http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.

php/src/news/sub/article/action /ShowMedia/id/4335 I: http://sovereignjustice.org/index.php?topic=263.msg1856#msg1856 or direct link: II: http://www.petitiononline.com/weunite1/petition.html Letter to United States Attorney General Violations of U.S. Law by Judicial Officers and Employees of the Superior Court of the State of California March 29, 2008 By American Homeowners Resource Center (View author info) http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.php/src/news/sub/news/action/Profile/auth orid/94 Los Angeles, California Dear AHRC Editors, Members and Friends: Well meaning lawyers who work on the side of homeowners or citizens are often abused by judges in courts, and if they persist in zealous advocacy, the judges use the State Bar to take away their licenses so that they cannot work as lawyers. Many lawyers gouge and sell out homeowners, others refuse to handle homeowner cases, some leave the practice or the state quietly. All this makes judicial fraud and theft by lawyers and judges so common in America's courtrooms. California is the epicenter of the home foreclosure tsunami sweeping America. The government protected lawyers, politicians, and judges are part of the legislative, judicial and corporate fraud that now affects millions of our families, our communities, our country and the world. Richard I. Fine, a brave and talented California attorney and United States Department of Justice Attorney, has been declared ineligible to practice law by the California State Bar for zealously representing the interests of citizens against corruption. As is usual in California and in most of America, the District Attorney, the Attorney General and the Chief Justice failed to address this judicial violation by a judge.

Hence this letter to the U. S. Department of Justice and to the United States Congress. Please copy, sign, mail or fax this letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey and members of the U S House and Senate Judiciary Committees. If you wish to email it, copy it and then send it to Mr. Mukasey's email address below. Please forward it to your friends, publish it on both local and international websites. This problem affects us all and we all need to work together to protect our rights, liberty and property - American Homeowners Resource Center Staff ------------------------------------------------------------------------------U. S. Attorney Attorney General Muckasey Via e-mail: AskDOJ@usdoj.gov. and U.S. Mail Hon. Michael B. Mukasey Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave. Washington, D.C., 20530-0001 Re: Urgent Request to U.S. Department of Justice to Open an Investigation and Impanel a Grand Jury to Investigate Violations of U.S. Law by Judicial Officers and Employees of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Officials and Employees of the County of Los Angeles and Officials and Employees of the State Bar of California and Return Indictments Where Appropriate Dear Attorney General Mukasey: The members of the American Homeowners Resource Center (AHRC) network formally request that you open a U.S. Department of Justice investigation and impanel a Federal Grand Jury to investigate violations of U.S. Law by judicial officers and employees of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles (LA Superior Court), officials and employees of the County of Los Angeles (LA County) and

officials and employees of the State Bar of California (California State Bar) and return indictments where appropriate. AHRC is a public interest interactive website for homeowners. The primary driving force behind AHRC is a national and international grassroots network of homeowners working together to protect homes. The AHRC website receives approximately three million (3,000,000) hits per month. The members of the AHRC network are concerned about the lack of due process affecting American families and homeowners in our judicial system. We are particularly concerned about the oppressive tactics used to prevent attorneys from representing families and homeowners in court cases by judges and the "State Bars" in California and across the United States. The need is great and immediate for this action. The citizenry has not been able to obtain any relief at the local level. California courts have refused to address the problem. The LA Superior Court and California State Bar have sought to disbar Richard I. Fine, a prominent attorney with a national reputation for fighting abuse of power by government officials who has been fighting to cure the problem, by charging him with "moral turpitude", recommending his disbarment and ordering him "inactive" for exercising our First Amendment rights by bringing Federal civil rights suits and motions to disqualify the judges who are denying due process to plaintiffs fighting LA County. Only a Federal investigation and Grand Jury with resulting indictments where appropriate, will solve the problem. The crux of the problem is the systematic denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which has occurred in cases in the LA Superior Court. Part of this is due to the conflict of interest created by the LA Superior Court judges receiving money from LA County, who is a party before them in approximately 670 new civil cases each year, in thousands of Family Court and Juvenile Court matters where LA County is a party or participant and thousands of Criminal Court matters where LA County is a party or participant. The LA Superior Court judges have remained on these cases and ruled against the party opposing LA County. The LA Superior Court judges then retaliated against Richard I. Fine, the attorney who has moved to disqualify

them or brought a Federal suit against them for their actions, by seeking his disbarment by the California State Bar and California Supreme Court for such actions against them. The California State Bar which is an administrative arm of the California Supreme Court has ordered Richard I. Fine to be "inactive", without notice or hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and has recommended his "disbarment" in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. I. The Systematic Denials of Fair Trials and Due Process in LA Superior Court Cases Where LA County is a Party The LA Superior Court judges are State of California employees, elected by the public, whose compensation is set by the State Legislature as set forth in Article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution. Their present salary is $178,789.00 plus benefits. LA County, who by statute, does not have any responsibility for trial court funding, pays the LA Superior Court judges an additional $40,000.00 per year in cash and contributions to 401k and 457 retirement plans. LA County has stated in court papers that the reason it makes these payments is: "to attract and retain well-qualified judges to serve the public in one of the most expensive regions in the state". The LA Superior Court judges and Court officials know that they are denying due process to every individual or entity who is a litigant against LA County, by deciding cases when they are receiving money from LA County. This was shown by their actions in the case of Harold P. Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, LASC Case No. BC 351286, filed in 2006, in which LA County was sued for making payments to the LA Superior Court judges as an "unconstitutional gift of public funds" in violation of Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution. The lawyers for Sturgeon are Judicial Watch, the case was transferred out of the LA Superior Court. In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, no case prior to Sturgeon, or since Sturgeon, has been transferred out of LA County based upon the LA Superior Court judges receiving money from LA County, despite attempts to do such.

LA County statistics showing the number of new civil cases dismissed by judges or voluntarily dismissed after motions to dismiss were filed, and the number of cases lost due to decisions by judges in the FY 2007, in an October 3, 2007 letter from the LA County Counsel to the LA Board of Supervisors, indicate that the "real purpose" of the contributions is to reduce the exposure of LA County to liability in the LA Superior Court. This was accomplished by creating a financial atmosphere in which judges deciding LA County cases were relying financially upon LA County for their living expenses and therefore would not decide against LA County. The statistics supported this "real purpose". The statistics showed that 670 new cases were filed in fiscal year 2007 and 261 dismissals occurred based upon favorable rulings for LA County. This is approximately 39%. The October 3, 2007, letter did not state the ratio of filed cases to dismissals for non LA County cases. LA County took 24 cases to trial and prevailed in 15. Five were defense [jury] verdicts. This shows that 10 defense decisions were done by the LA Superior Court judges. This is over 41%. These are more cases decided by judges against the plaintiffs, than the 9 cases the plaintiffs won at trial before a jury. It appears the plaintiffs did not win any cases before a judge. These statistics show on their face, that the $40,000.00 cash payments to the judges who were deciding LA County cases may have affected their decisions, as apparently no judge decided in favor of the plaintiffs in any case against LA County. Specific examples further bolster this conclusion by showing this activity has been systematically occurring from prior to 1999 through the present. In 1999, in the case of Silva v. Garcetti and LA County, LASC Case No. BC 205645, App. No. B 150641, S. Ct. No. S 105221, LA County and the LA District Attorney were sued for unlawfully withholding $14 million in child and spousal support payments beyond the 6 month statutory time period. LA Superior Court Judge James C. Chalfant dismissed the case, even after LA County had testified that they started to pay out the overdue child and spousal support monies. After the case was over, it was discovered that Judge Chalfant had been receiving monies from LA County during the case

and did not disclose such. The payment of monies to Judge Chalfant was then raised with the California Court of Appeal who stated that, it was too late to raise such. The payment of monies was raised with the California Supreme Court who refused to hear it, and the case, on May 22, 2002. Later in 2002, it was discovered that Justice Todd of the California Court of Appeal, one of the justices who refused to consider the payments to Judge Chalfant, had received monies from LA County while she was a recent LA Superior Court judge, and did not disclose such in the appeal; nor did the other appellate justices disclose that they also knew of the payments to Justice Todd. In 2004-2007, in a series of taxpayer cases entitled Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants Association et al., v. County of Los Angeles et al., LASC Consolidated Case No. BS 089838, LA County and various developers of Marina del Rey were sued to void the leases between LA County and the developers on the grounds that they were "an unconstitutional gift of public funds to a private person" in violation of California Constitution Article XVI, Section 6. The suits also sought to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars owed to the taxpayers of LA County due to under payments on the leases compared to fair compensation which would have been paid in a "fair" commercial transaction paying LA County the fair market value for the land leased to the developers. Judge Soussan G. Bruguera struck the disqualification even while admitting that she was receiving money from LA County. The California Court of Appeal refused to hear the petition for writ of mandate to order her disqualified and the case transferred out of the LA Superior Court (App. No. B178404) and the California Supreme Court refused to review the petition (S. Ct. No. S128928). Judge Bruguera dismissed the cases before trial, however she delayed her decision for over 90 days thus placing plaintiffs in a position that they either had to file a notice of appeal before she rendered her decision, thus losing their constitutional right to have a court decide their case or allow her to decide and be subject to California Rule of Court (CRC) Rule 8.104(a) and CRC Rule 8.108(b) and (d) requiring a notice of appeal to be filed the earlier of 90 days after a motion for reconsideration is filed or 180 days after the judgment is filed when no time limit is set on the trial court to decide the

motion. These CRC rules are a denial of due process, as they remove the Constitutional right to trial in the first instance and the right to have a court hear the matter in the second instance. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal filed after the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on the 91st day (App. No. B198659) and the California Supreme Court refused to hear the matter (S. Ct. No. S157640), thereby denying the plaintiffs their constitutional right to have a court hear their matter. Other problems include court personnel illegally taking monies from court controlled conservatorships, trust funds or class settlement funds. An example of judicial officers using class settlement monies for their own benefit occurred in the case of Di Flores et al. v. EHG et al., LASC Case No. BC 150607, in which a class settlement fund of $7.86 million was established to pay class members who were examined by a "fake" doctor. Court papers show that LA Superior Court Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell, purporting to act as a "temporary judge" transferred the class settlement fund from Wells Fargo Bank to Bank of America (where according to his filed Form 700 Financial Disclosure Form, he had loans), signed papers approving the taking of over $2 million from the class settlement fund to be used to "purchase claims against Bruce E. Mitchell, the Superior Court, and other 'judicial officers'", pay legal fees of approximately $300,000.00 to defend an action to stop such purchase, pay private lawyers over $1.6 million of unearned fees on the condition that they would withhold 35% [$535,000.00] to pay further legal fees to defend an action to stop such purchase, and pay approximately $600,000.00 in fees to others. Amongst the members of the class who lost this $2 million are FBI agents and Secret Service agents. In the Family and Juvenile Court Systems, judges are assigning "case loads" to "non profit corporations" where they may be sitting on the board of the non profit corporation who then bill the court for their services. In many cases in all of the branches of the LA Superior Court, LA County or one of the parties opposing the plaintiff is represented by the LA County Counsel, which is an office of LA County. The LA County Counsel also represents the LA Superior Court or its judges, creating a conflict of interest,

and denial of due process as to any plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit with LA County. The conflict arises from the fact that both the judge and the LA County Counsel are being paid by LA County, LA County may be paying for experts or witnesses even if LA County Counsel is not in the case and LA County Counsel represents the judge and the LA Superior Court. LA County also uses a "private county corporation" to fund the building of courthouses, despite the fact that a "Courthouse Fund" exists in the LA County General Fund. The "private corporation" has judges on its board of directors. The "private corporation" issues "certificates of participation" which are sold as securities to the public for the construction of the courthouse. Once constructed, the "private corporation" then leases the courthouse to LA County with the taxpayers paying a higher rate than they would have paid if a municipal bond had been issued. This places the judges and LA County in a position of "defrauding" the taxpayers. A municipal bond would have required a taxpayer vote. LA County used this same mechanism in 1993 by selling Marina del Rey to a "private county corporation", the Los Angeles County Capital Asset Leasing Corp. in a "byzantine bond financing" to cover the 1992-93 Los Angeles County Budget Shortfall. The Los Angeles County Capital Asset Leasing Corp.,on May 25, 1993, also sold $133 million of tax exempt "Certificates of Participation" backed by the anticipated revenues of the leases from Marina del Rey to the public and an additional $55 million was placed with other Los Angeles County Funds for a total obligation of $188 million. The $188 million was used to cover the budget shortfall. After the issuance of the "Certificates of Participation", the Los Angeles County Capital Asset Leasing Corp., also on May 25, 1993, immediately sold Marina del Rey back to the County of Los Angeles. Each year $14.8 million of Marina del Rey lease revenues was used to pay off the "Certificates of Participation" through the year 2007. This "debt" essentially reduced the net income from the lessees in Marina del Rey to zero or a net loss when all expenses of operating Marina del Rey were considered. The taxpayers paid for the 1993 budget deficit without voting for any "indebtedness. The relationship between the judge sitting on the board of directors of the corporation which owns the courthouse which is leased to LA County, and LA County being a party to the case, and the judge being part of the "fraud"

upon the public, denies due process to the person litigating against LA County. In all of these situations, the judge should not be "sitting" on the case, as he/she is not impartial, and various U.S. Constitutional provisions, First and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees and Federal laws have been violated.

II. The Systematic Retaliation in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by LA Superior Court Judicial Officers in Conjunction with the Officers and Employees of the California State Bar to Render Inactive and Disbar Lawyers Who Challenge the Financial Relationship Between LA County and LA Superior Court Judicial Officers and Other Improprieties The LA Superior Court judges and judicial officers have engaged in a concerted action to retaliate against lawyers who have challenged the payments to them from LA County while they were deciding LA County cases. In both the Silva and Coalition to Save the Marina cases mentioned above, the lawyer who brought the cases, fought the cases and challenged the payments to the LA Superior Court judges was Richard I. Fine. Additionally in a third case, Amjadi and LACAOEHS v. County of LA Board of Supervisors et al., filed in 1994, LASC Case No. BC 110446, App. Nos. B137683, S. Ct. No. S 096448 and B 138307, Richard I. Fine won on May 12, 1999, an $11 million judgment and an injunction requiring LA County to establish a "special fund" for "environmental inspection fees" collected, place the $11 million in such "special fund" and freeze such "environmental inspection fees" for 3 years or until the $11 million was exhausted. The Court did not award Amjadi and LACAOEHS (a LA County union of environmental inspectors) attorneys fees. After the case was over, it was discovered that Judge Kurt Lewin was receiving money from LA County during the case. In 2002, Richard I. Fine filed two federal civil rights cases regarding the payments to the LA Superior Court judges and judicial officers by LA County while it was a party before them alleging such payments to be a denial of due process and denial of the right to a fair trial. The cases were LACAOEHS v. Lewin et al., USDC Case No. CV-02-02190 AHM (JTLx) (Lewin case) and Silva v. Chalfant et al., USDC Case No. CV-02-04645 AHM (JTLx) (Silva case), the latter of which was a defendants class action case seeking to enjoin such payments from LA County while it was a party before any LA Superior Court judge or judicial officer.

Richard I. Fine also filed motions to disqualify LA Superior Court judges and judicial officers who were part of the putative class in the Silva case. Some judges such as Richard Hubbell (now deceased) recused themselves. Other judges such as Soussan G. Bruguera, (mentioned above), refused to recuse themselves. Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell, (mentioned above in the Di Flores case), refused to recuse himself. Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell was also a named defendant in the Silva case, as he was sitting as the "temporary judge" in the Eminent Domain Department of the LA Superior Court. Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell was the "complaining party" and "complaining witness" to the California State Bar against Richard I. Fine. The California State Bar filed charges of "moral turpitude" under Cal. B&P Code section 6106 against Richard I. Fine for (1) filing the Lewin case, (2) filing the Silva case, (3) filing disqualifications against Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell in the Di Flores case to recuse himself as being biased as being a defendant in the Silva case, (4) filing the federal civil rights case of Fine v. Mitchell et al. USDC Case No. CV 03-07332GLT in 2003 and (5) other statements in court filed papers. At the time Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell filed the complaint with the California State Bar, and at all times subsequent thereto through the present, Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell, the LA Superior Court judges, the California State Bar, the Board of Governors of the California State Bar, the Judges of the California State Bar Court, the Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the California State Bar and the Trial Counsel of the California State Bar knew that the complaint and any case by the California State Bar would violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They knew of the 2002 case of Richard A. Canatella, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the State Bar Association; the Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief Counsel of the State Bar of California, Trial Counsel, Defendants-Appellees (9th Cir. 09/09/2002) 304 F.3d 843 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Martin J. Jenkins, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-00-01105-MJJ. The lawyers for the Defendants-Appellees were Jay M. Goldman and Dina E. Goldman of the Office of the General Counsel, The State Bar of California, San Francisco, California, and Tom Blake, Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, San Francisco, California. They knew that Canatella challenged the constitutionality of B&P Code section 6106 under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The published opinion showed a First Amendment violation on behalf of attorneys who are zealous litigators. The Court stated at paragraphs 50-52:

[50] On the record before us, we believe not only that "[t]he parties remain philosophically on a collision course," Berner, 129 F.3d at 24, but that there is a strong likelihood Canatella may again face discipline under the challenged provisions. His threat of future prosecution is not merely hypothetical and conjectural, but actual. In relying on Canatella's disciplinary record to reach our conclusion, we do not maintain that past "prosecution" by itself gives rise to a present case or controversy. But we have no reason to doubt that Canatella's interactions with the State Bar heretofore do not have at least some "continuing, present adverse effects," Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, whether these effects be further discipline, or the chilling of what may be constitutionally protected speech.*fn11 Because the equitable relief he seeks would alleviate the harm he has alleged, Canatella demonstrates standing and his claims should be allowed to proceed. [51] Moreover, in recognition that "the First Amendment needs breathing space," the Supreme Court has relaxed the prudential requirements of standing in the First Amendment context. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 956 (1984). Where, as here, a plaintiff raises an overbreadth challenge to a statute under the First Amendment, standing arises "not because [the plaintiff's] own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the [challenged statute's] very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. *fn12 [52] Here, the district court did not take Broadrick and its progeny into account in addressing standing, and its analysis fails to recognize that Canatella challenged the statutes both facially and as applied. We cannot selectively read the facial overbreadth claim out of Canatella's complaint, and on that basis, reduce the scope of Canatella's alleged harms for purposes of standing analysis. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1495 (11th Cir. 1993); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1991). *fn13 Canatella claims that the vagueness and overbreadth of the statutes result in censorship of protected speech by all California attorneys who push the envelope of zealous advocacy. Canatella does not allege that he suffers injury only if he is again sanctioned by a court, and investigated, and disciplined (or disbarred) by the State Bar; nor must he do so to demonstrate standing for an overbreadth claim. It is enough that Canatella shows that he and others in his position face a credible threatof discipline under the challenged statutes, and may consequently forego their expressive rights under the First Amendment. Nor have we reason to doubt that other California attorneys find themselves in Canatella's dilemma. The alleged source of the harms that Canatella and others like him may face is the

arguably vague and overbroad language of the challenged provisions under which California lawyers perform their jobs and are subject to discipline. He seeks an injunction preventing enforcement of the challenged provisions, and a declaration that they are unconstitutional. He alleges concrete and particularized harms to his First Amendment rights and demonstrates a sufficient likelihood that he and others may face similar harm in the future. Under the rubric of Broadrick, this is enough to satisfy the prudential requirements of standing for a First Amendment overbreadth claim. *fn14 (Emphasis added.) *fn11 In performing our relaxed standing analysis, we need not consider the precise relationship between Canatella and those he argues are in his position. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 n. 5 (1972) ("Indeed, in our First Amendment cases we have relaxed our rules of standing without regard to the relationship between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert precisely because application of those rules would have an intolerable, inhibitory effect on freedom of speech."). *fn12 The Broadrick rule applies only to statutes that regulate speech. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612; Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, Canatella challenges rules "directed narrowly and specifically at expression or conduct commonly associated with expression," id. at 305; City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co, 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988), and a relaxed standing inquiry is proper. *fn13 In Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 200 (9th Cir. 1996), we considered whether a federal court had jurisdiction to hear a facial First Amendment challenge to a Seattle ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on sidewalks, observing: "It's true that our ordinary reluctance to entertain facial challenges is somewhat diminished in the First Amendment context. However, this is because of our concern that "those who desire to engage in legally protected expression . . . may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid. . . . When we allow such challenges, we mostly say we're protecting the free speech interests of 'parties not before the Court.' " Id. at 303 (citation omitted). *fn14 In so holding, we do not imply that the mere existence of the challenged provisions gives rise to an injury sufficient for standing purposes. Instead, it is Canatella's history with the California Bar, his continuing activities as a zealous advocate, and the nature of his challenge to the provisions that lead us to conclude the requirements of standing are met in his complaint. (Emphasis added.)

From the opinion it may be determined that "State Bar defendants" argued that the First Amendment did not apply and that Canatella did not have standing. The opinion shows a bias on behalf of the State Bar judges against the First Amendment in B&P Code section 6106 cases which is expressed by them in their private capacity and not expressed by them in their published court decisions. The joint defense of the State Bar Defendants manifests ex parte communications and an agreement between the State of California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the State Bar Association; the Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief Counsel of the State Bar of California, and State Bar Trial Counsel to the effect that B&P Code section 6106 is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in any case which is brought by the State Bar in the State Bar Court, and in particular a case like that against Richard I. Fine which is based solely on documents filed in the Court. The joint defense of the State Bar Defendants manifests ex parte communications and an agreement between the State of California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the State Bar Association; the Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief Counsel of the State Bar of California, and State Bar Trial Counsel to the effect that B&P Code section 6106 is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment, which will be used to violate due process in any case where the First Amendment is used to challenge the constitutionality of B&P Code section 6106, by the State Bar Court judges rejecting the First Amendment defense to any B&P Code section 6106 charge, and in particular a case like that against Richard I. Fine which is based solely on documents filed in the Court. Later in the case, State Bar Court Judges Remke, Epstein, Watai, Stovitz, Honn, McElroy, Niles, Platel and Talcott, Chief Trial Counsels of the State Bar Michael Nisperos, Jr. and Russel Michael Nisperos, Jr. and Presidents of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California James E. Herman and John Van de Kamp were individually named in the amended case of Richard A. Canatella (Canatella) v. Ronald V. Stovitz et al., USDC Case No. C-00-0-01105-JSW (USDC Northern California) and 9th Circuit Appeal No. 05-15447 (2006) 213 Fed.Appx.515 (Appellate Opinion Not For Publication) in which they were represented by the same counsel. Canatella challenged the constitutionality of B&P Code section 6106 under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Court assumed it "implicate[d] some protected speech, and defendants argued that Canatella did not state a cause of action specific to him. (See paragraph 12 of Canatella v. Stovitz et al.) The joint defense of the State Bar defendants, who are the State Bar Court judges

in the case of Richard I. Fine on its face shows, a bias on behalf of the judges against the First Amendment in B&P Code section 6106 cases which is expressed by them in their private capacity and not expressed by them in their published court decisions. The joint defense manifests ex parte communications and an agreement between the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, the Presidents of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, the Hearing Department Judges and the Review Department Judges to the effect that B&P Code section 6106 is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in any case which is brought by the State Bar in the State Bar Court, and in particular a case like that against Richard I. Fine which is based solely on documents filed in the Court. The joint defense manifests ex parte communications and an agreement between the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, the Presidents of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, the Hearing Department Judges and the Review Department Judges to the effect that B&P Code section 6106 is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment, which will be used to violate due process in any case where the First Amendment is used to challenge the constitutionality of B&P Code section 6106, by the judges rejecting the First Amendment defense to any B&P Code section 6106 charge, and in particular a case like that against Richard I. Fine which is based solely on documents filed in the Court. In summary, at all times all of these individuals knew that they were denying due process to Richard I. Fine or any other attorney who was being charged with "moral turpitude" for filing court papers. Further, at all times these individuals also knew that the systematic ordering an attorney "inactive" without notice as automatically occurs by the California State Bar Court judges when a "recommendation of disbarment" is made violates due process under the U.S. Supreme Court case of In re Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544. The retaliation of the LA Superior Court judges against Richard I. Fine did not stop at the California State Bar, but extended to cases where he was personally a party. In 2007, in the case of Winston Financial Group, Inc., v. Fine et al., LASC Case No. BC 237891, LA Superior Court Judge John P. Shook refused to overturn a settlement which had been obtained by fraud even after it was disclosed that Winston Financial Group, Inc. had committed fraud upon the Fine's and the Court by claiming to have been a lender and the beneficiary of a trust deed on their home when it was not true. This action by Judge Shook was also a violation of Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution which states:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. In January, 2008, in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, Real Parties in Interest Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North, LASC Case No. BS 109420, Judge David P. Yaffe issued a sanction and attorneys fee order against Richard I. Fine, without notice or hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution after Richard I. Fine was no longer in the case. Further David P. Yaffe, was most probably receiving monies from LA County, when he did this and while the case was and is proceeding. The aforementioned examples demonstrate the systematic retaliation in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by LA Superior Court Judicial Officers in conjunction with the officers and employees of the California State Bar to render inactive and disbar lawyers who challenge the financial relationship between LA County and LA Superior Court Judicial Officers and other improprieties. Please be so kind as to immediately open an investigation and impanel a Grand Jury to investigate violations of U.S. Law by judicial officers and employees of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, officials and employees of the County of Los Angeles and officials and employees of the State Bar of California and return indictments where appropriate. Thank you for your immediate attention to this urgent matter. Sincerely,

cc: • House Judiciary Committee- Repr. John Conyers - Chair, , Burton Wides Counsel http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.php/src/business/sub/letters/form/2? directory_id=2306 • Senate Judiciary Committee - Chair Senator Patric Leahy http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.php/src/business/sub/letters/form/2? directory_id=2307

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