PT&T vs.

NLRC 272 SCRA 596 Facts: Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee who’s having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the said discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that she wasn’t aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t deliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissed from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. Issue: Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due to certain company policy. Ruling: Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Where’s a company policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages.

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband. Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the

congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. 252 Facts: Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Issue: Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Ruling: Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

Balogbog vs. CA G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997 Facts: Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of marriage certificate. Ruling: Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention has no merit. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.

Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez 185 SCRA 425 Facts: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her

respondents. In addition. the Vargases contended that. as the next of kin in the Philippines. As a consequence. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy. he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. in the absence of such qualification. Private respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio. The Penal Code article. it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that. in fact. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code. swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. An exchange of pleadings followed. it is said. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy. and Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite of marriage license. Cosca vs. inter alia. unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144. the respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization. Ruling: There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. for the following offenses: Illegal solemnization of marriage Falsification of the monthly reports of cases Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners. who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code. Complementarily. the term "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft. 294 of the Civil Code. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. despite the absence of marriage license. hence. Invoking Arts. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas. the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisite of marriage. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 Facts: Ramon C. a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of . the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Thus.body. Indubitably. Ruling: On the charge regarding illegal marriages. he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.

But on September 3. defendant. judgments and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. 1955 defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders. trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to pay Beatriz actual. defendant left a note to Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due to opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court but this time defendant’s counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil. criminally and administratively liable. respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage. following their mutual love. decided to get married on September 4. moral and exemplary damages. 1954. On June 21. Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the defendant. gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. Two days before the wedding. wedding apparels. Velez 12 SCRA 648 Facts: Francisco Velez. and Beatriz Wassmer. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations. plaintiff-appellant. defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be returning very soon for the wedding. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff damages. . Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s petition for relief. defendant did not appear nor was he heard from again.the marriage. Wassmer vs. 1954. Thus. However.” Beatriz moved to strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Ruling: The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed to appear. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered. actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

that before starting the ceremony. Arañes vs. which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. 2002 Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret. he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage . MTJ-96-1088 July 19. Orobia without the requisite marriage license. In this case. embarrassment and sufferings. which required the respondent to comment on the complaint. he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario. and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario. Since the marriage is a nullity. 1996 Facts: Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death. among others. among others. No. upon Orobia’s death. a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations. confirming the fact that Mr. Samar.) Commodore Dominador B. Ruling: The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity. Judge Occiano A.Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy A. a married man separated from his wife. despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. petitioner’s right. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. via a sworn Letter-Complaint. he is still considered married to his first wife. MTJ-02-1309 April 11. or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia. Respondent averred. paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. (2) in remote places. which caused her so much hardships. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the FC. he did not violate Article 7.M. Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive death thus. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan. With respect to the second charge.M. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga. No. to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized.

which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. which preceded the issuance of the marriage license. On 28 May 1992. Except in cases provided by law. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal. However. the Supreme Court held that a marriage. which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage. is void. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia. Judges. and even denied her petition. this being a violation of the best evidence rule. and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion. In People vs. A valid. Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married. Upon the death of Roberto. due to the earnest pleas of the parties. who are appointed to specific jurisdictions. Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. No. . respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. After the solemnization. Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. but they never did. Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City. together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Lara. Vda. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. and a resident of Davao City. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented. De Chua vs. and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City. passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence. Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. the influx of visitors. it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage. but it decided in favor of herein respondents. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage. Residence Certificates. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction. CA G. 116835 March 5. 1998 Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. This was latter appealed to the appellate court. he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Transfer Certificates of Title. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.R. there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite. passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.

and in 1996 while in Australia. Cardenas.Republic of the Philippines vs. In fact. 103047 September 12. respondent claims that he . Malvar. No. inter alia. In their application for marriage license. In 1992. The respondent. 1970.R. On October 19. No. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. when Castro discovered she was pregnant. including the procurement of the marriage license. In 1994. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother. Rederick Recio. Castro and Edwin F. absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its nonissuance.R. a Filipina. 1994 Facts: On June 24. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Thus. in Cabanatuan City. Thereafter. including the names of the applicants. an Australian citizen. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29. 1396182 to the contracting parties. the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. 2001 Facts: Article 26. the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. it was only in March 1971. In 1998. 138322 October 2. their conjugal assets were divided. The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license. they lived separately. in Rizal in 1987. 1970 in Pasig. the marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio. their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Castro gave birth. respondent acquired Australian citizenship. There being no marriage license. The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. herein petitioner. a certificate of due search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. with the consent of Cardenas. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage. The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search. Recio G. City Court Judge of Pasay City. he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. On the other hand. 1971. CA and Castro G. Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar. a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. Metro Manila. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Angelina M. As custodians of public documents. claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in November. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage. respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino. a Filipino was married to Editha Samson. petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty. he married Grace Garcia. the couple parted ways.” Since October 1995. In 1989. Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. that the couple decided to live together. Garcia vs. However.

private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that. 1987. and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence. followed by a separation de facto between them. Although. the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country. After about three and a half years of marriage. petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. the court may under some foreign statutes. may be recognized in the Philippines. capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. . Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26. Petitioner. On September 7. provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. which was validly admitted as evidence. Pilapil vs. before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. filed an action for legal separation. seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. 1979. Manila. Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Hence. the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. petitioner Imelda Pilapil. a German national. issued by an Australian family court. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. and private respondent Erich Geiling. petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". The marriage started auspiciously enough. Even after the divorce becomes absolute. In this case. they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry. the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. a Filipino citizen. support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. on the other hand. is admitted. Hence. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action. the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner. Together with other evidences submitted. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens. Thereafter. still restrict remarriage. while still married to said respondent. Therefore. 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree. before they were married. not to its admissibility. this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court. private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. On January 15. 1986. appearance is not sufficient. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. In the present case. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree. and the couple lived together for some time in Malate. the Federal Republic of Germany. it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. marital discord set in. On October 27.

which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. Republic vs. had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. court. 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the Family Code The Office . an American. between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. in any state of the United States.S. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property.A. Thus. Hence. Villanueva were married with two children. Van Dorn vs.. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized American citizen.Private respondent. provided they are valid according to their national law. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.S. which may be recognized in the Philippines. he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. In 1982. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. he cannot sue petitioner. Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business. Upton sued her before RTC. a Filipina. the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. in Hongkong in 1972. on the ground of incompatibility. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes. U. as her husband. Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U. and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley. pursuant to his national law.S. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U. the wife sued for divorce in Nevada. being no longer the husband of petitioner. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no “community property”. an American. married Richard Upton. Romillo Jr. In this case. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void. they further posit that Orbecido should file for Legal Separation or Annulment instead. 1985 shot Teodulfa. long. who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried. there must have been (1) a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen. it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. also to remarry. the following must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact. which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts. and infeasible. For the application of Article 26(2). Ruling: YES. Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be in the case of the former. Pepito had a . 1997. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the alien spouse. and that (2) a valid divorce decree is obtained by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry. Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24. tedious. is futile to sever marital ties. petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Niñal vs. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. and in the case of the latter. (3) divorce decree capacitated one to remarry. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent. should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. (2) foreign law. only about 20 months had elapsed. subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24.of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not applicable and raises this pure question of law. In this case. Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11. at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage. 1986. 1974. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). In lieu thereof. Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period. After Pepito’s death on February 19.

The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment. as manifested in their joint affidavit. 2001 Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano. Sanchez A. it was indicated that both were "separated. but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment. which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. otherwise. having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish. 2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. . had he known that the late Manzano was married. Cosca vs. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Araneta Avenue." Respondent Judge. he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249 Facts: Same. No. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. Article 27-34. Also. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Caloocan City. 2. respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. 3. the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2. and 5.M. 4. he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous. the following requisites must concur: 1. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already. Clearly. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other. he would have advised the latter not to marry again. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.000. According to him. However. Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage. Four children were born out of that marriage. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license. so a marriage license was not required. MTJ-00-1329 March 8. claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. Just like separation.subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. Issues: 1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code. on the other hand. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. in their marriage contract. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage. Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin. free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other. Manzano vs. her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.

he begot a daughter named Cresenciana. Flaviana Montellano. Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding respondents are not legitimate children of their said parents. 163 which were owned by their common father. Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Urbana and Ireneo. CA G. Baldomera. CA rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo. who died on November 8. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents. children on first and second marriage.R. Maria del Rosario. . With his second wife. This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. Ruling: With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui. Upon his death. it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years. Ruling: In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized. the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. namely Jacinto. The petitioners. including the respondents. However. On his first wife. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement. he begot four children.Issue: Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage with the exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code is valid. 1992 Facts: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. are entitled to equal shares of estate of their father. the children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. filed a counterclaim to dismiss the said complaint. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision. Julian and Paulina. he begot three children. Mariategui vs. Lupo died without a will. 1904. Eusebia Montellano. 2 months and 7 days old. L-57062 January 24. children on third marriage. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit. No. 163. And his third wife. Felipa Velasco. At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when he was still unmarried. Issue: Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the said estate. However. descendants from his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No.

As such. he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig. and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living. filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo. one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them. no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. Domingo vs. to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license. private respondent. petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. petitioner. there being no divorce. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect. the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and. have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. It added that private respondent has no property which in his possession. the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage. Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. and were known in the community to be such. provided all requisites for its validity are present. absolute or from bed and board is legitimate. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio.Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. unknown to her. Moreover. The laws presume that a man and a woman. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void. Niñal vs. She alleged that they were married at Carmona. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage. CA 226 SCRA 572 Facts: Delia Domingo. it is from the beginning. Under these circumstances. Rizal. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122 Facts: . that a child born in lawful wedlock. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife. bigamous marriage. as a consequence. deporting themselves as husband and wife.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. (b) alleged in the complaint. Issue: Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. depended on his parents for aid and assistance. Republic vs. subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. 1985. it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. Article 35 Issue: Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio. . 1997 Facts: On April 14. Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends. plaintiff Roridel O. Ruling: The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.Same. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. resulting in frequent quarrels between them. After a year of marriage. Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license. CA and Molina February 13. Ruling: Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son.

The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for both of them for they got married on September 20. No. immaturity and like circumstances. observe love. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. extremely low intelligence. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she never did. Ruling: The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as. On May 18. Issue: Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the FC. 1995 Facts: Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. or to somehow get in touch with Julia. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. CA G. The ecstasy. likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities. Julia called Leouel for the first time. respect and fidelity and render help and support. 112019 January 4. 1986. or at the very least to communicate with him. correlated. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. did not last long.S. Thus. Leouel averred.R. but all his efforts were of no avail. Seven months after her departure. to work as a nurse despite his husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. however. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. while not controlling or decisive. psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which. the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents. include their mutual obligations to live together. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. Julia finally left for the U. Occasionally. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. It was bound to happen.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. Leouel Santos vs. because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’ family affairs. 1988. 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.S. should be given great respect by our courts.. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220. where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to locate. Republic vs. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home. as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U. Quintero-Hamano .

No. an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. However. On October 27. which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. she gave birth to their child. Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. Issue: Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity. petitioner. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor. On January 14. CA held that denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must present evidence. 2004 Facts: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano. No. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. 1993. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on psychological incapacity. 143376 November 26. 1981. Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Choa vs. two children were born. Hence.G. These charges included Complaints for perjury. One month after their marriage. and Alfonso Choa. . Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. illness. On November 16. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person. 1987. on the ground of psychological incapacity. no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. In proving psychological incapacity. Cavite. However.R. Thereafter. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Out of this union. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent. not physical. Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Unknown to respondent. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. After sending money to respondent for two months. it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological. Ruling: The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. respondent. a Japanese national. 1988. respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. concubinage and deportation. Toshio stopped giving financial support. were married on March 15. false testimony. the evidence against petitioner is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. It cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. She wrote him several times but he never responded. 2002 Facts: Leni Choa. Sometime in 1991. The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. Choa G. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Also filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the evidence. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. 149498 May 20.R. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

R. In support of his petition. that petitioner was essentially a normal. More disturbingly. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. a psychiatrist. Abcede. On the other hand. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths. or at least abide by the truth. Indeed. educational attainment and other events or things. who stated. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Clearly in this case. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence presented merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. No. According to the trial court. income. the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation. her occupation. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. shy and conservative type of person. filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes. a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond. No. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. petitioner presented Dr. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. 155800 March 10. state of health. among others−had been duly established. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. the people around her. introspective. Reyes G. 1997 . which according to them. a clinical psychologist. the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Antonio vs. but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations. they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. however. much less its psychic meaning. 2006 Facts: Leonilo Antonio. Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to render the marriage null and void. were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage.The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. After trial.R. Lopez. they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction. including parenting. Ruling: It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. simply because she filed cases against him. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. and Dr. trust and respect. Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity. declared null and void. The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. From the totality of the evidence. respondent. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. 119190 January 16. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous. singing abilities and her income. petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. based on the tests they conducted. respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. CA G. petitioner. there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

On August 19. Hence. Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. there was no sexual contact between them. Until their separation on March 15. The complaint seeks among others. While in Canada. they maintained constant communication. Both agreed to get married. He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. The former replied and after an exchange of letters. Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity. a Filipino citizen. 145226 February 6. and that he might consummate their marriage. 1988. while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent. The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband. In 1984. R. normal and still a virgin. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. His motion was granted. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit. Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. in order to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations. Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Morigo vs. 1989. on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother. with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The husband’s senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. 2004 Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City. The wife claimed that her husband was impotent. In 1990. On the other hand. for a period of four years. He also insisted that their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy. In 1986. She also claimed that her husband married her. and was a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. After school year. they became sweethearts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City. Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge. People of the Philippines G. Issue: . Ruling: Yes. the declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia.Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. the husband claimed that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. When arraigned in the bigamy case. but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. If a spouse. 1991. No. the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. and the refusal is senseless and constant.

stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void. it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. married civilly on September 21. With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100. by providing that the spouses can. Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good faith. her husband abandoned her. by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation." In the instant case. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus. In 1943. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman. and in its Article 108. Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final decree abated the action. 1934 and canonically on September 30. Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. by their reconciliation. Under the circumstances of the present case. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio. no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. without more. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. Go Hiok. needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Peñaranda . Such act alone. Eufemio amended answer to the petition and alleged affirmative. Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent. which is now moot and academic. petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Gandionco vs. however. the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal separation. Being personal in character. Before the trial could be completed. 1943. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. Lapuz-Sy vs.

After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte.R. as a remedy. the couples live with the sisters of the husband. Ginez G. the couple came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters.R. Ruling: Petition is dismissed. Early in July 1951. Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. L-72984 November 27. Teresita also filed a complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong.G. 1956 Facts: Benjamin Bugayong. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage. No. he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering. Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. Issue: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case of concubinage. Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Froilan Gandionco. L-10033 December 28. No. After marriage. Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila. can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at the discretion of the judge. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense. 1987 Facts: Teresita Gandionco. Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of . Support pendente lite. cousin of the plaintiff-husband. who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint. The respondent Judge Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite. On the second day. Bugayong vs. legal wife of the petitioner. before the latter left to report back to duty. Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. while on furlough leave.

as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete). that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies. Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion. accounting and separation of property." that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. that she learned of such marriage only on 1979. It is clear that the petitioner did. the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land. In this interim. In her complaint. in fact. . nor excuse compliance. fishponds and several motor vehicles. specifically pray for legal separation. Ruling: Petition is granted. and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. that they had a child named Consuelo. she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato. Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation." obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato. Pacete vs.infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband. That other remedy. that during her marriage to Pacete. the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code. whether principal or incidental. have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense. the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

asserting that he never refused to see her. Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children. Potenciano vs.R. Potenciano Ilusorio. her husband being Crispin Anahaw. then plaintiff. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit. Defendant. 1967. her illicit lover and above all her own son. However. Respondent. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Macadangdang filed his answer. No. Issue: Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband. CA G. The lower court in a pre-trial conference. an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff.Macadangdang vs. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband. admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner. and granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda Ilusorio. now petitioner. 139789. . with the CIF of Davao. she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. the legally presumed father. then defendant. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. 139808 July 19. In its decision rendered. issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations. the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. much less consent to. 2001 Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio. Correspondingly. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. upon agreement of the parties. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject. For this Court to allow. the lower court dismissed the complaint. an opportunity to be heard. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. This would be a severe assault on morality. She also alleges that due to the affair. CA 108 SCRA 314 Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman. the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago.

However. who is obliged to support the wife. Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. Article 68 emphasize mutual love. Ruling: The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses. may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.Issue: Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family Code to have custody of her husband in consortium. respect and fidelity among husband and wife. Ruling: The law provides that defendant. they are duty bound to live together and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. Goitia vs. the option given by law is not absolute. . Therefore. However. who is obliged to support the wife. may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano. Article 68 Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband outside of the conjugal domicile. 252 Facts: Same. they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil. The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant. The law provides that defendant. having separated from bed and board since 1972.

However. would make the application of the law absurd. Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present case. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. private respondent wed Ofelia Ty. but for another reason. CA G. anxiety. 139789 May 12. No.R. In the same breath. 2000 Facts: Edgardo Reyes. she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish. Bildner G. To do so. he was still married to Anna Maria. married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a civil and church ceremony respectively. the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license. in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church wedding in Makati. petitioner. She submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence.Ty vs. RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent. Ilusorio vs. 127406 November 27. No. private respondent. besmirched reputation. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital obligations of the respondent. they would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital obligation. Should they grant her prayer. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the time they got married.R. However. 2000 Facts: . Logic. social humiliation and alienation from her parents. if not common sense. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. militates against such incongruity.

1995. The children. Sylvia and Lin. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious. Out of their marriage. also a candidate for the same position. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age. On March 29. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective. Issue: Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice. petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to . Therefore. not merely nominal or moral. frail health. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. On the other hand. filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. Romualdez-Marcos vs. When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City. Ruling: It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law. 8 in said certificate. On March 23. Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. However. the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. With these. changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. Ruling: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint. poor eyesight and impaired judgment. the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law but never automatically loses her domicile of origin. To justify the grant of the petition. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 Facts: Article 69. a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 1995. alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. In 1972. private respondent Cirilio Montejo. the spouses had six children.Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty years.

business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity.strengthen and unify the family. 118305 February 12. for the sake of family unity. Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence. Ayala Investments vs. spouses Ching. respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Thereafter. VP. business or activity. occupation. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM. Upon application of private respondents. Private respondents. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other. occupation. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Therefore.R. No. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Thus. filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. 1998 Facts: Article 73. executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments. This difference could. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. CA G. . recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles of origin. the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession. PBM failed to pay the loan. proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. 146683 November 22. he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay. the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. To settle and end a case filed by the first wife. After the death of Zosima. Out their union was born Herminia Palang. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda. 2001 Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. respondent. Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Article 87. both jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. When he returned for good. Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision. A few months before Francisco’s death. who accepted the donation in . Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. Francisco asked his niece Leticia. Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. No.R. to take care of his house and store. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Thereafter. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When Miguel was then 63 yrs. Thereafter. in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. not with his wife or child. Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang. he left to work in Hawaii. On the other hand. old. Francisco registered the lot in his name. he refused to live with his wife and child. Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. Tabancura Vda. As evidenced by deed of sale.Agapay vs. De Batocael G. Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a donation and therefore void. petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with her own money. Arcaba vs. Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Herminia Palang. A few months after the wedding.

prevent him from competently administering his properties. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. CA G. Ruling: The CA.. Sr. 2000 Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. No. Gilda Jardeleza. nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.R. upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.. the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. the donation inter vivos is considered null and void. .” Thereafter. assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. However. In such case. there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties. which the SC affirmed. filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. Respondents. Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property. alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets. 109557 November 29. recovery of possession and damages. Ruling: Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Ernesto Jardeleza. who are nieces. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. ruled that in the condition of Dr. the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case.. Uy vs.the same instrument. the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization. petitioner. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. Therefore. respondent.

physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment". Partosa-Jo vs. The defendant. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendant’s polo shirt and iron safe. to give them financial support. Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. through the definite findings of the trial court. and not mere separation. Therefore. as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. respondent. although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City. When their motions for reconsideration were denied. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. at Bacolod City. was married to Severino de la Cruz. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but retain its affirmation on trial court’s ruling. holds that the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. In point of fact. The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan. defendant. nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership. De La Cruz 130 Phil 324 Facts: Estrella de la Cruz. with vehemence. averring that he has never failed. The complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never entertained. his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their children. The defendant started living in Manila. There must be real abandonment. instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. if the husband. and it is considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife. sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan. both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property. During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay Cadastre. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. two of whom were studying in Manila. Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record. The SC. CA 216 SCRA 692 Facts: Jose Jo. Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. The first woman. neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse. denied that he has abandoned his wife and family. even for a single month. . petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter.De La Cruz vs. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez. petitioner. Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations. They are also engaged in varied business ventures.

Petitioner filed its amended complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note. the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. as evidenced by his signature on a promissory note in behalf of the A & L Industries. the same can be made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo. for the said property to be held liable. About two months prior to the loan. The respondent also refuses to give financial support to the petitioner. Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give support to the petitioner. When the obligation became due and demandable. Ruling: SC ordered the release of the attachment of the said property. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim. alleging that Augusto had already abandoned her and their children five months before the filing of the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed. However. She also alleged that her signature was forged in the special power of attorney procured by Augusto. respondent.. They also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment that the said spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The physical separation of the parties. . BA Finance Corp.Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment. In the case at bar. Though it is presumed that the single proprietorship established during the marriage is conjugal and even if it is registered in the name of only one of the spouses. Issue: Whether or not the exclusive property of private respondent forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be made answerable to the obligation. however. secured a loan from the petitioner. BA Finance Corporation vs. Petitioner contends that even if the signature was forged or even if the attached properties were her exclusive property. sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. CA 161 SCRA 608 Facts: Augusto Yulo. Ruling: SC granted the petition. The trial court issued the writ of attachment thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.

Johnson & Johnson Inc.500 plus interest and costs. Defendant-husband moved to quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the motion. The defendant-husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation incurred by the defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Johnson & Johnson. Spouses Katigbak 90 Phil 77 Facts: The plaintiffs. vs. after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record that there was no privity of contract between respondent and defendant-husband regarding the obligations incurred by the defendant-wife. With these. Only the defendant-wife and her paraphernal property can be held liable. Roberto Laperal Jr. RTC granted the complaint and ordered defendant to pay. However. they held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said obligation. they issued a writ of execution against the properties of the defendant-wife but the two notices of levy on execution covered also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership. who acted as an agent in the sale on the commission of jewels. demands for the payment and even offered accommodations to pay the obligation but failed. and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total sum P113. Subsequently. on the ground that the complaint . petitioner filed a motion to fix the value of the levied properties. CA 262 SCRA 298 Facts: Delilah Vinluan. Hence. Issue: Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred without his consent. Spouses Laperal vs. Ruling: SC denied petition based on the respondent Court’s original findings which had already become final and indisputable. the conjugal partnership. The conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant-husband cannot be levied upon. engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products incurred an obligation to the said company. and his wife Purificacion M. petitioner. as well as the defendanthusband cannot be held liable. The defendant Evelina moved to dismiss. She issued checks amounting to the payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak. Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Thus. defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises. respondent filed a complaint against defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages.

and she is not a necessary party defendant.” The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has been transferred to him. Ruling: The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. rights and properties. Victoria’s will stated that her interests. Ramon was not her agent. Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against spouses Bernas praying that the property entered in the loan agreement be cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. a relative Raymundo Aranas. For the repayment of the sums borrowed by him. and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. Modesto’s will. As a result. To reach both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife Evelina Katigbak. real and personal as her share from the conjugal partnership be bequeathed to Consolacion and Raymundo and also to Dorothea and Teodoro in equal shares. They ground their cause of action upon their alleged discovery on two wills executed by Modesto Aranas and his wife Victoria. The plaintiff opposed the motion but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and acquired the land at the auction sale as the highest bidder. their surviving children. Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz Registry of Property. Issue: Whether or not the property mortgaged be a conjugal property of the spouses Modesto and Victoria. IAC 192 SCRA 21 Facts: Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa owned a parcel of land in Capiz. Modesto and Federico Aranas adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible with his own private funds. The first transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not signed by Evelina. As a security they mortgaged to Bernas their father’s property. his two surviving illegitimate children named Dorothea and Teodoro borrowed P18. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. After they died. signed the agreement as a witness. After the death of Modesto. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any.000 from Jesus Bernas. Issue: Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her husband against the spouses Laperal. "Where the husband is alone liable. on the other hand. are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her". no action lies against the wife. Modesto was married to Victoria Comorro but they had no children. and that both defendants refused to pay the notes. Hence this appeal. About a month later. bequeathed to his two illegitimate children all his interest in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage. which is not the case.failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against her. Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. . Villanueva vs. Neither can the paraphernal property be made to answer for debts incurred by the husband. In the loan agreement executed between the parties. and he did not contract for her.

and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife.000. and then returned the money to said widow.Ruling: Even if it be assumed that the husband’s acquisition by succession of the lot in question took place during his marriage. paid Rosario Gelano Vda. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured. That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary. The plaintiff-appellant. entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. the lot would nonetheless be his “exclusive property” because it was acquired by him “during the marriage by lucrative title”. The deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiffappellant Rosario Gelano. is his exclusive and private property. as administrator of the deceased's estate. was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order. Graciano and Nicolasa. issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership.150. if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration. (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate. Canada. which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased. the sum of P20. the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part. which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate. payable to the latter's estate. and (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds. During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. which Modesto had inherited from his parents. whose main office is in Montreal. as a matter of law. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively. Certain it is that the land itself. . are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter. constitute community property. The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. exclusively. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila. Posadas 56 Phil 215 Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10. if they belong to the assured exclusively. and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. the Bank of the Philippine Islands. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands. Ruling: SC holds. BPI vs. on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership.

however. It is immaterial in the. his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Ruling: The respondent directly received the money or services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession. then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Here. Article 121-122 Issue: Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. Hence. Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson. Meanwhile in Hongkong. it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda. That he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such transactions. and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties. the court promulgated decisions in favor of the Wong’s. levy on execution and the auction. where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business. was dishonored for lack of funds. that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. During the marriage. the law presumes and rightly so. . no actual benefit may be proved.Wong vs. Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as Attys. Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision as well as the writ of execution. They had been most of the time living separately. Issue: Whether or not the properties levied on execution are exclusive properties of Romarico. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. After trial. Katrina was charged with estafa. From the very nature of the contract of loan and services. an action for collection of a sum of money. Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. If he paid it out of his salaries. Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. CA G.R. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. Simply stated. No. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20day period agreed upon. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina. levied upon were four lots in Angeles all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. that contract falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father. Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature. the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. 118305 February 12. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. Ayala Investments vs. While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check. with money borrowed from an officemate. 1998 Facts: Same. Ruling: The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear.

Thus. Defendant-husband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation. 2002 Facts: Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989. respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25. Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25. petitioner issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. Hence. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25. Abelardo G. Inc. No. Thereafter. respondent and his wife filed separate answers. he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof.000.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. seller of the property. Since he is not a stockholder. Carlos Construction. H.Carlos vs. 146504 April 4. petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of the amount he loaned to them. The amount was in full payment of the property. Issue: Whether or not the amount of US$25.000. that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. who acknowledged receipt thereof. She claimed.000.000. defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. from petitioner.R.000. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own. the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. L. . As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband. Ruling: Early in time. thus benefiting the family. however.00 for the purchase of a house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home.

Issue: Whether or not Article 147 correctly applied on the status of the parties in the liquidation of their properties. Valdez vs. with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors. but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Jr. the couple separated. is presumed to be equal. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other. Issue: Whether or not the parties are considered as co-owners of the properties. but separated from their respective spouses. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share. Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered with the SEC.Mallilin vs. likewise provides that. property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which. if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other. Ruling: The Supreme Court stated that. Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name. in the absence of proof to the contrary. The complaint alleged that petitioner and respondent. and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. the property regimes are those provided for in Article . they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties. 2000 Facts: Petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin. cohabited after a brief courtship while their respective marriages still subsisted. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. Article 147. Due to irreconcilable differences. Ruling: A co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Castillo G. RTC 260 SCRA 211 Facts: Same. in avoid marriage. 136803 June 16. Emphasis to the RTC’s judgment on liquidation of properties in connection with the provision of property regime w/o unions of marriage. No.R. both married and with children. During their union. Elvira Castillo.

. The evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner and titles over the property were. covering two parcels of residential land with a house. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City for the return of the said commodities. 2005 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 23 years old when she and Eduardo G. The sale at public auction proceeded. The conjugal home shall equally be co-owned by the couple and shall be divided equally during liquidation in accordance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence. Ruling: The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. the levy on execution of the property was null and void. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. married to Eduardo Francisco. Francisco were married. She alleged then that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo.R. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance. Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan. G. Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial court and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. the fruits of couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Inc.500 bags of cement from MIWCC but failed to pay for the same. who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International. Francisco vs. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco. the case may be. The liquidation of the co-ownership shall be in accordance with the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code which are not in conflict with Article 147 or 148. 151967 February 16. or the value thereof. Eduardo. Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the RTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. No. The Imus Rural Bank. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo.147 or 148as. bought 7. The Register of Deeds made of record at the dorsal portion of the said titles. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. However. Inc. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco. MIWCC made a bid for the property.

clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.thereafter. Confronted with this reality. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. she later claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by cohabitation between her and Miguel. Ruling: The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland. Agapay vs. At that age. SC finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Juaniza vs. issued to the latter as vendee after her marriage to Eduardo. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage. said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Jose 89 SCRA 306 . Palang 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Same. Article 148.

00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1. Issue: Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code (now Article 148 of FC) is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry. petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship. and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest. Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1. there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. 2000 Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos. Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. No. Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant. Upon appeal to the RTC. 1969 which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. that it was agreed upon that after a few months. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. but was denied. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code. the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent. Fernandez G.00 a month. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her. for sixteen (16) years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises. as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building.R.000. In their complaint. Ruling: It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 137650 April 12.Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23. both as rental. and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees . Rosalia Arroyo. which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. and physical injuries suffered by. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of. Tumlos vs." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years. At the time of the accident. and Gina Tumlos. Toto Tumlos.600. the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.

The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial. petitionerspouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property. Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone.R. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. . she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Clearly. No. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. Docena vs. The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. In any event. this fact by itself does not justify her claim. the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the co-owner of the property in litis. Likewise. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. Ruling: Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed. 140153 March 28. her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition.of the other apartments. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. Lapesura G. there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of co-ownership. 2001 Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees. for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.

Daniel. reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences. Ruling: The petition was granted. pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer specifically denied the claim of damages against them. Martinez G.R. however an exception to it. Manolo and Daniel. but also because the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. Sr. After an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties. RTC G. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. that is. Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents’ answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. Hontiveros vs. No. but that the same proved futile. Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made. Sr. As pointed out by the Code Commission. The court dismissed the case and petitioners moved for . This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson for damages due to uncollected rentals on a land located at Jamindan. where the latter appears to have sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila.R. it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. Rodolfo. 162084 June 28. Thus. Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners’ claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after trial. Capiz.Martinez vs. likewise. had been admitted to probate. a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature. that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages. demanding that he vacate the property. Jr. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. 1999 Facts: The spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros. 2005 Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon. the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo. namely. Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion. He then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons. They alleged that they were the owners of the property. In the meantime. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made and/or exerted by them. the allegations must still be proved. No amicable settlement was. RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez. Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. No. 125465 June 29. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.

are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family. Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. and his eleven children. parents and children. who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros. The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother. private respondent Ayson. 129242 January 16. Section 2. whether at law or in equity. Romeo Manalo. Under this provision. 2001 Facts: Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right. but their motion was denied. Ruling: The petition was denied for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward compromise were made prior to filing thereof. of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. this petition for review on certiorari. However. Ruling: Petition was granted. the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife. Manalo. Consequently. At the time of his death. Manalo vs. Hence. 1992. Pilar S. as administrator thereof. whether full or half-blood. the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. ascendants and descendants. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. He was survived by his wife. who are all of legal age.R. Issue: Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners. culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. No. CA G. through counsel. who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros. . petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1.a reconsideration of the order of dismissal. and brothers and sisters. 151 of the Family Code. and petitioner Maria Hontiveros.

as the case may be. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. et al.Albano vs. 1988. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed malpractice as a notary. a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito . His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Gapusan A. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage. during the marriage. 1022-MJ May 7. In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. No. respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Vintar.M. Ruling: To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement. et al.” The said judgment having become final and executory. Breva 185 SCRA 766 Facts: On January 29. a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals entitled "Francisco Salinas. for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership". 1976 Facts: Redentor Albano in a verified complaint charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio Gapusan of Ilocos Norte with incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for tile personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. vs. Jose Modequillo. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family Modequillo vs. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.

It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.. Inc. a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. Ruling: Under the Family Code. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased residential lot with a bungalow. However. Issue: Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family Code. Davao del Sur. Ruling: . Issue: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code. Private Respondent E & L Merchantile. Eventually. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag. it is. and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home. the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. Instead of filing an answer. Manacop Construction Co. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent. Private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. Inc. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution.Malubay at Davao del Sur. the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. Thus. forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof. execution of the judgment was delayed. therefore. Metro Manila to collect indebtedness. If the family actually resides in the premises. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs. the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. before the RTC of Pasig. These chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory.F. The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. Manacop vs. Private respondent opposed the motion. CA 277 SCRA 941 Facts: Petitioner Florante F. In the present case. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. pursuant to the Civil Code. filed a complaint against petitioner and F. a family home as contemplated by law.

Art. And here there is no such proof. (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land. His sickness became worse. No. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former. his wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife. 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC. are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. or at least had access one to the other. his brother.R. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. Macaraig 89 Phil 165 Facts: Mariano Andal. and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. as guardian ad litem. Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. and the child was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas. 105625 January 24. and Emiliano was not impotent. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy. eloped with Felix. brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. CA G. Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Felix. and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. he became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. who did not even attend his funeral. 1994 . The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in question.The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. Maria Dueñas. went to live in his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 FC have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC. Sometime thereafter. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together. Benitez-Badua vs. Andal vs. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife.

RTC ruled that Theresa’s marriage with Mario Gopiao is still valid and subsisting thus the marriage with Gerardo is bigamous and the child born was condemned illegitimate. Concepcion vs. respondents proved by testimonial evidence that spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage because the spouse Isabel was treated by an obstetrician-gynecologist which prevented her to give birth. Vicente’s sister and nephew prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate. The older sister of Vicente also declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the spouses. Gerardo Concepcion found out that his wife was still married to Mario Gopiao. Ruling: Petitioner was not the biological child based on facts. who were unable to procreate. Theresa Almonte married Gerardo Concepcion. both parties submit their pieces of evidence. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. The fact that the child was conceived and born at the time the spouses had lived together. 166. 123450 August 31. On the other hand. upon their death the fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued.Facts: Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. Ruling: Jose Gerardo is deemed born legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was the biological child of the spouses and has the right to be the sole heir. She argued that a putative father cannot have visitation rights over the illegitimate child and the child’s surname be changed to the mother’s maiden name. Theresa averred that he married Mario but that was only a sham and she never lived with him at all. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased spouses and is capable of administering the estate. Custody was then given to Theresa. on the ground that Articles 164. Live of Birth Certificate was repudiated by Notarized of Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses by submitting documentary evidence and that the spouses continuously treated her as legitimate child. Hence. these articles govern a situation where the husband or his heirs denies as his own a child of his wife. In RTC.R. and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the child by nature or biological child of a certain couple. which they begot a child named Jose Gerardo. 2005 Facts: Ma. 170. Issue: Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. Gerardo opposed the motion and insisted on the visitation rights and retention of the father’s surname to the child. The claim for inheritance of a child who is not the biological or adopted child of deceased was denied. Rather. as she was there at the time the spouses were having this problem. CA G. On the other hand. . he filed for annulment on the ground of bigamy. Petitioner Marissa. Marisa Benitez-Badua opposed the petition. No.

The law and only the law determine, who are the legitimate or illegitimate children, for one’s legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein is merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

Liyao vs. Liyao G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Facts: Corazon Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than 10 years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage. Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. During her three day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao. Ruling: SC denied the petition. A child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. SC finds no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Eceta vs. Eceta G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004 Facts: Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and coowner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. Issue: Whether the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta. Ruling: Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pretrial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

Constantino vs. Mendez 209 SCRA 18 Facts: Amelita Constantino, petitioner and waitress at Tony’s Restaurant, met Ivan Mendez, respondent. On that first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he stayed. While dining, Ivan professed his love to Amelita through a promise of marriage and then they have had a sexual intercourse. But after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed that he is a married man. However, they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November 1974 whenever Ivan is in Manila, which resulted to Amelita’s pregnancy. Amelita pleas for help and support to Ivan but failed. She then filed for the recognition of the unborn child and payment for damages. However, Ivan rebutted by the petition of the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. RTC ruled in favor of Amelita, respondent petition the complaint CA that RTC erred in its

ruling. CA favored the respondent and dismissed the complaint of petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Amelita was able to prove the paternity of Ivan to her son Michael to warrant support. Ruling: SC dismissed the petition. She was inconsistent in her response whether they did or didn’t have any sex in Manila in the 1st and 2nd week of November. At first, she said she remembered during cross-examination. Later in her response, she said she doesn’t remember. This is relevant because the child Michael is a FULL TERM baby. He was conceived approximately sometime in the 2nd week of November. She wrote to Ivan asking for support around February stating that she was four months pregnant. This means, she thinks she conceived the child on October. She wrote to Ivan’s wife where she revealed her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. Moreover, she confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend resulting to her leaving work.

Bernabe vs. Alejo G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002 Facts: Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son was born and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died as well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. RTC dismissed the complaint and that the death of the putative father had barred the action. CA ruled that Adrian be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Petitioner Ernestina averred CA’s ruling to be of error due to RTC’s ruling based on Article 175. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter. Ruling: SC ruled in affirmative. an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The FC makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”

Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. At the end of 1945. expressly or impliedly. however. As affirmative and special defenses. the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter. he never recognized Monina. Ruling: SC affirmed the decision of CA in recognizing Monina as illegitimate daughter of Francisco. Moreover. Monina was born in Iloilo. All told. implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Abaya 13 Phil 249 Facts: Casiano Abaya. Further. Monina's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws". had enjoyed the continuous. Francisco alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944. Conde vs. Francisco contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel.R. became a CPA and eventually. as his illegitimate child. such that she obtained a Master's degree. Monina further alleged that Francisco gave her support and spent for her education. Issue: Whether or not Monina Jison is the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family. Paula . laches and/or prescription. 1998 Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison. unmarried. No. 124853 February 24. and did not know of her whereabouts since then. Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such. As a result. and since childhood. FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza Amolar.Jison vs. a Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco's refusal to expressly recognize her. CA G.

The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate. Only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. were the wife of Eutiquio Marquino and their legitimate children all surnamed TerenalMarquino. No. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the acknowledgment of the natural child from Casiano Abaya. . Marquino vs. Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the matter. as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde. She always received financial assistance from them. she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. Thus. Eutiquio was still single.Conde. She prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya. Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete City. The Marquinos. to wit: if he or she died during his or her minority. Respondents appealed to the respondent IAC. Also impleaded as defendants. and Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on the CIF of Negros Occidental. and in three cases only. Annulment of Partition. he or she may exercise it either against the presumed parents or his or her heirs. she died. An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. Issue: Whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character. The records show that Bibiana was born of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino. 1994 Facts: Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation. However. strongly denied her allegations. The right of action which the law concedes to the natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. As exception. IAC G.R. During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence. or while insane. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his or her legitimacy lasts during his or her whole lifetime. on the other hand. The trial court dismissed the case. Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. Ruling: The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Roman Abaya brother of Casiano. Support. came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. 72078 June 27. it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child. or after action had already been instituted. They averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. At that time.

Sadly. not during the lifetime of the parents. Ruling: SC ruled that respondent commited deceitful conduct and orders his dismissal from the service. contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct. Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home and. there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife. She was born out of wedlock of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. respondent ought to know that. excusable negligence or oversight. since then. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. Abadilla vs. complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate". and even after the death of the parents. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility. Respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan. when in truth and in fact. his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence. these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born.Ruling: The child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime. In the case at bench. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. in his comment. In other words. Respondent. and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. . despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla. As a lawyer and a judge. she died before she could present her proof of recognition. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Complainant Abadilla. Issue: Whether or not respondent commited deceitful conduct in legitimating his three illegitimate children born out of adulterous relationship.

and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. with copies thereof seasonably served. to all intents and purposes. petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 Facts: Rene Teotico. no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will. executor. .Teotico vs. filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. or administrator. Republic vs. the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles. as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera. finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance. Ana del Val Chan. As a consequence. The order was duly published. claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. CA and Bobiles 205 SCRA 356 Facts: Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat. the probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof. allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. Teotico. legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir. a deceased brother of the same testatrix. The probate court. be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents. married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The court a quo. and be. and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner. Vicente B. the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. a deceased sister of the testatrix. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Ruling: Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Jason Condat. Hence. then six years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. After the parties had presented their evidence. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. Issue: Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding. issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat. The trial court rendered judgment disposing that the minor child. Rene Teotico. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.

Adelberto's natural parents. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo. Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc. shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. then a minor of 10 years of age. This petition for adoption was granted that is. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Issue: Whether or not petitioners. Tamargo vs. SC holds that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. claimed that not they. notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal. Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents. may still file the instant petition. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. Prior to the incident. Adelberto Bundoc.Ruling: The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. In the instant case. namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura. ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine. the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time. were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. however. but rather the adopting parents. Respondent spouses Bundoc. reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption. Accordingly. a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo. Ruling: SC granted the petition. .

That is good reason for immediate execution. trade or vocation even beyond the age of majority" and on the basis of this article support was granted to Alfredo Javier Jr. USA. respondent and Alfredo Javier. Article 204. Emphasis on the options of support. they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier Jr. the relationship of the spouses become strained and with that Alfredo Javier filed an action for divorce against Salud Arca at Alabama. is the son of petitioner Alfredo Javier. She also professed that the cause of their separation was not of desertion on her part but of the defendant. Ruling: It has been held that the wife. With the events transpired. And that since his departure to US Navy. he had always supported his spouse and his son through allotments by US Navy Department of US Government. Issue: Whether or not the wife can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile. Jr. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252.Javier vs. Issue: Whether or not the defendant is still obliged to support his son even if he reaches the age of majority. Alfredo Javier. Support also includes the education of the person to be supported "until he complete his education or training for some profession. Ruling: Unquestionably. Goitia vs. Alfredo Javier left for US on board a ship of US Navy. may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy. She then stayed to her native place in Tanza. for he was an enlisted man in the US Navy. respondent chose to live with defendant’s parents but left due to frictions having occurred between them. notwithstanding the provision of the law giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his home the one having the right to the same. Lucero 94 Phil 634 Facts: Salud Arca. who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband. Cavite. 262 Facts: Same. Through these she prayed that the complaint be dismissed. respondent averred that defendant was not a resident of Alabama but a resident of Naic. and if financial assistance is to be rendered only at the termination of the appeal his education. . defendant had their marriage solemnized at the MTC of Manila. without fault on her part. At the time of their marriage. Having received the complaint. would be unduly delayed. or the completion thereof. Cavite. Because of defendant’s departure.

By virtue of the said manifestation. the agreement entered into between the petitioner and private respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the nature of a compromise. The trial court denied the motion. future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. ruling that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. De Asis 303 SCRA 176 Facts: Private respondent. The manifestation sent by private respondent amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the subject minor. represented by her legal guardian. Ruling: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor alleged and that he cannot be required to provide support for him. The motion was granted by the trial court. another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against petitioner. Furthermore. which then dismissed the case with prejudice. and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter. this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis. brought an action for maintenance and support against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. the petitioner. in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor. . Furthermore. which cannot be countenanced. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The mother’s child sent in a manifestation stating that because of petitioner’s judicial declarations. Hence. alleging that petitioner is the father of subject minor. the right to claim support from his putative parent. it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from him. Glen Camil Andres de Asis.De Asis vs. she was withdrawing her complaint against petitioner subject to the condition that the latter should not pursue his counterclaim. Issue: Whether or not the lower courts acted in grave abuse of discretion after the first complaint was dismissed and adjudged. herein private respondent. the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. CA dismissed the same. It violated the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. despite repeated demands. Subsequently.

a classmate. was born. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances. Reynaldo was sent by his employer. Issue: Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted. The children are now both over seven years old. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior. Amadora vs. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. meanwhile. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo. though. and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children. He had to leave his children with his sister. Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. fired a gun that . Teresita left for Los Angeles. CA 160 SCRA 274 Facts: Like any prospective graduate. From all indications. Guillerma Layug and her family. a son.Espiritu vs. to Pittsburgh. their second child. this time. California to work as a nurse. CA 242 SCRA 362 Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. While they were in the auditorium of their school. was born on 1988. decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. Ruling: SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of the children to the father. Pablito Damon. the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. As it turned out. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. and given the name Reginald Vince. their daughter. but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed. On 1986. and upon their return to the United States. Teresita. personality conflicts. Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. Rosalind Therese. the National Steel Corporation. thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. Reynaldo is a fit person. Reynaldo and Teresita got married. fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience.

the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. or condoned their non-observance. Moreover. private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Where the school is for arts and trades. Additionally.mortally hit Alfredo. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices. however. the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students. Ylarde's parents. Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora. The remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Issue: Whether or not both private respondents can be held liable for the death of Ylarde. the dean of boys. private respondent Aquino ordered the pupils to help Banez in the burying of the stones caused by the fittered remnants of World War II. Classes had already ceased. ending all his expectations and his life as well. the concrete block caught him. Ylarde vs. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli. where the school is academic. Alcantara and Ylarde. Private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to borrow some rope. the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. pinning him to the wall in a standing position. it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. its rector the high school principal. Ruling: SC close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. together with Daffon and two other students. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school. as the victim's parents. Therefore. filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. petitioners in this case." After private respondent Aquino left. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block. The complaint against the students was later dropped. and the physics teacher. three days later. private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. 2180) should apply to all schools. playfully jumped into the pit. This is the general rule. the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. academic as well as non-academic. Ylarde sustained injuries. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Reason: Old academic schools. Aquino 163 SCRA 697 Facts: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School. the herein petitioners. through their respective parents. After trial. the heads are not liable. Alonso. private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone. a public educational institution located in Pangasinan. As part of work education. the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive . On appeal to the respondent court. Also. Were it not for his gross negligence. he died. Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. Before leaving.

Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages. Mary’s Academy. Vivencio Villanueva and St. Dapitan City. Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years. St. Hence. but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. and Guada Daniel. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents. Carpitanos G. a grown. Allegedly. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Mary’s Academy vs. it is not the school. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. 143363 February 6. 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. There is no showing of such. on the fateful day. As a student of St.man of thirty-five. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence. Sherwin. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School.today. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. the vehicle owner. . Accordingly. the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. No. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard. with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. James Daniel Sr. must have causal connection to the accident.R.

Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption. Art. The father and the . for acts committed by the latter. insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child. Such fault or negligence. Emphasis on effects and suspension/termination of parental authority. The parents of the girl instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. there being no fault or negligence. the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. 2180). APPLICABLE PROVISIONS: Art. between 18 to 19 years old. the mother. in case of his death or incapacity. 18 years old. Articles 220-233. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Libi vs. Ruling: DENIED. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. Ruling: GRANTED. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The simple reason is that the child was still under their care and custody at the time of the incident. and deceased Wendell Libi. the girl lived with her best friend. but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.Tamargo vs. Parental liability is a consequence of PARENTAL AUTHORITY. 2176: Quasi-delict – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Issue: Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the death of Julie Ann Gotiong. In order to avoid the guy. were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. IAC 214 SCRA 16 Facts: Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong. The natural parents of Adelberto should be held liable for damages caused by the child following the doctrine of IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. The father and. diligentissimi patris familias. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible. the girl hold steadfast to her decision. On the day of the incident. CA 209 SCRA 518 Facts: Same. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising due diligence. (Art. 2180: Imputed Negligence – The obligation imposed by Art. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. is called a quasi-delict. the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. But.

Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her. 2180 of the Civil Code. The guy knew of it. that the said partial decision is now final. not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner. The said gun was missing. Republic G. 101 of RPC doesn’t apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already. instead of her maiden name. Santamaria. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL. that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Art. the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Ruling: The fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is. 3. No. Santamaria. It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests. Moreover.mother each had a key. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl.R. she has also ceased to live with him for many years now. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. . such as the bag of his mother. This finding is however without basis. she married Mr. she naturally used. they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Santamaria. The key must have been negligently left lying around or he had free access to it. 4. Santamaria' Mr. that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court. 1962 Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in the CIF of Baguio a petition which reads: 1. Santamaria. The damages is based on Art. 2. these were not the causes upon which the petition was based. That during her marriage to Enrique R. In the first place. that of Elisea L. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition. hence. L-18008 October 30. Santamaria vs. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL. Enrique R. Laperal vs. Enrique R. Elisea L. in our opinion. entitled 'Enrique R. it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name. Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name.

Llaneta vs. and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta. Victoria vda. Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's. L-32504 May 15. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. Shortly after Teresita's birth.R. Agrava G. one Atanacia Llaneta. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died. where she was born. Ruling: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. as she was required to present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon. using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. . The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. de Ferrer. 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname based on her alleged facts. Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. No. instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason. When she was about twenty years old. would cause untold difficulties and confusion.

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