Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua

(Alliance of Democracy for Papua)
YAYASAN KERJA SAMA UNTUK DEMOKRASI DAN KEADILAN

Final Report 2011 Symbol, Language and Violence Everywhere

I. INTRODUCTION : Papua, in 2011, was still filled with violences which even increasing compared to a year before. These violences occurred massively either in cities or kampongs. These violences happened intensively for longer time at certain regions or places such as violences occurred in PT. Freeport, Puncak Jaya and Jayapura which involved areas of different religions, ethnicities, and professions. The victims ranged from civilians to security personnel. Although these violent actions and the victims are well documented, it is hard to obtain actual facts of the occurences. These actions tended to force public to identify the perpetrators and their motives, raise suspicion to one another and live in fear. Money and power have been regarded as the strongest motive to take anybody’s life, civil society or security members. The government, particularly, legal apparatuses have not been able to prevent or reveal any actors and their motives as well as to draw lines among those violent actions. The main reason might be inability to play neutral and higher internal contention within legal institutions and other security apparatuses for the sake of money and power. These have raised public distrust in government. No one can not be counted on to protect them since security personnel were also part of the victims. Local governments were not able to administer the governments and protect their people when they have the authority and sources of funds. This included their responses to various violent actions when government administration still employed the status of “Tertib Sipil” (civil order). Central government’s dominance was getting stronger, both in the form of intevensions in regulations and behaviors.

II. MAJOR ISSUES 1. Local governments were not capable to administer governments and protect the people. a. At least in the last 6 months, civil government of Papua Province has been administered by an acting governor who does not have better perspective of the region and still takes the position as the Directorate General of Local Development Supervision of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and is keen to central government interest. These have lent the current governor to not carrying out the task maximally and failure to maintain communication with local governments and the people. Security approach has still been seen as the perfect choice to settle problems in Papua. b. In line with it, the regents of the kabupatens where the intensity of violent actions are extremely found now join in the nomination of Papua governor election. They have been really occupied with preparing their victory, so local government administrations do not run well. No crucial roles have been taken to overcome problems in their regions which gives room for the central government intervension (security approach). c. A lot of funds are given directly to the kampongs which weakens the functions of distrik government since the kampongs prefer to communicate straight with kabupaten. This has made many kampong apparatuses to stay at cities of kabupatens. Although a lot of funds have been supplied to kampongs, no significant changes have been made particularly to very remote kampongs or desa (another term for village) than changes in the pattern of money-oriented life. Monitoring to kampongs or desa has seldom been carried out as well. d. MRP (Papua People’s Assembly) has been paralyzed in terms of regulations and personality which can be seen from the process of election and stipulation of MRP members, chair election, and MRP position that totally controlled by Jakarta. Local local government leaders and MRP members are not able to stand consistently and they easily fail to keep commitment they made. The formataion of MRP and MRPB (MRP for Papua Barat Province) has created internal problems such as changes in code of conduct, Chair of MRP election, and tension among members. This is also seen in their funding. Since the election and they started to work, MRP and MRPB do not have their own budget allocated in the regional budget. The two institutions still survive upon funding from each Regional Secretariat. e. The role of DPRP (Papua Legislative Assembly) has been focusing on particular issues promoted by certain people whereas the role of other members of the assembly can not be monitored. This has weakened the coordination which results in poor

mechanism in decision making and administration process. The focus of the legislative discussion on local regulations of 2011 was only on PERDASUS (local regulation) regarding Governor Election. Holding Company has shown that the regulation has only oriented to authority holder interest and government funds were not allocated for public interest. f. Constitutional efforts made by many parties toward governor election, for example governor tenure and citizen constitutional rights have still been linked to political interests. Meanwhile, different forms of legal instruments have still been applied that lessen the development of democratic and political education to society. It even raises confusion since it is maintained for the necessity of political actors. Now issues on separatist movements have been linked to local government such as during local government election, government administration or infrastructural project. It is allegedly a scenario to involve TPN/OPM as the cause to the suspension of billion rupiah infrastructural project in a way to divert the funds. TPN/OPM is made to involve altogether which causes fear to those who plan to carry out inspection or visit the place where the project implemented. Separatisms have become stronger justification to deploy troops to a number of corporations’ areas (large or small) and it has been utilized in the competition of security apparatuses’ existence.

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Ten Years of Special Autonomy: Failure to Satisfy Papuans Basic Rights a. After the increasing demands for reprobration of special autonomy in 2010, the year 2011 had been dominated by news on evaluation of the special autonomy. Yet, the news was to some extent made by DPR RI (local government representatives), DPRP and the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, there are no reports or follow-ups of the process of the evaluation. To date, government has still maintained the special autonomy which is considered capable to overcome problems in Papua since no other choice available. The implementation of the special autonomy has still been focused on settling problems regarding people’s welfare whereas fulfilling civil and political rights mainly by institutionalizing human rights instruments contain in the special autonomy as well as the rights for democracy and freedom which are still under repression. The increase in political, economic, social and cultural cases in 2011 shows the progressive failure of the special autonomy as solution to Papua. The special autonomy is not only making a lot of money to be supplied to Papua, it also draws money out from Papua from the disbursement of the funds to the central government. This has been maintained by the practice of “uang kecil beli uang

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besar” (little money buy large money), purchasing project, the culture of paying tribute to government inspectors, the culture of wasting a lot of money outside Papua and such other type of corruption. d. Presumption of corruption appeared in different version, started out by statement from Papua police, Papua High Court, PCW report upt BPK findings that claimed that there was an indication of abuse of special autonomy funds since 2001 – 2010 reaching around Rp. 4 trillion. However, most of the findings have not been processed. According to Head of Papua High Court, there are 142 corruption cases in Papua and Papua Barat (Bintang Papua 3/8/2011), 69 cases are under investigation, 44 cases have been processed at court and in 2011 there were 20 cases had been put to Tipikor (corruption act) court decision (Cepos/4/01/2012). Excessive supply of funds in thein the form of RESPEK, empowerment funds or special BK3 funds for Kabupaten Keerom hav Kebijakan bagi – bagi uang dalam bentuk dana RESPEK, pemberdayaan ataupun khusus dana BK3 untuk kab Keerom have not been distributed and used accountably whether in small portion or in making changes. Although RESPEK agents have been placed, assistance they have not been able to carry out the assistance maximally. Certain kamung community members at times spend the funds and notify the agents later. The agents can not approach all kampongs due to insufficient fundings or the agents resign. In addition, the accountability is very complex that it is hard to prepare the financial report. Monitoring has only been reported on papers because of “limited funding supports which enable the agents to monitor down to all kampongs,” as explained by an inspection official of Kabupaten Keerom. Distribution of physical aids, including those under special autonomy funds, is sometimes available to cities or stops at centers of distrik government. The distribution of the supports is many times held to local offices or distriks responsibility without any financial support. As a result of it, the aids are compiled, unused, or dissapear. Special autonomy has not been made special to Papua beside a lot of both incoming and outgoing funds that are hard to control. In line with such ineffective implementation of the special autonomy, the speciality of the special autonomy and its developmental policy has gone astray in terms of regulations and behaviors.

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3. Violence Heightening and more open a. The Bintang Kejora flag has still been used as a propaganda as to give label to Papua’s Independence. The raising of the flag has still occurred at certain moments such as December 1st, 2011 which occurred in Merauke, Wamena, Timika, Puncak Jaya and

Jayapura. The flag was also found waving or at a particular occasion during police intensive search as found when the flag was raised in Tanah Hitam and Nafri case in Jayapura in August. b. Violence against civilians has also been running and easily caught in the eyes such as those occurred in Kali Kopi (7 April 2011), Samabusa Nabire Derek Adi (14 May 2011), the shootings in Nafri (August 2011), Keerom Dasnum Gomba (17 August 2011), Gorong – Gorong Timika (10 October 2011), KRP III (Papuan People Convention on 19 October 2011) and Matias Tenouye in Degewo (13 November 2011) and such other cases. At particular cases, the perpetrators were visibly identified but the police has only processed them locally as found in Matias Tenouye case. Police has not been able to reveal the actors and at the same time the government is prone to stay innosense or does not want to hold responsibility as seen in the victims of KRP III. c. Security apparatuses have also been victims of various number of violent actions for example cases occurred in Pintu Angin Puncak Jaya (21 Juli 2011), Puncak Senyum (3 Agustus 2011), Perumnas IV (agustus 2011), AKP Dominggu Awes Puncak Jaya (24 Oktober 2011), Berap (1 Desember 2011) and Wandigobak Mulia (3 desember 2011) and such other cases. Unfortunately, although police and military forces have carried out operations either those which carried out respectively or collectively involving deployment of personnel from outside Papua, the perpetrators at times linked to TPN/OPM which most of them have not been captured. d. Local government elections in several kabupatens have been the triggers from several other violent actions among the supporters because of ignorance of democracy and politic, inconsistency of political parties and the election committee as well as contestion among government administrators as occurred in Kabupaten Puncak, Yahukimo and Lanny Jaya. e. Actions and publications in the name of TPN/OPM have been launched by various groups and interacted through media and society and news. This includes making claims of several violent actions, for example, several incidents upon Nafri case and the shooting of Mulia Police Chief. Although the police has carried legal procedure, it is hard to determine which of the suspects were the real shooter. f. The deployment of military personnel have been excessively carried out and open like when the intensive search was held upon Nafri case and KRP III which has gone against the procedure specified in Law Number 34 of 2004 namely this has to be carried out under approval from the president or Legislative Assembly. This shows how dominant military power has been played ignoring civil authority and the police.

g. The spread of information can not be controlled and widely accessible to public and can only be controlled by particular groups. Civil society can not develop a quick response system which is functioned as a media to confirm an event or news. This can be seen from many provocative messages spread through various means of communication that raised certain community distress such as university students who live in dormitories and non Papuans. It was even worse when the message was to provoke ethnic and religious conflict, for example the cases on August in Nafri, BTN Tanah Hitam, Angkasa and the news of the killing of an Ojek (motorist who gives rides for money) which all were sensational during and after KPP JDP (July 2011), ILWP Conference in London (Agustus 2011), KRP III (October 2011) and on 1 desember 2011. h. Infiltration of security personnel into civil institutions and many social activities, including journalist works were common occurrences. Intimidation, stigmatization, criminalization were efforts directed to human rights activists, religious leaders, journalists who work for democracy and justice in order to stop the process of revealing facts on violence to necessitate wider legal processes and advocacy.

4. PT Freeport: Strategic Violence a. The demonstrations managed by the PUK SPSI of PT Freeport which occurred for certain period of time already took the lives of certain people. Mediations were managed many times (tripartite and bipartite) but they were not completed well and this has shown that PT Freeport has taken the case seriously. Moreover, the conflict which was first pertaining to industrial matter related to the workers welfare now had involved adat community and security forces which then dragged it to be wider and packed with political nuances. b. Violent actions around PT Freeport mining areas have not been easily overcome as a result of the strong roles of security forces which back up the company, carry out business of which backing up pendulang traditional (local people who find gold using tray-like medium), are allegedly linked to militant formation and encroachment into managerial and financial position among security authorities. c. The ceaseless violent incidents around PT Freeport mining areas which have taken many deaths has raised an impression that the mining areas have been a good place to generate any strategic issues altogether. These strategic issues include investments, adat community and security forces for the same of struggle for money and power.

5. Development of education, Health, People’s Economy and Infrastructures do not meet the need of the people a. Basic education at kampongs has been a serious problem which mainly because of the absence of the teachers. Insufficient supply of funds, transportation and matters pertaining to promotion has sometimes been the main trigger of the problem. The decrease in the quality of education does not only occur at kampongs only but cities as well. The educators still demand for better facilities such as desktops, laptops, or motorcycles. b. Vocational schools at cities have developed vastly with better management compared to the other public schools. The vocational schools have mainly obtained supports from sources outside the special autonomy funds. However, these supports have not been able to develop opportunities for business maximally. Unemployment rate is high whereas job orientation has still been focused to gain supports from governments such as provision of capital and promotion to work as civil servants.

c. Numerous demonstrations have created another problem to education particularly with the case of Universitas Cenderawasih which begin to have their implication to teaching and learning process. Besides, campus has not been a good place for learning since campus has been a target of violence. Although there are many private universities/colleges, they have not been improved well. They have complained to have no better attention and supports from the government, considering they also have facilitated the majority of Papuans from kampongs with limited financial supports. d. Protests staged by paramedics and health officials as occurred in RSUD Dok II Jayapura and RSUD Jouwarry Kabupaten Jayapura have shown that the governments, particularly the hospitals managements have not been capable to manage the financial sources for the interest of development in the quality of health service. For example, this would include Jamkespa (health assurance for native Papuans), supply of medicines, surgery equipment, sterilization equipment, office tools and furnitures, budget for patients’ meals etc. as well as ignorance of the paramedics and medical professionals’ safety and welfare. e. Development of health in a number of kampongs is relatively showing better improvement compared to education sector mainly availability of facilities, medical professionals and medicines. However, many medical professionals at puskesmas (hospital at distrik level) and pustu (secondary hospital) do not often receive their salaries in time or the salaries are abused. Moreover, aids supplied from puskesmas at times can not be distributed maximally because of insufficient funds.

f. Disparity between kampongs and cities, the rich and the poor, Papuans and Non Papuans and among Papuans is high due to economic policies that have not been directed to favor particular groups with limited access. g. Government policy on small entrepreneurs by localizing Papuans entrepreneurs away from fair competition is contrary to the policy which gives wider room to entrepreneurs with large capital power. In addition, proper capital gain and somewhat paperworks to comply with at banks are not able to give supports to Papuans. This has resulted to unchanging welfare condition of Papuans for years. At kampongs, the supply of funds for the people economic development can not be provided continuously and without agent assistance. h. The steps taken by local governments to overcome demographic obstacles specifically from main kabupatens to the new-formed regions by which the governments build roads or provide air transport have not been planned efficiently. This has an implication to developments of other sectors such as education, health, economy as well as government presence.

6. Random Advocacy of Natural Resources Management a. Management of natural resources has mostly been managed traditionally. Numbers of entrepreneurs have still been in doubt of the security condition and twisting bureaucracy in Papua and conflicts regarding ulayat rights among adat communities. b. Authorization for the management of natural resources which is of kabupaten/kota governments authority and the use of military backups at a number of companies areas have been the chief weapon for big entrepreneur to transfer the people land property rights. The governments sometimes do not take any heed of ulayat rights when authorizing a business operation. This is even made clearer when governments are in the position of gaining tribute or shareholders of the companies. c. Adat community movements have not been focused on strengthening adat community. Interest in economic realm or involvement in a number of political agendas has loosen their commitment in investment which is vulnerable to fractions within adat kinship. Moreover, consumptive culture has made the people to be easily influenced to transfer their ulayat rights and value their lands in view of economy. Internal conflicts are getting wider which bring about creation of fake adat figures on companies interests. d. Advocacy for management of natural resources has not been managed in synergic manner between ‘calling for refusal’ or ‘preparing the people.’ As a result, the people

sometimes can escape investors’ allurements while they can trapped as well into other investors’ allurement. Such advocacy would then come to its end with failure. This can even be worse if the advocacy duration is very short and the distance between the people and advocacy agents is far. Advocacy at regions such as Degewo Nabire, Depapre and Senggi have to be based on physical conditions and longer allocation of time.

7. Women and Children are still Domestic Issues a. Although facts have shown the domestic violence has been increasingly found at cities due to higher distribution of money which of men dominance, women are not able to pursue the type of violence publicly. The culture where women want to sustain their status as wife and even if husbands are the sole supplier of all family needs has made women to be reluctant to proceed the cases to legal procedure. b. Socialization of Law on Domestic Violence (PKDRT) and Child Custody has been managed evenly. However, it is difficult to be applied since the law has always been in the form of socialization and insufficient advocacy available to a number of violence against women and children. The UN Resolution 1325 on the importance of women involvement in formal discussion have not been commonly campaigned. c. Adovocacy of women groups have not been developed in synergic manner among economic, cultural and political levels and for political movement. So, it has always been managed for particular moments or made present for the sake of justification. d. Criminality rate of children at school rate is increasing for example theft (including motor vehicles theft), tortuturse and adultery. These are all resulted from the consumptive way of life, free information in public, and untight interaction at home.

8. The Concept of Dialog: Finding Definition a. About 26 Public consultations to Papuans and 6 consultations to strategic community which have been organized by Jaringan Damai Papua (JDP) are significant gain to sustain supports to the concept of dialog as solution to settle problems in Papua. Despite the supports, JDP and its activities encountered rejections as well. It faced it through pressures and defamation both institutionally and individually. b. Papua Land of Peace Conference (KPP) organized by JDP was a crucial momentum to bring together central government and local government as well as Papuan

people’s representatives, despite of strong standpoints made by all parties. The KPP produced an indicator of Papua Land of Peace as a reference for thematic discussion to sustain supports for the dialog. Declaration brought about in the KPP raised controvercy which demands clarification of JDP’s position. After implementation of KPP, JDP reaffirmed its position: facilitator for all. The statement was reaffirmed in the year-end evaluation. Regarding central government reception of the concept of dialog as seen in SBY speech on 9 November 2011, JDP is asked to change its objectivity. c. SBY’s response to the dialog as a way to settle problems in Papua came on the right moment and gains appreciations from foreign parties to Indonesian government. However, that does not change security condition in Papua to gradually better condition because violence still exists. SBY’s reaction to appoint Dr. Faridh Husein as a special delegation and the formation of UP4B have still been questioned in relation to their authority and communication in order to establish dialog as a peaceful solution in Papua. d. Certain parties that used to refuse to accept the concept of dialog have not taken major roles even are competing for strategic position. Their behaviors sometimes interpreted as competition among particular groups or individuals which often provoke character killing carried through campaigns. When the concept of dialog becomes open, it is hard for all parties to get together to give definition to the dialog.

III. CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT CONDITION 1. Higher intensity of demonstrations were staged in Papua, particularly Jayapura as a way to protest various government policy. Movements staged by adat community, religious groups and NGOs as a repressive action tend to slow down and are not in a synergic manner. The tight formal agenda of each institution and other internal problems require special attention which includes management of human and funding resources. Local government elections have also made civil society elements such as NGOs, women groups, adat community, youth groups and religious institution to involve in political agenda. The politic dissecting civil society has been maintained through domestication, infiltration and internal resistance. As a result of this any expressions or actions bears suspicions. It is hard for people to differentiate between to communicate, negotiate and building alliance. Key figures at civil society are not able to establish synergic commitments and each group keep playing their own agendas even though communication has been maintained properly. No mutual scenario has been established in a momentum which makes advocacy impossible to run maximally.

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Although violent actions are intensively growing in Papua, the roles played by international agencies particularly embassies have still been directed to their institutions that is how they obtain accurate information maximally where civil organizations are potential source of the types of information. Their contributions to civil movements are cautiously made due to Indonesian government policy. This is contrary to the agendas they carry regarding law enforcement, clean and authoritative governance, conflict resolution and capacity building for other civil society.

IV. GOVERNMENT APPROACH 1. The government has still employed ethical approach through the special autonomy and UP4B policies which have only been focused for the sake of improving people’s welfare. Fulfillment of human rights which concerned with civil political rights that mainly include freedom of expression and legal protection have not been attained clearly. The increase in the special autonomy funds for which infrastructures are allotted, can not be able to tackle the basic problems native Papuans face. Discriminative legal approach is still maintained to, for example hinder freedom of democracy and expressions as seen in KRP III. But that has not been able to reveal the tortures and killings of civilians at KRP III. The settlement of corruption cases which allegedly have involved government leaders in the province and kabupatens have gone slowly, without follow ups or even SP3 (warning) as found in such cases which involve regents and politicians. Statements made by President SBY regarding Papua on 9 November 2011 in which the president shared his willingness to hold dialog with Papuan people under three pillars: NKRI, OTSUS and UP4B. Previously, on 16 August 2011, the president made an expression Developing Papua with Heart. Besides, SBY also requires the ministeries to pay on site visit to Papua. Although SBY made several special statements in response to problems in Papua, security approach has still been maintained as the prime approach. This is markedly seen in the form of allied operation of military and police, deployment of troops as well as various intelligent operations. Moreover, military oppressions have been defined as an access, not crime against humanity as expressed by Indonesian government in response to the victims after KRP III or the incident in Bukit Eduda Enarotali.

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V. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATION OF 2012 A. CHALLENGES 1. The public view UP4B a policy in place of Special Autonomy Law. The central government policy has been put into questions and considered not reflecting what is really needed in Papua. Rejections to UP4B come also from local governments because UP4B is afraid to reduce to roles previously played by local governement. 2. Paralel with the decreasing implementation of special autonomy, the definition of native Papuans will easily be designed for political reasons within the regulations, bureaucracy, and individual which directed to benefit particular groups instead of Papuans. ‘Papuanisasi’ (efforts to put all Papuans to work at all sectors) at governmental and private sectors has been oriented to particular groups that have access to power and money. 3. The governor election process in 2012 wil be filled with mobilization of government power, utilization of ethnic and religious sentiments, and money which are potential for conflicts. The governor election will create a stage for political fights at institutional level and attitude toward the definition of native Papuans. Political parties tend to be used for the sake of gathering strengths and members of political parties do not stay consistently. The governor election is adherent to competition among capital holders not a contest for democracy. 4. The increasing amount of DIPA Papua of 2012, allocation of special autonomy funds in APBD (regional budget) along with their ineffective distribution and monitoring as well as discrimination in handling corruption cases will have an implication in the increase of corruptive behaviors. Besides, certain parties entangled allegedly with corruption will gain their strong resistance which take the cases away from legal procedures and concentrate on political issues. 5. Violent actions will continue to occur including certain regions which are strategically valuable such as PT Freeport mining areas and Mimika, Enarotali and Jayapura only if legal apparatuses can not maintain neutral and professional works. Violence can also occur if distribution of communication and information is loosing orientation. So, security approach will still be the main choice used by central government even though the government has opened room for dialog or carries on other ethical policies in Papua. 6. Along with the ineffective administration of government particularly in regulations and the emerge of certain actions which have implications in political situation such as governor election, the concept of dialog and violent action, relation between

Papuans and Non Papuans is still very political and fragile which opens room for security intervension. 7. The demands for fulfillment of the basic rights of Papuans as mandated by special autonomy law have to be carried on specifically those concerning law and human rights and economic rights, education and health. Natural resources and land transfer of lands for certain investments are still the source of agrarian conflicts. 8. The increasing responses for the dialog from central government, international parties and different civil organizations will still be difficult to be put into the same line. Each party formulate each scenario including interpreting president SBY’s statement which allows dialog under 3 pillars (NKRI, OTSUS and UP4B). The heaviest problem in Papua is still rested on the willingness and ability to establish optimal consolidation among different factions.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The central government has to carry out entire evaluation on the implementation of special autonomy and give recommendations and considerable acts upon the evaluation. Through UP4B, the government will be focused on building trust through intensity of quality of communication with Papuan people and promote improvement in administration of local governments. Furthermore, concrete works have to be performed related to steps made for the fulfillment of basic human rights including the political prisoners and convicts in Papua. 2. Relation among local governments has to be restored which include improving internal problems within respective institutions. Obeying institutional mechanism and be willing to establish both formal and informal communication maximally are efforts to strengthen consolidation among civil society. 3. Local governments have to have the courage to use the authority by enforcing regulations which favor civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as clean government, free of corruption. Through institutionalization of human rights instruments contained in special autonomy law, fulfillment and rehabilitation of the human rights victims and political prisoners and convicts rights as well as building capacity of law enforcement institutions such as police, court, attorney office and correctional house. 4. Monitoring of the administration of government regarding public service such as education, health, economy, and infrastructure have to be strengthened and

appropriate sanctions have to be imposed to those who abuse implementation of government. This is maintained by improving management, infrastructures and attention to medical professionals and teachers at remote regions, advocacy of people’s economy and supply of accessible transportation. 5. Law enforcers have to be consistently alert to resist interventions from authority holders and money orientation particularly incidents which significantly put police as an institution dishonor through firm, professional and open behavior against corruption cases. 6. Reformation in security sector has to be carried out as one ultimate condition to minimize the cycle of violence in Papua. deployment of troops and a number of military operation in Papua has to refer to Law Number 34 of 2004. The structure and roles of various intelligent institutions have to be improved so as to be able to anticipate, respond to or give accurate information throught coordination and with correspondence to local values. 7. Civil consolidation movements which include religious, adat, NGO components and the like have to be improved to have a sharing commitment by mapping of roles and capacity and improvement in ability to make use of every momentum in right manner in order for advocacy to be carried out maximally. Along with it, it is necessary to develop better education in democracy and politic and communication to eliminate stigmatization and sole definition of a particular group or behavior. 8. Natural resources management and forest function transfer to satisfy economic needs have to be equipped with analysis of economic and social transformation according to changes the people encounter through synergic advocacy of ulayat rights. Along the same line, agenda to strengthen capacity and create competition among civil society have to be intensified particularly in response to economic developments by provision of capital, easy accessible administration and maximal advocacy as well as completing other supporting factors such as transport and market. 9. The supporters of the dialog are willing to work together to develop, reproduce and channel the concept of the dialog in order to produce aligned and dignified format of the dialog. Consolidations should also be established among factions to gain maximal legitimation toward achievable orientation. 10. Various foreign agencies which have given attention to problems in Papua have to place civil orgainizations in Papua fairly. Opportunities are created to support human

rights enforcement, clean and authoritative governance, conflict resolution and civil capacity strengthening agendas. VI. AlDP INSTITUTION: 1. In the beginning of 2011 AlDP made several strategic changes to improve and strengthening achievement of the organization Vission and Missions as well as professionalism. At the end of 2011 the number of ALDP staffs were 6 people consisting of 3 women and 3 men and 3 volunteers, namely Harry Kapouw, Richard Mayor and Gustaf Griapon. So, there are 9 people work as ALDP staffs. At the end of 2011, 2 AlDP staffs (Yusman Conoras SH and Cory Silpa SH) were successful to obtain licence to be advocate to strengthen litigations. 2. In general, most of ALDP’s activities in 2012 were follow-ups of agendas of 2011 namely Cross Ethnic Kampong Discussion and the launching of the film ‘Tumbuh Bersama’: learning about peace from kampong, Jakarta Papua Dialog Campaigns, Jakarta Papua Dialog for Strategic Community, Legal Drafting Provincial Regulations of Ad Hoc Legal Commission, Political Prisoners Monitoring, Improvement of Human Rights Campaign on AlDP website, Political Participation Empowerment and Study on Representation Mechanism, Advocacy of Judicial Review of Articles on subversive actions (NGOs coalition), Anti Torture Day Campaign and IRCT Network meeting in Manila and UN Women activities as well as various analysis and quick responses toward developments in Papua. ALDP staffs have participated actively in preparing implementation of Papua Land of Peace Conference (KPP) organized by JDP. It also maintains advocacy of Nickel Company in Depapre, Degewo mining project, ulayat rights of the people in Pantai Barat Sarmi and other meetings. AlDP has been undertaking various legal and human rights cases either individually or in coalition, starting from consultation level to advocacy at police, court and attorney office levels.(Attached: Notes of ALDP’s Dialog and ALDP’s case handlings). 3. With the works of the institution and its facilities, ALDP is making its continues efforts to give wider access to various society groups to be involved in ALDP’s activities so as to have transformation of awareness and understanding among wider potential groups. In line with it, its chances and institutional network (local, national and international) are becoming more open. Improvement of staffs’ roles, professionalism and institution’s work performance would improve as well through provision of infrastructures, trainings and intensification of monthly meetings and program materials toward strategic changes.

4. Composition of the Executive Board 2011-2013 Director Deputy Director Division for Democracy Division for Justice Financial Division Adm and Gen Affairs Divison Volunteers : : : : : : : Latifah Anum Siregar Yusman Conoras Hamim Mustafa Cory Silpa Evi Irian Tiong Otis Breiram Harry Kapouw, Richard Major dan Gustaf Griapon

Address

Contact Persons

: Jl. Raya Sentani Padang Bulan, Jayapura, Papua 99351 Telp/Fax: +62 967 587890 Email: aldp.papua@gmail.com, Facebook: aldp_papua@yahoo.co.id, Twitter : @aldp2, Website : www.aldepe.com : Latifah Anum Siregar, SH: 0852 440 60000 / amo_regar@yahoo.com Yusman Conoras: 0813 4486 0725 / yoes_advokasi@yahoo.com

Jayapura, 10 January 2012

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