Acknoyleogements v
Acronyms vi
Summary viii
1. Introduction 1
Creehhouse gases ahd !oresIs 2
ClimaIe chahge agreemehIs: origihs ahd sIaIus 3
ForesIs uhder Ihe UNFCCC ahd Ihe KyoIo ProIocol 4
Ceheral obligaIiohs IhaI may Iouch oh !oresIs 5
ObligaIiohs o! developed couhIry ParIies 6
Flexible mechahisms 7
Clari!icaIiohs !rom COP-6 Io COP-9 8
AccouhIihg 9
AcIiviIies 14
LimiIs 16
Cleah DevelopmehI Mechahism 17
ComplicaIiohs !or poIehIial haIiohal legislaIioh 19
2. 5ome nationaI IegaI responses 21
UhiIed SIaIes o! America 21
Luropeah CommuhiIy 24
CosIa Rica 24
AusIralia 25
Cahada 26
Domihicah Republic 27
Peru 27
Spaih 27
New Zealahd 27
Dehmark 28
3. LegaI and institutionaI issues o! !orest-based mitigation 29
ProperIy ahd Irahs!er issues 31
Owhership 31
Size 36
DuraIioh ahd Iimihg 38
1rahs!er 39
Risk 41
LiabiliIy ahd damages 43
RegulaIory commahd-ahd-cohIrol issues 44
Subsidy ahd Iax issues 45
Ih!ormaIioh issues 47
LducaIioh 47
CerIi!icaIioh ahd veri!icaIioh 48
Plahhihg 49
Research 50
IhsIiIuIiohs 50
4. 5ome concIuding observations !or IegisIative dra!ters 53
WhaI should be Ihe role o! legislaIioh ih supporIihg use o! !oresIs
ih CHC miIigaIioh? 53
WhaI experIise mighI dra!Iers heed Io succeed ih Ihis area? 53
ßibIiography 55
LegislaIioh ciIed 58
MulIilaIeral IreaIies 58
Regiohal, haIiohal ahd subhaIiohal legislaIioh 58
1Lis pullication yas prepareo ly IennetL ¡. Eosenlaum, Principal, Sylvan
¡nvironmental Consultants (Syenco), WasLington, LC, Lniteo States, ano reviseo
ano expanoeo ly Lieter ScLoene, !AC !orest Eesources Livision, ano Ali
Mekouar, !AC ¡egal Cllice. 1Le autLors tLank tLe lolloying persons lor tLeir
contrilutions: jon ¡inosay ol tLe !AC ¡egal Cllice, ¡aura Iosloll ano Mark
1rexler ol 1rexler Climate ano ¡nergy Services, ¡nc., Susan Casey-¡elkoyitz ol
tLe Þational Eesources Lelense Council, CLarles oi ¡eva ol tLe Worlo Bank, Anni
¡ukács ol tLe Worlo Conservation Lnion ¡nvironmental ¡ay Center, jenniler
Gleason, Marc Allas ano CLirmini Iooituyakku, participants in tLe ¡-¡AW
netyork, Hans IolsLus ol !AC`s ¡nvestment Centre Livision, Heikki GranLolm,
Programme Cllicer, Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange
Secretariat, Martina jung ol tLe Hamlurg ¡nstitute ol ¡nternational ¡conomics,
Eita Þeznek ol tLe Society ol American !oresters, Mike MurpLy ol tLe Lniteo
States Lepartment ol Agriculture ÷ !orest Service, CLris Eolle ol West Coast
¡nvironmental ¡ay, Lave SpittleLouse ol tLe BritisL Columlia Ministry ol
!orests, Canaoa, ano 1ony ¡empriere ol Þatural Eesources Canaoa. Memlers ol
tLe !AC ¡nteroepartmental Working Group on Climate CLange kinoly revieyeo
initial versions ol tLe paper. 1Le ¡nvironmental ¡ay ¡nstitute in WasLington,
LC, provioeo lilrary ano online resources. 1Le ¡nvironmental ano Biomolecular
Systems Lepartment ol tLe Cregon HealtL ano Science Lniversity, Lniteo States,
supplieo lilrary access lor Mr Eosenlaum. 1Le !AC ¡egal Cllice ano tLe !AC
¡nteroepartmental Working Group on Climate CLange (Wull Iillmann, CLair)
provioeo linancing.
AI] Activities implementeo jointly
AAL Assigneo amount unit
CAP Common Agricultural Policy (¡C)
CCB Certilicate lor lorest conservation (Costa Eica)
CDM Clean Levelopment MecLanism
CLK Certilieo emission reouction
CLKCLA CompreLensive ¡nvironmental Eesponse, Compensation ano
¡ialility Act (Lniteo States)
Carlon oioxioe
COP Conlerence ol tLe Parties (to tLe LÞ!CCC)
COP/MOP !irst session ol tLe Conlerence ol tLe Parties serving as tLe
meeting ol tLe Parties to tLe Iyoto Protocol
CTO Certilialle 1raoalle Cllset
LC ¡uropean Community
LCCP ¡uropean Climate CLange Programme
LKL ¡mission reouction unit
IAO !ooo ano Agriculture Crganization ol tLe Lniteo Þations
IOÞAIIIO Þational !uno lor !orestry !inance (Costa Eica)
CLKT GreenLouse Gas ¡mission Eeouction 1raoing (Canaoa)
CHC GreenLouse gas
CMO Genetically mooilieo organisms
CPC-LLLLCI ¡PCC Gooo Practice Guioance lor ¡ano use, ¡ano-use
cLange ano !orestry
IÞAKLI Þational !orestry Agency, Lominican Eepullic
IPCC ¡ntergovernmental Panel on Climate CLange
ISO ¡nternational Crganization lor Stanoaroization
]I joint ¡mplementation
lCLK ¡ong-term certilieo emission reouction
LLLLCI ¡ano Lse, ¡ano-Lse CLange ano !orestry
Mt Megatonne (1 million tonnes)
ÞCO Þon-governmental organization
OCIC Cllice on joint ¡mplementation (Costa Eica)
ppm Parts per million
KML Eemoval unit
SBSTA Sulsioiary Booy lor Scientilic ano 1ecLnical Aovice
TAK 1Liro Assessment Eeport ol tLe ¡ntergovernmental Panel on
Climate CLange
tCLK 1emporary certilieo emission reouction
LÞ Lniteo Þations
LÞICCC LÞ !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange
LSC Lniteo States Cooe
1Lis pullication examines tLe oevelopment ol international lay on climate cLange
ano oiscusses yLat issues national ano sulnational legislative looies may Lave to
consioer regaroing climate cLange mitigation ano lorests.
Climate cLange presents tLe yorlo yitL a oaunting prollem. ¡merging science
suggests tLat Lumans may le alout to cause a major cLange in yorlo climates. 1Le
economic ano ecological stakes are LigL. ¡n an ioeal yorlo, mature science youlo
guioe policy ano legal relorm. ¡n tLe real yorlo, ye oo not alyays Lave tLe luxury
ol certainty ano tLe comlort ol strictly rational oecisions laseo on scientilic insigLt.
Eesponoing to tLe cLallenge yill reouire pioneering ellorts in science, politics,
pollution control, lorest lano management ano lay.
As oescrileo most recently in tLe 1Liro Assessment Eeport ol tLe
¡ntergovernmental Panel on Climate CLange (1AE), most scientists tLink tLat
increaseo atmospLeric levels ol greenLouse gases, incluoing carlon oioxioe (CC
contrilute to climate cLange. !urtLermore, tLe 1AE sees strong evioence tLat most
ol tLe yarming olserveo over tLe last 50 years is attrilutalle to Luman activities.
WLile lurning ol lossil luels ano oelorestation aoo CC
ano otLer greenLouse gases
to tLe atmospLere, vegetation ano soils can lunction as net carlon sinks ano long-
term carlon reservoirs.
Lnoer tLe Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange
(LÞ!CCC), tLe international community is committeo to reoucing net
greenLouse gas emissions. WLen in lorce, tLe Iyoto Protocol to tLe Convention
yill give Parties listeo in Annex ¡ ol tLe Protocol (mostly oevelopeo countries ano
countries yitL economies in transition) specilic reouction targets. 1Ley can meet
tLese targets ly reoucing emissions or ly promoting carlon sinks. 1Le reouctions
can le accomplisLeo oomestically or tLrougL cooperative actions involving otLer
Parties to tLe Convention. 1Le Parties to tLe Convention Lave leen meeting
annually to clarily rules ano mooalities ol climate cLange mitigation, ano recent
meetings (particularly Conlerence ol tLe Parties 6 [CCP-6|, CCP-6lis, CCP-7,
CCP-8 ano CCP-9) Lave aooresseo specilic issues concerning tLe so-calleo ¡ano
Lse, ¡ano-Lse CLange ano !orestry (¡L¡LC!) activities.
AltLougL lorests may play an important role in tLe international response to
climate cLange, Parties to tLe Convention Lave olten reacLeo oillerent conclusions
regaroing tLe proper role ol lorests ano appropriate national legislation to loster
tLat role:
º !irst, olligations ol Parties oiller, particularly letyeen Annex ¡ nations ano
non-Annex ¡ nations. 1Lis applies to olligations lor emission reouctions, lut
also many otLer commitments, e.g. reporting.
º Secono, altLougL tLe Conlerences ol tLe Parties Lave settleo many points,
some ouestions remain alout tLe role ol Larvesteo yooo prooucts ano
lorestry projects in meeting tLose olligations, notally Loy to simplily
rules ano mooalities lor small-scale allorestation ano relorestation projects,
ano Loy to traoe ano oeal yitL carlon creoits originating oomestically or
º 1Liro, tLe legal issues ol climate cLange mitigation tLrougL lorests yill
oepeno on approacLes taken to mitigation ano compliance in otLer sectors.
A nation`s metLoo ol lorest-laseo mitigation must le compatille yitL tLe
nation`s overall approacL to greenLouse gas control, a nation tLat cLooses
to rely on sulsioies ano inoirect regulation to reouce emissions ly inoustry
yill prolally approacL tLe role ol lorests oillerently lrom a nation tLat relies
on oirect regulation ol emissions or lrom a nation tLat cLooses to rely on
º !ourtL, tLe approacLes taken yill vary oepenoing on national lorest policies,
institutions, lorest oynersLip structures, ecosystems, lays, neeos ano otLer
national circumstances.
º !iltL, tLe role ol national or supranational legislation on compliance (versus
international stanoaros set ly tLe Parties) is still unclear. Complicating tLe issue
lurtLer, in some cases glolal ano regional stanoaros may oiverge. !or example,
altLougL tLe Iyoto Protocol alloys Parties to lullil parts ol tLeir olligations
tLrougL purcLasing certilieo emission reouctions (C¡Es) lrom carlon ollset
projects unoer tLe Clean Levelopment MecLanism (CLM) involving lorests,
a recent proposal lor a ¡uropean Community Lirective (CCM[2003| +03)
seeks to eliminate creoits createo lrom ¡L¡LC! activities lrom recognition
in internal emission traoing yitLin tLe ¡uropean Community.
1o oate, national legislative activity on tLe issue ol lorests ano climate cLange
Las leen limiteo. Countries Lave relieo more on creative use ol existing legislation
tLan creation ol ney legislation.
1Lere are a ley exceptions. Costa Eica Las createo a Certilieo 1raoalle Cllset to
attract oevelopeo nations looking to sponsor mitigation projects. 1Le lirst project
lunoeo unoer tLis mecLanism Las involveo lorests. 1Le state ol Þey SoutL Wales in
Australia Las cLangeo its property lays to recognize a separate legal interest in tLe
carlon seouestration potential ol lorest lano. 1Le Lominican Eepullic Las aoopteo
a lay tLat yill alloy it to create incentives lor managing lorests lor environmental
services sucL as carlon seouestration. Þey Zealano is actively struggling yitL tLe
ouestion ol oynersLip ol carlon seouestereo in tLat country`s extensive oomestic
allorestation ano relorestation. 1Le list ol otLer jurisoictions tLat Lave consioereo
or aoopteo some sort ol lorest-relateo climate lays incluoes tLe Lniteo States ano
some ol its constituent states, tLe ¡uropean Lnion, tLe Canaoian province ol
Allerta, Peru, Spain ano Lenmark.
1Le lull range ol lorest legislation in response to climate cLange coulo incluoe
protection, aoaptation ano mitigation initiatives. Protective measures youlo attempt
to guaro existing lorests lrom oestruction or oegraoation tLrougL clear-cutting or
unsustainalle management, or lrom climate cLange-relateo oamages. Aoaptation
initiatives youlo Lelp lorest managers prepare lorests lor tLe anticipateo aooitional
stresses lrom a cLanging climate ano tLe resulting extremes in yeatLer. Mitigation
initiatives youlo seouester more carlon in living lorest liomass, soils ano yooo
prooucts as yell as reouce tLe net amount ol national greenLouse gas (GHG)
emissions ly sulstituting yooo energy lrom sustainally manageo lorests lor lossil
luels, ano yooo prooucts lor energy-intensive materials, sucL as aluminium or
steel. 1Le oiscussion in tLis paper covers only mitigation tLrougL allorestation,
relorestation or lorest management.
Many issues coulo arise in ellorts to oevelop ney legislation to loster carlon
seouestration in lorests. A nation interesteo in a property-laseo system may Lave
to aooress sucL issues as:
º WLo can claim creoit ano receive payment lor carlon seouestration ano can
tLat oynersLip le translerreo¹
º WLo is responsille lor carlon oelits lrom oelorestation, lorest Larvesting or
natural calamities¹
º Hoy yill tLe amount ano ouration ol carlon creoits le oetermineo, recoroeo
ano verilieo¹
º Hoy can tLe government promote oroerly sales or otLer translers ol
º Hoy yill national lay allocate tLe risk ol lailure ol carlon seouestration
projects, complementary to any provisions alreaoy containeo in tLe
international agreements¹
º Will tLe lay assess lialility lor oamaging a lorest`s carlon seouestration
A nation interesteo in commano-ano-control approacLes to encourage lorest
sinks coulo turn to regulating lorest use ano management oirectly. !or example,
it coulo specily permissille logging tecLnioues, reouire prompt relorestation ol
Larvesteo or otLeryise oenuoeo areas, or set minimum stocking levels lor immature
stanos ano minimum Larvest ages lor mature stanos.
Þations coulo also promote tLe use ol lorests as sinks tLrougL sulsioies. 1Lese
may le payments, gooos or services given to lorest oyners to promote management
lor maximal carlon seouestration ÷ lor example, reyaroing oyners lor extenoing
rotations or reloresting yitL species tLat lix particularly LigL amounts ol carlon.
1Le sulsioies coulo also le in tLe lorm ol enLanceo government acouisition ano
management ol lanos lor carlon seouestration, or ol partial interests in lanos.
Governments coulo also speno money on letter enlorcement ol general lorest
protection lays or on promoting tLe tenoing ol young stanos lor letter groytL
ano LigLer stalility.
!inally, governments coulo try to promote lorest carlon seouestration
using inlormational mecLanisms. 1Lese incluoe inlorming lanooyners alout
management options ano aovantages tLrougL specializeo extension services,
guioing manulacturers ano consumers ol lorest prooucts on yays to reouce
yaste, certilying tLe success ol private seouestration ellorts, ollering Lelp in lorest
planning to consioer GHG impacts ano promoting researcL on lorest management
lor carlon seouestration.
CCP-9 linalizeo tLe majority ol tLe rules on ¡L¡LC! in Lecemler 2003. 1Lis
maoe tLe international role ol lorests in meeting seouestration goals mucL clearer
ano sLoulo Lelp tLose Parties tLat yisL to aoopt lays on ¡L¡LC! activities.
1Le sulject ol carlon storage in Larvesteo yooo prooucts, Loyever, is still unoer
oiscussion lut is unlikely to lecome a relevant implementation issue lelore 2012. ¡n
spite ol uncertainties on yLen tLe Iyoto Protocol yill enter into lorce, Parties yill
Lave to start responoing nationally soon il tLey Lope to meet impenoing oeaolines.
!or example, national systems lor tLe estimation ol removals ly sinks must le
in place lelore tLe eno ol 2006. Þations sLoulo noy le tackling tLe ouestion ol
yLetLer ano Loy to encourage ano integrate tLe use ol lorests as carlon sinks into
national legal regimes.
SON)A· ... Milail L:o:itcl plants [resl trees e:ery year.... He tries to pre:ent
tle old [orests being destroyed. I[ you listen to lin you uill agree uitl lin
entirely. He says tlat [orests beauti[y tle country, tlat tley teacl nan to
understand ulat is beauti[ul and de:elop a lo[ty attitude o[ nind. !orests
tenper tle se:erity o[ tle clinate. In countries ulere tle clinate is nild, less
energy is uasted on tle struggle uitl nature, and so nan is so[ter and nilder.
In sucl countries people are beauti[ul, supple and sensiti:e, tleir language is
elegant and tleir no:enents are grace[ul. Art and learning [lourisl anong
tlen, tleir plilosoply is not gloony, and tleir attitude to uonen is [ull o[
re[ined courtesy.
/MIHAIL LVOVITCH] ASTBOV· ... I an ready to let you cut doun uood as
you need it, but uly destroy tle [orests: ... Tlere are [euer and [euer [orests, tle
ri:ers are drying up, tle uild creatures beconing extinct, tle clinate is ruined,
and e:ery day tle eartl is grouing poorer and nore lideous.... Here you are
looking at ne uitl irony, and all I say seens to you not serious and ÷ perlaps I
really an a crank. But ulen I ualk by tle peasants' uoods ulicl I la:e sa:ed
[ron cutting doun, or ulen I lear tle rustling o[ tle young copse planted by ny
oun lands, I realize tlat tle clinate is to sone extent in ny pouer, and tlat i[ in
a tlousand years nan is to be lappy I too slall la:e lad sone snall land in it.
Irom Act I ol the play Uncle Vanya, by Anton Chekhov (1900),
as translated lrom the Kussian by Constance Carnett (1923)
1. Introduction
!orest managers lace tyo lasic concerns linkeo to Luman-inouceo climate cLange.
Cne is aoaptation: Can lorest managers reouce tLe oamage to lorests lrom
climate cLange¹ 1Le otLer is mitigation: Can lorest managers Lelp reouce climate
cLange itsell¹ !orestry Larlours tLis possilility via conservation ol lorests,
via management ol lorests as carlon sinks to ollset greenLouse gases emitteo
elseyLere, tLrougL its capacity to proouce reneyalle, carlon-neutral energy, ano
tLrougL its prooucts, yLicL not only store carlon lor apprecialle times lut can
sulstitute lor LigL-energy materials. 1Lis paper aooresses mitigation.
¡t is an appealing proposition to turn Larmlul emissions ol carlon oioxioe,
tLe main cause ol climate cLange, via pLotosyntLesis into ney lorests, tLerely
replacing some ol tLe 16 million Lectares ol natural lorests tLat tLe planet loses
annually. Almost tLree oecaoes alter Lyson (1977) pullisLeo tLis concept, 188
Parties to tLe Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange Lave
painstakingly elalorateo rules ano guioelines to put Lis ioea into practice tLrougL
tLe Iyoto Protocol.
Þegotiating tLe role ol lorests in mitigating climate cLange Las proveo time
consuming ano contentious. 1Le rules are complicateo ano proceoures costly to
tLe point tLat tLey may prevent some countries lrom using tLe lull range ol lorestry
options to temper climate cLange. Þoy countries lace tLe lormioalle cLallenge ol
creating national lrameyorks to implement tLe Iyoto Protocol regaroing lorests,
ano little time remains until 2008 ÷ tLe start ol tLe lirst commitment perioo. 1Lree
main tasks lie aLeao.
º Ceneral commitments concern all countries ano can le carrieo out yitL
relative ease. Action incluoes aooressing lorests in national aoaptation ano
mitigation programmes, raising ayareness, promoting sustainalle lorest
management ano conserving ano enLancing lorest sinks.
º Monitoring lorest carbon stock changes places oillerent luroens on
inoustrializeo ano oeveloping countries, lut cLallenges lotL.
º Transposing the international climate change regime into national
laws reouires ney or reviseo legislation on lorests at tLe national or
sulnational level, along yitL appropriate capacity ano institutions to support
1Le paper traces tLe groying international lay on climate cLange ano examines
yLat issues may come lelore national legislatures concerning lorests. 1Le lirst
section ol tLe paper ollers some lasic inlormation on climate cLange ano tLe
international legal response. 1Le secono section revieys some early national
responses relateo to lorests. 1Le tLiro section consioers some ol tLe general legal
issues tLat may emerge regaroing lorests ano climate cLange mitigation.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 2
GreenLouse gases (GHGs) play a key role in tLe ¡artL`s climate. ¡nergy lrom tLe
sun tLat passes tLrougL our atmospLere yarms tLe surlace ol tLe ¡artL. Some ol
tLat energy raoiates lack toyaros space lrom tLe surlace as inlrareo ligLt. GHGs
alsorl or reraoiate tLe inlrareo ligLt, preventing tLe energy lrom travelling out
into space, tLerely trapping Leat. WitLout GHGs, tLe planet youlo le too colo
to sustain its current lile. ¡ncreases in GHG levels coulo make tLe planet groy
yarmer. Accoroing to tLe current unoerstanoings ol yorlo climate, sucL yarming
youlo also cLange patterns ol precipitation, tLe lreouency ano intensity ol storms
ano extreme yeatLer, sea levels ano a pletLora ol relateo parameters ol terrestrial
ecology. Human unoerstanoing ol tLe glolal climate system is still imperlect, so
it is impossille to preoict yitL precision Loy tLe climate yill cLange in particular
places. Hoyever, most scientists stuoying tLe sulject preoict tLat yarming yill
signilicantly ano lor tLe most part aoversely allect Luman society (¡PCC, 2001).
1Le concentrations ol GHGs, notally ol carlon oioxioe (CC
), are
clearly increasing oying to Luman activity. ¡noustry noy aoos alout 6.3
gigatonnes ol carlon as CC
to tLe atmospLere eacL year, ano tLe oestruction
ol lorests contrilutes at least anotLer gigatonne. 1Le current concentration ol
in tLe atmospLere, 370 parts per million (ppm), is alout 35 percent LigLer
tLan it yas in pre-inoustrial times (280 ppm). AltLougL tLe total amount ol carlon
in tLe atmospLere is enormous (arouno 750 gigatonnes), antLropogenic activities
are clearly causing very signilicant increases (American Petroleum ¡nstitute,
¡n nature, GHGs are constantly entering ano leaving tLe atmospLere. 1Le
oceans excLange CC
ano otLer GHGs yitL tLe atmospLere ano Lolo CC

oissolveo or precipitateo out in seoiments. Actively groying trees ano otLer plants
capture CC
lrom tLe atmospLere, comline it yitL yater tLrougL pLotosyntLesis
ano create sugars ano more stalle carloLyorates. 1Ley may store a signilicant part
ol tLe carlon alsorleo lor apprecialle lengtLs ol time, lrom years to millennia.
CarloLyorates lecome tLe luiloing llocks ano energy supply lor most ol lile on
¡artL. ¡ventually, yLen plants ano animals oie, CC
returns to tLe atmospLere.
WLen yooo prooucts or otLer organic materials lurn or oecompose, tLey also
release CC
1Le ellect ol GHGs on climate is truly international. 1Le most oamaging
ellects lrom many otLer air pollutants are sLort term ano local, causing most
Larm near yLere tLey are releaseo. 1Lerelore, control ol tLese ellects is a local or
regional concern. ¡n contrast, GHGs cause glolal cLanges to climate. Þo matter
yLere GHG emissions originate, tLey oisperse tLrougLout tLe atmospLere. 1o
control GHG-inouceo climate cLange, ye must curl GHG sources ano enLance
carlon sinks on a glolal scale.
justilially, most attention Las locuseo on lossil luels ano cement as tLe major
source ol greenLouse gases. Hoyever, lorests Lave also receiveo attention.
1Lree classes ol lorest-relateo activity can allect GHG concentrations. 1Le
lirst is tLe estallisLment, enLancement or protection ol lorest ecosystems.
Introduction 3
Allorestation ano relorestation ol non-loresteo lanos can increase, ano prevention
ol oelorestation can maintain, tLe amount ol carlon Lelo in lorests. 1Lese are
yioely acknoyleogeo as potential means ol ollsetting or reoucing a part ol
antLropogenic GHG emissions. 1Leir relatively loy cost, compareo yitL non-
lorest ollset options, may make tLem economically attractive (Layal, 2000).
Humans can also vary tLe yay tLey manage existing lorests to increase tLe carlon
storage on site. !or example, selective cutting scLemes, lengtLeneo rotations,
reouceo-impact logging, ano species cLoice may acLieve a LigLer average level ol
seouestereo carlon. Simply postponing or eliminating Larvesting can sometimes
le a sLort- to meoium-term means to keep carlon seouestereo (ScLulze, WirtL
ano Heimann, 2000).
1Le secono is tLe enLanceo use ol lorest prooucts. Lsing yooo in luiloings
ano otLer long-liveo oljects ellectively seouesters carlon lor tLe lile ol tLe olject.
Sulstituting essentially carlon-neutral yooo lor energy-intensive materials sucL
as lrick, aluminium or steel may signilicantly reouce tLe use ol lossil luels, yLicL
ol course release carlon oioxioe yLen lurneo.
1Le tLiro is sustainalle proouction ol yooo luel lrom lorests, yLicL can
oisplace lossil luels. AltLougL lurning ol liomass luels releases CC
, tLe regroytL
ol a sustainally manageo lorest ollsets tLat release. 1Lus, lorest luels can supply
energy virtually yitLout net contrilution to GHG levels.
1Le international community Las responoeo to tLe cLallenge ol climate cLange
yitL a series ol agreements. 1Le Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on
Climate CLange (LÞ!CCC) yas signeo at tLe Lniteo Þations Conlerence on
¡nvironment ano Levelopment in 1992 ano entereo into lorce in MarcL 199+. As
ol May 200+, 188 nations Lao ratilieo or acceoeo to tLe Convention (LÞ!CCC
Secretariat, 200+a). 1Le LÞ!CCC sets goals ano oljectives ano outlines lasic
mecLanisms lor tLe climate cLange regime, lut lacks many specilics, in particular
ouantilieo GHG reouction olligations. ¡t calls lor annual Conlerences ol tLe
Parties (CCPs) to york out lurtLer oetails ol tLe international response. 1Le lirst
CCP met in 1995, tLe nintL in Lecemler 2003 in Milan, ¡taly.
1Le Iyoto Protocol yas tLe proouct ol tLe tLiro CCP (CCP-3). 1Le Protocol
sets specilic reouction targets ano timetalles lor reoucing net GHG emissions
lrom inoustrializeo nations. ¡t Las not yet entereo into lorce. Article 25, paragrapL
1 reouires tLat tLe Protocol le ratilieo, approveo, accepteo or acceoeo to ly at
least 55 Parties, incluoing oevelopeo nations (listeo in Annex ¡ ol tLe LÞ!CCC)
responsille lor at least 55 percent ol 1990 Annex ¡ CC
emissions. ¡n MarcL 2001,
alter a cLange ol presioential aoministrations, tLe Lniteo States presioent oeclareo
tLat tLe Lniteo States yas yitLoraying its support lor tLe Iyoto Protocol ano
tLat Le youlo not seek to ratily it. 1Le Lniteo States yas responsille lor alout
36 percent ol 1990 emissions lrom Annex ¡ Parties. As a practical matter, il tLe
Lniteo States continues to yitLLolo support, tLe Eussian !eoeration must ratily
tLe Protocol or it yill not enter into lorce. As ol May 200+, 122 Parties Lao ratilieo
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 4
tLe Protocol, lut tLey represent only ++.2 percent ol 1990 Annex ¡ CC
(LÞ!CCC Secretariat, 200+l). ¡n late May 200+, tLe Eussian presioent stateo tLat
tLe Eussian !eoeration yas likely to ratily tLe Protocol. (!or current ratilication
status, consult tLe LÞ!CCC ¡nternet site [unlccc.int|.)
1Le CCPs continue to meet ano proouce agreements ano oralt agreements
lor tLe lirst session ol tLe Conlerence ol tLe Parties serving as tLe meeting ol tLe
Parties to tLe Iyoto Protocol (CCP/MCP 1). 1Le Lniteo States Las not yitLorayn
lrom tLe LÞ!CCC ano participates in tLe CCPs, attenoing oiscussions on tLe
Protocol as an olserver. !orest issues Lave surlaceo most prominently in CCP-
6, CCP-6lis, CCP-7 ano CCP-9, oulleo tLe °lorest CCP°. Meeting in 1Le
Hague, tLe ÞetLerlanos, in Þovemler 2000, CCP-6 laileo to reacL agreement,
mainly over several issues relevant to ¡ano Lse, ¡ano-Lse CLange ano !orestry
(¡L¡LC!). 1Le Parties took tLe issues up again in july 2001 in Bonn, Germany
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 2001), in a meeting knoyn as CCP-6lis. 1Lis meeting proouceo
a oralt agreement (tLe Bonn agreement), yLicL tLe Parties aooeo to ano aoopteo
at CCP-7 in MarrakesL, Morocco, in Þovemler 2001 as tLe so-calleo MarrakesL
Accoros. 1Le oecisions ol CCP-7 can le louno in tLe lour main oocuments
proouceo at CCP-7 (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, 2002l, 2002c, 2002o). 1Le central
agreement concerning ¡L¡LC! is Lecision 11/CP.7 (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a,
pp. 5+÷63). 1Lis agreement is a recommenoation, ano tLe Parties to tLe Protocol
must lormally aoopt it alter tLe Protocol enters into lorce. Hoyever, like tLe
Protocol itsell, tLe agreement represents a yorking consensus ol tLe Parties on
tLese issues. 1Le next section ol tLis paper oiscusses lorest-relateo olligations ol
tLe Parties as stateo in tLe LÞ!CCC ano tLe Iyoto Protocol. 1Le sulseouent
section looks at some ol tLe ouestions tLat tLe LÞ!CCC ano tLe Protocol lelt
open, ano Loy CCP-6, CCP-7 ano CCP-9 Lave oealt yitL tLem.
Lnoerstanoing Loy tLe climate cLange agreements may allect lorests is a
complicateo task. !irst, lorests are integral to tLe glolal carlon cycle. Almost any
relerence to sinks or net emissions coulo Lave implications lor lorests. Secono,
tLe agreements tLemselves can le olscure. ¡n tLe negotiations, consensus Las
at times leen more important tLan clarity. WLere tLe negotiators encountereo
controversial issues, tLey sometimes oelerreo oecisions to later agreements or
useo amliguous language. 1Liro, altLougL tLe later agreements aoo content to
tLe earlier ones, tLe oocuments Lave no master inoex or talle ol cross-relerences
to guioe tLe researcLer. As a result, tLe texts reouire patient cross-cLecking ano
carelul scrutiny to unoerstano.
1Le oiscussion in tLis section outlines provisions relevant to lorests in tLe
LÞ!CCC ano tLe Iyoto Protocol. 1Le next section looks at tLe issues still
open alter Iyoto ano Loy tLe Parties aooresseo tLem lrom CCP-6 to CCP-9.
1Le reaoer yisLing to Lave a more tLorougL unoerstanoing ol tLe role ol lorests
sLoulo investigate tLe lull set ol oocuments, all availalle on tLe LÞ!CCC ¡nternet
Introduction 5
site (unlccc.int). ¡n aooition, tLe oocuments on tLe ¡ntergovernmental Panel on
Climate CLange (¡PCC) site (yyy.ipcc.cL) aooress some ol tLe tecLnical issues
concerning using, managing ano measuring tLe carlon sink potential ol lorests.
GeneraI obIigations that may touch on !orests
1Le LÞ!CCC casts a lroao net over tLe issue ol climate cLange. ¡ts Article 1
oelinitions illustrate tLat lreaotL. °Climate system° means °tLe totality ol tLe
atmospLere, LyorospLere, liospLere ano geospLere ano tLeir interactions°.
°Eeservoir° means °a component ol tLe climate system yLere a greenLouse gas
or a precursor ol a greenLouse gas is storeo.° Clearly, lorests ano yooo prooucts
are reservoirs. 1Le terms °source° ano °sink° also Lave lroao oelinitions. Sources
are processes or activities tLat contrilute GHGs to tLe atmospLere, ano sinks
are processes, activities, or mecLanisms tLat remove tLem. !orests may oualily
as eitLer or lotL oepenoing on yLetLer tLey are releasing, removing or lotL
releasing ano removing GHGs. 1Le term °emissions° is oelineo yitLout regaro
to tLe nature ol tLe source, so tLat a lorest may le a source ol emissions just as
surely as a lactory or a veLicle.
Article 3 ol tLe LÞ!CCC oeclares tLe lasic principles ol tLe Convention, ano
again it paints in lroao strokes. Lnoer paragrapL 3, it oeclares tLat policies ano
measures to comlat climate cLange sLoulo °le compreLensive, cover all relevant
sources, sinks ano reservoirs ol greenLouse gases . ano comprise all economic
sectors°. Clearly, tLis language covers lorests ano lorest management.
!or most nations looking to aoopt implementing legislation, tLe key provisions
ol tLe LÞ!CCC legin yitL Article +, oealing yitL commitments ol tLe Parties.
Article + contains tyo sets ol commitments. 1Le lirst set, in paragrapL 1, applies
to all Parties. 1Le secono set, in tLe sulseouent paragrapLs, largely oescriles
commitments ol °Annex ¡° or °Annex ¡¡° nations. Annex ¡¡ ol tLe LÞ!CCC
lists tLe major nations ol Western ¡urope, plus Australia, Canaoa, japan, Þey
Zealano, 1urkey ano tLe Lniteo States. Annex ¡ lists tLe Annex ¡¡ nations plus
several ¡uropean nations tLat yere in transition to a market economy in 1992
yLen tLe treaty yas yritten: lrom tLe lormer Lnion ol Socialist Soviet Eepullics,
tLe Eussian !eoeration, Belarus, ¡stonia, ¡atvia, ¡itLuania ano Lkraine, ano lrom
¡astern ¡urope, Bulgaria, CzecLoslovakia, Hungary, Polano ano Eomania.
Lnoer Article +, paragrapL 1 ol tLe LÞ!CCC, all Parties must:
º oevelop ano upoate inventories ol emissions ano removals ol GHGs (tLese
incluoe emissions lrom oelorestation ano removals lrom lorest groytL ano
also emissions lrom tLe lurning or oecomposition ol lorest prooucts),
º oevelop programmes to mitigate climate cLange, incluoing ellorts to aooress
emissions ano sinks, yLicL youlo incluoe lorests ano tLeir soils,
º promote tecLnologies tLat leao to loyer GHG emissions (tLis sulparagrapL
ol tLe LÞ!CCC specilically mentions tLe lorestry sector),
º promote sustainalle management ol sinks ano reservoirs (again, tLe
LÞ!CCC specilically mentions lorests),
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 6
º prepare to aoapt to tLe impacts ol climate cLange, ano oevelop appropriate
plans lor areas tLat migLt le allecteo ly lloooing, orougLt, or oesertilication.
(AltLougL tLe LÞ!CCC ooes not expressly mention lorests, yitL tLis
reouirement, tLey are a special concern ÷ trees cannot migrate as some
animals can, tLey can le extremely sensitive to cLanges in temperature,
precipitation ano evaporation, ano tLeir long lives make tLem vulneralle to
cLanges in climate tLat occur over tLe course ol oecaoes.)
ObIigations o! deveIoped country Parties
1Le LÞ!CCC oralters reasoneo tLat lecause tLe Annex ¡ nations yere responsille
lor most ol tLe increases in atmospLeric GHG concentrations, tLey sLoulo lear
a greater luroen in reoucing GHG emissions ano increasing sinks. Lnoer Article
+ ol tLe LÞ!CCC, tLese nations committeo tLemselves to aoopting policies to
limit GHG emissions ano protect ano enLance sinks ano reservoirs. Specilically,
tLese policies yere originally aimeo at returning net emissions to 1990 levels.
Clligations unoer tLe Iyoto Protocol are stronger ano mucL more specilic.
Iyoto Protocol Article 2 oirects Annex ¡ nations to protect ano enLance sinks ano
reservoirs, promote sustainalle lorest management, allorestation ano relorestation,
ano reouce incentives ano sulsioies tLat run counter to tLe oljectives ol tLe
LÞ!CCC. Iyoto Protocol Article 3 tigLtens tLe LÞ!CCC`s emissions goal,
calling lor a reouction ol aggregate emissions ol tLe countries listeo in Annex B
to 5 percent leloy 1990 levels ouring a lirst commitment perioo. Annex B ol tLe
Iyoto Protocol contains a sligLtly reviseo list ol LÞ!CCC Annex ¡ nations.

¡acL nation in Annex B Las a specilic net emissions target expresseo as a certain
percentage ol 1990 emissions. !or most countries tLe reouction target lies letyeen
92 ano 9+ percent, yLile tLe Eussian !eoeration ano Þey Zealano committeo
tLemselves to a stalilization ol emissions, ano Australia, ¡celano, ano Þoryay are
alloyeo to increase tLeir emissions ly a certain percentage alove tLe 1990 level.
(Memler States ol tLe ¡uropean Community Lave agreeo to acLieve compliance
jointly [Council ol tLe ¡uropean Community Lecision ol 25 April 2002| ano Lave
internally reoistriluteo assigneo net emissions unoer a luroen-sLaring agreement,
yLicL alloys increases lor some memlers lut reouces permissille emissions ol
otLers ly more tLan 20 percent.)
!urtLer, Article 3 ol tLe Iyoto Protocol sets out a time lrame lor acLieving
tLese reouctions. 1Le lormal commitment perioo is tLe live-year span lrom 2008
tLrougL 2012. Parties must sLoy progress toyaros tLe goal ly 2005.
WLat role may lorests play in meeting tLese reouctions¹ 1Le Protocol limits
yLicL lorestry activities count toyaros lullilment ol treaty olligations. Article 3,
paragrapL 3 ol tLe Iyoto Protocol states:
1Le net cLanges in greenLouse gas emissions ly sources ano removals ly
sinks resulting lrom oirect Luman-inouceo lano-use cLanges ano lorestry
Þot listeo in Annex B are Belarus ano 1urkey.
Introduction 7
activities, limited to allorestation, relorestation and delorestation since
1990, measureo as verilialle cLanges in carlon stocks in eacL commitment
perioo, sLall le useo to meet tLe commitments unoer tLis Article ol eacL Party
incluoeo in Annex ¡ [empLasis aooeo|.
CtLer kinos ol lorest activity migLt allect net GHG emissions. Cne example
is lorest management. ¡onger rotations, specilic tree species ano silvicultural
systems, selective Larvesting, maintenance ol large trees on-site as soil sLelter or
exclusion ol lire ano oisease migLt make a lorest a larger ano more permanent
carlon sink. AnotLer example is lorest protection. By legal or institutional
controls over lano use, a government can protect lano tLat youlo otLeryise le
likely to le oeloresteo. Article 3, paragrapL + ol tLe Protocol states:
1Le Conlerence ol tLe Parties [sLall oecioe| Loy, ano yLicL, aooitional
Luman-inouceo activities relateo to cLanges in greenLouse gas emissions ly
sources ano removals ly sinks in tLe agricultural soils ano tLe lano-use cLange
ano lorestry categories sLall le aooeo to, or sultracteo lrom, tLe assigneo
amounts lor Parties incluoeo in Annex ¡.. SucL a oecision sLall apply in tLe
secono ano sulseouent commitment perioos [i.e. alter 2012|. A Party may
cLoose to apply sucL a oecision on tLese aooitional Luman-inouceo activities
lor its lirst commitment perioo [2008 to 2012|, provioeo tLat tLese activities
Lave taken place since 1990.
As is oiscusseo leloy, CCP-7 reacLeo a oecision tLat tLe aooitional Luman-
inouceo lorest activities unoer Article 3, paragrapL + incluoe lorest management,
croplano management, grazing lano management ano revegetation (LÞ!CCC
CCP, 2002a, p. 59, 1 6).
fIexibIe mechanisms
Several provisions in tLe LÞ!CCC ano Iyoto Protocol alloy nations to acLieve
GHG emission reouctions or enLancement ol sinks cooperatively. As a general
matter, tLe LÞ!CCC commits tLe most LigLly oevelopeo nations, listeo in Annex
¡¡, to give oeveloping countries linancial ano tecLnical assistance to implement
tLe Convention ano oeal yitL tLe ellects ol climate cLange. LÞ!CCC Article +,
paragrapLs 3 tLrougL 5, olligates tLe oevelopeo nations to assist oeveloping
nations tLrougL lunoing lor emissions reouctions, lunoing lor aoaptation to
aoverse ellects ano transler ol environmentally souno tecLnologies.
1Le LÞ!CCC ollers tLe possilility tLat Parties can satisly some ol tLeir oyn
olligations to reouce GHG emissions ly Lelping otLer Parties reouce emissions.
1Le LÞ!CCC states tLat Annex ¡ Parties can return to tLeir 1990 GHG emission
levels °inoivioually or jointly° (Article +, sulparagrapL 2[l|) ano tLat Parties
coulo implement national climate cLange mitigation policies jointly (Article +,
sulparagrapL 2[a|). 1Le ¡uropean Lnion Las employeo tLis article in setting up its
internal luroen-sLaring system (see ¡L Council Lecision ol 25 April 2002 [2002/
358/C¡|). At tLe time it yas signeo, tLe Parties Lao some internal oisagreements
alout tLe role ol joint ¡mplementation (j¡). 1Le Convention expressly oirecteo tLe
Conlerence ol tLe Parties to oevelop criteria lor j¡ (Article +, sulparagrapL 2[o|).
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 8
1Le Parties agreeo to a pilot pLase to test tLe leasilility ol activities implementeo
jointly (A¡j).
1Le Iyoto Protocol legins to set up a lrameyork lor tLe transler ol emission
permits letyeen Parties, lut it leaves some uncertainties. Articles +, 6, 12 ano
17 ol tLe Protocol contemplate llexille mecLanisms ol compliance. Article +
oeals yitL tLe possilility tLat a group ol Annex ¡ Parties or a regional economic
integration organization coulo jointly lullil tLeir reouction commitment ano
Loy sucL a so-calleo °lullle° allects tLe reouction olligations ol tLe Protocol.
Article 6 alloys Annex ¡ Parties to transler °emission reouction units° generateo
tLrougL j¡ projects ano alloys Parties to autLorize °legal entities° to participate in
tLese translers. ¡ligille j¡ projects incluoe all ¡L¡LC! activities alloyeo unoer
Article 3, paragrapLs 3 ano +.
Iyoto Protocol Article 12 introouces tLe Clean Levelopment MecLanism
(CLM), originally a part ol A¡j. 1Le CLM is an instrument unoer tLe autLority
ol tLe CCP ano superviseo ly an ¡xecutive Boaro. CLM projects yill typically
involve Annex ¡ countries as investors ano non-Annex ¡ Parties as Losts, essentially
joint ventures letyeen oevelopeo ano oeveloping countries. Hoyever, tLe traoing
rules oo not explicitly reouire CLM projects to le linanceo ly oevelopeo
countries, oeveloping countries can initiate tLeir oyn projects to create certilieo
emission reouctions ano tLen sell tLem to Annex ¡ Parties (Lnilateral CLM).
Eeouctions resulting lrom tLese projects, leginning in tLe year 2000, count
toyaros satislying an Annex ¡ Party`s olligations to reouce aggregate emissions
ouring tLe years 2008 to 2012. An °operational entity° accreoiteo ly tLe CCP
must valioate tLe project lelore implementation ano verily tLe project`s emission
reouctions lelore tLe ¡xecutive Boaro can issue creoits lor tLe emission reouctions
acLieveo. CLM projects can le implementeo in tLe energy sector as yell as in tLe
¡L¡LC! sector. ¡n tLe CLM, Loyever, tLe latter are restricteo to allorestation
ano relorestation projects only. !orest management ano conservation, as yell as
carlon seouestration in agriculture, remain excluoeo lrom tLe CLM lor tLe lirst
commitment perioo.
!inally, Iyoto Protocol Article 17 oirects tLe CCP to oeline tLe rules lor
emissions traoing among Annex B Parties.
1Le LÞ!CCC ano Iyoto Protocol lelt open some important ouestions
concerning ¡L¡LC! activities:
º Accounting. Hoy sLoulo Parties ouantily tLe amount ol carlon removeo
tLrougL lorest sink activities¹ Hoy can tLe Parties measure tLe ellect ol tLese
activities relially¹ Cnce tLe removal is measureo, Loy sLoulo Parties keep
track ol it ano report it¹
º Activities. WLat activities oualily as °oirect Luman-inouceo lano-use cLange
ano lorestry activities° unoer Iyoto Protocol Article 3¹ More specilically,
yLat oo tLe terms °allorestation°, °relorestation° ano °oelorestation° mean,
Introduction 9
as useo in Article 3, paragrapL 3, ano yLat otLer lorestry activities can ollset
emissions unoer Article 3, paragrapL +¹
º Limits. SLoulo tLere le a limit on Loy mucL creoit a Party can claim lor its
¡L¡LC! activities¹ !or example, coulo a Party rely entirely on lorest sinks
to acLieve its emission goals¹
º Cooperation. WLat rules apply to lorestry projects unoer tLe llexille
mecLanisms, incluoing Article 6 on joint ¡mplementation, Article 12 on
Clean Levelopment MecLanism ano Article 17 on emissions traoing¹ Are
tLere any limits on tLe amount ol creoit tLat a Party may claim lor projects
in otLer countries¹
Hoy to measure tLe carlon removeo tLrougL lorest activities is largely a tecLnical
matter, altLougL it Las policy implications. Human knoyleoge ol tLe carlon cycle
is imperlect, ano so policy-makers lace uncertainties. Hoy ooes lorest management
allect carlon in lorest soils¹ ¡l trees are Larvesteo ano tLe yooo is useo lor lilre,
Loy long yill tLe carlon in tLe yooo remain out ol tLe atmospLere¹ ¡l ye cannot
ansyer ouestions like tLese yitL certainty, Loy sLoulo ye grant creoit lor lorestry
activities tLat raise tLese kinos ol ouestion¹
CCP-6 ano CCP-7 oio not oller complete ansyers to tLese ouestions, lut
tLey oio provioe some lasic guioing principles ano relevant oelinitions, ano tLey
mappeo out a means lor lilling in missing oetails. ¡igLt policy principles governing
tLe treatment ol ¡L¡LC! activities (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 56, 1 1) can le
louno in tLe CCP-7 Lecision 11/CP.7 ano incluoe tLe lolloying:
º °1Lat tLe treatment ol tLese activities le laseo on souno science.° 1Lis
seems to le a straigLtloryaro statement. Hoyever, it may imply acting
conservatively yLere tLe science is uncertain.
º °1Lat consistent metLooologies le useo over time.° 1Lis too youlo seem
to le straigLtloryaro. Hoyever, tLe principle is potentially in conllict yitL
tLe previous principle: WLat Lappens il ney science sLoys tLat olo metLoos
Lave llays¹
º °1Lat tLe mere presence ol carlon stocks le excluoeo lrom accounting.°
Storing carlon at constant levels ooes not allect tLe climate, lut cLanging tLe
amount ol storeo carlon makes lor a source or a sink ano allects tLe amount
ol GHG in tLe atmospLere.
º °1Lat accounting lor [¡L¡LC!| ooes not imply transler ol commitments
to a luture commitment perioo.° 1Le sink ellect ol lorestry activities is
usually non-permanent, as lar as tLe inoivioual tree or a single stano ol trees
is concerneo. !or example, yLen lano is alloresteo, tLe trees seouester carlon
in liomass. ¡l tLe trees or inoivioual stanos are tLen Larvesteo, alloyeo to oie
naturally or succuml to a calamity ano tLe lano remains treeless, tLe yooo,
stumps, roots, litter ano accumulateo soil organic matter yill eventually
oecay, releasing carlon lack into tLe atmospLere. Cnly temporary storage
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 10
yas acLieveo. 1Lis principle seems to call lor activities tLat acLieve a
permanent, or at least inoelinite, removal ol GHGs. Cngoing, sustainalle
lorest management youlo oualily, as it maintains groying stock on a site
in tLe long term. But yLat il an allorestation project ooes not provioe
lor sulseouent sustainalle management¹ As oiscusseo leloy, Parties Lave
aooresseo tLis issue tLrougL temporary carlon creoits, essentially a lorm ol
carlon leasing.
º °1Lat reversal ol any removal . le accounteo lor at tLe appropriate point
in time.° Again, tLis principle speaks to tLe reversille nature ol lorest sinks
ano tLe olligation to immeoiately ollset any releases ol carlon previously
accounteo as a removal. 1Lerelore, Parties oecioeo tLat upon tLeir expiration,
all temporary creoits must immeoiately le replaceo ly ney temporary or
permanent creoits.
º °1Lat accounting excluoes removals resulting lrom (i) elevateo carlon
oioxioe concentrations alove tLeir pre-inoustrial level, (ii) inoirect nitrogen
oeposition, ano (iii) tLe oynamic ellects ol age structure resulting lrom
activities ano practices lelore tLe relerence year.° Parties oio not yant anyone
claiming an unearneo lenelit lrom lorestry. ¡levateo carlon oioxioe levels
enLance tree groytL il pLotosyntLesis ano tree increment are limiteo ly tLe
natural CC
concentration ol tLe air. A Party may not claim lenelits lrom
tLis sioe ellect ol pollution. Also, Parties may not claim lenelits lrom lorest
activities tLat occurreo lelore 1990. As lar as allorestation, relorestation ano
oelorestation are concerneo, tLe rules in Article 3, paragrapL 3 are clear:
activities starteo lelore 1990 cannot earn creoits ouring tLe lirst commitment
perioo. Hoy to treat management ol lorests tLat existeo lelore 1990 is more
complicateo. ¡n almost all Annex ¡ countries, tLese lorests Lave an uneven
age-class structure yitL young, rapioly groying stanos preoominating. ¡t
is not management since 1990 tLat yill proouce tLe majority ol carlon
seouestration occurring ouring tLe commitment perioo in tLese lorests,
lut simply lusiness-as-usual management ano tLe existing age structure.
By restricting tLe amount ol creoits tLat most Annex ¡ countries may earn
lor °lorest management° in lorests tLat existeo lelore 1990 to rougLly 15
percent ol actual national lorest carlon increment, Parties louno a practical
solution to tLis vexing prollem. MucL LigLer alloyances yere granteo to
some countries, e.g. japan, Canaoa, ano tLe Eussian !eoeration, lor political
reasons relateo to ratilication.
Cn tecLnical matters ol carlon measurement ano reporting, CCP-7 aoopteo
in principle accounting metLoos set out in tLe ¡PCC`s Eeviseo 1996 Guioelines
lor Þational GreenLouse Gas ¡nventories (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 57, 1 3,
aoopting ¡PCC, 1996). CCP-7 also inviteo tLe ¡PCC to elalorate sucL guioelines
lor tLe lano use ano lorestry sector ano oevelop special reports on gooo practice
guioance ano uncertainty management, Luman-inouceo lorest oegraoation ano
separation ol oirect Luman-inouceo ellects lrom inoirect ano natural ellects to
Introduction 11
le sulmitteo lor consioeration ano aooption ly CCP-9 (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a,
p. 55, 1 3).
CCP-9 only partially aoopteo tLe ¡PCC`s Gooo Practice Guioance lor
¡ano Lse, ¡ano-Lse CLange ano !orestry (GPG-¡L¡LC!)
in Lecemler 2003
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 200+a, pp. 31÷32, aoopting ¡PCC, 2003, in part). Þo agreement
coulo le reacLeo on tLe Iyoto-relevant cLapter relating to Article 3, paragrapLs
3 ano +, Article 6 (joint ¡mplementation) ano Article 12 (Clean Levelopment
MecLanism). CCP-10 yill reconsioer tLe matter.
CCP-7 also aoopteo a series ol oelinitions ano guioelines lor Iyoto Protocol
Article 3, paragrapLs 3 ano + (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, pp. 58÷6+). 1Lese aooress
lotL accounting ano activity ouestions (tLe relevance ol tLe oelinitions lor activity
ouestions is oiscusseo lurtLer leloy).
!or accounting purposes, a key oelinition is tLat ol °lorest° (LÞ!CCC CCP,
2002a, p. 58, 1 1[a|):
°!orest° is a minimum area ol lano ol 0.05 to 1.0 Lectares yitL tree croyn
cover (or eouivalent stocking level) ol more tLan 10 to 30 percent yitL trees
yitL tLe potential to reacL a minimum LeigLt ol 2 to 5 metres at maturity in
situ. A lorest may consist eitLer ol closeo lorest lormations yLere trees ol
various storeys ano unoergroytL cover a LigL proportion ol tLe grouno or
open lorest. Young natural stanos ano all plantations yLicL Lave yet to reacL a
croyn oensity ol 10 to 30 percent or tree LeigLt ol 2 to 5 metres are incluoeo
unoer lorest, as are areas normally lorming part ol tLe lorest area yLicL are
temporarily unstockeo as a result ol Luman intervention sucL as Larvesting or
natural causes lut yLicL are expecteo to revert to lorest.
WLere tLe oelinition specilies ranges, sucL as 0.05 to 1.0 Lectares, tLe CCP
intenos eacL Party to select a ligure yitLin tLe range ano tLen apply it consistently
in its accounting. 1Le CCP oirects eacL Party to report tLe ligures it selects, lut
ooes not specily Loy a Party sLoulo make its selection, apart lrom reouesting
a plausille explanation il Parties oeviate lrom parameters lor minimum area,
croyn cover, ano LeigLt previously cLosen lor reporting lorest area to !AC (see
LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 61, 1 16). !or many Parties, tLe selection yill le an
aoministrative matter ano yill lolloy existing lay or practice. Hoyever, Parties
coulo also make tLeir selection oirectly tLrougL legislation. ¡ven Parties making
tLe cLoice aoministratively may yisL to inoicate in legislation yLicL aoministrator
Las tLe autLority to make tLe selection, yLicL lormalities sLoulo le lolloyeo to
make it or yLicL stanoaros sLoulo guioe tLe aoministrator`s cLoice.
1Le alove oelinitions ano principles all appear in a single oecision ol
CCP-7, Lecision 11/CP7, yLicL locuses on ¡L¡LC!. CtLer CCP-7 oecisions
Cnly tLe part on lactoring out oirect Luman-inouceo cLanges lrom inoirect Luman-inouceo
cLanges ano natural ellects yill le consioereo lor possille aooption ly CCP 10.
1Le GPG-¡L¡LC! incluoes tLe metLoos to estimate, measure, monitor ano report cLanges in
carlons stocks ano antLropogenic emissions ano removals lrom ¡L¡LC!, as yell as tLe Gooo
Practice Guioance ano uncertainty management relating to tLese.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 12
oeal yitL general matters lut also Lave strong implications lor lorestry activities,
as tLe proceoures ano rules applying to lorestry must matcL tLe general regime ol
climate cLange mitigation estallisLeo lor otLer sectors.
CCP-7 Lecisions 16/CP.7, 17/CP.7, 18/CP.7 ano 19/CP.7 provioe common
oelinitions lor a set ol cooperative implementation terms tLat may eventually le
useo generally in accounting ano compliance reports (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002l,
p. 8, 1 1, p. 26, 1 1, p. 52, 1 1, p. 57, 1 1). 1Lese terms incluoe °assigneo amount
unit° (AAL), °emission reouction unit° (¡EL), °certilieo emission reouction°
(C¡E) ano °removal unit° (EML). AALs represent tLe amount ol net GHG
emissions assigneo to tLe respective Annex ¡ country ly its emissions target.
C¡Es ano ¡ELs are ollsets resulting lrom project-laseo emission reouctions.
WLile C¡Es are createo unoer tLe CLM (Article 12), ¡ELs result lrom joint
¡mplementation projects (Article 6). EMLs apply to seouestration acLieveo
oomestically in Annex ¡ countries.
1Le MarrakesL Accoros ioentilieo issues concerning oelinitions ano mooalities
lor incluoing allorestation ano relorestation unoer tLe CLM to le elalorateo
ly tLe Sulsioiary Booy lor Scientilic ano 1ecLnological Aovice (SBS1A) ano
consioereo lor aooption ly CCP-9. Cne ol tLe issues aooresseo yas non-
ol carlon seouestration in lorests, yLicL maoe it necessary to
oistinguisL letyeen creoits generateo ly energy ano lorestry projects in tLe
CLM. At CCP-9, tLe Parties oecioeo to account lor tLis non-permanence ly
creating temporary creoits tLat yill Lave to le replaceo il tLe storeo carlon is
releaseo lack into tLe atmospLere. 1yo oillerent types ol temporary creoits Lave
leen createo in tLe Iyoto lrameyork: °temporary C¡Es° (tC¡Es) ano °long-
term C¡Es° (lC¡Es).
1Lese can lotL le useo toyaros meeting Annex ¡ commitments lor tLe
commitment perioo lor yLicL tLey yere issueo, ano cannot le carrieo over to
a sulseouent commitment perioo. Verilication ol tC¡Es ano lC¡Es occurs at
live-year intervals. WLile a tC¡E expires at tLe eno ol tLe commitment perioo
sulseouent to tLe commitment perioo lor yLicL it yas issueo, an lC¡E is valio
until tLe eno ol tLe project`s creoiting perioo.
¡l tLe carlon remains seouestereo
until tLe next verilication, tLe same amount ol tC¡Es can le issueo lor use in tLe
lolloying commitment perioo.
SLoulo tLe carlon, Loyever, le releaseo lack into
tLe atmospLere, tLe tC¡Es yill Lave to le replaceo ly otLer creoits at tLe eno
ol tLe lirst commitment perioo. SLoulo verilication ol carlon unoer tLe lC¡E
approacL sLoy a oecrease in carlon stocks since tLe previous certilication report,
CtLer issues incluoe aooitionality, leakage, uncertainties ano socio-economic ano environmental
impacts, incluoing impacts on liooiversity ano natural ecosystems.
¡n case a reneyalle creoiting perioo yas cLosen, it expires at tLe eno ol tLe last creoiting perioo
ol tLe project activity. Consioering tLe availalle options lor tLe lengtL ol tLe creoiting perioo, tLe
maximum valioity ol an lC¡E can le 60 years.
¡l tLe seouestration Las increaseo since tLe last verilication, tLe amount ol tC¡Es issueo yill
increase ly tLat amount.
Introduction 13
tLe Annex ¡ country Loloing tLe lC¡Es yill Lave to replace tLe CC
lost ly an eoual amount ol otLer creoits.
¡n case no reverilication is carrieo out,
tLe respective lC¡Es expire immeoiately. !actors sucL as tLe respective project
risks ano market expectations yill oetermine yLicL ol tLe tyo creoit types yill
le prelerreo ly tLe project participants. 1Le relevant text concerning tC¡Es ano
lC¡Es can le louno in LÞ!CCC SBS1A (2003) p. 5, 1 1 ano pp. 13÷15, 11
1Le lasic unit ol measurement lor all tLese terms yill le tLe same, unless
mooilieo ly later oecisions. ¡n eacL case, tLe unit °is eoual to one metric tonne ol
carlon oioxioe eouivalent, calculateo using glolal yarming potentials oelineo ly
[Lecision 2 ol CCP-3| or as sulseouently reviseo in accoroance yitL Article 5°
ol tLe Protocol (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002l, p. 8, 1 1, p. 26, 1 1, p. 52, 1 1, p. 57, 1 1).
1Lis unilormity yill make it easier to traoe ano track creoits.
Þote tLat tLe CCPs aoopteo tLese terms to apply to olligations ol Parties.
Þational lays, concerning tLe rigLts ano olligations ol inoiviouals yitLin a
nation, may use otLer terms ano units. Hoyever, Parties yill neeo to le alle to
oemonstrate compliance using tLe CCP terms ano units.
CCP-7 Lecisions 19/CP.7, 20/CP.7, 21/CP.7 ano 22/CP.7 oeal yitL tLe annual
reports ano inventories ol emissions ano sources reouireo unoer tLe Protocol.
Lecision 19/CP.7 reouires Parties to sulmit a report oescriling some lasic cLoices
tLe Party Las maoe regaroing its compliance. 1Lese cLoices incluoe tLe ligures lor
minimum area, tree croyn cover ano LeigLt lor use in oelining °lorest°, yLetLer tLe
Annex ¡ Party yill claim creoits lor lorest management, grazing lano management,
croplano management ano revegetation ouring tLe lirst commitment perioo (see
tLe oiscussion ol lorest management ano revegetation unoer °Activities° leloy),
ano yLetLer tLe Annex ¡ Party yill report tLe net ellect ol ¡L¡LC! activities
annually or lor tLe entire live-year (2008÷2012) commitment perioo (LÞ!CCC
CCP, 2002l, pp. 58÷59, 1 8).
Lecision 19/CP.7 also reouires eacL Party to estallisL a national registry to
track ¡ELs, C¡Es, AALs ano EMLs (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002l, pp. 61÷68, 11 17÷
+8). As is oiscusseo leloy in tLe section on market-relateo legal ano institutional
issues, national lay coulo take a variety ol approacLes to tLe issue ol yLo may claim
to oyn lorest removal creoits. !or example, tLe creoits coulo le tLe property ol no
one yet claimeo ly tLe nation, or tLey coulo le private property tLat anyone coulo
oyn. ¡acL Party yill yant to organize its registry to rellect its oynersLip lays
ano institutions. 1Le purpose ol tLe registry reouirement is to ensure accurate
accounting ol tLe various units, ano tLe oecision incluoes several provisions
ol potential interest to legislative oralters to oiscourage lrauo ano error. !or
example, registries must provioe eacL EML, C¡E or ¡EL yitL a unioue serial
numler. Eegistries must cooroinate yitL an international transaction log, yLicL
¡l tLe seouestration Las increaseo since tLe last verilication, ney lC¡Es valio until tLe eno ol tLe
project`s creoiting perioo are issueo.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 14
yill track traoes letyeen Parties. ¡very Party`s registry must le open to pullic
inspection tLrougL an ¡nternet interlace.
Lecision 22/CP.7 oeals yitL supplementary inlormation tLat Parties must
incluoe in tLeir inventories to oemonstrate compliance yitL tLe Protocol.
ParagrapLs 5 tLrougL 9 specilically aooress ¡L¡LC! activities (LÞ!CCC
CCP, 2002c, pp. 22÷2+). Most ol tLe reporting reouirements tie oirectly lack
to tLe principles ano oelinitions in Lecision 11/CP.7. !or example, Parties must
oemonstrate tLat tLe claimeo reouctions resulteo oirectly lrom Luman-inouceo
activities. 1o aooress concerns alout tLe reversille nature ol ¡L¡LC! carlon
seouestration, Parties must ioentily tLe location ol lanos involveo ano inventories
in sulseouent commitment perioos must report on emissions ano removals lrom
tLose lanos.
CCP-7 also aoopteo some general rules on traoing ol creoits tLat yill apply to
all transactions, incluoing tLose involving lorests. 1Lese appear in Lecisions 15/
CP.7 tLrougL 18/CP.7, in tLe secono volume ol tLe CCP-7 oecisions (LÞ!CCC
CCP, 2002l). !or a oiscussion ol tLe implication ol tLese rules lor lorests, see
¡coSecurities ¡to (2001).
Article 3, paragrapL + ol tLe Iyoto Protocol oirects tLe CCP to oecioe yLicL
¡L¡LC! activities, lesioes allorestation, relorestation ano oelorestation, ougLt
to le counteo toyaros tLe Parties` net emission reouction commitments. CCP-6
took up tLis issue, as yell as tLe matter ol oelining allorestation, relorestation
ano oelorestation more clearly. 1Le issue ol activities, in particular tLe issue ol
creoiting lor lorest management ol existing lorests since 1990, proveo to le LigLly
controversial, ano contriluteo greatly toyaros CCP-6`s lailure to reacL overall
agreement. CCP-6lis ano CCP-7 took up tLese issues again ano linally proouceo
an agreement (lor tLe status ol issues at tLe eno ol CCP-6, see LÞ!CCC CCP,
2000, lor more on tLe politics ol tLese issues, see Vespa, 2002).
1Le key oecision ol CCP-7 regaroing sink activities yas tLat lesioes
allorestation, relorestation ano oelorestation Parties coulo claim creoit lor net
removals ol GHGs lrom °lorest management°, °croplano management°, °grazing
lano management° ano °revegetation° (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 59, 1 6). 1Le
principles ano oelinitions tLat CCP-7 aoopteo Lelp explain yLat tLis means.
CCP-7 aoopteo a general environmental protection principle in response to
concerns tLat managing lanos lor carlon seouestration coulo leao to sLort-sigLteo,
unsustainalle lorest uses, incluoing tLe oestruction ol natural lorests: °1Lat tLe
implementation ol [¡L¡LC!| activities contrilutes to tLe conservation ol
liological oiversity ano sustainalle use ol natural resources° (LÞ!CCC CCP,
2002a, p. 56).
CCP-7`s oelinition ol °lorest management° rellects tLis principle (LÞ!CCC
CCP, 2002a, p. 58). !orest management is:
a system ol practices lor steyarosLip ano use ol lorest lano aimeo at lullilling
Introduction 15
relevant ecological (incluoing liological oiversity), economic ano social
lunctions ol tLe lorest in a sustainalle manner.
1Lis oelinition seems to cover lorestry lor timler proouction ano also many
kinos ol management lor non-commooity uses. ¡t seems to incluoe protective
management ol natural lorests, lut excluoes carlon stock cLanges in truly
unmanageo lorests lrom accounting. !or tLe proper unoerstanoing ol tLe
environmental impact ol tLe lorest management activity in tLe MarrakesL Accoros,
it is essential to realize tLat aooitional management activities, lor example, specilic
projects tLat enLance carlon seouestration in Annex ¡ oomestic lorests, are not a
prereouisite lor oltaining creoits. Creoits may accumulate lrom lusiness-as-usual
lorest management, as long as Parties cLoose lorest management as an activity
unoer Article 3, paragrapL +. Cn tLe otLer Lano, countries may estallisL an
internal national regime, yLere tLey allocate creoit ano payments to lorest oyners
commensurate yitL tLe carlon seouestereo alove ano leyono lusiness-as-usual
management tLrougL aooitional activities, sucL as lengtLening ol rotations, species
cLoice or unoerplanting ol existing stanos.
CCP-7 also aoopteo oelinitions ol allorestation, relorestation ano oelorestation
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 58). !or tLe most part, tLese oelinitions are lroao.
WLere tLey excluoe some activities, tLe excluoeo activities olten lall yitLin
tLe oelinition ol anotLer term. !or example, tLe oelinition ol °allorestation° is
limiteo to:
oirect Luman-inouceo conversion ol lano tLat Las not leen loresteo lor a
perioo ol at least 50 years tLrougL planting, seeoing ano/or tLe Luman-inouceo
promotion ol natural seeo sources.
¡l tLe lano Las leen loresteo yitLin tLe last 50 years, planting or seeoing may
oualily as °relorestation°, oelineo as:
tLe oirect Luman-inouceo conversion ol non-loresteo lano to loresteo lano
tLrougL planting, seeoing ano/or tLe Luman-inouceo promotion ol natural
seeo sources, on lano tLat yas loresteo lut tLat Las leen converteo to non-
loresteo lano. !or tLe lirst commitment perioo, relorestation activities yill le
limiteo to relorestation occurring on tLose lanos tLat oio not contain lorest on
31 Lecemler 1989.
¡l tLe lano oio contain lorest on 31 Lecemler 1989, tLe activity still migLt
lall unoer tLe term °lorest management°, as oelineo alove. 1Le pLrase °Luman-
inouceo promotion ol natural seeo sources°, prolally meant to cover Luman-
assisteo natural succession on non-lorest lano to lorest, may rellect a poor or
oelilerately amliguous cLoice ol yoros. Applieo literally, it youlo excluoe natural
lorest re-estallisLment tLrougL root sprouting or lrancL layering, common in
many species.
CCP-7 also oecioeo to alloy Parties to claim creoit lor GHG removal lrom
°revegetation°. Eevegetation incluoes any increase in carlon stocks on sites ol
0.05 Lectares or greater tLrougL Luman-inouceo estallisLment ol vegetation. 1Lis
opens tLe ooor lor claiming creoit lor scattereo urlan tree planting, roaosioe tree
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 16
management, ano some lorms ol agrolorestry tLat oo not result in °lorest°. ¡t
youlo also alloy creoiting tLe estallisLment ol sLruls ano non-yoooy vegetative
cover, lor example, soil amenoment tLrougL lupines.
1Le one common reouirement ol tLese oelinitions is tLat tLe activity le
oirectly Luman-inouceo. Parties may not claim creoit lor purely natural cLanges
to lorest.
As mentioneo alove, croplano management ano grazing lano management are
also eligille ¡L¡LC! activities unoer Article 3, paragrapL +.
At CCP-6, Parties oelateo lorest management`s role in meeting emission
reouction commitments. Some Parties opposeo alloying lorest management
activities to count toyaros tLe initial Iyoto Protocol commitments. 1Ley argueo
tLat tLe Protocol oralters assumeo tLat tLe Parties youlo meet tLe commitments
largely tLrougL emission reouctions at tLe sources. 1o alloy Parties yitL large
lorest Loloings to meet commitments tLrougL lorest management youlo le unlair
ano only marginally Lelplul to tLe purpose ol tLe LÞ!CCC. 1Le nations yitL
large lorest Loloings argueo strongly tLat tLey youlo Lave oilliculty ratilying tLe
Protocol il tLe CCP excluoeo lorest management.
¡n tLe eno, CCP-6 ano CCP-7 reacLeo a compromise, alloying lorest
management to count, lut limiting tLe amount ol creoit tLat a Party coulo claim
lrom lorest management ouring tLe lirst commitment perioo (tLe years 2008
tLrougL 2012) (Vespa, 2002). Lelits unoer Article 3, paragrapL 3 can le ollset
tLrougL lorest management up to a limit ol 9 Mt ol carlon per year times live
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 60, 1 10). Beyono tLese 9 megatonnes (Mt) ol carlon
per year, lorest management activities can le accounteo lor up to certain limits
negotiateo inoivioually lor eacL Party, yLicL are listeo in tLe MarrakesL Accoros
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, p. 60, 11 10÷12 ano pp. 63 & 6+). As tLe size ol eacL
country`s cap is a proouct ol a political negotiation process, some countries lareo
letter tLan otLers. Þotally, Canaoa, japan ano tLe Eussian !eoeration may
incluoe large ouantities ol sink creoits in tLeir GHG emissions accounts, yLereas
otLer countries generally receiveo a maximum creoit ol alout 15 percent ol tLe
carlon seouestration in tLe nation`s manageo lorests, as estimateo in tLe !AC
Glolal !orest Eesource Assessment lor tLe year 2000.
Can a Party carry over unuseo creoits lrom ¡L¡LC! removals to sulseouent
commitment perioos¹ ¡n general, il a Party`s emissions are less tLan tLe assigneo
amount unoer tLe Protocol in one commitment perioo, it can claim creoit lor tLat
letter-tLan-reouireo perlormance in a sulseouent commitment perioo (Protocol
Article 3, paragrapL 13). Hoyever, tLe Protocol language only relers to emissions.
CCP-7 oecioeo tLat tLe language excluoes removals. A Party cannot carry over
unuseo ollsets lrom carlon removals
into sulseouent commitment perioos
Carlon creoits lrom removals incluoe EMLs, tC¡Es ano lC¡Es.
Introduction 17
(LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002l, p. 61, 1 16). Since all tLe oillerent ollsets are lungille,
Parties yill prolally use tLe non-lankalle removal ollsets lor compliance in
tLe lirst commitment perioo ano carry over to tLe next commitment perioo tLe
lankalle ollsets. 1Lus, tLe restriction on tLe lankalility ol removal ollsets sLoulo
not sulstantially limit tLe carrying over ol ollsets.
CIean DeveIopment Mechanism
CCP-6lis ano CCP-7 aooresseo one key llexille instrument as it specilically
applies to lorests: acouiring creoits unoer tLe Clean Levelopment MecLanism
(CLM), oescrileo in Article 12 ol tLe Iyoto Protocol. WLen tLe Protocol yas
oralteo, oeveloping nations say Article 12 as encouraging oevelopeo nations
to sLare mooern, ellicient inoustrial tecLnology as a means ol gaining creoits.
Hoyever, investments in lorestry yielo creoits more cLeaply tLan investments
in inoustrial tecLnology. Leveloping countries leareo tLat tLe CLM coulo result
in large areas ol tLeir lanos leing committeo to lorest use, sloying ratLer tLan
speeoing tLeir economic oevelopment. Worse, tLe conversion coulo cause Larm il
rare non-lorest Lalitats lecame lorests, il oiverse natural lorests lecame unilorm
manageo plantations, or il ney lorest plantations excluoeo rural populations lrom
traoitional lano uses.
1Le agreement oralteo at CCP-6lis ano aoopteo at CCP-7 limits CLM
¡L¡LC! projects to allorestation ano relorestation. !urtLermore, lor tLe lirst
commitment perioo (tLe years 2008 tLrougL 2012), tLe creoit tLat a Party can
claim lrom ¡L¡LC! projects unoer tLe CLM is 1 percent ol tLe Party`s lase
year (1990) emissions, times live. 1Le °times live° language rellects tLe live-
year lengtL ol tLe commitment perioo. 1Le Iyoto Protocol calls lor Parties to
reouce tLeir annual emissions 5 percent leloy 1990 emissions. 1Le CCP agreement
means tLat over tLe live years, one-liltL ol tLe reouction can come lrom CLM
¡L¡LC! projects. !uture CCPs must oecioe Loy to treat CLM ¡L¡LC!
projects alter 2012. (1Le relevant language on tLese issues is in LÞ!CCC CCP,
2002a, pp. 60÷61, 11 13÷15, ecLoeo in LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002l, p. 22, 1 7.)
AltLougL CCP-7 proouceo general oelinitions ol allorestation ano
relorestation, it reouesteo tLe SBS1A to recommeno °oelinitions ano mooalities
lor incluoing allorestation ano relorestation projects unoer [tLe CLM| in tLe lirst
commitment perioo [2008÷2012|° to tLe CCP (LÞ!CCC CCP, 2002a, pp. 5÷6,
1 2 ano 2002l, p. 22, 1 10). ¡ssues lor tLe SBS1A to aooress incluoeo oelinitions,
non-permanence, leakage, aooitionality, uncertainties ano socio-economic ano
environmental impacts, incluoing impacts on liooiversity ano natural ecosystems.
¡n oecision 19/CP.9 (LÞ!CCC CCP, 200+l, pp. 13÷31), CCP-9 aoopteo tLe
SBS1A recommenoations (LÞ!CCC SBS1A, 2003), tLus paving tLe yay lor tLe
implementation ol CLM lorestry projects. 1Le lolloying summarizes tLe most
important CCP-9 oecisions regaroing lorestry in tLe CLM:
º 1Le oelinitions ol lorest, allorestation ano relorestation unoer Article 3,
paragrapLs 3 ano + yill also apply to tLe CLM.
º 1Lere yill le a longer creoiting perioo lor lorestry projects in oroer to
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 18
account lor tLe long economic rotations in lorestry. As in tLe text relating to
energy projects, tyo options are availalle.
1Le project oeveloper can cLoose
a creoiting perioo ol eitLer 20 years, reneyalle tyice, or a creoiting perioo
ol 30 years yLicL cannot le reneyeo. 1Lerelore, tLe maximum lengtL ol a
creoiting perioo yill le 60 years.
!or energy projects tLe creoiting perioo is eitLer seven years yitL tLe option to reney tyice
(maximum ol 21 years) or a ten-year perioo yitLout reneyal.
Overviev o! ruIes and modaIities reIating to LULUCf
under the Kyoto ProtocoI
A !our-Iier sysIem cappihg sysIem limiIs Ihe exIehI Io which ParIies cah accouhI !or
emissiohs ahd removals !rom LULUCF acIiviIies:
1. I! a ParIy's acIiviIies uhder ArIicle 3.3 lead Io a debiI, meahihg IhaI
a!!oresIaIioh, re!oresIaIioh ahd de!oresIaIioh acIiviIies cause more emissiohs
Ihah removals, Ihe ParIy is allowed Io o!!seI Ihe emissiohs Ihrough !oresI
mahagemehI up Io a limiI o! 9 MI o! carboh per year Iimes !ive (UNFCCC COP,
2002a, p. 60, ¶ 10).
2. 8eyohd Ihese 9 MI o! carboh per year, !oresI mahagemehI acIiviIies cah
be accouhIed !or up Io ah ihdividual cap !or each ParIy IhaI is lisIed ih Ihe
Marrakesh Accords (UNFCCC COP, 2002a, p. 63).
3. Lmissiohs ahd removals !rom croplahd mahagemehI, grazihg lahd
mahagemehI ahd revegeIaIioh cah be accouhIed !or oh a heI basis (UNFCCC
COP, 2002a, pp. 59-60, ¶ 9).
4. Uhder Ihe Cleah DevelopmehI Mechahism, ohly a!!oresIaIioh ahd re!oresIaIioh
are eligible. 1he use o! !oresIry crediIs geheraIed uhder Ihe CDM by Ahhex I
ParIies is limiIed Io 1 percehI o! Ihe respecIive ParIy's base year emissiohs !or
each year o! Ihe commiImehI period (UNFCCC COP, 2002a, p. 61, ¶ 14).
LULUCf in Annex I Parties
ArticIe Activities Mandatory Accounting further ruIes
Yes Cross-heI
NeI-heI accouhIihg i! a
couhIry's LULUCF acIiviIies
ih 1990 cohsIiIuIe a heI
source (ArIicle 3.7)
ForesI mahagemehI
AccouhIihg !or !oresI
mahagemehI capped (see
!our-Iier sysIem)
Croplahd mahagemehI
NeI-heI Crazihg lahd mahagemehI
Introduction 19
º 1yo types ol temporary creoit Lave leen createo to account lor tLe non-
permanence ol carlon seouestration tLrougL lorestry projects.
º Sustainalility criteria lor lorestry projects Lave leen very controversial.
As in tLe climate regime Lost countries Lave tLe prerogative to oeline
sustainalility criteria, no list ol criteria or proLiliteo projects, e.g. tLose
involving invasive alien species or genetically mooilieo organisms (GMCs),
exists. A ratLer general yoroing in tLe preamlle states tLat Lost countries ano
Annex ¡ luyers ol lorestry creoits evaluate, in accoroance yitL tLeir national
lays, risks associateo yitL tLe use ol potentially invasive alien species ano
GMCs. !urtLermore, tLe project oocumentation Las to incluoe a oetaileo
oescription ol project cLaracteristics as yell as an analysis ol socio-economic
ano environmental conseouences in oroer to make tLis inlormation availalle
to tLe general pullic. Hoyever, a socio-economic or environmental impact
assessment stuoy is not olligatory (LÞ!CCC SBS1A, 2003, p. 2, p. 7,
1 12(c), pp. 18÷19, Appenoix B).
º !ixeo costs ano transaction costs may seriously luroen CLM projects,
particularly in tLe lorestry sector, yLere oesigning, registering, measuring,
monitoring ano certilying may le expensive. 1o Lelp smaller projects
cope, small-scale energy projects lenelit lrom simplilieo mooalities ano
proceoures. Accoroing to tLe CCP-9 agreement, simplilieo rules ano
proceoures yill apply to lorestry small-scale projects tLat are expecteo to
result in net antLropogenic greenLouse gas removals ly sinks ol less tLan
8 It ol CC
per year ano are oevelopeo or implementeo ly loy-income
communities ano inoiviouals, as oetermineo ly tLe Lost party (LÞ!CCC
SBS1A, 2003, p. 5, 1 1[¡|). CCP-9 inviteo Parties to sulmit suggestions
on Loy to simplily mooalities ano proceoures lor small-scale projects, lor
consioeration ly CCP-10 in Lecemler 200+ (LÞ!CCC CCP, 200+l, p. 1+,
11 +÷6).
º A tecLnical paper prepareo ly tLe LÞ!CCC Secretariat in 2003 summarizes
tLe status ouo ol tLe oiscussion on Loy to account lor carlon seouestereo
in Larvesteo yooo prooucts (LÞ!CCC Secretariat, 2003). SBS1A is
continuing to consioer tLis issue, altLougL it is unlikely to le incluoeo in tLe
lirst commitment perioo.
WLat approacL migLt legislatures use to promote ano regulate tLe use ol lorests
as carlon sinks, reservoirs ano sources ol environmentally lrienoly prooucts ano
reneyalle energy¹ 1Le complexities ol tLe LÞ!CCC ano Iyoto Protocol ano
tLe nature ol lorest mitigation make it oillicult to give a general ansyer to tLis
!irst, tLe LÞ!CCC ano tLe sulseouent Iyoto Protocol create oillerent
olligations lor oillerent Parties. Because tLe oevelopeo nations Lave Listorically
emitteo tLe majority ol GHGs lelieveo to orive climate cLange, tLey lear
tLe primary luroen ol reoucing emissions or seouestering carlon unoer tLe
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 20
LÞ!CCC. Some ol tLe more extensive legal relorms yill prolally Lave to occur
in tLese nations.
1Le oeveloping nations yill lace oillerent sets ol compliance ouestions, many
arising out ol projects unoertaken in tLe lrameyork ol tLe CLM or in tLe context
ol reporting on lorest carlon stock cLanges in national communications. Solving
tLese ouestions may reouire a yioe set ol legal ano institutional approacLes.
Some ol tLe issues may le conventional matters ol improving lorest conservation
protection ano assessment. Some may involve ney yays ol looking at property
oynersLip, lano use, social ano environmental impact, lorest management ano
lorest inventories.
Secono, ouestions remain alout tLe longer-term role ol lorestry as mitigation.
CCP-7 ano CCP-9 Lave gone a long yay to ansyer some open ouestions,
especially as tLey apply to tLe lirst commitment perioo ol tLe Iyoto Protocol,
2008 to 2012. But tecLnical issues ano issues concerning tLe treatment ol lorests
in sulseouent commitment perioos remain completely open.
1Liro, tLe legal issues concerning mitigation tLrougL lorests yill overlap yitL
tLe legal issues concerning mitigation ano compliance generally. !or example, a
Party may yisL to set up a GHG emissions traoing system tLat oeals yitL all
kinos ol sinks ano all kinos ol sources, lrom larms to lactories, not just lorests. As
oiscusseo in more oetail in tLe tLiro cLapter ol tLis paper, countries yill encounter
some legal issues tLat are unioue to lorests ano otLers tLat apply to a lroao range
ol sources ano sinks. Some legal issues may le seen as °lorest lay° matters yLile
otLers may le consioereo issues ol property lay or lays governing investments
ano linancial transactions.
!ourtL, tLe oirection ol legislation yill vary oepenoing on tLe local legal
system ano institutions. A legal system tLat recognizes social property ano
community oynersLip yill oller oillerent options lrom one tLat ooes not. ¡n a
society yLere tLe liscal institutions are yeak or untesteo, it may le impractical to
estallisL mitigation programmes laseo on market traoing. 1Lese kinos ol prollem
are lamiliar to legislative oralters, lut GHG mitigation may raise tLem in ney
!iltL, tLe role ol national legislation in compliance is still unclear. Lo countries
really neeo ney lays¹ Cnly a ley countries Lave maoe legislative cLanges in
response to climate cLange concerns. CtLers Lave responoeo tLrougL policy
cLanges ano aoministrative acts unoer existing lays ratLer tLan tLrougL ney
legislation. As tLe international response continues, yitL experience gaineo ano
oeaolines approacLing, legislation may lecome more important.
2. 5ome nationaI IegaI responses
As one autLority oescrileo tLem, tLe national responses to climate cLange Lave
leen a mile yioe ano an incL oeep (Mark 1rexler, ouoteo in Anonymous, 1998).
Parties to tLe LÞ!CCC Lave proouceo oetaileo reports on tLeir activities. ¡n
many cases, Loyever, tLe reports oo not rellect activities initiateo tLrougL ney
legislation. EatLer, tLe reports oescrile ongoing ellorts tLat incioentally may
Lave lenelicial ellects on climate cLange. ¡n some nations, tLe most striking ney
initiative is simply tLe ellort to proouce tLe report itsell.
Eecent lorest legislation in several countries Las enoorseo tLe use ol lorests as
greenLouse gas sinks or oeclareo a policy ol lorest-laseo mitigation. !or example,
Article 1 ol tLe 1998 !orest ¡ay ol CLina incluoes aojusting tLe climate as a goal
ol tLe lay. Article 1 ol !rance`s Loi d'orientation sur la [oret (2001) oeclares tLat
lorest policy is a lactor in ligLting tLe greenLouse ellect, ano Article 7 encourages
greater use ol yooo-laseo materials ano luels toyaros tLat eno. 1Le 1996 Ley
!orestal ol Guatemala notes lixation ol carlon as one ol tLe lenelits tLat lorests
provioe. Article 7 ol Mexico`s Ley General de Desarrollo !orestal Sustentable
(2003) incluoes capture ol carlon among tLe environmental services tLat lorests
provioe, ano Article 33 incluoes carlon lixing as one ol tLe lactors tLat lorest
policy sLoulo promote.
ÞevertLeless, to oate ley national lays Lave cLangeo existing legal lrameyorks
or introouceo ney mecLanisms to encourage lorest-laseo greenLouse gas
mitigation. Some general lorestry lays may Lave mitigation as an incioental
purpose, lut may result in activities inoistinguisLalle lrom lorestry carrieo out
in traoitional programmes. Some nations may Lave notLing in lay tLat mentions
lorests as greenLouse gas sinks, lut tLey can ano oo claim creoit lor lusiness-
as-usual lorest-relateo carlon seouestration, yLicL is carrieo out unoer lays ano
institutions tLat preoate tLe LÞ!CCC.
1Le Lniteo States ol America ollers an example ol a national response tLat Las
locuseo more on policy tLan legislative cLange in tLe area ol lorests. 1Le 2002
Þational Communication to tLe LÞ!CCC Secretariat (Lniteo States Lepartment
ol State, 2002) oescriles a numler ol leoeral programmes tLat involve lano use,
lorests or yooo luels. Many ol tLese programmes pursue general conservation
goals ano oo not Lave carlon seouestration as tLeir main purpose. An example is
tLe Conservation Eeserve Program, yLicL pays larmers to take excess lanos out
ol proouction ano return tLem to lorest or otLer long-term conservation uses.
AnotLer example is tLe Þational !ire Plan, yLose primary purpose is to reouce
lorest loss lrom catastropLic yilolires. ¡n 2003, tLe Lniteo States enacteo a major
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 22
piece ol lorest legislation, tLe HealtLy !orest Eestoration Act (Pullic ¡ay Þo.
108-1+8), yLicL lists as one ol its purposes to enLance carlon seouestration.
Hoyever, its primary aim is to reouce tLe susceptilility ol leoeral lorests to
catastropLic outlreaks ol lire, insects ano oisease.
Some ol tLe programmes Lave a more specilic locus on climate cLange. !or
example, tLe oepartments ol agriculture ano energy togetLer run a researcL
ano oemonstration programme lor liomass luels. 1Lis programme preoates tLe
LÞ!CCC ano stems lrom a sLort set ol climate cLange ano agriculture provisions
calleo tLe Glolal Climate CLange Prevention Act ol 1990 (Pullic ¡ay Þo. 101-
62+, title XX¡V, cooilieo at 7 LS Cooe §§6701÷6710).
A provision in a 1992 lay encourages people to report voluntarily to tLe
government any GHG reouctions tLey create (¡nergy Policy Act ol 1992, Pullic
¡ay Þo. 102-+86, §1605[l|, cooilieo at +2 LS Cooe §13385[l|). 1Le government
may eventually recognize tLese reouctions unoer luture GHG reouction
programmes. ¡n 2001, tLe government`s oatalase recoroeo 303 oomestic ano
66 international lorestry projects, claiming a total seouestration ol almost eigLt
million metric tonnes ol CC
(Lniteo States ¡nergy ¡nlormation Aoministration,
As is olten tLe case in tLe Lniteo States, tLe 50 state governments Lave leen
more yilling tLan tLe leoeral government to aoopt innovative lays. (!or an
overviey ol Lniteo States state ano local actions, see Iosloll ano 1rexler [200+|.)
AltLougL some state legislatures Lave passeo non-linoing resolutions opposing
tLe Protocol, ano a ley Lave even passeo lays lorliooing state ollicials lrom
aoopting non-voluntary GHG reouction measures lelore tLe Lniteo States
ratilies tLe Protocol (see, lor example, tLe Iyoto Protocol Act ol 1998, +15 ¡llinois
Compileo Statutes 1+0/), several Lave lookeo lor yays to limit tLeir net GHG
emissions. Þaturally, some ol tLese ney lays involve lorests.
1Le state ol Calilornia maintains a voluntary registry ol GHG reouctions
acLieveo since 1990. ¡n 2002, tLe state amenoeo tLe registry lay to reouire tLe
registry to aoopt proceoures, protocols ano criteria lor monitoring, estimating,
calculating, reporting ano certilying carlon seouestration lrom conservation ano
conservation-laseo management ol native lorests, ano to reouire tLe registry to
reler lorest oyners to approveo provioers ol aovice on conservation ano lest
management practices lor native lorest carlon reservoirs (2002 Calilornia Statutes
cL. +23). Some otLer states Lave set up voluntary registries, as Las tLe leoeral
government, lut Calilornia`s registry lay is unusual in Laving specilic lorestry
1Le state ol Connecticut can incluoe conoitions in its air pollution permits
tLat reouire tLe permit Loloer to plant trees or turl grass to ollset CC
(Connecticut General Statutes §22a-17+o).
!or a more oetaileo oiscussion ol Lniteo States actions, see Hayes ano Gertler (2002) ano justus
ano !letcLer (2003).
Sone national legal responses 23
1Le state ol ¡oaLo, knoyn lor its agriculture, loresteo mountains ano
conservative politics, Las estallisLeo a Carlon Seouestration Aovisory
Committee. ¡ts outies incluoe recommenoing policies ano programmes to
promote non-inoustrial private lorest lanooyner participation in carlon traoing.
1Le lay creating tLe committee mentions tLe possililities ol oeveloping emissions
traoing markets, encouraging creation ol lrokers or otLer traoing intermeoiaries
ano proouction ol eoucational materials lor lanooyners. 1Le lay oirects tLe cLair
ol tLe committee to conouct an assessment ol tLe carlon seouestration potential
ol agricultural ano private-lorest lanos in tLe state. A ley otLer states Lave set up
sucL committees to look at carlon seouestration on agricultural lanos, lut ¡oaLo`s
lay is unusual in expressly incluoing loresteo lanos (¡oaLo Cooe §§22-5201 to
1Le state ol Maine, a Leavily loresteo state yitL an inoepenoent political lent,
Las aoopteo a °leao-ly-example initiative°. 1Le lay sets state-yioe goals lor
GHG emission reouction, calls lor participation in a regional GHG registry ano
manoates creation ol a climate action plan tLat alloys seouestering GHGs tLrougL
sustainally manageo lorestry, agriculture ano otLer natural resource activities (38
Maine Eeviseo Statutes §§57+÷578).
1Le state ol Minnesota Las createo a °releal° programme °to encourage,
promote ano luno tLe planting, maintenance ano improvement ol trees . to
reouce atmospLeric carlon oioxioe levels ano promote energy conservation°
(Minnesota Statutes §88.82). ¡n a similar vein, tLe state ol Þey Mexico Las a
general tree-planting programme createo ly a 1990 °!orest Ee-¡eal Act°, yLose
linoings speak ol tLe lenelits ol seouestering carlon (Þey Mexico Statutes
Annotateo §§68-2-29 to -33).
1Le state ol Cregon, a major prooucer ol lorest prooucts, Las empoyereo its
State !orester to act as a lroker to register ano market °lorestry carlon ollsets°
lrom non-leoeral lorests.
1Le State !orester is to oevelop a carlon ollset
accounting system, ano tLe State Boaro ol !orestry may oevelop rules governing
creation, measurement, verilication ano transler ol ollsets (Cregon Eeviseo
Statutes §§526.780÷.789). 1Le State !orester may manage tLe state-oyneo lorests,
incluoing lorests set asioe to generate income lor tLe pullic scLools, to create
marketalle carlon ollsets (Cregon Eeviseo Statutes §§530.050 ano .500).
Cregon Las also integrateo carlon seouestration into one ol its relorestation
ellorts. 1Le state Las createo a !orest Eesource 1rust to linance relorestation
ellorts on privately oyneo lano in return lor a limiteo interest in tLe income lrom
commercial Larvests (Cregon Eeviseo Statutes §§526.700÷.775). An aoministrative
rule reouires lanooyners using money lrom tLe trust to give tLe trust oynersLip
ol any carlon ollsets createo tLrougL tLe relorestation (Cregon Aoministrative
Eules §629-022-0700[2|).
1Le leoeral government oyns ano manages over Lall tLe lano in tLe state, incluoing signilicant
lorest reserves not unoer tLe State !orester`s autLority.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 24
1Le Cregon Pullic Ltility Commission may alloy electric utilities to create
ollsets tLrougL small-scale tree planting on °unoerprooucing lorest lano° ano
pass tLe costs on to tLeir customers (Cregon Eeviseo Statutes §757.266). Cregon
also consioers CC
emissions in oecioing yLetLer to alloy construction ol ney
electrical poyer generation plants (Cregon Aoministrative Eules §§3+5-02+-0500 et
seq.). ¡n a recent plant approval, tLe state accepteo tLe plant oyner`s payment to tLe
!orest Eesource 1rust as creating a ouantilialle, verilialle ollset (CatLcart, 2000).
1Le ¡uropean Community (¡C) ollers anotLer example ol extensive reporteo
activity (¡uropean Community, 1998) lut relatively little ney legislation
specilically aooresseo to lorests. 1Le ¡C stanos out as a Party to tLe LÞ!CCC,
leing a multinational entity ratLer tLan a single nation. ¡t Las autLority to
aoopt regulations, yLicL are linoing on its memler nations. 1Le Council ol tLe
¡uropean Lnion Las approveo tLe Iyoto Protocol on leLall ol tLe Community
(Council Lecision ol 25 April 2002).
1Le ¡C`s main legislative ellort concerning lorests is relateo to its Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). ¡t aoopteo CAP in late july ol 1992, not long alter
tLe LÞ Conlerence on ¡nvironment ano Levelopment yLere tLe LÞ!CCC
yas signeo, lut yell lelore tLe ¡C ratilieo tLe LÞ!CCC in Lecemler 1993.
1Le policy ollers linancial support lor allorestation ol agricultural lano ano
silvicultural actions tLat may increase carlon seouestration. 1Le ¡C also ollers
to sLare tLe cost ol lorest lire prevention projects, supports monitoring ol lires
ano tLe ellects ol air pollution on lorests, ano supports general lorestry researcL
(¡uropean Community, 1998).
More recent actions incluoe contrilutions to CCS1 ¡21, a major ¡uropean
researcL ellort on lorest carlon (see yyy.lil.lsagx.ac.le/coste21/inlo/action),
tLe estallisLment ol a Working Group on !orest Sinks yitLin tLe ¡uropean
Climate CLange Programme (¡CPP), yLicL proouceo a set ol oetaileo tecLnical
recommenoations lor implementation (¡CPP Working Group on !orest Sinks,
2002), ano a proposal ly tLe Commission lor a oirective amenoing tLe oirective
lor greenLouse gas emission alloyance traoing yitLin tLe ¡C, in respect ol tLe
Iyoto Protocol`s project mecLanisms. 1Le latter may allect oemano lor C¡E
lrom lorestry CLM projects.
Costa Eica ollers an example ol a more activist approacL to GHG lorest
mitigation legislation. Þot leing an Annex ¡ nation, Costa Eica Las no ouantilieo
reouction goal lor GHGs unoer tLe LÞ!CCC. Hoyever, its political stalility
ano reputation lor environmental steyarosLip Lave maoe it an attractive partner
lor A¡j pilot projects. Costa Eica Las signeo lilateral agreements concerning GHG
projects yitL tLe Lniteo States, Þoryay, Syitzerlano, !inlano, tLe ÞetLerlanos
ano Mexico.
Sone national legal responses 25
¡n 1995, Costa Eica createo an Cllice on joint ¡mplementation (CC¡C). CC¡C
came out ol an agreement signeo ly tLe Ministry ol ¡nvironment ano ¡nergy yitL
tyo private sector groups representing inoustrial ano linancial interests ano one
non-governmental organization yitL expertise in lorest protection.
¡n 1996, Costa Eica passeo a ney lorestry lay (Þo. 7575). Article 69 ol tLe
lay oeoicates a tLiro ol tLe national tax on Lyorocarlons lor lorest conservation.
1Lis income is to compensate lor tLe environmental services tLat lorests provioe,
incluoing mitigation ol gas emissions. Article +6 ol tLe lay creates tLe national
lorest linance luno (!CÞA!¡!C). Article 22 ol tLe lay alloys !CÞA!¡!C to
issue lorest lanooyners certilicates lor lorest conservation (CCBs) representing
payment lor environmental services. 1Le lanooyners can use CCBs to pay taxes
ano otLer lees oyeo to tLe government.
A 1996 executive oecree set up a Þational Specilic !uno lor tLe Conservation
ano Levelopment ol Sinks ano Leposits ol GreenLouse Gases. ¡ncome lrom tLe
sale ol GHG mitigation services goes into tLe luno. 1Le government spenos tLe
luno on tLe support ol local A¡j projects.
1o make tLe ollsets more attractive to potential investors, Costa Eica Las
createo a traoalle security, knoyn variously as a GreenLouse Gas Mitigation
Certilicate or a Certilialle 1raoalle Cllset (C1C). C1Cs represent specilic levels
ol GHG reouction or mitigation, expresseo as eouivalent amounts ol carlon
removeo lrom tLe atmospLere. 1Le government Las oesigneo tLe C1C to le
inoepenoently verilialle ano to meet any tecLnical or proceoural reouirements ol
Costa Eica issueo its lirst C1Cs in 1997 to tLe Government ol Þoryay ano
a consortium ol private Þoryegian companies. 1Le C1Cs representeo creoit
lor 200 000 metric tonnes ol carlon ollset tLrougL a relorestation ano lorest
conservation project.
Costa Eica also enacteo a ney lay on tLe Lse, Management ano Conservation
ol ¡ano in 1998 (¡ay Þo. 7779). 1Le government, in a report on LÞ!CCC
implementation activities, pointeo to tLis lay as promoting relorestation ol
oegraoeo lorests ano preventing oegraoation ol existing lorests (Eepullic ol Costa
Eica, 1999). Hoyever, tLe text ol tLe lay ooes not appear to speak specilically to
climate cLange issues.
¡n Þovemler 1998, tLe state ol Þey SoutL Wales in Australia passeo tLe Carlon
EigLts ¡egislation Amenoment Act (Þo. 12+). 1Lis act aims to create a traoalle
interest in tLe carlon seouestration potential ol lorests. ¡t recognizes a carlon
seouestration rigLt as a lorm ol lorestry rigLt. !orestry rigLts are conveyalle
interests in lano. 1Ley may create a pro[it a prendre. ¡n tLe case ol a carlon
seouestration rigLt, tLis is not a rigLt to remove natural prooucts lrom tLe lano so
mucL as a rigLt to claim tLe lenelits lrom tLe carlon seouestration. 1Le act also
recognizes tLat a lorestry covenant associateo yitL a property may provioe access
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 26
to or guarantee maintenance ol tLe lorest on lano sulject to a carlon seouestration
rigLt. 1Le act expressly alloys tLe state`s !orestry Commission ano electricity
generators ano oistrilutors to Lolo ano traoe carlon seouestration rigLts.
Accoroing to ¡ee (2000), tLe state lorestry agency in Þey SoutL Wales Las
contracteo yitL 1okyo ¡lectric Poyer Company to seouester carlon in a °planteo
lorest estate.° Planting tLe lirst year yill cover 1 000 Lectares, yitL letyeen 10 000
ano +0 000 Lectares to le planteo over tLe lile ol tLe agreement. ¡ee also reports
tLat tLe Syoney !utures ¡xcLange is yorking yitL tLe state government to
oevelop a market lor carlon creoits.
Canaoa, yitL a vast lorest resource, a commitment to implementing tLe Protocol
ano ten provincial governments, may lecome a laloratory lor oeveloping
sulnational legislative approacLes relevant to lorests. 1o oate, Loyever, ney
legislation Las leen limiteo.
Allerta Las passeo a Climate CLange ano ¡missions Management Act (Statutes
ol Allerta 2003 cL. C-16.7). 1Le act oelines sinks to incluoe plants ano soils ano
oeclares tLat sink rigLts are property rigLts, lut leyono tLat it is sLort on specilics.
¡t calls lor tLe government to aoopt regulations supplying many ol tLe oetails,
incluoing °tLe manner in yLicL ano tLe terms ano conoitions sulject to yLicL
emission ollsets, creoits ano sink rigLts may le createo, oistriluteo, excLangeo,
traoeo, solo, useo, varieo ano cancelleo° (Act §5[l|).
¡n 1998, eigLt provinces ano tLe !eoeral Government ol Canaoa entereo into a
memoranoum ol unoerstanoing creating a GreenLouse Gas ¡mission Eeouction
1raoing (G¡E1) pilot project. G¡E1 yas oesigneo to give memlers practical
experience in emission reouction training ano luilo tLe lounoation lor a possille
luture traoing system. Several inoustry ano environmental groups yere also
participants in tLe project, yLicL is oescrileo in Bisson (2000) ano on tLe G¡E1
Wel site (yyy.gert.org).
Parties yisLing creoit lor GHG reouctions sulmitteo proposals to G¡E1`s
steering committee. Among otLer tLings, G¡E1 reouireo tLat GHG reouctions
Lao to le measuralle ano verilialle, ano Lao to exceeo any reouctions manoateo
ly lay.
G¡E1 projects incluoeo reouctions in emissions as yell as sinks. Cne ol tLe
lirst projects revieyeo ly G¡E1 involveo sulstituting yooo yaste lor natural gas
to poyer inoustrial loilers at a lacility in BritisL Columlia. G¡E1`s otLer lorest-
relateo project involveo carlon seouestration ly tLe province ol SaskatcLeyan`s
Ministry ol ¡nvironment ano Eesource Management. 1Le ministry generateo
creoits lrom ney yLite spruce plantations ano lrom estallisLing a ney lorest
reserve on lano lormerly availalle lor timler Larvest ano traoeo tLem to
SaskPoyer, an electric utility. G¡E1`s pilot project pLase enoeo in june 2002, ano
it Las ceaseo lunctioning as a traoing excLange.
Sone national legal responses 27
¡n Lecemler 1999, tLe Lominican Eepullic enacteo a ney lorest lay (Ley 118-99).
Article 95, paragrapL ¡ ol tLe lay alloys tLe national lorestry agency, ¡ÞAE¡!,
to aoopt regulations creating special incentives to promote tLe valuation ol tLe
environmental services ol lorests, incluoing carlon lixation. 1Le State yill also
issue negotialle reimlursement certilicates to linance 80 percent ol tLe expenses
ol capital ano investments maoe in tLe estallisLment ano Lanoling ol plantations
ano management ano protection ol lorests. 1Le expenses incluoe payment ol all
tLe existing taxes.
Peru`s 2000 Ley !orestal y de !auna Sil:estre Las provisions tLat alloy tLe
government to grant concessions lor carlon seouestration. Article 2 ol tLe lay
oelines environmental services ol lorests to incluoe tLose tLat protect soil, regulate
tLe lloy ol yater, conserve liooiversity, conserve ecosystems ano scenic leauty,
alsorl carlon oioxioe ano maintain essential ecological processes, Article 10 ol
tLe lay alloys tLe government to grant concessions lor ecotourism, conservation
ano environmental services, sulject to regulations unoer tLe lay. Presumally tLe
Loloer ol tLe concession coulo claim creoit lor any carlon seouestereo.
Spain aoopteo a ney lorest plan in 2002 ano a national lorest lay in 2003
(Ley +3/2003, 21 Þovemler, de Montes), yLicL oeline oomestic lorest policy
regaroing climate cLange. 1Le plan consioers policy support crucial to climate
cLange mitigation. ¡t estallisLes tLe potential lor mitigation laseo on availalle
area, evaluates tecLnical capacity lor seouestration ano assesses possililities lor
enLancement. 1Le lay recognizes glolal cLange mitigation ano yooo energy
as valualle lunctions ol lorests tLat sLoulo le enLanceo. Article 65 oirects
pullic aoministrations to promote positive environmental lenelits lrom lorests,
incluoing carlon lixation. Pullic aoministrations may grant sulsioies, concluoe
contracts yitL oyners or invest oirectly in pullic lanos to acLieve tLe goals.
EesearcL on energy use lrom slasL ano aoaptation ol lorests to climate cLange
Las also leen initiateo, ano tLe lay calls lor a stuoy on tLe aoaptation ol SpanisL
lorests to climate cLange.
1Le Government ol Þey Zealano agreeo tLat some creoits lrom allorestation
ano relorestation sLoulo accrue to tLose unoertaking sink activities. Hoyever, as
signatory to tLe Protocol, it also consioers tLe neeo to meet reouction olligations
as its ultimate responsilility.
AltLougL legislation Las not leen introouceo, tLe government intenos to
retain sink creoits lrom all post-1990 commercial lorests lor tLe lirst commitment
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 28
perioo. ¡t also plans to accept lialility lor up to 10 percent ol carlon losses
lrom oelorestation. ¡anooyners yLo enter into contracts to manage post-1990
lorests as permanent protection lorests, excluoing Larvest, yill le alle to traoe
accumulateo creoits. ¡anooyners accept tLe costs ol participating in emission
traoing, e.g. monitoring, ano responsilility lor emissions lrom tLe lorest.
¡n 1999, Lenmark estallisLeo an emissions cap ano traoing system lor CC

among its electric utilities (Act on CC
ouotas lor electricity proouction, Act Þo.
376 ol 2 june 1999). 1Le system estimates CC
proouction laseo on tLe amount ol
energy proouceo multiplieo ly a CC
emission lactor lor tLe luel useo to proouce
tLe energy. 1Le lay assigns an emission lactor ol zero to several reneyalle luels,
incluoing yooo cLips, luelyooo, yooo pellets ano yooo yaste. ¡n ellect, it
recognizes tLat proouction ol tLese luels removes CC
lrom tLe atmospLere.
1Le LanisL act preoates mucL ol tLe CCP york clarilying tLe role ol
¡L¡LC! activities in llexille mecLanisms. Hoyever, section 12 ol tLe act alloys
tLe Minister ol ¡nvironment ano ¡nergy to issue guioelines integrating tLe LanisL
system into an international emissions traoing system.
3. LegaI and institutionaI issues
o! !orest-based mitigation
1Lis cLapter oeals yitL promoting ano regulating lorest-relateo GHG emission
reouctions ano removals. ¡n particular, it oiscusses mitigation laseo on use ol
A laymaker oealing yitL tLe lull range ol lorest-relateo climate cLange
issues yill Lave concerns leyono lorest lano-laseo mitigation. A party to tLe
LÞ!CCC or tLe Protocol may consioer lays to meet proceoural ano institutional
reouirements, e.g. proceoures lor carlon inventory ano reporting. Persons
interesteo in tLese aspects may lino guioance in Articles 5 ano 7 ol tLe Protocol
ano tLe Lecisions ol CCP-7 citeo in tLe lirst part ol tLis paper regaroing tLe
¡PCC Gooo Practice Guioance.
Any nation unoertaking long-term planning lor its lorests yill Lave concerns
alout aoaptation ol lorests to altereo climates. Aoaptation is a particular concern
in lorestry, lecause tLe long lile span ol trees means tLat trees planteo tooay must
lace climatic conoitions over many oecaoes ano perLaps centuries. !oresters knoy
tLat trees planteo ayay lrom tLeir typical geograpLic ano ecological range olten
sLoy oillerent groytL cLaracteristics ano increaseo vulneralility to insects, oisease
ano lire. Climate cLange may sLilt tLe optimal geograpLic areas lor tree groytL,
stressing existing vegetation. Governments may yisL to support aoaptation
tLrougL sponsoring researcL, eoucating lanooyners ano loresters on management
lor stalility ano resilience, increasing ellorts to control insects, oiseases ano lire,
ano anticipating ano provioing lor unmanagealle risks, sucL as major lloyooyns
lrom Lurricanes. 1Lere may le a role lor government-lackeo oisaster insurance
lor lorest oyners. Assigning lialility lor lorest oamage lrom climate cLange ano
collecting oamages is prollematic unoer a court-laseo system, lecause ol tLe large
numler ol causal agents scattereo lar leyono tLe jurisoictional lounoaries ol any
court. Hoyever, governments migLt consioer a GHG-laseo tax supporting a luno
lor aoaptation projects or oamages to reouce tLe inoivioual lorest oyner`s climate
cLange-relateo risks.
Besioes lano-laseo mitigation, lorests can also play a role tLrougL tLe use
ol lorest prooucts as materials or as luels. WLen a person luilos a Louse out ol
yooo insteao ol cement or lrick, tLat yooo represents carlon removeo lrom tLe
atmospLere ano emissions avoioeo in tLe energy-intensive manulacture ol otLer
materials. 1Le Protocol ooes not yet regulate creoit lor carlon storage in lorest
prooucts, altLougL tLe SBS1A is continuing to consioer tLe issue.
ÞevertLeless, governments may yisL to encourage tLe use ol yooo ano yooo
lilre in yays tLat keep carlon seouestereo lor as long as possille. ¡n manulacture,
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 30
lays coulo reouire yaste reouction planning in larger, more sopListicateo saymills
ano pulp ano paper mills, incluoing steps to oiscourage oecay ol storeo cLips or
timler. ¡ays coulo lar lurning ol sayoust ano yooo yaste, unless tLe Leat yas
captureo ano useo in processes tLat youlo otLeryise use lossil luels. Builoing
cooes coulo encourage tLe use ol yooo ano reouire lire- ano oecay-resistant
or retaroant oesigns. ¡ays coulo promote recycling ol yaste paper tLrougL a
variety ol means, lrom increasing supply ly encouraging consumers to segregate
recyclalles, to increasing oemano ly Laving government prelerentially purcLase
prooucts yitL recycleo content.
1Le oiscussion leloy legins ly consioering issues tLat migLt arise il tLe lay
recognizes claiming creoit lor carlon seouestration to le a kino ol property
rigLt. °CynersLip° ol lorests ano lorest prooucts, yLetLer private, community,
social or state-laseo, is tLe oloest ano still most prevalent legal mecLanism lor
allocating lorest resources ano encouraging tLeir sustaineo use. Hoyever, oyning
an intangille resource sucL as carlon seouestration, actual or potential, poses ney
cLallenges to olo systems ol property lay.
1Le oiscussion tLen consioers regulatory approacLes. 1Lese migLt incluoe
regulation ol lorest use or conversion ano regulation ol tLe manulacture, use or
oisposal ol lorest prooucts.
1Le tLiro area ol oiscussion is sulsioy-laseo approacLes. 1Lese issues may
le tLe most lamiliar to lorest managers tooay. 1Le legal issues tLat arise out ol
government spenoing to promote GHG mitigation yill le similar to tLe issues
arising out ol otLer government spenoing to promote gooo lorest steyarosLip,
lreouently as an inoirect compensation lor tLose lorest services lor yLicL no
market exists.
1Le linal area ol oiscussion is inlormation-relateo approacLes. 1Lese involve
attempts to promote eoucation, proouct lalelling or certilication, ano government
evaluation ol management systems.
Lillerent Parties yill Lave oillerent interests in tLe possille relorms. !or
example, an Annex ¡ nation trying to meet a specilic reouction goal may le
interesteo in a tax or regulatory system to reouce emissions coupleo yitL market
measures to reouce costs ol compliance. 1Le market measures may oemano ney
lays concerning oynersLip ol carlon sink potential. ¡n contrast, a non-Annex ¡
Party, yitL no goal to meet, may le more interesteo in making cLanges tLat migLt
attract CLM investments ano oirect tLem toyaros sustainalle oevelopment
goals. ÞevertLeless, tLe non-Annex ¡ nation may also le interesteo in ney lays
concerning oynersLip ol carlon sinks to make investment in lorest projects more
Some ol tLe ioeas in tLis cLapter Lave application leyono lorest projects. !or
example, tLe market issues ol oynersLip, lialility ano risk apply to any project
tLat results in emission reouctions or removals. !or tLe sake ol simplicity ano
consistency, nations sLoulo aooress tLese kinos ol issues tLrougL general lays tLat
apply to all mitigation projects.
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 31
1Lis section consioers legal issues tLat yill arise il a Party seeks to use property
rigLts ano market translers to encourage carlon seouestration in lorests. Markets
can create incentives ano encourage voluntary participation in mitigation activities
oomestically or alroao. 1LrougL social or community oynersLip, markets can
empoyer local groups in tLeir oealings yitL outsioers yLile alloying tLem to
continue to lolloy traoitional use rules among tLemselves. Working at tLeir lest,
markets can serve environmental ano sustainalle oevelopment goals yLile ligLting
Market approacLes can also leao to unoesiralle outcomes. 1Ley must le
carelully tuneo to promote mitigation, or tLey yill promote accumulation ol
yealtL regaroless ol its conseouences. 1Ley can attract corruption. 1Ley can
catalyse unexpecteo social cLange. Moreover, altLougL tLey may look gooo on
paper, il tLe necessary liscal, governmental ano cultural structures are alsent,
markets yill stumlle or lail entirely. Markets can le poyerlul tools, lut tLey are
not panaceas.
1Le oiscussion leloy consioers issues tLat yill arise lrom oynersLip ano
traoing ol creoit lor carlon seouestration. 1Le Parties tLemselves yill set tLe
rules lor translers letyeen Parties to tLe Protocol. But yLat il an Annex ¡ nation
oecioes to purcLase carlon seouestration creoits oirectly lrom lorest oyners¹
WLat il a nation regulates major ney sources ol emissions, reouiring tLem to
acouire ollsetting reouctions or removal units¹ WitL tLe proper legal structure,
tLese translers involving inoivioual luyers ano sellers youlo le sulject to national
1Le initial inouiry alout oynersLip must le: WLat yill Parties or inoiviouals yisL
to oyn¹ 1Le LÞ!CCC ano Protocol preoominantly lrame mitigation in terms
ol yLat a Party Las acLieveo. Compliance oepenos on GHG emissions avoioeo or
GHGs removeo lrom tLe atmospLere. 1Le agreements look to present conoitions
sLapeo ly past actions. Parties yill yisL to claim actual carlon seouestereo, as
verilieo ano certilieo removal creoits.
1o encourage GHG removal tLrougL property rigLts ano markets, national
lays must le concerneo yitL a more alstract concept tLan tLe present amount ol
carlon seouestereo in a lorest. 1Le lay must make clear yLo Las tLe rigLt to claim
oynersLip yLen tLe lorest seouesters carlon.
1o make a rougL analogy, yLen a larmer sells lruit, tLe luyer is only interesteo
in yLat lruit tLe larmer Las to oller. WLen tLe larmer plans lor prooucing lruit,
tLe larmer must tLink alout yLat lanos Le may legally Larvest ÷ perLaps tLe
lanos Le oyns, or tLose Le Las leaseo, or tLose lor yLicL Le Las lougLt a rigLt to
Larvest, or perLaps even pullic lanos lrom yLicL anyone may come ano gatLer
lruit. WLen a Party presents evioence ol compliance to tLe LÞ!CCC Secretariat,
tLe secretariat yill le interesteo in Loy tLe Party`s sources ano sinks Lave actually
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 32
perlormeo. Hoyever, yLen a Party plans lor compliance, or yLen an inoivioual
plans to exploit sinks to ollset emissions to comply yitL a national lay, tLe Party
ano inoivioual yill le concerneo alout yLat sinks tLey may legally claim. 1Ley
yill yant tLe lay to clarily yLo may claim to oyn tLe potential lor lorests to
seouester carlon.
WLo oyns tLe carlon seouestering potential ol a lorest¹ 1Le olvious ansyer
is: tLe oyner ol tLe lorest. Hoyever, tLe olvious ansyer is lar lrom tLe only
possille ansyer. Beloy are some possille oynersLip systems:
¡. 1Le oyner ol tLe property oyns tLe potential ano:
A. 1Le potential ooes not exist as a separate property rigLt. 1Le property
oyner cannot sell or give it ayay inoepenoently ol selling or giving ayay
tLe property. Hoyever, il tLe oyner can allect tLe potential tLrougL
management ol vegetation ano soils, tLe oyner can contractually
promise to manage tLe property in yays to increase tLe potential.
B. 1Le potential ooes not exist as a separate property rigLt as sucL,
Loyever, tLe oyner ol a property can grant a covenant allecting tLe
potential. Lnlike a contractual olligation, tLe covenant youlo °run
yitL tLe lano°, linoing tLe present oyner ano anyone yLo Lappeneo
to lecome an oyner ol tLe property in tLe luture.
1. 1Le covenant attacLes to anotLer property relateo to tLe nrst
property. 1Le oyner ol tLe oominant property tLen youlo
Lave tLe rigLt to protect or perLaps enLance tLe potential ol tLe
sulservient property. 1Le covenant can only le translerreo yitL
tLe oominant property.
2. 1Le covenant attacLes to a person (an inoivioual, corporation or
government entity). ¡t cannot le translerreo.
C. ¡nsteao ol a covenant, tLe rigLt is in tLe lorm ol an easement or servituoe.
1Lis may attacL to a oominant estate or it may attacL to a person, in
yLicL case it can le translerreo to anotLer person inoepenoently ol any
transler ol unoerlying lano.
L. 1Le potential is a separate, alienalle property rigLt, sucL as a
usulructuary rigLt or pro[it a prendre, governeo unoer tLe lays
concerning oynersLip ol lano (real property, immovalle property,
etc.). 1Le oyner can convey tLat rigLt to otLers yitLout conveying
tLe yLole property oynersLip. WLen tLat potential is translerreo to a
ney oyner:
1. 1Le ney oyner ol tLe potential inLerently Las tLe rigLt to allect
Loy tLe property is useo, il tLat is necessary to:
a. protect tLe existing potential ol tLe property,
l. protect or enLance tLe existing potential ol tLe property.
2. 1Le ney oyner ol tLe potential Las no inLerent rigLt to allect Loy
tLe property is useo, Loyever, tLe property oyner can separately
grant tLe potential oyner tLat rigLt:
a. tLrougL a contract or otLer legal mecLanism tLat linos tLe
current oyner,
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 33
l. tLrougL a covenant or otLer legal mecLanism tLat °runs
yitL tLe lano° ano linos tLe present ano any luture
property oyner.
¡. As in (L) alove, lut tLe rigLt is governeo unoer tLe lays
concerning personal, movalle or some otLer class ol property tLat
ooes not incluoe lano.
¡¡. 1Le potential is a pullic gooo:
A. Cyneo ano oynalle ly no one. ¡t is like sunsLine or air. Many people
may take aovantage ol it, particularly as it improves tLeir oyn lano ano
conoition ol lile, lut no one can claim to oyn it, luy or sell it, or take
creoit lor tLe gooo it ooes lor otLers.
B. Cyneo ly tLe national government:
1. As a passive entity tLat can take creoit lor carlon seouestration lut
tLat Las no particular poyer to reouire lanooyners to protect or
enLance seouestration, ano:
a. tLat Lolos tLe potential in trust lor tLe nation ano cannot
sell or give it ayay,
l. tLat can sell or give tLe potential ayay.
2. As in (1) alove, lut tLe national government Las inLerent poyer to
regulate tLe use ol lano to protect or enLance carlon seouestration.
1Lis regulatory poyer is inalienalle.
3. As in (1) alove, lut tLe national government Lolos poyer, as tLe
oyner ol a property rigLt, to allect property use to protect or
enLance seouestration. ¡l, as in (1)(l), tLe government may transler
tLe property rigLt, tLe ney oyner youlo also acouire tLe rigLt to
allect property use.
+. As in (1)(l) alove, lut tLe national government Lolos tLe potential
as trustee lor tLe lenent ol tLe lorest oyner or tLe pullic. Any
pronts lrom tLe sale or use ol tLe potential must go to tLe
lenenciaries ol tLe trust.
C. Cyneo ly a sulnational or local government yitL poyers as in (B)
alove. Þote tLat it migLt le possille to Lave oynersLip vesteo in
one level ol government yitL some or all regulatory poyers vesteo in
anotLer level ol government.
L. Cyneo ly no one until someone takes steps to capture tLe carlon. !or
example, il Corporation A lunos a project to plant trees along roaosioes,
Corporation A youlo oyn tLe resulting carlon seouestration, regaroless
ol yLo oyns tLe roaosioe lanos. !urtLer:
1. Anyone can acouire carlon seouestration potential in tLis yay.
2. Cnly a limiteo numler ol entities are eligille to oyn carlon
potential in tLis yay ano tLese are:
a. entities emitting carlon ano oesiring ollsets,
l. (a) plus tLe government,
c. (a) or (l) plus °lanks° cLartereo to oeal in mitigation
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 34
o. (a) or (l) or (c) plus ÞGCs interesteo in environmental
e. (a) or (l) or (c) or (o) or any lanooyner.
Some ol tLese options may seem ooo, lut some ol tLe oooest Lave analogues
in otLer lays. !rom tLe Lniteo States come tLese examples:
º Lnoer tLe Pacilic ÞortLyest ¡lectric Poyer Planning ano Conservation
Act, electric poyer utilities in tLe nortLyestern Lniteo States can acouire
oynersLip ol conservation capacity, inlormally calleo °negayatts° (negative
yatts), ly linancing projects tLat reouce electric oemano. !or example, a
utility coulo pay to install tLicker insulation on tLe tanks ol electric yater
Leaters ol consumers. 1Le consumers youlo oyn tLe ney insulation ano
enjoy loyer electric lills, Loyever tLe utility youlo oyn tLe reouceo
electric oemano. 1Le utility can sell tLis reouceo oemano to tLe government
agency responsille lor assuring tLat tLe region Las sullicient energy to
meet oemano.
º Lnoer tLe Lniteo States Clean Air Act, in regions tLat Lave not attaineo
national goals lor air ouality, ney sources ol air pollution must arrange
ollsets. ¡l tLe pollution prollem in tLe region is severe enougL, tLe ney source
must arrange an ollset greater tLan tLe ney source`s expecteo emissions. 1Le
exact size ol tLe ollset is oetermineo ly tLe ney source`s expecteo output
multiplieo ly a lactor rellecting tLe severity ol tLe local pollution prollem.
¡n areas yitL mooerate prollems, tLe ollset may le close to one lor one. ¡n
areas yitL severe prollems, tLe ollset may le more like tyo lor one. 1Le
ollset is not a separate property interest, lut more a contractual arrangement
letyeen tLe ney polluter ano an existing polluter. As an aooeo guarantee
ol perlormance, tLe government alters tLe air pollution permits ol tLe tyo
sources to rellect tLe agreeo-upon ollset.
º Also unoer tLe Lniteo States Clean Air Act, tLe largest sources ol
sulpLur oioxioe in tLe nation Lave leen assigneo emission alloyances. A
source may only emit as mucL sulpLur oioxioe as it Las alloyances. A source
yitL too ley alloyances must eitLer reouce its emissions or acouire more
alloyances. 1Lese alloyances are alienalle, ano tLere is an open market in
tLem. Some environmental groups Lave lougLt tLem ano °retireo° tLem.
º Lnoer tLe Lniteo States Clean Water Act, persons oreoging or lilling
yetlanos neeo a permit. As a conoition ol tLe permit, tLe government olten
reouires tLe applicant to arrange mitigation ol any oamage oone to tLe
yetlanos. A typical mitigation reouirement migLt le to restore an area ol
oegraoeo yetlanos. ¡n some areas, tLe government operates mitigation lanks
(Lniteo States Army Corps ol ¡ngineers et al., 1995). People yLo restore
yetlanos create a creoit tLat tLey can place in tLe lank. ¡ater, a person in
neeo ol a mitigation project can luy tLe lankeo mitigation.
º Most states ol tLe Lniteo States alloy private lanooyners to grant or sell
conservation easements. 1Le Loloer ol a conservation easement can prevent
oevelopment ol tLe sulservient lano. Sometimes tLe Loloer can reouire tLe
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 35
lano to le kept in a natural state. Sometimes tLe terms ol tLe easement reouire
tLe lano to le actively manageo lor conservation purposes. 1Le Loloer ol tLe
easement oroinarily cannot sell it or reap any monetary gain lrom it, lut
Lolos it strictly to lenelit tLe pullic. Lsually, tLe lay only alloys tLe state
or ÞGCs oeoicateo to conservation to acouire conservation easements.
º A ley Lniteo States local governments recognize a lully traoalle rigLt to
oevelop lano. Property oyners in areas markeo lor conservation cannot
use tLeir rigLts to oevelop tLeir oyn property, lut tLey can sell tLe rigLts
to property oyners in areas markeo lor oevelopment. Cyners tLat luy tLe
rigLts can °overoevelop° or luilo more extensively tLan neigLlours yLo
Lave not lougLt tLe traoalle rigLts. 1Le intent ol tLe system is to compensate
lairly property oyners in tLe conservation zone lor tLe restrictions on tLeir
property use.
1Le point ol tLese examples is tLat tLe universe ol possille mooels lor carlon
seouestration oynersLip ano traoing goes yell leyono traoitional notions ol
property ano markets. ¡egislative oralters looking lor mooels may lino tLem in
traoitional systems ol property lay or in innovative systems ol mitigation, traoing
ano ollsets ol environmental Larm.
1Le cLoice ol Loy to sLape tLe nature ol tLe property rigLt in carlon
seouestration yill oepeno on several lactors. ¡xisting lays ano legal traoitions
yill play a major role ano may constrain tLe cLoice. ¡egislators ano jurists usually
preler to apply existing patterns ol lay to ney situations ratLer tLan to aoopt
raoical innovations.
!or example, in a country tLat only recognizes easements or servituoes tLat
oirectly lenelit otLer properties, legislators may Lesitate to recognize a servituoe
tLat can le traoeo inoepenoently ol a oominant estate. Costa Eica ollers a
concrete example ol tLis. 1Le country Las yanteo to create a property interest in
tLe nature ol a conservation easement tLat youlo create a legal rigLt to prevent
tLe sulservient lano lrom leing oevelopeo or cleareo. Hoyever, Costa Eican lay
only recognizes easements tLat lenelit a specilic oominant estate. 1Le country Las
aoopteo tLe minor liction tLat a conservation easement is lor tLe lenelit ol (ano so
attacLes to) nearly reserveo natural areas.
AnotLer lactor is tLe nature ol tLe local economy. ¡n a country yitL an unstalle
currency or poorly oevelopeo markets, it yill le impractical to set up a national
system laseo on traoalle rigLts. Hoyever, a limiteo system granting creoits to
large polluters tLat linance mitigation projects may le leasille.
A tLiro lactor is tLe governmental capacity to oeal yitL alstract lorms ol
lanooynersLip. ¡n a country yLere tLe government linos it oillicult even to
oetermine yLo oyns surlace rigLts to a particular piece ol lano, it youlo le
unrealistic to put in place a complex system ol intangille, oivisille interests.
A lourtL lactor is tLe nature ol tLe oemano lor carlon seouestration. ¡l tLe
major goal ol a country is to encourage loreign governments to invest in lorest-
laseo mitigation projects, ano government-to-government oealings are tLe oesireo
outcome, a system vesting oynersLip ol seouestration in tLe national government
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 36
may le appropriate. ¡l oevelopeo countries aoopt lays tLat encourage inoivioual
emitters ol GHG to seek ollsets, oeveloping countries seeking private investment
may yisL to vest oynersLip ol seouestration potential in private Lanos.
1Le ultimate interpretation ol tLe Iyoto Protocol may allect tLe cLoice
ano oesiralility ol market mecLanisms as yell. ¡l tLe Parties oevelop a system
tLat promotes transler ol mitigation creoits, it yill make market systems more
Carlon oynersLip is not an alstract ouestion lor lorest oyners. ¡ven yitLout
a large market, carlon values may le sulstantial (see Box).
Hoy lig is tLe carlon seouestration potential ol a lorest stano¹ 1Lis ouestion is at
Leart a tecLnical matter ano can le measureo on-site. Hoyever, in a legal context,
even tecLnical matters Lave legal aspects.
As a starting point, nations yill yant to consioer international regulations ÷
tLe guioelines tLat tLe Parties aoopt lor international use. !or example, CCP-9
lormally oelineo tLe CLM terms °laseline°, °aooitionality° ano °leakage° as tLey
apply to lorests. 1Le °laseline net greenLouse gas removals° are oelineo as °tLe
sum ol tLe cLanges in carlon stocks tLat youlo Lave occurreo in tLe alsence ol
tLe allorestation or relorestation project activity unoer tLe CLM° (LÞ!CCC
SBS1A, 2003, p. 5, 1 1[c|).
1Le issue ol aooitionality is closely relateo to tLe one ol laselines. 1Le text
on aooitionality ol energy projects in tLe CLM (LÞ!CCC SBS1A, 2003, p. 7,
VaIuating carbon sequestration in Irish !orests
Irelahd's ihdusIrial emissiohs will probably exceed KyoIo commiImehIs cohsisIihg
o! ahhual emissioh reducIiohs o! approximaIely 15.4 MI CO
or 4.2 MI o! carboh
(C). ForesIs esIablished sihce 1990 will !ix 0.3 MI C per ahhum, o!!seIIihg abouI 6.5
percehI o! Irelahd's proiecIed excess emissiohs, ahd reducihg carboh crediIs Io be
acquired ih ihIerhaIiohal markeIs by Ihis amouhI. AI a markeI value o! C30 per Iohhe
o! carboh ih ihIerhaIiohal emissioh Iradihg, Ihese youhg Irish !oresIs alohe would
save Ihe couhIry ah ouIlay o! abouI C9 millioh ahhually, or C45 millioh over Ihe
commiImehI period 2008 Io 2012.
1he average raIe o! carboh gaih ih Ihese youhg !oresIs is esIimaIed aI 3.4
Iohhes o! carboh per hecIare per year. 1hey would Ihus accumulaIe a gross value o!
approximaIely C100 per hecIare ahhually.
CrediIs !or Ihe acIiviIy "!oresI mahagemehI" ih Irelahd are capped aI 50 000
Iohhes o! carboh per year. I! Ihe couhIry chose !oresI mahagemehI as ah eligible
acIiviIy uhder Ihe KyoIo ProIocol, ah addiIiohal gross value o! ahhually C1.5 millioh
could accrue.
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 37
1 12[o|) Las leen aojusteo to account lor tLe circumstances ol lorestry projects
ano reaos:
1Le proposeo allorestation or relorestation project activity unoer tLe CLM
is aooitional il tLe actual net greenLouse gas removals ly sinks are increaseo
alove tLe sum ol tLe cLanges in carlon stocks in tLe carlon pools yitLin tLe
project lounoary tLat youlo Lave occurreo in tLe alsence ol tLe registereo
CLM allorestation or relorestation project activity.
1Le yoroing ol tLe aooitionality oelinition Las leen sulject to oillerent
interpretations. ¡n assessing CLM projects, it is up to tLe CLM ¡xecutive Boaro
to oecioe Loy to interpret tLe oelinition.
¡eakage relers to tLe net cLange in GHG emissions outsioe tLe project
lounoary. 1Le CCP-9 oecision oelines it as: °tLe increase in greenLouse gas
emissions ly sources yLicL occurs outsioe tLe lounoary ol an allorestation or
relorestation project activity unoer tLe CLM yLicL is measuralle ano attrilutalle
to tLe allorestation or relorestation project activity° (LÞ!CCC SBS1A, 2003,
p. 5, 1 1[e|).
!or more on tLese terms ano tLeir possille oelinitions, see LÞ!CCC
Secretariat (2002a).
Þational laymakers yill Lave to oecioe yLetLer ano Loy to apply similar
oelinitions to carlon transactions unoer tLeir jurisoiction. As yitL oynersLip,
tLere are many possililities. 1o give an example, say tLat a coal-lurning utility
negotiates yitL a private lorest lanooyner lor tLe purcLase ol tLe carlon sink
potential ol a lorest, so tLat tLe utility may claim it as an ollset ol its emissions.
¡n one possille case, tLe contract ooes not oiscuss tLe size ol tLe potential, lut
tLe size is important to tLe utility in its relations yitL government regulators. 1Le
lay coulo oeclare tLat tLe size is oetermineo ly:
º a specilic, oljective lormula, estallisLeo ly legislation, alloying little room
lor prolessional juogement,
º a set ol general guioelines, estallisLeo ly legislation, alloying room lor
prolessional juogement ol government ollicials,
º a set proceoure, estallisLeo ly legislation, sucL as a Learing, alloying
interesteo inoiviouals to provioe expert testimony to a linoer ol lact, yLo
makes a oecision laseo on tLe testimony,
º any ol tLe lirst tLree options alove, except tLat tLe lormula, guioelines or
proceoure are set case-ly-case ly negotiateo agreement ol tLe utility ano
regulator ratLer tLan ly general legislation,
º any ol tLe alove tLree, except tLat tLe lormula, guioelines or proceoure are
set case-ly-case unilaterally ly tLe regulator,
¡ven tLe attempt to clarily Loy to interpret tLe meaning ol °youlo Lave occurreo in tLe alsence
ol tLe registereo CLM project° ly tLe CLM ¡xecutive Boaro (see tLe reports ol tLe ¡xecutive
Boaro at its nintL ano tentL session, com.unlccc.int/¡B) oio not leao to tLe expecteo clarity on tLe
issue. 1Le oecisions ol tLe ¡xecutive Boaro on laseline metLooologies, Loyever, suggest tLat tLe
¡xecutive Boaro is interpreting aooitionality in a relatively strict manner.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 38
º any ol tLe alove tLree, except tLat tLe lormula, guioelines or proceoure are
set ly some tLiro party. 1Lis migLt le a stanoaro-setting organization sucL as
tLe ¡nternational Crganization lor Stanoaroization or its national alliliates,
an impartial arlitrator agreeo to ly tLe luyer ano seller, or a group alliliateo
yitL tLe LÞ!CCC Secretariat.
¡n anotLer possille case, tLe contract Las terms tLat oepeno on tLe size ol tLe
carlon seouestration potential, ano tLe size coulo le set:
º ly a metLoo specilieo in tLe contract, cLosen ly tLe luyer ano seller,
º ly a metLoo specilieo in legislation, regaroless ol yLat tLe luyer ano seller
state in tLe contract,
º ly a metLoo specilieo in legislation, unless tLe luyer ano seller specilically
agree to anotLer metLoo in tLe contract,
º ly lay, tLe customary metLoo or tLe metLoo in common use in tLe traoe,
unless tLe contract specilies anotLer metLoo.
Creating yorkalle lay in tLis area may reouire lamiliarity yitL national lays
concerning interpretation ol contracts, regulation ol utilities ano control ol air
pollution. ¡t may reouire some lamiliarity yitL applicalle international stanoaros.
¡t may also reouire tLorougL tecLnical unoerstanoing ol carlon seouestration
ano traoitional lorestry issues, sucL as site, groytL ano yielo, ano lorest prooucts
CatLcart (2000) oescriles Loy tLe state ol Cregon, Lniteo States, Las oecioeo
to oetermine tLe size ol carlon ollsets createo ly its !orest Eesource 1rust
projects. 1Le state is limiting tLe total claimalle ollset to tLe expecteo long-
term average ol carlon storeo on tLe site over multiple Larvest ano regeneration
cycles. 1Le state sultracts lrom tLis amount an estimate ol carlon storeo on
tLe site lelore relorestation to get tLe long-term net average increase in carlon
storage. 1Lis cLoice appears to le a policy oecision tLat tLe government Las maoe
unilaterally, yitLout lormal legislation, altLougL tLe legislature recently gave tLe
State Boaro ol !orestry autLority to yrite regulations governing lorestry carlon
ollsets (Cregon Eeviseo Statutes §526.786).
A ouestion relateo to °WLat is tLe size ol tLe removal¹° is °WLat units oo ye
use to oescrile tLe size¹° As oiscusseo in tLe lirst cLapter ol tLis paper, tLe CCP
seems to Lave ansyereo tLis ouestion ly creating tLe removal unit (EML) ano a
group ol similarly sizeo permanent as yell as temporary units to measure traoes
ano compliance yitL Protocol goals. 1o promote traoes ano simplily accounting,
countries sLoulo aoopt tLese international units to oescrile size.
Duration and timing
Closely relateo to size are issues ol ouration ano timing. Governments ano otLer
organizations may lase olligations on annual or live-year cycles, lut lorest
cycles ol groytL, Larvest, ano oecay exteno over mucL longer perioos. 1Le rules
lor ollsets must reconcile tLese oillerences ano oeal yitL otLer complications ol
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 39
!or example, can ollsets le measureo in units tLat lungilly comline time
ano mass¹ ¡s one tonne ol carlon seouestereo lor live years eouivalent to live
tonnes lixeo in liomass lor only one year¹ ¡s live tonnes lixeo lor one year at tLe
leginning ol a compliance perioo eouivalent to live tonnes lixeo lor one year at
tLe eno ol a compliance perioo¹
Ano yLat alout tLe non-permanent nature ol lorests¹ ¡l governments grant
carlon creoits ano linancial ayaros to lorest oyners lor carlon increment in tLeir
lorests, yill oyners Lave to pay lack yLen tLey Larvest tLeir lorest, or yLen tLe
lorest succumls to tLe next Lurricane¹
¡nternationally, tLe Parties Lave solveo tLe prollem ol non-permanence tLrougL
tLe concept ol temporary creoits ano carlon leasing. Þational governments may
aoapt tLe Parties` solution or may seek alternatives tLat lit lotL international
reouirements ano local neeos. As examples, Þey Zealano noy proposes carlon
creoits ano market participation lor oomestic allorestation ol protection lorests
tLat excluoe luture Larvests, yLile tLe state ol Cregon is alloying lorestry ollsets
in proouction lorests laseo on expecteo average seouestration over multiple
Larvest cycles.
1Le alove oiscussions Lave legun to raise some ol tLe legal issues tLat migLt
arise regaroing translers ol oynersLip ol a lorest`s carlon seouestration potential.
Assuming tLat tLe potential can le oyneo ano translerreo at all:
º Can it le translerreo separately lrom tLe oynersLip ol tLe lano¹
º ¡l lanooyner A translers tLe oynersLip ol tLe potential to luyer B:
÷ Can B lorce A to manage tLe lorest to maintain or enLance tLe potential¹
÷ Can B enter tLe lano ano assess tLe potential¹
÷ Can B enter ano actively manage tLe lano¹
÷ ¡l A tLen sells tLe unoerlying lano to ney oyner C, ooes C lear any
olligations toyaros B¹
÷ Can B transler tLe oynersLip ano all it entails to a stranger, D¹
º Can tLe government lorce A to transler tLe potential to tLe government lor
pullic use¹
1Lese kinos ol ouestion are common ones in tLe yorlo ol property transactions.
1Le ansyers yill oepeno on yLetLer tLe government recognizes tLe potential as a
kino ol property, sulject to property transaction lays, or as sometLing tLat results
lrom particular kinos ol leLaviour, sulject to lays regaroing contracts.
¡l tLe potential is transleralle, some issues ol lrauo prevention may arise. 1Le
interest yill le intangille. 1Lere may le no pLysical inoication tLat someone
otLer tLan tLe lano occupier Lolos tLe interest, leyono tLe paper or electronic
recoro ol transler Lelo ly tLe parties. WLat youlo prevent an unscrupulous oyner
lrom selling tLe same carlon sink potential over ano over to oillerent parties¹
Governments lace similar prollems yitL otLer incorporeal property rigLts,
sucL as security interests or usulructuary rigLts. 1Le spectre ol lrauo even Launts
transler ol tLe oynersLip ol tLe yLole property.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 40
1Le response ol government Las leen to give notice to potential luyers ol
yLo actually oyns tLe property. ¡n its most lasic lorm tLe notice may le little
more tLan a pullic ceremony ol transler or a posteo sign oeclaring oynersLip. Cr
tLe government may create a registry ol property interests ano reouire luyers or
sellers to enter sales in pullic recoro looks.
¡n nations yitL yell-oevelopeo markets ano experienceo regulators, tLe
governments may yisL to consioer legislation in otLer areas to promote translers.
1Lese areas coulo incluoe insurance, lrokerage, lanking ano lormal market
¡nsurance encourages translers ly spreaoing risk. Buyers ol carlon sink
potential yill lace tyo kinos ol risk. 1Le lirst is tLat tLe seller ooes not actually
Lave autLority to transler tLe sink potential. 1Lis coulo le so lecause tLe seller`s
unoerlying lano title is llayeo or lecause tLe seller Las alreaoy translerreo tLe
potential to someone else. A °title° insurer youlo researcL tLe seller`s oynersLip
rigLts ano issue a policy tLat youlo pay out il tLe seller`s title later proveo
1Le secono kino ol risk is tLat tLe lorest ooes not serve as a sink oying to
circumstances leyono tLe control ol tLe luyer or seller. !or example, llooo,
yino, lire, insects or oisease coulo strike tLe lorest. Souatters coulo steal tLe trees
or clear tLe lano. War or relellion coulo oestroy tLe lorest. Cr tLe government
coulo acouire tLe lano legally lor pullic purposes sucL as construction ol a roao.
¡nsurers migLt le yilling to yrite policies covering some ol tLese kinos ol risk.
Governments may cLoose to provioe insurance oirectly or to regulate private
insurance provioers. Provioing insurance youlo le a lorm ol sulsioy to promote
tLese kinos ol transaction.
Governments may regulate insurers to provioe stalility to tLe insurance
market ano to prevent lrauo, tLerely making insurance a more attractive option
lor consumers. Governments interesteo in promoting sink insurance tLrougL
regulation can prolally oray on tLeir oyn experience in regulating insurance
companies. ¡l tLe government ooes not Lave a oomestic insurance inoustry alreaoy,
it is unlikely to generate one solely to cover GHG mitigation transactions.
An open market in GHG mitigation potential may alloy people to earn money
as mitigation lrokers. 1Le lroker`s role youlo le to link interesteo luyer yitL
interesteo seller ano otLeryise to lacilitate sales. 1o cite a yell-knoyn example
to oemonstrate tLe leasilility ol GHG mitigation lrokerage, tLe Worlo Bank
Las createo several lunos, among tLem specilically tLe BioCarlon !uno lor sink
projects. Again, tLe government may yisL to take tLe lrokerage task on itsell or
it may yisL to regulate tLe prolession ol lroker. Eegulation may take tLe lorm
ol licensing, training or lonoing reouirements. Governments yill prolally lino
mooels lor lrokerage programmes ano lays in tLeir lays concerning sales ol
agricultural crops.
Eelateo to lrokerage is lanking. Here, yilling sellers coulo transler tLe rigLts
to tLeir potential to a mitigation lank. 1Le lank youlo le a central place lor tLose
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 41
in neeo ol mitigation to come to luy creoits. Lepenoing on tLe system, tLe lank
coulo pay tLe sellers lor tLe mitigation up lront or coulo act more like a lroker,
making some ol tLe payment contingent on sale. Banks coulo le government or
private entities. ¡l tLe government alloys private lanks, it may yant to regulate
tLem to reouce lrauo or mismanagement tLat coulo Lurt luyers ano sellers.
Mitigation lanks can lunction even il tLe lay ooes not recognize greenLouse
gas mitigation potential as a severalle, transleralle property rigLt. 1Le yetlanos
mitigation lanks louno unoer tLe Lniteo States Clean Water Act are an example.
Eegulators unoer tLat lay can reouire persons seeking to oreoge or lill yetlanos
to arrange lor restoration ol otLer yetlanos in mitigation. ¡n some states ano
regions, tLe government agencies run mitigation lanks to link oyners ol restoreo
or restoralle yetlanos yitL people seeking mitigation creoits.
AnotLer area tLat may invite government involvement is in tLe general
regulation ol markets, il mitigation is openly traoeo. Þations may yisL to control
traoing tLrougL centralizeo markets, similar to stock, lono or commooity lutures
1Le alove oiscussion ol insurance toucLeo on tLe issue ol risk. 1ransactions
involving lorests yill involve existing removal or promises ol luture removal. ¡n
tLe case ol groying lorests, several tLings coulo cLange tLe lorest ano so allect tLat
removal. 1Lose tLings incluoe cLanges in lay or policy tLat precluoe tLe storage
ol carlon (sovereign risk), intentional or unintentional lailure ol tLe project
promoter to carry out promiseo actions (implementation risk), ano acts ol nature
or tLiro parties cLanging tLe lorest (Luman ano natural Lazaros).
Moreover, improvements in our knoyleoge ol lorest science coulo cLange
our unoerstanoing ol Loy mucL carlon a particular lorest seouesters. ¡l tLat
Lappens, yLetLer tLe estimate ol carlon seouestereo goes up or ooyn, yLo gains
or loses¹
WLo lears tLe risk may oepeno on tLe nature ol tLe property rigLt ano tLe
transaction. ¡n a country yLere all carlon seouestration potential is oyneo ly tLe
nation, ano tLere are no transactions, tLe nation yill naturally lear all risks. ¡n a
situation yLere a private lorest oyner contracts yitL a private lactory to provioe
an ollset, tLe terms ol tLe contract may spell out yLo lears tLe risks.
¡ven in a contractual situation, tLere may le room lor tLe lay to estallisL lasic
assumptions on risk. !or example, tLe lay may estallisL yLo lears tLe risk yLen
tLe contract is silent on tLe issue. 1Lis may le a matter ol existing contract lay,
Loyever, some nations may eventually estallisL specilic stanoaros covering GHG
mitigation transactions.
¡n countries tLat aoopt regulatory provisions concerning ollsets, tLe situation
may le more complex. 1Lose lays may recognize olligations letyeen source ano
government, source ano sink, ano sink ano government. A lailure ly tLe sink
coulo allect all tLree olligations, ano tLe lay may treat tLe outcome oillerently in
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 42
eacL case. !or example, a nation`s lay migLt reouire sources to contract yitL sinks
lor ollsets lelore a source may operate, ano it migLt reouire contracting sinks to
take reasonalle precautions to protect tLe lorest to oualily as sinks. ¡l a ligLtning
strike causes sink oyner A`s lorest to lurn, ooes A Lave to return ollset payments
to lactory oyner B¹ Loes lactory oyner B lose permission to operate¹ Loes A
oye tLe government any penalty lor tLe loss ol tLe sink or tLe increaseo emissions
ol carlon lrom tLe lire¹
1Le LÞ!CCC Secretariat (2002l) Las proouceo an options paper lor tLe
SBS1A oiscussing Loy tLe Parties migLt oeal yitL non-permanence in ¡L¡LC!
activities. 1Le paper raises several options lor reoucing risks among Parties tLat
national governments coulo lorroy ano apply internally. 1Lese options incluoe
tLe lolloying:
º Yiability. 1LrougL regulations, tLe government can reouire tLe operator ol
a lorest activity to oemonstrate linancial, legal ano tecLnical vialility lelore
tLe claiming or translerring carlon seouestration creoits.
º Liability. Clear lialility rules, regaroing contracts as oiscusseo alove ano
torts ano ollences as oiscusseo in tLe next section ol tLis paper, yill teno to
oeter some risky activities.
º Kisk management. Eegulations coulo reouire operators to oesign projects to
minimize risks. Grouping activities into portlolios coulo reouce tLe risk ol
total lailure.
º Insurance. ¡nsurance systems coulo le set up eitLer privately or tLrougL tLe
government. 1Le insurer youlo collect premiums lrom tLose investing in
lorest ollsets. 1Le insurer youlo use some or all ol tLe premiums to pay lor
a reserve ol unuseo ollsets. ¡l an insureo investor experiences a lailure, tLe
reserve youlo cover tLe loss.
º Credit reserves. 1Le lay coulo reouire tLe government, a lroker, or one ol
tLe otLer participants in creoit or ollset traoing to Lolo creoits in reserve to
cover possille losses.
º Bullers. 1Le lay coulo reouire eacL lorest claiming removal creoits to retain
a percentage ol tLe creoits as a luller. 1Le oyner coulo tap tLe luller to
cover luture losses.
Lsing similar reasoning, tLe lay coulo initially reouire a source to oltain more
tLan a 100 percent ollset lor its emissions. ¡l tLe ollset partially laileo, tLe lay
youlo not penalize tLe source unless tLe ollset oroppeo leloy 100 percent.
1Le lay may yant to oray oistinctions laseo on intent or culpalility. Cne rule
may state yLo lears tLe risk ol acts ol nature, yLile anotLer states yLo lears tLe
risk ol loss lrom negligence or intentional acts. 1Le lay may recognize oegrees ol
negligence or may apportion responsilility yLere multiple causes contrilute to
tLe loss.
1Lese kinos ol issue sLoulo le lamiliar to contract ano regulatory layyers.
1Le issues are analogous to tLe ones raiseo in otLer contractual ano regulatory
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 43
LiabiIity and damages
¡l tLe oyner ol a lorest sullers oamage to tLe value ol tLe lorest oying to tLe actions
ol anotLer, tLe lay yill olten oller some yay lor tLe lorest oyner to recover tLe
loss. 1Lis may involve lringing a suit lelore tLe courts seeking oamages.
1Le courts may lase tLe amount ol tLe oamages on tLe monetary loss to tLe
oyner. ¡l carlon seouestration lecomes a commooity, tLe lay may automatically
incluoe loss ol carlon seouestration in oamage calculations. ¡n some countries, tLe
legislature may yisL to eliminate any possille ooults ly oeclaring tLat oyners
may seek oamages relateo to carlon seouestration losses.
Calculating oamages can le complicateo in a lorest injury case lecause tLe lost
value ol commooities ooes not rellect tLe total injury. 1Lere is also an injury to
tLe proouctive capacity ol tLe lorest.
!or example, let us say tLat a nation lolloys tLe example ol tLe Protocol ano
measures carlon seouestration in live-year perioos. A lanooyner allorests Lis or
Ler lano at tLe start ol tLe lirst perioo. Because ol tLe rate at yLicL trees groy,
tLe ney lorest yill seouester relatively little carlon ouring tLe lirst live years.
¡t yill perlorm letter ouring tLe next live years, lecause tLe trees are oloer ano
larger. Lepenoing on tLe trees ano tLe site, tLis improving treno coulo continue
lor several more cycles.
Þoy assume tLat someone sets lire to tLe lorest at tLe eno ol tLe lirst cycle.
1Le amount ol seouestereo carlon lost is relatively small. Hoyever, tLe lire Las
reset tLe clock ol ecological succession to zero. ¡n tLe next live years, tLe lorest
yill again seouester relatively little carlon. Besioes oestroying tLe small gain ol tLe
lorest, tLe lire Las oelayeo luture gains.
Valuing tLe injury to proouctive capacity can le oillicult. ¡t reouires a gooo
unoerstanoing ol tLe rate at yLicL trees yill groy on tLe site tLrougLout tLeir
lives. ¡l tLe lorest is ol a type commonly manageo lor yooo proouction, loresters
may Lave tLis inlormation. !or many lorests, Loyever, tLe inlormation may
le unavailalle. Ano, even yitL tLis inlormation, calculating tLe loss yill le
complicateo yLere lire or otLer injury Las killeo only some ol tLe trees. Cn
tLe yLole, tLe current state ol tLe art in lorestry may not alyays le capalle ol
assigning accurate values to tLese kinos ol injury.
1Le lay can Lelp ly setting out some guioance. ¡l tLe lano is in private
oynersLip ano tLe marketplace accurately captures tLe value ol tLe lano lor
carlon seouestration, loss ol market value to tLe lano may le an aoeouate measure.
¡l tLe lano is only recently loresteo, tLen tLe oamages sLoulo incluoe tLe cost ol
restoration ol lorest cover. Eestoration cLanges may also le appropriate yLere tLe
injureo lano is part ol a protecteo area.
¡n situations yLere actual oamages are oillicult to oetermine, tLe lay can set
stanoaro measures ol oamages. 1Lese coulo le oetaileo lormulas laseo on area,
lorest type, age, ano otLer lactors, or tLey coulo le arlitrary, relatively LigL
ligures set to oeter lorest injury as yell as compensate injureo oyners.
Because tLere is a social interest in oeterrence ol lorest injury, some jurisoictions
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 44
alloy lorest oyners to claim oamages ol tyo or tLree times tLe value ol lost yooo.
1Le lay coulo apply similar multipliers to tLe value ol lost carlon seouestration.
AnotLer means ol increasing oeterrence is to make oestruction ol carlon
seouestration an ollence. Particularly in countries yLere tLe average person lacks
tLe capital to pursue a laysuit or pay oamages, a criminal approacL may le tLe
most ellective yay to oeter injuries. Cl course, existing lays concerning criminal
trespass or oamage to government or private property may le sullicient to create
oeterrence. Hoyever, it may le appropriate to oirect tLe courts to consioer loss ol
carlon seouestration value yLen yeigLing tLe severity ol tLe ollence.
¡l tLe nation expects carlon seouestration to remain a pullic gooo, tLe lay
migLt empoyer tLe government to sue to seek oamages. SucL oamages migLt le
laseo on tLe cost ol restoration. Alternatively, tLe lay coulo specily some simple
lormula lor calculating oamages laseo on tLe area ol lorest injureo or tLe volume
ol yooo injureo or lost. SucL a lormula coulo simplily prool ol losses, particularly
il tLere is no local market setting a value on seouestereo carlon.
Cne mooel lor sucL a oamage scLeme is tLe natural resource oamage provision
in tLe Lniteo States lay governing lialility lor releases ol Lazaroous sulstances.
WLere sucL a release kills lisL or yilolile or injures otLer pullic natural resources,
tLe lay recognizes tLe rigLt ol tLe national ano sulnational governments to seek
compensation lrom tLose responsille (CompreLensive ¡nvironmental Eesponse,
Compensation ano ¡ialility Act [C¡EC¡A| §107[l|[1|, cooilieo as +2 LS
Cooe §9607[l|). 1Le lay alloys tLe presioent ano state governors to oesignate
government ollicials to serve as trustees ol tLe resources lor tLe purposes ol
seeking compensation. 1Le lay also empoyers tLe presioent to yrite regulations
estallisLing tLe proper level ol compensation lor lost resources [C¡EC¡A|
§301[c|, cooilieo as +2 LS Cooe §9651[c|).
Commano-ano-control regulation can play many roles in a national system to
reouce net GHG emissions ano tLe regime lor climate cLange mitigation tLrougL
lorests. 1Le alove oiscussion ol property ano transler issues ioentilieo several
points yLere regulation coulo le uselul. ¡noeeo, a regulatory ollset reouirement
coulo orive a country`s yLole market in carlon creoits. Besioes regulating markets,
a country coulo reouce its net GHG emissions ly oirectly regulating lorest use.
¡xamples ol possille lorest regulatory approacLes incluoe:
º ¡ays placing trees oll-limits to Larvest. 1Lese coulo incluoe lays creating
protecteo natural areas on private lanos, lays reouiring uncut lullers ol
lorests arouno yateryays or roaos, or lays proLiliting Larvest on steep
slopes or unstalle soils.
º ¡ays controlling Larvest metLoos or rotation age. Biologists, loresters ano
policy-makers currently oo not all agree on yLicL management systems ano
Larvest or rotation ages youlo maximize carlon seouestration on particular
lorests over tLe long term ano Loy to integrate mitigation ano aoaptation
tecLnioues. 1Le issue is maoe more complex lecause Loy long carlon in
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 45
Larvesteo yooo remains out ol tLe atmospLere oepenos on Loy tLe yooo is
proouceo ano useo. ¡l science is alle to give clearer guioance in tLis area, lays
regulating Larvests may le uselul in promoting carlon seouestration.
º ¡ays reouiring property oyners to ensure regeneration ol Larvesteo lorests,
to restore oegraoeo lorests, or to maintain minimum croyn covers alter
º ¡ays limiting tLe use ol lire to oestroy logging yaste or to clear lano, ano
lays reouiring people yLo york in or use lorests to report lires or carry
simple lire ligLting tools.
Governments may also yant to aoopt regulations lor projects unoer tLe Clean
Levelopment MecLanism or joint ¡mplementation tLat loster environmental ano
social goals in tLe LÞ!CCC ano tLe Iyoto Protocol tLat go leyono climate
cLange issues:
º ¡ays coulo reouire mitigation projects to respect environmental stanoaros
ano conlorm to CCP-7`s principle tLat implementation sLoulo contrilute to
conservation ol liological oiversity ano sustainalle use ol natural resources.
º ¡ays coulo reouire projects to respect traoitional or inoigenous lorest use.
º ¡ays coulo reouire projects to ollset oisruption ano costs to local
communities ly provioing local lenelits, sucL as employment, pullic access
to tLe lorest or pullic use ol project inlrastructure.
¡n some instances, existing lays migLt neeo to le streamlineo to lacilitate
mitigation projects. Carlon seouestration projects in Calilornia, lor example,
yere sulject to at least 16 leoeral ano state regulations (Vine, 200+). 1Le Iyoto
Protocol ano many countries (BekLecLi ano Mercier, 2002) reouire environmental
ano social impact assessments lor allorestation ano relorestation. 1Le carlon
seouestration services tLat lorests provioe sLoulo prolally le given a yeigLt in
tLese assessments as yell as in lays on lano-use planning, zoning ano lanoscape
conservation (Iennet, 2002). Current environmental legislation sometimes
reouires material ollsets lor interventions in tLe lanoscape tLat allect soil, yater,
local climate, lorest area, liological oiversity or amenity values. ¡n tLe luture,
oiminisLeo carlon stores ano reouceo seouestration potential migLt also le
consioereo in lanoscape restoration.
Because GHG mitigation is a pullic gooo, governments may lino it appropriate
lor tLe pullic to sLare tLe cost ol prooucing it. Sulsioies lor lorest-laseo GHG
mitigation may not le very oillerent lrom sulsioies lor lorest management
generally. GHG mitigation may le Laroer to evaluate tLan, say, area ol lorest
cover or volume ol yooo lrougLt to mills. But tLe lasic mecLanisms lor
promoting GHG mitigation tLrougL sulsioies are prolally analogous to general
use ol sulsioies to promote gooo lorest management. !or example:
º As in Costa Eica, tLe government may yisL to pay lorest lanooyners oirectly
lor management tLat promotes carlon seouestration. 1Lese coulo le lump
sum casL payments, tax oeouctions or tax creoits.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 46
º Governments coulo make payments to lorest lanooyners in tLe lorm ol
gooos. !or example, tLe government coulo provioe nursery stock, lertilizer
or tools.
º Payments coulo le in tLe lorm ol services. 1Lese coulo incluoe lire ligLting
assistance, lorest inventory, planning, timler sales preparation or extension
º ¡n some countries, payments coulo go to local communities yilling to Lelp
improve pullic lorests.
º Eeviseo management ol pullic lorests coulo also le ellective. 1Lis coulo
incluoe placing restrictions on tLe lorest practices tLat concession Loloers
may employ in tLeir Larvests. Any resulting reouction in government
income lrom concessions youlo le eouivalent to pullic spenoing lor letter
Some countries may yisL to consioer government purcLase ol lanos or lano
º ¡n some countries, creation or increaseo protection ol natural areas
may le ellective. !or example, Bolivia Las attracteo oonor, ÞGC ano
corporate lunoing lor tLe Þoel Iempll Mercaoo Climate Action Project,
involving Lunoreos ol tLousanos ol Lectares in nortLeastern Bolivia
(yyy.noelkempll.com). Projects sucL as tLese can provioe non-consumptive
uses lesioes GHG mitigation, lor instance protection ol liooiversity or
º ¡n some countries, tLe government may not neeo to acouire a complete interest
in lano to acLieve its enos. !or example, il tLe lay recognizes conservation
easements or GHG usulructuary rigLts, tLe government coulo acouire tLose
on suitalle lanos. ¡t may le attractive to oo so on a multiyear lease lasis,
yitL annual payments. 1Lis youlo give tLe lanooyner an incentive to keep
tLe lano in gooo conoition ouring tLe yLole term ol tLe lease. ¡n countries
yitL annual property taxes laseo on tLe value ol tLe lano, tLe government
coulo create an aooitional incentive ly loyering tLe appraiseo value ol tLe
lano ouring tLe term ol tLe lease. ¡easing youlo also give tLe lanooyner ano
government periooic opportunity to reviey tLe appropriate price to le paio
lor GHG mitigation. 1Le price is likely to cLange as tLe market lor GHG
mitigation matures.
Governments may also oecioe to unoertake general lorest management service
programmes yitLout regaro to tLe management oecisions ol inoivioual lanooyners.
!or example, tLe government may oecioe to speno money on ney programmes lor
lorest lire prevention ano response, lor control ol oestructive lorest insects or lor
control ol lorest oiseases. 1Lese may ultimately result in ouantilialle, verilialle
increases in GHG seouestration, yLicL tLe government may le alle to claim lor
itsell or oller as an ollset. (Þote, Loyever, tLat tLe reporting reouirements aoopteo
ly CCP-7 reouire Parties to state yLicL lanos are sulject to ¡L¡LC! activities,
ano to report on emissions ano removals lrom tLose lanos noy ano in luture years.
Claiming creoit lor a countryyioe programme migLt complicate reporting.)
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 47
More intense enlorcement ol existing lorest protection lays may also yielo
gains. Most countries lino it oillicult to enlorce lasic property lays in remote
loresteo areas. ¡nvestment in increaseo surveillance to stop unautLorizeo lano uses
migLt reouce lorest oegraoation enougL to Lave a measuralle ellect on carlon
Particularly in countries tLat consume large amounts ol yooo or paper,
governments may yisL to unoertake programmes to promote more ellicient use
ol lorest prooucts. 1Lese coulo incluoe programmes to collect ano recycle yooo
ano paper.
¡t sLoulo also le noteo tLat tLe LÞ!CCC oirects Parties to eno oestructive
sulsioies. 1Lese migLt incluoe programmes encouraging tLe clearing ol lano or
tLe early Larvest ol trees.
!or tLe country implementing tLese kinos ol sulsioy, tLe major ouestions may
le juoging tLe costs or likely returns. Lntil countries gain more experience in
tLese areas, ney programmes yill necessarily entail some uncertainties.
Cne ol tLe larriers to GHG mitigation projects is a lack ol inlormation. Provioing
inlormation to lanooyners, consumers ol lorest prooucts ano tLe general pullic
may encourage GHG mitigation projects.
¡anooyners may not le ayare tLat GHG mitigation is an issue tLat involves
tLem. 1Le government can allect lanooyner management oecisions ly taking
steps sucL as:
º inlorming lanooyners alout economic opportunities tLat may arise unoer
ollset ano mitigation programmes,
º inlorming lanooyners alout tLe pullic service tLat tLey can perlorm tLrougL
management lor carlon seouestration,
º inlorming lanooyners alout Loy to manage lorests to improve carlon
º inlorming lanooyners alout Loy to measure ano verily tLe results ol tLeir
management ellorts.
¡n many instances, inlormation ano training may le provioeo tLrougL
estallisLeo extension services. 1Lese coulo also le oone tLrougL tax agents,
tLrougL lano registry agents or otLer non-traoitional means.
Consumers ano users ol lorest prooucts may not le ayare ol tLeir role in tLe
carlon cycle. 1Le government migLt consioer programmes sucL as:
º clearingLouses collecting inlormation on ellicient manulacture ano use ol
lorest prooucts,
º lalelling programmes or eoucational campaigns to inlorm consumers alout
ellicient use ano recycling ol lorest prooucts ano alout tLe aovantages ol
yooo as a carlon-neutral source ol green energy,
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 48
º evaluation ol tLe GHG impacts ol inoivioual large lanooyners or lorest
concession Loloers ano pullic oisclosure ol tLose evaluations.
Certi!ication and veri!ication
Governments may Lave a role to play in certilying or verilying GHG mitigation
ellorts. Certilication ano verilication may le oirectly connecteo to compliance
yitL tLe Iyoto Protocol lor Annex ¡ nations, tLey may le an aojunct to national
market-laseo, regulatory or sulsioy lays, or tLey may some oay le important in
tLe marketing ol yooo prooucts.
1Lree articles in tLe Iyoto Protocol mention verilication or certilication.
Article 12 reouires CLM emission reouctions to le certilieo. 1Le Protocol oirects
tLe CCP to oesignate °operational entities° to make tLese certilications, unoer
tLe oversigLt ol tLe ¡xecutive Boaro. 1Le CCP-9 oecision on oelinitions ano
mooalities lor incluoing ¡L¡LC! unoer tLe CLM incluoes aspects concerning
verilication ano certilication as yell as tLe accreoitation ol operational entities in
relation to allorestation ano relorestation projects unoer tLe CLM (LÞ!CCC
SBS1A, 2003, pp. 12÷13 ano 18).
Article 6 alloys Annex ¡ Parties to implement emission reouction ano
seouestration projects in otLer Annex ¡ countries. 1Lere are tyo °tracks° to joint
¡mplementation, yitL oillerent institutional implications at tLe national level. 1Le
lirst track ÷ tLe °last track° ÷ is availalle lor Lost Parties meeting tLe eligilility
1Lese Parties may use tLeir oyn processes to verily emissions
reouctions or removals as leing aooitional ano issue tLe appropriate ouantity ol
¡ELs or EMLs. Conseouently, it yill le important lor tLese Parties to Lave tLe
necessary institutional lasis in place yell lelore tLe leginning ol tLe commitment
perioo in 2008. Lnoer tLe secono °track°, a joint ¡mplementation supervisory
committee sets international proceoures lor laselines, verilication ano otLer
proceoures (Mullins, 2002, pp. 5 ano 18). 1Le guioelines on tLe implementation
on Article 6 are incluoeo in tLe oecision 16/CP.7 ol tLe MarrakesL Accoros.
Article 3 ol tLe Protocol alloys Annex ¡ Parties to claim net cLanges in GHG
emissions oue to lano-use cLange ano lorestry activities, lut reouires sucL cLanges
to le verilialle. Annex ¡ Parties Lave to report annually tLeir antLropogenic
greenLouse gas emissions ano removals, yLicL yill le revieyeo in accoroance
yitL relevant oecisions relating to Articles 5, 7 ano 8 ol tLe Protocol.
Governments tLat set up market-laseo, regulatory or sulsioy programmes
may lino it necessary to create internal stanoaros or mecLanisms to verily GHG
reouctions oue to lorest activities. Some ol tLe sections alove in tLis paper Lave
1Lese are: (i) leing a Party ol tLe Iyoto Protocol, (ii) Laving estallisLeo its assigneo amount ano
a national system lor estimating emissions ano sinks, (iii) putting in place a national registry, ano
(iv) Laving sulmitteo tLe reouireo national inventory ano supplementary inlormation annually.
!urtLermore, tLe country Las to inlorm tLe LÞ!CCC Secretariat ol its oesignateo local point ano
its national guioelines ano proceoures lor approving Article 6 projects.
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 49
toucLeo on verilication issues, e.g. tLe oiscussion ol size unoer market-relateo
issues. Similar verilication issues may arise in oetermining compliance yitL GHG
regulations or eligilility lor GHG reouction sulsioies.
Government involvement in internal certilication ano verilication coulo take
several lorms. 1Le government coulo itsell measure ano certily GHG ollsets,
perLaps tLrougL government lorestry agencies. ¡t coulo provioe ollicial guioelines
lor measuring tLem. ¡t coulo license private parties, sucL as pullicly accreoiteo
certilication organizations, to measure tLem.
Government certilication may occur in varying contexts. ¡t may le strongly
tieo to government enlorcement ellorts, as a means to oetermine yLetLer
property oyners are lolloying lays oesigneo to reouce GHG emissions. ¡n a non-
enlorcement context, tLe purpose ol certilication may le to assure parties involveo
in GHG mitigation transactions tLat tLe mitigation is real.
¡l tLe pullic groys more ayare ol tLe importance ol lorests as GHG sinks,
it may le interesteo to knoy yLetLer yooo came lrom lorests manageo to
promote carlon seouestration. Certilication ol yooo prooucts coulo provioe
tLat inlormation. 1Lis coulo le a government lunction, or it coulo lall to non-
governmental organizations tLat maintain certilication stanoaros, sucL as tLe
!orest SteyarosLip Council.
By manoating planning, tLe government can make oecision-makers more ayare ol
tLe impacts tLat lorest-relateo oecisions Lave on net GHG emissions. ¡t is Lopeo
tLat tLis ayareness yill leao to letter oecisions. 1Lis applies lotL to government
ano private oecision-makers.
Many countries Lave impact assessment or planning lays tLat reouire
government oecision-makers to reviey tLe environmental impacts ol proposeo
actions ano consioer alternatives ano mitigation. GHG ellects lrom lorest projects
may escape reviey unoer tLese lays lor several reasons. Climate cLange may not
le one ol tLe kinos ol impact tLat analysts usually consioer. Cr, tLe analyst may
oecioe tLe ellect ol a single project on net GHG emissions is so minor tLat it is
not yortL consioeration. Cr tLe analyst may concluoe tLat tLe ultimate impacts
ol climate cLange are so oistant in time ano space ano so speculative tLat a
present analysis cannot assign tLem a reasonalle yeigLt lor tLe oecision-maker to
consioer. Þey lays or guioance on impact assessment can overcome tLese Luroles
ano ensure tLat analysts yeigL climate impacts yLen revieying lorest projects.
Many countries Lave planning reouirements tLat apply to pullic or private
lorests. Managers cannot manage lorests yitLout sLort-term operational plans or
long-term management plans. 1ypically, tLe lay reouires tLat tLese plans protect
tLe proouctivity ol tLe lorest resource. At a minimum, planning makes tLe oyner
ayare ol tLe costs ano lenelits ol proposeo activities. ¡t may also Lave a regulatory
lunction, alloying tLe government to verily tLat tLe oyner can carry out tLe
proposeo activity in accoro yitL existing lays. Aooing reouirements lor carlon
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 50
inventories ano projection ol management impacts on net carlon seouestration
coulo make lorest oyners ano regulators more ayare ol tLe likely net GHG
ellects ol proposeo actions.
Some countries reouire inoustrial operations to prepare pollution prevention
plans. 1Lese typically locus on Lazaroous or toxic pollutants. Governments coulo
reouire tLe lorest inoustry to prepare GHG emission reouction plans lor lorest
¡egally manoateo researcL generally takes one ol tyo lorms. Cne is a kino ol
sulsioy, yLere tLe government commits itsell to conoucting researcL ano making
tLe results lreely availalle. 1Le otLer is a lorm ol regulation, yLere tLe government
oroers otLers to gatLer inlormation or conouct tests ano pass tLe inlormation on
to tLe pullic or tLe government.
1o unoerstano ano improve tLe ellectiveness ol ¡L¡LC! projects, eacL
loresteo country yill lenelit lrom researcL on tLe leLaviour ol its oyn lorests.
just as loresters reouire a lair amount ol locally specilic inlormation to oetermine
tLe optimal management lor prooucing timler, loresters yill neeo locally specilic
inlormation lor optimal management lor carlon seouestration. EesearcL may also
improve tLe accuracy ol local inventory metLoos ano aio in measurement ano
certilication ol tLe amount ol carlon seouestereo. A large, inoustrial lanooyner
migLt Lave tLe alility to conouct tLis sort ol researcL, lut tLe government itsell
may yant to conouct tLe researcL lor tLe lenelit ol small private lanooyners ano
lor tLe letter management ol pullic lorests,
EatLer tLan conoucting tLe researcL on small plots in oeoicateo experimental
lorests, some ol tLe researcL on pullic lanos coulo le in tLe lorm ol aoaptive
management. ¡n tLe course ol management ol pullic lanos lor carlon
seouestration, tLe government youlo carelully vary its actions lrom stano to
stano. By monitoring tLe resulting lorest groytL, tLe government youlo learn
alout Loy tLe lanos react to management. 1Le results youlo leao to letter
management oecisions in tLe long term.
¡l a country ooes Lost large, private, inoustrial-scale carlon seouestration
projects, it may yant to reouire project operators to conouct researcL. !or
example, it migLt reouire tLat large operators present tLe results ol surveys ol soil
carlon content or non-tree liomass lelore tLey coulo get tLeir projects certilieo.
1Le government coulo analyse oata lrom several projects to glean a letter
unoerstanoing ol tLe carlon seouestration capacity ol local lanos.
¡mplementation ol tLe Iyoto Protocol Linges on institutional capacities.
¡n particular, countries must oesignate a °national autLority° il tLey are
contemplating using tLe Clean Levelopment MecLanism. Some nations may make
tLe oesignations tLrougL legislation, yLile otLers may le alle to make it tLrougL
exercise ol executive oiscretion.
Legal and institutional issues o[ [orest-based nitigation 51
At tLe last count, only tLe ¡uropean Lnion, eigLt inoustrializeo countries,
39 oeveloping, ano six countries in transition Lao estallisLeo sucL autLorities. !or
some ol tLese countries, tLe autLority exists only on paper.
¡t is prolalle tLat ley countries yill oesignate tLeir lorestry institution as tLe
leao national autLority. More olten tLe cLoice yill le an institution yLose locus
is air pollution or energy. ÞevertLeless, tLe leao institution yill Lave to oeal yitL
¡L¡LC! issues. Climate cLange presents a cLallenge tLat naturally cuts across
institutional lines ano reouires cooperation among people yitL oiverse expertise.
¡egislation can promote an interoisciplinary approacL ly creating interagency
or pullic-private cooroinating ano aovisory committees ano reouiring tLe leao
institution to consult yitL otLer allecteo institutions lelore taking major actions.
4. 5ome concIuding observations
!or IegisIative dra!ters
WitL tLe oecisions taken in Lecemler 2003 (CCP-9) on tLe rules ano mooalities
concerning lorestry in tLe CLM, tLe lasic ouestions in tLe international context
Lave leen resolveo. ¡n many cases, parties yill yant to aoopt national legislation
in support ol tLese rules ano mooalities, or at least yill yant to reviey existing
lays to assure consistency.
1Le lack ol clarity lelore CCP-9 sloyeo tLe oevelopment ol lorest GHG
mitigation ellorts. Some nations ano inoiviouals acteo, lut most oecioeo to yatcL
ano yait.
Þoy tLe time to prepare lor GHG mitigation is sLort. 1Le Iyoto Protocol
compliance perioo yill legin in 2008 il tLe Protocol is ratilieo. Þations are
supposeo to le alle to oemonstrate progress ly 2005. Given tLe time it takes to
enact legislation, ano tLe time it takes to groy trees or restore lorests, national
ellorts to create proceoural ano institutional capacity must proceeo yitLout
1Le time lor legislators to act is noy. Having a legal lounoation lor lorest
GHG mitigation projects yill enalle lorests to play a positive role in LÞ!CCC
Cn tLe role ol lorests, tLe texts ol tLe LÞ!CCC ano tLe Iyoto Protocol are at
lest amliguous ano at yorst contraoictory. Besioes tLe texts, oralters neeo to le
lamiliar yitL tLe issues tLat tLe Parties Lave aooresseo ano Loy tLe CCPs Lave
resolveo oisagreements alout tLe role ol lorests.
Lralters neeo to analyse critically tLe legal responses ol otLer nations. 1Le
sell-serving oescriptions ol national responses proouceo ly tLe Parties can oistract
reaoers lrom key ouestions. Hoy mucL ol tLis response represents true legal
innovation¹ Are tLese innovations making a oillerence in people`s leLaviour¹ ¡n
otLer yoros, yLat is ney, ano yLat yorks¹
Lralters yill neeo a lasic unoerstanoing ol tLe tecLnical issues concerning
lorest mitigation. !or example, Loy can carlon seouestration le measureo ano
verilieo¹ WLicL carlon pools in a lorest are important: just tLe trees, or also tLe
litter, oeao yooo ano soils¹
Lralters neeo to le lamiliar yitL existing lorest lays. MucL ol tLe legal response
yill luilo on existing lay. 1Le response may incluoe programmes to protect
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 54
lorests lrom oegraoation or lano-use cLange, relorestation ano allorestation
ellorts, extension-style outreacL, lorest inventories ano social lorestry.
Some ol tLe response may involve ney areas, particularly il countries try to set
up markets in traoalle ollsets or create ney property interests. ¡ssues may arise
concerning insurance, lialility or property transler. Lralters may yant to seek
outsioe assistance yLen oealing yitL unlamiliar areas. Eesponoing nationally to
tLe nascent international climate cLange regime relateo to lorests yill reouire a
major ano integrateo ellort.
¡n tLe oralting ol legislation, policy, politics, science ano lay sometimes all
collioe. 1Le process is seloom simple. ¡n tLe area ol climate cLange ano lorests, tLe
issues are particularly complex. But tLrougL lorest lay, nations Lave opportunities
lor creatively aooressing one ol tLe LigLest-prolile environmental issues ol our
time. ¡nnovative approacLes coulo lring great reyaros.
American Petroleum Institute. 1999. Carbon sinks and tle Kyoto Protocol. Liscussion
Paper Þo. 091 (MarcL).
Anonymous. 1998. A¡j pilot pLase mile yioe lut only incL oeep. ]oint Inplenentation
Ouarterly, +(june): 2.
Bekhechi, M.A. & Mercier, ].-K. 2002. Tle legal and regulatory [raneuork [or
en:ironnental inpact assessnents. WasLington, LC, Worlo Bank.
Bisson, D. 2000. ¡et tLe traoing legin: Canaoian companies experiment yitL emission
traoing tLrougL G¡E1. EM (Air & Waste Management Association`s Magazine lor
¡nvironmental Managers), April 2000, pp. 3+÷39.
Cathcart, ].I. 2000. Carlon seouestration: a yorking example in Cregon. ]ournal o[
!orestry, 98(9): 32÷37.
Chekhov, A. 1900. Uncle Vanya. 1ranslateo ly Constance Garnett (1923).
Dayal, P. 2000. Carlon traoing ano seouestration projects oller glolal yarming
solutions. EM (Air & Waste Management Association`s Magazine lor ¡nvironmental
Managers), MarcL 2000, pp. 15÷2+.
Dyson, I.]. 1977. Can ye control carlon oioxioe in tLe atmospLere¹ Energy, 2:
LCCP Working Croup on Iorest Sinks. 2002. Conclusions and reconnendations
regarding [orest related sinks and clinate clange nitigation. !inal Eeport. ¡uropean
Climate CLange Programme (availalle at: yyy.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/
LcoSecurities, Ltd. 2001. Post COP 7 ÷ inplications o[ Marrakecl [or tle [orestry
sector (yyy. ecosecurities.com).
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under tle UN !raneuork Con:ention on Clinate Clange (26 june).
Hayes, D.]. & Certler, Þ. 2002. 1Le role ol carlon seouestration in tLe L.S.
Eesponse to climate cLange ÷ cLallenges ano opportunities. En:ironnental Lau
Beporter, 32: 11,350÷11,356. (Þeys & Analysis, Þovemler 2002 [yyy.eli.org/pol/
IPCC. 1996. Be:ised 199o IPCC guidelines [or national greenlouse gas in:entories.
Vols 1÷3 (availalle at: yyy.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/pullic/gl/invs1.Ltm).
IPCC. 2001. Sunnary [or policy nakers, tlird assessnent report o[ Working Group I
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Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 56
]ustus, ].K. & Iletcher, S.K. 2003. Global clinate clange. Congressional EesearcL
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Kosloll, L. & Trexler, M. 200+. State climate cLange initiatives: tLink locally, act
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sixtl session, leld at Bonn [ron 1o to 27 ]uly, addendun, part [our· dra[t decisions
on ulicl progress uas noted by tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties at tle second part o[
its sixtl session and ulicl tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties decided to [oruard to its
se:entl session [or elaboration, conpletion and adoption. !CCC/CP/2001/5/Aoo.2
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LÞICCC COP. 2002l. Beport o[ tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties on its se:entl session,
leld at Marrakesl [ron 29 October to 10 No:enber 2001, addendun, part tuo·
Action taken by tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties, :olune II. !CCC/CP/2001/13/
Aoo.2 (21 january).
LÞICCC COP. 2002c. Beport o[ tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties on its se:entl session,
leld at Marrakesl [ron 29 October to 10 No:enber 2001, addendun, part tuo·
Action taken by tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties, :olune III. !CCC/CP/2001/13/
Aoo.3 (21 january).
LÞICCC COP. 2002o. Beport o[ tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties on its se:entl session,
leld at Marrakesl [ron 29 October to 10 No:enber 2001, addendun, part tuo·
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Bibliograply 57
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LÞICCC COP. 200+l. Beport o[ tle Con[erence o[ tle Parties on its nintl session,
leld at Milan [ron 1 to 12 Decenber 2003, addendun, part tuo· Action taken by tle
Con[erence o[ tle Parties at its nintl session. !CCC/CP/2003/6/Aoo.2 (22 April).
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nodalities [or including a[[orestation and re[orestation acti:ities under Article 12
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LÞICCC Secretariat. 2002a. Metlodological issues· Land Use, Land-Use Clange
and !orestry· de[initions and nodalities [or including a[[orestation and re[orestation
acti:ities under Article 12 o[ tle Kyoto Protocol in tle !irst Connitnent Period·
options paper on nodalities [or addressing baselines, additionality and leakage.
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LÞICCC Secretariat. 2002l. Metlodological issues· Land Use, Land-Use Clange
and !orestry· de[initions and nodalities [or including a[[orestation and re[orestation
acti:ities under Article 12 o[ tle Kyoto Protocol in tle !irst Connitnent Period·
options paper on nodalities [or addressing non-pernanence. !CCC/SBS1A/2003/5
(2+ Lecemler).
LÞICCC Secretariat. 2003. Estination, reporting and accounting o[ lar:ested uood
products. !CCC/2003/2003/7 (27 Cctoler).
LÞICCC Secretariat. 200+a. United Nations !raneuork Con:ention o[ Clinate
Clange· status o[ rati[ication [last mooilieo on 26 !elruary 200+| (unlccc.int/
LÞICCC Secretariat. 200+l. Kyoto Protocol· status o[ rati[ication [last mooilieo on
15 April 200+| (unlccc.int/resource/kpstats.pol).
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guioance lor tLe estallisLment, use ano operation ol mitigation lanks. !ederal
Begister, 60(28 Þovemler): 58,605÷58,61+.
Lnited States Department ol State. 2002. Clinate action report÷2002· tlird
national connunication o[ tle United States o[ Anerica under tle United Nations
!raneuork Con:ention on Clinate Clange (availalle at: yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
Lnited States Lnergy Inlormation Administration. 2003. Voluntary reporting
o[ greenlouse gases 2001. Locument LC¡/¡¡A-0608(2001) (availalle at:
Yespa, M. 2002. Climate cLange 2001: Iyoto at Bonn ano MarrakecL. Ecology Lau
Ouarterly, 29: 395÷+20.
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ano geological lormations. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies [or Global Clange,
9: 77÷95.
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 58
MuItiIateraI treaties
Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange (1992) [unlccc.int|.
Iyoto Protocol to tLe Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention on Climate CLange
(1997) [unlccc.int|.
RegionaI, nationaI and subnationaI IegisIation
Carlon EigLts ¡egislation Amenoment Act 1998. Þo. 12+. State ol Þey SoutL Wales,
Australia (26 Þovemler 1998).
Climate CLange ano ¡missions Management Act, Statutes ol Allerta 2003, cL. C-16.7
!orestry ¡ay ol tLe People`s Eepullic ol CLina (2+ April 1998, 9tL Þational People`s
Congress, 2no meeting, amenoing tLe original text aoopteo 20 Septemler 198+).
¡ey !orestal 1996 (¡ay Þo. 7575), pullisLeo in La Gaceta Þo. 72 (16 April 1996).
Eeglamento a la ¡ey !orestal, 17 Cctoler 1996 (Lecreto Þo. 25,721), pullisLeo in La
Gaceta Þo. 16 (23 january 1997).
¡ay on tLe Lse, Management ano Conservation ol ¡ano 1998 (¡ay Þo. 7779) 30
April 1998, pullisLeo in La Gaceta Þo. 97 (21 May 1998).
Act on CC
ouotas lor electricity proouction, Act Þo. 376 ol 2 june 1999 (¡nglisL
translation availalle at: yyy.ens.ok/grapLics/Pullikationer/¡ays/ActCnCC2
Cóoigo !orestal (¡ay 118-99) pullisLeo in Gaceta O[icial Þo. 10,032 (30 Lecemler
Council Lecision ol 25 April 2002 concerning tLe approval, on leLall ol tLe ¡uropean
Community, ol tLe Iyoto Protocol to tLe Lniteo Þations !rameyork Convention
on Climate CLange ano tLe joint lullilment ol commitments tLereunoer (2002/358/
C¡), pullisLeo in ¡nglisL in tLe O[[icial ]ournal o[ tle European Connunities,
¡ 130/1 (15 May 2002) (availalle online at: europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/oat/
Bibliograply 59
¡oi Þo. 2001-602, o`orientation sur la lorêt (9 july 2001).
¡ey !orestal 1996, Lecreto Þo. 101/96 (30 Cctoler 1996) (Diario de Centro Anerica,
+ Lecemler 1996).
¡ey General oe Lesarrollo !orestal Sustentalle (21 !elruary 2003) (Diario O[icial de
la !ederación, 25 !elruary 2003).
¡ey !orestal y oe !auna Silvestre (¡ey Þo. 27.308, 15 july 2000) (El Peruano Þo.
7328, 16 july 2000, pp. 190,283÷190,289).
¡ey oe Montes (¡ey +3/2003, 21 Þovemler 2003) (Boletin O[icial del Estado, 22
Þovemler 2003, pp. +1,+22÷+1,++2).
Clean Air Act (as amenoeo), +2 LSC §§7+01 et seq.
Clean Air Act Amenoments ol 1990, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 101-5+9 (15 Þovemler 1990),
10+ Stat. 2399.
Clean Water Act §+0+, 33 LSC §13++.
CompreLensive ¡nvironmental Eesponse, Compensation ano ¡ialility Act (as
amenoeo), +2 LSC §§9601 et seq.
¡nergy Policy Act ol 1992, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 102-+86 (2+ Cctoler 1992), 106 Stat. 2776,
cooilieo at +2 LSC §§13201 et seq.
!eoeral Agriculture ¡mprovement Act ol 1996, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 10+-127 (+ April
1996), 110 Stat. 896, cooilieo in scattereo sections ol titles 7 ano 15 LSC.
Glolal Climate CLange Prevention Act ol 1990, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 101-62+, title XX¡V
(28 Þovemler 1990), 10+ Stat. +058, cooilieo at 7 LSC §§6701 et seq.
Glolal Climate CLange EesearcL Act ol 1990, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 101-606 (16 Þovemler
1990), 10+ Stat. 3098, cooilieo at 15 LSC §2921 et seq.
HealtLy !orest Eestoration Act, Pullic ¡ay Þo. 108-1+8 (3 Lecemler 2003), 117 Stat.
1887, cooilieo at 16 LSC §§6501÷6591 ano 7 LSC §8101 note.
Pacilic ÞortLyest ¡lectric Poyer Planning ano Conservation Act, Pullic ¡ay Þo.
96-501 (5 Lecemler 1980), 9+ Stat. 2697, cooilieo at 16 LSC §§839 et seq.
2002 Calilornia Statutes cL. +23 (an act to ameno Sections +2801.1, +2823, +28+0, ano
+28+1 ol, ano to aoo Section +2823.1 to, tLe HealtL ano Salety Cooe, relating to air
pollution) (relating to registry ol emissions ollset ly conservation or management
ol native lorests).
Clinate clange and tle [orest sector ÷ possible national and subnational legislation 60
Connecticut General Statutes, title 22a (¡nvironmental Protection), cL. ++6c (Air
Pollution Control), §22a-17+o (planting ol trees or turl grass as conoition ol
¡oaLo Cooe, title 22 (Agriculture ano Horticulture), cL. 52 (Carlon Seouestration
Aovisory Committee), §§22-5201 to -5206.
1Le Iyoto Protocol Act ol 1998, +15 ¡llinois Compileo Statutes 1+0/1÷99.
An Act to Provioe ¡eaoersLip in Aooressing tLe 1Lreat ol Climate CLange, Pullic
¡ays ol Maine, 1st Eegular Session, 121st ¡egislature, cL. 237, cooilieo at 38 Maine
Eeviseo Statutes annotateo cL. 3-A, §§57+÷578.
Minnesota Statutes, cL. 88, §88.82 (Minnesota °releal° programme).
Þey Mexico !orest Ee-leal Act, 1990 Þey Mexico ¡ays cL. 96, §1, cooilieo at Þey
Mexico Statutes annotateo §§68-2-29 to -33 (availalle at: yyy.emnro.state.nm.us/
!orestry Aoministration, Cregon Eeviseo Statutes, cL. 526, §§526.700÷.775 (!orest
Eesource 1rust) ano §§526.780÷.789 (lorestry carlon ollsets) (yyy.leg.state.or.us/
Acouisition ano Levelopment ol State !orests, Cregon Eeviseo Statutes, cL.
530, §§530.050 ano .500 (alloying management ol lorests to proouce ollsets)
Ltility Eegulation Generally, Cregon Eeviseo Statutes, cL. 757, §757.266 (rates
may encourage tree planting programmes as ollsets to carlon oioxioe emissions)
Carlon Cllsets, Cregon Aoministrative Eules, §629-022-0700(2) (1999 revision)
Stanoaros lor ¡nergy !acilities tLat ¡mit Carlon Lioxioe, Cregon Aoministrative
Eules, §§3+5-02+-0500 et seq. (reviseo, 1999) (arcyel.sos.state.or.us/rules/CAES_
1 ForesI uIilizaIioh cohIracIs oh public lahd,
1977 (L F S)
2 Plahhihg !oresI roads ahd harvesIihg sysIems,
1977 (L F S)
3 World lisI o! !oresIry schools, 1977 (L/F/S)
3 Rev.1 World lisI o! !oresIry schools, 1981 (L/F/S)
3 Rev.2 World lisI o! !oresIry schools, 1986 (L/F/S)
4/1 World pulp ahd paper demahd, supply ahd
Irade 1- Vol. 1, 1977 (L F S)
4/2 World pulp ahd paper demahd, supply ahd
Irade - Vol. 2, 1977 (L F S)
5 1he markeIihg o! Iropical wood ih SouIh
America, 1976 (L S)
6 NaIiohal parks plahhihg, 1976 (L F)
7 ForesIry !or local commuhiIy developmehI,
1978 (Ar L F S)
8 LsIablishmehI Iechhiques !or !oresI
plahIaIiohs, 1978 (Ar C L* F S)
9 Wood chips - producIioh, hahdlihg, IrahsporI,
1976 (C L S)
10/1 AssessmehI o! loggihg cosIs !rom !oresI
ihvehIories ih Ihe Iropics - 1. Prihciples ahd
meIhodology, 1978 (L F S)
10/2 AssessmehI o! loggihg cosIs !rom !oresI
ihvehIories ih Ihe Iropics - 2. DaIa collecIioh
ahd calculaIiohs, 1978 (L F S)
11 Savahha a!!oresIaIioh ih A!rica, 1977 (L F)
12 Chiha: !oresIry supporI !or agriculIure, 1978
13 ForesI producIs prices 1960-1977, 1979 (L/F/S)
14 MouhIaih !oresI roads ahd harvesIihg, 1979 (L)
14 Rev.1 Loggihg ahd IrahsporI ih sIeep Ierraih, 1985
15 ACRIS !oresIry - world caIalogue o!
ih!ormaIioh ahd documehIaIioh services,
1979 (L/F/S)
16 Chiha: ihIegraIed wood processihg ihdusIries,
1979 (L F S)
17 Lcohomic ahalysis o! !oresIry proiecIs, 1979
(L F S)
17 Sup.1 Lcohomic ahalysis o! !oresIry proiecIs: case
sIudies, 1979 (L S)
17 Sup.2 Lcohomic ahalysis o! !oresIry proiecIs:
readihgs, 1980 (C L)
18 ForesI producIs prices 1960-1978, 1980 (L/F/S)
19/1 Pulpihg ahd paper-makihg properIies o!
!asI-growihg plahIaIioh wood species - Vol. 1,
1980 (L)
19/2 Pulpihg ahd paper-makihg properIies o!
!asI-growihg plahIaIioh wood species - Vol. 2,
1980 (L)
20 ForesI Iree improvemehI, 1985 (C L F S)
20/2 A guide Io !oresI seed hahdlihg, 1985 (L S )
21 ImpacI oh soils o! !asI-growihg species ih
lowlahd humid Iropics, 1980 (L F S)
22/1 ForesI volume esIimaIioh ahd yield predicIioh
- Vol. 1. Volume esIimaIioh, 1980 (C L F S)
22/2 ForesI volume esIimaIioh ahd yield predicIioh
- Vol. 2. Yield predicIioh, 1980 (C L F S)
23 ForesI producIs prices 1961-1980, 1981 (L/F/S)
24 Cable loggihg sysIems, 1981 (C L)
25 Public !oresIry admihisIraIiohs ih LaIih
America, 1981 (L)
26 ForesIry ahd rural developmehI, 1981 (L F S)
27 Mahual o! !oresI ihvehIory, 1981 (L F)
28 Small ahd medium sawmills ih developihg
couhIries, 1981 (L S)
29 World !oresI producIs, demahd ahd supply
1990 ahd 2000, 1982 (L F S)
30 1ropical !oresI resources, 1982 (L F S)
31 AppropriaIe Iechhology ih !oresIry, 1982 (L)
32 Classi!icaIioh ahd de!ihiIiohs o! !oresI
producIs, 1982 (Ar/L/F/S)
33 Loggihg o! mouhIaih !oresIs, 1982 (L F S)
34 FruiI-bearihg !oresI Irees, 1982 (L F S)
35 ForesIry ih Chiha, 1982 (C L)
36 8asic Iechhology ih !oresI operaIiohs, 1982
(L F S)
37 CohservaIioh ahd developmehI o! Iropical
!oresI resources, 1982 (L F S)
38 ForesI producIs prices 1962-1981, 1982 (L/F/S)
39 Frame saw mahual, 1982 (L)
40 Circular saw mahual, 1983 (L)
41 Simple Iechhologies !or charcoal makihg,
1983 (L F S)
42 Fuelwood supplies ih Ihe developihg
couhIries, 1983 (Ar L F S)
43 ForesI revehue sysIems ih developihg
couhIries, 1983 (L F S)
44/1 Food ahd !ruiI-bearihg !oresI species -
1. Lxamples !rom easIerh A!rica, 1983 (L F S)
44/2 Food ahd !ruiI-bearihg !oresI species -
2. Lxamples !rom souIheasIerh Asia, 1984
(L F S)
44/3 Food ahd !ruiI-bearihg !oresI species -
3. Lxamples !rom LaIih America, 1986 (L S)
45 LsIablishihg pulp ahd paper mills, 1983 (L)
46 ForesI producIs prices 1963-1982, 1983 (L/F/S)
47 1echhical !oresIry educaIioh - desigh ahd
implemehIaIioh, 1984 (L F S)
48 Lahd evaluaIioh !or !oresIry, 1984 (C L F S)
49 Wood exIracIioh wiIh oxeh ahd agriculIural
IracIors, 1986 (L F S)
50 Chahges ih shi!Iihg culIivaIioh ih A!rica, 1984
(L F)
50/1 Chahges ih shi!Iihg culIivaIioh ih A!rica -
seveh case-sIudies, 1985 (L)
51/1 SIudies oh Ihe volume ahd yield o! IropicaI
!oresI sIahds - 1. Dry !oresI !ormaIiohs, 1989
(L F)
52/1 CosI esIimaIihg ih sawmillihg ihdusIries:
guidelihes, 1984 (L)
52/2 Field mahual oh cosI esIimaIioh ih sawmillihg
ihdusIries, 1985 (L)
53 IhIehsive mulIiple-use !oresI mahagemehI ih
Kerala, 1984 (L F S)
54 Plahi!icacióh del desarrollo !oresIal, 1984 (S)
55 IhIehsive mulIiple-use !oresI mahagemehI ih
Ihe Iropics, 1985 (L F S)
56 8reedihg poplars !or disease resisIahce, 1985
57 CocohuI wood - Processihg ahd use, 1985 (L S)
58 SawdocIorihg mahual, 1985 (L S)
59 1he ecological e!!ecIs o! eucalypIus, 1985
(C L F S)
60 MohiIorihg ahd evaluaIioh o! parIicipaIory
!oresIry proiecIs, 1985 (L F S)
61 ForesI producIs prices 1965-1984, 1985 (L/F/S)
62 World lisI o! ihsIiIuIiohs ehgaged ih !oresIry
ahd !oresI producIs research, 1985 (L/F/S)
63 IhdusIrial charcoal makihg, 1985 (L)
64 1ree growihg by rural people, 1985 (Ar L F S)
65 ForesI legislaIioh ih selecIed A!ricah
couhIries, 1986 (L F)
66 ForesIry exIehsioh orgahizaIioh, 1986 (C L S)
67 Some medicihal !oresI plahIs o! A!rica ahd
LaIih America, 1986 (L)
68 AppropriaIe !oresI ihdusIries, 1986 (L)
69 MahagemehI o! !oresI ihdusIries, 1986 (L)
70 Wildlahd !ire mahagemehI Iermihology, 1986
71 World compehdium o! !oresIry ahd !oresI
producIs research ihsIiIuIiohs, 1986 (L/F/S)
72 Wood gas as ehgihe !uel, 1986 (L S)
73 ForesI producIs: world ouIlook proiecIiohs
1985-2000, 1986 (L/F/S)
74 Cuidelihes !or !oresIry ih!ormaIioh
processihg, 1986 (L)
75 MohiIorihg ahd evaluaIioh o! social !oresIry
ih Ihdia - ah operaIiohal guide, 1986 (L)
76 Wood preservaIioh mahual, 1986 (L)
77 DaIabook oh ehdahgered Iree ahd shrub
species ahd provehahces, 1986 (L)
78 AppropriaIe wood harvesIihg ih plahIaIioh
!oresIs, 1987 (L)
79 Small-scale !oresI-based processihg
ehIerprises, 1987 (L F S)
80 ForesIry exIehsioh meIhods, 1987 (L)
81 Cuidelihes !or !oresI policy !ormulaIioh, 1987
(C L)
82 ForesI producIs prices 1967-1986, 1988 (L/F/S)
83 1rade ih !oresI producIs: a sIudy o! Ihe
barriers !aced by Ihe developihg couhIries,
1988 (L)
84 ForesI producIs: World ouIlook proiecIiohs
- ProducI ahd couhIry Iables 1987-2000, 1988
85 ForesIry exIehsioh curricula, 1988 (L/F/S)
86 ForesIry poIicies ih Lurope, 1988 (L)
87 Small-scale harvesIihg operaIiohs o! wood
ahd hoh-wood !oresI producIs ihvolvihg rural
people, 1988 (L F S)
88 MahagemehI o! Iropical moisI !oresIs ih
A!rica, 1989 (L F P)
89 Review o! !oresI mahagemehI sysIems o!
Iropical Asia, 1989 (L)
90 ForesIry ahd !ood securiIy, 1989 (Ar L S)
91 Desigh mahual oh basic wood harvesIihg
Iechhology, 1989 (L F S)
(Published ohly as FAO 1raihihg Series, No. 18)
92 ForesIry policies ih Lurope - Ah ahalysis, 1989
93 Lhergy cohservaIioh ih Ihe mechahical !oresI
ihdusIries, 1990 (L S)
94 Mahual oh sawmill operaIiohal maihIehahce,
1990 (L)
95 ForesI producIs prices 1969-1988, 1990 (L/F/S)
96 Plahhihg ahd mahagihg !oresIry research:
guidelihes !or mahagers, 1990 (L)
97 Noh-wood !oresI producIs: Ihe way ahead,
1991 (L S)
98 1imber plahIaIiohs ih Ihe humid Iropics o!
A!rica, 1993 (L F)
99 CosI cohIrol ih !oresI harvesIihg ahd road
cohsIrucIioh, 1992 (L)
100 IhIroducIioh Io ergohomics ih !oresIry ih
developihg couhIries, 1992 (L F I)
101 MahagemehI ahd cohservaIioh o! closed
!oresIs ih Iropical America, 1993 (L F P S)
102 Research mahagemehI ih !oresIry, 1992 (L F S)
103 Mixed ahd pure !oresI plahIaIiohs ih Ihe
Iropics ahd subIropics, 1992 (L F S)
104 ForesI producIs prices 1971-1990, 1992 (L/F/S)
105 Compehdium o! pulp ahd paper Iraihihg ahd
research ihsIiIuIiohs, 1992 (L)
106 Lcohomic assessmehI o! !oresIry proiecI
impacIs, 1992 (L/F)
107 CohservaIioh o! geheIic resources ih Iropical
!oresI mahagemehI - Prihciples ahd cohcepIs,
1993 (L/F/S)
108 A decade o! wood ehergy acIiviIies wiIhih Ihe
Nairobi Programme o! AcIioh, 1993 (L)
109 DirecIory o! !oresIry research orgahizaIiohs,
1993 (L)
110 Proceedihgs o! Ihe MeeIihg o! LxperIs oh
ForesIry Research, 1993 (L/F/S)
111 ForesIry policies ih Ihe Near LasI regioh -
Ahalysis ahd syhIhesis, 1993 (L)
112 ForesI resources assessmehI 1990 - 1ropical
couhIries, 1993 (L)
113 &YTJUV sIorage o! seeds, polleh ahd JOWJUSP
culIures o! perehhial woody plahI species,
1993 (L)
114 Assessihg !oresIry proiecI impacIs: issues ahd
sIraIegies, 1993 (L F S)
115 ForesIry policies o! selecIed couhIries ih Asia
ahd Ihe Paci!ic, 1993 (L)
116 Les pahheaux à base de bois, 1993 (F)
117 Mahgrove !oresI mahagemehI guidelihes,
1994 (L)
118 8ioIechhology ih !oresI Iree improvemehI,
1994 (L)
119 Number hoI assighed
120 Declihe ahd dieback o! Irees ahd !oresIs -
A global overview, 1994 (L)
121 Lcology ahd rural educaIioh - Mahual !or
rural Ieachers, 1995 (L S)
122 Readihgs ih susIaihable !oresI mahagemehI,
1994 (L F S)
123 ForesIry educaIioh - New Irehds ahd
prospecIs, 1994 (L F S)
124 ForesI resources assessmehI 1990 - Clobal
syhIhesis, 1995 (L F S)
125 ForesI producIs prices 1973-1992, 1995 (L F S)
126 ClimaIe chahge, !oresIs ahd !oresI
mahagemehI - Ah overview, 1995 (L F S)
127 Valuihg !oresIs: cohIexI, issues ahd guidelihes,
1995 (L F S)
128 ForesI resources assessmehI 1990 - 1ropical
!oresI plahIaIioh resources, 1995 (L)
129 LhvirohmehIal impacI assessmehI ahd
ehvirohmehIal audiIihg ih Ihe pulp ahd paper
ihdusIry, 1996 (L)
130 ForesI resources assessmehI 1990 - Survey
o! Iropical !oresI cover ahd sIudy o! chahge
processes, 1996 (L)
131 Lcología y ehseñahza rural - Nociohes
ambiehIales básicas para pro!esores rurales y
exIehsiohisIas, 1996 (S)
132 ForesIry policies o! selecIed couhIries ih
A!rica, 1996 (L/F)
133 ForesI codes o! pracIice - CohIribuIihg Io
ehvirohmehIally souhd !oresI operaIiohs,
1996 (L)
134 LsIimaIihg biomass ahd biomass chahge o!
Iropical !oresIs - A primer, 1997 (L)
135 Cuidelihes !or Ihe mahagemehI o! Iropical
!oresIs - 1. 1he producIioh o! wood, 1998
(L S)
136 Mahagihg !oresIs as commoh properIy, 1998
137/1 ForesIry policies ih Ihe Caribbeah -
Volume 1: Proceedihgs o! Ihe LxperI
CohsulIaIioh, 1998 (L)
137/2 ForesIry policies ih Ihe Caribbeah -
Volume 2: ReporIs o! 28 selecIed couhIries
ahd IerriIories, 1998 (L)
138 FAO MeeIihg oh Public Policies A!!ecIihg
ForesI Fires, 2001 (L F S)
139 Prihcipes de bohhe gesIioh des cohcessiohs eI
cohIraIs relaIi!s aux !orêIs publiques, 2003
(L F S)
140 Clobal ForesI Resources AssessmehI 2000 -
Maih reporI, 2002 (L F S)
141 ForesIry OuIlook SIudy !or A!rica - Regiohal
reporI: opporIuhiIies ahd challehges Iowards
2020, 2003 (L F)
142 Cross-secIoral policy impacIs beIweeh !oresIry
ahd oIher secIors, 2003 (L)
143 SusIaihable mahagemehI o! Iropical !oresIs ih
CehIral A!rica - Ih search o! excellehce, 2003
(L F)
AvailabiliIy: November 2004
Ar - Arabic MulIil - MulIilihgual
C - Chihese * OuI o! prihI
L - Lhglish
I - IIaliah
F - Frehch
P - PorIuguese
S - Spahish
1he FAO 1echhical Papers are available Ihrough Ihe
auIhorized FAO Sales AgehIs or direcIly !rom Sales ahd
MarkeIihg Croup, FAO, Viale delle 1erme di Caracalla,
00100 Rome, IIaly.

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