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For purposes of legal research, readers may find useful the discussions/citations in the position paper below that I have prepared in an ejectment case which involved the issues of stature of frauds and formalities of contracts.
POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF THE PLAINTIFF, by counsel, respectfully states: I. PROPERTY INVOLVED.
The property subject matter of the instant ejectment case is the residential house and lot located at xxx., xxx Subd., xxx, xxx City, with an area of 240 sq. m. and covered by TCT No. xxx registered in the name of A, plaintiff in the instant ejectment case. Attached as Annex “A” hereof is a certified true copy of the said TCT No. xxx to prove the ownership in fee simple by plaintiff A of the subject property.
II. EJECTMENT COMPLAINT
The verified complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) filed by the herein plaintiff A …, thru her former counsel, Atty. Xxx, prayed for a judgment in favor of the said plaintiff and against the defendants B, et. al. directing the latter to (a) Vacate the aforesaid residential house and lot and to peacefully surrender the same to herein plaintiff; (b) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 48,000.00) for actual damages sustained as a result of loss of employment in Japan and for the monthly rent for the townhouse unit; (c) Pay the plaintiff in such amounts representing for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as this Honorable Court, in its wise and sound discretion, may determine; (d) Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Php25,000.00 and Php2,000.00 per court appearance as Attorney’s fees; and (e) Pay the cost of the suit.
The allegations of the ultimate facts of the instant ejectment complaint are quoted hereinbelow:
“x x x. 1. That plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino and a resident of xxx Street, Unit xxx, xxx Subdivision, xxx City where she may be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court; 2. That defendants are all of legal age and are presently unlawfully residing at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision, xxx II, xxx City and may served with summons and other legal processes therein by this Honorable Court; 3. Plaintiff is the lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx
evidenced by Transcript of Certificated of Title No. xxx issued by the Register of Deeds of xxx City, Metro Manila and more particularly described as: X x x x x. 4. It was solely out of the compassion and tolerance of the plaintiff, A which enabled all of the defendants to temporarily reside at her paraphernal property located at xxx Avenue, xxx Subdivision, xxx City. As members of the same family, complainant willingly allowed the defendants to briefly reside therein together with her minor child, K and eldest son, V while plaintiff continued her employment at Japan; 5. It was their understanding then that they were to reside therein by tolerance and rent-free, but as soon as the time comes that the plaintiff would need a residential unit for her or her immediate family’s need, all of the named defendants would necessarily vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff; 6. On September 7, 2006, plaintiff’s son got married. Necessarily and by reason of the fact that they do not have any other residential unit available, they required the defendants to vacate the premises and seek another place to stay. Unfortunately, this infuriated the defendants most specifically, defendant B who maintained that she was allegedly allowed to permanently reside therein, after having been allowed by the plaintiff to allegedly construct improvements, and to allegedly pay the necessary bills and dues of the household; 7. That by reason of the persistence of the defendants, they confronted the plaintiff’s son and forcibly asked him to vacate the residential unit. In order not to create any commotion and by reason of the delicate condition of his wife, they provisionally departed his mother’s residential house and lot; 8. All of the defendants are at present still occupying the residential house and lot and refuse to vacate and surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff who immediately left Japan to console her son’s predicaments. She immediately asked the defendants to vacate the premises upon her return but (was) simply threatened (by the defendants) and was forcibly asked (by the defendants) to leave her property;
By reason of the defendant’s unjustified refusal to vacate the premises. plaintiff through the undersigned counsel transmitted through registered mail with return card a “Final Demand Letter to Vacate” dated 21 November 2006 addressed to all of the defendants to vacate the premises within FIFTEEN (15) days from receipt of the demand letter which defendants received on 23 November 2006. She sought their assistance to peacefully lead away the said defendants and for the plaintiff to get back the physical possession of the house and lot rightfully belonging to her.9. X x x. In fact. 12. the claimed counsel of the defendants with much regret informed the undersigned counsel that his clients cannot comply with the final demand to vacate the property located at No. Plaintiff normally receives FORTY THOUSAND . x x x. On 28 November 2006. x x x. 13. On a mediation proceedings on the matter. the Tanggapan ng Kapitan ng Barangay issued a Certification (Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman) authorizing the plaintiff to file the appropriate action unto this Honorable Court stating that “walang nagawang pagaayos o pagkakasundo sa mga partido” was reached. 11. they disregarded the initial notice sent by the Barangay and even ignored the scheduled meetings/dialogues before the Lupon. xxx Subdivision. xxx City. On an effort to settle the matter. However. on (17 November 2006). X x x. 10. Plaintiff initially made an attempt to settle the matter amicably by filing a “Sumbong” (Complaint) before the Barangay Pamplona Dos Barangay Council against the defendants for unlawfully depriving her of the peaceful possession and enjoyment of her residential house and lot. As a reply. defendants unwaveringly manifested their refusal to vacate the premises before the Honorable Barangay Captain Romualda Villalon who mediated the parties. Thus. the undersigned counsel received a letter in response to the demand letter transmitted to the defendants. no amicable settlement was reached upon by the parties. 14. xxx Avenue. plaintiff would be compelled to stay at the Philippines for a period of time and as a result would necessarily lose her employment.
in addition to the moral damages. raised the defense that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the property to B. in its wise discretion. by incorporation and reference. . the defendants B. herein plaintiff has suffered and continuously suffers sleepless nights. docketed as Civil Case No.00) a month as salary from her employment. of xxx City. all of the foregoing allegations in her verified Answer. unjustifiably failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse to vacated the said premises. due to defendant’s wanton disregard and deliberate violation of the plaintiff’s right to enjoy the rightful possession of her property. serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from which entitle her to the recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable Court. Thus. et. In controverting the instant ejectment complaint. By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the defendants when they deliberately refused to vacate the aforesaid premises and by way of example or correction for the public good.00) as attorney’s fees plus Php2. and despite due notice and demand to vacate the same. interests. plaintiff was constrained to rent a residential townhouse unit at xxx Subdivision for which the plaintiff is constrained to pay at a month rental of EIGHT THOUSAND (Php 8. for specific performance and damages.(Php40. in its wise discretion. al. Further. al. X x x.000. may determine. Branch xxx. who have been unlawfully possessing and occupying the subject parcel of land. plaintiff herein is duly entitled for the payment of exemplary damages in such amount. 16.000. Defendants. 17.00 per court appearance. in the instant ejectment case cited the pendency of the case of “B vs. Likewise as a result of the unlawful possession of the residential house and lot. xxx. A” before the Regional Trial Court. 15. and for whose services she agreed to pay the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php25.00) pesos a month. as this Honorable Court. without presenting any proof of the due execution and authenticity of any written/documented or oral contract or agreement to positively prove and substantiate the alleged transaction.000. plaintiff was constrained to engage the services of a legal counsel to protect her own rights. “ (end of quote) The herein plaintiff adopts into this position paper. et. may determine. the defendants B.000. Due to defendants’ refusal to vacate the premises.
WHEREFORE. as well as payment for the debts and loans incurred by defendant A son. plus legal interest thereof from the filing of the complaint: ii) P1.000.00 representing reimbursement to the plaintiff for the support of defendant A eldest son. as exemplary damages. it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing judgment be rendered as to the principal cause of action: a) Ordering defendant A to execute the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff over the house and lot located at No.000.20.00. ii) P200. b) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the following amount: i) P300. judgment be rendered: a) Ordering defendant A to pay plaintiff the following sums: i) P1.00. herein defendant V. including the insurance thereof. xxx Avenue.000. representing the funeral expenses of defendant A minor son.000. and iv) To pay the costs of suit: In the alternative.000. xxx City and covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title No. K.00.00. representing rentals payments from August 2001 to October 2006 for . real property taxes homeowners association dues and payment for compromise settlement on the property in question. insurance premiums.105. as attorney’s fees. B (plaintiff in the said RTC-level case) prayed in her Amended Complaint as follows: X x x. herein defendant V: iii) P2.00. as moral damages. plus legal interest thereof from the date of the filing of the complaint: ii) P55.000.66 representing reimbursement to the plaintiff for the expenses of the renovations and Improvements. plus legal interest thereof from the filing of the complaint: b) Ordering defendants A and V to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the following: i) P1. xxx Subdivision.In the said RTC-level civil complaint.414.265. representing reimbursement to the plaintiff for the payment of defendant V’s car. iii) P100.351.000. premises considered.928. xxx of the registry of Deeds of xxx City.
2006 respectively x x x. February 14. The annotations therein will show that defendant was at constant connections with her children. To prove the contrary. . A -Seiwa (defendant in the said RTC-level case and plaintiff in the instant ejectment case before this Court) and her husband K alleged in their original Answer filed thru their former counsel. K1 and K2 as opposed to the allegation of the plaintiff that she agreed to the proposal that she would stand as the guardian of the children of the defendant which is self-serving in nature and cannot be substantiated by the plaintiff by evidence oral or documentary. 2. (end of quote). B. 1. in the said Civil Case No. X x x. which was set up by the plaintiff for defendant V.the business xxx Enterprise. The truth of the matter being that no written nor oral arrangement was ever reached by the parties with respect to the sale or transfer of the paraphernal house and lot registered under the name of the Defendant A before she contracted marriage with defendant K. 2006. 2001 and February 6. It is solely by reason of the compassion of the defendant towards her sister. xxx Subdivision. plus legal interest thereof from the filing of the complaint: iv) P100. the plaintiff herein and her brothers that they were permitted to stay at her paraphernal house and lot located at No.. C who had predeceased this controversy and her ungrateful children. R and C. defendant incorporates her Philippine Passports issued on March 1. xxx Avenue. Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. Along with them then was their biological mother. as attorney’s fees. Defendant belies the allegation of the plaintiff that the former was required to stay at Japan most of the time having the resident status therein and being married to a Japanese national.000. Xxx. Atty. C and her paraphernal property.00. Defendants resolutely maintain that no earnest efforts towards an amicable settlement were conducted between the parties. the following basic legal and factual defenses: Xxx. defendant A. Defendants deny the allegations stated in paragraph 6 of the complaint. xxx. Plaintiff has no legal right over the property of the defendant. For the record. 3. Plaintiff was permitted by tolerance to stay at the property of the defendant as a mere transient. Defendant’s mother stood as the guardian of V. her mother. She was surprised to find out that the instant case was filed by the plaintiff and that inappropriate and dishonest measures were undertaken which evidently showed her ungratefulness and greediness towards her sister. 4. xxx City.
among the following contracts that are considered unenforceable are: “(2) Those that do not comply with the statute of frauds as set forth in this number. evidence. 10. xxx that defendant was never in default in meeting with her obligations as well as that of her children. be in writing. or his agent. Further. V or by the plaintiff in a few instances using the money provided by the defendant. xxx registered with the Registry of Deeds of xxx City. therefore of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or as secondary evidence of its contents: (b) A special promise to answer for the debt. This is the primary reason why the various receipts (various attachments supplied by the plaintiff in her complaint) are issued under the name of the defendant and significantly not under the name of the plaintiff precisely because these were in fact paid by the defendant or by the defendant’s child. Furthermore. X x x. the improvements introduced by the plaintiff were constructed without the knowledge or the express consent or authority of the defendant who is the registered owner of the house and lot as perused from the Transfer Certificate of Title No. Significantly. 8. The allegation that the defendant be required to sell her house and lot to the plaintiff by virtue of the supposed verbal communication does not have any legal or factual basis. 7. 9. or miscarriage of another. pay the legal taxes due. the complaint merely alleges that defendant is liable to pay plaintiff for moral and exemplary damages. and support the defendant’s son. It is relevant t point out that under Article 1403of the Civil Code of the Philippines.5. She was a frequent vacationer here in the Philippines who at all times have shouldered the necessary payments for the obligations enumerated by the plaintiff upon her return and through her money transfers from Japan in order to pay these obligations. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action. and subscribed by the party charged. The operative or . X x x. unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof. no contract express or implied would indicate the claimed allegation of the plaintiff that she was to permanently reside on the property of the defendant and introduce improvements thereon. V with his various obligations. default. or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein”. 6. (e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year.
the Withholding Exemption Certificate of earned Income. A and her spouse K raised the following counterclaim: X x x. by way of example or correction for the public good. and the Incumbency Certificate of the defendant are herein attached and made an integral part of this Answer with Counter-Claim x x x. defendant. 11. A copy of the Certificate of Possible Salary Payment. As a result of this present controversy. the foregoing paragraphs are herein repleaded and reproduced insofar as they are herein relevant.000. x x x. By way of COUNTER-CLAIM. defendant was constrained to litigate this case and in order to protect their rights and interests was constrained to engage the services of counsel whom she .constructive facts making up the pleaded cause of action for damages were not stated in the complaint for which no credit should likewise be given thereto. 14. serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from which entitles her to the recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable Court. X x x. (end of quote) In their same Civil Case No. may determine. 13. Lastly and by reason of the baseless and unfounded complaint. Likewise and as a result of the unlawful possession by the plaintiff of the residential house and lot of the defendant. A suffered and continuously suffers sleepless nights. in its wise and sound discretion. defendant was compelled to stay at the Philippines for a period of time and as a result lost her employment in Japan. By reason of this baseless complaint. in addition to the moral damages.00) pesos a month for which once again the plaintiff must be compelled to pay by way of actual damages.000. 15. in its wise discretion.00) a month as salary from her employment for which the plaintiff must be required to pay by way of actual damages. material and significant. xxx. may determine. the latter was constrained to rent a residential townhouse unit at xxx Subdivision for which the defendant was constrained to pay a monthly rental of EIGHT THOUSAND (Php 8. 12. Defendant receives a monthly equivalent of Forty Thousand Pesos (Php 40. Also. as this Honorable Court. defendants herein are duly entitled for the payment of exemplary damages in such amount.
xxx. A and her spouse K (defendants therein) prayed for the following reliefs in their original Answer: X x x. • Monthly rentals of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8.00). EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein plaintiff (TCT No. it is most respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Court to dismiss the instant complaint. xxx. X x x. addressed to B signed by Atty.00) Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for. • Moral and Exemplary damages in such amount as determined by this Honorable Court. WHEREFORE. as to the counter-claim. B the following amounts: • Forty Thousand Pesos (Php 40. III. al. counterclaims and prayers as stated in her original Answer in the said Civil Case No.Letter (re: Final Demand Letter To Vacate). former counsel for A. addressed to B Herrera. 2.00) respecting the monthly income lost by the defendant from her employment in Japan. in the said Civil Case No. and all persons claiming possession of the subject property owned by . (end of quote) Further.00) incurred and continually incurred by the defendant as a result of the refusal of the plaintiff to surrender the peaceful possession of the defendant’s paraphernal property.000. 2006. 2006.000. Xxx. Annex “B” . the plaintiff respectfully submits to this Honorable Court the following documentary evidence in support of her ejectment complaint against the defendants: 1. dated November 8. marked as Annex “A” hereof. Annex “C” – Letter. after due hearing be ordered to pay the defendant. • Attorney’s fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50. all her foregoing allegations.000. the herein plaintiff A hereby adopts into this Position Paper. supra).000. premises considered.. (end of quote) For the record. by incorporation and reference. X x x. xxx. et.was obligated to pay the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50. dated November 21.
addressed to A and K thru N re: Attorney’s Fees. Jr. Annex “L” . 9. Xxx to protect her rights against the unjust acts of the defendants. current counsel for A. compelling the plaintiff to seek judicial redress. It proves the recalcitrance of the defendants in ignoring and rejecting the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff. Annex “F” – “Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman”. Annex “J” – “Legal Retainership Agreement”. Manuel Laserna. 11. counsel for B. signed by Atty. issued by A and notarized by Atty. 2007.Special Power of Attorney in favor of V dated January 12. addressed to Atty. dated November 13. re: Notice of Termination of Lawyer-Client Relationship and Legal Services. et. signed by Atty. dated April 15. dated April 3. showing the litigation expenses incurred by A in hiring the legal services of the said law firm to protect her rights against the unjust acts of defendants B. 2006. Xxx in xxx City. 3. Annex “D” .. 2007. signed by N and the Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices. issued by the said Barangay addressed to A and B. Annex “G” – “Engagement Contract”. Annex “H” – Letter. signed by A and K and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Tokyo. 2007. Myrna C.Letter dated November 24. al. but Maria xxx chose not to voluntarily participate therein) 5. addressed to A and B. Xxx.. addressed to Atty. 2006. Annex “K” – Special Power of Attorney in favor of the Laserna Cueva Mercader Law Offices acting thru Atty. 2007. signed by Atty. 2006. dated April 3. Manuel J. Xxx of xxx Law Offices. et. former counsel for A. 7. 4. thru Atty. 6. et. she had actual and constructive knowledge thereof. Laserna Jr.. Al. . Mercader. dated November 17. et. al. denying and rejecting the demand of plaintiff B to vacate the subject property.. former counsel for A. Manuel Laserna Jr. It proves the jurisdictional demand made by the plaintiff to the defendants to vacate the subject property under Rule 70 and the earnest efforts of the plaintiff to exhaust all remedies before commencing the instant court action. and/or Atty. Annex “I” – Letter. dated September 26. (Although defendant Maria xxx was not named therein. showing the expenses for professional fees incurred by the plaintiff in hiring the services of Atty. Xxx. being an actual resident of the property under the control and subsidy of B. dated April 11. addressed to A..A. thus. Annex “E” – “Patawag” issued by Barangay Pamplona II. 8. Xxx. Japan. al. signed by A and K. signed by her former Atty. It shows the failure of the defendants to settle with the plaintiff the instant ejectment controversy. Tafalla. 10. 2006. Xxx. 2007.
They disprove the claim of B that she was the one who had spent for all such expenses.“Contract of Lease”..Various business records of “xxx Enterprise” owned by the son of the plaintiff. al. sustenance. dated September 16.Employment records of the plaintiff A as an employee in Japan. which the plaintiff owns in fee simple as its lawful and registered owner. of the children of the plaintiff or that she was the one spending for the maintenance of the subject property or that she was the one who funded the burial of the deceased K. at P8. Annex “N” . his business-related transactions. etc. his wife. e. for the premiums of the fire insurance policies of the subject property. showing her incomes/salaries and financial capacity as such. Inc. and all other related necessary expenses relative to the children of the plaintiff and to the subject property. dated October 27. the upkeep and maintenance of the subject property. thus. Annex “M” (with sub-markings). to move out of the subject property owned by his mother (herein plaintiff) A. Annex “Q” (with sub-markings) – Proofs of various dollar remittances the plaintiff A had made from Japan to her son V and the defendant B for the support. 14. constraining him to lease a property in xxx City. al.g. as well as the Japan-based incomes that she had lost/waived for attending to the litigation of the pending cases involving her property in the Philippines. Incumbency Certificate. and the various annual local real estate taxes caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the local government of xxx City. et. V. 2006. his son V. 18. They disprove the claim of the defendant B that she was the one financially supporting the living expenses. It proves the huge economic opportunity losses the plaintiff and her children are incurring by reason of the unjust act of the defendants in dispossessing the plaintiff of her subject property. Annex “O” (with sub-markings) . V. e. issued by the xxx Co. the burial of another son of the plaintiff. charges and fees caused to be paid by the plaintiff to the 15..00/month. Annex “R” (with sub-markings) . who was harassed by defendants B. and his costs of . personal businesses and other expenses and costs of living of the son of the plaintiff. showing the fair marker value of the subject property and the improvements thereon.12. 16. They show the financial capacity of V to support himself. the various monthly dues. 13. where he and his wife could reside and where his mother could reside whenever she returns to the Philippines for vacations. 17. et.g. businesses. which the plaintiff had helped fund and organize. xxx Homeowners Association as a member in good standing of the Association being a homeowner therein. with supporting documents. on the subject property.000. education. 2006 of the son of the plaintiff. V. K.“Appraisal Report”.. Annex “P” (with sub-markings) ..Various proofs of payments caused to be paid/remitted by plaintiff A either directly or thru her duly authorized representatives.
etc. Annex “S” . 21. re: the purchase and full payment of a Mitsubishi Lancer vehicle made by the said corporation. xxx City) which A filed against the University of Perpetual Help Hospital and its attending doctors to seek damages for the death of K. as settlement money for the death of K (son of A) and showing that Atty. showing that he had paid his business loans thru his said account. personal maturity. xxx City).) related to the Deed of Exchange.Business and financial records of xxx Management Inc. a son of the plaintiff A. which the plaintiff A. xxx (RTC Branch xxx. A (represented by her [late] mother C)”. counsel for B in the instant ejectment case. Please note that the business names xxx and yyy were patterned after the names of the children of the plaintiff. and business acumen of V as a businessman. et. registration fees. The said records show that the amortizations for the said car were made and paid by the said Corporation and xxx Clan for the benefit of the latter and that the payments were made thru the account of the said corporation in BPI Family Bank. al. N v. the Compromise Agreement. contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one who paid for all such expenses. 19. B made it . received 10% thereof as his fees. 22. Branch xxx. 23.000. They prove that plaintiff A had paid for all the expenses (taxes. Annex “W” (with sub-markings) – Records of the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. Annex “X” (with sub-markings) – Records of the amicable settlement of Civil Case xxx (RTC. whose major stockholders are the xxx Clan. contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one who had funded the same.00 from the University of Perpetual Help Hospital.Business records of xxx Enterprise and yyy Collection (registered in the names of defendants B and R). Xxx. had helped put up and fund at a time when the said B and R were basically penniless or under financial straits.living expenses. They show the financial capacity. contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one who was supporting the personal maintenance and business operations of V. as we well-earning Japan-based employee. Annex “U” (with sub-markings) – Records of the checking account of V in Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC). as attorney in fact of A. contrary to the claim of the defendant B that she was the she who paid such business loans of V. Annex “T” (with sub-markings) . entitled “Sps. 24.. and the registration of the titles involved therein. involving the subject property. 20. The natural father of V belonged to the said Clan. The said amount was used by B to renovate/improve and maintain the expenses for the subject property and/or other expenses relative to the children of A and to defray some of the litigation expenses of the said civil case. Annex “V” (with sub-markings) . contrary to the claim of defendant B that she was the one who had paid for the said car.The passports of V showing his business travels abroad. The records show that the defendant B. received P600.
or who has acted beyond his powers. showing their various travels to the Philippines to care for and supervise A’s children in Metro Manila and to monitor their education. . unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation. (b) A special promise to answer for the debt. untrue and fabricated. (e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year. default. (f) A representation as to the credit of a third person. or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein. at the time of the sale. or some note or memorandum thereof. or pay at the time some part of the purchase money. names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made. it is a sufficient memorandum. of the amount and kind of property sold. chattels or things in action. (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage. 1403. assuming that such an agreement actually is vehemently denied by the plaintiff for being Under Art. or a secondary evidence of its contents: (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. and subscribed by the party charge. (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Fraud as set forth in this number. They disprove the claim of B that A had abandoned her children to her care. terms of sale. at a price not less that five hundred pesos unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels. IV. other than a mutual promise to marry. be in writing. unless the same. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action. Civil Code. or miscarriage of another. STATUTE OF FRAUDS The alleged contract of sale unenforceable and cannot be instant ejectment case. good conduct and businesses. price.appear claimed that the funds she used for the said purposes came from her own pockets. APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE A. of such things in action. or the evidences. an allegation which false. that existed. or some of them. of the agreement cannot be received without the writing. the following contracts are unenforceable. therefore. but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book. or by his agent. (d) An Agreement for the sale of goods. Annex “Y” (with sub-markings) – Passports of A and her husband K. 25. evidence. between the plaintiff A and the defendant B is raised as a valid legal and factual defense in the is.
24). Although the said provisions simply provides for the form or method by which contracts coming within its terms may be proved. the claimant must first prove the existence and due execution of such a contract. if any. La Tondeña. [26 Phil. Bolifer. 543). Under the Statute of Frauds. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are susceptible of ratification. 196. Monserrat. Hernandez v. and which is not signed by any person having authority to bind the seller. (Arroyo v. 91 Phil. 485]. are “ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same. According to Art. 512. held insufficient where the same was not signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the accountant who claimed (without establishing) that he was the vendor’s agent” (Reyes vs. takes a contact out of the operation of the statute. For example. 512. Almirol vs. Libo. 22 Phil. 48 Phil. Performance. 33 Phil. Gomez v. but which telegram neither describes the property nor states the purchase price. notwithstanding its formal defects. 68 Phil. 1406 provides that when a contract is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 777). a contract that has not been completed or executed yet. Cocjin vs. 1405 provides that contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds. the parties may avail themselves of the right under article 1357. 111. such memorandum of note should be in the form of a document or writing. Adal. (Conlu v. Kuenzler & Streff v. Lizarraga . Lopez. 78 Phil. 241. a telegram advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale of land had been previously made to come at once in order to complete the purchase. 76 Phil. 20 Phil. Robles vs. or (2) by the acceptance of benefits under them. Jiongco. the only formality required is that the contract or agreement “must be in writing and subscribed by party charged or by his agent”. or by the acceptance of benefits under them”’ while Art. which had been written either for the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose which satisfies all the statute’s requirements as to contents and signature would be sufficient. Domalagan v. whether total or partial. formal or informal. 76 Phil. 81 Phil. Art. In one case. the Supreme Court held that “a voucher or entry in an accountant’s book of account” purporting to show payment of a specified amount as consideration for the sale of leasehold right over a house “was. Araneta. and a public document is necessary for its registration in the Registry of Deeds. Paratcim 59 Phil. 568). Salcedo. Tabiliran. 493. referred to in No. such contracts may be ratified either (1) by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same. nonetheless. however.The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds. 471. 15 Phil. Laban. The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses (Shoemaker vs. that is. Although the Supreme Court has held in many cases that no particular form or language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing under the statute of frauds. is not a sufficient memorandum of sale to satisfy the requirement of the statue. Azur. 2 of article 1403. 1405 of the Civil Code. nonetheless. 387. Gallemit v. Magalona v. The settled rule is that the statute applies only to executory (Factoran vs.
373. reasonable. .G. 257). This is so because “the doctrine is based on equity. L-15133.G. 2. 1963. sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403. the following must appear in a public instrument: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation. Diama vs. Macalibo. or that he has made improvements thereon because and as a consequence of said supposed contract to sell (Pascual vs.Hermanos. 54 O. 55 O. of the Civil Code as to the forms or formalities of a contract or an agreement. Poncio. and 1405. Examples of “performance” include: (a) a sale of real property which has been consummated by the “delivery of the property to the vendee” (Soriano v. definite. For. Carbonnel v. Macalibo. 50 Phil. Heirs of Magali. Perez. For the doctrine to be availed of. aside from being fair. The doctrine of partial performance “cannot be invoked against the statute where the contract is vague. Under Art. In one case. Perez. ambiguous and uncertain” in its terms and as to subject matter. (b) or which has been “partially executed by payment of a part of the price” to the vendors “and the delivery” of the land to the vendees (Almirol vs. 1358. supra). Inc. 54 OG 2888). realty Investment. Forms of Contracts The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the subject property to defendant B fails to meet and comply with the strict procedural and evidentiary requirements set forth in Articles 1358. and unequivocal” in this terms and as to subject matter. obviously. modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property. there can be no partial performance until there is a “definite and complete agreement between the parties”. I74 Phil. Performance must be duly proved. the statute would apply (Babao vs. 2888). nothing less will suffice. 70. it was held that the transaction is not taken out of the coverage of the statute of frauds by the “mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession of the land as a tenant and that he had made substantial improvements thereon”. 53 O. Firstly. Lizarraga Hermanos. in order that a contract not to be performed within one year may be taken out of the operation of the statue. Diama vs. Babao v. 2415). such allegation being an “insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been executed or performed”. 91 Phil. No. unambiguous. and if anything remains to be done after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of money. et. B. transmission. July 31. 387). and it would be inequitable to enforce an agreement that does not satisfy the above requirements” (Babao vs. Barcelona vs. 387. seq. and just in this provisions. Civil Code. There must be an allegation to the effect that he had taken possession of the land in view of a supposed verbal contract he had with the defendant to purchase it.G. 50 Phil. the parol agreement relied upon must be “certain. clear. Barcelona. Partial performance does not of itself exclude the application of the Statute of Frauds. Perez. it must appear clearly that full or complete performance has been made by one party.
repudiation or enunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains. Civil Code. Under Art. in whatever from they may have been entered into. as a general rule. fraud. C. recognizing this necessity. one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed. EJECTMENT LAW AND CASES The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with technical and substantive requirements of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence applicable thereto. their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement. 1359. the same should be resolved by the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff ASeiwa. there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract. or should prejudice a third person. contracts hall be obligatory. inequitable conduct. does he ask for the restoration of his possession? Any controversy over ownership rights should be settled after the party . when. The questions to be resolved simply are these: First. Magat. or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document. fraud. the proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract. Although. inequitable conduct or accident. considering the summary nature of the instant ejectment suit. by reason of their importance. regardless of the pendency of the RTC-level case filed by B. threat. was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force. or stealth? And lastly. who had actual possession over the piece of real property? Second. yet there are certain contracts falling within the purview or scope of this rule which. The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or possession de facto over the real property. 67 SCRA 262). or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties. The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of real property – possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs. enumerates in Art. Thus. and grants in Art.(2) The cession. If mistake. The Civil Code. should be executed in accordance with certain formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect the interests of the contracting parties as well as that of third persons. (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document. (3) The power to administer property. strategy. by reason of mistake. 1357 a coercive power to the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the observance of the required form. 1358 the different classes of contracts which must appear either in a public or in a private document.
The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building and that such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. Section 1. it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises. In view of the summary nature of an ejectment suit. Under Sec. or a lessor. and unless. shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. or any person or persons claiming under them. or stealth. If it finds that said allegations are not true. by virtue of any contract. Under Sec. threat. when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. . intimidation. 19 of Rule 70 provides that if judgment is rendered against the defendant. irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. vendor. such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee. Rule 70 provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force. an ejectment case is a summary procedure. Under Sec. it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. with the other papers. Rule 70 provides that.who had the prior. the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building. for the restitution of such possession. vendor. unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond. attorney’s fees and costs. Concina. during the pendency of the appeal. Sec. 18 of the Rule. or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor. or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises. Section 2. In the absence of a contract. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true. execution shall issue immediately upon motion. Sec. 16 of Rule 70. strategy. or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court. express or implied. or by posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon. approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents. peaceful and actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon vs. he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract. together with damages and costs. if any. vendee. and that all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. 3 of Rule 70. the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. unless otherwise stipulated. to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. If a counterclaim is established. and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. 30 SCRA 897). damages. vendee. nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.
Bleza.. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case. Lim Si vs. (Alvir vs. 100 SCRA 339. Sarona vs. No. 63 SCRA 278). their rights according to the Civil Code. whereas in an action for reconveyance. An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. Encarnacion.. It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases that “a mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession” because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property (Prado vs. 130 SCRA 357). An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from a landlord. 98 Phil 868 (1956). Vera. 1980. October 17. without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. al. it may receive evidence on possession de jure to determine the nature of possession (Consing vs. et. (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of the landlord. the main issue is possession de facto. the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory. (b) whether or not there is a lease contract between the parties. nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto (Ramirez vs. al. Rule 70. In an unlawful detainer case suit. while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of ownership. 22 SCRA 1256). independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may se forth in his pleading. L-53788. Teodoro vs. Rules of Court. Montecillo. In actions of forcible entry and detainer. 1981. 21 of the Rule. . Villegas. Jamandre. the inferior court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between the parties is one of landlord and tenant. vs. Ching Pue vs. As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto. 22 SCRA 632 (1968). Gonzales. Defendants’ claim of ownership of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the inferior detainer. Lim. Pajarillaga. L-19379. G. Pardo de Tavera vs.Under Sec. Mirasol. it is inadequate for the ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property. 64 SCRA 1). 150 (1956). and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to the ownership of the land and the building. April 30. Valdellon.R. 81 (1950). July 30. The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature (Devesa vs. Pharma Industries. the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease contract has already expired. 106 SCRA 187). 99 Phil. 1964. Inc. et. As such. Calpo. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto. cited in Spouses medina and Bernal vs.. L-45640. vendor or vendee or other person after the expiration or termination of the detainer’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract express or implied (Section 1. 27 SCRA 822. ownership is the issue. 87 Phil. (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the date when it will take effect.
al. Cruz v. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lease continued by tolerance of the owner. 752). failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 63 Phil. No. vs. No. Tuason. In such a case. 121 SCRA 347).This is so because the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Canaynay vs. L-1364. Loo Soo v. et al. R. Pharma Industries. G. 1951. Elepanio. No. citing Montelibano vs. it is declared in a great number of cases that the trial court will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations alone (Savinada v. L-2332. Pascual. 79 Phil. Animas. 81 SCRA 269). 107 SCRA 564. 43 SCRA 136. When consent is withdrawn and owner demands tenants to leave the property. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission. April 28. May 30. Villegas. No. 1949. Navarro 126 SCRA 167). Castro vs. L-4684. Hingaran Sugar Plantation. G. Aguilar. 802-803). 1951). Pajarillaga. is “necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand”. G. May 30.G. Macalalag. Guarin.R. 36. RECENT EJECTMENT JURISPRUDENCE . 21 SCRA 146. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of action not involving possession. 117 SCRA 735). without any contract between them. 22 SCRA 1257. 109 Phil. Even where defendant in a detainer or forcible entry “alleges title to the property” in his answer.. It is “time procedure” designed to remedy the situation (Mabalot vs. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. 52 O. 1950. Villanueva. Mediran V. et. 6193. De Los Rey7es v. L-3466. Neither is prior physical possession of the property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Sarmiento. So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs. October 4.Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot override substantial justice (Dakudao vs. 64). Where the possession of defendant is “by tolerance” on the part of the plaintiff. Dehesa vs.R. the possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time that there is a demand to vacate (Amis vs. 100 SCRA 339). Osorio. Española. L-2132.R. Madela. Robles vs. (Philippine National Bank vs. the owner’s right of possession is deemed asserted.G. Sarona vs. D. October 13. San Jose. 81 SCRA 543. Consolacion. 37 Phil. 1959. It is not necessary that there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a possessor “by tolerance”. Lunsang. Aragon.. or his predecessor. Inc. Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be divested of its jurisdiction over ejectment cases “simply because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership over the litigated property” (Alilaya vs. delos Reyes. Jr. the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate (Calubayan vs. 797. The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved (Republic vs. 122 SCRA 877).
Avendaño. September 27. respondent [G. citing Pue et al.The plaintiff A further cites the following recent ejectment-related jurisprudence in support of her complaint. 81. v. Thus: X x x. In the case of CONCEPCION V. No. the firmly settled principle is that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the defendant. etc. April 10. et. per Barredo. Gonzales. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former(Ramirez v. 2. 1977. an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. v. AMAGAN. Bleza. In this case. it was held as a general rule. 868 (1956). 2000]. it was held ha on the issue of jurisdiction. that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding. 138377. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v." [Wilson Auto Supply Corp. unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal. v. on not a few occasions. 1992. As a general rule. vs. on considerations of equity. 98 Phil. The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first ascertained. 106 SCRA 187 (1981)). and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.. Yatco. 3. February 9. the issue is pure physical or de facto possession. and. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession. TEODORICO T.G. Lim. et. Court of Appeals. al.R." [Vda [de Legaspi v. (1950))..] In these cases. 208 SCRA 108. Guballa Sr. Respondents. 168 SCRA 518 (1988)). or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. It has been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. CJ. 17 SCRA 920 (1966)) do not abate the latter. In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. February 28. J. however. per Narvasa. 87 Phil. R. 79 SCRA 135. al. and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ. therefore. . No. MARAYAG. without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. 107036. CA et al. As an exception. a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. the Court also held: "1. 1993. vs.
133 SCRA 520 (1984). An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same property(Quimpo v. 134651. GR No. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure].. Inc. 174 SCRA 517 . . or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property(Salinas v. CA. 154 SCRA 153 (1987). In the caser of Sps. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Guzman v. CA. Leopoldo Sy v. 95818. Jimenez v. Cuyegkeng. and later. to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Be that as it may. 5 July 1996. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank [G. Gaurana.R. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e. However. L-29264.4.R.g. Court of Appeals.. No.annulment of document). Dante v. Benguet Consolidated. 118284. CA. A complaint for . Caparros v. v. G. September 18. Navarro. 46 SCRA 139 (1972)). 59255. from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. such as where the issue was raised by petitioners for the first time only in a Petition for Review and only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals. 149 SCRA 352 (1987). An action for reformation of instrument (e. De la Cruz v. Aug. 174 SCRA 517 (1989). Abragan. a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. de la Victoria. 258 SCRA 347. even on appeal. Court of Appeals. it was held that the rule is settled that although a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Neither do suits for annulment of sale. 29 December 1995. we find no error in the MeTC assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter. 177 SCRA 604 (1989). G.366 (1996)] although the resulting judgment would be conclusive only with respect to the possession but not the ownership of the property [Sec. Ching v. CA. 154 SCRA 153 (1987) . 29 August 1969.R. in subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the RTC. CA. citing Rodriguez v. 2000]. 7. 29 SCRA 419. Demamay v.annulment of sale and title. 174 SCRA 108. (annulment of sale and reconveyance).] and invoked its jurisdiction with the filing of their answer. In the case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Rosales v. CFI. Inc. Pardo de Tavera v. it was held that nothing is more settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned with the issue of physical or material possession of the subject land or building. Rule 70. if the issue of possession depends on the resolution of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint.R. 129887.. 126 SCRA 167.. Inc. 161 SCRA 264 (1988)). 6. 18 SCRA 1184 (1966). CA et al. Patricia. Court of Appeals. 251 SCRA 545. 258 SCRA 347. Inc. 18. v. Dante v. 186 SCRA 608 (1990).annulment of sale with damages. No. Navoa v. Philippine Feeds Milling Co. 22 SCRA 632 (1968). 1991).g. Navarro. in seeking affirmative relief from it. Malaya. Commander Realty. Ang Ping v. the same must not result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play. RTC . No. Salinas v.. Court of Appeals. February 17. 177 SCRA 288 (1989) . 153 SCRA 412 (1987).annulment of title. Thus: X x x. [G. 66 SCRA 600 (1975)). Drilon v. Sison. 8 SCRA 549 (1963). and where petitioners participated actively in the proceedings before the MeTC [Refugia v. the municipal trial court may resolve the latter [Refugia v. 170 SCRA 758 (1989) . Jimenez. 2. or title. 126 SCRA 167 (1983) annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage. No. Encarnacion. 5. No. Sison. CA (annulment of sale and reconveyance). 2000]. Galgala v. 8.
No. 31 January 1972. thus. Spouses ADOR and TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS. As such. G. their stay was by tolerance of respondent. No. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA ANZURES. petitioners. [G. although possession by petitioners (other than Villaluz) lasted beyond March 31.R. is considered as possession by tolerance. Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". X x x. the allegations in the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Court of Appeals. Francisco. 232 SCRA 372. 43 SCRA 136]. 30 November 1962. 1988 up to the time they received the demand to vacate on February 23. 25 June 1980. 138 Phil. Aguilar. 6 SCRA 785. 106214.petitioners were able to enter the subject premises as sublessees of Purisima Salazar who. [Sumulong v. 1988 (the date they were supposed to vacate the premises in accordance with the agreement between petitioner Villaluz and private respondents). No. And such right legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate [Sy Oh v.R. citing Calubayan v. In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ. Pangilinan v. it was held that the one-year reglamentary period under Section 1. As correctly found by the appellate court. Yu v. No. De Catchuela v. The complaint clearly stated how entry was effected and how and when dispossession started . 10 May 1994. 98 SCRA 172.]. L-22645. CHIT ILAGAN. [Vda. Said petitioners are not lessees but their status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. L31985. nevertheless their continued possession from April 1. 1997].unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Garcia and Lim Chi v. to which we agree. their . L-16084. Hon Garcia. No. vs. despite the termination of her lease with respondent. Hon. de Lara. No. In this case. X x x. Pascual. continued to occupy the subject premises without any contract with it. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 108817. Thus: X x x. 21 SCRA 146. Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. 18 September 1967. respondents. L-29275. September 5. The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy has continued by tolerance of the owner. 777]. Their right of possession of the said property stems from their being employees of petitioner Villaluz who only allowed them to occupy the premises for a certain period. 1989.
vs. the same was timely filed within the prescriptive period. without any contract between them. 36]. [ Refugia v. 28[ See Vda. 1989. 14 SCRA 430. Remedial Law Compendium 793 (1997)] The above doctrine expressly and properly applies to co-defendant MARIA xxx. the one year prescriptive period for filing the appropriate action to remedy the unlawful withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of receipt of the last demand to vacate[Calubayan v. Regalado. and who lives with them. In such case. November 29. Yu v.R. relatives and other privies of the defendant. since the complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12. 1999]. The foregoing facts were not denied (in fact. et. al. admitted sub silencio) by the other defendants in their past pleadings in this case.. CA. Pascual. No. 128743. COURT OF APPEALS. INC. control. who is under their direction. X x x. de Prieto v. is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand. subsidy and assistance. Canaynay v. [I Florenz D. petitioner. Reyes. 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that time that possession becomes illegal. that "the person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission. or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last demand to vacate. supervision. INC.. it was held that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto. c) transferees pendente lite. Having merely stepped into the shoes of the latter. if they are: a) trespassers. who is an aunt of the defendants B. De Lara." otherwise the remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the premises. . Sarmiento. 258 SCRA 347 (1996). 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]. Accordingly. respondents[G. 79 Phil. or f) members of the family. b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant. e) co-lessee.possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. said petitioners cannot acquire superior rights than that of petitioner Villaluz. It has been ruled. squatters or agents of the defendantfraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment. In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES. and who had actual and constructive knowledge of the existence of the mandated Barangay conciliation and mediation proceedings but nonetheless impliedly waived her appearance thereto by not voluntarily appearing and participatingtherein despite such knowledge. d) sublessee. former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES.
No. Miller. 29 August 2006. and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands”. . 2008. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. The courts may deny equitable relief on the ground that the conduct and actions of a party are inequitable. G. or deceitful. PRAYER WHEREFORE. He or she who has done inequity shall not have equity. with awards of damages. Ampil.R. or fraudulent. 137533. (Miller vs. “One who seeks equity must do equity. litigation expenses.) VI. No. 483 SCRA 315. G. 27 February 2006.R. it is respectfully prayed that instant ejectment suit be decided in favor of the plaintiff A and against all of the defendants. dishonest. 149615.R. CONCLUSION It is an established principle in law that one who comes in equity must come with clean hands. 392 SCRA 506). Las Pinas City. and costs of suit. 22 November 2002. G. No. ordering the defendants to VACATE and SURRENDER the de facto/material possession of the subject property to the plaintiff or her duly authorized legal representative/s. 160016. premises considered. unfair. Abacus Security vs. (Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. January 9.V. as duly proved by the various documentary evidence attached to this Position Paper.