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BLGE STRATEJ

Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

BLGE STRATEJ
Jeopolitik, Ekonomi-Politik ve Sosyo-Kltrel Aratrmalar Dergisi Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010 ISSN: 1309-212X
mtiyaz Sahibi: Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi Editr: Do. Dr. Atilla SANDIKLI Editr Yardmclar: Yrd. Do. Dr. Fatih ZBAY, Mustafa GN Yayna Hazrlayan: Eren OKUR Yayn Kurulu: Prof. Dr. Hasret OMAK, Prof. Dr. M. Oktay ALNIAK, Do. Dr. Atilla SANDIKLI, Do. Dr. Bekir GNAY, Do. Dr. Cenap AKMAK, Do. Dr. Abbas KARAAALI, Yrd. Do. Dr. Fatih ZBAY Hakem Kurulu: Prof. Dr. Sami SELUK, Prof. Dr. Ali KARAOSMANOLU, Prof. Dr. Ersin ONULDURAN, Prof. Dr. lter TURAN, Prof. Dr. Nur VERGN, Prof. Dr. Orhan GVENEN, Prof. Dr. elik KURTOLU, Prof. Dr. Hasret OMAK, Prof. Dr. M. Oktay ALNIAK, Prof. Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Dr. Zht ARSLAN, Prof. Dr. Fuat KEYMAN, Prof. Dr. Beril DEDEOLU, Prof. Dr. Hakan YILMAZ, Prof. Dr. Oktay UYGUN, Prof. Dr. Salih AYNURAL, Prof. Dr. Erhan BYKAKINCI Bilge Strateji Dergisi ylda iki say olmak zere Bahar ve Gz dnemlerinde yaynlanr. Bilge Strateji Dergisi hakemli bir dergidir. Bilge Strateji Dergisinin tm haklar sakldr. zinsiz yaynlanamaz. Kaynak gsterilerek alnt yaplabilir. Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi Mecidiyeky Yolu Caddesi, Celil Aa Merkezi, No: 10, Kat: 9, Daire: 36, MecidiyekySTANBUL www.bilgesam.org, www.bilgestrateji.com, bilgesam@bilgesam.org Tel: 0 212 217 65 91-Faks: 0 212 217 65 93

NDEKLER
Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma The New Cyprus Strategy A Recognition Do. Dr. Atilla SANDIKLI...1 Trkiye-Azerbaycan likilerinde Son Dnem The Recent Period of Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations Yrd. Do. Dr. Reha YILMAZ........23 Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi Energy Diplomacy in Caspian Basin Aslhan TURAN.....41 Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr New Security Threats and Results for the Future of the European Union and Turkey Factor Emine AKADA.69 Trkiye-srail likilerinde Yeni Dnem The New Period of the Turkish-Israeli Relations Erdem KAYA.........89 The Bush Administration Fiasco Fram Hegemony to Empire and the Obama Restoration Hegemonyadan mparatorlua Bush Ynetiminin Fiyaskosu ve Obama Restorasyonu Muharrem EK.......109 The USA-Turkey Relationship After 2003 Iraq Crisis 2003 Irak Krizi Sonrasnda ABD-Trkiye likileri Mustafa GN..129

Turkeys Maturing Foreign Policy: A View From the US Trkiyenin Olgunlaan D Politikas: Amerikadan Bir Bak Jessica SIMS...161

YEN KIBRIS STRATEJS TANINMA The New Cyprus Strategy A Recognition Do. Dr. Atilla SANDIKLI

zet: Trk d politikasnda, AB yeliinden, gvenlie, uluslararas hukuktaki sorumlulua kadar pek ok konunun hallindeki en byk kilit nokta, Kbrs sorunudur. Kbrs sorununa zm arama abalar zaman zaman kesintiye uram ve yeniden canlandrlmaya allmtr. Trkiyenin uzlamac tavr karsnda GKRYnin zm zorlatran ayak direyici tavr Annan Plann oylamasnda kantlanmtr. Bu makalede, Kbrs sorununda zm zor bu duruma nasl gelindii tarihi bir perspektifle anlatlacaktr. Ayrca, zm yollar rasyonel bir projeksiyonla ve tanmaya ilikin yeni bir strateji ortaya konularak deerlendirilmeye allacaktr. Anahtar Kelimeler: Kbrs, KKTC, GKRY, mzakere sreci, tannma.

Abstract: Cyprus issue is the most important point managing many problems in Turkish foreign policy, such as European Union membership, security andresponsibilities which are arising from international law. Theefforts to find solution to Cyprus issue have been intermitted and tried to renovate. In spite of Turkeys constructive approach on this issue, Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (the GASC)s disaccord manners were proved by the referendum of Annan Plan. In this article, how we arrived today in this complex Cyprus problem will be explained through a historical perspective. Also, there will be an attempt to analyze solutions to this question by a rational projection, in fact; in new strategy a recognition will be asserted as a way to solve this problem. Keyword: Cyprus, Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus GASC, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (the TRNC), negotiation process, a recognition.

Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi Bakan.

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

GR Trkiyenin hzla gelimesini snrlayan en nemli sorunlardan birisi de hi phesiz Kbrs Sorunudur. Trkiye ve KKTCnin adada kalc ve adil bir bar antlamas imzalanmas iin uygulad strateji ve yapt giriimler Gney Kbrs Rum Ynetiminin uzlamaz tutumu nedeniyle hep baarszlkla sonulanmtr. zellikle GKRYnin Avrupa Birliine giriinden sonra elde ettii durum stnln Trkiye ve KKTC zerinde bir bask unsuru olarak kullanabilme avantaj Annan Plan gibi kapsaml bir plana dahi hayr denmesine neden olmutur. Kbrs Sorununun zm iin uygulanmakta olan mevcut strateji Rumlar anlamaya ynlendirebilir mi? Sorunun ortaya kndan bugne kadarki sre iinde, koullarda ve d politika ortamnda meydana gelen gelimeler yeni bir Kbrs stratejisinin belenmesini gerektirmekte midir? Yeni stratejinin hedefi ne olmaldr? Ortaya konan problematiklere cevaplar bulabilmek iin Kbrs adasnn jeopolitiini, Sorununun ortaya kn ve geirdii aamalar incelemekte yarar vardr. 1. KIBRISIN STRATEJK KONUMU Yzlm 9251 km2 olan Kbrs adas, Trkiye'ye 71 km, Girit adasna 550km, Kta Yunanistanna 900 km., Suriye'ye 98 km, Msr'a 316 km. uzaklktadr.1 Kbrs adas, bu zellikleri ile; blgede, deniz ve hava yollar zerinde, batmayan dev bir uak gemisi ve fzeler iin rampa; Anadolunun gneyden igali iin adeta bir atlama ta gibidir. Mersin ve skenderun limanlarna giri ve klar etkili bir ekilde kontrol edecek konumdadr. Ayn ekilde Suriye ve srail liman ve sahillerinin gvenlii iin de byk deer tar. Akdenizin dousundaki deniz nakliyatnn kontrol asndan fevkalade nemlidir. Trk boazlar ile Svey Kanalnn Dou Akdenize almas Kbrs adasnn nemini daha da artrmaktadr. Ayrca Kbrs, Ortadou petrolleri ile petrol nakliyatnn kontrol bakmndan da ok nemli bir konumdadr. Ege Denizinde Yunan adalar ile kuatlm Anadolunun, gneyden de kuatlmasn tamamlayan nemli bir

Kbrsn Dn- Bugn-Yarn, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1995, S.1.

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

adadr.2 2. KUZEY KIBRIS TRK CUMHURYETNN KURULMASI 307 yl Osmanl hkimiyeti altnda kalan Kbrsn ynetimi 1878 ylnda, hkmranlk hakk Osmanl mparatorluunda kalmak kaydyla, ngiltere'ye devredildi. Trkiye Ada zerindeki ngiliz egemenliini Lozan Antlamasyla 1923 ylnda tand.3 1931den itibaren Kbrsl Rumlar Yunanistan ile birleme taleplerini dile getirmeye baladlar ve kinci Dnya Sava sonrasnda da Kbrsn Yunanistan ile birletirilerek, tamamen bir Elen adas haline getirilmesi eklinde zetlenebilecek olan ENOSS kampanyasna hz verdiler.4 BM'den tek tarafl "self-determinasyon" (kendi kaderini tayin etme), Enosis lehinde bir karar elde edilememesi, Kbrsl Trklerin Enosis'e kar direnileri ve Trkiye'nin kendilerini desteklemekteki kararll, Trkiye ile Yunanistan arasnda mzakerelerin balatlmasna imkan salad. Trkiye ile Yunanistan 11 ubat 1959 tarihinde Zrih'te anlamaya vard. Londra'da ngiltere'nin ve Kbrs'taki iki toplumun liderlerinin onay alnd. Bu ekilde ortaya kan Zrih ve Londra Anlamalar bamszlk, iki toplumun ortakl, toplumsal alanda otonomi, Trkiye, Yunanistan ve ngilterenin garantisi ilkelerine dayandrld.5 Rum taraf, Kbrs Cumhuriyetinin kurulduu ekilde yaamasna ans vermedi. Kbrs Trklerini devlet kurumlarndan dlamaya, izole etmeye, Adadaki varlklarn sona erdirmeye ve nihayet Yunanistan ile birleme yolunu amaya ynelik olarak giriimlere arlk verdi. Kbrs Trk tarihine Kanl Noel adyla geen bu kampanya nceden hazrlanm olan Akritas Planna6 dayandrld.

Cumhur Evcil, Yavru Vatan Kbrsta Zaferin Hikayesi, Gnkur.Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etd Bakanl Yaynlar, Ankara, 1999, S.1. Daha Geni Bilgi in Baknz. Necip Torumtay, Kbrs Sempozyumu A Konumas, Kbrs Sempozyumu Kitab, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1998, s.15. 3 Rfat Uaral, Siyasi Tarih, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1987, s. 592. 4 Ahmet C. Gaziolu, Kbrs Tarihi ngiliz Dnemi, Kbrs Aratrma ve Yayn Merkezi Yayn, Lefkoa, 1997, s. 76. 5 Sabahattin smail, 150 Soruda Kbrs Sorunu, Kasta Yaynevi, stanbul, 1998, s. 52. 6 Orbay Delicermak, Yerinde Yeller Esen Anayasa, Ankara, 1997, s. 17.

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

15 Temmuz 1974 tarihinde Yunan Cuntasnn desteiyle EOKA lideri Nikos Sampson aday Yunanistan'a balamak amacyla Makarios'a kar bir darbe gerekletirerek iktidar ksa sreyle ele geirdi. Kbrs'n egemenliine ve toprak btnlne kasteden bu hareket karsnda Trkiye, 1960 Garanti Antlamas erevesinde, nce ngiltere'ye ortak mdahale teklifinde bulundu. Trkiye, ngiltere'nin olumsuz cevap vermesi zerine, Ada'daki Trklerin gvenliini de dikkate alarak 20 Temmuz 1974 gn Bar Harekatn balatt.7 Bylece Kbrs'n Yunanistan'a ilhak nlenmi ve Kbrs Trk halknn varl gvence altna alnm oldu. BM gzetiminde kalc bir bar antlamas imzalanmas iin taraflar arasnda ok uzun sren grmeler yapld. Bu grmeler sresinde zaman zaman nemli tkanklar ve sorunlar yaand. Sorunlarn almas ve GKRYyi bara tevik etmek iin Kbrs Trk Halk, ileride kurulacak muhtemel bir federasyonun Kbrs Trk kanadn oluturmak zere, 13 ubat 1975'de Kbrs Trk Federe Devletini (KTFD) kurdu.8 Zaman iinde Kbrs Trk halk bar antlamas iin yapt giriim GKRY tarafndan samimi bir karlk bulmad. GKRYyi bara zorlamak maksadyla, "self-determinasyon" hakkna dayanarak ve siyasi eitlii vurgulayarak 15 Kasm 1983 tarihinde Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyetinin (KKTC) kurulduunu ilan etti.9 24 maddelik Bamszlk Deklarasyonunu10KKTCnin bamsz bir devlet olduunu belirtiyordu. Bu yola gidilirken federasyon tezi muhafaza edildi ve Rum tarafna bar ve zm arsnda bulunuldu. Bu nedenle tantm iin kararl ve yeterli giriimler yaplmad.

Fahir Armaolu, 20. Yzyl Siyasi Tarihi, 11. Bask, Alkm Yaynevi, stanbul, s. 801804. 8 Ali Fikret Atun, kinci Kbrs Seferi, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1999, S.113. 9 Faruk Snmezolu, Trk D Politikas, Der Yaynlar, stanbul, 2006, s. 414. 10 Bamszlk Deklarasyonunun metni:The Declaration and Resolituon adopted by the Turkish Cypriot Parliament on 15 November 1983-For the Liberty, equality, Dignity, and Security of Our People, Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyeti Yayn. 4

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

3. MZAKERE SREC 3.1. Mzakere Srecinin Balangc KKTC Trkiye dnda dier lkeler tarafndan tannmad ancak BM Genel Sekreterini harekete geirdi ve iyiniyet grevi erevesinde 1984 Austos aynda yeni bir giriim balatmasn salad. Bu erevede Kbrsl Trk ve Rum yetkilileri ayr ayr grmek zere Viyana'ya davet etmitir. Genel Sekreter, taraflara Viyana alma Noktalar diye bilinen belgeyi sunmutur. Bu tarihten sonra, Kbrs sorununun eitli veheleri tek tek deil, ayrlmaz bir btn halinde ele alnmaya baland. 1985 ylnda Kbrs Trk ve Rum taraflarnda yaplan seimleri mteakip, BM Genel Sekreteri taraflarla istiarelerde bulunduktan sonra 29 Mart 1986da Taslak ereve Antlamasn sunmutur.11 Sz konusu ereve Antlamas, Kbrsta iki uluslu bir federal devlet kurulmasn, Rum Cumhurbakan ve Trk Cumhurbakan Yardmcsnn veto yetkilerinin olmasn ve Trk tarafnn toprann yzde 29un zerinde bir oran olarak belirlenmesini ngrmtr. KKTC Cumhurbakan Denkta 21 Nisan 1986da, Trk taraf iin nem arz eden temel hususlar dile getiren ve paketi bir btn halinde kabul ettiini bildiren bir mektubu Genel Sekretere gndermitir. Denkta 27 Nisan 1986 tarihli ikinci mektupla da antlamay imzaya hazr olduunu bildirmitir. Rum Lider Kipriyanu ise nerilere yant vermeyerek uluslararas bir konferans arsnda bulunmutur. 3.2. Fikirler Dizisi ve Mzakere Sreci Kbrs sorununa zm arama abalar 1990 ylnn ilk aylarndan itibaren tekrar hareketlilik kazanm ve giderek younlamtr. Bu abalarn sonucunda Trkiye ve Kbrs Trk tarafnn da aktif katklaryla BM Genel Sekreteri Butros Ghali, "Fikirler Dizisi" adn tayan ve gayr resmi nitelikte olan bir anlama erevesi tasla oluturmu ve bunu taraflara iletmitir. 1992 ylnn Haziran ve Kasm aylar arasnda New York'ta yaplan mzakereler, kapsaml zme ilikin zl konular etrafnda odaklam, Kbrs'ta kurulacak yeni ortakln siyasal vehesini

11

Armaolu, a.g.e., s. 960.

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

ieren konular "Fikirler Dizisi"12 erevesinde ele alnmtr. Fikirler Dizisinde iki federe devletten oluan bir federal yap zme esas alnm; 1960 dzeninde de ngrld zere, 1960 Garanti ve ttifak Antlamalar muhafaza edilmi; ayrca Federal Kbrsn Trkiye ve Yunanistan'a her konuda "most favoured nation" stats tanyaca belirtilmitir. ereve Anlamasnn, iki tarafn mutabakatn takiben yaplacak Drtl Konferans'ta nihai hale getirilmesi ve 30 gn ierisinde de iki toplumda referanduma sunulmas ngrlmtr. Kbrs Trk taraf 100 paragraflk Fikirler Dizisinin 91'ini kabul etmi, dier 9 paragraf mzakereye hazr olduunu aklamtr. Rum taraf ise, Kbrs Trklerinin, federe bir birim olarak da olsa, ayr bir yapya sahip olmalarn ve Garanti Antlamasnn devamn kabul etmemitir. Rum tarafnda yaplan ubat 1993 Bakanlk seimlerini Fikirler Dizisine kar karak kazanan Klerides, i bana gelir gelmez Fikirler Dizisi'ni mzakere etmeyeceini, esas tercihlerinin AB yelii ynndeki abalarn younlatrmak olduunu aklamtr. Nitekim bundan sonra, Rumlar AB yelii ynndeki gayretlerini, Yunanistan'n da yardmyla gelitirmeye balamlardr. GKRY, Mart 1995te ABnin adaylk stats vermesiyle tamamen AB yeliine odaklanm ve tek yanl bir kararla Kbrs Trk taraf ile diyalogu kesmitir. BM Genel Sekreteri Kbrs zel Temsilcisi araclyla Mart 1997'de balatlan dolayl grmeleri takiben, BM Genel Sekreteri'nin yz yze grmeler iin yapt ar zerine 1997 ylnn Temmuz ve Austos aylarnda yaklak birer hafta sreyle Denkta ve Klerides, Troutbeck (ABD) ve Glion'da (svire) bir araya gelmilerdir. Troutbeck grmeleri srasnda AB Komisyonu'nun genileme konusundaki "Gndem 2000" raporu ve GKRY ile 1998 banda tam yelik grmeleri balatlmasna ilikin13 tavsiye karar basna szdrlmtr. Trkiye ve KKTC tarafndan AB'nin bu tutumuna kar tepki gsterilmi, bu balamda, 20 Ocak 1997 tarihli Trkiye-KKTC Ortak Deklarasyonu'nda ngrlen erevede, GKRY'nin AB yelii ynnde ataca admlarn KKTC'nin Trkiye ile
12

Melek Frat, Yunanistanla likiler, Trk D Politikas, Cilt II, (Ed.) Baskn Oran, letiim Yaynlar, stanbul, 2002, s. 455-456. 13 Atilla Sandkl, Atatrkn D Politika Stratejisi ve Avrupa Birlii, Beta Yaynlar, stanbul, 2008, s. 298. smail, a.g.e., s. 330-331. 6

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

btnleme srecini hzlandraca 20 Temmuz 1997 tarihli Ortak Aklamada kaydedilmitir. Bu dorultuda, KKTC Cumhurbakan Denkta tarafndan 31 Austos 1998 tarihinde, soruna kalc bir zm bulunmas amacyla Ada'daki iki devlet arasnda bir Konfederasyon tesis edilmesi nerilmitir.14 neri, Kbrs'taki iki devletin aralarndaki temel meseleleri zmelerini mteakip ortak bir yaplanma gerekletirmeleri temeline dayandrlmtr. 3.3. Mzakere Srecinin Kesilmesi ve Yeniden Canlandrlmas Kbrs mzakere srecinin yeniden canlandrlmas giriimleri 1999 ylnn ikinci yarsnda hzlanmtr. 3 Aralk 1999-10 Kasm 2000 tarihleri arasnda Cenevre ve New Yorkta 5 tur aracl grme yaplmtr. Beinci turda, grmeler srerken Cenevre'ye gelen BM Genel Sekreteri Annan 8 Kasm gn taraflara Szl fadeler ad altnda bir kat sunmutur.15Katta yer alan ifadelerin, srecin ieriiyle uyumad grlmtr. Denkta, Kbrs'ta iki ayr egemen devlet, iki halk ve iki demokrasi bulunduunu, aracl grmelerin amacnn kapsaml grmelere geilebilmesi iin zemin hazrlanmas olduunu, ancak be turda bunun yaplamadn, grmelerin alm olduu seyir nedeniyle ve Kbrs Trk tarafnn ortaya koyduu makul ve gereki parametreler kabul edilmedike aracl grmelere devam edilmesinde yarar grmediini aklamtr. Cumhurbakan Denkta 8 Kasm 2001 tarihinde, Kbrs sorununa bir k yolu bulunmas amacyla GKRY lideri Kleridese mektup gndererek Adada yz yze grme nerisinde bulunmutur. Bu erevede Denkta, Klerides ile 4 Aralk 2001de Adada ara blgede bir araya gelmitir. Grmenin sonunda BM Genel Sekreteri temsilcisi De Soto tarafndan yaplan aklamada, iki liderin 2002 Ocak ay ortalarnda Adada dorudan grmeyi kabul ettikleri kaydedilmitir. ki taraf arasnda 6 tur olarak yaplan grmelerde, arlkl olarak egemenlik, eitlik, merkezi otorite ile kurucu devletlerin yetkileri hususlar ele alnmtr. BM Genel Sekreteri Annan, Cumhurbakan Denkta ve GKRY Lideri Kleridesle 3-4 Ekim
14 15

Rauf Denkta, Hatralar, Toplay, Boazii Yaynlar, stanbul, 2000, s. 453. Atilla Sandkl, Tarihsel Bir Perspektif inde Kbrs Sorunu ve Avrupa Birlii, Harp Akademileri Blteni, Say: 200, Harp Akademileri Basmevi, stanbul, s.16-17.

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

2002 tarihlerinde New Yorkta bir araya geldi. Grmelerden sonra Genel Sekreterin yapt aklamada Kbrs sorununun basit bir zm bulunmad ve kapsaml zme ulamak iin taraflar arasnda iki tarafl ad hoc nitelikteki teknik komitelerin kurulmasna karar verildii ifade edilmitir. 3.4. Mzakere Sreci ve Annan Plan Annan, 11 Kasm 2002 tarihinde taraflara, Annan Plan olarak da anlan Kbrs Sorununa Kapsaml zm Temeli balkl belgeyi sunmutur.16 Gerek Denktan salk sorunlar, gerekse Ankarada yeni hkmetin kurulma almalar nedeniyle Trk tarafnn plana resmi bir yant vermesi gecikmitir. Bu kritik artlarda ortaya konan plan Trk kamuoyunda iddetli tepki grmtr. Plan mzakere zemini olarak kabul eden Rum taraf ise, mevcut ekliyle kabul edilemeyeceini belirtmitir. BM, Kopenhag Zirvesinden iki gn nce, 10 Aralkta gzden geirilmi, zerinde ufak-tefek deiiklikler yaplan plan taraflara iletmitir. Cumhurbakan Denkta, plannn pek fazla deiiklik iermediini, eski plan olduunu aklamtr. Son dakikaya kadar zm abalarnn srd Kopenhagda hem Rum hem de Trk taraf plana imza atmay reddetmitir. BM Genel Sekreteri Annan, 26 ubat 2003 tarihinde gittii Adada Annan Plannn nc versiyonunu taraflara sunmutur. Genel Sekreter sz konusu plan ve planda ngrlen sreci kabul edip etmediklerini bildirmek zere iki taraf 10 Mart 2003 tarihinde Laheye davet etmitir. Davet zerine iki lider 10 Mart tarihinde Laheyde bir araya gelmilerdir. Anlan toplantya Garantr lkeler olarak Trkiye, Yunanistan ve ngiltere de katlmtr. Grmeler ncesinde Papadopulos ve Denkta, Annan plannda yaplmasn istedikleri deiiklikleri BM yetkililerine iletmitir. BM Genel Sekreteri, taraflara tadil edilmi plan zerinden 28 Mart tarihine kadar mzakereleri srdrmelerini ve plann 6 Nisan tarihinde referanduma sunulmasn nermitir. Grmelerde Denkta, planla ilgili olarak Trk tarafnn kayg ve beklentilerini gndeme getirmi, iki tarafn mutabk kalmasndan sonra plann referanduma sunulabileceini kaydetmitir. Bu erevede, Denkta, 28 Mart tarihine kadar grmelere devam etmeyi kabul
16

Snmezolu, a.g.e. s. 622.

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

etmitir. Papadopulos da plandaki mevcut boluklarn doldurulmas gerektiini ifadeyle, grmelere devam etmeyi kabul etmi, ancak Rum kamuoyunun aydnlatlmas bakmndan referandum iin iki aylk bir kampanyaya ihtiya duyduunu ileri srmtr. Yunanistan tarafndan da desteklenen bu taleple, Rum tarafnn referandumu Gney Kbrsn 16 Nisan tarihinde ABye Katlm Antlamasn imzalamasndan sonraya brakmak istedii grlmtr. Ancak Genel Sekreter, 11 Mart sabah konunun kmaza girdii sonucuna vararak grmelere son vermeyi tercih etmitir. BM Genel Sekreteri Annan 1 Nisan 2003 tarihli raporunda dorudan grmelerin sonusuz kalmasndan Kbrs Trk tarafn sorumlu tutmutur. 16 Nisan tarihinde, Atinadaki AB Zirvesinde dier 9 aday lkeyle birlikte GKRY de AB ile Katlm Antlamasn imzalamtr. Bylece, Trk tarafnn uyarlarna ramen, GKRYi zme tevik edebilecek nemli bir unsur yitirilmitir. BM Gvenlik Konseyinin 14 Nisan 2003 tarihli toplantsnda BM Genel Sekreterinin 1 Nisan tarihli raporuna istinaden Kbrs konusunda bir karar kabul edilmitir. 1475 sayl bu kararn ilem paragraflarnda taraflardan BM Genel Sekreterinin iyi niyet misyonu erevesinde Annan Planndan yararlanarak kapsaml bir zme ulalmas maksadyla mzakerelere devam etmeleri istenmi ve Genel Sekretere iyi niyet misyonunu srdrmesi ynnde destek verilmitir. 1013 ubat 2004 tarihleri arasnda New Yorkta yaplan grmeler, Trk tarafnn olumlu ve yapc tutumu sayesinde baarl gemi ve Adada mzakerelerin tekrar balamas yolunu amtr. New Yorkta varlan mutabakat, Kbrs Trk ve Kbrs Rum taraflarnn belli bir tarihe kadar Annan Plann mzakere etmelerini, zerinde anlamaya varlamayan noktalarda mzakerelere anavatan Trkiye ve Yunanistann katlmyla devam edilmesini ve nihayet anlalamam nokta kaldysa bu alanlarda BM Genel Sekreterinin yetkisini kullanarak formller retmesi ve ortaya kacak nihai belgenin her iki tarafta ayr ayr, ancak e-zamanl olarak dzenlenecek referandumlarla Kbrs Trk ve Kbrs Rum halklarnn onayna sunulmasn iermitir. Bylece, 1 Mays 2004 tarihinden nce zme ulalmas ve ABne birlemi bir Kbrsn katlm hedeflenmitir.

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

Mzakereler neticesinde nihai hale getirilen zm plan 24 Nisan 2004 tarihinde GKRY ve KKTCde referandumlarla Kbrstaki iki halkn onayna sunulmutur. Rum halknn %75.83 Plan reddederken,17 Kbrs Trk taraf kendileri iin getirecei pek ok zorlua ramen %64.91 ounlukla Plana evet demitir.18 Rum tarafnn Plan byk bir ounlukla reddetmesinde GKRY lideri Papadopulosun 7 Nisan 2004 tarihindeki halka sesleniinde Rum halkn gl bir hayr demeye armas ve Rum liderliinin devlet eliyle srdrd hayr kampanyas da nemli bir etki yapmtr. Sonuta, Rum toplumunun reddi karsnda, BM ve AB dahil tm uluslararas camiann destekledii bu kapsaml zm plan geersiz hale gelmitir. 3.5. Mzakere Sreci ve GKRYnin AB yelii GKRY 1 Mays 2004 tarihinde, Kbrs Cumhuriyeti ad altnda ABne tam ye olmutur. Trkiye tarafnda ayn gn yaplan aklamada, ABye katlacak olan Rumlarn, Kbrs Trklerini veya Kbrsn tamamn temsil etmeye yetkili olmadklar, eit statye sahip Kbrs Trkleri veya Kbrs Adasnn tamam zerinde yetki veya egemenliklerinin bulunmad, Kbrs Cumhuriyetinin Kbrs Trklerine zorla empoze edilemeyecei, kendi anayasal dzenleri altnda ve kendi snrlar ierisinde rgtlenmi bulunan Rumlarn, Kbrs Trklerini veya Kbrsn tamamn temsil eden yasal hkmet olarak kabul edilemeyecei belirtilmitir. Aklamada ayrca, Kbrs Trklerinin kendi lke snrlar ve anayasal dzenleri ierisinde rgtlenmi bir halk olarak, hkmet etme yetkisini ve egemenliklerini kullanmakta olduklar, bu erevede Trkiyenin, Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyetini tanmaya devam edecei ve Gney Kbrsn ABye giriinin Trkiyenin 1960 Antlamalarna dayanan Kbrs zerindeki hak ve ykmllklerine hibir ekilde haleldar edemeyecei ifade edilmitir. BM Genel Sekreteri, 28 Mays 2004 tarihli iyi niyet misyonu raporunda, referandumlar sonrasnda Kbrs Trklerinin durumunun uluslararas camia
17

http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hem-hayir-dediler-hemkorkuyorlar/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/19.01.2010/33335/default.htm?ver=07 18 http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yes-be-annem/siyaset/haberdetayarsiv/19.01.2010/33332/default.htm?ver=12 10

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

tarafndan ele alnmas gereine iaret etmekte ve Kbrs Trklerine bask uygulamak veya onlar dnyadan tecrit etmek iin hibir gereke kalmadn kayda geirmektedir. Bu erevede Kbrs Trklerine ynelik ambargo ve kstlamalarn kaldrlmas iin uluslararas camiaya ve Gvenlik Konseyine kuvvetli bir arda bulunmu, Kbrs Trk tarafnn kalknmasn engelleyen ve onlar dnyadan tecrit eden uygulamalara son verilmesini istemi, 541 ve 550 sayl Gvenlik Konseyi kararlarnn buna engel tekil etmediini vurgulamtr. Genel Sekreter raporunda ayrca, Kbrsta kalc bir zmn siyasi eitlik ve ortaklk temeline dayal olmas gerektiini vurgulam, zm Plannn baarszla uramasnn sorumluluunu Kbrs Rum tarafna yklemi, Rum tarafnn tutumunu sorgulam ve gerekten siyasi eitlie ve ortakla dayal zm istemeleri halinde Rumlarn bunu dile getirmelerinin yeterli olmayacan, ayn zamanda eylemleriyle de gstermeleri gerektiini belirtmitir. Rumlarn bylece Annan Plann deil, esasen zm reddettiklerini de kayda geiren Genel Sekreter, durumun kapsaml bir deerlendirmeyi gerektirdiini vurgulam, Trkiyenin ve Kbrs Trk tarafnn mzakereler ncesinde, srasnda ve sonrasndaki olumlu tutumunu takdirle karladn beyan etmitir. 4. MZAKEREYE TARAFLARIN BAKII VE GETRDKLER NERLER GKRY Radyo Televizyon Kurumu tarafndan 18-19 Mart 2006 tarihlerinde semen nitelii tayan 1200 kiinin katld bir anket gerekletirilmitir. Sz konusu anket, Kbrs Rum Halknn genel olarak Kbrs sorununa, Kbrsl Trklere, lkemizin AB yeliine ve Gney Kbrs Rum Ynetimine bakna dair dikkat ekici ipular iermektedir. Anket sonularndan, bata genler olmak zere Kbrs Rum halknn nemli bir blmnn Kbrsl Trklere sempati duymad ve onlarla tek bir at altnda yaamak istemedii ortaya kmtr. Bata ABD, AB lkeleri ve dier ilgili taraflarca bile uzlamaz tutumuyla zme engel olduu dile getirilen GKRY lideri Papadopoulos'a ve izledii Kbrs politikasna destek verdikleri grlmtr. GKRY'de yaplan anketlerde 18-25 ya arasndaki Rum genlerin %61inin Trklerle birlikte yaamak istemediklerini beyan ettikleri gz nnde bulundurulduunda, Kbrs sorununa BM erevesinde kapsaml bir zm

11

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

bulunmas ynndeki abalar asndan GKRYde yerleen reti zihniyeti aka sergilemektedir. GKRYde 21 Mays 2006 tarihinde milletvekillii genel seimleri gerekletirilmitir. Seimler hem Annan Plan zerinde 24 Nisan 2004 tarihinde dzenlenen referandumlardan sonra yaplan ilk genel seimin galibi Kbrs sorununun zmn reddedenler olmutur. 2004 ylndaki referandumlarda Annan Plann savunan ana muhalefet partisi konumundaki DSnin oylarnda 2001 ylna oranla %3.67 civarnda kayp olmas dikkat ekicidir. Seim sonularnn dikkat eken bir dier yn, Rum lider Papadopulosun banda bulunduu DKO partisinin oylarn % 3.07 orannda artrm olmasdr. Bu partinin seimlerde oylarn artrmas, anlan reti zihniyetin az da olsa GKRYde tabann genilettiine iaret etmektedir. Referandumlar sonrasnda KKTC Cumhurbakan Talat ile GKRY lideri Papadopulos, 5 Eyll 2007 tarihinde BM Genel Sekreterinin zel Temsilcisi Mllerin de hazr bulunduu bir toplantda bir araya gelmilerdir. Cumhurbakan Talat, toplantda, 14 ayda 52 grme yaplmasna ramen gelime salanamadn, Rum tarafnn teklifi dorultusunda bir-iki Teknik Komite ve alma Grubu kurularak almalara balanmas ve srecin oluruna braklmas halinde kapsaml zm perspektifinden uzaklalacan vurgulamtr. Talat, iki tarafn kapsaml zm perspektifi zerine younlamalarnn ve ykmllk stlenmelerinin nem tadnn altn izerek, iki-iki buuk ay srecek hazrlk dnemini takiben mzakerelerin balatlmas ve 2008 yl sonuna kadar kapsaml zme ulalmas ynnde bir neri getirmitir. Talat ayrca, gnlk yaam ilgilendiren Teknik Komitelerin de bu grme srecinden bamsz olarak bir an nce faaliyete gemesini teklif etmitir. Talat, ayrca Adada kapsaml zmn, yerleik BM parametreleri ve mzakere srecinde ortaya kan mktesebat zemininde gereklemesi gerektiine dikkat ekerek, mzakerelere sfrdan balanmasnn mmkn olmadn kaydetmitir. GKRY lideri Papadopulos, Cumhurbakan Talatn nerilerini reddetmi ve kstl bir gndem erevesinde liderlerin belirli aralklarla bir araya gelmesi eklinde zetlenebilecek bir tutum sergilemitir.

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Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

KKTC Cumhurbakan Mehmet Ali Talat, 16 Ekim 2007 tarihinde New Yorkta BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-Moonla bir grme yapmtr. Talat bu grmede Papadopoulosun uzlamaz tutumuna atfta bulunarak, Kbrs Trk tarafnn kapsaml zme ilikin yaklamn izah etmi, ayrca Genel Sekretere Kbrsta iki taraf arasnda olumlu bir atmosferin tesis edilebilmesi iin bir Gven Artrc nlemler paketi sunmutur. AKEL lideri Hristofyas 17 ubat 2008 tarihinde yaplan GKRY bakanlk seimlerinde ilk turunda oylarn %53.37sini alarak GKRY bakanlna seilmitir. KKTC Cumhurbakan Talat 22 ubat 2008de BM Genel Sekreterine muhatap mektubunda Kbrs Trk tarafnn zm iradesini muhafaza ettiini ve yeni bir mzakere sreci balatmaya hazr olduunu bildirmitir. Babakan Tayyip Erdoan da BM Genel Sekreteri, AB Komisyonu Bakan, BMGK daimi yeleri ve AB devlet ve hkmet bakanlarna muhatap 6 Mart 2008 tarihli mektubunda esas olarak KKTCnin zme ynelik yaklamn desteklediini vurgulamtr. KKTC Cumhurbakan Talat ile GKRY lideri Hristofyas, 21 Mart 2008 tarihinde gerekletirdikleri grmede Teknik Komiteler ve alma Gruplar kurulmas ve ay sonra bir araya gelerek BM Genel Sekreterinin yi Niyet Misyonu erevesinde kapsaml mzakerelerin balatlmas hususlarnda mutabakata varmlardr. 23 Mays tarihindeki grmede siyasi eitlie dayal iki blgeli, iki toplumlu federasyona ballklarn teyit etmiler ve ortakln eit statdeki Trk ve Rum Kurucu Devletlerinden oluan, tek uluslararas kimlikli ve federal bir hkmete sahip olmas konusunda vardklar mutabakat, Ortak Aklamaya dercetmilerdir. Liderler, 1 Temmuz 2008 grmesi sonrasnda yaptklar Ortak Aklamada tek egemenlik ile tek vatandalk konularn grtklerini ve bu konularda prensipte anlaarak uygulama detaylarn kapsaml mzakereler erevesinde deerlendireceklerini belirtmilerdir. 25 Temmuz tarihli Ortak Aklamada, Liderler, zerinde anlamaya varlacak zmn ezamanl ayr referandumlara sunulmasn ve kapsaml mzakerelerin 3 Eyll tarihinde balatlmasn kararlatrmlardr. KKTC Cumhurbakan Mehmet Ali Talat ile GKRY lideri Hristofyas 3 Eyll 2008 gn bir araya gelerek, Kbrsta BM Genel Sekreterinin iyi niyet misyonu erevesinde kapsaml zm mzakerelerini balatmlardr. Liderler 3 Eylldeki 13

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

altan sonra yaplan toplantlarda federal dzeyde yasama, yrtme, yarg, kilitlenmeyi zc mekanizmalar ile bamsz kurumlar konular zerinde durmulardr. Ynetim ve yetki paylam konusunda zerinde anlalan hususlar yannda, baz esasl konularda taraflar ciddi gr ayrlklar iindedirler. Rum ynetimi, esas olarak gl bir Federal Devletin erklerinde Rum arln dolayl ya da dolaysz garanti altna alacak dzenlemelerde srar etmektedir. KKTC liderlii ise siyasi eitlik ilkesinin Federal yapda andrlmasnn nne geecek biimde temsil ve karar mekanizmalarnda Kurucu Devletlerin etkin katlmn koruyacak ve kendilerini egemence ynetmelerini salayacak dzenlemeleri BM parametrelerine uygun biimde savunmaktadr. Bu balamda, Rum ynetimi ortak listeyle seilecek Bakanlk Ofisi, Yrtmede ortaya kacak tkanklklarn zm srecinde daha uzun sre Rum tarafnda kalacak Bakanlk makamnn oyunun belirleyicilii, Yasama tkanklklarnda Rum arlkl zm mekanizmasnn karar alabilmesi gibi nerilerinde kat bir pozisyon benimsemekte, buna paralel olarak d ilikilerin yrtlmesi, hava ve deniz yetki alanlar, hava ve deniz ulam, liman ve havaalanlarnn mlkiyeti gibi konularda da dayatmac olmaktadr. KKTC taraf, Kurucu Devletlere kalacak artk yetkilerin mmkn olduunca geni tutulmas, Federal Yrtmenin Annan Plan temelinde Bakanlk Konseyi biiminde oluumu, Kurucu Devletlerin yetki alanlarna dahil konularda d ilikiler kurmalar ve yrtebilmeleri, Yasamada ve yar-yargsal yetkili kurumlarda siyasi eitlik ilkesinin gzetilmesi gibi hususlar savunmaktadr. Dier yandan, Rum ynetimi yeni ortakln hayata geirilmesi ile ilgili ilke ve prosedrlerin belirlenmesini mzakerelerin sonuna brakma eiliminde srarc grnmekte, KKTC taraf ise bu noktann bir an evvel akla kavuturulmasnn nemine dikkat ekmektedir. Ayrca, normlar hiyerarisi konusunda KKTC taraf, AB normlar ve mktesebatnn zmn dier vehelerini andrmayacak biimde ifade bulmasn, Federal yasalarla Kurucu Devlet yasalar arasnda ise hiyerari bulunmamasn savunmaktadr. Rum taraf, mlkiyet bal altnda yrtlmekte olan mzakerelerde, gmenlerin mlkleri zerindeki haklarn kullanma biimlerine kendilerinin karar vermeleri zerinde srarcdr. Kbrs Trk taraf ise, mlkiyet rejimine ilikin kriterlerin belirlenmesini, iade, tazminat ve takas yntemlerinin belirlenecek ltlere gre iki kesimlilik ilkesini andrmayacak biimde uygulanmasn, dolaysyla yerleik BM parametreleri ve Annan Plan dzenlemelerine riayet
14

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

edilmesini savunmaktadr. Rum liderlii bu aamada BM Gvenlik Konseyi tarafndan da tanm yaplm olan iki kesimlilik ilkesini tanmad da dahil olmak zere BM mktesebat ve kapsaml zm sreci prensipleriyle badamayan uzlamaz bir tutuma ynelmekte, Kurucu Devletler de mlkiyet ounluu ltn reddetmekte, nfus ounluu ltn ise tartma konusuna dntrmektedir. GKRY lideri Dimitris Hristofyas ile KKTC lideri Mehmet Ali Talat, Kbrs'n btnleme srecini hzlandrmak iin 11-13 Ocak 2010da Lefkoa'da younlatrlm grmelere katld. Grmenin gndem maddeleri arasnda hkmet ynetimi, yetki paylam, ekonominin btnlemesi konular yer ald. Rum ve Trk kesimleri liderleri ilk tur grmenin sona ermesinin ardndan yaptklar aklamalarda grmede somut gelimeler salanamadn belirttiler. Grmeden nce Rum kesiminin, Trk kesimi liderinin ileri srd neri paketini ak bir dille reddettiini aklamas, younlatrlm grmelerden olumlu sonularn kmas ynndeki beklentilere glge dmesine neden oldu. SONU Aklamalardan anlalaca zere GKRY, ABye dahil olduktan sonra KKTC zerindeki ambargo ve izolasyonlarn devam ynndeki giriimlerine devam etmektedir. Trkiyenin AB adaylk mzakerelerinin kmaza girmesi 19 ve kilitlenmesi iin almalarna arlk vermitir. Ayrca adadaki grmelerin olumsuz sonulanmas maksadyla ince bir siyaset yrtmektedir. Amac KKTC ekonomisinin gelimesini engellemek, Trk halkn fakir ve GKRYye muhta duruma getirmek, ekonomik olarak kt durumda olan halkla devleti kar karya getirerek KKTC yetkililerinin aznlk stats iinde Kbrs Cumhuriyetine dahil etmektir. Bunu gerekletirebilmesinin nndeki en byk engel Trkiyedir. Bu
19

Trkiye, 1963 Ankara Anlamasn ABne 1 Mays 2004 tarihinde ye olan ve aralarnda GKRYnin de bulunduu on yeni lkeye temil edecek olan Uyum Protokoln 29 Temmuz 2005de imzalad. Ayrca bir deklarasyonla Uyum Protokolnn imzalanmasnn GKRYnin siyasi olarak tannmas anlamna gelmeyecei kayda geirildi. Halihazrda Uyum Protokol paralelinde Trk liman ve havaalanlarnn GKRY gemi ve uaklarna almasna ynelik basklar, Trkiyenin yelik mzakerelerine de yanstlmakta olup, 8 fasl bu gerekeyle askya alnm durumdadr.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

nedenle AB Mzakere srecini kilitlemekte ve Trkiyeyi kendi beklentileri dorultusunda bir anlamaya ynlendirmeye gayret sarf etmektedir. GKRY AB yesi olduktan sonra yaanan sre bize ak bir ekilde gstermektedir ki Kbrstaki mevcut statko GKRYnin lehinedir. Bu nedenle mevcut statkoyu bozmaya ynelik her giriimi engellemeye almaktadr. BM nclnde bu gne kadar yaplan grme ve mzakerelerde elde edilen zemini kabul etmemektedir. GKRYyi bar anlamasna zorlamak ve bebek admlaryla ilerlemekte olan Trkiye-AB mzakere srecine olumsuz etkilerini krmak iin stratejide deiiklik yapmak gerekmektedir. Her zaman adil bir bar anlamas peinde gayret sarf etmek ve bu yndeki giriimlerine devam edecei emareleri vermek Rumlarn uzlamaz tutumunu krmamaktadr. GKRYnin uzlamaz tutumunu ortadan kaldrmann tek yolu bar anlamasyla ilgili almalara devam ederken kararl bir ekilde KKTCnin tannmas ynndeki giriimlere arlk vermektir. KKTCnin tannmas ynndeki giriimler bar anlamas iin yaplacak almalara engel tekil etmez. Tam tersine KKTCnin ne srd Annan planyla da resmilemi iki kesimli, iki kurucu devletli ve siyasi eitlie dayal yapya ve Trkiyenin etkin garantrl tezine hizmet eder. nk KKTCnin baz devletler tarafndan tannmas GKRYnin en hassas tarafn oluturmaktadr. Bu giriimler GKRYdeki endieleri arttracak, stratejinin en nemli unsurlarndan bir tanesi olan ve kendi lehine ilediini deerlendirdii zamann nemli bir risk oluturduunu grecektir. Tannma Stratejisi BM Genel Sekreteri Annann raporunda belirtildii gibi Rumlar gerekten siyasi eitlie ve ortakla dayal zm istiyorlarsa bunu sadece dile getirmelerinin yeterli olmayaca, ayn zamanda eylemlerle bunu gstermeleri gerektii vurgulanm olacaktr. Bu sayede Rumlarn grmelerde daha sonu odakl ve ibirliine ak bir yaklam sergilemeleri salanabilecektir. Tannma stratejisinde; KKTCnin hukuki anlamda baz devletler tarafndan tannmasn salamann yannda, bu mmkn olmad takdirde tannma imaj yaratacak sonular almak da nemlidir. Tannma stratejisinin amac sadece KKTCnin tannmasnn hedeflenmesi deildir. Esas olan oluturulacak algyla, Rumlar makul bir anlama imzalamaya zorlamaktr. Baz devletlerde ve uluslararas rgtlerde temsilciliklerin almas, uluslararas toplantlara gzlemci
16

Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

olarak da olsa katlmn salanmas bu imaj yaratacak yollar olarak saylabilir. KKTCde yabanc yatrmlarn arttrlmas, uluslararas ticaret ve direkt uularn salanmas ve turizmin gelitirilmesi de tannma imajnn oluturulmasnda etkili olacaktr. Rum Ynetimi 2006 ylnda Katarda bykelilik am, buna tepki gsteren Trkiye ile ilikilerinin bozulmasn istemeyen Katar, KKTCye de bykelilik ama izni vermiti. Rum Ynetimi 2009 ylnda Birleik Arap Emirlikleri, rdn, Endonezya, Kba, Brezilya ve Bulgaristan'da olmak zere 6 bykelilik at. Fakat bu lkelere ynelik olarak benzer bir alma KKTC tarafndan gerekletirilemedi. En azndan bu lkelerde temsilcilik alabilirdi. imdi ise Anadolu Ajans'nn Rum basnna dayandrd haberinde, Gney Kbrs hkmeti, bu yl Umman ve Slovakya'da bykelilik amay planlyor. 2011 ylnda Kuveyt ve Kazakistan'da, 2012 ylnda ise Kanada'da bykelilik almas programlanyor. Dolaysyla KKTCnin yapmas gereken giriim ve almlar Rum Ynetimi gerekletiriyor. nk Kbrs Rum Ynetiminin en byk hassasiyeti KKTCnin uluslararas alanda tannmas anlamna gelecek gelimeler meydana gelmesidir. Kbrs Rum Mahkemelerini adann geneli iin yetkili kabul eden ABADn Orams davas hakkndaki gr, 05.03.2010 tarihli Demopoulos/Trkiye ve dier 7 dava hakknda Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesinin kararyla geersiz hale geldi. Bu karar hukuki yollarla yaratlan tannma imajnn en yeni rneidir. Karar KKTCde Trkler tarafndan oluturulan Tanmaz Mal Komisyonunu etkin bir i hukuk yolu olarak tanm ve Rumlarn mlkiyet meselelerini dorudan AHMe getirmelerini engellemitir. Bu elbette bir tanma deildir, ancak Orams davasyla Rumlarn lehine dnen ibreyi, KKTC lehine evirmitir. Mahkeme bir ynetimin dier devletler tarafndan tannmamas, o ynetimin yapm olduu idari ve hukuki tasarruflarn tannmayaca anlamna gelmez demitir. Yani KKTCnin i hukuk yolunu tannmann KKTCyi tanmak anlamna gelmeyeceini aka belirtmitir. Ancak karar bu haliyle bile GKRY zerinde bir bask oluturmaya yetmitir. Sonu olarak; KKTC ile GKRY arasnda kalc ve adil bir bar anlamas tesis etmek iin mevcut statkonun deitirilmesine ynelik yeni bir strateji belirlenmesi gerekir. Bu stratejide KKTCnin tannmasna ynelik giriimlere arlk 17

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

verilmelidir. Bu giriimler uluslararas kurulular nezdinde yrtld gibi devletler nezdinde de srdrlmelidir. Tannma KKTC ve Trkiye zerindeki basklarn ynn deitirecei gibi, grmelerin ve mzakerelerin zeminini de deitirecei iin bir pazarlk marj salayacaktr. Ayrca GKRYnin grme ve mzakere masasnda belirli bir sonuca ulamak iin yapc bir yaklam iine girmesi tevik edilecektir.

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Yeni Kbrs Stratejisi Tannma

KAYNAKA AGSK, AB ve NATO likilerinin Gelecei, Trkiyeye Etkileri Sempozyumu, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 2001. Girit Oyunu ve Kbrs, Karadeniz Haber Ajans Yaynlar, stanbul, 2000. slam lkelerinden KKTCye Darbe, Gazete Vatan, 26.02.2010 Kbrs Sempozyumu, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1998. Terrorism In Cyprus, The Grivas Diaries, H.M. Stationory Office, 1955. 1997 Yl Sonu tibar le Kbrs Sorunu, SSAV Yaynlar, stanbul, 1998. ARMAOLU, Fahir, 20nci Yzyl Siyasi Tarihi, Cilt II: 1980-1990, Trkiye Bankas Kltr Yaynlar, Ankara, 1992. ATUN, Ali Fikret, kinci Kbrs Seferi, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1999. Bamszlk Deklarasyonunun Metni.: The Decleration and Resalution adopted by the Turkish Cypriot Parliament on 15 Novemder 1983-For The Liberty, Equality, Dignity and Security of our People, Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyeti Yayn. DELCEIRMAK, Orbay, Yerinde Yeller Esen Anayasa, Ankara, 1997. DENKTA, Rauf, Hatralar, Toplay, Boazii Yaynlar, stanbul, 2000. DODD, Clement H., Cyrpus, The Need For New Perspectives, The Eothem Press, England, 1999. DODD, Clement H., Storm Clouds Over Cyprus, The Eothem Press, England, 2001.

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EVCL, Cumhur, Yavru Vatan Kbrsta Zaferin Hikayesi, Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etd Bakanl Yaynlar, Ankara, 1999. GAZOLU, Ahmet C,. Kbrs Tarihi ngiliz Dnemi, Kbrs Aratrma ve Yayn Merkezi Yayn, Lefkoa, 1997. GAZOLU, Ahmet C., Enosis emberinde Trkler, Kbrs aratrma ve Yayn Merkezi Yayn, Lefkoa, 1998. GAZOLU, Ahmet C., Enosise Kar Taksim ve Eit Egemenlik, Kbrs Aratrma ve Yayn Merkezi Yayn, Ankara, 1998. GAZOLU, Ahmet C., ngiliz daresinde Kbrs, Stat ve Anayasa Meseleleri, Lefkoa, 1996. GAZOLU, Ahmet C., Two Equal and Sovereign Peoples, Lefkoa, 1997. Hasan CEMAL, Bir Saatli Bombann Tik Tak Sesi, Milliyet Gazetesi, 07.07.2001. Hasan CEMAL, Trkiye, Tuhaf Bir kmaza Girmi Durumda, Milliyet Gazetesi, 08.07.2001. http://www.milliyet.com.tr SMAL, Sebahattin, 10 Soruda Kbrs Sorunu, Kasta Yayn, stanbul, 1998. KABAALOLU, Haluk, Avrupa Birlii ve Kbrs Sorunu, Yeditepe niversitesi Yayn. KARLUK, S.Rdvan, Avrupa Birlii ve Trkiye, Beta Yaynlar, stanbul, 1998. Kbrsn Dn-Bugn-Yarn, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1995. Kresel ve Blgesel Kapsamda Sorunlarmz, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1999.
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LELOLU, Duygu, Ankaraya Ar Ceza, Radikal Gazetesi, 11.05.2001. NECATGL, Zaim M., The Cyrrus Question and The Turkish Position in nternational Law, Oxford Universty Press, New York, 1998. SANDIKLI, Atilla Trkiyenin D Politikasnda AB ve Alternatifleri, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, 2001. STAVRNDES, Zenon, The Cyprus Conflict, National Identity and Statehood, Lefkoa, 1999. SRMEL, Merve N., Avrupa nsan Haklar Mahkemesi Szn Tuttu: Yetkili Kurum Tanmaz Mal Komisyonu, www.bilgesam.org SRMEL, Merve N., TURAN, Aslhan P., Kbrsta Mlkiyet Sorunu: Loizidou ve Orams Kararlar, www.bilgesam.org ENOUL, Nahit, AGSK, AB ve NATO likilerinin Gelecei, Trkiyeye Etkileri Sempozyumu Kapan Konumas, Sempozyum Kitab, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, 2001. TORUMTAY, Necip, Kbrs Sempozyumu A Konumas, Sempozyumu Kitab, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1998. Kbrs

TURANLI, Rana, Kuzey Kbrs Trk Cumhuriyeti lke Etd, stanbul Ticaret Odas Yaynlar, stanbul, 1997. UAROL Rfat, Siyasi Tarih, Harp Akademileri Yaynlar, stanbul, 1987.

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22

TRKYE-AZERBAYCAN LKLERNDE SON DNEM The Recent Period of Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations Yrd. Do. Dr. Reha YILMAZ zet:
Trkiye-Azerbaycan ilikilerinde zaman zaman gerginlikler yaansa da genellikle dostluk ve kardelik iinde olunmutur. zellikle Sovyetlerin yklmasndan sonraki dnemde iki devlet daha da yaklam stratejik ortaklk dzeyine ulamtr. Bu durum sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi alanda etkisini gstermi ve iki lke ortak hareket ederek blge siyasetine yn vermitir. Hatta bu durum ihmale varan ar gvene sebep olmutur. Bu gven devletlerin birbirini ihmal ederek yeterince tanmamasna sebep olmutur. Bu sonu TrkiyeErmenistan yaknlamasnda kendisini ak olarak gstermitir. Trkiye ve Ermenistan arasnda imzalanan protokoller Azerbaycan Trkiye ilikilerinin gerilmesine, hatta ilikileri kopma noktasna getirmitir. Problem, sonrasnda ilikileri iyiletirmek iin her iki lke yetkilileri byk aba sarf etse de taraflarda onarlmaz izler brakmtr. Bu sonu iki lke ilikilerinin aslnda tekrar ele alnmas ve yeni temeller zerine oturtulmasnn gerekliliini gstermitir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Trkiye, Azerbaycan, stratejik ortaklk, d politika

Abstract:
Although some tensions occurred in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations now and again, it usually based on friendship and brotherhood. Particularly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these two countries became closer and relations have reached to the level of strategic partnership. This situation has showed its influence in social, economic, and political sphere and the two countries acting together directed themselves to regional policy. Even, this situation has caused overconfidence. This confidence caused countries not to be sufficiently recognized by neglecting each other. This result was quite clearly showed itself in TurkeyArmenia rapprochement. The Protocol signed between Turkey and Armenia strained Azerbaijan-Turkey relations and even it brought the bilateral relations to the point of rupture. Although after the problem both countries officials made great efforts to improve the relations, it left irreparable traces on both parties. This result demonstrated the necessity of the two countries relations to be discussed and created on a new basis. Keywords: Turkey, Azerbaijan, strategic partnership, foreign policy

ankr Karatekin niversitesi Uluslararas likiler Blm retim yesi.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

GR Azerbaycan bamszlk sonras dnemde yaanan sorunlar tekrar yaamamak iin, Haydar Aliyevle birlikte balatt denge siyasetini lham Aliyev dneminde de srdrmtr. Bu kapsamda uluslararas aktrler arasnda siyasi ve ekonomik bir denge salanmaya allmaktadr. Ancak, baz lkelerin Azerbaycan d politikasnda zel bir yeri bulunmaktadr. Tarihi dostluk ve kardelik erevesinde yakn bir diyalog ierisinde bulunduu Trkiye, iki milyona yakn Azerbaycanlnn alt ve lkenin en nemli sorunu olan Karabada etkin bir aktr olan Rusya, doal kaynaklarn dnya pazarlarna ulatrmada bir bakma garantr olan ABD, lkenin d politikasnda dorudan etkin rol almaktadr. lkenin d politikasnda dini faktrlerin etkisiyle kmsenemeyecek bir ran etkisi de mevcuttur. Azerbaycann d politikasnda zel bir yeri olan Trkiye, dostluk ve kardelik siyaseti erevesinde lkenin sorunlu dnemlerinde yannda yer almtr. zellikle bamszlk sonras dnemde lkenin bamszlnn tannmas ve toprak btnlnn salanmas iin uluslararas kamuoyu oluturmada byk yardmlar olmutur. Daha sonraki dnemde yrtlen almalarla bu yaknlk stratejik ortaklk dzeyine ulamtr. Bu gler arasnda denge kurmaya alan ve lkesel menfaatleri bu kapsamda belirleyen Azerbaycan hkmeti, Trkiye-Ermenistan normallemesine ilikin almalarla birlikte d politikasnda deiime gitme sinyalleri vermitir. Trkiye ile ilikilerde belli dzeyde souma yaayan Azerbaycan, Rusya ile yaknlamaya gitmi, dier taraftan Uzak l (in, Japonya ve G. Kore) ve srail gibi aktif siyasi aktrlerle de diyaloga girmitir. zellikle, Trkiye ile srail arasnda yaanan gerginliin ardndan bu soumann hzlanmas dikkat edilmesi gereken bir durumdur. 1. AZERBAYCAN DI POLTKASININ SON DNEM HEDEFLER Azerbaycan d politikasnn temel ama ve istikametlerini 3 dnem altnda toplamak mmkndr. Bu dnemin temel amalar hkmetlerin politikalarna

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Trkiye-Azerbaycan likilerinde Son Dnem

gre belirlenmitir. Her dnemde de ortak olan temel unsurlar vardr. Bunlar u ekilde gruplandrmak mmkndr:1 1. lkenin bamszlnn korunmas; 2. lkenin toprak btnlnn salanmas; 3. Karaba probleminin zlmesi; 4. Uluslararas kurumlarla entegrasyon; 5. Pazar ekonomisine gei. ster ayrlma abalar, isterse de toprak iddialar sonucu blgede ortaya kan anlamazlklarn zlmesinde gerek uluslararas glerin ikili standartlar gerekse uluslararas hukukun yetersizlii kendisini ak olarak gstermitir. Bunun sonucunda Karaba ve etrafndaki blgelerin igaline aradan uzun bir sure gese de son verilememitir. Bu durum tehlikeli bir sreci balatm, Azerbaycanda bar yollarla problemin zm taraftarlarnn says azalarak, sava isteyenlerin oran artmtr.2 Bunun doal bir sonucu olarak Azerbaycan d politikasnn istikameti zaman ierisinde deimitir. Azerbaycan hkmetleri problemin zmne tesir edebilecek Karaba konusunda yardm bekledikleri glere yaklaarak, d politikasn daha ok Batya ynlendirmitir. Bamszlk sonras dnemde iktidara gelen hkmet Karaba probleminin geliimine gre farkl siyaset uygulamlardr. Muttalibov dneminde Rusya ve dier Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri ile yaknlama maksad gdlrken, Elibey hkmeti dorudan Trkiye ve Batyla entegrasyonu ama edinmitir. Ancak Haydar Aliyev dneminde bu siyasetlere son verilerek, Bat, Rusya ve Dou arasnda Denge Siyaseti yrtlmeye allmtr. lham Aliyev ynetiminin d politikasnn temel istikameti, babasnn d politikasn devam ettirmek olmasna ramen, son dnemde Batl lkelerden beklenilen destein verilmemesi karsnda Rusya ile
1

Ali Hasanov, Muassr Beynelhalk Mnasebetler ve Azerbaycann Harici Siyaseti, Bak, "Azrbaycan" Neriyat 2005, s. 242-247. 2 Elmar Mammadyarov, The Foreing Policy of Azerbaijan: Affecting Factors and Strategic Priorities, Azerbaijan in Global Politics Crafting Foreing Policy (Ed.) Alexandros Petersen, Fariz smailzade, Baku, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2009, p. 11-14.

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beklenilenden daha fazla yaknlamaya gitmitir. Bunda Rusyann 2008 Austosunda Grcistana mdahalesi srasnda Batl lkelerin vaatlerin tesinde etkili bir mdahalede bulunmamas ve Karaba sorununda beklenen destein verilmemesi byk etkendir. 2. AZERBAYCAN DI SYASETNE ETK EDEN UNSURLAR Azerbaycan, Gney Kafkasyann gvenlik kompleksinin ayrlmaz bir parasdr. Bu blgede kabul edilmi ve gelecek iin ngrlen siyasi kararlar gvenlik meseleleriyle karlkl iliki ierisindedir. zlmemi anlamazlklar d politika stratejisine olduu gibi, lkelerin i politikasna da gl tesir gstermektedir. Bunda anlamazlk taraflarnn hareketlerine, d glerin mdahale perspektiflerine bakmak gerekmektedir. G. Kafkasyada ikili kutuplamaya doru bir gidi mevcuttur. Bu kutuplamann merkezinde D. Karaba probleminin taraflar Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan bulunmaktadr. Ermenistan Rusya ve ranla yakn bir ibirliine giderken, Azerbaycan; Trkiye, Grcistan ve Batl kurumlarla entegrasyonu semitir. Bir taraf demokrasi, insan haklar ve pazar ekonomisinin blgede hkim klnmas iin ortak hareket ederken, dier kutupta blgedeki atmalarn krklenmesiyle elde edilen bask ve g n plana kmaktadr.3 Azerbaycan d politikasnn esasn ilk yllardan itibaren toprak btnlnn salanmas, dolaysyla Karaba probleminin zlmesi yer almtr. Zira lkenin her alanda istenilen dzeyde geliememesinin temel nedeni Karaba sorunun zlememesidir. Zira bu sorundan dolay Azerbaycann bakmak zorunda kald Azerbaycan kaynaklarna gre bir milyon, BM kaynaklarna gre ise 584,000 mlteci vardr.4

Rayner Fraytaq-Virminqhaus, Azerbaycann harici ve Tehlikesizlik Siyaseti, AZERBAIJAN FOCUS, No 1, Temmuz-Austos 2009, s. 101. 4 Aleksandr Raar, Sebastian Riider, Azerbaycann Karadeniz Hazar Havzas Blgesinde Geosiyasi Rol: Teklifler ve mknlar, AZERBAIJAN FOCUS, No 1, Temmuz-Austos 2009, s. 44. 26

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D. Karaba probleminin bar yollarla zlmesi iin yllardr verilen abalarn sonusuz kalmas, Ermenistann Rusya yardmyla tehlikeli boyutlarda silahlanmas, Azerbaycann petrol ve doalgaz gelirleriyle ekonomisi dzeltmesi ve ordusunu modernize ederek gelitirmesi, Azerbaycan kamuoyunda her geen gn artan bask ve nihayet en yakn mttefiki Trkiyenin, Ermenistanla ilikilerini normalletirme karar almasnn verdii endie5 Karaba sorununun her an scak atmaya dnme riskini beraberinde getirmitir. 3. AZERBAYCAN-TRKYE LKLERNDE YEN DNEM Azerbaycan-Ermenistan anlamazl 20. yzyln balarna gider. Tarihin tozlu raflarna bakldnda blgede ok ac olaylara rastlamak mmkndr. 1905, 1915, 1918, 1950, 1987 ve 1990l yllar bu tr olaylarla hatrlarda kalmtr. Genellikle Ermeniler lehine gelien olaylarda Azerbaycanllarn yannda tek destek Trkiye olmutur. yle ki Azerbaycan Trklerini yalnz brakmamak iin zor anlarnda bile Trkler imknlarn seferber etmitir. I. Dnya Sava sonrasnda toplu soykrmla kar karya kalan Azerilere Osmanllarn Kafkas slam Ordusu vastasyla yardmc olduu gibi, Sovyetlerden sonra bamszlna kavuan ve Karaba ve etrafndaki blgelerin Ermenilerce igal edildii dnemde de bu yardm devam etmitir.6 Bu destek sadece askeri alanda olmam, ekonomik ve siyasi alanda da Trkiye Azerbaycann uluslararas kamuoyuna sorunlarn anlatabilmesi, uluslararas gler tarafndan lkenin bamszlnn tannmas ve gelitirilmesi iin byk katklar olmutur. Her iki lke BTC, BTE, BTK gibi uluslararas projelere imza atarken, dier yandan d politikalarnda da ortak hareket ederek uluslararas kamuoyunda birok sorunu birlikte gslemitir.7 Bu ibirliinin en iyi grld konu ise Karaba sorunu olmutur. Zira Trkiye, dnya konjoktrn dikkate alarak Karaba Savanda Azerbaycana yardmlarda bulunmu, Kelbecerin Ermenilerce igali zerine Ermenistan
5

Reha Ylmaz, Azerbaycan ve Azerbaycanly Anlayabilmek, USAK Stratejik Gndem, http:// www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=1043, 07.09.2009. 6 Mahir Abdullayev, Trkiye-Azerbaycan Alakalar, Mtercim Yaynlar, Bak, 1998, s.21. 7 Sevin Ruinten, Azerbaycan Trk Devletleri ile Siyasi Elageler Sisteminde Bak, Adilolu Neriyat, 2005, s.27-78.

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kaplarn kapatarak Azerbaycana verebilecei en yksek destei vermi ve bu kap Batl devletlerin tm basklarna ramen hala almamtr. Trkiyede hkmetler deise de Trk halknn, kamuoyunun ve hkmetlerinin destei hi azalmam, atarak devam etmitir.8 AKP hkmetinin iktidara gelmesi ve Trkiyeyi blgenin sper gc haline getirme almalar erevesinde d politikas da deimitir. Bu erevede neredeyse tm komularyla problemi olan bir Trkiye yerine, yakn ibirliine dayal bir evre politikas yrtlmeye balanmtr.9 Bu siyaset erevesinde Yunanistan, Suriye, ran, Bulgaristan, Grcistan ve Irakla aamal olarak yakn ibirliine girilmi, hatta karlkl vizelerin kaldrlmasna varan bir yaknlama elde edilmitir. Sorun olarak sadece Ermenistan kalm, bu lke ile de greceli olarak grmelere balanmtr. Bu dorultuda Ermenistanla da yaknlamaya ynelinmi ve tarihi sorunlar zebilmek iin gizli grmelere balanm ve nihayetinde Zrihte AGK ebakanlarnn da katlm ile ilikilerin normallemesini salayacak bir protokol imzalanmtr. Trkiye-Ermenistan arasndaki bu yaknlama ve protokollerin imzalanmas Azerbaycanda tepkiyle karlanm ve iki lke ilikilerine olumsuz tesir edecek olaylar meydana gelmitir. Trkiye tarafnn Karaba problemi zlmeden kaplarn almayacana dair verdii tm gvencelere ramen Azerbaycan taraf bu gvenceleri yeterli grmeyerek Trkiyeye kar eitli yaptrmlara mracaat etmitir. ncelikle gaz tarifelerinin yeniden dzenlenmesi, sonrasnda Trk mallarna ynelik ekonomik yaptrmlar, lkede faaliyet gsteren Trk firmalara ynelik basklar ve nihayetinde Trk bayraklarnn Trk ehitliklerindekilerde dhil gnderden indirilmesi Trk tarafnda da ciddi bir tepkinin olumasna sebep olmutur. Her ne kadar karlkl olarak ilikilerin normallemesi iin gayret

Geni bilgi iin baknz. Yaar Kalafat, Araz Aslanl, Trkiye Azerbaycan likileri, Trk D Politikas, (Ed.) dris Bal, s. 382-396. 9 Geni bilgi iin baknz. Blent Aras, Davutolu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, SETA Policy Brief, no: 32, May 2009. 28

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gsterilse de ilikilerin nceki dzeye ulamas mmkn gzkmemektedir. Zira lkede halk ve kamuoylarnda karlkl itibar kayb sz konusudur. Trkiye taraf Ermeni yaknlamasnn Karaba probleminin zmne katkda bulunacan, Ermenistann meselelere ncekinden daha lml ve yapc yaklaacan10 ifade etseler de, Azeri taraf bu protokollerle birlikte Ermenilerin glenecei ve grmeleri tkamayabalayaca ve problemde uzlamaz bir konuma gelecei beyan ederek11 bir bakma Karaba konusundaki uzlamazl Trkiyeye balamaya alan bir tavr sergilemitir. 4. TRKYE LKLERNDE FARKLILAMA MI? NORMALLEME M? Sovyetlerin yklyla bamszln kazanan Azerbaycan ilk tanyan lke olan Trkiye ile Azerbaycan ilikileri tarihi dostluk ve kardelik iersinde devam ede gelmitir. Ancak, Azerbaycann doal kaynaklarn dnya pazarlarna ulatrmas ile birlikte blgede artan nemi, Trkiyenin son dnemde blgede dorudan inisiyatif alan d politika stratejisi her iki lkenin daha da yaknlamasna ve stratejik ortak olarak hareket etmelerine sebep olmutur. Bunun sonucunda Azerbaycan ve Trkiye arasnda ticaret, siyaset, ekonomi, eitim, salk, kltr, turizm ve dier sahalarda artan bir ibirlii balamtr. Hatta bu ibirlii Azerbaycan ordusunun yapsal olarak hazrlanmas, NATO standartlar seviyesine ykseltilmesi, Trk ordusuna uluslararas grevlerinde yardm, blgesel problemlere ortak tavr, uluslararas kurumlarda ortak almalar, ekonomi ve ticaret alanlarndaki uluslararas projelerde fikir birlii seviyesine ulam ve

10

Blent Aras, Fatih zbay, Trkiye ve Ermenistan: Statko ve Normalleme Arasnda Kafkasya Siyaseti, SETA Analiz, No: 16, Ekim 2009, s. 9-10. 11 Trkiy-Ermnistann mnasibtlrin Bakdan bax, http://www.voanews.com/azerbaijani/archive/ 2009-09/Azedavudturkiyeelxan.cfm?moddate=2009-09-01; http://az.apa.az/print.php?id=165816, 12 Oktyabr 2009; Trkiy-Ermnistann mnasibtlrin Bakdan bax, http://www.voanews.com/azerbaijani/archive/2009-09/Azedavudturkiyeelxan.cfm?moddate=2009-09-01

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birok baarl sonular elde edilmitir.12 Bu birliktelik Haydar Aliyevin Bir Millet ki Devlet sylemiyle de bir bakma tescillenmitir. Ancak zaman ierisinde taraflarn birbirilerini okumada doan sorunlar, bir bakma karlkl gvenden kaynaklanan ihmal, stratejik ortakln kurumsallatrlamamas sonucunu dourmutur.13 Bu durum her iki lkeyi siyaseten birbirinden uzaklatrm, yanl anlamalara sebep olmutur. zellikle Azerbaycann d siyasetinde en nemli unsur olan Karaba konusundaki endieleri, iki lke ilikilerinde ani bir krlmaya sebep olmutur. Azerbaycandaki dier lobi ve marjinal glerin almalaryla daha da alevlenen tartmalar karlkl restlemelere kadar varmtr. Son dnemde Azerbaycan-Trkiye ilikilerinin gerginleme sebeplerine bakldnda Grcistan olaylarnn tesirini ak ekilde grmek mmkndr. Uzun sredir Rusya ve Trkiye arasnda denge siyaseti yrtmeye alan Azerbaycan hkmeti Rusyann blgedeki hareketliliinden menfi ekilde etkilenmi ve ister istemez Rusyann tesiri altna girmitir. Bunun sonucunda Trkiyeye kar yrtlen stratejik ortaklk siyasetinde nemli saylabilecek bir deiim olmutur. Trkiye-Ermenistan ilikilerindeki normalleme sreci bahane edilerek, Azerbaycan kamuoyunda Trkiyeye kar anti propaganda balatlm ve halk nezdinde Trkiye hkmetinin ciddi bir itibar kaybna uramasna, sebep olunmutur. Bu siyasetin yrtlmesinde Rus lobisi ve Trkiyedeki baz marjinal glerin Azerbaycan uzantlar aktif rol almtr. Trk muhalefetinin etkin katksyla bu tepkiler zellikle AKP ve hkmetin ypratlmasna ynelmitir. zellikle Trk hkmetinden bekledii ilgiyi gremeyen Azerbaycan muhalefeti gerek resmi yayn organlarnda, gerekse ulusal kanallarda ilikileri olumsuz ynde etkileyebilecek yaymlar yapmtr.14 Bunda, Trk hkmetinin Azerbaycan
12

Reha Ylmaz, Azerbaycan ve Azerbaycanly Anlayabilmek, USAK Stratejik Gndem, http://www.usak.org.tr/myazdir.asp?id=1043, http://www.yeniazerbaycan.com/news/6245.html, 11.09.2008. 13 Aras, Azerbaycan ile Yeniden, Sabah, 01. 07. 2009; "Azrbaycan Trkiyn n nmli strateji trfdadr", http://www.anspress.com/nid119191.html, 12.06.2009. 14 Trkiy-Ermnistan protokollar Azrbaycann maraqlarna cavab vermir, http://az.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1603843.html, 03.01.2010; Rauf Arifolu, Tek 30

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iktidarndan uzaklaarak, Azerbaycan muhalefetine ynelmesi beklentisinin etkisi kukusuzdur.15 Hatta ilikilerdeki tansiyonun ykselmeye balad dnemde Azerbaycan muhalefet parti lider ve yelerinin Trkiyeye giderek sivil toplum kurulularnda ve basn yayn organlarnda boy gstermesi, hkmete mesaj verici nitelikte demelerde bulunmalar, Trk sivil kurulularn harekete geirecek tarzda almalarda bulunmalar bu amac gerekletirmeye ynelik atlan admlardan sadece birkadr. Ancak, Azerbaycan hkmeti bu krizi iyi okumu bir yandan kamuoyunu bilinli ekilde soutmu, dier yandan Trk hkmetiyle yakn diyalog kurarak problemin zm srecine aktif olarak itirak etmitir. Bu srete Azerbaycan hkmetinin nde gelen siyasi liderleri iki lke arasndaki tarihe dayal scak ve yakn ilikileri n plana kartan beyanatlarla ilikilerin normallemesine almtr.16 Bu erevede tecrbeli siyasiler de ilikilerin normalleme srecine girdiini ve bu konuda her iki tarafn ok iyi dnmesi gerektiini ifade ederek bir bakma toplumu yeni dneme hazrlamaya almtr.17 Bu gayretlerin sonucunda, Azerbaycan kamuoyu ve hkmetinin katklaryla yumuayan ilikiler, krlma noktasna gelmeden Trk siyasilerin resmi aklamalar, Babakan Erdoann Bak ziyareti ve Azerbaycan Parlamentosundaki konumas sonucunda zlmtr. Sonrasnda alnan tedbirler, dzenlenen toplantlar ve hkmet yetkililerinin almalar ile ikili ilikiler hzla eski seviyesine ulasa da, her iki lke ilikilerinin Bir Millet ki Devlet gibi hissi sloganlardan Stratejik Ortaklk dzeyine srayamadn ak ekilde gstermitir.18 Zira iki lke ilikilerine zarar
Trkiye, Yeni Msavat, 21.02.2009, Trkiye Geriye, Azerbaycana Gaytd, Yeni Msavat, 14.04.2009. 15 Xaliq Bahadr, Azerbaycan-Trkiye: Kim Udtu? Kim Uduzdu?, http://azadliq.az/?p=7487, 16.05.2009; sa Gamber, Azadlk gazetesi, http://azadliq.az/?p=25030, 02.09.2009. 16 Novruz Mmmdov, Azrbaycan-Trkiy mnasibtlrinin mrkkblmsind maraql olan qvvlr z mqsdlrinatmayacaq, http://www.interfax.az/az/index.php?option=com_ content& task=view&id =37188&Itemid =9, 05.05.2009; Msavat gazetesi, 02.09.2009 17 Zerd Alizade, Azrbaycan - Ermnistan - Trkiy mnasibtlri fonunda Dalq Qaraba mnaqisinin hlli, Karaba Bilgi Ajans, 01.04.2009; Sabir Rstemhanl, ANS Televizyonu Xeberler Program, 02.09.2009. 18 Trkiye Azerbaycan altay Raporu, Kafkasya almalar 2, Temmuz 2009, s. 9 vd.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

verebilecek kk lekli bir siyasi kriz karsnda, atmaya son verebilecek sivil ve/veya resmi bir kurumun olmay karsnda en st dzey yetkililer, Azerbaycan devlet bakan ve Trkiye babakan probleme dorudan mdahale etmek zorunda kalmtr. Bu dahi ikili ilikilerde hissiliin glgesinden klarak gerek nitelikli almalara olan ihtiyac gstermitir. 5. KARABA PROBLEMNDE SON NOKTA: SAVA TAMTAMLARI ALARKEN Trkiye-Ermenistan yaknlamasyla beraber blgede Dalk Karaba problemi gerek blge, gerekse uluslararas siyasetin merkezinde yer almtr. Zira problemin zlmesi iin son bir yl ierisinde ciddi bir trafik yaanm, her iki devlet bakan alt kez grmtr. Grmeler sonucunda nemli problemlerde anlama saland, sadece baz zel meselelerin mzakere edildii ifade edilse de aslnda gelinen noktada elde edilen herhangi bir sonu bulunmamaktadr. Zira Azerbaycan taraf her ey hallolmadan hi bir ey halledilmi olamaz 19, Ermenistan taraf ise fiili kazanmlarmz hukukiletirilmedike problem zlm kabul edilemez20 anlayndan geri adm atmamaktadr. Son yaanan olaylarn akabinde problemin zmnde Ermeni tarafnn elini glendirdii gerekesiyle Trkiye sulansa da, problemin zmne ilikin geliim srecine bakldnda gerek sebeplerin Trkiyeden ziyade blgede nfuz mcadelesi veren gler olduu ak ekilde gzkmektedir. Bu gler, her ne kadar problemin bar yollardan zlmesi iin gayret sarf ediyor gibi gzkse de, Karaba probleminin zlmesi iin taraflarn uzlamaya yaklat dnemlerdeki, masum ancak etkili mdahaleleri ile zmszl tetiklemitir. Nitekim Trkiyenin Ermenilerle yaknlaarak, Karaba problemini zme giriimi, yine bu glerin perde arkas mdahaleleri ile zmszle mahkm edilmitir. Soruna ilikin bu youn trafik, Karaba probleminin zmne ilikin Mnih grmelerinde kalc bir zm beklenmesine sebep olsa da sonu,
19

President Ilham Aliyev receives Azerbaijani and http://www.today.az/news/ politics/53523.html, 20 Cavid Veliyev, Bara Uzak Prag Grmeleri, http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir1657.html, 11 Mays 2009. 32

Armenian

intellectuals,

Trkiye-Azerbaycan likilerinde Son Dnem

beklentilerin uzanda kalmtr. Hatta bu grmelerde Karabaa ilikin bir zmn yaknda beklenmemesi gerektiini devlet grevlilerinin toplant sonras aklamalarnn satr aralarnda bulmak mmkndr. Azerbaycan Dileri Bakanl basn szcs Elhan Poluhovun: Her konuda anlaana kadar hi bir konuda anlalmayacaktr. Problemin zlmesi iin ncelikle Dalk Karaba etrafndaki igal edilmi topraklar geri verilmeli, bu blgelerdeki alt yap yenilenmeli, mlteciler topraklarna geri dnmeli, nce Dalk Karabaa geici stat verilmeli sonrasnda da nihai stats belirlenmelidir21 eklindeki beyanatnda Mnih grmeleri sonrasnda zellikle Trk kamuoyunda oluan iyimser havann yersiz olduunu ak olarak ortaya koymutur. Zira son bir yldr devam ede gelen sylemlerden farkl yeni bir ilerlemenin olmad aktr. Ayn talepler ve ayn ret cevaplar her iki lkenin yetkililerince defalarca tekrarlanmtr. Bu grmelerde nemli ilerlemelerin olmadnn bir baka iareti ise, Azerbaycan ynetiminin son dnemde artan oranda sava tehdidinde bulunmasdr. Azerbaycan Hkmeti yetkilileri: Azerbaycan ordusunun gll22, igal edilmi topraklar kurtarabilme kabiliyetinin bulunmas23, Azerbaycan tarafnn sabrnn sonsuz olmad24 ve sonuta Azerbaycann uzayan grmelerden rahatszlk duyduu ve hakl taleplerini silah zoruyla alabilecei25 uluslararas kamuoyuna iletilmitir. zellikle Trkiye-Ermenistan ilikilerinin normallemeye balamasyla birlikte bu sylemlerdeki art ak olarak grlmektedir. Bu durum hi phesiz Azerbaycan tarafnn grmelerden midini kestiini gsteren bir sonutur.

21 22

Bizim Yol Gazetesi, 27.11.2009. Sfr biyev: "Azrbaycan Ordusu Qafqazda n gcl ordudur" , http://www.anspress.com/ nid121122.html, 03.10.2009. 23 lham liyev: al olunmu torpaqlar azad edilmyndk Azrbaycan Ermnistana tzyiq gstrck, http://az.trend.az/news/official/chronicle/945391.html, 22.06.2007. 24 lham liyev: Azrbaycann sbri tknmz deyil, http://az.trend.az/news/top/826552.html, 23.06.2006 25 Sfr biyev: "Azrbaycan Ordusu Qafqazda n gcl ordudur", http://www.anspress.com/ nid121122.html, 03.10.2009.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

Trkiye-Ermenistan yaknlamasnn Azerbaycan tarafn bu derece rahatsz etmesinin sebeplerini ana balkta toplamak mmkndr. Birincisi, Trkiyenin Ermenistanla yaknlamas Azerbaycan ynetimini yalnz kalma konusunda korkuya sevk etmitir. kincisi, yllardr devam eden srete AGT Minsk Grubunun baarsz almalar nedeniyle zme ulalamamas ve grmelerin ok uzamasdr. ncs, Karaba probleminin Azerbaycan kamuoyunda oluturduu rahatszlktr. Azerbaycan sava tehditlerine daha ncede mracaat etse de26 uluslararas kamuoyu tarafndan pek dikkate alnmamtr. Karaba problemi daha nceki problemlerde ayn konumda bulunmayan Bat ile Rusyay ayn konuma getiren ve ayn tezlerle ynlendiren istisnai bir problemdir. Bunda Bat ile Rusyann jeopolitik, corafi ve dini sebeplerle Ermenistann yannda yer almalar nemli bir etkendir. Bu husus bir kez daha kendini gstermitir. Azerbaycann tehditleri uluslararas kamuoyunu rahatsz etmi olmal ki, eitli Bat lkeleri ve Rusya, Azerbaycan silahla bu problemi zmekten vazgemesinin gerekliliini sk sk dile getirmektedir. Hatta Rusya bu konuda Grcistan rneini ileri srerek bir bakma Azerbaycana gzda vermeye almaktadr. Bu konuda Rusya Dileri bakan Sergey Lavrov Atinadaki AGT Dileri Bakanlar Toplantsnda: AGT erevesinde gvenliin salanmas iin anlamazlklarn zlmesi nem arz etmektedir. Anlamazlklarn g kullanlarak zlmesinden kamak iin buhranlarn Birlik prensibi erevesinde zlmesi zorunludur. Sadece bu tr prensipler, geen yln Austosunda Grcistanda karlalan gce bavurarak problemi zme senaryolarndan kamaya imkn verecektir27, eklindeki beyannda Rusyann Ermeni yanls tutumunun gstergelerini bulmak mmkndr.

26

http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20071030054319634&sec_id=11,30 Ekim 2007, eriim tarihi: 02.01.2010 27 Bizim Yol Gazetesi, 27.11.2009. 34

Trkiye-Azerbaycan likilerinde Son Dnem

Arabulucularn konumlar Karaba probleminin zmn nemli bir risk altna almtr. Zira arabulucular Karaba probleminin zlmesi iin gerekli olan baz zorunlu unsurlar nasl zme kavuturacaklarn bilmemekte ya da bilmek istememektedir. Karaba sorununun bar yollarla zlebilmesi iin ncelikle sava durumunun ve igalin sona erdirilmesi gerekmektedir. Ancak, Ermeni tarafnn atekese ramen her gn Azerbaycan mevkilerini bombalamalar ve zaman zaman Azerbaycan askerlerinin bu bombalamalarda hayatlarn kaybetmeleri, buna karn Ermeni tarafna herhangi bir yaptrmn uygulanamamas AGTin problemi zme adna Ermenilere tesir edemediinin ak gstergesidir. Ayrca, Ermenilerin igal edilen topraklar yamalamas ve doal kaynaklarn snrszca smrmesi, hasat zamanlarnda igal altndaki topraklarda karttklar yangnlar Azerbaycan tarafna ynlendirerek milyonlarca dolar zarar vermelerinin nlenmesi, buna karn AGT ebakanlarnn Ermeni tarafn sulamaktan srarla kanmalar problemin zmnde AGTin problemin zmndeki mevkiinin yetersizliini gstermektedir. Azerbaycan resmi ve sivil birimlerince AGT Ebakanlar Rusya, ABD ve Fransann eitli sebeplerle Ermeni tarafn destekledii kabul edilmektedir. Bu birim yetkililerince taraf aka belli olan lkenin tekelindeki Karaba probleminin uluslararas kamuoyunun geni ekilde mzakere etmesi ve baka platformlarda zm aranmasnn nlenmesi Karaba probleminin Ermenistan tarafnn istekleri dorultusunda halledilmesi konusunda iradelerini aka desteklemektedir. Kald ki, Trkiye-Ermenistan yaknlamasna tam destek veren Bat Kulb ve Rusya srarla Karaba probleminin bu sreten ayrmaya ve bakalatrmaya almaktadr. Ayn ekilde, Karaba probleminin zlmesi noktasnda Trkiyenin gayretlerinin nnn alnmaya allmas, Trkiyenin zm srecinden uzaklatrlmak istenmesi ve nihayetinde Azerbaycan yalnz kalma korkusuyla panik atak kararlar almaya zorlanmas, Karaba konusunda Minsk Grubu lkelerinin yerini ve tarafn ak olarak gstermektedir. Mevcut artlara bakldnda Karaba probleminin yakn zamanda zm mmkn grnmemektedir. Bu nedenle atmalarn zlmesine ilikin kurallar erevesinde problemin yeniden ele alnmas, araclarn deitirilmesi, problem zme tekniklerinde deiiklie gidilmesi, Almanya ve Japonya gibi lkelerin srece dhil edilmesi kanlmazdr. Aksi takdirde problemin Filistindeki gibi 35

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

uzun yllar devam etmesi ve zmszle mahkm edilmesi kanlmazdr. Ya da geri dnlmez bir savan scak rzgrlarnn her geen gn kuvvetlenerek frtnaya dnmesi. SONU Bugn gelinen noktada Trkiye-Azerbaycan ilikileri beklentilerin ok uzanda kalmtr. Bunun gerek sebebi her iki tarafn da ar gvenle dierini ihmal etmesidir. Bu nedenle Trkiye-Azerbaycan ilikilerinin dostluk, kardelik ve Bir millet-iki devlet sylemlerinden teye gtrlmesi ve stratejik ortaklk dzeyine karlmas, kurumsallatrlmas zorunludur. Bunun yan sra iki lke ilikilerine hkim olan ar duygusallk ve yksek beklentiler yerine gereki ve uygulanabilir politikalara gidilmesi kanlmazdr. ki lke arasndaki ilikilerin kurumsallatrlmasna, ncelikle ortak yol haritasnn kartlmasyla balanmaldr. Daha sonraki aamada yol haritasna uygun olarak ortak birimler kurulmal ve ortak karar alma mekanizmas oluturulmaldr. Ancak, iki lke zaman zaman birbirlerinin politikalarna ar adapte olmakta, sonuta ar etkilenme ortaya kmaktadr. Bu nedenle, iki lke ilikilerine zellikle d politikada bamsz alan braklmaldr. lkeler arasndaki ilikilerin nemli unsurlarndan birini enerji oluturmaktadr. Zira enerji konusunda iki lke birbirine muhtatr. Trkiye, blgeye ynelik yeni siyasetini uygulayabilmek, Avrupann enerji arz gvenliini salamak adna stlendii yeni rol yerine getirebilmek iin Azerbaycana ihtiya duymaktadr. Azerbaycanda enerji kaynaklarn dnya pazarlarna ulatrabilmek ve enerji kaynaklar zerinde Rus basksndan kurtulabilmek iin Trkiye hattna muhtatr. Bu aamada iki lke blge kaynaklarn dnyaya ulatrma adna ortak enerji stratejisi ve siyaseti gelitirmek zorundadr. Kafkasyadaki karmak yap ve statko artk srdrlemez hale gelmitir. Blgesel g olmaya ynelik siyaset reten ve uygulamaya koyan Trkiye, bu siyasetin istenilen neticeleri verebilmesi iin blge lkelerinin gvenlik ve istikrar sorunlarn diyalog ve bar yollarla zmek zorundadr. Hi phe yok ki, Karaba sorunu bu sorunlarn merkezinde yer almaktadr ve zm halinde
36

Trkiye-Azerbaycan likilerinde Son Dnem

blgede birok sorun ona bal olarak ortadan kalkacaktr. Bu aamada Azerbaycan ve Trkiye sorunun zm iin daha yakn diplomasi uygulamal, global karar mekanizmlerinin imknlarndan daha fazla istifade ermenin yollarn aratrmaldr. Gney Kafkasyann en gl lkesi ve gelecek vadeden devleti olan Azerbaycan, Trkiyenin blgede artan nemi ve nemli bir karar alc haline geldiini grmeli ve onunla birlikte global sistemde kendine yer aramaldr. Bu da 2003ten itibaren Trkiye tarafndan uygulamaya konulan Komularla Sfr Problem Politikasn iyi okumak ve bu erevede oluturulacak bar kuanda yerini almakta olacaktr. Bu nedenle Azerbaycan, Trkiyenin Kafkasyadaki ibirlii ve istikrar araylarna destek vermelidir. 2009daki krizlerde iki lke ilikilerinin i ve d marjinal glerce maniple edilebileceini gstermitir. Bu olumsuz etki ynetimlerinin i kamuoyunu yeterli derecede bilgilendirmemesinden kaynaklanmtr. Bu nedenle her iki lke ynetimleri, kamu diplomasisini etkin ekilde kullanarak bir yandan kara propagandann nn almal, dier taraftan da sivil toplum kurulular araclyla almalara destek aramaldr. Sonu olarak, Trkiye-Azerbaycan ilikileri, Kafkasya gvenliinin belkemiini oluturmaktadr. Bu nedenle, eitim, gvenlik, ekonomi, kltrel ve bilim alanlarnda ibirlii kanlmazdr. Zira bu tarz ibirlii siyasi alanda da etkisini gstererek, ilikilerin gelimesine olumlu katkda bulunacaktr.

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KAYNAKA "Azrbaycan Trkiy n n nmli strateji trfdadr", http://www.anspress.com/nid119191.html, 12.06.2009. lham liyev: Azrbaycann sbri tknmz deyil, http://az.trend.az/news/top/ 826552.html, 23.06.2006 Trkiye Geriye, Azerbaycana Gaytd, Yeni Msavat, 14.04.2009. ABDULLAYEV, Mahir, Trkiye-Azerbaycan Alakalar, Mtercim Yaynlar, Bak, 1998. ALZADE, Zerd, Azrbaycan - Ermnistan - Trkiy mnasibtlri fonunda Dalq Qaraba mnaqisinin hlli, Karaba Bilgi Ajans, 01.04.2009. ARAS, Blent, Azerbaycan ile Yeniden, Sabah, 01. 07. 2009. ARAS, Blent, Davutolu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, SETA Policy Brief, no: 32, May 2009. ARAS, Blent, ZBAY, Fatih, Trkiye ve Ermenistan: Statko ve Normalleme Arasnda Kafkasya Siyaseti, SETA Analiz, No: 16, Ekim 2009. ARFOLU, Rauf, Tek Trkiye, Yeni Msavat, 21.02.2009, Azerbaycan-Trkiye Alakalar ve Haydar Aliyev, I. Kitap, Bak, Qafqaz niversitesi, 2002. BAHADIR, Xaliq, Azerbaycan-Trkiye: http://azadliq.az/ ?p=7487, 16.05.2009; Bizim Yol Gazetesi, 27.11.2009. Kim Udtu? Kim Uduzdu?,

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HASANOV, Ali, Muassr Beynelhalk Mnasebetler ve Azerbaycann Harici Siyaseti, "Azrbaycan" Neriyat Bak, 2005 http://az.apa.az/print.php?id=165816, 12 Oktyabr 2009; http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20071030054319634&sec_id=11,30 Ekim 2007, eriim tarihi: 02.01.2010. Isa Gamberle Rportaj, Azadlk Gazetesi, http://azadliq.az/?p=25030, 02.09.2009. lham liyev: al olunmu torpaqlar azad edilmyndk Azrbaycan Ermnistana tzyiq gstrck, http://az.trend.az/news/official/chronicle/945391.html, 22.06.2007 . KALAFAT, Yaar, ASLANLI, Araz, Trkiye Azerbaycan likileri, Trk D Politikas, (Ed.) dris Bal, s. 382-396. MAMMADYAROV, Elmar, The Foreing Policy of Azerbaijan: Affecting Factors and Strategic Priorities, Azerbaijan in Global Politics Crafting Foreing Policy (Ed. Alexandros Petersen, Fariz smailzade), Baku, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2009. MMMDOV, Novruz, Azrbaycan-Trkiy mnasibtlrinin mrkkblmsind maraql olan qvvlr z mqsdlrin atmayacaq, http://www.interfax.az/az/index.php? option=com_ content& task=view&id =37188&Itemid =9, 05.05.2009. Msavat Gazetesi, 02.09.2009 President Ilham Aliyev receives Azerbaijani and Armenian intellectuals, http://www. today.az/news/ politics/53523.html RAAR, Aleksandr, RDER, Sebastian, Azerbaycann Karadeniz Hazar Havzas Blgesinde Geosiyasi Rol: Teklifler ve mknlar, Azerbaijan Focus, No 1, Temmuz-Austos 2009. 39

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

FRAYTAQ-VRMNQHAUS, Rayner, Azerbaycann harici ve Tehlikesizlik Siyaseti, Azerbaijan Focus, No 1, Temmuz-Austos 2009. RUNTEN, Sevin, Azerbaycan Trk Dvletleri ile Siyasi Elageler Sisteminde, Bak, Adilolu Neriyat, 2005, s.27-78. Sabir Rstemhanlyla Rportaj, ANS Televizyonu Xeberler Program, 02.09.2009. BYEV, Sfr "Azrbaycan Ordusu Qafqazda n http://www.anspress. com/ nid121122.html, 03.10.2009. gcl ordudur" ,

Trkiye Azerbaycan altay Raporu, Kafkasya almalar 2, Temmuz 2009, s. 9 vd. Trkiy-Ermnistan protokollar Azrbaycann maraqlarna cavab http://az.trend.az/news/politics/foreign/1603843.html, 03.01.2010; vermir,

Trkiy-Ermnistann mnasibtlrin Bakdan bax, http://www.voanews.com/ azerbaijani/archive/2009-09/Aze-davudturkiyeelxan.cfm?moddate= 2009-09-01; VELYEV, Cavid, Bara Uzak Prag Grmeleri, http://www.turksam.org/tr/ yazdir1657.html, 11 Mays 2009. Yeni Azerbaycan Gazetesi, 11.09.2008. YILMAZ, Reha, Azerbaycan ve Azerbaycanly Anlayabilmek, USAK Stratejik Gndem, http://www.usak.org.tr/myazdir.asp?id=1043.

40

HAZAR HAVZASINDA ENERJ DPLOMASS Energy Diplomacy in Caspian Basin

Aslhan P. TURAN

zet: Enerji devletlerin d politikalarnda belirleyici faktrlerden biridir. Orta Dounun istikrarsz yaps, devletleri, enerji ihtiyacn karlamak zere zengin petrol ve doalgaz kaynaklarna sahip olan Hazar Havzasna ynlendirmitir. Devletlerin ekonomik bymelerinde ve refah seviyesini arttrmalarnda nemi bir rol oynayan enerjinin gvenliinin salanmasnda ve nakil hatlarnn inasnda devletlerarasnda nfuz mcadeleleri yaanmaktadr. Bu almann amac, Hazar Havzasnn jeopolitiini ve enerji gvenliini, nfuz mcadeleleri nda incelemek ve enerji kaynaklarnn devletlerin siyasal ve ekonomik kalknmalarndaki etkisini aratrmaktr. Anahtar Szckler: Hazar, enerji, gvenlik, enerji nakil hatlar, nfuz mcadelesi

Abstract: Energy is a determinant factor of foreign policy. Instabilities in the Middle East have oriented states to the Caspian Basin, rich on petrol and natural gas resources, to provide their energy needs. Playing an important role for economic growth and prosperity, security of energy and construction of pipelines, are emerging international struggle for influence. The aim of this article is to analyze the geopolitics of Caspian Basin and the energy security with struggles of influence and to discover how the energy effects political and economic development. Keywords: Caspian, energy, security, pipelines, struggle of influence

Paris 1 Sorbonne niversitesi, Avrupa Birlii Hukuku yksek lisans mezunu.

41

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

GR Gnmz uluslararas ilikiler sisteminde enerji, para ve g kayna olarak alglanmaktadr. Seyrekleen enerji kaynaklarnn tedariki devletlerin d politikalarn belirleyen temel jeostratejik koz haline gelmitir.1 Enerji retim alanlar Kuzey ve Orta Amerika, Orta Dou, Rusya, Kafkasya, Hazar ve Orta Asya iken, tketim alanlar Kuzey Amerika, Avrupa, Japonya ve Uzak Dou lkeleridir. Kaynaklar snrl, tketim artma eilimi gsterirken, enerji politikalarnda asl sorunu kaynaklarn hangi devletler tarafndan denetlenecei, yani enerji gelirinin hangi yntemlerle ve hangi oranlarda paylatrlaca tekil etmektedir.2 Sovyetler Birliinin 1991de dalmasyla sona eren Souk Savan ardndan, devletlerarasndaki mcadele ideolojik olmaktan km ve ekonomik rekabete dnmtr. Bu rekabette n plana kan temel unsur enerji unsurudur. Enerji kaynaklar asndan ise Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya, Orta Doudan sonra byk glerin gznde son derece nemli bir konuma yerlemi bulunmaktadrlar. Gerek enerji kaynaklarnn retimi gerekse nakil hatlar projeleri, blgesel devletler ve enerji talebindeki kresel devletlerarasnda nemli bir rekabet arac haline gelmitir. Bu rekabetin en youn olarak yaand Hazar blgesinin nmzdeki 20 yl iinde ham petrol d satm potansiyelinin hzla artaca dnldnde, enerji ihtiyac her geen gn artan devletlerin, dikkatlerini Hazar blgesine evirmelerinin sebebi anlalmaktadr.3 Hazar blgesi 19. Yzyln ortalarndan beri enerji ticaretinde nemli bir rol oynamaktadr. Bamszlklarn kazanmalarnn ardndan, Hazar havzasnda bulunan Azerbaycan, Trkmenistan ve Kazakistan yabanc yatrmclar iin ekici bir adres olmutur. Hazar blgesinde SSCBnin dalmasnn ardndan yeni devletlerin ortaya kmas ve dnya petrol ve doalgaz rezervlerinin nemli bir oranna sahip olmalar, hem komu devletlerin hem de enerji arzna ihtiya duyan byk ekonomilerin ilgisini hazar blgesine ve Orta Asyaya ekmitir. Blgede
1 2

Michael T. Klare, Gostratgie de lEnergie, The Nation, 7 Mays 2008 ar Krat Yce, SSCB Sonras Hazar Blgesinde Enerji Mcadelesi ve Trkiye, Enerji Stratejileri, 30 Mart 2005, http://www.turksam.org/tr/a307.html 3 rgen Uurlu, evresel Gvenlik Balamnda Uluslar aras Enerji Politikalarnda Trkiyenin Yeri ve nemi, Blgesel Politikalar (Ed.) Hasret omak, s. 176 42

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

rekabet halinde olan lkeler, bata Rusya ve Amerika olmak zere, ran, Trkiye ve indir. lkeler arasndaki bu etkinlik mcadelesi Byk Yeni Oyun olarak adlandrlmaktadr. Uluslararas ilikilerde ekonomik karlarn nem kazanmas sebebiyle, ok uluslu irketler de devletler kadar d politikada belirleyici bir role sahip olmaya balamlardr. Dolaysyla enerji sektrndeki rekabette gerek kamu irketleri, gerekse zel irketler arasnda ve hatta devletlerle irketler arasnda rekabet ortam olumaktadr. Enerji nakil hatlarnn irketler tarafndan ina edildii gz nnde bulundurulduunda, kimi zaman irketlerin devletlerden daha aktif olabildikleri grlebilmektedir. Devletlerin ve ok uluslu irketlerin, yrttkleri enerji politikalarnda ana hedef gze arpmaktadr: enerji kaynaklarnn gvenliinin, enerjinin ulam gvenliinin ve fiyat istikrarnn salanmas. Bunlarn yan sra, kullanlmak istenen enerjinin dk maliyetle elde edilmesi ve talep edilen miktarla kalitede pazarlara ulatrlmas hedeflenmektedir. Enerji kaynaklar, retimi ve tanmas, d politika davranlarnda rekabete yol amaktadr, ancak ayn zamanda yeni ibirlii perspektifleri de sunmaktadr. Bu erevede, enerji her hal ve artta devletler iin bir g ve istikrar unsuru olabilir mi? Ya da etnik atmalar, silahlanma yarn veya siyasal istikrarszlklar krkleyici bir etki yapabilir mi? Bu sorulara cevap ararken, Hazar blgesi gz nnde bulundurularak enerji gvenlii ve Hazarn stats tartmalar ile nfuz mcadeleleri ele alndktan sonra; enerjinin devletlerin siyasal ve ekonomik kalknmalarnda oynadklar rol, gei lkesi konumundaki Trkiye ve kaynak sahibi Azerbaycan zerinden incelenecektir. 1. HAZARDA ENERJ POLTKALARI Enerji arznn eitliliinin salanmas enerji stratejilerinin merkezini oluturmaktadr. Enerji kaynaklarna sahip olan ve reten devletler, ekonomik kalknmalarn salamak iin alc eitlilii ararken, enerji ithalats devletler de kaynak eitlilii peine dmektedirler. Bu sayede devletler, enerji gvenliklerini salamaktadrlar. Herhangi bir ekonomik ve siyasi kriz dneminde, tketiciler enerji yokluuyla karlamamakta; tek bir tketiciye bal kalmayan reticiler de enerjiden gelir elde etmeye devam edebilmektedir. Hazardaki enerji politikalar, 43

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

yani retim ve datm faaliyetleri, hem blgenin zengin enerji kaynaklarna sahip devletler, hem blgesel gler, hem de kresel gler tarafndan, rekabet ve ibirlikleri erevesinde belirlenmektedir. Gnmzde, diplomaside ekonomik olgular byk nem kazanm bulunmaktadr. D politika artk sadece bar ve gvenliin korunmasyla deil, refahn salanmasyla da ilgilidir. Unutulmamaldr ki barn korunmas ile ekonomik ve sosyal amalarn gerekletirilmesi birbirleriyle balantl elerdir.4 Dnya apnda kaynaklarn kullanlmas, evrenin korunmas gibi konularda devletlerarasnda ibirlii olanaklar giderek artmaktadr. Bu da devletlerin birbirlerine git gide daha baml hale geldiklerinin bir gstergesidir.5 Diplomaside siyaset kadar ekonominin de nemli hale gelmesi sonucunda, d politikada aktr eitlilii de artmtr. Enerji diplomasisini gz nnde bulundurduumuzda karmza kan, belki de devletlerden daha ok etkiye sahip, ok uluslu irketlerdir. Ekonomik gleri ve uluslar aras balantlar sayesinde, sadece ticari anlamda deil, devletlerin siyasi statleri ve hatta i ilerindeki gelimeler zerinde, devletlerden daha fazla rol oynadklarn sylememiz mmkndr.6 1.1. Enerji Gvenlii ve Hazar 1.1.1. Enerji gvenlii Devletler artk endstri, tama ve askeri operasyonlar gibi temel aktivitelerinde, enerjiye tamamen baml hale gelmilerdir. 1973te Arap-srail savalar sonrasndaki petrol krizi, enerji politikalarnda, arz gvenliinin nemini gzler nne sermitir. Avrupa Komisyonu, enerji gvenliini u ekilde aklamaktadr: Stratejik stoklarn korunmas veya ekonomik artlar iin yeterli olmayan ulusal kaynaklarn yetersizlii yznden gelecekte nemli oranda sorun tekil edecek enerji ihtiyacna kar, ulalabilir ve istikrarl d kaynaklar salama becerisi. 7
4

Hner Tuncer, Diplomasinin Evrimi: Gizli Diplomasiden Kresel Diplomasiye, Kaynak Yaynlar, 2009, Istanbul, s. 95 5 Tuncer, op cit, s. 138 6 Tuncer, Op cit., s. 145 7 14 Eyll 1990 tarihli Avrupa Topluluu Komisyonu tarafndan kabul edilen SEC 90 (1248) belgesinden; http://aei.pitt.edu/3687/01/000287_1.pdf 44

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

Enerji arznn ve ulamnn gvenliinin salanmas iin blgede uzun sreli bar ortamnn, ekonomik ve siyasi istikrarn tesis edilmesi temel ihtiyatr. Bu amac gerekletirebilmek iin TACIS gibi programlar erevesinde Hazar blgesi lkelerinde demokrasiyi glendirmek ve Pazar ekonomisine geite destek olmak iin yardmlar yaplmaktadr. Enerji, altyap, ulam ve telekomnikasyon sektrleri ncelikli olarak yardm alanlar arasndadrlar.8 Pek ok enerji ihra yolunun bulunmas, gerek tketiciler, gerek reticiler, gerekse de enerji piyasalar iin, teknik veya siyasi bir gerilim yznden enerji datmnn aksamas riskini ortadan kaldraca iin, daha gvenilir bir ortam yaratacaktr. Enerji arz gvenliini salamann en iyi yolu arz eitliliini salamaktan gemektedir, yani ne kadar ok retici blge olursa enerji piyasas o derecede istikrara kavuabilecektir. Bu sebepledir ki Ortadoudaki savalar ve siyasi gerginlikler, bu blgeden salanan enerjiye olan bamll azaltma eilimi dourmutur.9 Bu durum da Orta Asya ve Hazar devletlerinin enerji arzna olan ilginin artmasna sebep olmaktadr. Hem blge devletlerinin rettikleri petrol veya doalgaz satma imkn bulmalar hem de enerji ithal eden lkelerin farkl merkezlere ynelmeleri arz gvenliini salama asndan son derece nemli yer tutmaktadr. Petrol ve doalgazn boru hatlar vastasyla ithal blgelere tanmas, blgesel ve uluslar aras gler, ayn zamanda petrol irketleri arasnda rekabet yaratmaktadr. Bu adan hkmetler ve irketler arasnda hangi boru hattnn ncelikli olaca konusunda uzun mzakereler srdrlmektedir. Mzakerelerde temel talar elbette ki stratejik nceliklerle finansal karlar oluturmaktadr. Hkmetlerin stratejik hedefleri yannda, irketlerin basklarn da burada hatrlamakta fayda vardr, nk enerji nakil hatlar irketler tarafndan ina edilmektedir. Hazar blgesinde ilk petrol rafinerileri 1870li yllarda Nobel kardeler, Marcus Samuel ve Rohschild ailesi tarafndan kurulmutur. Birinci Dnya Savana kadar Orta Dou petrolleri her ne kadar biliniyorduysa da, Rus petrolnn (Azerbaycan petrol) ucuz olmas ve tama yollarnn daha gelimi olmas sebebiyle en nemli
8 9

Uurlu, op cit, s. 186 Gawdat Bahgat, Energy Security: The Caspian Sea, Minerals & Energy, Vol 20, No 2, 2005, s. 5

45

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

kaynak yine Bakyd. SSCBnin dalmasnn ardndan Hazar blgesindeki en nemli enerji kaynaklarnn Azerbaycan, Kazakistan ve Trkmenistanda olduu ortaya knca, Hazar Havzasnn dnya devletlerinin ilgisini ekmesine sebep olmutur. Uluslar aras Enerji Ajansnn verdii rakamlara gre, Hazar blgesi uluslar aras alanda enerjinin yeni jeopolitii olarak tanmlanmaktadr. Hazar blgesinde enerji politikalarn ve nfuz mcadelelerini etkileyen bir baka etken ise, Hazarn hukuki statsnn, kyda devletlerarasnda tartmal durumda olmas ve bu ihtilafn, taraflar arasndaki ilikilerde bask unsuru olarak kullanlmasna, hatta silahlanma yarna sebep olmasdr. 1.1.2. Hazarn Stats Hazarn stats 1991 ylna kadar SSCB ve ran arasndaki antlamalarla dzenlenmekteydi. 1921 Dostluk Antlamasyla, ran ve Sovyet gemilerinin Hazar Denizinde serbest dolamalar karar alnrken, 1935te bu hkme ilaveten 10 millik balklk blgesi kurulmutur. 1940 ylnda imzalanan antlamayla ise deniz yzeyinin ve dibinin ortak kullanm ngrlmekteydi. Sovyetler Birlii dneminde, Hazarn Sovyetlere ait olan ksm, 1970te Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Rusya ve Trkmenistan arasnda paylatrlmtr. SSCBnin dalmasnn ardndan Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan, 1970te kendilerine verilmi blgelerde egemenlik haklar olduu iddiasyla ortaya kmlar ve de ayrca Hazara kyda olan be devlet arasnda Hazarn gl m deniz mi olduu konusunda ihtilaf kmtr. Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan, Hazarn deniz olduunu iddia ederlerken, Rusya ve ran, Hazarda fazla petrol ve doalgaz kaynaklar olmad iin, gl olduunu savunmakta ve kaynaklarn eit paylamndan yana tavr almaktadrlar. Trkmenistan ise net bir iddiada bulunmamaktadr. Hazarn deniz olduu iddiasnda bulunan Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan, Hazar Denizinin 1982 tarihli Birlemi Milletler Deniz Hukuku Szlemesine tbi olmas gerektiini sylerken ve bundan doan haklardan faydalanmalarn talep etmektedirler. Szlemeye gre, her kyda lkenin 12 millik bir ulusal karasularnn 35 millik mnhasr ekonomik blgesinin olmas gerekmektedir. Geri kalan blgeler ise kyda lkeler tarafndan eit bir kullanm iin paylatrlmaldr. Rusya siyasi ve ekonomik gelimeleri gz nnde bulundurarak Hazarn statsyle ilgili birka kez gr deitirmi ve sonunda 1998de Kazakistan ile
46

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

Hazarn kuzey ksmnn deniz dibinin paylalmasn ngren bir antlama imzalamtr. Benzer nitelikteki bir antlamay 2001 ylnda Azerbaycan ile de imzalamtr. ran ise Rusyann bu tavrn eletirerek eit paylam prensibini kabul ettirmek istemektedir. Bu antlamay protesto etmek amacyla 23 Temmuz 2001 tarihinde, ran uaklar Azerbaycan hava sahasn ihlal ederek, Hazar Denizinde aratrma yaban Azeri gemilerini de taciz etmitir. Rusyann bu tutuma tepki gstermesinin ardndan hakkaniyete dayal bir paylam yaplmas gerektii tezini dile getiren ran, yrrle konmak istenen projeleri engellemek amacndadr.10 Hazarn statsyle ilgili toplanan zirvelerde de evre koruma ve deniz tamacl ile ilgili konularda uzlama salanmtr. Ancak deniz dibi paylam, su tabakasnn kullanm, su rnlerinin korunmas, deniz snrlarnn tespiti, blgenin gvenlii gibi konular zme kavuturulamamtr. Hazarn statsnn belirlenmesinde en nemli konu su dibinden denecek enerji nakil hatlarn ilgilendirmektedir. Bu sorunda da ran Hazarn dibinin milli sektrlere gre blnmesine kar karken, Rusya evre sorunlarn gereke gstererek, Hazarn altndan boru hatt denmesini engellemek istemektedir. Bu da Azerbaycan ve Kazakistann karlarna ters dmektedir ki bu durum Rusyann yakn evre politikasnn temel talarndan birini oluturmaktadr, nk Rusya enerji hatlar zerindeki egemenliini kaybetmek istememektedir. 1.1.3. Hazarn Jeopolitii ve Silahlanma Sovyetler Birliinin dalmasyla birlikte yeni bamsz olan devletlerle blgesel gler arasnda, zellikle enerji kaynaklar iin rekabet bakmndan yeni bir konjonktr ortaya kmtr. Bamszlklarn kazanan lkeler konumlarn salamlatrmaya alrken, blgesel gler arasnda da bir etki mcadelesi balamtr.11 Orta Asya ve Hazar lkeleri, nkleer gce sahip drt lke tarafndan evrelenmitir: Rusya, in, Hindistan, Pakistan. Bir dier komu olan Trkiye, hem blge lkeleriyle tarihi ve kltrel paylamlar dolaysyla hem de NATO yesi vasfyla rekabette yerini almaktadr. ran da tarihi balar ve nkleer program sayesinde blge lkeleri zerinde etkin olmaya almaktadr. ABD ise
10

Frat Purta, Hazar Blgesinde Rekabetin Yeni Boyutu: Silahlanma Yar, 1 Ekim 2004, http://www.turksam.org/tr/a307.html 11 Kamer Kasm, Souk Sava Sonras Kafkasya, USAK yaynlar, 2009, Istanbul, s. 1

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terrle sava politikas ile Afganistana girmi, Al-Qaida ile mcadele edebilmek iin askeri sler kurmu ve bu ekilde komu lkelerin arasnda rekabette yerini almtr. Etnik temelli atmalar ve bamszlk talepleriyle birlikte blge istikrarszlk sergilemektedir ki, bu durum ABD ve Avrupa iin enerji kaynaklarnn naklinin gvenli bir ekilde salanmas gereksinimi dourmaktadr. Sovyetler Birlii dneminde yeterli zenin gsterilmedii enerji yatrmlar, yeni dnemde blge lkeleri iin nemli bir gelir kayna haline gelmitir. Ancak siyasi istikrarszlk hem bu lkelerin enerji sektr sayesinde zenginlemesini engellemekte, hem de nakil hatlar zerinden uluslar aras bir rekabet ortam olumasna sebep olmaktadr. Hazar blgesinde etki sahibi olmak isteyen gler, kimi zaman blge devletlerinin i politikalarna da mdahaleden ekinmeyerek, enerji hatlar zerinde avantaj salamak ve yeni bamsz devletler zerinde etki kurmak istemektedirler.12 Hazar blgesindeki enerji politikalar sadece retimle ilgili deil, retilen petroln tketicilere tanmas ile ilgilidir. Limanlara yakn olan retim alanlarnda ok fazla problem kmasa da, retim alan denize uzak yerlerde, enerji nakli ya dorudan boru hatlaryla ya da uygun grlen en yakn limana tanmas yoluyla salanmaktadr.13 Petrol ve doalgazda byk lde da baml olan kresel aktrlerin, ekonomilerindeki gelimeye bal olarak gelecekteki enerji ihtiyalar artacandan, ABD gibi sper, in ve Hindistan gibi ykselen gler, Rusya ve Trkiye gibi blgesel gler, zellikle enerjinin tanmas konusunu gvenlik sorunu olarak kabul etmektedirler. Bu nedenle de petrol ve doalgaz arznn karlanmasnda Orta Dou, Orta Asya ve Hazar blgesi, kresel ve blgesel g atmalarnn odan oluturmaktadr.14 zellikle 90l yllarn sonlarndan itibaren blgede balayan enerji mcadelesi ve karlkl gvensizlik duygusu, blge lkeleri arasnda silahlanma yarn
12 13

Kasm, op cit, s. 5-7 Doan Aydal, Enerji Kan Kokuyor: Biyokimyasal Sava ve Enerji Kartelleri, Tima Yaynlar, 2009, Istanbul, s. 47 14 H. Naci Bayra, Kresel Enerji Politikalar ve Trkiye, 4 ubat 2010, http://www.avsam.org/tr/a1909.html 48

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

tetiklemitir. ABDnin ekonomik olarak blgeye girmesinden sonra, NATO araclyla askeri adan da nfuzu, Rusyann Hazar donanmasn glendirmesine sebep olmutur. Buna karlk, daha nce Hazarda donanmas bulunmayan Kazakistan ve Trkmenistan da deniz gc oluturmutur. Azerbaycan ise 2002 ylndan bu yana ABD ile ortaklaa deniz tatbikatlar dzenlemektedir. Hazarn stats zerine daha nce bahsedilen ihtilaf da silahlanmaya sebep olan bir baka nedendir, nk paylam konusunda ciddi bir kar fark ve uzlamazlk sz konusudur.15 ABDnin siyasi ve ekonomik varln, NATO kanalyla askeri adan da blgeye yerleerek glendirmesi, Rusyay yeni giriimlerde bulunmaya sevk etmitir. Dastanda ortak karargh ina etmek, Ermenistana S-300 fzeleri yerletirmek gibi giriimlerle, NATOnun askeri gcn dengelemeye almaktadr. 2002 ylnda anghay birlii rgtne dnen ibirlii de Rusyann ABDyi dengelemek maksadyla balatt bir sretir. Ayrca, yine 2002 ylnda BDT iindeki askeri ibirlii revize edilmi ve Kolektif Gvenlik rgt kurulmutur. ABDyi dengelemek iin silahlanmasna hz veren Rusyann bu hareketlenmesi de blge devletlerini endielendirmi ve onlarn da silahlanmasna sebep olmutur. Daha nce Hazarda donanmas olmayan Kazakistan, Rusyann Hazarn, aidiyeti tartmal olan kuzey ksmn abluka altna almas sonucu, blgede Kazak askeri varln arttrmaya balam ve Hazar kylarn lkesi iin stratejik ncelikli blge ilan etmitir. Ayrca petrol sahalarnn gvenliini tek bana salamak amacyla bir deniz filosu oluturma almalarna 2003 ylnda balamtr. Hazar blgesi lkelerinden Trkmenistann ise silahlanmasna sebep olan bir dier nemli blge lkesi olan ve baz petrol yataklar zerinde paylam sorunu yaad Azerbaycandr. Azerbaycann 2001den itibaren ABD ile yakn ilikiler iine girmesi ve sava gemisi satn almas, Trkmenistan Ukraynadan silah satn almaya yneltmitir. Bunun yannda 2002de imzalanan Dostluk ve birlii

15

Purta, op cit.

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Antlamasn takiben, Rusya ile de ilikilerini gelitirmeye balam ve Gvenlik Antlamas ile de bu ilikileri derinletirmitir. 16 Enerji kaynaklar bakmndan zengin Hazar Havzasnn istikrarn ve gvenliinin salanmasn hem blge devletleri hem de kresel gler iin nem tamaktadr. Bu amac gerekletirmek iin Hazar Havzasna ynelik hangi devlet nasl bir politika retmektedir? 1.2. Hazarda Nfuz Mcadeleleri Hazar Havzasnda etkinlik mcadelesine giren blgesel devletler olduu gibi kresel devletler de vardr. Bu devletlerin farkl d politika aralar olsa da, temel amalar, enerji gvenliini salamak ve ulam hatlar zerinde hak sahibi olmaktr. 1.2.1. Blgesel Aktrler Trkiye, blge lkeleriyle tarihi ve ekonomik balar olan bir lkedir. zellikle Sovyetler Birliinin dalmasndan sonra, Trkiye ilikileri aktifletirmek politikasna ynelmitir. Trkiye, enerji tketimi, retiminin ok stnde olmas dolaysyla nemli bir enerji ithalats konumundadr. Ayrca, en nemli petrol ve gaz kaynaklarna sahip Hazar blgesiyle Avrupa ve dier ithalatlar arasnda doal bir kpr grevi stlenmektedir. Dileri Bakan Ahmet Davutoluna gre Hazar Havzasnda Trkiyenin izlemesi gereken taktikler, blge devletlerinin Rusyaya kar statlerinin kademeli olarak glendirilmesi ve Hazar-Karadeniz balantsnn bu cumhuriyetler zerinden gereklemesinin temin edilmesi ve ran ile aramzdaki ideolojik gerilimleri son vererek ekonomik ibirliini salamlatrmak yoluyla Rusyann blge zerindeki etkisini 17 dengelenmesidir. Trkiyenin konumu ekonomik ve siyasi kalknma blmnde detayl olarak incelenecektir.

16 17

Purta, op cit. Ahmet Davutolu, Stratejik Derinlik: Trkiyenin Uluslar aras Konumu, Kre Yaynlar, 2010, Istanbul, s. 181 50

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Rusya iin Orta Asya ve Hazar blgesi, arka bahe veya yakn evre olarak adlandrlan stratejik neme sahip bir blgedir.Enerji kaynaklarn bir politika arac olarak kullanarak, tm dnyaya kar, Orta Asya ve Hazar blgesinde etkisini yeniden kurmak istemektedir. Rusyann Hazar blgesindeki d politika amalar u ekilde zetlenebilir: Rusyann gvenliini ve jeopolitik menfaatlerini teminat altna alabilecek ekilde dost bir tampon blge salamak; Rusya ilerine yaylabilecek veya snr uyumazlklarna yol aabilecek etnik gerginliklerden kanmak iin blgede istikrar temin etmek; Azerbaycan, Kazakistan ve Trkmenistan petrol ve doalgaz kaynaklarndan azami istifade etmek; yabanc glerin blgeye giriini engellemek ve blgedeki Amerikan varln zayflatmak.18 ABDnin, blgeye nfuz etme abalar Rusyann pheci yaklamlarna sebep olmaktadr. Kendi gcn korumak iin de eski Sovyet cumhuriyetleriyle ilikilerini glendirmek maksadyla ibirlii giriimlerinde bulunmaktadr. Bu giriimlerden en nemlileri Ortak Gvenlik Antlamas Tekilat ve Bamsz Devletler Topluluudur. Fiilen Rus hegemonyas blgeye hl hkimdir: Rus gaz tekeli Gazprom, Trkmenistann neredeyse btn doalgazn satn almakta, baz Rus irketleri batl ortaklaryla birlikte arama ve retim aamalarnda yer almakta ve bylece Hazar petrolleri ve gaz zerindeki etkinlikleri devam etmektedir. Hazar Havzas, son derece yksek miktarda doalgaz ve petrol barndrmaktadr, bu kaynaklarn uluslar aras pazarlara ulamasnda, d satm hatlarn kontrol altnda tutan Rusyann en byk engel olduu sylenebilir. Ulam yollarn elinde tutan Rusya iin gnmzdeki en nemli Pazar Avrupadr ve bunun iin de Avrupaya kendisinden baka doalgaz satan bir devletin olmasn engellemeye almaktadr.19 Rusya, yksek enerji fiyatlar ve zengin kaynaklar dolaysyla ekonomik kalknmasn salarken, bir yandan da d politikasnda siyasi gvenilirliini arttrmaya abalamaktadr. Rusya, enerji politikalarn diplomatik ilikilerinin anahtar olarak grmektedir. Ancak zellikle son yllarda Rusya, sergiledii
18 19

Purta, op cit. Uurlu, op cit., s. 181

51

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

tavrdan dolay, partnerden ok bir tehdit olarak alglanmaya balanmtr. Rusya ve Almanya arasnda Baltk Boru Hatt projesinin imzalanmas ise, orta ve dou Avrupa lkeleri tarafndan Molotov-Ribentrop Paktna benzetilmi ve Rusyann ak tehdidi olarak alglanmtr.20 Siyasi veya enerji fiyatlandrmas konusunda yaanan ekonomik krizlerin ardndan, son dnemde Rusyann Ukraynaya ve Grcistana doalgaz akn durdurmas eletirilere neden olmutur. Bu ekilde enerji organlar zerinde bask kurarak, BDT lkelerinin ekonomileri zerinde olduu kadar, i ve d siyasetleri zerinde de hkim rol oynamak hedefindedir. Genel olarak Rusyann d politikasn incelediimize, Rusya yanls politika yrten devletlerin fiyat indirimiyle dllendirildii gzlenirken, yani siyasi ilikilerin fiyatlar zerinde dorudan etkili olduuna tank olunurken, Rusyann enerji arzna ne kadar gvenilebilecei sorgulanmaktadr. 21 Hem blgesel bir g olan, hem de Hazara kydaolan ran ise, Orta Asyadan dnya pazarlarna petrol ve gaz datmnda kendisini doal bir gei yolu olarak grmektedir. Ancak bu gr ABDnin muhalefetiyle karlat iin snrlandrlmak zorunda kalmaktadr. Denize alan limanlar sayesinde rettii petrol ve doalgaz uluslar aras piyasalara ulatrma imknna sahiptir, ancak Trkmen ve Kazak petrolnn ve doal gaznn da taycs olmak istemektedir. Bunu salayabilmek iin imzalanan antlamalara dk cretten tama yapaca taahhdnn de konulabileceini aklamtr. 1997 ylnda Trkmenistanla imzalad antlamas sonrasnda, dk kapasiteli doalgaz boru hatt ina edilmitir ki bu hat hala daha Trkmenistann nakit para karl ihracat yapt tek hat durumundadr.22 ran Hazar blgesi devletleri iin limanyla da cazip bir seenektir. ran ile Trkmenistan arasnda ibirlii ulam ve enerji alanlarndadr. Trkmenistan, rann Orta Asyaya almas iin bir gei lkesiyken, ran da Basra Krfezine ulamda gei lkesidir. 1995 ve 2007 ylnda imzalanan

20

Andrew Monaghan, Russians Energy Diplomacy: A Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol 7, no 2, June 2007, .s 276 21 Monaghan, op cit., s. 282 22 Aykal, , op cit., s 51 52

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

antlamalarla, yaplmtr.23

ran-Trkmenistan-Kazakistan

arasnda

demiryolu

inaatlar

1.2.2. Kresel Aktrler Rooseveltin petrol karlnda Suudi Arabistana askeri koruma salamay stlenmesinden sonra enerji gvenlii ABD d politikasnda temel unsurlardan biri haline gelmitir. 1980de Carter doktrininin ilan ile Orta Douda enerji gvenliine herhangi bir tehdit sz konusu olduunda Amerikan askeri mdahalesi ngrlmekteydi. Hazar petrol kaynaklarnn, Basra Krfezi kaynaklar kadar zengin olmas, Hazarn ABD iin bir dier stratejik blge, hatta kar sahas haline gelmesine sebep olmutur. Blge lkeleri bamszlklarn kazandktan sonra, ABD, ncelikle bu lkelerin, Sovyet miras olarak kitle imha silahlarna sahip olmalarndan dolay endie duymutur. Bu yzden ilk hedefi, ekonomik ve siyasi bask uygulayarak, blgeyi silahlardan arndrmak eklinde belirlenmitir. ABDnin eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri ile ilgili ncelikleri, bu lkelerin uluslar aras sisteme entegre olmalar ve enerji kaynaklarnn gvenli bir ekilde uluslar aras pazarlara tanmasdr. Bu amac gerekletirmek iinse, bamszln yeni kazanan lkelerin, piyasa ekonomisini benimsemelerini ve demokratik bir yapya sahip olmalarn desteklemektedir. Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan doalgaz kaynaklarndan faydalanmak iin antlamalar imzalayan Amerikal irketler, bu sayede ABDnin Orta Douya olan bamln azaltmak istemilerdir. 1994te Asrn Antlamas ile beraber, Amerikal irketler, Hazar petrollerinin ilenmesi ve pazarlanmasna ilikin projelerde nemli paylara sahip olmulardr. 21 Temmuz 1997de ise ABD Dileri Bakanl, Hazar sorumluluk sahas olarak grdklerini ilan etmitir. Bir dier deyile, ABD, Hazardaki enerji kaynaklarnn gvenliini salanmasnda sorumluluk aldn ilan etmekteydi. Enerji nakil hatlarnda dou-bat koridoru projesini destekleyen ABD, yeni bamsz olan devletler zerinde ran etkisine kar Trk modelinin yerlemesini ngrmekteydi. Kendi asndan dost

23

Bayram Sinkaya, ran Cumhurbakan Ahmedinejadn Tacikistan ve Trkmenistan Ziyaretleri, 14 Ocak 2010, www.turksam.org/tr/a255.html

53

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

olmayan lkeler araclyla enerjinin tanmasna ve enerji aknn durmasna sebep olacak atmalarn kmasna engel olma stratejisi gtmektedir. Hazar blgesinde hkimiyet kurmak isteyen ABD, tek tarafl veya ok tarafl antlamalar yoluyla bu amacna ulamaya almaktadr. Bu antlamalar arasnda, Azerbaycanla ve Kazakistanla imzalanan ve Hazar Denizinde ortak askeri tatbikatlar gerekletirilmesini ngren ve Hazar Koruma Program gibi hava, deniz ve kylarn karlkl kontroln taahht eden askeri antlamalar da vardr. Bunun gibi bar koruma ve kriz ynetimi salamak amacyla yrrle girmi olan askeri yardm program Bar in Ortaklk da, ABDnin blgede etkin rol oynamasn salamaktadr. 1997de Grcistan, Ukrayna, Azerbaycan ve Moldova arasnda imzalanan, 1999da zbekistann katlmyla rgte dnen ve Avrupa ile Asya arasnda bir ulam koridoru oluturarak, Hazar petrollerinin gvenliini salamay hedefleyen GUUAM, ABD tarafndan desteklenmitir. Ayn yl, blgede Rusyann katlm olmadan ilk kez uluslar aras nitelikli bir askeri tatbikat dzenlenmitir. GUUAM araclyla, Rusyann eski Sovyet corafyasnda etkisini azaltmak ve yeni kurulan devletlerin bamszlklarn glendirmeleri amalanmtr.24 11 Eyll saldrlarndan sonra blgeye askeri adan yerleme imkn bulan ABD, politik ve ekonomik olarak hi olmad kadar blgeye etki etmeye balamtr. Saldrlardan sonra enerji kaynaklarnn tanmasnn yan sra, Kafkaslarda ve Orta Asyada gvenliin salanmas da ABDnin bir dier stratejik hedefi olmutur. Bu politikalar vastasyla blge devletleri zerinde gvenlie dayal bir bask unsuru oluturmakta ve ekonomik karlarn azami seviyeye ulatrmaktadr. Terrle mcadele kapsamnda Afganistana dzenlenen mdahalede, zbek, Krgz, Tacik ve Kazak havalimanlar ABD uaklarna alm, Rusya ile de ayn konuda ibirlii sylemleri gndeme gelmitir. Gnmzde Krgzistanda ABDnin askeri s sahibi olmas, blgedeki Amerikan varln glendiren nemli bir faktrdr. Hazar blgesinde enerji arzndan faydalanmak isteyen ve enerji politikalarna dahil olmak isteyen bir dier devlet ise indir. Hzla byyen ekonomisiyle, 90lara kadar, petrolde kendine yeten bir lkeyken, gnmzde enerji ithali yapan bir lkeye dnmtr. 1978den 2004e kadar enerji tketimi %245 orannda
24

Frat Partu, op cit.

54

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

artarken, enerji retimi %194 orannda artmtr. Sanayileme ve kentleme hzla artarken ulusal kaynaklarn yeterli olamayaca gzlenmektedir.25 Bu sebeple de Hazar petrollerinden ve doalgazndan faydalanmak iin stratejiler gelitirmektedir. in, snr sorunlar zmek amacyla, 1996 ylnda, anghay birlii rgtnn kurulmasna nclk etmi ve Uygur blgesinin istikrarlatrlmas ile radikal hareketlerin engellemesini hedeflemitir. in enerji ihtiyacn stratejik gvenlik sorunu olarak alglamaktadr. Rusya gibi in de ABDnin blgedeki nfuzunu krmak istemektedir ve Kazakistan ile Trkmenistanda enerji kaynaklarna ynelik projelerde etkin aba gstermektedir. Orta Asya hidrokarbon kaynaklarn enerji ihtiyac iin ncelikli olarak gren in, Rusyann petrol ve doalgaz datm yollarn elinde bulundurmasndan ve blge lkeleri zerinde bask kurmasndan ekonomik karlar zedelenecei dncesiyle, son derece rahatszdr. Ancak Orta Doudaki enerji kaynaklarnn retim ve datmnn ABDnin kontrolnde olmas nedeniyle, Orta Asya lkeleri ve Rusya ile projeler gelitirmeyi tercih etmektedir. Ykselen bir dier devlet olan Hindistan da in gibi giderek artan nfusu ve enerji ihtiyacn karlamak iin, istikrarszlaan Basra Krfezine olan bamlln azaltmak iin Hazar blgesine ynelmitir.26 Avrupa Birliinin enerji politikalarnn temel belirleyicisi vardr: rekabet gc, enerji arz gvenlii ve evrenin korunmas. Bu amalar iin enerji tketiminde kmrn payn koruyarak, doalgazn payn arttrmak, nkleer enerji santrallerinin gvenliini azami lde salamak ve yenilebilir enerji kaynaklarnn payn arttrmak temel nceliklerdir. ABnin d enerji kaynaklarna bamllnn artmas sonucu, Orta Dou, Hazar blgesi ve Rusya ile yakn ilikiler kurulmaktadr. Enerji gvenliini salamak ve srdrlebilir kalknmay devam ettirmek amacyla, tek bir Avrasya enerji pazar oluturmak istemektedir. Bunun iin de oklu boru hatlar politikas izleyerek, enerji ithalatnda kaynak eitlilii yaratmay dnmektedir.27

25 26

H. Naci Bayra, op cit. Bayra, op cit. 27 Bayra, op cit.

55

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

Enerjinin stratejik nemini 1973 petrol krizinden sonra gndemine alan AB, imzalad tm antlamalara enerji ibirliini de dhil etmektedir. 1991 ylnda Avrupa Enerji artn kabul etmi ve Komisyon 29 Kasm 2000 senesinde enerji tedarikinin gvenlii ile ilgili Yeil Kitab yaynlamtr. Bu kitabn en nemli ayan evrenin korunmas oluturmaktadr. 2006 ylnda ise kalc, rekabet iinde, gvenli enerji stratejisi, AB tarafndan onaylanmtr. Phare, Mercosur, Tacis programlaryla enerji ibirliklerini tevik eden AB, Orta ve Dou Avrupa lkelerinin de enerji politikalar retmelerini desteklemek iin Synergy programn ortaya koymutur.28 AB ekonomik temelli olan yardm programlaryla Hazar blgesinde istikrarn ve enerji gvenliinin salanmas iin adm atmtr: TACIS (BDT lkelerine ynelik teknik yardm program), TRACECA (Avrupa-Kafkasya-Orta Asya ulatrma koridoru) ve INOGATE (Avrupaya lkeler aras gaz ve petrol tanmas program). Dier yandan da Rusya ile 2005 ylnda AB-Rusya Enerji Diyalounu balatmtr. Rusya da AB yeleriyle ikili antlamalar imzalayarak Avrupadaki etkinliini arttrmay baarmtr. Ayrca Baltk Denizi Boru Hatt (Kuzey Akm) ile Rus doalgaznn Avrupaya dorudan tanmas ngrlmektedir. 13 Temmuz 2009da imzalanan Nabucco Projesi ile de Grcistan ve ran kl Hazar doalgaznn, Trkiye ve Bulgaristan zerinden Avusturyaya tanmas planlanmaktadr. Bu proje Avrupann oklu boru hatlar araclyla enerji arz gvenliinin salanmas ve tek bir Avrasya enerji pazar oluturma stratejisinin nemli bir ayan oluturmaktadr. Grld gibi, Hazar petrol ve doalgaz, her ktadan devletin ilgisini ekmektedir. Kimi devlet askeri olarak blgeye yerleip kazan salama yoluna gitmekte, kimisi ise kaynak sahibi lkeler zerinde siyasal yollardan bask kurmaya almaktadr. Enerji, gerek kaynak sahipleri gerek ulam salayan devletler asndan ekonomik ve siyasal getirileri olan bir unsurdur. Ancak enerjinin btn devletlere ayn ekilde kalknma saladn syleyebilir miyiz?

28

Louis Dubouis & Claude Blaumann, Droit Immatriel de lUnion Europenne, Montchrestien, 2006, Paris, ss. 329-331 56

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

2. ENERJNN SYASAL VE EKONOMK KALKINMAYA ETKS Enerji kaynaklarna sahip olan lkenin siyasal ve ekonomik kalknmlk durumuna gre, enerjiden salanan getirinin deeri deimektedir. Enerji kaynaklar bir lkenin uluslar aras arenada sz sahibi olmasn, olaylara yn vermesini salayabilmektedir. Ancak Hazar blgesinde, bamszln 1991 ylnda kazanm, demokrasi ve pazar ekonomisine gemeleri batl gler tarafndan desteklenen, bir yandan da Rusyann etkisinden kurtulmaya alan devletler iin durum biraz daha farkldr. Bu lkeler kimi zaman ekonomik adan smrlmekle kar karya kalrken, kimi zaman siyasal olarak istikrarszlklarla ba etmek zorunda kalmaktadrlar. Hazar kaynaklarnn uluslar aras pazarlara tanmasnn hem Trkiye asndan hem de blge lkeleri asndan etkilerini inceledikten sonra, blgenin en zengin kaynaklarna sahip Azerbaycann bu zenginliini ne ekilde kullandn greceiz. 2.1. Gei Blgesi olarak Trkiye Trkiye, nfusu, corafi konumu ve i kaynaklaryla, stratejik neme sahip bir lkedir. Gerilimin her an trmana geebildii, Kafkasya, Orta Dou ve Balkanlar blgesinin tam ortasnda bulunan, blgesinde eitli ibirlii rgtlenmelerine n ayak olmu gl bir lke durumundadr. Ad geen blgelerle, tarihi ve kltrel balar dolaysyla da sadece dou bat ekseninde deil, tm blgeler arasnda bir kpr ve arac rol de stlenmektedir. Souk Savan ardndan deien konjonktr ve eitlilii artan tehditler, yeni bir dnya dzeni olumasna sebep olmutur. Bu yeni dnya dzeninde de, d politikay etkileyen en nemli unsurlardan biri enerjidir. zellikle gelimi lkelerin artan enerji ihtiyac ve snrl kaynaklar, gzlerini petrol ve doalgaz asndan zengin alanlara evirmelerine sebep olmaktadr. Orta dou, KafkaslarHazar ve Rusyann enerji tedariki asndan nemleri gz nnde tutulduunda, belki de en merkezi konumdaki lke Trkiye olmaktadr. Trkiye, Avrupa ve bu blgeler arasnda siyasi ilikiler balamnda da kpr grevi stlenmitir. Hazar Havzas, Trkiye-Amerika ilikileri iin bir ibirlii sahas olurken, genel nitelii ekonomik ibirlii ve siyasi rekabet olan Trkiye-Rusya 57

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

ilikilerinde, zellikle enerji nakil hatlar konusunda, rekabetin en youn yaand blge olmutur. Trkiye blge lkeleriyle askeri ibirliini gelitirmeye alrken, Kafkasya stikrar Pakt gibi giriimlere de nclk etmektedir. NATO kapsamndaki Bar in Ortaklk projesi, Trkiyenin NATO yesi olmas sfatyla, blge lkeleriyle ilikilerini gelitirmesinde ve etkin bir aktr olmasnda nemli bir vastadr. Ancak, Trkiyenin Hazar blgesi ile ilgili gelitirdii politikalar yrrle sokmas ve blgede etkinlii arttrmasnn nnde bir takm engeller bulunmaktadr: engellerden biri, Rusyann blge zerindeki hkimiyetinin sona ermesine ramen, etkisinin srmesini salayan elemanlara sahip olmasdr. Nfus ve ekonomik adan daha gelimi olmas, blge devletlerinin yneticileriyle gemie dayanan ilikiler, doalgaz ve petrol ulam hatlarndaki egemenlik, blgesel etnik sorunlar kontrol etme gc (Gney Osetya, Dalk Karaba, Abhazya), yeni bamsz devletlerdeki Rus aznlklar, Rusyann Trkiyeye kar avantajl konumunu destekleyen temel sebeplerdir.29 Son yllarda, Trkiye ve Rusya arasnda siyasi, askeri, teknik ve kltrel konularda ibirlii gelitirilmitir. Ancak ekonomik ilikiler yannda, siyasi ilikiler ayn ivmeyle gelimemektedir. Bunun sebebi, Rusyann yakn evre olarak kabul ettii blgenin Trkiye iinde yakn evre olduunu reddetmesidir. Bunun yannda, Rusyann PKKy terr rgt olarak kabul etmemesi, Rusya asndan ise Trkiyenin eenlere destek verdii iddias ilikilerin sorunlu boyutunu oluturmaktadr. 2008 Austosunda yaanan Grcistan Sava, Rusyann stnlyle sonulanm olsa da, Trk Boazlarnda NATO gemilerinin Karadenize girmeleri, Trkiyenin konumunun nemini bir kez daha kantlamtr. Ayrca, Trkiyenin Ermenistan ile ilikileri normalletirme ynnde att admlar, Rusya tarafndan olumlu deerlendirilmekte ve Karadenizde istikrarn salanmas amacyla KE bnyesinde balatlan BLACKSEAFOR nemli bir giriim olarak grlmektedir. Trkiyenin daha etkin olmasnn nndeki bir dier etken ise, Sovyetler Birlii dneminde Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya ile Trkiye arasndaki balar tamamen kopmu olduu iin, ad geen blgeler zerinde snrl bilgiye sahipti. Gelime yolundaki
29

Adam Balcer, The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations: A Strategic Perspective, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2009, ss. 79-80 58

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

lkelerle ticari, sosyal, siyasi, ekonomik, teknik, kltrel ibirliini gelitirmek ve projeler hazrlamak amacyla 1992de Dileri Bakanlna bal olarak Trk birlii Kalknma daresi Bakanl (TKA) kurulmutur. 1993 ylnda Trksoy ad verilen proje balatlarak, Trk kltrnn korunmas, sonraki nesillere aktarlmas ve kltrel dayanmann salanmasna allmaktadr. Trkiyenin etkinliini arttrmasnn nndeki bir baka engel ise, Rusya ve ran ile rekabet etmek zorunda kalmasdr. Rusyann blgeyi tanmas ve askeri varl sayesinde ok daha avantajl bir konumda olduu bilinmektedir. Ayrca Rusya, Trkiye sayesinde blge devletlerinin Batyla yaknlamasn istememektedir. ran ise Trkiyenin ABDnin blgeye nfuz etmesi iin bir ara olduunu dnmektedir.30 Avrupann ihtiya duyduu enerji arz gvenliine katk salayacak pek ok boru hatt ina edilmi ve yeni projeler retilmitir. Trkiye, geni Hazar Havzas hidrokarbon kaynaklarnn dorudan Bat pazarlarna ulatrlmasn ngren ve 21. Yzyln pek Yolu olarak sunulan Dou-Bat Enerji Koridorunun gerekletirilmesine n ayak olmutur. Kafkasya ve Orta Asyay Avrupaya balayan boru hatt projeleri, blgenin Bat ile entegrasyonu asndan yararl olacaktr. Gvenli ve ticari adan krl boru hatlar, blgeye istikrar ve refahn getirilmesine katk salayacaktr.31 Hatlardan en nemlisi Bak-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) ham petrol boru hattdr ve 4 Haziran 2006 tarihinde petrol tamaya balamtr. 16 Haziran 2006da da Kazakistan resmen BTC projesine dahil olmu ve 2008den itibaren hatta petrol pompalamaya balamtr. Yeni enerji ulamnda ise Trkiye boazlardan tamay snrlandrmak amacyla by-pass projeleri gelitirmektedir. Bu amala Trans-Anadolu By-Pass Petrol Boru Hatt iin almalar 24 Nisan 2007de balatlmtr. Dou-bat enerji koridorunun bir dier nemli aya olan Bak-Tiflis-Erzurum Doalgaz Boru Hatt 3 Temmuz 2007de faaliyete gemitir. Bu hat ayn zamanda Kazakistandan ve Trkmenistandan doalgaz akn salayacak olan Hazar
30 31

Kasm, op cit., s. 93-94 TC Dileri Bakanl, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Trkiye'nin%20Enerji%20Strat ejisi%20(Ocak%202009).pdf, 6 Mart 2010

59

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

Geili Doal Gaz Boru Hatt Projesinin de ilk adm olarak deerlendirilmektedir. Avrupaya oklu boru hatlaryla petrol ve doal gazn tanmas iin Trkiyenin stratejik nemi arttran bir dier proje, Trkiye-Yunanistan-talya arasnda boru hatlar ebekelerinin enterkoneksiyonunun salanmasn amalayan TrkiyeYunanistan-talya Doal Gaz Ulatrma Koridorunun Gelitirilmesine likin Hkmetler aras Anlamann 26 Temmuz 2007de imzalanm olmasdr. Trkiyenin anlan projeler araclyla Norve, Rusya ve Cezayirden sonra Avrupann doal gaz tedarikinde drdnc ana arter olma hedefi, Trkiye-AB ilikilerinde yeni bir ibirlii alan aacak ve Avrupann Asya ile balantlarn daha da glendirecektir. Son dnemde Trkiye, enerji konusunda yeni bir projeye imza atmtr. 13 Temmuz 2009da hkmetler aras anlama eklinde imzalanan Nabucco Projesi, Grcistan veya Iran kl olarak Hazar doalgazn Trkiye ve Bulgaristan zerinden Avusturyaya tamay hedefleyen ve meydana geli nedeni Rus doalgazna olan bamll azaltmak olarak belirlenen bir projedir. En uzun gei hatt Trkiye zerinden yaplaca iin Trkiyenin enerji kaynaklarna ulamdaki nemi bir kez daha grlmektedir. Ancak, Nabucco hattnn balanmasnn planland Trans-Hazar Hatt henz ina edilmemitir. Rusya ile imzalanan Mavi Akm projesi ise, 12 protokol ve zel irketler arasnda imzalanan anlamalarla ortaya kmtr. Ama, Samsun-Ceyhan hatt ile Israil, Lbnan, Suriye ve hatta KKTCye petrol aktarmdr. Sonu olarak Rusya, enerji hegemonyasn srdrmeye devam etmektedir. Trkiye asndan asl nemli olansa 2011 ylnda yenilecek olan doalgaz anlamasnda, satn alnacak miktarda azaltmaya gidilmesi veya nc taraflara dolayl sata izin verilmesi suretiyle, metrekp baznda uzlamaya varlmasdr. Trkiye, Rusyann Kafkaslardaki ve Orta Asyadaki etki sahas politikasndan ve devletlerin i ilerine mdahale etmesinden rahatszdr. Ancak Rusyaya doalgaz konusundaki bamllk ve aradaki antlamalar, Trkiyenin Rusya kart bir politika izlemesini engellemektedir. Aslnda Trkiye tam da Avrupa ile Rusya arasndaki enerji rekabetinin ortasnda yer almaktadr. Avrupa asndan Trkiyenin Hazar ve Orta Asya enerji kaynaklarna ulamalarnda neredeyse tek yol olmas, Trkiyenin siyasal gcn arttrmaktadr. Buna karlk, Hazar blgesi devletleri iin de Trkiyenin batyla ilikileri kendilerinin de Rus basksndan
60

Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

kurtulmalar ve bat pazarlarna almalar asndan olduka byk bir nem tamaktadr. Peki, blgenin en zengin kaynaklarna sahip olan Azerbaycan, nfuz mcadelelerinden nasl etkilenmektedir?

Tablo 1: Nabucco Projesinin Boru Hatt Uzunluklar32 Ana Nabucco Hatt Trkiye Bulgaristan Romanya Macaristan Avusturya Besleme Hatlar Trkiye Toplam Grcistan snr-Horasan ran snr - Horasan : : :

: : : : :

1.558 km 392 km 457 km 388 km 46 km 226 km 214 km 1.998 km

32

http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp

61

Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

Harita 1: Trkiyede ina altnda ola veya tamamlanm boru hatlar33

2.2. Azerbaycan: Enerji g m? Hazar blgesi, etnik kkenli atmalarn ve byk glerin blgeye nfuz etme abalarndan kaynaklanan istikrarszlklarn yaand bir blgedir. Bu blgenin en nemli lkelerinden olan Azerbaycan, dnyada petrol endstrisini kuran ilk lkeler arasndadr.34 Souk Sava sonras bamsz olan Hazar blgesi devletleri arasnda doal kaynaklar bakmndan en zengin olan ve nfusu en fazla olan lkedir. Azerbaycann i ve d politikasnda ncelikleri, Dalk Karaba sorunu ve enerji kaynaklarnn en verimli ekilde uluslar aras piyasalara ulatrlmasdr.35 Enerjinin

33

TC Dileri Bakanl, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Trkiye'nin%20Enerji%20Strat ejisi%20(Ocak%202009).pdf, 6 Mart 2010


34 35

Uurlu, op cit., s. 185 Kasm, op cit., s. 18

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Hazar Havzasnda Enerji Diplomasisi

tanmas konusunda hem devletler hem de irketler baznda bir rekabet yaanmaktadr. Trkiyenin Azerbaycan ile etnik, kltrel ve dilsel yaknl mevcuttur. Azerbaycan, Trkiye asndan Orta Asyaya almada bir kpr olarak grmektedir ve enerji kaynaklar bakmndan lkenin istikrar iinde olmas taraftardr. Azerbaycan bamszln ilan ettiinde, ilk tanyan devletlerden biri Trkiyedir. Ermenistann, Azerbaycan topraklarn igaliyle ortaya kan Yukar Karaba sorunu, Gney Kafkasyada siyasi istikrarn, ekonomik gelimenin ve blgesel ibirliinin nndeki en nemli engeldir. Yukar Karaba ihtilaf Azerbaycanda bir milyonu akn insann yerlerinden edilmesine ve Azerbaycan topraklarnn %20sinin igaline yol amtr. Trkiye, Yukar Karaba sorununda Azerbaycann toprak btnln savunmakta, kalc ve adil bir zm bulunmas iin, AGT bnyesinde kurulan MNSK grubu iinde de grmelere katlmaktadr.36 Rusya iin de Azerbaycan, benzer sebeplerden dolay blgedeki ncelikli lkedir. Daha nce de deinildii gibi Rusya, Azerbaycan petrollerinin kendi topraklarndan geirilerek uluslar aras pazarlara ulatrlmasn istemekteydi. BTC hatt Rusyann darda braklmas sonucu dourmutur ancak rekabet ortamndan faydalanan Rusya, Azerbaycann topraklarnn igal edilmesine destek vermitir. Karaba sorununu, hem Azerbaycan hem de Ermenistan zerinde etki kurmak iin bir ara olarak kullanan Rusya, i ilerine karmasna ramen, Azerbaycanda askeri s kurmak iin izin almay baaramamtr. Karaba sorununun zmsz kalmas Rusyann hem Ermenistana askeri gvence vererek nfuzunu devam ettirmesine hem de Azerbaycana bask yapmasna yardm etmektedir. Rusya, Azerbaycann Hazar petrollerine ilikin konsorsiyum anlamasn engellemeye alm, antlamann imzalanmasndan sonra da petrol irketlerinin almalarn yavalatmak iin Hazarn hukuki stats sorununu srekli gndemde tutmutur. Rusyann bu giriimlerinin amac elbette ki enerji pazarndaki yerini yeni satclara brakmak istememesi ve Hazarn Rus tekelinden kp uluslar aras glerin blgeye yerlemelerinden endie duymasdr. Rusyann nem verdii bir
36

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa (TC Dileri Bakanl)

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dier konu da Bak-Novorossisk hattnn gvenliinin salanmas ve bu sayede de boru hatt projelerinde stn konumda kalmay baarmaktr. Bir yandan blgedeki askeri varln glendirmekte, dier yandan da byk enerji irketleri vastasyla ekonomik bir g haline gelmeyi temel ama olarak belirlemitir. ran asndan Azerbaycan hem enerji hem de kendi gvenlii asndan nem tayan bir lkedir. Azerbaycan petrolnn tanmas iin kurulan konsorsiyuma dhil edilmi olan ran, ABDnin kar kmas zerine konsorsiyumdan karlmtr. Bu da elbette rann enerji konusunda ibirlii iin Rusyaya ynelmesine sebep olmutur. Enerjinin yannda askeri alanda da ABDnin varln Rusya ile ibirlii yaparak dengelemeye almaktadr. Ayrca ran Azerbaycann i ilerine kararak ve devrim ihrac araclyla etki kurmak istemektedir. Dalk Karaba sorunu ABD iin de zlmesi gereken bir sorundur, nk Hazar petrollerinin nakli konusunda gvensizlik tekil etmektedir. atmalar srerken, ABD koridor nerisini desteklemitir, ancak gnmze kadar sren bar salama grmelerinden bir sonu alnmasn, tm giriimlerine ramen, salayamamtr. ABD Azerbaycan petrolnn Ermenistan zerinden tanmas projesinin iki lke arasnda bar salayabileceini dnmse de, Azerbaycan topraklarnn %20sini igal eden Ermenistan ile bir ibirlii iine girmek istememi ve petroln Grcistan ve Trkiye zerinden uluslar aras pazarlara ulatrmay tercih etmitir. Petroln Trkiye zerinden tanmas projesi de ABD tarafndan olumlu karlanm ve desteklenmitir.37 ABD, Azerbaycann bat izgisinde tutulmas iin mcadele vermektedir, nk ancak bu ekilde enerji gvenliinin salanabileceini dnmektedir. Bat yanls bir Azerbaycann ABDnin Kafkas ve Hazar blgesinde yrtecei politikalar iin son derece nemli bir lke olduu gzlemlenmektedir. Bu gr 11 Eyll saldrlarndan sonra Azerbaycan, ABDye terrle mcadelesinde tam destek vermi, Afganistana mdahalesi srasnda hava sahasn amasnda kendini kantlamtr.

37

Kasm, op cit., ss. 169-170

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Azerbaycan, ad geen tm lkeler iin hem bir enerji kayna hem de Orta Asyaya alma bakmndan nemli bir lkedir. Bu yzden blgesel ve kresel lkelerin yakn takibi ve etkisi altndadr. Siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri yollardan zerinde bask kurulmaya allan Azerbaycan, pek ok kereler, hr iradesini kullanarak d politikasnda bamsz kararlar almay baarmtr. Ancak Karaba sorunun zmszl, Rusyann bask politikalar ve ranla yaad Hazar Denizi ihtilaflar, Azerbaycann siyasal istikrar ve ekonomik kalknmay tam anlamyla gerekletirmesinin nndeki engellerdir. Austos 2008 sava Rusyann stnl ve Gney Osetya ve Abhazyann bamszlklarnn tannmasyla sonulanmtr. Bu sonu, Grcistann batya olan gvenini sarsarken, Trkiyenin, snrl imknlaryla yeterli destei salayamamasndan dolay da blgedeki imaj zarar grmtr. ubat 2010da Rusyann Abhazyada askeri s kurmasna ilikin imzalanan antlamayla Rusyann Karadenizdeki varl desteklenmekte ve Rusya blgede etkin bir aktr olmak iin nemli bir aama kaydetmektedir.38 Trkiye-Ermenistan arasnda ilikilerin normallemesi ynndeki alm kapsamnda, 10 Ekim 2009da Zrihte imzalanan protokol sonucu ise, Trkiye-Azerbaycan ilikilerinde bir takm sorunlar yaanmaya balamtr. Dalk Karaba sorunu zlmeden Ermenistan-Trkiye snrnn almasnn ngrlmesi, Azerbaycanda tedirginlie sebep olmutur. Azeri milletvekillerinin Trkiyeye gelerek alm engelleme abalar, ucuz doalgaz ithalatn ngren antlamann iptalini gndeme getirmesi ilikileri gerginletiren admlar olmutur. bir millet iki devlet sylemi yara alm ve Azerbaycan, Rusya ile gelitirdii yeni enerji ibirlii projelerinde Trkiyeyi dlar bir tutum sergilemitir.39 Dier yandan da Trkiye ile ilikilerde yaanan gerginliin son bulmas gerektii Azeri milletvekilleri tarafndan savunulmaktadr. Mart 2010da Azerbaycann Suriyeye Trkiyedeki boru hatlar zerinden doalgaz satmay kabul etmesi ve Nabucco projesi, iki lke arasndaki enerji ilikilerini devam ettirecektir.

38 39

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=115576 Bilge Sylei: Trkiye-Azerbaycan likileri http://www.bilgesam.org/tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=397:bilgesoylesi-1-turkiye-azerbaycan-iliskileri&catid=86:analizler-kafkaslar&Itemid=148

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

SONU Enerji, devletlerarasndaki ilikilerde en nemli belirleyicilerden biri olmutur. retici ve tketici devletler, farkl amalarla da olsa, gndemlerine enerji politikalarn almaktadrlar. retici devletler, kendi kaynaklar zerinde karar haklarnn olmasn ve farkl tketicilere petrol veya doalgaz satarak, ihracat gelirlerini belli bir seviyede tutmak hedefindedirler. Tketici devletler ise, kaynan devamllnn, ulamnn gvenliinin ve fiyatlarn istikrarnn salanmas iin politikalar retmektedirler. Bu politikalar aslnda bir ksr dngye sebep olmaktadr: enerji kaynaklar asndan zengin olan blgelere nfuz etmek isteyen devletlerin rekabetleri, enerji sahibi lkelerde istikrarszlklara sebep olmaktadr. stikrarszlklar ve bahsi geen nfuz mcadeleleri yznden, devletler silahlanma yarna girmektedirler. Bu yar hem devletler arasnda gvensizlii dourmakta hem de hkimiyet peindeki devletlerin gvenlik salama maksadyla, enerji blgelerine mdahale etmelerine sebep olmaktadr. Bu durumda, kresel glerle rekabeti devam ettiremeyecek durumdaki enerji zengini lkeler, ikili veya ok tarafl ilikiler gelitirerek, siyasal ve ekonomik adan kalknmalarn salamaya abalamaktadrlar. Enerji kaynaklarna sahip olmak iin eskiden beri sregelen atmalar ve istikrarszlklar, enerji kaynaklarnn gvenliinin nemini aa karmaktadr. Egemenlik mcadelesindeki devletlerarasnda ihtilaflar ve ksa sren atmalar yaansa da, gerek enerji ithalatlar, gerekse ihracatlar, kaynaklarn gvenliine ve ulamna zarar verecek srelerin yaanmasn istememektedirler. Dier yandan da petrol ve doalgazdan elde edilen gelirlerin silahlanmaya yatrlyor olmas, atma riskini de her zaman tamaktadr.

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KAYNAKA AYDAL, Doan, Enerji Kan Kokuyor: Biyokimyasal Sava ve Enerji Kartelleri, Tima Yaynlar, 2009, stanbul. BAHGAT, Gawdat, Energy Security: The Caspian Sea, Minerals & Energy, Vol 20, No 2, 2005, ss. 3-15. BAYRA, H. Naci, Kresel Enerji Politikalar ve Trkiye, 4 ubat 2010, http://www.avsam.org/tr/a1909.html BALCER, Adam, The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations: A Strategic Perpective, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2009, ss. 77-89. OMAK, Hasret (ed), Blgesel Politikalar, Umuttepe Yaynlar, 2009, Kocaeli. DAVUTOLU, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik: Trkiyenin Uluslararas Konumu, Kre Yaynlar, 2010, stanbul. DUBOUIS, Louis & BLAUMANN, Claude, Droit Immatriel de lUnion Europenne, Montchrestein, Paris, 2006. KASIM, Kamer, Souk Sava Sonras Kafkasya, USAK Yaynlar, 2009, Ankara. KLARE, Michael T., Gostratgie de lEnergie, The Nation, 7 Mays 2008. MONAGHAN, Andrew, Russians Energy Diplomacy: A Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol 7, no 2, June 2007, s 275-288. PURTA, Frat, Hazar Blgesinde Rekabetin Yeni Boyutu: Silahlanma Yar, 1 Ekim 2004, http://www.turksam.org/tr/a307.html

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SNKAYA Bayram, ran Cumhurbakan Ahmedinejadn Tacikistan ve Trkmenistan Ziyaretleri, 14 Ocak 2010, www.turksam.org/tr/a255.html TUNCER, Hner, Diplomasinin Evrimi: Gizli Diplomasiden Kresel Diplomasiye, Kaynak Yaynlar, 2009, stanbul. YCE, ar Krat, SSCB Sonras Hazar Blgesinde Enerji Mcadelesi ve Trkiye, Enerji Stratejileri, 30 Mart 2005, http://www.turksam.org/tr/a307.html 14 Eyll 1990 tarihli Avrupa Topluluu Komisyonu tarafndan kabul edilen SEC 90 (1248) belgesinden; http://aei.pitt.edu/3687/01/000287_1.pdf TC Dileri Bakanl resmi internet sitesi: http://www.mfa.gov.tr BOTA: http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp Cumhuriyet Gazetesi

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YEN GVENLK TEHDTLER, AVRUPA BRLNN GELECENE LKN SONULARI VE TRKYE FAKTR New Security Threats and Results for the Future of the European Union and Turkey Factor Emine AKADA

zet: Souk Sava sonras dnemde ortaya kan yeni gvenlik tehditleri, Avrupa Birliini yeni mcadele yollar ve yeni gvenlik politikalar retmeye itmitir. Ancak, bu srete ye lkelerin kendi aralarndaki anlamazlk ve blnmeler, Birliin ortak savunma ve gvenlik politikas temelli bir entegrasyona henz hazr olmadn, hatta bu durumunun ileride ABnin btnlne zarar vermesinin de olas olduunu gstermitir. Ayrca bu yeni tehditler Trkiyenin AB gvenlii iin nemini yeniden gz nne sermitir. Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birlii, terrizm, kitle imha silahlar, organize sular, blgesel atmalar Abstract: The emergence of new security threats after the end of Cold War has pushed the European Union to adopt new instruments and politics to struggle against these threats. But, during this period, the disagreements and the divergences between Member States have showed that the European Union is not yet ready for an integration based on the common security and defense policy and this situation can damage the integrity of the EU in the future. In addition, these new security threats have displayed the importance of Turkey again for the security of the EU. Keywords: European Union, Terrorism, Weapons of mass destruction, Organized crimes, Regional conflicts

Strasbourg Robert Schuman niversitesi, Yksek Avrupa Bilimleri Enstits, Uluslararas likiler ve Blgesel Btnleme Sureci Blm yksek lisans mezunudur.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

GR kinci Dnya Sava sonras belirgin bir nitelik kazanm olan Souk Sava, iki kutuplu sistem dneminde ABD ve SSCBnin liderliklerindeki Bat ve Dou Bloklar arasnda gerginlik ve ksmi atma biiminde srmtr. Bu dnem ierisinde devletler ya iki bloktan birine katlm ya da balantszlk olarak bilinen bir d politika stratejisi izlemilerdir. Souk Sava dneminde uluslararas gvenlik, iki kutuplu bir dnyada ittifaklar, etki alanlar ve nkleer caydrclk ile salanmaktayd. Sovyetler Birliinin dalmas uluslararas gvenliin grnmn tamamen deitirmitir. 1991den sonra Avrupann komnist tehdidi hedefleyen gvenlik stratejisi anlamn ve var olu nedeni yitirmitir. Souk Savan sonu tm dnyada srekli barn salanmasna ynelik umutlar da beraberinde getirmitir. Dnemin Amerika bakan Georges H. W. Busha gre Souk Sava sonras, yeni bir dnya dzeninin hkm srecei bir dnemdir. Bu dzeni salayacak olan devletler arasnda i birlii ve ortaklaa harekete dayal yeni bir ittifakt ve nihayet Birlemi Milletlerin kurucularnn ryas olan demokrasi, bar, refah ve silahszlanma gerekleecekti. 1 Fakat bir sre sonra bu iyimser yaklamlarn gerekleri yanstmad, hatta yeni gvenlik tehditlerinin ok daha endie verici olduu grlmeye balanmtr. Tm dier uluslararas aktrler gibi Avrupa Birlii (AB) de bu yeni tehditlerle yeni politikalar, stratejiler ve kurumlar vastas ile mcadeleye girimitir. Ancak farkl bak alar ve nceliklere sahip 27 lkeyi bnyesinde barndran ABnin bu tehditlere kar etkin ortak bir gvenlik politikas izlemesi kolay olmayacaktr. Bu amala ortaya konan almalarn Birlik yesi lkelerin anlamazlndan kaynaklanan engellere taklmas, tehditlerle mcadelede yeterli verimliliin salanamamasna ve bu engellerden kaynaklanan krizlerin ileride Birliin btnln tehlikeye atacak blnmelere sebebiyet vermesine yol aabilir. Bu hipotez bu almann ne srd temel argmandr. Dier bir hipotez ise Birlik

Bakan Bushun Amerikan Kongresindeki 6 Mart 1991 tarihli konumas. Bkz. www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm (eriim 22 ubat 2010) 70

Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr

iin bu kadar byk nem tayan gvenlik konusunda Trkiyeyi darda brakmann AB asndan daha byk sorunlara neden olacadr. Bu yazda, ncelikle Souk Sava sonras deien gvenlik tehdidi alglamalar ve ABnin bu tehditlerle mcadele yntemleri ve politikalar irdelenecektir. Daha sonra bu mcadelede Trkiyenin nemi zerinde durulacaktr. Son olarak da yeni gvenlik tehditleri ile mcadelede karlalan zorluklarn ABnin geleceine etkisi deerlendirilecektir. 1. YEN GVENLK TEHDTLER Eskilerinin yerini alan ve dnyay srekli bar ryasndan uyandran yeni gvenlik tehditleri ortaya kmakta gecikmemitir. Ancak Souk Sava sonras dnemde gvenlik tehditleri, kresel dzeydeki gelimelere paralel olarak, nemli lde deiiklie uramtr. Bu dnemde, realist dncenin alak politika (low politics) olarak tanmlad sosyo-ekonomik konular, askeri-gvenlik sorunlarna (high politics) oranla genel olarak daha dominant hale gelmitir. 2003 ylnda yaymlanan Avrupa Gvenlik Stratejisine gre bu yeni tehditler; terrizm, kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmas, blgesel atmalar, baarsz devletler ve organize sulardr. Bu tehditler birbirleriyle balantl da olabilmektedir: terristlerin organize su kapsamndaki faaliyetleri (kara para aklanmas gibi) veya 11 Eyllden beri gndemi megul eden ve insanlk iin en byk tehdit grlen terristlerin kitle imha silahlarna ulaabilmesi durumu gibi. Bu yeni gvenlik tehditleri uluslararas niteliktedir, yani tek bir devletten kaynaklanmayp sadece tek bir devlet iin tehdit oluturmamaktr ve bu durum, gvensizliin kresellemesi ne, dolaysyla uluslararas arenadaki hemen hemen tm aktrlerin kendilerini bu tehditlere kar mcadeleye katlmakla ykml hissetmesine yol amtr. Avrupann snrlaryla gvenliin snr tanmazl, Souk Sava sonrasndan 11 Eyll sonrasna gvenlie ynelik tehditlerin deiimi ekseninde Avrupa gvenlik alannda kurumsal ve politik deiimler yaplmasna yol amtr2.Uluslararas arenann nemli bir aktr olarak Avrupa Birlii de yeni
2

Heinz Gartner, European Security, NATO And The Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management, Routledge, Vol.7, Issue 3, 1998, s. 1

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

tehditlere kar, yeleri arasnda birlii ve dayanmay salayacak Avrupa Savunma ve Gvenlik Politikasn yrrle koymutur. Bu politikann uzun vadeli amalarndan biri de savunma ve gvenlik gibi byk nem tayan bir alann Avrupa btnlemesine yapaca katkdr. Uluslararas terrizm tehdidi, gvensizliin kreselleme sinin en nemli kantlarndandr. phesiz, terrizm yeni bir olgu deildir; radikal politik ve sosyal deiim impoze etme amal, ou zaman iddet unsuru tayan faaliyetlerin varl yz yllar ncesine dayanmaktadr. Bununla birlikte, 11 Eyll 2001deki terrist saldrlardan sonra terrle mcadele, uluslararas ilikilerin yeni gndemi haline gelmitir, nk bu saldrlar, terristlerin her an ve her yerde faaliyette bulunabileceini dnyaya gstermitir. Bu yeni terrizm bugne kadarki kavramsal erevesini am, yeni bir ekil kazanmtr ve artk ok daha ykcdr. Fransz politolog Olivier Roya gre yenilik terrizmin kendisinden deil, onun kitle imha silahlarna ulama olaslndan kaynaklanmaktadr 3. Dolaysyla, devletler bu byk tehlikenin farkna varmal ve daha nce terre kar aldklar tedbirleri, bu erevede tekrar gzden geirmelidirler. AB yesi lkeler arasndaki terrle mcadele amal ibirlii uzun yllara dayanmaktadr: 1976 ylnda kurucu antlamalardan bamsz olarak Avrupa Topluluu yesi devletler tarafndan kurulan TREVInin (terrorism, radicalism, extremism and violence international) amac bu alandaki bilgi paylamn glendirmektir. Sistem; adalet, i ileri bakanlarndan ve polis mdrlerinden olumaktayd. Kurumsal toplantlar, polis ve istihbarat birimleri arasnda dzenli bir iletiim imkn salyordu. Bu mekanizma iinde antiterr konularnda uzmanlarn yer ald iki operasyonel grup oluturulmutur. 1987 ylna kadar TREVI danma mekanizmas sreci iinde AT Komisyonu yer almam bu tarihten itibaren Komisyon temsilcileri de adhoc toplantlara katlmaya balamtr.4Bu ibirlii, 11 Eyll 2001deki Amerika ile Avrupann merkezini vuran Mart 2004teki Madrid ve Temmuz 2005teki Londra saldrlarndan sonra daha da glendirilmitir. ABnin terrle mcadele hareketi zellikle ye lke
3 4

Olivier Roy, Les illusions du 11septembre, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 2002, s. 9 Umut Kedikli, Avrupa Birlii'nin Terrizmle Mcadele Politikalar ve Hukuki Boyutu, Uluslararas Hukuk ve Politika Dergisi (UHP), Cilt: 2, Say: 7, 2006, s. 54-79 72

Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr

yasalarnn uyumlulatrlmasna, dzenlenecek operasyonlarda ye lkelerdeki kurumlarn ibirliine ve dier devletlerle srekli diyalogta bulunmaya dayanmaktadr. Birlik oncelikle ortak bir terr tanm kabul etmitir. Bu tanm paradan olumaktadr: birincisi, eylemin ierii asndan (context of action) bir lkeyi ya da uluslararas bir organizasyonu ciddi zarara uratan kastl eylemler; ikincisi, eylemin hedefi asndan (aim of action) bir lkenin halkn ciddi ekilde korkutmak veya sindirmek, bir hkmeti ya da bir uluslararas kuruluu bir ey yapmaya veya yapmamaya zorlamak ve ncs, bir lkenin ya da uluslararas kuruluun politik, sosyal, ekonomik, anayasal temel yapsn ykmak veya ilemez hale getirmek amac ile belirli eylemleri (specific acts) yapmaktr.5 13 Haziran 2003 tarihli terrle mcadele ereve karar ile de ye lkelerdeki terr suu tanmn ve ngrlen yaptrmlar birbirleriyle uyumlu hale getirmitir. Bu kararn bir dier nemli getirisi de Avrupa tutuklama emridir. Avrupa tutuklama emri, sulularn iadesi hakkndaki szlemelerin yerine gemekte ve devletleraras sulularn iadesi usul yerine mahkemeler aras sulularn teslimi usuln getirerek prosedrn daha hzl yrmesine olanak salamaktadr6. Avrupa Tutuklama Emri Kurumu, Avrupa Birliine ye devletlerin birbirlerinin hukuk sistemlerine gvenmeleri ve birbirlerinin mahkemelerinin kararlarn tanmalar ve kabul etmeleri esasna dayaldr. Ayrca, Birlemi Milletler Gvenlik Kurulunun 1373 sayl karar uyarnca terrist eylemlere kartndan phelenilen kii veya kurumlarn mal varlklarnn veya ekonomik kaynaklarnn dondurulmas da Birliin ald tedbirler arasndadr7. Avrupa Birlii Polis Tekilat (Europol) bnyesinde terrle mcadele amal bir Grev Gc (Task Force) ve 2002 ylnda Konsey karar ile AB yesi lkeler arasnda yargsal ibirlii salayacak Eurojust kurulmutur. Ayrca, 27 Mays 2005 ylnda Fransa, Almanya, Avusturya,
5

Council Framework Decision, Official Journal of the European Communities, (2002/475/JHA),13 June 2002 Bkz. www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jul/frameterr622en00030007.pdf (eriim 22 ubat 2010) 6 Avrupa Tutuklama Emri Bkz. europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_crimin al_matters/l33167_fr.htm (eriim 23 ubat 2010) 7 Anne Weyembergh, LUnion europenne et la lutte contre le terrorisme , Compterendu de la Conference-debat Terrorsme, Droit et Droits des victimes , 1 Mars 2006

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Belika, Lksemburg, spanya ve Hollandann imzalad Schengen III dedenilen Prm Antlamas terrle mcadelede snr tesi ibirliini glendirme amac tamaktadr8. Avrupal gvenlik kurumlar arasnda bilgi paylamna, yargnn glendirilmesine ve fonlarn kontrolne dayanan bir i birlii gelitirilmi olmakla beraber, kusursuz ileyen ve ye devletlerin btnlk ierisinde katlmn salayacak bir terrle mcadele politikas yrrle konulamamtr. Bunun en bilinen rnei, AB yesi devletlerin, 2003 ylnda Amerikann terrle mcadele politikasnn bir paras olarak balatt Irak sava srasnda kendi aralarnda kan anlamazlktr. ye lkeler ortak bir d politika yrtemedikleri gibi Amerikay desteklemek konusunda da kendi aralarnda blnmlerdir: sava taraftarlar (ngiltere, talya, spanya, Dou Avrupa lkeleri) ve red cephesi (Fransa, Almanya). Bugne kadarki en gelimi ve en gl blgesel entegrasyon modelinin gelecei iin bir alarm mahiyetinde olan bu politik baarszlk, ye lkelerin hala kendi ulusal politikalar ve ncelikleri olduunu kantlar niteliktedir. Kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmas konusunda alarm uzun sredir almaktadr. Nkleer, kimyasal ve biyolojik kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmas sorunu uzun yllardr uluslararas toplumun gndemindedir. Bu konuyla ilgili pek ok anlama imzalanm, pek ok denetim mekanizmas yrrle konulmutur. Buna karn, gnmzde Kuzey Kore ve rann nkleer programlar nedeniyle yeni bir nkleer kriz patlak vermitir. Kuzey Koredeki Kim Jong I ynetimi, ubat 2005te kitle imha silahna sahip olduklarn ilan etmi, Mays 2009da da yeni bir nkleer deneme gerekletirmi ve dnyann dikkatini tekrar kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmas sorununa ekmitir. rann ise Rusyann yardm ile, askeri amala kullanlabilecei phesi tayan bir nkleer reaktr projesi balatt bilinmektedir. En byk risk unsurlar, bu durumun baka devletleri de ayn yolu izlemeleri iin cesaretlendirmesi, bu devletlerin kitle imha silahlarn kullanmalar veya daha da kts bu silahlarn terristlerin eline gemesine gz yummalardr.

Prm: an effective weapon against terrorism and crime ? Authority of the House of Lords, European Union Committee, 18 th Report of Session 2006-2007 74

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Kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmasnn nlenmesi amal, Birlemi Milletler bnyesindeki almalardan bamsz olarak, Avrupa lkeleri Haziran 2002 ylndaki G8 zirvesinde iki nemli giriim karar almtr. lk olarak, kresel ibirlii erevesinde kitle imha silahlarnn oluturduu tehdidin azaltlmasna ynelik olarak uygulamaya konmu, Sovyetler Birlii dneminden kalma NunnLugar adl Amerikan programnn daha da geniletilmi ekli olan kresel ortaklk programnn yrrle konmas kararlatrlmtr. Bu programn hedefi silahszlanma, silahlarn yaylmasn nleme ve terrle mcadele iin gerekli fonu ve ibirliini salamaktr9. kinci olarak, Avrupa Konseyi, Nisan 2002de ortak kontrol mekanizmalarn, Rusya ve Orta Asya ile ibirliini, Orta Dou ve Asya ile politik diyalou ieren kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmasnn engellenmesinde alnacak nlemler konulu bir liste yaymlamtr. Ayrca, Haziran 2003teki Selanik Zirvesinde AB yesi devletler, kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmasna kar bir bildiri kabul etmiler ve Aralk ayndaki zirvede Kitle mha Silahlarnn Yaylmasna Kar Avrupa Stratejisini kabul etmilerdir. Buna gre geni kapsaml ve ok tarafl bir yaklam benimsenmesi gerektii dile getirilmitir10. Gnmzde, AB ierisinde kitle imha silahlarnn yaylmasnn nlenmesi amal politik ve stratejik almalarn var oldugu ak olmakla birlikte henz ortak bir politika izlenememektedir. Ortak bir yaklam benimseme almalar, tarihsel, stratejik, diplomatik veya ekonomik gerekelerden kaynaklanan blnmeler nedeniyle baarya ulamamaktadr. Nkleer silaha sahip lkelerle sahip olmayanlar, sivil amalara hizmet edecek nkleer gc savunanlarla buna pheyle yaklaanlar arasnda byk gr ayrlklar vardr. Ayrca, nkleer enerjiye sahip olan lkelerin ekonomik ve diplomatik karlar ou zaman bu silahlarn yaylmasnn nlenmesi almalarna ters dmektedir. rnein, Nkleer Silahlarn Yaylmasn nleme Antlamasnn revizyonu iin 2005 ylnda yaplan konferansta devletler fikir birlii salayamamtr. Fransa, 1995 ve 2000 yllarnda yaplm nkleer silahszlanma ile ilgili konferanslarda
9

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Kananaskis Summit Bkz. www.g7.utoronto.ca/francais/2002kananaskis/armes.html, (eriim 24 ubat 2010) 10 Bkz. Kitle mha Silahlarnn Yaylmasna Kar Avrupa Stratejisi, 2003, register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/fr/03/st15/st15708.fr03.pdf (eriim 24 ubat 2010)

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alnan sonulara atfta bulunulmasn nce kabul edip daha sonra redderek tutarszlk sergilemi11, ngiltere ise Amerikann yannda yer alarak, atom ekirdeinin blnmesinde kullanlan materyallerin retiminin durdurulmasn ngren AB destekli anlamaya taraf olmay reddetmitir12. Bat grubu13 ierisindeki bu anlamazlklar, Birlik yesi lkelerin halen ortak bir politika gelitirmede ve tek seslilikte baarsz olduunun gstergesidir. Organize sular, uluslararas toplumun dzenin tehdit eden dier bir unsurdur. 21 Nisan 1994te Amerikan senatosundaki konumasnda, dnemin CIA bakan James Woolsey geleneksel talyan ve latin amerikal su rgtlerinin, Rus, Asya ve Afrika kkenli yeni organize su rgtleriyle ittifak halinde olduunu ve bu durumun uluslararas toplum iin byk bir tehdit oluturduunu14 dile getirmitir. Son gelimelerle birlikte dnya apnda organize sulardan salanan para 1,5 trilyon dolarn zerindedir15. Organize su kapsamndaki eylemler olduka fazladr: dolandrclk, tefecilik, uyuturucu trafii, araba hrszl, fuhu, gasp, kaaklk, kara para aklama, cinayet Organize sula mcadeledeki en byk zorluk, suun srekli ekil deitirmesidir16. Bu nedenle de AB bu tehditle mcadelede yetersiz kalmaktadr. Avrupa Parlamentosu komisyonlarndan biri, Birlik bnyesinde, organize sula mcadeleyi destekleyici nitelikteki yasalarn yetersiz olduunu ve bu durumun, dier devletlere kar Birlii zor durumda braktn 17 vurgulamaktadr. phesiz, Birlik iin asl zor olan bu tehditle mcadele ederken ye devletlerin mnhasr yetki alanna mdahale etmemeye abalamaktr. Bu amala Komisyon
11

Harald Muller, Vertrag im Zerfall? Die gescheiterte berprfungskonferenz des Nichtverbreitungsvertraggs und ihre Folgen, HSFK-Report 4/2005, Frankfurt, 2005, s. 19 12 Ibid. 13 Geleneksel olarak, TNP revizyon konferanslarndaki grmeler, ana grup arasnda geer: Bat grubu, Dou grubu ve Balantszlar grubu 14 State of California, Office of the Attorney General, Daniel E. Lungren, Russian Organized Crime, Mart 1996, s.2 15 Christine Boutin, Organized crime-Drug and Human trafficikg in Europe, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee Report, 2003 16 Geraldine Bedell, Things can only get different, The Observer, 27 Nisan 2003 17 Avrupa Parlamentosu, ilikiler, Adalet ve Sivil haklar Komisyonu, Organize sularla mcadele amal ereve karara ilikin neriler, 28 Eylul 2005, s.2 76

Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr

tarafndan baz neriler sunulmutur: organize sular kapsamndaki eylemlerin tanmlarnn ortak hale gelmesi, Interpol ve Europol arasndaki ibirliinin glendirilmesi, sunulan kantlarn karlkl olarak tannmas ve ye lkelerin eitlii prensibine dayal, sadece organize sula mcadele edecek bir AB polis tekilatnn kurulmas 18vs. Ayrca, organize sularla balantl olarak kara para aklama eylemi, gelimi lkeler iin bal bana byk bir sorundur. Uluslararas Para Fonuna gre kara para aklama eyleminden elde edilen miktar dnyadaki toplam gayri safi yurtii hslann %2 ila %5i arasndadr19. Daha da nemlisi, bu olay sadece AB snrlar ierisinde deil, uluslararas alanda faaliyet gstermektedir ki bu da lkeler arasnda gl bir ibirliini mecburi klmaktadr. rnein Dou Avrupada faaliyet gsteren su rgtleri, Birliin douya doru genilemesi sonucunda faaliyetlerini batya da tama olana bulmutur20. Europol ve Eurojust henz gen kurumlar olmalar nedeniyle bekleneni tam olarak verememektedirler. Zaten AB yesi devletlerin kendi aralarndaki blnmeler de kurumlarn verimliliini engelleyen bir baka unsurdur. Avrupa tutuklama emrinin yrrle girme srecinde karslalan sorunlar bu duruma rnektir. talya hala Avrupa hukuksal ibirlii srecine kukuyla yaklamaktadr, Birlik yesi devletlerin byk ksm ise adli sicil kaytlarnn paylalmas nerisine scak bakmamaktadr21. Blgesel atmalar ve baarsz devletler de (merkezi otoritenin salanamad, devlet kurumlarnn gerektii gibi alamad, i sava yaayan veya terristler iin bir snak haline gelen devletler-failed states-) uluslararas bar tehdit eden unsurlardandr, bu nedenle AB blgesel kriz ynetimine ok byk nem vermektedir. 90l yllarda yrrle giren Avrupa Ortak Dileri ve Gvenlik

18 19

Ibid, s.3 www.karapara.gen.tr/haber_detay.asp?haber_id=96 (eriim 24 ubat 2010) 20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drugs and crime trends in Europe and beyond, Vienne, 29 Nisan 2004, s. 12 21 Bulletin quotidien Europe, 29 Ocak 2005

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Politikasnda da nemli bir yeri olan blgesel kriz ynetiminin k noktas, Souk Savan bitiminden itibaren baarsz devletlerin neden olduu tehdittir. 1992de kabul edilen Petersberg Deklarasyonu (AB'nin Avrupa Gvenlik ve Savunma Politikas iinde hazrlam olduu askeri ve gvenlik konulu grevler btn) barn korunmas veya yeniden inas bylece sivil halkn korunmas hususunu da iermektedir. Blgesel kriz ynetiminin nemi Avrupa gvenlik stratejisinde de vurgulanmakta ve uluslararas ilikilerde rol oynamak isteyen devlet d unsurlarn manevra kabiliyetinin 22 olduka artt belirtilmektedir. Byle bir dnyada, Avrupann ve dnyann gvenlii kukusuz, devletlerin kendi topraklarndaki dzeni salamalar ve korumalarndan baldr. Baarsz devletler, dnyadaki kurulu dzeni ykc ve blgesel istikrarszla yol ac unsurlar tadklarndan tehdit oluturmaktadrlar. Dolaysyla, byle bir durumda devlet otoritesinin yeniden kurulmas Avrupa kriz ynetimi politikasnn temel amacdr. Son yllarda, Birlik tarafndan kriz ynetimi erevesinde dzenlenen operasyonlarn artmas bu alanda bir Avrupa metodu ortaya kmasn salamtr. Kapasite ve uygulama asndan bu alanda, Avrupann NATO ve Amerikann nne getii sylenebilir23. Ancak, gerek karar alma aamasnda gerekse mdahale ve operasyon kapasitesinde baz eksiklikler hala mevcuttur. Birlik tarafndan gerekletirilen birok operasyon henz nihai sonuca ulamamtr. Mdahale edilen lkelerin yeniden merkezi bir otorite kurup kuramayaca, siyasal meruiyetin salanp salanamayaca henz bilinmemektedir. Ayrca, lke snrlarn aan bir krizde ABnin mdahale edip etmeyecei, etse dahi dzeni salamada etkili olup olamayaca kesin deildir. 1991 ylnda eski Yugoslavyann dalmas srasnda yaanan krizi nlemede Birlik yetersiz kalm ve baarsz olmutur. Avrupa snrlarnda yaanan bu krizi nlemedeki yetersizlik, Avrupa d ileri ve gvenlik politikasnn yrrle konulmasnda etken olmutur.

22

Avrupa Gvenlik Stratejisi- Daha yi Bir Dnyada Daha Gvenli Avrupa, Bruxelles, 12 Aralk 2003, s. 2 23 James Dobbins, Friends again?, EU-US relations after the crisis, Institut d'Etudes de Scurit de l'Union europenne, 2006, s. 26-28 78

Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr

Dier yandan ye lkeler, Birliin Afrikadaki operasyonlarna, Fransann Afrika lkeleri ile kkeni kolonizyon dnemine dayanan ayrcalkl ilikileri nedeniyle kukuyla yaklamaktadr. rnein, ad operasyonu srasnda, AB lkelerinin gl bir Fransz etkisinden ekinmesi, harektn btn halinde deil, blm blm yaplmasna ve harekt sresinin uzamasna neden olmutur. (Harekt karar Mays 2007de alnm, ancak gnderilecek birliklerin hazrlanmas Kasm 2007ye kadar srmtr.)24 zetle, AB Souk Sava ve 11 Eyll sonrasnda ortaya kan ok boyutlu gvenlik tehditleri ile yeni politikalar, yeni kurumlar, hukuki dzenlemeler ve uluslararas ibirlii temelinde mcadale etmektedir. Ancak bu mcadele gerek politikalarn gerektii gibi ileyememesi, gerek oluturulan kurumlarn henz ok yeni olmas, gerek lkeler aras anlamazlklar, gerek vizyon farkllklar, gerekse bu konudaki harcamalarn arttrlmasna souk baklmas nedeniyle yetersiz kalmaktadr. 2. TRKYE FAKTR Uzun yllar terrle mcadele etmi ve hala da eden bir devletin ordusu olarak Trk Silahl Kuvvetleri, terrle mcadele konusundaki tecrbesi, disiplini, eitimi ve harbe hazrlk seviyesiyle dnyann en iyi ordularndan biridir. Ayrca Trkiye terr konusunda yaad deneyimleri eitim, retim ve diplomasi yolu ile dnyaya aktarmaya ve dier lkelerle ibirlii ierisinde almaya devam etmektedir. te yandan, mslman ve demokratik bir lke olarak Trkiye ABye ye olduunda, Birlik Mslman lkeler nezdinde art kazanacak ve bu lkelere kendini daha iyi ifade edebilecektir. Kresel terrizmin tehdit ettii dnyamzda bu durum daha byk nem kazanmaktadr. Mslman lkelerdeki anti demokratik gler artk Hristiyan Bat Mslmanlarla beraber yaamak istemiyor tezini ileri srmeyecektir ve AB Gcn bir Hal Ordusu olarak grmeyeceklerdir25. Bylece, ABnin medeniyetler atmas tezini deil, gerekten eitlilikte
24

Guillauime Etienne, Lopration EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Succs et limites dune initiative europenne , Terra Nova , 27 Nisan 2009 25 Ouz Demiralp, The Added Value of Turkish Membership to European Foreign Policy, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Cilt:2, No:4, 2003, s. 117

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birlik dncesini savunduu ve uygulamaya alt vurgulanm olacaktr. Bu adan bakldnda, Trkiyenin rolnn, 11 Eyll sonras terrle mcadele ve terrn sebeplerini ortadan kaldrlarak kltrler aras diyalogun artrlmas amalarna ynelik olarak iyice glendii sylenebilir. Eski Alman Dileri Bakan Joschka Fischer, Bild gazetesine yapt aklamada, Trkiyenin AB yeliinin terrle mcadele asndan nemine ocuklarmzn ve torunlarmznbar iinde yaamas ve Avrupann gl olmas iin Trkiyenin AB yesi olmasok nemlidir. Trkiye Avrupann merkezi yap tadrdiyerek iaret etmitir26. Trkiye, taraf bulunduu uluslararas szlemeler ve Bat ittifakna ye olmann bir sonucu olarak, nkleer, biyolojik ve kimyasal silahlar gelitirmeyeceini ve konulandrmayacan taahht etmi bir lkedir. Ortadouda nkleer silahlara veya silah retimi teknolojisine sahip lkelerin bulunmas AB iin olduu kadar Trkiye iin de endie vericidir. Bu durumun nlenmesi amacyla yaplan almalara blge lkesi olarak Trkiye destek vermektedir. Ayrca, ABnin en nemli eksiklerinden birinin ikmal ve intikal olduu dnlrse Trkiyenin corafi konumu, NATO standartlarndaki sleri, limanlar ve dier tesisleri AB iin nem tamaktadr. Dolaysyla Trkiyenin yelii, bu bakmdan da son derece nemli bir katkdr. AB, kendi corafyas zerinde zgrlk, gvenlik ve adalet alan tesis etmek amacyla uygulamaya konan Avrupa Komuluk Politikas, bata organize sular olmak zere tm gvenlik tehditleriyle mcadelede byk nem tamaktadr. Komuluk politikasnn hedefi komular arasndaki balarn glendirilmesi, bylece her iki tarafta da refah, istikrar ve gvenliini arttrlmasdr. Trkiye ile AB arasnda gerekleecek bir btnleme, Avrupa Komuluk Politikas yoluyla komu lkelerle Avrupa normlar, standartlar ve politikalar zemininde kademeli ve ksmi entegrasyon salama amacndaki ABnin gelimekte olan Komuluk Politikalarnn kapsamn geniletmeye yarayacaktr27. Trkiyenin yelii Birlikin gney ve gneydoudaki komularna daha ok odaklanmasna katkda
26 27

Fischer: Trkiye'nin yelii torunlarmz iin nemli,Hrriyet, 02 Eyll 2004 Michael Emerson, Nathalie Tocce, adas Trkiyenin Avrupa Dnm, Doan Kitap, 1.Bask, Aralk 2004, s. 63 80

Yeni Gvenlik Tehditleri, Avrupa Birliinin Geleceine likin Sonular ve Trkiye Faktr

bulunacaktr ki bu da ABnin gelimekte olan gvenlik stratejisiyle uyumludur; nk bugn AB asndan grnr tehditlerin kayna olarak bu blge gsterilmektedir28. Bu balamda ngiltere Eski Dileri Bakan Jack Straw, Trkiye, Avrupann gvenliinde kilit rol stlenmi bir lkedir. Birlik ihracatlar iin de nemli bir pazardr. Ayrca, insan kaakl, uyuturucu kaakl ve snr tesi sularla mcadelede Trkiyenin nemli rol vardr. Trkiyeye verdiimiz sz tutarak, Avrupa Birliini daha gl, daha gvenli ve daha rekabeti bir konuma getiriyoruz. 29 demitir. Jeostratejik konumu ve askeri gc Trkiyeyi, blgesel atmalarla ve baarsz devletlerle mcadele etmek isteyen AB iin vazgeilmez ortak yapmaktadr. Zira ABnin Trkiyenin komu olduu corafyada yapaca kriz ynetimi operasyonlarn baars Trkiyenin destei ve lojistik yardmna baldr. Dier yandan, askeri imknlarnn genilii ve ordusunun tecrbesi Trkiyenin askeri katklarnn temelini oluturmaktadr. Trkiye NATOda ABDden sonra ikinci en byk kara kuvvetlerine ve beinci en byk deniz kuvvetlerine sahiptir. Ayrca modern ve gl bir orduya sahip Trkiye, dk younluklu atmalar konusunda da deneyim sahibidir. Petersberg grevlerinin bu tr atmalara gre tasarland gz nne alndnda blgesel kriz ynetimi ve bar koruma misyonlarnda Trkiyenin nemi anlalmaktadr. Nitekim Trk ordusu dnya bar ve gvenlii adna Bosna-Hersek, Arnavutluk, Karada, Makedonya, Somali, Afganistan ve Lbnana, BM ve NATO kapsamnda birlik gndererek bar salama grevlerinde bulunmu ve halen sz konusu lkelerin bir ksmnda da bulunmaya devam etmektedir. Bunlara ilave olarak Trkiye, Balkanlardaki ve Karadenizdeki istikrarn sreklilii ve blge lkeleri arasndaki iyi komuluk ilikilerinin gelitirilmesi iin Gneydou Avrupa Tugaynda (SEEBRIG) ve Karadeniz Grev Gcnde de (BLACKSEAFOR) hizmet etmektedir.

28 29

Ibid. Jack Straw, Hem Trkiye Hem de AB Kazanl, BBC World, 11 Ekim 2005, Bkz. www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/ europe/story/2005/10/051011_straw_turkey.shtml (eriim 25 ubat 2010)

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AB Komisyonu, 06 Ekim 2004 tarihli raporu ile Trkiyenin nemini zetle yle vurgulamaktadr30: Trkiye, AB asndan stratejik neme haiz blgesel bir kavak noktasnda yer almaktadr. Balkanlar, Orta Asya, Orta Dou ve Dou Akdeniz topraklar, Asya ile kara ve hava ulam, Rusya ve Ukrayna ile deniz ulam iin transit bir konumda bulunmaktadr. Kayda deer su kaynaklarna sahip olan Trkiyenin komular, Avrupa iin hayati enerji arz salamaktadr. Ekonomi ve nfus asndan, Trkiye nemli bir aktrdr. Byklk olarak dnyann byk ekonomilerindendir ve AB yesi olarak nfus asndan en byk ye devlet olacaktr. ler bir demokrasiye sahip, laik bir Mslman lke olarak blgede bir istikrar unsurudur. Bat ittifakyla olan btnlemesi ve birok ekonomik ve blgesel kurulua yelii vastasyla, Avrupann ve komu blgelerin gvenliine katk salayacaktr. zetle, Trkiyenin AB yelii AB Gvenlik Stratejisinde vurgulanan gvenlik tehditleri ile mcadelede byk nem tamaktadr, nk gerek corafi konum, gerek askeri g, gerek deneyim, gerekse vizyon balamnda Trkiye, uluslar aras gvenlie katks phe gtrmeyen bir devlettir. Trkiyenin Birlie kabul edilmemesi durumunda zaten byk eksiklikleri ve zayflklar olan AGSPnin ok daha nemli sorunlarla karlamas muhtemeldir. 3. AVRUPA BRLNN GELECENE LKN SONULAR Avrupa entegrasyonu erevesinde savunma ve gvenlik konularnn ele aln hep ok sesli ve ahenksiz olmutur. Gnmzde, Avrupal devletler en az be kurum araclyla bu alanda ibirliini salamaya almaktadr: Avrupa Gvenlik ve birlii Tekilat ve Avrupa Konseyi bnyesinde ibirlii, Avrupa Gvenlik ve Savunma Politikas araclyla AB bnyesinde ibirlii, ngiltere ve rlandann taraf olmad Schengen/Dublin eklinde anlamalarla glendirilmi ibirlii, hkmetleraras dzeyde birka lkeyi birletiren ok tarafl ibirlii (rnein, talya, Fransa, spanya, Portekiz ve Hollandann destek verdii, dnyann eitli blgelerindeki bar koruma operasyonlarnda grev alacak Avrupa jandarma

30

AB Komisyonu Trkiye Raporu Bkz. www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ab/rapor2004-01.html (eriim 25 ubat 2010) 82

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birlii- EUROGENDFOR-) ve devletler iin olmazsa olmaz nitelikteki iki tarafl ibirlii. Dier yandan, NATO bnyesindeki bata olmak zere, Avrupa ile Amerika arasndaki dayanma ve ibirlii de Avrupann gvenlii asndan ok byk nem tamaktadr. Ancak, transatlantik ilikilerde baz Avrupal devletler ve Amerika arasnda gr ve duru fark neticesinde zaman zaman gergin dnemler de yaanmaktadr. 2003 Irak sava srasnda Fransa ve Almanyann ABD karsndaki tutumlar transatlantik ilikilerde byk bir kriz patlak vermesine neden olmutur. Gnmz gvensizlik ortam, dnyada ve zellikle Avrupada, gerek ulusal gerek uluslararas dzeyde daha karmak daha zenli, daha rgtl ve daha entegre gvenlik politikalar benimsenmesini zorunlu klmaktadr. Geriye dnp bakldnda, ABnin yeni gvenlik tehditlerine cevap vermekte zorland ve yetersiz kald grlmektedir. Ortak bir bak asnn olmay ve tek sesliliin salanamamas bu alandaki almalarn nnde engel tekil etmektedir. Gnmz Avrupa Birliine kadar uzanan Avrupa btnleme sreci ncelikle savunma amal olarak balamtr. 1947 Dunkerque ve 1948 Brksel Antlamalarnn amac bir savunma rgt kurarak yeniden Avrupann sava yaamasn nlemekti. Bununla birlikte, yaklak 50 yl boyunca, Avrupa btnleme srecinde savunma konusu tabu haline gelmitir. Birlik, 1998 Saint Malo Zirvesi ve 1999 Helsinki Avrupa Birlii Konsey toplants sonras yeniden savunma ve gvenlik konusunu ele almaya karar vermitir. phesiz, AByi gvenlik ve savunma politikas gelitirmeye iten pek ok sebep vardr. Ancak bunlardan en nemlisi, dnya satran tahtasnda byk g haline gelebilmek iin sadece ekonomik g olmann yeterli olmadnn, gvenlik ve savunma konularnda da kendi z kaynaklarna dayanarak bamsz hareket edebilmek gerektiinin anlalm olmasdr. Bu noktada akla gelen ilk soru, gvenlik konularndan kaynaklanan yeni bir kriz annda ABnin yeni bir i blnmeyi atlatp atlatamayacadr. Bugn, 27 yeli bu yapya baktmzda farkl stratejik ve politik karlara dayanan drt farkl grup 83

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gze arpmaktadr: lki ngilterenin konumudur. Dil, tarih, kltr ve ruh olarak Amerikaya yakn olan ngiltere iin ncelikli olan Atlantik ilikileridir. Zaten, 2003 Irak sava srasnda Amerikay desteklediini aklayan ilk lke de ngiltere olmutur. Eski faist diktatrlkler (spanya, Portekiz, talya ve Yunanistan) ikinci grubu oluturmaktadr. Avrupa btnleme sreci, bu lkeler iin demokrasinin yeniden glenmesi anlamna gelmektedir. Ancak, Irak sava srasnda Amerikann yannda yer almlardr. Bu lkeler iin, AB fonlarndan yararlanarak ulusal kalknmay salamak, dolaysyla Birlik yesi olmak vazgeilmez niteliktedir31. Ancak, d politikada ncelikleri Atlantik ilikilerdir. nc grup, eski Varova Pakt yeni Avrupa Birlii yeleridir. Onlar da Irak savan destekleyenler arasndadr. Dou Avrupa devletlerinin bu desteinin nedeni, olas bir Rus tehlikesinden kendilerini sadece Amerikann koruyabileceine olan inantr. Son grup, Fransa, Almanya ve Beneluxten olumaktadr. Birliin lokomotifi kabul edilen bu grup, zellikle Almanya ve Fransa, Irak Savana tamamen kar bir tutum benimsemitir. Bu ema gz nne alndnda, savunma ve gvenlik temelli bir Avrupa entegrasyonunun gereklemesi zor grnmektedir. leride yaanacak byk bir kriz, Birliin temellerini sarsp onu dalma srecine sokabilir mi? Bu soruya yant vermek gtr, ancak gvenlik konularnn yol at blnmenin AByi ekonomik btnleme alanna yneltecei ve bu durumun da AByi en byk g olma hedefinden uzaklatraca sylenebilir. SONU Souk sava ve 11 Eyll sonras deien gvenlik tehditleri uluslararas bir nitelik kazanm ve daha karmak bir yapya sahip olmutur. Gvensizliin kreselletii dnyamzda uluslararas arenann tm aktrleri gibi ABde buyeni gvenlik tehditlerine kar yeni yaklamlar ve stratejiler benimsemek zorunda kalmtr. Ancak tehditlerle mcadelede yetersiz kalnmas, Avrupa Gvenlik ve Savunma Politikasnn yeterli bir alt yapya ve uzun vadeli bir konsepte sahip olmadn gstermitir. Bu durumun temel nedeni ise ye lkeler arasnda eski kolektif
31

Jacky Fayolle, Anne Lecuyer, Croissance rgionale, appartenance nationale et fonds structurels europens. Un bilan dtape, Revue de lOFCE, Vol. 73, 2000, p. 170 84

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savunma anlaynn yerine getirilen kolektif gvenliin esasn tekil eden gvenlik hedefleri konusunda politik konsensse varma zorunluluudur.32 Birlik yesi lkelerin hala farkl nceliklere, karlara ve dnya grne sahip olmalar gvenlik konularnda konsensse varlmasn engellemektedir. Ayrca, etkili ve caydrc bir gvenlik politikasnn geliimi, AB yesi devletlerin askeri kapasitelerini arttrmalarna ve gerekli finansman salamalarna baldr, ancak tm ye lkeler bu konuda ayn istek ve abay gstermemektedirler. Gvenlik konularnda tek seslilii salayamayan AB, kendi iinde blnmeler ve krizler yaamaktadr. te yandan bu tehditler ile mcadelede AB, askeri gcn yan sra diplomatik ve finansal giriimler, bilgi paylam ve polis operasyonlar gibi yumuak g unsurlarn da kullanmaktadr. Bu balamda sahip olduu jeopolitik konum, askeri g ve deneyim ile Trkiye Avrupa gvenlik politikalarnn baars iin olduka nemli bir devlet haline gelmektedir. Trkiyeye AB kapsnn tamamen kapanmasnn, zaten sorunlu ve yetersiz bir ileyie sahip Avrupa gvenlik politikasn daha da zor durumda brakmas muhtemeldir.

32

Sait Ylmaz, Avrupa Birliinin Gelecei, BUSAM, 2007, s. 3

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KAYNAKA Avrupa Gvenlik Stratejisi- yi bir dnyada gvenli Avrupa, Bruxelles, 12 Aralk 2003. BAILES, J. K. ALYSON, The European Security Strategy, An Evolutionary History, SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 10, 2005. BEDELL, Geraldine, Things can only get different, The Observer, 27 Nisan 2003. BOUTIN, Christine, Organized crime-Drug and Human trafficikg in Europe, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee Report, 2003. BROWN, Michael, Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century, Georgetown Univ Pres, Washington, 2003. COLLET, Andr, Dfense et scurit internationale face aux dfis du XXIe sicle, Renseignement Histoire et Gopolitique, 2005. DEDEOLU, Beril, Uluslararas Gvenlik ve Strateji, Derin Yaynlar, stanbul, 2003 DEMRALP, Ouz, The Added Value of Turkish Membership to European Foreign Policy, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Cilt:2, No:4, 2003. DOBBINS, James, "Friends again?", EU-US relations after the crisis, Institut d'Etudes de Scurit de l'Union europenne, 2006. EMERSON, Michael and Nathalie TOCCIE, ada Trkiyenin Avrupa Dnm, Dogan Kitap, 1.Bask, Aralk 2004. FAYOLLE, Jacky and Anne LECUYER, Croissance rgionale, appartenance nationale et fonds structurels europens. Un bilan dtape Revue de lOFCE, Vol. 73, 2000. GARTNER, Heinz, Europes New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner, London, 1991.

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GNESOTTO, Nicole, AB Gvenlik ve Savunma Politikas, TASAM Yaynlar, stanbul, 2005. ETIENNE, Guillauime, Lopration EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Succs et limites dune initiative europenne , Terra Nova, 27 Nisan 2009. ROY, Olivier, Les illusions du 11 septembre, Edition du Seuil, Paris, 2002. ROCHE, Jean-Jacques, Quelles Politiques de Scurit pour lApres Guerre Froide, Cahiers Raoul-Dandurand, No. 5, avril 2001. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drugs and crime trends in Europe and beyond, Vienne, 29 Nisan 2004. WEYEMBERGH, Anne, LUnion europenne et la lutte contre le terrorisme , Compte-rendu de la Conference-debat Terrorisme, Droit et Droits des victimes , 1 Mars 2006. YILMAZ, Sait, Avrupa Birliinin Gelecei, BUSAM, 2007. ZORGBIBE, Charles, Lavenir de la Scurit Internationale, Presses de SciencePo, Paris, 2003.

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TRKYE-SRAL LKLERNDE YEN DNEM The New Period of the Turkish-Israeli Relations Erdem KAYA zet: Gazze Savann ardndan Trkiye-srail ilikileriyle ilgili yaplan tartmalar iki lke arasnda yaanan gerginlii aklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadr. Trkiye, srailin iddet siyasetini gemite srekli protesto etmitir. Bu nedenle Ankarann Dkme Kurun Harektna verdii tepki ikili ilikilerin doal bir yn olarak deerlendirilmelidir. Ankarann 2000li yllarn bandan itibaren uygulamaya alt yeni d politika vizyonuyla blgede denge siyasetine dnmesi ve bu sre zarfnda blgede cereyan eden siyasi gelimeler (Irak Sava gibi) gerginliin yapsal arka plann ortaya koymaktadr. kili ilikiler, Trkiyenin blgede etkinleen varl ile yeni bir dneme girmektedir. Yeni dnemde Trkiye-srail ilikilerinin daha dk seviyede seyredecei zannedilmektedir. Anahtar kelimeler: Trkiye, srail, Trkiye-srail likileri, Gazze Sava. Abstract: The recent tension between Turkey and Israel cannot be explained by just paying attention to the post-Gaza War debates. Ankaras denunciation of Israeli state violence for the resolution of its conflicts has been a common feature of bilateral relations and thus it should be seen natural for Turkey to be critical of the Operation Cast Lead. Turkeys new foreign policy vision that has been in effect since the early 2000s and the political developments in the Middle East in the last decade expose the structural causes of the tension. Bilateral relations are entering into a new period with greater influence of Turkey in regional affairs. In this new period, it is estimated that the relations between Ankara and Tel-Aviv will continue to exist at a lower level. Keywords: Turkey, Israel, Turkish-Israeli relations, Gaza War.

Boazii niversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararas likiler Yksek Lisans rencisi, BLGESAM Ortadou Aratrmalar Enstits Uzman Yardmcs

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GR 2009 yl Orta Doudaki siyasi dengeler zerinde byk etkisi olan Trkiye-srail ilikilerinin en ok tartld yl oldu. srailin Gazzede yrtt operasyonun yol at insani trajediye Trkiyenin verdii tepki, zellikle Amerikada ve Orta Douda byk yank uyandrd. Babakan Erdoann Davosta Pereze verdii cevap ve yine Babakan ve Dileri Bakannn deiik platformlarda dile getirdii Gazzedeki insani dram, konunun gndemde kalmasn salad. Ekim aynda dier lkelerin yannda srailin de dzenli olarak katld Anadolu Kartal tatbikatnn, ulusal dzeyde yaplmasnn kararlatrlmas tartmay daha da alevlendirdi. Tatbikatn ulusal dzeyde yaplmas ile srailin katlmasnn engellendii ynndeki iddialarla ikili ilikiler sorguland. srail basnnda kan yorumlar ve Netanyahu iktidarnn radikal isimlerinin verdii tepkilerle sre devam etti. srail Dileri Bakan Yardmcs Danny Ayalonun Trkiyenin Tel-Aviv Bykelisi Ouz elikkolu aalama giriimiyle hat safhaya kan gerilim, srailin zr dilemesiyle dmeye balad. Savunma Bakan Ehud Barakn Trkiye ziyareti ve iki lkeden de st dzey yetkililerin verdii soukkanl mesajlarla gerginlik byk lde yattrld. Gazze Sava sonrasnda yaanan tartmalar Trkiyenin yeni d politika vizyonu ile ilgili farkl deerlendirmeleri beraberinde getirmitir. srailin Gazze saldrsn eletirdii iin Ankarann bat ekseninden kmakta olduu ynndeki iddialar bu deerlendirmeler iinde en arpc olandr. Ancak, Amerika ve Avrupada olduu gibi Trkiyedeki sraile yakn evrelerin de zerinde durduu Ankarann yzn douya dnd iddias gereki grnmemektedir. Eksen kayma iddias, sraili bazen srailden daha fazla savunan Yahudi lobilerinin verdii refleksin bir mahsul olabilir. 11 Eyll sonras Baty byk lde etkisi altna alan nyarglar asndan dnldnde ise, Trkiyenin zellikle Mslman lkelerle yaknlamasnn bu iddiann glenmesine sebep olduu sylenebilir. Nitekim Suriye ve dier Arap lkelerinin oundan daha douda bulunan Ermenistanla balatlan diyalog ve yaknlama ayn ekilde deerlendirilmemitir. Trkiyenin mevcut iktidarla birlikte yzn douya

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dnd iddias1 bat ile gelitirilerek srdrlen ilikiler dnldnde ise gerekliini iyice kaybeder. Blgesinde srailin ardndan en iyi ileyen demokrasiye sahip olan Trkiye, Amerika ile ilikilerini model ortaklk seviyesine ykseltmitir ve hala NATOnun en nemli yelerinden birisidir. Ankara, problemler ksa da Avrupa Birliine tam yelik mzakerelerine devam etmektedir ve Trkiyede ABye katlm srecinde acl demokrasiler dzeyine terfi etmeyi destekleyen nemli bir aydn kitlesi vardr. Yaanan gerginliin ardndan ikili ilikilerin sorgulanmasnn nedenleri, 2009 ylndaki tartmalardan ok Orta Dou siyasetinin deien dengelerinde aranmaldr. 1990l yllarla karlatrldnda, son on yl iinde blgedeki dengeleri belirleyen uluslararas ve blgesel artlarn farkllk arz ettii ortadadr. Washingtonn Souk Sava sonrasndaki tek kutuplu uluslararas siyasi yapy srekli klmaya ynelik abalar baarl olamamtr.2 Amerikann Orta Douda yegne etkili d aktr olarak algland 1990l yllar, yerini blgede daha ok aktrn sz sahibi olduu yeni bir dneme brakmaktadr. Rusya Federasyonu, sraille yakn ilikilerini muhafaza ederken Arap lkeleriyle siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri alanlardaki ban glendirmektedir. in Halk Cumhuriyetinin daha ok ekonomik ve askeri konularda blge lkeleriyle ibirliine girdii gzlemlenmektedir. rann nkleer enerji programnn neden olduu gerginlikte, Pekin-Tahran ilikilerinin batnn ran karsndaki yaptrm kabiliyetini nasl snrlandrd dikkat ekicidir. Sarkozy iktidar ile birlikte Fransa ve son yllarda Almanya belirli alanlarda blge lkeleri ile ilikilerini gelitirmektedir. srail, ran ve Trkiyeninse zellikle Irak Savandan sonra blge siyasetinde daha etkili olduklar fark edilmitir. Giderek daha ok kutuplu bir yap arz eden uluslararas sistemle birlikte deien Orta Dou siyasetindeki dengeler3 Trkiye-srail ilikilerini nemli lde etkilemitir. Trkiyenin blge lkeleriyle yaknlat, srailinse blgesiyle
1

Efrahim Inbar, Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Beyond, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 4,1, (2010), s. 2930. 2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, 25, 1, (2000), s. 36. 3 Milo Balabn, The Conflicting Rebirth of Multipolarity in International Relations, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2, 1, (2008), s.7071.

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btnleme srecini dondurduu bu srete ikili ilikilere yn veren dinamikleri iki balk altnda toplamak mmkndr. Birinci dinamik Trkiyenin 2000li yllarn bandan itibaren uygulad youn diplomasiye dayal yeni d politika vizyonudur. Ankarann bu vizyonu, Trkiyenin blgede Souk Sava sonras dnemde ara verdii denge siyasetine geri dnmesini salamtr. Bu gelime sraille 1990l yllarn ikinci yarsnda ilerletilen siyasi ve askeri ilikilerin doal snrna ulat hatta geriledii izlenimini uyandrmtr. ki lke arasndaki mnasebetlere tesir eden ikinci grup dinamikler, son dnemde Orta Doudaki siyasi gelimeler olarak ele alnabilir. kinci ntifada ile balayp Irak Savayla devam eden bu gelimeler iki lkeyi nceki on ylda yaknlatran artlar byk lde zayflatmtr. zellikle igal sonras Irakn durumu, Trkiyenin Suriye ve ranla rten kar alanlarn geniletirken sraille ortak menfaat paydasn drmtr. Bu sebeplerden tr, Trkiye-srail ilikilerinin sorgulanmasna yol aan tartmalar, son on ylda blgenin farkllaan siyasi dengeleri kapsamnda dnlmelidir. srailin orantsz iddet kullanarak igal altndaki Filistin topraklarna saldrmas ya da Trkiyenin protestosu yeni gelimeler deildir. Gemie bakldnda srailin sivil kayplara neden olan askeri harektlarn, Ankarann srekli eletirdii veya knad grlmektedir. Dolaysyla srailin Dkme Kurun Harektnn neden olduu insani trajediye Trkiyenin verdii tepki, yaanan gerginliin izahnda yetersiz kalacaktr. Ankarann yeni d politika vizyonu ile blge siyasetinde varln hissettirmesi ve iki lkeyi yaknlatran artlarn kaybolmasna neden olan gelimeleri incelemek daha aklayc olabilir. kili ilikilerin doasnn analizi ise yaanan son gerginliin Orta Douda deien siyasi dengelerin doal bir neticesi olduu tezini belirgin klacaktr. 1. TRKYENN YEN DI POLTKA VZYONUNUN KL LKLERE ETKS Ankarann temelleri 2000li yllarn banda atlan yeni d politika yaklam, Trkiyeyi blgesinde yumuak gc ykselen bir aktr haline getirmektedir. Ekonomik ve askeri gcnn art ile birlikte hissedilen yumuak gcnn, Orta Doudaki etkisi byk lde blgede denge siyasetine geri dnmesi ile ilgilidir.

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Belirli dnemlerdeki belirgin Bat yanls tutumu4 dnda Trkiye, Souk Sava yllarn genelde dengeli bir Orta Dou siyasetiyle ynetmitir. sraille diplomatik temas devaml srdrlrken, Arap devletleriyle ilikilerin gelitirilmesi ynnde admlar atlmtr. 1990l yllarda ise srail-Filistin bar grmelerinin olumlu etkisiyle Ankara-Tel-Aviv mnasebetlerinde bir canlanma sreci yaanmtr. 1991de sraille iyilemeye balayan ilikiler 1995ten sonra zellikle savunma sanayi, askeri ibirlii ve ticaret alannda hzla gelimitir. ki lke arasnda imzalanan Serbest Ticaret Antlamas 1997de yrrle girmi, 1998deki Ekonomik birlii Antlamasyla ticaret hacmi nemli lde bymtr. Bu dnemde, Trkiyeden sraile boru hatlar ile petrol, doal gaz ve su tanmas mzakere edilmitir. Ankara-Tel-Aviv arasnda savunma alannda da hz kazanan bu yaknlama, Trkiyenin PKK terr rgt ile mcadelesinde Bat tarafndan maruz brakld rtl silah ambargosunu5 amasn salamtr. Trk Silahl Kuvvetlerinin modernizasyon ihtiyacnn giderilmesinde sraille gelitirilen ilikilerin nemli katks olmutur. Ankarann 2020 ylna kadar savunma alannda 150 milyar dolar harcamay planlamas ise srailli firmalarn Trkiyede alan ihalelere dzenli bir ekilde katlmasn salamtr.6 Ancak, 1990larn ikinci yarsnda sraille artrlan ibirliine karlk, blgede rdn dndaki dier lkelerle ilikiler adeta yerinde saymtr. Ankara-Tel-Aviv arasnda ortak tatbikatlara varan stratejik ibirliinin blgedeki dier lkelere kar yrtld algs, Trkiyenin bu lkelerle olan ilikilerine olumsuz ynde tesir etmitir. Bu ibirlii; Rusya, ran, Yunanistan ile Arap lkelerinden zellikle Msr ve Suriye tarafndan tehlikeli grlmtr. Ankara-Tel-Aviv yaknlamasna kar oalan tepkilerin, Trkiyeyi blgesinden tecrit edecek dereceye varmas, Orta Douda denge siyasetine geri dnlerek engellenmitir. sraille iyi ilikilerini muhafaza eden Ankarann, blgedeki dier lkelerle de yaknlamas, atan taraflara eit mesafede bir Trkiye grnts salamaya balamtr.
4

lter Trkmen, Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin Ortadou Politikas, BLGESAM Yaynlar, stanbul, 2010, s. 1719. 5 Gencer zcan, Trkiye-srail likilerinde Dnm: Gvenliin tesi, TESEV Yaynlar, stanbul, 2005, s. 60. 6 ar Erhan ve mer Krkolu, Orta Dou ile likiler: sraille likiler, Trk D Politikas: Kurtulu Savandan Bugne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar 2.Cilt (Ed.) Baskn Oran, stanbul, letiim Yaynlar, 2006, s. 572.

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2000li yllarla birlikte blgesinde srail dndaki lkelerle de ilikilerini ilerleten, srail-Filistin sorununda aktif diplomasi yrten, Amerikann ran, Irak ve Suriye ile yaad gerginliklerde tarafsz kalan bir Trkiye ortaya kmtr. 2000 ylnda balayan II. ntifada esnasnda, Dileri Bakan smail Cem srail, Filistin ve Msr arasnda mekik diplomasisi yrtmtr. smail Cemin zellikle ran ve Yunanistan rneklerinde gelitirdii iyi komuluk ilikileri, Trk d politikasnda yer etmi ve eitlendirilerek devam ettirilmitir. PKK terr rgtnn lideri calann yakalanmas ve 10. Cumhurbakan Ahmet Necdet Sezerin Hafz Esadn cenazesinde bulunmas ile Suriyeyle balayan diyalog srdrlmtr. ABDnin Irak igali ncesinde Trkiye, savan nlenmesi iin blge lkeleri arasnda youn bir diplomasi yrtmtr. Amerikan birliklerinin Trkiye zerinden Kuzey Iraka girmesini salayacak 1 Mart tezkeresinin reddedilmesi ise zellikle Arap halklar nezdinde Ankarann itibarn ykseltmitir. Trkiye, bu dnemde gvenlik merkezli d siyasetten ziyade karlkl karlarn n plana karld ikili ilikilere odaklanmaya almtr. Bylece Ankara, Souk Sava sonras dnemde evresindeki lkelerle arasndaki problemli atmosferi daha olumlu bir havaya dntrebilmitir. Trkiye bu kapsamda Rusya Federasyonu ile ilikilerini7, Orta Asya8 ve Orta Dou9 siyasetini romantik alglardan, pragmatik bir zemine tayabilmitir. Son yllarda Kazakistan, Rusya, Irak ve Suriye ile gelitirilen stratejik ilikiler bu deien anlayn neticesi olarak deerlendirilebilir. zellikle Bush ynetimi dneminde Washingtonn ve
7

Rusya Federasyonunun eenistan meselesi ile Trkiyenin PKK terr rgt ile mcadelesine karlkllk ilkesi erevesinde yaklalarak, ekonomik ibirlii n plana kartld. 8 Bamszlklarn yeni kazanan Orta Asyadaki Trk cumhuriyetler ve Tacikistan ile olan ilikiler, Trkiyenin 1990l yllarn ilk yarsnda benimsedii koruyucu/kollayc aabey rolnden, youn diplomatik ve ekonomik ilikilerin amaland bir zemine ekildi. 9 Trkiyedeki ran rejimine olan bak asnn ikili ilikileri etkileme dzeyi drld. Bu gelime Trkiyedeki medyann daha oulcu bir yap arz etmeye balamasyla da aklanabilir. kili ilikilerde karlkl ekonomik karlar n planda tutuldu. ki lke arasndaki doal gaz boru hattnn 2002de devreye girmesi ile birlikte, ran Trkiyenin Orta Douda ticaret hacminin en byk olduu lke haline geldi. Dier taraftan Arap lkeleriyle olan ilikiler Trkiyedeki devleti/sekinci aydnlarn ve medyann genel Arap aleyhtar tutumundan bamsz, faydac bir dzlemde ele alnmaya balad. Bylece Suriye, Msr, Suudi Arabistan ve Krfez lkeleriyle ticari balar glendirilerek siyasi ilikiler gelitirildi. 94

Trkiye-srail likilerinde Yeni Dnem

1990l yllardan beri Tel-Avivin aksi yndeki srarl taleplerine ramen ranla ilikiler gelitirilerek srdrlmektedir. Ermenistanla yaknlama politikas ayn srecin daha problemli bir zeminde nasl uygulamaya konduunu gstermesi asndan nemlidir. Nihayet, Libya ile su transferi ve enerji alannda ibirliine dnk karlkl niyet beyan da bu kapsama dhil edilebilecek son gelimedir. Ankara, son yllarda blgesindeki anlamazlklarn zm iin kolaylatrc/arabulucu giriimlerde bulunmaktadr. Suriye-srail arasndaki dolayl grmeleri yrtmesi blge genelinde iyimser bir hava oluturduu gibi Washington tarafndan da olduka olumlu karlanmtr.10 Irakta 2009 yazndaki patlamalarn ardndan Suriye ile Badat arasnda ba gsteren krizin trmanmas Ankarann devreye girmesiyle durdurulabilmitir. Trkiye, Afganistan-Pakistan snrndan kaynaklanan problemlerin ibirliiyle giderilmesini tevik ederek 2007den bu yana l zirvelere ev sahiplii yapmaktadr. Ankara, WashingtonTahran arasndaki rann nkleer enerji programndan dolay balayan gerilimin diplomatik yollarla zmne dnk politikalar tasarlamaktadr. Cumhurbakan Abdullah Gln son Hindistan ziyaretiyle pekitirilen Ankara-Yeni Delhi mnasebetleri ise Kemir anlamazlnda Trkiyenin yakn gelecekte muhtemel bir arabuluculuk giriimini gndeme getirmitir. Ankarann nmzdeki dnemde, Yemende devam eden atmalarn bitmesi iin diplomatik aba sarf edecei zannedilmektedir.11 Pro-aktif d politika hedefinin bu giriimlerle hayata geirilmesi, Trkiyenin blge barna katkda bulunarak glenmesini salayacaktr. srail ve rann revizyonist politikalarna karlk, blge istikrarna ynelik siyaset gelitiren Trkiyenin rol12 bu nedenle daha etkili olabilir. Bylece, artan ekonomik ve askeri gcn diplomatik nfuza dntrrken
10

Gazze Savan takip eden srete Babakan Netanyahu Fransann bu rol stlenmesini istemise de, Parisin arabuluculuu am tarafndan kabul edilmemitir. imdiye kadar sadece de Gaullen dile getirebildii Fransadaki gl srail lobisi ve Sarkozynin srail yanls siyaseti Parisin arabuluculuuna glge drmektedir. 11 Dileri Bakanl Mstear Yardmcs Bykeli Engin Soysaln ubat aynn son haftasndaki Yemen ziyareti ile birlikte Ankarann Yemendeki problemleri anlamaya alt bilinmektedir. 2010 yl banda El Kaide terr rgtnn Yemendeki varl ile gndeme gelen lkenin kuzeyinde ii Hsi isyanclarla gneyinde ise ayrlk militanlarla ordu arasndaki atmalar devam etmektedir. 12 Patrick Seale, The Rise and Rise of Turkey, Agence Global, 2 Kasm 2009, http://www.patrickseale.com adresinden alnmtr.

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uluslararas kamuoyunun desteini de alabilecektir. Trkiye, iyi komuluk ilikileri ve serbest ticareti tevik ettii bu yeni tutumuyla, Avrupa ve ABDnin destekledii uluslararas normlara uyum salamaktadr. Trkiyenin blgedeki ihtilaflara dnk zm nerileri Avrupa Birlii tarafndan destek grebilecektir. Washington ise Orta Dou siyasetini Ankarann yaklamlarn gz nnde tutarak, Trkiye ile egdm salayarak yrtmek isteyebilir.13 Trkiyenin yeni d politika vizyonu sylem baznda srailin lml politikaclar tarafndan kabul edilmektedir.14 Ancak, Tel-Aviv ynetiminin Ankarann blgede artan yumuak gcne olumlu baknn snrl olduu tahmin edilmektedir.15 srail Trkiye ile ilikileriyle aslnda, dnya leindeki byk glerin yan sra Arap Orta Dousunun evresindeki Arap olmayan lkelerle iyi ilikiler kurma geleneini srdrmektedir.16 srailin kurucu Babakan David BenGuriondan bu yana, zellikle i Partili liderlerin Trkiye ile iyi ilikiler kurma abas bu stratejinin bir rn olarak deerlendirilmelidir. Dolaysyla, Ankarann blge siyasetinde artan etkinlii dorudan Tel-Avivin gvenliiyle ilgili karlarna ters dmedii srece, Trkiye ile mevcut ilikileri muhafaza etmek srailde bir d politika gelenei olarak kalabilir. Ayn strateji kapsamnda, srail; Etiyopya, devrim ncesi ran ve Azerbaycan ile ibirliine gitmitir. Azerbaycanla ilikilerde beklenen gelime gereklemese de srail, rana kar bu lke ile

13

Mervan El Kabalan, Trkiyenin Ykselen Blgesel Nfuzu, Turque diplomatique, Say 13, 15 ubat15 Mart 2010, s. 3637. 14 srail Cumhurbakan imon Perez, 2007de Trkiye Byk Millet Meclisindeki konumasnda, blgedeki ykselen iki siyasi akmdan ilkinin terr destekleyen rannki olduunu ifade etmiti. kinci akmn bar yanls Trkiyeninki olduunu belirten Perez, ran tehdidine kar ittifak nerisiyle destek aramt. Dier pek ok srailli siyaseti de Trkiyenin blgede giderek daha nemli bir lke haline geldiini ifade etmitir. sraildeki mevcut hkmetin zellikle i Partili yeleri de Trkiyenin blgedeki roln vurgulayarak Ankara ile iyi ilikilerin deerini belirtmektedir. 15 Trkiyenin blgedeki dier lkeler zerinde nfuzu arttka, Arap-srail anlamazlnda etki alan genileyebilecektir. srailin Filistin topraklarna ynelik stratejisinin, Trkiyenin iki devletli zm ve Kudsn stats gibi konulardaki duruu ile uyumamas uzun vadedeki potansiyel problemleri iaret etmektedir. 16 Efrahim Inbar, Trk-srail Stratejik Ortakl, Avrasya Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi Yaynlar, stanbul, 2001. S. 45. 96

Trkiye-srail likilerinde Yeni Dnem

ibirliine scak bakmakta ve ticari balarn glendirmeye almaktadr.17 Dier taraftan, Trkiye ile yakn zamana kadar askeri pakt grnts veren ikili ilikilerdeki hissedilen gerileme, srailin Yunanistanla eitlenen ilikilerine olumlu yansmtr. ki lke ortak askeri tatbikatlar yapmaya balamtr. Ankara, yeni d politika vizyonu dhilinde blgedeki karlarn denge siyaseti izleyerek artracan deerlendirmektedir. Trkiyenin blgedeki dier lkelere yaknlaarak gerekletirdii denge politikas ise Ankarann srailin tehdit alglad lkelerle ittifak yapt grntsne/algsna sebep olabilir. 19952000 yllar arasnda Trkiye-srail ilikilerinin hzla ilerlemesi Trkiyenin evresindeki dier lkeleri tedirgin etmitir. Arap Birlii toplantlarnda ve slam Konferans Tekilat zirvelerinde bu rahatszlk sk sk gndeme getirilmi, iki lke arasndaki ilikinin nihai hedefi sorgulanmtr. imdiki srete ise gemite Mslman lkelerle birlikte Rusya ve Yunanistan rahatsz eden bu dinamiin, srail tarafndan ayn ekilde okunmas sz konusudur. Amerikada ve bat Avrupa lkelerinde son derece gl olan srail lobilerinin, Trkiyenin Washington ve AB ile ilikileri zerindeki etkileri Ankara tarafndan gz nnde bulundurulmaldr. Bu nedenle, Arap lkeleri ve ranla artrlan ibirliinin sraile kar gelitirildii izleniminin nne geilmesinde yarar vardr. Trkiye bu dengeyi salad nispette, Orta Douda yumuak gcne rza gsterilen bir orta oyuncu konumuna terfi edebilecektir. 2. BLGEDEK GELMELERN KL LKLERE ETKS Orta Dou siyasetine yn veren dinamikleri belirleyebilecek uluslararas sistemdeki en kritik gelime ok kutuplulua doru gidiattr. Sovyetler Birliinin dalmasndan sonra, Washington blge siyasetine genelde srail karlar dorultusunda daha rahat mdahale edebilmiti. Souk Savatan sonra srailin blgede alglad en byk tehdit olan Iraka, Amerikann kinci Krfez Sava ile neticelenen saldrlar bunu gstermitir. Washington Orta Douda hala en gl aktr konumundadr. Ancak, Beyaz Sarayn blgeye ynelik politika
17

Netanyahunun Babakan olarak 1997deki Trkiye ziyaretinde Trkiye, srail ve Azerbaycan arasnda rana kar bir ittifak gndeme gelmiti. Trkiyenin byle bir giriime scak bakmad bilinmektedir.

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

gelitirirken hesaba katmas gereken deikenlerin says ve etkinlii artm durumdadr. Blgenin ne kan lkelerinin (Trkiye, srail, Suudi Arabistan, ran) Rusya ve inle ilikileri eitlenerek artmaktadr. Orta Dou lkelerinin konvansiyonel silah temininde Amerika aslan payn muhafaza etse de, bat Avrupa lkelerinin (ngiltere, Fransa, Almanya, talya) ve Rusyann pay hzla genilemektedir.18 inin 2020 ylna kadar Suudi Arabistan petrollerinin en byk alcs olaca tahmin edilmektedir.19 Dolaysyla, blge siyasetinde Rusya, in, ngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya gibi blge d aktrlerin nemli nfuz sahibi olaca yeni bir dnemin balad ileri srlebilir. Bu yeni dnemde, Washingtonn Trkiye-srail ilikileri zerindeki etkisinin zayflayaca, Ankara ve Tel-Avivin daha bamsz politikalar yrtebilecei zannedilmektedir. 2000li yllarn bandan bu yana Orta Dou siyasetini belirleyen ve Trkiyesrail ilikilerini etkileyen dier bir sre srail-Filistin anlamazlndaki gelimelerden kaynaklanmtr.20 II. ntifada sresince srailin kulland orantsz iddet ve Filistinli liderlere dzenledii suikastlar iki lke arasnda gerginlik dourmutur. Gerginlik ounlukla srailin igal altndaki Filistin topraklarna ynelik saldrlarna Trkiyenin verdii tepkilerden tr trmanmtr. 2006 ylndaki srail-Hizbullah sava esnasnda, Lbnandaki sivil hedeflere ynelik saldrlar Ankarann tepkisini ekmitir. Annapolis grmelerinin sonu vermemesi ve Gazze Savayla, srail-Filistin anlamazlnda bara olan umutlar bir kez daha snmtr. Gazzede devam eden ablukann sebep olduu insani drama Ankarann tepkisini srdrecei tahmin edilmektedir. Filistindeki 2006 seimlerini kazanan Hamasn sraille olan ilikilerinin, Trkiye-srail mnasebetlerini olumsuz etkilemeye devam edecee benziyor. srailin terrist kabul ettii Hamasn Suriyedeki lideri Halid Mealin 2006daki Trkiye ziyareti,
18

Grimmet, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 20012008, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Rapor No: R40796, 4 Eyll 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R40796.pdf adresinden alnmtr, s. 28. 19 Balabn, The Conflicting Rebirth of Multipolarity in International Relations, s.7071. 20 Gemite de srail-Filistin meselesindeki krizler Ankara-Tel Aviv arasnda problemlere neden olmutu. 1969da Mescid-i Aksann yaklmasna Ankara sert tepki vermi, srailin Kudsn statsn deitirici eylemlere son vermesini isteyen 271 nolu Gvenlik Konseyi kararn desteklemitir. 1980 ylnda ise, srailin Kuds bakent ilan etmesinden sonra, Trkiye Tel-Avivdeki maslahatgzarlk seviyesindeki temsilini ikinci ktip seviyesine indirmiti. 98

Trkiye-srail likilerinde Yeni Dnem

Tel-Avivin sert tepkisine neden olmutu. Trkiyenin, Hamasn tecrit edilmesini eletirerek, tavrn bu tekilatn srail-Filistin bar srecine dhil edilmesinden yana koymas, ikili ilikilerde tekrar gerginlie yol aabilecektir. Dier taraftan, srailin Kudsn tamam zerindeki hak iddias, bu ehrin statsnn iki lke ilikilerini etkilemeye devam edeceini gstermektedir. Netanyahu iktidarnn Dou Kudsn Yahudiletirilmesine hz vermesi Ankara tarafndan endieyle izlenmektedir. Bat eriada Filistinlilere ait evlerin yklmas ile genileyeme devam eden Yahudi yerleim blgeleri, srailin bara olan niyetinin sorgulanmasna neden olmaktadr. Bat eriadaki Halilurrahman Camii ve Hz. Yakupun ei Rahel Hanmn trbesinin Siyonist Miras Listesine dhil edilmesi Washingtonn ve Ankarann tepkisini ekmitir. srailin Mescid-i Aksann altnda ve evresinde yrtt arkeolojik kazlar daha nce iki lke arasnda ksa sreli bir gerginlie neden olmu, Trkiye kazlar yerinde denetlemek iin blgeye bir heyet gndermiti. Ankara-Tel-Aviv ilikilerinde problemlere yol aan dier bir sre Trkiye ve srailin Kuzey Irak siyasetindeki farkl hedeflerden dolay yaanmaktadr. 2003 ylnda Amerikann Irak igaliyle, Tel-Avivin Kuzey Irak siyasetinin belirginlemesi ikili ilikileri sarsmtr. srailin Kuzey Irakla sava sonrasnda glenen balar, iki lkenin Irak zerindeki karlarnn atmasna yol amtr. Bugn srailde Kuzey Iraktan g etmi yaklak 50.000 civarnda bir Krt Yahudi cemaati bulunmaktadr.21 srail Orta Dou genelindeki Arap olmayan unsurlarla ibirlii gelitirme siyasetini, bu cemaatin salad kltrel yaknlkla Kuzey Iraka tayabilmitir. Tel-Avivin blge ile gemiten bu yana Barzani ailesi araclyla devam ettirdii irtibatn Kuzey Irak zerindeki siyasi etkisi Trkiyeyi rahatsz etmektedir. Ankara, Irakn toprak btnl ynnde irade gsterirken, srailin blgedeki Krt Ynetimine olan destei Kuzey Irakn devletleme srecini hzlandrmtr. srailli firmalarn igal sonras Kuzey Irakta aralarnda Erbil uluslararas hava limannn inas da bulunan pek ok ihaleyi
21

20.yzyln ikinci yarsna kadar Kuzey Irakta yaayan Zaho Yahudileri, srailin kurulmasyla bu lkeye g etmilerdir. Bugn sraildeki Krt Yahudi cemaatini oluturan Zaho Yahudileri'nin Kuzey Iraktaki kltrel izleri devam etmektedir. Bkz. http://www.salom.com.tr/news/detail/13041-Zaho-Yahudileri.aspx

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Bilge Strateji, Cilt 1, Say 2, Bahar 2010

kazand bilinmektedir. Mistaravim komandolarnn Pemergelere askeri eitim verdii iddialar, srailli zel gvenlik irketlerinin blgedeki eitim faaliyetlerinin srail basnna yansmas ile glenmitir.22 Saylar 50.000i bulan Pemergelerin Saddam sonras Irakta en byk silahl grubu oluturduu hatrlanrsa, bu gelimenin Trkiye asndan hassasiyeti anlalabilir. srail, Irak Savandan sonra Kuzey Irak Krtleri ile ilerlettii ibirliine karn, Trkiye Krtlerine ynelik ilgisinin olmadn sk sk vurgulamaktadr. Fakat Kuzey Iraktaki Krt Ynetimi ile yakn ilikiler, srailin Suriyenin kuzeyindeki Krtlerle dolayl bir ekilde irtibat kurmasn salamtr. 2004te, Suriyenin kuzeydousundaki Kaml kentinde oynanan olayl futbol mann 23 ardndan yaanan gerginlie srail basnnn geni yer ayrmas dikkat ekmitir. srailin nmzdeki dnemde Suriye Krtlerinin yaad blgede rtl operasyonlara giriebilecei tahmin edilmektedir. Tel-Aviv, dier taraftan Kuzey Iraktaki varln Irakta artan ii etkisini dengelemeye ve rann blgedeki etki alann daraltmaya ynelik kullanmaya almaktadr. Neticede, Irakn istikrarnda Krt Ynetimi zerinden sz sahibi olan srailin Kuzey Irak siyaseti, Trkiye ile birlikte Irakn dier komularnn da rahatsz olduu bir gidiat dourmutur. Trkiye-srail ilikilerini etkilemeye devam eden dier bir blgesel gelime de, rann nkleer programyla beraber gelien gergin siyasi ortamdr. 2000li yllarla blgede denge siyasetine geri dnen Trkiye; Tahranla ilikilerini faydac bir bak asyla deerlendirmeye balamtr. Amerika ve srailin ran tecrit siyasetine ramen, Ankara-Tahran ilikileri devam ettirilmitir. Tel-Aviv, Trkiyeye ran tehdidine kar birlikte hareket etme teklifinde bulunmusa da, Ankara Tahranla olan iyi komuluk ilikilerini srdrmek istemektedir. Nitekim Trkiye-ran arasndaki ticaret hacmi 2002 ylnda doal gaz sevkiyatnn balamasyla, Trkiye-srail arasndaki ticaret hacmini gemitir. ki lke
22

Anat Tal-Shir, Israelis trained Kurds in Iraq, Yediot Ahronot Gazetesi, 12 Ocak 2005, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3177712,00.html adresinden alnmtr. 23 Irak snrndaki Kaml kentinde oynanan mata Deyrizor kentinden gelen Arap kkenli Suriyeli ve Krt kkenli Suriyeli taraftarlar arasnda kan arbedede, polisin mdahalesi sonucunda Krt taraftarlardan lenler olduu ileri srlmt. Arbedede Baas Partisi ve Saddam Hseyin yanls sloganlar atan Arap kkenli Suriyelilere karlk, Krt kkenli Suriyeliler George W. Bushun fotoraflarn savurmulard. 100

Trkiye-srail likilerinde Yeni Dnem

arasndaki ekonomik balar, enerji alanndaki ibirlii ile daha da glenme eilimindedir. 1990l yllarda Kuzey Iraktaki Krt i savanda farkl taraflar destekleyen Trkiye ve rann, Krt ayrlkl (PKK-PJAK) sorununda da karlar rtmektedir. srailin varlna tehdit olarak grd ve gsterdii atom bombas yapabilen bir rann, Trkiye ile devam eden ilikileri Tel-Avivi rahatsz etmektedir. Ankara, ran'n nkleer silah gelitirme programna olumsuz bakmaktadr. Ancak, program sonlandrmas iin ran'a yaplacak basknn nkleer silah sahibi bir srailin politik hedefleri dorultusunda yaplmasn elikili bulmaktadr. Trkiye'nin blge genelinde nkleer silahszlanma ynndeki siyaseti, srail'in ran'daki nkleer programn durdurulmas ile snrl politikasyla uyumamaktadr. Aslnda ikili ilikilere yansyan blgedeki bu gerginlik biraz da, srailin Realpolitik siyasetle Orta Doudaki g dengelerini kontrol etme hedefiyle aklanabilir. rann nkleer program olmasayd, Ankara-Tahran arasndaki ilikiler muhtemelen sraili yine rahatsz edecekti. Btn yelerinin Bat blounda yer ald ve Arap lkelerinin bile rahatsz olduu Badat Paktna Tel-Avivin kar km olmas bu siyasi gelenee iaret etmektedir. Dier yandan, srailin Amerikadaki ahinleri arkasna alarak rann nkleer tesislerini yok etme plan Obama iktidaryla daha da zorlamtr. srail, nmzdeki dnemde kendi kabiliyetlerini seferber ederek rann nkleer tesislerini vurmaya ynelik giriimlerde bulunabilecektir. zellikle Netanyahu iktidar dneminde hz verilen hazrlklar bu ihtimali kuvvetlendirmitir. rann nkleer program konusunda tedirgin olsa da, Trkiyenin bu lkeye ynelik bir saldry protesto edecei tahmin edilmektedir.24 Trkiye-Suriye snr ve Kuzey Irak zerinden rann nkleer tesislerine gerekletirilecek bir saldr, Ankara-Tel-Aviv ilikilerinde kriz karabilir.

24

Philip Robin, Prof.Dr. Ofra Bengio ile Enine Boyuna Trkiye-srail likileri, alom Gazetesi, 17 Haziran 2009, http://www.salom.com.tr/news/detail/12144-Prof-Ofra-Bengioile-Enine-boyuna-Israil-Turkiye-iliskileri.aspx adresinden alnmtr.

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SONU: KL LKLERN DOASI ZERNE 1949dan gnmze incelendiinde, Trkiye-srail siyasi ilikilerinin doasna ait baz zellikler n plana kmaktadr. Trkiyenin temkinli tutumuna karlk, ounlukla srail ikili ilikilerin gelitirilmesini isteyen taraf olmutur. Trk tarafnn ayn derecede istekli olduu dnem olarak 1990l yllarn ikinci yars ne kmaktadr. srailin iddeti politik bir ara olarak kullanma siyasetine, Trkiye geleneksel olarak muhalefet etmitir. Bu muhalefetini dorudan sraili knayarak ve uluslararas platformlarda srail aleyhindeki kararlar destekleyerek gstermitir. Hatta Ankara, Tel-Avivin sertlik yanls d politikas karsnda zaman zaman Arap lkelerinden yana tavr taknmtr. srailin siyasi problemleri iddete bavurarak zme giriimi ve Trkiyenin bu yntemi srekli eletirmesi, bir bakma iki lke ilikilerinin sabit bileenlerini oluturmaktadr. Dolaysyla, bu iki bileen zerinden Trkiye-srail ilikilerine bakmak aklayc olabilir. srailin Fransa ve ngiltere ile birlikte Msra saldrd Svey Krizinde (1956), Trkiye tepkisini Tel-Avivdeki eliliini maslahatgzarlk seviyesine indirerek vermitir. Kendi bykelisini geri eken Ankara, srailden de bykelisini geri armasn istemitir. Bu gelimeye ramen, 1958de Babakan David Ben-Gurion ve Dileri Bakan Golda Meirin teebbs ile srail, Trkiye ve ran arasnda istihbarat paylamn salayacak evresel Pakt kurulmutur. 1967 Savanda Trkiye tarafszln ilan etse de Arap lkelerinden yana tavr taknmtr. Ankara Trkiyedeki NATO slerinin bu lkelere kar kullanlmasn reddettii gibi, sava esnasnda rdn, Suriye ve Msra yiyecek yardm yapmtr. Savan ardndan BM Genel Kurulundaki toplantlarda Kudsn statsnn korunmas ve srailin igal ettii topraklardan ekilmesi ynndeki kararlar Arap lkeleriyle birlikte desteklemitir. Bu savatan sonraki srail ile Arap lkeleri arasnda devam eden tm atmalarda sraili protesto etmitir.25 1973 Savanda sraile yardm etmek isteyen Amerikann ncirlik ssn kullanmasn engelleyen Trkiye, Arap lkelerine askeri malzeme tayan Sovyet uaklarna hava sahasn amtr.26 1974te Rabattaki Arap Birlii toplantsnda
25 26

Erhan ve Krkolu, a.g.e. s. 796799. Ibid.

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Filistin Kurtulu rgtnn (FK) Filistin halknn meru temsilci olarak ilan edilmesinin ardndan, Ankara srailin terrist kabul ettii FKy 1975 ylnda tanmtr. 1979da balayan srail-Msr bar srecinde, Trkiye 1967 Sava ncesindeki snrlar ve FKnn de srece dhil edilmesi konularndaki duruunu deitirmemitir. 1987de patlak veren I.ntifada esnasnda, srailin kulland orantsz iddeti eletirmeye devam etmitir. ki lke arasndaki ilikiler 1991de, Ankarann Filistin ve srail temsilciliklerini bykelilik dzeyine karmas ile dzelmeye balamtr. 1990l yllarda Madrid Konferans ve Oslo Antlamalar ile canlanan Orta Dou genelindeki iyimser hava srail-Filistin anlamazlnn zme kavuturabileceine olan midi artrmtr. Trkiye-srail ilikilerine de yansyan bu siyasi iklimde srail, 15 Arap lkesi ile diplomatik ilikiler kurmu, Orta Dou ve Kuzey Afrika Ekonomik Konferansna katlmaya balamtr. Bu dnemde imon Perezin Yeni Orta Dou idealine uygun politikalar gelitiren srail, blge ile siyasi ve ekonomik olarak btnleme srecine girmitir. Fakat Oslo Antlamalarn reddeden Netanyahu dneminde (199699) bu btnleme sreci raydan km, Ehud Barakn Babakanl dneminde de (19992001) ilerleme salanamaynca, sre sona ermitir. 2001 ylnda radikal sa Likud Partisinin nderliindeki koalisyonun lideri Ariel aronun iktidarnda srail, igal altndaki topraklarda sertlik yanls d politikaya geri dnmtr. gal altndaki topraklarda 2000 ylnda balayan II. ntifaday bu yaklamla bastrma yoluna gitmi, Filistinli liderleri hedef tayin ederek ldrme (targeted killing) siyasetine arlk vermitir.27 II. ntifada srasnda Filistinli gsterici gruplara, srailli askerlerin ate amas ve Gazze limannda demirli Filistin sahil gvenlik gemilerine saldr yaplmasna Ankara tepki vermitir. 2000 ylnda Dohada toplanan SEDAK (slam Konferans Ekonomik birlii Daimi Konseyi) zirvesinde, Cumhurbakan Sezer Filistindeki olaylar sert bir dille eletirmitir.28 Trkiyenin, srailin suikast politikasna ynelik
27

Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Penguin Books, London, 2001 s. 600610. 28 http://cankaya.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanlarimiz/ahmet_necdet_sezer/konusma/ 17 Mart 2010 tarihinde ulalmtr.

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eletirel tavr ise 2004te Hamas liderlerinden eyh Ahmet Yasinin ldrlmesiyle zirveye kmtr. eyh Yasinin ldrlmesi Ankara tarafndan terr eylemi olarak nitelendirilmitir. 2006 yazndaki srail-Hizbullah savanda Lbnandaki sivil hedeflerin vurulmasna kar Trkiye eletirel tutumunu devam ettirmitir. srail, 6 Eyll 2007 tarihinde Suriyenin Deyrizor kenti yaknlarndaki nkleer reaktr olduu ileri srlen El Kibar tesisini hava saldrsyla vurmutur. Saldry resmi makamlarnca kabul etmeyen srailin bu operasyonu genel anlamda rtl kald iin Ankarann da belirli bir tepkisi olmamtr. srail, 2008 ylnn son gnlerinde Gazzede Hamasa kar balatt operasyonla iddet siyasetinden vazgemediini gstermitir. Trkiye de srailin orantsz iddete bavurmasn eletirme geleneini srdrmtr. 2009 ubat aynda iktidara gelen Netanyahu iktidar, rann nkleer tesislerine ynelik gerekletirmeyi hedefledii hava saldrs iin gerekli hazrlklar srdrmektedir. Ankara, bu problemin diplomatik yollarla zlmesini teklif etmektedir ve srailin olas bir saldrsn knayaca dnlmektedir. Gazze Sava sonras dnemle belirginleen Trkiye-srail arasndaki gerginlik devam etmektedir. Ankara'nn Gazze ablukasna ve Dkme Kurun Operasyonu'nun blge barna verdii zarara ynelik aklamalar, srail'de zellikle radikal siyasilerin tepkilerine sebep olmaktadr. Babakan Netanyahu'nun koalisyon hkmetinde Avigdor Liberman'n etkisi altndaki Dileri kanadndan gelen eletiriler bu kapsamda deerlendirilebilir. Dileri Bakan Yardmcs Danny Ayalon'un, Trkiye'nin Tel-Aviv Bykelisi Ouz elikkol'a ynelik tavr, srail'deki ar sa unsurlarn Trkiyeye tepkilerinin hangi seviyeye kabileceini gstermitir. i Partisi geleneinden gelen siyasilerin gerginliin yatmasna almalarna ramen, Likud liderliindeki mevcut koalisyon hkmetinin aksi ynde bir srece tekrar sebep olabilecei tahmin edilmektedir. Grld gibi, srailin 2000li yllarla birlikte d politikasnda tekrar sertlik yanls siyaseti benimsemesiyle, Ankara-Tel-Aviv ilikileri pek ok kez gerilmitir. likilerin doas temelde deimese de, iki lke arasnda Trkiyenin deien d siyasi vizyonu ile birlikte yeni bir dnemin balad ileri srlebilir. Bu dnemi yeni yapan dinamik, srailin iddeti politik bir ara olarak kullanma geleneine
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geri dnmesinden ok, Trkiyenin mevcut dengeler dhilinde Orta Dou blgesine ynelik artan siyasi ve ekonomik ilgisidir. Sonuta, Trkiye-srail ilikilerinin karakterine gemiten bugne baklmasyla, Gazze Sava sonras srete sra d bir gelimenin yaanmad grlebilecektir. Orta Dou siyaseti asndan ikili ilikilerdeki olaanst durum aslnda, Trkiye ve srailin yakn gemite askeri pakt grnts verebilecek dzeyde bir ibirliine girmi olmasdr. nmzdeki dnemde, bu grntnn giderek zayflayaca ve ikili ilikilerin daha dk seviyede devam edecei zannedilmektedir.

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KAYNAKA ALBOA, Aydan, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship in the Post-Cold War Era, Master Thesis, Bogazici University, 2002. ARAS, Blent, Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Toward A Societal Construction of Foreign Policy, Arab Studies Quarterly, 22, 4, 2000, s. 3158. ARAS, Blent, Turkey and the Palestinian Question Since Al-Aqsa Intifada, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 1, 3, 2002, s. 4963. ARI, Tayyar, Gazze Sonras srailde Dinamikler ve Bar Sreci, Ortadou Ettleri, 1, 1, 2009 s. 8398. BACIK, Gkhan, The Limits of An Alliance: Turkish-Israeli Relations Revisited, Arab Studies Quarterly, 23, 3, 2001, s. 4963. BALABN, Milo, The Conflicting Rebirth of Multipolarity in International Relations, Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2, 1, 2008, s. 5878. BENGIO, Ofra, Trkiye-srail: Hayalet ttifaktan Stratejik birliine. stanbul, Erguvan Yaynlar, 2009. BLME, Selin M., Charting Turkish Diplomacy in the Gaza Conflict, Insight Turkey, 11, 1, 2009, s. 2331. EL KABALAN, Mervan,. Trkiyenin Ykselen Blgesel Nfuzu, Turque diplomatique, Say 13, 2010, s. 3637. ERHAN, ar & KRKOLU, mer, Orta Dou ile likiler: sraille likiler, Trk D Politikas-Kurtulu Savandan Bugne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar I.Cilt, (Ed.) Baskn Oran, stanbul: letiim Yaynlar, 2006.

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ERHO, Reit Berker, Turkish-Israeli Relations: Evaluated As A Strategic Cooperation Model, Master Thesis, Bogazici University, 2005. GRIMMET, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 20012008, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Rapor No: R40796, 4 Eyll 2009 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R40796.pdf INBAR, Efrahim, Trk-srail Stratejik Ortakl. Avrasya Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (ASAM) Yaynlar, stanbul, 2001. INBAR, Efrahim, The Resilience of Israeli-Turkish Relations, Israel Affairs, 11, 4, 2005, s. 591607. INBAR, Efrahim, Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Beyond, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 4,1. 2010, s. 2735. KASIM, Kamer, Trk-srail likileri: ki Blgesel Gcn Stratejik Ortakl, 21. Yzyln Eiinde Trk D Politikas (Ed.) dris Bal, Alfa Yaynlar, stanbul, 2001. KKSAL, Snmez, Irakn Kuzeyindeki Muhtemel Gelimelerin Trkiyeye Etkileri, Trkiyenin Vizyonu: Temel Sorunlar ve zm nerileri, (Ed.) Atilla Sandkl, BLGESAM Yaynlar, stanbul, 2008, LARRABEE, F. Stephen, Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, 86, 4, 2007, s. 103. NACHMAN, Amikam, The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie, Middle East Quarterly, 5, 2, 1998 http://www.meforum.org/394/the-remarkable-turkish-israelitie ZCAN, Gencer, Trkiye-srail likilerinde Dnm: Gvenliin tesi, TESEV Yaynlar, stanbul, 2005.

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ZEL, Soli, Turkey-Israel Relations: Where to Next?, On Turkey Series, German Marshal Fund of the United States, 2010 http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?parent_type=P&id=866 ROBN, Philip, Prof.Dr. Ofra Bengio ile Enine Boyuna Trkiye-srail likileri, alom Gazetesi, 17 Haziran 2009 http://www.salom.com.tr/news/detail/12144-Prof-Ofra-Bengio-ile-Enine-boyunaIsrail-Turkiye-iliskileri.aspx SANDIKLI, Atilla, Turkeys Strategy in the Changing World, BILGESAM Publications, stanbul, 2009. SEALE, Patrick, The Rise and Rise of Turkey, Agence Global, 2 Kasm 2009 http://www.patrickseale.com SEZER, Ahmet Necdet, 9. slam Zirve Toplants'nda SEDAK Bakan sfatyla yaptklar konuma, 12 Kasm 2000 http://cankaya.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanlarimiz/ahmet_necdet_sezer/konusma/ SHLAM, Avi, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Penguin Books, London, 2001 TAL-SHR, Anat, Israelis trained Kurds in Iraq, Yediot Ahronot Gazetesi, 12 Ocak 2005, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3177712,00.html TAPINAR, mer, Turkeys Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism, Carnegie Papers, 10, Carnegie Middle East Center, Washington DC, 2008. TRKMEN, lter, Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin Ortadou Politikas, BLGESAM Yaynlar, stanbul, 2010 WALTZ, Kenneth N., Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, 25, 1. 2000, s. 541.

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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION FIASCO FROM HEGEMONY TO EMPIRE AND THE OBAMA RESTORATION Hegemonyadan mparatorlua Bush Ynetiminin Fiyaskosu ve Obama Restorasyonu Muharrem EK Abstract:
As the Bush administration started to implement the empire project, the US transformed from hegemony to an empire. However, since the project failed, the US, which could not be an empire either, passed into a revision period, as there is no way going back to hegemony. From that point on, the US lost its luxury to dictate be either on our side or against us like it did during Bushs term. During the Bush administration the US tried to use its advantageous status in the changing world with its empire project and strived to shape the said change in favor of its own interests. However, it could not succeed and, on the contrary, ended up weakening its present effectiveness and lost its superiority in many fields. Subsequently the Obama administration will mostly clean up the mess left by the Bush administration and will go for a revision. To start with, the Obama administration has to be on good terms with the Islamic World because of the badly distorted relations during Bushs term. Keywords: Hegemony, Empire, Bush, Obama, Neo-Cons, Globalization, Unipolar, US Foreign Policy

zet:
Bush ynetiminin imparatorluk projesini uygulamaya balamasyla ABD, hegemonyadan imparatorlua doru bir dnm ierisine girmitir. Ancak, Bush ynetiminin imparatorluk projesinin baarszla uramasyla birlikte ABD, artk ne imparatorluktu ne de bu lkenin hegemonyaya geri dn sz konusuydu. Bu noktadan itibaren ABD, artik Bush dnemindeki gibi dnyaya ya bizimlesiniz ya da bize kar eklinde dikte etme lksn de kaybetmitir. Bush ynetimi dneminde ABD, deien dnyada avantajl konumunu kullanarak imparatorluk projesini uygulamaya ve dnyay kendi karlarna gre ekillendirmeye almt, fakat bu politikalar baarszlkla sonulanmakla kalmam, pek ok alanda da ABDnin stnln kaybetmesine ve dnyadaki prestijinin de ciddi derecede zarar grmesine yol amtr. te btn bunlardan sonra iktidara gelen Obama ile ABDnin Bush ynetiminin enkazn temizlemeye ve yeni bir restorasyon/revizyon politikasna yneldii ifade edilebilir. Bu da Bush dneminde iyice bozulan ilikiler nedeniyle Obama ynetiminin ilk olarak slam dnyasyla ilikilerini dzeltmeye ynelik politika izleyecei/dii anlalmaktadr. Anahtar Kelimeler: Hegemonya, mparatorluk, Bush, Obama, Neo-Kon, Kreselleme, Tek Kutupluluk, Amerikan D Politikas

PhD Candidate, International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University

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INTRODUCTION The formation of the American Empire could be traced back to the hierarchical formation of the international system in 1945, the Washington Consensus of the 1980s, and to the neo-liberalism waves or the term the new world order that was firstly used in 1989 and to globalization in the 1990s. In other words, the American Empire has gone through the stages mentioned above and come to existence on account of this period.1 When we look from this perspective, the American Empire has come out because of a spontaneous2 period. In terms of power paradigms, the American Empire can be identified due to the logical evaluation of American power.3 According to the neo-cons of the Bush period, the American Empire can be defined as the destiny of the US. When we look from the systemic perspective, the American Empire basically started with the vertical hierarchical structuring4 of the international system in 1945 by the US, who won the Second World War. As an evolutionary process, it could be said that the American Empire has developed as a direct result of the neoliberalism waves of the 1980s, and the Washington Consensus, a period that has gained momentum with globalization in the 1990s.5 Parallel to globalization, the period of de-territorialization in the international system has started. On the other hand, with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, new markets were opened and with spatial fix, the hegemony of the global capital was widened. While globalization and the waves of enlargement were continuing with the soft, invisible, neutral situation of American hegemony, at the same time the US model (which is globalization=Americanization) also became effective on global scale.

Deepak Lal, In Praises of Empires: Globalization and Order, Palgrave, NY, 2004, p. 64. 2 This spontaneity is a structural determination of the American Empire and it could be expressed as the basic characteristic of empire project. 3 Ergin Yldzolu, Hegemonyadan mparatorlua, Everest Press, June 2003, p. 1. 4 lhan Uzgel, ABD Hegemonyasnn Yeniden nas, Orta Dou ve NATO, Mlkiye, Vol. XXVIII, No. 243, pp.7-20, p. 7. 5 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, Gardners Books, 2004, p. 18. 110

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However, the American hegemony went into a crisis in the 1970s and began to be questioned6 as a problem. During the 1990s the American hegemony lost its economic superiority or the new economic powers began to challenge the US. Because of that reason, until 2000s the American governments mentioned multilateral hegemony and the socio-economic dimension firstly. The Bush administration, as a result of these developments, has moved the military-security dimension of the hegemony to the fore. With this step, direct control period was adopted and the shift from hegemonic sovereignty to empire hegemony took place. 1. CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE: HEGEMONY AND THE EMPIRE The concept of hegemony as a Gramscian meaning hinges upon the unity of coercion and consent. The hegemonic power, which could also be defined as a type of sovereignty depending on context, is also the sum of components like accepting the leadership through consent and the capacity to repress the objections with the use of force and military power.7 The consent here stays at the backside of the conscious. The military power is used for repressing the objections to the hegemony. In a wider perspective, the hegemonic power rules the economy and provides suitable ideological and cultural support so the ideological sovereignty comes to the fore. In addition, the hegemonic government is in the management of the world market by providing the necessary political stability and managing the functioning of the world market under its own political auditing. In other words, hegemony is a power8, which regulates; audits; organizes; and stabilizes the political economy of the world. In addition to these, the hegemonic government should provide the energy resources and the ways for commerce to be opened and also manage the capitalisms crisis.9 The sine qua non condition of the hegemonic power is to continue the production of hegemony continuously. To do this, there are not only some formal instruments like NATO, IMF and the World Bank, but also informal instruments like coup dtat, intelligence activities, illegal groups,
6

John Agnew, American Hegemony into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq, Antipode, 2003, p. 871885, p. 883. 7 Yldzolu, op. cit., p. 2. 8 Richard B. DuBoff, U.S. Hegemony: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger, Monthly Review, December 2003. 9 Yldzolu, op. cit., s.2.

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and organizations, non-governmental institutions, foreign aids, economic sanctions, socio-cultural activities (media, series, new year, birthdays, Valentines Day) provide the production of the hegemony continuously.10 According to Immanuel Wallerstein, with leadership in the fields of production, commerce, and finance, states could have hegemony. Nevertheless, the hegemonic power should hold economic and military power and superiority in the fields of technology and information altogether. The hegemonic power should prevent systematic wars and protect the system from internal and external attacks. 11 In this context, the hegemonic power imposes order to the international system. By this way, the international system has a more hierarchic and less anarchical structure.12 Here, a vertical hierarchical structure, which depends on power, becomes valid in the international structure. This structure, which also spreads to the centerperiphery relationship and the periphery also has some gains from the opportunities of the hegemonic power. The periphery should open its economy for the use of the center and the capital.13 Because, when the hegemonic power is providing this, it also constitutes an area of consensus. In addition, the ideological, cultural, and ethical dimension should also be included in this analysis. Those dimensions also produce the hegemony, by composing the hegemonic momentum; rely upon the ideology, which defines and re-presents this moment. It also represents the concepts that support this ideology.14 The determining factor of the empire is the military power.15 By this way, the empire means a hegemony that counts on military power as its base. In addition, the empire, which depends upon the superiority of the asymmetrical power, tries to
10 11

Uzgel, op. cit., p. 7. Yldzolu, op. cit., p.2. 12 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States Unipolar Moment, International Security, Vol. 31, No.2, Winter 2008, p.741, p. 11. 13 Richard Saul, Empire, Imperialism, and Contemporary Global Power, International Studies Perspectives, 9, 2008, p. 309318, p. 311. 14 Niall Ferguson, Hegemony or Empire?, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003. Accessed on 30 December 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59200/niallferguson/hegemony-or-empire. 15 Hardt and Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, September 15, 2001, p. 11. 112

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govern by making the situation instable.16 In this context, there is a destructive approach in the empires.17 The search for absolute hegemony could also be called an empire and in this context, the empire signifies a process that is impossible to complete. The empire, which also has a pejorative meaning, means the period of colonization historically. All the same, each empire has some differences periodically. One of the most important paradoxes about empires is the nature of the problem which is, in general, the excessive expansion. By this way, the empires lose their power and become unsuccessful. 2. FROM HEGEMONY TO EMPIRE Firstly, it should be mentioned that hegemony includes the tendency to transform into a hegemonic empire. Therefore, the changing of the US hegemony to an empire, as mentioned below, following some parameters is not very surprising. Historically, in 1991 with the dissolution of USSR, the barriers that were in front of the US hegemony, the competitors and threats were eliminated. By this way, the hegemony of the US turned into a unipolar international system that had no competitors and threats.18 This case allowed the US to be a world empire. According to the neocons of the Bush period as the winner of the Cold War, the US appeared in the new unipolar system and the empire emerged as a gift or as fate.19 In other words, as a consequence of its superiority, the US rule changed from hegemony to an empire.20 However, the reverse of the coin pointed to an entirely different situation. Since the 1990s the US, with the collapse of the USSR and with the opening of new market space for the capital has witnessed a very rapid expansion and financial
16 17

Ibid., p. 14. Richard A. Falk, Dnya Dzeni Nereye?: Amerikan Emperyal Jeopolitikas, Metis Press., 2005, p. 333. 18 Ferguson, op. cit. p. 124. 19 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (American Empire Project), Holt Paperbacks, 2004, p. 167. 20 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition, Polity, 2006, p. 238.

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monitoring. As Fernand Braudel mentioned, this development was the fall of US hegemony. At the end of the 1990s, the US began to lose its superiority in many fields especially, in the economic areas.21 In addition, the problems of capitalism during the 1990s also began to create the hegemony problem. In other words, in addition to the fiscal expansion of the US, first Southeast Asia and then the EU emerged as economic power centers.22 This situation caused the capital to produce a new center, and became a competitor to the oldest center and this created the paradox. In this context, attributable to the loss of the US economic advantage; the US hegemony in a sense has begun to rally. The presence of a hegemonic power depends on the maintenance of its superiority at least in three fields (economic, military and technology).23 In conjunction, the weakening of hegemonic position of the US, its feeling of declining, the concern for guaranteeing its future, delaying and as much as possible preventing its competitors challenge, controlling strategic areas and energy resources are the most important factors for transition from hegemony to the empire. Not only the loss of economic superiority but also the economic-political areas like the Asian Crisis of 1997; the EUs transition to euro in 1999; the Kosovo problem; the obstruction of the Middle East peace process; the chronic problems of Afghanistan and Iraq; the spreading of war trends in Africa; and the spread of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have shown how the US has become ineffective. On the other hand, the argument of Karl Polanyi that the economic growth of the 1990s has brought growth to the US military should not be forgotten.24 Indeed, by this way, the report of Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 and the work called

21

Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power, Yale University Press, 1999, p. 426. 22 John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge, 2006, p. 11. 23 John A. Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape Of Global Power, Temple University Press, 2005, p. 19. 24 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press; 2. Edition, March 28, 2001, p. 145. 114

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Revolutions in Military Affairs25 was financed. During the early periods like 1989, the concept called The New World Order had been pronounced officially for the first time. As it can be seen obviously and explained clearly, during the Bush period in the early 2000s the militarist tendency came to the front and thus imperialism and Realpolitik returned to the US.26 However, at the same time the beginning of the empire meant the beginning of an end. The US, during the transition from hegemony to the empire has gone through a way that is impossible to return. The US will not be able to go back because hegemony cannot come back. 3. BUSHS TERM AND THE EMPIRE PROJECT During Clintons term, the socioeconomic and cultural aspects of the United States power were prioritized in order to sustain the hegemony and the so-called soft and neutral aspect of sovereignty became dominant as globalization gained impetus.27 When it came to Bushs term, the said infrastructure was, in a way, used as a preparatory phase for the empire and it then passed to the military strategic stage. Likewise, the preference for direct military control over the indirect control strategy of the Clinton period also represented the revival of the imperialist policy. In 1997, William Kristol, one of the intellectuals of The New American Century, used the term empire for the US in the Wall Street Journal for the first time. The other intellectuals of the project explicitly started the intellectual preparation of the empire project of the Bush administration. As a matter of fact, one of the said intellectuals, (Gray Schmidt, Richard Perle, Robert Kagan) Paul Wolfowitz, was the person to represent the government pillar of the project.28 In addition, the Pentagon changed its strategic military geography, which was sort of a preparation for the empire project. This included Central Asia and the Middle East as the

25

http://www.comw.org/rma/, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1029/MR1029.chap2.pdf, Accessed on 14 May 2009. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1416pgs.pdf, Accessed on 14 June 2009. 26 Anthony Padgen, Imperialism, liberalism & the quest for perpetual peace. (Empires, history; American imperialism), Daedalus, Vol.134 Issue: 2 p. 46(12) 2005, p. 46. 27 Ibid., p. 1. 28 Agnew, op. cit., p. 877.

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priorities of the United States with the establishment of CENTCOM in 1999.29 It can be understood from the Joint Vision 2020 document 30 that the Pentagon regarded this change as new potential areas of conflict. Accordingly, the priority on the Pentagons agenda was to prepare the US army and its military bases for wars over resources within the framework of conventional modernization. For that reason, the tendency of the Bush government towards a control strategy over the energy resources is very meaningful. Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) document31 of 2001 declares the United States as the single country in the world having global interests, as if accepting the idea of empire in the national security strategy of the US; which can be interpreted, in a sense, as the declaration of an empire. However, in order to implement the empire project, there was a need for a threat,32 and that need was satisfied by the September 11 attacks; it provided the

29

The United States made a projection in 1999 and identified strategic regions that should be taken under control in the future, and adopted a policy to design its military deployment accordingly. To this end, The Pacific Command selected Asia as the Central Command and an area of interest. This indicates the change in the strategic geography of the US. The fact that the US occupied Afghanistan first after September 11 under the framework of its antiterrorism strategy proves the said policy. M. Klare, New Geography of Conflict, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, First Owl Books, 2002, p. 216. 30 For detailed information see, http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm. Accessed on 02 January 2009. 31 For detailed information see, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/. Accessed on 14 March 2009. 32 At this point, if we think on the basis of the logic of US foreign policymakers and strategists, the possibility of the US, that needed a threat, building the Al-Qaeda threat is interesting, although it is somewhat speculative and banks on a conspiracy theory. In addition, we can briefly explain the reason why a threat is required with two main factors. Firstly, the need to sustain the continuous active presence and status of a power; just like the example of the Ottoman history. That is, after the Ottoman Empire defeated the Spanish navy, which it deemed as a rival and threat in the Mediterranean, its navy was left to decay in the shipyard; that is a striking example. Secondly, the threat has a function of legitimizing the implementation of the said policy. In this context, it can be stated that the Al-Qaeda threat is the main legitimizing factor in the implementation of the empire project by the US. 116

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opportunity for the US to officially put the empire project into practice.33 In fact, just after the attacks, the United States enforced the empire project under the cover of the anti-terrorism strategy. The official document of this was the National Security Strategy document of the United States for 2002 (NSS).34 The US broke new grounds in this strategy document and declared preemptive strikes or preventive war doctrine for the first time. It can be argued that, with this development, the US proceeded to an imperial dimension and started to seek an absolute hegemony. It means that the United States wants to reregulate the world according to its own benefits and secure its future against the changing balance of powers by means of using its advantageous position. In other words, it can be interpreted as an effort to call a halt to deterioration through military means or to prevent the emerging powers from being potential rivals. Considering the preemptive strike tactic of the Bush administration, it is understood that the empire prefers to elicit respect by means of creating terror with violence and thereby obtaining obedience in the end.35 However, the hegemonic power preferred to have the admiration of people by means of impressing them with its superiority in military and other fields. Likewise, another important difference is that the use of military power, which is the last option in hegemony, is selected as the first choice in the Bush administration within the framework of the empire project. Just as with its preemptive strike strategy, the US clearly declared its monopoly over the use of military power in the world. In this strategic document, the Bush government was declaring that the Grand strategy did not want to see any rival powers until 2025 and that it would do anything, including preemptive war, in order to sustain its indisputable military superiority. In other words; in this strategy and in the empire project, the United States wanted to be so far ahead of its potential rivals that those states would not seek to compete and the US would maintain its position as the incontestable superpower. From this point of view, the US was planning to implement the neo-

33

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon, 1998, p. 216. 34 For detailed information see, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html, Accessed on 04 June 2009. 35 Michael Ignatieff, The Burden, January 5, 2002.

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imperial project using military power and direct control as a base.36 The axis of evil definition of the Bush administration was also expressing the exterminatory approach of the administration. This approach is interesting, since it shows that the strategy of integration during the hegemony period was abandoned. Likewise, after the September 11 attacks the Bush administration introduced an anti-terrorism strategy against Al-Qaeda and global terrorism, and tried to build an imperial structure by establishing hierarchical relations in the rest of the world under the cover of anti-terrorism. In this context, it seems that it preferred to govern the region directly through military deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, with the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and its new bases37 the US aims at seizing the opportunity to control energy resources, control routes, and emerging powers as well as establishing pseudo-colonies. Similarly, within this framework, by means of its definition of rogue states and failed states, the United States adopts regime change as a foreign policy strategy just like in the empire states.38 While implementing the empire project, the Bush administration also made use of its moral, ideological, and religious motives.39 The religious discourse and universal statements of the Bush administration point that out.40 For instance, the concept of freedom is highlighted and the US is declared to be the guardian of
36

If we recall that militarized direct control mechanism is the imperial control mechanism and empires implement it, it is understood that the US tried to implement the empire project explicitly as it can be seen in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. 37 When we consider the fact that the US has about 725 military bases throughout the world in 130 countries and that it acts as a global gendarmerie at the world seas with its navy, it is clearly understood that the US is targeting to be a global empire. Within this framework, it is seen that the US is trying to implement the imperial management mechanisms by means of using the newly established COMs as the regional management centers of its global authority; thereby it is trying to build the architecture of the empire. Just as, in this context, it is quite interesting that AFRICOM was established in 2006 during the Bush administration in a region prone to new resource wars, and the 4 th Fleet is reactivated in the shores of Latin America. See. Joshua Micale Marshall, Power: Rangers: Did the Bush Administration Create a new American Empire or weaken the all done?, The New Yorker, 2004,02,02. 38 Harry D. Harootunian, The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost, and Regained, Prickly Paradigm Press; 1 edition, 2004, p. 48. 39 Ferguson, op. cit. p. 203. 40 G. Ryn, op. cit., p. 386. 118

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freedom. However, it is interesting to see that the civilizing mission of the old British Empire is replaced by the discourses of bringing freedom and democracy this time.41 It is possible to state that the empire project, which is implemented under the scope of the abovementioned aims and objectives, became a chronic problem particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the fact that the United States is being bogged down in these two countries. In the final analysis, it resulted in a big fiasco because of the economic crisis of 2008. It can also be claimed that revision policies will prevail from now on. 4. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE EMPIRE PROJECT Many factors played important roles in the failure of the empire strategy of the Bush administration. The main reasons can be explained as follows: First of all, basing the empire project solely on the military power raised some reactions. Among the Atlantic allies, the Germany-France axis resisted the unilateral hegemony of the US. This resistance reached its peak with the occupation of Iraq and led to the sharpening of the Atlantic separation.42 In addition, it can be argued that military power was insufficient for the implementation of the empire project. The delay of the United States in redesigning the army according to the changing conditions and failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, turned its indisputable military authority into a disputable one, which played an effective role in the failure of the project. Economic and financial incompetence of the US also played an important role in this failure. Trade deficit as well as oil dependency were the challenging issues for the United States. Interdependency has increased as a result of the global tendency towards an integrated economic structure since the 1980s and the United States turned into a dependent hegemony as a result.43 Therefore, the maintenance of the military
41

Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Basic Books, 2004, p. 221. 42 Uzgel, op. cit., p.11. 43 Martin Wolf, The Dependent Superpower, Financial Times, December 17, 2003.

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strategy by the Bush administration depended on the funding of its allies and volunteers. On the other hand, one of the essential factors of failure was the fact that the balance of power started to change systemically. The emerging powers were not eager to accept Pax Americana and the US could not prevent these emerging powers from becoming its rivals. Moreover, the fact that the emerging powers already started to compete particularly over resources, and they rose as new competitive powers even in areas under the US authority, indicates that the United States was late in preventing them. In fact, the unilateral approach of the US caused reaction and resistance against the empire project on the side of the emerging powers. Especially, under the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China and Russia objected to the unipolar and unilateral dominance and advocated equal status and multipolarity. On the other hand, the overexpansion paradox44, which is the natural fate of empires, played an important role in raising reactions against the empire project of the US and in its failure. Together with the overexpansion, the United States not only became more vulnerable, but also the costs increased and it started to lose its allies, even to see them turn into opposing powers. In addition to all these facts, there are some so-called secondary factors such as lack of an integrated plan; lack of a dedicated elite in the management of the project; and underestimating and ignoring the local issues in the project implementation strategy45. The financial relationship, also called global imbalances, which emerged after the Asian crisis, can be added to the abovementioned factors in the context of financial resource problems.

44

Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict Since the 16th Century, Is Bankasi Pub., 2006, p. 14. 45 Ergin Yldzolu, Lectures, Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, December 2008. 120

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5. POTENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY TENDENCIES OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION Contrary to the expectations, there will not actually be a radical change in foreign policy of the Obama administration when compared to the Bush administration. In other words, there will be no change in the grand strategy46 of the US (like preventing the emergence of rival powers and energy security). However, it can be stated that the methods and instruments to be used in the implementation of this strategy will change. It is possible to expect some differences in the selection of methods/instruments in foreign policy between the two periods, just like the difference between Clintons term and Bushs term. 47 Moreover, the global financial crisis of the day will be the most significant parameter to be considered in the foreign policy of the Obama administration.48 Within the framework of these parameters, it is expected that the unilateral policies such as, acting without consulting with the allies and international organizations; ignoring international law and the UN; and imposing its will to the rest of the world will be given up by the Obama administration, and multilateral policies will be more dominant.49 In this context, one may say that the foreign policy of the Obama administration is going to have economic instruments instead of military instruments and militarist policies. The US foreign policy is going to be more focused on economic policies together with the effect of the global financial crisis. Therefore, it may be stated that the soft power or smart power approach will prevail instead of the hard power, which was frequently expressed in the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Transatlantic relations, which were distorted during the Bush administration, are expected to be rebuilt during Obamas term and the United States is expected to act
46

James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, Wadsworth Publishing, 2009, p. 521. 47 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 298. 48 John Davis, Barack Obama & US Foreign Policy: Road Map for Change or Disaster?, AuthorHouse, 2009, p. 78. 49 Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, New Directions in US Foreign Policy, (Routledge Studies in Us Foreign Policy), Routledge, 2009, p. 271.

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more in harmony and in collaboration with Europe. Within this scope, in the forthcoming period we should not be surprised to see photos of the European quartet (France-UK-Germany-Italy), which emerged by reason of the global financial crisis, and Obama in the same frames quite frequently. The global financial crisis reminded us that, in fact, the US and Europe are on the same boat. In other words, if the US goes down, the EU will go down as well. The development of transatlantic relations may, at the same time, lead to a situation where, together with the efforts of the EU, the United States hegemony will be held accountable. Similarly, instead of the use of force strategies, such as preemptive strike, of the Bush administration, diplomacy and dialogue policies are expected in the new period within the framework of a pragmatic approach. Moreover in this new period, just like with the example of Iran, it can be argued that multilateral diplomatic pressure and economic sanction policies will be more dominant instead of military operation options. However, in cases where Iran does not respond to dialogue policies, it is difficult to claim that there will be no military operations, at least in the form of air strikes.50 On the other hand, Obama is also expected to introduce and develop a new peace concept within the framework of the abovementioned approaches in place for the Bush doctrine. From that point of view, it may possibly be stated that a geo-economic approach will be preferred in lieu of the geopolitical vision of the Bush period. Obama is also expected to take steps to rehabilitate relations in terms of antiAmericanization, which has developed in its backyard, Latin America, as a result of the United States strategy during the Bush administration to spread its global hegemony to the whole world. After that, distorted and stressful relations with Russia can be improved and the NATO-Russia Council, which is suspended because of the Georgian-Russian conflict, can be reactivated. In this context, it can be stated that in the new period more importance will be attached to the policies for reestablishment and strengthening of multilateral armament regimes with big powers like the EU, China and particularly Russia in order to ensure international

50

J Peter Burgess, Francois Debrix, Mark Lacy (editors), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy (Prio New Security Studies), Routledge, 2009, p. 122. 122

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security and peace51. It can be envisaged that regarding the Iraq issue, which is an indispensible priority of Obamas foreign policy, the withdrawal schedule may be put into implementation on a gradual basis and that NATO may play a role in the security of Iraq within the multilateral cooperation framework. The anti-terrorism strategy, which was the main reference point of the foreign policy of the Bush administration (the real face of the US hegemony is revealed by this strategy during the Bush administration and the king isnaked), is expected to be managed in a way more coherent with the multilateral international cooperation and international law (the UN). However, it is understood that the main reference point will be replaced with the rehabilitation of the global capitalist economic system. To be clear, the most important and long lasting issue to be dealt with that will be on the top of the agenda throughout Obamas term will be the US economy and the global financial crisis. In other words, because of the global financial crisis considering the fact that the crisis will last for a long period (10-15 years) the economy will be a dominant and prioritized issue in domestic and foreign policy so as to overcome the crisis with minimum damage. We can say that the agenda will be occupied with this issue at least in the first period of Obamas term. Therefore, it is estimated that the Obama administration will be kept busy with the US economy, recovery, and rehabilitation of the global capitalist system. In short, we can deduct from all issues that the Obama administration will mostly clean up the mess left by the Bush administration and will go for a revision. CONCLUSION It is a strong possibility that due to the fiasco of the empire project of the Bush government, the Obama administration will follow the Grand strategy of extending as much as possible the superpower status of the United States and slowing down the emerging powers as much as possible in order to prevent them from becoming rivals.52 Within this framework, it is foreseen that during Obamas term, the hegemonic struggle will take place in the geopolitical area of the Black Sea,
51 52

Ibid., p. 75. It can be thought that the US may implement an instability policy in the Asia-Pacific controlled by the Afghanistan-Pakistan-India triangle.

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Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa, and Asia-Pacific.53In parallel, it is predicted that the modernization of the Pentagons conventional forces in line with the conditions of the new period will be maintained54 and the US will continue to make preparations for the war over resources. One of the crucial points is that the Obama administration has to be on good terms with the Islamic world because of the badly distorted relations during Bushs term and within this framework, it is anticipated that the Palestine-Israeli issue will be settled, at least to an extent that is acceptable for Israel.55 It can be argued that as the Bush administration started to implement the empire project, the United States transformed from hegemony to an empire. However, since the project failed, the US, which could not be an empire either, passed into a revision period as there is no way going back to hegemony. In the meantime, the efforts spent by the US for the implementation of the empire project led to some systematic changes for both the US and the international system. First of all; while the indisputable military authority of the United States weakened, the economic authority of the United States against China in Asia and the EU in Europe, and its political influence to a certain extent, have lost strength56. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, on the other hand, the US penetration into the region is hindered as a result of Russias resistance. From that point on, the US lost its luxury to dictate be either on our side or against us as it did during Bushs term. From a systematic point of view, the failure of the Bush administrations foreign policy had a catalyst effect on the change of the balance of power57 and accelerated the shift of weight in favor of Asia-Pacific. Now, the geopolitics of the world is changing with the distinctive emerging powers and the international system passing through a centerless or multi-centered transition period. Therefore, the international

53 54

Uzgel, op. cit., p. 13. Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Foreign Affairs, January February 2009; Barack Obama, Renewing American leadership, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2007. 55 Appointment of bureaucrats from Clintons term in the Obama administration is a sign for this fact. 56 DuBoff, op. cit., p. 4. 57 Eland, The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and the Its Fatal Flaws, Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, No.459, November 26, 2002, p. 123, p. 13. 124

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system is guided towards a structure with multiple actors. Besides these developments, as we see that protectionism is becoming more widespread and economic nationalism is on the rise together with intensive competition for resources, the world gradually resembles the period before World War I. In other words, the world is going fast towards a new imperialism period, where competition and conflicts will take place over the resources. In a nutshell, the United States tried to use its advantageous status in the changing world with its empire project during the Bush administration and strived to shape the said change in favor of its own interests. However, it could not succeed and, on the contrary, ended up weakening its present effectiveness and lost its superiority in many fields. In the final analysis, as Michael Ignatieff stated, the imperial role of the United States, which stemmed from its superiority, could not turn the US into an empire, it even took the US out of hegemony, the so-called paradise, as a result of its weakness.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY AGNEW, John A., Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power, Temple University Press, 2005. AGNEW, John A., American Hegemony into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq, Antipode, 2003, p.871885. BURGESS, J Peter, Francois Debrix, Mark Lacy (editors), The Geopolitics of American Insecurity: Terror, Power and Foreign Policy (Prio New Security Studies), Routledge, 2009. CAMPBELL, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1998. CHOMSKY, Noam, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (American Empire Project), Holt Paperbacks, 2004. DAVS, John, Barack Obama & US Foreign Policy: Road Map for Change or Disaster?, AuthorHouse, 2009. DuBOFF, Richard B., U.S. Hegemony: Continuing Decline, Enduring Danger, Monthly Review, December 2003. ELAND, Ivan, The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and the Its Fatal Flaws, Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, No.459, November 26, 2002, p. 123. FALK, Richard A., Dnya Dzeni Nereye?: Amerikan Emperyal Jeopolitikas, Metis Press., 2005. FERGUSON, Niall, Hegemony or Empire?, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003. FERGUSON, Niall, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, Gardners Books, 2004.
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FERGUSON, Niall, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Basic Books, 2004. GATES, Robert M., A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Foreign Affairs, JanuaryFebruary 2009. HARDT and NEGR, Empire, Harvard University Press, September 15, 2001. HAROOTUNAN, Harry D., The Empire's New Clothes: Paradigm Lost, and Regained, Prickly Paradigm Press; 1. Edition, 2004. HARVEY, David, Globalization and the Spatial Fix, Geographicshe Revue, 2/2001, p. 2330. HUNTNGTON, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon, 1998. IKENBERRY, G. John, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition, Polity, 2006. KENNEDY, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict since the 16th Century, Is Bankasi Pub., 2006. KLARE, M., New Geography of Conflict, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, First Owl Books, 2002. LAL, Deepak, In Praises of Empires: Globalization and Order Palgrave, NY, 2004. LAYNE, Christopher, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States Unipolar Moment, International Security, Vol. 31, No.2, Winter 2008, p. 741.

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MARSHALL, Joshua Micale, Power: Rangers: Did the Bush Administration Create a new American Empire or weaken the all done?, The New Yorker, 2004.02.02. McCORMCK, James M., American Foreign Policy and Process, Wadsworth Publishing, 2009. OBAMA, Barack, Renewing American leadership, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2007. PADGEN, Anthony, Imperialism, liberalism & the quest for perpetual peace. (Empires, history; American imperialism), Daedalus, Vol.134, Issue: 2, p. 46 (12) 2005. PARMAR, Inderjeet, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, New Directions in US Foreign Policy (Routledge Studies in Us Foreign Policy), Routledge, 2009. POLANY, Karl, The Great Transformation, Beacon Press; 2. Edition, March 28, 2001. SAUL, Richard, Empire, Imperialism, and Contemporary Global Power, International Studies Perspectives, 9, 2008, p. 309318. UZGEL, lhan, ABD Hegemonyasnn Yeniden naas, Orta Dou ve NATO, Mlkiye, Vol. XXVIII, No. 243, p.7-20. VOGLER, John and Charlotte Bretherton, The European Union as a Global Actor, Routledge, 2006. WHTE, Donald W., The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power, Yale University Press, 1999. WOLF, Martin, The Dependent Superpower, Financial Times, December 17, 2003. YILDIZOLU, Ergin, Hegemonyadan mparatorlua, Everest Press, June 2003
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THE USA- TURKEY RELATIONSHIP AFTER 2003 IRAQ CRISIS 2003 Irak Krizi Sonrasnda ABD-Trkiye likileri Mustafa GN Abstract: Turkey and the USA have been strategic allies since declaration of Truman Doctrine in 1947. This strategic partnership got worse due to the USAs politics towards Middle East after 9-11 tragedy and Turkeys new changing domestic political situation through AKP in 2002. Specifically, 2003 Iraq crisis was milestone to decline the relationship between Turkey and the USA. In spite of deterioration of relationship, Turkey and the USA had to overcome this problem due to security, foreign, and economic concerns of both countries, and the process have advanced as expected. In this article, the USTurkey relationship will be examined in the contexts of recent Iraq crisis, Turkeys new approach to foreign policy, NATO, war on terrorism, European Union, and economic concerns in order to comprehend the new era of Turkey-US strategic partnership. Keywords: the US-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, US foreign policy, 2003 Iraq crisis, NATO, EU, war on terrorism, economic relations. zet: Trkiye ve Amerika Birleik Devletleri 1947de ilan edilen Truman Doktrininden bu yana stratejik ortaklardr. Bu stratejik ortaklk, 11 Eyll sonras Amerikann Orta Dou politikalar ve Trkiyenin 2002de AKP ile deien yeni siyasi atmosferi neticesinde zarar grmtr. zellikle, 2003 Irak Krizi ikili ilikilerin zayflamasnda bir dnm noktas olmutur. likilerdeki bu bozulmaya ramen, iki lkenin gvenlik, d politika ve ekonomik endielerinden dolay, Trkiye ve ABD bu problemi halletmek zorundaydlar; ikili ilikilerdeki sre de beklendii gibi iyileme ynnde ilerledi. Bu makalede, ikili ilikilerdeki yeni dnemi anlayabilmek iin, TrkAmerikan ilikileri, 2003 Irak krizi, Trkiyenin yeni d politika yaklam, NATO, terrizmle mcadele, Avrupa Birlii ve ekonomik ilgiler perspektiflerinde incelenecektir. Anahtar kelimeler: ABD- Trkiye ilikileri, Trk d politikas, Amerikan d politikas, 2003 Irak Krizi, NATO, terrizmle mcadele, ekonomik ilikiler.

Mustafa GN graduated from George Mason University with MA in Political Science and is currently Research Coordinator at Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BLGESAM).

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INTRODUCTION Turkey and the United States have been strategic security partners since Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. In the US and West eyes, Turkey was a crucial blockade against the Soviet expansion toward Mediterranean and Middle East. Moreover, Turkey provided significant NATO and American installations which controlled and monitored Soviet danger in the context of arms-control agreements. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkish officials feared that Turkey lost its strategic importance in the eye of the United States. Yet, that fear did not come to true because new world order has increased Turkeys strategic and geopolitical importance instead of decreasing. As in the past, Turkeys strategic importance comes from its geopolitical privileges. Turkey is located at the junction of three major areas in which the United States has much concern: the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. In these areas, Turkish partnership is more important than before in order to achieve American goals in terms of balance of power, democratization, energy politics, and cultural cooperation between East and West. Nonetheless, Turkish foreign policy has been changed by a new Turkish actor, Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey has begun to pursue an independent and activist foreign policy in the areas where the US has primary concerns. Specifically, Middle East has been a breaking point of Turkish-American relationship. Therefore, reliance of Turkey has become suspicious in the US perspective. Particularly, Turkish-American relationship was shattered because of recent invasion decision of Bush Administration into Iraq. At this point, the United States and Turkey have differed in invasion of Iraq and its consequences. Furthermore, Turkey and the United States have diverged on Iran, Syria, and Israel which have strong relations with the US in terms of both partnership and hostility. In addition to these differences, increasing anti-Americanism (!) in Turkey has raised the tension between Turkey and the United States. In short, Turkey and USA were a strategic partnership during the cold war era. After demise of the Soviet Union, that strategic partnership seemed to end. Yet new policy of the US upon Greater Middle East and other related areas showed that US-Turkey partnership has still continued because the US and Turkey needs each
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other more than before in this new period, so the US-Turkey relations got better than before. Unfortunately, 2003 Iraq and 1 March 2003 Bill crisis caused to decline the relationship as never seen before. The former strategic allies were in the lowest level in their strategic partnership and relationship in 2003 and 2004. But, after this period, Turkey and the United States have mitigated the deterioration of their strategic relations and sought to establish a new strategic partnership era in order to get mutual benefit in terms of their global and regional policies. In brief, these strategic allies need each other in order to maintain their healthy foreign and domestic political lives. The purpose of this study is exploring what the underlying reasons for deterioration of the US-Turkey relationship are; however, 2003 Iraq war and Bill crisis were the igniters of the deterioration, and why these allies needs each other. Even though both allies annoyed each other due to Iraq and Bill crisis, Turkey and the US have recently tried to normalize and mitigate their shattered relationship because both of them need their supports in the contexts of NATO, European Union, war on terrorism, and economic concerns. 1. THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE USA-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP The theoretical background of the US-Turkey relationship should first be considered in order to get better understanding of this alliance. Why are these two countries allies? What are the theoretical reasons for this alliance? These important questions will give us clear understanding of background of the partnership. For Turkey, resasons for alliance are to maintain its regional security, to get economic and military aid, and strengthen its Western-style state structure. The main reason for the US to establish strategic partnership with Turkey is Turkeys significant strategic importance for the US interests in the Middle East and global level.1

Nasuh Uslu, The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: the History of a Distinctive Alliance, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 13.

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1.1. Security When a country faces an external threat, that country seeks a security partner which has common threat. Then both countries combine their military recourses against the common threat. In other case, a weak country needs a powerful ally to protect itself against a major threat.2 The US-Turkey case is appropriate for both cases. In that era, Turkey was threatened by Soviet Union. That was a really big threat for Turkey because Soviet Union abolished Treaty of Friendship of 1925 and wanted the revise Montreaux Convention of 1936 in order to get more benefit. That meant constraint of freedom of Turkey. Because of this reason, Turkey wanted to get alliances of USA and NATO. In the post Second World War era, American officials came to Turkey, and Turkey and USA made an agreement for common Soviet threat by assisting Turkey both in economic and military levels. By making this agreement, both USA and Turkey got a strategic partner against Soviet threat, and US gained a useful installation for its Middle East policies.3 1.2. Assistance Need In order to strengthen their developing economy, lesser powers always seek economic aid. Generally, Major Powers which set up military alliance with lesser powers economically help their allies. Turkey did not join the Second World War because its economy was not powerful, and didnt want to struggle with war damage. Due to this reason, Turkey sought a powerful state which economically assists Turkey. The options were USSR and USA to get economic aid. In logical manner, Turkey chose the US in order to build an economic and military partnership. After establishing the alliance,

Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, Colombia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 25. 3 George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 1972, p. 21. 132

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Turkey has received economic and military assistance of USA many times until now.4 1.3. Strategic Reasons When a lesser power confronts with a threat, lesser power allows a major power to construct an installation in the country. It is important that Turkeys geostrategic importance5 urge the USA to set up strategic partnership with Turkey, and the US got a significance station against USSR. Also, Turkey strengthened its force against Soviet threat. As a result, the presence of the US troops in Turkey is beneficial for both countries interests, so Turkey has never stopped the US bases in the country even in troubled times, such as Cyprus crisis.6 1.4. Ideology Turkey has pursued a democratic and secular way since 1923. The main goal for Turkish intellectuals and ideology has been closeness to Western values after establishing new Turkish government. Thus, Turkey had to choose the USA option in order to reach its goal and set up its own healthy future. Along with getting closeness with USA and then NATO, Turkey carried out its own westernization plan.7 1.5. Internal Reasons Lesser states want to enter into alliances to stabilize their domestic environments. Entering into alliance with a respectful and powerful state and obtaining economic and military support increase lesser states charismas in the eye of the people. At those times, Turkish government really needed to increase its prestige because Second World War destroyed economy and prestige of Turkey and Turkish government. Turkish people lost their trust and reliance to Turkish government.
4 5

Uslu, op cilt p. 15. This issue will be explained in further sections. 6 Ibid, p. 16. 7 Ibid, p. 17.

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Therefore, this coalition with USA was an important budging for prestige of Turkish government.8 In order to comprehend Turkish-American relationship, the theory and model of this relationship should be formed. The reasons for this strategic relationship are mentioned above, but it still needs a general comprehensive theory to examine this partnership and embed it into a structure. Hence, Patron-Client State relationship and Dependency theory will be explained. 1.6. Patron-Client State Relationship In this theory, a state is small while the other is major or big. It can be said that Turkey was a small state according to its economy and military levels and really a client to USA in those years. What are the characteristic of patron-client relationship theory?There must be sizeable difference between the military capabilities of two states. This is clear that military capability of US was greater than Turkeys. 2- The client play important role in superpowers (patrons) competition. As it is known, Turkey was a political competition tool for USA and USSR in era. 3- In this relationship, patron and client are closely tied each other, and Client follows patron in every issue to get positive reward. Moreover, manipulation, coercion, and authority are in the background, yet they are not dominant. In Turkey-US case, Turkey has often followed and supported the US policies except some breaking points, such as Cyprus problem in 1070s and recent 2003 Iraq crisis. 4- Arm transfer is the powerful tool of influence for patrons. The US military assistance was significance for this relationship in the Cold War era. The significant two reasons for Turkey to structure a partnership with the US were Military and economic assistance. 5- Elite of the client state have same perceptions with patron state through domestic and foreign education. If we look at the Turkish elite in those years, it is clear that Turkish elite were influenced by Western values of American, French, and German schools in Turkey. Robert College (American), Galatasaray High school (French), and German high school were basic schools which raised Turkish elite.9
8 9

Ibid, p. 18. Ibid, p. 25-26.

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1.7. Dependency Theory Dependency theory is related with economic aspects of the patron-client state relationship. General characteristic of dependent country is that the internal market of the dependent country is internationalized and its economy is incorporated into the global capitalist system. A large share of needs is supplied externally, a large share of markets is foreign, and ratio of foreign to domestic capital, technology, production facilities, etc. is high. Development of economy is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy and by the attitude of multinational corporations. Also, there is an alliance between local and international capital and state, derived from mutual interest. Moreover, dependent state is specialized in the export of a few products, and its export heavily relies on few trading partners. In the Cold War era, Turkeys economy was fitting to dependent countries. Today, Turkey is a developing country, yet its economy is still affected by developed countries and multinational corporations. In general approach, realist perspectives played important role in this relationship. According to Realism, security, power and economic concerns are main three issues. Turkey was one of the reasons of Truman Doctrine10 which is a main tool for hegemonic politics of the US. Both America and Turkey needed each other for security, power, and economic concerns. The US needed Turkey in the Cold War era due to surround politics of the US to USSR and getting a strategic country against Soviet threat to balance of power. Also, Turkey was a fresh market and the gate of other market states in the Middle East. Turkey needed the US because Turkey wanted to balance its power to Soviet threat and get economic assistance by the US aid. As it is seen, realist arguments played important role to shape the US-Turkey relationship.11

10

For details see: George Crews McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle EastConnection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1990. 11 Burcu Bostanoglu, Turkiye-ABD Ilisikilerinin Politikasi: Kuram ve Siyasa, Imge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1999, p. 330-333.

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2. TURKEYS STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND IMPORTANCE Turkey is an important actor in the Middle East and Eurasia according to the USA interest in these regions. Turkey is located in an important area which is called heartland of Eurasia and of course the Middle East. On one side, Asia, which has recently become an important actor in international economic and politic arena, has internationally significant actors, Russia, Caucasus, East Asian countries, and Middle Asian countries. On another side, the Middle East countries, which have been popular for West in terms of energy and democracy, share same religion and similar culture with Turkey. On the other side Europe, where much of the worlds political and economic powers are concentrated has immense interest for those regions. As a result, Turkey is the key country or a bridge for all those countries to communicate each other in terms of cultural, economic, and political spheres.12 According to Henry Kissinger, Turkey is located between three revolutions consisting of the traditional state system of Europe, the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty, and the drive of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.13 Therefore, Turkey is linkage between ideological differences which Europe and the US dont have more chances to ideologically access to the region. After dissolution of Soviet Union, Turkey has thoroughly been interested in Turkic States. The reason for this interest is not only ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural affiliation but also marvelous oil and gas reserves in that region. Turkey politically entered to region just after the collapse of Soviet Union in order to establish ties with Turkic and Muslim states, and the US supported the policy of Turkey on those newly independent countries because Turkey was the only country to communicate those countries and to open Wests gate to this region in spite of Iran and Russia. As a result, Turkey has played a constructive role in this region as

12

Nezihi Cakar, A Strategic Overview of Turkey, Perceptions, 3 no. 2 June-August 1998, 1, http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume3b.php, Accessed 02 October 2008. 13 Stephen J. Flanagan, and Samuel J. Brannen, Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations, The CSIS Press, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 8-9. 136

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a counterweight to ambitions of Russia and Iran, and this role is really important for American interests.14 As an overview, the reasons for why Turkey is significant to American interest are: Turkey is neighbor to pivotal countries for American policy and interest. The instability within Turkey easily affects the other country in the Middle East because of Turkeys location and ties with Middle East countries. Turkey has critical waterways (Straits) and narrows which are trade and energy linkages. Turkeys economic contribution to small countries of region makes them economically stable. Turkish-American friendship is a good example for other Muslim countries which are opposed to the US due to religion. Turkeys cooperation for Iraq is important to decline violence and to increase political settlement of Iraq. Turkeys contribution to the US about global terrorism is significant to defeat terrorism from the Middle East. Turkeys contribution to NATO with its army force and NATO installations in its soil.15

14

Bulent Aras, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position, Portland, OR: F. Cass, London, 2002, p. 2-3, p. 20. 15 Rajan Menon, and S. Enders Wimbush , The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance? www.newamerica.net/files/Menon%20and%20Wimbush-US%20Turkey%20Alliance%20Survival%202007.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008, p. 131133. Rajan Menon, and S. Enders Wimbush, Is The United States Losing Turkey? www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008, p. 3-5.

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3. TURKEYS NEW POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY The breaking point of the US-Turkey relationship was of course 2003 Iraq intervention of the US. The strategic partnership was deteriorated at that time because Turkey didnt approach the US purpose as in the past. What was the reason for this different approach? The best answer of this question is changing domestic and political situation of Turkey. Turkey has undergone a rapid transformation by President Turgut Ozal since second part of 1980s, and it has reached its peak through AKPs new vision of international politics since 2002 election. Therefore, the US-Turkey relationship has been affected by that transformation and entered the new period consisting of deterioration and recondition. Turgut Ozal began to leave former Turkish isolationist and passive approach and pursued activist politics in the region. Ozals contribution to President George Bush in the Gulf War I. first was amazing, and that contribution rendered Turkey important political actor in the Middle East.16 In addition to that activist politic, Turkey initiated democratization process in those years by the European Union membership requirements. Under the light of these requirements, Turkish politicians advocated political and social reforms in the militarist based regime. When Turkeys political structure began to change from militarist to civilian, Turkey tried to change its hostile and combative attitudes towards periphery countries.17 After Turkey got the candidacy status from EU Helsinki summit in 1999, Turkeys relations with hostile countries have become getting better. For example, Turkey abandoned the tension politics with Syria, and pursued soft power to fix problematic issues. Also, Turkish Foreign Minister visited Greece in 2000 after the 40 years of freezing diplomacy due to Cyprus crisis. This transformation of

16

Alan Makovsky, Turkeys New Foreign Policy Activism, Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean: International Conference, June 9-19, 1999, (Istanbul: Ari movement, 1999), 19. 17 Heinz Kramer, A changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United State, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., c2000, 236-238. 138

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Turkish foreign policy accelerated when AKP came to power in 2002 election.18 AKP tightly followed the EU membership process because they had struggled with the 28 February 1997 post-modernist military interference to Turkish democracy as an Islamist side of government. Thus, AKP wanted to spread democratic understanding in the structure of government by EU process so that the US supported the AKPs renovation to transform the structure of Turkish government.19 Another important point for AKP is that AKP has created its own political elite, and released some new faces to Turkish political life. Due to renewing the political actors, the US had to agree with new Turkish politicians who are different than preceding ones who didnt struggle with American policies in the Middle East in larger scale.20 One of the new politic actors of AKP is Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, former chief ambassador of Prime Minister Erdogan and current Foreign Minister. He is the underlying reason of changing foreign policy of Turkey. He mentions the new Turkish approach to international relations in his book, Strategic Depth. He claims that Turkey ought to follow its own making instead of global designs, for Turkey has strong cultural and historical ties with regional states, and Turkey fosters a new vision which renders Turkey a regional power.21 4. SOURCE OF FRICTION: 2003 IRAQ CRISIS President Bush declared the US manner against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 in Manichean. The well known quota of President Bush is if you are not with us, you are against us. That speech was a result of stability to terrorism. Nonetheless,

18

Kemal Kirisci, Turkeys Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times. www.ciaonet.org/journals/iisfpa/v3i1/0000760.pdf Accessed 02 October 2008, 96. 19 Zeynep Dagi, Dogudan Batiya Dis Politika: Ak Partili Yillar, Orion Yayinevi, Ankara, 2006, p. 89. 20 Stephen J. Flanagan, and Samuel J. Brannen, Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations, p. 4. 21 Carol Migdalovitz, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views. CRS Report for Congress, August 29, 2008, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008, p. 2-3.

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that speech was hard to digest by some Muslim countries. Kemalists22 and Islamists didnt like this perspective due to different reasons.23 Due to Turkeys strategic importance for Iraq war, the US wanted to use Turkish territory to defeat Saddam Hussein. The deterioration of the US-Turkish relations began over this problem. Turkish civil, military, and politic societies didnt agree about opening the Iraq border to the US troops to access Iraq because of fear of independent Kurdish state, economic results, and of course uncontrolled the PKK in Northern Iraq. Ankara offered to the US to send 20,000 Turkish troops to help reconstruction, yet the US didnt agree with Turks and ignored Turkish anxieties on Northern Iraq.24 Before the voting, AKP administration, higher military generals and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer had often met to comprehend and finalize desire of the US on Iraqi-Turkish border. Turkey also wanted to get 92 billion dollars because of compensation of effect of Iraq war on Turkish economy. But, Turkey was refused again by Bush administration. Turkey had not yet defeated its anxieties and its anxieties had always been ignored by the US. Both Turkish civil society and opposition party and some AKP members didnt definitely want the US troops in the Turkish border. Turkish Military was hesitant about this intervention trough Turkish border. Therefore, on 1 March 2003, Turkish Grand National Assembly refused the request of Bush administration to use Turkish territory in order to access to Iraq.25 After the repair diplomacy, Turkey wasnt convinced to open border to American troops. As a result, the US was really shocked because Bush administration didnt assume such decision of Turkish side. The US had to choose a different way to access Iraq, and that meant much money and less efficiency of operation. As expected, The US and Turkish relations got worse as never been before. In addition to this crisis, Turkish Special Force was detained by the US soldier on 4 July 2003 in Suleymaniah, Northern Iraq. Hence,

22 23

The word refers followers of Ataturks revolution, secular and nationalist people. Rajan Menon, and S. Enders Wimbush, Is The United States Losing Turkey?, p. 6. 24 Steven A Cook, Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2006, 9-10. 25 Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gercek Oykusu Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004, p. 153-154, p. 173. 140

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Turkey and the United States were living the worst relationship period in their history.26 As a consequence of the detention of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq, public opinion about Bush administration was also deteriorated.27 Turkish people saw America as second best friend in a widely public poll in 2002. The first friend was nobody at 33 percent, and second friend was the US at 27 percent.28 In two years after Iraq intervention, another poll which shows public opinion about the US- Turkey relations was conducted in Ankara in 2005. The result of survey was basically:29 91 percent of Turkish public does not approve Bush policies. Only 0.5 percent approves George W. Bushs policies. 74 percent of Turks see Turkey and the US are allies. 16 percent of Turks define himself/herself anti-American. 4 percent of Turks hate Americans. According to majority of Turkish people (69%), the best American president for global security and peace is Bill Clinton. Only 3 percent of Turks see Bush is the best. According to majority of Turks (74%) the thorniest issue in the US-Turkey relations is the existence of THE PKK in Northern Iraq. Only 3 percent of Turks blame Turkish government due to deterioration of Turkish-American relations.

26

Ahmet Erimhan, Tezkereler Surecinden "Suleymaniye Baskinina": Cuvaldaki Muttefik, Otopsi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2004, p. 313. 27 Somebody mentioned that anti-Americanism had incredibly risen in Turkey, but that is not true because the incredibly rising idea in the Turkish people minds was anti-Bushism. 28 Philip H. Gordon, and Omer Taspinar, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 25. 29 ISRO, Turkey-USA Relations Survey Results 12 March 2005. www.turkishweekly.net/us-tr_eng.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008.

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5. RENOVATION OF THE USA-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP The relationship between Turkey and the United States was at the bottom level in 2003-2004 because of 1 March 2003 Bill and 4 July 2003 Suleymaniah crisis. The US had not considered Turkeys anxieties before deciding to fight with Saddam Hussein; then Turkeys response to the US was really bewildering when thinking in the context of strategic partnership and alliance. Therefore, both strategic partners declined the relations at the lowest level. Yet, Ankara and Washington realized that both former strategic partners needed each other more than before due to new policies of both countries and global changing at the political agenda. After 2004, both political actors of countries have showed their incentives to renovate the relationship, but those incentives were not enough to renew the broken relations and Turkey and the United States needs more cooperation than before. An example for renovation the relationship was done by the US in 2007 by supporting Turkey in terms of intelligence to defeat the PKK in Northern Iraq. This interaction diminished tension of Turkish side. Then, Turkish politicians declared their amity to the United States. Thus, The US-Turkey relationship was tilted to normal level. However, the United States and Turkey need more than this example because they need each other at NATO, EU, war on terrorism, and economic levels. 5.1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) In order to understand Turkeys importance to NATO and the US, its contribution to NATO should first be considered. Turkeys proximity to the Middle East, Russia, and Central Asia is reason for its importance to NATO. Before demise of Soviet Union, Turkey was the only barrier to Soviet threat in the Middle East and Europe. Also, Turkey was the only country which might have been faced Iraq, Syria, and Iran threats, so Incirlik airbase used many times by Turkey, US, and other NATO members in order to bomb enemies of NATO. Moreover, the Straits were the crucial feature of Turkey to control Soviet vessels. Due to Turkeys

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geographic position, Turkey was indispensable in the eye of the West block.30 Likewise, in the Turkeys eye, NATO was the most important tool to defend itself in this devil region including Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. After the Cold War, Turkeys importance to NATO seemed to diminish because the major threat to the US and NATO was the Soviet Union. But, after September 11 event, Turkey demonstrated its importance again to the US and NATO by owning geographic proximity to the problematic countries to the US and proving its cooperativeness in Lebanon and Afghanistan cases. Robert Wexler, chairman of the subcommittee on Europe, highlights Turkeys importance to the US: Turkish military forces have fought side by side with American forces from the Cold War to Balkan Wars, and from Korea to Afghanistan, where Turkey has twice led ISAF forces. As the only NATO country bordering Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Turkey has hundreds of its troops on the ground in Lebanon, maintains a strong relationship with Israel and is an essential component to the East-West Energy Corridor providing America and Europe with a critical alternative energy supply route other than gas and oil coming from the volatile Middle East and Russia.31 Also, Dough Bereuter, representative of Nebraska, emphasizes the importance of Turkey to the US policies in that region:

30

George Crews McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Macmillan, Hampshire, 1990, p. 170. 31 United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe. U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, March 15, 2007, p. 1-2.

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For this Member of Congress, Turkey remains a vital element of Americas strategy in NATO, in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Caucasus region and in the Middle East.32 As a result, Turkey has crucial importance to the US in context of NATO. The higher performance of Turkish military proved this importance in the past through assisting the US in Korea, Balkans, Afghanistan and lastly Lebanon. Turkeys proximity to problematic countries and its efficient and useful military render it necessary in the aspect of the US. The US will always need Turkeys military assistance as long as war on terrorism and Greater Middle East project are continued. 33 With regard to Turkeys need to the US in the context of NATO, NATO still provides the main multilateral tool for achieving Turkish security interest. Turkey always seeks strong security force of NATO in order to protect itself prospective danger from antagonist states. For example, if Iran continues to make nuclear weapon, Turkey will need security missile program of NATO in its territory.34 Despite the Cold War is ended, Turkeys need to NATO has been evolving. In this regard, the US has the largest and strongest military as a member of NATO, and the US military is pretty active in the Middle East and surrounded region of Turkey. If both former strategic allies heal their relationship as in the past, both allies get really beneficial assistant in their struggles with their enemies and global peace. By the way, NATO is a significance element to improve the relationship between Turkey and the United States. The Supreme Allied Commanders Europe (SACEUR), one of NATOs suborganization, has always kept up a successful
32

United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 1, 2003, p. 3. 33 F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner, Ran Corp., Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 22. 34 Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee. The future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan. Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2000, p. 42. 144

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relation period with Turkish Military. By the support of this organization, Turkey and the United States might generate better dialog between their militaries. 5.2. European Union There are some factors which renders Turkeys membership to European Union valuable to American perspective. First, one of the American higher officials claimed that Turkeys integration into EU was an important aspect of increasing cooperation between the US and Turkey. Turkey will be more effective in terms of illegal immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, drug trafficking, and environmental problems under the membership title of European Union. Those are what the US cares at the global level. Second, Turkeys accession to EU collapses of Huntingtons clash of civilization theory. Otherwise, Turkey leaves the westernization goal and finds undesirable religious allies. Furthermore, Turkeys integration into EU as a Muslim state will be a bridge between West and Islamist world in terms of democratization and war on terrorism. European Union is one of the key institutional settings which anchor Turkey to West. By the active promotion of Turkeys integration into Europe, the US will be able to get more benefit Turkeys membership to EU. First of all, the US will take advantages of strengthening secular Turkish democracy as a model to the Middle Easts antidemocratic Muslim countries through Turkish integration into EU.35 The last factor is that full membership of Turkey to EU will bring to the US more support in EU council. Therefore, the US should support EU membership of Turkey as a lobbyist of Turkey in EU.36 All those factors require improving relationship between Turkey and the US. EU membership of Turkey is significant for another point that if Turkeys relationship were poor with EU and the US, Turkey would be dragged to nationalism as in the past. When Ankara can not find any external ally, internal
35

Ziya Onis, and Suhnaz Yilmaz. Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity? home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/ONIS-YILMAZ-TURKEY-EUUS%20TRIANGLE-REV%20DEC%202004.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008, p. 12. 36 Sabri Sayari, The United States and Turkeys Membership in the European Union. www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dosyalar/MMTY/34/7_sabri_sayari.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008, p. 173-175.

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option become vulnerable because Turkey must relies on its own devises in order to create its foreign policy. Also, AKP would begin to look for new allies for compensation of weak relations with West; for example, Russia is the best substation for Turkey.37 Another benefit of Turkeys membership to EU to the US and EU is that energy cooperation between EU and Turkey will be increase through Nabuco pipeline. Azeri and Middle Asian gas and oil will be transfer to European countries without Russian pressure on the energy politics. As known, European countries consume Russian gas so that they are dependent to Russians demands. Due to alternative energy corridor which is Turkey Europe will get benefit both in energy and politic level. With regard to the US in this perspective, the US will be reduced Russian effectiveness on the Eurasian aspect by supporting Turkey for EU membership.38 It is important that the US support for Turkeys membership to EU helps increase Turkeys visibility and presents it under the better light. Specifically, it could underline the many areas where Turkeys devotion to NATO and the West, to western rights and coercions provides continuing proven value. The United States could point to those strategic areas where Turkish contribution is obvious and cooperative to a lasting common cause across the Atlantic.39 On the Turkish side, the US support for EU membership might be easier solution for Turkeys some ongoing problems. In fact, chronic Cyprus issue can be overcome in a simple way. The USs diplomatic pressure on EU makes this issue easier. Otherwise, an isolated Turkey without American support may confront the rejection of its EU membership.40

37 38

F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner, p. 23-24. Stephen J. Flanagan, and Samuel J. Brannen, Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations, p. 20. 39 Michael Lake, Tilting from US to EU, Frances G. Burwell, edit. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2008, 60. 40 Stephen J. Flanagan, and Samuel J. Brannen, Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations, p. 25. 146

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Along with Turkeys integration into EU, the US expectations of Turkey might be fulfilled. Turkeys EU agenda and the US desire to deepen democracy in Turkey and liberalize its political and economic lives coincide. Also, Turkey needs American investment, science and technology, and education when pursuing EU norms. As a result, Turkey and the US should improve their relations in order to get more benefit in terms of EU aspect.41 According to Soner Cagaptays speech in front of the Europe committee of Congress: Even if it doesnt result in Turkeys eventual EU membership, I think the EU process has been beneficial because it has catalyzed significant and much needed reforms in Turkey, yet it is also important since we are discussing foreign policy today to note that the powerful force behind the EU reform is also symptomatic of Turkeys emerging proEuropean tendency in foreign policy, especially toward Iraq.42 In the triangle relations among EU, Turkey, and the US, American support for Turkeys EU membership generates a smooth and deepening progress between Turkey and EU. Then deepening Turkish relations with EU mitigates reform progress in Turkey; therefore, due to that process, reconstruction of TurkishAmerican relations will be smooth and quick.43 Despite recent disagreement between the US and Turkey, both countries had better try to develop their relationship as soon as possible because both countries need each other to take advantages of EU.

41

Morton Abramowitz, edit. The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need, Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003, p. 141. 42 United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 1, 2003, p. 9. 43 Stephen J. Flanagan, and Samuel J. Brannen, Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations, p. 27.

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5.3. War on Terrorism After demise of Soviet threat, the United States and Turkey found themselves in a new collaboration against terrorism. Particularly, September 11 terrorist attacks made clear that the US and Turkey need each other in order to fight against terrorism. Also, along with emerging greater Middle East project, ensuring stability in the wider Middle East region has been an important cooperation reason for the US-Turkish partnership. Deepening the collaboration upon war on terrorism could reinvigorate bilateral relationship between the US and Turkey.44 In the Turkish perspective, Turkey has always opposed to separation of Iraq because integrity of Iraq keeps some extremist groups under the control. Kurdish movement in Northern Iraq has always bothered Turkish governments due to separatist role of the PKK in southeast of Turkey. Turkish anxiety about the PKK was that the second Iraq War created a vacuum which enabled the PKK to find protected paradise in Northern Iraq and increased its war in Turkey. Thus, the PKK would escalate its brutal attacks in Turkey. That Turkish prediction about the PKK came true and the PKK has escalated its attacks in Turkey, so many Turkish soldiers have been killed.45 The US has been the most important partner in the context of war against the PKK. Especially, after the US took control in Iraq in 2003, Turks has seen the US the most important authority to eliminate the PKK in Northern Iraq via cutting off the relations between the PKK and its supporters in Iraq and providing Turkish military forces by effective intelligence of the PKK actions in Northern Iraq. An example of this collaboration happened in 2007. Turkish and American army officials signed an agreement upon sharing intelligence in Northern Iraq to defeat the PKK, and then, Turkish forces began to fight with terrorist groups through Turkish air forces via American intelligence. That agreement has still continued

44

Frances G. Burwell, Rebuilding US-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context, Frances G. Burwell, edit. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, 2. 45 Carol Migdalovitz, Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy. Report for Congress, May22, 2002. www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31429.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008, 9. 148

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between Turkey and the US on fighting with the PKK together.46 Therefore, Turkey needs the US in order to fight against the PKK. In the US perspective, after September 11 attacks, Turkey voted related defense treaty and joined to coalition to fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Turkey provided the US with opening its air space within 24 hours to start operation against Al-Qaeda. Moreover, Turkey contributed the US by intelligence comes from Uzbek-Tajik-Hazera Afghan Northern Alliance. Then, Turkey sent 90 Special Forces troops to Afghanistan to train Northern Alliance forces. In addition, Turkish naval force blocked suspicious vessels in Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas, and all humanitarian flights to Afghanistan were operated from in Turkey.47 After Taliban problem emerged, Turkey sent 267 troops to Afghanistan to join International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping operation. Another Turkeys respond to Al-Qaeda terrorism was that Turkey blocked all AlQaeda account which related with Egypt, Libya, Uzbekistan, and Somalia, and defeated Turkish members of Al-Qaeda in Turkey. Also, Turkey undertook to educate 600 National Guard battalion of Afghans as well as supply them with necessary equipments and educated 20 new Afghan diplomats who would play significance role to establish new Afghan relationship with West.48 Turkish role on Al-Qaeda terrorism was critical to the US to fight against terrorism. The US had never faced brutal domestic terrorist attack until September 11 and hadnt known much more things about Islamist terrorism, thus, Turkey was the most important collaborator via its domestic terrorism experience and its Muslim identity. According to Douglas Bereuter, chairman of the subcommittee on Europe:

46

Frances G. Burwell, Rebuilding US-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context, Frances G. Burwell, edit. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, 6. 47 Ibid, 8. 48 Ibid, 9-10.

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After September 11, Turkey was one of the first to join us in the struggle against global terrorism. Turkey became a staging area for the Afghan operation and later took command of the international security force there.49 According to General Joseph W. Ralston: The PKK uses Iraq as a base to plan, train for, and conduct direct attacks against Turkey. For several years United States and Iraqi forces have lacked the resources to root out this pocket of terrorist camp.50 Also, as Robert Wexler, representative in Congress from the state of Florida, stated: The myriad of challenges to the US-Turkish relationship, which will be addressed by our witness, are multiple, complex and intertwined. The most significance divergence has been in Iraq and particularly as it relates to Kurdish terrorism. Since 2004, the PKK has killed and injured more than 1500 people in Turkey. Given Americas leading role in Iraq, there is a perception in Turkey that America has not done enough to remove the threat of the PKK terrorists based in Northern Iraq. Perceived inaction on the American side has lead to a nationalist backlash in Turkey against the US. It is critical that the US and Iraqi Kurdish leaders do more to make address the PKK threat.51

49

United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 1, 2003, p. 2. 50 United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe. U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, March 15, 2007, p. 18. 51 Ibid, p. 3. 150

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As a result, Turkey helped the US to defeat and take control of Islamist terrorism and need it for the future collaboration of terrorism. Turkey has suffered from the PKK, located Northern Iraq, so Turkey needs Americas contribution as a neighbor. 5.4. Economic Concerns Turkish-American economic relations began as early as 1785. By the sanction of an English company the United States began to trade with the Ottoman Empire. In 1811, the Ottoman Empire and the United States realized their economic importance for each other and signed an agreement to refine the economic relations. Due to mutually beneficial economic relations, the United States got capitulations from Sultan. In 1876, Turkey ranked among the ten leading nations of the world in foreign trade, and the United States was Turkeys third best customer. Hence, that important economic relationship had gradually increased even though Turkish-American political relations got worse in the First World War era. Yet, along with establishing new Turkish Republic, Turkish-American relations in both economical and political sphere remarkably boomed, so the United States was second buyer of Turkish goods before the Second World War.52 Today, the United States is seventh export and fifth import market of Turkey, and Turkey is seventeenth largest economy in the world, so needs to increase its share of the US trade. In the near past, the US-Turkey economic ties mainly depended on defense based trade. Yet, Turkish-American economic relationship has been expanded to the other sectors over the past three years by the contributions of both governments and NGOs. As a result, Turkey and the US have become important economic partners for each other, and this partnership seems to improve in the near future. 53

52

Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey 1830-1930, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1932, p. 345-346. 53 TAIK. Turkey Brief: Turkish-US Relations. March 2008. www.turkeynow.org/db/Docs/Turkey_Brief_2008.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008, 20.

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The other significant economic partnership between the US and Turkey is related with the energy sector. As a consequence of Turkeys geostrategic importance, Turkey has an immense potential to bridge three continents by oil and gas resources. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (BTC), the Blue Stream, and Nabucco gas pipelines have increased Turkeys both economic and political importance and have made a booster effect to Turkish economy. As it is remembered, BTC were realized by the positive effort of the US. Turkey would not be able to realize it without American support when Russia is considered. Due to common benefits, BTC was carried out and has brought economic and political benefits to the US and Turkey.54 Turkey is unique to the US in terns of economic relations due to: proximity to new markets in Middle East and Central Asia, the gateway of energy resources, strong ties with Caucasus and Central Asia, huge domestic market, a fast developing country, strong international investment record, high-skilled and competitive labor. For Turkey, developing trade relations and partnership on energy sector with the US have enlarged Turkish economy and improved Turkeys political importance in the regional and world levels. To the US, by active participation with Turkey at the economic level, the US has gained more economic and political benefits. Both American and Turkish officials emphasize this mutually beneficial economic partnership. Krsad Tzmen, the Minister of State, said: It is now high time to increase trade volume between Turkey and the United States to $30 billion after witnessing development in defense and security cooperation in the last several years. Of the 600 American firms doing business in Turkey, fully one-third of them
54

Frances G. Burwell, Rebuilding US-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context, 19-p. 21. 152

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started their economic activities here within the last two years, which shows the increasing level of international confidence in our economy.55 Ross Wilson, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, said: We have regretted that U.S. business is a little behind Europe and various Arab countries in the privatization race that is taking place in Turkey. We are trying to address this by re-launching the Economic Partnership Commission (EPC). The Turkish economy has achieved extremely impressive economic results over the course of the last four years in terms of the growth of Turkish gross domestic product, this countrys success in taming inflation, this countrys success in improving the climate for business and foreign investors, and resolving outstanding problems that companies, including American companies, have had in previous years All of that has led to a substantial increase in American investor interest here. Some of that has translated into specific commitments that have been made. The decision of General Electric Capital to invest in Garanti Bankasi is one big example. There have been several others in the news over the course of the last couple of months, and I hope and expect that there will be more.56 CONCLUSION Even though Turkish-American strategic partnership has deteriorated because of recent Iraq crisis, both former allies still share short and long-term interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Europe more than Cold War era. In addition, they have suffered from terrorism and dealt with nonproliferation in the region. Also, both countries depend on their supports in terms of economic and political developments so that they will be able to create a strong and healthy

55 56

TAIK. Turkey Brief: Turkish-US Relations., p. 25. Ibid, 26.

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political and economical future for their own countries if they succeed to establish strategic alliance and close partnership. Turkey travels in a process which will render Turkey a participant with new world order soon. In this journey, Turkey extremely needs American support for its security because it is encircled by many threats. The US emphasis on NATO as a main security organ of West is fitting to Turkeys anxieties and their solutions, so Turkey needs the US in order to strengthen its own security circle. Besides, the US is the key country for Turkey to sustain Israeli-Turkish relationship, to solve Kurdish problem, and to get more benefit from energy sector. Furthermore, support of the US for Turkeys candidacy of EU is significance for democratization of Turkey. The other American importance for Turkey is that the US is the most important arms supplier of Turkey. 80 percent of Turkish defense-industrial activity relies on the US. In the US perspective, Turkey is the most important country in that region to serve American interests. Turkeys role in NATO and war on terrorism are crucial for the United States successful policies in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Also, the US needs Turkey in order to get easy access to the Middle Eastern and Central Asian markets due to its strong ties with these regions. Soner Cagaptay, Director of Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, underlined that: Turkey is important for the United States because it straddles two vital regions for US policymakers--The Middle East and Central Eurasia-that is an energy rich area with a large Muslim population, stretching from the Black Sea to Central Asia to the north. Given the countrys location, as well as post-September 11 United States priorities toward these regions, Turkey bears utmost importance for Washington.57

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As a result, Turkish-American strategic partnership was gotten worse by 2003 Iraq war, but both countries should escalate the renovation process and improve their partnership more than before to achieve their mutual interests upon NATO, European Union, war on terrorism, and economic concerns.

Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, May 11, 2005, p. 18.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY ABRAMOWTZ, Morton, edit. The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need. Century Foundation Press, New York, 2003. ARAS, Bulent. The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position. Portland, OR: F. Cass, London, 2002. BOSTANOGLU, Burcu. Turkiye-ABD Ilisikilerinin Politikasi: Kuram ve Siyasa. Imge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1999. BURWELL, Frances G., edit. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2008. CAKAR, Nezihi. A Strategic Overview of Turkey, Perceptions, 3 no. 2 (JuneAugust 1998), http://www.sam.gov.tr/volume3b.php, Accessed 02 October 2008. COOK, Steven A. Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2006. Dagi, Zeynep, Dogudan Batiya Dis Politika: Ak Partili Yillar. Orion Yayinevi, Ankara, 2006. ERIMHAN, Ahmet. Tezkereler Surecinden "Suleymaniye Baskinina": Cuvaldaki Muttefik. Otopsi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2004. FLANAGAN, Stephen J. and BRANNEN, Samuel. Turkey's Shifting Dynamics: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations. The CSIS Press, Washington, DC, 2008. GORDON, Leland J. American Relations with Turkey 1830-1930. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1932.

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GORDON, Philip H., and Taspinar, Omer, Winning Turkey: How America, Europe, and Turkey Can Revive a Fading Partnership. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C, 2008. HARRS, George S. Troubled Alliance, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 1972. ISRO, Turkey-USA Relations Survey Results 12 March www.turkishweekly.net/us-tr_eng.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008. 2005.

Kirisci, Kemal. Turkeys Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times. www.ciaonet.org/journals/iisfpa/v3i1/0000760.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008. KHALLZAD, Zalmay, LESSER, Ian and LARRABEE, F. Stephen. The future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan. Rand, Santa Monica, CA, 2000. KRAMER, Heinz. A changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000. LAKE, Michael. Tilting from US to EU, BURWELL, Frances G., edit. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2008. LARRABEE, F. Stephen. Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner. Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA, 2008. MAKOVSKY, Alan. Turkeys New Foreign Policy Activism, Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean: International Conference, June 9-19, 1999. Ari movement, Istanbul, 1999. McGHEE, George Crews. The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets. Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1990.

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MENON, Rajan, and WMBUSH, S. Enders Is The United States Losing Turkey? www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. MENON, Rajan, and WMBUSH, S. Enders The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance? www.newamerica.net/files/Menon%20and%20Wimbush-US%20Turkey%20Alliance%20Survival%202007.pdf, Accessed 02 October 2008. MGDALOVTZ, Carol. Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy. Report for Congress, May22, 2002. www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31429.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. MGDALOVTZ, Carol. Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views. CRS Report for Congress, August 29, 2008. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. ONS, Ziya, and YILMAZ, Suhnaz Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity? home.ku.edu.tr/~zonis/ONIS-YILMAZTURKEY-EU-US%20TRIANGLE-REV%20DEC%202004.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. ROTHSTEN, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers, Colombia University Press, New York, 1998. SAYAR, Sabri. The United States and Turkeys Membership in the European Union. www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dosyalar/MMTY/34/7_sabri_sayari.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. TAIK. Turkey Brief: Turkish-US Relations. March 2008. www.turkeynow.org/db/Docs/Turkey_Brief_2008.pdf. Accessed 02 October 2008. United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, October 1, 2003.
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United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats. The state of U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, May 11, 2005. United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe. U.S.-Turkish Relations and the Challenges Ahead: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, March 15, 2007. USLU, Nasuh. The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: the History of a Distinctive Alliance. Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2003. YETKN, Murat. Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gercek Oykusu. Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 2004.

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TURKEYS MATURING FOREIGN POLICY: A VIEW FROM THE US Trkiyenin Olgunlaan D Politikas: Amerikadan Bir Bak Jessica SIMS

Abstract: In 2009, both the US and Turkey witnessed significant changes to both their domestic and foreign policies. After an examination of how key figures ideas have impacted the trajectory of the US and Turkeys domestic policies, the article looks beyond the domestic context at how each country is pursuing its foreign policy. Within each countrys foreign policy schemes the most important emerging issues affecting both nations and the US-Turkey relationship are discussed. Considering leaders statements and influential academics and journalists views, the article looks at whether US and Turkish policies converge or diverge on individual issues. Keywords: US Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, US-Turkish Relations zet: 2009 yl hem Washingtonn hem de Ankarann i ve d politikalarnda nemli deiikliklerin yaand bir dnem oldu. Bu makale, Amerikal ve Trk liderlerin lkelerinin i siyasi gelimelerine olan etkisinden hareket ederek iki lkenin d politikalarn incelemektedir. Makalede, Washington ve Ankarann d politikalarnda ikili ilikileri ve iki lke halklarn etkileyen en nemli mevzular ele alnmaktadr. Siyasi liderlerin aklamalarnn yannda ilgili akademisyenlerin ve gazetecilerin grleri dikkate alnarak, ABD ve Trkiyenin d politika hedeflerinin birletii ve ayrld belirli konular zerinde durulmaktadr. Anahtar kelimeler: Amerikan D Politikas, Trk D Politikas, Diplomasi, ABD-Trkiye likileri

Jessica Sims graduated from the Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University in 2009 and is currently a masters student in the History Department at Boazii University.

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INTRODUCTION The past year was one of dynamic change for both the US and Turkey. As each countrys domestic and foreign agendas dramatically expanded, the possibility for new issues and interests to affect the US-Turkish relationship also increased. For the US, the exit of former President George W. Bush and entrance of President Barack Obama ushered in a new approach to international affairs that at times took the country on a markedly different path and at others was indistinguishable from the previous administrations policies. Turkey has likewise opened several notable new channels in its foreign policy. With the appointment of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu in April 2009, the implementation of his foreign policy vision succinctly summarized as zero problems with neighbors has become the ideological foundation for Turkeys interaction with its near abroad. The distinguishing features of this vision are its independence, multi-lateral and proactive nature.1 Although the basis for the US-Turkey relationship remains strongly anchored in shared values, NATO, and US support for Turkeys European Union membership, as a result of both the change in American leadership after eight years of the Bush administration and the intensified pursuit of Davutolus strategy, it is important to examine some of the new issues that are becoming central to US-Turkish relations. Additionally, taking into account the domestic agenda of both President Obama and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan is essential in understanding the approach and perspective of Washington and Ankara towards international affairs and the US-Turkey relationship. 1. OBAMAS FOREIGN POLICY President Obama took office in January 2009 embodying the change he promised to bring to America as the first African-American president who also has Islamic family roots. While the US continues to face the worst economic crisis in decades, Obama sought to tackle the difficult domestic problem of health care reform.
1

Yenal Belgici, Semin Gumsel, Owen Matthews. Risky Diplomacy. Newsweek 28 November 2009. http://www.newsweek.com/id/224704 162

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However as his recent State of Union address underlined, reducing Americas 10% unemployment rate is and will continue to be the main focus of his administration, even at a time when the US is conducting two foreign wars.2 Congressional elections will be held at the end of 2010 in which Obamas political party will be extremely vulnerable to losing its majorities in Congress. This situation dramatically increases the urgency to improve the domestic economic situation and will demand an ever greater amount of Obamas attention. Any work that Obama has attempted to do on the international stage must be seen within this domestic context. Despite coming into office with a distinctly different foreign policy vision than his predecessor George W. Bush, Obama has achieved little success beyond simply articulating his perspective, partially because he has had limited time to focus on international issues as a result of the dire economic situation. During his first year in office one of Obamas central foreign policy themes was to change the global perception of the US from one based on arrogant unilateralism to one based on mutual respect and engagement. The center of this initiative has been the Muslim world which saw a rapid decline in relations with the US particularly following the invasion of Iraq and Bushs global war on terror. The effort to change the US image was paralleled by efforts to use diplomacy to solve some of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the US and the world. In his first trip overseas, Obama emphatically stated his commitment to one day achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. As a centerpiece of this vision is a pledge to reduce the US stockpile of weapons, in conjunction with Russia, and to prevent new nuclear-armed states from emerging. A dialogue with Iran was opened as part of this plan to negotiate an end to what the US and Europe considers a threatening nuclear weapons program in the country. The President has also committed himself to the difficult process of reopening diplomatic talks between Israelis and Palestinians in an effort to find a path towards the hitherto elusive twostate solution that Obama supports. While the administrations multi-front diplomacy resulted in few concrete policy changes during 2009, Obama did take real action in altering the US military
2

27 January 2010 Obama gives the annual State of the Union address in Washington D.C. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address

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engagements around the world. Remaining committed to his promise of ending the Iraq War by 2012, Obama oversaw the removal of US troops from Iraqi cities in the summer and has remained firm in his assertion that the timeline for US withdrawal of all combat troops will not be altered regardless of changing circumstances on the ground. Drawing down the Iraq War, Obama simultaneously increased the US involvement in the war in Afghanistan when he announced at the beginning of December that he will send an additional 30,000 US troops to the country. The difficult process of trying to repair relations with the Muslim world while simultaneously escalating a war in a Muslim country has and will continue to beleaguer Obama over the course of his administration. In his effort to define how the US views and relates with the Muslim world, Obama made two important speeches in Ankara and Cairo. On the last stop of his first overseas tour, Obama addressed the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) where he stressed his desire to work with the Islamic world on mutual interests with mutual respect. 3 Obama was clear that the symbol of him ending his European tour in Turkey was representative of the high importance his administration places on Turkey and the connection he sees between Turkey and the West. Avoiding the term model Muslim democracy4 that Ankara had unenthusiastically heard from the Bush administration to define its view of Turkey, Obama used the phrase model partnership to explain his vision for the US-Turkey relationship. Introducing this term, Obama said that Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation and a predominantly Muslim nationcan create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous. Turkeys connection to the Muslim world is therefore seen as one among several important components of Turkeys position in its region. During Erdoans visit to Washington at the end of 2009,
3

6 April 2009 Obama addresses the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-TheTurkish-Parliament 4 29 June 2004 President speaks at Galatasaray University. Bush Says Democracy will Bring Justice, Freedom, Prosperity. http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2004/June/20040629081619frllehctim0.1081812.html 164

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model partnership was included his description of the growing economic ties between the two countries. Since then, a discussion about how to further define the term model partnership has continued amongst media and academic circles of both countries. However, neither government has released any additional clues as to how this new term defines the relationship. 2. THE DEMOCRATIC OPENING In 2009, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) which has been in power since 2002, restarted the difficult process of finding a political solution to ongoing issues surrounding Turkeys Kurdish population. Although the future of the process is in serious turmoil, particularly following the Constitutional Courts decision to close down the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in December, its initiation was significant as it attempted to move what had been a largely military issue into the public political sphere. Without commenting directly on Turkeys domestic initiatives, the Obama administrations view of democratization efforts in Turkey was broadly articulated at the TGNA when he said, An enduring commitment to the rule of law is the only way to achieve the security that comes from justice for all people. Robust minority rights let societies benefit from the full measure of contributions from all citizens. This perspective would fall in line with a vision of the democratic opening reforms that allows not just Kurdish citizens but citizens of all religions and ethnicities to benefit from this process and to have equal opportunities to participate in their government. The US has been a vocal supporter of Turkeys candidacy for European Union membership and the democratization reforms the Turkish government has made as part of this bid. The US has also been clear that it supports these reforms for Turkeys own benefit and not solely to move it closer to EU membership. Although there is consistent support for Turkeys continued democratization, there is a limit to the level of attention the current Obama administration pays to Turkeys democratic opening. This is the result both of a significant preoccupation with the USs own economic problems and the peripheral place Turkeys domestic circumstances occupies in American foreign policy interests. 165

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Within US government circles, the awareness of this domestic process is essentially only present in the context of how Turkey will develop relations with its southern neighbor Iraq and particularly the Kurdish Regional Government as the US prepares to leave. Perhaps both the impetus and largest obstacle for the democratic opening has been the continued existence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) with its bases in northern Iraq. Regarded as terrorists by both Ankara and Washington, the PKK has been a critical issue in US-Turkish relations especially throughout the Iraq War, which noticeably exacerbated the conflict between the PKK and Turkish state. During Erdoans visit in December, Obama linked the ability to end the PKKs terror campaign with Turkeys domestic reform process saying that the steps Erdoan has taken to reach out to the Kurdish population have been very helpful because terrorism cannot just be dealt with militarily; there is also social and political components. The US views the level of success Turkey has in solving its domestic problems with its Kurdish population as an indicator of how Turkey may be able to help keep Iraq a stable and unitary state in the future. Proposals to open a consulate in Irbil and continuing investments in northern Iraq, particularly in the energy sector, are also viewed as methods by which Turkey can contribute to the strengthening of the Iraqi state while also bolstering its own economy and security. However, beyond its extension to Turkish-Iraqi relations, the US does not have a particular interest in how the democratic opening proceeds in Turkey. 3. IRAN Throughout 2009 one of the most dynamic examples of both Obamas commitment to diplomacy and Turkeys attempt to strengthen relations with its neighbors was Iran. Both the US and Turkey witnessed their respective governments taking new steps to warm, or in the US case defrost, relations with Tehran. For the US, Obamas attempt at diplomacy with the Islamic Republic largely was the result of a strategic concern about the continuation of Irans nuclear program, which the US believes is intended not just for civilian purposes but to acquire nuclear weapons. For Turkey, the presence of a largely unused natural gas supply as well as the
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opportunity for increased trade with a bordering country seem to be the driving force behind Ankaras deepening relations with Iran. In each process the importance of diplomacy was emphasized as the best way to ensure Iran would be a constructive international actor. However, the pursued format of each process has set Ankara and Washington on slightly different paths. In the US attempt to change its relations with Iran, Obama sent a message for the Iranian new year, Nowruz, in which he attempted to articulate directly to the Iranian people a new theme of respect that would characterize his administrations approach to the nation.5 With little reaction to the turmoil following Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads re-election in June, the US continued its opening to Iran by beginning a dialogue with the nation on October 1 as part of the P5+1 talks. After what seemed like an initial agreement for Iran to send the majority of its enriched uranium stockpile to Russia, the talks have steadily worsened as neither proposals from the P5+1 members nor Iran have been acceptable to all sides. As 2009 came to an end the US administration began laying the groundwork for tougher sanctions to be brought against Iran by attempting to consolidate international opinion against Tehrans perceived confrontational stance.6 As the country sharing Turkeys longest border, increasing relations with Iran seemed to be a natural step in Davutoglus zero problems policy. Following unmatched haste in congratulating Ahmadinejad on his controversial re-election, Ankaras growing relationship with Tehran has been a mix of concrete economic developments and flowery rhetoric of brotherhood. Erdoans visit to Iran last October resulted in new commitments by Turkey to invest $3.5 billion in Irans South Pars gas field. As part of an understandable desire to diversify its gas supply
5

White House. Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz. http://www.whitehouse.gov/Nowruz 6 On December 9, 2009 Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Phil Gordon gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in which he said Iran needs to understand the message of the international community that there are consequences for not responding to what we think are generous offers of engagement. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20980/useurope_partnership.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublica tion%2Fby_type%2Ftranscript

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which is dominated by Russia, Erdoans proclamation that Iranian gas could not only be used as a domestic supply for Turkey but also could be included in the proposed western-backed Nabucco pipeline7 went beyond what the US and other European partners will accept.8 Coupled with talks on a joint airline as well as multiplying the bilateral trade volume, Erdoans visit seemed to indicate his view that the way to best deal with Iran is to bring it into the international community through trade and energy links instead of isolating the regime as punishment over the secretive nature of its nuclear program. In addition to the growing trade and business links between Iran and Turkey, Erdoan and Ahmadinejad showed a particular affinity towards proclaiming the relationship as a brotherhood between the two nations. This new description included Erdoans continual support for Irans right to enrich uranium for peaceful nuclear purposes and a dismissal of fears that Iran is attempting to acquire a nuclear weapon. While in Iran on October 27, Erdoan stated This is an exercise on nuclear energy; it is an exercise with peaceful and humanitarian goals.9 Interestingly a recent poll of the Turkish populations perception of Irans nuclear program reveals that Erdoans stance reflects the sentiment of a majority of Turks who do not see Irans nuclear program as a threat.10 This poll is particularly relevant as it may indicate to Washington that Erdoans stance on Iran is unlikely to change despite an almost assured increase in American pressure to support new sanctions.

Steve Bryant and Rob Verdonck. Nabucco Gas Pipeline Forges Ahead Without Contracts. Bloomberg 13 July 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=ad2v9rmABZ.k 8 While on November 6, 2009 during a press conference at the US Embassy in Ankara, Gordon stated the US position that Just to emphasize the core point, even when investments or exchanges with Iran do not fall afoul of our law, as a general principle we dont think now is the time for business as usual with Iran. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_100609.html 9 Abdlhamit Bilici. Irans nuke program for humanitarian ends, Erdoan says. Todays Zaman 28 October 2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-191248-irans-nukeprogram-for-humanitarian-ends-Erdoan-says.html 10 MetroPoll. Trk D Politikasnn Yeni Yz. http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/turkdis-politikasinin-yeni-yuzu 168

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Obama and other senior US officials have made clear their desire to present a united international front against Irans nuclear program. A first test of this effort was the UN-IAEA resolution to condemn Irans evasion of IAEA regulations. Turkey abstained from the vote. Undersecretary of State Philip Gordon expressed US disappointment with Turkey over its failure to support the resolution while emphasizing his perception that both Washington and Ankara share a desire to prevent a nuclear arms race from developing in the Middle East. Recognizing Erdoans view that Turkeys links with Iran could allow it to play a mediating role between Iran and the west, the US has expressed openness to such a possibility, but has qualified any support with a desire for the message being conveyed to be consistent.11 For the US, that means the message is one of diplomacy with consequences if no agreement is reached. As National Security Advisor Jim Jones seemed to indicate in an interview at the end of 2009, the US is apparently not convinced that Turkey will be supportive of any sanctions that the US seeks to impose on Iran.12 Although the US may recognize the potential for Turkey to act as a link to Iran, without certainty that leaders in Ankara and Washington are envisioning the same path for negotiations and consequences to follow, its unlikely that the US will be supportive of Turkeys growing ties with Iran. Particularly if the diplomatic process comes to an end, the US may become more vocally unsupportive and uncomfortable with Ankaras close relationship with Tehran. 4. ARMENIA Among the most praised steps Ankara has taken as part of its zero problems policy has been the rapprochement with Yerevan, which became public in 2008 when President Abdullah Gl visited the country in what became dubbed soccer diplomacy. Unpublicized negotiations that began with Swiss mediation eventually became a source of criticism for both nations leaders who faced strong opposition to any reconciliation between the two countries which have never had formal
11

Council on Foreign Relations. US-Europe Partnership. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20980/useurope_partnership.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublica tion%2Fby_type%2Ftranscript 12 US Growing Impatient with Iran. Wall Street Journal 11 December 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126049205433686663.html

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diplomatic relations. After announcing at the end of August 2009 that a process to normalization had been agreed upon, it was still unclear whether negotiations over the establishment of ties would result in any concrete action. However on October 10, despite a lack of popular support, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian and Davutolu signed a protocol to normalize relations, including opening the border between the two countries. Major powers showed their support for the protocol as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana came to Zurich and helped facilitate the actual signing. In addition to the important step towards building a peaceful and stable Caucasus region, for the US-Turkey relationship the protocol also symbolized some progress on the issue of the Armenian genocide that annually plagues relations. With a large and politically active Armenian diaspora, the debate over the nature of events at the end of the Ottoman Empire is also a domestic issue for American politicians. As a candidate, Obama stated his view that there was an Armenian genocide and even pledged to openly recognize it if he became president, something no other sitting president had previously done.13 However, when the critical April 24th date approached, Obama failed to outright fulfill his campaign promise and instead used the Armenian term Meds Yeghern to describe the events. Obamas skirting of the problem was largely possible because of the newly opened Turkish-Armenian dialogue which Obama said he hoped would allow the two countries to come to terms with the past on their own. 14 US support for the protocol has been clear and consistent and in Obamas most recent meeting with Erdoan, he expressed the American desire to see the process carried through to completion saying he congratulated the Prime Minister on some courageous steps that he has taken around the issue of normalizing Turkish/Armenian relations, and encouraged him to continue to move forward along this path.
13

Organizing for America: Barack Obama.com. Barack Obama on the importance of USArmenian Relations. http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/19/barack_obama_on_the_importance.php 14 White House. State of the President on Armenian Remembrance Day. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-onArmenian-Remembrance-Day 170

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With strong opposition to ratifying the agreement in both the Armenian and Turkish parliament, the prospect of a closed border come April is becoming more real. This will have a serious implication when the Armenian Resolution again surfaces as a problem in US-Turkish relations. If Obama is unable to point to any significant steps forward in the implementation of the protocol, he will have a difficult time maneuvering around the g-word as he did in 2009. Although the likelihood of him triggering a crisis in the Turkish relationship by using the word is still unlikely, Obama may not be able to prevent US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, who comes from a state with a large Armenian population from finally bringing the Armenian Resolution up for vote. This danger is particularly real as 2010 is an election year in which democrats are feared to lose in several congressional and senate races. As the Armenian diaspora is a particularly wellfunded and politically active group that generally supports democrats, there is a real danger that Pelosi will again try to push through the Armenian Resolution in an attempt to hold onto as many democratic supporters as possible.15 Therefore, a clear if unstated goal for the Obama administration will likely be to avoid any problems in the US-Turkey relationship by strongly encouraging both Ankara and Yerevan to continue in their process to normalize relations and open the border as quickly as possible. 5. SYRIA, ISRAEL, GAZA Erdoans now infamous one minute remark that preceded his walk out from the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, has come to be a significant moment in the evolution of the Prime Ministers rhetoric about Turkeys neighbors in the Middle East. Despite a high level of theatrics, this move revealed the real frustration that Turkey had felt when the indirect peace talks it was mediating between Israel and Syria abruptly ended as a result of the Gaza War in late 2008. Since Davos, Erdoan has increased his criticism of Israels actions, and positioned himself as the most outspoken Muslim leader against the mistreatment of Palestinians.
15

The Federal Election Commissions report of campaign contributions by the Armenian American Political Action Committee (PAC). http://query.nictusa.com/cgibin/com_supopp/C00352054/

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In an interview with the American magazine Newsweek, Erdoan elaborated on his view of the situation in Gaza calling it an open air prison and stating his belief that Hamas is not an arm of Iran but is a political party.16 Even during his December visit to Washington, Erdoan spent considerable time speaking about this issue both in his speech at Johns Hopkins University and the German Marshall Fund.17 As a problem in US-Turkish relations, condemnation of Israel over the Gaza War plays a peripheral role in how the US approaches the relationship. In the past year, the most tangible affect was the cancellation of the Anatolian Eagle joint military exercise following Turkeys exclusion of Israel and the subsequent US withdrawal which signaled Washingtons displeasure over Ankaras decision. However, the increased criticism of Israel coupled with Turkeys warming relations with Syria and Iran, have helped fuel the debate in the US about whether Turkey is reorienting itself away from the West and towards its Middle East neighbors. For its part, the Obama administration has made it clear that they do not believe Turkeys axis is shifting away from the West saying instead that they appreciate and understand Turkeys desire to have ties with its neighbors.18 The US has also made it clear that they do not see the issues surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the same way. Obama acknowledged in his Cairo speech that Hamas does have support among the Palestinians.19 However, this is qualified by the US policy that negotiations with Hamas cannot occur until the organization denounces violence and recognizes Israels right to exist. As a result, US officials have not met with the leaders of Hamas and have been clear about their opposition to doing

16

Lally Weymouth. We believe we can achieve something: Turkeys Prime Minister speaks out from Davos. Newsweek 31 January 2009. http://www.newsweek.com/id/182448/page/2 17 Audio and video of Erdoans speech can be found at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/news-andevents/fall2009.htm 18 U.S. Department of State. 4 December 2009 Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Turkish Prime Minister Erdoans Trip to D.C. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133233.htm 19 U.S. Department of State. Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/124342.htm 172

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so until the stated conditions are met.20 This puts US policy squarely opposite Turkish policy which recognizes Hamas as the governing party of Gaza and saw Erdoan play host to senior Hamas officials in 2006. Nonetheless, Gordon as well as US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell have stated Washingtons view that Turkey could still play a role in the peace process.21 Yet Gordon also elaborated that the likelihood of Turkey playing a mediating role either between Israel and Syria or Israel and the Palestinians is slim unless Turkey is seen by all parties as being an honest broker again. This seems to indicate that among administration officials there is a perception of imbalance in how Turkey has approached its zero problems policy in the Middle East.22 Apart from a somewhat ambivalent position on future Turkish mediation in Middle East peace talks, the Obama administration does not seem to have fundamentally changed its view of Turkeys relations with its Middle East region despite debate to the contrary. 6. AFGHANISTAN The war in Afghanistan has dramatically gained importance on the American foreign policy agenda after Obama declared it the right war (as opposed to the wrong Iraq war) and then announced he would send 30,000 more US troops to the country. Additionally included in Obamas new strategy is the commitment of 10,000 more NATO troops which he hopes will join the American forces in pushing back the Taliban and ensuring the stability of the Afghan government. Turkeys role in Afghanistan as part of NATO has been one of peace-keeping and
20

1 June interview with National Public Radio in which Obama declines the notion that opening a dialogue with Hamas is necessary at this stage. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Transcript-of-the-Interview-of-the-Presidentwith-Michele-Norris-and-Steve-Inskeep-NPR-6-1-09 21 25 November US Special Envoy George Mitchell responds to a question about future Turkish mediation in peace talks between Syria and Israel. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132447.htm 22 12 November Ankara Embassy Phil Gordon: when Turkey says it wants to have zero problems with its neighbors and wants to have good cooperative relations with its neighbors, I think most Americans hope that includes Israel. http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_100609.html

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development. In addition to reconstruction work the Turkish government has sponsored the Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia summit to discuss ways of creating a stable and functioning state for the people of Afghanistan.23 While it is clear that the US appreciates the Turkish role in Afghanistan as Obama reiterated during his visit with Erdoan, it is also clear that the US had hoped greater military participation in the NATO mission would be included in Turkeys expanding regional influence. Recent revelations that the actual commitment from NATO for the Afghanistan surge is not even at the 7,000 level as previously stated, could mean that the US will start to push harder for Turkey, as well as other NATO members, to add more troops with less caveats as US Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey stated.24 However, as Erdoan has explained, there are real problems with asking a Muslim majority country to send combat troops to fight in another Muslim nation.25 Obamas attempt at improving relations with the Islamic world may have the affect of sensitizing him to the difficult position Erdoan is in as a result of his request. For both this reason and a pragmatic understanding that pushing Ankara will only strain relations without extracting the commitment Washington wants, it is possible that the US will instead look to Turkey to continue its role as developer and peacekeeper, and not push for Turkey to send combat troops, as the fight to hold Afghanistan together continues to be more difficult and costly. 7. ENERGY AND RUSSIA The emergence of a strong Turkish-Russian partnership is a clear example of Turkey reversing a historical rivalry in favor of pursuing Davutolus zero

23

The Summit of Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia Convened in Istanbul. TRT English 26 January 2010. http://www.trtdari.com/trtinternational/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=2185282d-f8404338-bcde-6f3e06305bcc 24 Craig Whitlock. NATO struggling to fulfill commitments for more troops in Afghanistan. Washington Post 27 January 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012603698.html 25 8 December 2009 Erdoan is a guest on the Charlie Rose Show. http://www.charlierose.com/guest/view/5400 174

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problems strategy, although the relationship began its warming trend earlier. As a regional power and supplier of 65% of Turkeys natural gas, Russia plays a significant role in Ankaras calculations over both its Caucasus and energy policies. Turkeys geographic position between Europe and the Caspian, Middle Eastern and Russian energy supplies has been at the center of Erdoans argument that Turkey should be seen as an energy hub on the world stage.26 This goal has driven Ankara to participate in a range of energy projects with both Russia and European countries, which Washington has at times viewed as competitors and not supplements as Ankara may wish. One of two key energy transit concepts that elevate Turkeys importance as a contributor to regional energy security is the Western backed southern corridor. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which came online in 2006, was the first manifestation of this vision whose core concept is to diversify energy supplies away from the Russian-dominated market. As part of the next stage in developing the southern corridor Turkey joined Austria, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in the Nabucco pipeline project that is intended to bring Caspian natural gas through Turkey and into Austrias Baumgarten station for distribution. Despite having the support of the US and EU, Nabuccos future remains in question because of uncertainty over which countries will supply the gas and because other Russianbacked projects have been more successful in moving through the development process. In addition to the southern corridor or the east-west energy supply route, the north-south corridor that connects Russian supplies under the Black Sea to Anatolia and optimistically to Israel and India, is also key to Turkeys vision of being an energy hub. Blue Stream, completed in 2003, is an essential part of this conception with the South Stream pipeline, set to open in 2015, seen as the next phase. While visiting Russia in January, Erdoan is reported to have affirmed Turkeys backing of South Stream, which would rival Nabucco as an alternative way of providing southern Europe with a natural gas supply. Russian President

26

Tuncay Babal, Turkey at the Energy Crossroads: Turkey, Present and Past, Middle East Quarterly, Washington DC, Spring 2009.

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Vladimir Putin announced that by November 10 Turkey would make all its necessary considerations for construction of the project to begin.27 The US interest and involvement in the Caspian energy market is the result of an overall strategy of increasing diversity in global supplies and ensuring that Europes energy security facilitates economic success.28 As a result, the US interest in completing Nabucco makes it markedly less enthusiastic about Turkeys other energy projects that would challenge the pipeline. Furthermore, Turkeys additional pacts would rely on the already existing supply from Russia instead of diversifying to include other sources which is part of the US energy strategy. As an alternate to Russia and an additional country that would join Azerbaijan as a supplier for Nabucco, Washingtons main candidate has been Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attended the July 2009 intergovernmental agreement signing ceremony for Nabucco and announced that Iraq would indeed contribute 15 bcm to the proposed pipeline. For Turkey, the most consistently proposed additional supplier for Nabucco has been Iran. The US special envoy for Eurasian energy Richard Morningstar has articulated Washingtons opposition to Irans participation in global energy projects until questions over its nuclear program are resolved.29 Although there is agreement over Turkeys importance as a center of energy transit in its region, the Nabucco project is clearly revealing differences between Ankara and Washington over how to develop the concept of the southern corridor beyond just principle.

27

Turkey, Russia Report Progress on Pipeline Deals. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 13 January 2010. http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Russia_Report_Progress_On_Pipeline_Deals_/19288 40.html 28 At a 15 July speech at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC, US special envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar outlined the US energy strategy for Eurasia. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0715_turkey_russia/20090715_turke y_russia_energy.pdf 29 At the Center for American Progress on 28 January 2010 Morningstar stated We see no place for Iranian gas in a Southern Corridor given the current approach of its leadership and while international efforts to address Irans nuclear program are underway. http://www.state.gov/s/eee/rmk/136141.htm 176

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CONCLUSION The US-Turkey relationship has entered 2010 with some familiar problems looming ahead and some unknown ones likely to emerge. As a relationship that has always faced multi-dimensional and multi-regional issues, the newly opened channels of diplomacy that are central to Turkeys maturing foreign policy will continue to add further substance to the evolution of the relationship. Among the most threatening issues for the US-Turkey relationship in the coming months are Iran and Armenia. Now that Russia has joined the US, France, Great Britain, and Germany in publically criticizing Tehrans nuclear program the likelihood of a UN vote on sanctions is quickly growing, leaving Turkey in a precarious position of supporting its neighbor or joining a consortium of its NATO allies and Russia.30 The familiar problem of the US Congressional Armenian Resolution is also on the list of potentially harmful situations for the US and Turkey in the near term. In early February the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman vowed to bring up a vote on the resolution which would mandate official US policy to use the word genocide and would call on Obama to use the word during his annual April 24 address. If there is not significant movement of the protocol through both the Armenian and Turkish parliaments before April the difficulty of preventing the US House of Representatives from bringing the resolution to a full vote will increase. The situation in Gaza and Israels relations with Syria are likely to remain a point of divergence for the US and Turkey publically but it is unlikely that the issues will greatly affect US-Turkish relations. Likewise, as Turkey and the US continue to pursue energy projects in the Caspian region, differences over supply countries and competing pipelines may remain. However, the overall effect is unlikely to do anything but harm the projects themselves, Nabucco in particular, and not significantly damage the relationship. For the Obama administration, the
30

McElroy, Damien. Iran defiant as Russia joins US and France in nuclear sanctions push. Telegraph 16 February 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7252461/Iran-defiant-asRussia-joins-US-and-France-in-nuclear-sanctions-push.html

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war in Afghanistan will still be the main focus but the push for Turkey to add combat troops to the mission is likely to continue to fade from the discussion. While the undoubtedly strong foundation of the partnership will continue to bind the two countries together, as developing issues progressively gain more importance on Washington and Ankaras agenda, the approaches to solving these issues may increasingly draw each country down slightly divergent paths.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY America.gov. Bush Says Democracy will bring Justice, Freedom, and Prosperity http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2004/June/20040629081619frllehctim0.1081812.html (accessed December 16, 2009) BABALI, Tuncay. Turkey at the Energy Crossroads: Turkey, Present and Past, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2009. BELGC, Yenal, Semin Gumsel, and Owen Matthews. Risky Diplomacy. Newsweek, November 28, 2009. http://www.newsweek.com/id/2247044 BLC, Abdlhamit. Irans nuke program for humanitarian ends, Erdoan says. Todays Zaman, October 28, 2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news191248-irans-nuke-program-for-humanitarian-ends-Erdoan-says.html Brookings Institution. Turkey, Russia, and Regional Energy Strategies. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0715_turkey_russia/2009071 5_turkey_russia_energy.pdf (accessed December 17, 2009) BRYANT, Steve, and Rob Verdonck. Nabucco Gas Pipeline Forges Ahead Without Contracts. Bloomberg, July 13 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=ad2v9rmABZ.k Charlie Rose Show. Recep Tayyip Erdogan. http://www.charlierose.com/guest/view/5400 (accessed December 16, 2009) Council on Foreign Relations. The US-Europe Relationship. http://www.cfr.org/publication/20980/useurope_partnership.html?breadcrumb=%2 Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Ftranscript (accessed December 17, 2009) Embassy of the United States, Ankara, Turkey. Foreign Press Center Briefing: Dr. Phillip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.

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http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statements_100609.html (accessed December 18, 2009) Federal Election Commission. Committees and Candidates Supported/Opposed: Armenian American PAC (ARMENPAC). http://query.nictusa.com/cgibin/com_supopp/C00352054/ (accessed January 7, 2010) McELROY, Damien. Iran defiant as Russia joins US and France in nuclear sanctions push. Telegraph, February 16, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7252461/Irandefiant-as-Russia-joins-US-and-France-in-nuclear-sanctions-push.html MetroPoll Stratejik ve Sosyal Aratrmalar. Trk D Politikasnn Yeni Yz. http://www.metropoll.com.tr/report/turk-dis-politikasinin-yeni-yuzu (accessed January 12, 2010) Organizing for America: Barack Obama.com. Barack Obama on the Importance of US-Armenian Relations. http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/19/barack_obama_on_the_importance.php (accessed January 6, 2010) Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies: Johns Hopkins University. Turkey in the 21st Century: Building Peace Through Diplomacy. http://www.sais-jhu.edu/news-and-events/fall2009.htm (accessed December 14, 2009) The Summit of Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia Convened in Istanbul. TRT English, January 26, 2010. http://www.trtdari.com/trtinternational/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=2185282d -f840-4338-bcde-6f3e06305bcc Turkey, Russia Report Progress on Pipeline Deals. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 13, 2010. http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_Russia_Report_Progress_On_Pipeline_Deals _/1928840.html
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U.S. Department of State. Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on Turkish Prime Minister Erdoans Trip to D.C. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/133233.htm (accessed December 7, 2009) U.S. Department of State. Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132447.htm (accessed December 14, 2009) U.S. Department of State. Center for American Progress: 2010 Outlook for Eurasian Energy. http://www.state.gov/s/eee/rmk/136141.htm (accessed February 1, 2010) US Growing Impatient with Iran. Wall Street Journal, December 11, 2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126049205433686663.html WEYMOUTH, Lally. We believe we can achieve something: Turkeys Prime Minister speaks out from Davos. Newsweek, January 31, 2009. http://www.newsweek.com/id/182448/page/2 White House. Transcript of the Interview of the President with Michele Norris and Steve Inskeep. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Transcript-ofthe-Interview-of-the-President-with-Michele-Norris-and-Steve-Inskeep-NPR-6-109 (accessed December 15, 2009) White House. Remarks by the President on the State of the Union. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address (accessed January 25, 2010) White House. Addressing the Turkish Parliament. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-ToThe-Turkish-Parliament (accessed December 16, 2009) White House. Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz. http://www.whitehouse.gov/Nowruz (accessed January 6, 2010).

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White House. State of the President on Armenian Remembrance Day. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-BarackObama-on-Armenian-Remembrance-Day (accessed January 6, 2010) WHTLOCK, Craig. NATO struggling to fulfill commitments for more troops in Afghanistan. Washington Post, January 27, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012603698.html

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BLGE ADAMLAR STRATEJK ARATIRMALAR MERKEZ Trk tarihi incelendiinde gemiteki baarlarn arkasnda iyi yetimi bilge adamlarn bulunduu grlmektedir. Ancak gnmzde olaylarn ok boyutlu olarak gelimesi ve sorunlarn karmaklamas, birka bilge kiinin veya aydnn gelimeleri zamannda ve doru olarak alglamasn ve alternatif politikalar retebilmesini zorlatrmaktadr. Gelimelerin yakndan takip edilmesi, gelecekle ilgili gereki ngrlerin yaplabilmesi ve doru politikalar retilebilmesi iin farkl disiplinlere ve grlere sahip bilge adamlar ile gen ve dinamik aratrmaclarn, esnek organizasyonlar iinde sinerji salayacak ekilde bir araya getirilmesi gerekmektedir. Dnyadaki ve yurt iindeki gelimeleri takip ederek gelecee ynelik ngrlerde bulunmak; Trkiyenin ikili ve ok tarafl uluslararas ilikilerine ve gvenlik stratejilerine, yurt iindeki siyasi, ekonomik, teknolojik, evresel ve sosyo-kltrel problemlerine ynelik bilimsel aratrmalar yapmak; karar alclara milli menfaatler dorultusunda gereki, dinamik zm nerileri, karar seenekleri ve politikalar sunmak maksadyla Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (BLGESAM) kurulmutur. BLGESAMn vizyonu, amac, hedefleri, alma yntemi, temel nitelikleri, tekilat ve yaynlar http://www.bilgesam.org/tr web sitesinde sunulmaktadr.

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BLGE STRATEJ DERGS Bilge Strateji; hakemli ve bamsz bir dergidir. Bilge Strateji, Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Aratrmalar Merkezi (BLGESAM) tarafndan yaynlanmaktadr. Yayn politikas ve bilimsel kriterler, bamsz editrler ve Yayn Kurulunca tespit edilmektedir. Alannda Trke ve ngilizce makaleleri yaynlar. Gz ve Bahar dnemlerinde olmak zere ylda iki kez yaynlanmaktadr. Bilge Strateji, uluslararas ilikiler bata olmak zere tm sosyal bilimler konularnda makaleler ierir. Bilge Stratejinin temel amac sosyal bilimler alanlarndaki farkl dnen yazarlarn fikirlerinden oluan sinerji ile yurt ii ve yurt dnda sosyal bilimler literatrne katkda bulunabilmektir. zellikle, sunaca farkl bilimsel dncelerle Trkiye Cumhuriyetinin siyasi, ekonomik, evresel ve sosyo-kltrel problemlerine zm retebilmektir.

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YAZARLARA BLG NOTU 1-Bilge Strateji Dergisi hakemli ve bamsz bir dergidir. Bilge Strateji Dergisi'nde yaynlanmak zere gnderilen makale daha nce herhangi bir yerde yaynlanmam olmaldr. 2-Makale dili Trke veya ngilizce olmaldr. 3-Makale; yazm stili, anlatmda akkanlk, dilin doru kullanm, yaznn planlamas, dipnotlar ile yaz arasndaki uyum, dipnotlardaki bilgilerin eksiksiz ve doru olmas, dipnotlarn yeterlilii, yaz ile ilgili yeterli kaynan kullanlp kullanlmad, almann bilim dnyasna katks, orijinallii, yazarn iddialarn savunmadaki yeterlilii, yaznn derinlii ve kalitesi gibi noktalarda tutarl olmaldr. 4-Makale 4.000 kelimeden az olmamaldr. 5-Makale ile birlikte 100 kelimeyi amayan zeti (Trke ve ngilizce olarak) ve yazar hakknda 5-6 satrlk bilgi notu da gnderilmelidir. 6-Makale, Times New Roman formatnda 11 puntoda ve 1,15 satr aralnda yazlmaldr. Dipnotlar iin Times New Roman formatnda 10 punto kullanlmaldr. 7-Makalenin bal Trke ve ngilizce olarak metne uygun ksa ve ak ifadeli olmal; balk ve alt balklar kaln harflerle yazlmaldr.

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8- Ana balklar ve alt balklar rakamlarla numaralandrlmaldr. Ana balklar byk harflerle yazlmaldr. Takip eden alt balklar ise, kelimelerin ilk harfleri byk dier harfler kk olacak ekilde dzenlenmelidir. rnek: 1. ANA BALIK 1.1. Alt Balk 1.1.1. Alt Baln Blm 9-Alntlamada dipnot (footnote) sistemi kullanlmaldr. Ayrca, bu alntlama sistemine uygun kaynaka (alfabetik olarak sralanacaktr) makalenin sonuna eklenmelidir. rnek: Kitabn dipnot olarak gsterimi;

Chris Brown, Kirsten Ainley, Uluslararas likileri Anlamak, (ev.) Arzu Oyacolu, Yayn Odas, stanbul, 2006, s. 43. Kitap iindeki blmn dipnot olarak gsterimi;

Ycel Bozdalolu, Yaplandrmac Yaklam (Konstrktivizm), Uluslararas likiler, Giri, Kavram ve Teoriler, (Ed.) Haydar akmak, Platin Yaynlar, Ankara, 2007, s. 150-151. Akademik dergi makalesinin dipnot olarak gsterimi;

Martin Weber, The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the Social Turn in IR, Review of International Studies, No: 31, 2005, s. 195. nternetten alnan dipnotun gsterimi;

Fatih zbay, Trkiye-Rusya likilerinde nc Dnem, 11.05.2010, http://www.bilgesam.org/tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=677


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:turkiye-rusya-iliskilerinde-ucuncu-donem&catid=104:analizlerrusya&Itemid=136 (eriim 08.11.2010). Kaynaka gsterimi;

SOYADI, Ad, Kitabn Ad, Yaynevi, Basld Yer, Basm Tarihi SOYADI, Ad, Makalenin Ad, Yaynland Materyalin Ad, Cildi, Says, Yl 10-Makale Teslim ekli: Makaleler bilgesam@bilgesam.org adresine Bilge Strateji dergisinde yaynlanmak zere gnderildii belirtilerek yazar iletiim bilgileriyle birlikte gnderilmelidir. Bu srete, makalelerle ilgili yaplmas gereken deiiklik ve dzeltmeler yazarlara bildirilecektir. Makalenin deiiklik yaplm hali, bildirim tarihinden en ge iki hafta sonra yukarda belirtilen e-posta adresine tekrar gnderilmelidir. 11-Yaynlanan yazlarn sorumluluu yazarlara aittir. Yazlardaki grler Bilge Strateji Dergisine mal edilemez. 12-Daha fazla bilgi edinmek iin www.bilgestrateji.com adresine baknz.

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