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Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - Oct 11

Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - Oct 11

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Published by Tim Mathews
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (October 2011); the eighth semi-annual report to Congress on this topic
Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (October 2011); the eighth semi-annual report to Congress on this topic

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Published by: Tim Mathews on Oct 30, 2011
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10/10/2012

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ISAF and the U.S. Embassy are assisting the MoI to develop the management and command and
control necessary for the APPF to meet the needs of the coalition and the international
community. The APPF currently has a guard force of approximately 6,400, and is expected to
integrate approximately 14,000 guards who are expected to transition from existing PSCs to the
APPF, while also generating additional forces of no fewer than 11,000 guards. In total,
approximately 25,000 guards will be required by 2012 in order to support ISAF and
implementing partner security requirements.

To support this growth, the APPF Training Center (ATC) was established in Bagrami District,
Kabul Province. To date, the APPF has three approved Programs of Instruction (POIs): Basic
Static Guard, convoy operations, and Personal Security Detail (PSD); however, the APPF does
not possess the capability to train the convoy and PSD POIs.

The ATC’s current maximum training capacity is 200 guards per three-week course, despite a
stated goal of 500 guards per course. The training center program is only capable of conducting
one course at a time and is hindered by resourcing issues, infrastructure shortfalls, and health
challenges. In an effort to increase the training capacity, the first APPF “Train the Trainer”
course was completed in July, graduating 42 Afghan National Police trainers. To date, these
Afghan trainers have taught three Static Guard courses, which have graduated 615 guards. All
graduates from these courses, however, are from existing contracted security units and have not
added any new capacity to be applied to ISAF or implementing partner requirements.

As directed by the bridging strategy, the MoI, ISAF, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy
recently completed a six-month assessment of the effectiveness of the bridging strategy and the
capacity of the APPF. Specifically, the assessment reviewed whether the APPF will be able to
assume effective management and provision of security to ISAF and ANSF construction sites
and ISAF bases at the end of the bridging period. Subsequent assessments will follow
approximately every three months thereafter.

Key observations from the initial assessment indicated that the APPF was unable: 1) to execute
and maintain the business operations necessary to remain a viable and solvent business; 2) to
man (recruit, vet, train), pay, equip, deploy, and sustain guard forces to meet contract
requirements; 3) to negotiate and establish legal and enforceable contracts with customers for
security services; 4) to command and control security operations across Afghanistan; 5) to meet
the requirements of the bridging strategy. Additionally, the APPF has not created an operational
State-Owned Entity to support business operations essential to manage and execute contracted
security services.

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Also indentified in the September 2011 six-month assessment, inadequate and unresponsive
administrative and logistics support from the MoI have adversely affected the sustainment of the
ATC. Examples of this include a lack of authorized or requested equipment, medical supplies,
fuel, and ammunition, as well as a lack of maintenance and/or repair of existing infrastructure,
such as generators and sewage.

In sum, the APPF is not on track to assume the responsibilities for security services performed
by PSCs, which, barring the extension of the current bridging strategy, are projected to be
disbanded on March 20, 2012. Combined planning efforts are ongoing to resolve the identified
issues in a timeframe that is consistent with President Karzai’s original directive.

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