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Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 138842, Oct. 18, 2000 Mendoza, J.

: Facts: Petitioners and respondent Romeo Nazareno are three of the five children of spouses Maximino and Aurea Nazareno, who during their marriage had acquired properties. After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed for intestate proceedings and he was thereafter appointed administrator of his fathers estate. Romeo discovered a deed of sale selling petitioner Natividad six lots including Lot-3b occupied by Romeo but which was sold to petitioner Maximino, Jr. Maximino, Jr. filed an action for recovery of possession which was favored by the court. Romeo in turn filed an annulment of the sales on the ground of lack of consideration in that the transfer was merely to avoid inheritance tax and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. Petitioners on the other hand filed a third party complaint against Romeo and his wife Eliza seeking the annulment of the transfer to Romeo of Lot 3 which is granted by the trial court except as to Lots 3, 13-b, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons. Issue: Whether a decision ruling against an administrator of an estate who is acting in his own interest may bind the estate. Held: The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CAGR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.

Limjoco vs. Intestate of Pedro Fragrante G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948 HILADO, J.: Facts: The Public Service Commission awarded a certificate of public convenience to the estate of deceased Pedro Fragrante to operate an ice factory in San Juan, Rizal. Petitioner, an operator of an ice factory in the same town questions the award on the grounds that the estate cannot be substituted for the deceased in the application for the certificate and that deceased persons estate cannot fulfil the citizenship requirement for the issuance of a certificate. Issue: Whether or not the Public Service Commission erred in awarding the certificate of public convenience to the deceased persons estate. Held: No. It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding. With regards to the issue of citizenship, the Court is of the opinion that if the deceased personality is extended to his estate in order to satisfy his obligations and to enforce his rights, then there is no reason to deny the same extension to his citizenship, in order to protect his interests and that of his creditors.

Rodriguez vs. De Borja G.R. No. L-21993; June 21, 1966 REYES, J.B.L., J Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila. On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. On March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will but withdrew the petition three days thereafter. On March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. On the same day but three hours later, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over the estate of the deceased? Held: The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules). There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.

Ong vs. PDIC G.R. No. 175116; August 18, 2010 PERALTA, J.: Facts: Jerry Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for the surrender of 2 TCTs against Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. (RBO), represented by its liquidator Guillermo G. Reyes, Jr. and deputy liquidator Abel Allanigue. According to the petition, said 2 parcels of land were duly mortgaged by RBO in favor of petitioner to guarantee the payment of Omnibus Finance, Inc., which is likewise now undergoing liquidation proceedings of its money market obligations to petitioner. Omnibus Finance, Inc., not having seasonably settled its obligations to petitioner, the latter proceeded to effect the extrajudicial foreclosure of said mortgages and the city sheriff of Tagaytay City issued a certificate of sale in favor of petitioner which were duly registered. Respondents failed to seasonably redeem said parcels of land, for which reason, petitioner has executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership which has not been submitted to the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City, in view of the fact that possession of the aforesaid titles or owner's duplicate certificates of title remains with the RBO. To date, petitioner has not been able to effect the registration of said parcels of land in his name in view of the persistent refusal of respondents to surrender RBO's copies of its owner's certificates of title for the parcels of land covered by the two TCTs. Respondent RBO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and that it was undergoing liquidation and it is the liquidation court which has exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's claim. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss because it found that the causes of action in the previous and present cases were different although it was silent on the jurisdictional issue. RBO filed a motion for reconsideration but was similarly rejected. The Court of Appeals, through a certiorari filed by RBO, annulled the challenged orders of the trial court which sustained the jurisdiction of the trial court and denied reconsideration thereof. Moreover, the trial judge was ordered to dismiss the civil case without prejudice to the right of petitioner to file his claim in the liquidation proceedings pending before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. Issue: Whether or not the civil case against RBO may proceed independently from the liquidation proceedings. Held: No. Petition denied. All claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e i n s o l v e n t b a n k . I t i s a p r a g m a t i c a r r a n g e m e n t d e s i g n e d t o establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. It is not necessary t h a t a c l a i m b e i n i t i a l l y d i s p u t e d i n a c o u r t o r a g e n c y b e f o r e i t i s f i l e d w i t h t h e liquidation court.

FIGURACION-GERILLA v s. VDA. DE FIGURACION et al. G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006 Facts: Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is settled and (2) there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to spend for the maintenance of the deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support was supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things, respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents during the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross share, without first contributing to the expenses. Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an accounting of the income of the prperties, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed? Ruling: While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

CIR vs. CA, CTA and JOSEFINA PAJONAR as Administratix of the Estate of Pedro Pajonar GR. No. 123206;March 22, 2000 Facts: Pedro Pajonar, a member of the Philippines Scout Bataan Contingent was part of the infamous DEATH MARCH during the second World War by reason of which he suffered shock and became insane. His sister Josefina Pajonar became the guardian over his person, while his property was placed under the guardianship of PNB by the RTC of Dumaguete. He died and was survived by his 2 brothers, nephews and niece and sister Josefina Pajonar. The Trial court appointed Josefina Pajonar as the regular administratix of Pedros estate. The PNB filed an accounting to the decedents property under guardianship valued at P3, 037,679, however PNB did not file an estate tax return, instead it advised Pedro Pajonars Heirs to execute an extrajudicial settlement and to pay the taxes on his estate. Pursuant to the assessment of the BIR, the estate of Pedro paid taxes in the amount of 2,557. Pursuant to a 2nd assessment by the BIR for deficiency estate tax, the estate paid estate tax in the amount of P1, 527,790.98. Josefina filed a protest with the BIR praying that the estate tax payment in the abovementioned amount or at least some portion of it be returned to the heirs. Without waiting for her protest to be resolved, Josefina filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) praying for the refund as erroneously paid taxes CTA rendered judgment in favor of Josefina and ordered the refund representing the erroneously paid taxes. Among the deductions from the gross estate allowed by the CTA were the amounts of P60, 753 representing the notarial fee for the Extrajudicial Settlement and P 50,000 as the attorneys fees in the Special Proceedings for guardianship. CIR appealed with the CTAs decision asserting that the Notarial Fee and the Attorneys Fee are not deductible expenses, but CTA denied CIRs appeals. Issue: WON, the Notarial Fee and the Attorneys Fees are allowed as deductible from the gross estate in order to arrive at the value of the net estate? Ruling: YES. The deductions allowed from the gross estate permitted under the NIRC provided for the deduction of the judicial expenses of the testamentary and intestate proceedings for purposes of determining the value of the net estate. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration. Administration as an allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for the purpose of arriving at the value of the net estate have been construed to include all expenses ESSENTIAL TO THE COLLECTION OF THE ASSETS, PAYMENTS OF DEBTS OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY TO THE PERSONS ENTITLED TO IT. In other words, the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the estate. Expenditures incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not deductible. The phrase "judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings" as not including the compensation paid to a trustee of the decedent's estate when it appeared that such trustee was appointed for the purpose of managing the decedent's real estate for the benefit of the testamentary heir. In another case, the Court disallowed the premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as an expense of administration since the giving of a bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office, and not necessary in the settlement of the

estate. Neither may attorney's fees incident to litigation incurred by the heirs in asserting their respective rights be claimed as a deduction from the gross estate. Coming to the case at bar, the notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement is clearly a deductible expense since such settlement effected a distribution of Pedro Pajonar's estate to his lawful heirs. Similarly, the attorney's fees paid to PNB for acting as the guardian of Pedro Pajonar's property during his lifetime should also be considered as a deductible administration expense. PNB provided a detailed accounting of decedent's property and gave advice as to the proper settlement of the latter's estate, acts which contributed towards the collection of decedent's assets and the subsequent settlement of the estate.