Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: • Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. • Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. • Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents • This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams

• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development. • A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
Potential Fractiousness of Society

Coalition Funding

Economic Investment

Economic Development

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Coalition Funding

Expectations for Essential Services

Economic Investment

Time to Develop Essential Services

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Economic Development

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. • Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Coalition Funding

Expectations for Essential Services

Economic Investment Governance

Time to Develop Essential Services

Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Economic Development

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

Perceived Security

Available Workforce External Material Support

A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to • Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. • Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. • Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.

Insurgent Acts of Violence

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Coalition An appropriate force mix, and correct operational Satisfaction with Funding Time to Develop Essential Services tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance

significant impacts on

• The Expectations for restoration of essential services. Economic Investment Essential Services Governance • The populace’s perception of security. • The Potential Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace. Fractiousness Economic of Society Development

Time to Develop Essential Services

Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Impact of Illegitimate Actions

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis

Perceived Security

Available Workforce External Material Support

Information

Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density

Time to Develop HN Security Forces

Insurgent to Force Density Ratio

Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures

Host Nation Security Forces

Coalition Force Density

Host Nation Force Density

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Coalition Funding

Essential Services
Time to Develop Essential Services Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Expectations for Essential Services

Economic Investment

Governance Economic Development
Support for HN Government

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Impact of Illegitimate Actions

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis

Perceived Security

Available Workforce External Material Support

Information

Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density

Time to Develop HN Security Forces

Insurgent to Force Density Ratio

Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures

Host Nation Security Forces
Host Nation Force Density

Coalition Force Density

The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24

Developing and Restoring Essential Services

Breakdown of Essential Services Essential Services

Satisfaction with Essential Services

Time to Develop Governance

Coalition Funding

Expectations for Essential Services

Economic Investment Governance

Time to Develop Essential Services

Psychological Operations Effectiveness

Potential Fractiousness of Society

Economic Development

Impact of Illegitimate Actions

Support for Insurgency

Neutral Populace

Support for HN Government

Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Strategic Emphasis

Perceived Security

Available Workforce External Material Support

Information

Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Density

Time to Develop HN Security Forces

Insurgent to Force Density Ratio

Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures

Host Nation Security Forces

Coalition Force Density

Host Nation Force Density

The Basic Information Ops Loop

Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters

Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents

Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

POPULAR SUPPORT

Potential Attractiveness of Govt vs. Insurgent Path

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 9

Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent Fear of Ins. Attack, Repercussions

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement

Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment

Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Average Connectedness of Population

Perceived Security

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 10

Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 11

Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Insurgent Damages & Casualties

Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions

Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control

Havens / Ability to 1 Operate Coordination Insurgent Insurgent Among Ins Leadership Offensives & Factions Training, Skill Presence & Exper (Clear & Hold) Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

Outside Support / Enablement of Ins.

Insurgent Terrain Advantage Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower, & ISR

2

Ins Provision of Gov’t & Services Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/ Ins Support for Payment

Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and © PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 12

Illegit Agric Production Trade & Employment

Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics

Ins. Damages & Casualties

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold)

Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT

IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 13

Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)

Legit Agric Production

2
Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail

Fraction of Workforce and Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit vs Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric

1
Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment & Spending Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 14

Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Ins. Damages & Casualties

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth
Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending

Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 15

Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment Relative Message Quality Gov’t vs Ins

Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov’t Funding Adequacy Gov’t Training, Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring

Gov’t Workforce Skill & Avail

Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO

Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality & Fairness

Gov’t/Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Tax Revenues

Overall Gov’t Reach, Execution, Capacity & Investment

Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures & Beliefs

Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 16

Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Ins. Damages & Casualties

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population
Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins. Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring

OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail

Legit Agric Production

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY
Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 17

Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
Coalition Knowledge & Understanding of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities Coalition StratComm/IO US Gov’t Support for Breadth of Operation Coalition & Support Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill

Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory & Aid

Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels)

Coalition Visibility to Population Western Affiliation Backlash

Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory & Aid

Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods

US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support

US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Coalition Dev. OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid

Provide Humanitarian Relief

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 18

Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate
Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

Ins. Damages & Casualties
Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity

Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold)

Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Coalition Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid Coalition Visibility to Population

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels)

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES
US Gov't Support for Operation

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO

Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY
Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Western Affiliation Backlash

Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs

Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment
Duration of Operation

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail

Legit Agric Production

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY
Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 19

ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops

ISR / Open Source Ops

Total Security Force Capacity & focus ANSF Unit Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline & Morale

ANSF & Manpower Recruiting & Retention

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity
1

1

Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

ANSF Institutional & Execution Capacity

ANSF Training & Mentoring
2

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

\
ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

ANSF Funding Adequacy

Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time. © PA Knowledge Limited 2009
Page 20

ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties

ANSF TACTICAL
Coalition Knowledge & Underst of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition COIN Support Strategy & Unity Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan
ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention

ISR / Open Source Ops

Total Security Force Capacity & Focus

Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

Ins. Damages & Casualties

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity

ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

OUTSIDE SUPPORT OUTSIDE SUPPORT TOTO INSURGENT INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Govt vs Insurgents
Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels)

COALITION COALITION CAPACITY & CAPACITY & PRIORITIES PRIORITIES
US Gov't Support for Operation

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity

Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO

US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support

Breadth of Coalition & Support

Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

OVERALL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY CAPACITY
Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash

Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent

Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

COALITION DOMESTIC Gov't/ Contractor SUPPORT Corruption & Coalition SUPPORT Tribal Favoritism Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs

TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent

POPULAR POPULAR SUPPORT SUPPORT

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

Potential Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail

Legit Agric Production

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & & SERVICES ECONOMY ECONOMY
Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 21

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics

=

Significant Delay

Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties

ANSF TACTICAL
Coalition Knowledge & Underst . of Social Structures Duration of Operation Coalition ‘COIN Support ’ Strategy & Unity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Coalition Retention Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ISR / Open Source Ops

Total Security Force Capacity & Focus

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity

Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

Ins. Damages & Casualties

ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
Havens / Ability to Operate Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins.

Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Coalition Avg COIN Experience Execution Capacity & & Skill Priorities

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring

ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold)

Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

Ins. Strategic Commun /IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding

INSURGENTS Ties to
Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov vs ’t Insurgents Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

NARCOTICS
Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun ./IO Forces, Aid Levels)

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES
US Gov't Support for Operation

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity

Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’ Ins. vs Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun / IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

CENTRAL Gov't GOV’T Funding

OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions

Breadth of US Domestic Coalition & Support Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun . & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Western Affiliation Backlash

POPULAR SUPPORT

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency IllegitAgric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Potential Attractiveness of Gov vs. ’t Insurgent Path

Terrain Harshness & Breadth

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Coalition

Transparency of Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't Processes & Professionalism Reach, Investments Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment

Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Recognition/ TRIBAL Engagement to Integrate Rivalry GOVERNANCE Ethnic/Tribal Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement

Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains & Sustainment In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Legit Agric Private Sector Production Workforce Skill & Avail

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Civilian Legit Other Production Services (SWET, & Services Non- Agric Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs.Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
Ability to Move Private Sector People Capital Mgmt., & Goods Investment & Rapidly Spending

WORKING DRAFT – V3
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 22

Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

2
ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

1

Ins. Damages & Casualties

ANSF Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins.

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population alition Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of ov’t visory Afghan Methods Aid

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov ’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov ’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Relative Message Quality Gov’t ’vs Ins.

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and Gov't/ANSF supporting the actively Strategic Central Gov't Commun/ Government. Institutional & IO Execution Relative WOM Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce Capacity Message Relative t Amplification insurgent ability to target and intimidateMessagepopulation such the ng Gov’t vs Ins Impact Gov’t Gov't acy that Gov’t sympathizersofare willing to be vs Ins active supporters. Integration Gov't Training Western Local Tribal Mentoring, • HUMINT: The population will beAffiliation willing to provide intel more Structures Gov't Perception of Vetting, and Backlash Workforce Coalition Intent Hiring if they Skill &not fear insurgent repercussions. do Avail & Commitment sparency• ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development Gov’t Gov't Overall Gov't facilitated Reach,the expansion Strength of by of secure regions. (ANA and cesses & isProfessionalism Religious stments ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or Policy Quality Execution Ideology & & Fairness Capacity & Tribal overrun. Investment Ability to Structures Cultural Erosion/
Displacement
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Neutral/On the Fence

S w

Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security Services Private Workf Skill &

Reconcile

Infrastructure Dev Adequacy

Page 23

Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance

han ANSF Institutional & Execution tion Capacity OpsSF sory Aid ANSF Coalition Funding sibility to Adequacy opulation

ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Appropriate Use of Force

& Pakistan) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Training, Skill & Experience

Retention, Manpower & ISR

Critical for the Government to recognize andPerceived the make Gov't Damages/Use of effort toSecurity engage existing tribal Relative structures andForce by Policy Gov’ t & Coalition Perception of Quality & Message Insurgent Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Investment Quality Strength & alition/Homeland Acceptance of Ties to local governance can Gov’t ’vs Ins. gain popular support and Intent fghan Methods rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and Gov't/ANSF Strategic ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability Central Gov't Commun/ Institutional & IO to engage the population. Execution Fear of Ins. Relative WOM
Capacity Training oring, g, and ring Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures Western Affiliation Backlash Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment

N &

Population Actively Supporting Gov’t & SF

Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Legit Agric Production Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Illegit A Produc Trad Employ

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

v't/ ractor ption & avoritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov ’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs Rela Econo Opport

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr, Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly

Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 24

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY
Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment

ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation

Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

ANSF Capacity & Priorities

Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

Western Affiliation Backlash

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Legit Agric Production

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly

Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending

WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 26

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment

Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation

Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

ANSF Capacity & Priorities

Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels)

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment

Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

Western Affiliation Backlash

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Legit Agric Production

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

WORKING DRAFT

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly

Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

Reconciliation Effectiveness

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 27

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT
Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Security Ops (Hold) Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Ins. Damages & Casualties Fear of Gov’ t/ANSF/ Coalition Repercussions Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions

Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation

Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

ANSF Capacity & Priorities

Outside Support/ Enablement of Ins. Insurgent Terrain Insurgent Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ /Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels)

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Likelihood of Crime/Violence /Ins. Support for Payment

Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

Western Affiliation Backlash

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Legit Agric Production

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly

Private Sector Capital Mgmt., Investment & Spending

WORKING DRAFT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 28

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative
ANSF & Coalition Damages/ Casualties ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security Force Capacity & Focus

Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Counter- Narcotics/ Targeted Crime Strikes tends to Damages negative messages more strongly than positive, but also Ops tends to Ins. amplify Fear of Sweep Ops & Casualties Gov’ t/ANSF/ (Clear) be biased towards current sentiments. Coalition
Repercussions Havens / Government Support/ “Western affiliation backlash” may undermineAbility to Enablement messages if they are Operate of Ins. seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an Coordination Ins. Among Ins. Offensives & Insurgent overly Western Not Territory posture Factions Presence Terrain Ins. Insurgent Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) (Clear & Hold) Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Outside

Coalition Knowledge & Underst. of Social Structures Duration of Operation

Coalition ‘ COIN Support’ Strategy & Unity

ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity ANSF Manpower Recruiting & Retention ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment

ANSF Capacity & Priorities

Policing & Security Ops (Hold)

Coalition Appropriate Balance of Effort & Force Coalition Avg COIN Experience & Skill Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities

Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan

ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Institutional & Execution Coalition Capacity Dev. OpsANSF Advisory & Aid ANSF Coalition Funding Visibility to Adequacy Population

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Advantage Recruiting, Retention, Manpower Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion

Funding & Material Support to Insurgents

Resource Coalition Levels Strategic (Military Commun./IO Forces, Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US Gov't Support for Operation US Domestic Perceived Cost/Benefit & Support Breadth of Coalition & Support

Coalition Dev. Ops- Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of Gov’t Advisory Afghan Methods & Aid Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Funding Adequacy Gov't Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Likelihood of Active Ins. Support for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels

Neutral/On the Fence

Population Sympathizing w/ Insurgents

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Private Sector Workforce Skill & Avail Terrain Harshness & Breadth

Population Actively Supporting Insurgency

Illegit Agric Production, Trade & Employment Duration of Operation

Western Affiliation Backlash

Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

Legit Agric Production

Fraction of Workforce And Agric. Legit vs Illegit

Coalition Dev.OpsInfrastructure, Services, Econ. Advisory & Aid

Gov't/ Contractor Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Population Basic Needs Service Levels & Employment Legit Other Production & Services Non- Agric Civilian Services (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Legit Economic Activity, Trade & Employment Legit vs. Illegit Relative Economic Opportunity

Population/Popular Support Infrastructure, Economy, & Services Government Afghanistan Security Forces Insurgents Crime and Narcotics Coalition Forces & Actions Physical Environment

Provide Humanitarian Relief

Infr., Services, Econ. Policy & Execution /Perceived Fairness

Ability to Move People & Goods Rapidly

Private Sector Capital Management, Investment & Spending

=

Significant Delay

WORKING DRAFT
Page 29

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative
h n ANSF Institutional & Execution n Capacity sy ANSF alition Funding bility to Adequacy ulation on/Homeland ceptance of an Methods Central Gov't Institutional & Execution Capacity Gov't Integration of Local Tribal Structures & Morale ANSF Training & Mentoring ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism Gov't Security Policy Quality & Investment ANSF Appropriate Use of Force Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

Fun Ma Sup Insu

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO Relative Message Impact Gov’t vs Ins

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Popu Sympa w/ Insu

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractiveness of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Path Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent T Ha &

ining ng, and g

Gov't Workforce Skill & Avail

Western Affiliation Backlash

Gov't Overall Gov't Professionalism Reach, Policy Quality Execution & Fairness Capacity & Investment Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal Structures& Beliefs Tax Revenues

Strength of Religious Ideology & Tribal Structures Cultural Erosion/ Displacement Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry

tor on & oritism

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and Private Sector Satisfaction availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing Workforce w/ Gains in Infrastructure Skill & Avail the population. Government message quality has been Security, Services Dev. Adequacy & relative strongerEmploymentto Visible Gains factions (who have typically not insurgent & Sustainment In Security, made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian Services & Employment has undermined message beliefs), but lack of progress Expectations Civilia Legit Other credibility. for Security, Servic Production
Employment Non- Agric Message availability is constrained by low “average Healthc Educat connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most to Private Sector message propagation Ability Capital Move / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to Management, People Investment & Infr., Services, Econ. negative messages more strongly than positive, but amplify & Goods Spending Policy & Execution Rapidly /Perceivedalso tends to be biased towards current sentiments. Fairness Services, & & Services (SWE

Provide Humanitarian Relief

“Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
Page 30

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security
p cal ty ANSF Capacity & Priorities g Security Ops (Hold) p Havens / Ability to Operate Ins. Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Coordination Among Ins. Factions Outsid Suppor Enablem of Ins. ANSF Avg. Professionalism Skill, Discipline, & Morale

ANSF Appropriate Use of Force

Territory Not Under Gov’t Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Ins. Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience

ANSF Corruption & Tribal Favoritism

R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness

Ins. Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Population Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’ t & Coalition

Perceived Damages & Use of Force by Ins.

Ins. Provision Of Gov’t & Services Ins. Targeted Attacks on Progress/ Support for Gov’t

Insurgent Capacity, Priorities & Effectiveness

Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding Relative Popular Support/ Tolerance Gov’t vs Insurgents

ty y & ent

Relative Message Quality Gov’ t ’vs Ins. Gov't/ANSF Strategic Commun/ IO

Perception of Insurgent Strength & Intent Population Actively Supporting Gov’ t & SF Population Sympathizing w/ Gov’t

Neutral/On the Fence

Relative Message Impact Gov’t Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions Gov't vs Ins and also perception of ‘who will win’tegrationlonger term: Western over of ocal Tribal Affiliation Structures • Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF /Backlash Coalition

Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment

Fear of Ins. Attack/ Repercussions Potential Attractivenes of Gov’t vs. Insurgent Pa Perception Of Gov’t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services & Employment Visible Gains In Security, Services & Employment Expectations for Security, Services, & Employment Priv W Ski

forces impact perceived security. • Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress”Strength of to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active Religious Ideology & supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force Tribal individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the Cultural Erosion/ Structures fear this Displacement generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. ecognition/ gagement to • In addition to near term security concerns, the population is Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry assessing ‘who will win’ over the Integrate long term by comparing Tribal tructures& perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government Beliefs strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.

Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology, Tribal Structures w/ Gov’t Path Average Connectedness of Population Perceived Security

Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment

Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric Ability to Move People Private Se Capita Managem Investme

I f

S

i

E

© PA Knowledge Limited 2009

Page 31

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful