CORDON AND SEARCH

MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS
FM 3-06.20 MCRP 3-31.4B NTTP 3-05.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.62

APRIL 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the international Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 16 August 2005. Other requests must be referred to: HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-RD, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-5000; HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021; NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands and other commands as appropriate.

This publication is available through the ALSA Web site (www.alsa.mil); through the Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (www.us.army.mil) and at the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (www.train.army.mil) Web sites; and through the Air Force at the Air Force Publishing Web site (www.e-publishing.af.mil).

PREFACE
1. Purpose
This publication consolidates the Services' best tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used in cordon and search operations into a single multi-Service TTP (MTTP) publication with the objective of increasing the probability of mission success. It provides MTTP for the planning and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Currently there is very little Service doctrine available on cordon and search operations and even less that addresses special operations forces (SOF) and aviation integration into these types of operations. This publication captures the fragmented TTP currently in the form of unit standing operating procedures (SOPs), class outlines for cordon and search training, operations orders, and the integration of SOF, interoperability, and aviation considerations into one publication.

2. Scope
This MTTP publication is a comprehensive reference source to assist ground commanders and subordinates, SOF, and aviation personnel in planning, training, and conducting tactical cordon and search operations. It fills a void in Service doctrine by highlighting commonalities and consolidating the TTP of the Services, SOF, and aviation concerning cordon and search operations. This publication captures lessons learned from recent operations and the Services best practices concerning cordon and search operations. This publication: • Supplements established doctrine and TTP • Provides reference material to assist ground, SOF, and aviation personnel in planning and coordinating tactical cordon and search operations • Promotes an understanding of the complexities of cordon and search operations emphasizing urban terrain considerations • Incorporates TTP, lessons learned, information from ongoing combat operations, and training exercises applicable to cordon and search operations

3. Applicability
This publication is a tactical-level document that focuses at the battalion level and below for the planning and conduct of cordon and search operations. The TTP in this document are applicable to joint forces of the United States, to include personnel planning. It applies to commanders, planners, ground forces, SOF, and aviation personnel who conduct cordon and search operations. This publication is intended to be theater non-specific. Services can use this MTTP as a basis for both institutional and operational training as deemed appropriate and feasible. Any use of force detailed in this TTP is governed by the rules of engagement (ROE) applicable to the operation. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. In addition to the rules for use of force contained in the ROE, units also retain the inherent right of self-defense. A use of force in self-defense must be necessary (that is, responsive to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent) and proportional (that is, reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude).

4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows: Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the procedures contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

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FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62

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User Information a. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document. Distribution is IAW the Marine Corps Publication Distribution System (MCPDS).mil Navy Commander.dj@maxwell.Distribution is in accordance with (IAW) applicable directives and the Initial Distribution Number (IDN) listed on the authentication page. E-mail: deputydirectordoctrine@usmc.mil ALSA Director. TRADOC.af. E-mail: afdc. MCCDC. facilities. and the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service commands. Navy Warfare Development Command ATTN: N5 686 Cushing Road Newport RI 02841-1207 DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201.af. Navy. US Army Training and Doctrine Command ATTN: ATFC-RD Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000 DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951.mil Air Force Commander. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary. US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). E-mail: doctrine@monroe. Air Force. Distribution is IAW Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure Desk Guide (MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy Supplement Publication-409 (NAVSUP P-409). NWDC. command and control organizations. b.navy.4B/NTTP 3-05. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine.director@langley. Suite 318A Quantico VA 22134-5021 DSN 278-2871/6227 COMM (703) 784-2871/6227. and procedures. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commander. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication IAW applicable governing directives. Marine Corps.mil Marine Corps Commanding General. Send comments and recommendations directly to— Army Commander. appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications.army. Air Force Doctrine Center ATTN: DJ 155 North Twining Street Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112 DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334) 953-2640/2256. Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)[N5].62 25 April 2006 .20/MCRP 3-31. ALSA Center 114 Andrews Street Langley AFB VA 23665-2785 DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902. personnel. Changes in Service protocol.mil ∗ Marine Corps PCN: 144 000 162 00 ii FM 3-06. Headquarters AFDC. E-mail: alsa. 5. US Marine Corps Combat Development Command ATTN: C427 3300 Russell Road. responsibilities.∗ The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commanding General. Key your comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each recommendation. Distribution is IAW Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360. E-mail: alsapubs@nwdc.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. c.

.................... RI 02841-1207...................FM 3-06..20 MCRP 3-31......................... I-9 Search Considerations ....................................... I-14 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the international Exchange Program or by other means.... or HQ AFDC............................ 36112-6112 DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document............................ I-1 Planning Considerations..viii CHAPTER I PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ................. ATTN: ATFC-RD.......................62 iii .. I-13 Information Operations (IO) .............................................................................................................. I-13 Communications .......................................................................... ATTN: DJ........4B NTTP 3-05..8 AFTTP(I) 3-2........ I-10 Direct and Indirect Fire Planning ................... I-7 Snipers/Recon Infiltration............................... I-13 Public Affairs (PA).... Ft Monroe.................................................20/MCRP 3-31....4B/NTTP 3-05.............20 MCRP 3-31.. Other requests must be referred to: HQ TRADOC...................................8 AFTTP(I) 3-2..................... ATTN: N5. I-1 Task Organization................. Quantico...62 US Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe...............62 FM 3-06.4B NTTP 3-05............. I-12 Special Operations Forces (SOF)............................ Virginia Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico...................... TECHNIQUES......... Maxwell AFB...... NWDC........................................ I-13 Logistical and Support Considerations ....... Virginia Navy Warfare Development Command Newport... Rhode Island Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Maxwell Air Force Base.. VA 22134-5021...... VA 23651-5000......................... Alabama 25 April 2006 CORDON AND SEARCH MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS............ AND PROCEDURES FOR CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................8/AFTTP(I) 3-2........ Newport.......... HQ MCCDC.. ATTN: C427..... 25 April 2006 FM 3-06................................................. I-11 Aviation Integration .... This determination was made on 16 August 2005.......................

.... III-6 Support Element ............................................................................... V-1 SOF Overview .................... IV-1 Air-Ground Coordination....... III-23 Breaching Techniques ..............................................................................................................................20/MCRP 3-31............... III-3 Search/Assault Element .................................................. III-23 Room Clearing............... IV-2 Rotary Wing Aviation Integration in the Cordon and Search ............................................................................................. III-13 Withdrawal from the Objective...........................................4B/NTTP 3-05....................................................... III-24 Searches... III-9 Tactical Control Measures ............................ II-1 IPB Considerations .................................................................................................................. II-2 ISR Planning................................................... V-2 Planning Considerations.. II-7 CORDON AND SEARCH EXECUTION PROCEDURES ................................................................. IV-6 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operations.................................. V-3 SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Lessons Learned ........CHAPTER II INTELLIGENCE AND URBAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS .............................. III-12 Helicopter Insertion.................................................................................................... II-1 Civilian Considerations ......................................................... III-2 Security Element..................................................................................................................... IV-2 Fixed-wing Aviation Considerations...................................................... III-1 Cordon and Search Methods for Success .................................................................... III-26 Exiting the Cleared Building(s) .................................. IV-1 CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Personnel .......................................................... IV-1 Overview............................................................... III-9 Movement to the Target..................................................................... III-29 AVIATION CONSIDERATIONS .......................................... III-12 Emplacement Techniques and Timing of the Cordon and Search Elements ..................................... V-1 SOF Applications in Cordon and Search Operations ............................... III-21 Control of the Populace in the Target Area .................................................... V-1 Integrated Operations .................................................................................................. III-11 Deception Techniques ...... III-11 Driving Considerations..............................................................62 25 April 2006 ........... III-1 Command Element ................................ II-5 Urban Planning Considerations .......................................... IV-12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION............ III-16 Road Blocks............................................... V-1 SOF Core Tasks ............................................... II-1 General ...................................................................................................... V-6 CHAPTER III CHAPTER IV CHAPTER V iv FM 3-06................................................................................................8/AFTTP(I) 3-2................................................................................................................................................................ IV-11 Airborne C4ISR Considerations.................................................................................................................

................................................................. References-1 ................................................... Civil-Military Operations (CMO)/Civil Affairs (CA) ........................................................................................ Glossary-1 ..................... B-1 C.............. Urban Terrain ..................................... Inner Cordon ..................................................................... Outer Cordon................... II-26 Figure II-6..................................... F-1 G............................................ A-1 B........C-1 D................ Single Point of Ingress ............................................... II-25 Figure II-3........... II-25 Figure II-4............................. II-28 Figure II-9...... Index-1 Figure I-1......... II-27 Figure II-7.......................................62 v ..... II-24 Figure II-2.................................... Shantytowns............ Information Operations................... III-8 Figure III-4................ Communications .................................................... City Core ...........8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.......................................................................... High-Rise Area ............ Street Patterns and Effects ............................ Industrial-Transportation Area................4B/NTTP 3-05........................................ III-6 Figure III-3.....................................CHAPTER VI LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS .................................................. II-29 Figure II-11........................................................................................ Dispersed Residential Area............................H-1 I....... II-30 Figure III-1........................................................................ Core Periphery ...................... II-26 Figure II-5........................ VI-2 Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA)................................................................................. Task Organization ...... Dense Random Construction ......... III-14 25 April 2006 FM 3-06............................................................................... Permanent or Fixed Fortifications ................................................................ Search Assault Element ................. Planning Checklists ............................... VI-4 Urban Operations Kits ....... Historical Lessons learned .......... III-10 Figure III-5................................. Smart Cards ...................... III-5 Figure III-2....... Simultaneous Occupation ................................ I-1 APPENDICES REFERENCES GLOSSARY INDEX FIGURES .....20/MCRP 3-31... II-28 Figure II-10.................... II-27 Figure II-8.......... Urban Area Reference System.............................................................................................. VI-1 Transportation and Vehicle Recovery.................................................................... Rehearsals ...................................................................................G-1 H. Interpreter Considerations .... Multidirectional Ingress.......... VI-1 Detainee Operations......................................................... VI-3 Classes of Supply Considerations ....... I-8 Figure II-1..........D-1 E........................... Close Orderly Block Construction .... III-11 Figure III-6....................... VI-1 Medical ...................... E-1 F....................................................................................................... VI-5 A........................................... VI-1 Support to Cordon and Search Operations .....................

........ Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Reserve .............8/AFTTP(I) 3-2....................................... III-17 Figure III-12............. Cordon and Search Smart Card .................... III-18 Figure III-14..................................... Control............ Patrol Checklist ......... Employment of QRF ................ III-20 Figure III-16... and Withdrawal .............................................. Traffic Control Point/Blocking Positions ...C-2 Table D-1.............. Direct Fire Planning........... Sequential Occupation (Sequence 1 Outer Cordon) . B-1 Table B-3........................ Simultaneous Egress ...................................... Sequential Egress (Sequence 1 Search Element) ....................... B-4 Table B-10............................. IV-6 Table B-1......D-3 vi FM 3-06............. Consolidation.......... B-2 Table B-7.................................................. Sequential Egress (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon)................. Patrol Checklist ....... Cordon and Search..4B/NTTP 3-05...........H-3 Figure I-1........................................................ I-3 Figure I-4..C-1 Table C-2......................... III-26 Figure C-1........ III-19 Figure III-15.......... IV-3 Table IV-2..................C-3 Figure H-1...... Rotary Wing Aircraft Capabilities ......... III-15 Figure III-8.. CAS Briefing (9-Line) ....... B-2 Table B-6................................D-2 Table D-2........ Sequential Occupation (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon).. Command......... III-17 Figure III-11.............. Perception Management (IO and CA Operations) ............................ Communications (C3) and Locations ....... Building Numbering System ........... Urban Priority Intelligence Requirements......................................... B-2 Table B-4........ Air Considerations (Rotary and Fixed-wing) .......................................................... III-15 Figure III-9.......................................20/MCRP 3-31.... B-3 Table B-8............................................................. Mission Equipment Checklist ..... Building Numbering System With Many Buildings ..... Sectors of Fire .............................. B-6 Table B-14................................ III-16 Figure III-10. III-18 Figure III-13.................. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities...... I-3 TABLES Table IV-1..... Single Point Egress .................................. B-4 Table B-9............... I-2 Figure I-2.... CAS Terminal Attack Control Attributes............................ B-1 Table B-2.. Target Reference Point ..... ROE/Escalation Procedures ....... B-2 Table B-5... B-5 Table B-11 Media Facilitation and Public Affairs Checklists..................................... Sequential Occupation (Sequence 3 Search Element) .................. Sniper Employment.. Urban Intelligence Requirements................... Sequential Egress (Sequence 3 Outer Cordon)...................... I-2 Figure I-3........................ Reorganization..................................................................... B-7 Table B-15..... Controlling Civilian Populace .............. CAS Battle Drill ............................... B-5 Table B-12....................................... Multidirectional Egress ............C-1 Table C-3............................. B-7 Table C-1........... Wolf Tail..................62 25 April 2006 .......................................................... B-6 Table B-14............. Urban Area Reference System ......... B-5 Table B-13.....................Figure III-7.........

.. Table H-1....H-1 Target and Friendly Marking Methods ......D-3 Violent Demonstration..........20/MCRP 3-31.................................................. Table D-4........ Insurgent-Related Violence........... F-3 Interpreter Checklist....... Table G-1...............................................................4B/NTTP 3-05..............G-2 Example Smart Card Used in Iraq ...............8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.......D-4 Rehearsal Checklist ..............Table D-3................ Table G-2........................H-4 25 April 2006 FM 3-06...................... Table H-2....G-3 Communications Checklist............. Table F-1...............................62 vii .........

A cordon and search may also be thought of as a movement to contact. using both traditional and non-traditional ISR. and reconnaissance (ISR). Provides reference material to assist supported and supporting personnel and organizations in planning.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. but are not limited to.20/MCRP 3-31. The information provided also addresses the applicability and appropriateness of available capabilities. This chapter. coordinate. This publication: • • • • Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of cordon and search operations. provides the tactical staff planner and the small unit leader a foundation from which to plan. Techniques. and the support element. Is focused on the scope of cordon and search operations. the cordon and search is typically oriented at finding insurgents or their caches. the elements of the cordon and search force. raid. and execute cordon and search operations. and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations Overview Cordon and search operations involve isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and/or contraband. and executing cordon and search operations.62 25 April 2006 . This viii FM 3-06. and air in the conduct of cordon and search operations. and supporting cordon and search operations. executing. The lessons learned.4B/NTTP 3-05. Applies to all elements of the force when planning.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CORDON AND SEARCH Multi-Service Tactics. in conjunction with appropriate follow on chapters and appendices. It addresses the capabilities brought to the fight of land. These include. and the impact of the populous. or area reconnaissance based on the accuracy of intelligence. and responsibilities within. integrate. the impact of structural features. Intelligence and Urban Planning Considerations Chapter II provides information pertaining to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield with focus upon the variables inherent in cordon and search operations such as the specific characteristics of urban terrain. surveillance. provide the backdrop for more detailed discussion of the ground elements and their role(s). While the actual operation may fall under the category of any of these missions. deliberate attack. sea. the command element security element. Execution Procedures Chapter III provides TTP derived from historical sources with emphasis on recent operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). search/assault element. Planning Considerations Chapter I provides considerations for staff planning in the conduct of cordon and search operations. Specific areas discussed include the conduct of. in conjunction with available resources. the geography. intelligence. This includes both ground personnel and the supporting aviation assets in the conduct of operations. coordinating.

and emplacing check points. Details include moving to and from the objective. locating.20/MCRP 3-31. and task organization that pertain to SOF and conventional force integration. as well as an understanding of potential limitations based upon the environment. Specific topics and products include: • • • • • • • • • Lessons learned Planning checklists Smart cards Rehearsals Information operations (IO) Civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA) Communications Interpreter considerations Urban reference systems 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Focus includes planning. and techniques associated with moving and searching personnel and vehicles within the objective area. Aviation Considerations Chapter IV provides information on aviation considerations in the conduct of supporting cordon and search operations. preparing. This chapter provides the planner and executor information and insight critical to maximizing aviation assets and capabilities in support of cordon and search operations. with conventional forces. The focus is to maximize the available capabilities of SOF units as they are used in the conduct of cordon and search operations. Logistics/Support Chapter VI provides information pertaining to logistical considerations during planning. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Integration Considerations Chapter V provides information regarding the principles for integrating and employing special operations forces. command relationships. These appendices provide tacticallevel focus in the form of checklists. preparing.chapter provides insight into the composition and inherent responsibilities of each element. and classes of supply needed to support cordon and search operations. and executing cordon and search operations. and marking procedures for friendly positions and enemy targets. air to ground integration. and references that are easily accessible and rapidly digested. This chapter highlights the unique capabilities aviation platforms bring to the fight. preparing. smart cards. Appendices The appendices provide details and amplifying information for use in planning.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. special equipment capabilities. in a coordinated effort. casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). and executing cordon and search operations. This chapter provides planning considerations. Areas of discussion include fixed and rotary wing employment in an urban environment.62 ix .

Camp LeJeune. MO Combat Doctrine Development. Fort Bragg. Langley AFB. 1st Marine Division. Camp Pendleton. Fort Benning. Hurlburt Field. Fort Bragg. NAB. NC Army US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Army Medical Dept Center and School.4B/NTTP 3-05. CA Infantry Officer Course. Fort Leavenworth. VA Marine Air Control Squadron 23. Camp Pendleton. Newport RI Air Force Air Combat Command/DOTW. II MEF. MacDill AFB. I MEF. CA 3rd Battalion 1st Marines. Fort Knox. Langley AFB. Coronado. CA 1st Battalion 8th Marines.62 25 April 2006 . NC Marine Corps Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Quantico. GA US Army Military Police School. CA JFK Special Warfare Center. Buckley AFB. VA Air Combat Command/DOYC JTAC/Air-Ground Office. Langley AFB. GA Air Force Special Operations Command. KY 1-360th Infantry Battalion.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. VA Air Combat Command. Marine Forces Reserve. CO Center for Army Lessons Learned. MCAS Miramar. 29 Palms. FL Commander Naval Special Warfare Command. I MEF. I MEF. Weapons and Tactics Division. Camp Pendleton. Quantico. Fort Rucker. VA US Army Infantry Center. Fort Monroe. CO Navy Navy Warfare Development Command. NC Provost Marshal Office. 1st Marine Division. Security Forces A-3/SFO Moody AFB.20/MCRP 3-31. 2nd-91st Brigade. CATD. VA Air Combat Command/Joint Air Ground Office. 1st Marine Division. FL x FM 3-06. CA 1st Battalion 7th Marines. AL C Company 7th Special Forces Group. LA 3-16 Cavalry. CA Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1. Fort Polk. 2nd Marine Division.PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication: Joint US Special Operations Command. Fort Carson. US Army Armor Center. VA Marine Special Operations Command Detachment 1. Fort Leonard Wood. The Basic School. TX Joint Readiness Training Center. Yuma. AZ 2nd Battalion 1st Marines. Fort Sam Houston. MCCDC. KS DOTD.

(4) Goals for the Operation. if as a friend—bring them. traditions. Respect for the inhabitants. if as an enemy— leave them behind. which may be a house. civilian populations in occupied areas are entitled to specific protections under the law of war. Planning Overview. The basic principle when conducting any search of a village or built up area is to complete the cordon and search mission with the least amount of disruption to the local population as possible. Commanders must consider numerous factors when planning and preparing for a cordon and search operation. etc. planning time may require immediate collaborative planning by key leaders of all the elements and a very accelerated MDMP. The populace may be inconvenienced to the point where they may discourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remaining. As in all cases the quality of the information associated with mission. Planning Considerations a. etc. Note: The US Army uses METT-TC. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Commanders should ask.20/MCRP 3-31. the planning time can be extremely limited between when a battalion first receives the mission from "higher" and when it is actually executed. These include the following: (a) Psychological: a positive political message. a series of houses.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. troops available and civilian (METTTC) becomes critical. and drive the critical focus of the insurgent’s efforts into the arms of the movement. The following four terms are used when discussing cordon and search operations throughout this publication: (a) Objective Area—The area where the cordon and search takes place. weapons cache. (1) Terms. time. The presence of regional officials and local police should not be automatic. their effectiveness will depend on how the population being cordoned and searched views these officials: i. (c) Target—The location of the HPT.4B/NTTP 3-05. Ideally a search within the area is conducted by local forces with some US advisors. as required. terrain and weather. enemy. close the lines of communication. Commanders and their staffs apply the same steps used in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Moreover. the USMC uses METT-T.62 I-1 . their homes. Given the complexity of the mission and the many assets task organized to support the operation. The operation can be enhanced if the host nation (HN) government has intelligence roots in the area and the people are pro-government or neutral.e. (b) Target Area—The area immediately surrounding the target. and religion is of paramount concern. property. but not to the point that the search drives them into sympathy with the movement. counterintelligence personnel... (b) Presence: show of force. “What is the focus of our planning?” In particular the “civilian” part of the factors of METT-TC should be specifically considered. (2) Population. including Geneva Convention (IV) and customary international law.Chapter I PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 1. (d) Objective—The goal of the operation. The use of HN forces can increase legitimacy of CMO. If possible the cordon and search should be executed as a combined civil and military operation. (3) Civil-Military Operations (CMO). When the objective of the cordon and search operation is a high payoff target (HPT). etc. Rough handling and abuse will alienate the populace. customs.

the principles of speed and surprise will be the keys to successfully achieving the mission. (b) Cordon and Knock/Ask—If the mission is focused on increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and security forces. The deciding factor in determining the type method to use will generally depend on the level of intelligence available on the objective and target. Contingency plans must cover such possibilities as intense booby trapping of the area. it may be necessary to sacrifice a degree of surprise and timeliness to achieve that goal. I-2 FM 3-06. The primary consideration is to capture the designated personnel. not cordon and ask. The intelligence picture in this case is more general in nature and indicates some enemy activity and local populace neutrality or aid to the insurgents possibly coerced through fear of retribution. In this instance the unit will focus more on maintaining a presence and control of an area by incorporating local authorities into the mission. capturing rebels.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. local populace support. If intelligence indicates enemy presence and either local populace neutrality or opposition. and host-nation security forces (HNSF) capabilities must be taken into account during planning the operation. (a) Cordon and Kick—The cordon and kick method is used to maintain speed. surprise. Rapid tempo is critical to maintain the initiative and to reduce the enemy’s ability to react or escape. sniper fire from within the village or surrounding areas. (1) Speed—Cordons should be rapidly established with an immediate transition to a search of the target . (6) Cordon and Search Methods. (5) Contingency Plans. and timeliness in entry to the target within the objective. Few aspects of any operation are as important as the development and dissemination of contingency plans. site. site. (d) Counterinsurgency: gathering weapons/supplies. etc. and location of major hostile force within the area. In this instance considerations of population perceptions and integration of HNSF are less important than accomplishing the task(s) of capturing the target individual.(c) Civic action: demonstrating that the government works. b. As commanders and their staffs plan the operation they must address all possible branches and sequels to the course of action (COA). or equipment but additional factors such as the enemy threat. The difference between cordon and knock and cordon and ask is that the first method simply informs the occupants of the search while the second seeks permission either directly from the occupants or through the local authorities. Principles of Cordon and Search. Cordon and kick operations seek to breach barriers or doors into the target structure to support the unit taking immediate control maintaining the initiative. The cordon and search method selected to accomplish the mission is dependant on a number of factors.4B/NTTP 3-05. The more specific the intelligence read of the situation the more direct the method of mission execution. Note: The USMC employs only cordon and knock. The transition to a raid encompasses all aspects of conducting a raid detailed in Service doctrine.20/MCRP 3-31. or equipment. Commanders should always have a contingency plan for transitioning to other combat operations in the event contact is made. Units will still approach the target with as much speed and surprise as possible to isolate the objective but will generally integrate HNSF or authorities to obtain the agreement by the occupants of the target to the subsequent search. Key to the successful transition is the rehearsal. (e) Intelligence: on enemy behavior.62 25 April 2006 . Commanders should always have a contingency plan for transitioning from a raid to a hasty cordon and search in the event actionable time sensitive intelligence is discovered. Speed will limit the enemy’s capability to react and mitigate organized opposition by the local populace.

(2) Surprise—All efforts must be made to deny the enemy the opportunity to react. (3) Isolation—The target area and the target must be physically isolated by establishing a cordon around each site. The cordon serves to prevent escape from the area, repositioning by enemy elements, or reinforcement. (4) Target Identification—Personnel must be properly tasked and trained to identify, capture, and/or exploit targeted enemy personnel and material. (5) Timeliness—It is critical to strike a balance between actionable intelligence, target activities, desired end state, and execution of the cordon and search. Failure to do so allows the enemy to gain the initiative, reposition as he desires, and escape. (6) Accountability—Frequently during a cordon and search several elements are executing decentralized operations. It is critical that all personnel and assets are accounted for and not left behind during the egress. (7) Minimization and Mitigation of Collateral Damage—Cordon and search operations are focused on eliminating threats or potential threats. If the operations cause excessive or unnecessary collateral damage, this may create resentment, which emboldens the enemy’s cause. Actions that cause extensive collateral damage may also constitute violations under both the law of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). (8) Detailed Search—Target areas must be thoroughly and extensively searched to ensure all of the enemy’s assets are captured. This requires proper coordination, marking, and adherence to unit SOPs. Target areas cannot simply be cleared they must be properly searched. (9) Legitimacy—Cordon and search operations focus on supporting the efforts of a legitimate HN government. The use and integration of properly trained HNSF are a requirement toward this end. c. Phases of a Cordon and Search. (1) Planning—The planning phase is used to define the sequence of action by each element to synchronize their tasks to ensure mission success. As time available to plan and prepare for a cordon and search mission is generally limited, it is often necessary to conduct planning while reconnaissance and intelligence collection are ongoing. As additional information becomes available, it is integrated and the plan updated as necessary. While many of the tasks required by a cordon and search is part of standard battle drills or unit SOPs, it is necessary that premission rehearsals be conducted to identify any gaps or seams and that all mission elements and teams understand their tasks. (2) Reconnaissance—Every target area should be reconnoitered prior to execution using many of the available resources. The reconnaissance plan must not provide the enemy with indicators of an impending cordon and search. For example: A reconnaissance patrol should not be conducted in an area where our forces do not habitually operate since it could compromise execution of the cordon and search. (3) Movement to the Objective—The timing, routes, and execution of movement to the objective should consider the factors of METT-TC and whether it should be simultaneous or phased. (4) Isolation—This is key to successful execution of the search. It consists of an outer cordon and an inner cordon. The objective may be isolated simultaneously or sequentially. Frequently, the search may have to be executed immediately after the cordon is established.

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(5) Search—This includes everything from clearing and search of target areas, consolidation and reorganization, and mitigation of negative effects caused by the search. (6) Withdrawal—During this phase the unit may be the most vulnerable. To mitigate risk, a relief in place may be effected, stay-behind elements may be left to cover the withdrawal, different routes and timing may be used, or other techniques may be employed such as simultaneous or phased withdrawals to mitigate the enemy’s ability to attack. d. METT-TC Considerations. A commander should use the full range of intelligence from his subordinates and staff and apply all lessons learned about his area of operations (AO) to each mission (civilian considerations may change on a daily basis). (1) MISSION—Most cordon and search operations are enemy-oriented and designed to capture or destroy enemy forces, material, or capability to operate covertly. (2) ENEMY—Enemy considerations drive the tactical planning. Commanders should consider the following enemy actions when planning a cordon and search: (a) Enemy resistance in the direction of attack into the target area—This includes the emplacement and use of mines and booby traps as well as ambushes. Using aviation, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or mounted patrol reconnaissance just ahead of the cordon and search force will assist the commander in finding and using the path of least resistance into the target area. (b) Enemy resistance in the objective area—In an urban area the commander must consider the possibility of enemy outposts in adjacent houses or courtyards, on the roofs of adjacent buildings, in subterranean hide positions, etc. The cordon forces must be aware of these suspected enemy positions. (c) Enemy resistance at the target—During planning the commander must assess the type and level of resistance expected. Intelligence and other information sources will assist in defining the necessary scheme of maneuver based on the threat. (d) Enemy resistance departing the objective area—Again, this includes emplacement and use of mines, booby traps, and ambushes. Using aviation or UAS reconnaissance assets will assist the commander in a quick egress. Commanders should strongly consider using a separate ingress and egress route or a stay behind force. Note: If intelligence indicates several armed insurgents are at the target, the commander might plan a support by fire (SBF) position with a crew-served weapon capable of penetrating the building's walls to facilitate the assault force's entry, as well as facilitating the tempo and aggressiveness of the assault team's clearance of the building. If intelligence indicates a more passive target, the commander might elect to knock on the door and allow the occupants to come to the consolidation point before the assault force enters the room. (3) TERRAIN—Terrain considerations for a cordon and search are similar to those for most other operations in urban terrain. As with any military operation, commanders must consider obstacles, avenues of approach (to include enemy avenues of withdrawal), key terrain, observation/fields of fire, and cover and concealment when evaluating the terrain. (4) TIME—The time available before mission execution determines whether the unit will execute a hasty or deliberate cordon and search. Commanders must also consider the time of day they are conducting these operations, whether they want to conduct them in the early morning hours before people arise and go to work or if in warmer climates they want to conduct
I-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006

them in the middle of a hot afternoon when people are likely to be indoors trying to escape the weather. "We conducted these operations in both day and night, depending on the time sensitivity of the target, minimizing potential for collateral damage (i.e., most folks are off the streets in late night), the availability of resources to the battalion, and the ability to achieve surprise. In some cases, the timing of the operation is based on when the targeted activity occurs (i.e., blackmarketing) or patterns detected for such activity. When conducting the operation at night in the urban environment, vehicles should approach the objective area with no lights and under NVGs if the illumination is poor and the sector of the city has poor night lighting. In some cases of objectives in smaller villages and towns where the entire village is the objective, the operation should often commence just at Before Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) so that the movement to the objective area is under cover of darkness and yet the actual search can be conducted in partial daylight. Working around the BMNT timing also minimizes the COB interference on the operation.” LTC Stephen Bruch Battalion Commander 2-502nd 101st Air Assault Division OIF 2003

(5) TROOPS AVAILABLE—Commanders must thoroughly evaluate the number of assets available for each cordon and search mission. The composition of each element of the cordon and search will vary from unit to unit, but commanders must ensure they have adequately resourced each element to meet the possible threats and accomplish their task and purpose. (6) CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS—Most cordon and search operations will occur in populated areas and civilians must be considered in the planning process. (a) Occupants and Neighboring Buildings—Commanders must consider the various categories of occupants they will find and how to separate them from the search activities. Units must be prepared to deal with women, children, ill, and elderly occupants of the target and to provide for their security and safety. The cordon and search elements must be prepared to search buildings immediately neighboring the target site. Neighboring buildings may share walls or fences with the target site and provide either a covered means of escape or additional cache sites for equipment. (b) Neighbor(s)—Units must plan to communicate with the people in the surrounding area. Commanders must plan to use a megaphone or tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) team (TPT) assets to inform the neighbors of any specific instructions the unit needs the community to follow. (c) Cultural Sensitivity—Service members and junior leaders must be aware of cultural taboos and ensure that their action or inaction does not incite the non-combatants in the target area. (d) Perception Management (Neighborhood Follow-up)—Units may plan to followup with the neighborhood after a cordon and search. Either through a TPT or civil affairs (CA)

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FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62

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large amounts of currency. They can assist in dissolving unwanted crowds. and return to owners intelligence related items (such as computers. A commander may receive several assets to assist him in accomplishing his mission.). The JTAC should be employed where they can effectively control supporting air IAW the maneuver plan. surrender. TPTs can provide pre-approved handbills. tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams (THTs). (6) Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC)/FAC. THTs.62 25 April 2006 . The security element may have CA teams. TPTs. then the neighborhood may perceive the detention of their neighbor as a sign of American cruelty or unfairness.team or through conversations with local leaders. and civil disturbance response. It may be necessary to prepare a TPT or CA team to document damage caused during a search and reimburse the occupants on-site. For instance. Fire support should be considered in the planning phase.20/MCRP 3-31. (4) Civil Affairs Teams. The benefit of the neighborhood understanding cordon and search operations could be the difference between that neighborhood supporting and harboring insurgents or that neighborhood denying safe haven to future insurgents. TPTs can be divided into a mounted and dismounted element. Casualty collection points (CCPs) should be predetermined during the planning phase. military police (MP). If a unit fails to communicate that information to them. The FIST should be collocated with the on-scene commander. (3) Fire Support Team (FIST). make available to intelligence units. They might assist in identifying or refining targets. the unit may communicate that to the neighborhood. maintain custody of. They are trained at interrogation and interview techniques. Target reference points need to be specifically designated for lethal and nonlethal planning.4B/NTTP 3-05. fire support officer (FSO). Mission specific signage and loudspeaker messages should be planned well in advance of the operation to allow ample production and preparation time.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. or Gunnery Sergeant (Marine senior enlisted tactical advisor) to command and control (C2) some of these additional assets. and/or HNSF. THTs should be placed where they can interact with the local populace and suspected individuals. These teams may be collocated with the search/assault element. They will require security. etc.) (5) Document and Computer Exploitation (DOCEX) Team. They might also assist in developing other targets and with managing informants. As an example the search/assault element may have TPTs. Messages may include non-interference. interpreters. translate. (2) Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). cellular communications. They can also provide the commander with the atmospherics of a specific area. and loudspeaker messages. The support element may have a CA team. A company commander might also use his executive officer (XO). this ensures that these critical medical assets are positioned where they are most effective. A detailed fire plan should be developed to assist the cordon team with sealing off the objective area. mission specific signage. (1) Tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) [or human exploitation teams (HETs) in the USMC]. TPTs can assist the commander in communicating with the local populace and in crowd control. seize. the unit may communicate some information about the cordon and search. interpreters. if the unit found an insurgent with bomb-making materials. They may require the assistance of an interpreter. e. and/or HNSF. and with assistance from the TPT. (See appendix E. posters. First Sergeant. They provide limited assistance during the execution of the actual cordon and search. (7) Forward Treatment Teams. financial documentation. can help to control the local populace. They may also be used to treat wounded or injured I-6 FM 3-06. and/or HNSF. maps. This team is highly organized and trained to search for. Combat Multipliers. interpreters.

(See appendix G for a detailed discussion on interpreters. (8) Aviation Assets. in that a general organization to conduct major tasks is established.20/MCRP 3-31.civilians.62 I-7 . they may be placed with part of the outer cordon to facilitate security for these medical assets. Organization of the force is similar to the method used in task organizing a patrol or raid force. (6) See chapter VI for HNSF logistical considerations. 2. It is critical that these forces are integrated in the operation because it adds legitimacy to the HN government and ultimately allows US forces to transition operational responsibilities to the host nation.4B/NTTP 3-05. (c) Overwatch during egress. relationships. (4) Operational security may also be a concern when working with these forces. Sniper employment considerations need to be addressed throughout all phases of the operation. Ground force commanders must have a contingency plan for recovering downed aircraft during the cordon and search operation. Interpreters are a limited asset. they cannot block or hold ground. It is best if they are only provided with generalities regarding execution time and location until they are completely embedded and under the control of the mission commander. The LNO should not take direct control of this element but should communicate instructions directly to the HNSF element leader and monitor for compliance. Considerations for sniper employment are: (a) Early infiltration into the objective area to provide current intelligence on the target and to cover ingress route(s) with direct fire. Host-Nation Security Forces (HNSF) (Police and Military). (d) Withdrawal of sniper teams. it is imperative to incorporate these assets during COA development. Subelements can be further broken down into teams to conduct special tasks based on mission requirements. (10) Interpreters. Based on availability the commander will have to determine where to task organize his interpreters. If not properly evaluated HNSF can become a liability rather than an asset. (1) HNSF have different levels of proficiency and capabilities. (3) Rehearsals are critical with these forces.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Task Organization a. (e) Counter sniper. The below figure depicts the task organization of a cordon and search force. (9) Sniper Employment. Therefore. (b) Overwatch of rooftops and security to search element while moving or during search operations. This breaks the unit into subelements. Security must be provided for these teams. however. They are a great combat multiplier. (5) It may be necessary to assign a liaison officer (LNO) or specific individual(s) to coordinate and control the actions of these security forces. (2) Training should be conducted with these forces when possible to improve capabilities.) f. and confidence. Elements within the Cordon and Search Force.

building. Task Organization (1) Command Element—The command element is the headquarters of the unit conducting the mission.20/MCRP 3-31. To seal off an area by any means. both physically and psychologically. to deny an enemy freedom of movement. For specific TTP concerning the following: To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation. • Neutralize—to render ineffective or unusable. (b) Inner cordon accomplishes a similar task as the outer cordon but only for a specific area such as a block. To seal off an area by any means. hinder. I-8 FM 3-06.4. • Interdict—to prevent. see FM 5-250.62 25 April 2006 . (a) Outer cordon prevents anyone from entering the objective area and assists the inner cordon in preventing the enemy from escaping from the objective area. hinder. The security element prevents possible outside influence affecting the mission of the search/assault force and prevents ingress/egress of enemy and indigenous personnel from the target area and objective area. to deny use of a route or approach. and booby traps. to deny use of a route or approach. Possible tasks include: • Fix—to prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period of time. or delay the use of an area or route by enemy forces. or portion of a building. coordinating the various assets.3. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. Possible tasks include: • Block—to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach. An inner cordon prevents enemy movement within the specific area and prevents enemy ingress into and egress from the target area.Figure I-1. see FM 5-250.4B/NTTP 3-05. • Isolate—to seal off. missiles. see FM 3-90. It provides command and control for the operation.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. or delay the use of an area or route by the enemy forces. This element is normally divided into two separate groups: the outer cordon and the inner cordon. (2) Security Element—The security element is responsible for isolating the objective and specific target areas within an objective. An inner cordon is established to isolate the specific area in which the target is located. The cordon and search commander may have the search/assault element perform the inner cordon task. • Block—to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach.4. an enemy from his sources of support. • Interdict—to prevent. To render safe mines. bombs. and to prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.

This element should be positioned where they can best accomplish their assigned planning priorities and be prepared to tasks. or destroy the target. It is imperative that this element not only understands but can comply with rules of engagement (ROE) in a dynamic environment and this issue is addressed upfront during planning and throughout all phases of the cordon and search. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. or location by destroying.• Suppress—to temporarily degrade the performance of a force or weapons system below the level needed to accomplish the mission. Snipers/Recon Infiltration Snipers and/or small recon units can be used in order to secure routes into the objective area as well as provide timely information concerning road conditions and civilian activity.20/MCRP 3-31.62 I-9 . The search/assault element initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The commander of the unit conducting the cordon or the search/assault element leader may break this element down into separate groups to accomplish its assigned tasks. To render a target so damaged it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (e) Destroy—to physically render an enemy force combat ineffective. (4) Support Element—The support element is designed to act as a force multiplier during a cordon and search operation. kill.4B/NTTP 3-05. or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces. (c) Clear—to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone. area. (3) Search/Assault Element—The search/assault element’s mission is to clear. These functions may be performed by multiple personnel/teams and may include: (1) Detainee Teams (2) Field Interview Teams (3) Documentation Teams (4) Demolition Teams (5) Mine Detection Teams (6) Tunnel Reconnaissance Teams (7) Fire Support Teams (8) Joint Terminal Attack Controller (9) Aviation assets (10) Tactical HUMINT Teams (11) Tactical PSYOP Teams (12) Civil Affairs Teams (13) Interpreters (14) Host Nation Security Forces (15) Military Working Dogs (16) Medical Teams (17) Sniper Teams 3. and assault targets within the specific building or area that the target(s) are located and to capture.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The following special teams and assets should be considered during planning. search. (d) Secure—to gain possession of a position or terrain feature with or without force and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. b. Special Teams and Assets. Team leaders should be included where applicable in the planning phase of the operation to advise commanders on their capabilities. (b) Seize—to clear the target area and obtain control of it. capturing. Possible tasks include: (a) Search—to conduct a movement to go over or look through with the intent of finding something.

Special care must be made to ensure all members of the patrol are using similar equipment as local populations will quickly become attuned to who snipers/recon units are and their specialized equipment (scoped rifles. For each search. This search technique allows for a very rapid search and minimizes the number of personnel dedicated to securing the building’s occupants. Possible insertion methods for snipers/recon units that have been used successfully include: (1) Security halt: moving sniper/recon teams into the area with a patrol and leaving them behind after a security halt. The US-only search is best used when time in the target location must be minimized or troops are not available to escort occupants around a building. The disadvantage to this technique comes from the possibility of compromising the identity of your informant. This search is conducted with a selected occupant of the household moving with the search element. This search is conducted by the designated search team without an informant or a member of the family or a worker from that building being present.4B/NTTP 3-05.). This search technique provides the search element with the actual informant who provided the intelligence on the target building. b. Units conducting operations in Southwest Asia have found that search considerations vary among provinces. (3) Informant-assisted Search. This search is conducted with the informant assisting the search team in their search. commanders must plan for a point to consolidate the occupants of a building or set of buildings. c. Units must provide an adequate disguise for their informant during this type of search. The informantassisted-search is best used when intelligence on the target building(s) is believed to be very accurate. This search technique allows the head person of the building to observe the search and confirm that none of his property was stolen and provides the US personnel with an indigenous person to open locked or possibly booby trapped rooms or storage areas. I-10 FM 3-06.62 25 April 2006 . (2) Occupant-assisted Search. as follows: (1) US-only Search. Search Considerations a. may not have keys to all the rooms or outer buildings. The search element must search the entire building and adjacent property in addition to the informant-identified areas. The disadvantage to this search technique comes from the requirement to devote extra personnel to secure the head person of the building during the search. This will most likely be the case in future theaters. cities. (2) Vehicle patrol: having snipers roll out of a moving vehicle at night in a dark area. Note: The identity of the informant may be compromised if taken into the target building as part of an occupant-assisted search. and neighborhoods. Care must be taken during extraction of snipers/recon units to ensure that a proper and safe link up is conducted. There are different types of searches. 4.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (3) False vehicle break down: having vehicle patrol act as though it was broken down in order to give snipers time to get out of the vehicle and into an initial insertion point. different packs etc. and it may place the search element in a position where they are implicated in theft allegations. The occupant-assisted search is best used when time in the target building(s) is not critical and when the intelligence on the target building is not very firm. The disadvantage to this type of search comes from the fact that US personnel may not know all the hiding spots in the building.Snipers/recon units can generally provide 24-72 hours of on target surveillance as well as cover movements onto the objective with precision fires as needed.

Changes to the ROE must be immediately disseminated by the chain of command and briefed to each Service member and leader in the cordon and search mission. (b) Inner Cordon—The inner cordon element must use strict and well planned fire control measures to avoid fratricide with the search/assault element and the outer cordon. The size of the force and escalation of force are appropriate to the threat. A disadvantage of the HNSF search is that the US forces may be linked to damage or harm caused by their security forces and the commander of the cordon and search mission must closely monitor the activity of the search element as a result. (a) Outer Cordon—The outer cordon force commander needs to establish clear sectors of fire that are oriented away from the cordon. 5. This search is conducted by the HNSF with US forces in support.20/MCRP 3-31. Planners must analyze the area of the outer cordon and identify local conditions that will restrict or limit direct fire capability.62 I-11 . In this type operation US forces provide security while the HNSF conduct the search of the target area or building. Searches may be conducted only to apprehend suspects or to secure evidence proving an offense has been committed. Weapons mix and capabilities will be adjusted based on the analysis of the objective area. Lacking organic capability in the US force. (2) ROE and Escalation of Force Training. An advantage of this type search is that the HNSF will understand the culture and more readily identify likely hiding spots within the target. ROE always maintain the right of US personnel to use the force necessary to accomplish selfdefense and specify the conditions which allow the use of deadly force. (1) The military or civil police who work with the populace are contacted before the search operations or periodically if search operations are a continuing activity. This is enabled by taking into account the dispositions of the friendly elements conducting the cordon and search operation and the ballistics of the direct and indirect fire weapons supporting the operation. (1) Direct Fire Planning Considerations Specific to Cordon and Search. Units must consider the impact of early warning on the effectiveness of their operation. d. Direct and Indirect Fire Planning a. (2) Search teams use a minimum essential force to eliminate any active resistance encountered. Military personnel must know that they may perform searches only in areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful).4B/NTTP 3-05. ROE must be briefed and checked during the preparation phase of the operation to ensure all members of the cordon and search understand it.(4) Host Nation Search. an interpreter must accompany US forces on this type search to effectively coordinate with the HN personnel. and the law of war. Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed during both the planning process and execution. The commander’s fire plan must explain how the unit will achieve its purpose while maintaining the safety of his unit members. Both lethal force and nonlethal force are included in the planning for the various conditions or 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Factors influencing ROE are national command policy. In this situation the HNSF conduct the physical search to locate personnel or material and document the result for prosecution. They include definitions of combatant and noncombatant elements and prescribe the treatment of noncombatants. Planning for the cordon and search must position each element and establish clear fire control measures to prevent fratricide. ROE specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces may engage. The USMC calls this process battlespace geometry.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the operational requirements. The personnel of search/assault element must recognize the hazard to both the inner and outer cordon forces caused by firing through exterior doors and windows.

and published on an air tasking order.3A/NTTP 3-01. Techniques. b. air-ground integration smart card.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. type of control (eyes on target. aviation ROE. and their task and purpose for each phase of the operation. Flash-bang grenades. 6. I-12 FM 3-06. and downed aviator/aircraft issues create additional situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals. smoke and other nonlethal systems provide the means to disorient or incapacitate personnel in the target area. Air assets require the same mission planning products as any ground unit: maneuver graphics. 9-line close air support check-in briefing. and in the Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower [FM 3-09. imagery. As a rule. objective sketches. Escalation procedures are briefed and rehearsed during the preparation phase of the cordon and search mission. Joint Tactics. When planning use of nonlethal systems the commander must ensure that the using force is trained and understands the capability and limitation of each. When employed within the ROE/RUF as an option in the force continuum. and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations [FM 3-06. (a) Joint ground forces conduct cordon and search missions as part of an on-going operation or in support of the HN as they respond to security issues. indirect fire assets frequently are not used because of the operational situation and theater specific ROE. Weapons effects and employment are also important planning factors in cordon and search operations. c. target-list worksheet.3. clearance of fires. Additionally. Cordon and search operations may be further bound by additional rules for the use of force (RUF). Techniques. While attack and reconnaissance helicopters are the primary air asset used during cordon and search operations. riot control agents. (b) Use of nonlethal systems can aid in capturing target personnel alive and also mitigate negative public perception of cordon and search operations. fixed-wing aircraft and utility helicopters may also be employed. Aviators must completely understand the ground maneuver plan.20/MCRP 3-31. nonlethal weapons provide an alternative to lethal weapons and provide an effective capability to protect the joint force while still accomplishing the mission. post major combat operations (MCO) are governed by restrictive ROE and are more sensitive to political considerations and public perception than direct combat military operations. route clearance. stun-guns. The first step in successful integration of fixed-wing aircraft begins with the ground maneuver unit’s air liaison officer/JTAC.32/MCRP 3-16. The procedures should be based on the theater ROE. limited conditions. friendly marking techniques. Nonlethal capabilities simply provide the combatant commander additional options for applying military force consistent with the situation to accomplish stated or directed objectives. For fixed-wing assets to be available.6].1/ MCRP 3-35. allocated. they must be requested. and the communication plan.62 25 April 2006 . i.4B/NTTP 3-05. however. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). Indirect fire considerations with munitions effects should be planned.. Procedures to request immediate air support are located in Joint Publication (JP) 3-09. Escalation procedures should be planned for and briefed during the orders process to include transitions to a higher threat environment. with the use of deadly force being the last option and then only under very specific. Aviation Integration a.circumstances that require force escalation. b.09/AFTTP (I) 3-2.6A/NTTP 3-09. commander’s intent. Refer to Multi-Service Tactics.29] for more specific information. preferably with the aviators present. Aviation should be a part of the planning process to include rehearsals. eyes on area). assault or raid.e.2/AFTTP (I) 3-2.

influence the will of the local populace. control. Airspace control measures and fire support coordinating measures are critical to mission success. f.20/MCRP 3-31. armed UAS have the ability to engage confirmed targets within the battlespace. integration and deconfliction of UAS must be coordinated during planning with ground command and control (C2) elements and all aviation assets. When applicable. However. SSE may also provide further intelligence required for follow-on operations. Information Operations (IO) IO have specific implications associated with and are derived from cordon and search operations. Unmanned aerial systems offer unique and essential capabilities to cordon and search. the logistical movement of detainees from the battlefield is a requirement. Key planning considerations to IO are: (1) What is the message joint forces want to address to the local populace? (2) What do we want the enemy/sympathizers to think about us? (3) What is the perception management plan? 10. during.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. coordinating altitudes. 7. In addition to intelligence. SOF capabilities significantly decrease the possibility of compromise and further enhances the conventional unit's ability to maintain the element of surprise. surveillance. Special Operations Forces (SOF) SOF provides numerous capabilities to the conventional commander for cordon and search operations. These aspects include things such as specific needs for blocking positions and various support requirements for HNSF. and special instructions (SPINS). There are a few unique aspects about logistics that must be planned and carefully considered for a cordon and search operation.4B/NTTP 3-05. e. Refer to appendix D for details. specially trained SOF personnel can facilitate sensitive site exploitation (SSE) of an objective. and develop relationships beneficial to US interests. During the execution of a cordon and search operation. 8. Aircraft such as the joint surveillance target attack and radar system (JSTARS) and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) could be part of a cordon and search operation. Public Affairs (PA) Commanders must plan for media being present throughout their operational area and possibly embedded with the unit during cordon and search operations. SOF elements are continually developing information that can be used by conventional forces and can refine intelligence developed by conventional forces during the cordon and search. Detailed logistical considerations are provided in chapter VI. restricted fire areas (RFAs). 9. Poor logistical planning and resourcing may lead to mission failure. and after cordon and search operations. SOF units are uniquely suited to facilitate intelligence collection in an asymmetric environment. The airspace control order will identify no-fire areas (NFAs). News reporting provides 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.d. and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities encompassed in unarmed UAS. SOF elements have the ability to move throughout the battlefield with relative ease. Logistical and Support Considerations A cordon and search mission is no different than any other mission with regards to logistics. Chapter V covers SOF capabilities and contributions to the cordon and search mission in further detail.62 I-13 . They can aid in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and could be used during the execution phase by updating the common operational picture (COP) and providing command. conventional commanders should take advantage of SOF capabilities before. Also. and communications (C3).

instant coverage of military operations and can turn minor tactical events into international events with strategic implications. National and international media coverage can profoundly influence external public support, and impact the behavior of all audiences—military and civilian—inside and outside the cordon and search area. Effectively planned, resourced and executed Pubic Affairs activities can be a force multiplier, leveraging operational support and enhancing the command’s credibility. Media operations also can be a disaster if they are not coordinated, resourced or executed properly. For this reason, Public Affairs planners must be included and involved in all phases of the operational planning. Engaging the media serves the best interests of the unit and the Soldiers conducting the mission. Public Affairs is a related activity to IO and therefore PA and IO plans must be mutually coordinated and synchronized to ensure they are complementary and support the overall operational mission. A checklist for PA considerations is included in appendix B.

11. Communications
a. Well organized and understood communication lines tie the various elements of a cordon and search mission together. Communication planning must not only define the methods to communicate between elements but also the form of that communication. Visual means such as hand and arms signals, laser pointers and/or designators, infra-red spotlights, chemical lights, and wolf-tails must be understood by all elements as to their purpose and meaning. Planning for voice communication must identify the designated radio frequencies for the various elements (i.e., medical evacuation [MEDVAC]/casualty evacuation [CASEVAC], indirect fire, close air support [CAS]) and to use brevity codes, key phrases, and report formats. b. As most cordon and search missions will occur in urban or built up areas, particular attention must be given to those conditions that will inhibit or prevent communication. The presence of high power lines, generators, structures, and battlefield haze or smoke are considerations when identifying the means of communication between the elements of the mission. Backup and redundant communication means are necessary to ensure reliable C2 of the mission. In some cases it may be necessary to have designated runner/courier teams to carry messages between elements. c. When HNSF are integrated into the cordon and search mission it will be necessary to integrate their communication means. The designation of interpreters and their training to operate radios or other equipment will be essential if the HNSF are operating as a separate element. In some cases this may involve using commercial cell phones or nonsecure radios which will make it necessary to develop code word and brevity phrases that will transmit command and control instructions with some degree of security.

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Chapter II

INTELLIGENCE AND URBAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. General
a. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) includes information about terrain and weather and civil considerations as well as the enemy. (The six factors of METT-TC—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations—make up the major subject categories relevant information is grouped for military operations.) In cordon and search operations, civilian considerations are prominent in IPB analysis. b. The successful conduct of cordon and search operations relies on the willing support and cooperation of the populations directly involved. Cultural awareness is needed to understand the motivations of the parties involved in the conflict and the population as a whole. This requires a detailed understanding of the civil considerations of the area in which US forces operate and thereby places a heavy reliance on the use of HUMINT. c. The objective area in cordon and search operations includes three primary components: the physical, military, and civilian considerations of the area. These components provide a structure for intelligence personnel to focus and organize to provide support to cordon and search operations. These entities are interdependent, not separate, and enable the commanders to gain an in-depth understanding of their objective area during cordon and search operations and to provide a focus for the intelligence analyst. d. Expect terrain in cordon and search operations to be complex. Some of the factors that ought to be considered are the density of construction and population within the objective area, the street patterns within the urban areas, and compartmentalization of areas within the objective area (such as areas separated by waterways or highways). Also functional zones should be considered (for example, the functions different areas serve within the objective area, such as residential, commercial, and government areas) as well as the potential for significant differences in receptiveness/cooperative nature of the populace within subsections of the objective area and areas surrounding the objective area to cordon forces.

2. Civilian Considerations
a. Civilian considerations comprise the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an objective area that influence the conduct of military operations. Factors of interest include the gender and mix of the populace; the cultural, religious, and socio-economic beliefs and thinking; and the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of groups and individuals. b. US leaders should identify and meet with key local leaders early in the operation. These key personnel can provide valuable information needed for successful completion of the operations, to include local infrastructure, a common picture of cultural norms, suspected enemy strengths, and probable means of support and locations for enemy forces. Support from local leaders usually means support from the populace. US leaders can assess the support of the populace by actions of the local leaders to them during meetings. c. Commanders must realize that the local populace will behave in their perceived selfinterest. They are keenly aware of five sets of interests at work: those of the US forces, the insurgent/hostile elements, the local opportunists, the legitimate government, and the general

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population. The populace assesses these interests constantly in order to ascertain their own stakes, risks, and advantages. d. The enemy knows it is difficult for US forces to accurately identify friend from foe. Local combat situations can change rapidly, as a noncombatant exhibits a hostile act or hostile intent. In Chechnya, Chechen rebels and Hezbollah terrorists effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces. The Chechens counted on the ferocious nature of the Russian counterattack to cause heavy civilian casualties in order to gain support from the indigenous population for the Chechen separatist cause. In Fallujah, Iraqi enemy forces pretended to surrender in order to maneuver into positions of advantage. e. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often key to understanding the population. Identifying local personnel in positions of authority is important. These local officials, tribal leaders, or village elders are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In many societies nominal titles do not equal power, influence does. Many “leaders” are mere figureheads, and the true authority lies elsewhere. f. The ability of a mission planner and an intelligence analyst to identify and understand trends and patterns of activity is essential in providing commanders with information they need. Every local area has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of heaviest activity along a line of communication is one case in point. Trade and business transactions, market sales, religious practices, governmental functions, and criminal activity are other examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies. Disruptions or irregularities in these patterns serve as a warning of insurgent activity or potential attack on US forces. g. It is important to remember that while certain general patterns do exist, most areas are normally composed of a multitude of different peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Treating the local population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and a poor understanding of the current situation. Individuals normally act independently and in their own best interest. Their behavior will not always coincide with friendly courses of action. Do not ignore the presence or actions of the different population components within an objective area when developing assessments.

3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Considerations
a. This section contains a list of considerations for developing cordon and search IPB. These considerations are presented to help orient analysts and operators by providing relevant questions, which may need to be answered. This list is not meant to be all encompassing or exhaustive. For additional information regarding IPB refer to FM 34-130/FMFRP 3-23-2, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. b. Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment for a Cordon and Search Operation. Stay focused on cordon and search IPB. The goal of defining the battlespace environment is to determine intelligence gaps and define parameters. Characteristics of the battlespace environment influence the commander's decisions or affect the COAs available to friendly forces or the adversary. Establishing an area of interest (AI) that exceeds the limits of the objective area and the command's battlespace, allows the command to anticipate significant developments. Defining the battlespace environment helps to focus IPB effort to:

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it may be modern or built around an ancient core. The goal of describing the battlespace effects is to understand how aspects of the battlespace affect enemy COAs and friendly COAs. d. predict. enemy. In evaluating the threat for a cordon and search mission.4B/NTTP 3-05. Step 2 includes examining the following influences on the battlespace: (1) How weather effects the mobility of targeted individuals and systems and their associated logistic efforts. C2 structures for operations. (3) Gain knowledge of street patterns and widths to give commanders and leaders a good idea of whether or not mounted mobility corridors in different zones can permit wheeled or tracked vehicles and facilitate C2. Knowing what the threat is capable of. such as infiltration or exfiltration routes. or regional base. and prioritize target group's activities to include: • Movement around potential objectives. Sophisticated weaponry may be an indicator of external support as well as the targeted group's ability to attack important and possibly well-defended targets. planners should accomplish the following: (1) Identify which friendly. thought to be present.20/MCRP 3-31. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. it may contain towering buildings or none over three stories. Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects. or have access to the objective area. and agricultural areas. (3) How efforts to create or increase unrest and dissension affect the population.(1) Determine points of entry. This is accomplished by developing threat models which accurately portray how threat forces normally execute operations and how they have reacted to similar situations in the past. (4) How effective the targets of the cordon and search operation are at conducting IO against existing or proposed HN policies and programs. A city will certainly have a significant influence beyond its boundaries on the region or even the nation in which it exists. and procedures the threat forces prefer to employ are the primary focus of evaluating the threat. Insurgents can influence the populace’s active support for or against the targets of the cordon and search operation. religious. and neutral groups are present. (2) How political and religious affiliation and practices influence the people’s attitudes towards both enemy and friendly operations. given the current situation. (2) Recognize that cities vary in ways other than size: a city may be the only large urban area in a nation or one of many. ethnic. c. and exfiltration routes. its physical layout may be orderly or chaotic. Step 3: Evaluate the Threat: Determination of the adversary’s capabilities and the tactics. (5) How economics and money affect the insurgents’ ability to conduct offensive operations.62 II-3 (4) . is critical to friendly mission success. Consider the insurgent organization. infiltration. (a) Does it have a high degree of command and control? (b) What is the level of planning and training within the organization? (c) What are their movement patterns? Movements may coincide with operational or logistical activities.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. techniques. (2) Determine if the target(s) are linked to a racial. (d) What are their trends and patterns? Use this analysis to template. (3) Determine the types of weapons that the targeted group have at their disposal.

activity. and staging areas. Political. (6) Consider that the insurgents may receive support. Determine the presence of organized crime in the area. (b) Evaluating and prioritizing each COA.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Insurgents may be driven by locals or be provided the use of their vehicles in order to have an apparent legitimate means of transportation. Centers of anti-US populations. documentation. weapons. (d) Determining named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs). banks. (d) Transportation. (c) Developing situational and event templates based on previous analysis efforts. Support to insurgents can be willing or coerced. (b) Determine the current law enforcement mechanisms and gaps that exist within the environment. Physical support includes safe passage. and Ethnic Affiliations. II-4 FM 3-06. such as the Muslim culture. Step 4: Develop Threat Courses of Action. Attacks on the population. (e) Religious. or action. What are the enemy COAs? Enemy courses of action might include the Ambushes of command-detonated mines or booby traps directed against cordon positions or other forces. rally points. (b) Physical. Potential ambush sites. and training at sites inside the country. agricultural areas. However. e. and fuel storage and production areas. Areas of antigovernment influence and residences of target group's leadership or key sympathizers. Charities.• • • • • • (e) following: • • • • • (5) Assembly points. Surveillance positions. the philosophy that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” may cause strange and unprecedented relationships to form. This may have the effect of influencing international policy or increasing the success of recruitment efforts. Cache sites. The following can be sources of insurgent support: (a) Moral. and collection of taxes and levies on the local population. such as states and provinces. Attempts to escape from the target area. Include an evaluation of individual villages and large political divisions. A significant leadership or cultural figure may make statements in support of an organization. in some cultures. Baited ambush of search force. (e) Identifying intelligence collection requirements. Attempts to reinforce the target area. informal transfer of currency by traveler or courier. (1) The goal of this step is to identify HPTs and to determine intelligence collection requirements. (c) Financial. (a) Determine crime conducive conditions within the urban environment. Commonalities and differences are significant in terms of estimating potential support or opposition an insurgent organization may receive in a given area.62 25 April 2006 . safe houses.20/MCRP 3-31. water sources. It integrates the three previous steps by: (a) Identifying the full set of COAs available to the enemy.

These sensors produce images of objects optically.4B/NTTP 3-05. Larger UAS. what are the best locations for placement of SOF teams (e. Due to the unconventional nature of the urban environment. or other media. Surveillance. obstacles such as damaged and destroyed buildings. execute. depending on the type.(2) Representative questions for determining adversary COA options are based on previous analysis (to include terrain. lasers. high points with good concealment and line of sight to multiple avenues)? 4. are able to loiter over the target area for extended periods of time. This allows the commander to focus ISR assets when and where they are needed. prepare. electronic display devices. Hunter and Predator. and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning a. If the outer cordon is not set. may compromise the operation and force the target to displace. and intact and destroyed bridges. The coordinated actions of the entire staff to develop the threat and environment portion of the common operational picture are key to providing successful ISR support to the commander. Techniques must be modified for every mission to accomplish ISR requirements—each cordon and search mission is unique. etc.. The topographical team can use this imagery to create updated mapping products for planning and operational uses. UAS can be used over a period of days to establish traffic/pedestrian patterns prior to commencing the operation. which ones are HPTs? (3) Representative questions for determining employment of collection assets include the SOF personnel analysis: Within each likely operating area. and digitally on film.62 II-5 . infrared.20/MCRP 3-31. Note: Imagery can assist in planning and execution with HN forces who may not be familiar with reading maps. such as Shadow and Raven. that operate at higher altitudes are nearly impossible to see or hear from the ground while smaller UAS. Imagery intelligence is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by photography. and radar. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. UAS route selection can be very challenging in a urban environment and needs to be thoroughly planned. weather. tactics. Developing the ISR plan for cordon and search operations is different from developing the plan supporting conventional operations. The key to successful ISR efforts is the integration of all ISR-assets throughout the entire mission process (plan. c. b. (b) Several UAS and manned ISR platforms have a real-time downlink capability to the supported commander on the ground.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. least risky methods to conduct reconnaissance of specific areas and to update and verify current maps of that area by showing clear routes. electronically. (a) UAS have the ability to provide valuable intelligence of the intended target area before and during the operation. (1) Imagery can provide several key advantages to the commander. the UAS could assist in observing for “leakers/runners” moving away from the target building. doctrine. the ISR effort is significantly more complex in combining and integrating HUMINT collectors and surveillance assets with the capabilities and tasks of limited ISR. capabilities. and assess). infrastructure. UAS imagery may be one of the fastest. Intelligence.g. These systems have day and night capabilities and.) and include: (a) What is the most likely enemy COA? What is the most dangerous? (b) What are enemy vulnerabilities and decisive points? Of the high value targets (HVTs).

HUMINT is the collection of information from a trained HUMINT collector of foreign information and multimedia to identify elements. Additional assets that can perform ISR functions: (1) Aviations Assets (for more detail see chapter IV). In turn this traffic often produces intelligence that can be acted upon immediately by units on the ground. Patterns in the amount of known enemy encrypted signals provide indications of specific threat courses of action. (5) Using be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) lists. have their face covered. Human Intelligence. e. (4) Using standard patrols for leaders recon. (1) Battalions currently derive most of their intelligence from HUMINT and SIGINT. intentions. and placed in a US vehicle or other secure area where they can pinpoint the target. Because of signal bounce within urban areas. (8) Bringing informants to provide positive identification of locations and/or personnel identified as HPTs. (3) Using route recon to target area.)—After the cordon is set. (7) Making false arrests of informants for intelligence collection. (b) Rotary Wing—All attack and reconnaissance rotary wing aircraft have forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) and day optics to perform ISR and most have the ability to record sensor data on video tape. insertion and extraction into a built up area may be difficult. Something as simple as establishing an anonymous tip line II-6 FM 3-06. have been extremely successful in producing intelligence by employing methods that cannot be detailed in an unclassified report.4B/NTTP 3-05. AV-8 with lightning pod. both passively and actively. however. HUMINT uses human sources and a variety of collection methods. and capabilities. However. Locals move freely and may easily identify things out of the ordinary. Battalions have had considerable success by tying signals interception with certain operations on the ground that are designed to increase the enemy’s electronic traffic. These teams can provide 24-48 hours of observation. (2) Using sniper employment (weighed based on compromise). the potential exists in an urban environment for their mission to be compromised by local observation. personnel. dispositions. (2) Conventional Sniper/Recon Teams. strength. Gun-camera images from aircraft that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight into enemy TTPs. fixed-wing aircraft could assist similar to UAS. Reliable “walk-in” tips are relatively rare. equipment. Collecting unencrypted threat signals can provide key indicators for threat courses of action. Signals intelligence attachments. it has the capability of engaging confirmed targets within the battlespace.62 25 April 2006 . (They can be placed in a US uniform. d. composition. The greatest source of HUMINT is not civilian tipsters but the observations of Service members on patrol. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). direction-finding capabilities for all SIGINT collection systems are significantly impaired. However. Possible sources of data that can become HUMINT are: (1) Using scout/reconnaissance teams and company level operations. (a) Fixed Wing (AC-130. tactics.20/MCRP 3-31. (6) Using children for information. Video can be used to establish local area atmospherics.) f. to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. etc.(2) Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the reconnaissance and debriefing process and allow the intelligence staff personnel to make their own judgments about items of interest that the patrol reports. Additionally.

has proven successful in giving the local populace a way of providing information without fear of retribution. (2) The urban environment has a significant effect on intelligence collected from signals, both friendly and threat. Structures and infrastructure can affect such things as signal strength and direction. In terms of collecting SIGINT, this means that comprehensive electronic preparation of the battlespace must be developed during the MDMP. g. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). MASINT will likely be the second most important type of intelligence gathered in the urban environment at the tactical level. Ground surveillance radars (GSRs) will have limited uses in the urban environment because of the lack of wide-open spaces in which they best operate, but can be used along the periphery of cordoned areas to detect infiltration and exfiltration of threat forces. The remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) and the platoon early warning device (PEWD) will play a primary role in monitoring many of the numerous routes that cannot be covered by human observers due to manpower constraints. REMBASS can monitor such avenues as subterranean passageways (and/or entrances and exits to such passageways), entrances and exits on buildings, fire escapes on buildings, perimeters, and traffic flow along routes (especially foot trails that may be used to infiltrate and exfiltrate personnel and equipment between urban and rural areas). h. Special Operations (SO) Intelligence Requirements. The currency, level of detail, and scope of SO intelligence requirements place unusual demands on theater and national intelligence systems. SO often require more intelligence collection, research, and analysis than most conventional missions. HUMINT is especially important to SO mission planning because it provides detailed information not usually available through technical means. HUMINT collection requirements flow from the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) joint intelligence support element (JISE) through the HUMINT operations cell. Graphics and imagery are important to SO planning. Detailed information from theater and national sources must be tailored so that it can be displayed, understood, and used by the tactical SOF element that will plan and conduct the mission. Detailed and current (less than 24 hours old) imagery of the objective area is normally needed. Some missions may require replicas, models, diagrams, and nonstandard geospatial information and services (GI&S) products. The scope of SO intelligence requirements also may include the social, economic, informational, and political dynamics of the operational area. The commander, joint special operations task force's (COMJSOTF) information requirements compete for limited collection resources and all requirements may not be satisfied. COMJSOTF intelligence requirements linked to theater priority intelligence requirements (PIR) will have the best prospects for timely support.

5. Urban Planning Considerations
a. Urban areas present the most complex physical terrain that exists. This physical terrain consists of manmade structures of varying types, sizes, materials, and construction arranged sometimes orderly and sometimes randomly. Urban areas are frequently defined according to size, from villages of fewer than 3,000 inhabitants to large cities with populations of over 100,000. Large cities vary enormously in size, ranging in population from 100,000 to over 20 million and in area from several to hundreds of square miles. Cities vary in ways other than size: a city may be the only large urban area in a nation or one of many; its physical layout may be orderly or chaotic; it may be modern or built around an ancient core; it may contain towering buildings or none over three stories. A city will certainly have a significant influence beyond its boundaries on the region or even the nation in which it exists.

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b. Regardless of variations, all urban areas share four main characteristics that are generally interrelated and virtually inseparable. (1) A complex manmade physical terrain is superimposed on existing natural terrain and consists of structures and facilities of various types. (2) A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade and natural terrain. (3) An infrastructure upon which the area depends may also occupy manmade terrain and provides human services and cultural and political structure for the urban area and often beyond, perhaps for the entire nation. (4) Societal differences found in most mid to large cities are different than those found in more rural areas and can cause obstacles to cordon and search operations. People have societal and cultural driven patterns of behavior in mid to large urban areas that need to be considered. c. These four characteristics interact to make each urban area a complex and dynamic cluster of systems, with a unique physical, political, economic, social, and cultural identity. Considered in isolation from the other elements of the urban triad, the physical terrain of urban areas presents significant challenges to military operations. However, physical terrain, both natural and manmade, is only the foundation upon which the population and infrastructure of the urban area are superimposed. Rather than terrain considerations, it is the impact of military operations on the urban population and vice versa that fundamentally distinguishes joint urban operations (JUOs). d. Cities vary immensely depending on their location, history, economic development, climate, available building materials, the natural terrain on which they are built, the culture or cultures of their inhabitants, and many other factors. A single city may incorporate high-rise business or administrative sections, suburbs, shantytowns, industrial areas, extensive parklands or other open areas, waterways, and various patterns of street grids and other transportation infrastructure. City patterns may consist of a central hub surrounded by satellite areas to form complex networks, or they may be linear, or shaped by dominating natural terrain features. They may contain street patterns that are rectangular, radial, concentric, or irregular. The city itself probably consists of a city core surrounded by various commercial ribbons, peripheral and industrial areas, residential areas, and perhaps poverty belts of shantytowns. The myriad ways that features can be combined make it necessary to approach each urban area as a unique problem. e. Understanding the physical characteristics of urban areas requires a different way of thinking about terrain. It requires the comprehension of the multidimensional nature of urban terrain, its general forms and functions, and size. The total size of the surfaces and spaces of an urban area is usually many times that of a similarly sized piece of natural terrain because of the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural landscape. Like other terrain, urban areas consist of airspace and surface areas. But in addition to those are manmade ‘supersurface’ and ‘subsurface’ areas. (1) Airspace. This is the area above the ground usable by aircraft and aerial munitions. In urban areas, airspace is broken up at low levels by manmade structures of different heights and densities in addition to the irregularities in natural terrain. This produces an “urban canyon” effect that can adversely impact operations. (2) Surface Areas. Surface areas are the exterior ground-level areas of streets and roads, parks and fields, and any other exterior space. These surface areas follow the natural

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terrain and are themselves broken up by manmade features. In the case of bridges and culverts, vehicle weight classifications should be considered along movement routes. Routes for armored vehicles may be restricted because of bridge limitations. (3) Supersurface Areas. Supersurface areas are the roofs and upper floors of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other structures that can be used for movement, maneuver, firing positions, or for other advantage. (4) Subsurface Areas. Subsurface areas are below ground level that consist of sewer and drainage systems, subway tunnels, utility corridors, or other subterranean spaces. These areas can be used for cover and concealment, movement, and engagement, but their use requires intimate knowledge of the area.

Figure II-1. Urban Terrain

f. Urban areas will contain varying degrees of physical infrastructure. This infrastructure will at a minimum include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings, hospitals, schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities. The infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be highly complex and sophisticated. For example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets; in another city it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large highways, subways, and other modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a city would be the transportation hub for the region in which it is located. g. In addition to the physical infrastructure of power plants, transportation networks, and the like, cities also have a service infrastructure: police, fire, and other government services; food and water availability and distribution; medical services; fuel and electricity; the news media and information flow; and others. This sort of infrastructure may be quite sophisticated and an integral part of the city’s life, it may be virtually nonexistent, or it may exist in a state of ineffectiveness. h. Within urban areas and urban zones. (1) City Core. The city core is the heart of the urban area—the downtown or central business district. It is relatively small and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the

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The core periphery is located at the edges of the city core.20/MCRP 3-31. Dense random and close orderly block are two common construction patterns that can be found within the city core and core periphery zones. the two regions are often quite different. Figure II-2.urban area’s shops. It normally contains the highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean areas. the core and periphery were developed and “grew” at different times. In most cities.62 25 April 2006 . Typical city cores of today are made up of buildings that vary greatly in height. and public institutions. As a result. Core Periphery II-10 FM 3-06. offices. five to ten stories in large cities. Figure II-3. The core periphery consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings.4B/NTTP 3-05. It is possible to encounter very old and ultra-modern buildings next to each other as you transition between the two.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The building heights are fairly uniform—two or three stories in small towns. City Core (2) Core Periphery.

Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. trees.(3) Dense Random Construction. Buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Wider streets generally form rectangular patterns in this area. gardens.62 II-11 .20/MCRP 3-31. and walls.4B/NTTP 3-05. Figure II-5. Dense Random Construction (4) Close Orderly Block Construction. This construction is a typical old inner city pattern with narrow winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards. Buildings are closely located and frequently close to the edge of a roadway. Close Orderly Block Construction (5) Dispersed Residential Area. Figure II-4. Inner-block courtyards are common. This type of area is similar to close-orderly block areas in Europe.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.

New construction normally consists of low. flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. this area consists of multistoried apartments. Older complexes may be located within dense.62 25 April 2006 . These areas are often contiguous to industrial or transportation areas or interspersed with close-orderly block areas. Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns. Industrial-transportation areas are generally located on or along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes.Figure II-6.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Wide streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. High-rise areas providing worker housing is normally located adjacent to these areas and are prominent in Asian cities. II-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31. separated open areas. High-Rise Area (7) Industrial-Transportation Area.4B/NTTP 3-05. random construction or close-orderly block areas. especially rail facilities. Dispersed Residential Area (6) High-Rise Area. and single-story buildings. pose significant obstacles to military movement. Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical because these facilities. Figure II-7.

wood. Some of the latest variants are built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor. brick. Figure II-9. Industrial-Transportation Area (8) Permanent or Fixed Fortifications. rock. Those in the United States are mostly of the coastal defense type. These include any of several different types and may be considered isolated forts. Asia.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. internal communications. or any combination of the above. and South America. While most of these fortifications are found in Western Europe.Figure II-8. such as the Hue Citadel in Vietnam and the German fortifications that surrounded Metz. service facilities. major caliber and other weapons. Middle East. and nuclear (CBRN) overpressure systems. concrete. Africa. biological. Permanent fortifications can be made of earth. Permanent or Fixed Fortifications 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. steel-reinforced concrete. or as part of a fortified line (Siegfried and Maginot Lines). radiological.62 II-13 . and chemical. many can be found in the Balkans.

their destruction may cause unacceptable civilian casualties. For example. radial ring. Even the larger cities can have shantytowns that consist of cardboard or tin shacks. See figure II-10 for a description of common street patterns within the AI and AO. However.(9) Shantytowns. explosive charges must be reduced or not used at all. to include vehicles and weapons. A unit with armored vehicles may easily knock down and traverse structures without affecting mobility at all. (b) During a cordon and search operation. Figure II-10. These types of structures present the problem of collateral damage. Most of the structures in the small towns and villages may be constructed from materials ranging from cardboard to concrete block. Regardless. a rectangular. Fires are also more likely to develop and spread in shantytowns.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the temporary nature of the structures can mean that mobility can be either more or less restricted than other sections of an urban area. (a) These less structurally sound buildings have no common floor pattern and are more likely to have only one room. II-14 FM 3-06. Shantytowns do not necessarily follow any of the above patterns and may be found in many different zones within urban areas. Weapons fired in one structure may penetrate the walls of one or more buildings.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. civilian casualties. Some countries in arid regions depend on adobe for construction. This penetration becomes a hazard for friendly forces as well as noncombatants. rapidly spreading fires. commanders must carefully consider the effects of their operations in this area. in which case mobility becomes more restrictive as the narrow paths often do not accommodate vehicles. as the weak structures afford little protection increasing the risk of fratricide.62 25 April 2006 . In order for buildings not to be structurally damaged or completely destroyed. Many underdeveloped countries are composed of small towns and villages and very few large cities. or combined pattern facilitates movement and control better than irregular patterns. Knowledge of street patterns and widths gives commanders and leaders a good idea of whether or not mobility corridors in different zones can permit wheeled or tracked vehicles and facilitate command and control. Shantytowns (10) Street Patterns and Effects. and large. radial.

Street Patterns and Effects 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.62 II-15 .8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.Figure II-11.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.

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Chapter III CORDON AND SEARCH EXECUTION PROCEDURES 1. attached to it. M-1 tanks. The security element sets up the cordon. fires must be precise and accurate as opposed to high volume.20/MCRP 3-31. Each of these vehicles obviously affords mobility. The mission of the outer cordon is to provide a containment in order to prevent a high value target (HVT) from escaping the objective area. the ability to provide accurate long range fires and observation.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The inner cordon will provide direct fires to suppress the enemy force and allow maneuver of the search/assault element to the objective. direct fire control measures can be complicated. The search/assault element must have a breach capability for fences. The search/assault element may also have to provide its own support by fire and have teams with specific capabilities such as demolitions. Cordon and Search Methods for Success a. doors. The mission of the inner cordon is to contain the immediate vicinity of the target to prevent escape and provide security to the search/assault element. Generally. because of the condensed and compressed nature of the physical area. it will need to designate personnel to maintain security as the search is being conducted. Generally. d. The outer cordon can be tasked to block specific locations in order to prevent escape from inside and interference from outside of the objective area. The outer cordon’s composition and capabilities should be based on METT-T. Stryker vehicles. four elements to perform the major tasks: a headquarters for command and control. to clear the building of combatants and search for targeted personnel and or contraband. the outer cordon ring unit may consist of antitank or heavy weapons vehicles (tube launched. b. fire when ready. and number floors. and to be prepared to perform the other elements tasks. The outer cordon may have to accomplish this task by being more terrain oriented to focus on the most probable avenues of approach into and out of the objective area.” See appendix I for examples. high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs]. at a minimum. wire guided (missile) [TOWs]. The conduct of a cordon and search operation requires. and a support element. Due to the congested nature of the urban environment. provide support by fire. two personnel with weapons.” The inner cordon "ring" may be infantry squads and sniper teams positioned to prevent the escape of dismounted personnel from the facility or building being searched. side A-B. and stopping and blocking power with respect to “get-away vehicles. If the cordon and search is opposed by a hostile force. “Immediate suppression. which usually involves two groups: an outer cordon "ring" for vehicular avenues of approach and an inner cordon "ring" for personnel avenues of approach. second floor. The support element may be tasked to be the reserve. The search/assault element often involves one or two squads that form into specific teams. the inner cordon provides support by fire. c. This way a request for immediate direct fire suppression can be specific and the risk of both collateral damage and fratricide reduced. or helicopters). Also. mine clearing MWD. The search/assault element will clear and search suspected buildings in order to capture or destroy insurgents and/or contraband and is the main effort.4B/NTTP 3-05. optically tracked. light armored vehicles. Bradley fighting vehicles.. and walls. One proven TTP is for the unit to number buildings. etc. and enough combat power 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. The fire command can be. This further sub organization may be designated and rehearsed before the operation begins or can be left up to the search/assault element leader to accomplish as the situation dictates. a search/assault element. building 23. letter building corners. As with the security element the commander may further task organize the search/assault element into sub units to accomplish specific tasks.62 III-1 . 2nd window. a security element.

4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. c. Bolt cutters. fences. The ability to observe the search/assault element will generally cause the command element to collocate with the inner cordon. (3) Be prepared to move leadership and support assets from one location to another during mission execution or as necessary. Based on the structures on the objective (doors. Key tips for cordon and search success: (1) Position key leaders so that they can see and control all subordinate elements. (d) When to cease fire. Do not let them get preoccupied with subordinate leader responsibilities. quickie saws. a demolitions team may be necessary to effect the breach. door rams. e. position vehicles and personnel to be searched so that the security element’s sectors of fire face to the outside of the friendly element and away from noncombatants. For example: (a) What actions to take in the event a vehicle penetrates a traffic control point (TCP) from outside the established perimeter. The command element is the single point of coordination for supporting assets and for status reporting to higher headquarters. (4) When executing searches.62 25 April 2006 . walls. gates). (5) Keep the bulk of the forces within the perimeter so that if the situation escalates they are essentially in a battle or support by fire position. (b) Who engages and with what weapons systems. The location of the command element must provide the ability to control the subordinate teams and supporting assets of the cordon and search mission.to adequately clear the target building or facility using standard entry and building clearing battle drills and close quarters combat techniques. As a critical component of the cordon and search III-2 FM 3-06. The composition of the command element may be as small as the commander and a radio operator or may include security vehicles. a commander is given a variety of assets to assist him in accomplishing his mission. The command element is the headquarters that provides C2 for the cordon and search mission and may have several combat multipliers attached. and what signal to use for cease fire. interpreters. b. HN officials and/or local authorities. d. and hooligan tools can be used for breaching in lieu of demolitions. When HN forces or authorities are involved in the operation. the commander will task organize his assets in order to maintain control of no more than three to five elements. Ideally. Visibility and communication capability will be deciding factors in identifying the best location for the command element during the actual mission. (6) Ensure that all personnel understand the direct fire plan as well as any contingency plans. 2. Frequently. The command element must remain mobile and able to move to any point within the cordon and search operation to ensure coordination of all elements and supporting assets. (2) Position key assets such as crew-served weapons and interpreters at the critical locations. Operation and communication security must be guiding principles when conducting integrated operations with HN forces. (c) Engage crew-served weapons or should they use only M-16s/M-4s. the command element coordinates with them and integrates them as identified during the planning phase of the operation.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Command Element a.

The security element limits enemy or civilian influence in the objective area and prevents targets from escaping the cordon. Constant communication between the aviation element and the outer cordon will better facilitate the isolation of the target area. As such it requires detailed planning.4B/NTTP 3-05. The command element ensures that all actions are documented as required and that the rules of evidence are followed where necessary. and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects. required for mission execution. (1) Some considerations for the outer cordon include: (a) Vehicles for TCPs and/or blocking positions (b) Battlespace geometry—fire planning and coordination (c) Overwatch positions (d) Aviation assets to observe target area and inform outer cordon if vehicles or persons leave the target area. 3.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and transport of the detainee. Aviation assets. (e) An initial detainee collection point for the receipt and temporary holding of detainees. The Outer Cordon. The conduct of the outer cordon is an integral part of the security element in any cordon and search operation. javelin with the command launch unit (CLU). control direct and indirect fires. (f) An initial material collection point for consolidation of captured material. and snipers or designated marksman. the command element designates a backup team in the event it becomes combat ineffective. Total isolation of the target area is the objective of the security element. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity. blocking position) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose.operation. lethal and nonlethal. (2) Each subordinate outer cordon element (TCP. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. security.20/MCRP 3-31. and facilitate the achievement of the outer cordon’s task and purpose. The command element also ensures that damage caused during the cordon and search operation is documented to identify legitimate future claims by the occupants of the target. The outer cordon isolates the objective area and prevents enemy or civilian influence. Primary Task. In the event a person is detained. and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate SA for the entire element. Security Element a. (3) The leader of the outer cordon element must develop and maintain situational awareness (SA) of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the search elements. They may have to establish multiple blocking positions and observation posts (OPs) and conduct patrols in order to isolate the target area. Weapon systems to consider for outer cordon positions are tracked and wheeled vehicles with weapons systems. crew-served weapons. communications systems. The security element may include: (1) Vehicle-mounted sections or platoons (2) Interpreter(s) (3) Detainee teams (4) Crowd control teams (5) OPs (6) TCPs or blocking positions (7) HNSF (military or police) (8) Integrated aviation assets (9) Dismounted squads or platoons (10) Female search teams b. They may have to use multiple avenues of approach and operate decentralized to accomplish their mission.62 III-3 . effective coordination. the command element monitors the documentation.

TCPs will typically be used in long duration cordon and search operations. Armor helps clear danger areas for other units to follow. III-4 FM 3-06. the blocking position does not allow for the passage of personnel or vehicular traffic.4B/NTTP 3-05. (b) Blocking Position. (5) Methods to consider when establishing outer cordon positions: (a) Hasty TCP. This method is used when cleared traffic will be allowed through. Another method of executing the outer cordon is the blocking position. and material holding areas will aid in security and improve overall operations. When planning cordon and search operations consider the ramifications of not allowing any traffic through the outer cordon. (6) Figure III-1 depicts an outer cordon element arrayed around an objective to block enemy or insurgent forces. One method of executing the outer cordon is by the employment of hasty TCP. It is also a significant building breaching assets using multipurpose antitank (MPAT) or high explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds for infantry.62 25 April 2006 . Tank thermals can also be used for counter-sniper and target location/surveillance. Construction of vehicle. Differing from the TCP. If employed. It is the most survivable ground platform that can be used to block/control main avenues of approach. Subordinate elements use Class IV materials to construct a TCP to facilitate personnel and vehicle searches IAW the cordon and search commander’s intent. which will allow personnel and/or vehicles to depart or enter the outer cordon at the commander’s discretion. but may cause a riot if conducted when people are attempting to get to work. (c) Screening Forces.(4) Armor can provide a strong show of force and can serve as an intimidating psychological weapon. This impact may be minimal during low traffic hours. The elements can be used to provide observation of fleeing personnel or deter infiltration along secondary routes. listening posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs). Ensure that screening forces have adequate combat power.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. personnel. See the tactical control measures section of this chapter for detailed information. The element employs a combination of blocking positions and screening forces. Armor-protected firepower allows for long-range engagements. and snipers may augment the outer cordon.20/MCRP 3-31. The outer cordon area may be too large to be covered entirely by blocking positions or TCPs. ensure that each element knows the routes and positions of the screening forces. The use of mounted or dismounted patrols.

The Inner Cordon. Rather it is an integral part of the cordon and search.Figure III-1. The inner cordon isolates the target in order to protect the search/assault element from threat activity such as direct fire. c. (e) Insures the marking system and the control measures are understood by all elements (see appendix H) as well as the signals (infrared (IR) strobe. (b) Serves as an immediate reserve for civil disturbances and for the search/assault element. As such it requires detailed planning and effective coordination. The keys to success for the outer cordon are detailed planning and rehearsals at all levels and maintaining situational awareness at all times.4B/NTTP 3-05. etc. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. sought by the commander. Outer Cordon (7) The outer cordon is NOT an independent operation. as well as meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects. lethal and nonlethal.) Inner cordon tasks include the following: (a) Serves as overwatch/support by fire/security for the search/assault element. (See figure III-2. (1) The inner cordon is the other integral part of the security element in any cordon and search operation.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. or civil disturbances and prevents escape from the immediate area. Creativity in the employment of the Security Element will assist with preventing the enemy from escaping. grenades. This may require forces to clear and secure surrounding buildings to provide overwatch to the target/building. explosives.) for air-toground identification.62 III-5 . (d) Maintains communication with the search element and coordinating fires within the inner cordon element. glint tape. (c) May establish multiple inner cordons for multiple targets. The outer cordon secures the objective area and in doing so contains the enemy and is the initial barrier to enemy reinforcements.20/MCRP 3-31. (f) Uses supporting structures in built up areas.

control direct fires. The search/assault element’s mission is to assault. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity.4B/NTTP 3-05. Weapon systems to consider for inner cordon positions include. light antitank weapons (LAWs). The element accomplishes its mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant III-6 FM 3-06. but typically the inner cordon commander does not control the air assets. The mission command element will direct the air assets and relay information to either the inner or outer cordon as necessary. The search/assault element initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The keys to success for the inner cordon are detailed planning and rehearsals at all levels. but are not limited to. Rather it is an integral part of the cordon and search. and close coordination with the other elements.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Figure III-2. 4. and grenades. provides security for the search/assault element and prevents potential enemy forces from escaping. Close coordination with the search/assault element is essential.(2) The unit performing the inner cordon (SBF.62 25 April 2006 . overwatch positions) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Inner Cordon (5) The inner cordon is also not an independent operation. clear.20/MCRP 3-31. (3) The leader of the unit conducting the inner cordon must develop and maintain situational awareness of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the outer cordon and the search/assault element. and search the target to capture kill or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. Aviation assets may be able to assist the inner cordon force in locating and tracking escaping personnel. medium or light crew-served weapons and small arms. Search/Assault Element a. and facilitate the achievement of the inner cordon’s task and purpose. multiple inner cordons may be required. Depending on the size or complexity of the target area. (4) The inner cordon is typically established by emplacing SBF or overwatch positions where they can best isolate the target area with overlapping sectors of observation and fires. The inner cordon isolates the target area.

transitions into the search team.) The search/assault element teams may conduct the following tasks: (1) Assault Team(s). c. the support team establishes a command post (typically a large room in a single house search or a centrally located house in a village search). The support team may be designated as the reserve. The detainee team maintains the detainee/enemy prisoner of war (EPW) kits (IAW the unit SOP. (2) Search Team(s). All of these teams must understand and be prepared to assume the role of the other teams in the search/assault element. The assault team can transition into the search team once the target is cleared (i. (4) Support Team. and conducts a search from top to bottom). noncombatants. the assault team clears a house from bottom to top.62 III-7 . (2) Field Interview Team. The search/assault element may be task organized into four teams—assault. clearing. Due to the split second decisions that have to be made. The field interview team should be attached to the support team but can be attached to the search team. it is imperative that this element not only understands but can comply with rules of engagement (ROE) in a dynamic environment. (Detailed descriptions and records of captured weapons. The security team also provides immediate security of detainees and noncombatants. (3) Security Team(s). The support team should not be confused with the security element if it performs the task of an inner cordon.4B/NTTP 3-05. and support—in order to facilitate accomplishing its mission. The support team provides overwatch of detainees or occupants of the house while the search is conducted to collect all contraband and evidence. The security team provides immediate overwatch inside the target to the unit conducting the search. The field interview team should be located at the detainee/EPW collection point and should include an 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. The assault team(s) are responsible for entering. The following assets are recommended to conduct an effective search: (1) Detainee Team. search. The field interview team is responsible for tactical questioning of detainees and local populace in and around the objective area.e. ammunition. the target must be cleared of enemy forces. and searching buildings in order to capture or destroy enemy forces or equipment.20/MCRP 3-31. In most circumstances. the search team will conduct its primary task of searching the target to capture or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. The support team can secure the occupants of the building(s) or captured equipment. b. see chapter VI for an example) and is responsible for all detainee/EPW handling. To accomplish its mission the search/assault element has three primary tasks: securing. These areas may be searched selectively (only specific rooms/buildings/blocks) or systematically (everything within a given area). security. clearing. and/or booby traps before the search begins. and by conducting a systematic search of the target. The support team maintains a strongpoint position and base of operations at the target and is responsible for establishing overwatch to allow the assault and search and security teams successful entry into target buildings and rooms..8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.) Once the assault and search teams clear the target. Once the target is cleared of combatants and secure. once found and initially secured by the other teams. The detainee team should consist of at least two individuals and be attached to the support team.personnel. and searching the target. and other material need to be IAW the commander's guidance and ROE. The assault team conducts the initial assault into the target and uses speed and violence of action to move through the target to completely clear and seize control of it. (See figure III-3.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Search Assault Element III-8 FM 3-06. If evidence/contraband is found. emphasis should be placed on tactical questioning.4B/NTTP 3-05. The documentation team should also document all residents of the house/village to establish residency in the objective area. The mine detection team can also be tasked to search for weapons caches once the target area is cleared and secured. The primary demolition team is attached to the search team and the alternate demolition team is typically attached to the assault team and is used to breach obstacles that are preventing the assault team from achieving their mission. The tunnel reconnaissance team is attached to the assault team and is used to clear all tunnels and subterranean levels in the target area. Figure III-3. The documentation team is responsible for video and written documentation obtained on the target. The mine detection team is attached to the search team and is used primarily for mine/improvised explosive device (IED) detection in and around the target area. During a field interview. The documentation team is typically attached to the search team and should be equipped with a digital camera/camcorder and evidence logs.20/MCRP 3-31. The documentation team should take pictures to document the contents of each house and the condition of each house.interpreter and a tactical HUMINT team. local residents. the documentation team should take pictures and if possible include detainees in the picture with the evidence/contraband to establish ownership. and evidence found. (5) Mine Detection Team. (3) Documentation Team. (6) Tunnel Reconnaissance Team. (4) Demolition Team.62 25 April 2006 .

c.. Commitment criteria is a guide to assist the commander on when to commit the support element but is not intended to be a trigger for employment. and surprise. this movement technique produces a much larger signature and is slower to seal off a cordon area. small arms. Possible commitment criteria are as follows: (1) Hostile crowd forming around inner cordon (2) Loss of main effort (3) Numerous rooms in building being searched (4) More than a specified number of detainees (5) Enemy engages inner cordon 6. timing.). and is capable of accomplishing. speed. (1) Single Point Ingress. The support element reinforces. This means that the support element leader must be intimately familiar with all aspects of the cordon and search mission from planning through its completion.5. There are two primary methods of movement to the target: single point ingress and multidirectional ingress. These tasks must be prioritized and given to the support element leader so he can plan and rehearse these actions IAW the commander’s plan. and escort civilians or detainees (5) Secure and safeguard captured material or equipment c. Commanders must develop primary and alternate routes and be prepared to react to any contingency while traveling to the target (i. Movement techniques to and from the target will be dictated by METT-TC. Order of March. However. This technique reduces problems with command and control. and deconfliction of fires.e.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. See figure III-4 for an example of a single point ingress to the target. IED . Support Element a. thus aiding in security. the task and purpose of the unit’s main effort.20/MCRP 3-31. etc. In addition. All units approach the target and assume their position as a single unit and break off from the main body at predetermined release points. Commanders and staffs should make every effort to have subordinate units travel along different but converging avenues of approach. the commander may direct the support element to accomplish priority planning tasks. Movement to the target in a column along a single path facilitates easier command and control. Movement to the Target a. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. safeguard. vehicle damage/breakdown.62 III-9 . Probable tasks assigned to the support element during a cordon and search operation are (but are not limited to): (1) Reinforce outer/inner cordon (2) Clear buildings (3) Search buildings (4) Secure. The commander must identify the tasks the support element may be required to execute. b. b. The order of march (OOM) will be dictated by the commander’s overall plan and scheme of maneuver formed during COA development.4B/NTTP 3-05. Techniques of Movement. Method of Movement.

The multidirectional approach will require units to depart from the same assembly area at different times or from multiple assembly areas. Single Point of Ingress (2) Multidirectional Ingress. a cordon and search force moves to the target from multiple directions. This technique can be more effective by sealing off multiple avenues of egress simultaneously. Ideally.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. III-10 FM 3-06. Drawbacks to this technique include difficulty with command and control.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 25 April 2006 . division of forces. and deconfliction of fires.20/MCRP 3-31. Movement to the target through multiple directions provides a lower signature with fewer vehicles collocated during approach. See figure III-5 for an example of a multidirectional approach to the target.Figure III-4.

4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. have vehicle trouble. Due to the relative safety. Checkpoints leading to the target and in the objective area are essential in ensuring that all units arrive at the target in the proper order and on time. and location. Tactical Control Measures The use of standard tactical control measures is essential to effective command and control over forces approaching and conducting cordon and search operations. forward operating bases (FOBs) or combat outposts are the most convenient areas for staging a cordon and search operation. Multidirectional Ingress 7. Deception Techniques Deception can be an effective tool to avoid mission compromise when approaching a target. If possible. (4) Phase Lines. or lose communications during ingress and egress from the target. (3) Rally Points. (2) Checkpoints. lost. size. However. Any technique that makes the cordon and search force appear to have a different mission or objective will aid in success. Phase lines are helpful in controlling cordon and search elements that are approaching the target from different directions or at different times. Rally points to and from the objective area allow for cordon and search elements to reorganize if units become engaged. (1) Assembly Areas.Figure III-5.20/MCRP 3-31. Several techniques that have been tried successfully include: 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.62 III-11 . commanders must assume that all friendly positions are under constant observation. position assembly areas in remote or separate areas or use multiple assembly areas in order to minimize any enemy surveillance efforts. 8.

they are not fool proof.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.) 9. Attempts should be made to take advantage of cultural traffic patterns that lessen the amount of traffic on the roads. Terrain and Weather Considerations. Terrain conditions on roads must be addressed prior to commencing any operation. Extreme wind. For night driving it is essential that all drivers have and are experienced with the use of night vision goggles (NVGs)/night optical devices (NODs). (4) Masking a cordon and search force inside another regularly scheduled convoy. Daily traffic patterns will impact the ingress and egress from an objective area. b. Weather considerations must also be used for planning. front. Route Support. cordon and search planners must recognize that helicopter operations create a loud noise and a large visual signature that may alert enemy forces in the area. heat. (3) Increasing the number and size of local patrols in the days prior to a cordon and search operation to acclimatize the change in operational tempo. Ambient light from urban areas and civilian traffic severely affects night optics. and rear of vehicles. poor road conditions can hinder movement into/off the target.62 25 April 2006 . b. Times of religious observance. which in turn affects visibility and the driver’s ability to react as well as see long distances. (The cordon and search force should be at the end of the convoy to avoid problems with command and control of the other elements of the convoy. 10. Helicopter assets are useful in observing routes of ingress and egress. III-12 FM 3-06. Visibility can be enhanced by placing IR chemlights/IR beacons on the antennas. nonworkdays.(1) Moving the inner cordon force into the objective area as a local dismounted patrol. ditches. Night Driving. c. IR headlights are an essential element for successful tactical driving at night. planned alternate routes of ingress and egress are essential.20/MCRP 3-31. no markings or identifiable equipment denies the enemy the ability to associate certain vehicles with certain missions. Day Driving. ensuring that enemy forces do not interfere with operations. Note: An effective technique to reduce attacks during vehicle movements at night is to drive under black out conditions when possible and switch to white lights if other traffic is encountered. extreme weather conditions can mask the noise/visual signature of approaching units as well as reduce local traffic. Moreover. (2) Changing vehicle identification markings to resemble another unit. night time. Helicopter Insertion a. However. Using helicopters for insertion of cordon forces is an effective means of quickly establishing a cordon force. and storms can hinder approach and C2. Dust from poorly repaired or country roads can slow the cordon forces approach to the target. Driving Considerations a. Commanders must expect and address civilian traffic jams that will inevitably be caused by roadblocks. Cordon and search elements must also be aware of driving hazards and terrain features such as canals. and time periods of extreme heat (siesta) or foul weather are ideal times for conducting cordon and search operations from a traffic perspective. However. Helicopter Assaults. While night optics increase capability at night.4B/NTTP 3-05. allowing safe travel and dispersion between vehicles. or pipelines that significantly restrict movement.

(e) Combat power is spread out. phase lines or check points to ensure that the positions are emplaced simultaneously). (2) Simultaneous occupation facilitates the element of surprise. control measures/battle tracking (i. (b) Security elements (both inner and outer cordons). It may also increase the probability of the outer cordon elements coming into contact with IEDs or direct fire engagements.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Vehicles and the HN populace may get trapped between the inner and outer cordon and cause unnecessary panic and control issues. There are two techniques for emplacement of the cordon and search elements: simultaneously or sequentially. Careful consideration must be given to both as there are advantages and disadvantages to each technique. with rapid. synchronized emplacement of the inner cordon and search elements. This requires precise timing and control. (3) Some disadvantages of this technique are that it requires multiple routes.20/MCRP 3-31.e. potentially makes CASEVAC more difficult. Techniques. Emplacement Techniques and Timing of the Cordon and Search Elements a. (c) Additional control measures required. makes control a little more difficult for the commander. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. (b) Multiple routes required.) (a) Security elements may occupy the outer cordon simultaneously to completely isolate the objective area at one time. b. and support elements can occupy their initial positions simultaneously. (See figure III-6.11. Simultaneous Occupation. (d) CASEVAC is more difficult. In summary. and spreads out the elements' combat power. It maximizes the unit’s ability to ensure that targeted individuals/materials do not escape..62 III-13 . (1) This occurs when the cordon and search elements occupy multiple positions at the same time. search elements. disadvantages include: (a) Difficult to control.4B/NTTP 3-05.

(5) Advantages (a) Ease of control. (b) Allows the enemy initial freedom to reposition or hide personnel and materials.Figure III-6. III-14 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Sequential Occupation.20/MCRP 3-31.62 25 April 2006 . III-8. (4) The search/assault element should move in and begin executing when conditions have been set by the other elements. Simultaneous Occupation c. (3) The support element should be positioned where it can best support the other elements based upon established planning priorities. This occurs when the elements occupy multiple positions in sequence. and III-9. (6) Disadvantages (a) Less effective at timely isolation of the objective area and the target.4B/NTTP 3-05. (2) The inner cordon is the next step to further isolate specific target areas and entry points.) (1) The outer cordon is established first to isolate the objective. (See figures III-7. (b) Simplicity for planning and execution.

Figure III-7.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-15 .4B/NTTP 3-05. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 1 Outer Cordon) Figure III-8. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon) 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.

Moreover.62 25 April 2006 . Methods of Egress (1) Simultaneous. The simultaneous egress method is least preferred.20/MCRP 3-31. the elements approaching the objective from one side may be observed by the enemy and the targeted individual(s) may be able to escape. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 3 Search Element) d. keeps combat power massed. prepare a counter attack. and the need for additional control measures and battle tracking to ensure synchronization. care should be taken to use different egress and ingress routes whenever possible to avoid ambush. 12. (See figure III-10. It lacks overwatch as units leave the area. or using one route in.4B/NTTP 3-05.) III-16 FM 3-06. Withdrawal from the Objective a.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. This technique facilitates C2. facilitates CASEVAC. and having outer cordon elements pass through the objective area is another technique. Sequential emplacement of the outer cordon elements. the major element of surprise is lost. requires less planning. However. hide. If this method is employed. or emplace an IED.Figure III-9.

A sequential withdrawal from a cordon and search objective area will provide greater security for forces leaving the cordon area.) Figure III-11.20/MCRP 3-31.Figure III-10.62 III-17 .8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. III-12. and III-13. Simultaneous Egress (2) Sequential. Sequential Egress (Sequence 1 Search Element) 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05. (See figures III-11.

62 25 April 2006 .4B/NTTP 3-05. Sequential Egress (Sequence 3 Outer Cordon) III-18 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.Figure III-12. Sequential Egress (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon) Figure III-13.

as well as. (a) Advantage. Figure III-14.) Single point egress provides simplicity in movement from the objective area to a predesignated rally point. ability to mass fire power if attacked. detainees and equipment is essential. However.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.) Multidirectional egress requires greater coordination for each cordon and search element. Depending on the terrain surrounding the target area a single point egress may be the only option. Single Point Egress (2) Multidirectional. Care must be taken to ensure that the route is properly secured to avoid the possibility of enemy attack. Egress Route Selection (1) Single Point. (See figure III-15. (See figure III-14. a single assigned point of egress may not be the simplest route off target for all elements of the cordon and search force as elements may have to move through the cordon site itself to reach the designated egress route.20/MCRP 3-31. Single point egress canalizes the cordon and search force with the possibility of the egress route being blocked or overrun by insurgents entrapping them.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 III-19 . Well established rally points are essential for multidirectional egress. (a) Advantages • Flexibility • Security • Speed 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.b. (b) Disadvantage. C2 of all cordon and search force elements will generally be easier with this type of movement. Accountability of personnel.

(b) Disadvantages • Accountability • Control • Requires greater communication assets • Ability to reinforce Figure III-15. Each must have separate evacuation plans addressing casualty collection points (CCPs). During mission planning.62 25 April 2006 . and specific units must be tasked to provide security if the detainee transportation unit is separating from the main body. Multidirectional Egress c.4B/NTTP 3-05. Egress Considerations (1) Detainees. If transportation of contraband is impossible. steps must be taken to demilitarize/destroy contraband with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/Engineering assets. and security for transportation teams. casualty transportation teams. a CASEVAC plan must address the possibility of injury to military personnel. casualty collection teams.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Depending on the expected contraband. It is important to transport enemy weapons and equipment in different vehicles from detainees. Securing detainees who have been injured is important to ensure their safety and the safety of military personnel. appropriate sized vehicles must be assigned to remove the contraband. Specific vehicles must be assigned/identified for the detainee transport mission. d. (2) Enemy Contraband. Casualties. III-20 FM 3-06. and detainees. Units assigned to handle detainees must be specifically tasked and equipped.20/MCRP 3-31. Property accountability and proper tagging of detainees are critical during the transportation and movement to a detainee collection point. civilians.

Air assets and sniper/recon units are good choices to overwatch routes. Armored vehicles make effective mobile roadblocks. vehicle borne improvised explosive device [VBIED]. Planning must include addressing the issue of disabled vehicles.. Military police units are well suited to conduct patrols along expected routes of egress as well. tow bars. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement.e. tow straps. vehicle towing. Targeted enemy personnel may inadvertently attempt to enter the objective area during the cordon and search. g. spare tires). ensure that the civilian population understands the roadblocks are a preventive and not a punitive measure. Local security must be provided and should include either deliberate or hasty barriers depending on the size and complexity of the cordon and search operation. Constant observation of egress routes during execution is essential. 13. Enemy action can include detonation of roadside bombs. f. Special consideration must be made for use of these units to avoid fratricide (link up points and recognition signals and all personnel understanding their locations). Sniper/recon units may be employed to cover withdrawal as well as conduct observation on enemy forces that the cordon and search operation missed.e. a bump/cross leveling plan. very survivable. Security. the cordon unit nearest the infiltration route should be the last to move. Insertion of stay behind forces may be accomplished during the cordon and search mission execution or sniper teams inserted prior to the mission can remain on station until the egress is complete. Overwatch. Service members executing a road block must have as much information about targeted enemy personnel as possible to increase their chances of detection and apprehension.62 III-21 . Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear. The rest area is located near overt overwatch so that personnel can be assembled quickly as a reserve force. rehearsals of vehicle repair. A security force is concealed an appropriate distance from the roadblock. The hasty roadblock is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. A roadblock requires adequate personnel to provide security. c. Special circumstances can be made for civilians escorted by military personnel. Vehicle Break Down..8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05. Tanks are excellent for route security because they are mobile. Overwatch units can give advanced warning or interdiction of enemy activity allowing a commander to choose an alternate route of egress. part of the force is allowed to rest. antitank guided missile [ATGM] teams). 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. b. If the roadblock is manned for any length of time. A roadblock for cordon and search purposes should not be positioned to surprise drivers who may not have enough time to stop safely. No civilians should be allowed through a road block for any reason. and a timeline for each contingency. Commanders must take care during infiltration to maintain overwatch upon elements exiting the objective area/target. Purpose. The purpose of road blocks is to facilitate the complete isolation of an objective area by stopping all vehicle and foot movement into and out of the target area. Stay Behind Forces. Planning for disabled vehicles must include logistical considerations (i. mortar attack. h.e. snipers. and have multiple weapons engagement options against threats (i. Route Security. Road Blocks a. Generally. Its actual location is designed to achieve surprise. Deliberate or Hasty. Generally in a cordon and search situation a variant of the hasty roadblock will be most appropriate due to limited time on target.20/MCRP 3-31. and preplanned coordinated ambushes. Coordination with adjacent units is critical to ensure that they do not interfere with the cordon and search operation by traveling through the area. often on a main road. The deliberate roadblock is a relatively fixed position in a town or in the open country.

the rest area. e. h. Radio communication is required between the various locations supporting the roadblock operation. (3) Symbology. Verbiage of signs will vary from culture to culture. Roadblocks should be placed in a position to dominate an intersection or roadway. Obstacles must be strong and big enough to prevent motorists from driving through or around them. (1) Positioning. or any other type of local enemy TTP. g.62 25 April 2006 . roadblocks should be in an area where civilian traffic approaching the area can easily turn around. f. Care should be made to ensure that the language and symbols used on signs are appropriate for the location and dialect. and dismount point. Portable signs in the native language and in English must be available.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and that deadly force will be used for any violation. Lights.20/MCRP 3-31. signs should communicate that military operations are ongoing. To assist in crowd control and direct access to the roadblock place a wire barrier behind the overwatch vehicle in order to improve security. Barriers for the isolation of an objective should be far enough in front of friendly forces to allow adequate standoff to engage any threats. Troops should be positioned behind the barriers to maximize standoff and survivability.) III-22 FM 3-06. Threats include personnel. Signs. Barriers. male and female search areas. Cones and signs should be placed furthest out from friendly forces. (2) General Technique. Generally.4B/NTTP 3-05. i.(1) Positioning. Signs should denote the speed limit of approach. vehicles. felled trees. (2) Employment/Description. buses parked sideways in the road. A friendly vehicle preferably with a heavy weapons system is placed at approximately the 100-meter position behind the wire barrier. Adequate lighting is essential to illuminate the barrier plan in order to avoid careless drivers hitting the barrier accidentally. vehicle parking area. Trigger lines and actions upon crossing them should not be mentioned in any signs. Chemlights or vehicle headlights may be sufficient to give notice of a barriers location. d. Obstacles across the road should be provided. Literacy rates and the general alertness of the civilian populace should be considered in constructing any signs. and engage enemy approaching the obstacle plan. able to move to the front of the barrier plan to interact with the local population if necessary. No street intersections will be located within the barrier plan. This will help to avoid a civilian traffic jam affecting the cordon and search forces routes of egress. a distance to stay back. or any other readily available strong object will work. Terrain Selection. Signs are generally positioned at the furthest point forward to ensure that any civilians approaching the roadblock are quickly informed of the roadblocks presence and purpose. These include the security position. covert overwatch positions should be employed to ensure the safety of those manning the roadblock. vehicle search area. Clearly marked barbed wire. Troop Positioning. and the combat support (CS) commander. If possible. Then place spike strips and/or concertina wires 10-20 meters behind the signs and cones. Further. English translation should be clearly written on the signs. debris. etc. car bombs. Communication. Barriers include: (1) Medium to large caltrops (2) Spike strips (3) Concertina wire (4) Military vehicles (5) Field expedient (civilian vehicles.

the head of the household can move with the search team. Escalation of Force at Roadblocks. Personnel must be well briefed as to the rules for escalation of force that apply to a roadblock. This prohibits movement of civilians. Control Heads of Households. a misfire 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. c. 15.62 III-23 . The disadvantages of this method are that it takes inhabitants away from their dwellings thus encouraging looting which engenders ill feelings and it increases the probability of false claims of theft and damage from the local populace.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. Service members must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock. and discourages looting. Personnel must also clearly understand the means of engaging vehicles that cross the trigger line. Care should be taken to ensure that all personnel understand that these munitions may cause serious injury and death. This method provides the most control. allows them to stay in their dwellings. There are several signal devices that can be used at roadblocks to warn oncoming traffic and as a precursor to employing lethal force to stop a vehicle. Linguist/Interpreter. However trigger lines should not be explained to civilians. The contents of the structure. a. Generally. Personnel familiar with the native language are essential on all roadblocks. Firepower. and allows for detailed interrogation. b. Breaching Techniques Note: Doors should be checked before they are breached. Generally. this is the best method for controlling the occupants during a search. trigger lines should coincide with the layout of the barrier plan. denies the belligerents an opportunity to conceal evidence. Control of the Populace in the Target Area a.j. however. (1) Trigger Lines. They may be unlocked. Examples of signal devices include: (a) M203 flare/illume (b) Hand held pop up (star clusters/parachutes) flares/clusters (c) Smoke grenades (d) Flash bangs 14. Assemble inhabitants in a central location. Vehicles that cross the trigger line must be treated as a direct threat to the roadblock and fire placed to immediately stop its approach. (2) Signal Devices. l. this person can be used to open doors and containers to facilitate the search. the use of ballistic breaching as an initial entry method may be necessary.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Often. Restrict the inhabitants to their homes. In certain situations. A clearly defined trigger line provides all personnel the confidence to engage only when necessary. The head of each household is told to remain in the front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a location separate from the search area(s). Home Restriction. Ballistic breaching is a means of gaining entry into a structure through an existing locked doorway. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their homes. Ballistic (Shotgun) Breach. k. a crew-served weapons system should be located at all roadblocks. simplifies a thorough search. During the search. Central Location.

Quick Access.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. 1 man. (3) The No. After the breach is conducted. shooters must consider the following target points on the door: (a) Door knob (b) Locking mechanism (c) Hinges (3) After the door is breached. (2) The No. 4.of an explosive charge. interior walls and partitions. Regardless of intensity. (4) After the demolition charge is placed.4B/NTTP 3-05. 3 man provides security overhead. or multiple rooms. and controlling the situation. 3. b.62 25 April 2006 . and Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints. Techniques. and all of its inhabitants (both hostile and other) by eliminating the threat. personnel will have to clear buildings room by room to neutralize possible threats. 2 man carries the demolition charge and places it. the assault team leader brings the breach team forward while the assault team provides local security. and door-breaching charges. sections 9 to 11. the gunner moves to the rear of the lineup and assumes the position of the No. The assault teams need to be familiar with the advantages as well as the disadvantages of each type of round. for breaching reinforced and nonreinforced exterior walls. (1) The order of movement for a shotgun breach has the gunner up front. Tactics. It contains valuable information about breaching techniques. Note: Understand the limitations of using a shotgun for room clearing because of its limited magazine capacity and the difficulty of reloading the weapon. Refer to FM 3-06. 3 man. ROE.20/MCRP 3-31. At the breach point. The order of movement for an explosive breach without engineer support is: (1) No. 4 order. 4 man. Various shotgun rounds can be used for ballistic breaching. Clearing Room by Room. and the No. No. A suggested order of movement for a mechanical breach is the initial assault team in order. The Marine Corps also has published MCIP 3-35. Explosive (Demolition) Breach. (2) Door breaching. or compromise of the assault force during its approach to the target may necessitate the use of ballistic breaching as a means of initial entry into the structure. No. Room Clearing a. Mechanical Breach. Room clearing is rapidly and methodically seizing control of a room. 16. followed by the No. (See paragraph 15 above. the breach team moves aside and provides local security as the assault team enters the breach. The degree of force used will vary according to the perceived threat and the actions of the occupants. Techniques range from simple mechanical and ballistic breaching to complex demolition breaching. Gaining quick access to the targeted rooms is integral to room clearing. for breaching techniques. the team moves to covered positions and prepares to enter in the standard 1. No. or target.01. 3. 1. 1 man provides security at the doorway. b. 2. and then the No. and then No. 2. followed by the breach man or element.) III-24 FM 3-06.11. dominating the room. chapter 8. 2 man. Leaders must take in consideration over penetration through walls and floors. c. When using the shotgun as an alternate breaching method to gain entry. The No. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain. Breaching techniques vary based on the type of construction encountered and the types of munitions available to the breaching element. 4 man provides rear security.

2 man will pass the “thumb up” signal back to the No. type of breach to be used. cover and concealment. His eyes and weapon are oriented on the breach point. Actions Upon Entry. When he feels comfortable with his position. 3 man and the No. (2) The first action to be taken by the Service member upon entry into a room is to clear the fatal funnel—that area which surrounds the door threshold. They should never get into the stack with a weapon muzzle pointing at another person. The swinging door is an obstacle that can best be avoided by lining up on the correct side. 3 man will acknowledge by squeezing the No.62 III-25 . the “thumb back/squeeze back” technique works well. (See figure III-16. By moving quickly. (2) If the No. (3) Each Service member has a primary and secondary sector of fire. and terrain. Movement to the Target. (3) The No. Lining up on the correct side will result in the fastest and smoothest entry possible. After he has received and acknowledged the nod of the No. 1 man. each person should avoid contact with the building. the team should line up on the hinge side. 2 man by nodding his head. the team should line up on the doorknob side. Personnel should move close to.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. If a stealthy approach to the target building is possible. This will continue until the “thumb up” signal has been passed back to the last man on the initial entry team. This is why weapons must be carried at a low or high carry and with fingers outside the trigger well. e. the No. 1 man and the No. lighting conditions. Corners are the points of domination in any room. 4 man must assume this critical responsibility. (2) The No. There are many different ways to pass the signal that everyone is ready.c. d. the assault team members reduce the risk of being hit by hostile fire directed at the doorway. Pass Signals. If the door opens inward.20/MCRP 3-31. the building exterior. Among these are the mission. However. The next action the assault team takes is to clear those corners and occupy them as points of domination. line up on the side of the door that provides the path of least resistance upon entering. 3 man. 1 man and the No. 1 man assumes his position on the breach point first. 2 man are initially responsible for the corners.4B/NTTP 3-05. f. (2) The assault team should. and will then pass a “thumb up” back to the man behind him. (1) The No. 2 man will acknowledge receipt by squeezing the No. but not touch. Move to Point of Domination. he will signal the No. especially banging against the walls with a weapon or other piece of equipment.) 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. 2 man are unable to clear the corners. If the door opens outward. This is the focal point of attention for anyone in the room. Staying close to the building makes personnel harder to see from inside the building. 1 man’s shoulder. the No. whenever possible. and each subsequent man will send the signal forward so that all in the team are aware that all others are prepared to enter. (1) The No. The actions personnel will execute upon entering a room are: (1) Clear the point of entry or breach point (fatal funnel). (1) Personnel should be trained to maintain muzzle awareness at all times. The movement technique used for approaching a target building is dictated by several factors. (4) The last man will then squeeze forward. 2 man’s thumb.

materiel. The control measures used can be both verbal and physical. Sectors of Fire Note: If one of the Service members has a weapon malfunction.20/MCRP 3-31. and it should be loud enough to be heard by those whose hearing may have been damaged by the sound of gunfire and explosives. Escort parties and transportation must be arranged before the search of a house. Verbiage should be short and to the point. Inaction or slow execution gives the initiative back to any hostile element in the room.4B/NTTP 3-05. and to look for III-26 FM 3-06. Controlling the Situation. that Service member should sound off with weapon down. By dominating the room and eliminating any threat. Physical control must be firm. This works because all sectors of fire are interlocking. Verbal control may be difficult because of the loss of hearing resulting from explosives and firearms use. This will be his signal to stand up.Figure III-16. He must take charge.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. commanding voice. A search can orient on people. 17. Live noncombatants or friendly personnel not engaged must also be controlled. The other Service member will scan his sector of fires. It usually involves both local police and Service members. but not overly harsh. The Service member should not stand up until one of his fellow Service members moves to him and taps him on the shoulder. buildings. or terrain. g. thereby providing redundant fire-power. The commander must decide whether the unit will conduct a detailed search or a hasty search depending on the intelligence available. Searches a.62 25 April 2006 . the assault team seizes control of the room and the initiative from the enemy. The team leader or a designated team member must immediately begin speaking to any people in the room in a loud. The object of a house search is to screen residents to determine if there are any targeted individuals and groups. take a knee and work through his malfunction.

to quickly identify concealed weapons or other devices.20/MCRP 3-31. (3) Search Individuals. and finally 5) conduct tactical questioning during the search regarding information of tactical significance. Misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations. Lists of prohibited or controlled-distribution items should be widely disseminated and on hand during searches. Search procedures are as follows: (1) Search Instructions. d. or insurgent activity are found. However. Forced entry may be necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. or improvised explosive devices. communication equipment. A search party assigned to search an occupied building may consist of local police. strangers will be physically isolated and leaders will become a focus point. Before US forces depart. intelligence material. 3) utilize a metal detection wand. It is imperative for the unit conducting the search to conduct their search only after the target has been cleared of enemy forces. e. One member of the search team provides security while another member makes the actual search: tasked organized as a search and cover team. Proper use of authority during searches gains the respect and support of the people. These bits of information are important for both current and future operations. such as weapons. contraband. b. The fact that anyone in an area to be searched could be an enemy or a sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. equipment. Frequently. and booby traps. find out where they are going and what they are planning to do after the search. The occupants from the cordon and search target(s) must be kept under constant observation not only to prevent talking but also to observe how they interact. supplies. 2) have the individual raise their arms and conduct a visual inspection. evidence. explosives. the unit conducting the search should not assume that the area is totally clear and be prepared for hidden personnel. The search element should have detailed instructions for handling controlled items. etc. (2) Search Again.controlled items. or other minor items during searches must be conducted and recorded lawfully to be of future legal value. 4) utilize the pat down technique starting from the head and moving systematically to the individual’s feet (the searcher may need to wear protective gloves). and female searchers. c. keep the individual isolated from the general population. If the searcher determines that the individual should be detained it is imperative to move the individual quickly and quietly to a detainee collection point without creating friction for the other civilians in the 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. the commander should arrange for the community to protect such houses until the occupants return. the seizure of contraband. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that insurgents are quite adept at hiding and burying contraband items. protective escorts (usually infantry). if available. particularly if no enemy forces. noncombatants. If a house containing property is searched while its occupants are away. Units must also ensure that if time permits. Even after the initial clearing is complete. it should be secured to prevent looting. The search team may utilize the following techniques: 1) keep the individuals separated at a distance and if possible. Searchers can return to a searched area after the initial search to surprise and eliminate insurgents or their leaders who might have either returned or remained undetected during the search. f. Commanders must ensure that the unit returns the objective area to its original condition. searchers must be tactful. they search every inch of the target building(s) and the surrounding objective area.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Units should search the entire area with mine detectors and dig in any spots where freshly dug soil appears.62 III-27 . Units should search every conceivable hiding place in the target building(s) as well as any outlying buildings and the surrounding ground. thus. to avoid making an enemy or sympathizer out of a suspect.4B/NTTP 3-05.

large pieces of furniture in odd positions (i. Searching of vehicles may require equipment such as detection devices. hands. not just a military police (MP) unit. before the vehicle itself is searched. but also trap doors. female searchers should be used. Also. torn fabric on furniture. Personnel will pull security on the driver as he conducts this action and immediately bring the occupant to the individual search area after opening all doors. refrigerator in center of living room). ceilings. Threat forces may use females to their advantage by using them to transport or hide contraband. the search team may use cameras or video recorders to establish the original condition of the house and the condition of the house after the III-28 FM 3-06. If something looks strange or modified. Cultural differences may make this a particularly sensitive problem so small unit leadership and supervision is recommended. The estimate of the situation will determine if all or a portion of the vehicles will be searched. Pay particular attention to furniture that weighs more than what it looks like.e. one person as the cover man to observe (booby traps/contraband. Suspicious occupants should be tested with explosive detection kits. the trunk. A TTP is to have the driver of the vehicle open all doors. tools. Escalation of posture and the nature of the search should be minimized unless hostile indicators are present. Personnel then conduct a thorough search of a vehicle. ventilation systems. To counter this.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 25 April 2006 . If male Service members must search females. and look for disturbances in the floorboards. If possible. inspect it thoroughly. and the hood himself. etc. A good technique is to use metal detecting wands to establish immediate need for a more detailed search. Look under the vehicle. The searchers need to understand the commander’s intent in order to determine what degree of security is required. Anything can be used to hide equipment or information.) and prepare to engage targets. Searches should not be limited to the immediate furniture or doors in the rooms. An explanation for the purpose/reason for the search through the use of an interpreter will mitigate friction between the search team/cover members and the individual subject to the search. in the engine compartment. (b) Room searches have a 3-dimensional focus. one person to record specific data. have the female raise her arms and conduct a systematic ‘pat down’ technique of her own. area behind large hanging pictures or pieces of furniture. mirrors. seats. walls with freshly fixed holes. or side panels of the vehicle. If it is necessary for a male to conduct a more detailed search of the female it is recommended to use the back side of the hands or ask another female from the same tribe or village to assist with the search. etc. A separate vehicle search area should be established to avoid unnecessary delays and traffic jams.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The search team consists of a minimum of three personnel: one person to move/open furniture or doors if the head of the household is not available.20/MCRP 3-31. The aggressive posture of the search team is determined based on the hostile indicators. The female searcher could come from any unit. In addition to information collection. and military working dogs. Searchers may have to inspect inside of all pieces of folded clothing or pockets of hanging clothes. use a metal detector to assist with locating weapons/ammunition caches. personnel.area. all possible measures must be taken to prevent perceptions of inappropriate conduct. Cordon and search forces should attempt to minimize unnecessary damage to the target area. g. (a) Units should develop systematic room searching techniques in order to prevent overlooking an area after the room has been cleared. (5) Search Vehicles. (6) Search Rooms. Occupants should be moved away from vehicles and individually searched. and Adam’s apple) in case the enemy is attempting to exfiltrate dressed as a woman. This will enable the searcher to visually inspect for concealed weapons. under rugs or carpet that has loose/pulled up corners. (4) Search Females. The searcher should also visually inspect for physical attributes of a man (large feet.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. they should be prepared for follow-on missions.inspection is completed. In certain theaters of operations. location. if available. Friendly personnel/adjacent units outside the target must be notified prior to the assault team’s exiting the target to avoid fratricide.20/MCRP 3-31. All sensitive material or equipment found on an objective should be documented with a camera. Exiting the Cleared Building(s) The last action is to evacuate the target area on command. the personnel or equipment should be immediately evacuated from the target area and extracted with the search/assault element. units may be required to compile search data in a military search report. The commander of the cordon and search force will make the determination as to when the search/assault element is ready to evacuate from the target. If personnel or equipment recovery was the purpose of the clearing operation. Once the search/assault leaves the target area.4B/NTTP 3-05. The recorder should make every effort to keep confiscated items separated and tagged with time. Confiscated items should also be marked with the same number as the detainee who was in possession of the items. before it is removed or collected.62 III-29 . 18. and reason for confiscation. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.

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etc. Commanders should also decide when and where to first integrate aviation assets (security versus surprise).4B/NTTP 3-05. (6) Asset Availability. (4) Ground Commander Scheme of Maneuver and Intent. Control. It is also critical that the aviation LNO is an integral part of the COA development process in order to ensure integration of aviation assets. reconnaissance. (2) Threats/enemy forces. (2) The aviation LNO or air officer also plays a critical role in keeping the aviation assets abreast of current operations. 2. A simple communications plan is essential for effective C2. and Reconnaissance (ISR) Requirements. (5) Intelligence. fighters with targeting pods. (4) Airspace C2 ensures deconfliction of the battlespace. many theater airborne platforms can be dynamically tasked/re-roled to support time-critical/dominant operations.29]. threats. Nontraditional ISR platforms (AC-130. Overview The following TTP and lessons learned are important factors for commanders to consider when planning and executing aviation operations in support of cordon and search operations. (1) Minimal planning time. However.62 IV-1 . dedicated UAS. Techniques. In order to successfully employ airpower.3A/NTTP 3-01. JSTARS. b. Due to limited resources and high demand. (7) Command.04/AFTTP(I)3-2. Surveillance. Aviation support in the cordon and search operation provides the ground commander increased SA. Air-Ground Coordination a. and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35. (3) Weather.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Many of the planning and execution factors can be found in Multi-Service Tactics. General Considerations. (3) Due to the nature of most cordon and search operations.) can respond faster and provide real-time reconnaissance of the target. rotary wing.Chapter IV AVIATION CONSIDERATIONS 1. security. Planners must know what is available and integrate assets accordingly. Some of the TTPs in this chapter have been taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) database on recent operations in Kosovo. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. and after-action reporting. flexibility. and Iraq and from lessons learned from our allies. and Communications (C3). Traditional ISR platforms (satellite. the urban environment presents unique requirements. there must be close integration with the aviation assets from the beginning planning stages. and limitations for air-to-ground operations.) generally require long lead times for tasking and analysis. and C2. aviation assets may not be available. through execution. Afghanistan.20/MCRP 3-31. fires. FLIR. etc. (1) Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with detailed mission planning. It is imperative that all aircrews have a clear understanding of the task and purpose of the mission. Planning Considerations.

and friendly location. the ground commander might require CAS when no JTAC is available. b. OH-58D. CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Personnel a. Aviation assets should have the same graphics and overlays that are being used in the cordon and search operation.20/MCRP 3-31. In rare circumstances. NFA.4B/NTTP 3-05. 3. Rotary Wing Aviation. (2) Make every effort to involve a qualified JTAC/FAC(A) in the situation. The requester must notify/alert his command element when a JTAC or FAC(A) is unavailable to conduct Type 1. AH-1. and restrictions. IV-2 FM 3-06. Rotary Wing Aviation Integration in the Cordon and Search a. and/or CAS aircrew should assist these personnel/units to greatest extent possible in order to bring fires to bear.62 25 April 2006 . the commander must consider the increased risk of fratricide when using personnel who are not qualified JTACs and accepts full responsibility for the results of the attacks. must be deconflicted from each other and rotary/fixed-wing aircraft during planning. (10) UAS Integration. (3) Provide as much of the 9-line briefing as possible. (2) Be prepared to "pull" information to complete the CAS briefing (3) Exercise vigilance with target identification. qualified JTACs. c. and SOF aviation assets. Aircrew in this situation will: (1) Make every effort to involve a qualified JTAC/FAC(A) in the situation. Ground personnel will: (1) Identify themselves as "non-JTAC qualified" on aircraft check-in. 4. The ground commander. Attack and reconnaissance aircraft can play a major role in the cordon and search operation. Units that have a reasonable expectation to conduct terminal attack control need to have certified JTACs available. This information will alert the CAS controlling agency (ASOC/DASC or JAOC) that aircrew will be working with non-JTAC-qualified personnel. The aviation LNO or equivalent should have a firm grasp of airspace management requirements. If the maneuver commander accepts the risk. (4) As a minimum. All UAS. Attack/reconnaissance aircraft include: AH64A/D. or 3 controls. d. target location." In these instances. JTAC. and aviation assets must be familiar with this deconfliction plan. to include the fire support plan and any special use airspace (ROZ. 2. he forwards the request to the CAS controlling agency. etc. FAC(A)s. weapons effect.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. regardless of type and service. Fully understanding aircraft capabilities and limitations is paramount to successful mission accomplishment. Non-JTAC controllers must clearly state to attacking aircraft that they are "non-qualified JTACs.) (9) Maps and Charts. Due to complexity of CAS. pass target elevation.(8) Airspace Control.

All Apache laser operations should be limited to codes 1111-1688 and ideally limited to 1488 in order to optimize standoff. Rotary Wing Aircraft Capabilities Marking Laser Capability Service Ordnance LST LTD USMC 7.75" Rockets 30mm Cannon USA USN Hellfire 2. (4) Close Combat Attacks (CCA)(USA) Rotary Wing CAS (USMC). IDM. (1) Command and Control. zones.4B/NTTP 3-05. but is widely used in other nations.50 cal MG Hellfire . Utility aircraft are best utilized for this purpose. Utility Rotary Wing Aviation Assets in the Cordon and Search. WP (Laser or RF) 2. Rotary wing assets provide excellent C2 platforms due to their ability to fly at slower speeds and see the battlespace as a whole. Utility aircraft can provide reconnaissance. airborne C2 as well as limited enemy suppression. GPS.50 cal MG GAU-17 GAU-16 NO YES YES YES Laser. DTV/DVO. the AH-64 laser tracker is compatible on codes 1711-1788. Rockets. b. air assault/movement of fighting forces and supplies. Additionally.62 MG NO NO Rockets . Rockets Laser Other Systems NVG FLIR GPS FLIR NVG GPS CCDTV DVO FLIR. but has max effectiveness from 1111-1148. however. (2) Security and Reconnaissance. routes.75" Rockets 20mm Cannon LUU-2 Flares USA Hellfire YES YES2 Laser.75" Rockets USMC BGM-71 TOW NO YES Rockets Hellfire Laser 5" Rockets WP 2.Aircraft UH-1N AH-1W1 AH-64A AH-64D including Longbow Table IV-1. 2 The AH-64 is compatible with the NATO tri-service laser coding system from 1111-1688. INS/GPS FLIR TVS NVG IDM NVG GPS FLIR OH-58D (Kiowa Warrior) MH-60/ HH-60 1 The AH-1W can designate codes 1111-1788. The AH-1F is no longer in service in the US Army. Due to 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-3 . attack and reconnaissance aircraft can provide limited C2 ISR functions by providing situational awareness.50 cal MG WP 2.75" Rockets 30mm Cannon USA Hellfire YES YES2 Laser.75" Rockets . General Rotary Wing Capabilities in the Cordon and Search. NVG. Rockets 2. c.20/MCRP 3-31. Radar. NVG. MMW. and rooftops. DTV/ DVO FLIR. (3) Aircraft can provide security and reconnaissance over specified areas. Rotary wing aircraft can be used to conduct attacks with a wide variety of weapons systems and ordnance.

contingencies must be planned for weather conditions. aircraft security is paramount during hovering engagements and is not the preferred method. Due to the increased demand of rotary wing assets. General Rotary Wing Limitations in the Cordon and Search Operation. such as rockets/cannon. e. The initial aircraft check-in with ground elements sets the tone for success on any mission. low ceilings. Aircraft operating in close proximity to ground combat are vulnerable to enemy and friendly small arms fire. These sensors provide for increased SA by allowing the aircrew and commander to mark and track targets. to see friendly and enemy forces during night and certain limited visibility situations. (5) Collateral Damage. Rotary wing aircraft employ a wide variety of sensors that may be employed during the cordon and search operation. adjusting indirect fires and fire control planning is paramount to safely integrating rotary wing into the cordon and search operation. Lower altitudes can provide greater SA. Small arms fire may force the aircraft to operate at higher altitudes or higher speeds thus effecting their ability to conduct reconnaissance and attack operations. trained. Due to the unpredictability of weather and battlefield effects. (1) Small Arms Fire. The static nature of the cordon and search operation causes aircraft to operate in relatively small areas where predictability of flight paths increases risk from small arms and surface-to-air fires. However. etc. careful planning must take place for their utilization. d. (4) Urban Limitations. positive identification (PID). Rotary wing aviation must be integrated into the decisive point or time of the cordon and search operation and off station refuel times must be planned for and taken into consideration. (7) Flight Profiles. Towers and wires are obstacles to rotary wing aircraft and may force aircraft to operate at higher altitudes.62 25 April 2006 . Close proximity to friendly forces and urban sprawl increase the possibility of collateral damage from weapons effects. The high volume of lights can reduce night vision device effectiveness.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Aviators must transmit the minimal essential information to the ground executors: call signs. Rotary Wing Aviation Use by Phase in the Cordon and Search Operation. (2) Fire Control Methods. Weather can also reduce sensor and laser effectiveness.their close proximity and situational understanding of the ground commander’s operation. Commands and signals must be known. (3) Weather. The lower flight profile also allows for more accurate employment of non-precision ballistic munitions. and rehearsed by all operators conducting the cordon and search operation. target acquisition. Many sensors provide for the ability to record engagements or the target area. rotary wing assets can deliver ordnance in minimal amounts of time and with great accuracy. Acoustical signature of helicopters can serve as deterrent to enemy action. friend or foe (IFF). and to engage targets utilizing maximum standoff ranges and cover and concealment. (5) Speed and Flexibility. and battlefield effects can cause rotary wing aircraft to be ineffective or unusable. Periods of limited visibility. Aircraft can engage during running or hovering fire. increasing their risk from surface to air missiles and reducing sensor effectiveness. Due to the close proximity to ground forces. compared to fixed wing.20/MCRP 3-31. (6) Sensors. which must use limited field-of-regard of targeting systems to accomplish the same task. total number of IV-4 FM 3-06. The speed of rotary wing aircraft is fast enough to be responsive to mission changes and slow enough to be controlled during the close fight. (6) Limited Assets and Station Time. This includes more rapid identification.

aircraft. Utility aircraft may be used to insert scouts and snipers. such as flares. (6) Aircrews and terminal guidance controllers must become familiar with the roof outline of buildings. If surprise is needed. rotary wing aircraft should operate in the area as usual to not alert the public to the forthcoming operation. Isolation/Establishment of the Inner and Outer Cordons. sensor/video reconnaissance. tracers. The primary task for aviation in this phase may be to search for leakers and provide security for the ground forces. Zone. rotary wing may be used to establish the outer cordon and conduct reconnaissance of the highspeed avenues of approach into and out of the cordon. The methods to mark friendly and enemy positions are limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and aircrews. range. Withdrawal. monitoring the search and cordon area. (2) Phase 2. Marking Targets and Friendly Positions in the Cordon and Search Operation. It is important that ground forces and aircrews have a common understanding of the markings being used. (5) Aircraft expect detailed and continuous directions. Rotary wing aircraft may also be used to secure the forces manning the outer cordon. or smoke from indirect fires. During this phase. Some proven techniques for signaling or marking friendly positions include: (1) Spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows. aircraft can be used to provide security and reconnaissance. and zone reconnaissance. These requirements may increase based on the level of air-ground integration during the planning process (operation may be hasty). Care must be used if surprise is to be maintained. convoy security. laser designators IR pointers. Ground forces should immediately return a current situation report (SITREP) along with any critical updates or changes to the initial plan. (1) Phase 1. The commander may decide to move rotary wing to the outer cordon to reduce the noise and stress associated with rotary wing aircraft operating in close proximity to civilians. combat identification panels (CIPs). (2) Traditional but simple signaling devices. (5) Phase 5. and infrared beacons. current location and station time remaining. aircraft may be used to conduct route. f. and route reconnaissance may be conducted. Reconnaissance. then this may be the first time that aviation is integrated into the operation. Methods and techniques employed must be adapted to the conditions prevalent at the time. During this phase.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. strobes. Search. as well as convoy security to include security of building rooftops. (3) Phase 3. Movement to the Objective. and transportation of EPWs/detainees and captured equipment. Flat roofs. area. area. (4) Smoke grenades. (4) Phase 4. pitched roofs. aircraft operate in the same manner as phase 3. and bearing. Rotary wing aircraft may be used in the same manner as the reconnaissance phase. Aircrews require positive identification of the target and friendly positions prior to releasing ordnance. CCA/rotary wing CAS and air-ground integration are key elements during this phase.62 IV-5 . 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. During this phase. and general information on the cordon and search site can be gained. domed roofs. and roofs with towers or air conditioning units will aid in acquisition. and signaling mirrors. (3) Use of glint tape. including reference points to the target. During the reconnaissance phase. Digital pictures.4B/NTTP 3-05.

Fixed-wing Aviation. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities Aircraft Ordnance LGB MAVERICK GP Bombs CBU Aerial Mines LITENING Pod1 SIDEARM LGB AGM-65 GP Bombs CBUs Aerial Mines 2. Table IV-2.5. Fixedwing assets give the ground commander increased SA of the battlespace and the ability to provide fires if the situation dictates. JSOW GP Bombs CBUs Aerial Mines JDAM GP Bombs CBUs + WCMD LGBs Aerial Mines NO NO NO NO PPN-19 SMP-1000 X Band KU Band PPN-19 PPN-20 SMP1000 NO YES None IV-6 FM 3-06. in general. Fixed-wing Aviation Considerations a.3 NVG GPS FLIR1 CCD1 YES1 NO2 YES YES1 NO2 YES1 Harrier II Plus 2 A-10 / OA-10A None AC-130H NO (1688 only) YES 40mm Cannon (512 Rounds) PPN-19 SST-181 PPN-19 SST-181 AC-130U 105mm Howitzer (100 Rounds) (256 Rounds) NO YES 40mm Cannon 25mm Cannon (3000 Rounds) FLIR LLLTV Radar4 GPS. This can be mitigated by their ISR capabilities on board the aircraft. fixed-wing assets bring with them. PLS FLIR ALLTV SAR Radar3 GPS SAR Radar3 GPS NVG SAR Radar3 GPS (T)FLIR LLLTV Radar NVG GPS B-1B B-2 B-52H JDAM GP Bombs CBUs + WCMD JDAM.62 25 April 2006 .75" Rockets 30mm Cannon 105mm Howitzer (176 Rounds) AV-8B Harrier II LST YES Laser LTD NO Marking Capability Beacon Option Other Systems Rockets 25mm HEI IR Marker LUU-2 Flares Laser1 IR Pointer1 WP Rockets 30mm HEI IR Pointer LUU-1/-2/5/. Fixed-wing aircraft may require more planning and coordination to support cordon and search operations.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the asset will be available to support the ground unit. Once the request is allocated and published on the air tasking order. Unit commanders should request the fixed-wing assets through normal request channels as early as possible. more limitations.20/MCRP 3-31. they do have the ability to work a larger area of the battlespace. the cost of higher altitude.6/-19 Laser1 M-257/-278 Illum Rockets 105mm 40mm IZLID ATI 105mm 40mm 25mm LIA None None None CCD TV NVG GPS ((N) FLIR (T) FLIR1 CCD1 SAR Radar2. While. While their reaction time is quicker. lower fidelity observation is incurred.4B/NTTP 3-05.

2.75" Rocket 20mm Cannon LGB.75” Rockets 20mm Cannon JDAM / JSOW10 Maverick SLAM (+ER) LGB.4B/NTTP 3-05. EO12 FLIR EO P-3 MQ-1B Predator Pioneer NO NO NO YES Laser/IR Illuminator None None 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities Aircraft F-14 LANTIRN F-15E LANTIRN F-16 LANTIRN8. LGB GP Bombs CBUs 20mm Cannon JDAM.8 SADL6 LINK-169 NO YES No YES YES YES No YES Laser Rockets Laser Rockets None Laser WP Rockets HE Rockets LUU-2 Flares None (T)FLIR GPS NVG SAR Radar3 NO NO YES NO None LUU-2 Flares None None FLIR GPS NVG FLIR Radar GPS SAR Radar3 GPS FLIR.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. IDM/IDT7.62 IV-7 . LGB Maverick GP Bombs CBUs + WCMD JSOW AGM-130 GBU-15 & 24 GBU / EGBU-28 20mm Cannon GP LGB CBU Aerial Mines WCMD JDAM HARM7.9 IR only LITENING6 IR & CCD HTS7 F/A-18 A/C/D/E/F F-117 S-3B Ordnance JDAM. JDAM GP Bombs CBUs Maverick Aerial Mines Various Hellfire11 LST NO Laser LTD YES Marking Capability Beacon Option Other Systems Laser Rockets LUU-2 Flares Laser None NO YES None NVG (T)FLIR GPS LINK165 SAR Radar3 GPS NVG FLIR LINK16 None GPS. Aerial Mines 2.20/MCRP 3-31. HARM GP Bombs CBU.Table IV-2. NVG.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. mirrors. (4) Common maps: Ensure the aircrew have common maps and know the common grid reference system. etc. major landmarks. armed reconnaissance. the gunship crew must understand the ground IV-8 FM 3-06. (6) JTAC/forward air controller (airborne)(FAC(A)) control responsibilities: CAS missions will be controlled IAW JP 3-09. AC-130 Gunship Operations. Techniques. VSD panels. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities Laser Ordnance LST LTD 1 If equipped with LITENING pod. strobes. Aircraft Marking Capability Beacon Option Other Systems b.62 25 April 2006 . phase lines. and interdiction. TIPs. For maximum effectiveness. The AC-130 is uniquely capable to support cordon and search missions due to its accuracy.3. (8) Downed aircraft contingency and downed aircraft recovery team (DART) procedures. AC-130 crews train intensively to support ground forces in close proximity to the enemy. ingress/egress routes. weapons effects. The AC-130’s primary mission is CAS. Reference JP 3-09. ensure the aircraft orbit high and/or far away enough to ensure the element of surprise is not lost. smoke. when assets are needed for maximum effectiveness. (3) Announced versus surprise search: For a surprise search. 6 Block 25/30/32. Additionally. 5 F-14D only. Joint Tactics. code names. (5) Ground commander expectations of fixed-wing assets: Station time. 9 Some Block 50/52. 11 Predator equipped with Hellfire has no SAR radar capability. (2) Detailed ground scheme of maneuver: Composition and location of friendly forces. 8 Block 40/42. 12 Real-time C-band video broadcast. 2 AV-8B Harrier “II Plus” (with Radar). sensor capabilities.Table IV-2. low yield munitions. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). for specific JAAT guidance. Specific Fixed-wing Mission Planning Considerations. etc. the AC-130 has the ability to have an LNO/noncommissioned officer (NCO) on board to advise the aircrew as to SOPs and TTPs likely to be employed by the cordon and search force in a crisis. Ground force situational awareness is enhanced by the gunship’s ability to keep “eyes on” the target area throughout the orbit with its electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensor systems. (1) Visual identification and tracking of friendlies: Glint tape. 10 F/A-18 Lot 10 and above. and extended loiter time.4B/NTTP 3-05. 4Beacon Tracking Radar. (7) Rotary wing aircraft and artillery integration: Cordon and search missions may provide an ideal opportunity for JAAT operations. spray paint. 3 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) with ground mapping modes. The AC-130 systems are designed to enable “friendly-centric” fire support—continuous monitoring of friendly ground forces while simultaneously sweeping the inner and outer perimeters for threats to the operation and identification of hiding/fleeing personnel. c. general direction of travel. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.20/MCRP 3-31. 7 Block 50/52.

Example: During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) a significant drop in enemy activity was identified when the AC-130 was simply heard overhead.movement scheme in order to be proactive in their coverage. In the armed reconnaissance mission. and other supporting arms and assets. etc. lines of communication (LOCs). Instead. The only exception is how each variant is affected by instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) conditions over target. arriving overhead an operation underway without adequate information severely degrades AC-130 situational awareness. Many aircraft are capable of transmitting full motion video via targeting pods to a remotely operated video enhancement receiver (ROVER). FAC(A)s provide numerous advantages because of their ability to see across the battlespace and the restricted line of sight (LOS) a JTAC may encounter. The following are the most likely fixed-wing missions/roles that will be accomplished in cordon and search operations: (1) Armed Reconnaissance. CAS aircraft provide timely. integrating CAS with other supporting arms. d. Reconnaissance in IMC is extremely degraded due to the ability to only detect (not identification (ID) or classify) radar significant targets: buildings. they are given a designated sector by the controlling agency and conduct reconnaissance in advance of ground forces and during an operation. vehicles. providing the ground commander valuable intelligence and SA. enemy movements. (3) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) [TAC(A)].and rotary-wing operations.. the tasked aircraft may take off with no assigned target to attack.20/MCRP 3-31. The TAC(A) is an airborne coordinator that can manage CAS. target briefings. TAC(A) duties include coordinating CAS attack briefs and timing. Fighter/Attack Operations. and coordinating between fixed.4B/NTTP 3-05. (2) For all practical purposes.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. providing CAS aircraft handoff to terminal attack controllers. FAC(A)s can reduce the workload of the JTAC by providing target area updates. The FAC(A) may be in a better position than the JTAC to mark a target for attacking aircraft.” but the AC-130U employs a strike radar system and is capable of both CAS and interdiction in IMC. Extensive mission planning is critical during IMC operations. FAC(A)s are desirable for situations in which multiple flights of attacking aircraft have the potential to be working in the same objective area. as excessive time is spent “sorting” friendly from unknown/civilians in the vicinity of the target via radio communication with the JTAC. (3) Another advantage to employing the AC-130 is the psychological impact it has on the battlefield. Radar beacons allow both gunship variants to positively ID friendly force locations “through the weather. with special consideration given to the potential for collateral damage. accurate ordnance delivery to destroy targets in close proximity to friendly forces. or fleeing personnel (squirter/leaker). It is critical for commanders and planners to consider the threat determined in the planning process before tasking the AC-130. and deconfliction procedures to attacking aircraft. (1) Due to its unique employment profile. FAC(A). grid references. aircraft can monitor the operation for possible threats. The FAC(A) also has the same vantage point of the target area as the attacking fixed-wing aircraft. coordinates are required to identify friendly positions and initiate calls for fire. Translation of the JTAC ground perspective to the CAS 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. AC-130s generally operate under the protection of darkness in higher threat environments. universal transverse mercator. relaying threat updates and battle damage assessment (BDA). but not enemy personnel. With these ATPs.62 IV-9 . Target reference points (TRPs). This mission is enhanced by the addition of advanced targeting pods (ATPs). the AC-130H and AC-130U have similar enough capabilities that ground forces need not be concerned with the minor differences. (2) FAC(A). (4) CAS.

3.29]. and Procedures for Aviation in Urban Operations [FM 3-06.) (p) Location of helicopters.3A/NTTP 301. If possible. UAS. Joint Tactics. ingress/egress routes (f) Announced versus surprise search (g) Enemy forces: expected number and location (h) ROE review (i) Maps.1/MCRP 3-35.62 25 April 2006 . Threats. Techniques. etc. Fixed-wing aircraft might be tasked to perform a show of force. (5) Show of Force. global area reference system (GARS). roads. (j) Communications plan: • Frequency. buildings. time. terrain. weather. overlays and graphics: phase lines. and track • Friendly identification and marking methods (n) Report criteria (o) Deconfliction plan (altitude. fixed-wing orbits and altitudes (q) Attack plan (r) Preferred method of attack for aviation weapons (s) Tracking plan for fleeing personnel (t) Egress point and direction (2) Aircrew to JTAC (a) Weapons (b) Station time (c) Target pod capabilities IV-10 FM 3-06. a JTAC or ground commander representative should provide a telephonic brief to a fixed-wing representative prior to execution of a cordon and search operation. space. see JP 3-09.04/AFTTP(I) 3-2. etc. backup • Secure. search. and the ground situation must be taken into account before descending over an objective area. General briefing considerations are: (1) JTAC to Aircrew (a) Mission overview (b) Other aviation assets available (c) Number of friendly forces (d) Type and number of vehicles (e) General direction of travel. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). Techniques.4B/NTTP 3-05. deconfliction measures.20/MCRP 3-31. e. Altitudes and airspeeds will be highly dependent on the tactical situation. For a detailed discussion of CAS.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. common geographic reference system (CGRS).aircraft’s air perspective during friendly/target acquisition is the most difficult aspect of fixedwing CAS. nonsecure • Brevity code words • Execution checklists (k) Expected type of CAS control (l) Preferred weapons (m) JTAC capabilities • Laser designator • NVGs • Coordinate generation capability • IR pointer • Laser spot. General Briefing Considerations. and Multi-Service Tactics.

Hunter. Predator employs the AGM-114 Hellfire in three variations: shaped charge (AGM-114K). (2) ISR. UAS provide capabilities well suited for supporting cordon and search operations. has proven effective during combat operations. Data obtained is normally routed to distributed common ground station locations for processing. synthetic aperture radar (SAR). search.• IR pointer • Laser designator • Laser spot. establishing prolonged orbits designed to optimize information flow among multiple users in a jamming environment. and exploitation and can be transmitted directly to the tactical user when required. etc.20/MCRP 3-31. blastfragmentation (AGM-114M. c. (3) Support for CAS Operations. and other specialized sensors. UAS may be tasked to perform the following roles: (1) Command and Control. analysis.4B/NTTP 3-05. and track • Litening (d) Preferred altitude and orbit (e) Communications capabilities • Back up frequency • Secure and non-secure communications • Code/brevity words to be used (f) ROE review (g) Preferred method of attack 6. Note: The USMC does not own any organic UAS that have the ability to perform radio relay or auto-retransmit. The Predator’s ROVER capability to transmit sensor video directly to ground parties. I-GNAT. b. The Army Hunter UAS has also been equipped to carry the Viper Strike (modified brilliant antitank) round. Global Hawk. modified AGM-114K). They possess data collection capabilities.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. d. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Effective communication between the UAS operator and ground commander is essential to successful execution and decisive actions on the target. Strategic and operational level UAS are allocated and apportioned through normal channels and tasked through the air tasking order (ATO). Larger UAS (Predator. Small tactical UAS provide limited range observation at reduced risk. a precision low channel designator (CD) weapon.62 IV-11 . Some UAS are equipped with both laser target designator and NVG-compatible laser illuminator designator. Because cordon and search operations are usually conducted in a small battlespace. Unmanned assets may be employed as a persistent communications relay aircraft. enabling laser operations and close coordination with other tactical assets. Long loiter and slow speeds permit methodical sensor scans of urban canyons. and inert kinetic round. UAS provide persistent sensors and some variants may carry precision weapon engagement capability. ROVER video links may increase SA when equipped ground forces are escorted by the UAS in a direct support role. including JTACs. including EO and IR cameras. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operations a. UAS like Global Hawk and Predator were designed as ISR assets. deconfliction between aircraft and UAS is a critical requirement.) are multirole platforms capable of multiple tasks in the urban environment.

Airborne Command.7.4B/NTTP 3-05. and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Considerations Aircraft such as the JSTARS and AWACS can be part of a cordon and search operation.62 25 April 2006 . attack aviation. control and reporting center [CRC]. etc. altitude capability and radio assets on board with significant line-of-sight capabilities make it an ideal platform. air support operations center [ASOC].) as required. DASC(A) can also maintain communication with all C2 agencies (direct air support center [DASC]. or even direct to the ground commanders if they have a communications link established. AWACS. Control. JSTARS. Communications. Its time on station. tactical air command center [TACC] [USMC]. the USMC direct air support center (airborne) [DASC(A)] (limited capability within KC-130 F/R/T model aircraft) can provide solid C2 to a cordon and search operation as an extension of the Marine Air Command and Control System. They can aid in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and can be used during the execution phase by updating SA and providing C3. EC-130 and Rivet Joint aircraft can monitor the objective area for enemy communications and pass this information to AWACS. Surveillance. Additionally. Computers. IV-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Intelligence. tactical air operations center [TAPC] [USMC].

) 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. The capstone manual for employment of SOF is JP 3-05. and the Services change their current planning and training frameworks to better reflect present and future operational employment scenarios. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.Chapter V SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION 1. SOF Applications in Cordon and Search Operations a. With their in-depth knowledge and strong relationships with foreign forces. More missions are now being conducted by combined SOF and conventional forces (CF). unconventional warfare. b. and information operations. which rely heavily on increased cooperation and mutual support. This chapter discusses the basic principles for effectively integrating and employing forces as a multi-Service warfighting team to maximize the overall capabilities of the unit at the tactical level during cordon and search operations. As such. 3. they can provide CF commanders with additional information/intelligence for the planning and conduct of cordon and search operations. joint SOF and CF planners focused on deconfliction of operations when needed. counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Overview. either in supporting roles or as fully integrated forces. SOF may provide rapid response within extremist forces in any theater and may provide linkage to national level agencies and intelligence support.4B/NTTP 3-05. employment. It serves as the overarching reference for application of SOF capabilities and provides detailed information on SOF C2. foreign internal defense. SOF is distinguished from CF by influencing the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. counterterrorism. (Although traditionally unique to SOF. SOF Core Tasks SOF are organized.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. 2. make it necessary that United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). special reconnaissance. Operations employing SOF and CF.62 V-1 . CF conduct similar activities involving HN/coalition forces. Previously. SOF Overview a. and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct action. During cordon and search operations. trained. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). SOF produce Military Capabilities Studies (MCS) and biographies on foreign SOF/CF units throughout the world. but combat operations in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) demonstrated that a degree of SOF/CF integration at all levels are important to mission success. and support at the operational level. civil affairs operations. Service and subordinate manuals refer to JP 3-05 when developing added guidance for SOF employment It is also the reference for theater and joint task force (JTF) commanders and below for SOF implementation. These studies and biographies are continually updated and are used to provide an accurate assessment of the foreign forces capability and limitations along with biographical data on their leadership. SOF may be utilized to advise the commander on HN and coalition capabilities in order to support the conduct of a cordon and search operation. Because SOF units are regionally oriented and in most cases maintain close relationships with HN forces/locals. PSYOP.

(3) SOF Supported by HN. CF units must plan to maintain their cordon. During SSE. Cordon and search elements may require specialized equipment and expert personnel to conduct an in-depth search of the target building(s). SOF can facilitate combined HN and coalition forces operations through assisting. (8) Interpreters.. The exact composition of a given force depends on the nature of the crisis and the prevailing strategic politico-military environment. Often times this on-the-spot interrogation provides the cordon and search force with real-time information on the location of other potential targets that could be immediately exploited with a hasty cordon and search at another location. While CF personnel can conduct tactical questioning. Sensitive site exploitation is a systematic search at a location to exploit intelligence (tactical or strategic) and allows for prosecution of detainees. SOF personnel typically are capable of gathering more specific intelligence from persons in a target building. Integrated Operations a. Through SOF/HN relationships and the detailed knowledge of HN capabilities. the nation’s evolving force structure must be both capable and responsive to implement and enforce the strategy that will protect our national interests. SOF units have a superior capability to reconnoiter and develop intelligence for the conduct of a cordon and search operation and provide information on insurgents and insurgent activities in a given area of responsibility. (6) HN Only. (4) HN Supported by SOF.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Targets may involve chemical. (9) Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE). or external assets/skills not available to the HN). As the political and military situation changes and the HN training and capabilities are deemed suitable. advise. Such “adaptive force packaging” seeks to maximize the capabilities of operational execution.4B/NTTP 3-05. personnel in the inner cordon force may require specialized equipment not normally carried with them. Our national military strategy recognizes today’s uncertain world requires flexible and interoperable forces that can respond quickly to the multitude of potential crises that may threaten US vital national interests. such as chemical agent monitors or radiacmeters. SOF Applications. (7) Reconnaissance. SOF units typically have access to superior interpreters and are often better trained in information gathering. targets may be determined to be of a nature that requires SOF participation in conjunction with CF. To respond to these crises. This section focuses on V-2 FM 3-06.b. and training for cordon and search operations. SOF personnel typically have access to local information not readily available to CF. planning. or nuclear sites or certain persons whose capture is deemed critical. SOF may be utilized to assist. advising. 4. (1) SOF Only. CF will usually provide the inner and outer cordon. and train HN forces to operate independently during cordon and search operations.62 25 April 2006 .20/MCRP 3-31. Additionally.e. (5) HN/Coalition Operations. the HN may conduct cordon and search operations supported by SOF (i. CAS. radiological. to provide the inner and outer cordon). Through intelligence and conventional forces targeting processes. HN forces may be effectively used in supporting roles (i. (2) SOF/CF. Targets identified as having a strategic value may require the commander to use SOF alone for a cordon and search mission.e.. biological. This information may be of significant value to the commander conducting a cordon and search operation.

(5) Make force protection arrangements for SOF. If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan. These include but are not limited to clearly defined command relationships. Commanders and their staffs must recognize and capitalize on the many tools that can achieve this integrated capability. police. and contract forces provides the best means of reducing the number of missed opportunities. b. more appropriate missions are probably available for SOF. The steps mentioned in the integration of SOF and CF apply to Service forces integrating at the tactical level. and the exchange of liaison and control elements. b. However. Joint S-2/S-3 planning cells should be implemented to integrate SOF and conventional units for the conduct of a cordon and search operation. (2) Ensure SOF input on how the CF commander’s intent and operational plan can be supported. During COA analysis.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. limitations. Practicing SOF and CF integration procedures and addressing interoperability challenges during training and exercises that may also involve foreign military. they do not possess sufficient combat power to confront enemy forces for a sustained period. Key items for consideration during planning include: (1) Conduct a mission analysis to determine if the tasking is appropriate for use of SOF. (b) The mission should support the theater geographic combatant commander’s campaign plan. well developed maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures.4B/NTTP 3-05. The staff involved in planning an operation may vary between a joint level staff to a JTF commander and operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader. Planners must understand that SOF are not structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. Depending upon the size and scope of the operation. They should not assign missions that are beyond SOF capabilities. delineated battlespace. c. (3) Bring SOF fully and early into the planning and coordination process. (c) The mission should be operationally feasible. the use of SOF is not appropriate. (6) Provide SOF with any non-SOF resources required to successfully execute the mission. The key to success is the integration of forces during all phases of an operation to include planning and rehearsals.62 V-3 . ensuring that the capabilities of each unit are maximized. and the potential for fratricide during conflict between SOF/CF and foreign military forces. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. unnecessary delays. properly used. Planning Considerations a. SOF offer specialized. Combined. The CF maneuver commander and the SOF unit commander must clearly delineate who will conduct which portion of the cordon and search operation.20/MCRP 3-31. Commanders should not use SOF as a substitute for other forces. and vulnerabilities. (a) The best use of SOF is against key strategic or operational targets that require SOF-unique skills and capabilities. The CF commander must consider that since SOF normally operate in small elements. (4) Recognize the characteristics and capabilities/limitations of each other’s forces. these capabilities afford all forces their requisite tactical flexibility and furthermore reduce the potential for fratricide. the SOF commander must realistically evaluate his force. 5. yet complementary capabilities to the CF commander.the integrated employment of SOF and CF forces available to the joint warfighting community for the conduct of a cordon and search operations. reliable COP. If the targets are tactical.

and weapon systems video to counter allegations of collateral damage. (3) Understand that SOF and CF units have the single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) and what organization develops the frequency hop set used by each unit. (10) During planning. (12) Coordinate to provide any non-CF resources required for CF to successfully execute the mission (e. or provided by a host nation. and pro-host nation document distribution). the SF commander and logistician must modify Army doctrine. V-4 FM 3-06. (2) In some cases. operational.. SF groups or battalions may depend on other Service CSS systems. (8) Plan and provide support for SOF mission termination and redeployment. SOF. (5) Recognize that SOF and CF. as well as multinational forces. multinational force.62 25 April 2006 . (2) Be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of potentially available strategic. e. The OPSEC process requires decision-makers to directly address how much risk they are willing to assume. indigenous guides). Ensure COMCAM understands the importance of who they can and cannot photograph.e.4B/NTTP 3-05. Insufficient security may compromise a mission. (1) In choosing to execute particular OPSEC measures. (1) Ensure the plan is supported from a communications perspective. (1) The special forces (SF) group depends on both the group support battalion (GSB) and the theater Army (TA) combat service support (CSS) infrastructure to sustain operations. d.20/MCRP 3-31. know the joint standard used for combat identification to enable the unit to arrive with the proper identification measures installed on vehicles. commanders must decide that the assumed gain in secrecy outweighs the cost in resources. and procedures to conform to the CSS procedures in theater.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. survivability. (11) Use combat camera (COMCAM) to support PSYOP. Logistics. whether organic to a Service. will have different levels of communications system proficiency. policy.g. print products. (2) Balance security with integration. Excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail due to inadequate coordination. When sustained by other Services. (9) Consider the different mobility. handbills. interpreters. pamphlet. and commercial communications systems and equipment. poster. (13) Plan for the use of tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) (i. Risk to these areas for compromise need to be considered. tactical. (4) Know what forces and nets use what communications security (COMSEC) software and what is the associated cryptographic change over time/period. United States government agency. and firepower capabilities of SOF and CF. f.(7) Rehearse with full SOF and CF participation.. with mounted and dismounted speaker teams. Operational Security (OPSEC). (3) Host nation/friendlies may be located within the cordon and search area. Communications.

Capabilities of force selected to conduct cordon and search: (1) Access to interrogation capabilities.4B/NTTP 3-05. SOF integration considerations: (1) Capable of conducting precision clearing (small imprint. (2) Familiarity with each other's TTP. (3) Integration and synchronization with ground owning units. actions on the objective. (c) Multiple/full scale infiltration. friendly personnel may be operating in indigenous clothing.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (b) Essential for success. special operations command and control element (SOCCE). (5) National-level intelligence capabilities. (2) IO capabilities of SOF. (6) In cordon and search area. (3) Need for LNOs. (4) Joint rehearsals.g. or a SOF LNO. j. fast execution for HPT).20/MCRP 3-31. Conventional and special operations forces must have clearly identified near. Command relationships: (1) Identify who is in charge (conventional terrain owner or JSOA activation).and far-recognition signals for any elements disguised in civilian attire or vehicles that may have infiltrated the target area ahead of the main force. special forces advanced operating base (SFAOB). (3) CF should incorporate SOF LNOs in the targeting process. lateral communication throughout operations planning. (5) At task force and below. (a) Familiarity with each other's TTP. exfiltration contingency. (a) HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET). Command relationships must be clearly delineated. SOF interface can be conducted with the special forces liaison element (SFLE). h. (4) At brigade and above. i. LNO between SOF and CF units: (1) Recognize there may be a need to send a secure communications capability (voice and data) with LNOs. (8) Units recognize local knowledge and use it. (7) All parties recognize and agree to on scene commander.62 V-5 . civilian clothing. (2) Access to language capability. (4) ISR capabilities. (2) Use the LNO to address communications system issues that require immediate coordination or action with the supporting unit. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. (6) Joint planning development. and/or foreign military/police uniforms or may be operating in indigenous vehicles. coordination and deconfliction are conducted between the SOF team leaders and the appropriate commander. (5) Avoid planning in a vacuum.

(b) Dissemination of PSYOP products. consider options to best integrate SOF and CF maneuver elements for mission accomplishment. Use kill boxes overlaid on or outside of these defined areas to facilitate more responsive fire support. (6) Begin the mission execution approval process early to allow sufficient time for proper coordination and to prevent delays in execution. (a) Mitigate harmful effects of cordon and search operations. (1) During mission analysis.4B/NTTP 3-05. SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Lessons Learned These lessons learned are from the SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Handbook. (a) 24 hours prior surveillance of objective. (7) Force must conduct debriefings. (Parallel planning and coordination may require trusted agents for compartmentalized plans. (b) PSYOP effects. (5) Activate and deactivate small areas of operation during rapid decisive operations. 6.62 25 April 2006 . (9) Access to CA/PSYOP. (6) Standard signal plan. September 2005. (7) Use collaborative planning techniques early and throughout and determine the collaborative planning tools/procedures to be used. (c) Marking routes ingress and egress. (8) Force must share intelligence to the widest possible audience and down to the lowest acceptable level.) V-6 FM 3-06. (c) Cultural effects. (3) Develop a clear and flexible battlespace organization. (b) Command must recognize sniper ability and limitations. (c) CA assessment of the area. initiative. (4) Increase awareness of delineated areas and detailed planning during integrated operations. (8) Plan for and include liaison and control elements early in the planning process. and responsiveness. (d) Snipers must be capable of communicating their capabilities and limitations to commanders (and given an opportunity to during planning).(b) Tactical HUMINT Team (THT). (5) Military working dogs. (2) Use mission-type orders and commander’s intent to permit subordinate flexibility. Detailed planning and execution coordination is required. (10) Ability to conduct sensitive site exploitation.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (a) Capabilities. (3) Ability to ID targets and conduct recon. (4) Snipers (weigh the advantages/disadvantages of compromise).20/MCRP 3-31.

(9) Conduct frequent coordination with other interagency players. (11) Know the differences in the ROE for CF and SOF. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. as well as a backup method or plan.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (14) Coordinate communications and information systems requirements and interoperability and rehearse communications procedures to ensure all forces have a common and secure means to communicate.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. (12) Identify acceptable risk and define clear command lines that empower subordinate commanders with mission approval authority. (13) Understand that acceptable levels of risk may differ for CF and SOF. (10) Plan to rapidly disseminate information to ensure appropriate actions in time to preclude missed opportunities.62 V-7 . Recognize how this may affect mission accomplishment when forces are synchronized.

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safety. Detainee Operations a. International law. These considerations are listed below and broken down by the following categories: transportation and vehicle recovery. silence. Transportation and Vehicle Recovery Pre-positioned maintenance and vehicle evacuation points may be established. Have available sand/dust goggles. and tag) are followed. speed. oil. and use of host nation forces. etc.4B/NTTP 3-05. rally points.Chapter VI LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS 1. Units should plan on executing this mission with a basic load of CL V and any additional special munitions that may be required based on mission analysis.20/MCRP 3-31. Ensure operators are trained to change flats. and maintenance collection points. Standardize EPW kits. Medical assets could be collocated at these sites. Cordon and search missions can be complicated operations requiring detailed logistic and support planning. detainees. (3) Gather detainee packets with vehicles or at a collection point. A detailed CASEVAC plan should be incorporated and rehearsed to ensure the unit has positioned assets to best support the mission. (2) Use blindfolds for detainees (IAW ROE). jacks (SL-3/Basic Issue Items [BII] for vehicles). medical.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. 2.62 VI-1 . Check serviceability of the spare. (1) Use like vehicles in pairs for ease of recovery. (b) Snatch ropes/sling load cables/mechanized vehicle tow cables/chains (good for towing and pulling down doors. neck gaiters. segregate. if you use one 5-ton. bring another. detainee operations support. communications. (b) Extra gas. carry spare tow bars and or straps (minimum of one per two like vehicles/practice recovery during rehearsals. duct tape. b. Support to Cordon and Search Operations a. military training. These could both be collocated with the security element/outer cordon. (3) Identify refuel points. (a) Spare tires. (a) For light wheeled vehicles. ROE. mission essential equipment. (c) It is critical that personnel are trained and well rehearsed on how to recover and tow a disabled vehicle for maintenance reasons or because of battle damage. (2) All vehicles should carry spare supplies. A detailed logistical estimate should be conducted during the planning process to ensure all required classes (CL) of supply are available for the mission. such as. 3. pressure dressings. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.). and ethical principles demand that EPWs. and civilians be accorded the utmost humane treatment: (1) Ensure procedures of 5-S’s and T (search.

The MEDEVAC coordinator should not be the unit leader or the aid provider. (12) Use explosive detection kits when available. (2) Ensure medical providers are equipped to support the type of casualties likely to occur in an urban environment—blast effects. VI-2 FM 3-06. Use Ziploc baggies for this purpose. Use the most expeditious means possible to evacuate a casualty. (4) Ensure planning considers that evacuation times in urban operations may be much longer than normal.(4) Evacuate.62 25 April 2006 . all detainees to the same location. (6) Take photos of each detainee and items of intelligence value in possession of the detainee. This requirement should be separate from CASEVAC and HNSF transportation requirements. resuscitate. Medical providers provide prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures necessary to locate.20/MCRP 3-31. Medical a. (8) Dedicate vehicles for detainee transportation. the medical provider must coordinate communications. broken bones. (7) Use zip ties or flex cuffs to secure detainees.4B/NTTP 3-05. (11) Remember documentation is important. (10) Recover shoes for the detainee to wear. Ensure both primary and alternate MEDEVAC coordinators are trained/competent regarding current MEDEVAC procedures. (6) Ensure the required coordinated plan establishing guidance for pre-positioned ambulance utilization/dispatch is prepared. (5) Keep personal effects with the detainee. etc. Consider the use of air ambulances as the means of medical evacuation according to METT-TC and the condition of the casualty. (5) Employ standardized air and ground medical evacuation resources. They should be used immediately to provide additional evidence for future legal processing. and other support requirements with appropriate local units prior to commencing operations. Enemy forces may be released because of improper documentation. (7) Appoint/identify a primary and alternate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) coordinator. (1) Ensure one or two medical providers are located at the CCP and one medical provider is located with the assault/search element. Ensure they are prepared to triage on site.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. To facilitate effective medical support. 4. recover. stabilize. (9) Plan for blankets or clothing to safeguard detainees when operations are conducted at night during inclement weather. and prepare patients for evacuation to the next level of care or to return to duty. Urban terrain may make this difficult and needs to be planned in advance. (3) Establish a CCP and coordinate evacuation plans with local/theater casualty/medical evacuation assets. (13) Provide needle proof gloves if possible to avoid injury to those searching and handling detainees. security. higher number of head wounds etc.

(15) Use a lightweight casualty evacuation cart. It can greatly assist in moving casualties away from contact and to a treatment location. within 10 minutes patient should be packaged for evacuation. use the following techniques: (1) CCP inside of a building/courtyard. (2) CCP in an open area. and within 1 hour the casualty should be under a surgeon's care. Security must be maintained at all times at this location. (e) Place friendly dead out of sight and beyond the routine casualties. and move CEE and CEA. (c) From ten o’clock to two o’clock place routine casualties. (10) Ensure all casualties have a medical information card per the unit SOP (one carried on gear and one carried on their person) filled out before the operation begins. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. (a) Establish a triangle. handle.62 VI-3 . (c) Use one of the far corners to place routine casualties.4B/NTTP 3-05. Units must develop a plan to consolidate. Ideally for casualty survival arterial bleeding needs to be stopped within 5 minutes. c. To establish a CCP. Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA) a.20/MCRP 3-31. casualties are not evacuated with deceased military personnel or with detainees. (b) Use the next closest corner to place priority casualties. They should be assisted by additional medics or other available personnel. Mark each corner with a distinctive color or other marker. (d) Use the remaining corner or preferably a separate room for friendly dead. (f) Place enemy casualties with security beyond the urgent casualties. (9) Coordinate with the next level of care to ensure advance preparation to receive casualties. (a) Use the closest corner to place urgent casualties. Mark each apex with a distinctive color or other marker. within 30 minutes casualties should be further assessed by a physicians assistant or a medical doctor. b. 5. CEE and CEA (1) Consolidate CEE and CEA at the end of the operation. (14) Ensure medics organize and control activities within a casualty collection point. Triage is critical and must be conducted early so that medical personnel can properly treat the most urgent casualties. (12) Develop a mass casualty plan. (13) Ensure. Note: Disposal/release of such equipment should be IAW the affected unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP).(8) Store wounded personnel equipment. when possible. (d) From two o’clock to six o’clock place priority casualties. (b) From six o’clock to ten o’clock place urgent casualties. (11) Provide armored evacuation and security platforms if possible.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Casualties must be triaged and segregated based on triage assessment in order to expedite treatment and evacuation. (e) Use an adjacent room for enemy wounded.

(4) A master manifest should be maintained at unit level that includes sensitive item inventories and other important information. (3) Blow it up in place. (5) Handle unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO)/improvised explosive device(IED)/booby traps IAW unit SOP. including photographic media. (c) Movement plan. In any case if they are part of the operation then they must be included and accounted for in our transportation plan. if needed. Transportation (1) Plan sufficient transportation to move the unit in a manner that supports the ground tactical plan. (9) Nontraditional assets such as civilian trucks may be appropriated IAW established ROE to assist in moving personnel or material to or from the objective. medical assets. Classes of supply that may be needed and should be considered for planning and execution of cordon and search operations are as follows: VI-4 FM 3-06. This list can be used to establish accountability if vehicles or sensitive items are lost for any reason. (8) To facilitate command and control.4B/NTTP 3-05. This includes briefings and inspects of personnel and vehicles. Movement may be by their own assets or provided to them. (6) Cross-level or load vehicles with key leaders. (2) Be aware that vehicles may not be organic to a unit. vehicles can be marked on the sides and/or back based on their departure times or elements during movement. so place someone from that unit to C2 and maintain accountability/liaison with the vehicles. b. (b) Loading plan. and personnel.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (3) HNSF need to be part of any transportation plan. etc. 6. Follow restrictions in ROE or unit directives.20/MCRP 3-31. control. (d) Unloading.) and backhaul it to a captured enemy equipment or ammunition site. All units should have this capability due to lack of availability of EOD/engineers. Make every effort to integrate attached units. (e) Withdrawal plan. (5) Conduct preventive maintenance (PM)/preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on vehicles prior to departure.62 25 April 2006 . Ensure understanding of SOPs and contact drills and conduct detailed rehearsals. (4) Possess the means to carry contraband (garbage bags. skills. logistics. Classes of Supply Considerations a. (6) Possess the means to catalog and record CEE and CEA information. security. and weapons systems to preclude the loss of any critical asset with the loss of one vehicle. and consolidation of vehicles plan (during execution).(2) Be prepared to secure areas where CEE and CEA are found. assets. (a) Staging plan. A technique is to plan ground movement in a manner similar to an air assault operation with five phases. (7) Make sure vehicles are marked or possess markers that can be used to identify their locations to deconflict air and other friendly fires. sandbags.

chemlights. Urban Operations Kits a. A company should maintain four urban operations kits and four breaching kits. (3) Grappling hooks—6. Additionally. wpns) level. and a small parts package may be brought for minor repairs. 2. (a) HNSF may have to be supplied/resupplied. b. and signs.(1) Class I—Sufficient food and water (preferably a 48–72 hours supply) must be planned. One technique is to have ammunition prepositioned forward so that ammunition can be quickly resupplied in the event of a prolonged engagement. oil. enemy. (7) Class VIII—Stretchers (preferably one for every two vehicles). duct tape. concertina wire. the platoon urban operations kit should include: (1) Sand table kit geared specifically for urban operations—1. Be prepared to push additional Class I if the operation is prolonged or forces are given a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to remain behind. (6) Class VI—Sundry packs may be obtained to distribute following the mission as part of perception management. spike strips. propane or commercial vehicle fuel may be brought in or controlled as part of action mitigation following the operation. a lightweight casualty evacuation cart. medical bags. fan belts. and HQ) should maintain their urban operations kit at the platoon level. some items need to be maintained at the squad (1. Note: Additional Class I stores may be required if detainees are anticipated. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. 3. batteries (at least enough for all equipment to be powered for 48 hours). By having the MOUT-specific items stored in a separate bag.4B/NTTP 3-05. (2) Class II—Planning considerations must be given to what supplies are needed such as engineer tape.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the breach kit can be used for standard breaching and MOUT. (5) Class V—Sufficient ammunition must be on hand and available for any anticipated engagement. (b) Additional quantities of Class I may be brought to assist in perception management and interaction with civilian populace when searching areas that were incorrectly identified. Planning should address this possibility. 3.20/MCRP 3-31. or civilian casualties. if available. Each platoon (1. (4) Class IV—Barrier materials may be needed for TCPs/blocking positions or detainee collection points. (8) Class IX—Spare tires. 550 cord. (3) Class III—Fuel. The HNSF may brief that they have sufficient Class 1 and then identify additional needs after the mission is executed. It is recommended that the platoon breach kits be augmented to create a MOUT kit. Additional Class 1 may also be used as part of a unit's CMO or IO efforts. Consider including traffic cones. Platoon. and other petroleum products must be brought in sufficient quantity to support the operation. While the platoon MOUT kit may be consolidated at the platoon level. At a minimum. and other items that will be required for the mission. (2) Wire handling gloves—4 pair. and other items must be restocked and positioned where they can support any friendly. The platoon military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) kit mirrors a standard breach kit in many ways. Include ammunition requirements for HNSF.62 VI-5 . 2. Company. 7.

Tools for search: (1) Shovels (2) Axes (3) Mine detectors/ground penetrating radar (4) Gun shot residue/swipe kits/explosive detection kits (5) Breaching kits (6) Bolt cutters (7) Picket pounders (8) Hooligan tools (9) Sledge hammer (10) Battering rams (11) Propane/oxygen-acetylene torch (12) Demo kits (13) Grappling hooks (14) Assault ladder (15) Cameras VI-6 FM 3-06. d.62 25 April 2006 . (4) Iron grappling hook with rope (for climbing and moving debris inside buildings in urban operations)—1. (3) Forced entry tool kit: hooligan tool/crowbar. (5) Nylon rope 120’ and snap links. At a minimum. (5) Defense preparation tools: hammers. nails. axe. and bailing wire. (6) Wolf Tails—2 per Service member. Squad. chemical lights (assorted colors & IR). See appendix H.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31.(4) Lightweight. duct tape. and bolt/lock cutters—1 ea. flashlights. engineer tape. saws. the squad urban operations kit should include: (1) Protective eyewear—1 per Service member (2) Wire cutters—1. sledge. foldable assault ladder—1.4B/NTTP 3-05. c. (7) Signal devices for lifting and shifting fires and for safely moving between buildings. and spray paint. battering ram. (8) A mirror device for observing around corners and up stairs—1 per fire team. (9) Marking supplies: Chalk.

and Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints [MCIP 3-35. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. This is contrary to current doctrine that identifies the streets as “fatal funnels of fire” and warns Marines to enter buildings rapidly and not stack in the street. insurgents attempted to escape by throwing down their weapons and either tried to evade Marine units or approached them pretending to be civilians. However.62 A-1 . the enemy encountered in Fallujah was far more willing to stand and fight to the death than experiences elsewhere in Anbar province suggested. most of them were incurred inside buildings where the enemy waited for Marines to come to him.01.Appendix A HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED Overview This appendix contains an overview of lessons learned concerning cordon and search operations during recent combat operations and includes historical examples in order to document effective and ineffective TTP across a broad spectrum of environments: (1) MCIP 3-35. These latest tactics are probably a result of the Marines’ ability to dominate by fire the streets and rooftops. In many instances. Tactics. that Marines were fighting an enemy that was universally suicidal.20/MCRP 3-31. TTP for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints (USMC OIF Lessons Learned) (2) Air-Ground Integration (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL] Handbook Cordon and Search. chapter 11) 1. they have fought as individual groups rather than establishing a mutually supporting series of positions. Although Marines have taken some casualties from rooftop shootings. This does not mean. Friendly Methods of Attack The two major attack options differ as follows: • “Attack to seize” objectives. the enemy generally did not choose to conduct offensive operations at night.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 machine gun) and grenades to initiate the engagements and would usually continue to fight until killed. by all accounts. Although these groups tended to congregate in houses close to one another. however. Techniques. The insurgents often used PKMs (7.01] Battalion Level Operations The Enemy The enemy facing Marines in Iraq since the end of OIF I typically consisted of small groups (4 to 12) of individuals armed with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) who generally choose to fight from inside buildings rather than out in the streets. The Marine Corps center for lessons learned (MCCLL) indicates most engagements were initiated by the enemy opening fire on Marines as the latter were entering a house or ascending the stairwell. Lastly.

a term Marines normally tend to shy away from as being too closely affiliated to attrition warfare. clearing meant extensive use of preparatory fires followed by prepared charges or rockets to conduct dynamic breaches. clearing every building in its path. In this case (Fallujah). The lesson is not a new one in urban warfare: Unless physically occupied by friendly forces. This problem would have been prevented if units conducting a penetration had designated the bulk of their force to conduct detailed clearing behind the lead elements. no area of a city is really secure. All battalions reported that they incurred more casualties during back clearing than during the assault phase. This task force’s mission was to open routes. this afforded the companies the opportunity to post minimal security while allowing their personnel to rest. a moving force is at a disadvantage at night in an urban environment.20/MCRP 3-31. and provide rear security for the forward companies. There are many variables in quantifying the success of a particular tactic but it is accurate to say that this course of action resulted in a lower number of casualties and significantly reduced problems with enemy infiltration back into previously cleared areas. This proved to be a very effective technique and one whose necessity arose from the enemy’s preference to engage dismounted infantry rather than the tanks that preceded them. and 2) ensure that the battalion’s zone is truly clear of the enemy. In doing so they accepted risk on their flanks and to the rear of their forward units. A-2 FM 3-06. as offensive weapons against pockets of resistance. the battalion advances deliberately with all companies on line from phase line to phase line. However. destroy caches and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).4B/NTTP 3-05.• “Conduct a penetration to destroy enemy in zone” and then to “search and attack in zone” in the course of seizing designated objectives. in some cases. units were losing Marines in areas that had been cleared and then vacated. This was another factor in their effort to “extend their culminating point. An interesting aspect of this tactic was the fact that this approach to the task of securing an area was methodical. Since the enemy did not appear to be able or willing to launch night attacks.” A task force composed of engineers and security elements from the battalion’s headquarters and service company followed in trace of the companies. At 1600 each afternoon. the battalion would come to a halt and the companies would put out observation posts (OPs) and “go firm” while the commanders met to conduct a chalk talk of the events of the next day which would include emphasis on the geometry of fires. At night the companies would establish OPs on their firm bases but would not run dismounted patrols in the streets. Attack to Seize This implies two precepts: 1) extend the unit’s (in this case a battalion) culminating point. This pattern was repeated several times and nine weeks after the initial attack. The task force used D-9 and D-7 bulldozers and armored combat excavators to clear rubble and. a vulnerability that was frequently TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints exploited by the enemy. incurring casualties in the process. one unit pushed through to seize its objectives ahead of schedule. As an example.62 25 April 2006 . The rationale for this was that even with night vision equipment. At 0700 the next day the companies would begin clearing again. Conduct a Penetration Some battalions either chose or were compelled by the wording of their original tasking to push as rapidly as possible to a designated objective. starting together on the same phase line. During execution.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The battalion pushed hot food up to the forward units every night. it then became necessary for the adjacent unit to move into the same area in order to clear it of insurgents.

for the most part Marines were the enemy’s key terrain. One battalion used a grid system of numbers and letters that worked well as a reference but was not exact enough for targeting since a designator such as AB5 would refer to a block of 20 to 25 buildings. although units pushed to seize designated objectives it became apparent that the enemy was not interested in the same terrain.62 A-3 . The fact that Marines had seized numbered objectives did not dislodge the enemy. the top down assault is taught as being the most ideal method for clearing a structure. all but one of the infantry battalions had tanks attached. this was the first time that these infantry companies had worked with tanks and most of these TTP were developed in the assembly area and refined during the actual operation. After action reports (AARs) from this operation noted that it would be prudent for all units deploying to Iraq to train in CONUS with tanks and engineers in order to practice TTP such as those developed in combat.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. This training should focus on breaching techniques. each with advantages and disadvantages. In order to provide background information on the nature of house clearing operations. only 10 digit grids were used. Tankers preferred to keep their sections together. the following methods and recommendations on house clearing techniques were drawn primarily from an AAR produced by K Company. which was heavily involved in Operation Al-Fajr. In most cases. A tank section would typically be placed in direct support of a company and would lead the way down streets with infantry clearing adjacent buildings. The dangers attendant in focusing on conducting an urban penetration without a plan for detailed back clearing must be balanced against mission requirements and deferring the clearing battles until a major objective is seized. Although it became necessary to seize certain high buildings and mosques in order to deny the enemy use of these structures as shooting platforms. Small Unit Tactics Tank Infantry Integration During the assault on Fallujah during November 2004. The infantry companies dedicated dismounted squads to provide security to each tank section since the tanks were "buttoned up” and had no other means to cover their dead space. and relative positioning. When using grids to designate targets. The infantry would use the “grunt phone” attached to the hull of the tank to communicate with the tank commander and M203 smoke and smoke grenades to designate targets. Top Down Assault An infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods.Lastly. 5th Marines. while the tanks provided overwatch. Commanders and small unit leaders paid great attention to geometry of fires since six battalions were operating in a relatively small area. Surprising the enemy by moving from the top down may 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. tank/infantry communications. 3d Battalion. These tank units were attached a few weeks prior to the operation and the TTP continued to be refined throughout the operation. movement and overwatch. typically using the 120mm high explosive antitank (HEAT) round which limited collateral damage. Tanks would fire into confirmed or suspected enemy positions.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Doctrinally.

most over three stories tall. Completely isolating a house in Fallujah is near impossible and.throw the enemy off balance. The assaulting platoon (if attacking with mechanized attachments) was required to simultaneously provide security for up to nine vehicles (tanks and tracks inclusive) and assault into innumerable. Additionally.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Many times this “shortcut” proved successful. which makes it harder to maintain momentum. the roof can be breached in order to drop grenades and explosives on top of the enemy. If the squad decides to break contact they are moving opposite of their momentum and more casualties will result. The pace of the assault demanded that houses be assaulted without optimal geometries of fire from the supporting elements established prior to entry. The structure must be flooded and Marines have to go overtop of casualties in order to kill the enemy. connected houses. The squad leader has more options when contact is made. and rocket fires. due to geometries. The enemy’s egress routes are greatly reduced but the house may not be entirely isolated. This limits the options for the squad leader on how to engage the enemy. Tanks. or up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun-trucks. Momentum must not be lost. The enemy’s defenses may not be prepared for a top down assault and the squad could rapidly overwhelm the enemy. Realistically. assaulting from the top down may not be the best option for the infantry squad in every situation. and asymmetrical in construction with rooftops of varying heights and molding.62 25 April 2006 . and vehicle security caused significant manpower problems for the rifle platoon. so each house required time intensive positioning of forces in order to best and most safely bring supporting heavy fires to bear should the need arise. A-4 FM 3-06. The swiftness of medical attention may mean the difference between life and death. Bottom Up Clearing On the other hand “bottom up” clearing offers advantages. once the squad makes entry and contact is made.20/MCRP 3-31. The enemy has the ability to escape by using its preplanned routes. like a townhouse. All assets require Marine security. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines because the clearing is more controlled and smooth whereas top down is always in high gear.4B/NTTP 3-05. tracks. The structure does not have to be flooded. But the squad is moving into the enemy’s defenses. tracks. Marine squads may not have enough Marines to effectively flood the structure. Often the enemy’s position was not known until entry was gained. Indigenous residences were sometimes adjoining. When clearing from the top. The squad has more momentum when moving down ladder wells. however. friendly casualties would precede the platoon’s ability to bring maximum destructive fires to bear. Momentum can be maintained in assaulting or breaking contact and the squad leader can switch rapidly from one to the other relatively quickly. Casualties can be pulled out faster and easier simply because gravity is working for the squad. If casualties are taken they are nearly impossible to pull up the ladder well with all their gear. If the squad knows that the enemy is inside. top down is unrealistic unless an adjacent house is first cleared from bottom up. tank. and certainly outside of the reach of tanks. Alleys and walkways were often inaccessible from the main axis of approach. often prevents the use of heavy machine gun. The casualties will not receive immediate first aid because the entire squad must be committed to neutralization of the threat. This is another reason why the structure must be flooded. It is easy for the enemy to hold the second deck and ladder well. resulting in a force that can be stretched too thin by simply providing security for itself. but on occasion. but a house cannot be cleared with machine gun and tank fires alone. The squad is slow moving up the ladder well. pulling out of the structure is extremely difficult.

the footholds can be used to establish a base of fire in order to assault or break contact. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. the use of sledgehammers in the assault breacher’s kit and shot gun slugs played an important role in giving the assault elements the tools necessary to decrease collateral damage. Each individual lower level to the bottom deck.20/MCRP 3-31. there should not be a standard assault method. Breaching Tools and Techniques During the assault on Fallujah. and casualty collection points. workshops.Overall. must include instruction on shotgun employment. Footholds Footholds are extremely important. First two seating rooms. All unit leaders must understand geometries of fires. make a decision on which method to employ. Predeployment training. Courtyard (including external outhouses. Bottom Up Assault • • • • • Front courtyard.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. surface danger zones of all infantry and tank weapons. When breaking contact. The units that had stun grenades were able to use these in situations to diminish casualties to friendly personnel and noncombatants. the squad can consolidate and coordinate its further clearing of the structure. however. By establishing footholds the squad establishes strong points during the assault that can be used for consolidation. The squad will bound back through each foothold.4B/NTTP 3-05. and tool sheds). A foothold can also be used as a casualty collection point. The succession of footholds that the squad establishes will be different when assaulting from either the top down or the bottom up. Flash-bangs would suppress the enemy without injuring friendly forces. The squad leader should understand the advantages and disadvantages of each. Sledgehammers were also useful in the construction of firing ports inside houses when going firm or for sniper emplacement. At each individual foothold. coordination. Top Down Assault • • • • All rooftops. A leader must not have to stop advancing during clearing of a house in order to give instruction on the proper procedures for safe and effective shotgun gunnery. base of fire positions. Central hallway. Uppermost rooftop. The squad must move from one foothold to another without stopping until each foothold is attained. Inside top deck. Each successive upper deck with its respective rooftop. assess each structure quickly. they are used as rally points in order for the squad and fire team leaders to get accountability of all their Marines. These options allowed the units to make dynamic entry without reverting to an explosive breach. Stun or flash-bang grenades were also particularly useful for extracting friendly casualties from inside enemy-dominated kill-zones.62 A-5 . If contact is made. rally points. and then take actions that maximize its advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. but were in short supply. and have a thorough understanding of realistic weapons capabilities and limitations—to include enemy weapons/weapons systems.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. it sometimes became necessary to use grenades as a back up after using some other casualty producing munitions. the need to be flexible must be emphasized because tactics will be different for every building. few Marines are trained in how to set a breaching charge. extreme caution must be taken when explosively breaching overhead.56-millimeter rounds. Shotguns have proven to be an invaluable breaching tool for internal doors. However. However. Experience showed that significant improvements could be made in the ways in which Marines are trained to use fragmentation grenades. one squad had to close to within 10 meters and employ hand grenades. This is another safety measure designed to ensure that the full 5 seconds are available in training to take cover from a mishandled grenade.4B/NTTP 3-05. One of the major lessons learned during combat was to release the A-6 FM 3-06. the outside gates are almost always constructed of metal and have no outside latch or doorknob. whether it is a mosque. Many doors that were breached with MK19 or tank main gun rounds resulted in secondary explosions. To destroy this enemy. A depleted enemy squad was protected by a series of unfinished concrete cubicles that stopped 5. The unit commander must determine whether the risk of secondary explosions from explosive breaching outweighs the time/labor involved in mechanical breaching. only two were confirmed as shot by 5. There could be very large weapons caches stored in storefronts with rolldown doors to include prefabricated IEDs and piles of mortar rounds of all sizes. The best means of breaching these is to ram them with a HMMWV. In urban fighting in Iraq. should be mandatory training for all military occupational specialty 0351s although it would not be practical to add this training to the curriculum at March Air Reserve Base. such as rockets fired into the building. explosive breaches become the best course of action.20/MCRP 3-31. In a high threat situation. it became readily apparent that the techniques used for breaching the outer perimeter gates of houses and opening the storage unit’s metal roll doors kept the Marines exposed to possible enemy fire for an unacceptable time and were also very time and energy consuming. when available. while the Marines were almost completely unafraid of enemy fire. Additionally Marines are trained to hold the grenade in such a manner that prevents the release of the spoon prior to throwing. storefront.56 millimeter and 7. breaks down perimeter walls with ease. rolldown metal doors. The hooligan tools in the breaching kits have tips that are typically too wide for the door jambs in Iraq. The position was never used in any combat engagement. a unit AAR cited the use of M67 fragmentation grenades during a fire fight in urban terrain to defeat the enemy. they were timid when it came to using grenades.During the operation. An assault breacher’s course. Grenades Grenades by themselves are not always effective in ensuring that the occupants of a building are disabled prior to entry. The amphibious assault vehicle (AAV). However. The platoon commander noted that. Of a total seven enemy dead. The first two grenades thrown were not held for 2 or 3 seconds and had no effects because the enemy had sufficient time to take cover. Mechanical breaching has proved to be a slower method than training in the United States would indicate since most houses have metal gates and doors with very large padlocks. or house. even one as simple as the use of detonation cord around a doorknob. The “prepare to throw” position is a peacetime safety measure that results in negative learning. of the type formerly conducted by the special operations training groups. The following three grenades were properly employed with devastating effects. factory. Additionally.62 25 April 2006 .62 millimeter rounds. As a side note.

Training There will be circumstances where detailed clearing of houses will be required.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Many multistory buildings will have extensive subterranean areas. Breaking down dozens of doors per floor with hooligan tools. Using the attached AAVs. Additionally. If contact is imminent. the exact number and location of stairwells should be determined. However. When clearing at the ground level. ammunition. or a HMMWV to push open the doors or knock a section of the wall down proved to be very quick and allowed for a larger number of Marines to storm the building. Demolitions Clearing a large. The outer metal doors surrounding many of the homes had flat locks and bolt cutters could not be used nor could detonation cords. This method also proved useful for evacuating injured Marines from rooms with barred/gated windows. When clearing a multistory building. The use of demolitions preserved strength in what became an exhausting mission. and energy. This will reduce the fratricide risk and isolate the floor. The floors should be cleared with a reinforced rifle squad while the remainder of the platoon remains in an assault position in the stairwell either above or below the floor being cleared. A burst of 40-millimeter ammunition could be used but the decision not to waste the ammunition was made. The geometry of fires on each floor was complicated by the compartmentalization created by the configurations of office spaces unique to each floor.20/MCRP 3-31. Some of the locks were just too thick for the small bolt cutters to accommodate. precede room entry with closed doors with a burst from the SAW or M-16. The possibility of firing back towards elements positioned in a hallway and the thin construction material of the walls required a positioning that removed friendly forces from the potential line of fire. A good planning figure is 30 rooms per floor for a 200-meter by 200-meter square building.4B/NTTP 3-05. While K Company. A safe assumption is that each building will have at least two stairwells. 3d Battalion. the exposure to enemy fire while attempting to breach the outer perimeter of the houses in their sector proved to be too risky using their current methods. 5th Marines was fighting the battle and clearing their sector of the AO. The breaching of the metal roll down storage units was challenging as well. The risks involved in the use of this TTP must be considered prior to its use. Always have a plan to attack downward into the basement or utility floors.spoon and wait 2 to 3 seconds before throwing to deny the enemy sufficient time to take cover.62 A-7 . multistory building requires demolitions or other nonmechanical means to open the hundreds of rooms. task organize the assault platoons with engineers and prefabricate breaching charges prior to the TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints assault. Engineers used charges made solely of detonation cord. The judicious use of demolitions will save the Marines’ energy for the tiring process of room clearing. or other expedient means will rapidly exhaust a maneuver force. Stacking rifle squads in the hallways increased the risk of fratricide because unusually shaped office spaces and adjoining passageways required multidirectional clearing. deficiencies in current training 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. and fuse igniters to safely and efficiently breach hundreds of doors during the assault. mule kicks. These must be secured as maneuver elements assault each floor. time fuse. tanks. Training in these techniques must be continued and reinforced. A HMMWV with an attached chain was used to rip open the door and this again saved the unit time. the sheer magnitude of such a task requires well thought out SOPs that maximize economy of force while maximizing combat power and flexibility at the point of attack. Note that other stairs may be located further into the building.

Many of the TTP that were employed during operations were not learned and rehearsed prior to deployment due to range and training limitations.for the conduct of breaching and other tactics in military operations in urban terrain (urban operations) were mentioned. Marines need to be trained to remove doorknobs. rooftops. 5th Marines conducted extensive training at Stu Segall Studios. and trash. building construction. FM 3-06. Again. as well as tight construction where there is little to no gap between buildings. The course could provide practical application instruction with blue bodies through windows and doors. Building construction and a lack of furnishings (including doors with locking mechanisms and windows) prevented the ability to realistically prepare for urban operations. There is a need to “dirty up” urban operations facilities. both wood and reinforced metal doors with deadbolts. Blockade entrances to houses with furniture. Recommend using this facility as a model for range regulations and for an inexpensive method to explosively breach mouse holes. and inside houses. 3d Battalion. loopholes. Facilities need to have doors and windows with bars added and Marines should be able to do both mechanical and explosive breaching against real doors. Camp Pendleton) and at March Air Reserve Base (Division Stability and Support Operations Exercise) prior to deploying. Buildings need to be fully furnished. AAVs. walls. Facility needs to include current open construction at Range 131 (buildings built with space between each structure). platoon-size is needed for both types of construction.20/MCRP 3-31.62 25 April 2006 • • • • • A-8 . units need to have the facilities support to conduct the following additional platoon-sized urban operations training: • Wheeled and mechanized asset integration require at least three streets amidst five building lanes. An “urban grenade employment course” should be added to urban operations training. Building type and construction also needs to vary. Add furniture. Recognize that the furniture will be destroyed. Streets should vary in width in order to provide better training for the wheeled/tracked vehicles to maneuver within tightly confined spaces. A good representation of a day’s work for a platoon tasked to clear in zone is an area 150 meters by 400 meters with three streets and multiple alleys running in a variety of directions. and HMMWVs to be able to simulate making breaches.4B/NTTP 3-05. Train to identify and to forward items of intelligence value. K Company. forcing the attacking unit to enter into the defender’s preplanned kill zone or be slowed by the blockade. doors. etc. curtains. It should not be set up in a neat and orderly manner. and locking mechanisms through explosive means (to include the shotgun). and range regulations at both Range 131 and March Air Reserve Base precluded training to the standards that were required for operations. Range regulations largely prohibited the use of explosive breaching. Specifically. vehicles. This lets individuals hide and causes significant problems searching and clearing rooms. hinges. MOUT (Urban Operations) town (Range 131. The Fort Knox urban operations facility provides an excellent facility for this training. Walls and buildings need to be constructed for tanks. The training areas were not large enough in size to facilitate a company’s maneuver with tracked and wheeled assets. building layout.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. They also need to be trained to make mouse holes through walls inside and outside of structures. Put furniture in all facilities. The limitations of size.

Explosives Most battalions made heavy use of their engineer squads that were attached to infantry platoons. Rockets Tube Launched. The result was a large turn-in by one unit and a perceived shortage by another.56 mm and 7.4B/NTTP 3-05. mortar fire was confined to directly supporting a battalion sector. generating a high demand for resupply. by employing multiple satchel charges and Bangalore Torpedoes to breach buildings and kill the occupants. demand for mortar rounds varied widely from sector to sector. two tube launched. with or without body armor. wire guided (TOW) missiles 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Collapsible Stock Squad Automatic Weapon This weapon received very favorable reviews since it facilitated the weapon’s use inside buildings. Each battalion had on average 20 to 25 of these. Because of this. optically tracked. Reportedly. for a total of 70 to 80 per battalion would have been an allocation better suited to the demand. Since there was no effective way to redistribute mortar rounds from a less engaged battalion to a more heavily engaged unit. proved to be very effective in penetrating the walls.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Unit live fire training should address firing in the burst mode for clearing rooms during pre-employment training. On one occasion. Optically Tracked. Mortars Both the 81 mm and the 60 mm rounds are perceived at the platoon level to be the most responsive supporting arm. one to two per squad. Fully automatic AK-47s can quickly gain fire superiority over single-shot M-16s.56 mm rounds and continued to fight.62 mm rounds did not penetrate the concrete and brick walls that composed most of the city’s buildings. and Marines are primarily trained to fire the M-16 in the single shot vice burst mode.20/MCRP 3-31. The M-4 is more manageable inside tight spaces. Shotguns Shotguns were used extensively for breaching and room clearing. These charges were prepared in great quantities prior to the operation. Mortars were used freely against enemy strongpoints. The . It proved to be a critical requirement to have breaching expertise at platoon level and below. the determined and possibly drugged enemy.62 A-9 .Organic Infantry Weapons M-16 Service Rifle The 5. By all accounts. has sustained up to five shots to the body with 5. additional rounds were pushed out.50 caliber round. Wire Guided Missile II This proved effective as a point destruction tool against enemy forces defending from buildings. Unlike artillery that was fired in general support across the battlespace. however.

then the effects were minimal to ineffective. The D-9 proved to be an extremely capable asset in house clearing.56 and 7. It was instrumental to coining the tactical task of “Recon by Destruction” wherein the enemy’s location is identified by the destructive removal of his hidden strongpoints. Combat Support Engineers D-9 bulldozers received highly favorable reviews. key leaders need to ensure that the engineer is familiar with established platoon SOPs and his role when in contact. the combat service support battalion (CSSB) dispatched its M-88 to support some D-9 recoveries. For instance.fired from street-level destroyed defenders on the 10th story of a 12-story office building. The only limitation was the number of rounds that could be carried. one company fired 250 SMAW rounds. AAV-R7. tank. the D-9 often became stuck during building reduction operations and organic assets (another D-9. Eventually.62 could not penetrate.4B/NTTP 3-05. however the RPG can be fired from many more positions due to its significantly smaller back blast.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. The infantry company commander seemed to prefer this asset to others (D-7. Communication with the D-7/D-9 was difficult and often required the rifle platoon to sacrifice one of its personal role radios for responsive and timely communications. A-10 FM 3-06.) were not capable of recovering the D-9. armored combat earthmover) as it could reduce the largest structures and survive most small arms fire engagements. etc. If the round impacted short or on an external surface and did not enter a closed space. Javelin Similar effects were achieved with the Javelin fired in the top attack mode on rooftop fighting positions and “ladder-well pillboxes” standard to most Iraqi houses. SMAW-NE rounds were highly effective only when shot into enclosed spaces (such as a room) through a window. Due to the unstable nature of the city terrain.62 25 April 2006 . When engineers are attached to rifle platoons. AAV. The M-203 Grenade Launcher was used with good effect but with the same limitation with regard to the number of rounds that could be carried. The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-novel explosive (SMAW-NE) (thermobaric) round proved to be especially effective for the latter purpose.20/MCRP 3-31. A D-9 cleared a row of buildings effectively within an extremely short period of time. Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW) high explosive (HE) and antitank (HEAT) round was used for breaching and as a means of destroying the enemy inside buildings. Many enemy bodies surrounded by weapons were found in rubble left behind by the D-9. They were effective in penetrating cement walls that 5. SMAWs were used with such frequency that in most cases resupply could not keep pace with expenditure. The SMAW is an outstanding counter weapon to the RPG.

brick fences. Marine tankers would traverse the main gun to the side and utilize TTP for the reduction of urban area strongpoints with the tank hull to create breach points. as tanks were asked to knock down walls many times. Additionally. thus creating entry points for the infantry. The breaching beam was tested on a building with outstanding results..8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31. Tanks in mechanical breaching must also exercise caution to ensure the front of the hull is used at a 90-degree angle or else risk damaging the fenders. fenders. tank/infantry phone. Once targets were identified with the 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Additionally. and mounted an M-1A1 tank-breaching beam that mounts to the front of the tank. This required the tankers to observe the impacts. high volume fire in support of building entry.4B/NTTP 3-05. The tank that had the mine plow mounted ended up setting the plow down after the second day of operation as it severely restricted maneuver in an already restricted environment. Tanks The M1A1 tank was used very effectively to create breaching points into buildings by physically pushing down structures. which at times was difficult when fully buttoned-up in the tank. the tank driver reported no obscuration of his view from the driver’s hole. especially when the D-9 was down or not available. etc. Armor piercing . If operating in an urban operations environment and away from waterborne operations for an extended period of time. On almost every occasion. Tankers utilized the front slope and rear hull of the M-1A1 tank to knock down buildings and walls. the bow plane made contact with the structures during breaching attempts. welded. a Marine welder designed. Tracks are an uncomfortable fit in tight urban spaces and are vulnerable and attractive to RPG attack. Mine plows were a nonfactor. All material was taken from destroyed Iraqi infrastructure in Fallujah. The front left and right corners of the AAV were used to make physical contact with building structures. The tank company commander stated that Pearson Blades would have been useful. it may be beneficial to remove the bow plane and cylinder to avoid damage. The force caused cracking in the area where the bow plane connects to the bow plane cylinder. walls. as only one was available at the start of the offensive (two more arrived later but were designed for the M-1A2). Use of the rear of the tank to create breach points is not recommended as it causes damage to the grille doors and tank/infantry phone. The most common method was for tankers to engage a building with a coaxially mounted M-240G and have the infantrymen call for adjustments from the impacts. rear grille doors.Amphibious Assault Vehicles The AAV up-gunned weapons system provided accurate. and number 7 skirts. The AAV was successfully used to mechanically breech and push down structures such as reinforced doors. Care must be taken to prevent gun tube damage and minimize rubble from covering the driver’s vision blocks. No damage was sustained to the tank and it successfully destroyed the building. Marine infantrymen working with tank sections utilized various methods to talk tankers onto enemy targets inside buildings. No modifications to the tank were required to mount this system. Infantrymen utilized organic weapons systems to shoot at positions they wanted destroyed with the tank main gun.50 caliber fires from the AAVs were invaluable when providing suppression through brick and concrete buildings. Downed power lines proved difficult in urban maneuvers close to residences with tracks. As a result.62 A-11 . concrete rubble and metal “rebar” was prevalent in many streets and was a potential hazard for the suspension system of the AAV. These techniques caused significant damage to the front headlights. It is not recommended that the rear of the vehicle be used since it may damage the ramp in the closed position or damage the prop buckets.

Because most of Fallujah is constructed from cement. Frequently minarets required multiple tank main gun impacts to achieve desired results. most tank engagements were closer than that minimum arming distance). HEAT also had better effects on reducing obstacles such as concrete barriers. In view of the minimum arming distance of the HEAT round and the nature of the close engagements (due to terrain.62 25 April 2006 . During Operation Al-Fajr. M-1A1 tank main gun rounds were effective at detonating buildings booby trapped and rigged with TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints The high explosive power and over pressurization created by the tank main gun destroyed IEDs or caused secondary detonations. tankers would initially engage with tank main gun and then immediately suppress the target with machine guns. An additional method utilized to some success was for the infantry to direct tankers onto targets based on the orientation of the gun tube in relation to the tank hull. the canister round would have been even more useful in engaging enemy hunkered inside buildings. When engaging fortified enemy positions less than 1 kilometer away.coaxially mounted M-240G. Refinements were made utilizing the aforementioned technique. Often. making communications with the tank Marines inside very difficult and communications were centralized to the platoon commander only. This round has over 1. A-12 FM 3-06. The ability of Marine tank crews to acquire and accurately engage snipers holed-up in minarets and multi-level buildings neutralized this threat on numerous occasions. High explosive obstacle reduction (HE-OR) by design is an obstaclereducing round made specifically for the urban environment. enemy insurgents utilized mosques and minaret towers to engage assaulting US forces.000 tungsten steel balls and is designed to take out entire squads of enemy formations with one round. As such.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Tank-infantry phones were often destroyed or inoperable. It is important for both tank and infantry commanders to understand the effects generated by various M-1A1 main gun employment techniques and ammunition types. The following examples demonstrate different effects: For 120-millimeter tank main gun ammunition. infantry units utilized their attached tank assets to clear buildings of IEDs and snipers. in terms of breaching power. Marine tankers developed techniques to maximize the effects of the tank’s organic weapons. However. they were engaged with tank main gun.4B/NTTP 3-05. HEAT was by far the round of choice compared to the others. The materials and masonry utilized in the construction of mosques and minarets was far superior to that of the civilian building infrastructure. tank crews utilized as many as 10 or more tank main gun rounds to achieve desired effects on the mosques and minarets. If a main gun round was fired at the first floor the suppression was shifted to the second floor to engage insurgents. Note: The efficient employment of the M-1A1 main gun in urban terrain can be both devastating and problematic. the shaped charge of the HEAT round provided more explosive punch and overpressure than the steel-nosed HE-OR. what is an appropriate M1A1 main gun employment technique or ammunition type for one situation may not be as successful in a different situation. the overall assessment from the majority of the tank commanders was that the HEAT round was the most potent and versatile round for the urban environment. The machine gun suppression ensured that the enemy could not attempt to leave a building or an area once a main gun round was fired. In addition.20/MCRP 3-31.

similar success at creating effects with secondary fragmentation was discovered.800 meters but.50 caliber weapons systems smoked out the enemy or suffocated them in place. over 150. This included parks.50 caliber needs a thermal sight. Tank ammunition effects were minimized by the initial impact on the buildings’ outside walls.000 7. industrial areas. fragmentation. Additionally. provided greater protection so insurgents quickly utilized this infrastructure to establish strongpoints. Insurgents adjusted their tactics against Marine tank crews by taking positions in fortified buildings and infrastructure. platoon and section volleys ensured that obscuration time did not affect other tank crews trying to engage targets since all tanks simultaneously fired. Marine tankers report that platoon and section volleys with tank main gun produces the most effective results on enemy positions and strongpoints in urban combat. Massed fires provided highly successful killing effects due to increased explosive energy. it is difficult to employ at night. tankers utilized the MPAT round during urban combat operations in Fallujah. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. and over 77. The tank . Tankers discovered that creating fires inside hardened buildings by using coaxially mounted M-240 and .62 mm. Buildings constructed of concrete masonry. riverside property. Insurgents adjusted tactics by engaging Marine tanks and then retreating into the inner rooms of buildings to avoid the effects of main gun over pressurization and fragmentation.50 caliber rounds. Based on ammunition availability. it was passing through multiple structures creating limited fragmentation effect and breach holes only 12 inches in diameter. During Operation Al-Fajr certain districts within the city had open terrain to support this TTP. Tanks fired approximately 3.000 main gun rounds. It is essentially a 120-millimeter shotgun shell. due to a lack of a night sight.62 A-13 . Tankers countered this tactic by firing the main gun directly into door openings and windows to maximize ammunition penetration into the inner rooms and causeways of infrastructure. Occasionally tank crews found it difficult to penetrate deep into some buildings without expending significant quantities of 120-millimeter tank main gun ammunition. high explosive obstacle reduction with tracer [HE-OR-T].4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. Crews experimented with different techniques and found that when the MPAT was fired in ground mode at infrastructure less than the minimum required arming distance. Additionally. The detonation of tank rounds on the “window frames” provided an additional brick and mortar fragmentation into the room increasing the effects of the round. over pressure. it achieved similar results.000 . and shock power. Insurgents discovered that M-1A1 tank ammunition easily penetrated buildings made of brick. it created larger breach holes capable of allowing infantrymen to enter. this round is armed as soon as it leaves the gun tube. when the MPAT was fired at a building in the air mode at less than the required arming distance. and traffic circles. Tank crews quickly identified that due to the smaller high velocity warhead of the MPAT. Marine tank commanders report the importance of utilizing open terrain in the urban operations environment because it allowed tank platoons and sections to maximize firepower on enemy strongpoints. and HEAT).Compared to the other 120-millimeter rounds (multipurpose antitank [MPAT]. When shooting the corners of buildings in order to engage insurgents seeking cover in these vicinities. this weapon is very accurate out to 1. MPAT rounds provided effective results for breaching if it was employed utilizing certain techniques.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Marine tankers discovered that the effects of 120-millimeter tank main gun ammunition were greater when it was shot at the sides of windows in buildings containing insurgents. Tank rounds that were fired directly through windows often passed through the rear walls limiting the effects of fragmentation. when compared to the HEAT.

4B/NTTP 3-05. destroy specific buildings.62 25 April 2006 . Close Air Support Prior to the operation. the enemy inside either withdrew or was incapacitated to the point that the company could then attack the building. The actual expenditure was over 6. deriving the target information from maps and satellite imagery.500 HE rounds. the battalion fire support coordinator fired unobserved fires on enemy buildings. a forward observer (FO) called for fire on a single building. All elements of 3d Battalion. On several occasions. the company fire support teams began adapting their artillery calls for fire. Because artillery was readily available. Danger close missions were conducted in an urban setting several times with no trepidation of the maneuver commander. Class V(W) Planning Factors for Fleet. with most offensive operations over 21 days. the companies needed the ability to engage specific buildings in close proximity to friendly positions. Confidence in the artillery in support of infantry maneuver was bolstered significantly. a building numbering system was created. Marine Corps Order 8010. Marine Corps Combat Operations. Air was the preferred method as they could use laserguided weapons. During Operation Al-Fajr. freeing the rest of the battery to fire other missions. the FOs found that they could get adjusting rounds on their target building and then.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.” they would still use just one tube to fire (generally four rounds) in order to minimize the error of the rounds. They found that after one 155-millimeter round fuzed on delay hit the building. The only collateral damage were shrapnel effects on buildings 370 meters away.20/MCRP 3-31. the battery began to dedicate one tube to that company. This allowed the FOs to engage point targets with artillery in close proximity to friendlies without the time associated with directing close air support (CAS) on target. Artillery was responsive. The FOs would not begin another mission. quickly received those fires. When engaged by riflemen in numerous buildings. does not address the expenditure of ammunition in urban operations. and 10 digit grids for them. 5th Marines and its attachments from other Services were given these references to use during the operation.Artillery Many expressed surprise that artillery proved useful in an urban environment. it could take up to 45 minutes to have air on station engaging targets. If the FO called a “fire for effect. Actions in Najaf covered a 27-day period. Generally the FOs were able to get their adjusting rounds to hit the target building after two or three adjustments. receive a modified nine-line brief in which the target description was “Building 615E” and he A-14 FM 3-06.000 HE rounds. During a preparation in the attack on Salman Pak. At times the battery would interpret these as random corrections on the same mission. Upon survey of the effects after the battle. with a phase-line network. and target reference points throughout the city. but would walk their adjustments from building to building. Once the fire support coordination center explained how the FOs were working. using additional adjusting rounds. All squadrons were given the references. routinely answering adjust fire missions in less than 5 minutes. however. The division used the recent battle in Najaf as a starting point and estimated firing a maximum of 1. the fire support coordinator noted damaged and destroyed buildings at the desired locations. An aircraft could check in. and had effects on that building with minimal collateral damage.

Hellfires were employed on many instances against specific portions of buildings (i. Some missions required larger bombs (i. but it would often reduce the target. the ground combat element elected to utilize a lower collateral damage Hellfire missile with precise and destructive effects.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Anything smaller than that would only damage the structure. upper left window) to destroy a suspected enemy position in a particular room of a building. but the ordnance was not available or not approved for the drop.38 against the building. large parts of the city of Fallujah were not covered in as much detail (building numbers per block) as the parts of the city that were of interest in the initial phases of the offensive. air is a tremendous asset and should be utilized at all opportunities. often causing catastrophic destruction to target buildings. Occasionally this effect occurred to such a degree that a FAC thought the weapons had actually failed (heard the bombs whistle in to the target and impact but no audible explosion was detected). and while it might have effects on the enemy hiding inside.. and metal augmented charge. success rate for destroying the structures and everything inside was nearly 100 percent when they had accurate hits. blast fragment. whereas an infantry assault would have taken several hours to accomplish the same goal and would have sustained casualties.. collateral damage to surrounding structures was minimal. The AGM-114 Hellfire is the weapon of choice in this endeavor. It may take an hour to get a bomb on target. and then an additional 15 to 30 minutes to receive clearance due to geometry issues with adjacent units. In an urban environment it could take 15 to 30 minutes to talk CAS onto the target.already had a 10-digit grid and a map reference. it would by no means guarantee destruction.e. a forward air controller (FAC) could pass: “Northwest of the intersection of phase lines Fran and Henry there is a three-story building. Buildings were generally concrete/masonry with mild reinforcement and were extremely sturdy by Western standards. at least a 500-pound bomb with a delay fuze was required. Rather than sending a GBU-12 or GBU. During Operation Al-Fajr a need was identified for a helicopter precision-guided munition that could destroy a target in a building without destroying the entire structure. but occasionally CAS was slow. when GBU-12s and GBU-38s were used to engage such targets (even two and three story buildings)." Call "contact” and hear the aircrew respond with “Contact” and 99 percent of the direction of aircraft was complete. Effects of air were tremendous. but not the preferred method. when the same type building was engaged with a 500-pound delay fuzed weapon. To completely destroy a normal-sized residential target building and everyone/everything inside it. During Operation Al-Fajr.4B/NTTP 3-05. There are currently three warhead options available to the Hellfire: shaped charge. Instantaneously fuzed weapons on structures caused far less damage to the structure itself. and drop bombs than to charge into enemy strongpoints. the bulk of the explosion was concentrated inside the building and the destructive force was maximized within the structure. However. However. the FAC realized that the lack of the usual “explosion” sound and flying debris was due to the fact that the bomb focused all its destructive power within the structure itself. during the direction of aircraft.000 pounds). Targets that were engaged were either buildings themselves or the enemy hiding in buildings. isolate.62 A-15 . and the effects were dramatic.20/MCRP 3-31. After closer inspection. Marines under cover (inside fortified concrete buildings) were safe during CAS strikes from 125 to 250 meters from the target—a technique. Or.e. However. Despite the time requirement. 2. This type of standardization was a critical factor in the success of an operation conducted in a complicated urban environment with a wide variety of friendly forces. If a GBU-12 hit its precise target. Proper fuzing is critical. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. It is often the better policy to pull back troops. and the explosion would also send much more shrapnel and debris flying much further out (increasing the potential for fratricide for close strikes). This caused a decrease in battle efficiency several days into the attack as well as during follow on stability and support operations.

Air assets require the same mission planning products as any ground platoon: maneuver graphics. These observations might be the situation around the target building. friendly marking techniques. aviators must completely understand the ground maneuver plan. Once the cordon is set. the initial plans call for aviation to provide area security outside the inner cordon and mostly beyond the outer cordon.” away from the objective searching for elements attempting to influence the ground commander’s mission (focus out).20/MCRP 3-31. clearance of fires. Air-Ground Integration: Recent Trends Integrating Army Aviation into the Cordon and Search Operations [CALL Handbook Cordon and Search. the C2 plan. chapter 11] Army aviation provides a critical element that is integral to the success of combined arms operations. Finally. or detection of anything attempting to exit the objective prior to the establishment of the outer cordon. as well as the establishment of a command and control (C2) structure capable of handling both air and ground assets. objective sketches. A-16 FM 3-06. are vital to any ground maneuver commander involved in cordon and search operations. aviation assets accomplish an egress route recon once the ground element completes its mission within the objective or the helicopter’s fuel situation dictates an early departure. The comments focus specifically on air-ground integration to assist ground maneuver commanders in preparation for cordon and search operations or any mission in which air-ground integration is critical. cavalry and attack helicopters provide the ground commander essential capabilities for the conduct of this operation. For any operation to be successful. integrated planning requirements. imagery. preferably with the aviators present. Attack and cavalry helicopters. The best results occur when ground commanders focus initial observations according to specific intelligence requirements.62 25 April 2006 . the location of a specific vehicle. Plan for Success The maneuver mindset dictates additional planning requirements for both air and ground. target-list worksheet. This task keeps the aviation element focused “out. Many of these issues can be addressed without a designated mission and can be drilled at company-level. and downed aviator/aircraft issues create additional situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals. This recognition dictates additional. aviation rules of engagement (ROE). no-fire areas (NFAs)/restricted fire areas (RFAs).8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. etc. Their capabilities. This remains true for air-ground integration especially during cordon and search operations. Cavalry and attack helicopters utilize sensors/video capabilities to gather requested information without alerting or heightening tensions of the people within the village. As applied to the cordon and search mission in the STX lanes. The following observations highlight several of the trends observed during these recent situational training exercise (STX) lanes. the AH-64 Apache and the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior. Additionally. enhance the ground commander’s ability to succeed. aviation is adaptable and capable of changing “on the fly” as the mission responds to enemy actions.4B/NTTP 3-05. Maneuver Element The first step in any air-ground integration is to recognize that cavalry and attack helicopter elements primarily serve as an additional maneuver element rather than just a fires platform. The typical scenario uses an opposing forces (OPFOR) technical vehicle and mortar team forcing a CCA opportunity during execution. The aircraft normally conduct route reconnaissance in support of ground movement to the objective with an initial observation and assessment of the situation within each objective. Additionally. when fully integrated within the planning process.2. all players must execute from the same page. To enhance the ground commander’s success.

This quick shift between "focus out" versus "focus in" only worked for those companies who tracked aviation much like one of their own maneuver platoons. some ground maneuver commanders accepted risk beyond the outer cordon refocusing air in search of snipers or other observation tasks inside the town (focus in).20/MCRP 3-31. Those who prepared the most during the planning process used products such as town sketches to vector air throughout the operation. Within the objective. only the companies that rehearsed and practiced this plan truly made it work. Their terminology appeared the same as with any maneuver platoon element. Those spending adequate time during planning to establish primary and contingency frequencies and to ensure all personnel were trained on radio operations saw the benefits in the actual lane execution. The communications plan serves as a vital item within the planning process. such as “unsecure” and “plain text”. Ground forces should immediately return a current situation report (SITREP) along with any critical updates or changes to the initial plan. Aviators must transmit the minimal essential information to the ground executors: call signs. These requirements may increase based on the level of air-ground integration during the planning process (operation may be hasty). Lastly. The STX lanes reinforce this process as units ready to receive air assets proved ready to adapt to the cordon and search environment. ordnance available. Items such as crypto net variables and time-of-day as well as competing terminology. Using the command net provides the greatest amount of situational awareness (SA) to all assets. Making use of the air’s observation capabilities. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Army aviation enhanced that SA immediately through situation reports of important activity. and estimated time of arrival (ETA). While the latter can succeed and may be required based on the competing tasks facing the ground commander. Once each situation reached resolution. the communications plan either enhanced or drastically hindered the overall mission.62 A-17 .8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. current location. The air tasks prior to the establishment of the outer cordon never changed. not the third party controlling the air assets. Cordon and Search Execution The initial aircraft check-in with ground elements sets the tone for success on any mission. the ground commanders returned air assets to the initial area security mission (focus out). total number of aircraft. several ground units altered the air tasks based on enemy actions inside the towns. and available time on-station (how long will fuel permit air to stay in the area— possibly the most crucial piece of information). though some refined the observation tasks seeking more specific information. This proved crucial as numerous civilian vehicles approached the objectives along various avenues of approach. affected actual execution. Those companies capable of developing and refining both the ground and air tasks during the cordon and search proved most successful on the STX lanes. nearly every ground maneuver element found it relatively easy to communicate with air assets.4B/NTTP 3-05. Most company C2 plans placed air assets on the company command net (frequency modulation(FM) frequency hop) while some chose to inject an intermediary control element placing air on an alternate net such as the fires net. alternate nets create additional problems and issues since typically only the ground “commander” has the authority to clear fires. Moreover. Often. Alternate nets require additional time transmitting such key information to the critical players.The C2 plan varied among the companies on the cordon and search lane. aviators provided the ground personnel a single-channel unsecure (plain text) frequency as an initial communications “link-up” net and a worse case contingency for communication.

This includes Army aviation assets. especially attack and cavalry platforms such as the Apaches and Kiowa Warriors.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. However. Army aviation. the lessons learned are great. Mission planning serves as the starting point to achieve this end.62 25 April 2006 . the basic element for any mission success is the ability to place all elements affecting the company-level mission on a common operating picture. A-18 FM 3-06. a crucial combat multiplier to any commander. The opportunity challenges both air and ground to their fullest. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) STX lanes provide a unique opportunity for many ground maneuver commanders to execute the cordon and search mission with all the crucial assets typically found in a combat theater. The training value proves immense.Conclusion Undoubtedly. are ready to adjust and adapt to the battlefield environment just like any maneuver element.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.

Urban Intelligence Requirements Urban IR Where are the indigenous security forces (ISF) operating in the AO? How are the ISF reacting to ACF activity in the AO? How are ISF reacting to coalition activity in the AO? What are the significant characteristics of ISF units in the AO? What are the rat-lines on the AO? What ACF cells are operating in the AO? Who are the ACF leaders in the AO? What are the local infrastructure priorities for infrastructure repair in the AO? What rivalries exist between leadership in the AO? Where are all the crossing points (foot and vehicle) for the canals in the AO? Is the indigenous police force corrupt? How is the indigenous police force received by the community? Can the indigenous police force be relied upon as an asset to assist US and joint forces? If the indigenous police force is reliable.4B/NTTP 3-05. cultural. intimidation)? Who are the supporters and what are their actions? Who are the nongovernmental/international organizations operating in the AO? Who are their key personnel? Are there any anti-coalition forces (ACF) affiliated religious sites in the AO? Where are the ACF safe havens/safe houses in the AO? Are there any ACF weapons caches within the AO? Are there any weapons markets in operation in the AO? What infrastructure needs to be repaired in the AO? Table B-2. leaflets. tribal.Appendix B PLANNING CHECKLISTS Table B-1. and other capabilities do they have? How many prison structures exist in the AO and are they operable? How many police stations exist in the AO and are they operable? 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.62 B-1 .20/MCRP 3-31. disinformation. religious leaders in the AO? What are the perceptions of these key community leaders? How do these key leaders make their decisions and how can those decisions be influenced? Who are hostile in the AO? Who determines the scope of the noncombatants? What political. what equipment. communications.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Urban Priority Intelligence Requirements Urban PIR Who are the key town council. TV. and religious sensitivities will have an impact on the noncombatants? Who or what are the key information providers in the AO? What effort is the enemy making to influence the target audiences? What tools are they using (radio.

Be aware that task organization and equipment can assume any mission or task. Use local police/army to assist with crowd control. Have FSO Have sniper/designated marksman located in overwatch. Control. Use a megaphone. Identify protected sites. Prepare a black/white/grey be on the look out (BOLO) list. Know the medical ROE for enemy or civilians wounded.Table B-3. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Reserve Establish planning priorities. Table B-4.62 25 April 2006 . Know the graphical control measures. Consider morale. etc. Know the recognition signals for link up. Command.). Identify and locate noncombatants (Red Cross. Recognize the enemy uniform when applicable. Rehearse using vignettes. Use IO messages. ROE/Escalation Procedures Know the theater-specific ROE. Know the commitment criteria during each phase of the operation. Know the unit-specific escalation procedures. Locate indigenous forces that can assist where ROE is restrictive. Know the identification/engagement criteria of protected sites. welfare. Communications (C3) and Locations Inner Cordon Outer Cordon Support Element Recon/Sniper Teams QRF Adjacent Units Aviation Assets Air Space Control Coalition Units Indirect Fire Support Agencies Available MEDEVAC Assets B-2 FM 3-06. Use concertina wire to create space in between locals/crowd and coalition forces. Controlling Civilian Populace Have interpreters for each moving element (2 x TCPs = 2 interpreters) or preposition the interpreters at the most likely positions needed. Table B-6. Have PSYOP. and recreation (MWR) Table B-5.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Have CA. Have release authority for nonlethal munitions.4B/NTTP 3-05. Complete a time and distance analysis.

use each weapon system in its best role.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 B-3 .Table B-7.20/MCRP 3-31. and security needs of the breach? Will the fires be masked by buildings or assault element movement? 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. take the best shots.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and destroy the most dangerous targets first? (Engagement Priorities) Have the element's fires been massed to achieve suppression. Direct Fire Planning Direct Fire Control Plan Direct Fire Munitions Effects Table Graphic Control Measures Direct Fire Control Measures Overwatch/Support by Fire Location and Orientation Known Breach Location Objectives Indirect Fire Targets (Consider Munition Effects) Phase Lines No Fire Areas (OP/Sniper Location) Outer Cordon Location and Orientation Direct Fire Planning Considerations How does the fire plan help achieve success at the decisive point? What is the company mission and the desired effect of their fires? Is the fire plan consistent with the ROE? Where are combat vehicles or other dangerous weapons systems? Which is the most probable enemy course of action? Most likely most dangerous? What are the PIR that indicate the enemy’s actions? Where is the element going to kill or suppress the enemy? From where will the element engage the enemy? Which enemy weapons will the element engage first? How will the element initiate fires with each weapon system? Which weapons will fire first? What will each engage? What are the engagement criteria? What is the desired effect of fires from each unit in the support element? How will the element distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy 3-dimensionally? What will the support element focus their fires on? (How will the support element units know where to engage? Will they be able to see and understand the control measures?) How will the element mass fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and achieve the desired volume of fire? Where will the element leaders be positioned to control fires? How will the element focus fires on new targets? How will the element deal with likely enemy reactions to their fires? Does the plan avoid overkill. obscuration. concentrate on combat vehicles. expose only those friendly weapons needed.

Air Considerations (Rotary and Fixed-wing) CAS 9-Line Briefing. Techniques.16.4B/NTTP 3-05. Refer to FM 3-09. Mark IAW unit SOP (can be facilitated by support element). For tactical strike requests. Consolidation. AC-130 Call for Fire. refer to multi-Service JFIRE or JP 3-09. UAS.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.3. Plan for employment of tactical HUMINT teams (THTs).3.32/MCRP 3-16. If necessary.2/ AFTTP(I) 3-2. General reference use FM 3-100.3. Planned restricted operating zones. Deconfliction with indirect fires. Work request through chain of command to the air operations center. No fire areas. rotary. Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE) or Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.Table B-8. Evacuate prisoner/detainees with basic subsistence (clothes. and Withdrawal Establish EPW.20/MCRP 3-31. Designate task and purpose for each element during consolidation and reorganization. Flight corridors (ingress and egress routes).1(A)/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and casualty collection points.6. ID. Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control (ICAC2) (Appendix F and G) and JP 3-52. identify stay behind force. and fire support coordinating measures. Identify sectors and responsibilities for each element. Restricted fire areas. Mark building exterior IAW TACSOP.6A/NTTP 3-09. Plan for use of PSYOP for crowd control (megaphones). fixed). Report completion to C2. Plan for use of camera/video for documentation. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone. Plan for additional security/commitment of reserve/QRF if search extends beyond plan. Refer to multi-Service JFIRE. plan to integrate aircraft for overwatch during withdrawal. Joint Tactics. Coordinating altitudes (UAS. CAS Execution with Non-joint tactical air controller (JTAC) Personnel.2/MCRP 3-25D/NTTP 3-52. medicine).62 25 April 2006 . airspace control. B-4 FM 3-06. If available. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). Table B-9. Reorganization. Task and purpose for aviation assets. shoes. Refer to multi-Service JFIRE or JP 3-09. captured material.

Perception Management (IO and CA Operations) IO IO pre-assessment of environment conducted. Security-at-the-source considerations. Reinforcement plan. CA Proactive in establishing link to involve local or special police forces to assist. Media pool and non-pool media engagement plans in the AO. Resupply Medical evacuation. Company IO officer conducts collection and analysis of the environment and collaborates with the higher headquarters IO campaign plan: Before! During! After! Press releases scheduled following decisive operations. Joint press releases. coordinated and reviewed. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Media available to exploit unit’s successes. Post meeting with local leaders. Plans for live EOM broadcast/interviews in the AO. IO operations conducted in order to shape the environment prior to decisive operations. Imagery clearance and release procedures. Sniper Employment Weigh the disadvantages of compromise. PSYOP products articulating resolve for upholding the rule of law. PSYOP Specific talking points and messages developed with emphasis placed on fair and impartial coalition forces. Communications. Table B-11 Media Facilitation and Public Affairs Checklists PA estimates and plans developed.20/MCRP 3-31. Table B-12.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 B-5 . General Post assessment planned and executed following decisive operations using feedback from CA/PSYOP/maneuver forces. Claim forms/immediate settlement capability. Information clearance and release authority. DOD-approved Public Affairs guidance. empowering local authorities. Location. and rule of law.Table B-10.

interdict. neutralize. Inspect breach equipment. Plan QRF and reserve routes. silhouette. Breach Be prepared for multiple means: knock. May be used to search perimeter area. or bash.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31. prepare demo: linear. or turn. B-6 FM 3-06.) Detainee/captured material holding area. Traffic Control Point/Blocking Positions Black/White/Grey List Concertina Wire Signs Written in Both Languages Interpreter Megaphone/with Extra Batteries Engagement Criteria What are the actions in the event a vehicle penetrates the blocking position/TCP? Trigger Lines Who engages and with what weapons systems? When do they cease fire and what is the signal for cease fire? Do crew-served weapons continue to engage or are they only to use M-16s/M-4s? Detainee/Captured Material Detainee packets. fix. Use checkpoints and road blocks covered by direct fire.62 25 April 2006 . Plan multiple routes for ingress/egress. suppress. zip ties. etc. As required. or destroy enemy forces. Outer Cordon Establish the vicinity objective area. Patrol Checklist Movement Deception plan when moving from forward operating bases (FOBs). Civilians on the battlefield (COB) holding area.4B/NTTP 3-05. Establish and prepare to attack by fire. Avoid movement during peak traffic hours or through congested areas. blow. enemy/neutral/friendly forces. Avoid ingress and egress on same route.Table B-13. Plan for transportation of detainees or captured material. Position to block. Manifests for vehicles. Table B-14. support by fire. Detainee kit (blindfold. Inner Cordon Position to place suppressive fires on objective. fix.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. simplifies search.Table B-14. most intrusive (perception of theft). assault.4B/NTTP 3-05. concertina wire Zip ties/flex cuffs Video cameras. Establish signal intelligence (SIGINT) box in search area to identify phone calls and facilitate follow on operations. i. Establish by-pass criteria. Table B-15. Plan to clear rooms: first man provides security. search. still cameras. second man checks for hidden persons and weapons..e. Secure search area prior to search. increase use of force. Control heads of households: Prevents looting. If compliance is not granted. Mission Equipment Checklist Megaphone/with extra batteries Breach equipment (hooligan tools. Conduct room search in three dimensions. Prepare to search perimeter area if security element compromised.20/MCRP 3-31. focus search for specified items. METT-TC: Announce authority to conduct search and request compliance. Monitor entry and exit points of search rooms and buildings at all times. tape recorders Signs in both languages for checkpoints IO products Pre-packaged HA supplies 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. As required. but gives residents chance to hide items. clearing.) Bolt cutters Ladders Flashlights/with extra batteries Metal detectors/wands Mine detectors Mirrors Creepers Class IV. announce room clear to search team leader.62 B-7 . organize into breach. etc. Restriction to homes: prohibits movement. and EPW teams. Patrol Checklist Clear Search Methods: Central assembly: best for population control.

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coordinate TTT/TOT ADO .4B/NTTP 3-05. deconfliction (ACA) plan. verifies deconfliction (ACA) plan. or assets that provide real-time targeting information 2 Supported commander delegates weapons release authority to the JTAC for all types of control. unit. terminate SEAD/marking missions ADO – Inform AD friendly air is off-station and adjust ADA status 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. CAS Battle Drill Aircraft 30 minutes from check-in with JTAC ALO/JTAC – Initiates battle drill. XO/S3 – Approve/disapprove mission based on tactical risk assessment S2 – Brief enemy SALUTE FSO – Report location of SEAD/marking battery and status of observers ADO – Report ADA status Aircraft conducting check-in with JTAC ALO/JTAC – Verify aircraft/ordnance. activity.Appendix C SMART CARDS Table C-1. pass SEAD/marking CFF. JTAC will provide “cleared hot” as appropriate for each attack in type 1 and 2 control and “cleared to engage” for type 3 Table C-2. prescribed guidance2 JTAC may provide blanket clearance 1 Observer: Scout. UAV.Disseminate “White Hold” Aircraft depart (Post Attack) ALO/JTAC – Collect and disseminate BDA and pilot reports (PIREPS) XO/S3 – Assess mission effectiveness and next course of action S2 – Collect and process BDA and PIREPS FSO – Deactivate ACAs. SOF.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. COLT. location. FIST. CAS Terminal Attack Control Attributes Type Results of Risk Assessment Commander assesses a high risk of fratricide to friendlies or noncombatants Lower risk to friendlies or non-combatants but JTAC maintains control of individual attacks JTAC Observes Target and A/C Required Timely and Accurate Target Data Provided 1 2 By JTAC.20/MCRP 3-31. confirm timing XO/S3 – Monitor the mission S2 – Continue to monitor enemy SALUTE FSO – Activate ACA plan. (Inherent to Type 1 Control) Not Required By Observer or through other JTAC sensors1 Commander assesses the lowest risk of By JTAC or Observer or by fratricide to friendlies or Aircrew if targets comply with Not Required 3 non-combatants.62 C-1 . equipment (SALUTE) FSO – Alert SEAD/marking battery. time. alert observers for targeting ADO – Inform AD community of inbound friendly air Aircraft 15 minutes from check-in with JTAC ALO/JTAC – Brief aircraft/ordnance and deconfliction (ACA) plan. alert JTACs XO/S3 – Initiate tactical risk assessment (verify friendly locations) based on commander’s guidance S2 – Verify enemy size.

Hazards.Table C-3. Threats.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Grid coordinates must include 100. 2. SEAD. Target Description: " " 6.4B/NTTP 3-05. Hack. Egress: " " Remarks (as appropriate): " " (Restrictions*. ACAs. grid coords to include map datum [e. include map data. Laser. FAH. 6. Heading: " " " 3. or 3) Control” 1." (minutes) (seconds) NOTE: When identifying position coordinates for joint ops. JTAC may request additional readback: JTAC: " .62 25 April 2006 . Weather. this is (Aircraft Call Sign) (JTAC) “Type________ (1. IP/BP: " " (Deg Magnetic) (IP/BP to Target) Offset: " (Left/Right) (When required) " 2. WGS-84]. cardinal directions and distance in meters) Position marked by: " " 9. Night Vision.20/MCRP 3-31. Lines 4. Location of Friendlies: " " (from target.* Target Location: " " (Lat/Long. Tgt Info.GTL {degrees magnetic north}.000 meter grid identification C-2 FM 3-06. Beacon) (Actual Code) 8. IR.. LTL . offsets or visual description) 7. CAS Briefing (9-Line) Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless briefed. and restrictions are mandatory readback (*).* Target Elevation: " " (in feet/MSL) 5.g. Type Mark: " " Code: " " (WP. Ordnance Delivery. Danger Close [plus commander's initials]) Time on Target (TOT): " " or " Time to Target (TTT): " "Standby plus . Distance: " " (IP-to-Target in nautical miles/BP-to-Target in meters) 4.

20/MCRP 3-31.62 C-3 . Cordon and Search Smart Card [page 1] 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.Figure C-1.

8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Cordon and Search Smart Card [page 2] C-4 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 25 April 2006 .20/MCRP 3-31.Figure C-1.

Figure C-1. Cordon and Search Smart Card [page 3] 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31.62 C-5 .

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In an area with an ongoing IO plan attempting to calm an area and make the inhabitants more willing to cooperate. (3) For caches: Seizing caches demonstrates the unit’s ability to protect innocent civilians from indiscriminate enemy actions. The cordon and search commander should consider what IO themes they might address. It shows that the unit is willing to protect the village. the inner and outer cordons. etc. c. Information Operations (IO) a. position or escort the media to locations where they will not hinder operations. indigenous forces. After the completion of the operation. Indigenous forces whether military or police may play a role in a cordon and search operation as they will undoubtedly speak to the locals in the process of screening prisoners or other tasks. To maintain control of the media during operations. discovered caches. the media may be escorted forward to observe actions that are consistent with promoting friendly IO messages and themes (US Service members treating civilians. (2) Local media interviews to help exploit successes. a commander planning a cordon and search in their area should use those contacts as part of his IO planning. An openly hostile area is a clear challenge to both IO goals and the success of a cordon and search operation.Appendix D INFORMATION OPERATIONS 1.62 D-1 .4B/NTTP 3-05. IO planning must be integrated and synchronized with the cordon and search operations. Similar thinking applies to using local leaders. Take for instance. (2) For Small Arms Engagements: Unit’s response to the enemy demonstrates positive influence.) b. As standard portions of a cordon and search operation are planned.20/MCRP 3-31. or religious). 2. if an IO has succeeded in establishing relationships with a local mayor or police chief or a cleric. Units should establish a point of contact for local media that may arrive on the objective or even be embedded with them. and local leaders (political. Immediate example of IO messages specific to cordon and search operations (Perception Management): (1) For structural damages: Point out how indiscriminate the enemy is when he attacks with mortars or direct fire. In such cases. similar IO considerations as nonlethal effects should factor into that planning. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the commander must relate the current success of that IO plan with what he plans to do in establishing his inner and outer cordons. legal. b. Another consideration is the IO aspects of special teams. The following IO products may assist units during cordon and search operations: (1) Hand bills (leaflets with messages) and posters. Part of the METT-TC evaluation includes the determination of what impact additional teams may have on the IO plan. Media (Local and Embedded) a. One way would be to embed CA and TPT with the inner and outer cordons to explain the intent of the operations. (3) Pre-taped recordings broadcast by PSYOP.

The drills are only a planning aid.3. The information contained in the drills must not be taken as a final and complete plan. IO Battle Drills Information operations battle drills are designed to serve as the basis for planning during activation of the crisis action team.62 25 April 2006 . Unit IO postured to assist the local populace. Element TF Cmd Group PSYOP N/A Task N/A Provide one TPT direct support to maneuver forces Conduct face-to-face operations with local populace in and around the cordon and search operation. The battle drills contain only generic tasks and purposes that must be refined to develop an IO concept that best addresses the situation at hand.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31. weapons and illegal goods confiscated with minimal interference. Prepare and disseminate leaflets to populace in and around the cordon and search operation Purpose Facilitate crowd control Reduce civilian interference Target Audience N/A Demonstrators/protestors Local populace Inform populace of activities associated with the cordon and search operation Exploit success of the operation and gain future assistance from the populace Provide factual information about the operation Exploit success of the operation Gauge public opinion / response to entry of coalition troops and seizure of illegal material Generate positive and factual media coverage of operation and coalition effort to maintain a safe and secure environment Generate positive and factual media coverage of operation and coalition effort Reduce civilian interference Local populace Local populace Develop and broadcast messages on radio stations CA Assess local leader and populace attitudes after conclusion of the operation BPT conduct press conference upon completion of operation Issue press release upon completion of operation Maneuver Disseminate PSYOP leaflets in and around cordon and search operation Local populace Local populace Civil leaders Local populace Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace Local populace PA IO Endstate: Suspected cache site(s) cleared. Cordon and Search IO Concept: IO deters interference and limits adverse reaction by local populace to cordon and search operations. On order exploit unit assistance provided to the local populace. Be prepared to exploit illegal arms/contraband seizure.4B/NTTP 3-05. Table D-1. D-2 FM 3-06. and documented with the public informed of progress towards a safe and secure environment.

Element TF Cmd Group Task Engage key regional and local leaders Disseminate PSYOP print products to villages in and around insurgent area Assess local leader and populace attitudes BPT issue press releases Purpose Reduce support for insurgency forces Target Audience Political leaders Civil leaders Hard-liners/extremists Local populace PSYOP Reduce populace support for insurgent forces and activities Gauge public opinion / response to insurgency activity Disseminate factual information to counter-misinformation and propaganda Inform populace that the coalition does not support any insurgent groups or activities Reduce support for insurgency forces CA PA Civil leaders Local populace Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace Local populace BPT conduct press conference Maneuver Engage key regional and local leaders Disseminate PSYOP print products Political leaders Civil leaders Hard-liners/extremists Local populace Influence attitudes towards insurgency activities IO Endstate: Popular support for insurgent activities and violence are neutralized. Insurgent-Related Violence IO Concept: IO limits populace support for insurgent forces. Unit returns to steady state operations within the sector. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Employment of QRF IO Concept: IO supports deployment of the QRF by displaying coalition capabilities and resolve and by supporting operations to return the sector to a stable.20/MCRP 3-31. peaceful environment.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05.62 D-3 .Table D-2. Element TF Cmd Group PSYOP N/A Task N/A Develop and broadcast messages on radio stations Purpose Highlight coalition capabilities and resolve to maintain a safe and secure environment Ensure populace do not interfere in QRF operations Target Audience N/A Local leaders Local populace Local populace N/A Local populace Local media Local populace CA PA Maneuver N/A Issue press release upon completion of operation Engage local populace in area where QRF deploys N/A Focus media attention on the capabilities of the QRF Ensure populace do not interfere in QRF operations IO Endstate: Units capabilities and readiness are demonstrated. Table D-3.

20/MCRP 3-31.Table D-4. Element TF Cmd Group PSYOP N/A Task N/A Provide one TPT direct support to maneuver forces Broadcast radio messages Purpose Facilitate crowd control Target Audience N/A Demonstrators/ protestors Local leaders Local populace Political leaders Civil leaders Political leaders Civil leaders Demonstration leaders Local leaders Local populace Civil leaders Local populace Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace Demonstration leaders Local populace Warn of possible sanctions to be imposed against the populace Elicit and maintain support in dissuading violence and identifying instigators and dissuading violent activity Inform of possible sanctions against opština CA Engage local leaders Engage demonstration leaders Engage local leaders or administrator Assess local leader and populace attitudes after demonstrations end PA BPT issue press releases Engage demonstration leaders Disseminate PSYOP print products and conduct face-to-face operations Mediate a resolution to the problem Gain support for possible sanctions against populace Gauge public attitudes toward coalition forces Disseminate factual information to counter-misinformation and propaganda Mediate a resolution to the problem Influence populace to cease violent activity Maneuver IO Endstate: The local populace does not engage in violent activities that interfere with or degrade unit efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment.62 25 April 2006 .8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. D-4 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05. setting the conditions for return to a safe and secure environment. Violent Demonstration IO Concept: Coalition forces influence local leaders and populace to discontinue their violent protests / demonstrations.

must be incorporated into the deliberate planning process. An effective technique to bridge this gap is to create spheres of influence (SOI).8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. commanders rely on the judgment and maturity of small unit leaders and their level of cultural awareness when dealing with indigenous populations. d. and create as positive an effect as possible on friends. and governing authorities. and local media at the brigade command level. and nongovernmental organizations/governmental organizations (NGO/GO) representatives at the battalion command level. With the right tools to deal with civilians. SOI is a non-doctrinal term that the American Heritage Dictionary defines as a territorial area over which political or economic influence is wielded by one nation. Examples include the following: District advisory councils (DACs). civil affairs forces can help to mitigate the negative effects of the shear intrusive nature of cordon and search operations on the general civilian populace. Joint Doctrine for CivilMilitary Operations. key city clerics. no matter what scale. cordon and search operations involve close interaction with the civilian population whether they are conducted in urban or rural environments. Where CA forces are not available. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. and individuals and contacts at the company command level. perception management. with minimum risk to their Service members and Marines while ensuring the safety of innocent civilians. fulfill important civil requirements consistent with military missions. and relations improvement. commanders can conduct these complex operations successfully. Commanders must take into account the affect that cordon and search operations will have on the civilian populace. b. intelligence. each commander from brigade down to company level is assigned liaison responsibilities with the appropriate level of civil authority. If used properly. By its very nature.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05. one negative act or poor decision can have incredible implications at the strategic and/or national level. Past operations have clearly indicated the need for CMO planning. As part of the CMO concept of the operation. neighborhood advisory councils (NACs). Although these leaders clearly demonstrate a high level of adaptability. and brigade levels of command and to retain command and authority at the lowest level in order to make decisions regarding civil and host nation military matters. police desk sergeants. allies. In effect. CMO is a commander’s responsibility. CMO plans must include measures to reduce capability gaps when civil affairs forces are not available. states “These forces [civil affairs forces] are designed to secure support from the civilian population. Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA) Forces a. JP 3-57. religious leaders.” c. business leaders. Reducing or eliminating the negative effects of cordon and search operations can potentially result in significant gains in information. and cooperation for future missions. Army and Marine Corps civil affairs forces are designed to assist the commander in planning CMO and in conducting civil affairs operations (CAO) and activities.62 E-1 . battalion. senior police chiefs. CMO. SOI methodology is designed to separate the responsibilities for liaison with civil authorities between company.Appendix E CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO)/CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) 1.

4B/NTTP 3-05. and tribal alliances. Army CA teams may be staffed with female CA operators that are fully capable of conducting a full range of civil affairs related activities. As mentioned earlier. 5. civil affairs operators can play a role in search operations. Many Army CA teams are staffed with female soldiers. Civil affairs team members can function as the primary point of contact during “administrative or soft type” searches. however. In many cases. gain cooperation.62 25 April 2006 . These activities will include general interaction with females and E-2 FM 3-06. CA forces can also coordinate and operate with tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams to address larger audiences and assist in controlling crowds. 3. company. However. Civil Affairs Team Task Organization Over 90% of Army civil affairs forces come from the reserve component. Civil affairs planning teams (CAPTs) augment staffs and assist commanders at brigade and higher level with CMO planning. and set the conditions for successful cordon and knock type operations immediately prior to or during the establishment of outer cordons and successive inner cordons. One or more CA teams may be task organized to support a maneuver battalion. Movement to the Objective During deliberate cordon and search operations and if operations security (OPSEC) permits. Marine CA forces will come from a reserve component Marine civil affairs group (CAG).2. Civil affairs teams operate with two tactical vehicles and one or two squad automatic weapons (SAW). to include nongovernmental and governmental organizations and agencies. Army CA forces may be attached to Marine units when CAG personnel are not available. CA forces can communicate intentions of maneuver commanders. The team is capable of limited self-defense. personalities. This frees platoon. During Search Operations If available. CA forces routinely conduct village and urban infrastructure assessments and may already have detailed databases developed to support planning and execution of operations from combat to stability and reconstruction. increase cooperation and understanding. maneuver units may fall in on and receive attachment of CA forces that are already operating in the AO. Civil affairs planners and operators at all levels are the direct link between ground forces and local authorities. As with CA teams. PYSOP teams should be augmented or travel with a security element if available. 4. CA teams in direct support of maneuver battalion commanders are also capable of conducting CMO planning.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31. acting to calm fears. CA During Planning Civil affairs forces can be utilized during all phases of cordon and search operations. CA forces that have operated in an area for extended periods will have established a solid relationship with these interpreters. which are invaluable when dealing with the indigenous female population. and battalion level commanders to do their jobs of commanding and controlling the cordon and search operation. it must be allocated or travel with a security element while conducting CA activities. CA forces may have already established productive relationships with local authorities and tribal leaders and can advise the commander on the atmospherics of the area to include cultural nuances. the reason for the operation. as well as distracting the occupants from the search. identification of key leaders. These teams are normally composed of four to six personnel. CA forces will almost always have local national interpreters assigned to them and in many cases will have a CAT II or CAT III interpreter assigned.

liaison with key female local government representatives. This is especially important when dealing with the sensitive cultural issues of women in many countries. If other female Service members or female MPs are not available, female CA operators can assist in searching local female household members and female detainees as long as they are properly trained in search techniques. CA forces can also coordinate assistance from local law enforcement or tribal leadership to ensure there is a “local face” on the operation.

6. Post Operation
One of the keys to successful CMO is the prevention or mitigation of negative activities on the part of friendly forces. Destruction of property is probably the most prevalent negative result of cordon and search operations but it is usually the easiest to remedy. Damage cannot be avoided during dynamic entries. Civil affairs teams can assist in identifying and documenting damaged items, assist in the claims process, and direct complainants to the proper authorities by coordinating with the local staff judge advocate (SJA). Civil affairs teams are also familiar with the funding sources used to compensate victims. One of these sources is the Commander’s Emergency Response Program or CERP fund. It is imperative that CA operators have access to these funds to help in mitigating property damage and to fund immediate impact projects such as wells. One technique is to develop pre-packages of humanitarian assistance (HA) supplies that can be distributed after the cordon and search operations. CA teams can coordinate the distribution of these supplies based on previous needs assessments. HA supplies may include rations (wheat, rice, etc.), building materials and tools, or clothing items. Along with remedying property damage and distributing HA supplies, CA forces may be involved in claims procedures for non-combatant loss of life. Civil affairs forces may disburse payments through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or may use local nationals to disperse payments through a civilian coordination center. The key to the remedy process is to never promise anything you can’t deliver.

7. Cooperative Medical Assistance (CMA)
CMA or medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) are high payoff events that can sway a population or group in a positive direction. Most war torn areas are in dire need of even the most rudimentary level of health care. Civil affairs teams routinely assess public health systems as a core capability. Where there is a lack of host nation medical and veterinary capabilities, CA forces can coordinate and temporarily supplement these activities using reachback medical capabilities within the CA battalion, CA brigade, or at the JTF level. Commanders must decide when these operations can be safely conducted and when they can be most beneficial. Veterinary services should not be ignored especially in agrarian societies. Rural populations have very close ties with their livestock. Well planned veterinary civic action programs (VETCAPs) can be used to leverage cooperation and information from these sources. It is important to note that these activities must be tied to a central relief plan and coordinated with the appropriate civilian agencies to reduce duplication of effort and minimize dependence on the military.

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E-3

8. Conclusion
Tactical level civil affairs teams can be an invaluable asset to the maneuver commander during cordon and search operations. CA activities related to cordon and search operations include populace and resource control, host nation support, and some measure of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). Civil affairs teams are an important tool for the commander in mitigating the negative effects of intrusive cordon and search operations and are the link to transitioning to stability operations. Commanders should leverage these assets while planning and conducting CMO support to cordon and search operations.

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25 April 2006

Appendix F

REHEARSALS
1. Rehearsal Overview
Rehearsals are used to prepare for upcoming missions. Generic rehearsals are worthwhile, but rehearsals should include mission-specific rehearsals. They are not a discussion of what is supposed to happen. They should test subordinates understanding of the plan. Rehearsals should also include vignette training to reinforce understanding of ROE when practical. The commander uses well planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following: (1) Reinforce training and increase proficiency on critical tasks. (2) Reveal weakness or problems in the plan, leading to further refinement of the plan or development of additional branch plans. (3) Integrate the actions of subordinate elements. (4) Confirm coordination requirements between the company team and adjacent units. (5) Improve each Service member's understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that may arise during the operation. (6) Ensure that seconds-in-command are prepared to execute in their leaders absence.

2. Rehearsal Principals
a. Determine attendees, location, and uniform. b. Prioritize events to rehearse. c. Start with generic rehearsals, then conduct mission-specific rehearsals after the operation order (OPORD) is given. d. Attempt to rehearse as many phases of the mission as possible using different rehearsal techniques. e. Rehearse on terrain/under conditions similar to execution. f. Rehearse the plan initially, then continue to rehearse contingencies based on the seven forms of contact. 3. Rehearsal Types a. Confirmation Brief: involves entire unit. (1) Confirms that everyone understands the plan. (2) Conducted immediately prior to departure from friendly lines. b. Reduced Force: involves only selected leaders. c. Full Force: involves entire unit.

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F-1

(4) Terrain model: graphically depict terrain/control measures. Talk through: (1) Oral: cover SOPs and mission expectations. (3) Full Dress: entire unit. Key leaders practice combat reporting procedures to include: (1) Contact Reports (2) CASEVAC Requests (3) Accountability Reports (4) SITREPs to Higher Headquarters 4.62 25 April 2006 .d. F-2 FM 3-06. (3) Radio: review sequence of events using FM radio net. Walk through: (1) Rock Drill: subordinates move rock to simulate actions. Rehearsal Techniques a. similar conditions as execution. Communications Rehearsals. b. (2) Map: use a map/overlay to brief the plan.4B/NTTP 3-05. (2) Key Leader: use key leaders to physically rehearse.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.

Ground-to-air Communications Execution Matrix Interpreter Plan Go No Go Criteria Outer Cordon Task/Purpose Order of March Roll-over Drills Establishment of TCP Civil Disturbance Detainee Plan Actions on Contact Signals Bypass Criteria Direct Fire Plan Compromise Plan Withdrawal Inner Cordon Task/Purpose Order of March Roll-over Drills Occupation Civil Disturbance Actions on Contact Engagement Priorities Signals Bypass Criteria Direct Fire Plan Compromise Plan Withdrawal 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. handheld).4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. Rehearsal Checklist General Determine Attendees/Role Call Intelligence/Reconnaissance Update Movement Plan from FOB to Staging Area or Release Point: actions on contact en route CP Location Net Structure—communications exercise—Ground Communications (FM.62 F-3 .8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.Table F-1.

62 25 April 2006 .4B/NTTP 3-05. Rehearsal Checklist Search Task/Purpose Order of March Roll-over Drills Occupation Civil Disturbance Special Teams Actions on Contact Engagement Priorities Casualty Collection and Evacuation Demo Misfire Signals Bypass Criteria Direct Fire Plan Compromise Plan Withdrawal Detainee Plan Transportation for Detainees Captured Material Plan Transportation of Captured Material QRF/Reserve Plan Commitment Criteria Staging Plan Movement Plan Roll-over Drills Link up Plan Contingencies for Each Phase of the Operation Aviation Communication frequency JTAC/FAC present and location Media Plan Security and Location CASEVAC Plan Occupation of casualty collection points (CCPs) For Each Separate Element to the CCP CCP to Higher Headquarters (Air or Ground Evacuation Plan) F-4 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.20/MCRP 3-31.Table F-1.

(2) Maintain the tone and style of the speaker. (2) Simultaneous. Interpreter Considerations a.4B/NTTP 3-05. (6) Maintain a professional relationship with both parties in order to appear unbiased. • They need to clarify a technical term. An interpreter may at times need to intervene. or interrupt.” c. Modes of Interpreting. without embellishments. Recommended. (3) Recognize cultural barriers that impede effective communication. (4) Intervention. (1) Consecutive. Enable communication between a provider and a client who do not speak the same language. • Interpreter listens to the speech of a speaker then summarizes and condenses the thoughts. For instance when: • They did not hear correctly or completely. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. Including vulgar or embarrassing comments. (1) Accurate interpretation of what is said.62 G-1 . omissions. (3) Summary. • Opportunity is great for omission of necessary information. Interpreter speaks almost contemporaneously with the speaker.20/MCRP 3-31. Note: The interviewer speaks directly to the subject. Enablers. Example: Use the phrase “What is your name?” NOT “Ask him what his name is. NOT recommended. (7) Strive to remain objective without display of personal emotion. (5) Determine in advance any specialized vocabulary to be used. (2) Culture mediation. (3) Never correct facts presented by a speaker. (8) Perform duties as unobtrusively as possible. not through the interpreter. b. NOT recommended. during an interpreted session. (4) Conduct communication in the first person.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Speaker completes a phrase or thought followed by the interpreter's re-stating in the target language. (1) Enable communication as if no language barrier existed.Appendix G INTERPRETER CONSIDERATIONS 1. • Social Values • Time • Authority (4) Styles of communication. Interpreter's Role. or editing.

). (1) Will remain impartial. etc. • They state the interpretation is not yet complete. When. The interpreter remains out of reach of the HUMINT source unless culture dictates other positioning. f. and have the same religious and ethnic background. water. Positioning. They can assist with the development of signs or hand bills written in the appropriate language. (1) Triangulation. Control of Interpreters: Who. (3) Assures they interpret the exact words and will not change the meaning or intent. (2) Will excuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest. d. (2) The first line leader should speak directly to the HUMINT source in first person. Note: The speaker needs to be aware not to exceed the interpreter's retention limits and to stop speaking to allow the interpreter to translate. etc. • Ensure they speak the right dialect. (2) What hand signals they may use if needing to interrupt. Table G-1. Conduct and Ethics.). e. the first line leader and HUMINT source are facing each other with the interpreter seated or standing equal distance from each party. What. Use Civil Affairs (CA) and/or tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) with interpreter to conduct interviews and debriefs. The interpreter is most aware of what is actually occurring during the interpreted session and is responsible for facilitating the best possible communication. place at positions where contact with the locals are most likely (blocking positions. Where and Why G-2 FM 3-06. (4) The interpreter should not engage in private conversation with indigenous personnel in front of the first line leader.4B/NTTP 3-05. (4) Assures that the military personnel have received the same instructions regarding the interpreted session. If not. flak vest. Their Allocation and Placement: • One interpreter per separate element if possible. The interpreter's introduction to both the unit commander and the first line leader should include: (1) Who they are and their role in the communication.62 25 April 2006 .• They were interrupted by other parties. Pre-mission Guides. Interpreter Checklist Ensure interpreters have the proper equipment (Kevlar. chow. (4) Will not use their position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for themselves or others. Mission Knowledge and Integration (operational security [OPSEC]): Prepare interpreter for known meetings. not to the interpreter.20/MCRP 3-31. (3) Will not disclose confidential information acquired in the course of official duty. (3) The first line leader should continue to look directly at the HUMINT source as the interpreter translates the first line leader's comments.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. search element.

Meaning that they cannot translate but can get a basic understanding of what the other person may be trying to communicate. Hand-held electronic “phraselators” have been deployed as prototypes in OEF/OIF. DARPA sponsors a pilot program called “Call-a-Translator” service available 24/7 in all the major world languages.2. It can be developed for any language where US forces are stationed.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Example Smart Card Used in Iraq COMMAND & CONTROL Stop / Awgfu Do not move / La Tit-har-rak Lower your hands / Nez-luEid-kum Turn around / Du-ru Li-wa-ra Drop your weapons / Theb-buu Es-lah-kum Move / It-har-rek Hands up / Erfa-aauu Eid-kum Move slowly / It-har-ku Ala Kayf-kum Come here / Ta-aal Ih-na No talking / La Teh-chi Walk forward / It-qad-damo Li-ged-dam Surrender / Sel-lem Nef-sek Come with me / Ta-aa-luu We-ya-yeh Calm down / Ala Kay-Fek.62 G-3 . Utilization of other means or products available to facilitate communication with other languages and cultures may allow the sparse number of interpreters to be more strategically placed. Table G-2.4B/NTTP 3-05. Ih-de Do not resist / Let Qa-wim Form a line / Awg-Fu Bis-si-reh Stay where you are / lb-quu-Ma-kan-kum One at a time / Wa-hed wa-ra El-tha-ni Speak slowly / Eh-chi Ala Kay-fek Lie on your stomach / Namu Aal-g-aa Ala Bat-ton-kum NUMBERS 1 / Wahed 7 / Sab-a 40 / Aar-ba-aain 100 Mi-yeh 2 / Ithnayn 3 / Thalatha 4 / Ar-ba-a 5 / Khamsa 6 / Sit-ta 8 / Thamania 9 / Tis-a 10 / Ash-rah 20 / Aash-rin 30 / Thalathin 50 / Khamsin 60 / Sit-tin 70 / Sab-aain 80 / Thamanin 90 / Tis-aain 1000 / Alt More than / Akthar Less than / A-qel Min 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. c. The table below is an example of a smart card used in Iraq. d. Interpreters are a very limited asset. b. Other Products Available to Facilitate Translation a. Some personnel may have a limited ability of the host nation language and can be used a “phraselator”.

Alah We-ya-kum Thank you / Shukran Good / Bad / Zayn / Mu zayn South / Jenub West / Gharb Water / Mai G-4 FM 3-06.4B/NTTP 3-05.? Who is in charge? / Minu almes-ul Do you understand? / De-tif-te-him? I do not understand.20/MCRP 3-31. Example Smart Card Used in Iraq BASIC PHRASES QUESTIONS Is it far? / Hu-wa Ba-aaid? Who? / Minu? What? / Shinu? Do you need ……? / Tehtaj….62 25 April 2006 . / A-nee Meda Af-te-him Do you have _____? / Aan-dek HELPFUL WORDS / PHRASES Weapon / Is-lah We are Americans / Ih-na amerikan Good-bye / Ma-aa sa-la-ma.Table G-2..? Which direction? / Ib-ya-It-ti-jah? How many? / Ish-ged? When? / Yemte? Where? / Wayn? Hello / Marhaba Help me / Sa-aaid-ni Yes / no / E / Laa North / Shamal East / Sharq Food / Ak-kel Danger / Khatar Medicine / Du-wa Mines / Algam Do you speak English? / Tehchee inglizi? Do you need help? / The-taj Mu-sa-aa-deh? Where are you injured? / Wayn Mi-taa-wer? Do you have …..8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.? / Aa-en-dek….

• Night: (primary) VS-17/VS-5 panel hung outside with chemlights exposed hanging outside the window facing the friendly forces. Mark each floor as cleared. (3) Cleared Rooms • Day: (primary) Chalk mark in designated design (square. Ensure heavy (tanks) and light (Infantry) forces have communication integration. (alternate) Paint replaces chalk. (alternate) Orange VS-17/VS-5 panel taped onto a pole/stake at entrance.4B/NTTP 3-05. 2. etc. • Night: (primary) Any color chemlight taped onto a pole/stake at the entrance with the color of the chemlight facing towards friendly forces. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. (2) Cleared Building • Day: (primary) VS-17/VS-5 panel. Communications Planning Checklist Table H-1. orange trash bag hung outside a window facing the friendly forces. chemlight at doorway.62 H-1 . Standardize signals and SOPs. (alternate) Chemlight in room.) next to door. circle. Building Marking for Communications of Ground Maneuver Forces on the Objective a. Conduct communications exercise to ensure all elements have the ability to communicate. taped onto pole/stake at entrance. Example 1 of a unit SOP for signals/markings: (1) Entrance to Buildings • Day: (primary) White engineer tape. (alternate) Any colored chemlight attached to engineer tape and hung outside a window facing friendly forces. (alternate) Engineer tape hung outside a window facing the friendly forces. Plan for long range communications capabilities.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (alternate) Orange VS-17/VS-5 panel taped onto a pole/stake at entrance with the addition a guide.Appendix H COMMUNICATIONS 1. triangle. Communications Checklist Standardize the vehicle/person marking system (ground and air).20/MCRP 3-31. • Night: (primary) Chemlight above doorway. Mark each floor as it is cleared.

(3) Floor Clear. H-2 FM 3-06. Using a Modified Wolf Tail. the signaler will first twirl the signal approximately 6-10 times while in view of a window on the support side of the building.b. This marking can also be used as a signal to shift fire from the floor immediately above or below (depending on the order of floors to be cleared) to the next floor in the clearance sequence. (See figure H-1 depicting a Wolf Tail marking. This ensures that the support element will be able to obtain the visual signal easily. It will be hung from the windows facing the SBF and other follow on forces.20/MCRP 3-31. Entry points will be marked with two Wolf Tails flanking each side of the entry point.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Follow-on forces do not have to enter a room to determine that it has been cleared.) (2) Cleared Rooms. Rooms cleared will be marked with the Wolf Tails (minus the 9 volt batteries) at the entrance of each room. When a floor is clear it will be marked with a Wolf Tail marking device with the chemlight activated and the 9-volt batteries making contact shorting them out causing a heat signature that can be picked up easily by thermal sights. (4) Building Clear. Example 2 of a unit SOP for signals/markings: (1) Entry Points.62 25 April 2006 . He then secures the signal to the window frame where it will be in full view outside of the building.4B/NTTP 3-05.

20/MCRP 3-31.62 H-3 .4B/NTTP 3-05. Wolf Tail 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.Figure H-1.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.

Placement may be difficult due to structures. Table H-2 lists some common marking methods and describes their characteristics. Common techniques include the use of smoke. intermingling of forces. and urban terrain all contribute to difficulty in identifying friendly troops and equipment. Target and Friendly Marking Methods TARGET REMARKS DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY MARKS2 MARKS NIGHT TO D/N UNAIDED1 GOOD GOOD Easily identifiable. NVG METHOD* SMOKE SMOKE (IR) ILLUMINATION. Often. radar. the simplest methods are the best.62 25 April 2006 .4B/NTTP 3-05. GROUND BURST H-4 FM 3-06. combat ID panels. D/N FLIR GOOD GOOD Easily identifiable. Procedures must be clearly understood and all participants must be issued the appropriate devices.20/MCRP 3-31. and signaling mirrors may be effective. or tracers. Marks must be visible to ground/air forces.3. and interposition of structures influence the effectiveness of these devices.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. All personnel must understand the strengths and weaknesses of available methods and equipment and how they pertain to urban conditions. Traditional signaling devices. During building clearing operations. Visual signaling or marking of positions aids determination of friendly force location. equipment. The following paragraphs address several factors to consider when using marking methods and equipment. laser. Positive air-to-ground communications are essential to coordinate and authenticate markings. may wash out NVGs. and IR beacons assist in the ID of friendly ground forces on urban terrain. may obscure target or warn of UNAIDED1 fire support employment. Fluid tactical situations. Night marking is greatly enhanced by the use of IR reflective smoke. The appropriate method. the progress of friendly units (both horizontally and vertically) may be marked with spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows. such as flares. as well. Table H-2. IR pointers. may obscure target or warn of fire support employment. When working in close proximity to friendly forces. strobes. or equipment combination must be chosen for the conditions at hand. thermal contrast. Placement may be difficult due to structures. Target Marking and Friendly Positions from Aviation Urban Ops a. Aircrews require positive location of the target and must be able to deconflict weapons effects from friendly positions before expending ordnance. b. Standardized usage of ground lighting. compatible with fielded systems and all personnel must be familiar with friendly marking systems. 1 D/N UNAIDED N/A GOOD Easily identified. Friendly force marking is limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and aircrews. marking and positively locating friendly units and targets are critical. Target marking or an orientation on enemy positions may also be accomplished using signaling procedures. Devices are available which aid in the recognition of friendly forces under difficult battlefield conditions. The use of gated laser intensifier (GLINT) tape.

Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting. SPOT TRACKER D/N UNAIDED1 N/A MARGINAL May be difficult to distinguish mark from NVG other gunfire. During daytime use. water. may be more effective to kick up dust surrounding target.METHOD* SIGNAL MIRROR SPOT LIGHT IR SPOT LIGHT IR POINTER (below . MAV Requires coordination of LASER laser codes. Can be used as a TRP for target identification. N UNAIDED1 GOOD MARGINAL Effectiveness dependant upon degree of urban NVG lighting. N NVG GOOD GOOD Less affected by ambient light and weather conditions. Target and Friendly Marking Methods TARGET REMARKS DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY MARKS2 MARKS NIGHT TO D UNAIDED1 GOOD N/A Dependent on weather and available light and may be lost in reflections from other reflective surfaces (windshields.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. N NVG GOOD MARGINAL Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting. D/N SEE GOOD GOOD Good friendly marking REMARKS device for AC-130 and some USAF fixed-wing (not compatible with Navy or Marine aircraft).). D/N HELLFIRE N/A GOOD Restrictive laser acquisition cone and LASER requires LOS to target. etc. Least impeded by urban terrain. N NVG GOOD MARGINAL Less likely to compromise than overt light. May be confused with muzzle flashes. N UNAIDED1 GOOD MARGINAL Could warn of fire support employment. NVG Effectiveness is dependent upon degree of urban lighting. windows. Coordination with aircrews essential to ensure equipment and training compatibility.62 H-5 . 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.4 watts) IR POINTER (above .4 watts) VISIBLE POINTER LASER DESIGNATOR TRACER ELECTRONIC BEACON Table H-2.20/MCRP 3-31.

May be obscured by urban terrain. Provides unique signature. Provides unique signature.62 25 April 2006 . Not visible to sensors without color capability. MRE Heaters) SPINNING CHEM LIGHT (OVERT) D/N FLIR POOR N/A N UNAIDED1 NVG GOOD N/A FLIR TAPE SPINNING CHEM LIGHT (IR) D/N N FLIR NVG GOOD GOOD N/A N/A H-6 FM 3-06. Difficult to acquire.. N/A Easily identified by D/N UNAIDED1 GOOD aircrew. May be obscured by structures. Easily obscured by structures. Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or buildings. Only visible during daylight. Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting. May be confused with muzzle flashes. Provides a distinct signature easily recognized. NVG N N D/N NVG AC-130 NVG ALL FLIR GOOD GOOD MARGINAL N/A N/A N/A Easily identified by aircrew.METHOD* STROBE (OVERT) STROBE (IR) HANDHELD SIGNAL FLARE (OVERT) HANDHELD SIGNAL FLARE (IR) GLINT TAPE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION PANEL VS-17 PANEL Table H-2. Coded strobes aid in acquisition. May be obscured by structures. Best at lower slant ranges. Not readily detectable by enemy. Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting. May be confused with muzzle flashes. N NVG GOOD N/A Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban lighting.e. Target and Friendly Marking Methods TARGET REMARKS DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY MARKS2 MARKS NIGHT TO N UNAIDED1 MARGINAL N/A Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban NVG lighting.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Easily masked by urban structures and lost in thermal clutter.20/MCRP 3-31. Not effective in highly lit areas. D UNAIDED1 GOOD3 N/A CHEMICAL HEAT SOURCES (i.4B/NTTP 3-05.

references to the objective or target may include local landmarks such as. Using the convention of basic alpha/numerical sector techniques becomes almost second nature so that when a network broadcast such as “Hardrock is taking fire from building 12” is heard. lead. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. et al. Michigan. Urban Grids and Reference Techniques It is essential for all forces to use the same reference system. add basic named areas of interest (such as cloverleaves. Boston. it cages every air assets eyes in the general vicinity of the activity. make analysis of the major routes through the urban area and label them with code names (route iron. Scale of the grid should relate to distance common to urban engagements while still making it usable as a quick reference for approximate initial location of interest. Detail can be added as the situation dictates. Regardless of the system used. following the initial call for fire format. gold. an established call for fire procedures must be used. Main urban areas can be overlaid with a simple grid reference. Military joint planners can produce the required detail overlay for an entire area of responsibility (AOR) very quickly prior to commencement of hostilities (they can easily be conceived as parts of operation plans [OPLANs] as well). Finally as time and mission objectives allow. “The third floor of building 5d. Aircrew should be prepared to transition to the system in use by the ground element upon arrival in the objective area.” This transition should be facilitated by using a “big to small” acquisition technique.e.) and use as common references with air and ground forces (i. bridges and other choke points) to the template..Appendix I URBAN AREA REFERENCE SYSTEM 1. Reference grids allow quick correlation between air assets and ground assets. up to and including numbering and identification of all structures within each grid. Detroit. everyone from the convoy truck drivers to tactical aircraft).4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. Ground maneuver elements generally use a terrain-based reference system during urban operations.62 I-1 . After the grid overlay is laid. For example.

20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05. Building Numbering System With Many Buildings I-2 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. the numbers should be subdivided by objectives or other means— figure I-2. Building Numbering SOPs a. Building Numbering System b. Figure I-2.62 25 April 2006 .2. If the area is large. All buildings in the objective area are numbered—figure I-1. Figure I-1.

4B/NTTP 3-05. Target Reference Point 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.62 I-3 . Other examples—figures I-3 and I-4.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.c. Urban Area Reference System Figure I-4.20/MCRP 3-31. Figure I-3.

62 25 April 2006 . Floors. Apertures in each wall are labeled from the ground floor left to top floor right alphabetically from A and numerically from 1. I-4 FM 3-06. the southern most is BLACK and the western most is BLUE. The northern-most wall is GREEN.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.d. the eastern most is RED.20/MCRP 3-31. and Apertures: Each wall of a building is then labeled with a color according to its cardinal orientation. Walls.

Multi-Service Tactics. SBCT Infantry Rifle Company. Techniques.11. April 2003.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2. June 2003. FM 3-21. and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations. JP 3-09. Techniques.3H/NTTP 4-01. Joint Tactics.22. June 2005. July 1988. FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33. October 2003. August 2002.1A/AFTTP(I) 3-2. July 2005. Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. Army CALL Handbook Cordon and Search.71. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Counter Insurgency Operations.16. Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat airspace Command and Control.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP(I) 3-2.58. Multi-Service FM 3-06. 1940. Combined Arms in Urban Terrain. Techniques. The Infantry Rifle Company. and Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints. FM 2-0. JP 3-09. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. FM 3-21. July 2004. JP 3-13. Urban Operations. FM 4-01. Joint Tactics.29.1. Multi-Service Tactics.40. FM I 3-07. The Infantry Battalion. Civil Affairs Tactics Techniques and Procedures.REFERENCES Joint Publications JP 1-02. FM 7-21. Mechanized Infantry Platoon-Squad.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 References-1 . Marine Corps MCRP 3-11. February 2002. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS) 3 September 2003.4B/NTTP 3-05. FM 3-05. JP 3-57.11. and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations. FM 7-10.20/MCRP3-31. JIISO Handbook. December 1990. and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. January 2003. Special Forces Operations. Intelligence. JP 3-05. May 2005. FM 3-06.01. CF and SOF Integration and Interoperability Handbook. MCIP 3-35.1. October 2004. Techniques. April 1992. A Commanders Tactical Notebook.45/MCRP 4-11.1.401. FM 3-06. December 2001. March 2005. Tactics. December 2003 JP 3-05.20.3. Multi-Service Tactics. Techniques. October 1998. DOD Dictionary. and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations. USMC Small Wars Manual. April 2004. August 2002. FM 3-100/MCRP 3-25D/NTTP 3-52. May 2004. June 2000.1/MCRP 3-35. 12 May 1998. Techniques. FM 3-05.

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20/MCRP 3-31.GLOSSARY PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS A AAR AAV ABF ACF ADA AFI AI AID ALO ALOC ALSA AM AMC Ammo AO AOR AP APC AR ARFOR ARNG ARSOF ASOC ASP ATGM ATO ATP AWACS BDA BDE BFV BII Bn BOLO BP BPT BSA C2 C3 C4ISR CA CAB after action report amphibious assault vehicle assault by fire anti-coalition forces air defense artillery Air Force Instruction area of interest Agency for International Development air liaison officer air lines of communication Air Land Sea Application amplitude modulation Air Mission Commander ammunition area of operations area of responsibility armor-piercing armored personnel carrier Army regulation Army forces Army National Guard Army special operations forces air support operations center ammunition supply point antitank guided missile air tasking order advanced targeting pods airborne warning and control system B bomb damage assessment brigade Bradley fighting vehicle basic issue items battalion be on the look out battle position be prepared to brigade support area C command and control command. and communications command.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. and reconnaissance civil affairs civil affairs battalion 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. communications.4B/NTTP 3-05. control. Intelligence. surveillance.62 Glossary-1 . control. computers.

joint special operations task force communications communications security continental United States common operational picture command post close quarters combat control and reporting center combat support combat service support combat service support battalion (Marine) common table of allowance commercial utility cargo vehicles D direct action district advisory council downed aircraft recovery team direct air support center (USMC) FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.CAG CALL CAO CAPT CARE CAS CASEVAC CAT CBRN CCA CCDTV CCP CD CEA CEE CERP CF CG CGRS CI CINC CIP CJCS CLO CLU CMA CMD CMO CMOC CO Co COA COB COMJSOTF com COMSEC CONUS COP CP CQC CRC CS CSS CSSB CTA CUCV DA DAC DART DASC Glossary-2 civil affairs group Center for Army Lessons Learned civil affairs operations civil affairs planning team Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere close air support casualty evacuation commercially available technology chemical.62 25 April 2006 . biological. and nuclear close combat attacks charged coupled device television casualty collection point channel designator captured enemy ammunition captured enemy equipment Commanders Emergency Response Program conventional forces commanding general common geographic reference system counterintelligence Commander in Chief combat identification panels Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff chief logistics officer command launch unit cooperative medical assistance command civil-military operations civil-military operations center commanding officer company course of action civilian on the battlefield commander.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. radiological.

all-round defense.62 Glossary-3 .4B/NTTP 3-05. and surprise fragmentary order fire support coordinator fire support element fire support officer foot fixed-wing G geospatial information and services global area reference system ground maneuver element government organization general purpose global positioning system General Services Administration 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. speed. control.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. rehearsals.20/MCRP 3-31. appearance.DASC(A) DOB DOCEX doc DOS DTV DVO ECC ECP EO EOD EPW equip ESF ETA ext FA FAC FAC(A) FASCAM FBI FCC FDC FID FIST FLIR FLSG FM FO FOB FOD FRACASS FRAGO FSCOORD FSE FSO ft FW GI&S GARS GME GO GP GPS GSA direct air support center (airborne) (USMC) date of birth document and computer exploitation document Department of State day television direct view optics E evacuation control center entry control point electro-optical explosive ordnance disposal enemy prisoner of war equipment emergency support function estimated time of arrival extensive F field artillery forward air controller forward air controller (airborne) family of scatterable mines Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Communications Commission fire direction center foreign internal defense fire support team forward-looking infrared force logistic support group field manual forward observer forward operating base field operation division flexibility.

reconnaissance J.62 25 April 2006 .4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31. friend or foe instrument meteorological condition inch inertial navigation system United States Army Intelligence and Security Command insurgents information operations intelligence preparation of the battlespace information requirement. surveillance. infrared intermediate staging base indigenous security force intelligence. K Judge Advocate General Joint Chiefs of Staff joint forces air component commander joint forces land component commander joint intelligence support element joint publication Joint Readiness Training Center joint special operations area joint special operations task force joint surveillance target attack and radar system joint tactical air controller Glossary-4 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.GSB GSR HA HE HEAT HE-OR HE-OR-T HET HF HHD HMMWV HN HNSF HPT HQ hr HSS HUMINT HVT IAW ID IDM IDN IED IFF IMC in INS INSCOM insurg IO IPB IR ISB ISF ISR JAG JCS JFACC JFLCC JISE JP JRTC JSOA JSOTF JSTARS JTAC group support battalion ground surveillance radar H humanitarian assistance high explosive high explosive antitank high explosive obstacle reduction high explosive obstacle reduction with tracer human exploitation team high frequency headquarters and headquarters detachment high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle host nation host-nation security forces high payoff target headquarters hour health service support human intelligence high value target I in accordance with identification improved data modem initial distribution number improvised explosive device identification.

terrain and weather.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-5 . troops and support available. terrain and weather.JTF JUO L LAV LAW LNO LOC LOGEEI LOS LP m MAGTF maint MASINT MCCDC MCCLL MCO MCPDS MCS MDMP MEDCAP MEDEVAC METL METT-T METT-TC MG MILES mm MMW MOPP MOS MOUT MP MPA MPAT mph MRE msn MSR MTT MTTP MWR NAC NAI NATO joint task force joint urban operations L logistics element light-armored vehicle light antitank weapon liaison officer line of communication logistics essential elements of information line of sight listening post M meter Marine air ground task force maintenance measurement and signature intelligence Marine Corps Combat Development Command Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned major combat operation Marine Corps Publication Distribution System military capabilities studies military decision making process medical civic action program medical evacuation mission-essential task list mission. enemy. techniques. ready-to-eat mission main supply route mobile training team multi-Service tactics. enemy.20/MCRP 3-31. civil considerations major general multiple-integrated laser engagement system millimeter millimeter wave mission-oriented protection posture military occupational specialty military operations on urban terrain military police mission planning agent multipurpose antitank miles per hour meal. troops and support available—time available [USMC] mission. and procedures morale. time available. and recreation N neighborhood advisory council named area of interest North Atlantic Treat Organization 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. welfare.4B/NTTP 3-05.

cover and concealment. oils. and avenues of approach outside the continental United States operational detachment-Alpha Operation Enduring Freedom officer in charge Operation Iraqi Freedom order of march observation post operational control opposing forces operation plan operation order operational security objective rally point P public affairs office publication control number penetration peace enforcement operations personnel platoon early warning device positive identification priority intelligence requirement platoon preventive maintenance preventive maintenance checks and services point of contact petroleum.NAVFOR NAVSUP NCA NCO NCOIC NCS NEO NFA NG NGO NOD NSN NVD NVG NWDC O/O OC OCOKA OCONUS ODA OEF OIC OIF OOM OP OPCON OPFOR OPLAN OPORD OPSEC ORP PAO PCN pen PEO pers PEWD PID PIR plt PM PMCS POC POL POW psn Navy forces Naval Supply Systems Command National Command Authority noncommissioned officer noncommissioned officer in charge National Communications System noncombatant evacuation operation no-fire areas National Guard nongovernmental organization night optical device National Stock Number night vision device night vision goggle Navy Warfare Development Command O on order observer-controller observation and fields of fire. lubricants prisoner of war position Glossary-6 FM 3-06. key terrain.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05.20/MCRP 3-31.62 25 April 2006 . obstacles and movement.

PSS PSYOP PVO PZ QRF RATELO RC RCA rd REMBASS req RFA ROE ROVER ROZ RP RPG RUF S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5 SA SAAF SALUTE SAM SAR SATCOM SAW SBF sec SF SFAOB SFLE SIGINT SINCGARS SIR SITREP SJA SMAW SMAW-NE SME SO SOC SOCCE personnel service support psychological operations private voluntary organization pickup zone Q quick reaction force R radiotelephone operator Reserve Component riot-control agent round remotely monitored battlefield sensor system requirement restricted fire area rules of engagement remotely operated video enhancement receiver restricted operations zone release point. activity. rally point rocket propelled grenade rules for the use of force S Adjutant Intelligence Officer Operations and Training Officer Supply Officer Civil Affairs Officer (USA) situational awareness small-arms alignment fixture size. time.62 Glossary-7 .4B/NTTP 3-05. and equipment surface-to-air missile synthetic aperture radar satellite communications squad automatic weapon support by fire second special forces special forces advance operation base special forces liaison element signal intelligence single-channel ground and airborne radio system special intelligence requests situation report Staff Judge Advocate shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-novel explosive subject matter expert special operations special operations center special operations command and control element 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. location. unit.20/MCRP 3-31.

20/MCRP 3-31. wire guided (missile) tactical PSYOP team target reference point tactics. and procedures travel television sensor U unclassified unmanned aerial systems United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United States United States Army United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command United States Air Force Glossary-8 FM 3-06. optically tracked. techniques.4B/NTTP 3-05.SOCOORD SOF SOFA SOI SOP SOSO LIC SP SPINS spt SR SSE STANAG STX T&EO TAC(A) TACC TACP TAI TALO TAPC TB TCP TDTT tech TF THT TLP TM tng TOC TOE TOR TOW TPT TRP TTP tvl TVS U UAS UN UNHCR US USA USACAPOC USAF special operations coordination element special operations forces status-of-forces agreement spheres of influence standing operating procedures low-intensity conflict (obsolete) (new terminology: stability and support operations) start point special instructions support special reconnaissance sensitive site exploitation standardization agreement situational training exercise T training and evaluation outline tactical air controller (airborne) tactical air command center [USMC]] tactical air control party target area of interest tactical air liaison officer tactical air operations center [{USMC] technical bulletin traffic control point temporarily disabling techniques/technology technical task force tactical HUMINT team troop-leading procedures technical manual training tactical operations center table of organization and equipment term of reference tube launched.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006 .

Also called CMO. or exploit relations between military forces. or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations. (JP 1-02. Also called BDA. functional damage assessment. against a predetermined objective. in the absence of other military operations. Y. maintain. governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities. (JP 1-02) civil disturbance—Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. and the civilian populace in a friendly. influence. (JP 1-02) casualty evacuation—The movement of casualties. Also called CA. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local. if directed. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. neutral. It includes movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. either lethal or nonlethal. ground. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.4B/NTTP 3-05. and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Z weapon executive officer PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS battle damage assessment—The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force. naval. or subsequent to other military actions. regional. and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations.USJFCOM USMC USPS UXO VBIED veh VETCAP VHF VIP wpn XO United States Joint Forces Command United States Marine Corps United States Postal Services unexploded explosive ordnance V vehicle borne improvised explosive device vehicle veterinary civic action program very high frequency very important person W. Also called CASEVAC. trained. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs. They may also occur. These activities may occur prior to.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. by other military forces. or national government. 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. (JP 1-02) civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air. and target system assessment.) civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish. during.20/MCRP 3-31. normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander. (JP 1-02) civil-military operations center—An ad hoc organization. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment. X.62 Glossary-9 .

nongovernmental organizations. humanitarian. Also called COMCAM.62 25 April 2006 . public affairs. Glossary-10 FM 3-06.) See also joint. or to transit through its territory. Major end items. coalition partners. Medical. (JP 1-02) humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. III. or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Clothing. facilities. There is no established structure. engineering. V. Also called HNS.4B/NTTP 3-05. United States Code. legal. and welfare items. special force. IV. combined navies. and lubricants. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02) force protection —Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members). X. Repair parts and components for equipment maintenance. IX. weather. and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. Construction materiels. or disease. (JP 1-02) host-nation support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime. and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment. individual equipment. section 401. (JP 1-02) host nation—A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations. and radios. the participating nations and services shall be identified. oils. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.20/MCRP 3-31. VI. combat camera—The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of combat. (JP 1-02) critical information—Specific facts about friendly intentions. and/or NATO organizations to be located on. Also called HN. Personal demand items. and critical information. and funded under separate authorities. to operate in. Also called FP. Nonstandard items to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development. and regional and international organizations. (JP 1-02) classes of supply—There are ten categories into which supplies are grouped in order to facilitate supply management and planning. (When all allies or services are not involved. information. reconnaissance. (JP 1-02) combined—Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (JP 1-02) detainee —A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. morale. resources. and other operations involving the Military Services. Also called CMOC. tentage.g. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents. Ammunition. toolsets. and other United States Government agencies. II. VII.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. crises or emergencies. (JP 1-02) human intelligence—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. including tanks. and its size and composition are situation dependent.to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical. I. capabilities. intelligence.. Rations and gratuitous issue of health. VIII. Petroleum. e. helicopters.

dental. a definite terrain feature. a combatant commander. units.4B/NTTP 3-05. and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country. and fragmentation. (JP 1-02) operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. multinational businesses. organizations. (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities. decisive. an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). or. 2. (JP 1-02) objective area—A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be directed. (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. The specific target of the action taken (for example. b. in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. or both. a. or an existing joint task force commander. or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). (JP 1-02) law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 1-02) joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense. Also called the law of armed conflict. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross. operations. The clearly defined. and undesired damage to property and the environment. the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. and c. the International Organization for Migration. nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. foundations. Also called HCA. etc. Also called IO. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have one. (JP 1-02) objective—1. (JP 1-02) interoperability—1. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. while minimizing fatalities. Also called OA. See also target. a sub-unified commander. The ability of systems.. penetration. units. (JP 1-02) joint—Connotes activities. permanent injury to personnel. and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.20/MCRP 3-31. Also called NGOs. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations. of the following characteristics: (1) They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel. (2) They affect objects differently within their area of influence.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems.62 Glossary-11 . b. generally funded by contributions from national governments. select and execute 25 April 2006 FM 3-06. and United Nations agencies. This area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets through blast. (JP 1-02) nongovernmental organizations—Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. (JP 1-02) international organization—An organization with global mandates. (JP 1-02) nonlethal weapons—Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material.

Also called TGT. Also called UXO.20/MCRP 3-31. activity. armed or otherwise prepared for action.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.4B/NTTP 3-05. (JP 1-02) traffic control point —A designated spot on the ground or road network where military forces control the traffic flow. (JP 1-02) rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives.31/MCWP 3-33. force. or geographic characteristics of a particular area.62 25 April 2006 . The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. and individuals. groups. (JP 1-02) quick reaction force—Any force with a specific mission to respond on very short notice. or to secure data concerning the meteorological. and intent. With respect to classified matter. guidance. or which may. objective reasoning. Oct 2003) reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain. 2. (JP 1-02) Glossary-12 FM 3-06. Oct 2003) unexploded explosive ordnance—Explosive ordnance which has been primed.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2. (JP 1-02) target—1. by visual observation or other detection methods. function. capability. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. installations. or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Measures taken by a military unit. (JP 1-02) psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions. An are a. organizations. information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy. installation. See also objective area. MTTP for Conducting Peace Operations. launched. dropped.measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to. equipment. projected. and which has been fired. or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to operations. Also called OPSEC. 3. the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. Also called PSYOP. hydrographic. typically less than 15 minutes. personnel. complex. impair its effectiveness. Also called ROE. fused.8/AFTTP(I) 32. (FM 3-07. (FM 3-07. motives.40. MTTP for Conducting Peace Operations. and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments.31/MCWP 3-33. Targets fall into two general categories: planned and immediate.40. (JP-102) security—1.

......................................... I-6........................... III-20 digital camera... H-6 Floor Clear ............................................. III-20 CCD ............................. III-4 BOLO .......................................... H-2 F FAC..... II-12 Informant-assisted Search ................................. III-7 FIST .................. IV-1 Airspace ......................................................... II-9 Civil Affairs .................................. VI-3 City Core ......... I-6 Fix . II-6 Dispersed Residential Area.. III-7 25 April 2006 FM 3-06... II-7 GPS . I-6 Documentation Team......................................... I-8 blocking position...................................... III-1 HNSF ..........................................A-10 EO... I-12 air officer ...................... III-1 Hellfire. III-20 Engineers ... A-4 Bradley fighting vehicles ................................... III-25 Assault Team ................... I-4 Enemy Contraband .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... A-6 GSR .......I-12..................... I-6 C C2 ............................................................... II-2.............. I-8 Fixed Wing .................................................... II-6 HVT................ I-1 HUMINT ..... VI-3 CEA............................................................ III-8 Downed aircraft ........................................................ I-6 civilians ............................ H-4................... III-23 Explosives ......... A-6 AAV.............. I-10 inner cordon ........................................................20/MCRP 3-31............................. VI-4 Host Nation Search ....................................................................................................................... IV-9 Field Interview Team.................................................................................................................................................................................................................. H-6 ACF.................................................................................................. H-7 EPW..I-13 C3 . A-5 Forward Treatment Teams................................... IV-8...................................................................................... II-11 CMO........... B-1 air liaison officer .......................... II-4............................................................ I-6 Command Element ... III-1 I IED ..............................................................................A-12 imagery ................. H-7 Grenades .................... I-3.............. III-1 Inner cordon ............................................................ B-4 Escalation of Force ......................................................................................................................... VI-2................................................ A-9 B Block .......................................................I-13 CA ..................... IV-3........................ I-2................................. I-9 Cleared Rooms . IV-8 Demolition Team ...................................................................................................... B-1 Armor .............................. VI-2 Casualties ......................... H-2 Close Air Support ..................................................IV-3........... III-9.......................................................................................................................... V-3 Collateral Damage ......................................... III-5 D DART ................................................ See HNSF HPT......III-8 Demolitions ..................................................................................... II-11 Destroy...........I-8 Contingency Plans ...................................... D-2 CASEVAC .................................... IV-3 HET......................................................I-11................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ IV-4 Combat Multipliers .... IV-1..................................4B/NTTP 3-05. I-2 Core Periphery .................... III-1 Breaching Tools and Techniques.......................................62 Index-1 ...........................................................................................I-12 Industrial-Transportation Area.................................................................................................................................. A-5 Building Clear.......... H-5.............................................................................. A-3......................................... II-6......... I-8 Inner Cordon ......................................... I-6 High-Rise Area.......... I-12 FLIR .................................................................................................... H-7 E ENEMY .........................I-5........... III-4 helicopters............... III-4 Artillery ..................... III-3 Blocking Position............... A-1 AWACS.............................................................. A-7 Dense Random Construction .. I-12 indigenous police ....................... IV-8 DVO ............................. I-2....................................................................................................... II-11 Document and Computer Exploitation (DOCEX)........................................................................................................................................................ II-6........ II-12 HMMWV........................................ A-8..................I-2 Cordon and Search Methods .................................................... II-8 anti-coalition forces ............................... A-7........................... I-14......................................... II-6 fixed-wing aircraft ............................................................................................................ I-1 COA .................. A-10............................8/AFTTP(I) 3-2................................................................................................................................... I-11 Host Nation Security Forces ..........................III-7 Attack to seize...............IV-12 Detainees ........ II-7 H Hasty TCP................................................................................................ B-1 indigenous security forces....................................................... II-10 G GI&S ................................... B-1 Indirect fire . A-15 FAC(A) ............... A-11 AC-130.IV-3................................................................. H-7 CCP ..............................INDEX A AAR................................................ I-5 Clear .................................................A-14 Close Orderly Block Construction .......................................... I-9 Detainee Team........................................ B-2 Bottom Up Clearing......... H-2 Footholds ...........................................................A-14 assault team.................. VI-3 CEE...................

.................................. H-6 MTTP .............................................I-13 Rockets ........... II-1................................................................................. H-4......................................................................................................................................................... I-12 nonlethal force........... I-1 Occupant-assisted Search .............................................................................. I-13.......................................................................... III-13 Single Point Ingress ........................ II-7 JSTARS ............. I-3 Principles of Cordon and Search................................................... I-11 number buildings................................ III-10 N Neutralize ............................... H-4 P PA ................................. I-9 Surface Areas .................................... III-1 LNO............... H-5.................... I-12.......................................................................I-4...........III-7 search/assault element ..........I-6............ I-12 L laser ........... I-2 PSYOP.......................... IV-9......................... I-8 Security Team ......................... I-9 Sensors ..................................................................................................... V-2 IR H-4.. IV-5 SJA .................................................... D-1 Permanent or Fixed Fortifications ....... I-9 search and attack in zone ......... D-2 R radar.................................................................... I-9 Support Team .............. I-4 Interdict ....... I-8 Isolation........................................I-4..................................................................................................... VI-2 METT-TC .............. I-4................ I-13.......................................................... I-8.................................. II-6 social hierarchy ........ II-14 Stryker vehicles....... II-6 Route Security........... I-4........................................... II-7 MDMP ...... I-7................. III-5 Overwatch ................. II-2 SOF................................... III-21 T TAC(A) ................................ H-4 Recon.... I-3 MRE ............................................ I-6.. IV-12 JTAC .................. I-9 Secure......................... I-3............................................................ II-6 Reconnaissance...................................4B/NTTP 3-05......................................... H-5...... H-4............................................................................ IV-5 MASINT ........................... IV-1............................................................................................................................. I-1 target location.................................................... IV-4 Sequential Occupation .................... B-6.................................................................................... H-4 O Objective ...........................................................62 2006 25 April 2006 . III-1 NVGs .................................................... II-7............ I-2 Objective Area... A-3 Tanks ...... III-1................ A-9 ROE .. III-8 Mortars....................... I-3 ISR ............. I-10 OPSEC ............................................................................ I-10 Target Marking ........................................................... III-3...................................... III-21 Street Patterns and Effects ................................. I-9 Security Element ........................................................ II-6 Signs ......... i Tank Infantry Integration ............ I-8 NFA........................ IV-1 Phases of a Cordon and Search ............................. V-5 LOS................. II-2........................... I-13 nonlethal ....A-16 Marking Targets .........................................I-8 Outer Cordon ...................................................................................... A-9 SIGINT ...................................... I-11......III-22 simultaneous egress ....................... III-6 Screening Forces ......................................................... III11................................................................ I-1..II-8 M M-1.........................................................................20/MCRP 3-31....................... III-3 overwatch................................................................................................................... III-1 Outer cordon .............. I-1.......................... IV-12. III-25 Perception Management .................... I-13.A-11 target.........I-7...III-7 Seize ................... III-21 J JISE ..............I-2................................................... III-21..... H-7 Target........................................ I-3 Planning ...................................... II-7 special teams ............................................... IV-10 Multidirectional Ingress ................................................... II-7 JSOTF.................................... V-1 Special Operations............................................. i.......... A-2 Search Team................................................................. V-2 Stay Behind Forces...................................... II-14 Shotguns .................................................. H-6 ISF ......... III-1 M-1A1 ................................................................................................................................................................... D-2 Pass Signals ...............III-7 Suppress ............................................................................................. I-1 MEDCAP............................................................................................... I-1 objective areaI-4................................................................................................... III-1 Subsurface Areas....II-9 support element ........................................................ IV-3........................ H-5 S SBF ................. I-8 Interpreters............................................... V-4 outer cordon ........................................................................................................................................................................ D-1 Mine Detection Team ............................. V-2 RFA...................................................... III-4 Search......................................................................................... V-7 Rotary Wing .......... B-1 Isolate ........................I-9 SSE................................................... III-14 Shantytowns .......... IV-9 tactical...........................II-9 Supersurface Areas ..................... VI-5 Movement to the Objective ... I-3 Target Area ............................. II-5........................................................................................................................................................................................................A-12 Maneuver Element ............................................................................................................................. III-16 Simultaneous Occupation ............................. A-9 MOUT ...... E-3 MEDEVAC ................................................................. i........... III-9 SITREP ............................ II-13 Index-2 FM 3-06...............................................................8/AFTTP(I) 3-2......................................................... I-1 target area............................................................................intelligence ...................... E-3 Sniper........................................ H-5 light armored vehicles ..................................................................................................................................

....................................... I-8..................... IV-4 Withdrawal ............ III-21 VETCAP...................................................................................................................................................... A-2.......................... E-3 W Weapons effects ............................................................................................target surveillance ...................................................................... I-13............................. III-1.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2........... I-5 Training ...................... A-3................................ III-1......................... H-2 WP ........................................................................................................ IV-1......20/MCRP 3-31.. A-3 TOW.... I-4 Wolf Tail ..............................II-7 US-only Search . I-10 V Vehicle Break Down............. I-10 target-list worksheet .. III-8 urban environment ................................ A-7 TTPi..4B/NTTP 3-05.............................. II-5...... IV-8..................................................... A-1...................... IV-3 U UAS... V-5.... IV-3 TPT ............... I-6 Top Down Assault ............................................... III-3 THT ....... I-12 TCP.................................. IV-11 25 April 2006 FM 3-06.......................... III-22.. I-12 Weather ...................... III-28............................ A-8 Tunnel Reconnaissance Team.......................62 Index-3 .....

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20. By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force BENTLEY B. and US Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115956. United States Army Chief of Staff JOYCE MORROW Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0613103 DISTRIBUTION: Active Army.20 MCRP 3-31. requirements for FM 3-06. SCHOOMAKER General. Army National Guard.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2. USAF Commander Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Air Force Distribution: F .FM 3-06.62 25 April 2006 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official: PETER J.4B NTTP 3-05. RAYBURN Major General.

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MARINE CORPS PCN: 144 000 162 00 PIN: 083289-000 .

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