IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE lnre: LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC, et al.

,' Chapter 11 Case No. 11-12010 (KG) Jointly Administered Debtors.
_________________ -' Objection Deadline: February 22, 2012 at 4:00 p.m. (ET) Hearing Date: March 7,2012, at 10:00 a.m. (ET)

MOTION OF LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC FOR DISALLOWANCE ASSERTED BY BRYAN STOW, TYLER STOW AND TABITHA

OF CLAIMS STOW

YOUNG CONA WAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP Robert S. Brady (No. 2847) Pauline K. Morgan (No. 3650) Donald J. Bowman, Jf. (No. 4383) Ryan M. Bartley (No. 4985) Rodney Square 1000 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19899 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253

DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP Bruce Bennett Sidney P. Levinson Monika S. Wiener Michael C. Schneidereit (pro hac vice application forthcoming) 333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2600 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 621-6000 Facsimile: (213) 621-6100 Co-Counsel for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

1 The Debtors, together with the last four digits of each Debtor's federal tax identification number are: Los Angeles Dodgers LLC (3133); Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company LLC (4851); LA Holdco LLC (2567); LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC (4850); and LA Real Estate LLC (3029). The location of the Debtors' corporate headquarters and the service address for the Debtors is: 1000 Elysian Park A venue, Los Angeles, California 90012.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT JURISDICTION & VENUE BACKGROUND A. 1 6 6

On Opening Day Of The 2011 Baseball Season, There Was A Large Contingent Of Security Personnel At Dodger Stadium And The Surrounding Parking Lots Before, During And After The Game 6 The Injuries To Mr. Stow The Claims Asserted Against The Dodgers By The Stows 11 12 13 13 17 17

B. C.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED A. B. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear And Determine The Motion As A Core Bankruptcy Proceeding The Stow Claim Should Be Disallowed As A Matter Of Law
1.

Bankruptcy Rule 7056 Applies To This Contested Matter..

2.

Under Applicable California State Law, Mr. Stow Is Required to Prove Causation, Which Is An Onerous Burden For Claims Brought Against Landowners Arising from the Criminal Conduct of Third Parties 19 Mr. Stow Cannot, As A Matter Of Law, Prove Any Causal Link Between The "Reasonable Steps" That The Dodgers Allegedly Failed To Take And The Injuries Suffered By Mr. Stow 22 a) b) The Dodgers Provided Adequate Police And Security Personnel. 23 The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Failure To Anticipate Criminal Acts Of Third Parties When They Lacked Actual Knowledge Regarding Any Prior Inappropriate Conduct Of Those Parties .... 26 The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Allegedly Providing Inadequate Lighting 28 The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Initiating A "Half-Off' Beer Promotion The Dodgers Cannot Be Held Liable For Failing To Escort Mr. Stow And His Companions Through The Parking Lot.
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3.

c) d) e)

29 31

t) C. D. NOTICE

The Dodgers Are Not Liable For The Presence of Alleged Gang Members 31 33

In The Alternative, Punitive Damages Should Be Disallowed

The Claims Of Tyler Stow And Tabitha Stow Should Be Disallowed Based On The Ruling Of The California State Court.. 36 36

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases ACR Mgmt., L.L.C v. Alexander (In re ACR Mgmt., L.L.C), 329 B.R. 142 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005) Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (2002) Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Ct. App. 1989) Caliolo v. Azdel, Inc. (In re Cambridge Indus. Holdings), 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 794 (Bankr. D. Del. July 18, 2003) Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610 (Cal. 2007), 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99 (2007) Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (Ct. App. 1986) Constance B. v. State of California, 223 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1986) Elv. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007) Foster v. Granite Broad. Corp. (In re Granite Broad. Corp'), 385 B.R. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (Ct. App. 1994) In re Allegheny Intl, Inc., 954 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1992) In re American Capital Equipment, LLC, 324 B.R. 570 (W.D. Pa. 2005) In re Amtrol Holdings, Inc., 384 B.R. 686 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 15 19 19 17 32 18 28 18 15

34 17 16 15, 16

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In re Aquaslide 'Ni Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) In re C&G Excavating, Inc., 217 B.R. 64 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) In re Chateaugay Corp., III B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) In re Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 112 B.R. 395 (D. Colo. 1990) In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 372 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007) In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 323 B.R. 583 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) In re HojJinger Indus., Inc., 307 B.R. 112 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004) In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 B.R. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) In re Myertech Corp., 831 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1987) In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 169 B.R. 374 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) In re Standard Insulations, Inc., l38 B.R. 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) In re UAL, 310 B.R. 373 (Banrk. N.D.IlI. 2004) In re WR. Grace & Co., 403 B.R. 317 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) Lackner v. North, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863 (Ct. App. 2006)

16, 18 15, 16 15, 16 15 18 17 15, 16 16 16 14 16 16 15 15, 16

17, 18 34,35

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Leong v. SF Parking, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41 (Ct. App. 1991) Lexington Insurance Co. v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 423 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2005) Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Ct. App. 1992) Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Ct. App. 1985) Nola M v. University of Southern California, 20 Cal. Rptr 2d 97 (Ct. App. 1993) Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. Asbestos Prop. Damage Comm. (In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc.), 330 B.R. 133 (D. Del. 2005) Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. App. 2009) Raleigh v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000) Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club, 34 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Ct. App. 2005) Rogers v. Jones, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1976) Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001) Sample v. Eaton, 302 P.2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) Smith-Lyon v. Trustmark Nat 'I Bank (In re Gunsmith's, Inc.), 271 B.R. 487 (S.D. Miss. 2000) Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Ct. App. 2009) Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1979)

31 18 18 34 passim 21,24,35

19 19

19 21 26,31 19,21 27 17 19 34

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Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School District, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748 (Ct. App. 2003) Valley Media Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc. (In re Valley Media, Inc.), 289 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) Statutes 11 U.S.C. § 502 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(I) 28 U.S.C. § 1334 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(I) 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) 28 U.S.C. § 1408 28 U.S.C. § 1409 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602(b) Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(c) Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) Rules Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9013 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) Del. Bankr. L.R. 9013-1

21 16

16 1, 15, 17 1 6 1 14 6, 14, 15, 16 16 6, 1 6, 1 30 30 6,33,34

1,5,17,18 1 1, 17 18 18 1

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TO THE HONORABLE KEVIN GROSS, CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE: Pursuant to section 502(b) of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), Los Angeles Dodgers LLC ("LAD" or the "Dodgers") hereby moves this Court (the "Motion"), pursuant to Rules 7056, 9013 and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Bankruptcy Rules"), and Rule 9013-1 of this Court's Local Rules ("Local Rules"), for disallowance of Claim No. 13 filed by Bryan Stow, Tyler Stow and Tabitha Stow in Case No. 11-12010 (the "Stow Claim") on the basis that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the claim should be disallowed entirely as a matter of law. In support of the Motion, LAD submits the Declaration of Lieutenant Steven J. Flores (the "Flores Declaration"), the Declaration of Francine Hughes (the "Hughes Declaration"), the Declaration of Sidney P. Levinson (the "Levinson Declaration"), the Declaration of Lieutenant David M. Smith (the "Smith Declaration"), and the Declaration of Captain Richard Wemmer (the "Wemmer Declaration") and respectfully states as follows. PRELIMINARY 1. STATEMENT

On March 31, 2011, "Opening Day" for the Dodgers' 2011 baseball season,

Bryan Stow was injured during an altercation that took place after the baseball game ended. The incident occurred in Parking Lot 2, situated on the outer ring of the parking lots surrounding Dodger Stadium. Wemmer Decl. at ~ 10. Mr. Stow subsequently filed a complaint in the Superior Court ofthe State of Cali fomi a for the County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC462127 (the "Complaint") against more than a dozen defendants, including LAD. See Declaration of Sidney P. Levinson ("Levinson Decl."), Exhibit 1.2 In the Complaint, Mr. Stow alleges that the

2 Although the Complaint also included several causes of action by Mr. Stow's children, the trial court sustained the non-debtor defendants' demurrers to those claims without leave to amend in September 2011. As a result, Mr. Stow's children are no longer parties to the case and, for that reason alone, their claims against LAD should be disallowed.

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Dodgers own and/or operate Dodger Stadium, and that they failed to provide proper security and oversight on the date in question. The Complaint asserts causes of action against LAD and other affiliated defendants for (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 2. Mr. Stow's lawsuit, as against the Dodgers and other Debtors, was automatically

stayed under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code when the Debtors filed for bankruptcy protection on June 27, 2011. Mr. Stow subsequently filed the Stow Claim on July 11,2011, to which he attached no documentation or support other than the cover page of the Complaint. Also in July, the LAPD arrested two individuals, Marvin Norwood and Louis Sanchez, as suspects in the altercation with Mr. Stow.4 Messrs. Norwood and Sanchez are currently in criminal custody awaiting trial. 3. By this Motion, the Dodgers request that this Court disallow the Stow Claim in its

entirety because, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Stow cannot prevail in his claims against the Debtors.5 The Stow Claim is, when stripped to its core, based on the faulty premise that a landowner is an insurer of the safety of persons on its property. That is not the law in California. As stated by the California Court of Appeal, the duty of a landowner is limited to "tak[ing] reasonable steps to protect invitees fromJoreseeable injury .... " Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr

395,397 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis in original). As a corollary to that principle oflaw, "a plaintiff, in order to establish liability, must prove more than abstract negligence unconnected to
3

The Complaint contains four additional causes of action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but none of these causes of action are alleged against LAD or its affiliates. Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez are not specifically named in the Complaint, which was filed prior to their arrest.

4

By pursuing this Motion, none of the Defendants in the underlying case waive or otherwise forego any factual or legal arguments or defenses that have or may be raised in this Court, in the action commenced in state court by Mr. Stow, or in any other proceeding. The Debtors specifically reserve all rights to pursue all arguments, defenses and motions in other proceedings.
5

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the injury." Id. at 397. 4. In Noble v. Los Angeles Dodgers, 214 Cal. Rptr. 295, 397 (Ct. App. 1985), which

is directly on point both factually and legally, the California Court of Appeal reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs who, as in Mr. Stow's case, alleged that the Los Angeles Dodgers were negligent in failing to prevent an assault on them by two assailants that took place in the Dodger Stadium parking lot after a night game. Like the plaintiffs in Noble, Mr. Stow does not contend that the Dodgers "had actual advance knowledge of the conduct of the assailants or of their presence in the parking lot." Id. Rather, Mr. Stow's complaint echoes the general argument made by the plaintiffs in Noble, that the Dodgers "were negligent in failing to effectively deter any and everyone from acting in such a manner." Id. (emphasis omitted). The court in Noble found that argument to be "a classic example of a plaintiff establishing what could be described as abstract negligence, in the context that the Dodgers' security didn't comport with plaintiffs' expert's or the jury's notion of 'adequacy,' but failing to prove any causal connection between that negligence and the injury." Id. at 399. 5. Mr. Stow cannot offer evidence of any "reasonable steps," id. at 397, that the

Dodgers could have or should have undertaken to prevent the injuries to Mr. Stow, or any causal link between the "abstract negligence" alleged against the Dodgers and the injuries Mr. Stow suffered in the altercation with Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez. In particular, prior to the altercation with Mr. Stow, the Dodgers had no actual knowledge of any misconduct by Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez, either during the game or afterward, nor did the Dodgers have actual knowledge of their presence in Parking Lot 2. The Dodgers did not receive any reports of any confrontations - or even any contact - between Mr. Stow and his companions on the one hand and Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez on the other. Wemmer Decl. at,-r 12; Smith Decl. at,-r

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12. This is not surprising because the two groups of patrons sat on opposite ends of Dodger Stadium during the game. Wemmer Decl. at,-r 8. Because the bleachers at Dodger Stadium are self-contained and there is no uncontrolled access to any other seating section, there would have been no way for Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez to travel from their section to Mr. Stow's section, short of exiting the Stadium and purchasing new tickets for entry into Mr. Stow's section in the bleachers. Wemmer Decl. at,-r 9. Nor did the Dodgers receive any complaints about the conduct ofMr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez from any of the 55,070 fans in attendance, or any request for assistance by Mr. Stow, despite posting and announcing the "Fan Code of Conduct," which explicitly encouraged patrons to report any inappropriate behavior to stadium security, on a giant LED "DodgerVision" screen situated in plain view of attendees and elsewhere throughout

the game and the stadium. Smith Decl. at,-r 12; Wemmer Decl. at,-r 12; Hughes Decl. at,-r 5. 6. Unable to prove that the Dodgers could have reasonably foreseen the criminal

conduct ofMr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez, Mr. Stow attempts to meet his heavy burden of proving causation by criticizing the manner in which the Dodgers deployed their security force on Opening Day. In Noble, the California Court of Appeal rejected the expert testimony offered by plaintiffs at trial which, like Mr. Stow's Complaint, sought to provide an after-the-fact critique of the security measures in place. The court in Noble refused to hold the Dodgers liable based upon their deployment of security personnel, even though the ratio of security people to customers was well below that provided by the Dodgers at the game attended by Mr. Stow. In Noble, the Dodgers had only 69 people assigned to security duties, for a ratio of 1 security person for every 900 customers. Noble at 398. On Opening Day, the security force provided by the Dodgers, the LAPD, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation ("FBI") and the California Highway

Patrol ("CHP") numbered 442. Hughes Declaration at ,-r10; Flores Decl. Ex. 1. All told, the

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security-to-fan ratio on Opening Day in 2011 was more than five times the level at the game attended by the plaintiffs in Noble. 7. Tellingly, representatives of Major League Baseball reported, based on

eyewitness accounts of their employees who attended the game,

See Email from

dated April 2,

2011, "FW: Dodgers Home Opening Game 3/31111," attached as Ex. 2 to the Levinson Declaration. From those first hand observations, MLB's concluded that, on Opening Day, there were no deficiencies in the level of security at the stadium. 8. In any event, Mr. Stow cannot "reasonably contend that even a significant

increase in police personnel will prevent all crime or any particular crime." Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 399. Just as the California Court of Appeal rejected the premise that a landowner can be held liable "solely on the basis of a failure to provide an adequate deterrence to criminal conduct in general," id. at 398, this Court should reject Mr. Stow's premise that the Dodgers should be held liable simply because the massive show of force provided at Dodger Stadium on Opening Day ultimately was not enough to deter every single potential criminal opportunity, including the altercation involving Mr. Stow.6 Accordingly, under Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which apply in this contested matter, the Dodgers are entitled to summary judgment to disallow Mr. Stow's claim. 9. In the alternative, this Court should disallow Mr. Stow's claim for punitive

6 Mr. Stow alleges a variety of additional "reasonable steps" that the Debtors should have undertaken to prevent his injuries. As shown below, based on facts that are not in genuine issue, Mr. Stow cannot establish a causal link between the alleged "reasonable steps" that the Debtors purportedly failed to undertake and the injuries that he suffered at the hands of his third party assailants.

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damages, which has no basis in fact or law. California Civil Code section 3294(a) permits the recovery of punitive damages only if the defendant has been guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice." Under this standard, Mr. Stow must prove, by "clear and convincing evidence," that the Dodgers' conduct was "despicable" and in "conscious disregard" ofMr. Stow's rights or safety. Based upon material facts that are not genuinely in issue, Mr. Stow cannot make that showing, and the Dodgers are thus entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Stow's claim for punitive damages. JURISDICTION & VENUE 10. This Court has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).

This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Venue before this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. No previous request for the relief requested herein has been made to this Court or any other court. BACKGROUND 11. The following provides a background of the circumstances surrounding

Mr. Stow's visit to Dodger Stadium on Opening Day 2011, along with a summary of the material facts that are not in genuine issue and that support summary judgment in favor of the Dodgers. The Dodgers respectfully refer this Court to the Declarations of Francine Hughes, Lieutenant David Smith, Captain Richard Wemmer, Lieutenant Steven Flores and Sidney Levinson, in support of this Motion and the relief sought hereunder. A. On Opening Day Of The 2011 Baseball Season, There Was A Large Contingent Of Security Personnel At Dodger Stadium And The Surrounding Parking Lots Before, During And After The Game. 12. On March 31,2011, Bryan Stow attended a Major League Baseball game with

three friends at Dodger Stadium. Complaint at ~ 1. It was "Opening Day" and the Dodgers were playing the San Francisco Giants. Hughes Decl. at ~ 4. The game started at about 5: 11 p.m. and

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ended at about 8:01 p.m. Id. In-house attendance was 55,070. Id. 13. Because it was Opening Day, security at the stadium was even more robust than

usual. There were 442 security personnel deployed and positioned throughout Dodger Stadium and the parking lots before, during and after the game. Id. at ~ 10. The security force at the Stadium on Opening Day consisted of the following: a) 195 assigned, uniformed, on-duty officers of the LAPD; b) 19 uniformed, off-duty LAPD officers retained by the Dodgers; c) 59 off-duty law enforcement officers retained by the Dodgers in designated white polo shirts; d) 124 private security guards employed by the Dodgers; e) 21 managerial security personnel posted at the Dodgers' security command post and throughout the premises; f) 5 officers from the City of Los Angeles Office of Public Safety; g) 2 officers from the California Highway Patrol ("CHP"); and h) 17 personnel assigned to the Stadium by the FBI, for a total of [442]. Id. at ~~ 7 and 9; Flores Decl. Ex. 1. These figures do not include the 15 personnel assigned to the Stadium by the Los Angeles Fire Department. Hughes Decl. at ~ 8. 14.
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By providing at least one security person for every 124 fans in attendance (55,070

442 = 124), the security ratio at Dodger Stadium compared favorably with the ratio of police

officers that the LAPD provided to the City of Los Angeles on the date in question. See Hughes Decl. ~ 10. With a city population of 4,033,236, and 3,361 police officers on active patrol, there was one police officer for every 1200 residents in the city on that date (4,033,236
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3,361

=

1200). Wemmer Decl. at ~ 13. Thus the security ratio at Dodger Stadium on Opening Day was almost ten times the ratio in the City of Los Angeles. 15. The number of security personnel deployed at Dodger Stadium on Opening Day

has increased over the past several years - from 308 in 2009, to 398 in 2010, to 442 on Opening Day in 2011. Hughes Decl. at ~ 10.

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16.

As part of their security program, the Dodgers maintain a "Drinking in Public"

patrol program whereby off-duty law enforcement officers retained by the Dodgers are assigned to patrol the Stadium parking lots both by foot and in golf carts in order to police public consumption of alcohol and other inappropriate conduct. Smith Decl. at ~ 7. In the event that fans are found consuming liquor in the parking lots, they are ordered to pour out every visible container of alcohol in their possession or face ejection from the Stadium. Id. 17. On Opening Day, 49 security personnel retained by the Dodgers were assigned to

patrol the parking lots as part of the Drinking in Public patrol program. Id. at ~ 9. The patrols began approximately 4 hours prior to the start of the game and continued until the beginning of the second inning, at which point the security personnel involved in the patrols entered the Stadium itself to provide extra security during the game. Id. Those personnel returned to patrolling the parking lots five minutes after the last batter was called out until over an hour and a half after the end of the game. Id. Indeed, the first responders to the altercation involving Mr. Stow were two security personnel who had been assigned to patrol Parking Lot 2. Id. at ~ 10; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 10. 18. In addition to the 49 security personnelincluding 9 off-duty LAPD officers on

bicycles - assigned by the Dodgers to the Drinking in Public patrols in the parking lots, 16 more security personnel were assigned to police traffic in the parking lots both before and after the game on Opening Day. Smith Decl. at ~ 9. Furthermore, the LAPD maintained and operated a mobile command post in the stadium parking lot throughout the game and assigned 54 on-duty LAPD officers to patrol the parking lots and surrounding areas. Flores Decl. Ex. 1. In total, approximately 94 Dodgers security personnel and LAPD officers were assigned to patrol the parking lots and surrounding areas on Opening Day. Id. at ~ 9; Flores Decl. Ex. 1.

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19.

The Dodgers also employed extensive security systems to ensure fan safety.

Smith Decl. at ~ 12. On Opening Day, five security management personnel were assigned exclusively to a central "command post" in the Stadium where they continuously monitored radio feeds and closed-circuit video feeds from throughout the Stadium and the parking lots. Id. They also monitored any complaints received from fans during the game and immediately communicated any potentially significant complaints to security staff so that they could be addressed. Id. As they do during every game, the Dodgers prepared "incident cards" in connection with complaints made by fans on Opening Day. Id. No incident card was prepared showing any complaint directed at Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez. Id.; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 12. 20. The FBI also maintained and operated its own security command post at the

stadium, deploying at least 17 individuals at the stadium and manning a variety of video surveillance devices at the ballpark. Hughes Declaration at ~ 9; Smith Decl. at ~ 11. Notably, the FBI operated video cameras in the parking lot that were connected to the closed circuit television system at the stadium. Smith Decl. at ~ 11. In this way and others, the Dodgers, the LAPD and the FBI worked together to maximize safety and security at the Stadium. Id. 21. Consistent with the above, representatives of Major League Baseball who

attended Opening Day reported seeing a large contingent of police and security officers, both in the parking lots and within the stadium. According to the Opening Day report from Dodger Stadium written the following morning by attended the game with who

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22.

report also commented favorably on the large number of security

posted at the concession stands and the extremely active command post:

23. served as

Opening Day report was provided to _ with the following summary:

who sent a copy to

Levinson Decl., Ex. 2.

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B.

The Injuries To Mr. Stow. 24. According to the Complaint, Mr. Stow and three of his friends arrived at Dodger

Stadium by taxicab. Complaint at ~ 47. During the game, Mr. Stow and his companions were seated in the Right Field Pavilion. Wemmer Decl. ~ 6. That section of the stadium, part of the "bleachers," is located beyond the outfield wall, directly behind the right field area of play. Id. At the conclusion of the game, Mr. Stow and his friends exited the stadium in search of a taxicab. Complaint at ~ 55. Although the designated cabstand at Dodger Stadium is located directly outside the Right Field Pavilion exit and is clearly visible from that exit, Mr. Stow and his companions walked in the opposite direction. See Wemmer Decl. at ~~ 7, 11. Cutting through two parking lots and across an access road, they moved away from the stadium and eventually entered Parking Lot 2, where the altercation involving Mr. Stow occurred. Complaint at ~ 56. 25. Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez attended the Dodger game on Opening Day.

Wemmer Decl. at ~ 8. They were seated in the Loge level on the third base side of the field, which is the opposite side of the field from where Mr. Stow and his friends sat during the game. Id. 26. As occurs at every game at Dodger Stadium, the Dodgers presented the "Fan

Code of Conduct" through a video presentation on the "DodgerVision" screen, which measures 26' 6" x 46' 6" and is visible throughout most of the Stadium, including from the area where Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez were seated, and over the public address system during the game. Hughes Declaration at ~ 5. Among other statements and directives in that production, fans were told: "If anyone is bothering you or hindering your enjoyment of the game, call or text the Dodger hotline." Id. As that presentation was running, the hotline number was displayed on electronic billboards inside the stadium. Id. That number was again displayed several times
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throughout the game. Id. 27. In addition, the "Fan Code of Conduct" is posted at turnstiles and elsewhere

throughout Dodger Stadium. Id. Among other things, the Fan Code of Conduct provides: "Fans should report any inappropriate behavior to the nearest Usher, Security Officer or stadium staff member." Id. 28. The Dodgers did not receive any complaints about Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez

at any point before or during the game. Smith Decl. at ~ 12; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 12. Nor were there any reported confrontations or contact during the game between Mr. Stow and his companions on the one hand, and Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez on the other. Smith Decl. at ~ 12; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 12. As noted earlier, this is not surprising because the bleachers where Mr. Stow was seated are self-contained, making it impossible for Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez to travel from their section to Mr. Stow's section without exiting Dodger Stadium and purchasing new tickets for entry into Mr. Stow's section. Wemmer Decl. at ~ 9. Moreover, there were no reported incidents of Mr. Stow making any complaint of any nature or any request for assistance from the Dodgers during Opening Day. Id. at ~ 12; Smith Decl. at ~ 12. 29. Contrary to the allegations in the Complaint, the Dodgers did not authorize, nor

did any of the Dodgers' vendors offer, any "half price specials" or other discounts on beer or alcohol during the Opening Day game. Hughes Decl. at ~ 12. C. The Claims Asserted Against The Dodgers By The Stows 30. On May 24,2011, Bryan Stow, Tyler Stow, and Tabitha Stow (collectively, the

"Stows") filed the Complaint in California state court alleging causes of action against the Dodgers for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, (3) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress and (5) loss of consortium. The Complaint seeks general, special, and punitive damages. Complaint at ~ 31.
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31.

On June 27, 2011 (the "Petition Date"), each of the Debtors commenced a

voluntary case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtors continue to operate their businesses and manage their properties as debtors in possession as authorized by sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. 32. On July 11, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the Stow Claim against LAD. Only one proof of

claim was filed by the Stows, in LAD's bankruptcy case." Levinson Decl., Ex. 5. The Stow Claim states that it is an unliquidated personal injury claim. The only supporting documentation attached to the Stow Claim is the cover page of the Complaint. 33. On September 30,2011, the California state court sustained the demurrer filed by

the non-debtor defendants as to the claims of Tyler Stow and Tabitha Stow, concluding that those plaintiffs "failed to allege any duty in negligence owed to the plaintiffs who were not present at the premises and did not observe the alleged incident, and that a claim for loss of consortium is not cognizable as to parents' children." See Levinson Decl., Exs. 3 and 4. BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED A. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear And Determine The Motion As A Core Bankruptcy Proceeding. 34. Section 157(b)(1) of the Judicial Code provides that a bankruptcy court may hear

and determine "all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising
7 The Stows did not file proofs of claim in any of the Debtors' bankruptcy cases other than for LAD. Consistent with the "Order Establishing Deadlines for Filing Proofs of Claim and Approving the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof' (the "Bar Date Order") [D.L 617], the notice of the bar date attached as Exhibit A to the Bar Date Order and served upon counsel for the Stows states, in capital letters, "IF YOU WISH TO ASSERT A CLAIM AGAINST MORE THAN ONE DEBTOR, YOU MUST FILE A SEPARATE PROOF OF CLAIM IN THE CASE OF EACH DEBTOR AGAINST WHICH YOU BELIEVE HOLD SUCH A CLAIM." Bar Date Order, Ex. A. The Bar Date Order itself provides that "unless otherwise ordered by the Court, any holder of a claim against any of the Debtors who is required, but fails to file proof of such claim in accordance with the Bar Date Order on or before the applicable Bar Date [November 30, 2011] shall be forever barred, estopped and enjoined from asserting such claim in these chapter 11 cases against any of the Debtors (or filing a Proof of Claim with respect thereto), and the Debtors and their properties shall be forever discharged from any and all indebtedness or liability with respect to such claim." Bar Date Order, at 6. Accordingly, by virtue of the failure of the Stows to file separate proofs of claims against Debtors other than LAD, they are barred from filing or pursuing any such claim against those other Debtors.

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in a case under title 11 ... and may enter appropriate orders and judgments .... " 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Among the examples of core proceedings enumerated in section 157(b)(2) of the Judicial Code are the allowance and disallowance of claims, as follows: Core proceedings include, but are not limited to -

(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12 or 13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B); see also In re Myertech Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that the allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate is a core proceeding). By

the Motion, the Dodgers seek disallowance of the Stow Claim because, as discussed below, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Stow Claim is unenforceable against the Dodgers under applicable law. 35. This Court's jurisdiction to "hear and determine" the instant Motion as a core

proceeding is not diminished by section 157(b)(2)(B)'s carve-out for the "liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). Bankruptcy courts within the Third Circuit (including this one) have interpreted the statutory phrase "liquidation or estimation ... for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11" as used in section 157(b )(2)(B) to mean fixing the allowable amount of an unliquidated or contingent claim, and not the threshold determination of the claim's validity or enforceability. In re Amtrol

Holdings, Inc., 384 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) ("[B]ankruptcy courts are authorized to determine the validity of a personal injury claim but not the amount"); In re 0-1 Holdings, Inc.,

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323 B.R. 583, 612 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (limiting application of the personal injury carve-out to "determination of the amount of a claim, and not a determination of the legal validity or enforceability of the claim"); see also In re C&G Excavating, Inc., 217 B.R. 64 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine validity of personal injury claim and dismiss claim if it is time-barred); ACR Mgmt., L.L.C v. Alexander (In re ACR Mgmt., L.L.C), 329 B.R. 142, 145 n.l (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005) (stating that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of personal injury claims even for distribution purposes at any time prior to trial of such claims)." 36. The interpretation of section 157(b )(2)(B) adopted by this Court and others finds

support in the language of the statute itself, which carves out only the "liquidation and estimation" of personal injury claims for purposes of distribution, but not the disallowance of claims. As explained in UAL, this interpretation (1) comports with the ordinary meaning of the statutory language; (2) comports with section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which distinguishes between determining the value of a claim and the validity of a claim as a matter of law; and (3) is consistent with other related jurisdiction provisions contained within title 28. In re UAL, 310 B.R. at 380 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502); see also In re G-I Holdings, 323 B.R. at 613 (explaining that a narrow interpretation avoids placing unnecessary burdens on the district court);

8 Accord In re UAL, 310 B.R. 373,378 (Banrk. N.D.Ill. 2004) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine the legal enforceability of a personal injury claim since it was not determining a dollar amount); In re Chateaugay Corp., 111 B.R. 67, 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he bankruptcy court must have jurisdiction to make the threshold determination of whether as a matter oflaw, a claim exists which can be asserted against the debtor, even if that claim sounds in personal injury tort or wrongful death"); In re Dow Corning Corp., 215 B.R. 346,360 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider an omnibus objection to personal injury claims and disallow such claims on summary judgment); In re Standard Insulations, Inc., 138 B.R. 947, 952 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that no jury right exists at claims allowance stage); Foster v. Granite Broad. Corp. (In re Granite Broad. Corp'), 385 B.R. 41, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that the "threshold determination of whether [the plaintiffs claims] are allowable and whether such claims are subject to estimation for all purposes" was still within the authority of the bankruptcy court).

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Amtrol, 384 B.R. at 690 (citing UAL and In re G-I Holdingsi.' 37. This interpretation is also consistent with the preservation of the right to a trial by

jury on personal injury claims because the resolution of a claim as a matter of law does not involve a trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5); see also In re G-I Holdings, 323 B.R. 583 at 615 (noting that there is no "proscription for summarily disposing of claims which have no basis in law, for instance, pursuant to 12(b)(6) or 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... where a trial would not be necessary=j.i'' As discussed in detail in section B below, the Stow Claim can

be determined as a matter of law and thus is not subject to the carve-out in section 157(b )(2)(B) of the Judicial Code. 38. As such, this Court has not only the ability, but also the duty to determine the

legal validity of the Stow Claim. See Valley Media Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc. (In re Valley Media, Inc.), 289 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (noting that it is inappropriate for bankruptcy courts to permissively abstain from adjudicating core proceedings); see also Smith-Lyon v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank (In re Gunsmith's, Inc.), 271 B.R. 487 at 492 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff s claim was a core proceeding that "must be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court").
Some courts in other circuits have interpreted the carve-out in section 157(b)(2)(B) to proscribe any determination ofa personal injury claim by a bankruptcy court, even on the basis oflegal validity. This "broad approach" is premised on the argument that any disallowance of a personal injury claim ultimately "liquidates" the claim because it provides for zero recovery. See In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 169 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994). However, for the reasons set forth in In re UAL, In re G-I Holdings, and In re Amtrol, the approach previously adopted by this Court is the better one.
9 10 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 45 B.R. 823, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (bankruptcy courts can estimate personal injury claims for purposes other than distribution); In re Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545, 549 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy court had the right and duty to estimate personal injury claims for purposes of confmning a plan under Chapter 11); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 45 B.R. 322, 326 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Estimation of [personal injury] claims for other purposes, such as 'confirming a plan' ... apparently remains a core proceeding for the bankruptcy judge."); In re HojJinger Indus., Inc., 307 B.R. 112, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004) (same); In re C & G Excavating, Inc., 217 B.R. 64, 64 n.l (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (same); In re American Capital Equipment, LLC, 324 B.R. 570, 574 (W.D. Pa. 2005) ("[B]ankruptcy courts can apply legal defenses to personal injury claims to determine their viability in the bankruptcy case and estimate personal injury claims for the purpose of determining the feasibility of a plan of reorganization"); In re Chateaugay Corp., 111 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 63 B.R. 527,532 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (bankruptcy court had the right and duty to estimate personal injury claims for purposes of confmning a plan under Chapter 11).

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B.

The Stow Claim Should Be Disallowed As A Matter Of Law.
1.

Bankruptcy Rule 7056 Applies To This Contested Matter.

39.

Section 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the disallowance of claims

that are "unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured." 11

U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). When asserting a proof of claim against a debtor, a claimant must allege facts that, if true, would support a finding that the debtor is legally liable to the claimant. In re Allegheny Inti, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the claimant alleges sufficient facts to support its claim, its claim is afforded prima facie validity. Id. at 173. But if an objection is made to the proof of claim, the claimant carries the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the validity and amount of the claim. Id. at 173. 40. Adjudication of the disallowance of a claim is a contested matter pursuant to Rule

9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules"). Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014; see Caliolo v. Azdel, Inc. (In re Cambridge Indus. Holdings), 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 794 at

* 11 (Bankr.

D. Del. July 18, 2003); In re FV Steel & Wire Co., 372 B.R. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.

2007) (holding that a claim objection is a contested matter subject to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014). Bankruptcy Rule 9014 in tum provides that Bankruptcy Rule 7056 applies to contested matters, thereby making Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to this proceeding. See In Re: WR. Grace & Co., 403 B.R. 317, 318-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of debtor under Bankruptcy Rule 7056). Consequently, the Court may apply the summary judgment standards set forth in Rule 56 to disallow the Stow Claim as a matter of law. E.g., In re Aquaslide 'N'Dive Corp., 85 B.R. 545,549 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (disallowing personal injury claim as a matter of law pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7056). 41. 01: 11776185.1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the moving party is entitled to -17-

summary judgment where the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Where the moving party has satisfied its burden under Rule 56(c), "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The non-moving party can defeat summary judgment only if it produces evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to each element essential to its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. EI v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d CiT. 2007); In re WR. Grace & Co., 403 B.R. 317, 319 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986). The non-moving party

cannot "rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); In re WR. Grace
& Co., 403 B.R. 317,319 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). Only evidence which is "ultimately reducible

to admissible evidence" will be considered. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 423 F .3d 318, 329 n. 6 (3d CiT. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). 42. Under the foregoing authority, the evidence presented by the Dodgers in support

of this motion shifts the burden to Mr. Stow to bring forward specific evidence establishing that he has a valid claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of his claim. In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 112 B.R. 395, 400 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that burden of showing validity shifted to claimant after debtor filed motion for partial summary judgment). As demonstrated below, he cannot carry that burden. 2. Under Applicable California State Law, Mr. Stow Is Required to Prove Causation, Which Is An Onerous Burden For Claims Brought Against Landowners Arising from the Criminal Conduct of Third Parties.

43.

State law - in this case, the law of California - governs the Stow Claim. See

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Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. Asbestos Prop. Damage Comm. (In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc.), 330 B.R. 133 (D. Del. 2005) (citing Raleigh v. tu. Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000). Although Mr. Stow's Complaint includes four causes of action against the Dodgers, the Complaint in essence advances the same basic negligence claim under four separate titles: (1) negligence; (2) premises liability; (3) negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Each of those claims is fundamentally premised upon the elements of a negligence claim: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. See Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890,897-900 (2002) (applying same "duty"

analysis to separate claims for "premises liability; negligence; and negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention"); Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (1989) ("[p]remises liability is a form of negligence"); Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,868 (Ct. App. 2009) (elements of "negligent hiring and retention" same as basic negligence claim); Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 486 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Negligent infliction of emotional distress does not exist as an independent tort. The tort is simply negligence"). 44. As discussed below, Mr. Stow's claim fails as a matter oflaw because he cannot

prove causation. As explained in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001), California imposes an onerous burden upon plaintiffs seeking to prove causation. The plaintiff in Saelzler was an employee of Federal Express who was assaulted while delivering a package at an apartment complex. The owner of the complex conceded that he owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and also admitted that he may have breached that duty by failing to provide security guards and locked gates. Nevertheless, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant's breach was a legal cause of

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her injuries. 45. In a thorough analysis of what does - and does not - constitute proof of causation,

the Saelzler court articulated the following five rules of law with respect to causation, all of which apply to Mr. Stow's claim: i) A mere possibility of causation is not enough. "[W]hen the matter remains one of pure

speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant." Id. at 1151. ii) The defendant's act or omission must have been a 'substantial factor+in bringing

about the injury. A plaintiff must establish that it is '''more probable than not' that additional security precautions would have prevented the attack." Id. at 1152. iii) Expert opinion is insufficient to establish causation. An opinion from an expert witness

that additional security measures might have prevented the assault is speculative and thus insufficient to establish causation. iv) Id. at 1152. The mere fact that an injury occurred does not

Hindsight cannot support causation.

mean that it was caused by the defendant: "[I]t would be grossly unfair to permit a lay jury, after the fact, to determine in any case that security measures were 'inadequate,' particularly in light of the fact that the decision would always be rendered in a case where the security had, in fact, proved inadequate." Id. at 1153. v) The burden of proof on the issue of causation remains squarely with the plaintiff at all times: "[E]ven assuming a triable issue existed regarding the extent or reasonableness of defendants' security efforts, even a flagrant failure to provide such measures would not justify shifting to defendants the burden of conclusively proving the absence of causation." Id. at 1155. If the law were otherwise, "defendants might be held liable for

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conduct which actually caused no harm, contrary to the recognized policy against making landowners the insurer of the absolute safety of anyone entering their premises." Id. (emphasis in original). 46. In recognition of the substantial burden imposed by these five rules, one

California Supreme Court Justice characterized a plaintiffs burden to hold a landowner liable for injuries caused by criminal acts of a third-party as "a virtually insurmountable barrier." Saelzler, 23 P.3d at 1155; dissenting opinion of Kennard, J.). And in fact, numerous other California courts have held that plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to prove causation in cases where a plaintiff was injured by the criminal acts of a third-party. See, e.g., Nola M v. University of Southern California, 20 Cal. Rptr 2d 97, 108 (Ct. App. 1993) ("To characterize a landowner's failure to deter the wanton, mindless acts of violence of a third person as the 'cause' of the victim's injuries is ... to make the landowner the insurer of the absolute safety of everyone who enters the premises"); Rinehart v. Boys & Girls Club, 34 Cal. Rptr 677,689 (Ct. App. 2005) (plaintiff injured by rocks thrown by third-party failed to establish causation by advancing the "speculative possibility" that additional supervisors might have prevented the incident); Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School District, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 765 (Ct. App. 2003) (plaintiff could not establish that different security measures would have prevented thirdparty's assault on the plaintiff; court rejected the suggestion that "the mere fact a fight occurred is sufficient, in itself, to establish negligence"). 47. Applying the above five-factor test to the various allegations made by Mr. Stow,

it is evident that Mr. Stow cannot overcome the onerous burden to prove causation and that his claim fails as a matter of law.

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3.

Mr. Stow Cannot, As A Matter Of Law, Prove Any Causal Link Between The "Reasonable Steps" That The Dodgers Allegedly Failed To Take And The Injuries Suffered By Mr. Stow.

48.

The Complaint alleges that the Dodgers breached their duty of care by "failing to

take reasonable steps" to prevent Stow from being exposed to "dangerous conditions and criminal activity." Complaint at ~ 89. This general allegation can be broken down into the following specific categories: i) failure to provide adequate police and security personnel, Complaint at ~~ 99-101, including failing to hire a permanent security chief, Complaint, at ~ 142; ii) failure to "anticipate criminal acts of third parties and the probability of injury arising from them," Complaint at ~ 92; iii) iv) failure to install proper lighting, Complaint, at ~~ 95-98; initiation of a '''half-off alcohol promotion for all day games at Dodger Stadium," Complaint at ~ 102; v) failure to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect patrons from imminent or ongoing aggressive conduct, such as by "providing an escort by existing security personnel to a car in that parking lot," Complaint at ~ 111; and vi) the presence of gang members, Complaint at ~ 99. 49. As shown below, based upon material facts that are not in genuine issue,

Mr. Stow cannot prove a causal link between the Dodgers' alleged failure to take those steps and the injuries suffered by Mr. Stow in Parking Lot 2. Because Mr. Stow cannot prove causation, the Dodgers are entitled to summary judgment. a) 50. The Dodgers Provided Adequate Police And Security Personnel.

The undisputed evidence shows that the level and deployment of security

provided by the Dodgers on Opening Day 2011 was, as a matter of law, more than adequate to

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defeat Mr. Stow's claim that his injuries were caused by any deficiency in security. In Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 396, which as noted above involves facts strikingly similar to the instant case, plaintiffs were assaulted by two assailants in the parking lot of Dodger Stadium following a baseball game, and the plaintiff alleged that the Dodgers had negligently failed to protect him against the assault. Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 396-97. Reversing ajury verdict for the plaintiff, the California Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish negligence as a matter oflaw. 51. Id. at 399. The court in Noble acknowledged the impossibility of preventing every

conceivable act of violence, holding that a landowner cannot be held to have caused an injury simply by "fail[ing] to provide an adequate deterrence to criminal conduct in general." Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 397. As part of its analysis, the court examined and discussed the level of security at Dodger Stadium on the date at issue, comparing it with the security force that the local police provided to residents of Los Angeles: The Dodgers had approximately 69 people assigned to security duties on the night in question. Some of those were stationed at various points inside and some outside the stadium. They thus had 1 security person for every 900 customers. Some were on mobile patrol. The Los Angeles Police Department presently employs approximately 7,000 police officers to police a city of approximately 3 million people. This computes to approximately 1 policeman to 425 persons. When we consider that only approximately one-third of those police officers can be on duty at anyone time during a 24hour period, the equation becomes 1 officer to approximately 1,200 inhabitants and the officers are scattered over a much wider area than the relatively compact confines of the Dodger complex. No one can reasonably contend that even a significant increase in police personnel will prevent all crime or any particular crime. Id. at 397-399. 52. This same principle oflaw was applied in Nola M v. University of Southern

California, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (1993), in which the court found that the University of Southern

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California had not caused the assault and rape of a woman on its campus. The Nola M court expressed exasperation with the plaintiff s abstract theories of negligence that alleged that the university should have provided additional security: [W]here do we draw the line? How many guards are enough? Ten? Twenty? Two hundred? How much light is sufficient? Are klieg lights necessary? Are plants of any kind permissible or is USC to chop down every tree and pullout each bush? Does it matter if the campus looks like a prison? Should everyone entering the campus be searched for weapons? Does every shop, every store, every manufacturing plant, have to be patrolled by private guards hired by the owner? Does a landowner have to effectively close his property and prevent its use altogether? ... To characterize a landowner's failure to deter the wanton, mindless acts of violence of a third person as the 'cause' of the victim's injuries is (on these facts) to make the landowner the insurer of the absolute safety of everyone who enters the premises. Id. at 108. 53. On Opening Day, 442 security personnel were on duty to protect the fans who

attended the game. Hughes Decl. at ~ 7-11; Flores Decl. Ex.l. The security-to- fan ratio was more than five times the level found to be adequate in Noble. In fact, the approximately 94 Dodgers security personnel and on-duty LAPD officers (not including FBI agents) who were assigned to patrol only the parking lots on Opening Day is twenty-eight persons more than was found to be sufficient as a matter oflaw to patrol the entire stadium in Noble. See 214 Cal. Rptr. at 397-399. In addition, an FBI security team was stationed in the parking lot. Smith Decl. at ~ 11; Hughes Decl. at ~ 9. A report issued by MLB representatives who attended the game observed the large contingent of security personnel, both before and during the game, commented that the level of security provided by the Dodgers on March 31, 2011 was one of the highest in all of Major League Baseball, and concluded that there were no deficiencies in the security at Dodger Stadium on Opening Day. See Levinson Decl. Ex. 2. 54. Any attempt to argue that the deployment of additional security on Opening Day

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would have prevented the altercation involving Stow is speculative under both the Saelzler factors and Noble. Consistent with the first Saelzler factor, the court in Noble emphasized that hypothetical theories of causation, or "abstract negligence," cannot support a finding of negligence, especially where "the direct cause of [the] plaintif:fs injury was the conduct of the person or persons who struck" him. Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr at 397. Noting that the Dodgers had provided one security person for every 900 fans, the court determined that the plaintiff could not establish "that inaction on the part of the Dodgers in any way caused plaintiffs' injuries." Id. The court explained: The present case is a classic example of a plaintiff establishing what could be described as abstract negligence, in the context that the Dodgers' security didn't comport with plaintiffs' expert's or the jury's notion of 'adequacy,' but failing to prove any causal connection between that negligence and the injury. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). 55. Unable to show any deficiency in the level of security, Mr. Stow alleges that the

Dodgers were negligent in failing to hire a permanent security chief prior to Opening Day. Complaint at,-r 70. But Mr. Stow fails to offer any evidence to even suggest (let alone prove) that, if a permanent security chief had been in place, he or she would have undertaken any specific measures that would have prevented the injuries to Mr. Stow. Nor does Mr. Stow allege that the many security professionals employed by the Dodgers who were present and on-duty on Opening Day were in any way unqualified to perform their duties and responsibilities. As an

example, one of those professionals was David Smith, who serves as the Assistant Manager of Security and Guest Services at Dodger Stadium. Smith Decl. at ,-r3. In addition to his employment with the Dodgers, David Smith is employed as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles County Sherif:fs Department, where he has served for 29 years. Id. at,-r,-r 3-4. 56. In short, plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, establish causation by alleging that

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the level of safety and security at Dodger Stadium on Opening Day did not comport with the plaintiffs notion of "adequacy." Stow must prove a direct causal connection between the

alleged negligence and the claimed injury. He has not established that fundamental element, nor can he. b) The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Failure To Anticipate Criminal Acts Of Third Parties When They Lacked Actual Knowledge Regarding Any Prior Inappropriate Conduct Of Those Parties.

57.

Controlling California law holds that a landowner is "not an insurer of [his

invitees'] safety," nor does he have any duty to control the conduct of third-parties "which he has no reason to anticipate and no reasonable opportunity or means to prevent." Rogers v. Jones, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (Ct. App. 1976). Rogers involved a fight in the parking lot of a professional sports stadium. In that case, the Court of Appeal noted that a risk of harm is "peculiarly inherent in the large crowds which attend stadium-held sporting events," especially when "thousands of spectators abruptly descend upon the parking area when the event is over." Id. at 407. As a result, "anticipating and preventing harm to some member of the public" is "difficult under the best of circumstances." Id. When the harm results from "a sudden,

intentional, malicious and criminal act of a third party," as it did in the Stow action, "anticipation of harm as well as a reasonable opportunity to prevent its occurrence may approach the impossible." Id. 58. Further, as explained by the Court of Appeal in Noble, the mere foreseeability of

violent incidents is insufficient to establish causation. Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 397. ("It is a sad commentary but it can be said that in this day and age anyone can foresee or expect that a crime will be committed at any time and at any place in the more populous areas of the country. That fact alone, however, is not enough to impose liability on a property owner when a crime does in fact occur on his or her property"). Instead, there must be a showing that "the defendants'
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inaction in some manner caused plaintiffs injury." Id (emphasis in original). As an example of what such causation entails, the court in Noble described a case in which the plaintiff, a spectator at a wrestling match, was hit by a thrown bottle after management did nothing to curtail or stop a fight that had been ongoing for six or seven minutes. Id (citing Sample v. Eaton, 302 P.2d 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)). There, the defendant property owner had actual knowledge of the "specific conduct" of third parties sufficiently in advance of the injury to give the defendant an opportunity to act to prevent the injury, thereby satisfying the causation element. Id at 397. In Noble, by contrast, the Dodgers did not have "actual advance knowledge of the conduct of the assailants or of their presence in the parking lot." IdY facts of Noble and is distinguishable from Sample. 59. The undisputed evidence confirms that the Dodgers had no reason to know about The instant case fits squarely within the

or anticipate the events that led to Mr. Stow's injuries. The Dodgers received no complaints about the behavior ofMr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez from anyone of the 55,070 fans in attendance even though the Dodgers broadcast a directive regarding the "Fan Code of Conduct" during the game and post that directive at every turnstile in the stadium. Hughes Decl. at ~ 5; Smith Decl. at ~ 12; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 12. The directive instructs fans: "If anyone is bothering you or hindering your enjoyment of the game, call or text the Dodger hotline" - and - "Fans should report any inappropriate behavior to the nearest Usher, Security Officer or stadium staff member." Hughes Decl. at ~ 5. 60. Nor were there any reports of any confrontations - or even any contact - between

11 In any event, even if the Dodgers had been provided such information in advance of the altercation, the Dodgers would have had no reason to foresee that Mr. Stow and his companions - who did not drive to the game but instead arrived in a taxicab -- would have any reason to be in Parking Lot 2, which is situated on the outer ring of the land surrounding Dodger Stadium and nowhere in the vicinity of the taxicab stand that is a short distance and visible from the Right Field Pavilion exit where Mr. Stow and his companions sat during the game. Wemmer Decl. at ~ 11.

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Mr. Stow and his companions on the one hand, and Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez on the other. Smith Decl. at ~ 12; Wemmer Decl. at ~ 12. Indeed, Mr. Stow and his assailants were seated in entirely different areas of Dodger Stadium and it would not have been possible for them to travel between their sections without leaving the Stadium and purchasing a new ticket for re-entry. Wemmer Decl. at ~~ 6-9. Consequently, the Dodgers had no knowledge of any conduct -let alone specific conduct - that might have given them "actual advance knowledge" that Stow might be involved in an altercation in the outer parking lots. 61. Under these facts which are not in genuine issue, Mr. Stow's negligence claim

fails as a matter of law. c) 62. The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Allegedly Providing Inadequate Lighting.

The Complaint alleges that the Dodgers "breached their duty of care to Plaintiff

Stow by failing to install proper lighting in [the] parking lots." Complaint at ~ 95. But in fact, the California Court of Appeal has recognized that allegedly inadequate lighting does not lead to a finding that a property owner "caused" an assault by a third party on its premises. Constance B. v. State of California, 223 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647-648 (Ct. App. 1986). In Constance B., the plaintiff, a woman who had been assaulted in the restroom of a state-owned roadside rest area, sued the state for damages. The plaintiff claimed that the placement of lights and trees (which created shadows) provided concealment for the assailant and created a risk of injury. The court dismissed this argument as follows: Nor are we persuaded that the matter should go to the jury on the vague supposition that, notwithstanding that the assailant was standing in the light, even brighter lights might have deterred the assault. This theory has nothing to do with the creation of an opportunity to commit crime by providing a place of concealment. It is premised on the notion that the assailant's psychological propensity for crime is affected by the quantity of light. It is a theory of mood lighting. If liability may be premised solely on this
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notion, proprietors will become the insurers of the safety of persons on their premises, subject only to the caprice of particular juries . . .. If we are unwilling as a matter of policy to insure against losses occasioned by crimes, we ought not foist that burden haphazardly on persons not at fault for criminal misbehavior. We conclude that the lighting condition was not a proximate cause of the assault. Id. at 652. 63. Here, Mr. Stow has not alleged that his assailants somehow used the absence of

lighting to conceal themselves from Mr. Stow's view and that, but for the absence of additional lighting, they would have been unable to do so and would not have become involved in an altercation with Mr. Stow. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that the altercation "took place over a prolonged period of time and drew the attention of various other patrons," Complaint at ~ 58, which if true demonstrates that the assailants were unconcerned with concealing themselves from the view of others. Under the Saelzler factors, recovery is precluded because any argument that different lighting would have prevented the altercation is entirely speculative and constitutes the sort of hindsight that the California appeal courts have repeatedly rejected as sufficient to establish causation as a matter oflaw. d) 64. The Dodgers Are Not Liable For Initiating A "Half-Off' Beer Promotion.

Next, Mr. Stow alleges that the Dodgers should be held liable because they

initiated a "half-off' beer promotion in 2011 for day games at Dodger Stadium. Complaint at ~ 102. First and foremost, the Dodgers did not conduct a "half-off' beer promotion on Opening

Day. Hughes Decl. at ~ 12. Because there was no such promotion on Opening Day, Mr. Stow's claim that a beer promotion was a "substantial factor" in the injuries caused to him is, on its face, unfounded and cannot survive summary judgment as a matter of law. 65. In any event, Mr. Stow could not establish any causal link between such a

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promotion and the injury that he suffered. Indeed, Mr. Stow does not even allege in his complaint that his assailants had been drinking. Nor can he prove that ifMr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez had been able to pay less for beer at day games later in the season, the prospect of that future discount would have somehow incited them to become involved in an altercation with Mr. Stow on Opening Day. 66. Moreover, Mr. Stow's claim fails under Section 25602(b) ofthe California

Business & Professions Code, which provides: (a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) No person who sells.furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage. (c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhardv. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court ( Cal. 3d __ ) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602(b) (emphasis added); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(c)(" no social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person may be held legally accountable for damages suffered by that person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from the consumption of those beverages"). 67. InLeongv. SF Parking, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d41 (Ct. App. 1991), the plaintiffs son was

killed in a collision with a driver who was leaving a baseball game at which he had consumed

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alcoholic beverages in the parking lot. The court found that the baseball team could not be liable for providing alcohol as a matter of law pursuant to section 25602, stating that the plaintiff "cannot hold any of the respondents liable for simply permitting [the driver] to consume alcoholic beverages on respondents' premises." Id. at 44. Likewise, Mr. Stow cannot hold the Dodgers liable simply for serving beer, even ifMr. Stow were able to allege or prove that it was consumed by Mr. Norwood and Mr. Sanchez. 68. Accordingly, Mr. Stow cannot establish a causal link between any alleged "half-

off' beer promotion (which did not occur on Opening Day) and the injuries to Mr. Stow. e) 69. The Dodgers Cannot Be Held Liable For Failing To Escort Mr. Stow And His Companions Through The Parking Lot.

With respect to Mr. Stow's contention that his injuries were caused by the failure

of the Dodgers to provide him with an escort to the taxicab stand after the game, Complaint at
~ 111, the California Court of Appeal has expressly rejected that proposition as a matter of law.

In Rogers, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 408, the court specifically addressed the hypothetical that a sports team could prevent an altercation in a parking lot by "assign[ing] an attendant or guard to each of the 53,000 fans in attendance." In that case, the court concluded that any such precautionary

measure "would be totally unreasonable and beyond the requirements of ordinary care." Id. The same is true here, particularly where there is no allegation that Stow or his companions even requested an escort for what should have been a very short walk from the Right Field Pavilion exit to the taxicab stand. t) 70. The Dodgers Are Not Liable For The Presence of Alleged Gang Members.

Finally, Mr. Stow alleges that his injuries were caused by the presence of "known Complaint at ~ 9. Nowhere does the Complaint allege that Mr. There is also no

criminals or gang members."

Stow's assailants were themselves "known criminals or gang members."

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evidence that Mr. Norwood or Mr. Sanchez are in fact gang members, or that the Dodgers had any actual knowledge of gang membership or prior criminal conduct by Mr. Stow's assailants. 71. In any event, the Dodgers cannot be held liable to Mr. Stow even if they allowed

individuals who might be gang members to attend Dodger games. In Castaneda v. Olsher, 162 P.3d 610 (Cal. 2007),63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99 (2007), a resident of a mobile home park was shot and injured as a result of a gang confrontation involving a resident of a neighboring mobile home. The victim sued the owner of the mobile home park on the basis that he had breached his duty not to rent to gang members. The California Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, no liability could be established on the basis that the landlord rented the mobile home to the gang member because to impose a duty on landlords to bar entry to "anyone who might be a gang member ... [would result in many cases in] arbitrary discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, family composition, dress and appearance, or reputation." original). ld. at 617 (emphasis in

The court also dismissed the notion that a landlord has a duty to investigate a rental

applicant's criminal record if that applicant "looks, dresses or talks like a gang member," stating that this obligation would be "burdensome, dubiously effective and socially questionable." 618. 72. The court in Castaneda further found the landlord not liable as a matter oflaw for ld at

not hiring security guards, even though prior gang activity involving a resident of the mobile home park had occurred on an adjacent empty lot. ld at 621-622. The court found this evidence insufficient to make violence foreseeable enough for the landlord to hire security guards. ld.

Moreover, the court held that causation could not be established because there was no evidence that the presence of security guards would have prevented the crime. ld at 622. In the instant case, even if foreseeability could be established, the Dodgers had a more than adequate security

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presence to address any risk of gang member activity and Mr. Stow will not be able to submit any evidence that the presence of more security guards would have prevented the altercation. 73. For all of the foregoing reasons, and based on the material facts which are not in

genuine issue, the Dodgers are entitled to summary judgment and the Stow Claim should be disallowed as a matter oflaw.

c.

In The Alternative, Punitive Damages Should Be Disallowed. 74. The Complaint on which the Stow Claim is based seeks an award of punitive

damages "according to proof." Complaint at 31 :6. This claim for punitive damages claim should be disallowed as a matter oflaw. California Civil Code section 3294(a) permits the

recovery of punitive damages only if the plaintiff can prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant has been guilty of "oppression, fraud, or malice": In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). Section 3294 goes on to define malice, oppression, and fraud as follows: (c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

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Id. at § 3294(c). 75. Nowhere does Mr. Stow allege that the Dodgers actually intended to cause injury

to Mr. Stow. The question is therefore whether the Dodgers' conduct was "despicable" and in "conscious disregard" of Mr. Stow's rights or safety. As a California court has explained: The adjective "despicable" connotes conduct that is ''' ... so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.' " [Citation] "'[A] breach of a fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] The wrongdoer "'must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights. [Citations.] "'Punitive damages are appropriate if the defendant's acts are reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy. The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does notjustify the imposition ofpunitive damages .... Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. '" Lackner v. North, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863,881 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added)(citations omitted). "Conscious disregard" has been interpreted to mean that "the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences." Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615,621 (Ct. App.

1994) (citing Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854,856 (Cal. 1979); Mockv. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1992)). Malice or oppression must be established by "clear and convincing evidence," which requires a "finding of high probability ... so clear as to leave no substantial doubt ... sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." Lackner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882 (citation omitted). 76. The Complaint attempts to justify punitive damages by alleging that the Dodgers

willfully and deliberately failed to prevent the altercation involving Mr. Stow by (1) failing to hire a permanent security chief even though they allegedly knew that there was criminal activity

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at Dodger Stadium, Complaint at '1175;(2) failing to heighten security, Complaint, at '1179;and (3) initiating a "half-off' beer promotion, Complaint, at'll 85. As discussed above, many of these allegations have no basis in fact - most notably, the allegation that the Dodgers offered a "halfprice" beer promotion on Opening Day, which is simply not true. But in any event, those allegations, even if somehow proven, would fail as a matter oflaw to support Mr. Stow's claim for punitive damages. 77. The first allegation fails because the Noble court explained at length that an

abstract contention that "a significant increase in police personnel will prevent all crime or any particular crime" is unreasonable and dismissed it as a basis even for establishing negligence, let alone punitive damages. Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 399; see also Nola M, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108. Moreover, in light of the massive security effort that was deployed on Opening Day, it is irresponsible to suggest that the Dodgers exhibited "extreme indifference" to the public's rights. Lackner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 881. 78. The second allegation fails because Mr. Stow cannot plausibly show that a

permanent security chief would have changed security in a specific way that would have prevented the injuries to Mr. Stow. 79. The third allegation, that the initiation of a "half-off' beer promotion provides a

basis for punitive damages, is nonsense - especially because no such promotion was offered at Opening Day. See Hughes Decl. at '1112. If selling beer at a discount constitutes conduct "so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people" then the same description must apply to every "happy hour" at bars and restaurants. 80. Accordingly, based on the material facts that are not genuinely at issue, no basis

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exists as a matter oflaw for Mr. Stow's claim for punitive damages, and this Court should grant summary judgment dismissing that claim against LAD. D. The Claims Of Tyler Stow And Tabitha Stow Should Be Disallowed Based On The Ruling Of The California State Court. 81. Both the Complaint and the Stow Claim include several causes of action by

Mr. Stow's children, Tyler Stow and Tabitha Stow. On September 30,2011, the California state court sustained a demurrer filed by the non-debtor defendants as to the claims of Tyler Stow and Tabitha Stow, without leave to amend. In its ruling, the state court concluded that Mr. Stow's children "failed to allege any duty in negligence owed to the plaintiffs who were not present at the premises and did not observe the alleged incident, and that a claim for loss of consortium is not cognizable as to parents' children." See Levinson Decl., Exs. 3 and 4. 82. The ruling above applies with equal force to the claims ofMr. Stow's children

against LAD. Accordingly, on that additional basis, summary judgment should be granted against those plaintiffs. NOTICE 83. Notice of this Motion has been given to (i) the United States Trustee for the

District of Delaware; (ii) counsel to the Stows; and (iii) all parties that, as of the filing of this Motion, have requested notice in these chapter 11 cases pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Dodgers submit that, under the circumstances, no other or further notice is required.

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WHEREFORE, the Dodgers respectfully request that this Court enter an order, in substantially the form of Exhibit A hereto, (i) granting this Motion; (ii) disallowing the Stow Claim and (iii) granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: February 3, 2012 Wilmington, Delaware YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP

Robert S. Brady 0. Pauline K. Morgan (No. Donald J. Bowman, Jr. (No. Ryan M. Bartley (No. 4985) Rodney Square 1000 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19899 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253 -andDEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP Bruce Bennett Sidney P. Levinson Monika S. Wiener Michael C. Schneidereit (pro hac vice application forthcoming) 333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2600 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 621-6000 Facsimile: (213) 621-6100 Co-Counsel for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC, et al., 1 Debtors.
________________

) Chapter 11 ) ) Case No. 11-12010 (KG) ) ) Jointly Administered )
) )

Hearing Date: March 7,2012 at 10:00 a.m. (ET) Objection Deadline: February 22, 2012 at 4:00 p.m. (ET)

NOTICE OF MOTION TO: (I) THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE; (II) COUNSEL TO THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS; (III) COUNSEL TO THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL DOING BUSINESS AS MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL; (IV) COUNSEL TO BASEBALL FINANCE LLC; (V) COUNSEL TO BRYAN STOW, TYLER STOW AND TABITHA STOW; AND (VI) ALL PARTIES THAT HAVE REQUESTED NOTICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 2002, IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEL. BANKR. LR 2002-1(B).

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-captioned debtors and debtors in possession (the "Debtors") have filed the attached Motion of Los Angeles Dodgers LLC for Disallowance of Claims Asserted by Bryan Stow, Tyler Stow and Tabitha Stow (the "Motion"). PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that any objections to the Motion must be filed on or before February 22, 2012 at 4:00 p.m. (ET) (the "Objection Deadline") with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, 824 N. Market Street, 3rd Floor, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. At the same time, you must serve a copy of the objection upon the undersigned counsel to the Debtors so as to be received on or before the Objection Deadline. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT A HEARING ON THE MOTION WILL BE HELD ON MARCH 7, 2012 AT 10:00 A.M. (ET) BEFORE THE HONORABLE KEVIN GROSS AT THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, 824 N. MARKET STREET, 6TH FLOOR, COURTROOM NO.3, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801.

The Debtors, together with the last four digits of each Debtor's federal tax identification number are: Los Angeles Dodgers LLC (3133); Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company LLC (4851); LA Holdco LLC (2567); LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC (4850); and LA Real Estate LLC (3029). The location of the Debtors' corporate headquarters and the service address for the Debtors is: 1000 Elysian Park Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90012.

01: 11774099.1

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, IF YOU FAIL TO RESPOND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS NOTICE, THE COURT MAY GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED IN THE MOTION WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE OR A HEARING. Dated: February 3, 2012 Wilmington, Delaware YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT & TAYLOR, LLP lsi Donald J Bowman Jr. Robert S. Brady (No. 2847) Pauline K. Morgan (No. 3650) Donald J. Bowman, Jr. (No. 4383) Ryan M. Bartley (No. 4985) Rodney Square 1000 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Telephone: (302) 571-6600 Facsimile: (302) 571-1253 -andDEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP Bruce Bennett Sidney P. Levinson Joshua M. Mester 333 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2600 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 621-6000 Facsimile: (213) 621-6100 -andDEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP Martin J. Bienenstock Philip M. Abelson 1301 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019 Telephone: (212) 259-8000 Facsimile: (212) 259-6333 Co-Counsel for the Debtors and Debtors in Possession

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EXHIBIT A Proposed Order

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC, et al., lL Chapter 11 Case No. 11-12010 (KG) Jointly Administered Debtors.
Ref. Docket No.

ORDER GRANTING LOS ANGELES DODGERS LLC'S MOTION FOR DISALLOWANCE OF_CLAIMS ASSERTED BY BRYAN STOW, TYLER STOW AND TABITHA STOW Upon consideration of the Motion (the "Motion,,)13 of Los Angeles Dodgers LLC ("LAD"), to disallow the Stow Claim; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1334; and consideration of the Motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § IS7(b); and venue being proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and due and proper notice of the Motion having been provided; and it appearing that no other or further notice need be provided; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, and finding that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that LAD is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, it is hereby ORDERED, 1. 2. ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that:

The Motion is granted. The Stow Claim is disallowed in its entirety.

12 The Debtors, together with the last four digits of each Debtor's federal tax identification number are: Los Angeles Dodgers LLC (3133); Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company LLC (4851); LA Holdco LLC (2567); LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC (4850); and LA Real Estate LLC (3029). The location of the Debtors' corporate headquarters and the service address for the Debtors is: lOOOElysian Park Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90012.

13

Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Motion.

3.

The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or

related to the implementation of this Order.

Dated: Wilmington, Delaware March __ , 2012 KEVIN GROSS CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

USl32298213.2

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