid more than $150 million in the past.interview/index. attacks on Nigerian oil pipelines.. Chronic insecurity and instability in the Delta region poses a threat to uninterrupted flow of oil in Nigeria. 2008.” CNN. Pirate Leader Says. in 2008 an estimated 90 pirate attacks occurred in East Africa alone.169 “Kenya's foreign minister. Retrieved on March 17. 168 Ploch 13 169 McKenzie. The National Strategy for Maritime Security.164 Ultimately. in the absence of alternative energy. If Africa will continue to become a major exporter of oil to the U.”170 Effectively controlling and battling crimes that occur in the waters of the coast of Africa is an arduous task for all governments involved. dependency on Middle Eastern oil will shift to other areas around the world (notably Africa). before Congress. .

Sudan is noted as being the first African country to have become entrenched in terrorism on an international level. based on intelligence that one of the bombers of the U. In 2006. “Gates: Pirates ‘Untrained Teens With Heavy Weapons’. the United States has stationed between 1. counterterrorism activity on the continent of Africa. terrorist activity perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists occurred. 2009. .S. April 14. An American ambassador was killed and the Saudi Arabian embassy was bombed. 173 Lyman 3 174 Ibid.31 first American ship to be hijacked by Somali pirates occurred in April of 2009.” Associated Press. Devlin. The Horn of Africa is considered to be the “Bridge to the Middle East” and is an area where the U. has placed much of its military and counterterrorism resources. through intelligence and equipment aid.”173 The Horn of Africa has been the area of the most U.172 Terrorism “Ungoverned” lands and weak states in Africa are of concern to the U.S.S.S.174 In 2008. embassy in 1998 had surfaced.176 In the 1980’s. “Since 2002. 175 Ibid. the U. 176 Ibid.171 Indicative of developmental issues in the region.S. since such areas are potential “breeding grounds” for terrorist organizations. the U...com/news/2009/april/0414_pirates_teens. <http://www.000 troops in Djibouti under the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA). Osama bin Laden was invited to visit Sudan in 1991 where he remained until 171 Barrett.177 At the request of Hassan al-Turabi. the ages of the four pirates ranged from 17-19. backed Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in order to topple a radical Islamic government that had taken control over Mogadishu. 172 Ibid.shtml>.gopusa. 12 177 Ibid.175 Also in the Horn of Africa is Sudan. leader of the National Islamic Front.200 to 18.S. bombed areas in the southern part of Somalia.

The reaction of Africans to the creation of AFRICOM was based on five areas of concern. Consequences The byzantine structure of past U. Second. “More rhetorical than material”. “According to U.S.179 Currently. 180 Ibid. the ambiguous introduction of AFRICOM led to questions and 178 179 Ibid. Third. First.S. foreign policy towards Africa has created distrust in Africa towards the influence and involvement of America and other western countries on the African continent.32 approximately 2006. it is the ongoing civil war in Darfur that is also of concern. 13 181 Lin 3 . Defense Intelligence. which many Africans feared AFRICOM would violate. Ibid.. there was an issue of sovereignty. Nature of the Problem Considering the convergence of Africa’s security challenges and the effects of those challenges on America’s security interests.181 Especially in light of the 2007 terrorist attacks. Morocco and Algeria is the source of a significant number of foreign fighters in Iraq. which occurred in both countries. the situation in Darfur still poses as a threat for the potential uprising of terrorist organizations. as well as current military leadership created a unified fear of what AFRICOM would mean for civilian and military led governments. the failure of AFRICOM to effectively address issues marring its potential success is obstacle severely limiting the Command.180 Concern is not just limited to the Horn of Africa.178 It is from Sudan that he was able to create financial and supportive terrorist networks and operations. the history of military leadership on the continent. but to North Africa as well.

In October of 2007 the Pan-African Parliament body of the AU “voted in favor of a motion to prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America’s Government’s request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.”183 Two of the countries he alluded to were South Africa and Nigeria. The response of Africa to AFRICOM has been mixed. Gen. 183 Ibid. 184 Ploch 23 185 Ibid. 2008.). “If you know the politics of Africa.org/empire/intervention/regionafrica/2008/0601africom. the “truth” behind mixed messages. and is expected to be 182 DeYoung.”184 AU leadership advised that AFRICOM should better articulate and consider the role AFRICOM would play in complementing the regional structure and organs. “U. Kenyan retired Lt. governments and civil organizations to the potential positioning of AFRICOM’s headquarters on the African continent.S. Fourth. and the initial lack of a presentation of how Africa would benefit from AFRICOM. 22 . no. However. such as the PSC and ASF. Africa Command to Trim Its Aspirations. “Very little was really known by the majority of the people or countries in Africa who were supposed to know before such a move was made.33 criticism about the transparency in the new Command. one major theme has been the disapproval of many leaders. <http://www.185 The ASF has followed the economic regional structure in Africa.S. Daniel I Opande explained that African reactions to AFRICOM were based on a minute amount of information received. Karen.globalpolicy.”182 He added. Africans voiced concern that AFRICOM showed a lack of confidence and western acceptance of “African solutions for African problems”..” Washington Post. we are not interested in having a headquarters here. there was a fear of a neo-colonialist or Cold War era styled showdown between the East (China) and the West (U. Finally.htm>. you know there are certain very powerful countries who said. June 1.

html.”189 Botswana had initially expressed openness to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. South African Defence Minister Mosioua Lekota stated that the “United States Africa Command should stay out of the African continent.”187 He further went on to say “AFRICOM was not really a new development. Lekota 186 187 Esterhuyse 123 “AFRICOM ‘Should Stay Off Africa’. 188 Ibid.S. as the US had always had some kind of focus on the African continent…at some point.2-11-1447_2173503. the Cold War. especially within the SADC. or in a sense.”188 Lekota expressed concern over the impact AFRICOM would have on the dynamics of the SADC and that a presence of a base in one of the member countries would “affect the relations between the sister countries. and not encourage an atmosphere. The ASF is the embodiment of the idea of “African solutions for African problems”. Retrieved on February 15. military presence on the continent. African leadership felt weary initially accepting what appeared to an increased U.news24. 189 Ibid. It is the idea of many in Africa that “for too long Africa’s future has been dictated by outsiders.” 2007. . The South African government has vehemently opposed the presence of AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa.”186 Colonialism.com/News24/AnanziArticle/0. 2009 from http://www.. Therefore. And with increasing engagement in the continent by rising powers around the world. the announcement of AFRICOM and the initial understanding of its function violated the idea that many African leaders and civil organizations had about future absolute self-sufficiency. such as China and India.00. of security. however. and botched humanitarian interventions have translated into hardship for the African people. the SADC placed a tremendous amount of pressure on the country’s leadership not to host the headquarters. there is a certain sense that Africa has to avoid the presence of foreign forces on its soil.34 functional by 2010.

” Center for Defense Information.”196 190 Reed.pdf>. however.”193 He argued that the United States has a “hidden agenda” to become “the most powerful nation in the world” and would “stop at nothing in achieving that. 2007.com/dynamicpage.C.191 After a 2007 visit to Washington. <http://www. Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua stated.” 192 Ploch 22 193 Agbodo.” The Nation. 195 Reed 7 196 Ploch 22 . 2009 from <www. “President Yar’Adua’s statement on the proposed AFRICOM is consistent with Nigeria’s well-known position on the necessity for Africa to avail itself of opportunities for enhanced capacity for the promotion of peace and security in Africa.”194 In reply. but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative [ASF].35 stressed that any member state of the SADC that offered to host AFRICOM headquarters “would suffer negative consequences from SADC fellows.”190 He later clarified that the consensus across the African continent was not disapproval of the programs AFRICOM could offer.cdi. Nigerian Senator Anthony Agbo stated.org/pdfs/reedAFRICOM. 191 “AFRICOM ‘Should Stay Off Africa’.asp?id=40605>. D. Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Mauekwe stated. 6.. December 12. 2007. “If the Command is about stationing troops on African soil. we feel there is no need for that. Jeff Amechi.”192 In reaction to the speculation of AFRICOM’s headquarters being based in Nigeria and President Yar’Adua’s acceptance of the Command. “‘A Big Image Problem Down There:’ Prospects for an African Headquarters for AFRICOM. “Senator Cautions Yar’Adua on AFRICOM. Valerie. “the issue of its location in the continent” was cause for concern.thenationonlineng. “We are not comfortable with that. 194 Ibid.”195 He later explained. “We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria. It spells doom for the security of this country…it means the country will not only become attractive to terrorists groups. Retrieved on February 15. but would indirectly give unlimited access to the US to spy on the country.

36 Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci expressed disinterest in having the presence of U.200 Due to the pressures of its regional neighbors. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 197 198 Reed 6 Ibid. the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa responded that he was against the establishment of a U. Morocco changed its position and in June of 2007 the Foreign Minister of Morocco stated that Morocco was averse to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters.”197 Both Algeria and Libya are against other countries within the region hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. military on Algerian soil within the framework of the “war on terrorism. Ambassador Carmen Martinez had issued a confirmation that the U.S. And what would you do if you find him with your wife?”203 It is a matter of trust.198 According to Moroccan newspaper. a low level of bribery.S. Ulla. and a good human rights record. Libya and Algeria expressed strong opposition to AFRICOM’s headquarters being hosted in any country in the region. had approached Zambia about establishing an Africa Command Office. reported U.S. 199 Ploch 21 200 Holm. 32. little of which many African governments have for the presence of stationed troops in their countries.202 Zambian Chief Government Spokesman Michael Mulongoti further clarified his country’s stance saying. 2008. In response to the request.”199 However. Morocco offered to host AFRICOM. The Post. and expressed that the United States was seeking “a site with good health and education services. “It is like allowing a giant to settle in your home. military base in his country.S. 201 Ibid. The UMA has expressed its opposition to the presence of any foreign military in Africa conducting operations. 202 Reed 6 203 DeYoung .S.201 Zambian newspaper. Attajdid. North Africa: A Security Problem for Themselves for the EU and for the U.

“In fact. and fear it making its way on to the African continent.205 For the past eight years. Retrieved on February 15. Tuckey mentioned the lingering effect of the U. military. the weak. but African people as well.” Africa Faith and Justice Network.-Liberia relationship of the 1980’s. testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee In June of 2008 on AFRICOM and its potential impact on Liberia. support for illegitimate or corrupt regimes.S.S.. transparent.” 208 She refers to the U. and accountable government. a staff member for the Africa Faith and Justice Network. Brownie J.37 Governments were not the only African institutions to regard AFRICOM with distrust. which did not bode well for the majority of Liberians seeking a democratized. military bases around the world. as a “bully of the small.- 204 205 Smith 19 Esterhuyse 123 206 Ibid. would never leave.S. 2009 from <http://www.org/frontpage_features/frontpage_feature/afjn_briefs_house_staff_on_africom. Army Strategic Studies Institute which found that “every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these U.S. there was an initial fear that once the U. suggested that AFRICOM do more to explain the purpose of AFRICOM to not just African leaders.207 Beth Tuckey. “June 2008 Testimony: House Foreign Affairs Committee.’ role in security reform in Liberia by citing a report from the U. There is also the perception of the U.html> .S.206 The Minister of Defense from Liberia.S. was allowed in the U.S. which was solidified by the invasion of Iraq by the U. 120 207 Ploch 8 208 Tuckey.S.afjn. Beth. Africans have witnessed a more “aggressive” U.204 Taking note of permanent U. Many civic groups in Africa perceived AFRICOM to be an increase in U. it has a very bad history in Africa – a history that harkens back to the proxy wars of the Cold War and U. 2008. the defenseless”.” she stated. Samukai.S. which would be a permanent fixture.S.S. military presence on the continent.S. “The ‘train and equip’ idea is not new.

”210 President Johnson-Sirleaf urged that AFRICOM’s purpose was to provide African states with the ability to “develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance. and developing good civil-military relationships. 213 Ploch 7 .” further noting.”211 In response to Liberia’s offer to host AFRICOM’s headquarters. but if not we will not take it. Reed 6 211 Ibid. Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf replied. one.38 trained Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. 212 Ibid.”213 In an attempt to rally support for AFRICOM. Prime Minister Meles Zanawi stated that Ethiopia was “ready to work with AFRICOM” and that “the command could contribute a lot to ensuring peace and stability in Africa.” Johnson-Sirleaf stated. so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with 209 210 Ibid. for the President dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the continent of Africa. “If it is good (AFRICOM) we will take it. After a meeting.”209 Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf attempted to convince other African states in opposition to AFRICOM’s presence to reconsider mutual benefits that could exist through an effective partnership with the new Command. the Chief of Defense for ECOWAS. stated that ECOWAS ultimately had the “final say” on any of the member states hosting the headquarters. “I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the speculation. President Kufour stated. “AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests. General Andrew Azazi. President Bush visited with Ghanaian President John Kufour. “I am happy. building security capacity.”212 After a November 2008 meeting between General Ward and Ethiopian officials. “but this does not meant that is to the exclusion of African ones.

“U. which does not bode well for African success in the future. expressed concern that the AFRICOM would only “bring more harm to Africa. 27 216 Reed 7 217 Cooke 39 218 Giroux.reuters. Iran and China—will definitely come too.”215 The Prime Minister of Uganda. officials] explain what is the reasoning behind the command. its enemies—Russia.”222 Kurt Shillinger. 22 Ibid. “Africa’ s Growing Strategic Relevance. <http://www. 2008. South African Institute for International Affairs analyst viewed much of the criticism 214 215 Ibid. African analysts have argued that AFRICOM will only push China to begin to militarize its relations with Africa. 221 Ibid.217 Furthermore. 222 Ibid..”221 “If America spreads itself in Africa. Pascal.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL30300688>. which thus far have been centered on economic partnerships.”220 Bile Abdi. . “has said he would allow AFRICOM on Ugandan soil only on a ‘temporary basis’ and only for a mission ‘that is acceptable to the [Ugandan] government’. Africa Command: Aid Crusader or Meddling Giant?” Reuters. 2007.S. 219 Reed 8 220 Fletcher.218 Brig. Gen Robert Winful from Ghana expressed concern that AFRICOM would cause an influx of militarized presence from countries outside of Africa. Jennifer.. and it’s all about partnership. September 30. 3(38): 3. and Chinese engagement in Africa will lead to a “colonial-era competition”.”216 Many on the African continent have expressed concern that increasing U. Yoweri Museveni.219 Algerian professor of Political Science. “What happens if China wants an AFRICOM?” Winful posed.S.”214 Ghanaian Air Vice Marshall Julius Boateng affirmed. Ismail Maaref Ghalia stated that AFRICOM’s focus was on “weakening the increased presence of other powers like China. an unemployed worker residing in Somalia.S. “I have had had a chance to hear [U.39 mutual respect.” CSS Analyses in Security Policy.

223 Conflicting messages coming from the U.”227 Rwanda’s Ambassador to the U. a headquarters location on the continent…that’s work that’s down the road. would eventually settle over time.”224 Four days prior. “we (AFRICOM) have pretty much got a potential location in each region…a couple of countries have approached us about hosting and we’ve responded with preliminary dialogue.”225 Other than mixed messages about bases and the mission of the Command.S. “noted the importance of explaining that the United States will not make decisions or engage in combat on behalf of African forces. Ploch 4 225 Ibid. An AFRICOM officer noted that AFRICOM “was seen as a massive infusion of military might onto a continent that was quite proud of having removed foreign powers from its soil. General Ward stated that discussions had not been conducted regarding “a basing – correction.226 The political process involved in the creation of AFRICOM and its perception in the United States was also an enigma for the African understanding of AFRICOM. James Kimonyo. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.40 towards AFRICOM as “neo-imperialistical conspirational objections” which.”228 Lt. however. Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae of Ethiopia “stressed that the United States must take into account that its interests are not always African interests (and vice versa). government in reference to the positioning of AFRICOM on the continent certainly did not aid in captivating the trust of African countries opposed to its presence on the continent. Theresa Whelan. the American bureaucratic intricacies were difficult to comprehend.S. On October 15 2008. 226 Esterhuyse 118 227 DeYoung 228 Ploch 8 . 223 224 Ibid. stated..

” Stars and Stripes. 2009.”229 Causes The main cause of AFRICOM’s failed reception is the insufficiency by decision makers to effectively apply America’s changed security framework to AFRICOM’s core structuring. <http://www. Few countries want to see the headquarters established on the continent. First.41 so AFRICOM must build on common interests between the two. Third. as opposed to searching for a host country for AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. the majority of African perceptions towards AFRICOM are not a negative reaction to the Command itself. Conditions and Trends Location Though reactions are mixed. three options exist for the location of 229 230 Ibid. and the importance of the knowledge required to increase the value of engagement has been given little importance. but the possibility of the location of its headquarters in Africa. an understanding of the level of engagement on the continent is hazy.stripes.asp?section=104&article=61658>. Appearing before Congress. Vandiver. March 29.com/article. . John. a decision as to the permanent location of AFRICOM’s headquarters has yet to be decided and articulated.230 Though Secretary Gates announced that no decisions regarding AFRICOM’s headquarters would be made until 2012. “AFRICOM Pleased With Capitol Hill Trip. General Ward explained that AFRICOM was focusing more on building programs and implementing initiatives. As of now. This has manifested itself in AFRICOM’s challenges three ways. the nature of the interagency cooperation built into AFRICOM’s organizational structure and its ability to provide cohesive policy has not been adequately accepted and explained. Second. considering and better articulating feasible options is still essential.

”234 Confronting security challenges in Africa undoubtedly relies on the utilization of a three D’s strategy. Interagency Approach While the U.233 As stated by Vice Admiral Moeller. The “Stuttgart +5” is a third option. 12 234 Ibid. The first option would be to maintain the headquarters in Stuttgart with no plans for a move elsewhere. it would be a possibility to follow the ASF’s regional plan and create five regional offices. AFRICOM could accept the invitation of one of the African countries willing to host. Thus. and build the headquarters in Africa. The AU has seen success and efficiency in utilizing regional and sub-regional organizations in order to resolve challenges as they arise.cgdev.231 The ASF has divided itself in to five regional brigades.” 12 See Figure 9 for ASF regional brigade structure 233 Brown. responsive governance. The style of interagency coordination has yet to be sufficiently explained by officials 231 232 “Security and Development in Southern Africa. <http://www.42 AFRICOM’s headquarters. Kaysie and Stewart Patrick. “its mandate and personnel” does not intrinsically provide the DOD with the ability to initiate or effectively understand sources of underdevelopment and various levels of instability on the African continent. health. 2007. Second. military is specialized in a vast array of skills. crime and poverty are all pieces of the security environment.232 If AFRICOM is effective in gaining more African trust in the next two years. Economic development.org/content/publications/?type=48>.S. . “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role. “We’ve understood for a long time that the challenges of Africa cannot be solved by the military alone.” Center for Global Development. which AFRICOM could consider. the sub-regional system has been utilized by the AU’s ASF through the PSC.

how such efforts will work seamlessly has yet to be truly expanded upon.. disagreement within departments on the Department of Defense’s new role has created mixed messages and confusion. July 10. Engagement on the African continent The first issue regarding AFRICOM’s engagement on the African continent is concerned with the level of engagement.235 Though there has been support for a whole government approach from other agencies. .D. regional. we don’t get at the heart of the issue. Five levels of possible engagement exist: continental. Various programs have been implemented in each level. however.. asks. or a whole government approach. Hence.236 Descriptions of how AFRICOM will engage with Africa have not been presented in a cohesive and coordinated manner. The second issue is the quality of knowledge of Africa’s cultural framework possessed by those engaging on any level. we don’t understand. others have voiced their disagreement with the idea of the military taking on developmental and/or diplomatic initiatives.”237 235 236 Ibid. Despite disagreements. 2007. from the Department of Defense’s African Center for Strategic Studies. <http://www.43 from AFRICOM. 11 Chau vii 237 Coon. and the magnitude of the input gained from each level. C. we misinterpret. yet no transparent mechanism exists to define the benefits of operating on a specific level. Charlie. many in all three agencies have explained how interagency cooperation would benefit U.S.” Stars and Stripes. Smith.stripes. “AFRICOM Struggles to Improve Image of U. They would prefer a consultation-based approach to interagency coordination.asp?section=104&article=54827&archive=true>. as well as by supporters within DoS and USAID. sub-regional. “Do we see what the Africans see?” He further commented that “in a lot of cases. bilateral and local.com/article. AFRICOM’s interagency coordination can either be defined by a consultation-based approach. policy towards Africa.S.

culture is defined as “multiple discourses. the three major structural issues will each be analyzed according to the chosen criteria. “Avoiding the Cookie Cutter Approach to Culture: Lessons Learned From Operations in East Africa. Rather than offering various policy “packages” as courses of action AFRICOM can implement. 2006.culturalq. but more often coexisting within dynamic fields of interaction and conflict. 241 Chau 53 . 2009 from http://www. a suitable option within each issue can be placed together to create one feasible package.”240 The “various tribal. LLC.com/. Therefore.44 Engaging on all levels in Africa requires an apprehension of the existing “cultural values. November-December: 73. occasionally coming together in large systemic configuration. Retrieved on April 1. which are much different from America’s. ethnic.” Military Review. Analysis of Policy Options AFRICOM’s status as a nascent Command places it in a position to confront major issues as they occur.”238 According to the Cultural Intelligence Center. cultural intelligence (CQ) is defined as “a person’s capability to function effectively in situations characterized by cultural diversity. Christopher and Laura Varhola. vi. which “exist below the surface of the immediate perception. local populations and central governments have views.”239 More so. Criteria for Analyzing Policy Options The following criteria will be utilized to analyze potential options in each issue: 238 239 Chau. and religious forces” that are present in Africa are cultural elements.”241 Throughout Africa. 240 Varhola. Culture Intelligence Center.

three options for the location of AFRICOM’s headquarters currently exist: Remaining in Stuttgart. Tests if the selected policy option will be capable of being sustained and absorbed into the structure of the target group.45 1. Absorption Feasibility: Assesses the acceptance of the policy option’s intended target group and others directly affected by the selected policy option. or creating regional offices in Africa and maintaining the headquarters in Stuttgart (Stuttgart +5). organizational structures. a move to Africa. Germany. Political Feasibility: Assesses the political will and “power” of involved actors/stakeholders in implementing policies. A “litmus test” is whether or not the actor/stakeholders acceptance of the policy option creates a policy that is upheld on paper only or actualized. Analyzes the decision-making mechanisms. Absorption Feasibility: The location of AFRICOM’s headquarters affects those in Africa (if physical structures are placed on the continent) and those who operate out of the headquarters. 3. Major Issues Location As previously stated. resource availability. programs and initiatives. Only one African country has been . Administrative Feasibility: Assesses the capability of existing administrative structures within an organization/department to execute the implementation of the selected policy option. Identifies the level of influence wielded by actors/stakeholders in ensuring the chosen policy option is encourages and executed. 2. and “load-bearing” capabilities of the intended decision makers/policymakers.

which is not feasible at this point in time. there exists very small political will in Africa to have the headquarters stationed there.S. Unless sovereignty is imposed upon. A move to Africa would require time spent and manpower to pick an approved location. The military. Governments would perceive AFRICOM in a very negative light. is currently overstretched. and as they hold the power of the purse. especially. and would view the headquarters as an intrusion and flexing of U. All other countries have strongly denied any building of AFRICOM’s offices or headquarters within the boundaries of their location. More so. which is not a necessity as long as the headquarters remains where it is currently located with full operating status. and initiate the planning and construction of headquarters.S. which is not a likely occurrence. funding for a new location would have to come from increased resources. to build an office in Zambia was still opposed. Administrative Feasibility: The location of the current headquarters is still effective in managing AFRICOM’s daily operations. Many in congress have accepted the African reaction to the headquarters’ positioning on the continent. . The request by the U.46 open to hosting the headquarters. and a location in Africa would require increased security personnel. The rest have been vehemently opposed. Liberia is the only country open to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. which reflected the majority of Africa’s government’s opinions on the matter. Political Feasibility: As previously stated. Regional offices would require more administration to maintain seamless integration between all five offices. Amicable partnerships would fall under heavy strain. would not be willing to fund such a venture. military source.

Thus. a consultation vs. Programs already exist in Africa that create linkages between security. which already exist within the framework of many programs in Africa. whole government based approach is a matter of will. However. Administrative Feasibility: AFRICOM has been structured to operate on a whole government approach. However. a whole government based approach towards partnerships between AFRICOM and African organizations. African governments have focused on security sector development. More so. The capabilities exist and are already in the works for a whole government approach. To initiate a consultation based approach would require restructuring AFRICOM’s organizational structure. Therefore. it would set back programs. governments and communities would be beneficial.47 Interagency Approach Absorption Feasibility: Security issues in Africa have strongly supported the evidence of linkages between security and developmental issues. the intrinsic nature of AFRICOM is to operate on a whole government approach. From the civilian Deputy. a consultation based approached could also be followed. development and diplomatic engagement. which is composed of integration between security and development. The whole government approach would be easily absorbed. to the presence of USAID offices within AFRICOM. Political Feasibility: Senator Feingold and other members of congress .

Administrative Feasibility: Ambassador Yates serves as AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military affairs. and most governments. Thus. It is a question of how deeply connected AFRICOM would like to be in Africa. regional and sub-regional organizations. it would appear that the political will of those holding the power over either approach have chosen a whole government approach. which shows their willingness and approval of such an approach. and USAID agreed to the building of an office within AFRICOM’s structure. The DoD has designed a new command based on this approach. The DoS approved of one of their own joining the Command as a Deputy. Civilian organizations and local communities have also approached AFRICOM’s potential as a partner in program implementation and evaluation as possibility. the intended targets in Africa would easily absorb any level of engagement. Those “in charge” of ensuring it occurs are for its implementation. Her entire office is built for engagement between AFRICOM and governments as well as civil . Each possible level of engagement has mechanisms that are already working on confronting Africa’s security challenges. Engagement Absorption Feasibility: The programs offered by AFRICOM have been accepted by IGO’s such as the African Union. that would be filled by a representative from USAID. Thus.48 have called for a whole government based approach towards America’s foreign policy engagement.

General Ward has engaged with leaders from African governments and Ambassador Yates has participated in discussions with civil organizations and visited the worksites of local and national NGOs in order to understand work that is being done on the ground. Civil organizations and the people view the presence of AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent as evidence of America’s militarization of U. policy towards Africa. There has been no indication that AFRICOM’s leadership is willing to focus on less than the five possible levels of engagement. and have collaborated with various stakeholders on each level of engagement. it appears as if the chosen option by the “power holders” within AFRICOM has been to engage in all five levels.49 organizations. Political Feasibility: Decision makers within AFRICOM have explored all options for level of engagement. African governments are against the building of AFRICOM’s headquarters or regional offices on the African continent. Germany. Therefore.S. Recommendations Location It is my recommendation that AFRICOM remain in Stuttgart. The “power of the purse” to pursue building of . AFRICOM is currently conducting programs that involve developmental projects. The DoD spent $100 million to renovate the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart for AFRICOM’s use. thus there already exists a functioning administrative and operating base. and fear such presence would only invite more harm. the administrative capability to function on all levels exists. Therefore. Bottom line.

the administrative structure of AFRICOM was designed around a whole government based approach to interagency coordination. In meetings with governmental officials and civilian organizations. Interagency Coordination Approach A whole government approach is the most viable option for interagency coordination.50 new headquarters elsewhere is mainly held by Congress. Absorption X Administrative Political Consultation . the ability for AFRICOM to have been created and funded with a whole government approach in mind signals the political will of those in power to utilize this approach and gauge its effectiveness. AFRICOM’s officials should state a commitment to a complete focus on building effective programs in Africa and not on hoping to earn enough “trust capital” to build AFRICOM’s headquarters or offices on the continent. It should be made clear to stakeholders in Africa that the current location of the headquarters will be permanent. Though African stakeholders could absorb both approaches. To move towards a consultation-based approach would alter the defining characteristics of the Commands’ new approach towards America’s security framework. Absorption X Administrative X Political X Stuttgart Africa Stuttgart +5 AFRICOM should indicate that there are no plans to build AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa. or establish regional offices. Furthermore. and there is no indication that there would be a willingness to accept the building of AFRICOM’s headquarters or offices in Africa.

44. Therefore. a transparency would exist that could diffuse the confusion and doubt presently in the minds of most Africans. Crocker. attention should be paid to the amount of funding directed to USAID and the security assistance budget within the DoS. developmental projects should be headed by USAID and DoS. <http://isd. and Chester A. Second. “America’s Role in the World: Foreign Policy Choices for the Next President.242 Thus. without creating a divisive breach of departmental “territory”.” Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. ed. offices that share mostly the same mission within each department/agency could operate together more efficiently.georgetown. Major criticism from officials within the two has stemmed from what is perceived as disproportionate and inadequate funding. It would be in the best interest of AFRICOM and the DoD to establish a joint report amongst all three departments outlining the common vision.51 Whole Government X X X The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy’s report suggests interagency cooperation could be effective if “new levels of integration.edu/Americas_Role_in_the_World.pdf>. linking tightly together such entities as DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Establishing coherent goals shared by all three stakeholders should be the first step in effectively explaining the whole government approach the Command is taking. while implementation efforts are carried out by the existing manpower within the DoD. objectives. goals. the State Department’s Bureau for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Engagement All three criteria allow for AFRICOM to format its level of engagement according to any 242 Pickering. Third. . 2008. Thomas R. and plans of action shared by all. and USAID’s Bureau for Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance” were paid more attention to.

the U. 245 Chau vii . Such engagement will also allow AFRICOM use various partners in each level for successful planning. Regional and Sub-regional Therefore. many civil organizations are capable of understanding local and community wide security challenges. As previously stated. Thus. U.S.245 By doing so.S. will be capable of understanding the social and political dynamics in African countries and regions. implementation and evaluation of all programs. it would be wise to gauge what engagement option would be the most effective in allowing AFRICOM’s interests to be well received and understood in Africa. policymaking in Africa falls of short of the comprehension that governments. “Understanding the perceptions of individuals and groups on these various levels” would benefit AFRICOM’s mission tremendously. Civil society in Africa has proven to be capable of addressing many security challenges.52 of the three options. listening to their perspectives and gaining knowledge of their needs and successful strategies is an imperative element to AFRICOM’s progress. people and institutions in Africa do not share the same perception of the world. The lens through which 243 244 Aning 10 Ibid. Absorption X X X Administrative X X X Political X X X All Levels Continent Continent.”244 Engaging on all levels is essential to successful AFRICOM programs.243 “Due to its grassroots engagement. it has been able to work effectively in areas where some international organizations are reluctant to venture.

are not defined by Western cultural norms. continue to view Africa through a “homogeneous lens”.S. Increasing the capacity of African militaries and civil organizations to maintain peace and security. a greater amount of study must be geared towards understanding the cultural complexities of the 246 247 Chau.”247 It is not just in AFRICOM and the DoD where an understanding of heterogeneous culture on the African continent is lacking. Africa’s complexity does not allow for the simplification of sources of conflict and definitions of social and political interaction. vii Varhola 73 248 Munson. 2008.53 beliefs. The art of this understanding will be in how effective AFRICOM will be in coinciding “American interests” with those of “traditional allies and partners in Africa. one-hour cultural briefs conducted during preparation for deployment often misrepresented the culture and diminished its importance in planning operations. FSOs in the DoS spend short stints in countries around the world. Spring: 99. “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa?” Strategic Studies Quarterly. is gaining awareness of the increasing need and support of “African solutions for African problems”. Instead. values and mental outlooks are shaped. but in other departments as well. AFRICOM’s potential effectiveness as a suitable policy solution will be fruitless. Robert.”248 In military education institutions and civil policymaking departments and agencies. Answers to the complex challenges on the African continent cannot be expected to be found within the Western or American cultural perception and framework. as well as create innovative solutions is of much value. As long as policy and military leaders in the U. . Part of understanding culture in Africa. they exist in the minds and hearts of most Africans who want to see a stabilized and developed Africa..246 “In the past. and never truly develop a complete understanding of the intricate composition of a country’s cultural makeup.

Senator Feingold should push for increased communication between all U. Africa will become a key global player in the future. .54 African continent. The ambition of African countries to achieve self-sufficiency will lead to a new Africa that is more capable and stable. all officials in various governmental departments that are expected to deal with Africa must be better educated and prepared to understand different cultural elements on the African continent. As the continent begins to effectively resolve security challenges that deter many countries from actualizing their economic and political potential. stakeholders involved in AFRICOM and U.”249 For U.S. policy towards Africa. All recommendations. should increase the success and positive perception of AFRICOM in all levels on the African continent. Other countries that have taken a more serious engagement in the continent prove this fact. Future leaders “must learn early on and often about the cultures.S. a report outlining and 249 250 Chau 56 Ibid.S. “one meaningful visit means much more than 10 terse PowerPoint-driven briefings. What can be strongly concluded is that Africa is rising as an area of geostrategic importance in the international system. Rather. governmental officials expected to interact with African governments and civilians. traditions. It is a resource rich continent with a high population growth trend. Conclusion Many topics raised in this paper present challenging issues that warrant further research and focus. and diverse African approaches.”250 Cultural intelligence cannot be a one-liner during a briefing. Within the framework of the above recommendations. if implemented. or a footnote in a report.

Various goals and stances exist making it difficult to ascertain one main U. stated in a hearing that. to address all of its future security needs.S.S. it is not just the African perception of AFRICOM that dictates the effectiveness the new command will have in being a new policy direction.S. Russell. 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa. is the physical capability of the U. The U. security interests.S. it is in the 251 Feingold. On March 11.S. has operated in and is still in danger of repeating is no longer a viable option. The U.S.-African policy in their hands.S.gov/record. military is currently overstretched.S.S.cfm?id=305904 . First. Many questions remain about the ability of the U. balance all of its military commitments around the world? The answer to these questions cannot be found in the reactions of Africans to a new command.55 expanding upon elements of U. Rather. and emphasize the role of Africa as a partner as opposed to a spectator. <http://feingold. policy towards Africa should be created.S.”251 The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U. or in the level of importance Africa is to U.S. However. Is Africa an essential military commitment? How will the U. military. policy perception towards Africa.S. is the political will of decision makers in the U. The political will and effort of policymakers in the U. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U.senate. Two other areas of concern exist. must create a cohesive policy goal and commitment towards Africa. or half-hearted ad-hoc measures.” March 11. “Opening Statement of U. Though the QDR replaced the BUR and its overlapping two war structure. Second. hold the fate of U.S. the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have recreated the two major regional conflict scenarios outlined in the BUR. It should outline the complimentary roles each agency will play. “This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies. 2008. Senator Russ Feingold.S.

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state.gov/documents/organization/62657.62 Figure 1: Non-Economic Aid to Africa (1996-2006) fpc.pdf .

63 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup  New Command Setup http://upload.org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/USAFRICOM_United_States_Africa_Command_Map _Draft_.jpg .wikimedia.

64 Figure 3: Current and Potential Effects of Environmental Degradation .

65 http://www.org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.jpg Figure 4: Countries Requiring Food Assistance .7.eoearth.

org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.jpg Figure 5: Effects of Weak Governance .66 http://www.9.eoearth.

2008. Figure 6: HIV Prevalence . “Hap”.67 Harlow.

2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic Figure 7: Malaria Prevalence .68 World Health Organization.

jpg Figure 8: Youth Bulge Density .69 http://www.itg.be/itg/Uploads/MedServ/malariaworld2005.

2008. Figure 9: African Standby Force (Brigade Setup) .70 Harlow. “Hap”.

.71 Appendix A: The Unified Combatant Command System The Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system was created National Security Act of 1947. A UCC is “a military command which has a broad.

”253 Currently. Geographical Commands • U. Pacific Command (PACOM) • U.S.S.S. “The UCP establishes combatant command missions. and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) U.S. .S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 252 253 http://www. Africa Command (AFRICOM) • U.72 continuing mission under a single commander and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) • U. Central Command (CENTCOM) • U. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) U.S. responsibilities.S.globalsecurity.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) U. there are six geographic commands and four functional commands.htm Ibid.S.”252 Changes to the UCC system are done so through the UCP (Unified Command Plan). Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) • • • • Functional Commands U. delineates geographic areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders.S. Europe Command (EUCOM) • U. and force structure.

73 .

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