Gifts under Transfer of Property Act

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O Table of Cases
1. Baby Ammal v. Rafan Asari, 1997)2 SCC 636.
2. Balwant Singh v. Mehar Singh AIR 1974 P&H 130.
3. Bhagatrai v. Ghanshyamdas, AIR 1948 Nag 326.
4. Bibi Maniran v. Mohammad Ishaque, AIR 1963 Pat 229.
5. Brif Raf singh v. Sewak Ram, 1994)4 SCC 331.
6. IT v. R.S Gupta, 1987)2 SCC 84.
7. omissioner of Gift Tax v. Abdul Karim Mohammed 1991)3 SCC 520.
8. uraisami v. Sarofa Ammal AIR 1981 Mad 351.
9. Ghulam Ahmed Sufi v. Mohammed Sidiq areel, AIR 1974 J&K 59.
10. Gomtibai v. Mattula, 1996)11 SCC 681.
11. ameela Begum v. ontroller of Estate uty, Madras, 1991)Supp. 1) SCC 136.
12. Kuppuswami hettiar v. A. hettiar AIR 1967 SC 1395.
13. M.M Khan v. S.A Khan, 1971)3 SCC 810.
14. Makku Rawther v. Manahapara harayil, AIR 1972 Ker 27.
15. Mohammed Hesabuddin v. Mohammed Hesaruddin, AIR 1984 Gau 41.
16. Mohammed Nari:uddin v. Govindarafalu Appah, AIR 1971 Mad 44.
17. Mohsin Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975)2 SCC 122.
18. N.M Thakker v. P.M Thakker, 1997)2 SCC 636.
19. Nasib Ali v. Wafed Ali, AIR 1927 Cal 197.
20. Ram Niwas Todi v. Bibi abrunnissa, 1996)6 SCC 444.
21. Shakuntala v. State of Haryana, 1979)3 SCC 226.
22. Shri Ram Krishan Mission v. ogar Singh, AIR 1984 All 72.
23. Sonia Bhatia v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1981)2 SCC 585.
24. State of U.P v. Sayed Abdul ain, 1973)2 SCC 26.
25. State of U.P v. Sayed Abdul alil, AIR 1990 SC 1272.
26. Taraknath v. Sushil handra ey, 1996)4 SCC 697.
27. '.P.K Umma v. P.N Kunhamu, AIR 1964 SC 275.
28. 'asudev v. Pranlal, AIR 1974 SC 1728.

Table Of Statutes
1. Indian Contract Act 1872.
2. Indian Registration Act 1908.
3. Indian Succession Act 1925.
4. Insurance Act 1938.
5. Stamp Act 1899.
6. TransIer oI Property Act 1882.

Introduction
GiIt is a TransIer oI Property and is deIined in Section 122 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882.
It is a unique transIer oI property in the sense that it involves no consideration. The basic essence
oI a giIt is the complete absence oI consideration|1|. The law oI giIts in India is governed by
Sections 122 to 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882. However Mohammedan giIts are
subject to the rules oI Muslim Law and the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 is not applicable to
such giIts.
The diIIerences between the Muslim Law oI giIts and the law oI giIts under the TransIer oI
Property Act aren`t very great. Apart Irom a Iew minor diIIerences owing to religion and custom
the basic essence and concept oI a giIt is the same under both systems oI law.
There cannot be too many diIIerences between giIts under diIIerent systems oI law as the
deIinition oI a giIt is very clear and there is a well-settled consensus as to what the essential
elements oI a giIt are. To have too many diIIerences between the laws oI giIts might interIere
with the Iundamentals oI the concept oI a giIt and give the transaction a diIIerent colour. For
example there is a consensus amongst almost all systems oI law that a giIt involves no
consideration and involves the elements oI voluntary giving and acceptance Iollowed by
possession in the hands oI the donee ie. the person who accepts the giIt Irom the donor ie. the
person who gives the giIt. This consensus is almost universal and will remain unchanged.
In this project a comprehensive comparative study and analysis oI GiIts under the TransIer oI
property Act 1882 and Mohammedan giIts has been perIormed. This project Iirst deals with
GiIts under the TransIer oI Property Act. It explains and analyses the various sections dealing
with giIts with reIerence to appropriate case law. The study oI Hiba or a Mohammedan giIt with
reIerence to the various rules oI Mohammedan law relating to giIts and judicial interpretation
also Iorms an integral part oI the project. This project also deals with a donatio mortis causa or a
giIt made in contemplation oI death with reIerence to the Indian Succession Act 1925. In order
to achieve a greater understanding oI the concept oI giIts the transaction oI giIt has been
compared and diIIerentiated Irom other Iorms oI transIer oI property. The project also compares
the law oI giIts under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 and the Muslim Law oI giIts. This part
oI the project is extremely important as it is here that the conIlict between Mohammedan giIts
and GiIts under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 is discussed. The researcher has endeavoured
to study the conIlict in great detail Irom various viewpoints and has also given some suggestions
about the same.
The right to giIt away one`s property whether movable or immovable is an important right and
an important element oI property law. Although a giIt involves no consideration in the legal
sense it involves the consideration oI love aIIection spiritual and religious beneIit etc. whose
importance cannot be overlooked. Thus the law relating to giIts has a humane element in it and
as such the law oI giIts should be clear and unambiguous without any scope Ior misuse and
controversy. This objective might be idealist but ultimately the law relating to giIts should
always strive to protect the interests oI the donee donor and the property involved in the greater
interests oI justice.
O #esearch Methodology
Aims and Objectives
The aim oI this Project is to provide a comprehensive analysis and comparison between GiIts
under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 and Mohammedan GiIts. The project aims at explaining
and analyzing the relevant provisions oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 and also
understanding the rules oI Muslim Law relating to giIts. The project also aims at diIIerentiating
GiIts Irom other Iorms oI TransIer oI Property and studying giIts under the Succession Act. The
controversy regarding the interpretation oI section 129 oI the TransIer OI Property Act 1882 has
also been highlighted in the project and suggestions to end the controversy between Hiba and the
TransIer oI Property Act 1882 have also been given.
Nature of project
The project is descriptive as well as analytical in nature. However the majority oI the project is
analytical in nature.
Sources Of Data
The sources oI data used are mainly secondary in nature. A host oI leading textbooks on Property
Law as well as case reporters like All India Reporter A.I.R) Supreme Court Cases SCC) etc.
and journals like Annual Survey oI Indian Law have been reIerred to.
Scope and Limitation
The scope oI this project is limited to the law oI giIts prevailing in India only. Areas oI Iocus and
concentration have been the provisions oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 relating to giIts and
the rules oI Muslim Law relating to giIts in India. Owing to the vastness and complexity oI the
rules under Muslim Law just the basic concepts and Iundamentals oI the law oI giIts have been
Iocused upon.
#esearch questions
The research questions are:
O hat is a giIt under Muslim Law and the TransIer oI Property Act?
O hat are the concepts oI property associated with giIts?
O hat are the various aspects oI Property law that muslim Law and the TransIer oI
Property Act deal with in relation to giIts and how are these various aspects dealt with?
O hat are the diIIerences between Mahomedan giIts and GiIts under the TransIer oI
Property Act 1882?
O hat are the main issues in the controversy and conIlict between the TransIer oI Property
Act 1882 and the Muslim Law oI GiIts?
O How has this controversy been dealt with ?
O How can this conIlict be resolved so as to prevent injustice oI any sort?
Mode of Citation
A uniIorm mode oI citation has been adopted throughout the project.

Gifts Under The Transfer Of Property Act,
1882
Section 122 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 deIines a 19 as
'Gift is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily
and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee,
and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.¨
In ordinary legal eIIect there cannot be a giIt without a giving or taking. The giving or taking are
two contemporaneous reciprocal acts which constitute a giIt. The essential elements oI a giIt
are:|2|
O The Absence oI Consideration
O The Donor
O The Donee
O The Subject Matter
O The TransIer
O The Acceptance
Absence of Consideration
The concept oI GiIt is diametrically opposed to any presence oI consideration or compensation.
The essence oI a giIt is that it is a gratuitous transIer. Blackstone says 'GiIts are always
gratuitous grants are upon some consideration or equivalent.¨|3| The word voluntarily` in
Section 122 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 is used in its popular sense denoting the
exercise oI unIettered will and not in its technical sense oI without consideration`. |4|
In Shakuntala v. State of Haryana[5j the Supreme Court stated that it is one oI the essential
requirements oI a giIt that it it should be made by the donor without consideration`. The word
consideration has not been deIined in the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 but we have no doubt
that it has been used in the Act in the same sense as in the Indian Contract Act 1872 and
excludes natural love and aIIection. II it were to be otherwise a transIer would really amount to a
sale or an exchange Ior each party will have the rights and be subject to the liabilities oI a seller
as to what he gives and have the rights and be subject to the liabilities oI a buyer as to what he
takes. It is the essence oI a giIt that it should be without consideration. The principles laid down
in the Indian Contract Act1872 relating to Iree consent would apply in determining whether a
giIt is voluntary. Law as to undue inIluence is the same in the case oI a giIt inter vivos as in the
case oI a contract. In Shakuntala v. State of Haryana [ôj it was held that a giIt made under undue
inIluence and not voluntarily was void. The court stated that while trying a case Ior undue
inIluence it must consider two things: a) hether the relation between the donor and donee is
such that the donee is able to dominate the will oI the donor. b) Has the donee used that position
to obtain an undue advantage over the donor?
Donor
The donor is the person who gives. Any person who is sui furis can make a giIt oI his property.
A minor being incompetent to contract is incompetent to transIer and a giIt by the minor would
thereIore be void. Trustees cannot make a giIt out oI trust property unless authorized by the
terms oI the trust.|7|
Donee
The donee is the person who accepts the giIt. A giIt may be accepted by or on behalI oI a person
who is not competent to contract. A minor may thereIore be a donee; but iI the giIt is onerous
the obligation cannot be enIorced against him while he is a minor. The donee may be a person
unable to express acceptance. Thus a giIt can be made to a child en ventre sa mere and could be
accepted on its behalI|8|. The donee must be an ascertainable person and so the public cannot be
a donee under Section 122 oI TransIer oI Property Act 1882. GiIt to an unregistered society and
a transIer oI property to God is also not a valid giIt within the meaning oI Section 122. In Shri
Ram Krishan Mission v. ogar Singh[9j dedication oI property by a Hindu to a dharmasala was
held not to be a giIt as the donee was not a living person.
Subject Matter
The subject matter oI the giIt must be certain existing movable or immovable property. It may be
land goods or actionable claims. It must be transIerable under Section 6 oI the TransIer oI
Property Act 1882. However it cannot be Iuture property. A giIt oI a right oI management is
valid but a giIt oI Iuture revenue oI a village is invalid. The release oI a debt is not a giIt as it
does not involve a transIer oI property but is merely a renunciation oI a right oI action. However
an actionable claim such as an insurance policy may be the subject oI a giIt. In a giIt deed the
meaning oI the word money should not be restricted by any hard and Iast rule but should be
interpreted having regard to the context properly construed in the light oI all relevant Iacts|10|.
Transfer
This element oI a giIt is explained later in the context oI Section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property
Act1882 in this section.
Acceptance
In order to constitute a valid giIt the pivotal requirement is acceptance. In N.M Thakker v. P.M
Thakker[11j it was held that the execution oI a registered giIt deed acceptance oI the giIt and
delivery oI the property together make the giIt complete. No particular mode oI acceptance is
required. Circumstances oI the case will determine the mode oI acceptance. A transaction oI giIt
in order to be complete must be accepted by the donee during the liIetime oI the donor. II the
donor dies beIore acceptance the giIt becomes void. Factum oI acceptance can be established by
diIIerent circumstances such as donee taking possession oI the property or being in possession oI
the giIt deed alone.|12|
Trusts
An interpretation oI Section 122 will reveal that a giIt may be made by the equitable machinery
oI a trust; and the interposition oI the trustees enables a giIt to be made to a person not yet in
existence and thereIore incapable oI being the donee oI a direct giIt.
Section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 states how the transIer oI a giIt is eIIected.
This Section may be studied under the Iollowing heads:

O Mode o1 1rans1er- Immovable Proper9
A giIt oI immovable property no matter what the value oI the property can only be made by a
registered instrument. This provision excludes every other mode oI transIer and even iI the
intended donee is put in possession a giIt oI immovable property is invalid without a registered
instrument.|13|
O $na9:res
The giIt deed must be signed by or on behalI oI the donor in order to eIIect transIer. Merely the
signature oI the intended donee on the giIt deed will not eIIect the transIer.|14|
O 99es9a9on
A giIt deed must be attested by at least two witnesses and a giIt deed not attested by witnesses is
void. The essential conditions oI a valid attestation under Section 3 oI the TransIer oI Property
Act 1882 are that two or more witnesses must have seen the executant sign the instrument or
have received Irom him personal knowledge oI his signature and with a view to attest or to bear
witness to this Iact each oI them has signed the instrument in the presence oI the executant. In
Brif Raf singh v. Sewak Ram[15j it was held that no particular Iorm need be Iollowed Iore
attestation oI a giIt deed. In this case a giIt deed was executed by the original owner presented
Ior registration by a duly authorized power oI attorney and attested by two witnesses. It was held
to be valid. Attestation was proved by one oI the witnesses by categorically stating that he had
subscribed his signatures on the giIt deed in three diIIerent capacities ie. Scribe attesting witness
and identiIying witness beIore the registrar.
O #es9ra9on
The word Registered` in this Section does not mean registered in the liIetime oI the donor. II the
other conditions to the validity oI the giIt are complied with the death oI the donor is not a
ground Ior reIusing registration. II a giIt oI immovable property is made by a registered
instrument that is duly registered then the pre-existing right title and interest oI donor stand
divested in the doneee by the operation oI Section 17 oI the Indian Registration Act 1908. In
Kuppuswami hettiar v. A. hettiar |16| it was held that a registered instrument styled as a
release deed releasing right title and interest oI releasor without consideration may operate as
transIer by way oI giIt when the document clearly shows intention to eIIect transIer and is signed
by or on behalI oI releasor and attested by at least two witnesses. A giIt oI immovable property
which is not registered is bad in law and cannot pass any title to the donee. An oral giIt oI
immovable property cannot be made under section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882. In
Gomtibai v. Mattula[17j it was held that mere intention to give away the property is not enough
to eIIect the transIer oI giIt. There has to be a registered giIt deed in order Ior the giIt to be
complete in the eyes oI law.
The eIIect oI an insuIIiciently stamped and unregistered giIt deed was considered in Balwant
Singh v. Mehar Singh.|18| It was held that an unregistered giIt deed cannot be used to prove title.
It was also held that under Section 36 oI the Stamp Act once a giIt deed is admitted in evidence it
cannot be called into question later on the grounds oI insuIIiciency oI stamp.
O #evoca9on o1 19 b Donor
The Privy Council has laid down that aIter delivery oI the deed oI giIt and beIore registration the
donor cannot revoke the giIt. In Bhagatrai v. Ghanshyamdas[19j it was held that where a giIt has
been eIIected by a registered instrument duly attested and the giIt has been acted upon by the
donee the title legally passes to the donee and cannot be deIeated by any intention oI the donor
to the contrary.
O Mode o1 1rans1er - Movables
ith regard to movable property this Section allows two alternative modes oI transIer viz.
Registered deed signed by or on behalI oI the donor and Delivery oI possession.

O Delver
In order that a giIt is valid under this section the donor should have done all that he can to put the
subject matter oI the giIt within the power oI the donee to obtain possession. A valid giIt must
ordinarily be Iollowed by possession|20|. In Baby Ammal v. Rafan Asari[21j the court held that
there must be prooI oI delivery and possession oI the giIted property. In the absence oI such
prooI the deed cannot be construed to be a giIt deed. In Taraknath v. Sushil handra ey[22j
there was no actual delivery oI the possession pursuant to the giIt having been made. It was held
that the circumstances did not warrant physical possession and constructive delivery oI the
possession was enough to hold the giIt valid.
O c9onable Clams
GiIt deeds transIerring actionable claims like shares insurance policies have been held to be
valid. In 'asudev v. Pranlal[23j a giIt deed relating to shares in a company was registered. It was
signed by both the donor and donee. The donor undertook to have the shares transIerred in the
books oI the company to the name oI the donee. The share certiIicates and the giIt deed were
delivered to the donee along with the blank transIer Iorms duly signed. BeIore the transIer could
be eIIected in the books oI the company the donor died. The question arose whether there was a
complete giIt or whether the donor`s heirs could claim the shares. It was contended that the giIt
would not be complete beIore complying with the Iormalities prescribed by the Companies Act
1956. The Supreme Court held that the requirements oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 were
Iully satisIied and the donee was clothed with a right to get his name entered in the company`s
books as the donee. This right would prevail over the claims oI the heirs oI the donor.
O 9en9
This Section does not apply to territories excluded Irom the operation oI the Indian Registration
Act 1908.
Section 124 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 states that a giIt oI Iuture property is void.
There cannot be a giIt oI Iuture property Ior such a giIt can only be a promise and a promise not
supported by consideration is invalid as a contract. There cannot be a giIt oI Iuture property
either under Hindu or Mohammedan law. In IT v. R.S Gupta[24j the court laid down that in
order to constitute a valid giIt there must be existing property. In this case a giIt was given by
instructing a non banking company Iirm or Hindu Undivided Family in which the donor had an
account to give eIIect to the giIt by debiting his account and crediting the account in the name oI
the donee. It was held that mere entries in the books oI account would not constitute a valid giIt
unless the company Iirm or Hindu Undivided Family has suIIicient cash in hand or overdraIt
Iacilities with any bank. The court decided that on Iacts the giIt in question was invalid in
absence oI cash balance or overdraIt Iacilities in the company.
Section 125 oI the TransIer oI Property Act1882 applies only when the giIt is to two or more
donees as tenants in common. The reIusal oI one donee will not prevent the giIt taking eIIect as
regards the share oI the others.
Section 126 oI the transIer oI Property Act 1882 lays down that conditional giIts are allowed by
law. The requirements as to validity oI conditions are:|25|
O A condition should not be vague.
O A condition should not be inherently impossible oI perIormance.
O The condition should not be illegal.
O The condition should not be immoral.
O The condition should not be opposed to public policy.
II the conditions attached to a giIt whether as conditions precedent or as conditions subsequent
satisIy the requirements mentioned above they are valid and can be given eIIect to. II there is a
valid condition precedent the giIt will not take eIIect until the condition is IulIilled. II there is a
valid condition subsequent the giIt ceases when the condition is satisIied. In N.M Thakker v.
P.M Thakker[2ôj a conditional giIt deed was executed by which possession and enjoyment oI the
property were retained during the donor`s liIetime. There was no recital oI acceptance and no
evidence in prooI oI acceptance. The giIt was to become operative aIter the death oI the donor. A
subsequent deed was executed by the donor within a month canceling the giIt deed owing to non-
IulIilment oI conditions subject to which there was an oral understanding between the donor and
donee. The court held that the giIt deed was validly cancelled owing to non IulIillment oI the
conditions. A Resumable GiIt is one which is revocable at any time at the mere will oI the donor.
Such a giIt is void abinitio.|27|
Section 127 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 deals with Onerous GiIts. The eIIect oI an
onerous giIt is that the donee is liable to the extent oI the giIted property in his hands to meet the
obligation with which the giIt is burdened. This section grants a minor the right to repudiate an
onerous giIt aIter attaining majority.
According to Section 128 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 a universal donee is a donee who
receives the whole oI the donor`s property by way oI giIt. On a plain reading oI this section it is
clear that the liability oI the universal donee is to the extent oI the property acquired by him by
virtue oI the giIt deed Irom the donor however in reality Section 128 Iastens the personal liability
upon the universal donee Ior all debts due by the donor at the time oI the giIt.
Section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 excludes Mohammedan Law oI giIts and giIts
made in contemplation oI death Irom the purview oI the law oI giIts in the TransIer oI Property
Act 1882. This section is extremely controversial and its constitutionality has been challenged. It
has been discussed in greater detail later in this project.

Mohammedan Gifts Or Hiba
A Hiba or a giIt under Muslim law literally means the donation of a thing from which the
donee may derive benefit¨.
Eminent jurists oI Muslim law have deIined giIt in various ways. Some oI the important
deIinitions oI Hiba or giIt are:|28|
MULLA : GiIt is a transIer oI property made immediately and without any exchange by one
person to another and accepted by or on behalI oI the latter.
FYZEE : Hiba is the immediate and unqualiIied transIer oI the corpus oI the property without
any return.
ABDU# #AHIM : A transIer oI a determinate property mal) without an exchange. Juristically
it is treated as consisting oI proposal or oIIer on part oI the donor to give a thing and oI
acceptance oI it by the donee. Until acceptance the giIt has no operation.
The importance oI Hiba or giIt in Muslim law lies in the Iact that whereas Muslim law allows
testamentary disposition within the limit oI one-third only a giIt inter vivos may be made
without any restriction. Muslim Law allows a person to giIt away the whole oI his property
during his liIetime.|29|
ssen9als o1 a Hba
The essential elements oI a giIt under Muslim Law are clear and well settled. They are:|30|
O Declaration oI the giIt by the donor
O Acceptance oI the giIt expressly or impliedly by or on behalI oI the donee
O Delivery oI possession oI the subject matter oI the giIt to the donee.
II any oI the above elements is missing the giIt is not complete and will be invalid in the eyes oI
Muslim Law.
Declara9on
Declaration does not simply mean an announcement oI the giIt but also entails that the donor
should have a real intention oI making the giIt. In '.P.K Umma v. P.N Kunhamu[31j a husband
made a giIt oI immovable property by registered deed to his minor wiIe who had attained
puberty. The giIt was accepted by her mother on her behalI. There was no guardian alive to
accept the giIt. The giIt deed was handed over to the minor wiIe`s mother in whose house the
husband and wiIe were living. The court stating that there was a complete intention to divest
ownership on the part oI the husband the donor to transIer the property to the donee his wiIe)
held the giIt complete and valid. In State of U.P v. Sayed Abdul ain[32j it was held that
declaration oI giIt by the donor is an essential condition Ior the validity oI a giIt. here there is
no real and bona Iide intention to transIer the ownership oI the subject oI the giIt an alleged giIt
maybe oI no eIIect. A giIt made with an intention to deIraud the creditors oI the donor is
voidable at the option oI the creditors.|33|
Acceptance
The donee must accept the hiba Ior it to be valid. This acceptance must be express or implied ie.
by conduct. However the giIt oI a debt to a debtor or his heir is valid without acceptance and is
not invalidated by the debtor`s reIusal to accept the giIt. It should be noted that no acceptance is
required when a giIt is to a child Irom his or her mother or Iather or Irom a guardian to a
ward.|34|
Delivery oI Possession
hen the donor makes a declaration oI a giIt and the donee accepts then the possession oI the
thing giIted should also be given to the donee. Such delivery oI possession may be actual or
constructive. It was held in M.M Khan v. S.A Khan[35j that it is essential to the validity oI a giIt
under Mohammedan law that there should be delivery oI such possession as the subject oI the
giIt is susceptible oI. In other words the taking oI the possession oI the subject matter oI the giIt
by the donee either actually or constructively is necessary to complete a giIt. In case there is
more than one donee possession by one donee is presumed to be in the name and on behalI oI
the other co-donees.
Registration oI a giIt deed does not in any way do away with the need Ior delivery oI possession.
There are certain cases when delivery oI possession is not necessary and the giIt is valid even
without delivery oI possession. They are:|36|
O hen the donor and donee reside in the same house.
O A giIt made by a husband to his wiIe.
O A giIt Irom a guardian to a ward or Irom a mother or Iather to their child.
O hen the subject oI the giIt is already in possession oI the donee.
Donors under Muslim Law
Every Muslim male or Iemale who is a major and sane may make a giIt provided he or she is
not subject to any Iorce or Iraud. A married Muslim Iemale can also make a giIt.|37|
Donees under Muslim Law
A giIt may be made in Iavour oI the Iollowing:|38|
1. Any living person who is capable oI holding property.
2. A giIt to a child in the womb is valid provided that the child is born within six months
Irom the date oI the giIt because in that case it is presumed that the child was actually
existing as a distinct entity in the womb.
3. A giIt oI a limited interest in the usuIruct oI the property may be made to an unborn
person provided that such person is in existence when the interest opens out Ior him.
4. GiIts may be made validly to juristic persons such as mosques dargahs and charitable
institutions like schools.
5. GiIts may be made to non-muslims. The giIt property will be subject to the personal law
oI the donee once he gets possession oI it.
Subjects oI Hiba
All mal or Iorms oI property over which control may be exercised are proper subjects oI giIt.
These include all mal whether ancestral or selI acquired movable or immovable corporeal or
incorporeal.
A giIt oI an ACTIONABLE CLAIM is also valid under Muslim Law|39|. A Muslim mortgagor
can make a valid giIt oI his right oI eq:9 o1 redemp9on even iI the mortgagee is in possession.
Section 387) oI the Insurance Act 1938 lays down that any person can assign and transIer his
insurance policy his personal law notwithstanding. Thus by virtue oI this section a Muslim can
make a valid giIt oI his insurance policy.
Registration oI GiIts
Under Muslim Law a giIt may be oral or written. As Muslim law recognizes oral giIts thus a giIt
under Muslim law need not be registered. As section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882
exempts Muslims Irom the provisions oI Section 123 oI the same act a giIt under Muslim law
cannot be invalidated Ior want oI registration. In Mohammed Hesabuddin v. Mohammed
Hesaruddin[4ôj the court observed that it cannot be taken as sine qua non in all cases that
wherever there is a writing about a Mohammedan giIt oI immovable property there must be
registration thereoI. The Iacts and circumstances have to be taken into consideration beIore
determining whether the giIt requires registration or not. In Nasib Ali v. Wafed Ali[41j it was
held that a giIt deed executed by a muslim who has made a giIt in accordance with the provisions
oI Muslim law is merely evidence oI a complete giIt and as such is not compulsorily registrable
and is admissible in evidence notwithstanding the embargo laid down by sections 17 and 49 oI
the Indian Registration Act 1908. In Ram Niwas Todi v. Bibi abrunnissa[42j the Supreme
Court oI India upheld the validity oI an unregistered oral giIt and laid down that Muslim personal
laws override tenancy laws and other speciIic legislations unless it is speciIically mentioned to
the contrary in the legislation.
19 o1 Corp:s (n) and Us:1r:c9 (Mana1)
hat Muslim law does recognize and insist upon is the distinction between the corpus oI the
property itselI and the usuIruct oI the property. Over the corpus oI the property the law
recognizes only absolute dominion heritable and unrestricted in point oI time and where a giIt
oI the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion the condition
is rejected as repugnant but interest limited in point oI time can be created in the usuIruct oI the
property and the dominion over the corpus takes eIIect subject to any such limited interests.|43|
In ameela Begum v. ontroller of Estate uty, Madras[44j it was held that a reservation oI the
rights in manaIi so long as the ayn is transIerred does not render the giIt bad.
Conditional Contingent and Future GiIts
Conditional GiIts may be oI two types:
O Conditional Gifts- Conditional GiIts or giIts that are suspended on a condition are
invalid unless the condition is such that it can be IulIilled immediately in which case it
constitutes the acceptance. Thus iI the donor says ' when tomorrow comes I will give you
a computer¨ the giIt is invalid. A condition which is capable oI immediate IulIillment
becomes the acceptance iI it is perIormed and the giIt is valid. Thus iI a person says to
another 'iI you owe me money you are absolved Irom it¨ then the giIt is valid as
existence oI the debt would constitute acceptance.
O Gifts with conditions- II a giIt is made subject to a condition which comes in the way oI
Iull ownership oI the giIted property the giIt is valid but the condition is void. II a house
is giIted on the condition that it shall not be sold then the restraint on alienation is void
and the house belongs absolutely to the donee. In Mohammed Nari:uddin v.
Govindarafalu Appah[45j the court considered the validity oI a giIt with a condition
restraining alienation under Muslim law as well as under the TransIer oI Property Act
1882 and held that it was not possible to put restraints on alienation.
Contingent GiIt
A hiba cannot be made to take eIIect on the happening oI a contingency or a Iuture uncertain
event. All contingent giIts are void.|46| Only a giIt oI an insurance policy which may be
contingent in nature is valid owing to the operation oI Section 387) oI the Insurance Act 1937.
Future GiIt
A hiba must be oI existing property. It cannot be made to take eIIect at any Iuture time whether
such time is deIinite or indeIinite. For example iI A makes a giIt to B oI 'the Iruit that will be
produced by his palm tree next year¨ the giIt is void as it is a giIt oI Iuture property.|47|
GiIt through the medium oI trust
A giIt may be made through the medium oI trust. The same conditions are necessary Ior the
validity oI such a giIt as those Ior a giIt made directly to the donee with the diIIerence that in the
case oI a giIt through the medium oI trust the giIt should be accepted by the trustees and
possession should also be delivered to the trustees. A Mohammedan cannot through the medium
oI trust settle property Ior the beneIit oI persons who are incapable oI taking under the law oI
giIt nor can he through a trust create an estate not recognized by the law oI giIts oI the sect to
which he belongs.|48|
Revocation oI GiIt
According to Muslim Law all voluntary transactions are revocable. Thus giIts may also be
revoked. A giIt may be revoked by the donor at any time beIore delivery oI possession. The
reason is that the giIt is not a giIt beIore delivery oI possession and hence the rules relating to
giIts do not apply to it. hen a giIt is complete and the subject matter oI the giIt is duly
transIerred to the donee revocation oI the giIt is possible only through intervention of the court
of law or by the consent of the donee.
In the Iollowing cases a completed giIt cannot be revoked even by the court or through the
consent oI the donee:|49|
O here it is made by the husband to his wiIe or vice versa
O here the donor and donee are related to one another within the prohibited degrees by
consanguinity
O here the donor or donee dies
O here the thing given is destroyed or lost
O here the thing given has passed out oI the donee`s possession by giIt sale or otherwise
O here the thing given has increased in value
O here the thing given has so changed that it cannot be identiIied
O here the donor has received a return ewa:) Ior the giIt
O here the giIt amounts to a sadaqa
Hiba-bil-ewaz
A hiba-bil-ewa: as distinguished Irom a hiba is a giIt Ior consideration. AIter the giIt has been
made the donee may oIIer to make a reciprocal giIt to the person making the primary giIt. Then
the reciprocal giIt is called the ewa: or return Ior the primary giIt. II the ewa: is accepted then it
becomes a hiba-bil-ewa:.|50|
In India the hiba-bil-ewa: is not recognized as a giIt. It is treated as a sale and has all the
incidents oI a contract oI sale. A hiba-bil-ewa: is thus governed by the law relating to sale in the
TransIer oI Property Act 1882.
Sadaqa
A sadaqa is a giIt made with the object oI acquiring religious or spiritual merit.|51| It is exactly
like a hiba with the only exception being that it cannot be revoked under any circumstance.

O Gifts Under The Indian Succession Act, 1925
A donatio mortis causa or giIt in contemplation oI death is deIined by Section 191 oI the Indian
Succession Act 1925 as: A gift is said to be made in contemplation of death where a man,
who is ill and expects to die shortly of his illness, delivers to another possession of any
movable property to keep as gift in case the donor shall die of that illness. Such a gift may
be resumed by the giver and shall not take effect if he recovers from the illness during
which it was made; nor if he survives the person to whom it was made.¨
The requirements oI a GiIt in Contemplation oI Death as laid down by Section 191 oI the Indian
Succession Act 1925 are:
O The giIt must be oI movable property
O It must be made in contemplation oI death
O The donor must be ill and expects to die shortly oI the illness
O Possession oI the property should be delivered to the donee
O The giIt does not take eIIect iI the donor recovers Irom the illness or the donee
predeceases the donor
These requirements oI a valid donatio mortis causa were laid down by the Supreme Court oI
India in omissioner of Gift Tax v. Abdul Karim Mohammed.|52| In this case the Supreme Court
interpreting Section 191 oI the Indian Succession Act 1925 stated that there was nothing new in
the requirements provided under Section 191 oI the Indian Succession Act 1925.They are
similar to the constituent elements oI a valid donatio mortis causa. The Court also laid down that
Section 191 provided Ior meaning or requirements oI a giIt in contemplation oI death and this
section could not be invoked Ior claiming exemption Irom giIt tax.
A giIt made in contemplation oI death is called a Mar:-ul-maut under Muslim Law. A mar:-ul-
maut satisIies the conditions oI section 191 oI the Indian Succession Act 1925.
A donatio mortis causa or giIt made in contemplation oI death is exempt Irom the provisions oI
TransIer oI Property Act 1882. The main diIIerences between a donatio mortis causa and a giIt
as deIined in the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 are:
O A donatio mortis causa is one made by a person expecting that he would die oI an illness.
An ordinary giIt may be made at any time.
O In a giIt made in contemplation oI death the condition that the giIt shall not take eIIect iI
the donor recovers Irom the illness is implied. In an ordinary giIt conditions are not
imported by implication.
O A donatio mortis causa is resumable at the will oI the donor. An ordinary giIt resumable
at the will oI the donor is void.
O A giIt made in contemplation oI death relates only to movable property whereas a giIt
under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 may relate to movable or immovable property.
O An ordinary giIt takes eIIect immediately aIter the giIt deed is completely executed while
a donatio mortis causa takes eIIect only on the death oI the donor.
O Gift And Other Transfers
A GiIt though a transIer oI property is a gratuity and an act oI generosity and does not contain
any element oI consideration in any shape or Iorm. Complete absence oI monetary consideration
is the main hallmark which distinguishes a giIt Irom a grant or other transactions like lease sale
mortgage etc. which may be Ior valuable or adequate consideration. here there is any
equivalent or beneIit measured in terms oI money in respect oI a giIt the transaction ceases to be
a giIt and assumes a diIIerent colour. The motive or the purpose oI making a giIt should not be
conIused with the consideration which is the subject matter oI the giIt. Love aIIection spiritual
beneIit and many other Iactors may enter in the intention oI the donor to make a giIt but these
Iilial considerations cannot be called or held to be legal considerations as understood by law.|53|
Thus in spite oI a giIt being such a unique Iorm oI transIer it is oIten conIused with other Iorms
oI transIer oI property. The courts have done their bit in clearing the conIusion and
diIIerentiating between a giIt and other Iorms oI transIer oI property.
GiIt and Licence
In The State of U.P v. Sayed Abdul alil[54j the plaintiII was allotted a house by His Highness
Nawab oI Rampur. AIter the merger oI Rampur with U.P in 1949 this house was given to the
Municipal board oI Rampur by the Government oI Uttar Pradesh. The Municipal Board
thereupon demanded rent Irom the plaintiII through notices and on reIusal to pay attached the
house. The plaintiII Iiled a suit Ior declaration that he was the owner oI the house in possession
and in the alternative he was a licencee entitled to remain in possession oI the house Ior liIe
without payment oI any rent. On a perusal oI the document by which this house was allotted to
the plaintiII the court observed that the Nawab meant to do nothing more than to give to the
plaintiII Iree residential accommodation in a house owned by the government. For a transIer oI
ownership the purpose is stated clearly to be that the property given will be owned and
possessed henceIorth by the donee in such a way that he can use it or deal with it as he likes.
Mere allotment oI accommodation by the order oI the Nawab will not constitute transIer oI
ownership. TransIer oI ownership in the ordinary course is expected to be evidenced by much
more clear and unequivocal language. The transaction was held to be a grant oI licence revocable
at the grantors option. In the absence oI any declaration oI giIt by the donor it cannot be taken to
be a giIt oI the property under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882.
GiIt and ill
hether a document operates as a giIt or a will is oIten a controversial subject. II it is a ill it
will be revocable even iI it contains a clause Iorbidding alienation. Otherwise the revocation
would be invalid in the Iace oI the condition Iorbidding revocation. The question was considered
in uraisami v. Sarofa Ammal.|55| The court pointed out that the real test to distinguish between
a giIt and a ill was whether or not there is a transIer in praesenti. In this case the executant
reserved to himselI a right in the property Ior his liIe time and subject to this gave the property
to A the plaintiII). A was not to alienate the property during the executant`s liIe time and the
patta Ior the land was to continue in the name oI the executant during his liIetime. It was
concluded Irom these directions that the executant intended to execute a settlement deed
operative in praesenti and so his subsequent revocation was invalid and the subsequent alienee
Irom him could not acquire any title.
O Hiba V. Gifts Under The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Analyzing the concept oI GiIt under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 and Hiba under Muslim
Law brings to light the Iact that there is not much diIIerence between Mohammedan giIts and the
law oI giIts under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882. The basic essence oI a giIt and its main
concepts are more or less the same under both systems oI law. However there are a Iew areas
where there are some diIIerences between a hiba and a giIt as understood by the TransIer oI
Property Act 1882.
AIter delivery oI the giIt is complete and the giIt is in possession oI the donee it cannot be
revoked under any circumstance under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882. However under
Muslim Law a hiba may be revoked even aIter delivery through the intervention oI the court or
through the consent oI the donee. There are however exceptions to this rule when aIter delivery a
hiba cannot be revoked under any circumstance.
The TransIer oI Property Act 1882 does not allow giIts to be made to juristic persons or to non
living things; however under Muslim Law a giIt may be made to a juristic person such as a
mosque.
Under Muslim Law a hiba-bil-ewa: a type oI giIt which has an element oI consideration is valid.
However under the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 a giIt which has any element oI consideration
is void. The hiba-bil-ewa: is not considered as a giIt in India but in Classical Mohammedan Law
a hiba-bil-ewa: is a valid giIt.
A donatio mortis causa or giIt made in contemplation oI death comes within the purview oI
Section 191 oI the Indian Succession Act 1925. A donatio mortis causa under Muslim Law is
known as a mar:-ul-maut. A mar:-ul-maut satisIies the conditions oI Section 191 oI the Indian
Succession Act 1925.|56| The only diIIerence is that through a mar:-ul-maut a donor can giIt
away only one third oI his estate and iI he wishes to exceed this limit the prior consent oI his
heirs is necessary.
Mohammedan Law allows oral giIts whereas the TransIer OI Property Act 1882 does not.
Registration is thus an essential element to eIIect transIer oI a giIt under the TransIer oI Property
Act 1882 whereas under Muslim Law Registration oI a giIt deed is not necessary. This
diIIerence is the main bone oI contention between the law oI giIts under the TransIer oI Property
Act 1882 and Mohammedan GiIts and has stirred up a huge controversy which has even led to
challenging the constitutionality oI certain provisions oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882.
Section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 lays down the manner in which a giIt has to be
eIIected and prescribes the need Ior a registered instrument signed by or on behalI oI the donor
and attested by at least two witnesses iI the subject matter is immovable property.
Section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 provides that 'Nothing in this chapter which
deals with giIts)..shall be deemed to aIIect any rule oI Mohammedan Law.¨
In Ghulam Ahmed Sufi v. Mohammed Sidiq areel[57j the Full Bench oI the Jammu and
Kashmir High Court was asked to make an 'authoritative pronouncement¨ on the proposition
oI law 'iI in view oI sections 123 and 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 the Muslim Law
on the question oI giIts stands superseded and whether it is necessary that there should be a
registered instrument as required by sections 123 and 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882
in the case oI giIts made under Muslim Law. On a review oI the case law and a close
examination oI the wording oI section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 the court
answered both the questions in the negative. It pronounced that Sections 123 and 129 oI the
TransIer oI Property Act 1882 did not supersede Muslim Law relating to oral giIts and that a
registered instrument would not be necessary Ior a giIt under Muslim Law. According to the
court only iI an instrument was executed and its execution was contemporaneous with the
making oI the giIt the instrument should be registered as provided in Section 17 oI the Indian
Registration Act 1908. This decision oI the court which it called an authoritative
pronouncement was a mere restatement oI what is undoubtedly settled law on the point at issue.
The court itselI reIerred in its judgment to the identical decisions in several earlier cases oI other
courts which IortiIied its pronouncement.
In Bibi Maniran v. Mohammad Ishaque[58j a Division Bench oI the Patna High Court rejected
the argument that Section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 violated Article 14 oI the
Constitution; the court held that the classiIication between Mohammedans and others was
reasonable having regard to the well known Iundamental diIIerences between the religion and
customs oI Mohammedans on one hand and the religion and customs oI others.
In Makku Rawther v. Manahapara harayil[59j it was held that Section 129 oI the TransIer oI
Property Act 1882 was ultra vires the Constitution iI it was held applicable to all Mohammedan
giIts and should thereIore be construed as limited to Mohammedan giIts oI a charitable or
religious nature. Justice Krishna Iyer in his judgment stated that 'secular¨ Mohammedan giIts
are diIIerent Irom Muslim giIts oI a 'religious¨ nature and such 'secular¨ giIts should conIorm
to the requirements oI writing attestation and registration as laid down in Section 123 oI the
TransIer oI Property Act 1882 in order to survive the scrutiny oI Article 14 oI the Constitution.
By classiIying Muslim giIts into secular and religious categories this judgment imported into the
Iabric oI Islamic law something which was hitherto unknown. In his judgment Justice Krishna
Iyer said that Muslim jurists do not give any hint anywhere oI any taboo oI a Mussalman
reducing a giIt to writing to get it attested or to get it registered by any public authority. He also
asserted that there is absolutely no conIlict between Section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property Act
1882 and the rules oI Muslim Law except may be where religious or charitable giIts are made.
Seen in this context it is not justiIiable to classiIy various communities Ior purposes oI
documentation attestation and registration oI purely secular giIts.
Justice Krishna Iyer`s judgment goes against the settled law in India on the point oI the conIlict
between Mulim Law and the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 with respect to giIts and has come
under severe criticism. It is impossible to distinguish between religious and secular giIts because
Hindu and Mohammedan laws are so intimately connected that they cannot be readily dissevered
Irom it. Moreover Justice Krishna Iyer`s classiIication oI giIts into religious and secular goes
against the norms oI interpreting Muslim law and iI such classiIication was adhered to it would
shake the Iundamentals oI Muslim Law.
It is oI extreme importance to look at this controversy Irom another viewpoint. Registration oI a
giIt deed is not an anti-religious or sacrilegious act. It does not interIere with the observance oI
religious rites. It ensures a proper authentic record oI the property transaction which is
ultimately beneIicial to the parties themselves. As the Muslim jurists have themselves
acknowledged in their deIinitions hiba is regarded as a part oI the law oI contract; the concept oI
contract underscores the concept oI hiba. Just as other sales and contracts by Muslims are subject
to the civil laws oI the country there is nothing unusual in covering these transactions also under
the ordinary civil laws. The only grudge can be on account oI the requirement oI registration Iees
but no Mohammedan jurist has claimed or justiIied immunity Irom secular taxation. An
exemption Irom some legal Iormalities should be claimed in such areas where it is essential to
keep intact religious rites ceremonies or observances oI essentially religious character. Too
much insistence on immunities Irom general laws oI the land breeds separatist tendencies.
Instead oI advancing hair-splitting arguments to claim immunity the Muslim society should
willingly come Iorward to claim maximum integration with the general legal system oI the
country.
O Conclusion
Having studied and compared the Mohammedan law oI giIts and giIts under the TransIer oI
Property Act 1882 it can be accurately said that the most signiIicant issue in India today
regarding the law oI giIts is the interpretation oI Section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act
1882 and the applicability oI the provisions oI the Act to the hiba or Mohammedan giIts. The
courts in India have upheld the constitutionality oI Section 129 oI the TransIer oI Property Act
1882 and have interpreted it to mean that the provisions oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882
shall not apply to Mohammedan giIts and Mohammedan giIts will be solely governed by the
rules oI Muslim law. However Justice Krishna Iyer`s judgment which has gone against the
settled law oI the land and held the TransIer oI Property Act 1882 to be applicable to Muslim
giIts oI a secular nature has come under severe criticism but has raised questions too regarding
the harmony oI laws relating to giIts.
Justice Krishna Iyer`s views on the law relating to giIts are too drastic and iI upheld would shake
the Iundamentals oI Muslim law.
The present situation oI extreme uncertainty overshadowing the law oI hiba brings no credit to
Indian jurisprudence. It creates great diIIiculties and hazards Ior muslims desiring to make
dispositions oI their property. It is thus diIIicult Ior lawyers to tender good advice to their clients
or to take sure step in conveyancing giIts.
An attitude oI callous indiIIerence compounded with inadequate understanding oI a system oI
law sometimes decried as outdated has led some judges sometimes to pass ill-considered
judgments that have inIlicted needless injustice on parties and created conIusion in legal
administration.
It is imperative that this Iield oI law be considered in great depth by the Supreme Court either in
its appellate jurisdiction or upon a presidential ReIerence under Article 143 oI the Constitution
in order that clarity certainty and rationality in the context oI the needs oI contemporary
society in accord with the innate genius oI Muslim Law and in harmony with the general legal
Iabric be restored to Indian Jurisprudence in the matter oI giIts.
However till this conIusion is cleared it is advisable Ior conveyancers to be on the saIe side and
satisIy the requirements oI registration as envisaged by the TransIer oI property Act 1882 and
the rules oI Muslim Law in the case oI all hibas.
To end this controversy legislative change is necessary. Such legislative change should
incorporate in the TransIer OI Property Act 1882 the substance oI the hiba as understood by the
Muslims provide discountenace oI oral giIts not evidenced by registration and provide a legal
Iacility to everyone. This will advance an integration oI the institutions and laws relating to giIts
in India and bring about harmony.
O Bibliography
BOOKS
1. AsaI A.A Fyzee utlines of Mohammedan Law Delhi: OxIord University Press 1987).
2. G.C Venkatasubba Rao ommentary on the Transfer of Property Act Madras: C.
Subbiah Shetty and Sons 1990).
3. M. Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah Mullas Principles of Mohammedan Law
Bombay: N.M Tripathi private Limited 1990).
4. Mulla Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Solil Paul ed. 9
th
ed.) New Delhi: Butterworths
2000).
5. Nishi Purohit Principles of Mohammedan Law New Delhi: Orient Publishing Company
1998).
6. Salil K. Roychowdhury and H.K Saharay The Indian Succession Act, 1925 Bombay:
N.M Tripathi Private Limited 1993).
7. Syed Khalid Rashid Muslim Law lucknow: Eastern Book Company 1996).

|1| Shakuntala v. State of Haryana 1979)3 SCC 226.
|2| Mulla Transfer of Property Act 1882 Solil Paul ed. 9
th
ed.) New Delhi: Butterworths
2000) 1290.
|3| Ibid at 1291.
|4| Id.
|5| 1979)3 SCC 226.
|6| AIR 1972 HP 117.
|7| Supra note 2 at 1294.
|8| Id.
|9| AIR 1984 All 72.
|10| Supra note 2 at 1295.
|11| 1997)2 SCC 255.
|12| Supra note 2 at 1291.
|13| Section 123 oI the TransIer oI Property Act 1882.
|14| Id.
|15| 1994)4 SCC 331.
|16| AIR 1967 SC 1395.
|17| 1996)11 SCC 681.
|18| AIR 1974 P&H 130.
|19| AIR 1948 Nag 326.
|20| G.C Venkatasubba Rao, ommentary on the Transfer of Property Act Madras: C. Subbiah
Shetty and Company 1990) 347.
|21| 1997)2 SCC 636.
|22| 1996)4 SCC 697.
|23| AIR 1974 SC 1728.
|24| 1987)2 SCC 84.
|25| Supra note 20 at 351.
|26| 1997)2 SCC 636.
|27| Supra note 20 at 352.
|28| Syed Khalid Rashid Muslim Law Lucknow:Eastern Book Company) 216.
|29| Id.
|30| Supra note 28 at 217.
|31| AIR 1964 SC 275.
|32| 1973)2 SCC 26.
|33| M.Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah Mullas Principles of Muslim Law Bombay:
N.M Tripathi Private Limited1990) 114.
|34| Supra note 28 at 217.
|35| 1971)3 SCC 810.
|36| Supra note 28 at 220-221.
|37| Supra note 33 at 117.
|38| Supra note 28 at 228.
|39| Supra note 33 at 113.
|40| AIR 1984 Gau 41.
|41| AIR 1927 Cal 197.
|42| 1996)6 SCC 444.
|43| Mohsin Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1975)2 SCC 122.
|44| 1991)Supp. 1) SCC 136.
|45| AIR 1971 Mad 44.
|46| Supra note 28 at 234.
|47| Supra note 28 at 235.
|48| Supra note 33 at 121.
|49| Supra note 28 at 238.
|50| Supra note 28 at 238.
|51| Supra note 33 at 141.
|52| 1991)3 SCC 520.
|53| Sonia Bhatia v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1981)2 SCC 585.
|54| AIR 1990 SC 1272.
|55| AIR 1981 Mad 351.
|56| ommissioner of Gift Tax v. Abdul Karim Mohammed 1991)3 SCC 520.
|57| AIR 1974 J&K 59.
|58| AIR 1963 Pat 229.
|59| AIR 1972 Ker 27.

  %7,3810741!745079.9    

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