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a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer. b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard. If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. c. Judgment according to law d. Tribunal with jurisdiction LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual. A. Due Substantive process Procedural and Administrative Due Process In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals: a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his case. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party. c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence. d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and known to the parties affected. f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and not rely on the recommendation of a subordinate. g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision. Substantive Due Process Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) Criminal Due Process In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People: F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
Bill of Rights I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Civil Procedural Due Process In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca: a. Court with jurisdiction subject matter. over the
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant law. c. Judgement rendered according to
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Constitutional Law II
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. (2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. (3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. (4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. VV. B. Due Process and Police Power Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
Constitutional Law II
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops Rendering Massage Services Valid. from compensation, and due process. (3) upon observance of
F: The ordinance was enacted for a twofold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for operating massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on general welfare clause. VV. Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV. C. Domain The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2) with just Due Process and Eminent
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just compensation. Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. 1. Taking either for public use or public purpose. Public Use Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a large group of people short of the public in general (e.g. expropriating property for the relocation of squatters). Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The
Constitutional Law II
contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain. VV. Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224. HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV. 2. Just compensation must be judicially determined Just Compensation Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property measured at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in the 1920's, the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and Amigable cases, supra), and using the conversion rates at the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art. 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations). EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV. Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through
Republic v. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. Teehankee. concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. De Knecht. The government filed expropriation proceedings . on one hand. No deposit before the taking is required. The lower court denied tthe motion. the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. among whom was petitioner. it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan. it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws. Later on. but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later. The case was remanded to the lower court. it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. on the other. the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. VV. Because of the protests of residents of the latter. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional. The social 3. leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties. observed Due process must be 100 SCRA 660 De Knecht v. Bautista (1980) F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project. Appeal. but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. however. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. VV. CJ. and progress and development.Constitutional Law II his law-making powers exercises this power. When BP 340 was passed. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari. in 1983. the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
and possession of. be subjected to an easement of right of way. 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines. 1. the SC ruled that "Normally. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. RULING: In RP v. the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. economic. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines. Moreover. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. the expropriated property. Charo. For these reasons. organized and unorganized. PLDT. Napocor's lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. Economic equality Art. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization. including the right to strike in accordance with law. Charo. reduce social. Art. than the money equivalent of said property.Constitutional Law II impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. To this end. III. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation. XIII. and peaceful concerted activities. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law. XIII. and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. 2. Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of . Sec. ownership. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements. the State shall regulate the acquisition. No person shall be deprived of life. through expropriation. without loss of title or possession. collective bargaining and negotiations. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. the expropriation. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. It is unquestionable that real property may. liberty or property without due process of law. Gutierrez. 3. NAPOCOR v. D. and living wage. The State shall afford full protection to labor. 1. the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less. Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. humane conditions of work. but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned property. Sec. 1. use. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat. XIII. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation. the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers. Art. Sec. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity." In this case. the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. and disposition of property and its increments. Sec. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. local and overseas. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Equal Protection Art. They shall be entitle to security of tenure. the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines.
Cuevas. 2. territorial sea. Sec. upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency. Hernandez. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. especially when they are admitted to the country as immigrants. when the national interest dictates. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of taxation. 5. the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. 10. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. the SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail trade. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho. Sec. Art. reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. In Villegas v. practice.exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII. to name a few. 10). In Vera v.Constitutional Law II recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments. Art. the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an occupation. 1155 (1937). Finally. was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case of filled milk (coco-fat added) . or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe. privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978) F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Ichong v. the admission to the practice of law. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 90 SCRA 379 (1979). For the protection of the law can be observed by the national interest. employed in Manila. brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. XII. pleading. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. 201 Phil. xxx The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters. VIII. Respondent. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. Art. 2). XII. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful for infants. In Ichong v. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. The Congress shall. and to expansion and growth. and deprived aliens of the right to earn a common livelihood. or modify substantive rights. 11. Sec. certain areas of investments. Hernandez. and legal assistance to the underprivileged. the Integrated Bar. Villegas v. the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws. 1155 (1937) But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. certain areas of investment (Art. and shall not diminish. In imposing a flat rate of P500. and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. and procedure in all courts. In the grant of rights. 86 SCRA 270 (1978). 2 par. increase. and exclusive economic zone. The Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places . an alien. Sec. Sec. III. Id. Sec. 201 Phil. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade.. Sec. VV.
95 SCRA 392 (1980). the law was already inoperative. use. because of public interest. as taxpayer. HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the provision. Vera v. 2. the State shall regulate the acquisition. and Alfredo Salapantan Jr. Sec. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. reduce social. voter and member of the bar. not invalid. the question should be resolved. Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. At any rate. thus denying them the equal protection of the laws. HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Political equality Art. shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. No petition seeking his disqualification has been filed against him. 95 SCRA 392 (1980). The retired employee in effect declares himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. Sec.. Sec. from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. 4 of Batas Blg. VV. Nevertheless. Comelec. HELD: Sec. Social equality Art. economic. To this end. sec. . XIII. C. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments and therefore. 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk. 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Sec. the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired elective provincial. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Romeo Igot. insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses. ownership. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection. 10. 1. Comelec. 18. Comelec. They brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does not involve disbursement of public funds. for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government. Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. In Igot v. Dumlao v. Sec." Petitioner. Art. sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground that it was contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantee of the Constitution. and disposition of property and its increments. In Dumlao v. .Constitutional Law II At that time of the decision thought. the SC upheld the validity of sec. IX. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever form. Igot c. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979) F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. VV. and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. They have no personal or substantial interest at stake and therefore no locus standi. as taxpayer and voter. city ot municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected. Sec. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. III. however. 4 of which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion. 3. His petition is a mere request for advisory opinion. sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52. It does not violate equal protection. VV.
to be nullified in these proceedings. Searches and Seizures Art. a SW. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable. Almeda. Tarlac. if any. Charo. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal. Salas. except upon lawful order of the court. thereunder. charging usurious rates. Arrests. & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law. and after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper. who was ill and confined at that time. ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. The applicant." The witness he presentted testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE was lending without a license because he personally investigated the victims who secured loans from the petitioner. 141 (1940) F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda. & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer. an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. proceeded w/ the execution thereof. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. shall be inviolable. 65 Phil. Warrants Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda. (1938) F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. (1) it must be issued upon probable cause. they could be held liable for perjury. lists. chits. PNs and other articles were seized and retained in the possession of the Anti-Usury Board. 2. Receipt books. III. the resp. accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law. swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license. (3) in the determination of probable cause. receipts. The existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace before issuing the warrant complained of. Their affidavits were sufficient for. together w/ the SW. & w/o the presence of the petitioner. the prop. Requirements for Search Pasion vda. Almeda. pet. de Garcia v. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.Constitutional Law II II. Locsin. as shown in the warrant itself. HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid. Sec. Even accepting the description of the prop. house or store of the petitioner for certain books. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded." On the same date. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. went to the office of the petitioner. a SW was issued to search the store and premises of the petitioner. the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. Sec. commanding any officer of the law "to search the person. Bu motion. Almeda. under oath or affirmation. obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. 70 Phil. In the instant case. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. By resolution. houses. RULING: YES. . (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses. 1. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought. the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board. judge. the judge must examine. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section. 689. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE A. in his application. accompanied by a captain of the PC.
mimeographing machines and tape recorders. RAM. The judge did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. In Stanford v. it must appear first that (1) the right exists. IS THERE A WAIVER? No express believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. VV. paraphernalia. typewriters. waiver. The deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. VV. It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. (3) that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. State of Texas. (Phil. The judge then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same. Corro v. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor. The delay in making the demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result im implied. the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines. the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. of Internal Revenue through Rev. they were turned over to the resp. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. was taken by the Dep. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of the consti. Instead. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. Broad statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was served upon Salas. ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. newspaper dummies. Petitioners brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized.) v. Ruiz. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied. HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. RULING: NO. and its pres. cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing. The judge did not have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to propound initial and follow-up questions which IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None. being a personal one. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued. To constitute a waiver of constitutional right. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times. of the existence of such right. She could not have objected bec. (2) that the person involved had knowledge. right. the US SC declared this type of warrant void. Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the NIRC. there was no case pending against the petitioner. video machines and tapes. HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner.Constitutional Law II seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to . the deposition of de Leon and his witness. as required by law. the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. waiver. Burgos v. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. Bache & Co.. Clerk of Court. Logronio. Certainly. 37 SCRA 823 (1971) F: The Com. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW against Bache & Co. Chief of Staff (1984) 133 SCRA 800 Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC. actual or constructive.
" executed by P/Lt. They also question the extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of a counsel. Prudente. RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425. on account of his training. Prudente v. 155 SCRA 486 (1987) F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. People. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. 180 SCRA 69 (1990) F: Judge Dayrit. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was probable cause." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles. (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was issued for one specific offense. the judge did not examine Angeles in the form of searching questions and answers. However. Angeles. and the judge must. (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly describe the place to be searched. Moreover. Dayrit. ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. the same are deemed inadmissible against them. While there was failure to state the particular provision of the law violated." Although the specific section of the law is not stated. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means . etc. by any person on his behalf. . a relative." it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession and control.by telephone if possible . 3 fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr. ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. the warrant itself qualified the description of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms. marijuana dried stalks which are suject of the offense stated above. was in the best position to conceive. The fact that the word "etc. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. RULING: NO. the SW specifically described the place to be searched and the things to be seized.Constitutional Law II his judicial mind. (1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness. the SC ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can. the Court declared that: " At the time the person is arrested. ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in possession of Dr. Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified sources. supported by a "Deposition of Witness. the SW described the place as PUP. In People V. Prudente. of Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms in that floor. explosives and ammunitions are punished in different sections of the PD. Charo. the complainant and any witnesses he may produce." was added to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on single offense. he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused. if any. in writing and under oath.or by letter or messenger. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of arms. Dimagmaliw. The probable cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. The articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act. before issuing the warrant. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses." This is deemed sufficient. for notwithstanding that possession of firearms. Furthermore. judge was invalid. Here. What appears on the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no. they are treated as belonging to a single specie. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. there is no question at all that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as basis for determining probable cause is alleged. with its address and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. Charo. The warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. Olaes v." This suffices to cure the defect. with reasonable effort. in the case at bar. Galit. upon applicatin of P/Maj. In enforcing the warrant.
and on that ground. 38 of the Labor Code. POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar. who may issue warrants of arrest and search. 38. Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Under Art. sees nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body. CA. in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law. Without probable cause. of Labor . the NIRC. 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws. The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022.Constitutional Law II The right to counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Unlike a magistrate. is to make him both judge and jury in his own right. for the purpose of deportation. we declare Art. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused. the neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. a. a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. the authorities must go through the judicial process. following a final order of deportation. 20 SCRA 385 (1967). This order was enforced on 26 January 1988. when he is neither. Charo. unconstitutional. par. The Sec. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court. being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal recruitment. Hence. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. 171 SCRA 348 (1989) F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. RULING: NO. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias. and the Revised Penal Code. the Tariff and Customs Code. quasijudicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. Salazar v. how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably ." he stands invariably. The Court agrees that PASTF exercises. having verified that she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this. This makes to our mind and to that extent. or was meant to exercise. 183 SCRA 145 F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022. The Court. Existence of probable cause. ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 Constitition. meaning to say. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. To that extent. as the accused's adversary and his accuser. it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills and competence but more significantly. now embodied in Art. III. are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002. there can be no valid search warrant. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. In Stonehill v. Achacoso. warrants of arrest. shall be inadmissible in evidence. unconstitutional and of no force and effect. 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: NO. Diokno." These requirements were even made stricter under the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a person under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when made in writing and in the presence of counsel. it is only judges and no other. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. prosecutorial powers. To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed. not being a judge. whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested. in whole or in part. C of the Labor Code. to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse.
this was a fishing expedition. printed matters. the description which read "subversive documents. leaflets. Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. In the latter case. Neither can it be based on a report. and typewriters. and thus the search warrant issued was not valid. the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times. Thus. handbills. In the Tariff and Customs Code. In Corro v." was again invalidated for the description was not at all particular or specific. in Corro v. reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. leaflets. To establish the requirement of probable cause. b. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they are testifying to. 37 SCRA 823 (1971). Lising. e. . he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished. Villamiel. As determined by a judge Under the 1987 Constitution. than if the goods were searched for the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In this case. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). tape recorders. after which he issued the search warrant in question. (Phil) v. Chief of Staff. 137 SCRA 541 (1985). like the clerk of court. thus making the warrants general warrants. d. the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. which violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. subversive documents. asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to. The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled). When Search May Be Made without a Warrant (a) When search is made of moving vehicles The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. the rule is: One crime. customs agents are specifically authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant. and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions. The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions. Likewise. Lising. no unfettered discretion must be granted to him. banners. The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. only a judge can issue a warrant. the testimony based on investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be not personal knowledge. the warrant is void. the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. thus making the warrant a general warrant. Ruiz. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff. the offensive material need not be set out in full. one warrant. the offensive and much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been removed c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witness.Constitutional Law II guilty thereof? In truth. in Burgos v. and thus threaten free expression. Otherwise. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing. 2. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide. The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else. etc. papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines. So said the Court in Bache and Co. When it comes to printed matters. the Light a Fire Movement. After he was through with the hearing. a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of ideas. articles.
the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest. Sec. The SC at first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized. Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away. Rule 126. charges of subversion and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. the place of premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search warrant. having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant.g. thus giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they should seize.Constitutional Law II Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e. Gonzales. If. (Rules of Court. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked into. as an incident of an arrest. because it was an incident of a valid arrest. Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group. and if the documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away. one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search. in the Nolasco case. that is. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. To be valid. But after the EDSA revolution. HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the things to be seized.) A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the commission of the offense. if the arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge. At 12:00 noon. there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor.m. In Nolasco v. NPA and NDF. There is absent a definite guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized.m. not separated by time or place from the arrest. Earlier that day. Milagros asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. (c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party Roan v. papers and other records of the CPP. and within the time of the arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. probable cause that the criminal is inside the car). It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are and what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive. of August 6. 12. 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. The arrest took place at 11:30 a. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them. her premises were searched and 428 documents. There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community.g. . The search warrant described the things to be seized as "Documents. Cruz Pano. Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for rebellion against Milagros. xxx".. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents. Nolasco v. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control of the arrested person. without a search warrant. (b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest. On the basis of the documents seized. 1984. the reconstituted SC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search was likewise valid. was searched and some documents seized. It is a general rule that. judge on 5/10/84. the search must be "incidental" to the arrest.-. a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. having been arrested already. At noon of the same day. But the seizure of the articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. Search incident to lawful arrest. 139 SCRA 152 (1985). The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime.
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply bec. the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. Motion to Quash. therefore." RAM. "this procedural flaw notwithstanding. he did not ask his own searching questions. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. A SW is still necessary.Petitioner should have. who both claimed to be "intelligence informers. if he knew and understood the same. Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Pita v. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit." and only bec.. all that resp." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. It is correct to say. judge. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns. policemen seized and confiscated from dealers. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) . that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. or if the acts related were really done openly. standing alone. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. judge did was question Capt. Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal HELD: YES. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. magazines. We do not agree. considering that these acts were against the law. was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. to establish the applicant's claims. or why his presence was not noticed at all. an offense is malum prohibitum. pornographic. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. Depositions were taken of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them.It does not follow that bec. Instead. In any case. the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the . personally known to him. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA. Sec. CA. or how far he was from the window." shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits. there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. necessary for the witnesses themselves. otherwise. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. But as we said and did in Burgos. before coming to the SC. we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the consitutional issues raised. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others. judge. except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. Bayona. His application. he seeks review with SC. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126. 4 of the ROC. It was. together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself. 178 SCRA 362 (1989) F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng.-. in the full view of the witnesses. however.Constitutional Law II RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. (Mata v. filed a motion to quash the search warrant by the resp. Malum Prohibitum. who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. or whether it was on the first floor or second floor. distributors. and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. but this is not entirely true. By his own accounts. they are prohibited.-. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant . the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. by their own personal info.
CA. R 113. The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge . the offense. gun. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. indeed. just been committed. the latter is more reasonable considering that. they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. valid or invalid. de Villa. 12. when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. As bet. 38 cal. Such an exercise may prove to be useless. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag. the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. HELD: From Sec. The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto. The US SC held in Terry v. They must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. two Metro Manila Dailies. a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. or is attempting to commit an offense. They did not know what its contents were. Hence. it is reasonable for an officer rather . It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. 188 SCRA 288 (1990) F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar.. if in their opinion. a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos. & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee. a smoke grenade. the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure. 5. . & 2 live ammunition for a . a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar. If probable cause exist.Constitutional Law II premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail. As the Sol-Gen said: "The assailed S & S may still be justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation whose object is either to determine the identity of suspicious individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officers seeks to obtain more info.22 cal. a search warrant will issue. the petition for review. the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. an obscenity rap is in order. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant." In such a situation. a political case. both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force. there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. among others. futile and much too late. foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at military or police checkpoints. However. whether political or "obscene". w/o a SW. R 136 of ROC. Davao City. There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. and trial on the merits.. they did not know that he had committed. or was actually committing. Petitioner was brought to the police station for further investigation. St. by reason of a defective warrant. While they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges. ROC. gun. because speech is speech. it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person. there is no question that. Ohio that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances & in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes. it was effected on the basis of a probable cause.38 Smith & Wesson revolver. there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an arrest. or when an offense has in fact. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber .. in the complete absence of a warrant. unlike in the former. (d) Stop and Frisk Posadas v. w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a . is actually committing.
People v. proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Matillano. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. and the Booking and Information Sheet." PETITION DENIED. 1994) F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid. of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. . Ruling: YES person caught committing an offense in flagrante. for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. The team. They were then made to sign an inventory. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. M-shells of different calibers. RAM. written in Tagalog. (e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently. but was acquitted of attempted homicide. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. five bundles of C-4 dynamites. ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence. The waiver must be expressly made. RULING: NO. The arrest that followed the hotpursuit was valid. he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintaing the status quo while obtaining more info.) Bam. accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. and for attempted homicide. the Receipt of Property Seized. He tried to escape by running inside his house. 233 SCRA 716 (July 6. The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. The accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion. together with the accused. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. a buybust operation was conducted by the police. holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. When appellant was asked to give a written statement. accused was arrested. 1989. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal. The team arrested appellant. and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. de Gracia.Constitutional Law II than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur. The policemen’s entry into the house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a People v. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. as a consequence of which. During the investigation. The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the house. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. Matillano. De lara F: After a surveillance conducted. RULING: YES. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. There was no need for a warrant. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money. Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to the search. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. maintaining peace and order. appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court. the military operatives. HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. Under the foregoing circumstances. w/o a SW and/ or court order. 1866 defines and punishes. economic and political dev't of the NCR. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings. Petitioners aver that. the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. bec. De Villa. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. Prior to the raid. Presidential Decree No. or threatened to be infringed. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. 170 SCRA 256 (1989) F: On 1/20/87. under the situation then prevailing." Valmonte v. 24 with variant elements. unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. Presidential Decree No. the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so. and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. In addition. taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. as a specific offense. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. . 1866. Furthermore. the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas. in the course of their routine checks. Consequently. thereby compelling the former to break into the office. of the institution of said checkpoints. When the military operatives raided the place. albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code. the building and houses therein were deserted. 3. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment.Constitutional Law II It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case. there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. indeed. homicide. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. such as illegal possession of firearms. arson. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order. had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed. or other offenses. There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. illegal. there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. the military. was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon. that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. In the first place. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. for that matter. the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. especially at night or at dawn.
and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience. Gaanan through a telephone . the resps. In the meantime. xxx HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary. they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights. Accdg. no permanent relief can be given at this time. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices bec. officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. Where not one victim complains. 17 of the Const. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM.:"The Pres. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.000 from him. when conducted w/in reasonable limits. second. there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted." They also cite sec. invasion or rebellion. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age. Under the circumstances of this TP's suit. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. De Villa. the problem is not initially for the SC. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. First. inj. True." However. bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.Constitutional Law II Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure. the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. are total lies. 181 SCRA 623 (1990) F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. But. Wire Tapping Gaanan v. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. the kicking in of doors. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls. and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police actions. however. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. 4. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8. bureaus and offices. Sec.:"The Pres. at the cost of occasional inconveninece. Guazon v. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden. including the essential and legitimate ones. VII. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. And. in the interest of public security. A show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Respondents stress 2 points. to the petitioners. shall have control of all the executive departments. the remedy is not to stop all police actions. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. the former should prevail. and not one violator is properly charged. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by admin. 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. cite Art. IAC. reasonably conducted. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Resps. This demand was heard by Atty. the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts. 18. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers.
) 6. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. the evidence admitted. (Rules of Court. In other words. Colorado. . One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken. Personal property to be seized. depending on whether it is contraband or not. Exclusionary Rule Art. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage. the SC noting that the total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to preserve. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. Diokno. and only its suppression can be asked for. 3. following the U. III. This has not always been the case. the SC. criminal punishment. dictagraph.S. In Moncado v. intercepting. conversation. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. case of Wolf V. without prejudice to any criminal.Constitutional Law II extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. In such case. persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate. when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines. and (c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. The evidence is absolutely useless. (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. What may be seized Rule 126. Sec. users. blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. 5. rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. action for damages. HELD: NO An extension tel.S. in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. the party can ask for its return. civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. Ohio 1969. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.g. Since Atty. or other devices enumerated in Sec. Consequently. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. The tel. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case. through punishment. or recording a tel. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. especially in the Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights. sec. even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed. resistance). it would not be returned. The victim may or may not get back the thing seized.-. on WON an extension tel. It the thing is contraband. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired. It was in Stonehill v. supra. the insufficiency of the other remedies (e. following the U. 2. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. by their very nature. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Furthermore. The Court noted. as in the Stonehill case. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. case of Maop v. Atty. complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act (RA 4200). the mere act of listening .A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a) Subject matter of the offense. People's Court (1948). But if the thing is legal.
w/n said documents. prosecutors). 2 is no. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof." or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws. insofar as the papers. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications.Constitutional Law II Stonehill v. When he opened appellant's box. w/n petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims. III. Diokno. stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense. caprice or passion of peace officers. as the "subject of the offense.as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. Opening one of the bundles. he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. His curiosity aroused. directed to any peace officer. and to seize several personal prop. w/n the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations. NIRC and the RPC. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof bec. Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes. As a consequence. (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. General search warrants are outlawed bec. By so doing. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations. Civil Action for Damages A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code. and/ or residences. papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by . following standard operating procedure. the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. mandamus & injunction. Marti. the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended. to recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. (2) No. 193 SCRA 57 (1991) F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts. Search and Seizure by Private Persons People v. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved.that the things to be seized be particularly described-. it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause. action for certiorari. and things seized from the officers of the corporations. a peculiar order emitted therefrom. & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. opened the boxes for final inspection. Sec. It was stated that the natural and juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. TCC. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers. RAM. 20 SCRA 383 (1967) F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. violating a given provision of our criminal laws. 8. NIRC & RPC. 7. he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. Mr. (3) If the answer in no. In Aberca v. thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights-. said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. Ver." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void. Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC). documents. HELD: (1) No. Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. several judges (resp. but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices. said corporations have their respective personalities. None of these requirements has been complied w/. one can indirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. warehouses. or committed specific omissions. prohibition. separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. whatever their nature. The averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed were abstract.
) Rule 126. between a private individual and other individuals.) The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S). rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence. Examination of complainant. would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. When warrant of arrest may issue. not law enforcers. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person. the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him. Merely to observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search. the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the govt.-Upon the filing of an information. where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof. xxx (Villanueva v. the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. In sum. or the lack of it. record. Appellant. whether citizen or alien. Thus. the judge may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause Compare Rule 112.The judge must.(a) By the Regional Trial Court. 9. is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com. It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes. and w/o the intervention of police authorities. is involved. the liberties guaranteed by the Consti. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Its concern is not the relation between individuals. the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.) Rule 112. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person.Constitutional Law II the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI. (Rules of Court. acting in a private capacity and w/o the intervention and participation of state authorities. Having observed that w/c is open. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. as distinguished from SEARCH warrants. the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. as in the case at bar. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. he shall issue a warrant of arrest. that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. ISSUE: May an act of a private individual. Sec. The arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight. the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals. from interference by govt. APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti. in writing and . is not search. be invoked against the state? HELD: We hold in the negative. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule 126. delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts. Sec. cannot be invoked against the State. an information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425.-.-. Second. 4 (on search warrants. Thereafter. Sec. the proprietor of the forwarding agency. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST. In the absence of governmental interference. 4. before issuing the warrant. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. who made the search/ inspection.) The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas. Querubin. Sec. however. First. Job Reyes.: " xxx The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. 6.-If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Abbas. Neverhteless. 98 Phil. Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. Amarga v. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC. The fiscal should. 2) and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. is left to his sound judgment or discretion. 739 (1956). The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. Makasiar. he can always ask the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary investigation. but merely discretionary. III. The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and has found probable cause on the part of the accused. Bam. Of course. to issue warrants to "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable . 1987 entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall. the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers. 29 coup attempt. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. noting that it has been practice long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis of the certificate. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. instead. To determine whether a WA should issue." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the information filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The Pres. It he is satisfied with the affidavits. The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" (Art. Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. who were publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star.Constitutional Law II under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.perhaps the first Commander-inChief of the AFP to have to do so. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. 739 (1956) F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua. legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. hid under her bed. he need not summon the affiants. on the basis of the affidavits. Beltran v. for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Sec. he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists. there exists probable cause. after conducting a PI. if the judge is in doubt. The fiscal deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged. After the PI. and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed. Abbas. have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 12. during the Aug. the Pres. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear." Instead of submitting his counteraffidavit. ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding. while the firing was going on-. of the Phils. upon the investigating judge to issue a WA. 98 Phil. Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. so he could determine for himself if. 5. It is not obligatory. he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Strict enforcement of rule People v. The appellant was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.38 caliber revolver was found buried under his house. Sec. or is about to be committed. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.) Rule 113. and the gun and documents were ordered confiscated. the person to be arrested has committed. as the appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time. the arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the crime has been committed. 7. 5. and it is uncorroborated and unreliable. on charges of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. the arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held unconstitutional. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. has in fact just been committed. but it was then already too late. his admission is inadmissible under [Art. Sec. in his presence. (3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive documents were hidden. as maximum. without a warrant. on the basis thereof. Following established doctrine and procedure. underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. is being committed. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. on May 13. The offense must also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. (b) When an offense. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. Sound policy dictates this procedure. Sec. Burgos. arrest a person: (a) When. The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence". given by Cesar Masamlok. the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence. as minimum. the appellant . 144 SCRA 1 (1986) F: On the basis of info. 5 (a). cases where an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112.A peace officer or a private person may. When arrest may be made without a warrant Rule 113. xxx 10. 5 talks of "citizen arrests".] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of counsel. the appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman. This is not an accurate interpretation. (4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. A . the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail.Constitutional Law II cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. (Rules of Court. when lawful. a. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. (2) Consequently.-. The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule. What the Consti. Davao del Sur. is actually committing. issue a warrant of arrest. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal. in People v. 12 (1). 1982. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. Subversive documents were also seized from a place near his house. or is attempting to commit an offense. or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself. III. sec. Thus. Section. Burgos. The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge". There is no such personal knowledge in this case. HELD: (1) Under R 113. to reclusion perpetua. 144 SCRA 1 (1986). Arrest without warrant. However.
They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board.C.. the person to be arrested has committed. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. without a warrant. The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the alleged sale transaction.. RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. Metro Manila and requested that said person be apprehended. w/o warrant were clearly justified. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113. The arrest therefore was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with. b. Arrest without warrant. The 'suspicious stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were conducted on them. but the gun and the subversive documents must be confiscated. Ramos. a driver and 2 passengers. 8199 Constancia St. is actually committing. They also saw a male person come out of the said house and approach and talk to the driver of the tricycle. Ramos. a marijuana cigarette'. as amended is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto. they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give something to the male person. A peace officer or a private person may. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. under Sec. The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. the Court. Q. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. is actually Rolando Dural. they asked the male person. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station I. namely. or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. Pajilan together with his companions approached the male person and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police officers. Rodriguez. which the male person. a member of the NPA liquidation squad. The tricycle driver brought out from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. I In Umil v. 1989) F: Pat. who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. and that they are. Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation. It was found that the wounded person. so that their arrests. ROC. in his presence. (a) and (b) of Rule 113. the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed. An arrest w/o a warrant. Makati. further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court. Dural was referred to the Caloocan . or is attempting to commit an offense. Exceptions to strict enforcement (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion Umil v. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Ave. 232 SCRA 498 (April 25. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. 187 SCRA 311 (1990) These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. arrest a person: (a) When. 5. People v.Constitutional Law II should be acquitted. in the act of committing an offense.. Upon positive identification by an eyewitness.. Sec. The Court finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on HC. Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid? Ruling: YES. Michael Orbeta. Pat. viz. pars. stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. Makati. Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle. who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No. the driver and the passengers of the tricycle did. when apprehended. when lawful. After a while they saw the male person go back to the house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette. a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the house located at 8199 Constancia St. 5.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the jumbled tel. antennae. The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. III Anonuevo v. In the course of the search were found several firearms. the agents found them to be loaded guns. On 8/24/88. the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place. He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation. of the CPP. They found firearms. the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces. . he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified. aka. They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause bef. regular power supply. Thus. At the hearing. subversive documents. a petition for HC was filed bef. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms. an info. Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info." They went to the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. case. charging them w/ viol. the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion. Hence." The petition for HC. At about 8 PM.) Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. vouchers.Constitutional Law II City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. an outlawed subversive organization. of PD 1866 was filed bef. Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. ledgers. for viol. he readily submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong. although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Dept. w/c was granted. w/o warrant is also justified. Enrile. to quell the rebellion. RTC-Pasig." and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades. a former NPA. same day. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra. this Court. is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed. A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. Nor was he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting incident. sister of Amelia Roque. pursuant to a search warrant . the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos. "Ka Nelia. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. of PD 1866 was filed. this Court on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. Q. When frisked. insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned. Subversion being a continuing offense. since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a crim. Ramos. the petition for HC on his behalf is now moot and academic. radio. When questioned. When confronted. who has been released on bail. he refused to give a written statement. At the PC stockade. journals. a search of the house was conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place. The arrest. A petition for HC was filed bef. among others. Obviously. However. charging her w/ viol. speaker and subversive documents. On 8/15/88. they were brought to PC HQ for investigation. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88. When arrested. R." referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. As to Dural. of Florida Roque. Accordingly. the writ of HC is no longer available II The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority. Another info. ammunition. Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized. A was identified as "Ka Ted. therefore.C. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict. Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame. the Constantino house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88. no. etc.
the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan. The petitioners. Sec. has been shown.Constitutional Law II HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. In view thereof.. w/o a prel. but were planted by the military to justify their illegal arrest. an info. At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88. he was immediately put under arrest. Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of Bunye II.45 cal. he may not be released on HC. a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2. hanggang sa magkagulo na. of PISTON. MM. w/o warrant. "Bukas tuloy and welga natin . head of the CPPNPA. during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession. Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. filed against them are null and void for want of prel. prel. no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. An info. inv. when arrested. In the afternoon of 11/22/88. picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning. As pointed out by the Sol-Gen. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person when apprehended. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. have not introduced any evidence to support their claim. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. ROC. xxx On 2/1/89. Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms. On 5/12/88. was conducted bec. The filing of an info. Upon questioning. Aguirre. RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him. ROC. filed w/ the competent court. Rivera was released from custody. when O. V The petitioners Ocaya. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Art. Mesa. Sec. and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. Sec. Anonuevo." Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R 113. In the course of the search... VII Nazareno v.. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88. issued a resolution denying the petition for HC." Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him. Lim. IV Ocaya v. having been first conducted. inv. but the men did not accede to his request. HELD: Vicky O. is sanctioned by Rule 112. where he was heard as saying. 142. On the other hand. believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson. He demanded that his sister be allowed to accompany him. Muntinglupa. RPC. charging him w/ viol. Sec. inv. VI Espiritu v. pursuant to R112. When he asked for the warrant. 5 (b). through trimedia was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. the officers. the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition. When he went down to talk to them. agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command. after the informations had been filed against them in court. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a . but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the petitioners. it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the . the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner type jeepney. Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers. ROC. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition. armed w/ a search warrant. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. 125. Mla. No. They were brought to the PC HQ for investigation. Station Commander. of Art. but he gave the lawmen his slip. he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. however. On 5/17/88. is w/o merit. Laguna. Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. conducted a search of a house located at Marikina Green Heights. while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. charging her w/ viol. inv. 125 of the RPC. 7. there was no previous warrant. did not belong to them. There is also no merit in the contention that the info. 7.. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car.
he was committing an offense. requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be based upon probable cause. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. given another opportunity. not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court w/c issued the process. R 113. a continuing crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. and for subversion w/c. like rebellion is. under Garcia v. is based on actual facts. but rahter. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order. whom the detained person is charged. the day before his arrest. i. The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime. ROC."from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. to the effect that an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound was based VIII In all the petitions here considered. received by the arresting officers. does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof. Dural. the indubitable existence of a crime. w/o warrant. 1990) did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant. Agnes Hospital. the writ of HC will not be allowed. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. His arrest was based on "probable cause. v. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. would have shot or would shoot other policemen.His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that. as the court itself stated in Morales.) On the Ilagan Doctrine. The answer and the better practice would be. FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. he was. 5 (b). ROC. or if such person is charged before any court. As the Court sees it. R 113. 202 SCRA 251 . criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. 5. it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be detained participated therein. judgement or order of commitment. Said confidential info. 4. where membership is penalized." and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in fact has been satisfied. Dural did not cease to be. had jurisdiction or not to issue the process. judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case. re-examination or re-appraisal. Jr. Enrile. at the time of arrest. MM. Ancheta. of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. bec. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. coupled w/ good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. and after investigation by the police." Umil v.Constitutional Law II respondents by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge.e. w/ a view to its abandonment. Dural was identified as one of several persons who. w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. ROC. Padilla. an outlawed org. or bef. after he was positively implicated by his co-accused.." Sec.. 5 (a). confined in the St. or become less of a subversive. Ramos. in all petitions for HC. R 102. v.. R 113. (Sec. Rolando Dural. had shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. w/in the contemplation of Sec. the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-. It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized govt is attained.) PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990 The decision (on July 9. ROC." (Peo. when arrested. simply bec.-. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communist equipment.. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo. w/c confirmed the belief of the military that the info. Anonuevo. R113. is still another thing. teh arrest falls under Sec. And at the time of the actual arrests.. arraignment asked the court a quo for reinvestigation. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms.. wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. or soon thereafter. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled. Case against E. for E. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction.) Supervening events made this case moot and academic. (2) a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said hospital for for a gunshot wound. On 8/31/88. informations were filed in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and disposition. or on 1/31/88. but xxx upon the nature of the deed. Anonuevo and Casiple). Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural.) ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant. Roque. third. they were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA members. at the time of their arrests. Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 5. explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons." but for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting officers. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. their arrests. w/o warrant. R. On good faith. caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. the peace officers did not appear. ROC. 5 (b). has in this case. R113.The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our community. w/o warrant. therefore. the court. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. was inciting to sedition. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations. Buenaobra. D. had bef. w/ info. A few days after Dural's arrest. found in the safehouse was a person named RC. w/o obviously becomes difficult at times. In the balancing of authority and freedom. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. R 113 are met. A few days after their arrests. are also justified. And then shortyly after their arrests. ammunitions. and/ or subversive documents.. Buenaobra. As to A. Casiple & V.Although the killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88. . An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. second. 5 (a). in their possession were unlicensed firearms. since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly. they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first. "xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime. Ocaya. (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. not for subversive or any "continuing offense. The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the info.-. W." (US v. They were. ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION. Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. even w/o a warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to prevent possible flight. as to their exact location and the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof. the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino safehouse.-. while Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later. NAZARENO'S ARREST. at the time the words were uttered. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. an info. He was placed under judicial custody. Sanchez. But. he had chosen to remain in detention.Constitutional Law II on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in said hospital.
The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination. That is as it should be for as law enforcers. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. i. xxx B. they violated his constitutional right to counsel. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the marked bills. 384 U. Linsangan denied the charge. (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. . 12. he must be provided with one. 17 hereof. Sec. on the other hand.S. solitary. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. Arizona. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. (2) No torture. To note these admissions. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. where compulsion is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs People v. HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist. Source: Miranda v. to remain silent. A Senator or Member of the House shall. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from him. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress Art. R 113. incommunicado.e. shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. 436 (1966) According to Chief Justice Warren. in compliance w/ Sec. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. 11. his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. intimidation. VI. are supported by probable cause. 195 SCRA 784 F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust” operation. in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional).. and their families. Sec. Linsangan. threat. one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the marked bills. III. 11. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant’s denials. a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Rights of custodial interrogation Persons under Art. After finding these positive for marijuana. but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. force. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section. when a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. Upon appeal. 5. the officers must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the investigation to ensure that the statements made are truly the product of free choice. violence. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Secret detention places.Constitutional Law II These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant. the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. ROC.
as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the pressure of custodial investigation. b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke his right. (The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a prominent Constitutional lawyer. the Court stated "the . No. and that the police are not acting in his interest. but also that it is false or untrue. for the law rejects the confession when. admissible in evidence. (Sec. for there can only be one purpose to the questioning. since the inherent pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the right to counsel. when A. the purpose is not so much to inform him. and that is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. ask him for an explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. At this stage. The early rule placed the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary and. he does not have to defend himself alone. 4. Villanueva. then one will be provided for him by the state. the rule has been that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence against the accused. a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one. code of 1916. 2 Law Rev. Although he may already know these rights. 3. people who could otherwise explain their innocence would be arrested. w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the Phils. he can rung after X and having grabbed him. b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police. In the later case of Peo. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. In 1953. then his rights must now be read. otherwise. v. 61 Phil. on the prosecution. Act No. anything he says can and will be used against him. 2) "Custodial investigation" .) The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation". 4. For instance. a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent.. 10.) It was held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings. b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right to counsel.when the investigation now focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise. the Miranda rule is not yet applicable. sees X running with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man. v. therefore. 2 (1988). to be repudiated. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in the police precinct. but without being directed at anyone's guilt in particular. a policeman. b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system. Mendoza. 2. it was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility. since the purpose of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to prosecute the person. de los Santos that "A confession.Constitutional Law II Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the following rights: 1. The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. LJ 409 I. must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and violence. by force or violence or intimidation. Act No. A police investigation consists of 2 stages: 1) "General exploratory investigation" when the investigation consists merely of general questions to find out who might be the culprit. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel. not even when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the truth. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony. Under the new rule. Right to remain silent a) To make him aware of it. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. 619. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent. It is at this stage that the Miranda ruling is necessary. the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood. even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
it is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police interrogators bef. Richmond. in Peo. xxx II. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation.Constitutional Law II admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission contained therein. The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. xxx Indeed. in the US. w/o a warrant. for vagrancy. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. Urro. the Court. while the latter was interrogated. As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest. went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions. the accused was arrested. THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The Consti. a person in custody may be interrogated. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself. stemming from custodial interrogation of the def. and/ or confessions or admissions from the accused. 2. The accused was then charged w/ robbery.) THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v.) THE MIRANDA RULE The prosecution may not use statements. The next day. to overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. . but in Miranda. the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by law. when the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. the petitioner was not entitled to counsel xxx. SC: 1. the suspect is taken into custody. The accused moved to dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. Hence. this petition for certiorari." xxx This is not bec. His motion was denied. regardless of their truth. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. it is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel. III. and to assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege. MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure confessions. does not state at what stage of the interrogation process they must be made. should he choose to exercise it. By custodial interrogation. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it. IN TURN. He was taken to police precint no. v. w/c have been adopted by the Phil. the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -. are null and void. unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Frankfurter.a system in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth xxx. Miranda v. J. he was included in a police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant. WAIVER OF RIGHTS." (Rogers v. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. People's Court. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and wilol be used against him. In Gamboa v. Cruz. Illinois. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. W/o expressly overruling its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva. 2 in Mla. 3.
knowing and intelligent. 1987. confession or admission. No similar phraseology is used in the exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. in fact. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory. statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking powder. on the previous night. in a prosecution for selling heroin." EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. it may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. Pagdalian was found dead. US. as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense. that the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. The accused was apprehended. 2. When the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the incident. never be used by the prosecution. the Consti. it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt. 17. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. are admissible. In such exigent circumstances. 1973.. With respect to confessions obtained bef. requires that the waiver to be valid. Although the previous Consti. when the present Consti. it could . 1985 but before Feb. No distinction is made bet.Constitutional Law II It is important to distinguish bet. 211 SCRA 262 F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence. 1973. the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. Jan. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Petitioner. 2. People v. the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. 4. xxx. 3." It held that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination. The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule. provided they are voluntary. must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel. the waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings. When answers are not actually coerced. 1987. where uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence.. police officers must not be made to choose bet. Does this mean there can be instances. free from the risk of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance In New York v. spoke of confessions only. Bolanos. A waiver of rights will not be presumed. Galit was handed down. for a limited purpose? In Harris v. such confessions. 17. but before March 20. 1. using the traditional test of voluntariness. Quarles. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. on his way to the Police . The victim. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded. 2. must be made w/ the assistance of counsel. taking into account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was made. I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. to be valid. as a def. they were informed that the deceased was with two companions. the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel does not apply. even though presented in evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti. the present Consti. v. says. sustaining stab wounds. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20. albeit. this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards.. IX. took effect." it is obvious that there can be no valid waiver of the warnings. As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary. knowing and intelligent" but the second cannot. The first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary. when the decision of Peo. With regard to confessions given after Feb. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public safety. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE. the rule is that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis. namely.. In the vehicle where the accused boarded. 1985.
i. Zerna. Res gestae is based on the belief that because certain statements are made naturally. For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof. Garay was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . Article III of the 1935 Constitution. Atty. whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and who is not an independent counsel. On the basis of the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial investigation which the court found to "have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession. to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice. dealt with in the section. the trial coust’s judgment was reversed. Sidigo.e. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. Suzette. Certainly. it can be gleaned that when accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest. it disregarded the defenses interposed by the accused and convicted Bandula. Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the accused during custodial investigation. they leave little room for misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by someone else( i. and 2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. and Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of mind. they had no counsel present. Not applicable to res gestae statements People v. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations People v. People v. there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. or sets of rights. HELD: The trial court. Bandula. the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence. It has placed the rights in separate sections. 12. which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18. And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. while already in police custody. or explain a physical act. Bam. If at all.e. 175 SCRA 216 (1989) It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights. Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula conformed with the constitutional requisites for its validity.Constitutional Law II Station. these are blatant violations of of Sec. Evidence which can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three headings: Words or phrases which either form part of. 3. The right against self. by the witness who will later repeat the statement to the court) and thus the courts believe that such statements carry a high degree of credibility. The 3 other accused were acquitted for "insufficiency of evidence". HELD: NO From the records. 158 SCRA 111 (1988) Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence.incrimination. and Ejan were charged in court for robbery with homicide. and 2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation. Ayson. in admitting the extrajudicial confession of the accused in evidence.e." Parenthetically. it appearing from the confession that acussed were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. Dionanao." is . spontaneously and without deliberation during the course of an event. Bolanos allegedly admitted that he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.. 232 SCRA 566 F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied and their house ransacked. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17. the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. 1. Bandula. 1973 2. Zerna)".. violated his Constitutional right to be informed. "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution. counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only basis for the conviction of the accused. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was admissible in evidence. Dy. the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense. namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination i. hence admissible in evidence. Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie concoction. On top of this.
However. to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor. as aforestated.. the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20. and to be . against self-incrimination. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U. criminal. 2) no force. It must be claimed. but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed. or impliedly. Miranda rights He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent. mentioned in Section 20. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry.incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights. that he has the right to the presence of an attorney.Constitutional Law II now embodied in Section 17. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense. as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. It cannot be claimed at any other time. has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence. Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right. After such warnings have been given. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right. whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself." Rights of Defendant in Criminal Regards Giving of Testimony Case As In fine. expressly. threat. It follows that the right may be waived. whether he be a party or not. is actually put to the witness." It simply secures to a witness. This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. i. "suspects" under investigation by police authorities. the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. civil.e." i. criminal. that against self-incrimination which. as this Court has already stated. or administrative proceeding. intimidation. which have been made more explicit. a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. or better said." And. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. incriminatory in character. and to be informed of such right. no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. group of rights. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. exist only in "custodial interrogations. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.. violence.S." Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. the right can be claimed only when the specific question.e. in any civil. Supreme Court in Miranda v. resulting in self. is accorded to every person who gives evidence. one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. and 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement. or administrative." or "incustody interrogation of accused persons. to repeat. Arizona. and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence. for preliminary investigation). and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel. that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding." The rights above specified. such opportunity afforded him.
that he had a right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or against him and after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes. Hence. technically. hence. after informing the suspect that he was under investigation. This cannot be considered as positive identification of the accused by the witness. the right to counsel does not yet apply. 4. he was not assisted by counsel. 1988 Police line-up not part of custodial inquest F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. at such stage. with full understanding of its consequences. Thus. Hatton. and COURT 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN describing the latter as a "mestizo. prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily. petitioner was not yet entitled. to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived. there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of the suspect by the witness. Cruz June 27. 5. d) WHILE TESTIFYING. knowing and intelligent F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20. as the term should be properly understood. was unconstitutional. a native of Samar. HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up. He was later charged with robbery and charged. Ongue identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed by the police as the suspect. contending that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. threat. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in the statement. However." Two days later. not to be subjected to force. People v. the defense objected. 388 US 218 (1967) People v. the statement made only a perfunctory opening question. were of no relevance to the inquiry.up. The date of execution of a) to refuse to be a witness. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary. During the proceedings in the police station. c) to testify in his own behalf. Custodial Phase of Investigation Police Lineups Gamboa v. without the assistance of counsel. . Wade. The prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. had not been shown to be fully acquainted with. intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will. to counsel. b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. he was included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights No valid waiver." The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation. In this case. VV. subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. violence. 210 SCRA 1 F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions including Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant. and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected. he was not yet under custodial investigation. The following day. his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up. US v.Constitutional Law II informed thereof. RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification. Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect in a police line.
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the statement before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of his right. People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) Public trial; waiver of right to counsel F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying "surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to counsel. HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there. Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In another case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that, for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was willing to answer questions of the police. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to remain silent and to counsel. People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed before the clerk of court and contains a waiver. HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free. VV. Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent and thus admissible. b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987) It is not enough that the confession is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987. In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession. Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985) F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The
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principal prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial confession of the defendant. HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling. In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted through a leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted, through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum. HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991) In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given, but these were not made in the presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt. HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence. VV. c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987) Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
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informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel. 6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule. In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention. HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. 7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings" The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived. What cannot be waived are: 1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For how can one waive what one does not know?) 2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel. 8. Exclusionary rule Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two, public safety. Impeach the credibility The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally without use. While it is
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not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover police agent. He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. But when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying. In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession of the government was obtained to his own advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury and the contradiction of his untruths. The reason, continued the Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Public Safety Public Safety may justify the police in taking confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). evidence in prosecution. C. Right to bail Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 1. When right may be invoked The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgement (which means after appeal). No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945). The case was unique in that after the war, the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary period due to the number of indictees. Bail and Habeas Corpus In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and detention, are valid, or that even if they were initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the subsequent filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one be released temporarily from such valid detention, and this can be made anytime after arrest. In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention are illegal, so that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal detention. When the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise the detainee is to be released. The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension the subsequent criminal
New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). In the case, the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because the public safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used by the accused against those in the supermarket. The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in
(f) The weight of the evidence against the accused. It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong. otherwise. The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in Villasenor v. and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong.195 million imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found excessive. Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention. Thus. Thus. De Villa. a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will" (Jackson). guidelines. said the SC in De la Camara v. but not limited to the following guidelines: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail. Right to bail and right to travel abroad Art. (g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial. the court's discretion to grant bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Character and reputation of the accused 5. and the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion perpetua. In such a case. 8. People v. 20). Bail in courts-martial Commendador v. The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua.Constitutional Law II of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. Donato. later contained in sec. Enage. 1. a bail of P1. Amount of bail. 2. In this case. When bail is a matter of right. still he cannot be denied bail. (d) Character and reputation of the accused. it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope. 9. 6 of Rule 114. Where the right to bail exists. 2. For if it includeds even those crimes which before and now are really punishable by reclusion perpetua. it should not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. while bail refers to legal detention. Forfeiture of other bonds. Sec. Excessive bail shall not be required. 26 SCRA 522 (1966). 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 4. 10. Nature of the offense. the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 7. 6. it is meant to apply only to those crimes which were once punishable by death. Character and strength of the evidence. and (j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond. Even when the accused has previously jumped bail. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national . 4. according to People v. 41 SCRA 1 (1971).-. Probability of the accused appearing in trial. Amparo). (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense.The judge who issed the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily. when it is a matter of discretion Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua. (e) Age and health of the accused. Abano. (c) Penalty of the offense charged. or even detention that started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a case in court. 196 SCRA 130 (1991) 3. 6. Health of the accused. Standards for fixing bail Rule 114. it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. (h) Forfeiture of other bonds. Ability of the accused to give the bail. (i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. Sec. 21 SCRA 312 (1967). Penalty for the offense charged. the remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. it would go against the very spirit of the Constitution. 5. San Diego. 3. 6. III. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. With the abolition of the death penalty (III. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
95 SCRA 392 (1980). Manotoc v. Sec. Presumption of innocence In People v. to have a speedy. which hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient reason". III. operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes a justifying or exempting circumstance. What the Court found insufficient was the business trip. then the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety. 1. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The case leaves the question of allowing an accused under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-ended. Comelec. de Guzman. but is subject to lawful orders of the court. the accused may be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. 1994. This ruling was modified by Rule 119. sec. He appealed to the SC. to meet the witnesses face to face. 96 SCRA 322 (1980). impartial and public trial. the SC noted that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. However.Constitutional Law II security. Two. Rights during trial Art. One. implicit in the bail is the agreement between the State and the surety that the State will do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of the court. in one of which he was the president. Dramayo. Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the killing of an unidentified person on Nov. 142 SCRA 149 (1986) F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two corporations. 6. Petitioner was charged with estafa. Court of Appeals. Pepito. thus affecting one of the conditions in the grant of bail. If the court thus allows his to leave. namely to have the accused available whenever the court requires his presence. but his request was denied by the courts. CA. public safety. People v. 42 SCRA 69 (1971). He filed a petition for certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. after arraignment. He later asked for permission to leave the country for business reasons. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 231 SCRA 739 F: De Guzman. 198 SCRA 130 (1991) D. a judge who allowed the accused to present his evidence ahead of the prosecution. was reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order of trial violated the constitutional presumption of innocence which places the burden proof on the prosecution. In Manotoc v. HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114. Waiver of the Right to Bail People v. over the objection of the prosecution. the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel abroad for a business trip. a law disqualifying candidates charged with national security offences was struck down as unconstitutional. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. or public health. In Alejandro v. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. after the acused admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. The firms were placed under a management committee by the SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of Immigration. 14. 142 SCRA 149 (1986). The Court gave 2 reasons why bail operates only within the country. 16. as may be provided by law. The constitutional right to travel is not absolute. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. VV. In all criminal prosecutions. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court. 1 upon the accused to make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. for violating the presumption against innocence. Only De Guzman and Castro were . Donato. sec. In Igot v.
Moreover in Peo v Alvarez. section 3 (now Rule 116. Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance. HELD: YES Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing of the unknown victim. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law"." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party. They were convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the testimony of Adelia Angeles. hence inadmissible as evidence. Accused was convicted of a capital offense. 11. This was further strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the victim and that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs. he may not know how to establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules of evidence said the SC in People v." Accused. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. Holgado. Ocampo to do so. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond resonable doubt. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years. Ruling: Under the circumstances. Cunanan. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. she testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. People v. he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4. that: If the defendant appears without attorney. Right to be heard personally or by counsel Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art.Constitutional Law II arrested and both pleaded not guilty. 2. there is no evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed by Mr. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. She positively identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who maltreated an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime committed. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. particularly in the rules of procedure. to say the least. Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has been overcome. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so . 85 Phil 752 (1952) F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. Sec. 85 Phil 752 (1952). 6). Holgado. With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). without counsel. Sec. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.) No matter how educated one may be.. it was not prudent. unaided by counsel. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. Rule 112. and. While it is true that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel. III. the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.
Rule 118). the SC ruled in the affirmative. Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119. (1949). Homeres. There is no law nor "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced. 84 Phil 525. Sec.) Abriol v. Of course if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case like the present. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and. convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2. 1. was accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. it being provided in Article II. We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. contending that the right of the accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer. 279. the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone. counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution. the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right. 2. Homeres. Such constitutional right is inviolate. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. His Honor Judge S. Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied -. and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. section 1 (17).. contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been denied. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. C. together with six other persons. De la Cruz. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. (1949) F: Fidel Abriol. the court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion. it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense. without allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense. 15.000. 28 Phil. and the court denies it to him.Constitutional Law II important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused.could the defense still present its own evidence? In Abriol v. 84 Phil 525. of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal. But if the motion for dismissal is denied. On the contrary. Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence. 2. that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. and citing as authority the case of United States vs. Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove .
Donesa. Sec. If the court denies the motion for dismissal." "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor." This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. Even in a case. Paraphrasing Mr. 11. 1472 may stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty. without counsel. the accusedappellant Ricardo Rio. the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary examination. the case must be dismissed. the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps. The process against him in criminal case No. Since there is a failure to prove the guilt of the accused. Justice Malcolm. with Ruling: YES A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court. as in this case.. (Rules of Court. Issue: Did such dismissal acquittal of the accused? operate as an People v. . Today said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for. he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided.. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.) 3. the proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there. manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. Rule 119. the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. 15. where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal. It continues.After the prosecution has rested its case. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. even during appeal. Sec. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. III. or (2) on motion of the accused filed with proper leave of court. such as the one at bar. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. the defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.Constitutional Law II stated. in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989.-. particularly in the rules of procedure. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. for despite such withdrawal. to have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". this is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime. 201 SCRA 702 (1991) F: On 29 December 1989. Dris. he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Right to free legal assistance Art. Rio. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. People v. The judge granted the motion. President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right . and. as Judge Cooley says. Up to the point when the prosecution rested. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity to be heard. 49 SCRA 281 (1973) Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal F: After prosecution presented its witnesses. Demurrer to evidence. the court must assign a counsel de oficio.
by way of alibi. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. In this spirit. The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another. "those who have less in life must have more in law. rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa. by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully.appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio. The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. If the appointed counsel for the accused. duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. assisted by Atty. he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client). in the Municipality of Muntinlupa. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free. This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant. according to defense counsel de oficio.Constitutional Law II greater reason. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious. On 26 June 1985. Moreover. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client. This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there was consent. whether acting de parte or de oficio. he would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense." Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. as aforestated. However. appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon. Alejandro of the province of Rizal. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt. From the records of the case. 1984. This claim was corroborated by the accused's brother. that is. After all. the rule in civil procedure. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office. which reads as follows: That on or about the 24th day of March. The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident in question. it is established that the accused. Philippines. this claim was. does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. HELD: On appeal. the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs. entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly. which applies equally in criminal cases. he also serves the ends of justice. Metro Manila. The charge was filed. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law . only because the complainant's mother caught them. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. would permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle. on appeal." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. the accused-appellant. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. the Court deems it more likely that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. for "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted. Amado Rio. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that. allegedly. at the arraignment. with the alleged consent of the complainant. The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes. It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13. it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. xxx The trial court found the accusedappellant guilty of the crime of rape. It is for everyone. to one of participation. as counsel de oficio. upon submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world. a brother of her very own mother. the abovenamed accused. for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe that one.
despite notice to his bondsman. and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. this petition for certiorari. Because petitioner was not arraigned. The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty. Garcia v. who did not appear thereafter. Sarmiento. a transgressor of its precepts. he was not informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The CFI affirmed the decision. 52 SCRA 143 (1970) The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws. So said the SC in Acevedo v. The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. (2) Public Trial A public trial does not require that the entire public can witness the trial. impartial and public trial (1) Speedy Trial The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and oppressive delays. the SC dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground that the objection came too late (the party only complained after the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air conditioned). Hence. 5. After one postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear.Constitutional Law II carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court. thus acquitting the accused. prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. Mendoza. After the offended party had testified and presented documentary evidence. who is sworn to uphold the law. 52 SCRA 143 (1970). Domingo. one which thus far . Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal proceeding. Domingo. he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make him. a case involving the prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence which had been pending for 6 years. The court can order the public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and order. 36 SCRA 247 (1970). The right is not absolute. to have his guilt determined within the shortest possible time. Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court litigation. thereby causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the accused for an extended period of time. As noted in Vera v. petitioner failed to appear. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined on a case to case basis. It is enough if it is conducted at a place where one's relatives and friends can be accommodated and the public may know what is going on. the case was reset. The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his client. Right to speedy. the court found petitioner guilty. compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose. Again. or otherwise. violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In Garcia v. HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is void. to the bar and to the public. People. Borja v. procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he must meet. the last step taken being the start of the cross-examination of the complaining witness. an unreasonable delay on the part of the prosecution to present its case. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. 77 SCRA 422 (1977) No valid trial in absentia without arraignment F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu. or certiorari. 4.
6. There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that any other person was excluded from the chambers. without objection on the part of respondent policemen. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in his behalf) There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery. 8. as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion. unless his presence is . His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Rule 115." Then. Some are smaller than others. Trial in Absentia Although the right to be present is not explicit in the provision. the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and operating. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. 1(c). Under such a situation.Constitutional Law II has remained unresolved.S. Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge violative of the right to a public trial? Ruling: NO The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be held in the chambers. perpetuation of testimonies. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of evidence and procedure. talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail bond. is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. be waived by the accused. Ohio. in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted. 273 U. In Tumey v. he would be interested in convicting those he tries so he would earn more. and of the city court Judge. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals. no problem arises. The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination. On fourteen separate occasions this was the case and there was no objection on their part. 150 SCRA 144 (1987). It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. even during Martial Law. In Olaguer v. no matter with what offense he may be charged. 7." What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection. Moreover. could not be an impartial judge. sec. Where a trial takes place. There is to be no ban on such attendance. relatives and counsel present. Military Commission. The trial must be public. as is quite usual. 510 (1927). too. it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused" This right to be present may. it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends. Right to confront witness The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of the witness. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. however. it was in the latter's airconditioned chambers that the trial was held. that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. it was held that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking laws. xxx (3) Impartial trial One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate who exercises cold impartiality.
a case involving a charge for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been arraigned. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned. and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is unjustified. he runds the risk of having his bail bond forfeited. Thus. Hence. respondent Judge declared the bail bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to produce the accused within thirty days and to show cause why no judgment . Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. The respondent Judge. and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Boria v.Constitutional Law II specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. Trial commenced but while it was in progress. But he was gone. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal prosecution could not move because the accused has either escaped or jumped bail. IV. The respondent Judge denied the motion and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. People v. Salas. the court may consider the case submitted for decision. the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of the evidence. (b) he has been duly notified of the trial. learning of the trickery. HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). (ii) he was duly notified of the hearing. Conviction without arraignment violates due process and ousts the court of its jurisdiction. The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. supra. Mendoza. The indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it should come after arraignment. the trial may be held "in absentia". Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia does not mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be present during the trial. (b) implied waiver when the accused without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice. As a result of the reinvestigation. with no bail recommended. without any justifiable cause. 19 [now Art. the prisoner took advantage of the first information filed and succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release. 84 SCRA 198 (1978). whether expressed or implied. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. If he does. Prieto. Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to appear. In People v. VV. sec. cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. Avanceña has been modified by Art. VV. an amended information was filed. if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment). 77 SCRA 422 (1977). The court will decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's evidence. Mendoza. So ruled the SC in People v. to which he pleaded not guilty. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction. this petition. III. Nonetheless. sec. and (c) implied waiver when the accused under custody who had been notified of the date of trial escapes. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only that (a) he has been arraigned. the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to jump bail. the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present evidence. and thereupon. the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. which further ruled that trial in absentia applies even to capital cases. ruled the SC in Boria v. In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right to be present. There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned. 77 SCRA 422 (1977).
However. and (iii) promulgation of judgment. a. but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. 1973 but he escaped. modifying People v.Constitutional Law II should be rendered against them. If the accused is in the custody of the law. the conclusion is inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the bail bond is premature. he may be represented by his counsel or a personal emissary. section 19 [now Art. HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? No. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record. regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not guilty. 17. reiterating Aquino v. (ii) entering a plea. except that when the judgment is for a light offense. his presence during the trial is a duty only if the court orders his presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to identify him. Salas. this petition for certiorari. Gimenez v. As we have consistently ruled. unless it is for a light offense. Avancena. Sec.) E. the case was set for hearing on Sept. b. 1. Arraignment and plea. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to appear. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein specified. jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. VV. 14(2)] on trial in absentia. After arraignment.) 3. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he is in the custody of the law). the SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be present during trial. during which he pleaded not guilty. Arraignment and plea. was charged with murder. on motion of defense counsel. whether of innocence or of guilt Rule 116. This rule however has been modified. III." The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari. 9. Sec. Priviledge against self incrimination Art. or a representative (Rule 120. infra.G. 2. Generally. infra. As things stand. infra. 32 O. He was tried in absentia. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the witnesses against him and present evidence.. c) Promulgation of judgment. presence in all stage is likewise a duty during (i) arraignment. When presence of the accused is a DUTY In People v. together with five others. sec. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. regardless of the offense. Nazareno. 160 SCRA 1 (1988) In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront witnesses F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr. his presence is required in the following cases: a) Arraignment. respondent Judge reconsidered his order. b) Entering a plea. the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of judgment). Salas. 713. c. who invoked the last sentence of Art. During trial. in which case accused may appear by counsel. 18. Sec. Military Commiission. 6. IV. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the accused has been arraigned and identified. Hence. The lower court was correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the respondent. . the following are the rules: 1. for identification People v. supra. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.-xxx (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Avancena. (People v. Promulgation of sentence. how made. (b) if he is in the custody of the law. III.
. in discussing the question before us. Gardner.S. without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. It was discovered that the rape victim was infected by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused was material to his conviction. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier. Y.) . He appeals the decision on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease. it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised. to extort communications from him. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated. But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself. sec. So also if the clothing which he wore. Mr. with all the tools and indicia of his crime. had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime. the evidence if material.Constitutional Law II Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. said: If. 144 N. taken from the defendant. against his will. [Art. and the result can be used in evidence against him. is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips. F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken from his body (U. the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. an admission of his guilt. The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. and not to a merely physical activity. by reason of blood stains or otherwise. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. or upon trial. He was found guilty of the charge. 119. Sec. In other words. even if the order goes too far. is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion. could not be used against him as evidence. 23. and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions. 145 (1912)). . had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same.) The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. v. 2263. 12 (3)] 1. (People vs. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. If the act is physical or mechanical. not an exclusion of his body as evidence.. then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house. Wigmore. in principle. in his valuable work on evidence. but testimonial compulsion. it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege. would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. whether voluntarily or by order. in other words. III. Phil. Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used against him Ruling: YES. Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. It refers therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties. (4 Wigmore. and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked. the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act. there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. Tan Teng. for when he is exhibited. The objection. than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. . there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection. when it may be material. is competent.
96 Phil 244 (1950)). is not testimony but his body his body itself. A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. Castillo. taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. Villaflor v. 415.S. six letters which. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article. for this involves the use of the mental process. Summers. Otadura. can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill. is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. (1917) Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. said respondent filed. 41 Phil. U. [Bermudez v. Salas and People v. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court.) The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed. (1917)). The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U. 41 Phil. making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting is not allowed. as in the Tan Teng case. it is possible that this method of determining pregnancy would violate due process as being too barbaric. . an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. (Harris vs. (People v. for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must. v. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. 64 Phil. because it does not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. 485 (1937) F: In connection with this administrative case. that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 36 and 37. Viewed against present standards.S. or. 62 (1920) F: The facts are not dispute. Coats . but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal.] Bermudez v. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant. 64 Phil. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses. The corollary to the proposition is that. He contends that said six letters are the complainant's. Mr. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. however. Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. 75 Ga. Castillo. for purposes of identification. 35. or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence. 34. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. be decided as cases arise. were marked as Exhibits 32. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. Indeed. However. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. 485 (1937). violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights Ruling: The constitutional guaranty. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor. or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. v. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. of course. The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People v.. Summers. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.Constitutional Law II The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even. 62 (1920)). Sara). substance.
she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath. Go. ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in evidence. Forced reenactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission that shabu. it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated. The complainant. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. They contended that they had not been shown a search warrant. Olvis. upholding the complainant. RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. in a criminal or any other case. In concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the accused prior to the search. Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting Ruling: No. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case. the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. Olvis. Upon the presentation of a search warrant. subject to the control and custody of the accused (the spouses) and necessarily in their possession. 154 SCRA 525 F: Villarojo. People v. People v. for this also involves the mental process. The investigator. was acquitted. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. or he should be asked. Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not allowed. one for all. and shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore. thereby denying the respondent's petition. and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. To this extent. that the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. did not compel her to submit to the trial required. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter. It would violate her right against self. and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the killing. the respondent's petition is denied. and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. in a criminal or any other case. then the evidence must be sought elsewhere. In view of the foregoing consideration and holding.Constitutional Law II Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. the alleged principal by inducement. it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury. 237 SCRA 73 F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by the police. to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. signed by the accused. But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime. as it is hereby held. the marked money. and several prohibited drugs were seized. then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally. the house of the accused was searched. The reason for the privilege appears evident. Essentially. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her. refused invoking her right not to incriminate herself. If such is its purpose. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. the “Certification” is a declaration against the . They were charged with and convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. the trial court relied on a document entitiled “Certificate of Reconduct of Search”.incrimination.
The constitutional guarantee. 1965. 2. the accused were convicted of the crime charged against them. the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. consistently with the self-incrimination clause. for some an even greater deprivation. Notwithstanding such.appellee.incrimination F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava Board looking into the killing . relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. 28 SCRA 344 (1969). petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness. Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. made of record his objection. Pamaran. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice. respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot. Pascual v." HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner." Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment. petitioner-appellee.. 28 SCRA 344 (1969) F: Arsenio Pascual. In what proceedings available The privilege is available in any proceedings. took note of such a plea. could not be compelled to take the witness stand without his consent.. The second paragraph of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against self-incrimination open to serious doubt. "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . 1965. Jr. A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2. counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner. finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself. unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. 138 SCRA 274 (1985) A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self. on February 12. the Board of Examiners. such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Galman v. Board of Medical Examiners. the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. Thereupon. through counsel. Board of Medical Examiners. compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. the SC held that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect.. In Galman v. That right is the hallmark of our democracy. stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed. Respondentappellant. More and more in line with the democratic creed. for they may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution. along with other rights granted an accused. infra. at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing. To quote from Chief Justice Warren. now respondentappellant. In this case. no force or intimidation had been exercised upon the spouses. filed on February 1. The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried out at their residence and that in the course thereof." In the light of the above.Constitutional Law II interest and tacit admission of the crime charged. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality. it was held that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty. Pamaran. petitioner-appellee. it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. even outside the court. In Pascual v.
to legislation. ruled that the right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity. say.S.S. sec. Aquino and Rolando Galman. The immunity is from the prosecution. sec. Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that it was not really necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect the right against self incrimination. U. "Use and Fruit "Transactional Immunity" Immunity" v. if the state can procure evidence. supra. independent of the testimony and its fruits. History in the United States In Councilman v. When the State requires testimony to be made before a board or body. 175 SCRA 216 (1989). but on the latter's objections. much less their right to remain silent. 3. and Zicarelli v. The respondents were called to determine their probable involvement in the crime. In 1964. U. They were charged as accessories in both. Thus.Constitutional Law II of former Senator Benigno Aquino. With the validity of this limited immunity was raised. public interest to get certain relevant information. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava Board. a person is exempted from the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising from what he testified on. Hitchcock (1892). They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for the killing of Sen. 12. SC in Murphy v. This is the only way to reconcile two conflicting values. The immunity in this case is from the testimony given." of a witness. and gave power to the Board to punish refusal to testify. 5 of PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. Yet they were not informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them. he can not be prosecuted anymore. III. Use and Fruit Immunity In a use and fruit immunity. The SC also said it cannot be contended that the privilege against self. The problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must grant in order to protect the privilege against selfincrimination. that can only be supplied by the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed constitutional right not to make a person a witness against himself. the state in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony . anything less violates the constitutional right. the U. 17 of the Const. The first portion of Sec. In the Philippines There is no fixed rule in the Philippines. It is to be noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the Miranda reference to "custodial investigation. III. Thus." The subject matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava Board indubitably evinced purposes other than merely determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. the SC in Castigas v. Congress the cue to revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit immunity". it has to grant immunity by means of law to the persons testifying. provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. a person is given immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with which he gave his testimony.S. This gave the U. "Transactional immunity" can be found in the following: Compare People v. not merely from the use of the testimony. even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven by independent means. The SC said it is not satisfied that when they testified they waived their constitutional right not be compelled to be a witness against themselves. it can prosecute the person testifying nevertheless.S. Transactional Immunity In a transactional immunity. providing for transactional immunity. Thus. the Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. so as not to violate their right against self-incriminatrion. the SC ruled that the only way to respect the right against self-incrimination is to give transactional immunity. HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava Board were "under investigation for the commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory Testimony Act. Through an immunity statute. The private and public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari. Art. Ayson.incrimination applies only to criminal prosecutions.
the court is ousted of its jurisdiction. too. as already noted. 1886. Aquino and Galman.D. Sec. sec. PD 1886. testimony forced out of a person cannot be used in evidence against that person. that is. the State must honor its obligation and disallow the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution. the accused could have invoked the right against selfincrimination. A fortiori. is not admissible under the exclusionary rule. that. which grants what is known as "transactional immunity. Sec. then the testimony. And so the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. by the police. "use and fruit immunity can be found in P. A classic case is Chavez v. Use and Fruit Immunity On the other hand. XIII. HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one. 138 SCRA 274 (1985). and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. Despite this however. Chavez v. all its proceedings are null and void. Effect of denial of the privilege by court When the privilege against selfincrimination is violated outside of court. and which was the subject-matter of Galman v. it hinted that were it not for the provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and testimony on pain of being held in contempt. But since the state needed the testimony. Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials were made to testify before the Agrava Board investigating the double murder of Sen. The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a subsequent proceeding. the Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. Roger Chavez was found guilty. 34 SCRA 663 (1968). Exclusionary rule Art. "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief. As a matter of fact. a case was file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan. in turn. Under P. 5. and not so much on uncounselled statement. Court of Appeals." The trial court branded him "a self. by the judge.Constitutional Law II Art. Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for the prosecution without him being considered a state witness inspite of objections by his counsel. Any testimony made.D. which created the Agrava Fact Finding Board. Court of Appeals. On the other hand. on habeas corpus. Galman v. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. say. Pamaran. The court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. 34 SCRA 663 (1968) F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled. VV 4. and it is as if no judgment has been rendered. and one of the evidence presented was the testimony he made before the Board. which grants "use immunity" and the other. Pamaran. but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof.1886. In this case. 12. to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced confession. 138 SCRA 274 (1985). There is his prayer. should he fail in this. . supra. 18.confessed culprit". III. When objected to. his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. was exempted from being "used" in a criminal prosecution. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions xxx (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. it gave them immunity and so now." The distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. every person summoned by the Board has to appear and testify on pain of being held in contempt. When the privilege is violated by the court itself. 5 grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board.
The petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all questions of illegal detention. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. And so he took the witness stand and was convicted by qualified theft. thus making the detention of Chavez illegal. and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right.incrimination. and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. . the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. the judgment of conviction and even the sentence were likewise void. Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the consitutional rights of the accused were violated. in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void. the judgment became final and executory. Habeas Corpus. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. midsentence. To him it was a case of compelled submission. directly or indirectly. of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack. it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt. occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. unfettered exercise of his own free. Nor could he escape testifying. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense. He appealed but the lawyer failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was dismissed. is an extraordinary post-conviction. as accused. contending that his convictioin was void because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in the violation of his right against self. Therefore. the accused Chavez was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in contempt to take the witness stand. he was ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void. to remain silent. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him. unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted. in reality. The course which petitioner takes is correct. The SC granted the petition and released him. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Years later. When the judge compelled the accused to take the witness stand. he claimed the right upon being called to testify. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure. Notes on the case: In this case. His testimony is not of his own choice. the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. and he served his sentence. and thus actionable by habeas corpus. Chavez went to the SC on habeas corpus. For. it may be the product of unintentional statements. in spite of his objection that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness against himself. it is his right to forego testimony. genuine will. A court which denies the accused of his constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. on the contrary." Petitioner. xxx With all these. Because. Pressure which operates to overbear his will.Constitutional Law II Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against selfincrimination was violated Ruling: YES The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court". he did not offer himself as a witness. remedy. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. disable him from making a free and rational choice. of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. as shown by this case. The constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity. Ultimately. which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself. and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. it is mandatory. this circumstance cannot be counted against him.
Judicial power exists only in the courts which have the exlcusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen. The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal. he cannot even be made to take the witness stand. the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet. But in the case of the accused. A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand. Leopando. 27. considering that one of them. The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson. but is a military officer. Hon. They filed a petition for habeas corpus. 1984) where the lone military personnel was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a civil court. 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. prohibition and mandamus before the SC. Military Commission (1975). a political leader. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. certiorari." On February 16. only one of whom is in the military. the SC held that "Martial law creates and exception to the general rules of exclusive jurisdiction. et al. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Alejandro R.xxx" Due process. (G. . at this time. but he modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. It was only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General Service. and martial law is a thing of the past. 27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. 1983 and March 13. the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. he can only object to the questions as they come.Constitutional Law II The case also illustrates the difference between the ordinary witness and the accused. xxx "The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition. he is deemed to have waived his right. invoking his right against selfincrimination. December 22. a trial. Minister of National Defense. 34. E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by military courts Animas v.R. 9. No. for the only purpose of such is to incriminate him. on September 21. 150 SCRA 144 Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the civil courts are open F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the respondent military commission and sentenced to death. petitioner Sgt. 62798. there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained." Since we are not an enemy occupied territory and even on the premise that martial continues in force. and must now thus submit himself to cross-examination. questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. hopefully never more to return. The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10. It is also clear from the records that the acts for which Sgt. Olaguer v. Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. the moment the accused agrees to take the stand. We apply the rule in Rolando A. The accused were arrested almost a year later. 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. 146 SCRA 406 (1986) F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve accused persons. the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. HELD: In Aquino v. Now that it is already late 1986. among others. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. " Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder. however demands that in all criminal cases prosecutions. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the performance of official duty. and renders offenses against the laws of war as well as those of a civil character. de Guzman v. 1978. for the offense devoid of any national security or political complexion and committed long before the proclamation of martial law. Military Commission No.during the November 11 elections. triable by military tribunals. Of course. As explained by Justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. by a military tribunal. Apart from these differences. the accused shall be entitled to. Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts as are established by law. Thereafter.
which time the petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary release. Through a statute. The SC. that crimes appear to have been committed. that no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases. and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned The fact cannot be ignored. and the necessary informations have been filed against them therein. is continued until their cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having jurisdiction. which outlaws the Communist Party and other "subversive associations". without the benefit of being proven so in court. was contended to be a bill of attainder. G. 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. Ferrer. Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over civilians Ruling: No As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction. however. however. the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty." of the Party and of any other similar "subversive" organization. and thus prohibited membership in such organization. its purpose is not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the legislative determination that membership in such organization is a crime because of the clear and present danger to national security. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial. becomes or remains a member. 157 are civilians. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself.Constitutional Law II the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it. so as to entitle them to immediate release from detention. It seems evident. if any of these offenses had any political color. holding that although the law mentions the CPP in particular. even during the period of martial law. Usman and Samu Gumal. and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws. and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. Ponce-Enrile. however. VV. Legislative Cruz v. Bills of attainder-adjudication of guilt Bill of Attainder A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the legislative determination of guilt for a judicial determination. or establish that the same are baseless. ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges. at . the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the Communist Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to Philippine security. 160 SCRA 702 (1988) F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on October 1. as has already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D. despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. Of the 217 prisoners. People v. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds. A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty). selects its members and the counsel on both sides. with. 48 SCRA 382 (1972) F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act. 48 SCRA 382 (1972). over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning. Justice will be better served if the detention of such of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released or excepted. this had neither been pleaded nor proved. and punishes any person who "knowingly. Ferrer. for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. dismissed the contention. and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. The State should be given a reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer. In People v.
18. When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Martinez. H. the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 2) it impairs freedom of contract. Mere beliefs and aspirations Art. Indeed. 146 SCRA 323 (1986) F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value. After the case has been submitted for decision. of the case for decision which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. The term "CPP" is used solely for definition purposes. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court. III. willfully and by overt acts. Sec. as the law alone. What it does is simply to declare the Party to an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in the outlawed organization. Thus. Debts and civil obligations Art. In fact the Act applies not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having the same purposes and their successors". a valid exercise of the State of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime. To carry out this mandate. Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. however. in Lozano v.] III. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. the Constitution mandates that the judicial. the Constitution in several other places provides periods for deciding a case: The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24 months from the date of submission . Sec. Martinez. Sec. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. Lozano v. It is true that under this law deceit is not necessary. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. III.judicial or administrative body or tribunal must decide the case consistent with the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. 2. which is a tax imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or business. What acts cannot be criminalized 1. 15 (1).Constitutional Law II HELD: NO A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. It is. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of property taxes and taxes on privilege. III. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against nonimprisonment for debt. which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the following grounds: 1) It offends the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt. 20. quasijudicial. 146 SCRA 123 (1986). Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE A. and that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic objectives. The constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rulemaking and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. or administrative bodies. so that technically the trial stage is terminated. What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of a contractual obligation. quasi. VIII. Sec. the imprisonment is not for the non.payment of debt but for the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict. without more would suffice to secure their punishement. 3) it contravenes the The right to a speedy disposition of cases complements the right to a speedy trial. knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment. What the Consitution further prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation. Right to a speedy disposition of cases Art. 16.
and punishes such an act. The amount concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law. Involuntary servitude Art. Sec. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. [Quoting Mekin v. Inc. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. when committed. 19. 3. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. and 6. 3. III. 2. 2 Phil. Ex Post Facto Law An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an act which. It is not the non. nor cruel. in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.. Any death . it is allowed to retroact. and thus could not have avoided the crime. when committed. the Congress hereafter provides for it. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. 3. the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. however. III. 8(a) thereof. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. III. and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading. RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties thereunder. or a proclamation of amnesty. and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense. Cruel. or makes it greater than it was. While it is true that Sec.payment of an obligation which the law punishes. 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers. B. Recent statistics show that one third of the entire money supply of the country consists of currency in circulation. Wolfe. 35 SCRA 428 F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. 74 (1902)] This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. When a law is more favorable to the accused. except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted. Sec. III. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any form shall exist. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law which was innocent when done. Excessive fines Art. Sec. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law.. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. degrading punishments and inhuman Art. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. HELD: NO An ex post facto law is one which: 1. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. the Congress hereafter provides for it. 5. 2. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Acts which when done were innocent Art. nor cruel. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could not have known the act was criminal. claiming to be a duly recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land. was not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. These demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which commercial papers are drawn. 8. 19. and praying for the detremination of the validity of Sec. Aggravates a crime . 22. In re Kay Villegas Kami. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but as an offense against public order. 4. What punishments cannot be imposed 1. Alters the legal rules of evidence. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. Sec. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. 18 penalizes a violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec.Constitutional Law II equal protection clause.
The Court said that Borja had been living in the shadow of death. threat. Congress provides for it. Sec. Thereafter. etc. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently discharged . . degrading or inhuman" punishment. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. 12. intimidation. and that therefore. Borja was sentenced and he served at the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to the SC. the prohibition was against "cruel and unusual" penalty. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment). force. xxx (2) No torture. The question concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of Art. ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution HELD: NO. III. the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis of its conclusion that he was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the assailants. Surigao del Norte. shall be dealt with by law. VV. Sec.] In 1935." HELD: Art. or those of antiquity. [Art. incommunicado. the accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its form or whether it depends on its severity has been ambivalently answered by the SC: In People v. this was a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. They were found guilty of murder. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. After all. The range of medium and minimum penalties remain the same. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. 92 Phil. People v. charging Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of Mamerto Sanico. Secret detention places. Three appealed to the SC which found them equally liable for the killing..Constitutional Law II penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fiscal conducted his own PI and on the basis thereof. due process prohibits barbaric and disproportionate penalties. Unfortunately. solitary. his defense of alibi would not prosper. Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the accused has been convicted the Constitution now further prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be meted out. 170 SCRA 107 (1989) F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that they were cattle rustlers. 248 of the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it to reclusion perpetua. it was against "cruel or unusual " penalty. sec. 900 (1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory desembowelment. section 19 does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. The SC spoke in a different way in People v. and not to fix the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present civilization. This notion is supposed to expand and grow. dela Cruz. in 1973. Although the sentence was initially valid. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 Constitution. People v. 19 which provides that "Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. so that what today is considered as acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel penalty. it had become cruel by the lapse of time. 19 (2). he filed an information for murder not only against remelito but also against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime charged. psychological or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee. the prohibition is against "cruel. III. or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions. he forwarded the records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The employment of physical. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Munoz. violence.) and not its severity. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979). The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to death. in 1987. III. Id. In the instant case. the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated or proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted both the preliminary investigation and preliminary examination. 200 SCRA 11 (1991) F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del Carmen. And yet. Lubreo. The purpose in changing the phraseology is to allow for experimentation.
Constitutional Law II Though Monter categorically stated in her direct examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the victim. Id. acquittal.appellant. supra. 5: (1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening facts" arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charged. intimidation. (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party. 766 (1950). the victim died. 21. (4) Conviction. of the accused. Identity of offenses and identity of act When an act gives rise to two or more offense which are punished by the same authority. where the SC disallowed the amendment of the information from slight physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution subjected the victim to another medical examination and found a wound. violence. C. There being no evidence of conspiracy. in the "reenactmment". 5. there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of . There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. 19. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. threat. force. that it was the fault of the prosecution if they had an incompetent medical examination. People. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. III. Sec. or the case dismissed without his consent. Obsania. xxx (2) No torture. or dismissal of the case without the express consent.. He could not even specify the part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio. psychological. acquitted. he cannot be held for the acts of his co. (3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused. It is worse in the case of Pangatungan. (2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. solitary. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking his mind (sic) and the neck". in Melo v. he never elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking " means. (Rule 117. incommunicado. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. xxx (2) The employment of physical. 12. Secret detention places. The protection against double jeopardy Art. Indefinite Imprisonments People v. incommunicado and other forms of detention and the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities Art. Subsequent following: prosecution is barred for the (1) Same offense (2) Attempt of the same offense (3) Frustration of the same offense (4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements of the 1st offense) (5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the elements of the 2nd offense) Exceptions to no. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance. and an individual is convicted. Sec. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. because after the filing of the information. People v. Yorac. Elements of double jeopardy. This overrules People v. Dacuycuy. Secret detention places. Thus. Sec. 23 SCRA 249 (1968): (1) Court of competent jurisdiction. Sec 7. 4. solitary. From her version. the participation of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt. (2) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. 85 Phils. 173 SCRA 90 (1989). of one of these offense (Crime A). she however candidly informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim. the SC allowed the amnedment of the information from its original cahrge of frustrated homicide. or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. III.
For although the offenses were different. HELD: The contention has no merit. People v. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution. The first sentence of Art. the SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused in the AquinoGalman double murder case a "mistrial" after the SC commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. of a fighting chance. there is double jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. Once the court deprives either party. acquitted. and double jeopardy would not apply. Sandiganbayan. 48 SCRA 292 (1987). the two offenses coming from the same authority. then if an individual is convicted. City Court of Manila. then it is ousted from its jurisdiction. flowed from the same act. In Galman v. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of electricity under the RPC. But when an act which give rise to two or more offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and an ordinance). Bocar. Thus. sec. even if he is charged of another offense which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime B by ordinance). But is a law and an ordinance are involved. VV. or the case dismissed without his consent. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of Ordinance No. Fourteen days later. two offenses arise. there is double jeopardy. the decision is null and void. Due process is a right not only of the accused but also of the State. Thus. one punished by a law and the other punished by an ordinance. And yet he can be prosecuted for both because. although both may be based from the same facts. III. 154 SCRA 175 (1987) . Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy If the court has no jurisdiction. which in this case is the State. the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against him. Double jeopardy arises only when he is again charged of that same offense (Crime A). Identity of Act: People v. the SC. the man is guilty of both concubinage and adultery. Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local authorities. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of offenses". Branch VI. Two situations contemplated People v. The case was however dismissed on the ground that the offense had prescribed. He admitted installing the electric wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the readings of electric current. because both offenses. The prosecution appealed contending the offense was different. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy already.Constitutional Law II another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the same act. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act. both flowed from the same act. the accused may again be charged. And in this case. From the same act (cohabiting with the married woman). 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting the installation of electric wiring devices without authority from the city government. or was ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of the parties. there is no identity of offenses. of any of these offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law). 1." Sum: If only a law in involved. In People v. The court also dismissed this case on the ground of double jeopardy. held that the move by the trial court of summarily dismissing a criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved a question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due process by denying it the chance to introduce its evidence. the act was punished by a law and an ordinance. there is double jeopardy when there is an identity of act. Relova. This ousted the court of its juridsiction. The second sentence provides an exception: that the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under the national statute such as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. the accused were ordered retried. and so the second case could no longer be filed. 138 SCRA 166 (1985). Thus. 144 SCRA 43 (1986). but the case was dismissed because the crime has prescribed. Identity of Offenses: If a married man maintains as concubine a married woman not his wife.
requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days. as there was according to him. 1949. Melo v. while the offense punished in Art. was not arraigned as he is still at large. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se. not just motion pictures. the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or immoral plays. 7. However. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. where the informatin allegedly contain the same allegations as the information in the first criminal case. 29. the offense defined in Sec. The gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. People. accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of compentent jurisdiction. An amended information . or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. Motion denied. Pangilinan. or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. Suzette. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included inthe offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motin pictures. with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill. 201(3) of the RPC. (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber proved because it is presumed. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board. in relation to Sec.-When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. All these requisites do not exist in this case. Rizal with frustrated homicide . upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. was accused of violating Sec. the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission consituting the former charge. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh same offense. 85 P 776 (1950) F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI. The other accused.7. 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. Rules of Court provisions Rule 117. do not make only one offense. Upon arraignment. he again moved to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of duble jeopardy. In other words. in two separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila. at 8 am. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. Court granted the motion. The nature of both offenses also differs. together with Roberto Pangilinan. Sec. Obillo died from his wounds. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the former complaint of information.Constitutional Law II F: Agapito Gonzales. At 10:15 am of the same day. accused pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. 11 RA 3060 and Art. for having allegedly inflicted upon Obillo. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. scenes. several serious wounds on different parts of the body. contrary to private repondent's allegation. Later. Former conviction of acquittal. acts. On the other hand. The elements of the 2 offenses are different. where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement. On Dec. its public showing constitutes a crimnal offense. and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. The 2 informations with which the accused was charged . double jeopardy. which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. In any of the foregoing cases. or shows. 2. HELD: NO It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy. also pending aginst him another criminal case.
Rogelio Zulueta. The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed . Branch XI. the accused was already in doubly jeopardy. for the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy. but also that the two offenses are identical. 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. People v. for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused. in a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy. On April 18. Suzette. ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries. and the accused was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20. the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of teh first prosecution . however. 1972. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16. HELD: NO Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused. therefore. 42 SCRA 230 (1971) F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod. the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay. was confined since April 8 1968 up to the present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial Hspital. when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the accused having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy. Accordingly. . Suzette. and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. for otherwise. Accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy. the provincial fiscal filed an information charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis. no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution. where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the accused dies. for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution. 1972 . People v. Yorac. there is the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. The phrase "the same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information. filed on October 24. an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense. and had served sentence therefor. to be convicted for an offense that was then inesistent. 1968. Thus. the healing period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be longer. A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was. to be convicted for an offense that was inexistent. according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr. Motion denied. the offended party being Lam Hock who. However as held in the MELO case. the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person HELD: NO. HELD: YES Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. during the first prosecution. who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries for injuries inflicted on Lam Hock .Constitutional Law II was filed charging accused with consummated homicide. ISSUE: W/N the defendant. if the second offense was then inexistent. 121 SCRA 637 (1983) F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila Branch XI. City Court of Manila. This rule of identity however does not apply.
Lutero. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB decision. strictly different offenses. the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein that the offense was committed with lewd designs. Suzette. Later. The unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfying the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giviing them. one offense may include the other. 23 SCRA 249 F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that through violence and intimidation. the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other. although. the lower court erred in dismissing the case by failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in substance of an indictment. double jeopardy does not attach where a criminal trial was a sham. which represents the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process. The accused after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the first information was fatally defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns. Sandiganbayan. for unchaste motives are deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double jeopardy. and accordingly.the offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute. The SC dismissed. (2) dismissal bec. through their acquittal. The motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. 1959 F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of a city ordinance. The wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries caused to the victim was already in existence at the time of the first examination of the doctor. Yap moved to quash the latter information. petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in the first case. Yap v. The criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents completely disqualified them and voided ab initio the SB verdict. Meanwhile. Thus. of denial of accused's right to speedy trial.-. Meanwhile. (3) accused is discharged to be a state witness.(1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of evidence. People v. coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. or through counsel. the legal shield of double jepardy. such dismissal is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused. the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged. 144 SCRA 43 F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the proceedings on the trial of the AquinoGalman duble murder case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. DJ cannot be invoked where the prosecution. April 30. as distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law . RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd designs" in the first information does not affect the sufficiency in substance of the information. Charo. Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available. Obsania. ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. under certain conditions. Later he was charged again in another criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres. In any case. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look into petitioners' allegations. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in this case. if the injuries mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence. In legal contemplation.When the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion of the accused personally." and that the amended information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity.-. However. there is no supervening fact which occurred to justify the non-existence of double jeopardy. unless he pleaded double jeopardy. petitioner was acquitted in the first case. once placed in jeopardy for one. Obsania had carnal knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will.Constitutional Law II In this case. When defense of double jeopardy not available. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Said delay was caused by the very superficial and inconclusive examination then made resulting to a later finding of fracture. it is no judgment. Galman v. RULING: YES. Hence this appeal by the fiscal. . the case has become moot and academic. A dictated.
it is the last recourse to get someone out of his illegal detention. In general as already noted above. The SC ruled that as a general rule. 39 P 778 (1919) Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is merely restrained. The writ of habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy In Chavez v. the following requisites must have been obtained to invoke the constitutional protection against it: (1) a valid complaint or information. such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same offense. the Court can now require the detaining officer to produce the body of the detainees and show cause why he should not be released. the privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy to question the illegality of the arrest or detention. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ. (Art. could not change his residence. Court of Appeals. when the public safety requires it. In case of invasion or rebellion. could not travel outside Metro Manila. The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. After 3 days.) directed A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ to the person detaining another. this is so only for 3 days. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ. habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of a void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge violated . 2. This rest of the section will be confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses. other than on the merits.. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended. though temporarily released. The writ will always issue as a matter of course. supra. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge. supra. any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. III. Thus. the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who. otherwise he shall be released. in which case double jeopardy will set in. when the case is dismissed. and to show cause why he should continue to be detained. An extensive discussion was made under the Commander-in. the President may. and the court cannot inquire any further to find out if the detention is legal. could not be interviewed by media. Sec. and not the writ itself. The case of herein accused falls under the general rule. 18. D. upon motion of the accused. or any other restraint to liberty. when the public safety requires it. 141 SCRA 233 (1986). commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place. When all else is lost. and had to report to the military. Enrile. Under the Conmstitution. 15. or convicted. in Moncupa v. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or rebellion. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus Art. The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought by the accused on the ground that they were denied their right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to prosecute. VII. and (4) the defendant was acquitted. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion. for a period not exceeding 60 days. Functions of the writ Villavicencio v. 1.Constitutional Law II As to the question of double jeopardy.Chief clause of the President.. all the detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court that the detainee is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension. The only remaining and decisive issue in this case seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed without the prior consent of the accused. Sec. (2) a court of competent jurisdiction. Lukban. or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The other accused. Chief of Staff. The SC ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees Free Market Place of Ideas 1. which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and compete in the free market place of ideas.Constitutional Law II due process by compelling him to take the stand and testify against himself. while those who appealed were now free. Sec. and the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Bustos. alert and even militant press is essential for the . however. or other common crimes. and their families. 3. Garcia. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. Lansang v. resulting in a new ruling in People v. supra HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure. Hernandez to the effect that there can be no complex crim of rebellion with homicide. of expression. III. Id. 12. (1919) The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a democratic society. Chavez v. For the discovery of political truth When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths. 24 SCRA 633 (1986). or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievance. some persons who were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with homicide. United States. or of the press. Suspension of the privilege Art. they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-. 2. rape. 18. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). those who did not remained in jail. Sec. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. and their families. III. rape. 3. 2. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print. did not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced accordingly. victims of tortures Art. appealed their conviction. 250 U. III. and so the only way to rule ultimately is by. IV. 42 SCRA 488 (1971) E. Sec. 37 SCRA 420 (1971). supra. This state of being is patenly anathematic to a democratic framework where a free. Sec.. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. (Justice Holmes.. Sec. 37 P 731 (1918) Burgos v. Compensation to. In Gumabon v. means of public opinion. Abrams v.S. Director of Prison. 616. xxx A. 4. Sec. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. VII. Affirmative rights 1. Hernandez. For self government United States v. 18. the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed. 11. and rehabilitation of.that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights Art. As a result. etc. III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Art. Free access to the courts Art. for these common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. Court of Appeals. 12.
the prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact. 268 US 652 (1925). is not open to consideration. legal moral or social duty). The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. such a presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater public interest involved. caustic. when the defense proves that the communication is privileged. United States (1971). Bustos. in the exercise of its discretion. and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. to bring the substantive evils. the Philippine Supreme Court. also in New York Times v. It is a question of proximity and degree. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting of an official proceeding. which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime. and growth of the speech). 380 US 51 (1964) 3. Supreme Court and. Public policy. welfare of society. Publication of Pentagon Papers). [Justice Malcom. [Gitlow v. uncer the Revised Penal Code. 51 (1964) The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of public affairs. this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute. the court cannot intrude. In such cases. giving the government a heavy burden to show justification for the imposition of such restraint. the burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact.S. by haphazard imitation. that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished. (New York Times v. And just as factual error afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free. Content-Based Restrictions 1. The most significant expression is the law on libel. 731 (1918). [Schenck v. Sullivan. the same is true of injury to official reputation. The falsity of some of the factual statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role. robust and wide-open. We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to debate on public issues being uninhibited. For individual protection B. so long as related to the conduct of his office) and good motive. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Prior Restraints Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. in and itself. and that it may well include vehement. United States v.] Example: Art. As it evolved. have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech. COMELEC. 142. If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of . The speech itself may not be dangerous. (New York v. Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined generally. Inciting to sedition. and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. When the legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime. Sanidad v. the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit. in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute.] The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is uttered. the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely.] While. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. 380 U. any defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-in-law). If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art.Constitutional Law II political enlightenment citizenry. United States.S. 249 US 47 (1919). C. As New York Times v. Sullivan. 181 SCRA 529 (1990) Subsequent Punishment And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of promoting free public opinion. New York. Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. Test of validity of content-based restrictions The U.
Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation. 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v. United States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB. 341 US 494 (1951). (Gonzales v. Makasiar. [Brandenburg v.S. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984) F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. 395 U. (not in VV's revised outline) Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger test is oversimplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity. while ordinarily. one can be held liable for what one has said if it causes damage to the rights of others. Applications contexts of tests in various a. when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition. [Dennis v. Although one cannot be prevented from saying something before he actually says it. Beltran v. Comelec) In Aver v. however. justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. Freedom of expression and national security Babst v. quoted in Dennis v. 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty crimes compete. but this latter test consider the weighing of values. Libel is the most common form of subsequent punishment. such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. who . Capulong and Enrile. On different dates in July 1980. feelings. 2. Ohio. associations and even private lives. Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil. Articles 353354 and 361-362 Freedom of expression and libel Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. and is likely to incite or produce such action. sentiments. Douds. it is not idle to note that. it is a question of balancing the freedom of expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile. under certain circumstances. United States.] The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test for being top dependent on the circumstances. Makasiar. HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. cited in Salonga v. one of them was charged with libel by a General who sought to recover P10 million in damages. Cruz Pano. Speaker may. They both emphasize the circumstances of the speech. 444 (1969). and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the speech is launched. except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. 134 SCRA 438 (1985).Constitutional Law II Holmes said: "Many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight. for instance. b. Be that as it may." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house. (Freund. (2) the availability of more moderate controls than those the State has imposed. Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. quoting Judge Learned Hand. Soliven v. [American Communication Ass'n v. beliefs. In addition. discounted by its improbability.] This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. they were summoned by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work. COMELEC. an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice" Read Revised Penal Code.
could have by himself caused the publication. the mayor. Lopez v. the charge is defective. the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law. An article must be sufficiently. 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall. 23. the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous since it did not single any particular individual." The plaintiffs. so they could go and he could be rescued. Hence. But the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. 172 SCRA 225 (1989) Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in bad faith F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. 1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear. the Bulletin Today published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. so that he can bring the action separately if need be. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the publication in the Feb. claiming of murders there. an ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper. complained that the article portrayed them as exploiters of sugar workers. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. Newsweek Inc. The fiscal denied his motion. . The letter constitutes privileged communication. this petition for certiorari. Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Sola. Court of Appeals. the letter was sent privately. VV. Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify any individual. the report referring as it does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. VV. Thus. this appeal to the SC. 34 SCRA 116 (1970) The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan Islands. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. moved to dismiss the complaint.Constitutional Law II were the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star. it cannot be libelous. Later. Petitioner found prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. The disputed portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so. This became the basis of an action for libel brought against petitioner and his clients. it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or allembracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class. specific or at least sweeping as to apply to all members of a group. An erratum was published by the This Week magazine." Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and instead. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. made in good faith and without comments or remarks. it is difficult to believe that the petitioner. in order to be deemed libelous. The SC. 12. or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. sugar planters of Bacolod. Lopez. directly to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. since the error in in this case could have been checked consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily. The trial court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. quoting Quisumbing v. of the privileged character of the publication. during the August 29 coup attempt. however. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. As an index of good faith. At any rate. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the press freedom. but with reduced damages. As for the news report. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. found for plaintiff. HELD: xxx (3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel bec. Manuel v. Cruz-Pano. Thus. He could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. VV. HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class. v.
Freedom of expression. the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of private concern.. press reporters and editors usually have to race to their deadlines. Maria Soto vda. xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life. In the preparation of stories. while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-tolife story of Moises Padilla. w/o limitations. but his motion was denied. Ltd. and other profit motives. Mercado v. v. HELD: US v." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. In the case at bar. 1988 F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution. the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particular bec. In the particular circumstances presented and considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under the agreement. However. in the PICTURE's case. This. Fernando. together w/ her sister and mother. [In the agreement signed by him. Justice Malcolm in US v. Petitioner paid P5. it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy Lagunzad v. use and develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the pictures. c. they should not be held to account. petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film bec.Constitutional Law II Quisumbing v." in consideration of P20. occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. Nelly Amante. this petition for certiorari. no matter how a public figure he or she may be. de Gonzales. 92 SCRA 476 (1979) F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by Rodriguez. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. Being a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. petitioner admitted that in the picture produced. agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit."] Ayer Productions Pty. and (had) in fact included. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M. vis-à-vis private respondent. persons portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin. Gonzales." He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his communication was privileged. 96 Phil 510 (1955) Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. mandamus and prohibition in the SC." a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Virginia Mercado of the Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx. Capulong April 29. HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures . He filed another motion which was also denied. indeed. w/o it. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. however.000. w/c was affirmed by the CA. Subsequently. Bustos was careful to point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by proof of malice. including scenes about his mother. . he had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain. The prosecution should be given a chance to prove malice.000 but as he failed to pay the balance agreed upon.. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. It is not. HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Thus. to a point of suppression. and (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family. and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. he was sued. this action for certiorari. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is unconstitutional HELD: YES. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. April 17. (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace. after all. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger. 60 Phil 265 (1939) A person can be held liable for making comments on a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice. (2) the state's interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the record in this case. who had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer. People v. 1990 Zaldivar v.Constitutional Law II and to exhibit them. It held that although such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the PAC. the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered. holding that the desecration statute as applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment. given that this flag burning was the culmination of a political demonstration and that the state conceded that the protester's conduct was expressive. a public figure. e. Enrile. Alarcon. d. Decision Affirmed. But in Lagunzad." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. and (2) was not adequately supported by the state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of unity. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. among other things. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint. But if the case is not pending. sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. Sandiganbayan. a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. and (c) the flag burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words" . it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which did not significantly destroy. since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag burning. He is. Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate the First Amendment. the orderly administration of justice. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of court) In re Ramon Tulfo. 90-4-1545-0. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. because the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes as it related to breaches of the peace. which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials. A state court of appeals affirmed. Fernandez. 170 SCRA 1 (1989) Cabansag v. and (2) defined desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover the act. AM NO. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression. express F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration where he burned an American flag while protesters chanted. although Moises Padilla was also a public figure. Symbolic burning case Expression-The to Flag- Flag burning when done dissent is protected speech. Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. In Ayer. although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. such comment is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression. was lifted by the SC. a state or national flag. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla. 102 Phil 152 (1957) A contempt imposed by the court on the party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee complaining about the delay in the disposition of the agrarian case.
and (3) the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity does not justify the conviction. (Miller v. and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is being said. Katigbak. VV. Tests of obscenity: (1) Whether the average person. the Board can only classify. The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. 37 L. and Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". public health or any other legitimate public interest. political or scientific value. in a patently offensive way. given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances. rather the presumption is against its validity. (3) Whether the work. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing caressing each other like lesbians. it may not foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest. the SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of the freedom of expression. sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law. and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny. using contemporary community standards. unlike newspapers which are read by people separated by walls. Gonzales v. .Constitutional Law II that are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace. (Miller v. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. taken as a whole. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. Ed. (2) Whether the work depicts or describes. In all other cases. and (b) although the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag. claiming violation of their freedom of expression. it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents. the owners enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang Tibay v. Dans. it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity. HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity. On the issue of obscenity. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed. Radio Broadcast In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. applying contemporary community standards. public morals. so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything. CIR. taken as a whole. 137 SCRA 647. Movies Censorship While prior restraint is the general rule. Thus on this score. If closed down. f. censorship in the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium. the test being whether. 2d 419. lacks serious literary. artistic. California. appeals to the prurient interest. v. since (a) the attempted restriction on expression is content-based. the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone for no fee.) g. California). The petitioner brought an action. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety. would find that the work. but only against impairments that would cause serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity. 137 SCRA 356 (1985) F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process because no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. 3) The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity. Necessarily. Baldoza v. bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. However. The limitation however. adopted in Adiong v." Of course. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Adiong. h. time. official acts. and space. Freedom of Information Art. Adiong v. Sec. III. [US v. the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print media. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the records. for the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative bodies. Access to official records. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. shall be afforded the citizen. COMELEC. and the right to reply. HELD: The case has been moot and academic. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. and to documents and papers pertaining to. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and . Dimaano. 207 SCRA 712 (1992) F: Petitoner. 7. Regulation of political campaign National Press Club v. 391 US 367 (1968). The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f media of communication and information. the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. Content-Neutral Restrictions O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. However. and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. a 1992 senatorial candidate.Constitutional Law II Eastern Broadcasting Corp. 177 SCRA 374 (1989) D. 207 SCRA 1 (1992) F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646. (DYRE) V. 71 SCRA 14 (1976) Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is guaranteed. COMELEC. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. or decisions. the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. COMELEC. before the Court could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National Telecommunications Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the requisite license. 137 SCRA 647 (1985) F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used to incite the people to sedition. Dans. assails Comelec Resolution No." as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities. transactions. Garcia v. O'brien. BOI. and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. RULING: NO. 207 SCRA 712 (1992)] 1. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 2) All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property. ISSUE: Whether constitutional.Constitutional Law II stickers on mobile places. not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists. The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. the expression becomes a statement by the owner. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle. and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining peace and order. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore. But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public peace. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. RULING: NO. then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC. health. 2. Freedom of Assembly Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. or not the resolution is The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor. the police can disperse the crowd. When trouble actually erupts. . only then can they fight back. another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due proocess of law. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If they anticipate trouble. the judgment becomes final and executory immediately. and he has proof of this. (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street. the police must not disperse the crowd right away but first give a warning. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial. Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty under the law. If still violence continues. must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. with their names visibly written. and (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities) The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the organizers and leaders. (2) date and time. then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises. etc. it is deemed granted. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. If violence persists. But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be heard. five working days before the day of the rally. If a rally does not have a permit. then he can deny the application. he should not deny the application right away. they must give a second warning.. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an individual to express his preference and. the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers. During the rally. to convince others to agree with him. but they are allowed protective devices. the police must call the attention of the leader of the rallyists. the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks. In consequence of this prohibition. or in any case if the applicant is satisfied with the decision. which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. and limits their location or publication to authorized posting areas. but they cannot use violence. If he does not act. (b) to police their own rank. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. order. by displaying it on his car. It must also have a statement of the duties of the rallyists. Significantly. public or private. They must be in full uniform. (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. Under the clear and present danger rule. Morever. They can carry no firearm except a nighstick. place and street. If the Mayor refuses to accept the application. The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. 580) A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least. (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner).
the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to the time.Constitutional Law II Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest. was overturned by the court. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. to a consideration of the time. as the statute is construed by the state courts. upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays. the principle has always been that one has the right to a permit.. Villegas. and discussing public questions. 80 Phil. Respondent Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended in the destruction of public and private property. Navarro v. State of New Hampshire. and to restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit. 80 Phil. and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of public order. to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. Villegas. acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP). time out of time have been used for purposes of assembly. and manner of the parades socially to secure public order. in Navarro v. an association of students. Petitioner contended that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding right to use public places for that purpose. place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use the public place and discriminate others. The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end before dark. offices and many stores. Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. injuries to a score of other persons and the closing down of schools. in the issuance of licenses. The validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court. stores closed and business was gravely affected because of violent incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable. Hague v. The Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to the recent election. place. As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso." But under the same ordinance. 31 SCRA 730 (1970) F: The petitioner. Thus. provided. " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. place. can be construed only to mean the power to regulate." (Justice Roberts.. 31 SCRA 730 (1970). and manner of the parade or procession. . govern. convenience and welfare. one must first obtain prior permit from the proper authorities. denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter. before one can use a public place. 71. 71 F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias." The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v. subject only to reasonable regulation. workers and peasants. ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit. communicating thought betwee citizens. which means and includes the power to control. RULING: NO. the SC. loss of a few lives. applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places. campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties. Primicias vs Fugoso. the licensing authorities are strictly limited. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. (a) it is concered only with the time. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. CIO) Although under a "permit system". on a finding that everytime there was an announced rally. where.
Reyes v. on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition. given the report of the NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded.m. He filed this petition because as of Oct. there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally. 125 SCRA 553 (1983) F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes. Ela. which. 135 SCRA 514 (1985). criminal acts. 346 (1956). 99 Phil. breaches of the peace. 125 SCRA 553 (1983). petitioner has manifested. like free press. Charo. Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders.L. The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner. and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies. and whose church is very near the klosk. the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting the . Neither can there be objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy.B. Bagatsing. In J. 1983 starting 2 p. Bagatsing. The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and personnel of the embassy. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally. in order to protect the President Ignacio v. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. Reyes v. It affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is free to all. U. HELD: Free speech. A statute requiring persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not unconstitutional. and at a place when they would not disrupt the normal activities of the community. which can try questions of fact and law. sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the time. Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit. the applicant can question the denial in the lower court.Constitutional Law II ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly. if granted. 26.S.L.B. In Ignacio v. and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure. 346 (1956) F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit. the SC upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area restriction". J. it has no means of preventing. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits." There can be no legal objection. 20. whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners. ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid. prosecution for damages. Embassy. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly during certain days and time. 99 Phil. place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit. Barangan. may give rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members of the rival denomination. HELD: NO. the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman Catholic Church. Ela. In German v.
their suspension was condoned. with an enthusiastic audience goading them on. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place other than the one allowed by the administration. based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. marched on the street and shouted anti-government invectives. censorship is presumptively unconstitutional. The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent punishment. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result. However. the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit.Constitutional Law II and his family. They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. Sanchez (1987) 154 SCRA 541 . GAUP. they may deprive other groups which want to use the streets too. extremely critical. The threat to their lives is constant and felt throughout the world. HELD: As held in Malabanan v. at times even vitriolic. Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of publication. the propensity of speakers to exaggerate. the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. Arreza v. Ramento. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) F: On Oct. On the scheduled date. At any rate. even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential Security Command. students and employees. they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They brought an action for mandamus. The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be overemphasized. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers. Nestle Phils. In Malabanan v. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. the measure is constitutionally acceptable. GAUP. Malabanan v. In case a rally is held in a private place. Inc. 13 SCRA 94 (1985) F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. In publication. They take into account the excitement of the occasion. utterances. when people use streets. it is allowed in the case of assembly. were let loose. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. the exuberance of youth. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. 1982. So as long as only the incidents of speech are regulated. Ramento. 28. There is very little possibility or justification for the regulation of news. classes and office work was disturbed. 13 SCRA 94 (1985). German v. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. The excitement of the occasion. v. On appeal. with clenched fists. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 2. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. no permit from the mayor is required. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. They wore yellow T-shirts and. The rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen. the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally in a private university. that is quite understandable. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate penalty. their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government demonstration close to the residence of the President. But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very nature of the expression. Jude's.
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. walkouts and other temporary work stoppages. 3. their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident would not be repeated. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. it is the legislature and. In govt employment. As now provided under Sec. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. SSS failed to act on the union's demands. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees. The right of the people. 4. they are not allowed to strike. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. When required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. Moreover. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt. Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels. however. to accede to their demands. at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises. the right to association in general is a civil. the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. 8. employment are fixed by law.political right. rules. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation. owned and controlled corporations with original charters. to form unions. including those employed in the public and private sectors. where properly given delegated power. alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS.Constitutional Law II F: While these cases were pending in the SC. uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. against petitioners SSSEA. govt. Relations bet. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. i. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike? Since the terms and conditions of govt. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector Art. Sec. the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. SSS Employees Assn vs CA. The SSSEA went on strike bec. "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal. 175 SCRA 686 (1989) F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. in order to pressure the Govt. through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice. HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. like workers in the private sector. the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket quarters. and regulations. or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right. associations. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes. not through CBA's . Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and strike. III. w/c motion was denied.e. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose.
to determine for itself who may teach. and (d) allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. (c) appointment and tenure of office of academic staff. 9. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. and the freedom of the individual university teacher. the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. experiment and creation. aaserting its duty to protect the respondents as faculty members for . The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS. RULING: NO. how it shall be taught. The rights invoked by private respondent may be asserted only as against the Government through the DECS. The UPCBHS Foundation Inc. the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (a) admission and examination of students. Private respondent invokes the right to quality education and to free secondary education. Ayson.Constitutional Law II E. what may be taught. Garcia assailled her expulsion for being unreasonable. Academic Freedom Garcia v. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom. and who may be admitted to study. 68 SCRA 277 (1975) F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to readmit petitioner. (b) curricula for courses of study. "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting." that it would be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. On other hand. one must distinguish between autonomy of the university. UP v. It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. facilities. It is the business of a university to proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation. UP intervened. ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the UP? RULING: NO. mandamus is not available for the petitioner. among others. Failing on such conditions. the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve. There are standards to meet and policies to pursue." However. So. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic freedom. Faculty of Admission. In considering the problems of academic freedom. What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. 1993 F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences attended by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the Tasadays. UP was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary education. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. Garcia. both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. CA. 176 SCRA 647 (1989) F: In 1972. For the above reason. UP can order its abolition on academic grounds. The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it. that the reasons given therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations and grave misconduct. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university prevail . as a corporate body. UP v. Charo. program because they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class. Feb. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities.A. in its M. ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner. professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. There is no duty on the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the students. the BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. This status of the individual teacher is as important as the status of the institution to which he belongs and through which he disseminates learning.
97 (1968). the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Art. XIV. Vitale. directed the School's District principal to cause the recitation in public schools of a brief. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion? c. Religious instruction in public schools Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely possible. J. [Civ. [Art. the SC disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer before the start of classes in public schools as. Still. Sec. religious instruction in public elementary and secondary schools during class hours. Engel v. by using its public school system to encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. creation and management of educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipinoowned corporations. Is the purpose of the law religious.Constitutional Law II acts and utterances made in the exercise of academic freedom. Its observance on the part of the students was voluntary. Arkansas. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. because the use of classrooms and electricity are costs in the State). concurring). Donnelly. Allegheny County v. It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions. 421 (1967) F: The respondent Board of Education upon the recommendation of the State Board of Regents. shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. 1. 370 U. or is it secular? b. it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues. Lynch v. The lower court denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.] 3.. without discrimination or preference. RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community.] Religion can even be integrated in the school curriculum. Non-Establishment Clause The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with. Operation of sectarian schools While the ownership. by one approved by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is allowed. denominationally neutral prayer. Greater Pittsburg ACLU. 492 US 574 (1989). 4(2).S.Establishment clause. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion. III. 393 U. sectarian schools and those run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from these requirements. provided the administration is in the hands of Filipinos.S. even if nothing is done against the individual. 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor. Hence this petition. Indeed. the questions to be asked are: a. XIV.] The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York.] 2. Code. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. in resolving the complaint for damages. Anti-evolution laws In Epperson v. 59 SCRA 54 (1974). violative of the Non. the SC held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose religions finds the theory offensive. 359 (1). endorsement or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. To be sure. who could be sectarian. Vitale. it is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. 3(3). V. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools In Engel v.S. the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. 421 (1967). A. 4. The complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. 370 U. Sec. Sec. for there may be atheists who are not so favored. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. 5. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the State and religious matters in religion? The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest support to any one religion. The prayer was composed by govt officials as part of a . In assessing the validity of the law. [Art.
Ilocos Norte. teaching and observance. It rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade religion. The Prov. unlike the free exercise clause. 5. 374 U. mosques. the establishment clause was violated. does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion. is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas. directly. To withstand the strictures of the establishment clause. the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. religious purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal. The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference to religious training. it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to the Non. 51 Phil. non-profit cemeteries. 203 (1963) The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory authority requiring the reading without comment. The constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to compose official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the govt. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the school exercises.S. Provincial Board. although overlapping in certain instances. Abington School District v. Provincial Board. 28. On the south siide is a part of the church yard. churches. directly and exclusively" used for religious purposes to be exempt. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now that the property must be "actually. Tax exemption Art. The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging the free exercise thereof. Schemp. Board imposed a tax on the whole land. parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto. VI. of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. none of those factors being consistent with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals. If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion. actually. The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid. Schemp. On the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was once a tower. 51 Phil. 203 (1963). there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. . charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school and held in school buildings under the supervision and participation of teachers employed in those schools. buildings and improvements. and upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand in hand. then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. In Abington School District v. represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia. The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. If not for purposes. 352 (1927) F: The plaintiff. RULING: YES. xxx (3) Charitable institutions. free from any compulsion from the State. Sec. forbids two diff kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. at the opening of each school day. and all lands.S. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. 374 U. The stablishment clause.Constitutional Law II governmental program to further religious beliefs.Establishment clause. educational Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the Establishment clause which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. This is particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the exercises. and exclusively used for religious.
Aglipay v. Ind. So long as the use of public property is only incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with the use to which other members of the community are similarly entitled. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in view. which comes under the tax exemption. In Ignacio v. then the non-establishment clause is not violated. the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved the application for a permit not so much because he was afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public purposes only and not for religious purposes. 201 (1937). When the Jehovah's Witness members use the public squares. Therefore. As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery. What it gave the Director of Posts was the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. Constitutional provision that no public money or property shall be appropriated for the use. and whatever benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only incidental. or leprosarium. Sec. The Director issued the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of the stamps. 29 (2)] But in Aglipay v. Public aid to religion The payment or use of public money or property for any religious institution or clergy is not allowed. It also comes within the exemption. The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The exemption in the payment of the land tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. Mons. [Art. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the country and its people. It therefore must include not only the land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man. while it is no longer used as such. RULING: NO. benefit or support of any sect or religion. in the case of a convent. ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu. neither is it used for commercial purposes and. VI. its use is limited to the necessities of the priest. It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character. 201 (1937) F: The petitioner. Ruiz. penal institution. Church. government orphanage. 219 SCRA 256 (1993) Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the flag. 64 Phil. the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was merely incidental and was not the aim and purpose of the government. Head of the Phil. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the stamps was done in violation of the ." What was emphasized was not the event but Manila. The stamp contained a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila. sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. 64 Phil. the SC held that the stamp printed by the government showing the map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did not violate the NonEstablishment clause because its main purpose. was to call the world's attention to Manila as the site of an international congress. supra. Flag Salute Ebranilag v. they are no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only incidental. Aglipay. Free Exercise Clause 1. and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade. 6. B. accdg to the evidence. except in those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP. Ela. Ruiz. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious group only incidental. is now being used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities. Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use of large tracts of land for buildings. a vegetable garden belongs to a house and. The same constitutes an incidental use in religious functions.Constitutional Law II RULING: NO.
Appellees. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid. ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both private and public). In connection with pledges. Compare West V. to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil. 101 P 386 (1957) F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of bibles and religious articles. However. Board of Barnette. from the schools is not justified. xxx The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent. both religious and patriotic. moral. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines American Bible Society v. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. HELD: NO. of a serious evil to public safety. since the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept. City of Manila. Order No. they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in exercising their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. The State asserts the power to condition access to public education. if they should commit breaches of peace by action that offend the sensibilities. we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. the flag salute is a form of utterance. RULING: NO. to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag. F: The State Board required public school pupils to salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful absence. saluting the Phil. is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship. To sustain the compulsory flag salute. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. 319 US 624 (1943) Education v. sing the national anthem. during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school. members of the Jehovah's Witnesses. As there is no disruption. health or any other legitimate public interest. xxx Although petitioners do not participate in the compulsory flag ceremony. through the iron hand of the law. will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. xxx xxx Forcing a small religious group. It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. expulsion is unwarranted. for refusing. They quietly stand at attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.Constitutional Law II F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag. The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without securing the necessary license and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance. on account of their religious beliefs. 2. 8 dated July 21. the expulsion of the pets. National Anthem. Absent such a threat to public safety. The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. consider the flag as a graven image which they are forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. the school authorities have the power to discipline them. that the state has a right and duty to prevent. and recite the patriotice pledge. of other persons. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates .
as may be provided by law. It does not impair the obligation of contracts for not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation of the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into such contracts. xxx . HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. for in so doing. In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor General. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of religion. Exemtion from union shop Victoriano v. 4. It is true that the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same. The freedom to travel is one of the most cherished. The present petition is likewise moot and academic. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. Sec. he resigned from the respondent labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a member prohibits union membership. 3. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Art. VI. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. Madella. it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980) Right to travel This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. The union appealed. III of the 1935 Constitution. HELD: YES. persons receiving salaries from provincial funds. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. As the union demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a closed shop agreement. 6. It has been held that in order to withstand objections based on this ground.Constitutional Law II the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Salonga v. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor organization. In the first case. it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship. Nonetheless. as well as its right to disseminate religious beliefs. Those who can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. The mark up can only be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious cause. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque. public safety. Neither does the law constitute an establishment of religion. but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. soldiers in active service. in view of the likelihood that this Court may be faced again with the same situation. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association. the statute musr have a secular purpose and that purpose must not directly advance or diminish the interest of any religion. or contractors for public works. Disqualification from local government office Pamil v. or public health. Fr. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. III. 59 SCRA 54 (1974) F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory. Salonga v. Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union security agreements. Bohol. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) F: In 1971. In 1962. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. the case became moot and academic. Victoriano brought this action for injunction. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff society. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to Art.
independent from although related to the right to travel. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel. i. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof. is part of the law of the land. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Manglapus. The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and right to travel. a totally distinct right under international law. However. it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl. . Respondents argue the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. the right involved is the right to return to one's country. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or not. but it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law. RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. and under our Constitution.Constitutional Law II Marcos v.e. Essentially. In that context. 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989) F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.