Etext of The Federalist Papers

1

Etext of The Federalist Papers
From: http://www.constitution.org/liberlib.htm Our Thanks to The Consitution Society for Providing This Etext!! Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! Please take a look at the important information in this header. We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. **Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** **Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** *These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and further information is included below. We need your donations. Project Gutenberg surfs with a modem donated by Supra. The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison July, 1998 [Etext #1404] ******The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Federalist Papers****** *****This file should be named

Information about Project Gutenberg feder10a.txt or feder10a.zip***** Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, feder11a.txt VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, feder10b.txt From: http://www.constitution.org/liberlib.htm Our Thanks to The Consitution Society for Providing This Etext!! Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions, all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a copyright notice is included. Therefore, we do NOT keep these books in compliance with any particular paper edition, usually otherwise. We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance of the official release dates, for time for better editing.

2

Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a new copy has at least one byte more or less.

Information about Project Gutenberg
(one page) We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2 million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-two text files per month, or 384 more Etexts in 1998 for a total of 1500+ If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the total should reach over 150 billion Etexts given away. The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, which is only 10% of the present number of computer users. 2001 should have at least twice as many computer users as that, so it will require us reaching less than 5% of the users in 2001. We need your donations more than ever! All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are tax deductible to the extent allowable by law. (CMU = Carnegie- Mellon University). For these and other matters, please mail to: Project Gutenberg P. O. Box 2782 Champaign, IL 61825 When all other email fails try our Executive Director: Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com> We would prefer to send you this information by email (Internet, Bitnet, Compuserve, ATTMAIL or MCImail).

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor ****** If you have an FTP program (or emulator), please FTP directly to the Project Gutenberg archives: [Mac users, do NOT point and click. . .type]
ftp uiarchive.cso.uiuc.edu login: anonymous password: your@login cd etext/etext90 through /etext96 or cd etext/articles [get suggest gut for more information] dir [to see files] get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] GET INDEX?00.GUT for a list of books and GET NEW GUT for general information and MGET GUT* for newsletters.

3

**

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor
** (Three Pages) ***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. *BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project"). Among other things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

4

But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, [1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that time to the person you received it from. If you received it on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement copy. If you received it electronically, such person may choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to receive it electronically. THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you may have other legal rights. INDEMNITY You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: [1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this "Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, or: [1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, including any form resulting from conversion by word processing or hypertext software, but only so long as *EITHER*: [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and does *not* contain characters other than those intended by the author of the work, although tilde (~), asterisk (*) and underline (i) characters may be used to convey punctuation intended by the author, and additional characters may be used to indicate hypertext links; OR [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent form by the program that displays the etext (as is the case, for instance, with most word processors); OR [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC or other equivalent proprietary form). [2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this "Small Print!" statement. [3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the net profits you derive calculated using the method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon University" within the 60 days following each date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". *END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* From: http://www.constitution.org/liberlib.htm Our Thanks to The Consitution Society for Providing This Etext!! FEDERALIST No. 1 General Introduction For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York:

5

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth. Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government. It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even

multiply professions on this head. or may hereafter make its appearance. at the same time. And yet. For in politics. I own to you that. that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. upon many occasions. nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has. and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. to discuss the following interesting particulars: THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED. blameless at least. Were there not even these inducements to moderation. Yes.the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. however. and many other motives not more laudable than these. their interest can never be separated. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment. And a further reason for caution. I have had an eye. In the course of the preceding observations. will spring from sources. in a series of papers. I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. characterized political parties. You will. that. and your happiness. the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. as in religion. see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. My arguments will be open to all. no doubt. and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. personal animosity. party opposition. at all times. to putting you upon your guard against all attempts. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter. On the other hand. on the one hand.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 6 such men may be actuated by upright intentions. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. if not respectable -. in this respect. that we. I propose. we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions. it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth. commencing demagogues. by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. and may be judged of by all. and ending tyrants. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. however just these sentiments will be allowed to be. that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love. have collected from the general scope of them. TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS . I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty. it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty. and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics. which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people. the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people. and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. I shall not. in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment. from whatever quarter. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. my fellow-citizens. It will be forgotten. will be represented as mere pretense and artifice. Ambition. to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare. if duly attended to. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. This circumstance. your dignity. after having given it an attentive consideration. my countrymen. might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. avarice.

which. and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in union. and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government. and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. The same idea. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government. or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies. ___ FEDERALIST No. deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State. However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear. For nothing can be more evident. in its consequences. PUBLIUS 1. But the fact is. tracing the arguments to their consequences. will be evident. a point. and one. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union. we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. AND TO PROPERTY. and the wishes. whether it would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they should. to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject. and it is equally undeniable. no doubt. that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution. the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly. and the probable dangers. 7 It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION. . 2 Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence For the Independent Journal. THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT. It is well worthy of consideration therefore. to all general purposes. be one nation. Wednesday.[1] This doctrine will. is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution. prayers. to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. But politicians now appear. view of it. till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. the certain evils. be gradually propagated. that may seem to have any claim to your attention. under one federal government. 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to decide a question. in all probability. It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united. October 31. must prove one of the most important that ever engaged their attention. and efforts of our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that object. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address. In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance. the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. TO LIBERTY. which it may be imagined. that whenever and however it is instituted. has no adversaries. than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. who insist that this opinion is erroneous. as well as a very serious. that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system.

without having been awed by power. with minds unoccupied by other subjects. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence. It is not to be wondered at. professing the same religion. as if to bind it together. undertook the arduous task. for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. fertile. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders. and who. uninterrupted. It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories. while the most noble rivers in the world. privileges. convened the late convention at Philadelphia. at a very early period. and certain characters who were much opposed to it formerly. fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war. running at convenient distances. speaking the same language. when many of their citizens were bleeding. This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the people. and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. but that one connected. arms. have nobly established general liberty and independence. they as with one voice. and daily consultation. should never be split into a number of unsocial. that a government instituted in times so inauspicious. not imposed. should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer. they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils. and protection. A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people. and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states. and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities. Admit. and watered it with innumerable streams. or influenced by any passions except love for their country. nay. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions. and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism. for so is the fact. nor to BLIND reprobation. and made treaties. Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty. that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren. but to that sedate and candid . that this plan is only RECOMMENDED. and alien sovereignties. and it appears as if it was the design of Providence. are at present of the number. and being pursuaded that ample security for both could only be found in a national government more wisely framed. virtue and wisdom. Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and denominations of men among us. very similar in their manners and customs. As a nation we have made peace and war. it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy. and finally. widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. In the mild season of peace. present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids. united to each other by the strongest ties. yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND approbation. To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights. as a nation we have formed alliances. to take that important subject under consideration. jealous. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen. they observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more remotely the latter. by their joint counsels. attached to the same principles of government.a people descended from the same ancestors.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 8 it nevertheless has its advocates. at a time when their habitations were in flames. to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. they passed many months in cool. This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. in times which tried the minds and hearts of men. and efforts. as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies. With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people -. This country and this people seem to have been made for each other.

being convened from different parts of the country. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents. who obeyed the dictates of personal interest. have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. few of whom had been fully tried or generally known. they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information." PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. America will have reason to exclaim. or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good. and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience. were deceived and deluded. for it is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress. after the most mature deliberation. and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as. and who have grown old in acquiring political information. It is worthy of remark that not only the first. therefore. which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. and they took their advice. They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected. and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen. Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. That certainly would be the case. are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right on this subject. and happy they are in reflecting that they did so. 3 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent . That. or for what good purposes.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 9 consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand. notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it. they really thought prudent and advisable. they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. and the event proved their wisdom. still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention. and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons. These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress. With what propriety. or the undue influence of former attachments. Many. seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives. were also members of this convention. but others. yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities. in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country. that it may be so considered and examined. and which it certainly ought to receive. indeed. from a mistaken estimate of consequences. were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. but every succeeding Congress. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity. but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress. as well as the late convention. Not only many of the officers of government. in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS. That.

although town or country. it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America. for the most part. with respect to the two latter. vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes. The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations. like the Americans. which PROVOKE or INVITE them. and all of them. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union. intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest. Saturday. If this remark be just. and judicious than those of individual States. the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion. 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: 10 IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if. As the former of these comes first in order. Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention. may place men in State assemblies. in addition. under an efficient national government. The JUST causes of war. whether REAL or PRETENDED. it will result that the administration. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal. November 3. the political counsels. then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. and therefore able to annoy and injure us. has. It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers. the best men in the country will not only consent to serve. Spain. yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government. and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise. At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity. and Britain. Because when once an efficient national government is established. and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. are maritime. it is proper it should be the first discussed. -. affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad. arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence. and consequently .especially as it will have the widest field for choice. and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively. that of providing for their SAFETY seems to be the first. the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive. except Prussia. for. as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. but also will generally be appointed to manage it.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor Journal. Hence. as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE. or senates. or courts of justice. or executive departments. or other contracted influence. and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies. and. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government. systematical.

bordering on some States and not on others. But the national government. as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war. As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence. therefore. in thirteen States. and in that respect. will be those who. -. So far. it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter. and commonly do. yet as such temptations may. The bordering States. but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. The national government. not being affected by those local circumstances. it is well known that acknowledgments. have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants. if willing. the governing party may not always be able. feeble as it is. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning. Because.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor more satisfactory with respect to other nations. Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole. if any. but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States. who. result from circumstances peculiar to the State. But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government. even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations. and good faith and justice be preserved.whereas. the temptation will be fruitless. and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people. The wisdom of the convention. but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories. as well as in others. and may affect a great number of the inhabitants. and consequently having little or no influence on the national government. nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others. as well as the laws of nations. will not always accord or be consistent. as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government. or in three or four confederacies. and compensations are often accepted as . and opposes their acknowledging. as well as of men. not reaching the other States. 11 Because. as well as more SAFE with respect to us. under the national government. either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses. in such cases. will be most likely. to prevent the injustice meditated. but those temptations. by direct violence. naturally disposes them to justify all their actions. Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice. adjudications on the same points and questions. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government. will not be affected by this pride. they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones. whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested. or to punish the aggressors. naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The pride of states. and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury. They will be more temperate and cool. and that. will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner. as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments. treaties and articles of treaties. explanations. under the impulse of sudden irritation. Besides. and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government. cannot be too much commended. of one or two States than of the Union. to excite war with these nations. correcting. will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves. or repairing their errors and offenses.

notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish. and those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given. inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized. which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies. the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV. and will be more their policy. November 7. accompanied by four of their senators. 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations. and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves. for. which affect only the mind of the sovereign. there are others which affect nations as often as kings. With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries. revenge for personal affronts. 12 In the year 1685. It is too true. and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances. it is more their interest. nay.. But. or Britain. we interfere with more than one nation. and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities . or chief magistrate. These and a variety of other motives. to ask his pardon and receive his terms. but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult. In the trade to China and India. by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little confederacies. to FRANCE. But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations. absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it. ambition. 4 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power. With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade. but for the purposes and objects merely personal. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it. such as thirst for military glory. He demanded that they should send their Doge. for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war. as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs. but which well deserve our attention. but would also be more easily accommodated. often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. independent of these inducements to war.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor satisfactory from a strong united nation. or any other POWERFUL nation? PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. to restrain than to promote it. endeavored to appease him. Wednesday. however disgraceful it may be to human nature. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain. and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish. or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.

with an eye of indifference and composure. it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations. will. in whatever part of the Union they may be found. would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able. their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part. From these and such like considerations. and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do. added to the circumstance of vicinity. be more amplified and detailed. Let England have its navigation and fleet -. One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men.if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets. pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor which we used to purchase from them. As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole. had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen -. with all their respective forces. and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation. will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford. Wisely. 13 The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent. . and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union. assimilate. to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? We have heard much of the fleets of Britain. in power and consequence by land and by sea. and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators.let Scotland have its navigation and fleet -. and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance. instead of INVITING war. What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England. if consistent with prudence. by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate. relative to the object in question.let Wales have its navigation and fleet -. than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns. do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as. It can move on uniform principles of policy. and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other. the arms. The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances. But if one national government. and the resources of the country. let us inquire whether one good government is not. consolidate them into one corps. and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. when the fleets of America may engage attention. for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline. as well as from others not so obvious at present. if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland. and. and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies. and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion.let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be under four independent governments. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense. In the formation of treaties. as it were. Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side. therefore. and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. because the cheapness and excellence of our productions. it will regard the interest of the whole. if we are wise. and necessarily depends on the government. which might. more competent than any other given number whatever. It can harmonize. and protect the several parts and members. nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.let Ireland have its navigation and fleet -. either one or more or many. will tend to repress and discourage it. and the time may come. and cannot be provided for without government.

It must increase your strength. and by this union the whole island. being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest. that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion. makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland. another to France. as to its rulers may seem convenient). be natural. November 10. and conduce far more to the safety of the people. whether firmly united under one national government. on the other hand. it never fails to be against themselves. if you please. and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace. and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. of whom perhaps they have been jealous. they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. 1706.what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked. which merit our attention. certain it is. 5 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) For the Independent Journal. or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies. Saturday. whereas one government. remove the animosities amongst yourselves. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered. But whatever may be our situation. and perhaps played off against each other by the three. and they will act toward us accordingly. will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair. and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation. and when. that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is. nevertheless. it would. and property. our resources and finances discreetly managed.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 14 Apply these facts to our own case. and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies. to the Scotch Parliament. happen again. The history of the states of Greece. How. and united. would be free from all these embarrassments. and of other countries. pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage. under similar circumstances. liberty. one inclining to Britain. would the others fly to its succor. If. our people free. into three or four independent governments -. our trade prudently regulated. and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole. watching over the general and common interests.what armies could they raise and pay -. and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would. and trade. what a poor. and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. in her letter of the 1st July. and a third to Spain. they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong. our credit re-established. But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. riches. Leave America divided into thirteen or. or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors. contented. and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise. . abounds with such instances. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion. 1787 JAY To the People of the State of New York: QUEEN ANNE. our militia properly organized and disciplined. and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises. or split into a number of confederacies.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors. and happen it would. who will doubtless. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one nation. and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies. that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION. and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union. The North is generally the region of strength. and would also restrain them from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. and many local circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed confederacies would. No sooner would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests. prudence. whatever might promise to diminish her importance. would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise. and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid imputations. even if it was possible to form them so at first. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental nations was really the same. Much time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound policy. strength." envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection. and the partial interests of each confederacy. like most other BORDERING nations. we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good management which would probably distinguish the government of one above the rest. if not to promote. but. it might happen. that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors. or live in the constant apprehension of them. and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness. not only to lose confidence in her neighbors." 15 It was remarked in the preceding paper. be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another. instead of the general interests of all America. yet by the arts and policy and practices of those nations. and good government within ourselves. The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of strength. at a period not very distant. Distrust naturally creates distrust. and foresight would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years. on this occasion. and from whatever causes. and it gives us many useful lessons. admitting that to be practicable. their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed. We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost them. yet we find that they were for ages divided into three. they would always be either involved in disputes and war. Both those passions would lead them to countenance. that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad. whether expressed or implied. and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted. would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence. Whenever. . and by which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed. The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best acquainted.

then. Wednesday. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties. I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different and. in short. These have . Considering our distance from Europe. but on the contrary would be a prey to discord. than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. and from domestic factions and convulsions. which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies. neighboring nations. viz. 6 Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States For the Independent Journal. would frequently be found taking different sides.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 16 They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers.. that they would neither love nor trust one another. and foreign armies into our country. and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations. and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets. When did the independent states. than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. November 14. whether the division of America into any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations. still more alarming kind -. perhaps. it would be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations. Nay. acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions. jealousy. How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies. as in Europe. combine in such alliance. from the arms and arts of foreign nations. would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith. and would produce that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed. FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us. and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign alliances. nor. into which Britain and Spain were formerly divided. so would those treaties be essentially different. it is far more probable that in America. or unite their forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. and what innovations did they under the same character introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to protect. From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies. in a state of disunion. Different commercial concerns must create different interests.those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States themselves. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. Let candid men judge. and mutual injuries. if formed. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form.

and assuming the pretext of some public motive. and at the hazard of the safety and independence. Of this description are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion -. The ambitious cardinal. will themselves recollect a variety of instances. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence.[5] entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. in compliance with the resentment of a prostitute. The celebrated Pericles. as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his counsels. however. after various vicissitudes.[1] at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his countrymen. may with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. or the desire of equality and safety. intermissions. contrary to the plainest dictates of policy. enmities. which take their origin entirely in private passions. and destroyed the city of the SAMNIANS. Men of this class.. who was prime minister to Henry VIII. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society.[4] or from a combination of all these causes.[6] the petulance of another. distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war.[8] had in the contemporary policy. in the attachments. unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood. and rapacious. The same man. which. have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed. attacked. and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. whether the favorites of a king or of a people. would be to disregard the uniform course of human events. and renewals. would be an unnecessary waste of time. To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events. not less numerous than either of the former. stimulated by private pique against the MEGARENSIANS. it was the Emperor Charles V. vindictive. and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which they are members. would be to forget that men are ambitious. Perhaps. interests. was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres. have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or personal gratification. terminated in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. either foreign or domestic. he precipitated England into a war with France. according to their direction. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn.[2] another nation of Greece. or only united in partial confederacies. ferments. and pacifications. hopes. And there are others. permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown.[3] or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity. 17 A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that. the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known. as of Europe in general. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent. vanquished. a reference. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR. of a considerable part of Europe. The influence which the bigotry of one female.[7] and the cabals of a third. or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias..Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor been already in some instances slightly anticipated. but they deserve a more particular and more full investigation. of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe. and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.the jealousy of power. . it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. if these States should either be wholly disunited. tending to illustrate the general principle.

There have been. of course. Commercial republics. dragged their monarchs into war. it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the French. be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries. will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes. or continued them in it. as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV. Hannibal had carried her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome. resentment. becoming an object to the other Italian states. there are still to be found visionary or designing men. both for the one and for the other? Let experience. found means to accomplish that formidable league. before Scipio. Pope Julius II. Rome. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest. rivalships. proceeded from the people. Sparta. administered new incentives to the appetite. that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp. took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. in this particular. Venice. if I may so express it. offensive and defensive. seconding the . have been more frequently engaged in war. which so long kept Europe in a flame. and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. almost as many popular as royal wars. Carthage. and made a conquest of the commonwealth. have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy. nevertheless.[9] which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic. gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage. and are. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific. and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have. contrary to their inclinations. The provinces of Holland. of the commercial kind. like ours. though a commercial republic. invariably been found that momentary passions. and immediate interest. They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea. though dismembered and alienated from each other. predilections. and Carthage were all republics. upon various occasions. They will be governed by mutual interest. and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Yet were they as often engaged in wars.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 18 But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience. figured more than once in wars of ambition. was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. till. who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States. In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. and desires of unjust acquisitions. and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord. the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men. in later times. on the contrary. utility or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions. Few nations. Athens and Carthage. in many instances. have they in fact pursued it? Has it not. in turn. jealousy. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives have. in numerous instances. two of them. avarice. the least fallible guide of human opinions. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON. Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest. and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence. as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce. liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations. Athens.

either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation. at the same time.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 19 ambition. in the event of disunion. let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government. Ibid. as well as the other inhabitants of the globe." 2. confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. Aspasia. From this summary of what has taken place in other countries. the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania. and sometimes even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent. which soon after broke out in the House of Commons. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC. Ibid. and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we. which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial fruits.! So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States. that vicinity or nearness of situation. and by the usual progress of a spirit of resentment. declare -. The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main. with the connivance of Pericles. PUBLIUS 1. 4. for the .the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted. and a war ensued. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi. weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age. or rather the avarice. and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold.[10] protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by sound policy. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation. the innocent were. Letters of reprisal were granted. 3. are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue? Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk. points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY. -. whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own. let the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina. and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the court. Ibid. after a while. and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions. constitutes nations natural enemies. that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics. extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors. The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations. vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles. what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy. because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty."[11] This passage. of a favorite leader. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable. and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts. in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections.

what inducements could the States have. or through the submission of the Indian proprietors. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property. would revive this dispute. and which usually went under the name of crown lands. 10. Madame de Maintenon. This. 20 9. deluged in blood all the nations in the world. even under the restraints of a federal constitution. if disunited. unfortunately for us. was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. however. was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. November 15. the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union. 6. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably. the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them. 7 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) For the Independent Journal. This cause would exist among us in full force. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. with an air of seeming triumph. at different times. we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.precisely the same inducements which have. 8. The League of Cambray. it has been said. 11. A dismemberment of the Confederacy. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IT IS sometimes asked. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy. Duchess of Marlborough. of the tendency of which. the King of Aragon. especially as to all that part of the Western territory which. and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. 7. Madame de Pompadour. This has been so far accomplished as. till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say -. under a continuation of the Union. The Duke of Marlborough. and most of the Italian princes and states. It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution. comprehending the Emperor. Thursday. Worn by the popes. either by actual possession. 5. and would create others on the same . __ FEDERALIST No. But. to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. the King of France.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor embellishment of the statue of Minerva.

If that were at an end. If. we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions. To reason from the past to the future. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other. on one side. In the wide field of Western territory. without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. by cession at least. by negotiation and management. The infractions of these regulations. remained undiminished. contrary to probability. than to establish their own pretensions. if not by any anterior right. that each had a right to a share of this common stock. Even the States which brought forward claims. would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State. The submission was made. till. and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. or separate confederacy. respecting the land at Wyoming.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 21 subject. on the other. saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision. had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim. they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one. Their argument would be. seemed more solicitous to dismember this State. upon all occasions. in contradiction to ours. entered deeply into the same views. Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont. These being small States. At present. could not be revoked. The habits of intercourse. the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States. and the other. a jealousy entertained of our future power. acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage. the States which made the cession. therefore. New Jersey and Rhode Island. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. and Connecticut. . on the basis of equal privileges. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose. which characterizes the commercial part of America. Each State. on a principle of federal compromise. if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited. and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. and exclusions. that a grant. who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. These were New Hampshire. and States. the common property of the Union. This would occasion distinctions. that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed. to reclaim the lands as a reversion. which would beget discontent. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination. and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy. would naturally lead to outrages. to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country. and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties. as to a proper rule of apportionment. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation. like individuals. the efforts to prevent and repel them. a large part of the vacant Western territory is. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania. The spirit of enterprise. once made. and Maryland. by right of representation. Massachusetts. preferences. we shall have good ground to apprehend. there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted. admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. it should be admitted by all the States. nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it. has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. can vouch the opposition we experienced. would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased. something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens.

and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. would be productive of complaints. and the apportionment made.the real deficiency of resources. to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. accidental disorders in the management of the government. Others of them. The apportionment. in their opinion. be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision. foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands. either less impressed with the importance of national credit. must lay duties on her importations. in the meantime. and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. perhaps. Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors. immediate interest in the question. The procrastinations of the former would excite the resentments of the latter. may be considered as another probable source of hostility. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. Connecticut. the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions. and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal contention. Laws in violation of private contracts. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Delinquencies. if not a repugnance. that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money. in addition to the rest. to distinguish the customers in our own markets. as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them. still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes -.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor and these to reprisals and wars. as usual. The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. from the necessities of revenue. or because their citizens have little. The settlement of a rule would. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the . and the co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will answer in the affirmative. which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision. The relative situation of New York. as true as it is trite. would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. upon experiment. and quarrels. These. 22 The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side. and the progressive extinguishment afterward. a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt. and. nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. There is. The citizens of the States interested would clamour. Some of them. if there were not this impediment in the way. be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. nor would it be practicable. from whatever causes. not to be embraced with avidity. and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. For it is an observation. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis. the mismanagement of their finances. would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle. and. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would. recriminations. in the first instance. New York. feel an indifference. New York would neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted. from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors. if any.

of friendship and enmity. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places. have. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States. in similar cases. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. which mutually obstruct invasion. offensive and defensive. in the first period of their separate existence. 1787. with each other. and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject. and we reasonably infer that. an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received. under other circumstances. is no longer a history of nations subdued and .[2] PUBLIUS 1. Formerly. 8 The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States From the New York Packet. would. be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars. a war. it is proposed to publish them four times a week -. would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice. November 20. 2. to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. in that quarter of the globe. the enterprises of one much more considerable. with the aid of posts. __ FEDERALIST No. been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable. and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided. 23 The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible be laid before the public. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons. if not connected at all. have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. or only by the feeble tie of a simple league. that America. to gain admittance into an enemy's country. notwithstanding. Divide and command. Similar impediments occur at every step. this conclusion is to be drawn. though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy. than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. is able to impede. in case of disunion. and finally to frustrate.on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily Advertiser. or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor individual States hereafter. not of PARCHMENT. would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all. acting on the defensive. would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war. but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops. Divide et impera[1] must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us. but of the sword. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe. Tuesday. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island. would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation. The history of war. if unrestrained by any additional checks. and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole. by the operation of such jarring alliances. War between the States.

The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them. I confess. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it. in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. at least. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority. be asked. of battles that decide nothing. have produced an entire revolution in the system of war. These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution. however. But standing armies. This picture is not too highly wrought. They would. which was the true condition of the people of those republics. This. though. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had been effected. It may. to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. we should. and with the assistance of disciplined armies. or their representatives and delegates. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. Small states. at the same time. leaving the frontiers of one state open to another. distinct from the . give way to its dictates. will infallibly produce them. which is the offspring of modern times. after a time. of retreats more beneficial than victories. of much effort and little acquisition. they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free. but of towns taken and retaken. will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. perhaps. which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry. it may be replied. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 24 empires overturned. the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people.[1] Their existence. have often triumphed over large states. but they are solid conclusions. under vigorous governments. In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. Thus. with little difficulty. it would not long remain a just one. and by fortifications. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits. Even the ardent love of liberty will. would be desultory and predatory. may be given to this question. must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. in a little time. see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World. The want of fortifications. which have been destitute of these advantages. and have rendered disciplined armies. would facilitate inroads. The industrious habits of the people of the present day. The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. therefore. equally satisfactory. from the very terms of the proposition. would be the natural course of things. the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger. Frequent war and constant apprehension. Standing armies. and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce. drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard. Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. The means of revenue. problematical and uncertain. at most. War. absorbed in the pursuits of gain. or states of less natural strength. why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers. concurring with the habits of nations. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war. overrun their less populous neighbors. or states of greater natural strength. To be more safe. and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just. it is said. The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors. are not provided against in the new Constitution. be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government. is. and the science of finance. The populous States would. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. by way of objection to this. to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. which require a state of as constant preparation. are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers. by disciplined troops.

that the people of that island may be enslaved from other causes. 25 There is a wide difference. be necessary to our security. the inseparable companions of frequent hostility. and the integral parts should either remain separated. to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power. which is most probable. But if we should be disunited. which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. on the contrary. the contrary of all this happens. guarding it in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion. is all that has been deemed requisite. Europe is at a great distance from us. till the militia could have time to rally and embody. contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day enjoys. or insurrection. its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. in favor of military exigencies. by that situation. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier. and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors. and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it. the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom. and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. In a country in the predicament last described. and always apprehensive of them. It is possible. in a short course of time. but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions. and the citizens. the civil state remains in full vigor. If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. in a great degree. as she would have been. supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. is neither remote nor difficult. to make her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe. in the first case. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent. if at all. a victim to the absolute power of a single man. The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. These armies being. There has been. or to submit to its oppressions. not habituated to look up to the military power for protection. called into activity for interior defense. but as their superiors. and had been compelled. between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions. in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. nor would public opinion have tolerated. or an occasional mob. An insular situation. in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe -. though not easy. but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction. would in all probability be. or. are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights. rarely. like them. also. neither corrupted. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. should be thrown together into two or three confederacies. If. Britain had been situated on the continent. Extensive military establishments cannot. to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. The inhabitants of territories. in this position. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters. No motive of national policy has demanded. and in one which is often subject to them. This peculiar felicity of situation has. little room for the operation of the other causes. they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil. if they are even so inclined. neither love nor fear the soldiery. . a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. we should be. for a long time past. and a powerful marine. nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state.our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other. which serve to weaken their sense of those rights. often the theatre of war. The rulers of the former can have a good pretext.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor body of the citizens. she. at this day. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it.

The efficacy of various principles is now well understood. and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view. and a much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore framed in America. not less magnificent. And. but solid and weighty. which will be equally permanent monuments of their errors. arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place. From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments. as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. in a few glorious instances. But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies of the originals from which they were taken. like most other sciences. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers. November 21. however. most of which contain no guard at all on this subject. The regular distribution of power into distinct . which have flourished for ages. we behold them with a mixture of regret. they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated. and trace it to all its consequences. if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes. I trust. and it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this subject has been taken.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 26 This is an idea not superficial or futile. these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. and formidable. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom. which were either not known at all. has received great improvement. 9 The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection For the Independent Journal. refuted their gloomy sophisms. If they exhibit occasional calms. The science of politics. America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society. __ FEDERALIST No. and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty. while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy. the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated. real. but against the very principles of civil liberty. or imperfectly known to the ancients. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States. and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. certain. the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. have. they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution. PUBLIUS 1. Wednesday. Happily for mankind. not only against the forms of republican government.

as has been already mentioned. capable of increasing. by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little. with great assiduity. on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages. answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue. They are means. Massachusetts. clashing. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth. either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. The utility of a Confederacy. tumultuous commonwealths. North Carolina. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics. The opponents of the plan proposed have. nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence. we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy. nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. which shall be attended to in another place. I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government. cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. Such an infatuated policy. by the multiplication of petty offices. and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States. jealous. that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government. and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. The latter is that which immediately concerns the object under consideration. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC." (says he[1]) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person. however." "This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one. New York. or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. I shall venture. however novel it may appear to some. "It is very probable. it will be sufficient to remark here that. till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to . as well to suppress faction and to guard the internal tranquillity of States. which they intend to form. is in reality not a new idea.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 27 departments. the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma. the introduction of legislative balances and checks. in the discussion of which we are at present interested. the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior. such a desperate expedient. but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America. together with the external force of a monarchical government. Neither Virginia. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work. the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord. and powerful means. by means of new associations. be of use to examine the principle in its application to a single State. might. as to increase their external force and security. but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one confederate government. it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union. had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican. Pennsylvania. and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism. Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place. to add one more. in the sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occasion. And this is the true question. It will.

as far as example will go. those of the middle class to TWO." or an association of two or more states into one state. The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies. able to withstand an external force. for if there be any . in the main. more subtle than accurate. they are reformed by those that remain sound. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. In the Lycian confederacy. of all the advantages of large monarchies. and must effectually remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make." "Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. in every rational import of the terms. arbitrary. modifications. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. The essential characteristic of the first is said to be. And it will be clearly shown in the course of this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed. an association of states. it would still be. it has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government. in fact and in theory. it enjoys the internal happiness of each. but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice. by a constitutional necessity. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished. and not on the other. by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate. though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union. and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. the confederacy may be dissolved." "A republic of this kind." I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages. supposes to be inherent in their nature. The proposed Constitution. They have. and the confederates preserve their sovereignty. It has indeed happened. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences. because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the Union. and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. which serve to prove. Should abuses creep into one part. or a confederacy. The extent. they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. that governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of. has been raised between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. and the smallest to ONE. that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. which is. and with respect to its external situation." "As this government is composed of small republics. may support itself without any internal corruptions. A distinction. This fully corresponds." 28 "If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority. the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities. it is possessed. These positions are. without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. This was certainly the most.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor provide for the security of the united body. The state may be destroyed on one side. at the same time. so long as it exists. delicate species of interference in their internal administration. he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty. that there is no absolute rule on the subject. Were he to have too great influence over one. Were he to subdue a part. this would alarm the rest. which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics. an intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper. by means of the association. with the idea of a federal government. so far from implying an abolition of the State governments. for local purposes. the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON COUNCIL. to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

the other. both ancient and modern. but it would be an unwarrantable partiality. and that measures are too often decided. It will be found. but it will be found. by removing its causes. whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole. and confusion introduced into the public councils. Thursday.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 29 thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions. of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. by controlling its effects. therefore. or of interest. to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side. without violating the principles to which he is attached. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens. at the same time. chap. He will not fail. that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.. provides a proper cure for it. have. and. on a candid review of our situation. indeed. effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations." Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian. i. been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished. who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion. 10 The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) From the Daily Advertiser. equally the friends of public and private faith. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one. the evidence. that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties. by destroying the liberty which is . not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party. that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes. book ix. if not wholly. to set a due value on any plan which. as was wished and expected. November 22. or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. __ FEDERALIST No. that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments." vol. and alarm for private rights. 1787. injustice. cannot certainly be too much admired. By a faction. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models. it would be that of Lycia. says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic. none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. that our governments are too unstable. it is the appointment of their own officers. I understand a number of citizens. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one. and we shall be led to conclude. PUBLIUS 1. particularly. as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations.. adversed to the rights of other citizens. speaking of this association. These must be chiefly. The instability. for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements. and of public and personal liberty. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union. i. but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. "Spirit of Laws. in truth. Yet Montesquieu. which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.

no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests. perhaps. an aliment without which it instantly expires. concerning government. not indeed concerning the rights of single persons. that it was worse than the disease. and those who are debtors. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man. his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other. or. the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results. but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. and render them . The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. and many other points. and he is at liberty to exercise it. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality. The diversity in the faculties of men. that where no substantial occasion presents itself. is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes. themselves the judges. from which the rights of property originate. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty. as well of speculation as of practice. divided mankind into parties. a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time. Yet the parties are. Those who are creditors. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation. is a shilling saved to their own pockets. nay with greater reason. and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. and in what degree. actuated by different sentiments and views. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities. ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire. A landed interest. 30 It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy. which is essential to animal life. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. As long as the reason of man continues fallible. because his interest would certainly bias his judgment. and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors. and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. inflamed them with mutual animosity. in other words. with many lesser interests. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion. because it nourishes faction. With equal. but so many judicial determinations. a manufacturing interest. a moneyed interest. or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions. and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. fall under a like discrimination. and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. yet there is. and.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor essential to its existence. have. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged. an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power. and the same interests. the same passions. according to the different circumstances of civil society. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love. and must be. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property. a mercantile interest. and divide them into different classes. grow up of necessity in civilized nations. the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause. in turn. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. by giving to every citizen the same opinions. and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity. which is essential to political life. and the most numerous party. different opinions will be formed. yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation. the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. corrupt his integrity. not improbably. the other. than it would be to wish the annihilation of air.

the greater number of citizens. by their number and local situation. that is. have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property. secondly. at the same time. the effect may be inverted. can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction. be felt by a majority of the whole. having such coexistent passion or interest. opens a different prospect. on the one hand. will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves. over which the latter may be extended. enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. convened for the purpose. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals. and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. who assemble and administer the government in person. it may well happen that the public voice. which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole. in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. the form of popular government. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. it may convulse the society. . Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented. to refine and enlarge the public views. in the latter. to a small number of citizens elected by the rest. whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country. by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens. On the other hand. they would. The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first. The inference to which we are brought is. By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. on the other hand. we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government. that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed. which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. and their passions. Nor. If a faction consists of less than a majority. can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. When a majority is included in a faction. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide. It may clog the administration. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention. or the majority. but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. Men of factious tempers. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy. A republic. From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy. and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together. their opinions. Under such a regulation. pronounced by the representatives of the people. and promises the cure for which we are seeking. have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights. and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS. by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place. must be rendered. and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. in many cases. relief is supplied by the republican principle.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 31 all subservient to the public good. a communication and concert result from the form of government itself. and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union. The effect of the first difference is. Theoretic politicians. the delegation of the government. be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions. by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens. in almost every case. and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. A common passion or interest will. and greater sphere of country. who have patronized this species of government.

as by reducing it too much. the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure . the former will present a greater option. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. and the smaller the compass within which they are placed. and then betray the interests. against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union. and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice. and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect. the fewer the distinct parties and interests. and being proportionally greater in the small republic. and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority. however small the republic may be. it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried. it is to be remarked that. but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it. By enlarging too much the number of electors. The question resulting is. is enjoyed by a large over a small republic. it clearly appears. first obtain the suffrages. the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents. it follows that. you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests. communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties. as in most other cases. the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government. there is a mean. whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal. Extend the sphere. -. or of sinister designs. in order to guard against the cabals of a few. it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength. and that. if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic. The smaller the society. the representatives must be raised to a certain number. they must be limited to a certain number. and the suffrages of the people being more free. on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. may. the local and particular to the State legislatures. The other point of difference is. again. and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: In the first place. of the people. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy. the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national. the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests. or if such a common motive exists.is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. you render him unduly attached to these. and to act in unison with each other.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 32 of local prejudices. Besides other impediments. where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes. by corruption. that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy. Does it. will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic. the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party. you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens. The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States. It must be confessed that in this. consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here. by intrigue. in fine. in controlling the effects of faction. and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. increase this security. In the next place. Hence. it may be remarked that. or by other means. Hence. however large it may be.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 33 the national councils against any danger from that source. By prohibitory regulations. in fact. has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. Saturday. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States. which have all the dispositions. requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. for an equal division of property. to and from America. ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. which distinguishes the commercial character of America. and likely from local circumstances to remain so -. and the immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other. for commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind. and an indirect conveyance of its products and returns. for instance. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE importance of the Union. for an abolition of debts. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade. Those of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming. and would possess all the means. In the extent and proper structure of the Union. we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three millions of people -. it would not be difficult to trace. with the fairest prospect of success. we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it. throughout the States. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. at the same time. in the ships of another country.to any manufacturing nation. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans. is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion. Did not prudence forbid the detail. which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. If we continue united. There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit. or for any other improper or wicked project. therefore. for the privileges of our markets. upon other . and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. of monopolizing the profits of our trade. and which has. 11 The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy For the Independent Journal. the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers. we had a government in America. between a direct communication in its own ships. in a commercial light. capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our ports. A rage for paper money. in the dominions of that kingdom? When these questions have been asked. we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other. by facts. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us. and of depriving us. as far as possible. what would be the probable operation of this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate. commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. than an entire State. of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. Suppose. extending. This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation.increasing in rapid progression. with painful solicitude. for the most part exclusively addicted to agriculture. November 24. in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district.

who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade. conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the American trade. they have received a plausible. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature. forfeits even the privilege of being neutral. if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers. by inducing an impracticability of success. A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us. as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations. having nothing to fear from us. in this respect. would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign. would with little scruple or remorse. It would be in the power of the maritime nations. but not a solid or satisfactory answer. would produce a relaxation in her present system. on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. to become the arbiter of Europe in America. would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. despicable by its weakness. A price would be set not only upon our friendship. and by transferring to other hands the management of this interesting branch of the British commerce? A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of things. It has been said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain. who. an extensive navigation. An active commerce. they would in all probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as . A few ships of the line. it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies. who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. and as they have a common interest in being our carriers. And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country. the natural strength and resources of the country. By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope. Our position is. A nation. because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the Dutch. would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations. This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the West Indies. in this respect. and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate. But in a state of disunion. But would not her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch. Under a vigorous national government. these combinations might exist and might operate with success. would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. availing themselves of our universal impotence. to prescribe the conditions of our political existence. The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. directed to a common interest. we shall discover that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other. a most commanding one. But in the reverse of this eligible situation. Such a point gained from the British government. and which could not be expected without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets. erelong. and with the importunities of the West India islands. sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side. This situation would even take away the motive to such combinations. to create a navy which. and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within our reach. and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere. at a period not very distant. but upon our neutrality. from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. and still more in preventing our becoming theirs.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 34 occasions. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other. supply their wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. by enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets.

The dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of these rights. To the establishment of a navy. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. that different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. and to that of the Mississippi. and of better quality. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture.I allude to the fisheries. it can scarcely happen that they should all be at one time in the latter predicament. and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital. might make herself the admiration and envy of the world. and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. indeed. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value. advantageously participate in it. would not be unlikely to do it. An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions. and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which. The difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be composed. France and Britain are concerned with us in the fisheries. That unequaled spirit of enterprise. or when time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several States. which would only embrace the resources of a single part. it now is. and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial unions. The necessity of naval protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation. and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 35 would in effect destroy it. What more natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors? This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. would be of signal importance. The disposition of Spain with regard to the Mississippi needs no comment. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop. in different degrees. of course. but if there be a variety of articles. either in the view of naval strength or of national economy. with wisdom. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished. if chiefly constructed of Southern wood. will become.tar. union will contribute in various ways. As a nursery of seamen. but for exportation to foreign markets. The more southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores -. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a greater plenty of iron. a NAVY. pitch. A navy of the United States. no more than the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy. and unsalable at others. To this great national object. It happens. We should then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our commodities. not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home. They. and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation. There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights of the Union -. as it would embrace the resources of all. to the navigation of the Western lakes. it must be indispensable. arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctations of markets. not less than the value. All the navigating States may. The speculative trader will at once perceive the force of these observations. a universal resource. which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to our disadvantage. of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable branch of traffic. and by which we are able to undersell those nations in their own markets. which signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators. The variety. Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods. . and turpentine. and on this account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable obstruction or stagnation. it can call to its aid the staple of another. of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part. from the diversity in the productions of different States. would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided mastery. would be stifled and lost. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope. and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich our enemies and p rsecutors. is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy.

in direct terms. But they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity. Union will enable us to do it. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race. attributed to her inhabitants a physical superiority. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. the active mechanic. 36 There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed. each having a distinct set of interests. Africa. in proportion as commerce has flourished. I shall briefly observe. Unhappily for the other three. extended her dominion over them all. and to teach that assuming brother. as well as geographically. that our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. and the industrious manufacturer.all orders of men. And how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for the products of the earth. The often-agitated question between agriculture and commerce has. November 27. in fine. as well as political. and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. there would still be an intimate intercourse between them which would answer the same ends. and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world! PUBLIUS "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains. from indubitable experience. by promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals. -." __ FEDERALIST No. and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes. and has proved. Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor It may perhaps be replied to this. and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares. which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the quantity of money in a state -. The world may politically. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World. and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion. The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth. which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry. and with them the human species.could that. to the satisfaction of their friends. By multipying the means of gratification. by her arms and by her negotiations. be divided into four parts.that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere. 1787. and have gravely asserted that all animals. and America. concur in erecting one great American system. of a striking and animating kind. 12 The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue From the New York Packet. which furnishes new incitements to the cultivation of land. superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence. Europe. look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils. Tuesday. can only result from a unity of government. A unity of commercial. bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union. have successively felt her domination. Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry. that their interests are intimately blended and interwoven. has. that whether the States are united or disunited. and to make them flow with greater activity and copiousness. it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of industry. by force and by fraud. The assiduous merchant. Men admired as profound philosophers have. interests. land has risen in value. this intercourse would be fettered. interrupted. degenerate in America -. those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise. the laborious husbandman. It has been found in various countries that.[1] Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. in . moderation. in different degrees. received a decision which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them. which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States. Asia.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 37 every shape. and to the celerity with which it circulates. to sustain a long or continued war. the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed. and from excises. He has several times been compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the preservation of his essential interests. a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade. the facility of communication in every direction. fail to augment that article. There are other points of view. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable. the affinity of language and manners. on the other hand. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of popular government. the number of rivers with which they are intersected. cultivated. and of bays that wash there shores. from the experience we have had on the point itself. which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an adversary. and of putting it into the power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade. excises must be confined within a narrow compass. than in America. and. Duties on imported articles form a large branch of this latter description. In some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. The relative situation of these States. Commerce. so far it must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany contain a great extent of fertile. is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason and conviction. and populous territory. that monarch can boast but slender revenues. or of too great abstraction and refinement. from imposts. The pockets of the farmers. in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands. No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be surprised at this circumstance. and it is one. far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind. The temper of our governments. contributing to both these objects. how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy.all these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty. that this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. that state of things which will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best adapted to our political welfare. As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more simple and efficacious. But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections. It is evident from the state of the country. new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried. And yet. The genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. As far as this would be conducive to the interests of commerce. much more practicable. and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the inperceptible agency of taxes on consumption. from the habits of the people. in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. the familiar habits of intercourse. and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied. among a multitude of proofs. If these remarks have any foundation. and the treasuries of the States have remained empty. In most parts of it. so far it must tend to the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain. will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies. for a long time . In America. in a great degree. The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned. to the quantity of money in circulation. upon the strength of his own resources. from the want of the fostering influence of commerce. must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier. -. and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. from the vigor of the government. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt. and is unable.

if we are not able to avail ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. to the economy. it must resign its independence. the whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at four millions of gallons. Neckar computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. That article would well bear this rate of duty. as to the principal part of our commerce. and sink into the degraded condition of a province. judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports. therefore. Destitute of this essential support. And the government having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere. must be had at all events. in small parcels. and of detection. which. even there. would produce two hundred thousand pounds. as well by land as by water. Revenue. In this country. The single article of ardent spirits. resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. at much less expense. and which would be relinquished by separation. nor. would be intolerable in a free country. If. I believe. with respect to each other. What will be the consequence. at a shilling per gallon. and of other neighboring nations. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. as between the coasts of France and Britain. would be both easy and safe. to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation. with the additional facilities of inland communication. perhaps. There is. would rarely choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. would be impracticable. if by disunion the States should be placed in a situation. or to any partial confederacies.[1] There seems to be nothing to hinder their being increased in this country to at least treble their present amount. in the States where almost the . an advantage which nature holds out to us. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State. in their true signification. In France. The passage from them to us. laden with valuable cargoes. it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. Hitherto. there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. that these duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent. Vessels arriving directly from foreign countries. would not permit those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the avenues into their respective countries. there will be. it may safely be asserted. and which.the ATLANTIC COAST. The difference between a direct importation from abroad. on the contrary. but a circuitous contraband to one State. and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it. according to time and opportunity. Here also we should preserve by Union. to the morals. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic. if the principal part be not drawn from commerce. and to the health of the society. Mr.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 38 to come. that one national government would be able. and in Britain they exceed this proportion. the co-operation of its measures in each State would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast. It has been already intimated that excises. are too little in unison with the feelings of the people. The United States lie at a great distance from Europe. This is an extremity to which no government will of choice accede. This is a prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign countries. It is therefore evident. there be but one government pervading all the States. or in a single night. but ONE SIDE to guard -. might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. indeed. such an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture.. are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice. and an indirect importation through the channel of a neighboring State. must be palpable to every man of discernment. further than would be practicable to the States separately. and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed. beyond comparison. under federal regulation. A few armed vessels. nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these spirits. as well after as before their arrival at the places of their final destination. in a few hours. through the medium of another. where there is an inland communication. and at a considerable distance from all other places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade. to extend the duties on imports.

PUBLIUS 1. nevertheless. and there will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. but when we consider that the island of Britain. But public and private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert. must be satisfied in some mode or other. In populous cities. This idea admits not of precise demonstration. as to the principal departments. in a great measure. to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent. we shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.one consisting of the four Northern. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies -. __ FEDERALIST No. coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. we may with propriety consider that of economy. November 28. The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates. and a third of the five Southern States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 39 sole employment is agriculture. there will be but one national civil list to support. Wednesday. without much aggregate benefit to the State. As the necessities of the State.and each of them. If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude. According to this distribution. unless all the sources of revenue are open to its demands. but beyond these circles. in a manner. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another. 13 Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government For the Independent Journal. escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. And as. contains about eight millions of people. Thus we shall not even have the consolations of a full treasury. nearly commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies. No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention. and unite in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion. it must. the finances of the community. each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. from the difficulty in tracing it. another of the four Middle. the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate supply. there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for -. if they are divided into several confederacies. on the other hand. There is little probability that there would be a greater number. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue. If the States are united under one government. and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good. Personal estate (as has been before remarked). properly organized and exerted. Civil power. reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions. cannot be subjected to large contributions. . under such embarrassments. to occasion the oppression of individuals. because there is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of any given number of individuals. cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respectability or its security. it may be enough the subject of conjecture. the defect of other resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the possessors of land. is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent. by any other means than by taxes on consumption. and can. are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous to permit very ample collections in that way.

This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan. and liberty of every part. from various circumstances. in opposition to this still more powerful combination. may with certainty be expected to unite. in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States. is her true policy. Confederacy. may not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. as the conservator of peace among ourselves. from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection. Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to support a national government better than one half. or any number less than the whole. and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue. They may prefer a system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of their commodities. will be strengthened by another supposition. nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. The four Eastern States. on the basis of her own navigation. An active foreign commerce. we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most naturally league themselves under two governments. commerce. in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists. There are other obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it. New York. If. New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier. when we come to take a nearer view of it. than to the tranquillity. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. more probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. 1787. As she must at all events be a frontier. will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground. would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union. and if we also take into view the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States would be divided. situated as she is. we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy. 14 Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered From the New York Packet. an objection. she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern. as the only substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the liberties of the Old World. or one third. Friday. and coincides with the opinions and dispositions of her citizens. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy. as our bulwark against foreign danger. however. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit trade. there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of that State. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern league. if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey. revenue. November 30. rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern. and as the proper . as the guardian of our commerce and other common interests. The more Southern States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 40 The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed. which. which is founded on the principle of expense. If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial considerations.

and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. Under the confusion of names. Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy. It is. It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her consideration. to seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half. consequently. the want of those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find. the observation that it can never be established but among a small number of people. or palliate the evils of those forms. living within a small compass of territory. the amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. and among others. and by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. in order to supply. to which we owe the great principle of representation. the people meet and exercise the government in person. is to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. that in a democracy. applying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. at the same time. no example is seen of a government wholly popular. Can it be said that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union. and founded. A republic may be extended over a large region. as it is perceived that the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of republican administration. whose writings have had a great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. I remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy. computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees. by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be concentred. To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some celebrated authors. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies below that latitude. All that remains. it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles. will be confined to a small spot. that during the term of thirteen years. let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a democracy only. and that the members from the most distant States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from the States in the neighborhood of Congress. by imaginary difficulties. on the west the Mississippi. Taking the mean for the distance. and even in modern Europe.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 41 antidote for the diseases of faction. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees. The limits. within this branch of our inquiries. The true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived. and will include no greater number than can join in those functions. on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees. they have endeavored to heighten the advantages. The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does . wholly on that principle. which have proved fatal to other popular governments. and its force directed to any object which the public good requires. in others falling as low as the forty-second. A few observations on this subject will be the more proper. by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican. and on the north an irregular line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree. the representatives of the States have been almost continually assembled. That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government. as fixed by the treaty of peace. As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand. as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species. in a republic. America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs. A democracy. are: on the east the Atlantic.

or the States forming our western or northeastern borders. Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America. knit together as they are . On a comparison of this extent with that of several countries in Europe. though it would not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government would be compelled. so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union. however formidable in appearance. but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. or nearly throughout. will be at the same time immediately contiguous to foreign nations. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts. may partake least of the ordinary circulation of its benefits. its adversaries would have some ground for their objection. and will thus find. these considerations. Roads will everywhere be shortened. or even to support alone the whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual danger. of course. and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete. I submit to you. but they would find it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy. on particular occasions. be a frontier. accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated. or in their neighborhoods. in the third place. Let it be remarked. to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. where a diet representing the whole empire is continually assembled. which concern all the members of the republic. by the principle of self-preservation. that the intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task. The subordinate governments. they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects. A fourth and still more important consideration is. an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection. and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout. the representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts of the Union. will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country. If they should derive less benefit. the whole extent of the thirteen States. therefore. my fellow-citizens. in greatest need of its strength and resources. or than Poland before the late dismemberment. The arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier. that as almost every State will. A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 42 not probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. and between different parts of each. which we know to be practicable. and that you will never suffer difficulties. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects. to reinstate them in their proper jurisdiction. In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. will retain their due authority and activity. an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout. on one side or other. which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. where another national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. we find that in Great Britain. and to add to them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms. the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. Were it proposed by the plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States. It may be inconvenient for Georgia. and kept in better order. inferior as it may be in size. which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for. in regard to its safety. and which. or however fashionable the error on which they may be founded. It is not a great deal larger than Germany. some observations remain which will place it in a light still more satisfactory. to send their representatives to the seat of government. and will consequently stand. from the Union in some respects than the less distant States. in full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions will allow them their due weight and effect. Favorable as this view of the subject may be. Passing by France and Spain.

and the world for the example. happily. No. December 1. IN THE course of the preceding papers. which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness. in favor of private rights and public happiness. rivals. the people of the United States might. They formed the design of a great Confederacy. my countrymen. and that the difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry has beset the way. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered. the importance of Union to your political safety and happiness. In the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you. believe me. my fellow citizens. must at best have been laboring under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. It will be . by jealousy or by misrepresentation. respectable. at this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils. this was the work most difficult to be executed. Happily for America. whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations. But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected. posterity will be indebted for the possession. and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit. If they erred most in the structure of the Union. can no longer live together as members of the same family. the knowledge of their own situation. and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens. we trust.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 43 by so many cords of affection. is that of rendering us in pieces. to place before you. they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. I have endeavored. the most alarming of all novelties. of the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre. enemies. should you permit that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice. in a clear and convincing light. 15 The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union For the Independent Journal. Saturday. we wonder at the fewness of them. that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors. the truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If their works betray imperfections. can no longer be fellow citizens of one great. the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights. for the whole human race. shut your ears against this unhallowed language. this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention. or for names. Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys. and flourishing empire. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York. consecrate their Union. to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense. they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity. you will recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the attention of a free people. that. and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide. that the field through which you have to travel is in itself spacious. the most rash of all attempts. no government established of which an exact model did not present itself. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the globe. the most wild of all projects. the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be exposed. in order to preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. for custom. that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world. And if novelties are to be shunned. If the road over which you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome. merely because it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America.

Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which. not less than of our rights. in respect to the same treaty. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops. let us make a firm stand for our safety. not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice. our reputation. and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction. The facts that support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large. to which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor my aim to remove the obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done. Here. and have at length extorted from those. It is true. nor treasury. at least. We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation. too stubborn to be resisted. by express stipulations." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either controverted or doubted. and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived. what indication is there of national disorder. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. nor government. which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. have produced a species of general assent to the abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our national system. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. poverty. and which in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. however these may differ in other respects. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity. and can only be fully explained by that want of private and public confidence. and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money. our dignity. which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks.[1] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith. but the . as has been before observed that facts. my countrymen. and which. they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment. 44 In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the subject. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. It must in truth be acknowledged that. a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government. our tranquillity. that there are material imperfections in our national system. which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes? This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the proposed Constitution. impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people. ought first to be removed. There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not experience. the point next in order to be examined is the "insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation of the Union. ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market. without sacrificing utility to despatch. and insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. it may in general be demanded. to the prejudice of our interests.

of observance and non-observance. should prescribe to us. as our mutual jealousies and rivalships. a principle. There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time. consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a confederate government. But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation. from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never realized.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 45 usefulness of the concession. that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws. constitutionally binding on the members of the Union. of a superintending power. this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive and defensive. the scheme would indeed be pernicious. we must extend the authority of the Union to . They still. how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith. at an augmentation of federal authority. in order to show that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections. which. they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized nations. at sovereignty in the Union. subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war. and which is in itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT. or. if it is to be executed at all. as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option. which is the same thing. the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money. seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. and quantity. but they were scarcely formed before they were broken. circumstance. but they have no authority to raise either. in short. and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been enumerated under the first head. but from fundamental errors in the structure of the building. Except as to the rule of appointment. without a diminution of State authority. The consequence of this is. leaving nothing to future discretion. and triple and quadruple alliances were formed. The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS. by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy. It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind. is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy. place. for deviating from a principle which has been found the bane of the old. if we still will adhere to the design of a national government. nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations. in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES. at least. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts. and to drop the project of a general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE. that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head. This renders a full display of the principal defects of the Confederation necessary. which cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric. yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. all the resources of negotiation were exhausted. on the part of the old adversaries of federal measures. under the direction of a common council. and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion. in fine. While they admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy. If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each other. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union. and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and enemies of each other. we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government. and complete independence in the members. there should still be found men who object to the new Constitution. but it would have the merit of being. upon the only principles that can give it a chance of success. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world. and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.

with perfect good-humor. for which they would blush in a private capacity. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is actuated. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice. There was a time when we were told that breaches. there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs. and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. without constraint. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. The reverse of this results from the constitution of human nature. that the persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of a confederacy will at all times be ready. amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom. but these sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. to execute the resolutions or decrees of the general authority. or. therefore. to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. a penalty or punishment for disobedience. and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects. From this spirit it happens. the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed without the intervention of the particular administrations.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor the persons of the citizens. and an unbiased regard to the public weal. the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will. be enforced. Regard to reputation has a less active influence. 46 Government implies the power of making laws. by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. in fact. or by the COERCION of arms. It is evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can. and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims. which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men. If. whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not. It is essential to the idea of a law. This simple proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect. The first kind can evidently apply only to men. It has its origin in the love of power. would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought. that disposes those who are invested with the exercise of it. every breach of the laws must involve a state of war. there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. that compose it. In an association where the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the communities. when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. there is. Sentences may be denounced against them for violations of their duty. by the COERCION of the magistracy. in other words. will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. an impatience of control. without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state. This language. The same process must be repeated in . Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind. that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members. in the last resort. and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny. experience. All this will be done. or States. or communities. or by military force. of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected. whatever it may be. A spirit of faction. at the present day. and belied the original inducements to the establishment of civil power. which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. -. can only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice. by the States.the only proper objects of government. the last kind must of necessity. that it be attended with a sanction. which is essential to a right judgment. This penalty. Such a state of things can certainly not deserve the name of government. be employed against bodies politic. will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses. that in every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties. in the nature of sovereign power. and military execution must become the only instrument of civil obedience. nor would any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. In addition to all this. The rulers of the respective members.

"I mean for the Union. and the immediate effect of the use of it. framed by the councils of the whole. This exceptionable principle may. . PUBLIUS 1. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the complying. Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration. in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads. arrested all the wheels of the national government. Each State. The confirmations of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. will always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. as truly as emphatically. matured themselves to an extreme. which has. in their political capacities. to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 47 every member of which the body is constituted. could not. the only constitutional remedy is force. long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits. at different times. who looked forward to remote consequences. and that whenever they happen. It has happened as was to have been foreseen. 16 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) From the New York Packet. as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have made of it. I shall content myself with barely observing here. and the execution of the plans. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies. is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of the confederate kind. step by step. civil war. and to crush us beneath its ruins. of which we have any account. The causes which have been specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. which history has handed down to us. or communities. has successively withdrawn its support. the applauding suffrages of political writers. under the Confederation. at length. who have seen how difficult it often is. yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience. and under different impressions. be styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring. the delinquencies of the States have. Tuesday. The measures of the Union have not been executed. where there is no exterior pressure of circumstances. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States. and brought them to an awful stand. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand. appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken principle. that of all the confederacies of antiquity. to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points. as far as there remain vestiges of them. and were accordingly those which have best deserved. without hesitation. till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a federal government. 1787." __ FEDERALIST No. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such assemblies. combat. the Lycian and Achaean leagues. and which even speculative men. or to the least delinquent States. and have most liberally received. deliberating at a distance from each other. In our case. December 4. the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite.

without difficulty. whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority. in its application to us. to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. It is easy to see that this problem alone. as often as it should occur. if a large and influential State should happen to be the aggressing member. will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective capacities. And the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. would instantly degenerate into a military despotism. It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. and of oppression. or. from the firm union of which they had so much to fear. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. This would be the more likely to take place. considering the genius of this country. . it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league. nor would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could. There would. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union. would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted. and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty. it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to its cause. Independent of this motive of sympathy. inflame the passions. Such a scheme. The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. of partiality. The suggestions of wounded pride. be invented to alarm the apprehensions. the better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. When the sword is once drawn. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived. If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national government it would either not be able to employ force at all. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States within the limits of their duty. and conciliate the good-will. even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. If associates could not be found at home. but it will be found in every light impracticable. even at the distance of half a century.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 48 It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government. It is not probable. with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement. This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. the instigations of irritated resentment. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing. in the majority that happened to prevail in the national council. it would often be impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. Whoever considers the populousness and strength of several of these States singly at the present juncture. similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defense. It would rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single member. And the case must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views. They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. in fact. In the article of pecuniary contribution. when this could be done. A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity. would even be capable of answering its end. in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail. who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to individuals. and looks forward to what they will become. as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers. if practicable at all. be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. which would be the most usual source of delinquency. recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers. that the complying States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against the non-complying States.

and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals. Attempts of this kind would not often be made with levity or rashness. would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a decided preponderancy in the contest. They would be obliged to act. The government of the Union. possess all the means. or TO ACT EVASIVELY. so as not to appear. in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half. it could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws. The pausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. if they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves. like that of each State. the particular governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. As to those partial commotions and insurrections. as to the objects committed to its care. in short. the principle of legislation for sovereign States. upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. it could be overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the same evil under the State governments. of executing the powers with which it is intrusted. and the measure is defeated. exemption. The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this. which sometimes disquiet society. To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. The magistracy. It has rarely been attempted to be employed. because they could seldom be made without danger to the authors. with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions. from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction. unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority. and void. But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not require the intervention of the State legislatures. If opposition to the national government should arise from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals. The success of it would require not merely a factious majority in the legislature. and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of bloody wars. that are possessed and exercised by the government of the particular States. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defense. would doubtless be as ready to guard the national as the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness. or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not . they have only NOT TO ACT. they. If the interposition of the State legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union. The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience. and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. and have aright to resort to all the methods. No omissions nor evasions would answer the end. that if any State should be disaffected to the authority of the Union. and in such a manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land. as the natural guardians of the Constitution. and bring the matter to the same issue of force. being equally the ministers of the law of the land. it must be founded. has never been found effectual. but against the weaker members. but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature. supported by military coercion. that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives. unconstitutional. or advantage.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 49 Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties. and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution. from whatever source it might emanate. but the concurrence of the courts of justice and of the body of the people. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. It must.

. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 50 infect the great body of the community the general government could command more extensive resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind than would be in the power of any single member. all those things. may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: AN OBJECTION. in the first instance. they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. and all the powers necessary to those objects ought. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution. finance. that the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives. spread a conflagration through a whole nation. and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities. It may be said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful. December 5. or to the splendor of the national government. in certain conjunctures. to be lodged in the national depository. No form of government can always either avoid or control them. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require. or through a very large proportion of it. in my last address. Wednesday. and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion. in other words. for argument's sake. will generally possess over the people. a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions. and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. in short. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence. and the possession of them. negotiation. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State. of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered. And as to those mortal feuds which. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty. Commerce. When they happen. can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. still it may be safely affirmed. 17 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. would contribute nothing to the dignity. the people of the several States. which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. But let it be admitted. which are proper to be provided for by local legislation. or. would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. to the importance. that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition. the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature. they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm. because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory. and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization. for that reason.

cannot be particularized. not unfrequently. is the most powerful. The operations of the national government. which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments. and frequent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. There was a common head. and a number of subordinate vassals. confederacies. The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted. esteem. Relating to more general interests. and. whose authority extended over the whole nation. and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. the times of feudal anarchy. who had large portions of land allotted to them. and of all others which have borne the least analogy to them. When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities. that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. strictly speaking. and. and reverence towards the government. It is a known fact in human nature. and an active sentiment of attachment. Though the ancient feudal systems were not. contributes. the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince. the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union. and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or . affection. more than any other circumstance.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 51 The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national government. But in general. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to authority of the sovereign. chieftain. dangerous rivals to the power of the Union. which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light. and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign. which answered. and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off. yet they partook of the nature of that species of association. who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience. -. the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative men. running through every part of the society. being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property. This. and which will form so many rivulets of influence. either to preserve the public peace. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood. This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by historians. most universal. of all others. falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens. or sovereign. The variety of more minute interests. without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it might afford. regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake. There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments. This great cement of society.I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. which will necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local administrations. would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise. less likely to inspire an habitual sense of obligation. in proportion. within his particular demesnes. unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter. independent of all other causes of influence. to impressing upon the minds of the people. This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation. they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people. to his neighborhood than to the community at large. but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State administrations would be directed. or feudatories. It is that which. or to protect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too weak. he would acquire a personal weight and influence. on the other hand. to the persons of whom they held it. the purpose of a more regular authority. for the time.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

52

States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority. This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom. The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into particular DEPOSITORIES, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies. A concise review of the events that have attended confederate governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. 18 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the New York Packet. Friday, December 7, 1787 MADISON, with HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States. The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

53

powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple. In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines by which government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions. Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination. It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party. Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage. After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude. Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athenians who had begun it. As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the confederacy.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

54

Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome. The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction. The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it. The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was preferred. It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems. It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted. One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY. We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic. Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

55

and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who, as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league. The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most abject compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achaeans, though weakenened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed universal liberty[1] throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour. I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head. PUBLIUS 1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the members on the federal head. __ FEDERALIST No. 19 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 8, 1787 MADISON, with HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

56

In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and decorations of power. Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members. The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial chamber. The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe. From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels. The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving

and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe. and punished the inhabitants. though director of another circle. They either fail to execute their commissions. to be more united by the necessity of self-defense. arising from the jealousies. It may be asked. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters. who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers. pride. Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common. and the articles of it. incident to the nature of sovereignty.these causes support a feeble and precarious Union. made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution. on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor the innocent with the guilty. and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies. outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. infected with local prejudices. that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. and the Duke of Bavaria. or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. and have. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. confusion. betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness. on various occasions. with one half of the empire. the emperor. -. disarmed. as he had secretly intended from the beginning. In Donawerth. the weakness of most of the principal members. He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand troops. The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among these sovereign subjects. We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. and reannexed the city to his domains. Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his imperial sovereign. on some public occasions. that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. to which foreign powers are parties. of giving them an interior organization. the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary dominions. the enemy are in the field. perhaps. . a free and imperial city of the circle of Suabia. whilst the repellant quality. badly paid. and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy. produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts. In one of the conflicts. compared with the formidable powers all around them. separate views. founded on a proper consolidation. its situation is still deplorable. in which the emperor. on any emergency. which has been judged necessary in time of peace. The small body of national troops. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions. that before the diet can settle the arrangements. the emperor himself was put to flight. what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members. if this obstacle could be surmounted. prevents any reform whatever. and which time continually strengthens. was on one side. If the nation happens. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution. with the other half. to revive an antiquated claim. on the opposite side. and misery. is defectively kept up. Previous to the peace of Westphalia. and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected. and commonly proved an overmatch for him. and finding it a fit occasion. and before the federal troops are ready to take it. obtained an appointment to enforce it. and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members. and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury. 57 In the sixteenth century. are retiring into winter quarters. In the exercise of these. of general inbecility. Peace was at length negotiated. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony. the Abbe de St. with one part of the empire on his side. and Sweden.[1] he took possession of it in his own name. Nor is it to be imagined. was seen engaged against the other princes and states. and dictated by foreign powers. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire.

where all the most important concerns are adjusted. "Nouvel Abrég. by the mutual aid they stand in need of. by the fear of powerful neighbors. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets. for suppressing insurrections and rebellions. with the United Provinces. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases. and which have left the general diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages. and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. at the head of the Catholic association. against the contumacious party. 20 The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) From the New York Packet. though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense. it serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. __ FEDERALIST No. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. PUBLIUS 1. to have severed the league. December 11. The controversies on the subject of religion. which merits attention. Chronol. d'Allemagne. may be said.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 58 If more direct examples were wanting. de l'Hist. This tribunal. or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable . it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up. no common judicatory. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne. 1787. who. by their joint interest in their dependent possessions. no common troops even in war. That separation had another consequence. an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded. in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons. and of Luzerne. that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons. The competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683. no common coin. etc. choose an umpire. which all the cantons are bound to enforce. in fact. pronounces definitive sentence. might not improperly be taken notice of. by their individual weakness and insignificancy. capable of trying its strength. and to employ force. as a government over local sovereigns. at the head of the Protestant association. The provision is. it failed. The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy. with France. Tuesday. Poland. in case of disagreement.. Pfeffel. nor any other common mark of sovereignty.. They have no common treasury. to one of which they were formerly subject. So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United States. it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors. if necessary. MADISON." says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition. by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners. who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one third of its people and territories. with Victor Amadeus of Savoy. with HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics. which in three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests. under an oath of impartiality. They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position.

His revenue. however. and in general regulates military affairs. from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure. to regulate the mint. to assist at the deliberations of the States-General. he has. A council of state. In all important cases. to make war and peace. considerable prerogatives. three. and peculiar calamities from war. appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers. discord among the provinces. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor texture. The union of Utrecht. and at their particular conferences. a chamber of accounts. amounts to three hundred thousand florins. from entering into foreign treaties. They hold their seats. As stadtholder of the union. reposes an authority in the States-General. In all these cases. The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances. not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous. yet confirming all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed. but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the . and of the governments and posts of fortified towns. to raise armies and equip fleets. to execute treaties and alliances already formed. to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals. unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. and superintends and directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval affairs. to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports. In his military capacity he commands the federal troops. foreign influence and indignities. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors. consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. exclusive of his private income. from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe. to give audiences to foreign ambassadors. however. and. and has throughout the power of pardon. with five colleges of admiralty. whose sentences are not executed till he approves them. The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General. some for six. some for life. 59 The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states. Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy. In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces. In his marine capacity he is admiral-general. a precarious existence in peace. and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their constitution. and establishes councils of war. disposes of all appointments. more than all. perhaps. says another respectable writer. as well as for the union. who is now an hereditary prince. from establishing imposts injurious to others. from his being stadtholder in the several provinces. with a saving to the provincial rights. unless with the general consent. provides for garrisons. executes provincial decrees. The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder. It was long ago remarked by Grotius. aid and fortify the federal administration. The standing army which he commands consists of about forty thousand men. when other methods fail. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government. to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations. presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy. as delineated on parchment. The provinces are restrained. from colonels to ensigns. seemingly sufficient to secure harmony. and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts. and one years. or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. from his great patrimonial estates.

the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. . The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas. In 1726. which drew the others into a sort of dependence. which are frequent. the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. obliges each province to levy certain contributions. cannot pay an equal quota. and probably never will. must depend on the contingencies of the moment. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known. the fatal evils of the existing constitution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree. will stop at the salutary point. and have made no less than four regular experiments by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES. says Sir William Temple. says another. It has more than once happened." These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. for want of proper powers. supplied the place. Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership. in 1648. they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution. the States-General are often compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. if the provinces had not a spring within themselves. for one moment. be executed. several of which are equal to each other in strength and resources. my fellow-citizens. as they can. was concluded without the consent of Zealand. Let us pause. to apply a remedy. and then to obtain reimbursement from the others. called for. The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices. that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet. elude matters taken ad referendum. and compelling them to the same way of thinking. or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. by her riches and her authority. a thing practicable.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor theory. than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities. In critical emergencies. Whether the usurpation. for the propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our political happiness. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power. at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy. convened for the special purpose." says the Abbe Mably. 60 The same instrument. let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven. when once begun. "the Union could never have subsisted. without waiting for the others. or otherwise. Foreign ministers. This spring is the stadtholder. and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions. in a confedracy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest. In matters of contribution. capable of quickening their tardiness. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these purposes. who have little commerce. the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it. it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces. it is the practice to waive the articles of the constitution. In 1688. by deputations. but this article never could. by a defective constitution. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious. by which their independence was formerly and finally recognized. who was himself a foreign minister. and equal singly to a vigorous and persevering defense. because the inland provinces. over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history. the acknowledged. The treaty of Westphalia. though dreadful. and where several of them are too small to meditate resistance. by tampering with the provinces and cities. or go forward to the dangerous extreme. "Under such a government. Holland." It is remarked by Sir William Temple. but utterly impracticable in one composed of members. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain. on pressing exigencies. "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership.

a legislation for communities. I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. The first wish prompted by humanity is. stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind. has been the subject of much plausible animadversion. may receive and console them for the catastrophe of their own. 21 Other Defects of the Present Confederation For the Independent Journal. . The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation. is that a sovereignty over sovereigns. either by pecuniary mulcts. a government over governments. by which it is declared. as resulting from the nature of the social compact between the States. freedom and happiness: The next. and from the actual invasion of foreign arms. The important truth. or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY. This also had its adversaries and failed. from dissensions among the states. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. that the American Confederacy. "that each State shall retain every power. December 12. Wednesday. it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease. but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition. and where its responses are unequivocal.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be administered by the federal authority. in the face of that part of the second article. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision. All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members. or of contravening or explaining away a provision. as now composed. the crisis of their distiny. they ought to be conclusive and sacred. or by any other constitutional mode. that this severe trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish their union. I shall now proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate of other confederate governments. as contradistinguished from individuals. not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this country. that the asylum under which. in that plan. is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. Experience is the oracle of truth. by a suspension or divestiture of privileges. or punish disobedience to their resolutions. 61 This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions. and severe criticism. jurisdiction. preposterous as it may seem. It will appear. and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head. have no powers to exact obedience. it must be by inference and construction. we trust. which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case. a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist. and render it the parent of tranquillity. we shall be obliged to conclude. in this particular. as it is a solecism in theory." There is. The United States. and the want of which. doubtless. which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of those who oppose the new Constitution. so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity. from the specimens which have been cited. and right. that the United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State. which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies has been already pointed out. Neither the value of lands. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and constitute national wealth. and can only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany. Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions. and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has been made of it. and trample upon the liberties of the people. The guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence. must be renounced. too many checks cannot be provided. in relation to revenue. though it might in its consequences endanger the Union. does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws. and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of those States. The want of a guaranty. as involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the members. must be satisfied that there is no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism. bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island. The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind. 62 The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. A guaranty by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community. evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. nor the numbers of the people. No man who is acquainted with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much greater proportion . Pennsylvania with Connecticut. or Maryland with New Jersey. in a popular or representative constitution. The peace of society and the stability of government depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina. is a change of men. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people. This right would remain undiminished. it would furnish a like result. The natural cure for an ill-administration. while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be expected from union. while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. I speak of it now solely with a view to equality among the States. or even of France. we shall at once discover that there is no comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and that of the relative wealth of those nations. has any pretension to being a just representative. and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three last-mentioned countries. and to imply a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility. The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the counties of the same State. If the like parallel were to be run between several of the American States. of Connecticut or New York? The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government. established in Massachusetts. would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it.

may admit of a rule of apportionment. and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country. When applied to this object. Imposts. to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule. Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect taxes. may be compared to a fluid. no general or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. a formidable objection. The expense of an accurate valuation is. minute. Those of the direct kind. which principally relate to land and buildings. and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The suffering States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand. upon any scale that can possibly be devised. the nature of the government. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the nature of things. are entitled to a preference. soil. and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them. numbers. Situation. from the duties on other objects. the state of commerce. excises. If inequalities should arise in some States from duties on particular objects. And. the genius of the citizens. or adventitious to admit of a particular specification. is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and requisitions. The attempt. of industry. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land. Either the value of land. The consequence clearly is that there can be no common measure of national wealth. the poor can be frugal. The state of agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected with each other. not incompatible with the end. as those which would necessarily spring from quotas. an extension of the revenue. the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience. It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption. find its level with the means of paying them. for the purpose intended. and. the nature of the productions. however." If duties are too high. in all situations. This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union. climate. may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether at large. but by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own way. . "in political arithmetic. if inequalities should still exist. be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States. as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject. cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression. two and two do not always make four. the degree of information they possess.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion! 63 The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes. and private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. or the number of the people. therefore. if any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. that is. an equilibrium. the saying is as just as it is witty. nor so odious in their appearance. of course. will be established everywhere. which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed. as a rule. The rich may be extravagant. the collection is eluded. They prescribe their own limit. they lessen the consumption. of arts. the establishment of a fixed rule. these will. which will. occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches of different countries. these circumstances and many more. that they contain in their own nature a security against excess. and which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some States. in a country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement. so uniform in their operation. in the view of simplicity and certainty. in time. all duties upon articles of consumption. they would neither be so great in their degree. and the product to the treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. that. The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own option. Or. and. too complex. This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of this class. in general. in all probability. may serve as a standard. This. In the course of time and things.

that there is no object. 1787. while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system. and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist. on the most superficial view. either as it respects the interests of trade or finance. by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless. by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them. therefore. 22 The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) From the New York Packet. yet we may reasonably expect. but the want of concert. without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest. contrary to the true spirit of the Union. is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. The power of raising armies. that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens. if not restrained by a national control. have. Friday. restrictions. . and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency. and it is to be feared that examples of this nature. would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intcrcourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. December 14. The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States. to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular. and exclusions. should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain. that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States. in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries. there are others of not less importance. It is not.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. This practice in the course of the late war. to be wondered at that Mr. and for this reason. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries." Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us. Jenkinson. arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State. in different instances. by separate prohibitions. It is indeed evident. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers.[1] Several States have endeavored. "The commerce of the German empire[2] is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories. 64 The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject. has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind. from the gradual conflicts of State regulations. given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others. little need be added in this place. by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation. which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.

But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. nor just to require the last. if not relinquished. as in that of the contributions of money. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 65 was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense. In order to furnish the quotas required of them. concerning which doubts have been entertained. in every view. see much reason to reget the want of this hope. The system of quotas and requisitions. and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a majority of the Union. as remiss as the others were diligent. for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a majority of the people. a system of imbecility in the Union. In addition to this. or New York. It is neither rational to expect the first. to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. or North Carolina. or two thirds of the whole number. which even exceeded their abilities. those oppressive expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced. Sophistry may reply. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America. The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies. when we consider how little prospect there is. considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union. while those at a distance from danger were. and there are others. and to Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania. This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. slow and scanty levies of men. The smaller States. in their exertions. But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy. Hence. and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not in this case. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness. and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. which. that sovereigns are equal. made efforts to furnish their quotas. whether it be applied to men or money. also. is. there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority. The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment. ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. for the most part. in the most critical emergencies of our affairs. they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. To give a minority a negative . and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure. however. The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. would prove fatal to its duration. would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power. or Connecticut. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle. Besides. Hence. ought readily to renounce a pretension which. it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States. It gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale. would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. must consent to the most important resolutions. short enlistments at an unparalleled expense. in reality. which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.[4] and it is constitutionally possible that these nine may give the vote. influenced by motives of self-preservation. which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts. is. and of inequality and injustice among the members. The States near the seat of war. but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. We shall not. that not seven but nine States. nor is the inference accurate in point of fact. upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties. alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. continual fluctuations in the troops. It may be objected to this.[3] and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded. or Virginia. a poison. and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes. but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men.

in order that something may be done. a greater number. to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 66 upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision). to . to destroy the energy of the government. In the first case. caprice. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act. And yet. that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary. we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. Hence. Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. In republics. it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation. in its tendency. In such a state of things. has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation. though there have been abundant specimens of every other kind. but we forget how much good may be prevented. by his bribes and intrigues. where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object. contemptible compromises of the public good. by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes. in practice. A nation. in which the goodness or badness. Suppose. and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended. turbulent. in the last. which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island. is. we were engaged in a war. must conform to the views of the minority. in some way or other. among their numerous advantages. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration. though the contrary of this has been presumed. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution. from the nonattendance of a few States. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority. or fatally defeated. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies. Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace. though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition. has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater. is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade. have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet. and to substitute the pleasure. is of the greatest importance. persons elevated from the mass of the community. or corrupt junto. A sixtieth part of the Union. though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves. the weakness or strength of its government. go forward. and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods. in such a system. continual negotiation and intrigue. as well as to domestic faction. tedious delays. where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens. than where a simple majority would suffice. to tie up the hands of government from making peace. that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption. for instance. kept in a state of inaction. and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war. It is not difficult to discover. In those emergencies of a nation. he would have to corrupt a smaller number. The public business must. and give a tone to the national proceedings. An hereditary monarch. in conjunction with one foreign nation. because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE. has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. or of something approaching towards it. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. Congress. One of the weak sides of republics. This is one of those refinements which. Its situation must always savor of weakness. or artifices of an insignificant. Upon the same principle. to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. sometimes border upon anarchy. in a commercial view. we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe. It is often. the majority. respecting the best mode of conducting it. this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier. and how much ill may be produced. there is commonly a necessity for action. against another. And. with which we might have a treaty of commerce. with views that might justify us in making separate terms. than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide.

And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. there may be as many different final determinations on the same point as there are courts. in a letter to his court. And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation. became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled. intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies. The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right). and the interests of every member of which it is composed. may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock. like all other laws. the reputation. The faith. Their true import. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection. in the last resort. to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. violence. As often as such an interference was to happen. their safety. to have any force at all. in various instances. as far as respects individuals. must be considered as part of the law of the land. under the present Constitution. the peace of the whole Union.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 67 stations of great pre-eminence and power. acting under the authority of those legislatures. and from the interference of local regulations. there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices. be ascertained by judicial determinations. The treaties of the United States. or rather fettered. It is well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have. which. besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion. or opposition. there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws. been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe. on so precarious a foundation? In this review of the Confederation. in a single day. the want of a judiciary power. The treaties of the United States. are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices. A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned. I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects. are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures. and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice. If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. must. all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest. and as many different courts of final jurisdiction. if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction. This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters. . Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing from each other. the passions. and to overbalance the obligations of duty. possessing a general superintendence. The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. without tumult. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. may find compensations for betraying their trust. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories. their happiness. To produce uniformity in these determinations. that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound. who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions. they ought to be submitted. These ingredients are both indispensable. In this case. for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence. passing over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men.

the objects to be provided for by the federal government. but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government. This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches -. was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill. which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven. is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived. the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT. If that plan should not be adopted. even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure. This.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 68 authorities. Georgia. article "Empire. as they are now constituted. New Hampshire. by successive augmentations of its force an energy. as necessity might prompt. New Jersey. 1787. and they will be less than a majority. that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. original fountain of all legitimate authority. that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Encyclopedia. or affect to be. Thus. in some instances. the persons upon whom . It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system. at least equally energetic with the one proposed. PUBLIUS 1. and either the machine. it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers. will moulder into pieces. Owing its ratification to the law of a State. solicitous to avert." 3. 2. December 18. the probability would be. from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure. 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union From the New York Packet. and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution. in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it. and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures. as nearly as I can recollect. 4. given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Tuesday. __ FEDERALIST No. it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. but they do not contain one third of the people. South Carolina. the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty. to the preservation of the Union. to intrust it with those additional powers which. we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are. we shall finally accumulate. and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE necessity of a Constitution. Delaware. ought to reside in the United States. Rhode Island. or. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. and has. in a single body.

would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions. this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it. demonstrated that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory. it will follow. and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense. as a necessary consequence. that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community. BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES. we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America. to build and equip fleets. The experiment has. however. we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head. from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal. OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration. Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be. and the observations. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops. but the moment it is decided in the affirmative. These powers ought to exist without limitation. have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances. and a regard to the dictates of good faith. who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them. the superintendence of our intercourse. open for discussion. is a question in the first instance. to direct their operations. political and commercial. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits. as equally impracticable and unjust. the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States. that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the system. and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor that power ought to operate. to prescribe rules for the government of both. to govern the army and navy." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests. will. As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States. . in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments. that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. in any matter essential to the FORMATION. 69 The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies.the common defense of the members. the persons. it must be admitted. though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of the common defense. or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES. in any matter essential to its efficacy that is. and may be obscured. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money. carries its own evidence along with it. This is one of those truths which. DIRECTION. with foreign countries. The principal purposes to be answered by union are these -. to build and equip fleets. and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy. I imagine. to provide for their support. the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks. the intention evidently was that the United States should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the "common defense and general welfare. made under the last head. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite. to direct their operations. ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained. the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END. but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. to a correct and unprejudiced mind. unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed.

the coincident powers may safely accompany them. Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense. the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS. which will move within more practicable spheres. without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensible to their proper and efficient management. and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success. Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws. and with every other that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions. as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided. I am greatly mistaken. as the centre of information. and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies. an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities of war. from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it. or. for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS. a confederate instead of a sole. and I flatter myself. allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. as far as it can be done. if any thing of weight has yet been advanced of this tendency. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to showing. as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the people. an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense. disorder. which. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration. would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. should not. or may be. but firmly embrace a rational alternative. upon a dispassionate inspection. Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end. which. and to make all regulations which have relation to them. however. A government. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the proper department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities which are connected with this object. will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part. government. nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess. in other words. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions. the constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government. to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the most essential national interests. as candid inquirers after truth. be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished? Every view we may take of the subject. that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority. and that the extent of the country will not permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can safely be reposed. Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided. as the representative of the WHOLE. and leaving in the State governments the EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And will not weakness. by the extension of its authority throughout the States. and which. The same must be the case in respect to commerce. can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care of the general defense. it would prove that we ought to contract our views. which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power. will serve to convince us. that the internal structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. it ought to be rejected. and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. offered to our consideration. that the observations which . that the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing. that the impracticability of one general system cannot be shown. If it be true. I trust.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 70 If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple. be found to answer this description. as has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side. will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten.

that this legislature was to be a popular body. must be evident. as the standard of our political creed. it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE. He would naturally say to himself. in contradiction to the practice of other free nations. the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. A stranger to our politics. he would be surprised to discover. would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction. in respect to this object. that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace. consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected. I shall now endeavor to show. as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. is this. which. rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government. in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution which. that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace. the moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation. so jealous of their liberties. in all . I have met with but one specific objection. and rejected in all the rest. to the control of the legislature. have. at all events. It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form. or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops. not in the EXECUTIVE. there was to be found. will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity. in any shape. that neither the one nor the other was the case. without the appearance of argument. an important qualification even of the legislative discretion. and to the general sense of America. who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture. Wednesday.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 71 have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This. without having previously inspected the plan reported by the convention. If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself. is the strongest argument in favor of an energetic government. Disappointed in his first surmise. December 19. without even the sanction of theoretical opinions. we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire limits of the present Confederacy. supported only by bold assertions. except in one or two of our State constitutions. without subjecting his discretion. drawn from the extent of the country. in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces. 24 The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered For the Independent Journal. The proprietory of this remark will appear. in the article of military establishments. if I understand it right. for any other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. a principle unheard of. upon a nearer view of it. It must needs be that this people. an objection which. that the very difficulty itself. and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies. If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution.

that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions. On the other side. under this impression. that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject. belonging to these two powers create between them. On one side of us. however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. Still. that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions. has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor. Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation. would be unlikely to be observed. their natural allies. from the necessities of society. and a departure from this model. how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them[1] contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace. he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings. or ardent temper. But however little this objection may be countenanced. are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. It would probably occur to him. the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions. at the unexpected discovery. he would say. with jealous circumspection. restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular. A future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. in the new plan. Here. in a favorite point. and though they had. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking. rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings. that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions. but would acquire a mixture of indignation. in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies. dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 72 the preceding models of the constitutions which they have established. he would observe to himself. because they have most to fear from us. would be improper to be imposed. The improvements in the art of navigation have. in a great measure. are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature. had not imposed a single restraint on that of the United States. and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If. or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence. neighbors. and would lament. rendered distant nations. and extending to meet the British settlements. and if imposed. as to the facility of communication. about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of government. it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. If. he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else. he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. on the contrary. instead of containing the prohibition he looked for. that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity. inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this point. that these articles. the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace. his astonishment would not only be increased. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands. even by precedents among ourselves. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility. could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan. He would never be able to imagine. while any source of information remained unexplored. the omission of which. and stretching far into our rear. The . a common interest. No doubt. or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. at length. and most to hope from them. yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security.

would be pernicious. If we should not be willing to be exposed. and if practicable. indeed. it may be said certain. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy. If we mean to be a commercial people. and Maryland have. particular posts. that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments. or even to be secure on our Atlantic side. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets. These circumstances combined. moderate garrisons will. and ever since the peace. There are. PUBLIUS 1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions. this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose. in all likelihood. Previous to the Revolution. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals. however that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection. The militia would not long. and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature. THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up. and sometimes of the fleet itself. and for the defense of these. the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service. Here is a simple view of the subject.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 73 increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. and their constitutions are equally silent. and her constitution says not a word about the matter. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty. Delaware. we must endeavor. Massachusetts. admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger. there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace. and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE". that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. in a naked and defenseless condition. a small one. to have a navy. to their insults and encroachments. The first is impracticable. submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. and probably garrisons. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it. it is probable. nay. if it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. in truth. rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty. and will be. New York has no bills of rights. be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards. In proportion to our increase in strength. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable. if at all. __ FEDERALIST No. the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia. in each of their bils of rights. and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. I am told. and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals. which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect. but not the less real for being small. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the other States. we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. 25 . It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. would form conclusive objections to the scheme. except the foregoing. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. fortifications. New Hampshire. but where naval establishments are in their infancy. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations." This is. or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. as soon as possible.

If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive. The States. or inability of a part. and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States. 1787. In this situation. The design of the objection. from local situation. which has been . and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. an inversion of the primary principle of our political association. And the means of guarding against it ought. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power. dangerous to all. to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments. have. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. They would each choose to have some counterpoise. to bear the burden of competent provisions. though in different degrees. under the direction of the Union. that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion. It happens that some States. The framers of the existing Confederation. the foundation of which will be the love of power. the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members. for a considerable time to come. The truth is. it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. in express terms. New York is of this class. would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony. New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety. prohibited them from having either ships or troops. that the existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions. Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union. unless with the consent of Congress. which the experience of ages has attested. in reality. the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government. Spain. is therefore common. and finally to subvert. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments. fully aware of the danger to the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States. But this would be. it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon. the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces. If. December 21. and baneful to the Confederacy. in which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. would be as little able as willing. are more directly exposed. they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority. The danger. its provisions should be proportionally enlarged. and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. and being at the separate disposal of the members. and those probably amongst the most powerful. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. military establishments.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 74 The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) From the New York Packet. There are other lights besides those already taken notice of. Upon the plan of separate provisions. in like manner. to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States. and pretenses could easily be contrived. Friday. nourished by mutual jealousy. but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. the constitutional authority of the Union. The territories of Britain. On the other hand. in addition to this immense advantage. improvidence. For it is a truth.

instigated by Spain or Britain. affords an example of the truth of this remark. created by our choice. like most other things. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger. as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty. War. dependent on our will. the army. in a time of profound peace. Should this at any time happen. has resolved to raise a body of troops. by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation. forbid a reliance of this kind. had like to have lost us our independence. however great and valuable they were. is to preclude standing armies in time of peace. how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities. as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 75 mentioned. This doctrine. but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone. and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey. to obviate this consequence. nevertheless." contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week. against threatening or impending danger. by perserverance. have. by time. We must receive the blow. in some scheme of usurpation. and appeased again by timely concessions. whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. erected eternal monuments to their fame. and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. in substance. that the national government. or on whatever pretext. when once raised. The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability. it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace. at this instant. and in all probability will keep them up as long as . We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders. and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success. by their valor on numerous occasions. a month. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification. The facts which. might in the first instance raise troops. and the matter would then be brought to this issue. the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. may be applied to the execution of the project. of a combination between the executive and the legislative. which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition. from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision. that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense. would always be at hand. Considerations of economy. Pennsylvania. are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. All violent policy. the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen. and would be at all times equal to the national defense. before we could even prepare to return it. before it was actually invaded. defeats itself. because we are afraid that rulers. and meet the gathering storm. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be given to some foreign power. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. might endanger that liberty. If. is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence. from our own experience. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government. must be abstained from. and by practice. and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. from whatever cause. Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark. or at least possibility. When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up. and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania. to provide against apprehended danger. though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend. and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE. not less than of stability and vigor. in the course of the late war. as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs. The American militia. confirm this position.

because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws. that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere. or is less urgent and palpable. but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better. though on different ground. We have seen. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience. The Lacedaemonians. as well as under those of other nations. and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions. 26 The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered For the Independent Journal. and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all. Saturday. December 22. how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected. in the means of providing for the national defense. however. under the nominal title of vice-admiral. and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error. demanded Lysander. to gratify their allies. as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection. This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples. in addition to the rest. to command the combined fleets. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress. that the necessity of doing it. though dictated by necessity. which is. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system. and that it is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. but the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure. that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. The idea of restraining the legislative authority. The Peloponnesian confederates. and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. we may try change after change. had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral. that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject. is implied in the very act of delegating . we may travel from one chimerical project to another. that even in this country. in its application to the United States. 1788 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE. and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth. is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. even by its own constituents. and that all the others have refused to give it the least countenance. how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity. which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society. And it teaches us. having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 76 there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country. It also teaches us. where it made its first appearance. who had before served with success in that capacity.

the doctrines they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it. it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed. And I am much mistaken. than in the .Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 77 power. the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run. in time of peace. the general decision of America. yet as a national sentiment. But it was not till the revolution in 1688. or too rigid. for a long time after the Norman Conquest. And this number James II. that if the principles they inculcate. an acknowledged prerogative of the crown. As incident to the undefined power of making war. At the revolution. by his own authority. I call them unnecessary. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions. and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. could so far obtain as to become the popular creed. they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous. who effected that memorable revolution. till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. are of the number of these instances. was against law. that "the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective. in favor of liberty. it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung. that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat." In that kingdom. they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of government whatever. where this error was not adopted.000 regular troops. when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch. In England. because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State constitutions. which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. who were paid out of his civil list. that English liberty was completely triumphant. to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority. can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else. under those constitutions. which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain. no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite. UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT. upon other occasions. first by the barons. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. by expedients which. The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights. beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. and more extravagant. that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legislature. to think of any restraint on the legislative discretion. that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies. The power of raising armies at all. kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5. As if the tone of government had been found too high. increased to 30. Even in some of the States. too wellinformed. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable. had. we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up. The patriots. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. and afterwards by the people. they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community. on various points. if experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind. and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. fortified by the events that have happened in other ages and countries. Charles II. in this respect. the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty. were too temperate. Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative. From the same source.000. from standing armies in time of peace. It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. have been condemned or forborne.

if not absurd. decide. As often as the question comes forward. would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition. and to declare their sense of the matter. by the party in opposition. and among others. to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body. as one of the best of the forms of government established in this country. by aiming at too much. but. there ought at once to be an end of all delegated . the ARM of their discontent. not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction. there is a total silence upon the subject. as often as the period of discussion arrived. once at least in every two years. by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. so large as seriously to menace those liberties. As the spirit of party. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man. no doubt. whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it. in some of these constitutions. that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up. and it was superfluous. in time of peace. in point of efficacy. persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. will have a salutary and powerful operation. if it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it? Let us examine whether there be any comparison. It is not said. between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events. but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot. there will be. with respect to Pennsylvania. will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers. for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years. the State legislatures. or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made. and will be ready enough. Accordingly. and would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned. is calculated to effect nothing. that every man. could only be formed by progressive augmentations. by this provision. to sound the alarm to the people. both in Europe and America. that even in the two States which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision. It is remarkable. in different degrees. if any thing improper appears. which would suppose. if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable. by steering clear of an imprudent extreme. and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body. and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe. discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy. An army. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army. the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation. Can it be doubted that such a provision. but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up. which has been justly celebrated. the community will be warned of the danger. Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. and not only to be the VOICE. which alone had the power of doing it. the latter. the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself. who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the federal government. to come to a new resolution on the point.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 78 legislatures themselves. The former. in that of this State of New York. and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED. if necessary. and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits. the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject. must be expected to infect all political bodies. between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution.

It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing. the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable. by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union. But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state. because the Executive. rests on mere general assertion. let us inquire what ground there . would be impracticable. Tuesday. and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties. in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person. which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into submission. would quickly follow the discovery. upon what pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war. If such suppositions could even be reasonably made. for any duration. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion. that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. but almost unavoidable. still the concealment of the design. 1787. in different shapes. for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived. But the question again recurs. nay. however. It would be announced.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 79 authority. This. unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia. in a country so situated. and if the defense of the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another place). 27 The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) From the New York Packet. What colorable reason could be assigned. December 25. would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IT HAS been urged. it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive. it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. this is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external. then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection. and the destruction of the project. like most other things that have been alleged on that side. if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense. and of the projectors. it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy.

in this place. or latitude of choice. or opposition in the people. be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER. that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils. in the course of these papers. The more it circulates through those channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow. which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new. in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. and engender schemes which. that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men. must be evident. rather than weakened. Various reasons have been suggested. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. disaffection. which. which is. that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option. the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern. with a more critical eye. Man is very much a creature of habit. Several additional reasons of considerable force. It will be sufficient here to remark. will be strengthened. that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government. the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings. and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors. dissatisfaction. will occur when we come to survey. If this reflection be just. and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction. I will. which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State. that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people. to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments. but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. and disgust. a proportionably strong discouragement to it. the . but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government. that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion. and the affections of the citizens towards it. The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition. One thing. the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart. or temporary prejudices and propensities. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule. and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment. at all events. there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them. the dread of punishment. if possessed of a due degree of power. can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy. frequently contaminate the public councils. The inference is. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. to the people. than the laws of the particular members.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 80 is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community. there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member. or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution. there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will. the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life. hazard an observation. terminate in general distress. though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire. the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. and will have less occasion to recur to force. which. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind. that the authority of the Union. Will not the government of the Union. to fortify that probability. the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion. than that of a single State. that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims. in smaller societies. than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents.

that seditions and insurrections are. that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies. Thus the legislatures. December 26. in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. executive. unhappily. and magistrates. __ FEDERALIST No. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments. all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed. and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State. the consequences of this situation. that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government). in the execution of its laws. and judicial. of the respective members. by his own reflections. or the views of encroachment. Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government.[1] Any man who will pursue. legislative. if at all. in its proper place. by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States. will. be fully detected. by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was. Wednesday. we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 81 authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. in the common apprehension. there could be no remedy but . in its will. by war and violence. will become the SUPREME LAW of the land. to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good. will be incorporated into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations. will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union. that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government. or to the obligations of duty. to the observance of which all officers. The plan reported by the convention. and that as often as these happen. maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body. as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction. It merits particular attention in this place. cannot be denied. if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy. for it is certainly possible. in each State. courts. 28 The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) For the Independent Journal. and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. 1787 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force. has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction. that the laws of the Confederacy. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force. they can only be redressed. however constituted. or ever can be instituted. will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each. can be promoted by such a conduct? PUBLIUS 1. I would still ask them how the interests of ambition. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary.

that Pennsylvania. or a principal part of it. The usurpers. two. or even if there should be an entire separation of the States. only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people. Suppose. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont. has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. as far as it has any foundation in truth. is applicable to the State governments themselves. the different parcels. can too often crush the opposition in embryo. the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression. if not to the rights of the Union. it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace. can take no regular measures for defense. and that whether we have one government for all the States. and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions. to say that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people.[1] If the representatives of the people betray their constituents. from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens. the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. in similar extremities. Regard to the public peace. An insurrection. without concert. upon due consideration. and the national presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty. that the national government might be under a like necessity. the insurrection should pervade a whole State. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State. there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia. except in their courage and despair. eventually endangers all government. is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty republics? Let us pursue this examination in another light. which is attainable in civil society. If. subdivisions. or three. why should the possibility. it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support. or even four Confederacies were to be formed. Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject. In a single state. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State. acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases. in this supposition. and. be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract. in lieu of one general system. and what. should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend. This is the essential. on the contrary. clothed with the forms of legal authority. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their . The smaller the extent of the territory. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms. or districts of which it consists. could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia. having no distinct government in each. and if the general government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people. there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. and which against the usurpations of the national rulers.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 82 force. and when these happened. or different governments for different parcels of them. would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents. be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must. be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the States? Would the militia. in cases of this extraordinary nature. whatever may be its immediate cause. after all. would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties. the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition. without resource. may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. without system. if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers.

The great extent of the country is a further security. Wednesday. The legislatures will have better means of information. with all the celerity. in which they can combine all the resources of the community. and its resistance revive. the distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire. be regulated by the resources of the country. may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. through the medium of their State governments. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter. will infallibly make it preponderate. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance. the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments. to take measures for their own defense. who are in a situation. it will not be possible to maintain a large army. and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself. But in a confederacy the people. If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State. they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. by throwing themselves into either scale. in proportion to the artificial strength of the government. And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The natural strength of the people in a large community. as of the people at large. is greater than in a small. that the State governments will. We should recollect that the extent of the military force must. regularity. and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men. provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. If their rights are invaded by either. They can discover the danger at a distance.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor preparations and movements. __ FEDERALIST No. they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition. Power being almost always the rival of power. and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease. and as the means of doing this increase. For a long time to come. We have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. and the confidence of the people. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States. for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning. 1788 HAMILTON . without exaggeration. January 9. the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. and possessing all the organs of civil power. and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty. in all possible contingencies. PUBLIUS 1. its efforts would be renewed. afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others. 29 Concerning the Militia From the New York Packet. 83 The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state. at all events. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized! It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system. The people. and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny.

that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing. What reason could there be to infer. with the most evident propriety. and sometimes even from the same quarter. that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited. . there is none that was so little to have been expected. as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. arming. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army. it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared. to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction? By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy. in its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia. in the hands of the federal government. not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. an efficacious power over the militia. as it would be to believe. The same persons who tell us in one breath. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country. If it cannot avail itself of the former. It would be as absurd to doubt. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate. therefore. or is so untenable in itself. that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority. or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects. In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union. to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty. it will be obliged to recur to the latter. is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority." Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention. whenever they were called into service for the public defense. AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS. ought. will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper. it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor To the People of the State of New York: 84 THE power of regulating the militia. we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself. that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. and disciplining the militia. it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed. inform us in the next. whence it has been inferred. and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. as far as possible. is as uncandid as it is illogical. It is. would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws. that the conclusion which has been drawn from it. To render an army unnecessary. that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers. and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy. that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property. It is observed that select corps may be formed. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color. The latter. fortunately. it will follow. and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense. RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS. that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

85

composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse: "The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year. "But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist." Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee. There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia. In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

86

ill-written tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes -"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire"; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches into a monster. A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths? If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs. In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of self-preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. 30 Concerning the General Power of Taxation From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of providing for the

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

87

support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another. Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish. In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might require? The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies. What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury. The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every POWER ought to

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

88

be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES. To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good? Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums. It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

89

the established funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by loans. The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice. Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. 31 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible. The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other

Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union. But this untractableness may be carried too far. How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their opposition). though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those mysteries in religion. 90 But in the sciences of morals and politics. therefore. free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people. yielding to some untoward bias. Those of them which have been most labored with that view. deprive the FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities. and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible. But we find. against which the batteries of infidelity have been so industriously leveled. so far from acquiescing in their justness or truth. seem to make their principal and most zealous effort against this part of the plan. As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the national exigencies must be procured. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject. But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might. that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of the Union. As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective capacities. the power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community. unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. the power of procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies. is a point agreed among geometricians. They are in substance as follows: A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care. It is. yet they have much better claims in this respect than. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have. men are found far less tractable. the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor words. as that the national government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. the federal government must of necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes. extending even to the minutest atom. in general. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and imposition. they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this place. we should be disposed to allow them. to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations. Men. it is right and useful that this should be the case. seem in substance to amount to this: "It is not true. do not give their own understandings fair play. and may degenerate into obstinacy. but. and the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. in fact. or disingenuity. that its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. because the exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation. upon too many occasions. that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution. they entangle themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties. as introductory to an examination of what may have been offered by way of objection to them. To a certain degree. Did not experience evince the contrary. perverseness. and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national . should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully stated. it would be natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions. the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing. as necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants. and probably would in time. As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned.

at other times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union. January 2. It might allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ toward insuring success. and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will commonly possess most influence over them. the natural conclusion is that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict. to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State governments. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: . it is to be hoped. than by the federal head upon the members. 1788. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people. which is evidently the true one. and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head. it will not be difficult to obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States. as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 91 legislature. the same species of security. The State governments. who. and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the Constitution. Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle. and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity. It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. As in republics strength is always on the side of the people. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside. 32 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the Independent Journal. to be such as to afford. will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments. are invested with complete sovereignty. we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism and irresolution. and knows not on which side to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. as they will hold the scales in their own hands. it is easy to imagine an endless train of possible dangers. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No." This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the national government. we get into an unfathomable abyss. I repeat here what I have observed in substance in another place. all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land. Wednesday. that all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the government. by their original constitutions. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the pretense of an interference with its own. and in a due dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. to a proper extent. If the proposed construction of the federal government be found. The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the federal government. In what does our security consist against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation. not to the nature or extent of its powers. Upon this ground. and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. upon an impartial examination of it.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

92

ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution. An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises"; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE. A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this particular, there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

93

just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article, UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the kind. As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty. The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes every hypothesis to the contrary. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. 33 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

94

the following clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority shall be the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions that disturb its equanimity. What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect taxes? What are the propermeans of executing such a power, but NECESSARY and PROPER laws? This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and culumniated provision in question do more than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration, and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless. But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimatb authorities of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare. But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

95

executing the powers of the Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a landtax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan of the convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to obscure the plainest and simplest truths. But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a goverment, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY confines this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been expressed. Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in this respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union. PUBLIUS

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor __ FEDERALIST No. 34 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York:

96

I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall to the lot of the State governments to provide. To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness. In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would be inclined to resort. To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to

on the contrary. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic. and judicial departments. it ought. yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in a single war. what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our option. yet we may safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their data. and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity. to the support of its legislative. But would it be wise. and let us only . or would it not rather be the extreme of folly. executive. for some time to come. Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded upon reasons of state. is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character. would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind. or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us. If. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the European world. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France and Britain. though even these will admit of no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people. the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society. short of an indefinite power of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert. we ought to exceed this point. wearied and exhausted as they both were.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 97 maintain those establishments which. in general terms. it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. the proportion may still be considered as holding good. with their different appendages. are insignificant in comparison with those which relate to the national defense. by foreign war or domestic convulsions? If. or hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks can deserve no weight. it should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a republic. would suffice in time of peace. The expenses arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of a state. Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity. on the one hand. on the other hand. and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged. and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the community against future invasions of the public peace. If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that which it is supposed ought to be made from the other. and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of the world. where all the ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for. we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace. who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are entirely out of its reach. not above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned. If it should break forth into a storm. the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable dangers. and the frugality and economy which in that particular become the modest simplicity of republican government. In the kingdom of Great Britain. that however moderate or unambitious we may be. where can we stop. and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure). to be remarked that there should be as great a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic administration. to stop at this point. wars and rebellions. we cannot count upon the moderation. What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is.

even in imagination. equal to and not greater than the object. at a rough computation. the total amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds. we ought. that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination. in order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper occasion for them. which the State governments will continue to experience. If any fund could have been selected and appropriated. and when these debts are discharged. There remain a few other lights. that there must always be an immense disproportion between the objects of federal and state expenditures. one third of the resources of the community. would be to take the resources of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare. and to the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon. at most. in respect to this branch of power. that would not either have been too much or too little too little for their present. if we add all contingencies. an EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further. January 5. But this cannot happen again. In this view of the subject. If we desert this boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands. to defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If this principle be a just one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds. while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits. without the aid of any elaborate illustration. It is true that several of the States. In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves. of State authority to that of the Union. the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue. between the Union and its members. if the proposed system be adopted.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 98 calculate on a common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations. in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities. 35 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) For the Independent Journal. separately. the possession of one third of the resources of the community to supply. not on temporary. which are an excrescence of the late war. to which. to calculate. the command of two thirds of the resources of the community to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses. and we shall instantly perceive. are encumbered with considerable debts. it would have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States. The convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination. too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation between external and internal taxes. The preceding train of observation will justify the position which has been elsewhere laid down. this would leave to the States. in EXCLUSION of the authority of the Union. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own necessities. but on permanent causes of expense. in perpetuity. would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. by what logic can it be maintained that the local governments ought to command. in those provisions which are designed to be permanent. one tenth of its wants. there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS and the END. Saturday. what particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States. and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this purpose. the only call for revenue of any consequence. 1788 . will be for the mere support of their respective civil list. in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration. then. Suppose.

would frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. The confinement of the national revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with inequality. a great proportion falls upon the merchant. it is evident that the government. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit of smuggling. in the article of revenue. that it is far more equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common stock. which is always prejudicial to the fair trader. HOPE. to any great extent. especially in a country of small commercial capital. that those duties should form the only national fund. whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. in an improper degree. and in the last place. to the manufacturing classes. as long as other resources were open. Suppose. of course. the consumer generally pays the duty. and to promote domestic manufactures. and is not likely speedily to be. therefore. from a different cause. stimulated by . In this view they are productive of inequality among the States. I am apt to think that a division of the duty. When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the importing State. who is often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer. according to their numbers or wealth. The maxim that the consumer is the payer. But it is not so generally true as to render it equitable. They would not. conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers. it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. which inequality would be increased with the increased extent of the duties. that the interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an extreme. and eventually to the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community tributary. New York is an importing State. and an unequal distribution of the taxes. When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market. is so much oftener true than the reverse of the proposition. more often happens than is commonly imagined. New York is more deeply interested in these considerations than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of. to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets. To make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises. but breaks in upon his capital. they sometimes force industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with less advantage. The States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants. since the higher they are. the proper objects of which are particular kinds of manufactures. in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed. by their own manufactures. suffer in a double light from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts. will not. I shall make one general remark. but if the avenues to them were closed. The merchant.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: 99 BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the Union. She would. which is. the federal power of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports. but when the markets happen to be overstocked. a manufacturing State. There are persons who imagine that they can never be carried to too great a length. and sometimes not only exhausts his profits. to produce a favorable balance of trade. as has been contended for. consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in the same favorable situation. they oppress the merchant. between the seller and the buyer. for want of being able to command other resources. It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid upon it. than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. that if the jurisdiction of the national government. I readily admit that this would be the case. as well among the several States as among the citizens of the same State. is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more expeditious sale. should be restricted to particular objects. the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption. Two evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of industry.

and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. it will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. and according to their situation and talents. in order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer. what reason is there to conclude. which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to correct. and of other parts of the community. They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments. would beget experiments. seems most to be relied on. The first success would be apt to inspire false opinions. will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other. and experience confirms it. They know that the merchant is their natural patron and friend. which is composed of a greater number. With regard to the learned professions. Every landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible. in a deliberative assembly. the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless. is. in a political view. that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. nor is this less the case in the senate. But even if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation. especially in politics. is unnecessary. which. in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries. This argument presents itself under a very specious and seducing form. with few exceptions. No tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. would have the intended effect. the inequalities spoken of would still ensue. impracticable. in the first place. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined. But when we come to dissect it with attention.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 100 necessity. These considerations. which consists of a smaller number. from the other causes that have been noticed. they truly form no distinct interest in society. the thing would never take place in practice. without which. to give their votes to merchants. often occasions false hopes. fortified by rigorous precautions and additional penalties. and particularly in relation to taxes. and they are aware. in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. The object it seems to aim at is. and in the sense in which it is contended for. though not in the same degree. and that the influence and weight. till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new precautions. Let us now return to the examination of objections. their interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition. The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people. I reserve for another place the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers. and shall content myself with examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary supposition. We must therefore consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the community. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution. Many of them. and to produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its constituents. and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. and superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils. that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide. unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. by persons of each class. little need be observed. indeed. we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both. that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense. One which. that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens. and this. are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. than in the assembly. is altogether visionary. false reasonings. Nothing remains but the landed interest. I take to be perfectly united. and look into our own senate and assembly. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Necessity. and many others that might be mentioned prove. that each different occupation should send one or more members. Where the qualifications of the electors are the . for a time.

Tuesday. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. the representative body. so much as the business of taxation. whether they have to choose a small or a large number. The man who understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients. from his own interest in that species of property. merchants. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least burdensome. who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry. is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of their nature. be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning. and men of the learned professions. will be composed of landholders. and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent. their votes will fall upon those in whom they have most confidence. It is said to be necessary. habits. and to which a wise administration will never be inattentive. whether these happen to be men of large fortunes. are the true. 36 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) From the New York Packet. But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not. that all classes of citizens should have some of their own number in the representative body. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy. as far as may be proper. to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the learned profession. and foundation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people. and the necessity of being bound himself. and his posterity. the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. or of no property at all. with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government. or an absurd one.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 101 same. it is necessary that the person in whose hands it should be acquainted with the general genius. by the laws to which he gives his assent. January 8. or sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. and with the resources of the country. HAMILTON . And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations. so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society? If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society. or of moderate property. in order that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and attended to. and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This dependence. and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public honors. extent. and modes of thinking of the people at large. 1788. ready to promote either. be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them. Where this is the case.

but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon the general course of things. If any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of the counties. and bypaths in each State. one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature . There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situation. and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver. to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted. with the state of its agriculture. which is a clear indication. for the credit of human nature. is. so that. manufactures. Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue. it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land. a minute topographical acquaintance with all the mountains. The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to the same result. What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith. rivers. The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. which are afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature. even under governments of the more popular kind. I answer that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule. which demands a knowledge of local details. and industry? Nations in general. it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in practice. of merchants. but from the society in general. how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the county. There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims our attention. and will command the tribute due to their merit. streams. in the first instance. as far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question. with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth. usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to boards composed of a few individuals. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with advantage. or is it a general acquaintance with its situation and resources. who will truly represent all those different interests and views. and I trust. commerce. whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous. property. unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations. with the nature of its products and consumptions. and of members of the learned professions. by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption. that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency. Though the objection be made to both. The door ought to be equally open to all. yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor To the People of the State of New York: 102 WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations. who digest and prepare. than between the merchant and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between any of the departments of labor and industry. If it should be objected that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures. of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local circumstances. the plans of taxation. but not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or character of the government. as applied to taxation. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. And indeed. less conclusive. as well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances. as to the latter. and in particular it might be asked. highways. that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation. not only from the classes to which they particularly belong. as from an interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States.

and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems. as already observed. or according to the best judgment. interfere with each other. and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. As neither can CONTROL the other. must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors. the federal government may then forbear the use of it. to abstain from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to. The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded circumspection. By way of answer to this. An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule. but is to be determined by the numbers of each State. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can. imposts. local details. will be preferable. which alone requires the knowledge of local details. and easy to be comprehended. In either case. indeed. there is a provision that "all duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to general principles. . simple. would be to avoid those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State. it has been triumphantly asked. appears to have. but even in this view it will not bear a close examination. or can easily be procured from any well-informed man." It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on the side of the Constitution. in a legal sense.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 103 of the difficulties apprehended. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment. A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States. appears most probable. and of its members. or otherwise than by the experiment. either by ACTUAL valuations. and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another must be few. when applied to real property or to houses and lands. each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. and will be their most simple and most fit resource. The second answer is. we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. that if the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really inconvenient. a circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their powers and duties. and excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States. at the discretion. When the particular debts of the States are done away. and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass. The national legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. and it is impossible to prove in theory. The contrary. When the States know that the Union can apply itself without their agency. The objection. more foundation. that it cannot be advantageously exercised. Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power. as described in the second section of the first article. or by OCCASIONAL assessments. mutually. that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. especially of the mercantile class. An effectual expedient for this purpose will be. The laws cannot. must be referred to those who are to execute the plan. Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to the discretion of the national legislature. it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part. therefore. Land taxes are co monly laid in one of two modes. As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union. in all its parts. permanent or periodical. be adopted and employed by the federal government. the EXECUTION of the business. of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. elected by the people or appointed by the government for the purpose. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself. the possibility almost of interference will vanish. In addition to the precaution just mentioned. that the exercise of that power. because it will be more effectual. we may safely count upon its operation. if convenient. And where there is an IMMEDIATE common interest. The first is. as well as from the information of the members from the several States. The principal thing to be attended to. This could always be known from the respective codes of laws. at first sight. But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed that must be altogether satisfactory.

that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation. if to be done by the authority of the federal government. which is the most convenient branch of revenue. or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition. I should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government. Happy it is when the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own power. where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or provision. because they possess this power? If they are not. Are the State governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies. As to the suggestion of double taxation. and with this further advantage. and must naturally tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case. it will not be to be done by that of the State government. And the government.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 104 Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation. to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers. have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain. with this advantage. where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth. the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes. in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. or will make use of the State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. There may exist . there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one. and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes. confess my disapprobation of them. I. it will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the channels of the national government. with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the national government. and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. the answer is plain. without scruple. which applies to the duties on imports. because it will save expense in the collection. coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens. for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect. ought ever to have the option of making use of them. I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal government. but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. There are certain emergencies of nations. a duplication of their burdens by double taxations. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind. and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States[1] which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights. As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union. here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience. instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed. in which expedients. At all events. and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. As to the first point. and nothing more can be required than to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan. which may be considered as productive sources of revenue. the other. is a reason peculiar to itself. and of course will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods. if the provision is to be made by the Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts. This will best answer the views of revenue. In other cases. that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne. The real scarcity of objects in this country. from the possibility of such emergencies. can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation. become essential to the public weal. and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great question before the people. which may be applicable to a variety of objects. and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression! As to poll taxes. the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as possible. But all suppositions of this kind are invidious.

had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. I equally flatter myself that a further and more critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government and will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety and expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution. That this remaining task may be executed . E1. will.][E1] [I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to its energy. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter. which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government. 37 Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government From the Daily Advertiser. and which were most formidable in their first appearance. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation. but if they had operated in the formation of the plan. in order to render the view of the subject more complete. however. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities. The New England States. several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. might have claimed an investigation under this head. which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security. There are others which. I flatter myself the progress already made will have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious part of the community that some of the objections which have been most strenuously urged against the Constitution. if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!][E1] PUBLIUS 1. [I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers proposed to be vested in the United States. which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions. and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. would have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public happiness and national prosperity. The mass of judiciary power. are not only destitute of substance. our plan cannot be complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it. without examining it on all its sides. in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. comparing it in all its parts. though omitted here. be taken notice of under the next head of our inquiries. and calculating its probable effects. I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon. and showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before the public. and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary objects of union. and the expediency of adopting it. January 11. 1788. __ FEDERALIST No. or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. Friday.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 105 certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State. and more honorable for human nature.

that the act of the convention. that they have scanned the proposed Constitution. that public measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good. The predetermined adversary. The intentions of the first may be upright. that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical. It has been shown in the course of these papers. In some. the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have taken his bias from the weight of these considerations. it has been too evident from their own publications. An irregular and mutable . which recommends so many important changes and innovations. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description. With equal readiness will it be perceived. a very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government. will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his ignorance of the subject. But the truth is. with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form. that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles. were liable. on the other hand. that besides these inducements to candor. as a body of men. to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. that the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious. these different characters on a level. that they themselves also are but men. without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their undertaking. was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries. as future experiences may unfold them. it could not appear surprising. as well as of our own. and which touches the springs of so many passions and interests. Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger. which must render their opinions also of little moment in the question. To those who have been led by experience to attend to this consideration. The views of the last cannot be upright. but will keep in mind. however. In placing. and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it. not only with a predisposition to censure. many allowances ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the convention. inseparable from human affairs. The most that the convention could do in such a situation. by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. not only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults. but with a predetermination to condemn. It has been shown. Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it. some reflections must in this place be indulged. that a faultless plan was not to be expected. as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. as the language held by others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias. It is a misfortune. which are among the chief blessings of civil society. Among the difficulties encountered by the convention. yet that it could not be easily accomplished. and can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons. and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted. I wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in the purity of their intentions. who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 106 under impressions conducive to a just and fair result. which candor previously suggests. or the expectation of the public. which may be viewed in so many lights and relations. both on one side and on the other. Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by the convention. and must be culpable. should find or excite dispositions unfriendly. can have been governed by no venial motive whatever. and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors. and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others. and with it the superstructure resting upon it. but will see the propriety of reflecting. They solicit the attention of those only. which give warning of the course to be shunned. and to require indispensably that something should be done for our relief. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention. as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people. they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment. with respect to the weight of their opinions. The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. that we must consequently change this first foundation. as they may on the contrary be culpable.

From the cursory view here taken. and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science. it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part. sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined. we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due proportions. between the various provinces. and the statute law. and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation. When we pass from the works of nature. we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Sense. The jurisdiction of her several courts. though penned with the greatest technical skill. where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world. Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the general and that of the State governments. On comparing. and lesser portions. its three great provinces the legislative. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty. of admiralty. in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in their nature. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side. How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work. and judiciary. but that those intrusted with it should be kept in independence on the people. until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular . are found to be separated by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations. perception. is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions. not only that all power should be derived from the people. in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated. executive. the ecclesiastical law. imagination. are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal. with satisfactory precision. and. judgment. however. will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations. into which they are subdivided. remains still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain. and interested. still more. by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. The precise extent of the common law. in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate. which prove the obscurity which reins in these subjects. or which marks the ermination of the former and the commencement of the animal empire. but a number of hands. these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty. by a short duration of their appointments. The experience of ages. memory. in the effects of good government. of law. etc. the maritime law. or even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. as the great body of them are.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 107 legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious to the people. with the continued and combined labors of the most enlightened legislatures and jurists. on the contrary. and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few.. and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power. desire. requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. afford another illustration of the same important truth. but the execution of it by a single hand. and remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy. with sufficient certainty. volition. has been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and different tribunals of justice. and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them. A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been arranged and assorted. The boundaries between the great kingdom of nature. enlightened as they are with regard to the nature. to the institutions of man. Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter. Questions daily occur in the course of practice. will better appear on a more accurate view of it. and other local laws and customs. and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of this country. Stability. of equity. the law of corporations. All new laws. general and local.

the convention should have been forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagination? The real wonder is that so many difficulties should have been surmounted. and as far as either of them is well founded. resulting from a difference of local position and policy. which would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. under the pressure of all these difficulties. When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language. The convention. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of the astonishment. in forming which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence. but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them. the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. and to the distribution of its powers. We may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to the other. Would it be wonderful if. fully proportioned to their superior wealth and importance. Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects. We had occasion. in a former paper. to give such a turn to the organization of the government. assuaging their mutual jealousies. Any one of these must produce a certain degree of obscurity. therefore. so the different parts of the United States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances. To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves. and however accurately the discrimination may be considered. that after the ratio of representation had been adjusted. yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence. according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. and the imperfection of the human faculties. which must have been experienced in the task of forming it. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution. luminous as it must be. We cannot err in supposing that the former would contend for a participation in the government. his meaning. Here. and surmounted with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. must have experienced the full effect of them all. Other combinations. which produce a like effect on a larger scale.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 108 discussions and adjudications. also. As every State may be divided into different districts. inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. must have created additional difficulties. And although this variety of interests. then. There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions. for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper. as would increase the importance of the branches. Nor could it have been the large and small States only. to take notice of the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution. it shows that the convention must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations. in delineating the boundary between the federal and State jurisdictions. Perspicuity. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less. the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated. which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies. or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. imperfection of the organ of conception. It is extremely probable. this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle between the same parties. . and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. is a history of factions. and its citizens into different classes. requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed. The history of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant opinions. The use of words is to express ideas. may have a salutary influence on the administration of the government when formed. and adjusting their respective interests. and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object.

or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the people. he alleged. and applying them to the particular instances before us. had been prepared by Tullius Hostilius. The second conclusion is that all the deputations composing the convention were satisfactorily accommodated by the final act. The Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus. was the author of that which bore his name. 1788. and disappointments. the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men. Theseus first. and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty. however. which. Saturday. a people who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals. who stepped forward with a project for such a reform. or were induced to accede to it by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good. Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. that the Athenians.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 109 contentions. 38 The Same Subject Continued. In revolving the causes from which these exceptions result. The proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular. the proceeding was strictly regular. a brighter aspect is presented. Minos. instituted the government of Athens. we are necessarily led to two important conclusions. The first is. in a very singular degree. but as far as the advocates for a regular reform could prevail. but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity. __ FEDERALIST No. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by Romulus. And Solon. should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have proceeded. Numa and Tullius Hostilius. according to Plutarch. we are told. they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage. What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments. and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen. and its second from Aratus. and by their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are contrasted. January 12. they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth. and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of the senate and people. in which government has been established with deliberation and consent. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history. In some. was the primitive founder of the government of Crete. to take upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution. instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. Amphictyon. should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of . On the abolition of royalty the consular administration was substituted by Brutus. in a few scattered instances. and may be classed among the most dark and degraded pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. cannot in every instance be ascertained. that a people. an exemption from the pestilential influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative bodies. and after him Draco and Solon. Whence could it have proceeded. and the work completed by two of his elective successors. was in a manner compelled. that the convention must have enjoyed. This remark is applicable to confederate governments also. by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens. and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed From the Independent Journal. If. and by a despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments. we learn.

Are they . without denying the reality or danger of the disorder. to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments. confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their happiness. And Lycurgus. and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them. and. however. The physicians attend. who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy. And she is warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences. from whose common deliberations more wisdom. History informs us. selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief. in some States. than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it. that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject. and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger. Is it an unreasonable conjecture. they serve not less. more true to his object. than the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities. The prescription is no sooner made known. when these articles were submitted for their ratification. is so far from being desperate. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive. She has been sensible of her malady. and best entitled to his confidence. It is observable that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States. not only by many considerations of a general nature. had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of selfpreservation. Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts. that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his first counsellors. There is abundant reason. Might not the patient reasonably demand. of the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend. persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence. and. was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition. under pain of certain death. first of his country. the case of the patient is carefully examined. and endangering the event of the contest. as well as the expedients which they were obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. to suppose that immaterial as these objections were. after coolly revolving his situation. than by her peculiar foresight. assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution. but that the case. on one hand. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. rather by her local situation. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led to make. by which this happy effect is to be produced. that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse. and the characters of different physicians. before he ventured to follow this advice. not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error which on actual trial has discovered itself. One State. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. with proper and timely relief. would he not act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the latter. but by the particular case of the Articles of Confederation. rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy. it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. and forbid him. than a select body of citizens. If these lessons teach us. nor agree in proposing one? Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment. consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable. and then of his life. nevertheless. likewise. Solon. to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government. but most tolerable to their prejudices. we may remember. They are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy. or rather in the very bowels of our country. they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous inflexibility. as well as more safety. a consultation is held. they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical. to make use of it. although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates. without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of counsellors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 110 themselves and their posterity. than a number of persons interpose. and of securing his final success by a voluntary renunciation. on the other.

from the number of persons who are to administer the new government. but sees clearly it must be one or other of them. according to some. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of appointing to offices. With another. From another quarter. we are alarmed with the amazing expense. whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power. and judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty. or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department. in their objections to the remedy proposed. whilst a fourth is not wanting. because it is not a confederation of the States. so they are also the most sagacious. but a government over individuals. are any two of them agreed. but contends that it ought to be declaratory. Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent. with full powers. that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy." Even among the zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced. discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation. who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers. but to the want of a bill of rights. is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive alone. and that the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. both in this favorable opinion of their merits. The demand of one gentleman is. and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second convention. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy. and considers it as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President himself. I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that department. on another occasion. that as they are the most zealous. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports. of those who think the late convention were unequal to the task assigned them. but by no means to the extent proposed. "We concur fully. From this quarter. Another would prefer a larger number. not of the personal rights of individuals. that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction. whether. executive. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. A third does not object to the government over individuals. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution the language is that the legislative. and in their unfavorable opinion of the convention. is the vicious part of the organization. Were the experiment to be seriously made. or to the extent proposed. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights. No part of the arrangement. and sometimes from the same quarter. is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions. "in the objection to this part of the plan. the admission of the President into any share of a power which ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate. with all their enmity to their . is equally obnoxious. that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature. and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon the subject. This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected." reply others. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume. let us suppose. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. A patriot in a State that does not import or export.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 111 agreed. which is alternately a member both of the legislative and executive departments. but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation. and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. To another. Let us further suppose that their country should concur. the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation. As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal Constitution. there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. the exclusion of the House of Representatives.

Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men. the contrast just stated will hold good. and they have already begun to make use of it. into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please. in any one point. that a rich and fertile country. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress. that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. and were to continue in force. the existing Congress. a single body of men. are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. it is in fact a lifeless mass. But waiving illustrations of this sort. because the latter had some alloy in it. for a certain period. or assumed by. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also. They have begun to render it productive. under proper management. will soon become a national stock. We may calculate. they can borrow. Then. and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses. because the latter had not a porch to it. and. that however large the mass of powers may be. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building. and whether the Constitution. not until a BETTER. as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta. depart so widely from their example. It is a matter both of wonder and regret. that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in theory. or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary. A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States. who can RAISE TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER. and most of the States have recognized. it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the State for the means of carrying them into practice. and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them. to appoint officers for them. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses. if it were to be immediately adopted. therefore. to erect temporary governments. as long as a shilling will be lent. and no better government be substituted. which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 112 predecessors. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect. with the concurrence of the Executive. yet must it hereafter be able. would not stand as fair a chance for immortality. and the command of the army. It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope. by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and death. in the first place. that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States. that if the Union is to continue. now before the public. or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller. as in the discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations. . they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper. in the next place. they would. that it empowers the Senate. or for some time to come. to be the supreme law of the land. say I. All this has been done. and done without the least color of constitutional authority. effective powers must either be granted to. I shall be told. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury. and to furnish. without any such control. no alarm has been sounded. Is it an objection against the new Constitution. but until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers. liberal tributes to the federal treasury. to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress. both abroad and at home. of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States. and appropriate money to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. Yet no blame has been whispered. in either of which events. Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever. can make treaties which they themselves have declared. and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold. But this is not all. and it may with reason be expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt.

been frequently placed on the list of republics. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed. or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom. These examples. by any thing here said. in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people. as no less necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress. or during good behavior.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 113 And yet there are men. be found to depart from the republican character. in urging the establishment of the latter. at the same time. If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established. The same title has been bestowed on Venice. The first question that offers itself is. combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy. The public interest. not by recurring to principles. The government of England. a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention. to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. has. its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible. 39 The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles For the Independent Journal. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America. I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. Wednesday. for a limited period. Poland. no satisfactory one would ever be found. but in the application of the term by political writers. then. urge against the new system the objections which we have heard. with equal impropriety. are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society. where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised. the necessity of the case. to the constitution of different States. which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic. and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure. show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions. or a favored class . imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. but who are advocates for the system which exhibits it. with the fundamental principles of the Revolution. If the plan of the convention. Would they not act with more consistency. therefore. Holland. we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking. has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect. by a small body of hereditary nobles. What. which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms. than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly? I mean not. has been dignified with the same appellation. January 16. or at least may bestow that name on. not from an inconsiderable proportion. and. which has one republican branch only. we may define a republic to be. in the most absolute manner. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No.

And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. by the people.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 114 of it. In the other States the election is annual. this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. though a remote choice. According to the constitution of every State in the Union. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places. as in all the States. the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior. otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles. the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. be the choice. "But it was not sufficient. no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. as in New York and Delaware. exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers. In order to ascertain the real character of the government. it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally. the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard. will. both under the federal and the State governments. might aspire to the rank of republicans. as in the several States. first." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision. and claim for their government the honorable title of republic." say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution. Even the judges. to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government. we perceive at once that it is. would be degraded from the republican character. otherwise every government in the United States. and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter. According to all the constitutions. is elected immediately by the great body of the people. First. which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states. and for the period of two years. like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures. The House of Representatives. The Senate is elective. which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland. as in the State of South Carolina. and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective. derives its appointment indirectly from the people. they have framed a NATIONAL government. secondly. to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn. And according to one. will be a subject of legal regulation. also. According to most of them. again. conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions. as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed. They ought. Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded. to have preserved the FEDERAL form. with all other officers of the Union. is. and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified. and in many instances. instead of which. and in South Carolina for two years. as it unquestionably ought to be. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions. in the most rigid sense. that of good behavior. either directly or indirectly. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people. and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. In several of the States. however. The Senate. the chief magistrate is elected for three years. to a period of years. Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system. the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed. it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established. conformable to it. some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. according to the example in most of the States. as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject. "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. and thirdly. with equal care. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. for the period of six years. to ascertain the real character of the government in question. and the Senate of Maryland. On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed. both within the legislative and executive departments. which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States. to . how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority. the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility. of the people themselves. like the present Congress.

is obvious from this single consideration. derived from the supreme authority in each State. the act of the people. on the other hand. in the latter. So far the government is FEDERAL. nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features. 115 On examining the first relation. and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. it appears. on the individual citizens composing the nation. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation. In this relation. the authority of the people themselves. then. though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. The difference between a federal and national government. So far the government is NATIONAL. Neither of these rules have been adopted. the new Constitution will. if established. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. on the whole. but. will derive its powers from the States. be a FEDERAL. but a FEDERAL act. but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. and not a NATIONAL constitution. and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States. that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union. and the people will be represented in the same proportion. that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America. not by the legislative authority. in this relation. partly as unequal members of the same society. not the FEDERAL character. independent of all others. in its ordinary and most essential proceedings. will not be a NATIONAL. they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. as political and coequal societies. The Senate. given by deputies elected for the special purpose. is considered as a sovereign body. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio. and on the same principle. in ratifying the Constitution. but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations. in their individual capacities. the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority. to the extent of them. but by that of the people themselves. to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. as these terms are understood by the objectors. is supposed to consist in this. In several cases.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor the operation of those powers. in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority. in their political capacities. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character. from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America. establishing the Constitution. therefore. on the other. and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people. That it will be a federal and not a national act. But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers. it changes its aspect again . and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate. is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives. on one hand. as forming so many independent States. and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced. again. On trying the Constitution by this criterion. as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. The eventual election. not as individuals composing one entire nation. which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies. not as forming one aggregate nation. Each State. differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed. The act. and the operation of the government on the people. a NATIONAL government. as they now are in the existing Congress. it falls under the NATIONAL. in their individual capacities. not FEDERAL. not NATIONAL. designate it. may. The next relation is. or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. as they are in the legislature of a particular State.

and this authority would be competent at all times. not federal. then. and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. in strictness. in the extent of them. in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments. is a position not likely to be combated. on the other hand. and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character. not national. all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme. In the former case. the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy. since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only. to the general authority. not by CITIZENS. the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one. but a composition of both. In requiring more than a majority. 1788. In this relation. the tribunal which is ultimately to decide. to speak more properly. and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments. than the general authority is subject to them. this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. to alter or abolish its established government. it is partly federal and partly national. neither a national nor a federal Constitution. finally. so far as they are objects of lawful government. again. In the latter. But this does not change the principle of the case. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority. within their respective spheres. not national. therefore. Were it wholly federal. it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. and. according to the rules of the Constitution. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact. in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn. and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES. it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character. The proposed Constitution.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 116 when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. or. In its foundation it is federal. in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient. and may be controlled. within its own sphere. it is federal. The decision is to be impartially made. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions. or abolished by it at pleasure. Among communities united for particular purposes. in the operation of these powers. whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. no more subject. is to be established under the general government. it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. like that of a majority of every national society. is. Friday. directed. January 18. the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union. it is national. If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made. 40 On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained For the New York Packet. Were it wholly national. Among a people consolidated into one nation. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE SECOND point to be examined is. and principles. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things. the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. not only an authority over the individual citizens. . The idea of a national government involves in it. that it could be safely established under the first alone.

A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. that the object of the convention was to establish. to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY. and be made to conspire to some common end. who shall have been appointed by the several States. have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution. The one is. it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. then. that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly. as when agreed to by them. and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes. 1786. which the less important part? Which the end. in September. will effectually provide for the same. or to that from Congress. that every part of the expression ought. render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. in February. and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN. The other is. 3d. 1st. adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT. and which rejected? Which was the more important. 1787. by the assent of a Congress of the United States. which part of the definition ought to have been embraced. if possible. which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers. as shall. by express instructions to their delegates in Congress. in strictness. that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress. let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention. however. and to report such an act for that purpose. and OF THE UNION. the means should be sacrificed to the end. the less important should give way to the more important part. as a mean to remedy which. that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide. had reference. 4th. and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State. be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union. That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient. when agreed to in Congress. in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. as it is expressed in the act of Congress. as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis. As all of these. as well as founded on legal axioms. in the judgment of the convention. that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other. dictated by plain reason. for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. for making alterations therein. and to the States. and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK. be held at Philadelphia. 2d.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 117 The powers of the convention ought." From these two acts. and whereas experience hath evinced. that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates. and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: "Resolved. There are two rules of construction. either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis. Suppose. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. and of the legislatures of the several States. that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression. to be allowed some meaning. The act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States. in these States. that there are defects in the present Confederation." The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following: "WHEREAS. it appears. rather than the end to the means. is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION. . and confirmed by the States. to the United States in Congress assembled. several of the States.

not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures. What are these principles? Do they require that. whether the preservation of these articles was the end. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity. to alter old ones. in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. But pretermitting these instances. Let them declare. be laid on the TITLE. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States. in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy. if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. of the post office. and measures. a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means. of claims under grants of land by different States. to insert new articles. and not immediately on individuals? In some instances. nor described its objects with so much latitude. on the post office. the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government. by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury. The . that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded. or whether the establishment of a government. as has been shown. Let them declare. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title. as insufficient means. or that an adequate government should be omitted. weights. and that the States. of coins. the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. In some instances. the general powers are limited. had not New York herself. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention. and in two States[1] are actually so appointed. adequate to the national happiness. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. beyond this limit. and an adequate government be provided. in all unenumerated cases. between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS. those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people. that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one. of piracy. in the establishment of the Constitution. In cases of capture. will. or even of a civil magistrate. was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed. also. and to which they ought. the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new. and ought not to have been varied? I ask. The truth is. to have been sacrificed. and the articles of Confederation preserved. and that. that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in the articles of the confederation could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government. that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax. was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people. and the Union preserved. and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures. whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America. particularly. so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations. But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other. than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. of trade with the Indians. so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles. in fine. Do these fundamental principles require. it is presumed. and. as in the old. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. to a certain extent. into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress. require that the powers of the general government should be limited. above all. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed. are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. and under the Confederation. in this case.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 118 answer these questions.

and so understood by the convention. they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE. that they were so meant by the States. that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former. forms ought to give way to substance. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory. and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written. As this objection. has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. therefore. that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention. by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States. were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. powers. comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it. would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced. wholly foreign to their commission.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 119 misfortune under the latter system has been. though the most plausible. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES. had been attended to and promoted. made by a single State (Virginia). but of operative. They had seen. made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. It is worthy of remark that this objection. that the States were first united against the danger with which they were . and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens. as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different. that in all great changes of established governments. warranted. of recommending a great and critical object. in the public estimation. towards a partial amendment of the Confederation. and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. throughout this great empire. assumptions by Congress. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION. not only of recommendatory. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor. It may be collected from their proceedings. and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. not only justified by the public opinion. The THIRD point to be inquired into is. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. I dismiss it without further observation. and by the same rules. convened at Annapolis. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States. unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness. has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention. They must have reflected."[2] since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object. how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment. in a variety of instances. that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis.

equally unknown to the Confederation. which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext. ought surely to be. that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights. is the subject under investigation. by every virtuous citizen. that if they had exceeded their powers. __ FEDERALIST No. who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion. under these masks. if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country. its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed. by the circumstances in which they were placed. would not less excite animadversion. under all these impressions. according to the noble precept. Saturday. They must have borne in mind. in proposing a Constitution. let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception. 2. Declaration of Independence. that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES. that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers. has no foundation to support it. than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. except in one instance little urged by the objectors. were anywhere seen. as whether the advice be GOOD. on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control. it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is. as the confidential servants of their country. for that reason alone. not warranted by their commission. shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry. but required. if they had violated both their powers and their obligations. taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes. Connecticut and Rhode Island. How far this character is due to the Constitution. nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples. not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes. Had the convention. to exercise the liberty which they assume. their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them. January . 41 General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution For the Independent Journal. in all cases. of securing its happiness. by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished. for Congress. let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention. the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever. and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever. It might even have occurred to them. to be rejected? If. this ought nevertheless to be embraced. no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms. they were not only warranted. and of pointing out a system capable. except in those who wished to indulge. their secret enmity to the substance contended for. and for the State of New York. of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events. by the friends of mankind. nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 120 threatened by their ancient government. that where a disposition to cavil prevailed. what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world. and that finally. PUBLIUS 1. in their judgment. in particular. and in the midst of all these considerations. of sacrificing substance to forms. it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy. who recommended the appointment of this body. a body utterly unknown to their constitutions.

of regulating and calling forth the militia. if not of the lesser evil. Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 19. to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment. 4. including the restraints imposed on the States. and that in every political institution. Security against foreign danger. a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. It may display the subtlety of the writer. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States. of levying and borrowing money. the point first to be decided is. to the particular structure of the government. 5. that the choice must always be made. That we may form a correct judgment on this subject. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages. that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. It would be superfluous. it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union. of providing armies and fleets. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility. It is . to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The SECOND. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. in case of an affirmative decision. of which a beneficial use can be made. and the distribution of this power among its several branches. it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation. that in all cases where power is to be conferred. and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque. 3. it may inflame the passions of the unthinking. whether such a power be necessary to the public good. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: 121 THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. at least of the GREATER. therefore. and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust. therefore. Under the FIRST view of the subject. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government. not the PERFECT. two important questions arise: 1. and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. 2. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form. good. They will see. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States? Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question. 6. Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. as the next will be. that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them.

The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety. it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. as well as providing fleets. The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. It was remarked. as well as in WAR? The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. All Europe has followed. The fears of the weaker. every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. be forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. provision. or without a single soldier. have. which it cements and secures. The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. Not the less true is it. the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. and of maintaining both in PEACE. destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. They will. because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power. in like manner. as far as they ever existed. the example. ready for the service of ambition or revenge. is a dangerous. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. of France. The Union itself. the same event might follow. A standing force. then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government. or been forced into. They were introduced by Charles VII. 122 But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS. America united. unless we could prohibit. A wise nation will combine all these considerations. or the ambition of the stronger States. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations. as Charles VII. on a former occasion. that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. will set the same example in the New. Had the example not been followed by other nations. be ever determined by these rules. with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. and by no others. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors. the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. with a handful of troops. at the same time that it may be a necessary. in fact. and that the liberties of Europe. exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited. and. for a moment. How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers. It is worse than in vain. therefore.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor involved in the power of self-defense. that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs. or Confederacies. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments. did in the Old World. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible. But let it never. will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. been the price of her military establishments. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own . The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. so long as they continue a united people. and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army. by real or artificial dangers. all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. the rulers of Great Britain have never been able. with few exceptions. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe.

jealousy. of these establishments in each. it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves. to extend the term beyond a single year. inflame their mutual animosities. In America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies. cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises . I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. Next to the effectual establishment of the Union. the management of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification. in practice. and render them the instruments of foreign ambition. It must. though unlimited by the British Constitution. This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored. whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. of standing armies. that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength. ought not suspicion herself to blush. has nevertheless. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution. in pretending that the representatives of the United States. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary. that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America. can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject. Had the argument from the British example been truly stated. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. and that the American ties down the legislature to two years. where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives. none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people. without desiring. and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. where the House of Commons is elected for seven years. Every man who loves peace. But among all the blunders which have been committed. indeed. and wars. and revenge. Now.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 123 limits. but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the Union. that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature. under a united and efficient government. contentions. would form a part only of her lot. every man who loves liberty. not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter. elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the people. expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS? A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. be numbered among the greatest blessings of America. as the longest admissible term. the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term. Of this truth. or too often exhibited. the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment. every SECOND YEAR. if in Great Britain. and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction. ought to have it ever before his eyes. every man who loves his country. where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people. and from such a progressive augmentation. and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature. which has spared few other parts. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth. The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure. must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter. which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown. as any establishment that can become necessary. or without daring. so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad.

Some. and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population. if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers. been clearly shown to be necessary. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland. both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. the authors of the objection might have had some color for it. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue. the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. not only on that element. It has been urged and echoed. if we do not call to mind in our calculations. I will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external -." amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance. is properly thrown into the same class with it. being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense. 124 The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection. the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. I trust. but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. and excises. that for a considerable time it must be a principal source. and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. or even to regulate the course of . taxes on articles imported from other countries. and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy. though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. than their stooping to such a misconstruction. both in the extent and the kind of imports. imposts. and has. In a more remote stage. duties. The power of levying and borrowing money. which must be the general measure of the public wants. will be truly miraculous. that at this moment it is an essential one. also. have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution. by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders. meant for duration. has been examined already with much attention. the trial by jury. Her seacoast is extensive. and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean. In the present condition of America. This power. require rather the encouragement of bounties. the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor. ought to contemplate these revolutions. are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties. who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation. and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger. which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers. therefore.taxation by which they mean. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture. A system of government. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections. to pay the debts. The great emporium of its commerce. that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations. than the general expressions just cited. A power to destroy the freedom of the press. A very important district of the State is an island. the great reservoir of its wealth. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs. lies every moment at the mercy of events. that the power "to lay and collect taxes. and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds. the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them. no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. on the language in which it is defined. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. our escape from insults and depredations. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject. which will be wrought into articles for exportation.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor on our safety. and will. the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials. but every part of the other bordering on it. The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained. or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. and be able to accommodate itself to them. if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration. than to be loaded with discouraging duties.

" But what color can the objection have. as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution. attaching themselves to these general expressions. shall be defrayed out of a common treasury. . and consuls. and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import. and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead. 1788. The objection here is the more extraordinary. consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations. But what would have been thought of that assembly. other public ministers. and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent. This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 125 descents. to send and receive ambassadors. or the forms of conveyances. must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare. January 22." The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare. and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted. as described in article third. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation! PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. The objects of the Union among the States. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase. are "their common defense. after the year 1808. shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning. which. if. 42 The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered From the New York Packet. it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. including a power to prohibit. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE SECOND class of powers. Tuesday. had not its origin with the latter. and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded. and offenses against the law of nations. If we are to be one nation in any respect. is an absurdity. and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever. the importation of slaves. we must take the liberty of supposing. when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows. to regulate foreign commerce. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning. lodged in the general government. as to give meaning to every part which will bear it. to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas." etc. and allowed by the United States in Congress. security of their liberties. to wit: to make treaties. they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution. as a discouragement to such importations. as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. and mutual and general welfare.

unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas. to employ the inferior grades of public ministers. The definition of piracies might. into violations of their chartered authorities. Yet it has been found expedient. It were doubtless to be wished. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States. a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy. and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution. But it is not difficult to account. within these States. and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer. and to send and receive consuls. that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls. Both of them are comprised in the articles of Confederation. ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this. be left to the law of nations.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 126 The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors. where foreign embassies may be necessary. that a period of twenty years may terminate forever. by the plan of the convention. would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject. The regulation of foreign commerce. or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation." is expressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors. without inconveniency. the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties. as defined in the codes of the several States. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity. under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States. Felony is a term of loose signification. given by the ninth article of the Confederation. than the more obvious and striking defects of the old. the mission of American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the authority. that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808. either for this restriction on the general government. having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed. The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses. and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government. and that a power of appointing and receiving "other public ministers and consuls. But neither the common nor the statute law of that. or of any other nation. These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations. or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser. and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. But the admission of consuls into the United States. as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation. perhaps. and that where no such treaties exist. though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model before them. that the former is disembarrassed. and has been the practice of Congress. seems to have been nowhere provided for. The term ambassador. It is true. speak their own propriety. For the sake of certainty and uniformity. and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. or forced by the defects of the Confederation. if taken strictly. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal administration. therefore. even in the common law of England. that within that period. with this difference only. whose functions are connected with commerce. by a concurrence of the few States which continue the . of an exception. and is a still greater improvement on the articles of Confederation. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper. belongs with equal propriety to the general government. and offenses against the law of nations. comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers. and may be totally abolished. where no previous treaty has stipulated it.

records. that it would nourish unceasing animosities. the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. In Germany it is a law of the empire. to coin money. and the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organization of the government. and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. and to establish post offices and post roads. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and secureties of the United States. The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members. before public bodies as well as individuals. to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. I mention these misconstructions. pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest. and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved. but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government. and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs. to wit: to regulate commerce among the several States and the Indian tribes. and uniform laws of bankruptcy. Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States. one is. without the general permission. it may be added that without this supplemental provision. that the practice in this. without the consent of the emperor and the diet. where the Union is so very slight. We may be assured by past experience. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States. is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State. has not followed the law. to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. in any form. that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors. though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper. during the passage through their jurisdiction. regulate the value thereof. if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution. to fix the standard of weights and measures. and the effect they shall have in other States. not with a view to give them an answer. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject. and of foreign coin. by resentment as well as interest. in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 127 unnatural traffic. it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export. and certain powers of the judicial department. the desire of the commercial States to collect. To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest. since it would stimulate the injured party. In Switzerland. and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair. by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. for they deserve none. each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons. as in many other instances in that confederacy. But the mild voice of reason. to prescribe the manner in which the public acts. without an augmentation of the tolls. from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States. but the former are reserved for a distinct class. has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. rivers. and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans. with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members. that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges. an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors. by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice. . The powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this third description. is but too often drowned. that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances. or passages.

though not members of a State. it is declared "that the FREE INHABITANTS of each of these States. as well as the current coin. by residence or otherwise." "all the privileges of trade and commerce. paupers. of too serious a nature not to be provided . What would have been the consequence. All that need be remarked on the power to coin money. are entitled. therefore. is. the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of Confederation. with complete sovereignty in the States. and of foreign coin. may. that by providing for this last case. by taking away a part. that is. The power is there restrained to Indians. not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself. without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation." cannot easily be determined. not members of any of the States. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part of the article. can be regulated by an external authority. vagabonds. or rather every State is laid under a necessity. to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State. certain descriptions of aliens. the difficulty is diminished only. is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union. and then asserted their rights as such. and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another. legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter. residence for a short term confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another. The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system. or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and immunities of free citizens. however. and PEOPLE in another. if such persons. that those who come under the denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State." etc. And how the trade with Indians. to subvert a mathematical axiom. or that of the respective States. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State. and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin. and letting the whole remain. enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce. and THE PEOPLE of each State shall. An alien. of naturalizing aliens in every other State. The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities. and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. elude his incapacity. other consequences would probably have resulted. regulate the value thereof. There is a confusion of language here. were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the privilege of residence. that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. We owe it to mere casualty. In the fourth article of the Confederation. By the laws of several States. although not citizens of such State. excepted. in every other. is absolutely incomprehensible. and fugitives from justice. but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction. which render the provision obscure and contradictory. shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States. The very improper power would still be retained by each State. not removed. had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State. In one State. is not yet settled. and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States. which is remarkable. within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been. This is not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities. within the jurisdiction of the other. qualifications of greater importance are required. But were an exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone. both to residence and citizenship. in every other State. to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 128 The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation. by previous residence only in the former. The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin STRUCK by their own authority. FREE CITIZENS in another. who had rendered themselves obnoxious. and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable.

arsenals. by securing. and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States. and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The new Constitution has accordingly. perhaps. for a limited time. the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 129 against. by virtue of its general . and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation on this head. become the seat of the government of the United States. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged. where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated. in any stage of the process. The power of establishing post roads must. Wednesday. in Great Britain. A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. become productive of great public conveniency. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate. and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. in every view. January 23. 43 The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) For the Independent Journal. "To exercise exclusive legislation. and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care. over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may. for the erection of forts. with great propriety. and other needful buildings. and may. made provision against them. that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. and the effect they shall have in other States. I might say of the world. is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation. The power of prescribing by general laws. 2. to authors and inventors. dockyards. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers: 1. records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved. within a foreign jurisdiction. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice. by judicious management. carries its own evidence with it." The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. by authorizing the general government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. in all cases whatsoever. be a harmless power." The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government. the manner in which the public acts. to be a right of common law. and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States. by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress. by laws passed at the instance of Congress. magazines.

by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime. The particular precaution against the erection of new States.. 5. and as the authority of the legislature of the State.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 130 supremacy. but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood. against a junction of States without their consent. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions. has the new system supplied the defect." As treason may be committed against the United States. derived from their own suffrages. as a municipal legislature for local purposes. for protection in the exercise of their duty. as still further to abridge its necessary independence. from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author. to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. or parts of States. as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it. will of course be allowed them. as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution. at the discretion of nine States. the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. The public money expended on such places. All objections and scruples are here also obviated. and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity. "To declare the punishment of treason. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. Without it. equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend. and restraining the Congress. by which were evidently meant the other British colonies. and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government. magazines. is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. and that of the States concerned." . to concur in the cession. by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned. even in punishing it. or of any particular State. The general precaution. or forfeiture. quiets the jealousy of the larger States. will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the Constitution. as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State. as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them. but a dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government." with a proviso. without the concurrence of the federal authority. The necessity of a like authority over forts. by the partition of a State without its consent. the convention have. requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States. 4. therefore. This consideration has the more weight. 3. that no new States shall be formed. on her joining in the measures of the United States. that "nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States. established by the general government. The eventual establishment of NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States. as well as of the Congress. but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission. no provision is found on this important subject. opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger. the natural offspring of free government. "To admit new States into the Union. with great judgment. have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other. might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it. and the other COLONIES. as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession. With great propriety. without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned. and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it. except during the life of the person attained. every imaginable objection seems to be obviated. fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it." In the articles of Confederation. Canada was to be admitted of right. and the public property deposited in them. in every such establishment. is not less evident. etc.

to protect each of them against invasion. and on application of the legislature. As long. but when it would be improper.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor This is a power of very great importance. had its share of influence on the events. as well as the monarchical form. "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons. But theoretic reasoning. But a right implies a remedy. It may possibly be asked. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State. that the federal interposition can never be required. in the former. and composed of republican members. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered. the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other. especially a small State as by a majority of a county. therefore." In the latter case. in the latter case. The history. proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. there . A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. will hardly be considered as a grievance. or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened). Why may not illicit combinations. It has been remarked. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms. in this as in most other cases. for purposes of violence. both of ancient and modern confederacies. that even among the Swiss cantons. and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded. a restriction which. 131 6. it will be. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be." says Montesquieu. "As the confederate republic of Germany." In a confederacy founded on republican principles. and consequently. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed. of course. are not under one government. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. must be qualified by the lessons of practice. ought not the federal authority. against domestic violence. it is presumed. experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. either that a majority have not the right. "consists of free cities and petty states. These questions admit of ready answers. it might seem not to square with the republican theory. and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments. that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority. but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. of the new confederate. than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort. as the other cantons. to subvert a government. the disproportionate force. subject to different princes. to support the State authority? Besides. At first view. which. than those of a kindred nature. as the existing republican forms are continued by the States. the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. or that a minority will have the force. no doubt. they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public. properly speaking. and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is. to protect the local magistracy. and where else could the remedy be deposited. and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government. provision is made for this object. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government. bound to pursue the authority. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States. and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. be formed as well by a majority of a State. without the concurrence of the States themselves. that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions. not only against foreign hostility. and if the authority of the State ought. and as well by the most democratic. or a district of the same State." "Greece was undone. which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. to suppose. what need there could be of such a precaution. they have a right to do so. The proviso annexed is proper in itself." he adds. by the ambition of enterprising leaders.

among other reasons. that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. in fine. that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 132 are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution. they are reformed by those that remain sound. The existence of a right to interpose. "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States. the others are able to quell it. it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States. what few others need to be informed of. and tearing a State to pieces. in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence. who. necessarily involves a validity on the other side. and that as the article is merely declaratory. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition. will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it. the establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force. unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. than under the Confederation. and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. and engagements entered into. of military talents and experience. that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies. though not a constitutional right? the answer must be. as it would be without the compass of human remedies. before the adoption of this Constitution. that such a case. an assertion of their validity on one side. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments. and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution. than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. an important one is. if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked. the omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot against the national rights. and may have been inserted. that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants. or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen. not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges. what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions. that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations. who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine." 7. Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution. are sunk below the level of men. than the representatives of confederate States. Should abuses creep into one part. during the calm of regular government." This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition. so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability. they would unite the affection of friends. They may be further told. as being no less valid against the United States. by the accession of alien residents. as well as against them. that every . or of secret succors from foreign powers. Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources. under this Constitution. may emerge into the human character. flying to arms. "To consider all debts contracted. and comprising a superiority of the entire force. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu. but who. what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States. or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States. of a casual concourse of adventurers. for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States. as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side. The authors of this discovery may be told. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power. and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics.

9. would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. and that no real danger can exist that the government would DARE. and authorizes them. it may be observed. which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 133 constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary. or on the other. can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. could not but be foreseen. this constitutional declaration before it. PERHAPS. The second question is not less delicate. equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors. or even without. to pronounce the compact violated and void. In general. both on one side and on the other." That useful alterations will be suggested by experience. "To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the States under two exceptions only. Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion: 1. can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority. implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature. to remit the debts justly due to the public. that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other. to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God. that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States. moreover. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention. It was requisite. The claims of justice." This article speaks for itself. and that extreme difficulty. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate. It guards equally against that extreme facility. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns. which would render the Constitution too mutable. will be . if they please. yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States. to the great principle of self-preservation. and the remaining few who do not become parties to it? The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case. "The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States. that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty. with. on the pretext here condemned. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it. On what principle the Confederation. 8. and the flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation. which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim. The scene is now changed. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution. It. as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side. ratifying the same. that a mode for introducing them should be provided. and that a breach. committed by either of the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties. and with it the part which the same motives dictate. therefore. also. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact. The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. absolves the others. which might perpetuate its discovered faults.

on the necessary confidence in the public councils. Had every State a right to . the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected. in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the federal head. and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage. as a concurrent right with that of Congress. it may be observed. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. 44 Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States From the New York Packet. and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion. a right of coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers. pass any bill of attainder. or rather an accumulation of guilt. was left in their hands by the Confederation. and. The loss which America has sustained since the peace. but is somewhat extended in the new. or confederation. is copied into the new Constitution. The right of coining money. Friday. according to the latter. make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts. which must long remain unsatisfied. The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen. and for reasons which need no explanation." The prohibition against treaties. In this instance. letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war. emit bills of credit. above all. it is hoped. will. from the government of the United States. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States: 1. and must be fulfilled. which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice. 1788. or law impairing the obligation of contracts. or grant any title of nobility. alliances. the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past. ex post facto law. constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure. January 25.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 134 in force. whilst considerations of a common interest. that the same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin. grant letters of marque and reprisal. and on the character of republican government. of the power which has been the instrument of it. not urge in vain MODERATION on one side. as well during war as previous to its declaration. "No State shall enter into any treaty. and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union. the new provision is an improvement on the old. coin money. In addition to these persuasive considerations. also. on the industry and morals of the people. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general authority. and PRUDENCE on the other. prove with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man. which is here taken from the States. these licenses must be obtained. under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. alliance. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system. and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible. According to the former.

is withdrawn from the States. in cases affecting personal rights. therefore.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 135 regulate the value of its coin. and thus the citizens of other States be injured. to remark further on this head. and snares to the more-industrious and lessinformed part of the community. keep troops or ships of war in time of peace. the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. without the consent of Congress. and I am much deceived if they have not. or engage in war unless actually invaded. except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. too. They have seen. in so doing. ex post facto laws. there might be as many different currencies as States. as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. Very properly. Without the SUBSTANCE of this power. therefore. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money. Those who object to the article. are contrary to the first principles of the social compact. 2. than to coin gold or silver. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences. that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions. or with a foreign power. can only mean that the FORM of the provision is improper. that some thorough reform is wanting. and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious. Of these the first is. lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports. therefore. or in any department or officer thereof. and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights. and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports. Bills of attainder. that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. The SIXTH and last class consists of the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest." The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. or have been so fully developed. therefore. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions. which will banish speculations on public measures. and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States. inspire a general prudence and industry. and to every principle of sound legislation. "No State shall. and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States. no part can appear more completely invulnerable. and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded. 1. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause. No State shall. Our own experience has taught us. as a part of the Constitution. and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports. retrospective alterations in its value might be made. every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of Confederation and needs no comment. the "power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. and give a regular course to the business of society." Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this. lay any duty on tonnage. on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency. that they may be passed over without remark. nevertheless. But have they considered whether a better form . It is needless. and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. without the consent of the Congress. The power to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts. become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators. yet on a fair investigation of it. They very rightly infer. enter into any agreement or compact with another State.

by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition. there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government. has been or can be executed by Congress. they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them. to the alternative of construing the term "EXPRESSLY" with so much rigor. not EXPRESSLY granted. or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction. than if no partial enumeration had been made. that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated. than that wherever the end is required. to avoid this consequence. Had the Constitution been silent on this head. the PARTICULAR POWERS. No axiom is more clearly established in law. as if the general power had been reduced to particulars. they might have been altogether silent on the subject. every particular power necessary for doing it is included. but. as if the State legislatures should violate the irrespective constitutional authorities. and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever. accommodated too. therefore. which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power. would be less forcibly excepted. which are to expound and give effect to the legislative . must always necessarily vary with that object. but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce. if it were necessary. and described the residue by the general terms. wherever a general power to do a thing is given. as their predecessors have been. or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper. the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor could have been substituted? 136 There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject. or in reason. and would have been liable to this further objection. they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions. that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive. the means are authorized. in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution. Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the second article of Confederation. for in every new application of a general power. If. without recurring more or less to the doctrine of CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference. because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper. If it be asked what is to be the consequence. It would be easy to show. not only to the existing state of things. been pursued by the convention. NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER. In the first instance. the same. and any one of these were to be violated. they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and proper". the task would have been no less chimerical. and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same. that no important power. it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation. Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution. by unavoidable implication. and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated. the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates. the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments. and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum. Had this last method. delegated by the articles of Confederation. the government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing. it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only. Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect. every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility. I answer. in short. at the same time.

or which shall be made. it would have seen a monster. on the legislatures of the several States. The members and officers of the State governments. without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. I content myself with one. forever be conducted by the officers. would interfere with some and not with other constitutions. as the constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy. will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution. There being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former. to sound the alarm to the people. in which the head was under the direction of the members. it might happen that a treaty or national law. on the contrary. that the State magistracy should be bound to support the federal Constitution. In the third place. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof. at the same time that it would have no effect in others. an express saving of the supremacy of the former would. To be fully sensible of this. the world would have seen. 2. in all cases. under the authority of the United States. and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States. that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter." The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it also. and the members of the several State legislatures. all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution. by the election of more faithful representatives. which is obvious and conclusive. violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed. "The Senators and Representatives. shall be the supreme law of the land. in such States. would have been annulled. probably. and will. have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution. these will be ever ready to mark the innovation. in favor of the State constitutions. it would have seen the authority of the whole society every where subordinate to the authority of the parts. a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government. In fine. for the first time. and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives. so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation. The election of the President and Senate will depend. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance. and would consequently be valid in some of the States. both of the United States and the several States. as these constitutions invest the State legislatures with absolute sovereignty. that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legislatures. for this plain reason. The truth is. as the constitutions of the States differ much from each other. and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby. we need only suppose for a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had been left complete by a saving clause in their favor. shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. and all executive and judicial officers. and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people who can. annul the acts of the usurpers. and all treaties made. 3. of great and equal importance to the States. any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. In the first place. and ." It has been asked why it was thought necessary. The members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect. and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors. in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of Confederation. In the next place.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 137 acts.

Saturday. But if the Union. and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain. to urge as an objection to a government. 138 4. in a word. that the people were made for kings. the American Revolution effected. and are brought to this undeniable conclusion. is it not preposterous. not kings for the people. The question. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New. whether this amount of power shall be granted or not. whether the Union itself shall be preserved. is the supreme object to be pursued. of the States. the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America. January 26. 45 The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered For the Independent Fournal. if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States. without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. therefore. that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness. We have now reviewed. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper. instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government. in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good. as has been shown. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness. whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established. was the precious blood of thousands spilt. in detail. my voice would be. and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished. if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty. all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government. the next question to be considered is. I pass them over in this. be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger. but that the government of the individual States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor according to the laws. the real welfare of the great body of the people. not that the people of America should enjoy peace. Abolish the Union. or. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place. In like manner. that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was. Reject the plan. liberty. resolves itself into another question. and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. it would be. as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the . and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World. whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. if. and safety. have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. might enjoy a certain extent of power. that particular municipal establishments. was the American Confederacy formed. The adversaries to the plan of the convention. then. in other words.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 139 happiness of the people. The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government. The Lycian Confederacy. in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies. in most of these examples. perhaps. yet. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered. the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members. each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments. in most cases. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power. On the other side. of the subordinate authorities. Even the House of Representatives. and particularly. as far as its principles and form are transmitted. with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The more I revolve the subject. is the question before us. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people. to the local influence of its members. must have borne a still greater analogy to it. of themselves determine it. The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States. under the proposed Constitution. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination. has been shown. whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Without the intervention of the State legislatures. the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former. will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men. How far the sacrifice is necessary. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the . into one consolidated government. as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case. to despoil the general government of its authorities. whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess. Thus. a very extensive portion of active sovereignty. Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers. We have seen. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter. we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions. Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. These cases are the more worthy of our attention. to the predilection and probable support of the people. On the contrary. and must consequently feel a dependence. though drawn immediately from the people. whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other. if at all. and to each other. had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people. we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government. and will. to the powers respectively vested in them. the voice of every good citizen must be. the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons. the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. Although. and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head. or tended to degenerate. In the feudal system. it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. as the States will retain. the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government. and finally the disunion. and very little. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated. which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments.

The more adequate. of possibility. both in number and influence. improvement. treaties and finance. and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been. and that the eventual collection. and properties of the people. with all the county. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter. Should it happen. excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace. and foreign commerce. liberties. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast. the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States. with the members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union. and the internal order. the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. with which last the power of taxation will. the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people. indeed. that the Confederacy is to possess. Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted. and will be very numerous. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of Confederation. for three millions and more of people. that in other instances. for the most part. we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. there would not be less than thirty or forty. particularly in the organization of the judicial power. or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with . those of the State governments. be connected. armies and fleets. The members of the legislative. It is true. however. it is true. The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers. but that seems to be an addition which few oppose. I may add. The regulation of commerce. officers of different descriptions. that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States. corporation. appointed by the several States. intermixed. executive. and town officers. those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system. and in this view alone. and not very numerous. the justices of peace. whose influence would lie on the side of the State. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which. must exceed. concern the lives. it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union. beyond all proportion. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. are few and defined. negotiation. and from which no apprehensions are entertained. but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to. that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own. in the ordinary course of affairs. The powers relating to war and peace. will generally be made by the officers. compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within the compass of probability. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important. in times of peace and security. the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. under the immediate authority of the Union. and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States. are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue. or even more. the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. and prosperity of the State. and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare. and many of them persons of character and weight. as war. or. Indeed it is extremely probable. is a new power. ministerial officers of justice. the State governments will have theirs also. the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States. and according to the rules. officers of militia. as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 140 side of the former than of the latter. and may exercise. The former will be exercised principally on external objects. to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. with the other more considerable powers. peace. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government. except for supplemental purposes of revenue. than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense. whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country.

With the affairs of these. whether either. besides those suggested on a former occasion. To maintain that such an event would have ensued. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system. all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. wherever the derivative may be found. that the State governments would have lost their constitutional powers. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. and that opposition to . too. the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. had. reserving the proofs for another place. And with the members of these. nevertheless. resides in the people alone. therefore. and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject. and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments. It was engaged. in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear. requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents. that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments. The federal administration. and to have viewed these different establishments. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared From the New York Packet. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: RESUMING the subject of the last paper. They must be told that the ultimate authority. I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. It was. no less than decency. will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship. invariably found. I assume this position here as it respects the first. that the existence of the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essental purposes of the Union. but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people. Many considerations. on the side of these. Experience speaks the same language in this case. would be to say at once. during the war. Tuesday. and of family and party attachments. or which of them. an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever. and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States. after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over. that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor. January 29. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed. will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. constituted with different powers. and designed for different purposes. the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. not only as mutual rivals and enemies. we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. Truth. our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion. 1788. By the superintending care of these.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 141 success towards single persons. and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise.

Were it admitted. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress. are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess. from an undue attention to the local prejudices. to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States. and the dignity and respectability of its government. The motives on the part of the State governments. that the new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued. If an act of a particular State. which the members themselves will carry into the federal government. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State. The opposition of the federal government. would but inflame the zeal of all parties on . but on the prejudices. It has appeared also. though unfriendly to the national government. but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both. how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union. as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. much less. It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments. rather of partisans of their respective States. to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. interests. the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. that the prepossessions of the people. interests. the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments. will be more on the side of the State governments. than the latter will be on the former. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State. the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due. that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits. than of the federal government. to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government. that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. And in that case. to resist and frustrate the measures of each other. in the nature of things. be advantageously administered. will inform us. of course. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes. the State governments must clearly have the advantage. as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration. it is executed immediately and. will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures. will generally be favorable to the States. that the members have but too frequently displayed the character. therefore. the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred. that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. or the preorgatives of their governments. be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers. than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. as has been elsewhere remarked. or the interposition of federal officers. and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate. however. But in a distinct and very important point of view. on whom both will depend. but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend. because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can. the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. not on the national prosperity and happiness. by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The prepossessions. than of impartial guardians of a common interest. whilst it will rarely happen. the advantage will lie on the same side. the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects. to the aggrandizement of the federal government. The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals. 142 If.

or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. with the people on their side. an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation. and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. the existence of subordinate governments. or even a warrantable measure be so. refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union. than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. in the United States. the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves. the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State. let it however be made. as was produced by the dread of a foreign. the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal. This proportion would not yield. if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. one part of the empire was employed against the other. Let a regular army. according to the best computation. and the evil could not be prevented or repaired. does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls. if at all. which would seldom fail to be the case.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 143 the side of the State. That the people and the States should. that with this aid . On the other hand. still it would not be going too far to say. or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. Besides the advantage of being armed. a standing army can be carried in any country. the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment. throughout this period. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. which are carried as far as the public resources will bear. in short. And it is not certain. be formed. without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. would not excite the opposition of a single State. on the authority of the State governments. fighting for their common liberties. whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. It may well be doubted. which may sometimes be the case. must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy. that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm. But ambitious encroachments of the federal government. Extravagant as the supposition is. perhaps. in any State. elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands. that the traitors should. The highest number to which. for a sufficient period of time. that the State governments. to which the people are attached. They would be signals of general alarm. difficulties not to be despised. Every government would espouse the common cause. their repugnance and. and continue to supply the materials. and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government. or of a few States only. should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States. until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. yoke. would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter. would form. and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced. the embarrassments created by legislative devices. forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition. in a large State. more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Plans of resistance would be concerted. and by which the militia officers are appointed. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe. with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. officered by men chosen from among themselves. but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. The attempt was unjust and unwise. fully equal to the resources of the country. The disquietude of the people. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms. would be able to repel the danger. would result from an apprehension of the federal. In the contest with Great Britain. would oppose. The same combinations. will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. which would often be added on such occasions. very serious impediments. A correspondence would be opened.

who could collect the national will and direct the national force. executive. who will be supported by the people. must. 1788. they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence. Wednesday. January 30. executive. whether of one. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it. On the other supposition. and judiciary. on the most favorable interpretation. that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States. or many. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 144 alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. and that all those alarms which have been sounded. it is said. and whether hereditary. no regard. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value. in the same hands. legislative. or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form. it will not possess the confidence of the people. of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments. that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion. is its supposed violation of the political maxim. by these governments. and of officers appointed out of the militia. a few. On the first supposition. and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. 47 The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts For the Independent Journal. On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper. than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment. or it will not. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form. seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government. as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union. be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them. which appears altogether conclusive. and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts. The accumulation of all powers. that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession. that the legislative. Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people. In the structure of the federal government. it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance. . and attached both to them and to the militia. and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments. than that on which the objection is founded. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No.

"if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. had possessed also the complete legislative power. therefore. or body of magistrates. as his own words import. though not admitted to a legislative vote. I persuade myself. who is the sole executive magistrate. though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices. again. in the form of elementary truths. it may clearly be inferred that. and another. and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. Were the federal Constitution. no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. His meaning. and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. the acts of each other. Let us endeavor. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. nor any legislative function. when he pleases to consult them. The entire legislature.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 145 selfappointed. or to use his own expression. and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye. nor administer justice in person. as the mirror of political liberty. by which Montesquieu was guided. though they are shoots from the executive stock. The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. if the king. or no CONTROL over. as. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject. The judges. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics. and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. can amount to no more than this. though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law. or with a mixture of powers. From these facts. have. the several characteristic principles of that particular system. On the slightest view of the British Constitution. though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy. not to mistake his meaning in this case. the force of legislative acts. and by which all similar works were to be judged. however. one of his constitutional councils." or. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him. again. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative. we must perceive that the legislative. that it will be made apparent to every one. This. on another hand. so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard. may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. and to have delivered. that the charge cannot be supported. or elective. are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations. it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment. or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary. or the supreme executive authority. in the first place. or the supreme administration of justice. can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in . though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. to ascertain his meaning on this point. though he can put a negative on every law. in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person. however. when made. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief. under certain limitations. he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act." he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in. on the impeachment of a third. having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation. and form. that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department. let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns. That we may be sure. then. is not among the vices of that constitution. can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him. really chargeable with the accumulation of power. the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. can exercise no executive prerogative. which. executive. and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort.

The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body. a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers. gives a like control to the judiciary department. Lastly. a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers. and independent of. seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments. the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers. what is more. the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority. are appointable by the executive department. violated the rule established by themselves. and the Senate. is the presiding member also of the Senate. is in its nature an executive function. nevertheless. or either of them. in this last point at least. and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from." says he. a partial control over the legislative department. "there can be no liberty. we find that." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages. and. whose constitution was the last formed. particularly executive offices. And its court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal . and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner. The President. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department. the compilers of the Constitution have. in the appointment of officers. OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor the executive department. in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. 146 The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject. notwithstanding the emphatical and." Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut. It gives. for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department." Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative. or either of them. but briefly stated as they are here. and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR. in some instances." This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu. which is a part of the legislature. and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention. the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down. each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT WILL ADMIT. Were it joined to the executive power. and has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative. and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches. and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. again. or either of them. and. executive. is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed. there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. The Senate. both executive and judiciary. because they were formed prior to the Revolution. The members of the judiciary department. who is the head of the executive department. If we look into the constitutions of the several States. which is a branch of the legislative department. has a casting vote in case of a tie. New Hampshire. to the executive magistrate. is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. besides an equal vote in all cases. they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body. As the appointment to offices. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. as it has been explained. but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution.

are appointable by the legislature. he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. who is the executive magistrate. appointed. also. the appointment not only of the executive chief. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the governor. In conjunction with an executive council. the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative department. except that the justices of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly. is in one case vested in the legislative department. The constitution of North Carolina. and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases. executive. executive. to the legislative department. declaring that the legislative. According to the constitution of Pennsylvania. The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it. with six others. he appoints the members of the judiciary department. and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. In South Carolina." refers. the appointment of the members of the judiciary department. as are also the members of the executive council. executive. All officers may be removed on address of the legislature. is chancellor and ordinary. the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department. and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. In the constitution of Georgia. are filled by the same department. The governor. at the same time. The members of the executive counoil are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the State. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative. and the members of the judiciary by the executive department. including even justices of the peace and sheriffs. to be referred to the same department. in this State.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor members of the judiciary department. the president. and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution declares. and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. and judiciary departments . of one of the legislative branches. three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the Supreme Court of Appeals. and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct. and president. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive department. but that the chief magistrate. who is the head of the executive department. with a casting vote. also. both executive and judiciary. on the impeachment of the other. but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department. that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature." Yet we find not only this express exception. "that the legislative. The executive chief. it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace. where it is declared "that the legislative. notwithstanding. The executive prerogative of pardon. is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals. with his executive council. so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other. down to captains in the army and navy of the State. executive. is appointed by the legislature. and the appointment of officers in the executive department. and that all the principal offices. Her constitution. the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace. with respect to the members of the irferior courts. It gives to the latter. Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms. The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Throughout the States. nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. which declares "that the legislative. In Delaware. judiciary as well as executive. is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative department. 147 The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature. or surrogate of the State. and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers.

and even an actual consolidation. It is equally evident. What I have wished to evince is. and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American constitutions. the boundaries of these departments. Will it be sufficient to mark. and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct. is the great problem to be solved. After discriminating. the next and most difficult task is to provide some practical security for each. and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative. It is agreed on all sides. or judiciary.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 148 shall be separate and distinct. and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper." we find that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature. with precision. members of the government. In citing these cases. in the constitution of the government. so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other. and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. therefore. and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution. in which the legislative. that power is of an encroaching nature. nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. I shall undertake. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify. the several classes of power. directly or indirectly. under which they were framed. It will not be denied. in the administration of their respective powers. of the different powers. they carry strong marks of the haste. to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others. can never in practice be duly maintained. is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author. that none of them ought to possess. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature. 1788. What this security ought to be. and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble. 48 These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other From the New York Packet. But experience assures us. against the more powerful. in theory. in the next place. executive. that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. . Friday. the degree of separation which the maxim requires. and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. as essential to a free government. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. executive. as they may in their nature be legislative. of violating the sacred maxim of free government. and still stronger of the inexperience. that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture. an overruling influence over the others. against the invasion of the others. executive. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper. February 1.

But in a representative republic. Let those who doubt it. But as a more concise. on some favorable emergency. On the other side. As little will it avail us. and has in some constitutions full discretion. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one. The concentrating these in the same hands. and being more simple in its nature. A respect for truth. the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments. whether the operation of a particular measure will. was himself the chief magistrate of it. Jefferson. to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates. where the executive magistracy is carefully limited. "All the powers of government. attested by two unexceptionable authorities.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 149 The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed. The legislative department derives a superiority in our governments from other circumstances. The authority in support of it is Mr. besides his other advantages for remarking the operation of the government. and judiciary. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations. where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions. or been attentive to. a dependence is thus created in the latter. evidence. result to the legislative body. Its constitutional powers being at once more extensive. that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands. it can. it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions. and are continually exposed. the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger. yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions. I will refer to the example of two States. that they are chosen by ourselves. In a democracy. but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of . tyranny may well be apprehended. the course of public administrations. extend beyond the legislative sphere. or will not. I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject. 195. supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed him on this subject. by a supposed influence over the people. however. has expressly declared in its constitution. legislative. a State which. An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not the government we fought for. which. obliges us to remark. executive. is precisely the definition of despotic government. they might be multiplied without end. over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments. The first example is that of Virginia. that they seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate. mask. and in all a prevailing influence. p. both in the extent and the duration of its power. that the three great departments ought not to be intermixed. but one which should not only be founded on free principles. and less susceptible of precise limits. under complicated and indirect measures. which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude. In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch. which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. to start up in the same quarter. and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly. and at the same time equally satisfactory. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people. and not by a single one. and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain. as we have seen. by assembling all power in the same hands. by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures. I might find a witness in every citizen who has shared in. the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass. must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations. it will be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his very interesting Notes on the State of Virginia. by means which reason prescribes. which is inspired. with the greater facility. and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. It will be no alleviation. with an intrepid confidence in its own strength. Were it necessary to verify this experience by particular proofs. It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies. who. that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen. projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of every State in the Union.

the Council of Censors. The salaries of the judges. In this respect. nor. There are three observations. If. SECOND. a great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war. although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the constitution against improper acts of legislature. The judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office. They have accordingly. which will render them obligatory on the other branches. it will be found. other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the constitution. and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct. or by a few hands. DURING THE WHOLE TIME OF THEIR SESSION. unauthorized measures would. and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence. THIRD. IN MANY instances. and cases belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination. that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. had been occasionally varied. violating. in most of the other instances. also. BUT NO BARRIER WAS PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS. they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department. that the legislative.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 150 magistracy. and THE DIRECTION OF THE EXECUTIVE. of course. it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. that convention which passed the ordinance of government. but the greater part of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government. and to the truth of most of which both sides in the council subscribed. and powers assumed which had not been delegated by the constitution. It appears. For this reason. the executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by the number of members composing it. executive. may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war. IS BECOMING HABITUAL AND FAMILIAR. therefore. which the constitution expressly requires to be fixed. The constitutional trial by jury had been violated. be more freely hazarded. if made. . can be effectual. laid its foundation on this basis. no opposition is likely to be made. Some of them. and the other authority." The other State which I shall take for an example is Pennsylvania. and from the facts enumerated. or exercised. the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration of the people. the council were necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and executive proceedings. or assumed to themselves. was "to inquire whether the constitution had been preserved inviolate in every part. A great number of laws had been passed. which ought to be made on this head: FIRST. or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief. which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of this body. " In the execution of this trust. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body. Those who wish to see the several particulars falling under each of these heads. the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers. which are in print. it appears that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances. may consult the journals of the council. DECIDED RIGHTS which should have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY. than where the executive department is administered by a single hand. and some of them for their continuance in it. as marked out by the constitution. because in that case they may put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly. without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. without any apparent necessity. so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time. with the constitutional powers of these departments. however. as that no one could transcend their legal limits. Executive powers had been usurped. and whether the legislative and executive branches of government had performed their duty as guardians of the people.

or new-model the powers of the government. for the establishment of a constitution for that commonwealth. than against the . diminish. to recur to the same original authority. Saturday. original. is perhaps altogether his own. or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed. and as it immediately relates to the subject of our present inquiry." quoted in the last paper. His proposition is. as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits. it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory. under which the several branches of government hold their power. and is the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded. is derived. which had been prepared in order to be laid before a convention. it is evident. The plan. marks a turn of thinking. I do not dwell. should be able to gain to its interest either of the others. by the legislature. expected to be called in 1783. and it must be allowed to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open. comprehensive. 1788. One of the precautions which he proposes. not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people. is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands. ought not to be overlooked.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 151 The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these observations is. but also whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others." As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power. The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission. that a convention is necessary for altering the constitution. February 2. none of them. "that whenever any two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion. or even one third of its members. without an appeal to the people themselves. 49 Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention For the Independent Journal. each by the voices of two thirds of their whole number. can alone declare its true meaning. which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of the other departments. or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT. In the first place. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia. and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented. the remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision. that a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. and it is from them that the constitutional charter. who. and accurate. If the legislative authority. and enforce its observance? There is certainly great force in this reasoning. and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of power against the invasions of the stronger. the provision does not reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against the third. however. can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers. has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a constitution. because it may be thought to be rather against the modification of the principle. a convention shall be called for the purpose. like every thing from the same pen. on this objection. as the grantors of the commissions. for certain great and extraordinary occasions.

of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders. they are known to have a double effect. But whether made by one side or the other. and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelligence of the people of America. In a nation of philosophers. like man himself. The appeals to the people. A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. The latter. that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government. If it be true that all governments rest on opinion. 152 In the next place. The future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. therefore. it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual. would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their different situations. The convention. produced by a universal resentment and indignation against the ancient government. But the legislative party would not only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the people. The reason of man. it may be considered as an objection inherent in the principle. would be composed chiefly of men who had been. and that they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the people. But the greatest objection of all is. and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability. deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing. The former are generally the objects of jealousy. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges. We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other departments. The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions. . as well as by the nature and permanency of it. who actually were. Notwithstanding the success which has attended the revisions of our established forms of government. members of the department whose conduct was arraigned. and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal influence among the people. it would probably be the case with many.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor principle itself. of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms. or who expected to be. And in every other nation. which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions. by the mode of their appointment. The same influence which had gained them an election into the legislature. are numberous. of friendship. When the examples which fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS. They would consequently be parties to the very question to be decided by them. and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the number with which it is associated. would usually be made by the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number. would gain them a seat in the convention. could mingle its leaven in the operation. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. or the abuses to be reformed. do not present any equivalent security against the danger which is apprehended. We are to recollect that all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord. this consideration ought to be disregarded. are too far removed from the people to share much in their prepossessions. in short. on the other hand. If this should not be the case with all. The members of the legislative department. and their administration is always liable to be discolored and rendered unpopular. frequent appeals would. and can be personally known to a small part only of the people. on whom every thing depends in such bodies. Their connections of blood. the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side. With these advantages. is timid and cautious when left alone. and pretty certainly with those leading characters. in a great measure. and its practical influence on his conduct. and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made. it must be confessed that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily multiplied. that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect in the government. it can hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.

If the periods be separated by short intervals. Some of them are unquestionably founded on sound political principles. and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. It would be connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the community. not the REASON. 1788. Tuesday. this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance it. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. and in proportion as the remoteness of the others may favor a dispassionate review of them. sometimes happen. of the public. that occasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an effectual provision for that purpose. by considerations drawn from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten. But it is the reason. And in the last place. a distant prospect of public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to which it might be urged by the force of present motives. would be arrested in their career. the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date. that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals to the people. eagerly bent on some favorite object. If the periods be distant from each other. I do not examine. The executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of the people. In the first view. alone. Is it to be imagined that a legislative assembly. the public decision might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the legislative party. that appeals would be made under circumstances less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties. without particularly considering them as provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. We found in the last paper. consisting of a hundred or two hundred members. February 5. PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it. perhaps. A strong party among themselves might take side with the other branches. the same remark will be applicable to all recent measures. It will be attended to. 50 Periodical Appeals to the People Considered From the New York Packet. they would be of long standing. or opponents of. as to admit of no specious coloring. The PASSIONS. I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the Constitution.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 153 It might. by keeping the several departments of power within their due bounds. The usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden. or of parties springing out of the question itself. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in. however. or twenty years? In the next place. fifteen. therefore. In such a posture of things. which are liable to the objections urged against them. of the public would sit in judgment. How far the provisions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be adequate. In the first place. and all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision. and would not easily be extirpated. that ought to control and regulate the government. It appears in this. appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. the abuses would often have completed their mischievous effects before the remedial provision would be applied. that mere declarations in the written constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government. But still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the question. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: IT MAY be contended. would have taken deep root. the measures to which the decision would relate. that in the examination of these expedients. where this might not be the case. .

" This important and novel experiment in politics merits. I have never understood that the decisions of the council on constitutional questions. within the seven preceding years. and had been for a long time before. to inquire. misconstrue the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments. if I mistake not. The important task would probably devolve on men. In some of them it may. made under circumstances somewhat peculiar. that. their opinions. by its researches. from the names of the gentlemen who composed the council. Had this not been the case. which I venture to remark. It even appears. whether rightly or erroneously formed. The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. very particular attention. proves at the same time. unfortunately. "whether the constitution had been violated. the inefficacy of the remedy. if they are so to be called. it was split into two fixed and violent parties. as well as for other purposes. at least. the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. Fifth. But as applied to the case under consideration. First. One of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784. because an extinction of parties necessarily implies either a universal alarm for the public safety. as we have seen. however unimportant in themselves. Every unbiased observer may infer. to revise the preceding administration of the government. and at the same time without meaning to reflect on either party. in several points of view. will be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed nor desired. and by its example. In all questions. have had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. or unconnected with each other. instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places. whether the decisions of this body do not. in order to correct recent breaches of it. Fourth. and whether the legislative and executive departments had encroached upon each other. that in one instance the contemporary legislature denied the constructions of the council. PASSION. the existence of the disease. at the same or any other given period. of the legislative assembly within the same period. When they are governed by a common passion. Is it to be presumed. It is at least problematical. Third. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions. without danger of mistake. Were the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies elected by the people. perhaps. has been actually tried in one of the States. in several instances.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 154 The scheme of revising the constitution. . Second. it involves some facts. was. that some. Two of the members had been vice-presidents of the State. Throughout the continuance of the council. must have presided over their decisions. and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. all persons who should have been concerned with the government within the given period. that at any future septennial epoch the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed that any other State. and a number of others distinguished members. be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. therefore. or any individuals of either party. This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the experiment was made was at that crisis. as a single experiment. It appears. and several other members of the executive council. will be the same. violently heated and distracted by the rage of party. of its most active members had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State. or an absolute extinction of liberty. One of them had been speaker. and actually prevailed in the contest. the difficulties would not be obviated. This censorial body. within the period to be reviewed. the same names stand invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. It appears that the same active and leading members of the council had been active and influential members of the legislative and executive branches. as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. not REASON.

be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority. as in all other cases. But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department. therefore. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: TO WHAT expedient. it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive. legislative. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 155 who. however. but the . then. Wednesday. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular. as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is. by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may. it is evident that each department should have a will of its own. secondly. the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea. not independent of the legislature in this particular. by their mutual relations. But what is government itself. with inferior capacities. through channels having no communication whatever with one another. and therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be examined. In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government. that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate. would in other respects be little better qualified. which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty. from the principle must be admitted. and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department. it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first. their independence in every other would be merely nominal. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. they would probably have been involved in the parties connected with these measures. Some deviations. Were this principle rigorously adhered to. for the emoluments annexed to their offices. It may be a reflection on human nature. the defect must be supplied. for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments. and have been elected under their auspices. 1788. which may perhaps place it in a clearer light. and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. or the judges. Some difficulties. It is equally evident. shall we finally resort. because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members. Although they might not have been personally concerned in the administration. February 6. Were the executive magistrate. the people. 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments For the Independent Journal. The provision for defense must in this. I will hazard a few general observations. that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others.

is but a precarious security.that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major. as the rightful interests of the minor party. to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. This. no government would be necessary. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. of the society itself. on the other hand. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -. This policy of supplying. the legislative authority necessarily predominates. and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions. as I persuade myself they are. as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers. at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. no doubt. the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. moreover. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them. neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. There are. The second method will be exemplified in the . the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments. In the compound republic of America. and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. the defect of better motives. and to render them. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power. If a majority be united by a common interest. and in the next place oblige it to control itself. An absolute negative on the legislature appears. the primary control on the government. the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness. might be traced through the whole system of human affairs. which place that system in a very interesting point of view. by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable. all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government. without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles on which these observations are founded be just. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department. by different modes of election and different principles of action. the rights of the minority will be insecure. but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. if not impracticable. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. A dependence on the people is. In republican government. where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men. at best. the other. that it should be fortified. at first view. by opposite and rival interests. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. First. two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America. and may possibly be turned against both parties. the weakness of the executive may require. If angels were to govern men. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions.that is. The different governments will control each other.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 156 greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels. by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former. private as well as public. In a single republic. Second.

a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good. so. In the extended republic of the United States. the society itself will be broken into so many parts. in the latter state. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself. Justice is the end of government. I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained. by the uncertainty of their condition. the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government. provided it lie within a practical sphere. for the rights of every class of citizens. in other words. anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature. parties. to provide for the security of the former. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained. in the former state. even the stronger individuals are prompted. by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE. a will independent of the society itself. and sects which it embraces. the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects. February 8. and as. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies. also. to wish for a government which will protect all parties. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker. and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. Friday. will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security. under the republican forms. to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers. or of the minority. there must be less pretext. that the larger the society. and classes of citizens. I shall begin with the House of Representatives. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government. that the rights of individuals. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of . the weaker as well as the more powerful. by a like motive. interests. 52 The House of Representatives From the New York Packet. and among the great variety of interests. 1788. or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. It is no less certain than it is important.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 157 federal republic of the United States. and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. must be proportionately increased. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE. will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced. where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger. the more duly capable it will be of self-government. It is the end of civil society. by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter. or. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests. whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society. the only other security.

anterior to the date of Magna Charta. First. the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found. and which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. It must be satisfactory to every State. it is not alterable by the State governments. whether native or adoptive. The earliest records of subsequent date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year. and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity. under on alarm for . and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress. and an intimate sympathy with. The first to which this character ought to be applied. to be the best that lay within their option. it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known. But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose. is too obscure to yield instruction. is reduced to a precise meaning." which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II. be safe. it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on. as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person. does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation. when a revolution took place in the government. secondly. The qualifications of the elected. The provision made by the convention appears. The history of this branch of the English Constitution. the term "frequently. and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years. and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. therefore. being fixed by the State constitutions. which passed a few years later in the same reign. that. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States. The last change. On the accession of William III. being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions. is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule. whether biennial elections will. therefore. must be in no office under the United States. by the State itself. at the time of his election. and must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected. not that they were to be ELECTED every year. have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. and. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. to define and establish this right in the Constitution. Let us consult experience. would have been improper for the same reason. in this case.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 158 republican government. is the House of Commons in Great Britain. Under these reasonable limitations. By another statute. under various pretexts. must. very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II. And even here. and without regard to poverty or wealth. during the time of his service. To remedy this grievance. or which may be established. the people. in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive. whether they be necessary or useful. must have been seven years a citizen of the United States. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch. from three to seven years. It will be safe to the United States. The scheme of representation. the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description. It was incumbent on the convention. that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years. being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity. whether young or old. the subject was still more seriously resumed. because it is conformable to the standard already established. it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent. or to any particular profession of religious faith. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people. because. The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article. would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. two questions must be considered: first.

The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights of their constituents. if I have not been misinformed. not as a proof of any peculiar merit. that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The principle of representation. a period of about thirty-five years. But the periods of election were different. the shorter ought to be its duration. moreover. In the second place. Of late these shackles. for the priority in those instances was probably accidental. if I mistake not. in one branch of the legislature at least. They varied from one to seven years. as other legislative bodies are. watched and controlled by the several collateral legislatures. the greater the power is. from this view of it. or some other contingent event. from the spirit and conduct of the representatives of the people. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections. under the federal system. and octennial parliaments have besides been established. was established in all of them. must be left to further experience. by public act. is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds good. Elections in Ireland. till of late. was continued throughout his whole reign. with a few exceptions. it has. and. nevertheless. The example of Ireland. conversely. The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is. for binding the representatives to their constituents. In Virginia. was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their deliberation. This particular example is brought into view. What effect may be produced by this partial reform. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom. claims particular attention. the resolution of independence. and were seldom repeated. and in the chance of some event which might produce a general new election. and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof. it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever. which other legislative bodies are not. prior to the Revolution. at the same time that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent. The parliament which commenced with George II. as to those whose elections were most frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain. been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on its people. would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections. does not exceed a triennial return of them.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 159 the Hanoverian succession. can throw but little light on the subject. It is a received and well-founded maxim. have been broken. it was the first also in espousing. with the other necessary reforms. The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members. but that it will be. and which. but merely as a proof. Have we any reason to infer. no comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing. for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible. so far as the disposition might exist. when British colonies. which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves. the smaller the power. that biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle. And in the third place. and which vanquished the obstacles to independence. was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. if they should be disposed to seduce. The example of these States. and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL elections. Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty. except on the accession of a new prince. on another occasion. the House of Representatives from . As far as we can draw any conclusion from it. cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their constituents. that where no other circumstances affect the case. the more safely may its duration be protracted. elections under the former government were septennial. and all the other vicious ingredients in the parliamentary constitution. were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown. we cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years. that the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament.

The important distinction so well understood in America. confined to any single point of time. or monthly.as is proposed in the federal government. of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone. daily. has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons. from the States whose elections are different from both. that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason. paramount to the . as has often been remarked. weekly. Where no Constitution. They have in particular. as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. and yet it would be not easy to show. therefore. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. they are annual. on the last occasion. South Carolina excepted. as well with regard to the Constitution. and by these causes. seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided. the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side. and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side. changed the period of election. Saturday. Even in Great Britain. where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed. and will be doubly watched on the other. by legislative acts. In South Carolina they are biennial -. liberty is not. February 9. In searching for the grounds of this doctrine. some of the most fundamental articles of the government. not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: I SHALL here. between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government. against the danger to which it is exposed. in this respect. it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable. which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. They have accordingly.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 160 their duty to the people. actually changed. to abuse. it is not less true. if it were found expedient. and a law established by the government and alterable by the government. and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution. be reminded of a current observation. we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance. perhaps. why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves. continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. Here is a difference. "that where annual elections end. and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. in several instances. 1788. than South Carolina. tyranny begins. but by the same act. as well as annual. that when once established. as in some instances it actually has been. between the longest and shortest periods. than in the elections of other civil magistrates. and has led them to seek for some security to liberty. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. In Connecticut and Rhode Island. With less power. I can discover but one. and the means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government. In the other States. The election of magistrates might be. but lies within extremes. as four to one. and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. and. the periods are half-yearly. Happily for mankind. that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed. for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures." If it be true. or that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects. 53 The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) For the Independent Journal. on several occasions.

either existed or could be obtained. and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them. was to be sought for. than those of any other nation would be. that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. Another part can only be attained. unalterably fixed by such a Constitution. or even more frequent. The laws are so far from being uniform. to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. and what better security would the case admit. in all such cases. No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region. without some acquaintance with the commerce. where elections were annual. and even of the laws. Yet some knowledge of the affairs. Some other security. without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation. and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant. The period of service. but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government? The second question stated is. to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. It is true that all these difficulties will. and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is. and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time. and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. of all the States. and the regulatious of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated. In a single State. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited. and to the general affairs of the State. the ports. no constitutional security. by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws. that they vary in every State. which lie within a small compass. similar to that established in the United States. was to be attempted. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. the usages. And the increased intercourse among . for fixing the national sentiment. one year. if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 161 government. in this form. by degrees. than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. as we have seen. or at least thoroughly attained. therefore. therefore. by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections. the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State. as the federal government will be. be very much diminished. ought. and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal. are not very diversified. applicable to the subject was that of a year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations. as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations. without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code.

and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations. But with all these abatements. Some portion of this knowledge may. as happens in all such assemblies. that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. The election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same principle. It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations. the judge of the elections. and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 162 those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements. but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. and hold but one legislative session in a year. 54 . No argument can be drawn on this subject. and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance. the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed. as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation. will be thoroughly masters of the public business. particularly in the more distant States. They are elected annually. no doubt. A few of the members. of less importance. this practice might become a very serious abuse. from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel. the legislative business of a single State. so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse. a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means. no matter by what unlawful means. but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. There are other considerations. is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation. and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information. where they are large. before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat. qualifications. If a return can be obtained. if limited to a single year. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming. as it necessarily must be. The greater the proportion of new members. and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience. be acquired in a man's closet. and returns of its members. as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it. become members of long standing. by frequent reelections. Each house is. will possess superior talents. the irregular member. than if extended to two years. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate. Hence. might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service. A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative. for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases. is submitted to the federal government. but which are not unworthy of notice. yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs. who takes his seat of course. and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. perhaps. for that. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual. for obtaining irregular returns. as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. will. both in novelty and difficulty. it is true.

I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes. by the capricious will of another -. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property. and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent. and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body. that slaves are considered merely as property. is by no means founded on the same principle. on the other hand. in his life and in his limbs. not to have found a ready preference with the convention. and it will not be denied. it has reference to the proportion of wealth. not for himself. The federal Constitution. not as a mere article of property. that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away. stated in its full force.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 163 The Apportionment of Members Among the States From the New York Packet. In being compelled to labor. but for a master. as persons. because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States. it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules. All this is admitted. and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. not as a part of the irrational creation. but does it follow. In the former case. and taxation more immediately to property. and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected.the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society. of which it is in no case a precise measure. when the shares of representation were to be calculated. not as persons. when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. and it is admitted. and in other respects as property. in being vendible by one master to another master. that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property. This is the objection. This is in fact their true character. "This question may be placed in another light. against the violence of all others. it will perhaps be said. and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America. the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. In the latter. that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers." might one of our Southern brethren observe. which . as a moral person. decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves. February 12. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. with which it has a natural and universal connection. 1788. But we must deny the fact. "that representation relates more immediately to persons. "We subscribe to the doctrine. the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people. will probably be as little contested. therefore. Tuesday.the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank. The true state of the case is. and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws. that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation. and in no respect whatever as persons. from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation. and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. It is agreed on all sides. In being protected. that these are the proper criterion. or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation. in some respects. though the rule itself in this case. and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others -. even the master of his labor and his liberty. if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants. as I understand it. that the Southern States would concur in a system.

A State possesses no such influence over other States. to be paid to property in the choice of those hands. The one as well as the other. therefore. and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A rigorous adherence. as it is in truth. As far. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. an influence over each other. who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. The new . "This objection is repelled by a single abservation. the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State. Upon what principle. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature. when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 164 considered their slaves in some degree as men. one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not. and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. than the very laws of which they complain? "It may be replied. and consequently. which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants. that the slaves. and particularly in the State of New York. therefore. than of the persons. Upon this principle it is. the Constitution would. are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. but refused to consider them in the same light. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. which regards them as inhabitants. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative. In every State. that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. that in several of the States. than what may result from their superior number alone. by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants. over the representatives of other States. the same in any two States. when burdens were to be imposed. perhaps. Some attention ought. Let the case of the slaves be considered. a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted. is waived by those who would be gainers by it. then. to this principle. In the federal Constitution. as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage. In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint. so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. perhaps. have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. and not at all to property. however. that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren. the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice. in like manner with other inhabitants. ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether. this policy does not prevail. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution. that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule. ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property. therefore. States have not. it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. like individuals. of individuals. who. in this respect. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property. "After all. In some of the States the difference is very material. as inhabitants. may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. arising from superior advantages of fortune. should themselves contend. a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State. should have been admitted into the census according to their full number. by the policy of other States. founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants. "For another reason. that the government to which all the States are to be parties.

under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. In general it may be remarked on this subject. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone. if not on the co-operation. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend. secondly. 1788. by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people. in a considerable degree on the disposition. I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established. and other similar confederacies. and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points. it will be more and more disproportionate. have each a precise equality of value and effect. rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes. and consequently each vote. Scarce any article. The charges exhibited against it are. In one respect. and produce the requisite impartiality. the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. which will control and balance each other. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule. February 13. thirdly. have an unequal influence. In each of the latter.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 165 Constitution is. they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative. Wednesday. it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible. a contrary temptation would prevail. first. by the increase of the people. whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State. by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts. that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents. nor is there . 55 The Total Number of the House of Representatives For the Independent Journal. the States will have opposite interests. or a State more or less wealthy or powerful. and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives. forms another and a very interesting point of view. on the whole. Under the proposed Constitution." Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject. as well as from that of the United Netherlands. yet. in this respect. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. Hence the states. of the States. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist. that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests. and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many. fourthly. that defective as the number will be in the first instance. the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. though possessing an equal vote in the public councils. in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention. By extending the rule to both objects. indeed. materially different from the existing Confederation. will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature. or if there be any difference in the case. that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature.

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections. It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will. the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island. they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand. whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives. The truth is. whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five. in answering the fourth objection. a very considerable difference is observable among States nearly equal in population. This is a number which. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State last mentioned. that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few. in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. . Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths. and Massachusetts. Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest States. if applied to the State of Delaware. that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion. and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies. that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed. or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. the number of representatives will amount to two hundred. at the rate of one for every thirty thousand. every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. at the outset of the government. New York. On a contrary supposition. and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. they would. that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power. as. to four hundred. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. In all very numerous assemblies. On the other hand. to a thousand. the ratio of Pennsylvania. at this time. and the control of the State legislatures. It is said. when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that time. has little more than one third of the number of representatives. the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit. raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. Within three years a census is to be taken. hereafter show. whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other. In Pennsylvania. let us weigh the objections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives. I take for granted here what I shall. the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five thousand. and of fifty years. As great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. if it does not already. And according to the constitution of Georgia. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. on the other hand. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. At the expiration of twenty-five years. as Delaware. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress. I presume. of whatever character composed. would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 166 any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance. where it amounts to between three and four hundred. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates. and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the other States. justify less frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require. according to the computed rate of increase. Another general remark to be made is. With these general ideas in our mind. passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. will be sixtyfive. and twenty or thirty years hence. in the first place. and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes. In Rhode Island. The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist. amount to three millions. the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation. will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body. amount to between four and five hundred.

without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America. it is to be presumed. fortunately. They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy. and a hundred or two hundred for a few more. as a temporary regulation. who would either desire or dare. time. and every second year repeat the choice of. and from the greatness of the prize at stake. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government. or under any circumstances which can speedily happen. which must feel so many motives to watch. be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years. cannot possibly be sources of danger. they were not chosen by. The sincere friends of liberty. Now. are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that the people of America. nor responsible to. how has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be. or the Senate. standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit. From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents. they were generally continued for three years. is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated. for a still longer term. or of which the emoluments may be increased. would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people. it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled. and which possess so many means of counteracting. and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed. Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President. and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot. to betray the solemn trust committed to them. their fellowcitizens at large. even from the whispers of calumny. will not. with which all reasoning must be vain. which they can possess. then. during the term of their election. or both? Their emoluments of office. any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate. will be in the dispensation of appointments. I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time. and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time. selected by the people themselves. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed. who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion. the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. requires a prophetic spirit to declare. ought alone to quiet this apprehension. nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures. and a fuller population of our country may produce. and recallable at pleasure. will choose.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 167 The true question to be decided then is. or can be in any short time. though appointed from year to year. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created. The only means. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust. as they must allbe American citizens. which makes no part of my pretensions. What change of circumstances. they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations. and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy. within the short space of two years. sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a . be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question. in the United States. But judging from the circumstances now before us. whether the smallness of the number. in their present temper. more than suffice for very different purposes. the federal legislature. the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. and the eagerness of the party which lost it. I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution. through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives. and prior to the ratification of the federal articles. But. their private fortunes. the spirit which actuates the State legislatures.

is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 168 certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the United States. a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary. It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. and must continue to be made. which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district. . recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority. as has been elsewhere remarked. 1788. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is. in a great measure. taxation. the inference would be. are commerce. 56 The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) For the Independent Journal. As far as it may consist of internal collections. A skillful individual in his closet with all the local codes before him. than to review the different laws. and the militia. in many cases. the laws of the State. Taxation will consist. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority. A proper regulation of commerce requires much information. and reduce them in one general act. and the diversity of their interests. leave little more to be done by the federal legislature. that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government. Besides this source of information. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance. framed by representatives from every part of it. and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate. that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents. of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. diffusively elected within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts. regulations on this subject which will. without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies. the number of their inhabitants. which do not lie within the compass of legislation. In every State there have been made. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State. and which seem most to require local knowledge. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men. the best answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities. February 16. Saturday. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects. and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either. will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide.

and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings. This information. and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State. These. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform. will have an assimilating effect. on the part of each State. we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts. Whilst a few representatives. and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary. where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled. a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other. however. and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance. and may even at the very time be members. taken singly. but will probably in all cases have been members. and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries. therefore. therefore. and a local knowledge of their respective districts. with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 169 might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government. which would very much shorten the labors of the general legislature.][E1] The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used. will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Taking each State by itself. movement. which apply universally. and its interests but little diversified. and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation. they are the same throughout each particular State. The experience of Great Britain. On a comparison of the different States together. a fuller representation. which presents to mankind so many political lessons. most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry. does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess. A few men. each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population. one ninth are elected by . and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. whether mountainous or level. and will require. every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States. and discipline. The art of war teaches general principles of organization. of the State legislature. For however different the rules of discipline may be in different States. without any aid from oral information. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States. we find a great dissimilarity in their laws. its laws are the same. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight millions.][E1] [With regard to the regulation of the militia. there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. the more simple objects will be preferred. At present some of the States are little more than a society of husbandmen. from each State. and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States. will be just the contrary. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes. so far as it may relate to local objects. and the whole State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it. corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. Of this number. [The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State. but of those among different States. to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives. on the comparative situation of the different States. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws. The general face of the country. both of the monitory and exemplary kind. is rendered necessary and difficult. is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. as was formerly remarked. The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. The changes of time. not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State.

consider them in this light alone. in a very small proportion. it is notorious. however. and in the next place. that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate. __ FEDERALIST No. and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. can add any thing either to the security of the people against the government. that it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is. or ought to be. with great propriety. in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence. by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 170 three hundred and sixty-four persons. who do not reside among their constitutents. The aim of every political constitution is. February 19. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it. PUBLIUS 1. the common good of the society. Yet it is very certain. there will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY constitutents. 1788. first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern. 57 The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation From the New York Packet. to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. is such a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people. the principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government. We will. and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others. Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal Constitution. Burgh's "Political Disquisitions. The most effectual one. on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the House of Representatives that violates the . and who do not even reside among the people at large. and one half. The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government." E1. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy. and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few. interest. With all these concessions. that a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it. are very faintly connected with them. two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depository of the safety. Tuesday. than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore. or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. but that the defects in the British code are chargeable. and most virtue to pursue. not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances. and happiness of eight millions that is to say. and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest assurance. this is perhaps the most extraordinary. On the contrary.[1] It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected.

I will add. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power. there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 171 principles of republican government. as well as on the great mass of the society. and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant. when their exercise of it is to be reviewed. or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination of the people. than from innovations in the government subversive of the authority of the people. it must generally happen that a great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the people. both in public and in private life. In the second place. however. There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor. would be found very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. of religious faith. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment. those ties which bind the representative to his constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature. restraining them from oppressive measures. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together. of which few governments have furnished examples. of birth. and of confidence. more than the ignorant. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. which. not the haughty heirs of distinguished names. and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised. All these securities. on the contrary. If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust. of esteem. In the third place. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State. in the fourth place. more than the poor. of favor. apart from all considerations of interest. Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements. If it be asked. not the learned. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. No qualification of wealth. more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. what is to restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular class of the . that they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends. we are to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities which entitle them to it. Hence. and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens? Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich. as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives. is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. but without which every government degenerates into tyranny. they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease. would have more to hope from a preservation of the favor. as they will have been distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens. strictly conformable to these principles. In the first place. they will enter into the public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at least to their constituents. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature. It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters. or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not. we shall find it involving every security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents.

and an abhorrence to the federal government? If this be the point on which the objection turns. as to the two first points. or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one. according to the present rate of money. ambition itself. nor of a city or borough. If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature. must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice of their public servants.a spirit which nourishes freedom. Nor would it. that each representative of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand citizens. who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their own rulers. Reason. so the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him by the intrigues of the ambitious or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich. Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their constituents. Duty. the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America -. interest. unless he possess a like estate of half that annual value. Will it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment to the State governments. To this qualification on the part of the county representatives is added another on the part of the county electors. very grossly departed from. he could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right of suffrage. assures us. than five or six hundred. the nature of just and constitutional laws. whilst in the individual States. Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances. the election of a representative is left to about as many hundreds. the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty. unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year. gratitude. or at least that the mode prescribed by the State constitutions was in some respect or other. We have seen how far such a supposition would err. which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling. and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth. or that the right of eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or fortunes. . Is it supported by REASON? This cannot be said. as well as on the people. without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative. and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the British code. it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many. and that human prudence can devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of the people? Are they not the identical means on which every State government in the Union relies for the attainment of these important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government. and above all. It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that government will admit. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here. Is the CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of suffrage. that the real representation in the British House of Commons very little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them? Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives. no person is eligible as a representative of a county. are the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people. it deserves to be examined.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 172 society? I answer: the genius of the whole system. be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is. and in return is nourished by it. in fact. yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it. in every instance where the administration of the government does not require as many of them as will amount to one for that number of citizens? Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the last paper. on the contrary. that as in so great a number a fit representative would be most likely to be found.

in the security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of . It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts and counties a number of representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. which elect her State representatives. they cannot be incapable of choosing one. I leave every man to decide whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to countenance a suspicion. would have great weight. The districts in New Hampshire in which the senators are chosen immediately by the people. or the members of the Assembly in the two last States. as the progress of population may demand. Our own is explicit and decisive. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary for that purpose. Massachusetts. which I am to examine. So is the governor of that State. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole State. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. in which every elector votes for each of its representatives in the State legislature. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 173 But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. It forms. This is the case in all the other counties of the State. are nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in the Congress. it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject. If the same electors at the same time are capable of choosing four or five representatives. The following observations will show that. is grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time to time. if well supported. and those of New York still more so. but one county. and New York. or the executive council of Pennsylvania. In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the Congress. like most other objections against the Constitution. Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been employed against the branch of the federal government under consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New Hampshire. It has been admitted. Some of her counties. that this objection. and the president of New Hampshire. and of this State. however. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives. have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few. Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the State constitutions. And what may appear to be still more directly to our purpose. that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the people tends to elevate traitors and to undermine the public liberty. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives. 58 Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered For the Independent Journal Wednesday. February 20. 1. Pennsylvania is an additional example. are almost as large as her districts will be by which her federal representatives will be elected. calculating on the number of sixty-five representatives only. the whole city actually elects a SINGLE MEMBER for the executive council. of Massachusetts. or are in any respect less worthy of their places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in other States by very small divisions of the people? But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted.

and as their concurrence would be indispensable. in the latter. there are several. 2. the apportionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants. therefore. 3. vanish on a close and accurate inspection. a gradual increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the constituents. Hence it is by no means certain that a majority of votes. we shall find that some of them contain no determinate regulations on this subject. to readjust. Should the representatives or people. except the originating of money bills. when not merely prompted by common interest. under the single exception that each State shall have one representative at least. It may be alleged. existing only in appearance. on the opposite side. that one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens. felt by the same side of being supported in its demands by right. and it appears that the former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for them. And it so happens that four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes in the House of Representatives. Within every successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. This is the difficulty which has probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation. but justified by equity and the principles of the Constitution. would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of representatives. This advantage must be increased by the consciousness. of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members. The following reflections will. The peculiarity lies in this. that the Senate would be prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition. From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in which their influence predominates. a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition. from time to time. Fortunately it is among the difficulties which. that others correspond pretty much on this point with the federal Constitution. a coalition which. As far as experience has taken place on this subject. that in the gradation between the smallest and largest States. when supported by the more powerful States. will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses. . it cannot be doubted that the House. to augment the number of representatives at the same periods. of contending against the force of all these solemn considerations. and that the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere directory provision. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are. The number which is to prevail in the first instance is declared to be temporary. the just and constitutional views of the other branch might be defeated. consequently. It is farther to be considered. though most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former are too little removed in extent and population from the latter. and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people. the other of the States: in the former. secondly. the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States. and by the Constitution. Its duration is limited to the short term of three years. notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions. and the consciousness. If we review the constitutions of the several States. first. composed of the greater number of members.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 174 representatives. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the latter. under the sole limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. perhaps. the larger States will have most weight. be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects. even in the Senate. would not fail to take place. by reason. which. if I mistake not. to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions.

will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. It is. the more numerous an assembly may be. will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger. and the more permanent and conspicuous the station.that powerful instrument by which we behold. I have passed over the circumstances of economy. the more it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people. In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives. the supplies requisite for the support of government. in engaging in the federal service a large number of such characters as the people will probably elect. or an artful statesman. in a word. in my judgment. a single orator. in the present state of affairs. in fact. a very serious attention. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be found. by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason. would not the one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the smaller the number. by the interest which their States will feel in the former. The large States. To those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches of the government. On the same principle. Admitting. although it could not have failed to involve every department of the state in the general confusion. One observation. Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations. and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or. advance in population with peculiar rapidity. But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions. whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance. An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter. These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject. Now. and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. that they should all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States. all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. has neither been apprehended nor experienced. if such a trial of firmness between the two branches were hazarded. the larger the number. and the senators from all the most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter. hold the purse -. a constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger States. This power over the purse may. or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. which. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse. in the history of the British Constitution. As these States will. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President. the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. was generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand. will have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each other. be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people. the more multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered. it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics. for obtaining a redress of every grievance. of whatever characters composed. they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the representatives to the number of inhabitants. that the senators from all the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of Representatives. but they alone can propose. or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate. that in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be. the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings. for a great length of time. of men in power. where the whole body of the people assembled in person. They. I must be permitted to add on this subject as claiming. and finally reducing. In the first place. who will prevail in the House of Representatives. In the next place. and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. under present circumstances. therefore.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 175 It will not be looking too far to add. however. as far as it seems to have wished. might have had some effect in lessening the temporary number of representatives. and a disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number proposed. the stronger must be the interest which they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government. however. Ignorance .

notwithstanding. it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions."[1] This provision has not only been declaimed against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross. but the fewer.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 176 will be the dupe of cunning. at any time. the election of its own members. 59 Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members From the New York Packet. and MANNER of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof. The countenance of the government may become more democratic. a practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular government. and in particular cases. they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. It might have been an additional shield to some particular interests. or. more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. PLACES. Friday. in one instance it has been thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of the system. on the contrary. the fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition. It is in these words: "The TIMES. that EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION. and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. if not in all. but the Congress may. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. except as to the PLACES of choosing senators. February 22. will be the springs by which its motions are directed. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider. and the ruin of popular governments. approve an adherence to this rule. if there be any article in the whole plan more completely defensible than this. in the last resort. AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY. Experience will forever admonish them that. by law. The machine will be enlarged. Lastly. at first sight. AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY. that which has been suggested against the number made competent for legislative business. The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit. may properly be here noticed. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new laws to be passed. or active measures to be pursued. OF LOCAL INFORMATION. I am greatly mistaken. and often the more secret. in the work of the convention. but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. Every just reasoner will. a practice which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is required. in particular emergencies. and. and will disapprove every deviation from it which may not appear to have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the work . to extort unreasonable indulgences. that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to regulate. an interested minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal. but it has been censured by those who have objected with less latitude and greater moderation. they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. That some advantages might have resulted from such a precaution. 1788. a practice which leads more directly to public convulsions. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required for a quorum. cannot be denied. make or alter SUCH REGULATIONS. and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. than any other which has yet been displayed among us. in this place. It would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases. As connected with the objection against the number of representatives.

The interest of each State. but it is an evil which could not have been . as a portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future weakness. to an unbiased observer. it may be added. will not. and when no improper views prevail. it will not be less apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the national government. may be both more convenient and more satisfactory. empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States. in its full extent. and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments? The violation of principle. be found solid. that by declining the appointment of Senators. because they have a power to do this in one instance. in the hands of the State legislatures. than where it would unnaturally be placed. yet he will not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle. in the first instance. whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety. than to transfer that care to any other hands. Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution. and perhaps anarchy. that as its existence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so essential a point. to the pleasure of the State governments. and. is an unanswerable objection. upon examination. It is to little purpose to say. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far more decisive. or primarily in the latter and ultimately in the former. may destroy the national government. And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just theory. They have submitted the regulation of elections for the federal government. It will not be alleged. been preferred by the convention. Even in this case. it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State governments as on the part of the general government. than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government. I presume. in ordinary cases. there can be no objection to intrusting them with it in the particular case under consideration. in this case. it may be remarked that the constitution of the national Senate would involve. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power. This argument. would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. or wholly in the State legislatures. it is more rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be placed. which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the situation of the country. as far as possible. though he may acquiesce in the necessity. if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other. by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that risk. ought to depend on itself for its own preservation. they ought to have it in every other. would have required no comment. to trust the Union with the care of its own existence. But it will not follow that. to the local administrations. be as readily conceded. that an election law could have been framed and inserted in the Constitution. They could at any moment annihilate it. to maintain its representation in the national councils.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 177 some particular ingredient. that a discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It is certainly true that the State legislatures. that a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take place. both as an unwarrantable transposition of power. with reason. As an objection to this position. to recommend their admission into the system. and from this it may be inferred. without an equivalent for the risk. they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union. with which a rigid conformity to the rule was incompatible. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy can never be dignified with that character. but they have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a conviction. without any motive equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the convention in respect to the formation of the Senate. that each. It may be alleged. So far as that construction may expose the Union to the possibility of injury from the State legislatures. and it will therefore not be denied. by forbearing the appointment of senators. would any man have hesitated to condemn it. Nothing can be more evident. It will. though specious. which. The constitutional possibility of the thing. the danger which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the State legislatures to regulate the federal elections. would be a complete security against an abuse of the trust. in a similar respect. it is an evil. that there were only three ways in which this power could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature. The last mode has.

wholly from a place in the organization of the national government. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the people. and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement. and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers. where no necessity urges. in all probability. every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national situation. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State legislatures. which might issue in a dissolution of the Union. that there is a degree of weight in the observation. that a temporary combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of senators. where the temptation will always be the strongest. there is to be a rotation. which will always nultiply the chances of ambition. to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of Representatives. is exemplified in some of the States at the present moment. If the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections. might accomplish the destruction of the Union. It ought never to be forgotten. and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States that we can have any thing to fear. PUBLIUS . by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the people in the public felicity. The joint result of these circumstances would be. stimulated by the natural rivalship of power. But the security will not be considered as complete. will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the State legislatures. Its preservation. on the present question. proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general government to the advancement of their happiness in which event no good citizen could desire its continuance. will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe. The senators are to be chosen for the period of six years. But however wise it may have been to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience. a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. in their political capacities. If this had been done. in a few of the most considerable States. that a firm union of this country. to be represented in the federal councils. to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust. or will. therefore ought in no case that can be avoided. there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years. I shall not deny. the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people. and supported by a strong faction in each of those States. could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity of the body. a combination of a few such men. than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators. it would doubtless have been interpreted into an entire dereliction of the federal principle. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government. But with regard to the federal House of Representatives. that the interests of each State. if the leaders of a few of the most important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election. no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil. for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good. may be in a very opposite temper. and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils. at times when the particular rulers of particular States. which will either never exist at all.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 178 avoided without excluding the States. nor any greater good invites. It may be easily discerned also that the national government would run a much greater risk from a power in the State legislatures over the elections of its House of Representatives. The scheme of separate confederacies. by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited). and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. and would certainly have deprived the State governments of that absolute safeguard which they will enjoy under this provision. The people of America may be warmly attached to the government of the Union. will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. under an efficient government.

It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may. which forbid all apprehension on the subject. must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. February 23. is altogether inconceivable and incredible. permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. yet there are causes. And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects. could ever find its way into the national councils. that is. it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner. and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union. be committed to the State legislatures. in a greater or less degree. that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous . which may. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people. can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. be the security of all. and on the other. that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not." which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body. and Õstill more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches. be violated. 1788. without occasioning a popular revolution. It is not pretended. As to the Senate. but that so fundamental a privilege. what would be the danger on the other side. there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors. of the 1st article. that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them. manners. The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection. by confining the places of election to particular districts. there are considerations of a more precise nature. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter. 4th section. that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people. in respect to a particular class of citizens. 60 179 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) From the Independent Journal. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: WE HAVE seen. the Senate by the State legislatures. 1st clause. Saturday. On the one hand. from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 1. In addition to this general reflection. The interest of all would. without hazard. this seems to be the most chimerical. But it is alleged. Let us now see. by a victorious and overbearing majority. it may be concluded with certainty. it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive. in this respect at least. the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property. in certain turbulent and factious seasons. no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply. that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government. Of all chimerical suppositions. headed and directed by the State governments. by the deliberate policy of the government. to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. in the genius. __ FEDERALIST No. as well physical as moral. in a country so situated and enlightened.

must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce. As long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures. But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry. that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils. or the moneyed interest. And thirdly. will it court the elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born. the landed interest must. and in much more various proportions. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country. it will be conveyed into the national representation. commerce nearly divides its empire. in reference to one branch of the legislature. if not all of them. It cannot therefore be presumed. and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. where the rules of an equal representation obtain. in the primative composition at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other. a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. than the representation of any single State. perhaps. agriculture is predominant. that for the reasons elsewhere assigned. so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate. it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed -. In proportion as either prevails. that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests. a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. Secondly. that the credulous votaries of State power cannot. which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect. preponderate in the government. In a few of them.whether in their hands or in those of the Union.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 180 circumstances of that sort. The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. upon their own principles. to give countenance to the objection at any rate. and for the very reason. that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature. first. In order. In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land. is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government. that the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. upon the whole. It will be sufficient to remark. to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result . enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. because that class would. that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale. And I scruple not to affirm. If we make the latter supposition. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate. it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members. that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest. which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it." to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society? If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property. I am governed by the consideration. or between the different kinds of property. In most. that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter. unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. I presume it will readily be admitted. The inference will be. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established. or the manufacturing interest? Or. than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. however. that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class. it may be asked. it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality. or the mercantile interest. in the natural course of things. if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. suspect. than are to be found in any single State.

by the urgent calls of public necessity. the MANNER of elections." as they are called. at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body. not less tenacious than conscious of their rights. are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. than to trust to precarious expedients which. because. as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors. for argument sake. but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light. in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are "the wealthy and the well-born." These.[1]) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is. __ . I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property. be admitted. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community. must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor. however. Particularly in the Southern States and in this State. and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens. their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body. as has been remarked upon other occasions. in the view of revenue alone. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the TIMES. scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case. and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. it seems.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 181 from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce. that the expedient suggested might be successful. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen. were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers. disgrace. set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they. and are unalterable by the legislature. At one time. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers. and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people? PUBLIUS 1. that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them. however. by some miraculous instinct or foresight. might terminate in the dismission. is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation. Let it. would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election. (as every intelligent man knows it to be. it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist. the PLACES. to voerthrow their tyrants. as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us. But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made. but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire. They appear to have in view. on the contrary. and with the means of gratifying that disposition. still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. those whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born. they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. are defined and fixed in the Constitution. confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they.

furnishes a ready answer to this question. Tuesday. will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision. so far as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions. those of the Senate. have afforded little or no additional security against the danger apprehended. where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to them also. would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany. in the great districts into which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in number. 1788. that if the public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the national rulers. the effect upon his conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or twenty thousand miles. and for this reason it will be impossible to acquit the one.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor FEDERALIST No. that when the place of election is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector. will be guiltless of the sacrifice. the power under examination. by an impartial and judicious examiner. Suppose. If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan proposed. that it ought to have been accompanied with a declaration. than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the national government in the same respect. we can be at no loss to determine. It may readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New York. and the want of it will never be considered. A review of their situation. for instance. sooner than they would repair to the city of New York. The constitution of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections.. etc. the . or in any part of the county of Montgomery. in fact. contained in the plan of the convention. February 26. abstracted from any experience on the subject. that objections to the particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections will. Hence it must appear. by the like expedient. would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany. to participate in the choice of the members of the federal House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws. And. would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. as a serious. by confining elections to particular places. when pressed in argument. that all elections should be had in the counties where the electors resided. that as the former have never been thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty. apply with equal force to the modification of the like power in the constitution of this State. the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election for the county and district of which it is a part. would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State constitutions. in this particular. they would find little less room for disquietude and alarm. and comprehend each from two to six counties. 61 182 The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) From the New York Packet. A declaration of this nature would certainly have been harmless. This. at least. Cambridge. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections. with this qualification. If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only. it might not have been undesirable. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in respect to the constitutions of most of the other States. Saratoga. to give their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate. The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men. I shall content myself with the single example of the State in which I write. in substance. was a necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. and to condemn the other. which afford every facility to it. than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in the COUNTIES. I answer. But it would. still less as an insuperable. however. objection to the plan. than for the legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union. say they. from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to elections. But as that view would lead into long and tedious details.

as a fundamental point. as they come forward in succession. and which could not as well have been obtained from any other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of elections for the federal House of Representatives. 62 . and interests. and it may be asked. Why. and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. as innocent omissions in the State constitutions. they ought to convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a single State should. on the ground of theoretic propriety. in order to maintain its superiority. The consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere. or other sinister motives. upon experiment. what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the convention. they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to subvert the liberties of three millions of people. Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate. both as a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body. they can only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the representatives of the people in a single State should be more impregnable to the lust of power. and in several respects distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local circumstances. what would deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government at the same epochs. and as a cure for the diseases of faction. and that if a time had been appointed. or at most. It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of great importance to the public welfare. not less zealous admirers of the constitution of the State. It may be asked. than the representatives of the people of the United States? If they cannot do this. To those who are disposed to consider. and for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each year. prejudices. The times of election in the several States. Why was not a time for the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be entrusted to legislative discretion. There is a contagion in example which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist. vary between extremes as wide as March and November. And in relation to the point immediately under consideration. If each State may choose its own time of election. might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations. then. And it may be added that the supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative. with the advantage of local governments to head their opposition. assimilating constantly to itself its gradual accretions.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 183 presumption is that they are rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition. could not a time have been fixed in the Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention in this State are. as they are now established for local purposes. than of two hundred thousand people who are destitute of that advantage. have been found less convenient than some other time. But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this disposition. it would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish. nothing can be said. with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time. spread over a vast region. the question may be retorted. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it. it might. The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same. than that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of thirteen States. I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. incline to a preference of a particular class of electors. than the well-founded inferences of a candid research after truth. in general. The same answer may be given to the question put on the other side. Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the provision in question. that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members. it is possible there may be at least as many different periods as there are months in the year.

which. And the former must have been a citizen nine years. consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. and may form a convenient link between the two systems. V. and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. then. and which. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens. lies between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. ought to have an EQUAL share in the common councils. which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national councils. II. requires at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages. and the term for which they are to be elected. that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation. The appointment of them by the State legislatures. whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence. the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations. a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result. 1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: 184 HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives. Wednesday. of America. IV. III. If indeed it be right. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point. instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue. The qualifications proposed for senators.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor The Senate For the Independent Journal. A senator must be thirty years of age at least. being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States. the parties. but "of a spirit of amity. II. and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. and. with powers equal to its objects. partaking both of the national and federal character. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States. as seven years are required for the latter. But it is superfluous to try. February 27. I. and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice. and still more loudly by the political situation. it does not appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic. The qualification of senators. that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States. does not call for much discussion. is called for by the voice. is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. Under this alternative. ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. by the standard of theory. The number of senators. not of theory. as distinguished from those of representatives. I enter next on the examination of the Senate. bound together by a simple league. however unequal in size. that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small . the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil. In this spirit it may be remarked. as a representative must be twenty-five. and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former. which. every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government. III. The only option. requiring greater extent of information and tability of character. to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. for the former. The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I. The powers vested in the Senate. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government. and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment." A common government. and that among independent and sovereign States. The equality of representation in the Senate.

and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws. explaining. and in order to ascertain these. Second. fidelity to the object of government. and the comprehensive interests of their country. and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable. it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an institution. would be more rational. to possess great firmness. though in a less degree than to other governments. All that need be remarked is. as a second branch of the legislative assembly. first. if left wholly to themselves. of a majority of the States. and then. come next to be considered. it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures. It may be affirmed. of a majority of the people. need not be proved. It doubles the security to the people. No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence. that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions. but so many monuments of deficient wisdom. it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate. and prove unfaithful to their important trust. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles. Examples on this subject might be cited without number. so many admonitions to the people. and now so well understood in the United States. distinct from. What indeed are all the repealing. on the best grounds. In this point of view. IV. a first. But a position that will not be contradicted. as well as from the history of other nations. and dividing the power with. and the duration of their appointment. should. must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. by their power over the supplies. by every possible expedient. and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. moreover. and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States. that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our governments. where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate? A good government implies two things: first. a senate. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. and with the genuine principles of republican government. and from proceedings within the United States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor States. if any interests common to them. 185 Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the Senate is. the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation. It is a misfortune incident to republican government. against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic. would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation. that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies. which is the happiness of the . that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it. But as the larger States will always be able. which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes. and amending laws. the affairs. to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States. First. since they are not less solicitous to guard. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial. Third. and consequently ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration. and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the authors of them. The number of senators. continued in appointment for a short time. and consequently ought to be less numerous. by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy. It ought. so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session. I will barely remark. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points. and distinct from those of the other States.

that she is the derision of her enemies. One nation is to another what one individual is to another. I scruple not to assert. the success and profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. with this melancholy distinction perhaps. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions. that the former. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members. as well as more important. it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first. no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy. To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his. great injury results from an unstable government. His more friendly neighbors may pity him. and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors. The remark is verified in private life. by all prudent people. whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability. if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read. in the strongest manner. not for the MANY. or undergo such incessant changes that no man. or so incoherent that they cannot be understood. and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. but how can that be a rule. reared not by themselves. Every nation. and from a change of opinions. secondly. can guess what it will be to-morrow. each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others. but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. which is little known. and can trace its consequences. however qualified they may be. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW. and all the advantages connected with national character. that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. In the first place. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. and what merits particular notice. or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans. the enterprising. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities. What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment. and less fixed? Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious. consequently. and becomes more just. Law is defined to be a rule of action. that the laws are made by men of their own choice. who knows what the law is to-day. when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word. . In another point of view. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations. Fourth. The federal Constitution avoids this error. The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. points out. It will be of little avail to the people. in national transactions. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue. the necessity of some stable institution in the government. most governments are deficient in the first. presents a new harvest to those who watch the change. is marked at once. a harvest. a change of measures.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 186 people. I will hint a few only. with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter.

1788 MADISON To the People of the State of New York: A FIFTH desideratum.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 187 But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people. the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy. that. must relate to operations of that power. An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is. 63 The Senate Continued For the Independent Journal. to be as undeniable as it is important. perhaps. which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit. of a due responsibility in the government to the people. of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual. the second is. that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. any more than an individual. Responsibility. Without a select and stable member of the government. illustrating the utility of a senate. No government. and in order to be effectual. proceeding from the causes already mentioned. I add. is the want of a due sense of national character. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State. a regard to national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now laboring. whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary. its respect and confidence. March 1. and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided. nor be truly respectable. when explained. it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. in some important cases. on various accounts. if the justice and propriety of her measures had. must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party. particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest. independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure. will long be respected without being truly respectable. the other depending on a . but paradoxical. without possessing a certain portion of order and stability. in every instance. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity. it is desirable. Saturday. but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world. as a SIXTH defect the want. appear not only new. than it is to obtain. This remark will. that in doubtful cases. in order to be reasonable. that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy. or even by the sister States. It must nevertheless be acknowledged. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations. or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust. by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations. and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation. arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this responsibility. the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind? Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be.

that the same extended situation. and actually will. Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the people. Rome. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address. The constitution of the senate in the last is less known. It may be suggested. At the same time. and a train of measures.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 188 succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures. notwithstanding. or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures. when compared with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics. These examples. of America. detached. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. which. In each of the two first there was a senate for life. and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves. are. ought not to be answerable for the final result. very instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens. on which the general welfare may essentially depend. endeavored in a former paper to show. that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations. which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. and palpable operation on its constituents. drawn out of the senate. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS body. Sparta. or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men. that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. In these critical moments. though as unfit for the imitation. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It may even be remarked. having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention. for such acts of the body as have an immediate. in reasoning . and which render extreme circumspection necessary. could be justly made to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. It adds no small weight to all these considerations. as they are repugnant to the genius. and that a smaller council. ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers. The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department. so there are particular moments in public affairs when the people. like the crowded inhabitants of a small district. may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects. justice. needs no explanation. engaged for one year. in order to check the misguided career. I have. and Carthage are. or some illicit advantage. which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics. to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. in all free governments. will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among them. as well ancient as modern. and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next. that a people spread over an extensive region cannot. It is at least certain. any more than a steward or tenant. this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. I shall not scruple to add. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country. until reason. on the contrary. in fact. in all governments. may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. but filled up vacancies itself. that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. And yet it is evident that an assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought. be subject to the infection of violent passions. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments. was appointed not only for life. stimulated by some irregular passion. the only states to whom that character can be applied.

first of four. thus qualified. if not all the popular governments of antiquity. and to the people themselves. and in Rome with the Tribunes. From these facts. that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece. illustrated by examples. however. and afterwards of six hundred members. we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage. but by officers elected by the people. are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people. and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome. will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. in support of what I advance. The true distinction between these and the American governments. consists in the principle of representation. Many of the defects. between the American and other republics. or the duration of its appointment. and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter. annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation. we find an assembly. and for the term of six years. . IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY. with this difference only. and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE capacity. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. two bodies. many of the executive functions were performed. that a senate appointed not immediately by the people. almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity. small indeed in numbers. or at least to the ancient part of them. appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the people. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE. The senate of Carthage. For it cannot be believed. whatever might be its power. but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. But to insure to this advantage its full effect. to which many others might be added. must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. The distinction. and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of the FORMER.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 189 from the one case to the other. it may still be maintained. Prior to the reform of Solon. than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act. that in the election of that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests. and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men. and considered as the REPRESENTATIVES of the people. and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy. I will refer to a few known facts. which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution. therefore. in observing. and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity. but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people. and enforced by our own experience. that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. it is clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. In the most pure democracies of Greece. But after allowing due weight to this consideration. in Sparta we meet with the Ephori. must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government. Similar instances might be traced in most. is by no means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. as we have seen. annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE. lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE. not by the people themselves. In answer to all these arguments. from any share in the LATTER. which require the control of such an institution. also. which is the pivot on which the former move. but annually ELECTED BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE. since they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws. Lastly. Subsequent to that period. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced. suggested by reason. I feel the less restraint. Athens was governed by nine Archons. The use which has been made of this difference. There are others peculiar to the former. in reasonings contained in former papers. of an extensive territory. The difference most relied on. the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating.

But if anything could silence the jealousies on this subject. To these examples might be added that of Carthage. the Ephori. that do not lie against the latter. the same sentence is pronounced by experience. than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch. were found an overmatch for the senate for life. There are some other lesser distinctions. whose senate. the annual representatives of the people. that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter. Without corrupting the State legislatures. Before such a revolution can be effected. it cannot prosecute the attempt. In Sparta. . Unfortunately. also. is not under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal Senate. had. prevailed. If the federal Senate. really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed. unquestionably. continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. by a very small proportion of the people. and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch. lost almost the whole of its original portion. the Senate. and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes. as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes. at the same time. it is to be observed. and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. the general reply ought to be sufficient. in very great proportion. and must finally corrupt the people at large. must then corrupt the House of Representatives. and. through all these obstructions? If reason condemns the suspicion. however. but no such symptoms have appeared. at the commencement of the second Punic War. from the salutary operation of this part of it. that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power. The fact is the more remarkable. instead of drawing all power into its vortex. rather than the latter. The House of Representatives. The Tribunes of Rome. some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland. therefore. and by the whole body of the people.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 190 To this general answer. who were the representatives of the people. ought to be seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives. for the anti-federal argument. a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the Union. a succession of new representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. as the federal Senate will be. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate can. the British history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of Representatives. it ought to be the British example. But a more particular reply may be given. even after their number was augmented to ten. the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitution. by any possible means within the compass of human address. It is distinguished. which would expose the former to colorable objections. in almost every contest with the senate for life. The Senate of that State is elected. On the contrary. must next corrupt the State legislatures. and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving. because the periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. must in the first place corrupt itself. The Senate there instead of being elected for a term of six years. have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the experiment. and that the former. is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. the opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment. and without corrupting the people themselves. its examples support the reasoning which we have employed. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. which has the people on its side. As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject. Here. according to the testimony of Polybius. It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government. is elected for seven years. and. instead of being elected for two years. it is well known. arrive at the object of a lawless ambition. and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. indirectly by the people.

The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. as well as the State legislatures who appoint the senators. nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate. If the observation be well founded. taking the advantage of the supineness. 64 The Powers of the Senate From the Independent Journal. and those under thirty from the second. so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and discernment. and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first office. Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people. into an independent and aristocratic body. to be deputed by the people for that express purpose. As the select assemblies for choosing the President. that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against. it confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment. sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR. seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective capacity. and commerce. "BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE. and with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism. Wednesday. there is reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and virtue.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 191 Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts. with the people on their side. by gradual usurpations. 1788. it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct. The inference which naturally results from these considerations is this. it is fair to argue. This mode has." The power of making treaties is an important one. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. especially as it relates to war. in such cases. and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested. TO MAKE TREATIES. we are warranted in believing. and in the manner most conducive to the public good. and it should not be delegated but in such a mode. will in general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens. The convention appears to have been attentive to both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors. often places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors. who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate. March 5. like transient meteors. the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and characters. that the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself. Unless on this principle. will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles. and they have committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. the House of Representatives. that wise kings will always be served by able ministers. The second section gives power to the President. JAY To the People of the State of New York: IT IS a just and not a new observation. and with such precautions. and attachment to the public good. as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves. . peace. that enemies to particular persons. but such a display of enlightened policy. in a greater degree than kings. and opponents to particular measures. and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it. that as an assembly of select electors possess. the ignorance. where the activity of party zeal. as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose. which. that the President and senators so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand our national interests.

and often much time. and they who have had much experience on this head inform us. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every . and direction. Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch. and they who preside in either should be left in capacity to improve them. strength. Although the absolute necessity of system. and they who assent to the truth of this position will see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws. yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 192 whether considered in relation to the several States or to foreign nations. There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and steadily pursued. and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits confidence. he may at any time convene them. tides very irregular in their duration. are those preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national view. and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be made to promote it. than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. act by the advice and consent of the Senate. or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs. and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. It is of much consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully maintained. if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. and of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their country. even when hours. for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place. but who would not confide in that of the Senate. nay. in so disposing of the power of making treaties. so in the cabinet. that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective. and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the Senate. They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly. that although the President must. To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those who preside over them. uniformity and order. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives. and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. the removal of a minister. The duration prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their political information. The loss of a battle. if no attention had been paid to those objects. and there doubtless are many of both descriptions. who would rely on the secrecy of the President. may turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. therefore. So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch. They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men. but also exact information. must have perceived that there are tides in them. there are moments to be seized as they pass. composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession. It was wise. With such men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged. of whatever nature. As in the field. It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties. and to form and introduce a a system for the management of them. therefore. and which can only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents. seem not to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects. that there frequently are occasions when days. not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men. the President will find no difficulty to provide. are necessary to concert and to execute. These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained. are precious. as well as a constant succession of official information will be preserved. is universally known and acknowledged. For these. which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations and circumstances. in the convention to provide. The convention have done well. but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns. Nor has the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men. but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite. in the conduct of any business. the death of a prince. in forming them. yet the high importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public mind. who are best able to promote those interests.

has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper persons. on the one hand. having no private interests distinct from that of the nation. as the laws passed by our legislature. they should be made only by men invested with legislative authority. They insist. and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us. the case is not supposable. if they act corruptly. and the government must be a weak one indeed. often appear. that because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature. and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents. or the judicial. They are just as binding.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 193 advantage which can be derived from talents. that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected. and profess to believe. or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions. as well as new truths. These gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of our courts. and. so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. if it should forget that the good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole. It surely does not follow. without doubt. who can think it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country. In proportion as the United States assume a national form and a national character. integrity. that the people may. should be repealable at pleasure. the executive. However useful jealousy may be in republics. but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. amend or repeal them. it abounds too much in the body politic. Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third. and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now. so will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention. and from secrecy and despatch on the other. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain. certain it is. It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of the community. have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature. though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed. commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature. with much propriety. and if they make disadvantageous treaties. how are we to get rid of those treaties? As all the States are equally represented in the Senate. probably. All constitutional acts of power. they will be under no temptations to neglect the latter. information. not on account of any errors or defects in it. that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first. but new errors. and therefore. Others. that the President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States. therefore. are to have the force of laws. whether. when made. and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them. that treaties like acts of assembly. and consequently. but because. They who make laws may. The idea is too gross . or however obligatory they may be when made. or under any form of government. the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects. proceed the fears and apprehensions of some. He must either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world. whatever name be given to the power of making treaties. which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY. objections are contrived and urged. but by both. are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern. as to most others that have ever appeared. and to insist on their punctual attendance. as they will be at any future period. not by only one of the contracting parties. are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. and the commissions constitutionally given by our governor. From this cause. but still let us not forget that treaties are made. as the treaties. Some are displeased with it. whether in the executive or in the judicial department. and deliberate investigations. As to corruption. yet when like bile in the natural. The proposed Constitution. But to this plan. and ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their conduct. they can be punished. they will all have an equal degree of influence in that body.

be null and void by the law of nations. and so far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate. and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it. as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. oaths. like all other fraudulent contracts. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing. What. such as honor. the love of country. it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased. as the Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of talents and integrity. if it should ever happen. But in such a case. and interest on one side or on the other. in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections. the treaty so obtained from us would. it may be asked. for this reason. from the abuse or violation of some public trust. Every consideration that can influence the human mind. thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 194 and too invidious to be entertained. and on this account. and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. 65 The Powers of the Senate Continued From the New York Packet. The difficulty of placing it rightly. are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices. We will. afford security for their fidelity. will be least hasty in condemning that opinion. 1788. and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties. the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. The prosecution of them. Friday. influence. in a distinct capacity. will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community. from that circumstance. With respect to their responsibility. will as readily be perceived. we have reason to be persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as. or. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL. be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions. reputations. all circumstances considered. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate. that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments. therefore. and will enlist all their animosities. speak for themselves. in other words. could be made. it appears. when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will. The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs. can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny. and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. and family affections and attachments. partialities. is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL . conscience. The convention. March 7. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men. A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent. In short. conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate. than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts. and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial. seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the government. should. and the party who is to receive or suffer it. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed. be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate representatives. which refer the main question to the decision of the court. in the last. or in the construction of it by the judges. HIS ACCUSERS? Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted. After having been sentenced to a prepetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence. It may be said. Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt? . would obviate the danger. unawed and uninfluenced. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of judges. It is this: The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment. which might. As well the latter. forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons. office. in other words. if at all. or. Would it be proper that the persons who had disposed of his fame. in its terms.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 195 INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it. would be fatal to the accused. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded? Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified. that error. pointed out that course to the convention. on certain occasions. the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused. would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature. in the second instance. as the former. and disqualification for a future. to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community. There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law. he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. to preserve. that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate. be deprived of the double security intended them by a double trial. ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the legislative body. that the intervention of a jury. as a court of impeachments. those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would. in the first sentence. of preferring the impeachment. or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION. and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend. In Great Britain it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment. The hazard in both these respects. in another trial. and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE. This can never be tied down by such strict rules. The awful discretion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have. could only be avoided. is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. A deficiency in the first. who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry. as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security. The loss of life and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which. imported nothing more than dismission from a present. and honors and emoluments of his country. in a great measure. and it is still more to be doubted. Several of the State constitutions have followed the example. There remains a further consideration. dangerous to the public tranquillity. whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority. by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. that by making the same persons judges in both cases. is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative. and will be at no loss to perceive. either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors. as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task. whether the members of that tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude. for the same offense. These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion.

should be thought preferable to the plan in this respect. This was perhaps the prudent mean. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government. would either be attended with a heavy expense. and the world a desert. to have united the Supreme Court with the Senate. Where is the standard of perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole commuity. It will not be easy to imagine any third mode materially different. already stated. Though this latter supposition may seem harsh. and of course entitled to fixed and regular stipends. in the formation of the court of impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several advantages. while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be substantially avoided. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. Saturday. To some minds it will not appear a trivial objection. I forbear to remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against the judiciary. from the procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought against them. stationary at the seat of government. arising from the agency of the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a certain extent. the benefits of that union will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of impeachments. As the court. HAMILTON . as well against. The second will be espoused with caution by those who will seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over the whole Union. which so considerable an augmentation of its authority would have afforded. at certain seasons. reported by the convention. which could rationally be proposed. extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men. Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of impeachments. and to add a new spring to the government. ought to be numerous. is this: a court formed upon such a plan. the advantage to the guilty. in the same judgment of it.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 196 Would it have been an improvement of the plan. the injury to the innocent. the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying them. it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage. from the opportunities which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption. but that the plan upon the whole is bad and pernicious. society would soon become a general scene of anarchy. and in some cases the detriment to the State. of persons wholly distinct from the other departments of the government? There are weighty arguments. But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been examined. or might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. such a plan. until every part of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection. from the prolonged inaction of men whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives. as is proposed to be done in the plan of the convention. It must either consist of permanent officers. or of certain officers of the State governments to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actually depending. yet it ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will. March 8. they ought to prove. 66 Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered From the Independent Journal. 1788. as in favor of. the utility of which would at best be questionable. and might not be likely often to be verified. or some other that might be devised. for reasons already given. that it could tend to increase the complexity of the political machine. not merely that particular provisions in it are not the best which might have been imagined. and to prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his INFALLIBLE criterion for the FALLIBLE criterion of his more CONCEITED NEIGHBOR? To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution. But an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention.

it is not easy to find a very precise answer. with what vehemence this part of the plan is assailed. with truth. then. be said to reside in its Senate. say the objectors. avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges. tending to give to the government a countenance too aristocratic. will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter. the constitution of this State. while that constitution makes the Senate. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy. This partial intermixture is even. it is observed. assigning to one the right of accusing. that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that body. with no less reason be contended. that the judiciary authority of New York. The proportion. may. on general principles. as well as more simple. I trust. it will lead to a more intelligible. civil and criminal. without exception. will. 197 The FIRST of these objections is. appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated in a former number. of the chancellor and judges to the senators. is admitted. distinct and unconnected. to examine each power by itself. The Senate. or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be more safe. is to have concurrent authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the appointment to offices: if. that the powers relating to impeachments are. perhaps. to the other the right of judging. in the main. and by others which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. in point of numbers. but the highest judicatory in the State. as before intimated. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can appeal. to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations. in all causes. in some cases. will be as complete as itself can desire. by men who profess to admire. not only proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government against each other. preserving them. If the plan of the convention be. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive upon the acts of the legislative body. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requisite to a condemnation. which has obtained in the plan of the convention. in the last resort. that the provision in question confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body. and to decide. the security to innocence. to these prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment. is so inconsiderable. The disposition of the power of making treaties.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor To the People of the State of New York: A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments. And it may. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place. how much more culpable must be the constitution of New York?[1] A SECOND objection to the Senate. than that which has been chosen. if not to a more certain result. The division of them between the two branches of the legislature. be placed in a light not less satisfactory. in violation of that important and wellestablished maxim which requires a separation between the different departments of power. by the ablest adepts in political science. together with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court. not only a court of impeachments. the hypothetical dread of the too . To an objection so little precise in itself. for determining what will give the Senate too much. too little. if practicable. where it may be deposited with most advantage and least inconvenience? If we take this course. to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining impeachments. from this additional circumstance. as a court of impeachments. If this be truly the case. and seems to be so little understood. on the principle here taken notice of. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with the Executive. and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes. in this respect. It is curious to observe. from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned. is. to be an indispensable barrier against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. and guards against the danger of persecution. an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the executive. if I mistake not. in the power of appointing to offices. in the disquisitions under the same head. will. it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence.

The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. partaking of the republican genius. to secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives. would constitute the senators their own judges. if they withheld their assent. at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed. proceeds upon the presumption. by being generally the favorite of the people. strong enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary. It was by them shown. that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate. with the advice and consent of the Senate. as from the reason of the thing.they can only ratify or reject the choice of the President. that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favorite. it must destroy the supposition that the Senate. because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him. in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. in contradiction to this principle. Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption. shall have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them. 198 But this hypothesis. is derived from its union with the Executive in the power of making treaties. which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors. who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive. The same house will possess the sole right of instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that of determining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elections of the President.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings. for the first office in it. that the favoritism of the latter would always be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. by their conduct. A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of impeachments. would there be . should feel a bias. yet if it be. happen. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives. of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the Union. it is asked. This. If any further arguments were necessary to evince the improbability of such a bias. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in this case. Thus it could hardly happen. But independent of this most active and operative principle. if not an overmatch. will be as generally a full match. be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. for every other member of the Government. in whose official creation they had participated. a case which it cannot be doubted will sometimes. and oblige him to make another. There will. it has been said. what prospect. but they cannot themselves CHOOSE -. that the responsibility of those who appoint. is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. After having combined with the Executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous treaty. The more it is contemplated. The principle of this objection would condemn a practice. has already been refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators. But that practice. and the proofs of the want of it destroy. They might even entertain a preference to some other person. dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them. that the majority of the Senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances of merit might inspire. It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE. and the interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous administration of affairs. They may defeat one choice of the Executive. to APPOINT. which is to be seen in all the State governments. or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. just. such as it is. A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments. in the main. the more important will appear this ultimate though contingent power. and. it might be found in the nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of appointments. towards the objects of that choice. for the fitness and competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice. as to have induced the representatives of the nation to become its accusers. It would not perhaps be rash to predict. of course. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the conduct of men. and they could not be sure. if not in all the governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during pleasure. as well on the credit of historical examples. will inspire a sufficient disposition to dismiss from a share in it all such who. the plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. that the most POPULAR branch of every government. if not frequently.

The convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the Executive. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union. the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace. HAMILTON .Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 199 of their being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve. In New Hampshire. also. 67 The Executive Department From the New York Packet. We may thus far count upon their pride. sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign power? The truth is. who should have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption: but they could not. And so far even as might concern the corruption of leading members. Tuesday. in fact. has never been admitted into any government. is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. it is evident. __ FEDERALIST No. or a want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations committed to him. if not upon their virtue. when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for the treachery of which they have been guilty? This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared against this part of the plan. is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this particular. In that of New Jersey. could a majority in the House of Representatives impeach themselves? Not better. if the proofs of that corruption should be satisfactory. have contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two thirds of the Senate. March 11. Pennsylvania. more than two thirds of the Senate. How. Massachusetts. consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional law -a principle which. that in all such cases it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body. 1788. we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence or to vindicate their own authority. by whose arts and influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures odious to the community. and South Carolina. to make it their interest to execute it with fidelity. PUBLIUS 1. for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate. the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the legislature. than two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the national legislature. and yet I am deceived if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation. that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity. and to make it as difficult as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public good. should escape with impunity. consenting to an improper treaty. sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation. The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties. that a majority of the House of Representatives. one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of impeachments. And yet what reason is there. So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate. with more or with equal propriety. they might also have had in view the punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate. I believe. and the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken to confide the trust to proper hands. and of two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several States.

if he be able. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries. not less weak than wicked. the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the individual States. of that detested parent. and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio. in few instances greater. I mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate. In one instance. The second clause of the second section of the second article empowers the President of the United States "to nominate. in some instances less. and all other OFFICERS of United States whose appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR. which I cite as a sample of the general spirit. perhaps. they have not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses. and who. have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. as to unmask the disingenuity and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which have been so insidiously. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. It is still more impossible to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition. claims next our attention. than those of a governor of New York. To establish the pretended affinity. Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or. 200 There is hardly any part of the system which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this. upon this false and unfounded suggestion. render it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance. giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates. has built a series of observations equally false and unfounded. which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. judges of the Supreme Court. Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party[1]. The authorities of a magistrate. and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. but as the full-grown progeny. that even in a disposition the most candid and tolerant. It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the President of the United States. there is no man who would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation. propagated.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor To the People of the State of New York: THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed government. other public ministers and consuls. to metamorphose the object. none which has been inveighed against with less candor or criticised with less judgment. as well as industriously. and WHICH SHALL BE . it might rather be said. they must force the sentiments which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. In the execution of this task. to appoint ambassadors. justify or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth and to the rules of fair dealing. or to treat with seriousness. not merely as the embryo. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable licenses of party artifice. they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the intended President of the United States. and there is. and let him. the devices. Calculating upon the aversion of the people to monarchy. He has been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the fact.

that. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY. in cases to which the general method was inadequate. This position will hardly be contested. and not to the recess of the national Senate. to the State Executives. which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States. it is equally clear. The last of these two clauses. But last. and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make the permanent appointments would. the first and second clauses of the third section of the first article. excludes from its description the members of the Senate. which shall then fill such vacancies. we have seen. that the clause before considered could have been intended to confer that power upon the President of the United States. and which SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW". and to place it in a clear and strong light. and as the national Senate is the body. for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment. who are to have no concern in those appointments. The first of these two clauses. "to the end of the next session" of that body. whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution[2]. if it had been intended to comprehend senators. and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION. in clear and unambiguous terms." and the duration of the appointments. by temporary appointments. and the latter directs. it is clear. DURING THE RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE. instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national Senate. to make temporary appointments "during the recess of the Senate. which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay. of course it cannot extend to the appointments of senators. must have originated in an intention to deceive the people. cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate. would naturally have referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of the State legislatures. of course. the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be construed to relate to the "officers" described in the preceding one. "if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or otherwise. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes. but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen IN THEIR RECESS. Third." Here is an express power given. for the following reasons: First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other. only provides a mode for appointing such officers. have governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary appointments. and this. whose situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the suggestion under examination has been founded." It is from this last provision that the pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. SINGLY. conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision. as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial . denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other. not only obviate all possibility of doubt. I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepresentation. The time within which the power is to operate. the vacancies to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the President. too palpable to be obscured by sophistry. "whose appointments are NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution. The former provides. the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President. chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF for six years". will satisfy us that the deduction is not even colorable. by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. "during the recess of the Senate. that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 201 ESTABLISHED BY LAW. to fill casual vacancies in the Senate. and to the obvious meaning of the terms. and would have extended the duration in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the legislature of the State. but proves that this supposition. the Executive THEREOF may make temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE LEGISLATURE. A slight attention to the connection of the clauses. but destroy the pretext of misconception. and will not require a future establishment by law. in whose representation the vacancies had happened." Second. who are to make the permanent appointments. by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF THEIR NEXT SESSION. which not only invalidates the supposition. too atrocious to be palliated by hypocrisy. destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility." Immediately after this clause follows another in these words: "The President shall have power to fill up all VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE. which.

Wednesday. than if they were all to be convened at one time. V. in one place. March 12. this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments. to form an intermediate body of electors. selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass. and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages. of any consequence. The most plausible of these. but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose. has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. and hesitate not to affirm. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it. to allow myself a severity of animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these papers. And as the electors.[E1] It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. 1788. the union of which was to be wished for. that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station. which has escaped without severe censure. promise an effectual security against this mischief. not to any preestablished body. chosen in each State. See CATO. than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. who has appeared in print. and . Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal. 2. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration. and at the particular conjuncture. which might be communicated from them to the people. 68 The Mode of Electing the President From the Independent Journal. for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed government. Nor have I scrupled. clause 1. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate. who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity. intrigue. or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. Article I. and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 202 judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. It was equally desirable. it is at least excellent. in so flagrant a case. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system.[1] I venture somewhat further. The choice of SEVERAL. __ FEDERALIST No. PUBLIUS 1. will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements. will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. section 3. No. A small number of persons. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. that if the manner of it be not perfect. are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen.

Talents for low intrigue. that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office. The process of election affords a moral certainty. but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America. or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty. Another and no less important desideratum was. already taken notice of. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust. How could they better gratify this." -yet we may safely pronounce.That which is best administered is best. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: "For forms of government let fools contest -. which is. which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt. It will not be too strong to say. that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration. requires time as well as means. but it will require other talents. in respect to the latter. that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State. that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors. thus given. The business of corruption. and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive. in respect to the former. Their transient existence. to the conclusion of it. No senator. and a different kind of merit.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 203 corruption. dispersed as they would be over thirteen States. but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. Thus without corrupting the body of the people. by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes. who shall assemble within the State. can be of the numbers of the electors. when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men. in any combinations founded upon motives. than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort. to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union. equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government. with the most provident and judicious attention. or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States. that the Senate is to do. . This advantage will also be secured. the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. in such a contingency. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution. that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. and their detached situation. All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention. representative. it is provided that. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them. are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government. the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes. afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so. all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. with this difference. and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. what is to be done by the House of Representatives. and the little arts of popularity. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men. The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one querter. and vote for some fit person as President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man. Their votes. by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives. to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment.

to the khan of Tartary. It is remarkable that in this. a constant for a contingent vote. In these circumstances there is a total dissimilitude between him and a king of Great Britain. That magistrate is to be elected for four years. in regard to the State from which he came. The first thing which strikes our attention is. it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. be considered as a point upon which any comparison can be grounded. in the supreme executive magistracy. upon conviction of treason. that the executive authority. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the representations which have been made in regard to it. than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 204 The appointment of an extraordinary person. is to be vested in a single magistrate. We have a Lieutenant-Governor. who presides in the Senate. who is elected for three years. with few exceptions. The other consideration is. 1788. The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator. Friday. that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body. It has been alleged. tried. we must conclude that a duration of four years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office. in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President. and. there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior. to place him in that of President of the Senate. __ FEDERALIST No. and is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their confidence. in this particular. there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain. and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor. . or to the governor of New York. chosen by the people at large. March 14. than a duration of three years for a corresponding office in a single State. to the Man of the Seven Mountains. but there is a close analogy between him and a governor of New York. as in most other instances. as Vice-President. that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. One is. E1. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed Executive. possessing the crown as a patrimony descendible to his heirs forever. that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President. the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. Vide federal farmer. PUBLIUS 1. all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one. This will scarcely. who is an hereditary monarch. however. if not mischievous. has been objected to as superfluous. Some editions substitute "desired" for "wished for". as they are marked out in the plan of the convention. If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State. for if. would be to exchange. 69 The Real Character of the Executive From the New York Packet.

while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies -. is by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its militia and navy. the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor. except in cases of impeachment. except those of impeachment. greater than that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the government. removed from office. on the other hand. of which the governor is a constituent part. by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. In this article.all which. and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. it be approved by two thirds of both houses. and of the militia of the several States. by the Constitution under consideration. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. The disuse of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the reality of its existence." In most of these particulars. seems to have been the original from which the convention have copied. The governor of New York may pardon in all cases. in particular. even in those of impeachment. but it would be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts. until the design had been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature. But the constitutions of several of the States expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief. which have not been matured into actual treason. Is not the power of the governor. and tallies exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of this State. The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. the power of the President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and of the governor of New York. if. and is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means of substituting influence to authority. may be screened from punishment of every kind. than could be claimed by a President of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain. and. The king of Great Britain. confer larger powers upon their respective governors. would appertain to the legislature. on a calculation of political consequences. as to this article. upon that reconsideration. therefore. to convene. should be at the head of any such conspiracy. do not. though he may even pardon . to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national agitation. He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States. therefore. but in substance much inferior to it. to adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware. If a governor of New York. on the other hand. or other high crimes or misdemeanors. or either of them. as well of the army as navy. whether those of New Hampshire and Massachusetts. on extraordinary occasions. there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable. would extend to all cases. in this article. the President of Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New York. on his part. because the former would possess.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 205 bribery. as first General and admiral of the Confederacy. A President of the Union.[1] The governor of New York. in respect to pardons. for reconsideration. to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. and it may well be a question. The qualified negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign. in case of disagreement between them with respect to the time of adjournment. In this delicate and important circumstance of personal responsibility. whose constitution. The President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union. Second. and to commission all officers of the United States. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces. except for treason and murder. The power of the President. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred and inviolable.First. no punishment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor of New York. singly. what the latter shares with the chancellor and judges. and the bill so returned is to become a law. both houses of the legislature. in this instance. The most material points of difference are these: -. has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. when called into the actual service of the United States. The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill. or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of the two houses. Third.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 206 treason. and every other man acquainted with its Constitution. to keep the machine from running into disorder. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure. as an established fact. in this instance. a power which. that the person who was to afford that exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure. The power of appointment is with . it is true. Every jurist[2] of that kingdom. by the proposed Constitution. alliance. the offense of treason is limited "to levying war upon the United States. is more a matter of dignity than of authority. may be employed to very important purposes. The President can only adjourn the national legislature in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature. should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any influence at all. that the prerogative of making treaties exists in the crown in its utomst plentitude. that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. provided two thirds of the senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. that. when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law. nor is it equal to that of the governor of New York. The Parliament. and might be incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity? The better to judge of this matter. with the advice and consent of the Senate. It must be admitted. and this may have possibly given birth to the imagination. But I believe this doctrine was never heard of. it would become a question. than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature. until it was broached upon the present occasion. The President is to nominate. or one of its branches. and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things. and it was far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner. Fourth. in this particular. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty. could shelter no offender. The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. that his authority in this respect is not conclusive. This. to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and commercial laws. and in general all officers of the United States established by law. and stand in need of the ratification. if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. in any degree. of Parliament. The President is to have power. The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this State for a limited time. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. whether the Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that delicate and important prerogative. therefore. and has the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty. to that of the British king. judges of the Supreme Court. though it has been a rich theme of declamation. with the advice and consent of the Senate. independent of any other sanction. knows. It has been insinuated. to make treaties. the power of the federal Executive would exceed that of any State Executive. giving them aid and comfort". If the Confederacy were to be dissolved. and. and that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete legal validity and perfection. though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor. But this arises naturally from the sovereign power which relates to treaties. is sometimes seen employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty. He not only appoints to all offices. upon an actual appeal to arms. and that by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds. and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. from the effects of impeachment and conviction. commerce. The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament. if the final execution of the design. There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President. upon every arrival of a foreign minister. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the government. and of every other description. and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the revision. but can create offices. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace. In this respect. there is no comparison between the intended power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. when the probability was computed. it will be necessary to recollect. that. in certain situations. and adhering to their enemies. than the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation.

has asserted that the king of Great Britain oweshis prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. and confirm his own nomination. possess more or less power than the Governor of New York. on the contrary. but by the statute the 13th of Charles II. the other. the other has an absolute negative. A writer in a Pennsylvania paper. the other is the supreme head and governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government. except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the article of treaties. The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation. his authority is in this respect equal to that of the President. and frequently with only two persons. And it appears yet more unequivocally. can erect corporations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace. and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. can lay embargoes for a limited time. "contrary to all reason and precedent. be greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union. and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists. in addition to this right. the governor can turn the scale. The one can confer no privileges whatever. and of all forts and places of strength. the other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. the other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce. Vol I. EVER WAS AND IS the undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors. composed of the governor and four members of the Senate. The one would have a qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative body. a monarchy." as Blackstone vol. under the signature of TAMONY. and a despotism. In the national government. 2. page 262. it was declared to be in the king alone. the right of nomination. if the council should be divided. The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties. chosen by the Assembly. closeted in a secret apartment with at most four. The governor claims. and of all forces by sea and land.. in the government of New York. we cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate of this State. can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The truth is. is immenmorial. chap. and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs. But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking. PUBLIUS 1. by the Long Parliament of Charles I. and that both or either house of Parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same. The President of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years. in practice. can coin money. .[3] If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national legislature. must. 257. than the considerable number of which the national Senate would consist. if the Senate should be divided. the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical servants of the people. and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. Hence it appears that. and exceeds it in the article of the casting vote. If he really has the right of nominating. that his prerogative. possesses that of declaring war. it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group. for that the sole supreme government and command of the militia within his Majesty's realms and dominions. The one would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices. in the aggregate. the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation. kings and queens of England. 6. it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would. the other can make denizens of aliens. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries. i. in this respect. noblemen of commoners. p. is an aristocracy.. no appointment could be made. that there is no pretense for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. in the disposition of offices.. and has frequently exercised. can regulate weights and measures. with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York. and was only disputed. expresses it. the king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 207 us lodged in a council.

There can be no need. to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice. 1788. and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand. __ FEDERALIST No. thirdly. which is not without its advocates. And independent of this claim. without at the same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles. therefore. in practice. under the formidable title of Dictator. . The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense are. it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws. March 15. and of anarchy. it will only remain to inquire. a due dependence on the people. Saturday. Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government. and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government. that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive. Every man the least conversant in Roman story. fourthly. and a government ill executed. however. first. as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks. first. an adequate provision for its support. of faction. unity. secondly.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 208 3. as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny. considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation. secondly. considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former. and pursue them through all their consequences. 70 The Executive Department Further Considered From the Independent Journal. we shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion. Taking it for granted. Candor. competent powers. since they can never admit its truth. while they have. duration. have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. to multiply arguments or examples on this head. They have with great propriety. knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man. to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition. with equal propriety. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THERE is an idea. a due responsibility. whatever it may be in theory. Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views. a bad government. however. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution. what are the ingredients which constitute this energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by the convention? The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are. must be. when we take into view the other considerations. Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a government. demands an acknowledgment that I do not think the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests. till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned.

This expedient must. or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country. They seem to think themselves bound in honor. and distract the plans and operation of those whom they divide. But if they have been consulted. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those magistrates. the other taking the command in the more distant provinces. under any modification whatever. they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions. and may in most lights be examined in conjunction. The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities. after the arms of the republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire. and in proportion as the number is increased. benevolent tempers have too many opportunities of remarking. From either. the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. As far. and between the military Tribunes. an indispensable duty of self-love. the Consuls. in their estimation. subject. consisting of a plurality of persons. they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government. with horror. to the conceit. if not to equal. to similar objections. and pursued by the Consuls. we shall discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Executive. and to the obstinacy of individuals. merely because they have had no agency in planning it. Men of upright. were induced to abolish one. of the last. until we advert to the singular position in which the republic was almost continually placed. secrecy. to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example. no doubt. and how often the great interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity. The experience of other nations will afford little instruction on this head. But quitting the dim light of historical research. and by all the motives of personal infallibility. and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number. Men often oppose a thing. Whenever these happen. who were generally chosen out of the former body. are the only States which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to single men. opposition then becomes. If it be a public trust or office. we shall find examples in the constitutions of several of the States. They are both liable. Decision. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls. were commonly united by the personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their order. is a matter of astonishment. however. to what desperate lengths this disposition is sometimes carried. it became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the administration between themselves by lot -. who were at times substituted for the Consuls. who . to the control and co-operation of others. weaken the authority.one of them remaining at Rome to govern the city and its environs. We have seen that the Achaeans. or by vesting it ostensibly in one man. Of the first.[1] Both these methods of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans. of making a division of the government between them. these qualities will be diminished. and to the prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the state. And what is still worse. In addition to this motive of union. there is always danger of difference of opinion. Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit. That the dissensions between them were not more frequent or more fatal. adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the magistracy.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 209 That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. as it teaches any thing. and have happened to disapprove. in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority. but the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. if I recollect right. on an experiment of two Praetors. This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority. in whole or in part. New York and New Jersey. in the capacity of counsellors to him. and especially from all these causes. activity. attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense. have had great influence in preventing those collisions and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the republic. they lessen the respectability. it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. in the most critical emergencies of the state.

and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government. and under such plausible appearances. yet often promote deliberation and circumspection. that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure. though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans. The first is the more important of the two.that is. promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. [But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive. Man. but it is unnecessary. and under such plausible appearances. and therefore unwise. amidst mutual accusations. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that. That resolution is a law. though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement. and which lies as much against the last as the first plan. or series of pernicious measures. from the first step to the final conclusion of it. inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature. Here. every thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality. especially in an elective office. than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted. but they apply. It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed -. Upon the principles of a free government.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 210 have credit enough to make their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. yet with considerable weight to the project of a council. Responsibility is of two kinds -. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. In the conduct of war. where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency. ought really to fall. will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted. and resistance to it punishable. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate. in public trust.vigor and expedition. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so . to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme. than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. or rather detestable vice. that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author.to censure and to punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. afford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty. The differences of opinion.][E1] [But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive. If no such cabal should exist. It is here too that they may be most pernicious. though not with equal. and which lies as much against the last as the first plan. especially in an elective office. It often becomes impossible. and serve to check excesses in the majority. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition -. in its consequences. There is no point at which they cease to operate. In the legislature. the opposition must be at an end. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. they are pure and unmixed. is. in public trust. amidst mutual accusations. to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity. the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect. ought really to fall. Responsibility is of two kinds -. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. and this without anycounterbalancing good. in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity. to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure. the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness. yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. is. The first is the more important of the two.to censure and to punishment. in the human character. Perhaps the question now before the public may. Man. or series of pernicious measures. It often becomes impossible. When a resolution too is once taken. that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.][E1]

211

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties? In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled with a council -- that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars. It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it. In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole discretion. But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself. The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE";[2] that it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

212

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,[3] were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy combination; and from such a combination America would have more to fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost always a cloak to his faults. I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue of public expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the distinguishing features of our constitution. PUBLIUS 1. New York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do not bind him. 2. De Lolme. 3. Ten. E1. Two versions of these paragraphs appear in different editions. __ FEDERALIST No. 71 The Duration in Office of the Executive From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 18, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration which may have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general principle of human nature, that a

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor

213

man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it; will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or certain title; and, of course, will be willing to risk more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other. This remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a man acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under a consciousness that in a very short time he MUST lay down his office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors, however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the legislative body. If the case should only be, that he MIGHT lay it down, unless continued by a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and irresolution must be the characteristics of the station. There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current, either in the community or in the legislature, as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people commonly INTEND the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always REASON RIGHT about the MEANS of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure. But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the people, we can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to the former, and at other times the people may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision. The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between the various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one independent of the other. To what purpose separate the executive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and, whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary,

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the balance of the Constitution.

214

It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in office can affect the independence of the Executive on the legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from the principle already remarked that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from the consideration of the influence of the legislative body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious to its resentment. It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less period, which would at least be recommended by greater security against ambitious designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the magistrate. It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the government. Between the commencement and termination of such a period, there would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the moment when the public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would derive support from the opportunities which his previous continuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of his constituents. He might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble beginnings, FROM THE MERE POWER OF ASSENTING OR DISAGREEING TO THE IMPOSITION OF A NEW TAX, have, by rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a free government, while they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make the monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation[1] attempted by them, what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined authorities of a President of the United States? What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? I shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his encroachments. PUBLIUS 1. This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was carried in the House of Commons, and rejected in the House of Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people. __

Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor FEDERALIST No. 72

215

The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered From the Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 19, 1788. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and perhaps its most precise signification. it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of the operations of war -- these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the government. With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him in his station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of permanency in a wise system of administration. Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation to the present point has had some respectable advocates -- I mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary. One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining, by meriting, a continuance of them. This position will not be disputed so long as it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could

That experience is the parent of wisdom. Add to this that the same man might be vain or ambitious. would be much more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power. in certain emergencies of the state. in such a situation. or his ambition. looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed. it is evident that a change of the chief magistrate. might content himself with the regular perquisites of his situation. in some instances. he might hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. By necessitating a change of men. to the preservation of its political existence. than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty. therefore. An avaricious man. to peculation. in such a situation. not easy to be resisted by such a man. to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted. A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be. and must commit that. and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the already settled train of the administration. too. How unwise. and. and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to possess? A third ill effect of the exclusion would be. when he looked forward to the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence for ever. such a man. and to declare that the moment it is acquired. There is no nation which has not. A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men from stations in which. . inasmuch as it would substitute inexperience to experience. who might happen to fill the office. after they have by a course of service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility. or at any similar crisis. together with his own reputation. An ambitious man.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 216 accomplish the work. nevertheless. or the stability of the government to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy. is the negative merit of not doing harm. wandering among the people like discontented ghosts. that men will vary and measures remain uniform. at one period or another. It is not generally to be expected. with a different prospect before him. is an adage the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations? Where more desirable or more essential than in the first magistrate of a nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution. though the same man. must be every such self-denying ordinance as serves to prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens in the manner best suited to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man. by the choice of their fellowcitizens. their presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety. and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory. its possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it was acquired. would at all times be detrimental to the community. for another. and reflected that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome reverse. probably. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. even of equal merit. his avarice would be likely to get the victory over his caution. perhaps it would not be too strong to say. instead of the positive merit of doing good. and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. at every personal hazard. at the breaking out of a war. in the first office of the nation. it would necessitate a mutability of measures. would feel a propensity. Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to sordid views. that it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. But with the prospect before him of approaching an inevitable annihilation. his vanity. And if he could expect to prolong his honors by his good conduct. and to which it is adapted? This. when he found himself seated on the summit of his country's honors. as well as avaricious. to usurpation. to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task. is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their country. experienced an absolute necessity of the services of particular men in particular situations. The most to be expected from the generality of men. Would it promote the peace of the community. the depriving the community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief magistrate in the exercise of his office.

and the Veto Power From the New York Packet. There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves. greater independence in the magistrate. in their opinion. And we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much stability. with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate. Friday. perhaps upon an inferior. could render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. to approbation and confidence. They might. Unless the exclusion be perpetual. the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other. footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement. yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. exercising a constitutional privilege. without proper attention to this article. may he have no object beyond his present station. in most cases. March 21. 1788. but when we consider that even a partial exclusion would always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious object. but MUST. But even in that case. greater security to the people. to make personal enemies. by constancy on their part. If the exclusion were to be perpetual. seconding the thwarted ambition of such a favorite. might occasion greater danger to liberty. 73 The Provision For The Support of the Executive. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the people. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive authority. would. There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the people. As to the second supposed advantage. he might induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves. a provision which was calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite. The legislature. the separation of the executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and nugatory. of whom alone there could be reason in any case to entertain apprehension. by the voluntary suffrages of the community. It is evident that. 2d. to which he may sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections. no friends. either reduce him by famine. and where. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. or tempt him by . while there is even the option of changing. the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 217 The contrary is the usual course of things. upon an equal. What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st. on the arrival of which he not only MAY. be exposed to their resentments. there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage. a man of irregular ambition. is an adequate provision for its support. than could ever reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office. when he acts under the impression that a time is fast approaching. These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion. for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a perpetual exclusion. they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating councils and a variable policy. and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive. nor need we desire to prohibit the people from continuing their confidence where they think it may be safely placed. with infinite reluctance.

in the Executive. the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of selfdefense. of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of the legislative body. either absolute or qualified. upon the acts of the legislative branches. . which have been enumerated. any other emolument than that which may have been determined by the first act. He can. they will have no power to alter it. even in this country. has been inferred and proved." It is impossible to imagine any provision which would have been more eligible than this. but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils. that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men. been combated by an observation. receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected. The propriety of a negative has. is the qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature. it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body. at stated times. and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States. have no pecuniary inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him by the Constitution. to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. or any of them. This done. will be at liberty to give. would no doubt convey more than is intended. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions. But the power in question has a further use. and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense. and in the main it will be found that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. which may happen to influence a majority of that body. Let us proceed to consider those which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United States. has also been remarked upon. Without the one or the other. or. has been already suggested and repeated. or annihilated by a single vote. and to absorb the powers. is once for all to declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which he shall have been elected. nor any of its members. nor will he be at liberty to receive. It not only serves as a shield to the Executive. in other words. And in the one mode or the other. to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative. or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good. taken in all the latitude of the terms. therefore. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body. The first thing that offers itself to our observation. to have the effect of preventing their becoming laws. the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us. The last of the requisites to energy. precipitancy. nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to his avarice.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 218 largesses. the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the component members of the legislative body. his power of returning all bills with objections. It is not easy. These expressions. that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive. calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction. The legislature. Neither the Union. on the appointment of a President. and that unless this presumption should be entertained. examples would not be wanting. upon some occasions. of the other departments. either by increase or diminution. till a new period of service by a new election commences. of course. It is there provided that "The President of the United States shall. but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights. the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each. are competent powers. They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities. There are men who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty.

the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation. but in a case of manifest propriety. to avoid being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect. The oftener the measure is brought under examination. useless in practice.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 219 But this observation. It has been represented. that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object. the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it. by the probability of the sanction of his constituents. inadvertence. it would never be exercised. that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself. Nor is this all. If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British monarch. in its progress to the throne. clothed for the short period of four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican? It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary. would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain case. as a power odious in appearance. But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws. The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government. when examined. would condemn. afford a satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great caution. and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. that because it might be rarely exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly designed. and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources. . and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body. because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a President of the United States. or of risking the displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the legislative body. that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive. than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them. indeed. with all his train of sovereign attributes. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making. A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has been exercised. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is. A king of Great Britain. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a common share of firmness. An argument. will appear rather specious than solid. at this day. It is far less probable. In the former supposition. The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws. or design. a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defense. but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible. on this account. and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period. that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations. which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government. But it will not follow. as much more likely to do good than harm. through haste. hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. though they would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case. against its expediency. Nor is it probable. There are men who. or extreme necessity. would. and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed. that he would ultimately venture to exert his prerogatives. or too much. will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to him. on maturer reflexion. to enable him to defend himself. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive. his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate interest in the power of his office. It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones. All well-informed men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws. than of his using it too often. or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. would have scruples about the exercise of the power under consideration. has been drawn from this very source. who. in the latter. and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility.

it is proposed to give the Executive the qualified negative already described. might not scruple to return it for reconsideration. with the chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court. He would be encouraged by the reflection. a warm opponent of the plan of the convention is of this number. too. if no such external impediments were to be feared. or any two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions. whose influence would be united with his in supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. This qualified negative. they might be induced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor under any circumstances. it would be more apt to be exercised. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the Executive. and frequently with success. and more apt to irritate. and for this very reason. than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. from doing what they would with eagerness rush into. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case. __ FEDERALIST No. And its utility has become so apparent. have from experience become its declared admirers. This is a power which would be much more readily exercised than the other. 74 The Command of the Military and Naval Forces. had departed from the model of the constitution of this State. March 25. PUBLIUS 1. they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition. though forcible. in favor of that of Massachusetts. A power of this nature in the Executive. than the mere suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed. which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this respect in the executive magistrate. 1788. In proportion as it would be less apt to offend. it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the legislative body. were violent opposers of it. in the formation of this part of their plan. and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body. that if his opposition should prevail. Abraham Yates. is in this State vested in a council. Mr. are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control. as has been elsewhere remarked. Tuesday. it may in practice be found more effectual. will often have a silent and unperceived. A direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more harsh. and thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary departments. HAMILTON . might receive an improper bias. will have the courage to do their duty at every hazard. Instead of an absolute negative.[1] I have in another place remarked. in compiling the Constitution. It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. in spite of the counterposing weight of the Executive. 220 But the convention have pursued a mean in this business. that persons who. who are to be the interpreters of the law. consisting of the governor. that the convention. the other is that by being often associated with the Executive. engaged in unjustifiable pursuits. and the Pardoning Power of the Executive From the New York Packet. One is that the judges. from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacities. When men. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. and this. subject to being finally rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. operation.

to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment." This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan. as the supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. and might be less sensible to the apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. in delicate conjunctures. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest. in proportion as it is undivided. when a welltimed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth. that little need be said to explain or enforce it. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity. And this ought the rather to be the case. as lately happened in Massachusetts. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength. have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. It deserves particular attention. But the principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion. As treason is a crime levelled at the immediate being of the society. would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution. we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had given birth to the offense.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor To the People of the State of New York: 221 THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. Even those of them which have." The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself. one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government. "The President may require the opinion. availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of others. or of a part of it. and which. the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person. or both. it may never be possible afterwards to recall. On these accounts. that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that body. than any numerous body whatever. of the principal officer in each of the executive departments. there seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the legislature. they might often encourage each other in an act of obduracy. except in cases of impeachment. if I mistake not. as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office. Of all the cares or concerns of government. justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. On the other hand. This. though of a different kind. when the sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the major party. and it is. On the other hand. and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. at the same time. might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general. of the branches of the legislative body. there are often critical moments. and the power of directing and employing the common strength. when the laws have once ascertained the guilt of the offender. It is not to be doubted. they might often be found obstinate and inexorable. it has been urged." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate. He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States. that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt. ought to have depended upon the assent of one. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat. been only contested in relation to the crime of treason. and least apt to yield to considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law. But there are also strong objections to such a plan. than a body of men. And when parties were pretty equally matched. in writing. The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the President has. In every such case. that a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted. the dread of being accused of weakness or connivance. upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective officers. as men generally derive confidence from their numbers. . coupled the chief magistrate with a council. would beget equal circumspection. the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. that treason will often be connected with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the community. if suffered to pass unimproved. when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. in other respects.

yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition. in other words. with a view to such contingencies. plainly. to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society. Though several writers on the subject of government place that power in the class of executive authorities. to two thirds of the members present. with no small degree of vehemence. seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate. that it is questionable. The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department. The power of making treaties is. as an inference from them. a day. of the true sense of the rule upon which that objection is founded. but derive it from the obligations of good faith. I shall rely upon the explanations already given in other places. though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of them. neither to the legislative nor to the executive. in a limited Constitution. that it ought to have been exclusively deposited in the Senate. on different grounds. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws. With regard to the intermixture of powers. others. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the intermixture of powers. The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws. might be occasionally conferred upon the President. Wednesday. in a very favorable light. point out the Executive as the . is no infringement of that rule. nor to the enaction of new ones. A proceeding of this kind. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. provided two thirds of the senators present concur. Another source of objection is derived from the small number of persons by whom a treaty may be made. properly. The loss of a week. for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure. or. and to belong. for if we attend carefully to its operation. The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations. Of those who espouse this objection. some contending that the President ought alone to possess the power of making treaties. either for this purpose or for the common defense. it will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive character. principally with a view to the objections which have been just stated. would be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of weakness. "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. and would have a tendency to embolden guilt. while the execution of the laws. I venture to add. that a discretionary power. that the particular nature of the power of making treaties indicates a peculiar propriety in that union. an hour. and in the second place. that the union of the Executive with the Senate. I shall here content myself with offering only some supplementary remarks. or one of its branches. to a discerning eye. and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations. would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. that power could be delegated by law.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 222 The dilatory process of convening the legislature. it may be answered in the first place. that it would generally be impolitic beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity. may sometimes be fatal. but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. As I flatter myself the observations made in a preceding number upon this part of the plan must have sufficed to place it. 75 The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive For the Independent Journal. that it is one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan. while another part seem to think that nothing more was necessary than to have substituted two thirds of all the members of the Senate. 1788 HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE President is to have power. in the article of treaties. which have the force of law. whether." Though this provision has been assailed. and shall take it for granted. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject. and the employment of the common strength. If it should be observed. to make treaties. March 26. I scruple not to declare my firm persuasion. out of the usual course. a part are of opinion that the House of Representatives ought to have been associated in the business. neither the one nor the other.

but they would also have the option of letting it alone. possessed of a moderate or slender fortune. in that case. while the vast importance of the trust. The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind. forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. taking its future increase into the account. would have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations. it would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration. It has been shown. would afford a greater prospect of security. have the option of employing him in this capacity. The fluctuating and. to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States. An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement. by the President and Senate.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor most fit agent in those transactions. While the Union would. to that of two thirds of the members present. The very complication of the business. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics. To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone. 223 However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch. But a man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate. yet it cannot be doubted that his participation would materially add to the safety of the society. It is true that the Senate would. as on that of integrity. will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair to be filled by men of such characters as to render their concurrence in the formation of treaties peculiarly desirable. and looking forward to a period not very remote when he may probably be obliged to return to the station from which he was taken. would be a source of so great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to condemn the project. and pique or cabal might induce the latter rather than the former. of course. the ministerial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional representatives of the nation. Besides this. by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies. lose a considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns. An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. the multitudinous composition of that body. a steady and systematic adherence to the same views. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him solely so important a trust. as well on the score of wisdom. and. and despatch. might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest. And whoever has maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appointment of a President. to commit to him the entire power of making treaties. which it would require superlative virtue to withstand. The greater frequency of the calls upon the House of Representatives. would not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy. that all provisions which require more than the majority of . are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. the price of his treachery to his constituents. the people would lose the additional security which would result from the co-operation of the Executive. has personally too much stake in the government to be in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers. and the remark is unquestionably just. The remarks made in a former number. under the second head of our inquiries. decision. and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together when convened. secrecy. that an hereditary monarch. as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world. and the operation of treaties as laws. will apply with conclusive force against the admission of the House of Representatives to a share in the formation of treaties. from this cause. upon another occasion. plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them. a nice and uniform sensibility to national character. which have been alluded to in another part of this paper. would of itself afford a solid objection. than the separate possession of it by either of them. It has been remarked. by the aid of a foreign power. to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty. The only objection which remains to be canvassed. though often the oppressor of his people. It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question. is that which would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members composing the senatorial body.

in many cases. we take into view the co-operation of the President. is a history of impotence. while there would be much fewer occasions of delay. it tends to keep the body complete." . by making a determinate number at all times requisite to a resolution. PUBLIUS __ FEDERALIST No. When. by the erection of new States. and usually do. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper. and disorder. contribute to the advantages of a numerous agency. and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. it would. and that where there is only a single member present from a State. where the members are to vote individually. HAMILTON To the People of the State of New York: THE President is "to nominate. and look forward to the probable augmentation of the Senate. represent a State. would be very little fit for the proper discharge of the trust. The former. whence it happens that Congress. his vote is lost. we shall not hesitate to infer that the people of America would have greater security against an improper use of the power of making treaties. but we shall probably be led to conclude that a body more numerous than the Senate would be likely to become. that as the members vote by States. 1788. that the convention have gone as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of numbers in the formation of treaties as could have been reconciled either with the activity of the public councils or with a reasonable regard to the major sense of the community. Proofs of this position might be adduced from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship. two members may. we shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the sufficiency of the members to whose agency that power will be intrusted. by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. If we add to this. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies which may happen during the recess of the Senate. by promoting punctuality. under the existing Confederation. has the contrary effect. rarely consist of a greater number of persons than would compose the intended Senate. than they now enjoy under the Confederation. And as. and the States-General of the Netherlands. April 1. in the President alone. or in the courts of law. the Polish Diet. and an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority. The latter. there is great likelihood that its resolutions would generally be dictated by as great a number in this case as in the other. under the new Constitution. If two thirds of the whole number of members had been required. judges of the Supreme Court. by making the capacity of the body to depend on a proportion which may be varied by the absence or presence of a single member. and. in all probability. other public ministers and consuls. And when we proceed still one step further. have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the government. perplexity. To require a fixed proportion of the whole body would not. diminishes the motives to punctual attendance. 76 The Appointing Power of the Executive From the New York Packet. better then merely to require a proportion of the attending members. who now are solely invested with all the powers of the Union. Tuesday. from the non-attendance of a part. to appoint ambassadors. would rarely fall short in number of the active voices in the existing Congress. it will justify a supposition that the active voices in the Senate. It ought not to be forgotten that. amount in practice to a necessity of unanimity. did not an example at home render foreign precedents unnecessary. by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 224 any body to its resolutions. or in the heads of departments. And the history of every political establishment in which this principle has prevailed. This consideration seems sufficient to determine our opinion. in addition to these considerations.

the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office. In the act of nomination. attachments and animosities. Premising this. than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number. ought to be modified in one of three ways. from their number and from their dispersed situation. which is proposed to be conferred upon him. and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled. on this account. in relation to the appointment of the President. I proceed to lay it down as a rule. that there would always be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities. He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify. we must expect to see a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes. A single well-directed man. The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the provision made. cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views. his judgment alone would be exercised. I presume. that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices. will. be derived from the power of nomination. the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party. in this respect. which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. Hence. with the concurrence of such an assembly. In the first. It ought either to be vested in a single man. the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the foregoing clauses. in substance. feelings. When. of the description already given. and interests. or in a select assembly of a moderate number. in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices. agree to the position. There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether they relate to ourselves or to others. while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will. by an assembly of men. And it will rarely happen that the advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations. But it is easy to show. that "the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration. will of course be the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other. In the last. by the convention. or of a compromise between the parties. or in a single man. what is said must be understood to relate to a select body or assembly. . or who have attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers. feel himself under stronger obligations. must. and it will not need proof." This will be the usual condition of the bargain. when examined. Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject. the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. It will be agreed on all hands. The exercise of it by the people at large will be readily admitted to be impracticable. and you shall have the one you wish for that. therefore.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 225 It has been observed in a former paper. mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an assembly or body of men. They contend that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the appointments under the federal government. by a single understanding. and as it would be his sole duty to point out the man who. that on this point must essentially depend the character of its administration. be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation." If the justness of this observation be admitted. and will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. will be more considered than those which fit the person for the station. which are felt by those who compose the assembly. that the power of appointment. it would leave them little time to do anything else. which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing the power in question in a body of men. in ordinary cases. as waiving every other consideration. that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would. It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union. who are to be the objects of our choice or preference. partialities and antipathies. than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment. The people collectively. The choice which may at any time happen to be made under such circumstances. In either case. and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal and intrigue. at least respectable.

his choice. should fill an office. his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to make the final appointment. A man disposed to view human nature as it is. And as no man could be appointed but on his previous nomination. that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them. It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments. though perhaps not in the first degree. The danger to his own reputation. every man who might be appointed would be. without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices. it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. in general.Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor 226 with the approbation of the Senate. both with regard to men and to measures. candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged. by the preference they might feel to another. because they could not assure themselves. though. The Senate could not be tempted. may secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. from personal attachment. but that the necessity of its co-operation. and that body an entier branch of the legislature. would be forced and improbable. where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and. yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President. in the business of appointments. well founded. could not fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity. and experience justifies the theory. who have an influential weight in the councils of the nation. that there is always a large proportion of the body. to reject the one proposed. Hence it is (the present reign not excepted) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch. to rest satisfied. that a man who had himself the sole disposition of offices. will be a considerable . it would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration. which consists of independent and public-spirited men. a silent operation. be no difference between nominating and appointing. for the most distinguished or lucrative stations. Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive might occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate. in the case of an elective magistrate. The possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing. from family connection. But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference. would be governed much more by his private inclinations and interests. The institution of delegated power implies. The venalty of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation against that body. This supposition of universal venalty in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning. yet the supposition. They could not even be certain. not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members. that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind. by the influence of the power of nomination. There can. or from a view to popularity. from betraying a spirit of favoritism. to his political existence. that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful. or of being in some way or other personally allied to him. It will readily be comprehended. and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected. which may be a reasonable foun