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Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? Population Change and Development Population Data Supplement World Development Indicators

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World Development Report 1984

Published for The World Bank Oxford University Press

Oxford University Press NEW YORK OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON HONG KONG TOKYO KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN " 1984 ky the InterniationialBank for Reconstruictioniand DevelopmientilThe World Bank 1818HStreet, NW. . .. t D.C. 20433 U.S.A. First printing Juhly l984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication mail be reproduced, stored in a retrievyal system, or transmitted in any form or byianiy means, electronic, mechanical, phiotocopying, recording, or othleru'ise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Maniufactiured in the United States of America. The denominations, the classifications, the boundaries,
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Foreword

This Report is the seventh in this annual series assessing development issues. This year the focus is on population change and its links with development. Population growth does not provide the drama of financial crisis or political upheaval, but as this Report shows, its significance for shaping the world of our children and grandchildren is at least as great. What governments and their peoples do today to influence our demographic future will set the terms for development strategy well into the next century. Failure to act now to slow growth is likely to mean a lower quality of life for millions of people. In the poorest countries of the world, and among the poorest groups within countries, poverty contributes to high mortality and even higher fertility. It thereby creates a vicious circle: the slow pace at which development reaches the poor contributes to rapid population growth, making the elimination of poverty increasingly difficult. Slowing population growth is a difficult challenge to humanity-but a challenge that must and can be successfully addressed. On the one hand, the situation is grave: this Report concludes that in some countries development may not be possible at all unless slower population growth can be achieved soon, before higher real incomes would bring fertility down spontaneously. On the other hand, there is reason for hope: the experience of the past decade shows that education, health, and other development measures that raise parents' hopes for their children, along with widespread access to family planning services, create a powerful combination in reducing fertility. The discussion of population places special emphasis on the role of public policy in an area where fundamental human values are at stake. Population is a subject that touches issues central to the human condition, including personal freedom and the very definition of economic and social progress. This Report tries to do it full justice, in a sensitive and thought-provoking way, recognizing

that governments and their peoples have a wide range of views on this subject. Even with success in efforts to slow population growth, future population growth will still be heavily concentrated in what are now the poorer areas of the globe. Thus the average level of human welfare will depend largely on the degree of economic and social transformation in those areas. The poverty of those areas cannot be blamed on rapid population growth alone; the causes of poverty go well beyond population change. Nor will reducing population growth alone ensure their economic transformation. But this Report shows that slowing the pace of population growth can make a difference-and that the ingredients for doing so are also those that will increase economic growth. The analysis of the population situation follows our annual review of global economic developments, which as in previous years occupies the first part of the World Development Report. It might be argued that the general public remains insufficiently aware of the growing links among nations over the past few decades, and of the extent today of international economic interdependence. In an increasingly interdependent world, low growth, fiscal and labor market problems, and resulting inflation in industrial countries have taken a heavy toll in developing countries. Exports have suffered, fear of protectionism has increased, and high real interest rates have made debt servicing a costly burden. If the industrial countries fail to regain the growth rates they managed in the 1950s and 1960s, many countries in the developing world will have great difficulty making progress in the years ahead. Indeed, the prospects for much of sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly grave. But it is also apparent that even in a harsh international climate, the developing nations can take actions to improve their own economic performance. Developing countries share the problems of the developed, from fiscal deficits to distorted
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labor markets. And they have a vested interest in reducing their own trade protectionism and adopting outward-oriented policies. Although recovery, at least in the industrial nations, is now on a firmer footing, the outlook for the years ahead is full of uncertainties. The outlook would brighten considerably if every nation took steps to improve its own domestic economic performance. But development assistance is also critical, in reviving the global economy and in addressing many of the fundamental development issues of our era, including population. Especially for the poorest countries, a substantial increase in concessional flows of funds is needed to secure development momentum. And although the direct costs of programs to reduce population growth are not large, a greater commitment by the international community is sorely needed to assist developing countries in the great challenge of slowing population growth.

As its predecessors, this year's World Development Report is a study by the staff of The World Bank, and the judgments in it do not necessarily reflect the view of our Board of Directors or the governments they represent.

A. W. Clausen President The World Bank

May 25, 1984

This Report was prepared by a team led by Nancy Birdsall and comprising Martha Ainsworth, Rodolfo Bulatao, Dennis Mahar, William McGreevey, Nicholas Prescott, and Gurushri Swamy, and assisted by Jill Armstrong. Deepak Lal and Martin Wolf contributed to Part I. The Economic Analysis and Projections Department, under the direction of Jean Baneth, prepared the statistical materials on which Part I is based, as well as supplied data for the whole Report. Peter Miovic coordinated the work of the Economic Analysis and Projections Department on Part I. Ramesh Chander supervised the preparation of the World Development Indicators, assisted by David Cieslikowski. Staff of the Population, Health, and Nutrition Department provided extensive help on Part II. The authors would like to thank these and the many other contributors and reviewers. Thanks also go to the production staff-Christine Houle, Pensri Kimpitak, Jeanne Rosen, and Gerald Martin Quinn (who also designed the cover)-and especially to the support staff headed by Rhoda Blade-Charest and including Banjonglak Duangrat, Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones. The work was carried out under the general direction of Anne 0. Krueger and Costas Michalopoulos, with Rupert Pennant-Rea as principal editor.

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breastfeeding.Contents Definitions and data notes Glossary x ix Demographic terms x Acronyms and initials xi 1 Introduction 1 The economic outlook 1 Population and demographic change 2 Part I 2 Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? 11 Recession in retrospect Industrial countries in the past two decades Developing countries after 1973 23 3 Prospects for sustained growth 34 12 A ten-year perspective 34 The Low case and developing countries 35 The High case and developing countries 37 Policy requirements of the High case 39 Capital flows and debt 42 Poverty and low-income countries 47 International action 48 The links with population 50 Part II Population Change and Development 4 Demographic change and public policy 51 The setting for high fertility 51 The need for public policy 54 Lessons from history 56 Current demographic change in developing countries Demographic prospects and goals 73 5 The consequences of rapid population growth 79 63 Differences among countries 81 Macroeconomic effects of rapid population growth Constraints on agricultural production 90 Population and the environment 94 Urban population growth and internal migration Population growth and the international economy Conclusions 105 6 Slowing population growth 106 81 96 100 7 Socioeconomic factors and fertility 108 Marriage. and contraception Incentives and disincentives 121 Family planning as a service 127 The use of contraception 128 Supplying family planning services 136 Financing family planning 148 Obstacles to program expansion 152 212 v .

3 4. 1985-95 42 Percentage decline in crude birth rates and in total fertility rates. selected countries. 2000 and 2015 86 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker.5 5. 1960-83 11 Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for the manufacturing sector and the aggregate economy.7 2. and growth rates. 1960-80 90 Cereal yields and fertilizer use.8 6. by country. 1983 and 1995 38 of GDP in developing countries. 1950-2000 67 Permanent emigration as a percentage of increase in populations of emigrants' countries 69 Projections of population size in selected countries.11 3. 1962-76 17 Percentage of industrial countries' imports covered by nontariff barriers 18 Net savings and savings by sector in industrial countries. Low scenario and variants.1 5. by country.10 2. selected countries.8 The policy agenda 155 Population policy 155 Policy priorities in developing regions Donor assistance policies 178 161 9 Ten years of experience 182 183 Economic adjustment 182 Population change: success and new challenge Population data supplement Bibliographical note 202 186 World Development Indicators Text tables 2.4 4.5 3. 1980 87 Kenya: projections of employment by sector.1 7.4 3. 1980-2015 85 Potential savings in primary-school costs under rapid fertility decline.9 2. selected countries. 1960-95 36 in trade in developing countries. and GNP per capita. under two scenarios. selected countries and years 114 Percentage of currently married women aged 15 to 49 using contraception. 1965-95 36 account balance and its financing in developing countries.6 5.5 2.6 5. 1970-83 30 Debt indicators for developing countries. 1980 67 Rural and urban population growth.2 2.5 4. GNP. Low scenario and variants. 2000 and 2050 77 Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions.6 4. savings. 1970-83 31 Average Growth Change Current Growth Growth performance of industrial and developing economies.2 4. 1962-78 16 Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP.6 2. 1964-81 22 Change in export prices and in terms of trade.2 3. 1970-81 24 Exports from developing countries. selected countries. 1969-81 94 Export structure and human capital 103 Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinants of fertility.3 5.3 3. and GDP per capita in 1980.1 3. by region and for selected countries 127 Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among those who want no more children 134 vi .2 207 Population.1 7. 1965-83 28 Current account balance and its financing.8 2. 1982-2050 78 Growth of population. 1960-95 35 of GDP per capita. GDP. and investment indicators for developing countries.2 5.1 2. 1955-80 82 Malawi: projected primary-school costs under alternative fertility and enrollment assumptions.4 2. 1961-81 17 Real rates of return on corporate capital.7 5.1 4. 1976-2050 89 Growth rates of food output by region. 1965-82 65 Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries.3 2.4 5. 1965-83 24 Consumption. 1985-95 41 of trade in developing countries.

6. 1961-83 12 Growth. 1972 and 1982 179 External assistance for population programs in developing countries vii . 1950-2100 75 75 Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's ten largest countries. 1980 149 Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands 153 Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures. selected countries and years Fertility decline within female education groups in selected countries 120 130 Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 1970-83.3 6.3 6. 1-2150 3 Indicators of standard of living. 1980 and 2000 Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more 162 Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries 151 156 Population data supplement tables 1.1 8.1 7. 1975. 2.2 6. 169 1960 and 1980 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America 171 and the Caribbean.8 4.5 6.5 4.1 8.7 4. selected countries.8 Past and projected world population.2 8. and unemployment in seven major industrial countries.4 4. 1800-1980 6 Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial countries. 262 1972 and 1982 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in the Middle East 168 and North Africa. India.1 2. inflation. Population projections 192 Population composition 194 Contraceptive use and unmet need Factors influencing fertility 197 Status of women 198 200 Family planning policy 196 Text figures 1. 4. 2020 Index of school-age and working-age populations. selected countries.3 4. 1950-83 How government decisions influence family decisions 106 109 Relation between fertility and income per person 110 Total fertility rate by education group in selected countries 113 Average timing of reproductive events in selected types of societies 115 Accounting for fertility decline. and Sri Lanka.2 8.3 2.D. 1966-83 12 Fertility and mortality transition in developed and developing countries.2 1. 1950.6 8.6 8. 1972 and 1982 Gross enrollment ratios by sex: selected countries in the Middle East and North Africa.2 4.4 8.3 7. 1972 and 1982 173 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in South Asia.4 7. A.2 Discontinuation of contraception.1 5.1 6. 5.5 7. 3. recent surveys 136 Public expenditure on population programs.1 4. 1950-2100 Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility and mortality 75 78 Brazil's age pyramid. and 1980 64 Urban agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants: 1950.6 4. 1972 and 1982 70 Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries.9 5.4 6.2 4.3 8. selected countries.2 5.6 7.5 8. selected countries 131 Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception. selected countries and years 5 Developing countries' share of population and production. 1975-83 177 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia.7. 1972 and 1982 70 Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the world's ten largest countries. and 2000 68 Fertility in relation to income in developing countries. 1965. 1950-2000 84 88 When will the number of agricultural workers start to decline? 93 Foodgrains and population in India. 1972 and 1982 174 Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh. 1860-1982 59 Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region.1 1. 1977-81 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa.7 8.

2 7.3 7.9 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum Administered protection and the open international trading system Comparisons between the 1930s and the 1980s 20 Adjustment to external shocks. 1980-2000 91 Food supplies for a growing world population Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds 95 Indonesia's transmigration program 99 The brain drain and taxation 102 Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China Landholding and fertility 109 Women's use of and control over their time Measuring the value of children 122 A deferred incentive scheme in Bangladesh ill 126 45 104 128 Family planning for health 132 Birth planning technology Measuring unmet need for family planning 132 Management information systems for improved service delivery Family planning fieldworkers 141 The impact of service quality: Matlab Thana.5 7.7 8. 7 6.1 4.1 2.3 5.5 4.7 8.2 2.4 2. how many people? 164 Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa 166 Teenage pregnancy 167 Changing policies and attitudes toward family planning in Brazil Family planning and women's credit cooperatives in Bangladesh China's one-child family policy 178 138 172 175 Maps Distribution of product among selected countries.5 4.5 5. 1982 Contraceptive prevalence 189 Births and total fertility 190 14 viii . 1974-81 25 The oil syndrome: deficits in oil-exporting countries 27 Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors 29 4 19 Costs of protection in textiles and clothing 40 43 Trade as an engine of growth Delinking from the world economy? 44 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from the experience of developing countries IDA 49 The isolation paradox 55 The Malthusian case: changes in labor supply.6 5.3 2.4 8.5 3.3 4.5 8.1 2.2 8.4 3.4 4.1 8.1 6.1 7.2 5.2 6.1 3.3 8.3 3.4 7.2 3. wages. and population growth in preindustrial England 57 The European fertility transition 62 66 Alternative measures of fertility and mortality 72 Is the rise in life expectancy slowing too soon? Three views of population change 76 80 Consequences of population growth: conflicting views 83 Prospects for poverty and population growth.4 7.2 4.4 5.6 5. Bangladesh 144 Military versus social expenditure 150 Pronatalist policies 157 China's census: counting a billion people 158 Demographic policy objectives 159 Africa: how much land.Boxes 1.1 5.6 8.8 8.6 7.3 6.

Saudi Arabia. Tunisia. * Middle-income oil importers comprise all other middle-income developing countries not classified as oil exporters. and Yugoslavia. * South Asia includes Bangladesh. Nigeria. and the United Arab Emirates. 1981. A subset. South Africa. This group is sometimes referred to as nonmarket economies. major exporters of manufactures. Burma. Kuwait. with 1982 gross national product (GNP) per person of less than $410. The recompilation was necessary to permit greater flexibility in regrouping countries for the purpose of making projections. All tables and figures are based on World Bank data unless otherwise specified. Israel.6 pounds. identified in the glossary) apart from Greece. and because of recompilation of certain data for Part I for a ninety-country sample.Definitions and data notes The principal country groups used in this Report are defined as follows: * Developing countries are divided into: lowincome economies. Malaysia. Tons are metric tons (t). which are included among the middle-income developing economies. Algeria. Libya. India.204. Lebanon. Republic of Korea. Tunisia. Yemen Arab Republic. and middleincome economies. Iran. Yemen (PDR). Grow7th rates are in real terms unless otherwise stated.000 million. Trinidad and Tobago. Singapore. Thailand. In Part II of this Report. Turkey. Growth rates for spans of years in tables cover the period from the beginning of the base year to the end of the last year given. comprises Argentina. Cameroon. Islamic Republic of Iran. Libya. Philippines. * Middle East and North Africa includes Afghanistan. * East Asia comprises all low. Kuwait. and Mongolia. as given in Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Iraq. Billion is 1. Gabon. Indonesia. German Democratic Republic. Peru. Israel. Czechoslovakia. identified below. Ecuador. Syria. Morocco. Nepal. east of. Data from secondary sources are not always available through 1983. Middle-income countries are also divided into oil exporters and oil importers. * High-income oil exporters (not included in developing countries) comprise Bahrain. Bhutan. Portugal. China. Saudi Arabia. Portugal. Oman. Syria. World Bank. Iraq. Brunei Darussalam. and Turkey. Poland. Greece. Romania. and Sri Lanka. The World Development Indicators uses the same groups but includes only countries of 1 million or more. regional groupings of countries are defined as follows: * Sub-Saharan Africa comprises all thirty-nine developing African countries south of the Sahara. The numbers in this World Development Report shown for historical data may differ from those shown in previous Reports because of continuous updating as better data become available. Hungary. Angola. Congo.and middleincome countries of East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. and Venezuela. * Middle-income oil exporters comprise Algeria. and including. equal to 1. Qatar. Bulgaria.000 kilograms (kg) or 2. * East European nonnmarket economies include the following countries: Albania. Hong Kong. Jordan. and USSR. Brazil. * Industrial market economies are the members of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD. 0 Latin America and Caribbean comprises all American and Caribbean countries south of the United States. with 1982 GNP per person of $410 or more. Oman. and the United Arab Emirates. excluding South Africa. Dollars are US dollars unless otherwise specified. Egypt. Egypt. ix . This group is commonly referred to in the text as industrial economies or industrial countries. Pakistan. Mexico.

Cohort. Programs that provide x information about. of an individual. generally between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine. Life expectancy at age five and above can exceed life expectancy at birth substantially if the infant mortality rate is high. Maternal mortality rate.Glossary Demographic terms Amenorrhea. condom. Dependency ratio. This rate takes into account that some women will die before completing their childbearing years. Family planning programs. The number of deaths per 1. withdrawal.000 live births in that year. The average number of years a newborn would live if current age-specific mortality were maintained. The number of births per 1. Crude death rate. Life expectancy at birth. A net reproduction rate of 1. and so on. Popuilation growth rate. Some analysts count only women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. the birth cohort of 1900 would be the people born in that year.000 live births in a given year. Family planning. or in a stable sexual union. Absence or suppression of menstruation. Contraception.000 population in a given year. The conscious effort of couples to avoid conception through rhythm. a couple. Net reproduction rate.000 population in a given year. The number of deaths of women due to complications of pregnancy and childbirth per 100. Married women of reproductive age. spermicides. Women who are currently married. The percentage of married women of reproductive age who are using (or whose husbands are using) any form of contraception. The physiological capacity of a woman. a group. Contraceptiveprevalance rate. The number of children previously born alive to a woman. and diaphragm. The average number of daughters that would be born to a woman (or group of women) if during her lifetime she were to conform to the age-specific fertility and mortality rates of a given year. Parity. Deaths as a component of population change. and services for. Life expectancy at later ages is the average number of years a person already at a given later age will live. male or female sterilization. The reproductive performance. arbitrarily defined as the ratio of the young (those under fifteen years of age) plus the elderly (those sixty-five years and over) to the population in the "working ages" (those fifteen to sixty-four years of age). school class cohorts. abstinence. There are also marriage cohorts. The ratio of the economically dependent part of the population to the productive part.00 means that each generation of mothers is having exactly enough daughters to replace itself in the population. The number of deaths of infants under one year old in a given year per 1. or couple to produce a live birth. man. measured by number of births. For example. Conscious effort of couples to regulate the number and timing of births. Fecundity. Mortality. injectable contraceptives. Infant mortality rate. The number of children born alive per woman in a cohort of women by the end of their childbearing years. Child death rate. The number of deaths of children aged one to four in a given year per 1. The rate at which a popula- . Fertility. Completed fertility rate. Crude birth rate. A group of people sharing a common temporal demographic experience who are observed through time. or a population. use of contraception. oral contraceptives. or use of contraceptives: intrauterine device (IUD).000 children in this age group.

and United States. Denmark. France. replacement level is equal to a net reproduction rate (see above definition) of 1. The rate of natural increase equals the crude birth rate minus the crude death rate per 100 people. Austria. FAO Food and Agriculture Organization. OPEC The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries comprises Algeria. Spain. Replacement-level fertility can also be expressed in terms of the total fertility rate. expressed as a percentage of the base population. Denmark. Ireland. Canada. UNESCO United Nations Educational. Finland. Luxembourg. Sweden. In the United States today a total fertility rate of 2. Ireland. Norway. United Kingdom. UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Assistance. the Islamic Republic of Iran. Federal Republic of Germany. France. Sweden. EC The European Communities comprise Belgium. Populationmomentum. UNDP United Nations Development Programme. Japan. Japan. Belgium. It also equals the population growth rate minus emigration. Indonesia. and United Kingdom. Growth in the proportion of the population living in urban areas.00. The level of fertility at which a cohort of women on the average is having only enough daughters to "replace" itself in the population. United Arab Emirates. GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Nigeria. Norway. Rate of natural increase. New Zealand. Italy. Replacement-level fertility. WHO World Health Organization.12 is considered to be replacement level. Netherlands. The rate at which a population is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year due to a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths. IDA International Development Association. and Venezuela. the higher is replacement-level fertility. UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Scientific. Qatar. New Zealand. DAC The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (see below) comprises Australia. Denmark. ODA Official Development Assistance. Netherlands. Turkey. and Cultural Organization. Saudi Arabia. Greece. Ecuador. Urbanization. it is higher than 2 because of mortality and because of a sex ratio greater than 1 at birth. IMF International Monetarynd. Total fertility rate. Federal Republic of Germany. Luxembourg. Netherlands. France. Switzerland. Iraq. Portugal. IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The higher mortality is. Greece. Belgium. United Kingdom. IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federaton. Postpartum. The average number of children that would be born alive to a woman (or group of women) during her lifetime if during her childbearing years she were to bear children at each age in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. Finland. WFS World Fertility Survey. Kuwait. Refers to the time immediately after childbirth. NGO Nongovernmental organization. Iceland. By definition. Canada. The tendency for population growth to continue beyond the time that replacement-level fertility has been achieved because of the large and increasing size of cohorts of childbearing age and younger. resulting from higher fertility and/or falling mortality in preceding years. and Commission of the European Communities. tria.tion is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year due to natural increase and net migration. Italy. Italy. Switzerland. Acronyms and initials CPS Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Federal Republic of Germany. United States. Libya. OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members are Australia. Aus- xi . Gabon.

I I .

or seriously retards the growth prospects of developing countries for many years to come. it is divided into two parts. the recovery now under way will not mature into sustained and rapid growth of the kind the world enjoyed for twenty-five years after World War II. Now that recession is giving way to recovery. by the second oil price rise of 1979-80. The second part is this year devoted to population-the causes and consequences of rapid population growth. depending on the policies pursued by governments and the effectiveness of governments in tackling economic problems. In both cases. As with most of its predecessors. the much publicized debt difficulties of the past two years came to a head because of the unusual combination in 1980-83 of recession and high real interest rates in the industrial countries. Delay will reduce the room for maneuver that policymakers will have in years to come. its link to development. Unless policymakers learn from its lessons. Industrial countries provide a market for about 65 percent of the developing world's exports. That much is clear from a review of the past. But it provided many valuable lessons for economic policy because it highlighted longstanding weaknesses in every economy and in international arrangements. and undermined social programs in almost every country in the world. Because of the industrial countries' predominance in the world economy. They show. which is the subject of Chapter 2. but they are not intended as forecasts of what will happen. It put great strain on the international trade and financial systems and caused friction between governments everywhere. For developing countries in particular.5 percent a year in 1985-95 if the industrial 1 .1 Introduction The past few years have produced so much turbulence in the world economy that governments and businesses have naturally been preoccupied with the short term. These scenarios look ahead as far as 1995. they can start to take a longer view. reduced investment. for example. That is one of several contrasting alternatives highlighted by the scenarios presented in Chapter 3. It increased unemployment. Their buoyancyor lack of it-and the amount of trade protection they choose to employ have a critical influence on the foreign exchange earnings of developing countries. that GDP in the developing world could grow at 5. The two parts mirror each other: economic policy and performance in the next decade will matter for population growth in the developing countries for several decades beyond. for example. Long-term needs and sustained effort are underlying themes in this year's World Development Report. the consequences of their economic failure have weighed heavily on the developing countries. population policy and change in the rest of this century will set the terms for the whole of development strategy in the next. Its roots went back farther. to the rigidities that were steadily being built into economies from the mid-1960s onward. policy changes will not yield immediate benefits-all the more reason for starting to act immediately. The rising trends in unemployment and inflation were the manifestation of increasingly inflexible arrangements for setting wages and prices and for managing public finances. The economic outlook The recession of 1980-83 was the longest in fifty years. the shift is welcome: development is quintessentially long term. The first looks at economic performance. In particular. They merely illustrate what might happen. yielding its best results when policies and programs can be designed and sustained for years at a time. past and prospective. It concludes that the 1980-83 recession was not an isolated eventcaused. These earnings in turn will largely determine whether the "debt crisis" gradually subsides. The chapter emphasizes that policy failings have characterized both the industrial and the developing countries. and why it has slowed down in some developing countries.

5 percent a year. At its peak. In just over thirty years.1).countries regain their momentum of the 1960s. some countries might be able to add close to an extra percentage point to their economic growth rates. Only in the eighteenth century did the number of people start to rise steadily. In a few countries in which fertility fell in the 1970s. In the long run of history. where fertility is already low. faster in today's developed countries. Though the general trend was rising. It could well do so again in the years up to 1995. Population and demographic change While the causes of poor economic performance can be traced back twenty years.5 billion to almost 4. growth continued to accelerate.1). For much of Africa and Central America. None of these improvements can be regarded as unachievable. Chapter 3 also explores the gains that developing countries could make by improving their own economic policies. slower elsewhere. population growth was not steady. all can be found in more or less chronic form in many African countries. world population nearly doubled again-growing from 2. it had reached about 1. The postwar experience of developing countries was not only different but historically unprecedented. in rural areas five and more. there is evidence that it has leveled off recently.4 percent in the 1960s.0 percent a year. The scope for raising growth rates by improving policies is therefore greatest in Africa. Much of the slowdown so far can be attributed to China. many of Africa's weaknesses require extra concessional aid if they are to be tackled effectively. this time in about 150 years. Consider that in the year 1 the world had about 300 million people. it contrasts the record of countries that have adopted outward-looking trade policies with those that have concentrated on import substitution. From 1750 2 until well into the twentieth century. In the twentieth century. from 0. but at only 4. the second half of the twentieth century stands out for its remarkable population growth. Africa's population grew faster. Though its total GDP growth was not much slower than in other regions in the 1970s. while mortality-though high-can be expected to decline. It peaked at 2. Most families in other developing countries now have at least four children. for the region as a whole. the balance of births over deaths was tenuous. if they make such improvements. and crises such as war or plague periodically reduced populations in parts of the world. Since 1950 population growth has been concentrated largely in the developing countries.5 percent in North America. however. Though a postwar baby boom combined with falling mortality in the industrial countries. the links between demography and development can be understood only by going back even farther into the past. Furthermore. population growth rates are rising and could rise still further. since they have already been achieved by some developing countries. in Europe and Japan postwar families were even smaller. It is now around 2.7 billion by 1900. The chapter stresses the valuable contribution that appropriate pricing policies can make to faster economic growth. Its population then took more than 1. population "momentum" means that growth rates in developing countries will remain high for several decades even if couples . For parts of South Asia and the Middle East. fertility in the United States meant that families had on average little more than three children. In addition. It concludes that. In particular. between 1950 and today. in most developed countries fertility had fallen to a level near or even below "replacement"-about two children per couple being the level which. because of a slightly greater decline in birth rates than in death rates (see Figure 1.7 percent a year in that period if the industrial countries do no better than in the past ten years. The predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is a recurring theme throughout this Report. In Africa couples say they want more children than in fact they are having. World population size doubled again.500 years to double. That would make the difference between almost every country in the world raising per capita incomes and people in many of the world's poorest countries growing steadily poorer. over the long run. holds population constant (demographic terms are defined in the glossary). By the 1970s. Of the policy failings that contributed to slow growth in other developing countries. their population growth rate rose above 2 percent a year.8 billion (see Figure 1. irrespective of what happens in the industrial countries. GDP per capita fell during the 1970s. the population growth rate never exceeded 1 percent in Europe and seldom exceeded 1.5 to 1 percent until about 1950 and then to a remarkable 2 percent. the world's population grew at the then unprecedented rate of about 0. Driven by falling mortality and continued high fertility. forecasts of a lower rate of population growth are based more on hope than on present trends. Further decline in population growth will not come automatically. close to an average of two children per family.

D.yces5 . 1977. 20 UN. 1966. A. Stu. 1-2150 Population (blins) 12 BCrth and death Crude rate 95 rates. Durand.Fast and projected world population.~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ DeeOped ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~countries' Population A. . 1 0-8O Crude thousand) 1(Per th1977 (peraU ) 8 3 .

.. bL-ri.i - ..n.&f-65groadh rate l.rh.).rth.rmh. pa.nl tile.:-. f.n im ar.' ih rat.lend to tall ink-ic.-. -It. n-un .. nf.1 M . I-.-n ~. n: jI.t beiveen 2 i -and 4 Ti percrfni irralifir c-i rh.-. . in I..rid 'nga I.d pcru.r .-.:-.' -.. ha I F.rid [innr r im. ntI t .. -- i--er rrn. t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ii ri.nth ..n.ra thi - ~i:d l.-nla 'cent . a ir pa r-. \. F.. groa-.w - L iii-r p-ri tiptla - I. n ba -.1r-ath I.i.pn iin th. I-.: 1..rr-rh Il -l I… r-i Ti.ro.r Il-C.r) - n ..:It i:. rtul._uur-nriu c:reated h. niwn~!3 i.:i:'-.-: r. . Cl-a pr-r 4L.-:Mcr. hirilic pr ooir. cir.J turthcr r-...ri-n e it rh. 1r. 'i-I nTt.r--r ni..:ial numb. .r1:I.'..r.eate -.or. Ra. b-c~~~~~~~~~~~~~.:.n -..Ifinc.puii- ir.np.n:.. lhw birth rat. .rin t I 1 r ccri atr .1 t AcrI r.-h. Irr -r tl ..-ia -.n.hribhi.It -II . tIa. i.i 22 . Ill *) en.ft-i. rii .rr -. bcob. 1 percent In it h - rr. r pihii.iam.f IIin ... . rp L. .cun.rrjii.~~~im -. r. ai - . .luritr-.-r p'. r. ITi..naId Ic .'th among .. h rate..-.ih..e.untri ht ItiO chnrti Inpcludng ajivti r n-aIb T..... wat 4 I.rg .mi.rat..r and Latin Anmerica -'ith annual . rn E--.. i-'ut i inr i.rr.-.4b.rrri a I.ILi.r.it- rul .rapidi-. t.4.i. r i-cd ir.1 3 D I.tc. a-it r.: nar- lhe nt. -r g.thr-r rhIn -t.:oirntrie.n ti. p in- -ar...ut rr.II IIa th.r Th' h. F ar sa.:r.d .ar-a thin I . ac r-. ir p-. 1I triI..ai.is.Er..r 1... h i. n'r. .-. r.tart-.po.-mErti unlcring:ilh:. I !i.irilrution art :countrie4 troth i-42 populairons exceeding I million b% aaerage Pi... . . Intr iiPrcl .ri .r i .- - I inm r V.rulaii. nr..IIh 1 .d hi :e Age structure Ls Senegal. i.l .Lch rciiii n- ~ i. brthV rat.& ifh - i. i -4 . -1 --.plar -mall dmEr. -I iTaK c.u. -i i ir in -..r.-: irj-zi trilt r3i. "ii.~ -p - irt T T--t-i.ro.2 2 rhinil 1r h jA . .r .ul p. N. corionirif~ prirnar-.rane**-LiI r ---. d-.p. uu-n =-. r. - and ginth glr.a- 4-i. -i-- rh.w i.-1-a.Jn.l.3. luc. dt-Cadm% F-i>' -a high lttrilit.. 1-.li.a *-h r.. and 2112i'I it i hc numbt-r . in ni-r pi lb.t-n n it. hd liNi ~~~~~~~~rat.i. r .tnt h ri ld. r ii-i 1 crrl rr.-.rc ~ k-lit.p-l I I.&iI. tail tr- Di.birth. 141 - ~ r I.. 4 . can ar aicr. trunabCr in. .It h-. r n)o thr >2.. rc.ui b-r.-r. r a i-un... 12.r n.h tErTlit1 3nd tailing nut-. -ne u . : .i y'a-. s IL r .LI hglLv F- :nid rbc vilnunrb-. . Jr :it a Dir-n.:. F..hig.a.%e ini rcr. rare : F r n. the-..: ...a.t -r< .r.t n.i 1cn.-A i. agc *lr. i.ithng crili.. it. nl.Ern1..tl I I- Jild --r-rc.c t bi Irip.l I1 I. icr rnu-.Iinc -d alna-.:nut j V-.9)' L-u~ 1 iI 3 hb nifi nt~. and t.r-h' t nipt.I-3 t I .r.I.. . i.a-i.-rIb ri arri p-.n it l.d-ae indp4..nti.intpcr Tad -da .-.i 1 4-.ram-.. 0 r-pI .1 i...rc..ia pci "om an. I'.id 'i..iiit r-p. IOSO.l .cr * i. I rd.trializr-d nation.ni t:rrli. t.arrd tal' p i n*i Ir- rapid gr-rnlIh *..n...r.-.-r t ir~.ndin-c rh. I i. fhal 2n.a.i iri.f. n r-. and eight birthmocrrnentUrn- ard -i.r..-. ..rr ir i1. 4rrsjc in th.r hi Uan. o.ct . t itll .o r..: tndu._m in 3rinu l gt-irioci iii.o dittcrcn.Il-d. rr3iid i. I L. ii r..~ F.Unirli~ *i i ih.r r Ihh.-.- ii Adlfl ri .rln bu.1 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum tirtrilir.! ha' I all.ri-Th-. ru i.f..--- : that lear rlic i--tal numb. .pla-i.r Jl.rit 1.pr-ii.i r r. Ii i-pi *--:-Iit--. pi in--zr.: titrtti il-nir.-arl.. r. oi porpulatiorn grrr. ! inF.~ .r mir .l-r1r-ri-idi -r.a. C...iiip r 1 rs.ut ha.upm%--rain oI Airwa A.~i-.n: -i 3 ..Box 1.~ni.r thrr. F-rE -c.-:inn'li-:l. n.. -~~~ - nA ~ n I-".t n.u.1ula.. rm3in ' i5. ra niid I ri t. .:.1d the t~~.

and few people were literate. . 5 . the high point of several centuries of accelerating growth and the beginning of what demographers project to be a continuous decline. Mosk. U. life expectancy has risen dramatically. The baby "bulge" that resulted from the trends of high fertility and falling mortality that started twenty years ago is now entering childbearing age.. Since 1950 it has been the countries with lower levels or income per person wltn lower levels of mcome per person that have had much faster population growth.S.Sinpaore Brazil . though income per person and adult literacy are not (see Figure 1. Since 1850. To reduce population growth to 1 percent a year by the early 1990s.000 England and Chile But these averages can be misleading. for many the gains have been small. absolute annual increases will be close to or more than 80 million people a year in developing countries well into the next century. selected countries and years Primary school enrollment rate (percent) l00 United States Singapore Chile Brazia Korea women aged twenty to thirty-four almost doubled between 1950 and 1980. Johansson. Zimmerman.have fewer children (see Box 1.2). 1965. Until the seventeenth or eighteenth century. as the children born in the 1960s enter their twenties. Progress in education and life expectancy in developing countries has been especially notable since 40 England and Vales Japan Sudan Ethiopia 20 1900 1960 1980 GNP per capita (constant 1980-82 dollars) 1950. the number of women marrying and bearing children will continue to increase. for example. 1968. Though absolute numbers will continue to increase for several decades. until world population stabilizes sometime in the twenty-second century. while world population size has more than tripled. The latter part of the twentieth century has been a demographic watershed. couples in China would need to have fewer than 50 E and Wales BanIadesh Sudan Japan $ Ethiopia 0 1900 1960 1980 two children on average. however.000 United States 2. the number of FIGURE 1. Consider a simple Sources: Tan and Haines. income per person has increased perhaps six times in real terms.2 Indicators of standard of living. The rise in living standards 50 Malaysia India 25 Sudan Bangladesh Pakistan Ethiopia 1900 1960 1980 Life expectancy at birth (years) 60 Sweden United States iCrhie Korea Malaysia India Pakistan . These considerations should not obscure the Literacy rate (percent) United States England and Wales Chile Korea Brazil central fact that the world's population growth rate is falling. Japan i Malaysia Korea Sudan Pakistan India E thiopa began the period already richer. primary school enrollment rates and life expectancy are above the levels achieved by richer countries eighty years ago. 1984.000 s Sweden . life expectancy had probably changed little. Bureau of the Census. and education has become widespread. 1960. In China. Though most people are better off today. throughout the 1980s. Keyfitz and Fleiger. M 3.1). 1977. 1983. the issue now is how quickly the rate of increase can be slowed downand how individual countries (and the international community) are to cope with continued growth in the meantime. Even in today's poorer developing countries. In those countries absolute increases in income have been much smaller than in the countries which 1.

720 billion Developing countries' share-44 percent 19 percent share 2. America's average income. These. had become forty-four times larger by 1980.3).000 to almost $8. The projections should not be treated as predictions. The demograplicfiituire World Bank population projections are shown in Table 19 of the World Development Indicators at the back of this Report. and this is not reflected in official exchange rates.example.3 Developing countries' share of population and production. especially for services.560. 1800 Source: McGreevey. and most countries of tropical Africa. differences in education and life expectancy also persist. where about 25 percent of the world's people live. Between 1955 and 1980 income per person in the United States grew at an average 2.000 between 1955 and 1980. and alternative projections prepared for this Report and shown in the Population Data Supplement. income per person grew at about 1. India. average income increased from $7. Only 5 percent was shared among the 47 percent living in low-income countries such as Bangladesh. They exaggerate differences between poor and rich countries because not only incomes but also prices.417 million Total world 1. If the assump- FIGURE 1. 1984. 1900 1930 1980 .0 percent a year. some forty-one times India's in 1955. Such comparisons raise several statistical difficulties. What had been a $6. By 1980. are explained in Chapter 4. The remaining 21 percent was shared by the other 75 percent of people. Meanwhile. the income gap between India and the United States is still estimated to have increased from almost $5. Among and within developing countries. 79 percent of the world's total output was produced in the developed countries.673 million population 944 millon I. 1800-1980 Total world production $970 billion $230 billion $2.030 to $11. in India. China. Large absolute differences in average income between developed and developing countries have persisted and have even increased since 1950 (see Figure 1.7 percent a year-but only from $170 to $260 (in 1980 dollars).630 billion $11.860 income gap between Americans and Indians in 1955 had almost doubled to $11. But even with appropriate adjustments (based on the UN International Comparison Project).300 in 1980. Pakistan. In 1980 dollars. The general conclusion is inescapable: much of the world's output is produced and consumed by relatively few of its people. but as illustrations of what can happen given reasonable assumptions. are lower in poor countries.

and that developing countries can take conscious steps to influence their demographic futures. Both mortality and fertility-the latter matters much more for population growth-can be brought down more quickly than projected. As a group. 170 million. having risen from almost 4. Nigeria. it is clear that future population increases will be concentrated in what are now the poorer areas of the globe. war. the actions that would speed the demographic transition are also those which would increase economic growth. making it the most populous nation on earth. (In the several developed countries in which fertility is now below replacement level. a country about the size of the state of Wisconsin in the United States. Economic growth depends on invest7 . In that strict sense.8 billion by the year 2050. and cures Part II of this Report discusses three themes. Why does rapid population growth slow development? First. Moreover. policy effort can make a difference. and in most developed countries in the year 2010. Yet their fertility is projected to decline significantly-and even with those declines their populations will more than double in the next fifty years.8 billion to more than 11 billion (see Figure 1.2 billion today to 1. world population would stabilize around the year 2150. Korea. In the past three decades many developing countries managed to raise average income even as their populations grew rapidly. in countries that are already crowded and still heavily reliant on agriculture. has been and will be faltering progress against what is still high mortality. and family planning efforts. The cost of rapid population growth.6 billion to 8. But the goal of development extends beyond accommodation of more people. By the time world population stabilized. on per capita income growth. Causes. and Kenya. whether. solely or even primarily. it is assumed to rise and then stabilize at replacement. while that of those countries now classified as developing would grow from over 3. The experience of the past two decades shows that economic growth and social development are possible. compared with 30 percent today. Such speculative pessimism needs to be set against the concrete reasons for optimism. may not be a catastrophe-with luck sudden famine. rapid population growth has been accommodated. the population of India would be 1. and 150 million. it exacerbates the awkward choice between higher consumption now and the investment needed to bring higher consumption in the future. political or environmental collapse can be avoided. mortality will rise to check further population growth. But continuing rapid growth on an ever larger base is likely to mean a lower quality of life for millions of people. Even allowing for some error in such projections. Although population growth does not provide the drama of financial crisis or political upheaval. respectively. Zaire. its significance for shaping the world is at least as great.2). * Rapid population grozoth is a developmenit problein. and what do they imply for future human welfare? The critical assumptions are that the decline in mortality will continue until life expectancy of about eighty years is reached. even starting at low initial income levels. The main cost of such growth.) In some respects these assumptions are optimistic. whether fragile administrative systems will be unable to maintain health programs. 230 million. would have a population of 450 million. and Malaysia in the 1960s (see Figure 1. Even with rapid income growth and advances in literacy in the next two decades. fertility trends. consequences. Declines need not rely. would have populations of 620 million. at least for the world as a whole. borne principally by the poor in developing countries. among the most populous countries in Africa.4 billion. Ethiopia. the average level of human welfare will depend largely on the degree to which economic and social transformation occurs in these areas. Consider the poorer countries of Africa and South Asia. A pessimist might wonder whether for some countries it is not already too late-whether rising unemployment and increasing landlessness will overwhelm social and political institutions. they are not likely to reach the income and literacy levels that triggered fertility declines in such countries as Brazil. Educational change can occur rapidly. with the fastest population growth-would account for 50 percent of the world's people. The population of today's developed countries would grow from about 1. sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia-today's poorest countries. and that fertility will decline to replacement level-in developing countries between the years 2005 and 2045.7 billion. depending on recent mortality levels. It would reach 9. it is to improve people's lives. Are the assumptions that produce these projections realistic. and lost opportunities for improving people's lives. Bangladesh.tions underlying the "standard" projections in Table 19 are correct.4 billion in 2050.1).

the resources available for investment are limited. Agricultural modernization and diversification into manufacturing will require large new investments in both human and physical capital. Even in countries with untapped natural resources-Brazil and Ivory Coast. rapid increases in population make it hard to manage the adjustments that accompany and promote economic and social change. Singapore. some couples have more children than they want. Information about family planning may be scarce or the costs of contraception high.ment-all the more so if human skills are scarce and technology limited. 0 There are appropriatepublic policies to reduce fertility. there may be social as well as financial costs in controlling fertility. health. in many countries increases in population threaten what is already a precarious balance between natural resources and people. in overall development strategy and in future population policy. Couples may not realize that mortality rates are falling. Where populations are still highly dependent on agriculture and the potential for increasing production through extending cultivation is limited. Where young women marry early. countries are in a better position to cope with the strains of rapid growthwhether their natural resources are limited or they are already "crowded. Couples may not be fully aware of the health risks of large families. First. This gap also occurs for several reasons. will seem necessary tomorrow to slow population growth. in the absence of pensions or public support. Poverty means not only low income but also lack of economic and social opportunities. mortgaging the welfare of future generations. for instance-rapid population growth makes it harder to effect the investments in complementary inputs (roads. This gap occurs for several reasons. Proposals for reducing population growth raise difficult questions about the proper domain of public policy. so that fewer births are needed to ensure that the number of children they want will survive to become adults. an insecure future. and political and economic systems are stable. the private gain from having many children may exceed the social gain. But if consumption is low already. other development policies must adapt in the meantime. Thus tradition can combine with lack of information about birth control to contribute to high fertility. security and status are linked to childbearing. Kenya. during a country's transition to a modern economy. as today's children become tomorrow's new parents. Malaysia. faster population growth makes investment in "population quality" more difficult. The growth of cities in developing countries. continuing large increases in population condemn many households to continuing poverty. Inaction today forecloses options tomorrow. the Republic of Korea. This Report considers two reasons for public policy to reduce fertility. The gap requires . Worst of all. Burundi. moreover. inaction today could mean that more drastic steps. For women who are poor and for whom other opportunities may be limited. In countries where the population is still largely dependent on agriculture. Such increases can contribute to overuse of limited natural resources. For any family there are obvious rewards from many children. But poor parents especially have other reasons for high fertility. a main reason for it is poverty. drainage. investment in transport and communications is in place. India. and limited access to services such as education. Second. public services. poses serious management problems. are cumulative. largely due to high rates of natural increase. and considerable administrative and political skill to ensure efficient allocation of scarce investment resources. Third. they look to their children to support them in old age. and Thailand-also tend to be those in which population growth is already declining. Where there is a gap between private and social gains. in the transition from a traditional to a modern economy. Yet these private rewards are achieved at great social cost because part of the responsibilities for educating and employing children falls on society at large. Family and fertility are areas of life in which the most fundamental human values are at stake. less compatible with individual choice and freedom. Second. and Nepal-progress in the face of continuing rapid population growth will be extraordinarily difficult. They rightly fear the risks of infant mortality because. and the amount of new land or other resources is limited-including Bangladesh. More births now make the task of 8 slowing population growth later more difficult." But countries in that category-Colombia. and family planning. Where education levels are already high. couples do not discuss sexual matters. and other agricultural infrastructure) and in the human skills needed to tap such resources. so too does continued rapid growth that in some rural areas threatens permanent environmental damage. The costs of rapid population growth. the Arab Republic of Egypt. These costs of rapid population growth differ among countries. and parents pressure new couples to have children. Population policy has a long lead time.

governments can use incentives and disincentives to signal their policy on family size. and they complement other development efforts in enhancing welfare. and on what it has already accomplished. where education is widespread. The pattern of decline shows that differences in income. Education. than in their richer neighbor. there is a particular strategy of development in which the signals transmitted to parents encourage them to have fewer children in their own private interests. for example. but comparable to what a few countries have already achieved. The specific policy agenda for each country depends on its political culture. and incentives. It has fallen more in India than in Pakistan. where family planning programs received government support starting in the late 1960s. this Report provides examples of the implications for population growth of "rapid" mortality and fertility declines. the status of women. Such measures are affordable: family planning programs. But experience shows that all this takes time to have an effect. but in Pakistan population policy has received less sustained support over the past two decades. The experience of the past two decades of population policy is encouraging. and extend services all provide new signals to households. Fertility has fallen most dramatically in China. * Experience shows that policy makes a difference. It has fallen more in Egypt and Tunisia. and Java in Indonesia. the successful experience of many countries already indicates it need not. on the nature of the problem it faces. where a public policy to slow population growth includes public education. Governments can do more to encourage breastfeeding and later age of marriage. access to family planning services. Social efforts to expand education and employment opportunities for women do the same. Karnataka. have been successful in reducing fertility at very low cost. Finally. helping to close the gap between private and social gains to high fertility. countries differ.public policy to provide alternative ways of securing the benefits that many children provide for their parents. broaden social insurance and pension schemes. a richer country where central government involvement is minimal. vary among countries and among different groups within each country. and to create conditions that enable people to realize their potential. it is much less likely that the social costs of each child exceed the private costs parents are willing to bear. While there are distinctions between different types of policies to reduce fertility. But to illustrate what is possible. and culture do not tell the whole story. Measures to improve income opportunities. society as a whole compensates those couples willing to forgo the private benefits of an additional child. Fertility has fallen faster and to lower levels in Colombia. countries with demographic objectives. and economic measures other governments might be reluctant to consider. governments can spread information about the advantages of planning family size-making it as easy as possible for individuals to choose the number and timing of their children and helping to close the gap between the number of children parents have and the number they want. family planning. than in Brazil. Lower fertility is only an intermediate objective. per capita income is low in both. and hence the policy actions needed. religion. a commitment to achieve lower fertil- ity must not mean a willingness to achieve it at any cost. and Tamil Nadu). social pressure. and in ways that also benefit the poor. Algeria. which reduce population growth by lengthening the average interval between generations. But large declines have also occurred in other low-income areas: Sri Lanka and several states of India (Kerala. When couples have two or even three children. where there is an active family planning program. Population growth can be slowed more directly. But if each couple has four or even six children. Through incentives. to increase individual choice. Within regions. The ultimate goal of public policy is to improve living standards. For most countries these declines would mean fertility rates of between two and three children per couple in the year 2000 and population growth rates of 9 . in virtually every country there is some appropriate combination of development policies geared to the poor. and economic and social policies that bring opportunities to the majority of people all make a difference. then it is more likely that the social optimum is being exceeded and that both social and private interests would be better served by smaller families. encouraging individuals to want smaller families. In short. These declines are for most countries more rapid than those shown in the standard World Bank projections. Such measures also respect human rights. The size of the two gaps. In fact. Many countries have shown that effective measures can be taken to slow population growth. Through support for family planning programs. in a society with only limited ability to finance the education of a growing population.

between 1 and 2 percent-moderate compared with rates today. about 70 million rather than 120 million in 2050 (compared with a population of 18 million today) and for Bangladesh. For some countries. These alternative paths of rapid declines in mor- tality and fertility give only a rough guide to what is possible. 230 million rather than almost 360 million (compared with 93 million today). In the longer run. the declines imply eventual large differences in population size compared with the standard projection-for Kenya. For some countries. . But the alternative paths illustrate an important point: the course of future population growth and its effects on social and economic progress are well within the realm of conscious human choice. they may be too ambitious. others have already set even more ambitious fertility targets. some countries may wish to move to even lower or zero rates of population growth.

9 6. Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.4 3. then 1. Developing countries were less badly affected.3 6. 2.1 5. The recession of 1974-75 was sharp but short in industrial countries.440 GDPgrowth rates (average annual percentage change) 1973-79 1980 1981 1982 5.3 -0. and an estimated 1 percent in 1983 (see Table 2. The recent recession had two proximate causes: the rise in oil prices in 1979.1 and Figure 2.110 800 610 2..3 6.3 percent in 1979.8 -2.4 4. Both the need to reduce inflation and Population.0 0. d.3 4.5 0. and the disinflationary policies of governments in most major industrial countries after 1980.9 5.5 5.3 -0.4 1.0 5. for a time.7 -0.5 1.4 percent in 1975.5 percent in 1980.7 4. The estimated 1983 data exclude Angola.5 3.8 5. Countrygroup Developing countriesb Low-income Asia China India Africa Middle-income oil importers East Asia and Pacific Mliddle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africac Southern Europe Latin America and Caribbean Middle-income oil exporters5 High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies . then by only 0.9 .1 5.5 1.7 5.5 5.7 percent.7 5. the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 8.2 5. Their GDP grew by only 2.2 5.3 5. a. c.0 1.8 5. The recent recession of 1980-83 was not so sharp but it lasted longer. their heavy borrowing allowed them to grow. before falling by 0.9 1. and GDP per capita in 1980.3 2.6 3. stemming from supply disruptions in Iran.6 3.3 2.1 6. In the second recession.9 -2.2 5.971 980 675 204 611 183 35 60 91 241 494 16 715 GD8p per capita (dollars) 650 250 250 290 240 250 1. 1960-73 6.0 4.6 5. In the industrial countries GDP grew by 3.5 Not available. 1.118 549 497 284 162 52 915 204 28 37 201 445 654 228 7. This change imposed substantial pressure on those countries which had come to rely on foreign loans as a principal way of escaping recession.1 percent in 1973..3 percent in 1980.3 percent in 1983.0 3.2 5. They had fared better in the first recession not only because it was shorter but also because.3 2.8 percent in 1974.2 5. however.0 4.8 5.4 2. 1960-83 9D (billions of dollars) 2.1).4 0.2 4.3 3.9 7.9 0. It fell by 0. Does not include South Africa. and 1.463 1980 population (millions) 3.7 2.1.6 4.Part I Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy? 2 Recession in retrospect The world has now had two major recessions in the past ten years.9 1983 1.3 2. the availability of foreign capital declined abruptly after 1981.840 1.7 4. and Iraq.9 6. and growth rates.210 1.3 1.6 7.280 2.4 percent in 1973 and 5.1 0.175 1.1 also more severely affected.6 6.3 -2.500 1.4 7.1 0.8 2. GDP.7 5.250 10.9 percent in 1974.7 -2.3 percent in 1981.9 8.5 6. Estimated. b.5 percent in 1982 and is estimated to have risen to only about 2. however. .9 10.3 percent in 1976.1 5.2 0.7 1.9 percent in 1982. GDP growth in industrial countries was back up to 4.7 4.6 8.2 5.6 6. Their GDP growth was 7. it fell only modestly to 4 percent in 1975 before rising to 6.4 percent in 1981. In 1976.4 -0.4 0.9 2. The developing countries were TABLE 2. where GDP rose by 6.2 .2 4.7 2.320 14.

and the present recovery appears to be the third strong upswing. 1983.1 Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial countries.FIGURE 2. The rate of unemployment has not shown any significant downturns but has had three marked upturns since 1969. and inflation and-more seriously-adverse underlying trends. improved policies in industrial countries could contribute to faster future growth in developing countries. 1961-83 Percent directions-with a lag in each case of about a year. France. and unemployment in seven major industrial countries. The cyclical peaks and troughs in unemployment have risen from 2.2 illustrates the experience of seven major industrial countries since the mid-1960s.. Estimated. The present marked downturn in the rate of inflation is the third since 1970. fallen below its previous cyclical trough. Industrial countries in the past two decades One explanation of why stop-go cycles have tended to be sharper in recent periods is that as FIGURE 2. To assess the prospects of developing countries. inflation.2 and 7. Inflation has. the peaks and troughs have risen from 5. Source OECD. In an interdependent world economy. In the case of inflation. World Bank data. yZ v 5\ I S 4 r F ' \1 li \ 2 ' 2' ' \li °____________________________________________ '. 1965 1970 1975 1980 but the conclusion is not warranted. cent in the first of the cycles shown in Figure 2. 1983. . italy. for developing countries. unemployment.2 to 12. it is therefore important to consider the extent to which poor policies in the industrial world were to blame for their difficulties. This might be taken as a break in V 1983' _ tendency toward progressive deterioration. GDP growth in the industrial countries has not matched its rate of 1973 in any subsequent year.7 per- 8 veloping countries / \ 6 AIJr ADeveloping countries - 3. growth in developing countries is significantly affected by what happens in industrial countries (see map).7 and 2. Since 1968 GDP growth has experienced three downturns. Inflation and unemployment have tended to follow GDP growth-in opposite 12 0 GDP growth rate 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983' Countries include Canada.7 percent in the first cycle shown in Figure 2. 1966-83 Percent 14 Consumer prices 12 / 10 8 N \ | / 6 Unemployment . however. r--4 2-- Figure 2. -2 1960 a. Sourcres: For developed countries. This deterioration may be explained in part by past policy choices as well as by underlying economic and social conditions. The progressive deterioration from cycle to cycle is also evident. United Kingdom. and United States.9 and 2. Japan.the Industrial countries. Germany. a.2 Growth.. OECD. Policy-induced problems the severity of the resulting recession can be understood only as a manifestation of a long-term deterioration in the economic performance of industrial countries.2 to 8 and 5 percent in the most recent.1 percent in the most recent. It shows that they have had marked cycles in GDP growth. To the extent that they were. In order to lower inflation to a level still well above the average for the 1960s. Estimated. unemployment rates have risen to three times the level of the 1960s.

A third source-trade liberalization and reintegration of the industrial economies after World War Il-though it had boosted growth for at least two decades. witnessed efforts by several governments to achieve the required stability in the labor market through some form of incomes policy. The oil price rises of 1973-74 and 1979-80 aggravated these difficulties and required adjustments which the industrial economies found difficult to make efficiently. and the Federal Republic of Germany. they have little to do with the stop-go pattern of cyclical disturbances combined with rising unemployment and inflation. Its structure also changed significantly. such as Austria. formal or (more usually) informal policies based on voluntary self-discipline among workers have had some success.5 to 23. formal incomes policies achieved only temporary success. The rising share of spending on health care and old-age security partly reflects increases in the proportion of old people. the authorities are forced to choke off the expansion with monetary restraint sooner than would have been necessary with less sensitive markets. Governments attempted a combination of all three. Meanwhile. some forces were working in favor of faster growth-rapid innovations in key industries such as electronics. Another source-the shift of workers from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity manufacturing-had also largely been exhausted.3 percent of GDP in 1961 to 40. Between 1960 and 1975 demographic change contributed about 13 . That pattern can be explained only by the economic policies followed in industrial countries. public spending rose from 29. Most of the increase was concentrated on health care (where prices were rising rapidly) and old-age security. LABOR MARKET RIGIDITIES. but increases in coverage and benefits were more important. especially by importing more laborintensive goods in return for exports of machinery and other sophisticated products and services.9 percent in 1981 (see Table 2. nominal wages rise and bond prices and exchange rates fall. although underlying changes in economic opportunities may explain a tendency toward lower growth. and second. was no longer providing the stimulus it did earlier.9 percent of GNP between 1954 and 1980. for example. the share of spending on education.2). and the opportunity to expand trade with developing countries.4 percent of GNP. unemployment. In other countries.soon as it is widely believed that governments are embarked on an inflationary course. such as the United Kingdom and the United States. combined with fiscal and monetary expansion. they cannot entirely explain the deterioration in economic performance. Although such fundamental factors played a part in slowing down GDP growth. The early 1970s. In some countries. Japan. Two policy-induced developments deserve particular attention: first. the increasing share of service industries in GDP may have slowed the growth of GDP since the growth of productivity has traditionally been lower in services than in manufacturing. Countries might also have exploited the potential for shifting labor out of unemployment and declining "smokestack" industries to new areas. in particular. either formally or informally. and fiscal deficits. especially under floating exchange rates. If real wages are above the level at which all those who seek work can find it. For the industrial countries as a whole. to let inflation rise if wages are not indexed to prices. The links between these are at the root of the problems of inflation. taxation.3). Among the seven major industrial countries the share of government expenditure on defense. and old-age security rose from 10. income maintenance. Finally. real wage inflexibility in the industrial countries contributed to "stagflation"-continuing inflation at relatively high unemployment. general administration. the increasing rigidity of the labor market and the resulting strong upward pressure on real wages. is that inflation rises more quickly than anticipated and. In the late 1960s real wages in manufacturing in many industrial countries were rising at a rate faster than warranted by underlying productivity growth. In general.4 to 10. The result. except in Canada (see Table 2. By the early 1970s the trend was marked. and slow growth. in turn. The tendency toward slower growth can be explained in part by changes in underlying conditions. health care. By the late 1960s the opportunities for catching up with the technology of the United States had been largely exploited by both Japan and western Europe. the tendency toward rising unemployment (especially in manufacturing) suggests that that is not what was happening. and economic services fell from 16. PUBLIC SPENDING AND DEFICITS. Furthermore. there are three solutions: to let unemployment rise. so one source of exceptional growth declined in significance. or to try to control wages through incomes policy. To begin with. Although there are forms of labor-using technical progress that could justify such a development. the growth and pattern of public spending.

~To and a.05 percent 14 .0.Y El a~~~~~~. Uiter.R.rit BrazilUp ° ol Mali l1.i: I:Trinidad Jaj Jaac = - *E 0 Gunes 0 a' rageria A ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i LrDva CNiger ChGiaad Nigerica V .de Stales 58ElrKndand t .5 CA. iW0. Zimbat Middle-income~~~~~~~~~~eron Argenina _ market economies~~~~~~~~Rari lndustrial IcnmeAfrica South Groups of economies F]Low-income economies E Middle-income economies High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies East European nonmarket economies Gross domestic product - 1 percent .Distribution of product among selected countries. . ugandal Cam-1gni Kenya Eonzanar Zam1E bia Lesotho. =e e Venezuela E Gn Senega Ma. 1982 4 : ~ l l ' 1 lJunea Kin. Guat~'~ ESa.gdo"..

l l l ' < ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Jpi. Nelhenanas Fe. L v t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~India[.J p. Those for which data on GNP are not available. Gekn. New Zealand 15 .eM Swniernana Auzf [ _. are excluded.. as well as those with fewer than 1 million inhabitants. a Papua New Guinea E Countries are drawn in proportion to their share of total GNP. A ram 7I l.:.ari .iej - Belg.

3 8.1 3.1 3. Rep.9 4.8 5.3 3.4 4.3 4.5 7.8 7.3 5. This has significant implications for developing countries. deficits can have important global consequences.8 2.6 3. in part because of the difficulty of separating the effects of business cycles and inflation from those of structural trends in these deficits.3 2.5 4.2 5.2 5.6 2.1 . . Between 1975 and 1981 changes in eligibility had ceased to be significant. deficits have caused difficulty in some countries at particular times.0 3. 1979.1 5.6 5.3 4. which have an interest in securing mediumand long-term loans to match the long gestation period of some of their development projects.8 6.3 5.6 8. taxes rose from 28.9 9.8 6.2 3.4 4.7 4.TABLE 2.5 percent in 1981.1 Note: Real product wage is defined as the ratio of the nominal wage to the price of commodities produced. To pay for the growth of spending.0 7.7 5.5 1. The significance of the general rise in public sector deficits is controversial. however.4 2. Fed.5 3. .2 Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for the manufacturing sector and the aggregate economy.1 3. Where large countries such as the United States are concerned.2 2.6 -1. that.8 5.0 6. on the industrialcountries Pressures in the labor market and on public finance in industrial countries have contributed to four major problems since the late 1960s: inflation.8 12.8 7. 20 percent of the growth of spending on social services and income maintenance.7 percent of GDP in 1961 to 37. E. by country.5 5.6 4.6 0. One main effect of inflation is that it heightens uncertainty about the future-evidenced.0 1. Experience that expansion breeds inflation .1 5.5 3. depending on the method of financing. It is undeniable.9 4.2 8.2 0. United Kingdoin Uinited States Canada France Italy Japan Manufacturing Real product wage 1962-69 1969-73 1973-75 1975-78 Labor productivity 1962-69 1969-73 1973-75 1975-78 Aggregate economy Real product wage 1962-69 1969-73 1973-75 1975-78 Labor productivity 1962-69 1969-73 1973-75 1975-78 5. mcasure. Source: Sachs.6 2.7 2. but worldwide.1 10.5 6.1 2.7 9.1 3.9 1. Demographic change then contributed 17 percent of the growth. for example.6 0.9 6. they drive up the cost of borrowing.0 4.7 2.1 5. That increase did not cover all the rise in spending.0 4.0 3.1 3.5 12. It can be argued that the deficits may sometimes have acted as a valuable support for demand during a period of recession.3 2. * Inflation may be seen as the result of accommodation to labor market pressures and the result of deficit financing.7 -1. 4.4 5. 1962-78 (average aninualpercentage c/lange) Sector.0 5. not only within the country.0 1.9 0.9 11. declining profitability.2 4. and a broadly defined protectionism. Insofar as they contribute 16 to high interest rates.6 0.4 -0. public sector deficits also increased as a proportion of GDP.0 3.0 5.4 9. Not available.6 7. while changes in eligibility and improvements in benefits contributed 80 percent.2 -0.1 -1.0 6.9 0.3 1.4 3.0 1.4 6.6 0.2 8.7 4.2 5. Perhaps the most important aspect of uncertainty.7 2.2 4.4 2.7 2. however.2 3.8 7.2 7.3 3.6 0. unemployment.6 5.0 6. by the high inflation premiums demanded in long-term interest rates.4 4.8 6. and improved benefits 78 percent.5 4.8 3. is created by the inflationary cycle itself. however. and period Germnany.

TABLE 2.3

Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP, 1961-81
(percent) Countnj 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981

Canada France Germany, Fed. Rep. Italy Japan United Kingdom United States Average for all industrial countries
Source: OECD, 1983.

30.0 35.7 33.8 29.4 17.4 33.4 29.0 29.3

30.1 38.5 36.9 34.3 20.3 35.6 29.2 30.6

36.6 38.3 40.2 36.6 20.9 38.4 32.3 33.3

39.6 44.0 48.1 42.2 27.8 46.2 34.5 37.9

41.4 48.9 49.3 50.8 34.0 47.3 35.4 40.9

and then policy-induced contraction is itself an important constraint on long-term investment and growth in both developed and developing countries. * The rise in unemployment has been related to real-wage pressures, exacerbated by the productivity slowdown of the 1970s. The effect of the productivity slowdown was to lower the rate of increase of the real wage that was compatible with full employment. In the United States real wages appear to have adjusted rapidly to the new trendthey rose little after 1973 and adjusted quickly to the 1973-75 recession (see Table 2.2). In western Europe, however, the same was not true until the late 1970s. In the 1970s employment grew by about 20 million in the United States; with a similar size labor force, countries in the European Community expanded employment by only 2 million. * The effects of real-wage pressures on employment have been exacerbated by the emergence in a number of industrial countries of both rising capital-output ratios and falling rates of profit, at least in the corporate sector (see Table 2.4). Faced with the higher costs of employing labor, firms shifted to more capital-intensive methods of production-

a natural reaction, but one that contributed to sharply rising unemployment. Among the countries where profit rates fell were Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. * With real-wage rigidities, declining profitability in the corporate sector, and rising unemployment, governments were under great pressure to protect specific industries. Often protection is viewed in terms of trade measures alone-tariffs and quotas-and its costs are seen in terms of what it does to prevent other countries' exports. But protection can take many forms, including subsidies, and can be viewed more broadly as the attempt to prevent or slow change by preserving outmoded industries and firms. Because it has taken covert and obscure forms, the evidence on the growth of protection is poor. Probably the most important protectionist policy in practice has been open-ended subsidies for specific firms in, for example, steel, chemicals, motor vehicles, and shipbuilding. In western Europe the share of public spending on subsidies was rising by the late 1960s and grew larger in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Also important have been quantitative restrictions in the form of "voluntary"

TABLE 2.4

Real rates of return on corporate capital, by country, 1962-76
(pcarcen t)
Geranwi!l Uniited United

Period

Caniada

Frantce

Fed. Rep.

Italy

lapa

d

d

States

Average 1962-64 1965-69 1970-73
1974-76 Not available. Souirce: Sachs, 1979.

7.9 9.6 9.0
9.2

9.7 10.0 11.6
8.0

19.3 19.5 15.0
11.4

10.4 11.4 10.3
..

28.2 27.9 21.9
13.5

11.9 10.6 8.3
3.7

12.0 12.2 8.6
7.1

17

export restraints and orderly marketing agreements, which violate the principles and rules of GATT. Estimates of the percentage of imports affected by nontariff barriers are shown for selected industrial countries in Table 2.5. The more effective the nontariff barrier the less the actual value of imports that enter a country. Thus estimates are only illustrative of the relative degree of protection. There has also been a growing use of "less than fair value" provisions of trade law as a form of harassment (see Box 2.1). Quite apart from the threat to developing countries, protection damages the industrial countries themselves. First, efficiency is reduced by actions that cut the link between domestic and international prices. Second, there is an important added source of uncertainty with potentially serious effects for long-term, trade-oriented investment and thus for returns on investment. Impact of rising oil prices To understand the impact of the 1979-80 rise in oil prices, it is necessary first to consider the policy reactions to the jump in prices in 1973-74. That

TABLE 2.5

Percentage of industrial countries' imports covered by nontariff barriers Imports fromi
Developed Inporter United States
Developing

earlier rise had amounted to an annual transfer of about 2 percent of GDP from the industrial countries, or roughly half a year's growth. But much of this could, at least initially, be borrowed back (and as the surplus available for borrowing fell between 1975 and 1979 so did the real price of oil). Although the oil price increase was damaging to industrial countries, it alone does not explain subsequent problems of slow growth, unemployment, and inflation except in the context of already existing economic rigidities. Consider the labor market. The rise in the price of energy lowered the real wage that was compatible with full employment. It also led to an incentive to shift away from energy- and capitalintensive forms of production toward more laborintensive methods. This substitution explains a part of the observed slowdown in labor productivity growth. Where the required reductions in real wages and real wage growth did not occur-as in some countries in western Europe-the productivity slowdown was small, but the oil price rise gave a permanent upward boost to unemployment. In industry some capital stock had become redundant as expectations for higher growth were punctured. The changing price of energy also accelerated the obsolescence of significant parts of the capital stock, especially in such industries as steel, shipbuilding, chemicals (including petrochemicals), and motor vehicles. Governments then responded with increased attempts to prop up such industries with protection and subsidies.

countries
13.0

countries
5.5.

Despite the failure of real wages to adjust and

the declining rates of return on corporate capital,

Japan
Switzerland

19.2
22.6

5.4
48.8

investment demand and then economic activity
were partially sustained for nearly a decade by low and sometimes negative real rates of interest. The economic conditions of the late 1970s and the "debt crisis" which subsequently emerged in the 1980s can be understood only in terms of the peculiar relationship through much of the 1970s between real wages, which tended to rise faster than productivity, and real rates of interest, which stayed low. Negative real rates of iterest spurred a rapid growth of borrowing, especially by the non-oil developing countries. Although in the 1950s and 1960s the shares of different groups of countries in international lending changed only gradually, in the 1970s the non-oil developing countries' share rose sharply. The great increase in lending was largely the result of the oil producers' surplus. The industrial countries were not large net borrowers themselves; investment growth was sluggish in

Sweden
Norwav Austria Denmark Ireland France United Kingdom Italy

1.0
8.2 15.0 194 15.0 20.1 14.9 12.5

7.0
10.9 8.1 19.2 9.5 7.1 14.3 7.0

Germany, Fed. Rep.
Netherlands Belgium and Luxembourg

12.6
16.1 19.2

8.5
19.8 29.7

Note: This table is based on detailed information on nontariff barriers available in UNCTAD. The figures measure the value of
imports affected by nontariff measures in relation to total

imports. Import figures are from 1980, whereas the information
on nontariff barriers applies to 1983. If a country's import restrictions are rigorous, it imports little and few of its imports are affected by restrictions. Thus these figures provide little basis for comparison among countries in the total amount of restrictions.inutilcutiswrnolagnebroes a. Weighted average; excludes Greece. 18

*Box 2.1 Administered protection and the open international trading system
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bility, and slow growth. There is considerable disagreement about the degree of disinflation needed to reduce inflationary pressures at any point in time. But the effects of the disinflation actually undertaken were not surprising. It is difficult to reduce inflation of the magnitude experienced in the 1970s without experiencing some loss of output and employment. The extent of the losses, however, depends on several factors. One is the economny's flexibility in the face of reduced demand. To the extent that labor contracts take time to renegotiate and wages do not adjust quickly, reduced demand tends to produce unemployment. There is evidence that over time the rate of rise of nominal prices, especially of labor but also of some goods, has come to respond more slowly to recessions. This is not a recent phenomenon. It has merely become worse and more general over time, requiring greater losses of output and employment for each percent19

Box 2.2
Th.: -r IJ
9n.

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age point reduction in the rate of inflation. This problem is then superimposed on the real-price rigidities, which have generated longstanding tendencies toward underemployment of resources. A second factor is the degree to which the government's commitment to reduce inflation is credible. If people do not believe that the authorities will do what they say, they can be convinced only by experience. The more deeply rooted is their disbelief, the more protracted and painful their experience may need to be. Thus, if the extent and persistence of the monetary tightening had been fully anticipated, nominal interest rates would have declined as inflation declined. Since it was
20

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the range of 9 to 10 percent (see Table 2.6). Household savings rates held up well in the 1970s, while corporate and government savings rates were strongly pro-cyclical. In recessions profit shares fall and governments run larger deficits. Thus a principal reason for the decline in gross and net savings rates was simply slow and unstable growth. It is as yet unclear whether there has also been a fundamental underlying trend toward lower rates of gross savings. But the high real rates of interest in the early 1980s do suggest that the credit market has become very tight and, in the event of increased demand for private investment, is likely to get still tighter.

Disinflation was successful in its immediate objective (see Figure 2.2). Among major industrial countries, the reduction in consumer price inflation was particularly sharp in the United Kingdom (from 18 percent in 1980 to 5.4 percent in 1983), the United States (from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 4.2 percent in 1983), and Japan (from 8 percent in 1980 to 0.7 percent in 1983). With few exceptions, however, even in the trough of the cycle, rates of inflation remained above the average for the 1960s. At the same time, there were serious adverse effects for world trade and the world trading system and equally-if not still more-serious effects for the international financial system.
21

TABLE 2.6

Net savings and savings by sector in industrial
(cerentage of GDP)
Net savings 10.8 12.0 14.1 11.9 9.0 9.6 10.4 11.4 10.9 9.5 8.8

indebtedness is denominated in dollars, the appreciation of the dollar greatly increased debt servicing costs for all,
countries.

including the developing

In the ten years preceding 1979, in the context of
Corporate Government Household 3.4 2.6 2.7 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.1 1.2 0.6 2.0 1.9 2.8 2.1 -1.3 -0.3 0.4 5.4 7.6 8.7 9.2 9.6 8.5 8.2 8.6 8.0 8.1 8.2

Year 1964 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

general world inflation, the US dollar depreciated

about 50 percent against the German mark and about 60 percent against the Japanese yen. This tended to raise the rate of increase of dollardenominated prices, and thus doubly helped debtors with dollar-denominated debts. The switch to global disinflation in the 1980s was accompanied by a strengthening of the dollar; between 1979 and 1982 it appreciated by 33 percent against the German mark and 14 percent against the Japanese yen. While national prices continued
to rise (albeit more slowly), the average of interna-

0.4
0.9 0.3 -0.2

Note: Based on seven major OECD countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Numbers mav not add to totals because of rounding. Souirce: Hakim and Wallich, 1984.

tional prices, converted into dollars, was actually falling. This greatly increased the burden carried
by debtors with dollar-denominated debts;

World trade grew by just 1.5 percent in 1980, stagnated in 1981, and then fell by 3.6 percent in 1982. The main reason was the sharp fall in the volume of trade in fuels. World exports of manufactures did better in terms of growth but still worse in relation to previous performance. They rose by 5.0 percent in 1980 and 3.5 percent in 1981 before falling by 2.3 percent in 1982. While the decline in the growth of world trade was largely the result of the recession itself, protection probably had some effect as well. New protectionist actions and agreements after 1980 largely concerned trade among industrial countries, especially imports into Europe and North America from Japan. There were, however, several developments that harmed developing countries, including a somewhat more restrictive renegotiation of the Multifibre Arrangement in 1981, subsequent restrictions on textiles and clothing, and further development toward comprehensive restrictions on imports of steel into the United States and the European Community. There are two reasons the disinflation of the early 1980s created such severe problems for the international financial system. The first was the mix of fiscal and monetary policies pursued by the United States. Because of a growing budget deficit financed by borrowing in a country with a relatively low savings rate, interest rates rose. They attracted a substantial capital inflow and helped produce a large real appreciation in the dollar's exchange rate. Since the bulk of international
22

because of the tightness of international credit markets, they faced interest rates well into double figures as well as principal repayments whose real purchasing power was actually rising. The second reason for difficulty was more deepseated. During 1960-73 the real interest rate in the Eurocurrency markets (three-month dollar rate deflated by the US GDP deflator) averaged 2.5 percent; during 1973-79 it averaged only 0.7 percent and at various times was negative. In such an environment, provided it lasts, it is almost impossible to owe too much. The tendency toward increased indebtedness was a general feature of economic life, and in no way unique to developing countries. Corporations and some governments in industrial countries tended to go increasingly into debt, as did the governments of a number of developing countries. When real interest rates jumped to almost 7 percent in 1981 and 1982, serious difficulty was bound to follow. The difficulties were most conspicuous in the case of developing countries, particularly those which had borrowed heavily from commercial banks in the previous ten years. Although official transfers and direct foreign investment had been the major form of capital flows to developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, they were overtaken by commercial bank lending in the 1970s. At the time, this seemed a benign vehicle for recycling the large surpluses of oil-exporting countries, and an effective way of obtaining higher investment in developing countries than could be financed through their domestic savings alone. But it also resulted in a huge buildup of commercial debt in

they maintained or increased the growth of export volumes. and of interest rates-complicated the tasks of decisionmakers (both public and private) everywhere.3). of exchange rates. These performances in turn were made possible by the kind of domestic and trade policies that permitted an effective adjustment to external conditions. The slowdown in industrial-country growth hurt all developing countries. the growth of gross domestic income (GDY) is more relevant than the growth in GDP.8). Sudan. the rise in instability in the 1970s-of prices. in sub-Saharan Africa.several countries. Tan23 . Middleincome developing countries were not uniformly successful in these areas. It also explains why some countries have done better than others.) Population growth rates in developing countries during the 1970s continued to be high and in some regions (notably sub-Saharan Africa) increased. The rise in nominal and real interest rates in the past few years and the slowdown--even halting-of new lending have made it difficult for some countries to service their commercial debt and raise the threat of a global financial crisis. between 1973 and 1979 the rate of GDP growth of middle-income oil importers of 5. although the effect was not the same for all.9 percent GDP growth. The effects of the terms of trade for oil-importing countries should not be exaggerated. The effect on oil exporters was at first more than offset by the rise in petroleum prices. A third influence is that of foreign trade. though. and the maintenance of overvalued exchange rates.7). In per capita terms. (The low growth of oil exporters shown in Table 2. Differences among developing countries The middle-income countries of East Asia and the Pacific achieved GDP growth rates of 8. In general. Developing countries after 1973 Thus the international environment had become less favorable to developing countries in the period after 1973 and became even less favorable after 1979-80. quotas. second. More trade and less protection in turn enable developing countries to develop efficiently in line with their own comparative advantage.6 percent a year was only a little above the GDY growth rate of 5. last year's World Development Report focused on their management of economic policies and institutions. first in coping with the 1974-75 recession.1 is somewhat misleading since there were large increases in income because of improvements in the terms of trade. especially manufactured exports (see Box 2. However. By allowing for changes in the terms of trade. The maintenance of high growth and near full employment in industrial countries provides a boost to world trade.0 percent a year compared with 4. costly and inefficient agricultural marketing systems for both inputs and outputs. All oil-importing countries experienced some worsening in the terms of trade in the 1970s. the 1970s was a successful decade for them. Other regions did less well. Production was held back by adverse external conditions in combination with a series of domestic policies: poor incentives to farmers. Inflation in the 1970s helped to some extent all debtors. Those which were exporters neither of oil nor of manufactures suffered most. and other forms of protection for declining industries. Recent improvements have not restored the terms of trade to their levels of the 1960s (see Table 2. The sharp rise of real interest rates after 1979 hurt most large middle-income borrowers. India also maintained its growth. then in achieving a sustained expansion until 1979.6 percent a year between 1973 and 1979. countries such as Ethiopia. interest rates and capital flows are only one determinant of growth in the developing countries. growth in many countries was therefore even less impressive. The changing balance between these three factors explains the performance of developing countries. they did so for two basic reasons. That was not true of low-income countries in Africa.3 percent. Only for oil exporters have changes in the terms of trade been important. especially sub-Saharan Africa. and most recently in struggling through the 198082 recession from which they have yet to recover. however. most of them in Latin America. some may have relied too much on borrowing without adjustment. For example. A second is their own policies. per capita incomes actually fell during 1973-83 (see Chapter 5). For the purpose of assessing economic welfare. First. Where oil-importing countries performed well. they maintained or increased savings and investment rates (see Table 2. GDY takes account of changes in the rate at which national output can be converted into national consumption. their rate of GDY growth was 9. Between 1973 and 1982. It also reduces the political pressures in industrial countries for tariffs. Most important. comparable to that achieved between 1960 and 1973.

1 5. which did depreciate their nominal exchange rates.8 ducer prices have been increased in many cases. zania.5 79.2 25.5 -14.0 88.2 -0.3 -2..0 27.7 Change in export prices and in terms of trade.5 23. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa also let their public finances deteriorate.8 72.1 -14.9 9.8 23.5 75. Liberia.9 -1.6 20.5 20.5 -3.3 75. Uganda.7 22.0 10. Malawi. -t prices Developing countries Food Nonfood Metalsandminerals Fuels Industrial countries Manufactures 6.1 67.2 10.2 5.4 75.1 24.4 22. 1970-81 (percentageof GDP) Country group 1970 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 All developing countries Consumption Investment Savings Low-income Asia Consumption Investment Savings Low-income Africa Consumption Investment Savings Middle-income oil importers Consumption Investment Savings Middle-income oil exporters Consumption Investment Savings 24 78.3 20. In countries such as Consumption. savings.4 -1.5 16.6 74. Madagascar.9 22. and Zaire experienced an appreciation of their real exchange rates.6 25. and Upper Voltaalthough the prices of a few agricultural commodities have been raised. In some other countries-Burundi.4 7. Nigeria.7 21.7 20.5 79.7 10.0 -7.2 76. a. Niger.5 -2.8 -1. Mali.9 72.7 75.4 -1. those for many others have fallen in real terms.6 5.0 17.4 27.5 13.9 .2 27.1 77. and Somalia. The same phenomenon affected pricing policies.9 25.1 11.0 -2.9 -5.9 25. Mauritius.6 21.2 -14.2 32.2 25.6 15.3 92. Tanzania. particularly in agriculture.5 24.6 Middle-income oil exporters 1.9 -0.6 6. because relatively high rates of domestic inflation were not fully offset by falls in their nominal exchange rates. Estimated.4 79.5 77.0 23.7 26.4 22..--p. and Togo. Madagascar. Even countries such as Kenya.9 70.6 -0.7 25. Ivory Coast.6 Cihangein tenns of trade Low-income Asia -0.5 29.8 91.0 -0.8 94.1 -9.7 22.9 -1.1 20.9 8. and investment indicators for developing countries.1 Developing countries 0.9 76.6 -1.1 26.5 -4.7 24.8 28.5 16.6 3. Although nominal proTABLE 2.7 7.7 25.1 Middle-income oil importers -0.5 91. ended up with a higher real effective rate or only a small devaluation.9 86.1 31.TABLE 2.5 76.5 9.1 23.1 -9.5 74.3 23.4 77.6 27.7 1.7 4.9 29.6 -12.2 -0.2 74.1 24.1 25.6 -16.4 Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.4 -8.0 -0.0 77.5 Low-income Africa -0.0 25.8 23.7 25.1 16.1 1.4 26.8 10.6 24.2 8.5 25.5 23. in real terms they were lower in 1982 than in 1980 in Kenya.9 79.4 76.6 3.8 27.6 4.6 15.3 26. 1965-83 (averageannual percentagechange) Countrygroup 1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982 1983 C!a t .

i dut gli Ni' 1 . IlDlrl ll tn.g ard he -u-r-a.an.. .- ak.I.ubituti.u1bi-rarial addiih. a.r-phatyt hlic.. l.i-. .nc -r.. 1 r-e p iTn rapidl t--.r. c.r -.eriged 4-.--ir nlh.4 .r.i-i .t t IId r In [-4 liE r-.r r 1.alri .Ih In ri n I .irllrlc2 hik 11t- it. .i.- -iernal '.d tKr 211 pII i r.t. lmpnrt ut. -rh m Ill .--am.ci.I..I a .nl i-a .. tC a'..-.ig.a ir.r --i. I nd car. irm. .p. ii.nibi-r ort:.-nt I L ptr:trn .re. 1974-81 u inhw ir 3. IFl....alit -a*.' 3i.. Intl lr-.Al lit1r 1t .I k 1 itin h.ni in-p.:ri 5parn itlied ill .cr up ihic. i%mrig-. It1 ii '1 1- re Ph' In r.n tti lard .g c:.I .-.inlcI-edSt ifl n .-l .itl c .c-i . ... Pnl.n a .. I lTh upL|.np It.c.n In r..... r. -Vmr-.ing.rhl in hi ... I'.en M * Pturer c.a arnd ZkthilL.-sr... -1-hck.-d --.hart lhir .n.I. Imii:d d:lnlta lt In..k. d *d1iu>inir.ic -n Ih *. S.-li.. 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Exports of manufactures. and Sierra Leone. Prices for industrial raw materials fell for the additional reason that high interest rates discouraged storage. Korea. having grown at 10. Turkey. In volume terms. incremental capital-output ratios-the amount of extra investment needed to produce an extra unit of output-rose.6 percent a year between 1973 and 1980. Brazil reduced monetary correction on financial assets in 1980.9). always relatively insensitive to income. they remained lower than in 1979. Among developing countries. Previous World Development Reports have suggested that outward-looking policies-those in which there is rough equality between the incentives for exporting and import-competing activi- . Between 1979 and 1983. Kenya from about 15 percent (early 1970s) to 9 percent (1981). Weak demand in the industrial countries during 1980-82 was the main cause of falling export prices for developing countries (see Table 2. raw material prices started to rise again. the extra public expenditure increased public sector deficits and exacerbated balance of payments and debt servicing problems. by contrast. Despite foreign capital inflows. Given the sluggish GDP growth in industrial countries. distortions in the domestic financial system made the problems of domestic adjustment to external pressures more difficult. Philippines. for example. Apart from low-income Africa. A common response in many middle-income countries (Brazil. In Ethiopia the savings rate declined from about 12 percent to 3 percent (1973-82). Nevertheless. After 1982. the prices of primary products in relation to those of manufactures reached a post-1945 low in 1982. Sudan from 10 percent (1970) to about 3 percent (1978). In many countries domestic savings collapsed in the 1970s. and inefficient use of resources in expanding the public sector. when it became clear that the predictions of their oil revenues had been too optimistic.9 percent a year between 1980 and 1983. developing countries did manage to increase their share of world markets for manufactures. As with the industrial countries.7). harsher external conditions in the 1970s exacerbated the consequences of various policy-induced distortions in many developing countries. Thus Turkey in 1977-79 maintained fixed nominal deposit rates in the face of accelerating inflation.4). however. the rise in oil prices considerably increased their incomes. While much of this borrowing went to finance investment. from less than 3 in Brazil in 1970-75 to nearly 4 in 1975-80. while food prices dropped because of bumper world harvests. and from 3. Guinea. their relatively slow GDP growth of the 1970s was compounded by general deflation in an attempt to reduce imports (see Box 2. the rates of return to both public and private investment were declining. Overall.and outward-looking trade policies. Effects of the recent recession In 1974-75 many developing countries were able to compensate for the deterioration of trading opportunities by exploiting the better opportunities for the migration of labor and for importing capital. Mali. Exports of food. For oil exporters. Inefficiency increased for a variety of reasons: shifts toward capital-intensive industry. But since the improvement was transitory. and Yugoslavia) to the 197374 rise in oil prices was to stimulate demand through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and then to finance the resulting current account deficits through commercial borrowing. as economic recovery began in industrial countries.Burundi. the rate of capital accumulation also fell considerably in sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana from about 15 percent (1970) to 3 percent (1981).5 in the Philippines. rose at only 6. Tanzania from 16 percent (1967) to 9 percent (1981). and as some supplies were limited by unfavorable weather. Nonetheless. the trends in savings and investment rates in most developing 26 countries did not worsen in the 1970s (see Table 2. and almost all developing countries faced worse terms of trade by 1983 than they had in 1980. low capacity utilization in various sectors. But the volume of their exports grew very slowly and the booming energy sector had a depressing effect on other parts of the economy.8). and Zimbabwe from about 20 percent in the early 1970s to about 10 percent in 1981. In some countries-India being a prominent example-they even improved. the developing countries' exports of raw materials and fuels fell absolutely during the recession. Among the major borrowers. one of the differences that weighed even more heavily in the recent recession than in the two preceding decades was between inward. Countries which saw an improvement in their terms of trade in the early 1970s also expanded their public spending. Malawi. most developing countries initially-and virtually all ultimately-found their external circumstances deteriorating in all significant respects.6 to 4. public expenditure has increased despite budgetary constraints. continued to grow (see Table 2. In 1983.

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4 2. income is estimated to have fallen every year since 1980 in low-income African countries (see Table 2.1 -3.1 7. combined with an improved institutional infrastructure. Where some protection is imposed.TABLE 2. they introduce other potential distortions and may lead to countervailing action by industrial countries.6 -21.0 150.1).5 5.0 0.3 19. 14.5 26. This is confirmed by a study of twenty-two oilimporting developing countries between 1979 and 1982.7 2. Because two-thirds of developing-country debt was denominated in dollars and much of it at variable interest. the recession in the industrial economies did not bring down interest rates substantially. ties-are preferable to inward-looking policies that emphasize import substitution. It greatly increased the costs of borrowing and of postponing domestic adjustment. than those which relied mainly on import restrictions. For low-income developing countries.5 7.1 13. because of a legacy of poor performance and policies.3 6. allowed them to maintain their economic growth.1 Note: Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.6 6. Estimated. Thus the impact of the recession on developing countries came in two distinct phases.5 2. The first-when adjustment was postponed by many developing countriesended in the middle of 1982.5 412.2 1.1 4.5 12.2 -2.6 74. But export subsidies can be costly to the budget.5 134.1 6.3 10.3 percent a year where it was weak.6 5.3 7. low-income countries in Asia (and especially China and India) embarked in the 1970s on reforms that introduced greater flexibility in their economic structure through greater integration into the world economy.9 -1.4 -1. Contrary to expectations. The middle-income developing countries of Asia had a much stronger recovery during 1983 than those of Latin America. The benefits of outward-looking policies are felt in terms of higher growth rates in the long run and in a greater ability to adjust to external shocks.9 165.0 6.6 0.0 -6.8 10.4 4.3 3.2 3.6 -0. In per capita terms. Moreover. Sub-Saharan Africa was much less successful in adjusting.9 1.9 4.3 5.7 -1. It found that countries with strong export growth had GDP growth of 3. those countries pursuing active trade policies (including elements of both export promotion and efficient import substitution) grew faster.6 -1.2 percent a year.8 percent a year.7 6. These policy reforms.1 36.0 37.9 17. compared with 2. China has been successfully promoting its manufactured exports.6 219.2 1.0 1. the second-a period . at 3.6 12.8 24.7 4. export and other subsidies can offset the resultant disincentive to export producers.1 5. while India has significantly increased its commercial borrowing since 1980-81. this equality needs to be achieved through the maintenance of appropriate exchange rates. the deterioration in their terms of trade was perhaps more serious than the effects of the debt problem itself. the rise in real rates meant a fundamental change in their finances.2 5.0 0.1 -2. The benefits of outward-looking policies may be gleaned from the different rates of recovery from the recession.9 6. However.5 5.1 16.9 1.9 18.6 -0.8 3.5 -17. They had generally lower ratios of public 28 debt to GDP and almost uniformly lower ratios of debt service to exports. and helped raise their domestic savings rates.8 percent a year where export growth was average and 1. 1965-83 Commodity and developing-country group Change in export volumes (average annual percentagechange) 1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982 1983 Value of exports (billions of current dollars) 1965 1981 Commodity Manufactures Food Nonfood Metals and minerals Fuels Developing-country group Low-income Asia Low-income Africa Middle-income oil importers Middle-income oil exporters All developing countries a. partly because the costs of adjustment in their dynamic economies were lower.0 8. They did not use borrowing to postpone adjustment to the same extent.1 5. To the extent possible.9 Exports from developing countries. In the same sample.3 7. and have had a generally superior performance since 1980.7 6.3 5.

1: m r - t I.J . m Ind . ri.rrA-d-N-. .runt i. rr-m Ir.. a t.--6third -art..A. rar-1.r-.i-n I.i irull' ir:- .?:ir.:3.ullthi ...-r.Ih .I' Im ranI ri~l h-ank j4.-u 11..ttI.'- ll''h. t..-.- rl.1 _-i i..i -cr. [I r.Ai4nilt 'h.t til.d-t-u n1 III ctr'aain. 1 ry i.V 1. --r- i- uru-i.-nir .liit i..J.IJ 1.hr I14 .:. p2.- u-ilL.ld tt-n-u. 11.i~A I-I indE% I -l aridt la I.k II. *P I (-Ii 'i . ii. u--i-u -M]u b 7F hrj i ll- -iren .r *--i.I..C rt.' % int. -iLthiii IeL .'rtna' . -I I.. DA -tim1 47 Ic-rr''riI-.~n-ilrE.rHii I1--IN p)CklIili.-.t . a derict .hp.: i rajrli Ill .F I.'..iiii -unitni. . urti.5 1I *nr ni I Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors iC-. r-It t A.(i. o J. -Ir. - l. I nu iili n-i..-r:hi.ll hit a-i i.tarai~jl.-i tI. -r II.-.u .. nic-r I-h.bi-ati.rpilI.-.u.t.n . '. h. rlir-... d-.-ii.i ~n.lb -it la.'* -i. tI h .-k '-n'iu p IP.h. i. tim iiJ J r.b -.n-ecut. I.4.ib..1r [ir IIr-LYICS r-~ inc Ir. d u-t -ir --.1 p ri rtlf l4 ..n *r. I r.pruCi .r.D I 'Cfl butd r-d-mi .<. r. bill-..-wlhe r. lbt.1i-ifl r Huti rid tiir.~~~~ti-.l it ur r.l. rn.I 14''Inrf I.. t.r?..uil -'c3PmtII r.uari.ja -2- i-. -. j%U a lL I-c itS li'Ni' 1C C !u.rplu i t i-11hibllp-an In 1-1~ f.r iirne .Ir.td Lj. III1 Ini t'ittl T pi .ra'd ctr. r.ir.11. irrr-r.irT- -a.I. Pi. ' I- S Iii lair- r-u P Ii:.li rbi r... ta rt irini.a r-C. I a- L\SCi-r l'- Aih rl...tli 1 rC n . Q t --L.3 biliflii U In L'.1 E L I II n I-.-- irr.. it-.t:.In P1-142 tr.T -dr.r.:..21-iIl-Iki- a TV.4 r-~ .If' it -tji. r'hL41i L T..i i-a-aM j. ch..i.'i.ur-.li. iN p.l..-r-CtLI w... I *ii~r 1 u. tri- reI ..li:fiI d-itu... r- i. -r Fr -iti.- a CIi 1. -r 1 -.-T I. tiC--' iii..n lo-nC r.C. . n..a -ur I.-'ni~t I A1* i~ Ii... I hI.rrl in'.taaIl .irdreo . II 'I -lu - .ci m-t. r h.t ? ii rimii T .it La)tin ic hr. Cr.uhr.ui .. O -rh irril.i i . Jl iru.. r..:..- uI . \mertn.r rh. It.rl. ri- iIn. --$14 1-Ilk.-r.-d n.11uputhi1 .) lIar 'r ek ."i- oozr.Ii hI t If IcIt.r-aIstur-1 .uin b. .~ Inu- W u.iCI nc L.r t I-..4r. . I.ul -P'-t. ih.fi-. a) -i' wi1 - h. h. P ' l.i -r -rti.I. itAr. c. r.>- au- .1-citU -rT.J-b' r~ '. w.i.1.Ct I.. tu4li \r.. .i 'II .. tr.i.id.n- ~ rltri. ' infr t ..: 1 na-er .. i F .lli tznltr j. vdiii..nflTii-rra ILLt5 -.. .I--4 LrAni rol In irro- 1.Ii h 'd~~i..iti. t a jlii 'iF nrm.uŽtat :L'f VI -It trii ro'i.-UnLfIr'...s-I F.r J . ' ree b.-r I-ui.'i I n1. ITOMi . . It prn.'.1 i 'nt ..rit In. .-.- 4 PNii ['liii Ill 1--' Ii front R'll. L Cin Ira tilt . -'.ll.. v ir I.iu.:a i rrir-1. a t...iz ...' r- to .tII-- i. ..-Irlifttri hm.fl -( *-ii2ii..l.IIV. an r.-1l'. lr.n i. c`iru.LtitLI r. aj r r-. ..:~~.i.it ir--. *r r'.. F. 2P .mL It..i.. ..i IIr IN.fl iiij -iLrLur-i*j IV.Box 2.-II ih hi -i.r 1 . r in I-U -ri n.hri C u-t-- iu.iEari.-iJ Ft.- .r C F Ir . 3 i. i-e0i. C.k l .rXtu. ii V j LiL U~i3 it.Ill r. ii IC .. ...:. id~-_t I. v.nin \r-l'riCifl.f rfC . .i iiij t- w..l -Jr.b I j r. i it r r. rJ ri-iri' hid t. a .Cii ni.in Ili- be .-I I.i LtitL C-ri C-nr 'i T F. .. -e.i4-:t d Iih. -le~-t .. .1 ii pI. rI l 11.r-.tp r- l . n -cc-AreI" -a It 3 lci ir. .1.p-a un~-r-inrr:r--dbi-- -'I.n--r Th VI. - ilhi..-puon-f .t XI h i.jr-rri Irn r i lwd F \rIcrrIt t a n.. ~~ii.n- Is I.yr Thi-:r r.'. t.-.*:rir.h tilhim -ii-. Inn aib. .rFia.trt -T it.

and changes in reserves.1 8.9 0.6 21.9 -48.2 3.8 5. although the denouement turned out to be similar.4 -26.5).7 -32. 30 .3 -70.1 -11.and long-term loans Current account (excludes official transfers) Financing Official transfers Medium.1 15.7 -12.3 .2 -16.9 11.9 -2.7 4.9 -21.5 -2. oilimporting developing countries as a group were forced to start curbing the volume of their imports.7 -69.0 -15.1 -21.0 -10.1 1.1 2.6 39.2 -107. Current account does not equal net exports plus net factor income due to omission of private transfers. however.9 -1. too.7 -2.2 -48.9 -26. The higher oil prices were not sustained.10). In 1983.0 -32.5 -14.9 22. for example.6 10.2 11.2 4.5 30.7 -0.0 -56. was $66 billion-more than half of their total current account deficit.3 -4.9 3.1 17.7 -81. in 1982 oil-importing developing countries did manage to borrow more than they were paying their creditors in capital and interest.4 -97.4 16.7 2.9 Notc: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.8 21.6 11. For oil exporters the experience in the early part of the recession was markedly different from that of oil-importing developing countries.1 -43. 1970-83 (billionis of current dollars) Countrygroupanditem 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983' Developing countries Net exports of goods and nonfactor services Net factor income Interest payments on medium.8 1.5 11.8 0.7 -10. In 1982.4 . In 1980 oil exporters ran current account surpluses and increased the volume of their imports.6 .8 2.1 -80. notwithstanding the capital flight occurring in some of them.9 -55.1 -0.5 -26.5 35.6 14.10 Current account balance and its financing.6 16.and long-term loans Official Private -9.5 .8 -57.6 -70.5 1.6 28.2 49. interest due from all developing countries. In 1981 they.6 -8.6 9.9 13.3 -21.and long-term loans Current account (excludes official transfers)' Financing Official transfers Medium.3 4.6 11.6 0.7 21.0 -41.6 -2.14.4 -32. a.and long-term loans Official Private Oii importers Net exports of goods and nonfactor services Net factor income Interest payments on medium.1 -25. Estimated.5 -46.6 -10. other capital.and long-term loans Official Private 0i2 exporters Net exports of goods and nonfactor services Net factor income Interest payments on medium. their combined current account deficits did grow-from $29 billion in 1978 to $70 billion in 1980 and $82 billion at their peak in 1981 (see Table 2.4 3. the flow was reversed.8 9. One reason for these increases was the rapid rise in interest payments. Nevertheless. at least with respect to commercial finance.8 -3.4 33. b.0 15.7 18.and long-term loans Current account (excludes official transfers) Financing Official transfers Medium.8 -10.8 11.0 -23.9 24.7 -65.3 -46.2 -12.16. slipped into deficit-of $26 billion followed by $32 TABLE 2.30.7 2.0 -9.3 -49.0 2.7 -69. however.3 9. Financing does not equal current account because of omission of direct foreign investment. The pressures of internationaldebt From the beginning of the 1980-83 recession.8 -31.16. and the volume of their oil exports fell. including that on short-term debt.of rapid and painful adjustment for some-has continued since then (see Box 2. Nevertheless.

the fall in net disbursements of external finance from a peak of $3. this was no doubt true.0 Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.9 108.3 to 24. In the context of a debt structure with short maturities and high nominal interest rates. a number of countries faced debt servicing difficulties. will be willing to service their debt out of income (rather than extra borrowing) and to the economic cost of debt service.9 12. and high rates of interest. Togo for five. A key question facing developing countries is the pace of the adjustment they need to make.7 0. In 1983 there were thirty-six reschedulings involving $67 billion of debt. For African countries.3 92. This has its direct counterpart in an internal adjustment that reduces real spending in relation to real output.9 2.2 71. 19. In effect.6 1.6 84.8 0.9 79.6 83.7 120. That cost depends on several factors: the ratio of debt to wealth (in the case of a country. If any single event can be isolated as the turning point in the attitude of the lenders. Subsequently.3 14. debt accumulation was on an explosive path.9 120. In almost all these respects.8 Official 33. the "debt crisis" had a different meaning.TABLE 2. It is possible to argue that the "debt crisis" was to some extent caused by imprudent decisions by both borrowers and lenders.6 19.9 347.3 150. and the cost of making transfers in foreign exchange.5 424.8 96. The ability of many countries to service their debt is weak.7 15.1 191. the ease with which the necessary adjustments to spending in relation to output can be made.9 15.3 billion in 1982 (see Table 2. Estimated.7 billion in 1982 has posed problems.3 21. Between 1979 and 1982 ratios of debt to GNP had risen from 19. the reduced willingness to refinance meant that these difficulties quickly spread to other borrowers. Though the overall indebtedness of low-income Africa is relatively low ($22. the strong dollar. although they were able to avoid rescheduling.11 Debt indicators for developing countries. which will be exacerbated by the reduction in the size of the seventh replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA).6 203. 31 .7 billion in 1982.8 Private 34.8 16.6 172. the real rate of interest. Nearly half of all reschedulings between 1975 and 1983 were by African countries. b.1 Ratio of interest service to GNP 0.8 0. and Liberia for four. of debt to exports from 84 to 109 percent.2 76.3 368. too.0 232.9 percent.8 19.4 20. creditors saw that the position of developing countries as a group was deteriorating.6 18.2 595.9 482.0 1. the immediate resolution of the problem also involved support by the central banks of the industrial countries and a degree of involuntary lending.4 16.7 Debt service ratiob 13.8 249.0 15. 1970-83 (percent) Indicators 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983' Ratio of debt to GNP 13. Adjustment in developing countries To restore their balance of payments.7 121.7 19. even for countries such as Korea and Indonesia. But the scale of the overall strains of indebtedness was the result of an unexpected mixture of circumstances-prolonged recession in industrial countries.5 83.7 76.8 136.8 208.6 billion of outstanding medium. In some cases.10).9 Total debt outstanding and disbursed (billions of dollars) 68. the present value of future national income).3 310. with Zaire alone accounting for six.7 2.1 13. Their creditworthiness. Most serious of all is the decline in official lending from $2.and long-term debt in 1983). as did the oil importers. a.9 billion in 1980 to $1. In both years the oil-exporting countries drew down reserves. Concern about creditworthiness is related both to the likelihood that debtors.6 1.1 Ratio of debt to exports 99. developing countries need to make some external adjustments to raise exports in relation to imports.0 190.5 61.4 79.11).4 1. Because of the number of lenders involved.4 141.4 63.3 24.1 10. and of debt service to exports from 15 to 20 percent (see Table 2. was being questioned.9 90.5 9.5 0.5 387.8 157.5 99. and this is reflected in the large number of debt reschedulings in low-income Africa. This unexpected mixture made debt servicing more difficult.1 26.6 billion in 1980 to $1.0 311.5 11.5 267. Ratio of interest payments plus amortization to exports. if necessary.2 538. it probably occurred in August 1982 when Mexico got into difficulties over its debt service obligations.0 168.

but others were to varying degrees facing balance of payments difficulties. it fell by 35 percent in Mexico in 1982. Ivory Coast. they were as large as 15 percent of GNP. Given the undeveloped state of domestic capital markets. Countries therefore need to switch output into exports and efficient import substitution. In a number of countries. in certain cases. In many cases imports have been cut to the point of consisting only of industrial raw materials and essential foodstuffs with little even for investment. In all these countries.4 to 21. was stagnant in Brazil. the required adjustments to this sharp decline in lending have taken two forms: an overt attempt to reduce the size of the public sector deficit and a de facto increase in taxation through a rise in the inflation tax. For oilimporting developing countries the current account deficit (excluding official transfers) fell from $82 billion in 1981 to $66 billion in 1982 and an estimated $46 billion in 1983 (see Table 2. and Yugoslavia. More than three-quarters was medium. Between 1980 and 1982 the volume of imports fell by about 50 percent in Argentina and 20 percent in Brazil.and long-term private loans to developing countries fell from $50 billion in 1981 to $34 billion in 1982. nearly half of which was concessional aid. Only a few countries have managed to expand exports enough to avoid serious domestic recession. For oil-exporting developing countries the deficit fell from $32 billion in 1982 to an estimated $10 billion in 1983. another 30 percent was due to official creditors. with most of the drop occurring in the second half of the year. Brazil. the combined deficit in 1983 was only a little larger than the interest due in that year. Even when the public sector was not the only borrower. experience shows that there are more and less efficient ways of achieving this result. deep cuts in spending are bound to reduce output. If they fail to make that switch. As a result. the acceleration in inflation that has occurred in a number of the principal debtor countries is not an accident. In the first quarter of 1983 net private lending was only $2. such deficits could be financed (even in the short term) only by inflation or by borrowing abroad. it often guaranteed foreign loans contracted by private borrowers. Indeed.3 percent. Since 1982 developing countries have substantially improved their trade balances. Adjustment has meant a sharp decline in per capita consumption. the current account of the balance of payments is 32 bound to improve.and longterm private lending shown in Table 2. Internally. the import restrictions employed in many indebted countries to curb imports threaten a long-term deterioration in the efficiency of trade regimes and a reduction in future growth.In many countries internal adjustments had to start with the public sector. the attempt to reduce spending in relation to output also creates a recession. Some 60 percent of the total was owed to commercial banks. But reductions in output itself provide no contribution to adjustment and represent pure waste. Given a large enough cut in real spending.10). Chile.6 billion. had sizable foreign debts.10 is almost entirely due to the rescheduling of existing shortterm debt. Their need to adjust was the most urgent of all developing countries. but by following effective adjustment policies. they succeeded in expanding both their real imports and exports during the 1980s. and rose by about 20 percent in Mexico. Indeed. Net disbursements of medium. Thus the increase in medium. per capita consumption had grown between 1970 and 1981. However. In 1982 the developing countries as a group had $715 billion of foreign debt. for example. public sector deficits had reached 10 percent of GNP by 1982. Borrowing abroad had helped finance internal public deficits. By contrast. most of this consisted of involuntary lending under the auspices of IMF rescheduling agreements. The strains increased enormously in 1982. the real value of exports declined in Argentina and Venezuela between 1981 and 1983. The same adverse effects on longterm growth will occur when it is public sector investment that is cut. Closing the deficits by increased taxation (whether overt or covert) has often led to a squeeze on the private sector with potentially adverse consequences for long-term investment and growth. It is one way for existing public sector deficits to be financed in the context of the decline in foreign lending. Korea and Turkey. More than half of total outstanding debt had been incurred by only ten countries. Adjustment involves a reduction of spending in relation to output. Furthermore. In many countries these declines have resulted largely from cutting imports in relation to output and from recession-induced reductions in demand for imports. In Brazil imports as a proportion of GDP fell from about 10 to 6 percent between 1980 and 1983 and in Chile from 30. During 1980-83 it fell by 2 to 10 percent a year in countries as diverse as Argentina. .and long-term. The extent of those liabilities can be gauged from a few figures.

education. along with devaluation. a decline in spending on education and health detracts from building human capital. bankruptcies. In the case of Brazil. the required external adjustments are more difficult and the corresponding internal adjustments more painful. Cuts in public spending have often been achieved by reducing or eliminating subsidiesnot only for parastatals but also for food. the United States. There is evidence that government spending on social programs has fallen by less than spending on production and infrastructure. In Brazil capacity utilization has fallen by about 13 percent since 1980. But much of social spending undoubtedly goes to maintain staff salaries. and investment (excluding petroleum) by 20 percent. In Argentina bankruptcies and judicial interventions increased from 52 in 1977 to nearly 300 in 1981. and health. and government takeovers have become common. a reduction in food subsidies. At another. 33 . In the Ivory Coast industrial value added fell by 3 percent in 1980 and 1981. The consequences of austerity are dramatic for the country concerned. and Japan individually than any one of the three is for the other two. so the materials and supplies necessary for maintaining health and educational standards may be falling much more. while less spending on infrastructure may damage a country's growth potential in the medium term.and long-term consequences can be far-reaching. This is a particularly serious problem in Latin America where a long history of import substitution and schemes for regional trade integration have led to significant intraregional trade. As for employment. These effects may indeed outlast the resolution of the current debt problems. in the Ivory Coast industrial employment has fallen by 10 percent since 1980. As a group. At one level. The short. Developing countries are also of great importance to one another. In Chile several hundred bankruptcies were reported in 1982. especially in manufactures. But they go further than that because cuts in imports affect the entire world economy.In many countries private investment suffered from weak domestic demand and high interest rates. Distress borrowing by private firms. the reductions in imports by the rest of Latin America (as well as by other developing countries) has seriously harmed its exports. Consequently. developing countries are larger markets for the European Community. the number of manufacturing jobs in greater Sao Paulo fell by 13 percent between mid-1980 and 1982. reduces real incomes.

slow growth and stubborn inflation. and their budgetary deficits and unemployment would remain high. This chapter begins by examining some scenarios for growth in the years up to 1995. Many developing countries face difficulties which are not dissimilar to those of the industrial countries. and developing countries would still have the potential to increase penetration of markets in industrial countries. The chapter then discusses the implications of the different scenarios for international debt. attention shifts to the prospects for sustaining the recovery. Designated the Low case and High case. This inflation rate is likely to be the average of widely divergent rates over successive cycles.5 percent. and so would discourage lending to many developing countries. The results have included falling returns on investment. nearly the same as between 1973 and 1979. Finally. in consequence. The Low case indicates what might happen if the industrial countries were to do nothing to improve their performance of the past ten years (see Table 3.5 percent . even in unfavorable world conditions. exploring the policies and conditions that would bring them about. They also do not consider or allow for any exogenous shocks to the world economy that could result from. The industrial countries have been slowed by the growing inflexibility of their economies. especially over trade liberalization and capital flows. basic scenarios. as Chapter 2 made clear. That task. these scenarios should not be viewed as predictions. The Low case is based on an average inflation rate in the industrial countries of 6 percent a year.5 percent because of the large budget deficits. especially policy-induced distortions in the economy and problems in controlling public spending and deficits. especially in labor markets. Looking further ahead. and by the upward pressures on public spending and the associated tendency toward higher taxation and periodic bouts of inflationary financing. along with the related policy issues for both the industrial and the developing countries.5 percent a year in 1985-95. a declining investable surplus. With real interest rates at 3. for example. threatening the exports of developing countries and their ability to service their debt. so development assistance would grow at 2. depends on overcoming certain deepseated problems that were revealed and exacerbated by two sharp rises in oil prices. by changing their own policies. the nominal interest rate would average 9. this chapter describes two 34 presumed depreciation of the dollar after 1985 of 13 percent.1). The ratio of official development assistance to GNP in the industrial countries is presumed to remain at its historical average. defensive policies of protection and subsidization. This is close to 7 percent in current dollars because of a considering both the choices facing industrial countries and the benefits that developing countries could reap. A ten-year perspective To illustrate the range of possibilities for the world economy in 1985-95. Protectionist sentiment would be strong. But protectionist actions would increase no more rapidly than in the past several years. Governments of industrial countries would find it hard to control inflation. it stresses the potential for international collaboration.3 Prospects for sustained growth With economic growth reviving. This rate too would probably fluctuate considerably over time. Competition for funds from the governments of industrial countries would keep real interest rates up. Their GDP growth would then average 2. and. governments are assessing the chances of raising long-term growth rates above their average in the 1970s. the outcomes depend on the policies adopted in developed and developing countries. in dollars at unchanged exchange rates. a severe disruption of energy supplies. In particular it looks at what has to be done to restore the growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s.

7 1.2 6.1 Average performance of industrial and developing economies.5 percent a year in the High case and 6 percent in the Low case. Per capita income in low-income Africa would decline.5 9.5 6. Investment confidence would rapidly improve.3 5.1 5.1 Note: Projected growth rates are based on a sample of ninety developing countries. the Low case means for some little or no growth.7 5.4 2. Inflation in the United States is 3. evidenced by the recent cut in the IDA replenishment (see Box 3.5 5.7 4.8 3.9 0. deflated by the rate of change in the US GDP deflator.5 4.1 2.9 2.5 percent a year.3 3.7 percent a year. 35 .8 5.5 below). with GDP growing at 4.9 5.8 9.3 5. Budget deficits. would lead to an expansion of the flows of capital to developing countries. Unemployment would then fall steadily.0 6.3 percent in current dollars). The High case. and to only 2.8 4.2 5.6 0.3 4. continue. among some middle-income oil importers. in dollars at present exchange rates (and 4. As unemployment eases.9 2.8 5. a. slow growth in the industrial countries would limit GDP growth in developing countries to an average of only 4.0 3. Inflation would average 3.3 percent a year in 1985-95 (see Table 3.TABLE 3. would gradually be reduced-first as a percentage of GDP. Average of three-month US dollar Eurocurrency rates for the periods 1960-73 and 1973-79. despite slower growth of their imports in relation to GDP.1 10. c.7 a year in per capita terms (see Table 3.1 5.1 4.9 3.3 2.2 3. giving nominal interest rates of only 6 percent. Given considerable differences among countries. 1960-95 (average annual percentage change) 1985-95 Country group Industrial economies GDP growth Inflation ratea Real interest rateb. a year in real terms.5 8. e.4 7. along with larger aid programs. In all their forms.9 1. offers industrial economies a path of sustained and steady expansion. But for the industrial countries as a whole.9 6.2 2.0 5. then in absolute terms.7 8.c Nominal lending ratec Developing economiesd GDP growth Low-income Asia Africa Middle-income oil importers Major exporters of manufactures Other Middle-income oil exporters Export growthe Manufacturese Primarye Import growthe 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 High case Low case 4.5 percent a year.8 1.7 7.2 4. Does not include South Africa.6 2.5 2.4 9.9 3. particularly in the United States. escape the full effects of slow growth in industrial countries. b. Average annual rate.2).5 6.2 2. The Low case and developing countries In the Low case. d. so developing countries would find it easier to expand their exports and to ease their debt servicing burden.3 4. by contrast. with bilateral aid increasing its share if present trends in the reduction of multilateral aid.3 14.5 6. capital flows to developing countries would therefore grow quite slowly.3 4.2 11.9 5. varying only modestly from year to year. it is higher in dollars because of an assumed depreciation of the dollar of 13 percent between 1985 and 1990. the real interest rate is projected to fall to 2.8 6.8 4. protectionist measures subside. This supposes that developing countries.7 4.3 6. which.4 5.7 3.1).6 1. Historical growth rates are for the periods 1965-73 and 1973-80. With lower domestic interest rates and smaller budget deficits.5 5.4 5.3 5. With deficits being brought under control.9 6. investment would increase.4 6.6 2.

9 7.8 4. while their adjustment continued.4 14.8 7.6 3.7 1.5 percent a year in per capita terms. Other less creditworthy countries. would grow less.0 percent in per capita terms. however.7 9.3 3.7 4.6 -0.4 1.9 2. per capita income of middle-income oil-importing countries as a group would grow at only 2.7 .0 -0. As oil prices rise.3 -1. Countries such as Korea and other major exporters of manufactures.9 6.3 8.7 -0.3 2.0 2.9 8.6 Major exporters of manufactures 10.0 per capita income would grow at only 1 percent a year. 36 6.1 7. Not available.9 -0.0 3. India at only 2.5 11.7 -0.7 2.3 Change in trade in developing countries.0 Asia 2.5 Low-income 3.6 12.0 2.4 5.6 7. Manufactured exports would expand at about 7.6 1. .8 4.0 3.3 9.6 4.1 3.1 8.1 4.9 2.9 2.5 3.7 1.1 Note: Projections are based on a sample of ninety countries.4 6.3 2. affected only by the slower growth of their world markets.7 percent a year during 1985-95 (see Table 3.1 7.4 0.3 -0.5 Middle-income Oil importers 8. With their populations growing at 2.6 -0.7 3.7 6. especially in the late 1980s.9 7.2 18.3 percent a year.6 4.8 3.3 percent or more a year in per capita terms.3 3.8 9.5 percent a year compared with 9.3 2.4 6. 2.4 2.9 8.5 3.0 4.9 9. 1960-95 (averageannual percentage change) 1985-95 Country group 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 Higig case Low case Increased protection Impnroved policies Alldevelopingcountries Low-income Asia Africa Middle-income Oil importers Majorexporters of manufactures Other Oil exporters Industrial countries 3.1 8.3 5.2 3. Middle-income oil exporters would have a GDP growth of 4.7 2.2 Other 4.5 7.5 3.5 7.2 Growth of GDP per capita.4 9.7 3.1 7.1 5.6 7.7 3.2 5.1 3.3 1.4 3.3 2.7 10.0 7. their GDY would grow much faster because of the continued improvement in their terms of trade.8 2.5 9.2 6.6 6.7 2.5 8. .6 4.3 -0.6 7.6 -0.0 3.6 percent a year.4 0.7 9.7 2.5 2.3 7.8 1.4 1.0 3.5 2.3 3.2 2. such as Brazil and Mexico.2 5.4 Africa 4. 1965-95 (average annual percentage change) Merchandise exports' Exports of manufactures 1985-95 Countrygroup 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 High case Low case 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 1985-95 High case Low case Alldevelopingcountries 6.2 4.3 3.6 15. The trade outlook would mirror growth for the different groups of developing countries.3 3.7 5. for a total growth of 5.0 2.1 7.3).6 per- cent a year over the ten years. even with some addi- TABLE 3. would get the capital they need to keep growing at 3.0 3.7 percent a year.4 2.7 -1. The reduction in growth rates of manufactured exports would be proportionately much smaller than that of industrial-country growth visa-vis the High case because.5 0.1 3.5 12.6 5.TABLE 3.6 6.2 8.7 3.4 5.5 18. in the early 1990s their growth would speed up.7 percent in the High case.3 7.1 Oil exporters 5.1 0.9 3. Exports by all developing countries would grow at 4.6 7.2 percent.0 -1. China and India would grow at 4.0 2.0 10.4 1.

6 2.9 6.9 2.3 1.3 percent a year. manufactured exports would still grow largely in line with the supply capacity of developing countries. however.6 6.6 8. so there is likely to be considerable dispersion around the average of 5.7 percent a year.6 3.6 7.5 7.3 5.1 3. As in the past.4 8. exports of primary products at 3.1 4.4 4. so they must continue to rely on concessional assistance for the bulk of their capital transfers.2 3.2 3.8 -0. and at 3. The major exporters of manufactures would do best.1 4. the prospects for developing countries would greatly improve. Their GDP would grow at about 5.1 4.5 6. Thailand.8 0. Under the High case. net loan disbursements (private and official) plus official transfers to the developing countries would fall in real terms. the poorest countries would grow at 3. Oil importers other than the major exporters of manufactures would grow at only 4. and credit would be available at lower interest rates.1 5. The High case and developing countries In the High case.2 5.1 4.4 4.4 2.5 7.2 9.1 4. They would receive somewhat higher real prices for a larger volume of exports.8 3. The volume of such exports is projected to increase only slightly. with GDP growth at 6.0 4. these countries' weak financial position means significant increases in commercial lending to them are unlikely. This is in part because the market outlook for these countries' commodity exports is not very good. would grow more slowly than growth in the industrial economies.2 3.5 percent in per capita terms.4 0.1).7 3. Exports of primary goods 1985-95 1965-73 1973-80 1980 85 High case Low case 1965-73 Merchandise imports" 1985-95 1973-80 1980-85 High case Low case Couittrygroup 5. per capita income would fail to rise. The more successful would see their development proceed as Korea's did in the 1960s and early 1970s. even in the High case.8 3.2 2. while developing countries would pay $58 billion in interest (see Table 3.0 3. and in Singapore with precision engineering. At the same time.5 percent a year.6 5. 37 .9 -1.0 1.3 2.1 1.5 4. given global GDP growth of about 5 percent.4).2 1. and oil exporters at 5.4 3.0 -1.6 0.7 4.4 percent a year.9 3.tional protection in industrial countries.7 percent growth for the middle-income group. World trade would grow at about 7 percent a year in real terms.2 percent to 5.6 5.9 3. They would begin to rely more on markets and less on government directives for the allocation of resources.4 7.3 3. Lowincome African countries would still do badly.3 percent a year.4 percent (see Table 3.3).0 2.1 2.5 4.3 3. Exports of manufactures from developing countries would grow at 9. with several Asian countries doing better.6 6.1 3.9 1.6 -0. In a world of freer trade. for example. And they would pursue more outward-oriented trade policies. Projections include exports and imports of nonfactor services.8 6.6 1. Such rapid growth would imply that they were moving into more technology-intensive products-as is already happening in Korea with heavy engineering. Some of the middle-income countries-such as Malaysia.8 4.3 percent a year. some countries could manage 8 percent or more.9 4.6 2. Under the Low case.8 2.9 7. and Turkey-could also make major structural progress in the years to 1995.3 4. Others would not.7 9. Mexico. almost as fast as it averaged in the 1960s (see Table 3.9 4.6 5.5 All developing countries Low-income Asia Africa Middle-income Oil importers Major exporters of manufactures Other Oil exporters a. exports of primary commodities.4 3.6 1.9 6. trade would grow faster in relation to GDP than it did in the 1960s.1 3.0 3. from $68 billion in 1983 to $63 billion in 1995.7 0.4 5.

starting from a very low base (see Table 3. the sacrifice of consumption 38 and investment needed to service loans on commercial terms is particularly painful. Net exports plus interest does not equal the current account balance due to omission of net workers' remittances.7 -0. private transfers.3 0.TABLE 3.7 4.9 85.bauehe paety tive difference as wetl. because the returns to these investments are high. loan disbursements plus official transfers to developing countries would rise from a peak of $83 billion in 1981 to $91 billion in 1995 (in constant 1980 dollars-see Table 3. . The contrast between the Low and the High case is not merely quantitative.7 99.5 -40.2 78. the returns to investment in poor countries can be very large indeed. aid can contribute significantly to development in the low-income countries and help to raise the global efficiency of investment.5 16. Meanwhile.2 67. It amounts to a qualitatiedfrnc aswl. Moreover.1 6.8 0.0 -36.0 914.1 3. The major exporters of manufactures.9 80.7 7.7 Low case 1995 -29.7 121. a rise in real terms of only 2.5 39. almost everybody in the world will enjoy some increase in real income. Ratios are calculated using current price data. 1983 and 1995 (billions of constant 1980 dollars) All developing countries High case 1995 -69. Some of them-such as the Philippines and Thailand-could do much better than others.1 26. Because the potential of the low-income countries will not be realized until these programs are in place. would become even more entrenched. however. and changes in reserves.6 22. Yet.1 Item Net exports of goods and nonfactor services Interest on medium.6 74. To do this.3 1.0 26.0 7. would see their manufactured exports grow at about 10 percent a year.7 Low-income Asia High case 1995 -17.8 -1.5 -52.0 -58.4 20.0 -55.5 -78.6 656. low-income Africa would have its manufactured exports grow at about 9 percent a year.0 -17.7 592. Concessional assistance is needed partly to finance the development of human capital and to strengthen institutions-programs for which economic returns are high but delayed.3). and investment income.9 21.5 8.2 17.Wt.4). with faster growth. other capital (including short-term credit and errors and omissions). Under the High case.3 12.0 35.2 47.3 49.1 2.5 1983' -8. The current account balance not financed by official transfers and loans is covered by direct foreign investment.2 17. millions of people in many developing countries will become progressively poorer.7 -9.9 -1.3 2.1 7.4 Current account balance and its financing in developing countries.0 -3. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.8 11. provided policies are reasonable. already accounting for 80 percent of the developing countries' exports of manufactures.8 89.9 -0.1 -2.0 5.5 9. Low-income countries would also obtain a growing inflow of capital in the High case. otnaino slow growth.1 -16. With a continuation of eve moeetece.6 8.4 -3. With low income levels. The question is how to win it.4 -0. under the Low case. the role of concessional aid in promoting development is vital. Other middle-income oil importers would expand their manufactured exports at about 9 percent a year. expanding into manufactured products.8 -48. The prize that the High case offers is considerable.3 13.7 -9.1 71.7 -12.1 14.and long-term debt Official Private Current account balanceb Net official transfers Medium.and long-term loansc Official Private Debt outstanding and disbursed As percentage of GNP As percentage of exports Debt service as percentage of exports 1983a -10.1 -109.4 -0. because the apparently insurmountable obstacles of the past ten years would steadily diminish if High-case growth were achieved-or. it would have to reduce its reliance on western European markets and to diversify its exports.5 percent a year from 1983-slower than the projected rate of growth of industrial countries.9 Note: The table is based on a sample of ninety developing countries.0 Low case 1995 -14.9 0.4 8.9 7.0 57.1 -2.7 -39.0 39. largely through the expansion of concessional loans from governments and international institutions. The GDP deflator for industrial countries was used to deflate all items.

2 -7. Given the fiscal pressures.9 -10.7 1983a 15.6 -26. but the pressures for more spending remain strong. Net disbursements.7 17.6 -3.2 22.5 224.8 177.6 28.0 145.4 224.2 234.4 2.8 35.2 242.0 3.6 -17.5 percent.5 5. Moreover.3 -15.6 20.7 8.3 7.5 -5.5 2.9 133.3 17.7 199. most industrial countries will need to maintain tight monetary policies. But since the oil exporters' surplus has disappeared and the United States is running a large budget deficit.8 3. To the extent that industrial-country recovery in the context of lower inflation leads to increased demand for money and greater investment.4 112.0 1983' -0. the real cost of borrowing is likely to remain high.1 6. On the contrary. While low by recent standards. in the United States it is about 4.4 20. In many.0 -0.4 29.5 Low case 1995 -1.9 -14.3 7.6 -5.0 -21.0 7.9 -14.3 -1.1 11.4 -0.5 4.8 3.3 3.0 10.9 9. If they could regain the productivity growth and high employment they managed in the 1950s and 1960s.8 2.5 6.6 a.9 2. especially in the light of past experience of the inflation cycle.0 1983a -12.3 50.3 -4.7 38.2 350.6 0.0 21.3 99.2 Low case 1995 -9.0 24.2 32.6 -22.3 -0.6 -2.1 -1.3 -1.7 -17.0 27.4 16.2 22.3 7.2 0. Deficits. Excludes official transfers.3 -3.4 1.1 20.Middle-income countries Lows-income Africa High case 1983' 1995 Major exporters of manufactures Low case 1995 High case 1995 -18.8 200.5 -19.3 293. budget deficits will tend to grow as the real interest burden is compounded 39 .9 26.0 245.0 2.6 19.7 2.9 -4.8 3.3 -5. and interest rates Economic recovery is likely to stimulate higher saving in industrial countries. It therefore seems probable that faster growth depends on tackling the problems that dogged the industrial countries in the 1970s.1 22.7 4.4 -2.8 -7. savings.7 -13. the political will to increase taxation is limited.9 -3.5 -40.4 3. global savings rates are unlikely to regain their level of the early 1970s.7 11.5 97.5 59. There is little sign that they would be prevented from doing so by some fundamental deterioration in the rate of technological progress. in the long run.5 -4.5 8.2 -3. the financing of public spending will probably become still more difficult in developed countries.4 Otheroil-importing countries High case 1995 -16. neither higher employment nor lower interest rates is likely to be brought about in any durable way merely by increasing nominal demand.0 Low case 1995 1. in some fields-telecommunications.1 3.8 4.1 41.3 1. c.7 30. the prospect is that both short-term and long-term real rates of interest will remain high in comparison with those of the 1970s.3 2.3 78.7 13.8 -0. Inflationary expectations have not disappeared. For that reason alone. at least not in the immediate future.1 30.5 -18.1 -17.0 -16. these are not rates that can be ignored.2 -1.9 Oil-exporting countries High case 1995 -9.7 -7. electronics.4 90.4 -4.9 14. In the major industrial countries. b.8 6.7 -22.0 4.1 3.7 19.0 -0.9 -8.1 16. Given the unfavorable context.0 -32. the High case would be achieved.6 22. Estimated.6 -0.0 2. biotechnology-the pace of technical change appears to be accelerating.2 -17.6 39. If they are to avoid a resurgence of inflation.6 142.3 -7.0 50.8 1.1 38.5 28.5 -25.1 -5.6 20.8 -22.8 -3.2 12.2 137.9 -19.1 11.2 -5. Policy requirements of the High case The difference between this basic Low case (variants of which are discussed below) and the High case hinges on the performance of the industrial countries.2 42. the "core" rate of inflation-measured by the rise in the GDP deflator-is running at between 1 percent a year in Japan and 9 percent a year in France.

itrnn Il.i rrl . ..I... ir-.iI .mn. such CC 1 lm iilr.-.over time. The cost of "saving" jobs is higher consumer prices and inefficiencies in production (see Box 3. r b I..-.r el--rt i-ls tii.ntflT Fri-u .j. -ri.I-t 0. -i-ie . il r-31i-l fi nl: t -r-..r I.. thrc--qu. .: -Lin'-. 1.rE und.lCgrowth. .ld tr e l r. a -t...' r ti ..1 d.-.n i-r. nel - -- i ver production foT export Mob . .rr.s SUi...icosts (i um .e. n .r..gh--s t.r I Ilit 1-.d h. ler r II d-rEpr.dnt r uir p.:krn.1'iIe -F.rd Z.:l-.nn -mr1n. -*irr. narlket I i. . r .111 I-r.I . i(i.nt incentives) to Ird :i..-i 1.-I i-I' t.lT-l.i T--.T tr r.'. r rh-r ..l*niai-l117.! mi I. itr TalliT r. i . r T-i.. I ne n developing councountries..3ob. i t.jfa.l-r. 15Th.--.-r ' pr-i-at h T nd n i 1. was about C$375$000.d ihe ... . in .:-i . ard .nu' rl".1-lri Ii.urlt ind P.ich t'rr3rrni. i. 1-d Ir.- .i i. : it. . rt. t I..n i4olhilai.. ill 111 . Itb... ain'i ri .. Tin .. ti-I.n..rIhs i A-iptircari iSTIT fl. -. r ani'41ls ptr not ' thf i'nT. '-tI' I St-Ti-. -i n I' lirge . culture.I.i r. r rh.cib.i L ..1r :-ni - .h r . Box 3.: :. The maintenance of an open trading system is. t..r. 1-.. $1 for every 7 cents gained by workers h-rr 1 rrn.cr r.lIIi Ilii- t p. more uniform and of economic - r-ltind.il iC.l ll zihd ! : h Ih . wage and other policies affecting labor costs-industrial countries need to introduce greater flexibility in the way they accept and promote economic change. r.. Irridol'iJL t.4 r..-. - But j.nO--fC iI' .: studies estimated the on the clothing i 1..n ail -i-p . would be wasted. irhnrr and u h - h-.rr.. ci --. which were much higher than it.I -lr-' Th. m ni.r.i n -'.*. r.urilrie-' i-*Td tr Olti as e k. ir. ri'i J r'rr: *. ir-mm fT of tariffs alone. ( r.-rA Sit d' 7...n. r p r ni. and trade..-. . 5l:andi -.-C t nrl e.r-enrtr .. . m . n--it. a cci.d ih. .rr.. . these protection.C$390. with foreign exchange controls and m ati I.r II). zr.ri _ I.:r :r...Iie 1 . . For every t. rli-c ut uS i-anti: I'. .0 Ihi.oilii. FT I- irir over agriand other measures b.aricr-j . r *d1. n hr h. r - . Ir-nCrIr. I snI..rr.e ba hr.1).. i p1. rind ii .fl. c.nr.ar t. tt-reih. ..r l' Th. ..000 in the late 1970s.n. i t (i. i T11) M -I. . .u .. it F*:- *r' tn .il lii i i-i'l_ n.-wr. lIt - TIl.. hri i. .Thr Develnpinz countries also use various .i m i .dir n pr .i patterns of incentives have per- I-p-ri-c n lb.. i..r.:1 Ba. protection is costly to the country using it.rni. t1U hii .:. therefore.: .. 40 .i J r.-l 'hitE .-1n ie ri' I ii .r . .irni 14 'r...c .:..-I. .ii.. t rT.t1.. ir.C 4 'liii icr rh-i._ I t Il. u -1r hib.1-.ratio of over 70 tol. hr iU her' s.rl-...rh..cil in *v.. K..et rmni.ii .Lird in . -ur.n. rt.r -.. ni..iih. iiI _. i.rtri. *n ir.iinal irLt - trade.i: .- I! r I- i..!. -ntur. sIt r.. L -nted tT-i rr lt .n-.rd . tid no ni r nT. -r. The cost per job Irrp It-I nit r!i !..1i-rt t'cr.. ib tsslt. tl-.nrr t p.-ti i.s 11'.r.Th ii I'll.i t t-h.. u-r .Tb.-'raitl -i rhir. r >. . tI . i ... .-. r-r.. r iri '* luI.. . r.-. Ir...t. * 14 1i0) (before welfare benefits).. -r. .-b ri-rr I hrh TI fra 31': t'r. 14 I-.. p. i-n .1l. particularly if other countries increase protection as a response. TbIr ir T. broader measures such as industrial ii..j r-. Ii'iit' h:a .br. Ii -n .-T t-. tr.ppirI I. 1t*Ttn.. r -..r -irrpl. ad1.... . i high -. i.fi : 1 0 arIIIn? i. . i d t.. .Ir .iil. - -\ranecnrn.._--ol i-c I..o.tr h t-nr-lh i.irmirT .rnlintli controls was estir. ...Studiesof T l -.- ITI lit i..il. tiI. C I-.p- fl. I lT and r.':.i i-. . T ir l..... rint r lii½.jt% Costs of protection in textiles and clothing dtir . r Ii-In rhi I-r. -. : r. rir.-T-l-Tnu fh_ nr-r.-..1 1.. 2k- - ilh t rrn.-i duction...hi-. as well as loss of potential jobs in export industries.r. would be better off.-cr1I ..3 Thi" -i:ac n eeded each wo rker to save p r . lr I ti)..ihi tl-r*if F.:restrictions(along l.r: I' n ar. t.r.ar. 1 % e. tli: Ic r dclt!.'. tE . .t. i 1. ni.i -- 1. For example.mc. 1 . rk-n -r .iro rd .in. I.I.in 1. pi:*. one Canadian dollar *hb: rIb-i k.'lu.c and Canada. The main focus of industrial countries in the years ahead should be on developing ways to reduce budget deficits.- .uf UIli rt tr.. ' Il e..Frnl... &i-t ind .r ..-.vd I h..i--'di-rci one and a half cents by which the worker I ir * I.nr I...ran. lfriv . ila:.-uCI I hr. .. m'-r. rnn n r.Tit . h. the L Ilr-.' tic-J r in ir:rms -.-.Trr. Ia-..T p.c *. ir r iTr.. 'i. r i F in rh th ri. .h.ia.Trl.' h Th- Au'. such as in lrmld 1--I . It. which alone can ensure growing real incomes of all groups in the economy. I-a1 :_ .i Ir. r t-r -r. riduTr. un. lord r IlIh LI. .. di§- Because the individual worker lost only d *:rk-r.-.. lol Iitl-u i li. .42'i . T.. ut'. r . r-Ik.i bIll.t.- o-rd t bin aj mubh pr.n.r.i d-T-.1.n.d.5i-ifl-. n ir . t .. dr -i. L -tII !II b Iiirci zr-ni n v.c -. I. an important means of reducing microeconomic distortions.*. p! - n ina I ri t- ii ri t -4.h -l'' m r ! .lr . -r-i production for lili andernd lrhin .....-T l-ir ri . . '. . n rt- r-... I ir.n..i Tr. T.iii. .- n a r.4 *-. 5 rl.-ril -. they also prevent the adjustment to a country's emerging and changing comparative advantage.pro- i. Microeconomic flexibility In several areas of their economies-subsidies to obsolescent firms and industries. I at. li InJ d l Ihhil L-i t. Though protectionist policies might temporarily maintain the real incomes of certain groups. I..O. nr . erL untnipi.

1 percent a year in the Low case to 4.7 4. -0.2 2. Even major exporters of manufactures manage GDP growth of only 4. low-income Asian countries grow at 4. TABLE 3.0 percent a year under Low I compared with 4.3 policy 5. low-income Africa at Countnjgroup case protectionism 4.3 percent in Low I. All regions are affected: exports by the major exporters of manufactures grow at only 5. Low II. by increasing and diversifying their exports. Major exporters of manufactures would manage 5.5 4. manufactures grow by 6. only 2.7 in per capita terms. last but not least.1 percent a year (see Table 3.7 percent in the Low case. while growth of GDP in the other middle-income oil importers falls to 3. by other middle-income countries at 2.1 percent compared with 7.An open trading system is also a way of capturing the potential for increased integration between developed and developing countries. 4. Developing-country exports of primary commodities would grow at 2.2 percent a year. b. they will thwart the newcomers' progress. Low scenario and variants. This is illustrated in Low lI-a second variant of the Low case which assumes slow growth in the industrial world but an improved performance by the developing countries.6). it is a sine qua non of a resolution of the debt problem. By seeking to retain a monopoly of such industries.2 percent in the High case. the next stage in their progress will carry them into industries that have hitherto been the preserve of the industrial countries.6 in per capita terms. from 5. To illustrate these implications. As Table 3.0 percent a year (Table 3. the Low case contains a variant (Low I) which assumes that governments in industrial countries step up protection against imports from developing countries (see Table 3. And.5 Growth of GDP in developing countries. 1985-95 (average annualpercentagerhange) Increased industrialLoa' country Improved developingcountryl recovering half of the difference between the Low and High cases.6 4.4 percent in the High case.0 percent as against 3.6). so developing countries can partly offset the effects of slow growth in the industrial world by improving their own policies.2). Unless the industrial countries keep their markets open.5 percent.3 percent under the High case.6 2. but 4.4 percent a year.2 percent a year.0 .6 3. Overall. In other respects. but exports of manufactures would grow at 8.5 percent a year. 2. the improved policies of Low II would allow GDP to grow in developing countries at an average rate of 5.1 percent a year compared with 6.0 5. export earnings would rise at more than 13. Low-income Africa grows at 2.4 percent a year.5).8 4.0 per4-1 3. Low 1. As a result.9 percent a year as against 5. and primary commodities.5 shows. They would achieve faster GDP growth by raising savings and investment rates. Under these circumstances. and by low-income Africa at a disastrously low 2. That would give the developing countries overall export growth of 5. the industrial countries' policies and performance are assumed to be unchanged. and by using imports more efficiently as well (see Box 3. Low-income Asian countries would grow at 4. adding inflation. since a further decline in their exports would slow their overall growth even more. For the more advanced developing economies.6 percent a year.1 49 3.2 percent as in the Low case. It is also in this context that the adverse effects on the developing countries would be most serious.7 3.7 percent in the Low case.0 Developing countries Lowincome Africa Middle-income oil importers Major exporters Other Middle-income oil exporters a. The threat of increased protectionism Slow growth in the industrial countries is the most likely trigger for a significant increase in protection directed against developing countries.3 percent a year. the developing countries reduce the growth in their imports. developing-country exports grow by 4.8 4.1 percent a year.7 percent a year. and other middle-income oil importers 4 percent. The benefits of improved policies in developing countries just as industrial countries might make matters worse (even within the Low scenario) by resorting to protection. the industrial countries will also be holding back their own economic growth.

3 2.6 7.0 1. Low scenario and variants. Increased protection by developed countries. Almost as important as trade in the long term.v case Low I 5. It is through borrowing from abroad that developing countries are able to supplement their own saving as well as to offset shortages of foreign exchange.1 4.8 6.6 6.3).4 2.4 3.6 Growth of trade in developing countries. are the interrelated issues of capital flows and debt. and to promote efficient import substitution.2 Low II' 5. cent a year. This would supplement the extra saving that improved policies would bring. 1985-95 (average annual percentagechange) Exports ofgoods and nonfactor services Countrygroup All developing countries Low-income Asia Africa Middle-income Oil importers Major exporters of manufactures Other Oil exporters Low case Low P Low Il 4. Under the Low case and its variants. interest rates would be higher and the growth of exports and GDP lower than in the High case. They therefore need to avoid overvalued exchange rates.1 7.6 3. The long-term prospect of receiving capital inflows that are not large enough to cover interest payments.4 4.2 3. financed either through external borrowing or through windfall gains from higher commodity prices. Many of the big debtors would experience growth of export earnings above that average-major exporters of manufactures would have the value of their exports grow at close to 15 percent a year-comfortably above the interest rate on their debt of above 10 percent. and hence for capital flows. it is politically difficult to cut public spending.5 7.6 7.6 1.1 8.1 8.3 3.6 6. Such policies would be twice blessed.7 lInports of goods and nonfactor services Low. to provide attractive incentives for exports.1 7. a.TABLE 3.1 2.2 2. implies that the service of debt is economically.2 7.1 4.4 5.3 4. It is also imperative that developing countries increase the flexibility of their budgets-another close parallel with the industrial countries.4 2. and inflation results. Borrowing is an opportunity.7 2.5 4.6 1. b. Faster growth of exports and GDP would also generate a larger inflow of foreign capital. Slow growth in developed countries but improved policies in developing countries. 42 Capital flows and debt The discussion thus far has considered the effects of the performance of industrial countries and of developing-country policies on trade and the growth of GDP.9 1. however. If lenders wish to avoid debt expanding beyond the servicing capacity of the borrower's economies.5 7.1 1.2 5.1 5.4 2.2 2.6 7.3 1.1 5.1 1.9 2.2 1.1 Note: These projections are based on a sample of ninety countries. the service of debt is a matter of political will.7 Exports of manufactures Low case LozniP Low II' 7.0 4. and therefore politically.9 2.8 8.9 1. net lending would then be lower while the real cost of borrowing would be higher. all of which would then be invested more efficiently.9 2.2 6.2 5. For this reason the long-term prospects for the world economy.1 3.6 7.7 5.4 4.7 6. and far more critical in the short to medium term. The key to more saving and better investment lies in maintaining positive real interest rates in the developing countries.8 3.6 1.1 4.6 5. but in certain circumstances it is also a snare.7 2.1 Exports of primarygoods Low case Low P Low II' 2.8 6.5 5.4 3.6 5.2 5.9 2. When these sources of finance diminish or dry up. Many of the difficulties faced by middle-income countries in the past decade have been due to heightened public spending commitments. For the indebted sovereign borrower.2 1.0 6.8 2.0 7. What is needed to achieve these improvements? The developing countries-and the industrial world-will suffer from any action that reduces trade (see Box 3.4 4.3 2. combined with slow growth of export earnings (as is threatened by the Low case).1 4.5 6.1 3.2 5.8 2.6 6. and strength of will depends on the cost of exercising it.9 1.8 2.1 6. costly.1 2.7 5.1 8.5 4.9 4.6 5.3 3.2 3.1 6. depend heavily on creating .0 6.

cc-unt lr. mentri' inrouch ii4 ifett n.:.itt ac*r-unt i.n.h \rzntn I -1rcv..4). -l 1 ip.I c c.hr lh.lilie pn Thb. EWprt srt-chure oi ewleced developing countries Iperenht nprir i rene-i-ad prc-iducri' *:-uiti-ps *:port rd .. |h . irt -ri n 1lc-tiat. p rt un i iiin the In-. a mcan l. r Jr-i th . tai. rgu in InI .d .h.. nrtir. c-nrc on the d.l.i-I-png unri --i p:r:.. nrh -:Enrtir mn the. in rirF -. In the short term.r . .H ut .v t ii r-..i.this . tF ' : n..-rie But i ira: critprciectep itt r.u e epirt . char... r.. d-1 . I . Ie' i ball krei ltil Jan.d it .. .r-..p-e Ltiunir4es and are sutilirtites i-i' .pi.i-unrrie c-t re il1CiC in ll: and maintaining cooperation on debt problems. hrt the .t:ur-. -il nl-pIng cu. ircteae-dt.-cc-Lir..I p-ri muntrie* t di elp-inc .-cntr.rd in iiduih.. Given the effects of the recession and the growth of debt.iatin a-. ih and le. ..m-npL-ris i-c th-a.. the position is somewhat different.i k-l .ni n-u .imir p iil t. An adverse world environment.per:e.n ~l-.-prtinc prInc \ar 11 tuth. tri.nd lc-n g-ricon.r o.rirsr the .rci-n trade a. .idu-Jd .dn tiens lcing a. .. d-.intmu c:l-nge.n- tri4 alro. .pina .untrt in Irnraiin in-:.arnd i peri-ence heat.. I--pin.- * paite pi. . amc.d-.s . th I manutct. c-unirneth.irn e pnrt. ir pr. rp-rri -n Ji E-eli.h-d 4n..r h .-..inglt primat | i-n his n.t I.tait .in a dae-:I-pirg-cc:unirx :iiiirnir . ut Thir.t rmanutacturt. in the dt.m zii. Switching usually requires a real depreciation in the exchange rate (see Box 3.ngle pnrr..tril ci-iintrie. i. can r! . r-.c * imprrintr epxprtt .hrt Au'rrtiit. But dt -eliping ..InD-untrnit I-n-: 1I-l's and r I.-.:s chani-. ILcgad hEhind m rt r-h.nd n--. oiid 'r1 ntrt Inal r1ar.p-nt chrtti mee per-ent .ht. While adjustment requires action by the indebted country itself.td -:r.--.'.iitih F. me-`:hincalI. me in de elIc-ped .3rial -2--uniri-:. !l e. r.d i. -iiect-p c-iinlre mnrkte r.tiida-. tena. thB dri.l tluti de. i. ia-t -. inile . -c--i -Heir-re iic.ih. ac:cmunt i.:e Th. 1i.ale .ili * pit-' ind inci-.ir manita.r 4.rinii:.r In the tree.Ln.- .r-arkt I..d- rnl tir eai:h I per-:--nt -:hange.:it r i.t li-m ).:l oi Pr..ip Thi maneiactut-:d \po. riTt rlb p-i hy. thI: Uniii..1 --. in ihe dnand ir t hi.ii- It.g a *-t -e r. substantial adjustments have been required to cover interest obligations.i.de-.anco..h3a han nc lathlfltt thee Nanitactiur-d pi:rts ir. U In rhe n.a i..i-.. hi p.d .1 : -.-te--pad cip t mn th..inlr.:c -mn-.ire nc- manulataure-.cantfi:. -. rather than confrontation.uch *-u tLntrie including India .iri-sthat traditicinalle specialized in a ..-... The process is less costly if it does 43 .eliiir. i i.(reice.r.l nontuel gi r in e. in ih tani -r pFpartintci-nsunipthai lie--ihar.Frnti In 1i . p iit d .Box 3.i -i da.n.arv e -port are gainin.-id 4l. r a lar r..i th.i r tr.in .rt4I iet Ch3pter 5ih -*-ur. inc .uit thrd ti deeliping-c-iuntr pipulalie-n it -ldding Ch.m primr. acJien.:. mLmirt rtiar. thir. -pr. r :9.pI i. dJ.-.lingEr matlar.ni* L-e--:en ic.-i:it1.--r ei-'mier-i -. prtcen rI Zn ine fl ] pi-tsr due ru.n :r.r-dcping cnun tilutured i9r c.-i hi.: grAup- linke-il I prtin t. t dirninated bi. I . the degree of retrenchment and its cost to the country also depend on the external environment in the next few years.and at -inc--me Jle--ped c.V. **o ti .ar-i rnnuil3tures hah.h3rt .in th. ctisu . e nene .:pindonica .. The best way to have adjusted would have been to combine cuts in spending with policies to switch production into exports and into efficient import substitution. d.:r iti.mmli r p *-pitted ninctr-rith-.unr % .nit ad-: -..-c-lintrlie. iem.hich ...rncn. e p.: I.nited iat-. Japenid .e !I . I Fpercent d-.i ni-me in de.\Ith.mini. n.i.nai has managed tc. iuntri.. however.i.than in |ji I lior d .tniaintd a mnall and reline ':le -nin. 4 .rate JIJr 1bm1.I. Crij'J -r. i r h-ur decades pr-cedintg * rId I r'c. h Atri-is he .-en' Ie-ilt- bu th. I in the. - .niei.. bhar te-retci. rr.e-l. iuri:e all'atic-n and l i...n de..2 Trade as an engine of growth bh' . ir in de: lI. tr.en am-rnr_ te%p-. tut had 3lrn.snt .:-.il. | r.trVi.\ .:untrtas intreas. .c. d 3r \: rItra.de de. debtors have to show that they are prepared to pay interest out of their own income. -c .ad'. ill.in relai iinrnil demiand nr Ir tartjrit T*r nl iunit -je.t ini -t.. in abcoutli .hr athcul .ti inr indu.iclt rhi nrie.rh it.-piny-c-untr ! e p rr ittI inctr-ased bh -nl-.-r inm die 1pin..i.malrl .r in iht ir. act-: tint rtt ahc-tit r..pinperti-. This is necessary not only to anchor the value of debt in the willingness to service it but also-in the context of high real interest rates and of low growth in indebted countries-to avoid explosive growth of capitalized interest in relation to GDP. anengim .Cin. . p 1 id : .epn-. -untite. pr-i-ucts di-es r.inn nt.. makes more costly the adjustments required of many bor- rowers. te.n Fng. e:.net-. blc. Because of the large current account deficits of many developing countries in the early 1980s... ii In rtlattcin t1. iuctuatI. turtd r ki-rt.1-an-ii thr medium.Iar .it: :u'. ad.-.iu.. Pe tt V-e. u I.

t r r.3 Ha. 'n.-r iht.r i. 0-..Jnre C.. r iti. if domestic and international prices are reasonably closely aligned-and if it is easy to expand exports rather than necessary to compress imports.. Unfortunately.ind.iarh n-. Irt. e.5 rhr- Je.1.ne .Zc nc. nl. h id r.r-r d3iticulit.t t .) exports as a percentage of total GNP would n.:.g -thr. tit Ir-in .t i-.:.r. in 1960 the rt.rEar. -..r .rtinub. thiar $15 rq gInr *:n.: he dlinin.u .aI -t i .-.:. t pcrindt.. aE t-. the 1980s.i nt. n-r. Tb. often by import controls that reduced the incentive to sell abroad.r. a - *uari'tr e indi. ii it ur rr. -i mrr.. airc nt e . -.i.r..c.t. many of the principal debtor countries got into difficulties just because these conditions did not exist: their exchange rates had become seriously overvalued.h t. the 1... Equally important.trial an "-cgir.J the :pr.n. export industries were relatively underdeveloped and.. '.-n. rr h-:uli. cr_.:it. r..ri. r...-r. .- Jtebr pr'tleni.. there were important '. 3 -cur . urdr fkrcrni . . a. h t u . rrI l. ri . ar. t:. inc. -. orld C.cs ill 1A ri-run ..rin. pci pni. .enr h:t'. Partly because of the difficulty of expanding exports and partly because of this domestic policy bias against exports.. nne' ..irl. their producers were heavily protected. i Irdcl-I a .imp-t !r.r.d n.t .rd.Or 3ri mi I *:...-Xit..nra rn. which makes it more difficult for them to exploit the opportunities for exports that do exist. and the share of the labor force in agriculture was 66 percent in Korea and 74 percent in India. e. icnt..n-rl .cn. 1..:nr .:..-nr-t bt .' im.i-r.:e C p i1-r.n. More inward-looking -Mcr.it-'nal . ih huch they m. in addition. cit i- unai .I.r.n.ll.Jr. .i t1. increase or .hir..tm.i r. .- ih. Korea were larger.:..h.* : ..' t- It. -ri.-ura. t n -lr.Ix .till cii bt tIhe r% . o' th but al .n ir..r'm Nevertheless. J r nerd ir.: -... e ._t.*I-mhe r h.p-prndn. ..nr i . . labor-intensive manufacturing is a major means for providing employment.rnllarTi..'rre thin .W-I.rahle in p..r..:. nom..ur. k.. -i*ul. the transfer of resources abroad needed to improve their current accounts should in theory be accomplished reasonably smoothly.r. 1rW. '.r.: ni .i: .uflhnt..1r : ut:U.re Jill.-. r . Oclot.m a .a rJ-..in n. .hr 'n-. ni. . is equivalent to only 5 percent of world exports. so its ..r..1-I-' stronger argument s..pn^ IUlIfTr Initgr3tu:..rDl. nd nv-rd n. Because the major debtors account for only a small fraction of world trade.r.:. hich AF.rmrn1 re.r i...rh -'r..ra3-.rd e-. in -:r.n F rii.i. in.-.--ur-: Thi - t'eiaj r tii-an und.iar.. -n.. India is a much bigger country with a I. ..nlFrkni poi.-lt rd e. .... The latter is likely not even to produce the needed exter- .i b . inic the world economs trr.. -.-JUtt rm.-1uenc:.. tht-'.n.- an ('it ....t-... curi. Fr 1 r .l-lr rhe pr.r. .For countries with pressure of p. with adverse implications for growth. foreign capital ti mr.E ^t. Some of the exports of debtor countries.pt rpid to be as high as k r.r:... in:..Box 3.ht ir it 1ih l.h 'I n..rrui t---. r. 3rd. trria.:...:.c t ht . .ri. 'rd To I.-eniutiu..bi.urinc rhr -t.n Dap-iral .tl.n-.ntp l u:n -A a'. tr. India and Korea were different in several respects: Korea's literacy rate in 1960 was more than twice that of India.b-It' ri. al. :. rr Y.much less than it could have.jtr h . .r ik3 .n r-.. uil.r I.n.-r Irte. n he Il-1- cc*od.ir hich claims that demand countries provides from ..i -. n . c. :ht well be in ah. i sit.riar. r.rg-r domestic market.ci it *.L 1t tr n.:nr. r3n.Ini F. not occur too swiftly.. un-u. A shift of $100 billion in develop44 ing-country trade balances. the amount required to meet debt service payments. . The relatively poor performance of Ird.r n. of to course.: r zr.] ro-C 0. th. .ul3t . *. th.d ': h3ng.1t. 'nr.li z-trr.it manufactured -F'-rz meant that employment outside . ..-p"-r.d r E. i. share of manufacturing in GDP was 14 percent in both countries.ddI.-. :1'!.ns n.7. -..ieur . rl .ra-rd. and. ii. I-.dc...u . t..-p.t-: . F.' . The nmre rh..l .:.In.I ri n l-'u i-...rr .n' 1l -.d- lion to only $4. imports have been cut dramatically instead.- -in I. in . 'rid AII countries have to trade to some extent.rt -ni. n. r*et... faced growing restraints in foreign markets.t t :.i:r an Delinking from the world economy? :pen riding and pajrrncnt4 mor.. 'r.-up:inz It..n-. d& nrilc..l.ndu. I nd i I-. n. th-a i' r it-.t.ii t .rti p..n Anrrir. .ni. ousiy tr.r Ailth i-i.h..rt .1 billion. nrit ...-.h en :r--* .uiCt.: i...-ri.t.. there is a difference between reducing imports by reducing domestic spending-painful though that is-and reducing imports by imposing direct restrictions on imports. ai.pr..:r iaril. -.-. -..n e ntrr.. face actual or potential restrictions in foreign markets.n ID1 !-r.rpuail.. i..nmilleam growth" for the developing . -1-- Ir-n-.:. 8 at ...cr'AIu. ha.bir. Moreover... .rr.t nil.r. Both countries had followed an inwardlooking development strategy in the -'. rhan r-11 p-r.an rh..--m: .-eimnil tiinir.t.-.. however..d. u. pn.: n..u.I land and a rapidly growrn ing labor force. n.h example..r.-Tatin.n. putl. in i'-'^ the *ame per.. .p h- of erbatcd tr in:-pprr..:r. rn-utru.ntr .. rr.tcuir -Fa. In-.-' .th.n-. rr.r rtrl. r' .rci . lessbuffetedbyexternal "utward-looking :. : rid e-.:t itt. the domestic system of incentives is biased against exports in many of the developing countries.ir. if a large proportion of domestic output is easily tradable-that is. i.rc.I'jt' .n.tr:nor.

...---alt e-chanec Ithr-..r-tttd --a tallht . n'nmic rapid arIer arl1 cOu"i1' 1 c-. It n Nlar.n rmlecduring lLCri-a rC-tl di amIaXbl n nlI-l ir an 1%ii V rt -pclr 45 . rern e change brcught ecohIall Rapid increart.aid hl I-" r.. ct tradt perc. t" 14 per2 pr I Iumrrd r.t the iug-la ot ednim. 1 .-ud. ri.al cUhangrge rate alth'gh therE nc.. hlirn. rlttc'liic c-cciir -h-n gi:trnnieni' i-Hot-. dollar.i.r 1"" ani ini-t..iC 1-A lIar and tml ru I ..recLiin.r in ljanar.c milau ..ri-i i hli.a-idl-tIa rth~ -.had cent -t CFIP In t u e nc-i a tht raking t r-tI the tiedJ n lur.rnni-nt *sIh.t1u 'i iinanced r-.'j .imgt rat.:nt4 3n-ther intere.1 . prarn.dr tpr -.tt d: pre aIttd1. lange te .cc mi ad.d rei e'.t. .rc. i: R.vtutir. lti t 24 3 31.- e-ur ak-nt icre i-ilntrltrin ome 2 lamrt.-pinc t. 1976-83 C.I 44 t-.:. B.n rcant in thu tIt | *. . inr-irt -ub.lin bLr *a. cent Th~ r-r'ai '.'rm trt theituatn .. al t- Turke% repre..rt Tlhin rat3-n r:-rvign I 1..-urce.or impl-..Ich-:d 42 prc--nt 1 pit.t t I---* 3 . ugh inport *u.that.in tL. tire n-mra l31 d .:haniciv .-..Ut-- rtad-'d .' until i4n -hiuatin nmp Additir'r-.Box 3.. n 31 1 -2 4 C -h 4 I1 l3ii 4Q i 0 1 1112 1-2 n 225 112' I 4 -:-il prica rise Real C-P' 4r.-. I hinge en p-tu.In.el had tat ''utp3aed the opreciat'r -t ht anrd L-intinu:d ic.-.arc ttmprarrl a t3bie Iir c. rde t .n aribe. -h.g Im %hil- requiret nir -rin: rt-uurce' ti r'mu d *--. -1-. r.-nit-ti ri. rIl'i i erct.tais e-king n-Ip pr. th pr:n . e nr. II lari: capital i 4 ntl-o-- that aln¾'. p'rctnt .n had tcac..r .acr otl'I-t. -rt .rTiC and i1 2i hanig .-I ih tIe. dN ric * \t rnal h..ci: .unit. real Th- in ihe prtice It'.F6r atid m1l I reducing thu degr e I It hut ii..ih.n c rt t t-. .aban3Ncned vt~:r' *r' and indu:e imp.lt ot h-Idrne th. much in tern-'. Frice I l-iSi Furklt. r in a l CI.mont more than thar 2 prer . rart Il intr.ard c t- att-n'.1i r. t. ratQsyrt alu..im ti: res-'urceth e3rn it to than thr ugoih \prtt .port had rthad til ..n-:..-.rt ront.r-. ti II-.I- it. -r ntr in re..I imp.. r--. r-e.atitn IFptrentI 223i 2 i i 2t14 I it 11 22 r' 21 1 4 $ I 1 2b 42 n 24 R 34 3 3m 3 42 i ?j i 2 I4 I _ - Inipi.le cl[ea-ne rate. 1-. nomimal rt tr-rcd T.lanr rerIl ectri'u tI.le i) .-n. act-tl rle.d t F iL an -npcund niarter ihe i-I ir--rF 'tler and ih.ctmplt ru-latin beit%etn the niag-ritm3 -.lgc-.I I'eal :DI ri-.r the rent tr--rn ac to: Oit r....underhln equilibruim rait m mi. percentage o en aluatl -n and tat. h-.urpas-.th rate per--nt ro Turk - s I 53 4 '4 t 2 nr 3 I E-L hange rite = Lira dollirs r1Marker clearinn rtC'% er%aluatn!r' Iprc:1-nti Nlarket c-aring ratt %' ithout I. m' torr -a tr alua - tle r.- -:hingt 'l r-rteia main.i-i ranou .'t DGEP durinng -~l ur-'-. F crmnrate.nnin~ a'a tll anrd .n th al e r min tit r--.z..orrtt parr .nitlh rate ipercenti r 3S3 7 4 3 2I hIll "I -] '4 n r -t!.c .itu-nt-di -m t r-grr otrc tamned a c. .e . a |clrt:hanlce til -..3 t.h . . -heJp i lit- urn ln -.-rt rti dtmard ltr thr pr.- Fp-c 'mali--i il p.. underl r iulibriint r.( t 4 1 I in: I..n--min -ti.'Žl i m imm'a \u.ari te1l by 12 a .h.lda echanriae rite i pccn -. 'rt mn-ranr . r--r n n the' prtrl protitai. unrtrt . In I') . r-~ Inc -Ei] ntularthe uz-1s nd Turkich c..-..lasiaI L.-r -r-.'ilt r-...rIo .p..ot the .-ace AI l Q rtprr. Iquiteo mimnoni p echang^-. t.1.l i) . l~~~~~~~~~ra rav rir. .ilu3tmi-ri h. unit -ti a...an irt-'.n*Ltim F-ric .hatirl in the s ar.lhan_e.*r-it-n prices nut ..Cr'-.ernal *hack.uI d changt e tc- irr rE and . rr unritd and c xp.3i-z-r-e inmr..di p r-udlie ettiC n-:i I\ . in...ulis are tat-r ttin a hmfdcre.ing rait at a rtu3a1.-il': th.n-rn:tie. aiu.rtat.I-hange rate = dinar.d' tpeid ... r---' lrn! lu--~ iu19-¾'i^ '.arind li.I-ihan ran-. e:r. -.. .. It.el cl!arin.fcri at.n the pre. I> 2 1is.et at--: aJ t.. h t ihi:h an-.: p--It nma.raw.hrtr: range 'hi d-l cede * te:. the 'IUgL-.nd1d to capt al mark-i deregitlatltpercenr ih prt . ad er-.clr-lize ei' Alutd 1.ni -it COr i o-rhr.. :h t n it. c-* tmril :h A.tling Pt 1Li fhc.ntcd an d e17-' rt nr t-tm.auc.mt Ilul.4 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from the experience of developing countries Xl-. -hrirag nlpg. e.rald re... r.a3.i r i practnt t: it3n 'th i h--t ~'e-erl prcee. -..-nri and e.il a.-el l Exchange rales and GDP growth in Yugoslavia and Turkey.t it ice a. etor txgn -ilutin Ihere de hnvd a. :na. *hiri tur-.m'-rh I.ll high duon' ..t lFi8 accoun o ii f i rerali '.. the r-'-v Ih to rncaura.announ:ed e\chan_c rat. -tercc .. -t.in..

* Countries that would be hurt least by a weak world economy. Many developing countries have been meeting their interest obligations and are likely to go on doing so. to associate a higher probability of default with fast repayment. This restraint on net borrowing means that imports can grow only slightly more rapidly than exports (5. many developing countries would face a higher rate. Their interest payments in 1995 would be $1. to minimize consumption losses now even if this means larger repayment humps-and hence consumption losses-in the future. at 12. The achievement of an adjustment "package" implies the recognition by both parties of an intermediate solution that does not jeopardize either the probability of repayment or the consumption of future generations.7 percent).4 billion. a real increase of 169 percent. If this process is too protracted.8 percent taking into account the projected increase in export prices. In dealing with debtors. the growth of net disbursements must be restrained to meet the target debt service ratio. Malaysia.5 percent. a real increase of 544 percent over 1983. and Singapore would boom compared with the rest of the world and would be creditworthy as a result. The slower the growth of exports and GDP of the borrowing countries. they would depend almost completely on official aid. Under the High case the loan disbursements and official transfers to the developing countries rise by 46 33 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1995. and the higher the real interest and inflation rates in the world economy. unfortunately. In both cases it is assumed that lenders will wish to see debt service indicators return to their levels of 1980. Adjustment also needs to be accompanied by changed financial attitudes. the private debt they now carry would have to be rolled over. including direct private investment. At the other extreme.5 percent. Much of the aid would have to go directly into consumption. Under the Low case.1 versus 4. for example. China and India depend little on international borrowing. The resulting rise in protection introduces a further bias against exports but does not do anything to cut spending in relation to output. however. But because export revenues grow only slightly more rapidly than the interest rate.7 billion of net disbursements of mediumand long-term loans in real terms. This preference arises from their perception of risks and perhaps from their failure. Having little prospect of commercial borrowing. 0 Low-income African countries. which shows the balance of payments of the developing countries under the High and Low scenarios. Middle-income countries such as Korea. adopted this second method of reducing imports.0 percent a year. but because this is the rate for prime borrowers.3 billion.7 percent a year in real terms in the High case and at less than 1 percent in the Low case. Net disbursements of medium. the smaller the amount developing countries can borrow. the nominal interest rate is 9. Developing countries' exports in the Low case are expected to grow at only 4.and long-term loans less interest payments are $22 billion in 1995 under the High case.4. One important means of achieving this solution would be to increase the flow of equity investment to developing countries. They start from low levels of income and face a period of slow income and consumption growth because of their need to use current output to service past debts. In the Low case the figure is negative: developing countries pay in interest $9 billion more than they receive in net loan disbursements. The effect of world economic growth on developing economies is revealed in Table 3. In the Low case. under the Low case they are only $29 billion. With a spread of 1. Next year's World Development Report will examine capital flows to developing countries. Debt outstanding and disbursed would be only 36 percent higher in real terms after twelve years. Most of the major debtors have. In 1995 net exports of goods and nonfactor services to developing countries are $70 billion under the High scenario. the developing countries would fall into three categories. as is required. Low-income Africa would receive only $2. governments try to postpone adjustment as long as possible. Finally.7 percent a year in real terms. it might affect their willingness to persevere with their adjustment. That is why the longer-term prospects for the world economy will help determine whether the present ad hoc combination of rescheduling by creditors and austerity by debtors proves to be the prelude to a harmonious resolution or the prologue to a disaster. Under the Low case they fall by 7 percent. although slow .nal surplus. the interest rate for many borrowers would be 11. commercial lenders tend to push for more rapid repayment. acting as individual lenders. debt outstanding and disbursed rises at 3. Net official transfers would be $2. It is assumed that developing countries reduce their debt service ratios from the high levels of the mid-1980s to the 1980 level by the end of the forecast period.

export revenues grow only slightly more rapidly than the (higher) interest rate and net lending falls over the period to meet target debt service ratios.and long-term loans in 1995 would be $8. In the High case.and long-term borrowing would be less than $1 billion more than their interest payments.0 percent. with nominal growth in export earnings of 12 percent.1 percent more debt outstanding in real terms in 1995 than in 1983.4. Increased protection makes prospects still worse. low-income countries have special reason to make the best possible use of their resources. Because they are so poor. If the situation described began to unfold. with per capita income growth for all developing countries 34 percent below the level of the High case. Most developing countries would be starved of external capital. however. per capita income growth falls from 3. Between the High and the Low case. 47 . This scenario. Other middle-income oil importers would be in a similar position: by 1995 their outstanding debt would rise by 15 percent in real terms. debt outstanding grows by only 1 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1995. the slow growth of industrial countries in the Low cases would balance the world economy on a knife's edge. To sum up. In all scenarios the major exporters of manufactures grow fastest. Nevertheless. Like the middle-income countries. The improved developing-country policies in Low II help. Loans disbursed would be $42 billion (compared with $49 billion in the Low case. although the real growth of outstanding debt remains low for the highly indebted major exporters of manufactures and for the middleincome oil exporters. Having run austerity programs for years. Some of their difficulties would be dealt with through debt renegotiations. many developing countries end up transferring resources to the industrial world year after year. they would benefit from policy changes that reduce the bias against exporting in favor of inefficient import substitution. which include many of these countries.2). Net disbursements to them of medium. especially as population growth continues to slow. leaving the rest of the developing world further and further behind. in addition. It is in the low-income countries-especially those of Africa-that slow growth does most to perpetuate and accentuate poverty. Improved developing-country performance on its own would make the picture brighter. then sustained cooperation becomes unlikely. Even a developing country exporting only manufactures might find its export earnings growing at less than the nominal interest rate. in the Low case. The major exporters of manufactures shown in Table 3. greatly increased industrial-country protection. the prospect for growth in developing countries would surely be worse than that implied by these projections. They would pay a nominal interest rate of 11. there are two major differences between the High and Low cases: net lending and export growth. Debt outstanding and disbursed to developing countries in 1995 would be only slightly larger than in 1983 in real terms.4 billion less than their interest payments. Domestic policy improvements are essential in enhancing the prospects of low-income countries. the most problematic of which would be with the big Latin American borrowers. in effect. For developing countries as a whole.growth in the industrial countries would squeeze the amount of concessional assistance they would receive. Lower growth of imports would also contribute to lower overall growth. The main difference between the Low case and the variant Low I (increased industrial-country protection) is that the main debtor nations would find it more difficult than ever to service their debts.6). In the Low case.0 percent (Table 3.) Interest payments of $55 billion would exceed disbursements as creditworthiness falls because of the protection-induced decline in exports. but the growth of exports would now average only 4. substantial extra borrowing is compatible with improved debt servicing for developing countries partly because the nominal interest rate is lower than in the Low case. As a result. would have only 9. If there is. In low-income Asia. some might effectively impose their own schedule for debt repayment.5 percent a year to 2. is untenable. prospects look brighter. Previous World Development Reports have emphasized the importance of prices in determining how well a country uses its resources. Poverty and low-income countries The implications of the scenarios are best understood if their GDP growth rates are adjusted for the widely differing population growth rates of the various regions. and their net medium.7 percent for developing countries (see Table 3. and because export revenues grow at a higher rate. * A group of countries that would be in and out of financial difficulties for the rest of the 1980s and possibly beyond. Mutual cooperation between lenders and borrowers is reasonably assured. as in the Low case.

Even without such benefits. A real increase in concessional assistance is needed. level and in a coordinated way. liberalization would expand exports and would tend to strengthen . in selected cases. Efforts by these institutions to encourage private direct investment should also continue. and the extension of the Lome Convention. What is required need not be very dramatic for any single institution. the discussions for possible supplemental budgeting to IDA. Any worsening of global prospects in terms of increased protectionism and further rises in dollar interest rates would erode the ability and perhaps even the willingness. not purely domestic. at times of their greatest difficulty. because growth prospects throughout the world would be transformed if they overcame the rigidities and inflationary fears that slowed them down in the past ten years. low-income countries have found that official aid has been falling in real terms. For the poorer countries the main challenge for the international community is to find ways of supporting policy reform through additional flows of concessional assistance.5). budget cuts too often damage programs with the greatest capacity for raising the economy's growth potential. provided they all act constructively. the World Bank. That said. especially those affecting developing countrieswould make an important contribution to restoring the momentum of the world economy. Commercial financing of such investments is therefore unrealistic. the developing countries could do much to help themselves through policy changes that increase the flexibility of their own economies. Some of them may be classified as current spending. Although governments may have scope for reducing spending without damaging long-term growth. combined with the reversal of the recent protectionist measures on industrial products. Official institutions. It is also essential to start liberalizing trade in agriculture. Their output is not directly tradable and often is not even marketable. particularly the IMF. In turn. Commercial banks have typically relied on borrowing countries' agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a basis for restructuring existing claims and. and the regional development banks can be helpful in this regard both by assisting in the design of more effective developing-country policies and by expanding their own lending in support of policy reforms (see Box 3. International action This chapter has shown that the world economic outlook would brighten considerably if every country took steps to improve its own domestic performance. could boost productivity in the 1980s. so in finance there is a need for concerted international action. This has been the challenge in the negotiations for the seventh IDA replenishment (see Box 3. For the developing countries to service their debt 48 without excessive cost to themselves. Finally. for committing additional funds. but education and health budgets are better seen as investments in human capital. they will need to expand their exports rather than just reduce imports. A trade-liberalization initiative that concentrated on the newer and proliferating forms of protectionism-various nontariff barriers. Most human development programs have long gestation lags. The onus on the industrial countries is greatest.5). For the middle-income countries the actions of a wide range of private and public institutions are important. it is important that official export-financing institutions adjust to the greater risks of lending to developing countries in a nondisruptive fashion.Because the public sector in low-income countries is large in relation to GDP. cutting imports usually means cutting public spending. This trend must be reversed if lowincome countries are to make any progress in the years ahead and the lot of the poorest people is not to deteriorate any further. Just as the liberalization of trade in manufactures provided a once-for-all but sizable boost to productivity growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The success of developing countries' efforts to deal with the rigidities and distortions in their own economies depends in part on the actions of official and private suppliers of finance. Yet. and has been for several years. As in trade. Measures that would result in increased financial flows to developing countries to help them undertake structural adjustment and maintain long-term financial viability will help make trade liberalization easier by improving their short-term balance of payments outlook. so the same approach to agricultural trade. Freer trade is also vital for solving the debt crisis. of borrowers to service their debt. some measures need to be taken at an international. But the transition back to fully voluntary lending requires prudent management on the side of both borrowers and lenders. Increases in voluntary lending by the commercial banks in the long term is an important ingredient in the restoration of growth momentum in middle-income developing countries.

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thus increasing the developing countries' capacity to obtain and service additional capital flows. in many countries by much more. It is affected by the macroeconomic perspective of Part I. for example-that reduce population growth. they do not begin to capture the links between population growth and economic development. lower GDP growth makes it more difficult for countries to finance programs-in education and family planning. incomes. If the world is to have ten years of slow growth. Thus short-run difficulties have long-run consequences. As will soon become apparent.developing-country creditworthiness. and personal beliefs-aspects of everyday life that explain why parents choose to have a particular number of children and what their choices add up to. Moreover. Governments throughout the developing world cannot ignore the literal sense in which population growth affects the economic performance that really matters-the average incomes of their people. The links with population Modest growth in the GDP of industrial countries means modest growth in their per capita incomes. In short. trade liberalization. Their populations are growing by 2 percent a year. health. Understanding those links requires much more than the mere counting of heads. enlarged flows of external finance. Part II of this Report is about population change in developing countries. Important as these simple facts are. employment. many millions of poor people will by definition get poorer. and it gives that perspective richer meaning. For the developing countries there is no such easy equation. GDP growth of 2 percent or so is merely a preliminary step before they can start to improve their per capita incomes. 50 . it is also about development in its widest sense. and improved economic policies in all countries are mutually reinforcing actions in support of restoring the growth momentum of developing countries. It requires consideration of education. culture.

For young children of primary-school age. those aged six to eleven just half an hour. inconvenience. especially. Nepalese village boys and girls of six to eight years work three to four hours a day caring for farm animals and helping with younger siblings. A second reason that having many children can make economic sense is the lack of schooling opportunities. But other governments have been more tentative. and if so. why fertility is high and. where wages are low. and petty retailing-can be combined with looking after children. and Mexico have developed comprehensive policies in the past ten to fifteen years. for poor parents. Korea in 1961. The setting for high fertility Why do the poor have many children? Consider the issue from the point of view of parents and potential parents. school can often be combined with work in the house or on the farm. One study of an American city and its suburbs found that children twelve to seventeen years old spend one hour a day doing housework. long-term benefits if they support parents in old age. low and insecure income. Children are also a form of investment-providing short-term benefits if they work during childhood. In much of Latin America political support for family planning is ambiguous. If they do not go to secondary school. In poor rural areas. including older siblings. the economic costs of children are low. To cut population growth means to reduce the number of children in an average family. In developed countries. where fertility is lower. should governments try to reduce fertility. in rural areas five and more. by contrast. But the choice between school and work becomes harder as children grow up. and poor health and family planning services. Nor do children contribute much to household chores and income as they grow up. It is this seeming paradox that provides the starting point for designing public policies to reduce fertility. Many Bangladeshi children work even longer hours. China. work somewhat less. First. who have many children. especially if there is a school in the village. income lost by the mother during a child's infancy may be easily recouped by the child later on. most countries in Africa have no particular demographic objectives. are readily available to help. and uncertainty of finding child care. India adopted a formal population policy in 1952. yet it is also the poor who lose out as rapid population growth hampers development. Should there be public concern and governmental action to reduce population growth? Along with public efforts to reduce mortality. second. particularly from the age of twelve or so. children can help a lot. Part II of this Report will show that it is the poor. But children involve economic costs. a major cost of children to parents is time lost from work-usually by the mother-or the cost. Sometimes children may also earn cash incomes. crafts. In the Philippines those in their late teens contribute as much to household cash income as do adults. There are several good reasons why.Part II Population Change and Development 4 Demographic change and public policy Most families in developing countries now have at least four children. Other family members. And much of women's traditional work-in farming. children in the Philippines and in Sri Lanka. enough to ensure rates of population growth above 2 percent a year. they can work more 51 . Javanese teenagers work eight to ten hours a day. the economic (and other) benefits of children are high. with little education. which many governments are trying to do. why the resulting rapid population growth slows development. and having many children makes economic sense. the difference between children's and mother's earnings will be small. first. what are appropriate policies to do so? To answer these questions requires an understanding of. parents have to spend time and money bringing them up. Indonesia. All parents everywhere get pleasure from children.

in many parts of the developing world it is still high. In Africa. and as education becomes more clearly the key to future success for children. securing ritual bonds that are as important as blood ties in cementing alliances. at best. Even land has to be managed to provide income and. effective and safe means of contraception. As parents' income rises. elsewhere. Parents may feel the need to have many babies to be sure that a few survive. Although mortality has fallen. In developed countries there are trusted institutions (banks. and Pakistan.themselves and. In poor countries. by caring for younger siblings. the need for support in their old age outweighs the immediate costs of children. One reason parents look to children for help in disability and old age is the lack of safe alternatives. and precious metals. there is no tradition of community support. One out of five children dies before reaching the age of one in some parts of Africa. parents everywhere send their children to school and keep them there longer. If available. a large family also has an advantage in land disputes. India. illegal abortion. one out of seven in much of Bangladesh. support from many relatives for children's education reduces the high economic burden of raising children that potential parents would otherwise bear. limiting the number of children may therefore mean sexual abstinence. children represent opportunities for the family's occupational diversification and hence for expansion or consolidation of its local power. Thailand. it is more likely that economic gain (or a small economic loss) simply prevents any interest in having fewer children. In some circumstances. pensions. and because having two or three educated children becomes a better "investment" (for the parents and for the children too) than having many who cannot be educated. A sixth factor encouraging high fertility among the poor is their limited information about. In Egypt. and Turkey 80 to 90 percent of parents surveyed said they expect to rely on their children to support them in their old age. the psychological or financial costs of avoiding pregnancy may exceed the costs of having another child. For many adults. In Latin America. . they may be expensive. ineffective and difficult traditional contraception. and the jealousies of neighbors. allow their mothers to work more. in some developing countries family systems may encourage high fertility. insurance. Where boys are more important than girls-say. Early marriage and childbearing are easier if the new couple can begin married life in the household of the husband's parents. In turn they often have fewer children-because schooling itself and the loss of children's help are costly. In parts of South Asia. Discussion of children as an "investment" should not imply that parents in developing countries are influenced only by economic considerations. For the rural poor. The social and political functions of large families are also important. community support is weakening as mobility increases. especially in poor rural areas. early marriage and many children may be the safest route to a satisfying adulthood and a relatively secure old age. The apparent disadvantages of secondary schooling are compounded if children must live away from home or travel long distances to get to school. children are the best possible annuity. Fourth. a way to transform 52 today's production into consumption many years hence that is less risky than are bank accounts. Yet in poor families many births. all of which are subject to theft. The very idea of birth control may be unknown or frowned upon. families serve as godparents to the children of allies and friends. poor parents are worried about who will take care of them when they are old or ill. capital markets are not nearly so well developed. Modern contraceptives may be unknown or simply not available. inflation. and access to. may increase the probability of infant deaths by weakening both mother and babies. For better-off farmers in Bangladesh. High infant and child mortality are a third reason for having many children. In every society children bring parents satisfaction and pleasure. and mutual aid societies) that help individuals to earn today and to save and spend tomorrow. poor and uneducated parents are much more likely to expect to live with (and be supported by) their children when they are old than are rich and educated parents. economic gain (where there is any) need not be the main cause of high fertility. may require children to work on it and make it a secure asset. or ritual coparenthood. government bonds. in any case. credit instruments. For young women who have few other options. infanticide-or. especially in rural areas. by the tradition of compadrazgo. particularly in relation to the incomes of the poor-and especially if they must be bought from private doctors. Fifth. For a poor family. the Philippines. Korea. as schooling opportunities improve. for security in old age-parents may need to have five children to be sure that one son survives. In Indonesia. In poor settings. especially if they are close together.

In this sense. when asked about the disadvantages of having children. clothing. Even in developed countries. From one generation to the next. where food is abundant. Evidence from urban areas in Colombia also shows that parents themselves. a disproportionate share of children grow up in large families that are least able to take advantage of increased educational opportunities and health services. a large number of children in the family has a negative effect on classroom performance and test scores. the first step in reducing fertility is to relieve their poverty and uncertainty about their own future. from a strictly economic point of view. Even then they may not avoid malnutrition: in one Colombian town studied. In Colombia and Malaysia in 1974. Older children may also be handicapped. some of this effect may be due to children from large families having less educated or poorer parents on average. high fertility may not be the direct cause of malnutrition. The same pattern is found in developing countries. studies show that children in large families and those born close together tend to be physically and intellectually inferior to other children. daughters who marry may move to another village. early weaning. So early difficulties in providing enough good food interact with later difficulties in supporting schooling. such costs are in fact the chief concern parents voice. food.Consequences for parents Despite the apparent advantages of many children. In Malaysia and Thailand about half of all children live in households that receive just 15 percent of total income. Children willing and able to help may themselves face difficulties in finding wellpaying work. Of course. Children may end up costing parents more than they expected. spend less on each child's education once there are more than four children. children have the most to gain from family income spent on health and education. As will be shown in Chapter 6. In general. malnutrition in preschool children was directly related to the number of children in the family. Consequences for children Even when parents seem to gain from large families. the resulting harm to the health and nutrition of mothers can cause low birth weight. So although parents can reasonably hope to be better off by having many children. In both sets of countries. But because fewer children lived in rich households. In some countries girls may require a dowry and thus be an economic burden. How much of an economic gain children provide may depend on circumstances that parents cannot easily predict-whether they gain or lose access to land. sons who go far to find work may be less supportive than was hoped. parents gain. poor families are clearly disadvantaged. If parents have many children in the hope of economic gain. as adults. Even old-age support is not guaranteed. it is not clear that. low income might be responsible for both high fertility and malnutrition. But in poor families. subsidies per child were twice as great for children in the richest fifth of households as for those in the poorest. those who receive less schooling will. and poor health of children in the critical early years. But in Nigeria most children contemplating secondary school would not come from very poor households. in the end some may not be. In Brazil more than 60 percent of all children live in the poorest 40 percent of households. among a sample of children taking the secondary school entrance exam. even in the poorest settings. and the Netherlands. the persistence of high 53 . children with many siblings tend to be smaller. In Nigeria. at all income and education levels. Thus children from large families receive less from both public and private spending on education. however. the number of children does not affect their physical growth. children from large families scored systematically lower than those from small families. For middle-class families in the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia. as large family size and low investments in children reinforce each other. In France. Some children do not survive. households which between them have just 10 percent of total income. and housing for children may be a burden. tend to have more children than parents who had more schooling. In either case. This is obviously true when births are closely spaced. Yet family budget studies consistently show that bigger families spend proportionately more on food. whether their children are healthy. government subsidies for education and health were approximately equal across households. In developing countries. whether they have the right balance of sons and daughters. children from large. so family size probably has some independent influence on educational performance. For households close to subsistence levels. the United States. children may lose. an unequal distribution of income is caused by and contributes to an unequal distribution of opportunities and skills.

we and our children will all enjoy a better chance in life. give up the possible private benefits of children. One reason private and social gains differ is the existence of "externalities": parents do not internalize the costs of their children to society as a whole. and other public services that boost jobs and income. the couple's wish for society as a whole is different from its wish for itself. parks for common enjoyment. Thus many couples choose to have only one child or even none. in effect. as are roads. Health and education costs of children are heavily subsidized by the public sector. Private and social gains also differ in areas other than fertility. discussed in the next chapter. governments can act as custodians of society. this too is a population policy to achieve a common goal (see Chapter 8). to consumer goods and social opportunities that compete with childbearing. To narrow this gap between private and social perceptions. The second justification for government action to reduce fertility is that people may have more chil- .1). Assured that each child would have a better chance of school and work in a less crowded world. Where natural resources are abundant." By developing a social contract. That way. although usually in the opposite direction. but the children born of many families will. to education. They are meant to have longer time horizons than their individual constituents. because other couples are having so many children. we can rely on government support for nationwide measures (to improve access to family planning services and to create incentives for their use) to ensure that everybody makes the same decision. even as each couple hopes to benefit from many children. Poor couples who hope their children will support them in their old age may rightly fear that. any one of their own children has less chance of going to school and eventually of finding a good job. it wishes its neighbors would have fewer. and to weigh the interests of future generations against those of the present. one family's children will have little effect on the availability of land. which provide the means to limit births. But in most countries there is another source of difference between the private and social gains from many children. Only through the public sector can people make. at least at the national level. clean water to protect health. The result. In this setting. a contract with each other: "If each of us has fewer children. chopping down forests. The need for public policy There are two broad justifications for government action to encourage people to have fewer children. Limits. For the common good.fertility in a changing world is a symptom of lack of access: to health services. people will not be confident that provision of contraceptives by private suppliers will alone lead to widespread reduction in fertility. it might have been happier with fewer children if it could have been sure that other couples would have done the same. so-called congestion costs caused in part by externalities may not be great. so that its children would face less competition for land and jobs. on its own. is that high fertility constrains the amount of resources available for investment and hence for future income growth. Yet why should one couple." from its need to decide alone to have more children than it would want if others were limiting their family size (see Box 4. The same is true of the effects on forests or pasture. As public social security systems develop and people have many ways to save for their old age. are placed on automobile speeds. the benefits of which individuals cannot capture and will not produce on their own: police protection. often backed by financial penalties. when its sacrifice alone would provide only minuscule ben54 efits to other families' children and grandchildren? Even when each couple decides to have many children. Private and social gains from children also differ in the developed countries. the private economic benefits of children diminish. and polluting air and water. Even as some couples have many children because of a lack of health services and schooling opportunities. The first is the gap between the private and social gains from having many children. and to family planning services. For example. their large families make it more difficult for the public sector to extend health and schooling to all. which would reduce the need for many births to insure against infant and child mortality. At the same time their private costs rise. each couple might be happy with fewer children. Government produces social goods and services. to social security and other forms of insurance for old age. which would raise parents' hopes for their children and would broaden women's outlook and opportunities. communications. In other words. legislation requires that children go to school and that everybody be vaccinated against contagious diseases. In some countries governments use financial and other incentives to encourage higher fertility. Suppose that. and achieves its wish. the government frees each individual couple from its "isolation paradox.

..- L Irri..A. . i. I .rii .ul i.--: t.* r. r:h iht Cl -. r.. ar'd I.t. ii Ac'l.un .r nr. it .k. khidr'n . I .iir. rl.fl.|li i.-. -'. a i th -i eir i' . lir ii-'.. h* r-i. couples may lack (or disbelieve) information about falling child mortality-or about their chance to reduce the risks to their existing children by keeping numbers down-and thus have more children than needed to reach desired family size.Sa li .It rih K rnir eel. which.. r.rr.illidrbrn n e i r.r I hl-p m i .A'. They may not be fully aware of the health risks.riri: mr3r. .th.d n . nfl.1 * irh-r dr.in *r.tu.ftir .-'ce eArnn r. or would want had they more information about.ie' :r andii[ui.1r'm. ..r. and better access to.. tl. i1 h..d-ul 'up-r i hern tc-ildr..ti.ihr ih-n'i tit- h. I ii'. i-.ci...It at- h k lea 11t.ri . Air J. rnrut.a ' c I. - ..:r. rtr and tclre t o ... l i h p .t | drr .ni. rJ ira m..1-. .dren than they want. k.-t * i.irc .rlt. ncrrt ri.m1 t p'' dual' in ir -i-.:c -pir r.r.h .t He. ei .ubh r ih..t..r .. . r.hi.. . health care is limited.h i i i n.ia C \tr : i I .. eart. .mn a. ni . ..:nmrnrt.1 Ir.rnaril many and closely spaced births.'i_*rh. r . rr3r.. ri r1 . r.uri rr . .'iim ile. h btflri ir l h.h :nipr-. to mothers and children.Lir. -A h.ikk urlr IIiI.. \ . .. H :1 hi trri .h J. r . couples may not know how to practice it. .1 th-d h -:. This can be achieved by private suppliers.i. burid : 1r.rI r. u re l itrt p.r i .r. chirar bL-t. t i.I.ni * it .*. especially if their parents pressure them to have many children. The very idea of planning pregnancies may be unknown.l nll 1-r L .Eii1 i ni l i t ri.'u4h il..i-i- .r`...plan hi -t_uid i. .- e ..... r tr.nnr ii r t p tt- d l d. n.-.rhe.r r. Ihmnir l.-iic in '1.r l. alli ne.r hrc .: i it it.th. paul.i... rira. They may be reluctant to ask questions.ti. r hi. In many countries government may need to subsidize or even orga55 . _it' IJUit il -. ru tl-: But ment riirr..rth.rni .r 1 . ri:jf prl. pur u. A. tl.ifliilt. . liiiii it i .. ...I i.i-.n . -r-. h r. r.' ani sher . r.1 .11.rri !ni.:htC.h rEd .nincaj. h ..i.-th-n.hainm r . r. ind manr.. '--iIr § l rca. in rural areas as well. If.4 r hi.:r . .:r.th .: C.n -utc.. . e.s ..r.. r. rP.I rhr. tar-r '3 nm:..-h h. th.l r n er.. .iii c.. ih.rid i ri.it.r-.tt ha. especially in remote areas.9I. a.r I er ir. . Jiiit rlier iI. n n ..: -.ntI.. but rr.-1. ro in.ir . 1t ti.d: :--ai l'..: IVh ne.-r i .t t-c:¶li.l atr A I )l1 r.nm dU. . It can encourage wider provision of modern contraceptives. .... which are less effective in preventing conception. ..ri- bu. th.r :ttrzn. Many modern means of contraception can be made available only with medical backup. It rh..aI. n arn. a-I-r a ...ldr.. 1nJ l i.:cI i. and demand is unknown and possibly limited. r.:I. Or they may lack ready access to modern contraceptives and be forced to rely on traditional methods such especially in towns and.. As a start..- r r p i. itr ii .. i riIh .t.. and e.: lar. nl m il.. A. hrriir alddup rA .r. in r.-iaF-" trtt idi I.:ei.. r.riiku .r.d trhr m. i 'i . ' *el. I. e t. and there is little profit in disseminating information and contraceptives where distribution systems are poor. . trnm liii i -.-. . In this situation. rk hi: lrd1 iaid 1.tt E. Cr I-t l. a t (MAt-Cr. the role of the government is critical..r5.i l:.rn-c.-. .nt.i- .Jr-d.uitcrm ul .e.. dr h- P.. doti .h r t *erm.:ray- rrrp:. a-..r.t tjheo:ii..i r 3. for some methods (such as condoms).r .. htIIr.in a . r ha' tatii.iri[h-.ii. T-.. dctrni.t . -r.. . t' i -: i1p31 : m. For example.-. . the tehir 1 rildr.n ihrh h ni. puts the mother's life at risk. They may not know that by stopping breastfeeding they risk more closely spaced births.ithrr . Box 4. .in. hr u id j' t :h-r h.tim ..h. t 1I.-r. i. thr g..hardl .a.... .1 th.1.*4rt t nii.c . r.rrca -er t.ii .:.-ri I.tdr r.i . especially if social norms dictate early marriage for young women and if couples do not discuss sexual matters. . ii-rr ill *ii-u. t . i I-i.i..uld t fu aiea . * r1I.Tartarrr r . 3.r. r t . Even if they know about family planning..j r *r r. ...... oIt On.mrrt ircem thiir * 1cr4. LuI iin .. or on abortion.. The isolation paradox .r iIii-. ii i I. i..ir.il. am rh. hii . in.er 1lir ili -r.rr I.ri r.. -r..idrnd h..n hd tl-it.. .tr.--. 3 .m.tU ih. u iti. \1 ihe '-1 a .-arr.-. .iiL.n . -nr.-.t :t ri.i .p. t. i cr it. n Fc-ivil n. putb IIr.Ia tirC t. I.:ti i. of as rhythm and withdrawal. easier fertility control..n .ni.. t -r.: xi.n. i.rx.1 r [hr. thr. ut Ci In : Cr APr-ir that -r-e:* J..1i r.rn-i:i .i l. . .1t.cr.1 mir. i t.1..l-rrr c.i.11 !1.h rt-h '. it can encourage parents in their desire to have fewer children simply by providing more information-about changing mortality and the health benefits of controlling fertility. h-. -rrT. ntli .rir..u . enriie .. h ir n .. h I':..Irl i li. ci... But private suppliers are unlikely to provide the full range of family planning services..d-rr I r l. hi.1.r *' 1. . th-ir In . if primitively performed. r th.ct e unti. Jr r. hcfl')rrfl.rrr 11. .. iirt .. i .I : it .1 h--J ie hid.crr.

but it could rise quickly if mortality rose. such as freedom of choice and pronatalist customs and beliefs. In the preindustrial age. South Asia. and eventually better job opportunities. Lessons from history Public concern with population growth is a recent phenomenon. population growth was periodically spurred by increases (often temporary) in the supply of food and declines in disease. In other parts of the world. Should governments not only ensure procreative freedom but also encourage social responsibility? The answer in this Report is a firm yes. life expectancy was probably little higher in 1600 than it had been 2. The agriculturalage and before For much of human history. since the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974. There. But circumstances in developing countries today are different. As will be shown in Chapter 7. Such governmental involvement has expanded in the past decade. compared with 25 percent a decade today). over time and among regions. wages fell and food prices rose (see Box 4. The transition to low mortality and low fertility in today's developed countries occurred without any explicit public policy.2). In the sixteenth century population declined in the Americas because of new diseases contracted from Europe. In England between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. population growth continued to be irregular and vulnerable to fluctuations in mortality.000 people or more probably never exceeded 6 percent. governments adopted a Plan of Action which recognized the to schs ofreeld rensT basic humanri bly" the number and spacing of children. reduction of inequality.000 years earlier. Support for family planning is usually how governments try to reduce fertility. Settled agriculture permitted a rise in populatle concult ur ba rs in the tion. different societies will not necessarily 56 agree on the precise nature of that balance. prosperity and population growth went hand in hand. there is evidence that when mortality fell so that labor supply increased. a sensible first step so long as there is unmet need for information about family planning and unsatisfied demand for services. population growth rates increased between about 1450 and 1650-to rates higher than 1 percent a decade in China. Even these increases were tiny by modern standards. The distinction between these two justifications for a public population policy-the gap between private and social gains.nize contraceptive services. The case is strong for support of programs to assist the poor to achieve their reproductive goals more efficiently and humanely. family planning programs have become an important vehicle for information about the private and social costs of high fertility. A dilemma arises whenever pursuit of one set of values-improvement of material welfare through lower population growth. Between 100 and 1850. Moreover. the percentage of the world's population living in towns and cities of 5. This would increase the welfare of parents and improve the chances of their children having greater educational opportunities. But there is a balance between the private right of procreation and social responsibility. insurance of future security-threatens other values. with renewed attention to the ethical implications of incentives and other policies that go beyond family planning. In fact. some concentration in urban centers. There has since been substantial progress in assuring freedom of choice through family planning programs-about 95 percent of people in the developing world live in countries that support this principle. Everyone's health was threatened more or less constantly by disease. and unmet need for family planning services-has not been important in practice. Only a tiny proportion of people were literate or numerate. and Europe. Government's role in developing and enhancing a social contract to lower fertility provides the basis for public subsidies to family planning. and for several reasons that point to the need for policy action. and the emergence of a small nonagricultural class. but every society needs to consider it. . Over long periods the world's population increased slowly (by far less than 1 percent a decade. Fertility in normal times was well below its biological potential. In fact disease kept the number of people well below a level at which starvation would have become a major cause of death. As discussed more fully in Chapter 8. family planning programs have been subsidized most where a public policy to reduce fertility is strongest. and for incentives to encourage individuals to reduce family size. substantial "unmet need" for family planning information and services does exist in many countries.

In.. In 'hi- h.'' *.. - I c -'r :nI. riturr :ie r-IIi i-.I_rr. Tr. ll . i rli 1. !r ...1. n t.n llri: tnIr:i-d pr. s.l. .r n. - . c r.1t 1w nmin.n1 ni.. i. 12u .. :t-. i r e II t1 ilr .. Ii..t . h d-n..1t .... 'I " .t jr~~li !n L O]itt-rl. .. lhrh..L lilIIatI .. !ii t :...1 ..rE -u r . II hI r. I1-1.. F...dt ii .: t prf.. et h .-i* .3. . P 'I .. .h.... n.in1 .i 1... rl-. Jrii .lilt 3nI ir---: rr.nlJflt t tnil ..1 r- .. rAil I-. -r.. . . r ... .*rh..-. p mAIN..11 rh: Iu... EArt3nbrSr jnanir§3. n..F.d I w l t i nir 't.llei' rh -: sni r. uri ml t. ...i..' 'II'" 1.- t..i icriit... .J...: r n I Ln. uI fertl. trifle ani r13n..i.. !L....l-.....n l n:ir'. J i-n F.t. r ni ln 1 r. * IFi Iircr J1..h rJul:tniFuT. .:.-. .h h-...1._ f] r. ii. rcrl e pu -il L _ prid 1 .' t. J qr...... n...r A- raMt-l in Ih.ddi.. l . th. rC.lir . ..L 1 -nii ..r': '.n Lre3 iAr i. in elcdted ... t.Box 4. r.-nlr. r..:trorn Lhmrieenth io lhe .n tht pr-iu thu r. mu I m... !9 I ni.Ji'i.pi.sla . lt m . [ L wi I I .r. m Ilrkd.. r. r.. L iI t hn I 4 Irn...Entiethi entrivir 't'. .iFr:..irn4 in i.mi. i.- IrcI- rl ed ti: rr.'. jAis l.r.. 1.Ir. i 4ltl lli I-i.. J::" ..1 rTIl : i .' II 1 r. i i dl . ....-l.ritur-to rh. r 1 L'roui!. didin i-t l cr..:-.- .1.Dlni . 1|.In. ..ri.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~T411-14 W .d. 11. .itir--r- I IrI...1.fl..:e:lt-.. .-.t IAti. - .- 1 m 3t-. tLII f 1 lrli:r nl.r .3 .. tem r ' . h . .L. t.ir ri R.n [! . .*n.in ..I *d 3 i t..il._..il..2 The Nlalthusian case: changes in labor supply.hr 1 . -rL. r...lnl. .r. i-h li Indu-rr.. *r.. br.i i . d n mjr. II -t [ r-n ilni i .. l F rt.._ sl nI.i.l..1 1 121 4'r 1'.... . ilt - Itlhuia. wages..1 ..ho-il! rat .ilArI r.nd rrieI t ... rE .I jiil . 1- Ti ' -i - .td:c it-hi .....u'. i.r r-.r-r I 5-1 th Dir [h ... . ! i.j I -ll -% . nth .nd r..Jn. 141 Ir I I n..l .fr..rm pre . ie.nFl i. t4'' nd .uchr .c 1 h...ir:d bh Ire Ft-rId: r-n. i. ..rSlllt. .. 3n. .. iflnn l%n.: Ir dir. I.:.sl Rt .In 1 ..-.. 1 r-td . n flu'' IIi r..ln r.:.. tli ri lr r !r : t t..-.- 57 .rn.1 1. -..ru r I..anrI d rii'e .t f p. t ir.4...1apil-. i. i..t. rr....t. sti:. !..:-i L-n .j ..Ir:. .l.Itulrilli-r 4 -1-.n o r pr. .t.ki. 11 111 rl' 2 r. . rr.n ri-in . .rl..fii Ii n li Fp. n I-. f...r..n * t i i1 '' t Ilr * p r- NI1ltrhu. t .. I-: rt.r.I. .--n * TI..-... I.. pj r.li . t:..l.. 4.g-1 1lil4 .. .tnh* -.-t II.1. r Lr n-. r Change.X|. n.tl:.. and population growth in preindustrial England P..- 1 .ir -A * Th. .. UIli r .sr J I Ii .: '-iJ !. A-...n .n-..rarr.:.r. n !. I-'i l. ru t Fruii..:F rr- rth c r..r . - ir t r. ... 1 . 3..-|. lr....t a .r ..nr .n ... riP.i3..- 1 n1h ilmI.l uhr.ariablei in England trmtl hrenhthteL .. J....lrLi hlie rI-i ..1 p.1.r.riz:r..I nied ... i IIti -hare -rd .

the birth rate and population growth were relatively low. In England and Sweden the landless married later than those who owned land.5 to 1. young adults often worked as servants to the better-off until they could marry. In England it peaked at about 1. compared with about thirteen per thousand in India today. in France it never exceeded 1 percent during the nineteenth century. France. and North America In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the beginning of the nineteenth century infant mortality rates exceeded 200 per thousand live births in many communities of Europe. about 40 .6 percent in the 1820s. Nearly 45 percent of the increase in the population of the British Isles during 1846-1932 emigrated. Now the key to high income is education. twenty-eight per thousand in Germany in 1867. and were more than 300 per thousand in what is now Germany. The crude death rate in France and England was about thirty per thousand at the beginning of the nineteenth century.5 percent a year. By contrast. In the rural 58 areas of many developing countries. in the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth century. fertility was lower than it is in developing countries today because marTiage rates were low and because those who married did so in their mid-twenties to late twenties or even in their thirties. so marriage is delayed and fertility is restricted. Europe's rate of population growth rose from 0. and New Zealand.5 percent a year. Marriage occurred particularly late in Ireland. deaths. and more than thirty per thousand in Sweden in 1870. where education beyond a few years is not available. About 50 million people left Europe for Australia. extended family systems permit earlier marriage. such contracts occurred between different families as well as between parents and children. England. compared with forty-seven per thousand in Colombia in 1960 and more than fifty per thousand in Kenya today (see Figure 4. except where cottage industry opened up new opportunities to earn a living. compared with an average of 100 per thousand in low-income developing countries today.Economic transformation:Europe. and the family's assets are shared. The rich send their children to school. Canada. No country in northwestern Europe had a crude birth rate above forty per thousand in 1800. France. it was much higher. Populations grew due to gradual declines in mortality and. As a result of low fertility and high mortality. Finally. crude birth rates are estimated to have been between fifty and fifty-five per thousand. Even that was low by modern standards.1). Another reason for slow population growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that mortality. Japan. Ireland's poverty led to late marriage and often to spinsterhood. so marital fertility was high. In 1871 half the Irish women aged twenty-five to twenty-nine were still unmarried (compared with 36 percent of English women). The contrast with fertility patterns today is marked. These studies indicate that as many as 15 to 20 percent of women in northwest Europe never married and that at any given time only 45 to 50 percent of women between the ages of fifteen and fifty were married. What would be the financial burden of marrying young and having children is reduced in the larger household (though even today marriage does come later and fertility is lower among the truly destitute in developing countries). Nevertheless. The crude birth rate in England was thirty-four per thousand in 1850. But religious beliefs prohibited birth control. was high by today's standards. and births in parts of Europe. to increases in marriage rates as new economic opportunities opened up. First. Norway. although gradually declining. the natural increase in population seldom exceeded 1. Germany. in several (Denmark. and Scandinavia. these natural increases were themselves partly siphoned off in emigration. before marital fertility began to decline. The poor in particular were forced to postpone marriage. At its peak (1881-1910) emigration was equivalent to 20 percent of the increase in Europe's population. population and income increases accelerated together. It was twenty-three per thousand in England in 1841. The mean age at marriage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was about twenty-five in Belgium. and Sweden) birth rates were nearer thirty per thousand. the early phase of modern economic growth in northwest Europe. They were about 250 per thousand in Sweden. Newly married couples had to set up their own households and thus had to postpone marriage until they were financially independent. when the industrial age began in the late eighteenth century. For particular countries. in some areas. the United States. A common arrangement was for older couples to pass land to the young in exchange for a guarantee of retirement support. for several reasons. The new couple often lives with the husband's parents for some time. In the past two decades historical demographers have used church registers to compile new and detailed information on marriages.

1965. they could adopt sons from outside the family. mean age at marriage was high. and Spain emigrated between 1846 and 1932. and between 30 and 40 percent of the increase in population of Italy. children outside the line of descent were forced to leave the household by marrying into another family or supporting themselves elsewhere. assuring slow but steady growth in each village. As in Europe. Detailed religious records of four villages in relatively affluent regions of Japan show that crude birth rates rarely exceeded thirty per thousand. exceeded population growth so that living standards gradually rose.1 Fertility and mortality transition in developed and developing countries.. Portugal. 1980. a figure lower than would be expected in a premodern society. population grew very slowly. 1860-1982 Crude rate (per thousand) 60 50 England and Wales Births Kenya 40 30 Births Deaths Deaths __ 20 10 1860 Crude rate (per thousand) 60 50 40 30 20 10 1870 1880 1890 1900 France 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 Colombia 1970 1982 Births Births Deaths 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 1982 Sources: Easterlin. The costs of chil- dren were shared neither within an extended family nor by the community. between twenty-two and twentyfive. This was more than the natural growth of population. and mothers tended to be between thirty-two and thirty-eight when their last child was born-evidence of con59 . Death rates tended to move in line with birth rates. ed. and economic growth.FIGURE 4. Couples had an average of just over three children. an acceptable and frequently used option. so Ireland's population fell between the 1840s and the end of the century. About 40 percent of women aged fifteen to forty-four were not married. Habakkuk and Postan. Nor did parents need sons to secure the line of descent. For Ireland annual gross emigration averaged 1. Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth century presented a similar picture. One explanation for low fertility was the Japanese "stem family": when they grew up.3 percent for the rest of the century. Fertility was not high.9 percent of mean population in 1851-61 and 1. More than 7 percent of Scandinavia's population emigrated to the United States between 1880 and 1890. although uneven. Marriage rates fluctuated with economic conditions: for people in their early twenties. percent of the mid-period population. from as low as 14 percent to as high as 80 percent when times were good.

as it now tends to do. so people did not need to be well educated (as they now do) to work in the modern economy. especially in what encouraged couples to choose smaller families? Three decades ago the reasons fertility declined in today's developed world might have been stated quite simply. Where population growth was most rapid. living conditions improve. fertility responds to falling mortality and adjusts downward. and later in Japan. could give people the foresight to limit childbearing. and the safety valve of emigration. increases in a geometrical ratio . In Europe. the rural population in most parts of Asia and Africa today is still growing by more than 2 percent a year. In a few places fertility decline preceded mortality decline.scious control of family size. And economic growth-if narrowly perceived as industrialization. What are the lessons for developing countries in what caused fertility to decline in today's developed world. so mortality begins to fall. On the second assumption. If it is assumed that parents did not report the births of infants killed. Fertility was relatively high. rich in natural resources and with good economic opportunities. probably by abortion and infanticide. and improved living standards could lead to "new . All these factors-combined with low birth rates. fertility did not start falling soon after mortality did. By the 1880s Japan's agricultural labor force was already declining. The transition to lozvfertility In 1798 the English parson Thomas Malthus wrote in the Essay on Populationhis now-familiar proposition that "Population. Compared with Europe and Japan. only by more deaths. His first assumption also proved incorrect. brought to Europe. Malthus later modified his views. . birth rates may have been higher than measured. eventually producing the slower rate of population growth that prevailed before economic conditions started to improve. and the shift from family to factory production-was neither necessary nor sufficient for demographic transition. . since there is evidence that more boys than girls survived. and real incomes rise continuously. and later to other economies. The proposition rested on two assumptions: technological change could not increase food supply faster than population. death rates that declined slowly as a consequence of economic and not merely medical advance. Why the delay? Average real incomes rose by more than 1 percent a year in the nineteenth . By 1850 fewer than half of England's population lived in rural areas. About one-third of total growth in population during 1850-1910 came from immigration of workingage people. In fact the story is not so simple. geometrical increases in agricultural and industrial production. experienced faster population growth in the nineteenth century. especially if it is supplied by the capital-intensive developed countries. There is a lag between falling mortality and falling fertility. North America. he noted in later editions of his Essay. almost 100 years after the start of the Industrial Revolution and at least as long after a sustained decline in mortality had begun. at least for Europemeant that population growth never represented the burden that it now does for developing countries. urbanization. and population growth (at least of the poorer classes) would not be limited by fewer births. Nor did technology displace labor." Population growth. he suggested in his first essay. Subsistence increases 60 only in an arithmetical ratio. During the nineteenth century rural population growth in today's developed countries averaged less than 1 percent a year. despite substantial migration to towns and cities. The Industrial Revolution. mortality was low. Contrary to what Malthus feared. The demographic situation of today's developed countries in the nineteenth century differed from what is happening in today's developing countries in several other respects. in North America. when unchecked. . . a new age of technological change. land was plentiful. tastes and habits" before rising income induced a self-defeating rise in population. In contrast. together with heavy immigration from Europe. Baby girls were probably the main victims. universal education. and what has come to be called the "demographic transition": the transition from high to low fertility and mortality rates. boosted the rate of population growth well above 2 percent in the early years of the century. But fertility began to decline earlier than in Europe. in others. With economic growth. In England fertility within marriage did not begin to fall until the 1870s. could be checked only by a shortage of food and a resulting increase in deaths. so the population growth rate fell well below 2 percent by the early twentieth century. Technology was less advanced in the nineteenth century. beginning just before Malthus wrote. but one follows the other quickly enough so that economic gains are not eaten up by a larger population. these conditions. the pattern of declining mortality and fertility was not so orderly-nor is it today in developing countries.

The percentage of farm owners in the agricultural work force rose from 42 to 57 percent between 1880 and 1930. When fertility began to decline. It also changed inheritance customs. the belief that one's children can rise in social status. Education was more widespread than in England. Similarly. followed by England and Wales in the 1890s. Perhaps as a result. Sweden's economy was still largely rural. fertility fell among landowners. When fertility started to decline. During much of the twentieth century. for most of the nineteenth century the costs to parents of educating children were confined to those at the top of the income scale. It brought new aspirations (perhaps including the education of children). at least after 1820. although unskilled workers and farm laborers (only a small fraction of the rural population owned their own land) enjoyed some increase in wages. Nonetheless. though within linguistic and cultural boundaries and not quickly across them (see Box 4. in 1870 almost 60 percent of children were in school. no other European country went below that level until Belgium and Switzerland in the 1880s. France never experienced a long period of falling death rates and high birth rates. The decline in fertilitv could not have been confined to the educated. forestry. Most women continued to have their first two babies within the expected interval of two to three years. Women's wage rates were rising especially fast. (Such new opportunities similarly provide a rationale for early marriage and high fertility in transitional societies today. the economy was changing. which caused an initial rise in birth rates as rural industry provided job opportunities outside agriculture. But. Abortion laws were 61 . Japan provides still another story. It did so also in other parts of Europe. it did so first among the professional middle class. it was the upper. during its great famine. the early phase of England's industrialization permitted earlier marriage. and made individual choice (as opposed to family and communal authority) more legitimate. a large body of French opinion has been persistently pronatalist. But fertility within marriage was as high in 1950 as it had been in 1930. fewer children made it easier to keep family landholdings intact. lengthened substantially. consisted mainly of small peasant holdings. Its population. the intervals between the second birth and the third. Only 8 percent of school-age children were enrolled at school in 1851. reduced allegiance to religious norms. In Sweden the demographic transition followed the classical pattern more closely. In the seventy-nine French departments for which data are available. unlike British. however. when mortality was still high. but it increased the number of families by giving more young people the chance to set up a household. the birth rate started falling in the 1860s due to later age at marriage. Soon after the French Revolution in 1789. former French colonies in West Africa still bear that legacy. the idea of controlling fertility spread quickly in France. But the French Revolution promoted what French demographers call social capillarity. fertility declined gradually as marriage age rose. which elsewhere produced a surge of population growth. Only as education spread did fertility decline in all groups.3). which felt most keenly the need to educate its children. with 74 percent of the work force in the late 1880s engaged in agriculture.) Rural industry may not have increased the income of any one family. is now unexceptional. by about 1960. despite much progress. In addition. and especially between the third and the fourth. As discussed in Chapter 8. fertility began to fall in France as early as the 1790s. Farm productivity had been rising rapidly from the 1860s. in Hungary and Poland peasant landowners began in the nineteenth century to limit their families so that their children could inherit a workable piece of land. Then.and middle-income groups that captured most of the income gains. once large compared with its neighbors. By the 1830s the French birth rate had fallen below thirty per thousand. Finally. under equal inheritance. The fertility of landowners was consistently lower than that of landless farm workers. There was pronatalist opinion between the 1920s and 1945 in support of Japan's expansionist policies. The death rate had started falling in the 1830s. During the nineteenth century. Apart from Ireland in the 1840s. French farming. After 1945 the national mood changed and public policy started to favor small families. As in France. Average incomes were rising from at least the 1860s. Parish records show that families in some villages were small enough to indicate that parents were deliberately controlling fertility. Those without land of their own left for the cities or emigrated to America. and fishing. Fertility within marriage decreased in the 1890s. only one in four people marrying was able to sign the parish register in 1786-90.century. Though urbanization and industrialization came later to France than to England. still only 59 percent were enrolled in 1891. it dropped by half.

n f-I i.n ..-p.. I r. ..ail j pr--.d i.. tdih ianat d p . . .. b 311 r p.i.r..--.tt .h. i.I. . r_hIiJi-u -i -I. r.r: .iri-.dI--p-r1w .troIi I1 c r.-r. IcriI . -nt D..* hay .r. V.hc-in un.i - Fr..-.4 ii and careic r Li 1 5% L iIS I r-cu L I u'l and latcr N . -c y r i rn r i-f ard nJ Ih n r..'ret- i-Žr. -.Etur.. ( rnr.. td l-c-iL 1--h y . ril. rus.r..r I 1 . t :.1 i rs.-r.r rni II .l F-erlI .-data t2 I - m~~~ 1' I - - : ~~ ~- -.ntaridL ~rr. ..c.r. .n pF.in.h. -: *r ....wr-. . -.:.h.r. r..t luJ r ..1 ri-i tyu. h r r.ir.1.i .r..irl -ir. ylr r. r il .. r. 1.G .3. * riI t 11 ir gn rizr. .d -I ir.i i l-r.r. .tl rr. r~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ u r i ...r- EIc[. ri...-c. --d rri. -. II Jl p.r: -.iurh>J -cr1-ur * . I I I in .ru rI.. bt Ii.an Ih. i-r.. ~~~~~ - I I~ i.r .h. 1%'' The European fertility transition crIrlihi.ea EI...... . arr. ri. !i#!'1]9095 r. r .Li ?-.lirflr. r. . -ri n i.11-*. -i r t-: .h ..t :. r. ..rtilir-..nr F..n ._ .d 1I Itiwlui r. .inl Fp1 Iin..n .s: 3.i.. I. .r i... * n Jr. - :cr. .-.d --t.ni... i 1 -Fair liiii-i *Ic ri .ir r.d rhn inii ciiiEijr--pr i:-jrichcq.ni ..I1.' nd .:rFrnr. l ii. r.. *<ff~~~~ -I- v Fuiy ~ -r~r.rhirii i\ 'll. Il p. in.. .-r I lIy?t .. n -i Il L. I*.n.l-\ . lir.. hr. rt -t irI .c.iiriaiir pI ii 5Larting dates of Iertilh transition in Etropean provincesIJb-1%h4 tI r i Qol . .t.. I... -ir. I* r n. .Box 4. I-. riyal :r r 'ii h r..I -..r..r. . -brrlyrwri . h r_h :.liri *-h r p1c.. .t lfr.r. .gI rd l. in IcL ti e r!.:ri.in Hr. c rhs t.-AlI i wr. nIi cn n IP 411 i FI r-. -rl n ilii el Iiar In Fr. u' F r-n--: 190 1950 yIr.iuI. .n . ['cii r. [ ] js. Wr.iprr: *. r.3 P.trc-nI4 d -3r.u. l3' t .ni ri~raII . .-.'-- _ .. h..inteni n. r rA d-. .nn.1 tri -i--.c . r . rr..AIiri S.cnl .ng r u. I.hril-...: ..u rEIrrr R.map.r I 1.ih. r.r. y-r .ulisrie -lilly. Thi[i:z...::A. drhIim..:l ch L r r ir . Ii u-d nil Iiip ir.

the decline accelerated in the 1950s and spread to all developing countries. and Japan social aspirations and land ownership help explain why smallholders chose to limit their families. Growth at 3 percent a year means that in seventy years population grows eightfold. In many. largely because of falling death rates (see Figure 4. As a result. and possibly infanticide. so that growth has slowed somewhat. In 1984 the world's population will increase by about 80 million. Most of the increase.0 percent in 1950 to 2. and contraception. Hungary. and birth rates are not declining everywhere. Fertility fell as education spread and became more necessary to earn a living. In general. at 1 percent a year it merely doubles. * Economic and social opportunities for the majority of people matter. so. it began from higher initial levels (see Figure 4. but was slow to do so farther afield. 1. Current population growth in the developing economies is a phenomenon for which economic and demographic history offers no real precedent. and where education was confined to the middle class through most of the nineteenth century. Though in the past two decades rates of population growth in some countries have been falling because of birth rate declines. largely because of improved living standards-medicine had contrib- uted little. The spread of the idea that fertility control is legitimate occurs more quickly as transport and communication become easier-a potentially powerful force now in developing countries compared with Europe before the twentieth century. Fertility decline was delayed in England. when mortality began to decline. In today's developed countries. * Low fertility is possible. growth is fastest in the poorest countries. Japan. The postwar rate of population growth in developing countries is without precedent.4 percent in 1965. * The mere idea that it is legitimate to limit births matters. by the 1920s and 1930s mortality decline was spreading from Europe and North America to Japan. With the introduction of antibiotics. Hungary. Mortality had already been falling slowly in Europe and the Americas. the consolidation of political and administrative systems. will occur in developing countries. and parts of Central and South America. The combination of continued high fertility and much-reduced mortality has led to population growth of between 2 and 4 percent a year in most low. In France and some other European countries fertility declined rapidly within cultural and linguistic boundaries. rates of growth are still unusually high. Not only did this mortality decline occur rapidly. But once economic and social conditions are favorable. which 63 .2). compared with 1 percent and less in most developed countries. At least initially it was not followed by fertility decline.2) and in societies where fertility levels were higher. Current demographic change in developing countries Only in a few developing countries have population growth rates fallen below 2 percent a year in the past two decades.liberalized. where the real wages of farm laborers and unskilled workers rose only slowly. What are the lessons for developing countries? * Fertility can decline in largely rural populations. spread. antimalarial spraying. now comprising about three-quarters of world population.and middle-income countries. Since then. In Sweden fertility decline was associated with rapid productivity gains in agriculture and with an increase in the share of landowners among all agricultural workers. as the Japanese experience has proved. and Sweden. For developing countries as a group. but it does not spread automatically. it did so in France. death rates have continued to fall but birth rates have declined even more. Improved communications. population growth rates rose from 2. but much more difficult. were withdrawal and abstinence. and cheaper transport all made it easier to transfer the new advances between and within countries. The current demographic condition of developing countries can be summed up in seven statements. This delinking of population growth and prosperity in what is now the developing world began after World War 1. The rate of natural increase (and of population growth) in developing countries is now about 2 percent a year. But in the early years of the twentieth century. The fall in the average growth rate is due almost entirely to the birth rate decline in China. medical science found ways to combat infectious disease. In France. about 73 million. population is still growing by more than 3 percent a year. late marriage and celibacy were important contributors. modern contraception speeds the decline in fertility. probably. especially use of condoms. without sophisticated modern methods of birth control. abortion. and the increased use of vaccination. India.

. ..1 -R_ 10 1950 Middle East and North Africa 1965 12.8 2018. 1980 1950 Industrialized countries 1965 1980 64 .. A.5 1980 21.II Il%23.6---1980 20 ' Caribbean so 44. .outh Asia 14. 1965.9 ~.8 -.7 1980 49..5 1965 1980 43. .- . .. .2 Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region. 18. 1950 1965 1980 . -.I1950 .8 Sub-Saharan Africa 10 1950 1965 17. .4 . _ Deaths Deaffis (per thousand: 4 ~~ ~ ~ ~ I 4 ~ J''.FIGURE 4. 1950 1965 8.. 1950. and 1980 Crude birth rate (per thousand) Rate of natural increase (percent) Crude death rate- 25 42. - .9 4 . 40 - 20 24.5 .9 - 30 220 w ' t 5.4 7. F-r ¾-) (excluding China) 10. 'q . .-45..I 10 1950 1965 ._ . 42.

1 and Figure 4.2 3.1 23. Guatemala.8 37.alone accounts for a third of all the people in developing countries and where the birth rate has fallen by over 50 percent since 1965 (see Table 4. In countries such as Kenya.6 4. (In fact. 1965-82 Crude birth rate decline Total fertility rate decline Region and couintry Sub-Saharan Africa Ethiopia Kenya Nigeria 1965-82 5.4 35.5 5.5 30. selected countries.0 9.4 42. population grows at about 3 percent a gr pp year.4). In the middle-income countries of Latin America as well.9 55.3 Morocco Tunisia Latin America and Caribbean Bolivia Brazil Colombia Cuba Guatemala Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Peru South Asia Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka 19.8 38. as death rates have fallen.2). birth rates are above forty per thousand and have changed little or not at all. Honduras. In Colombia.6 30.1 18. in Indonesia and elsewhere by 20 to 30 percent.9 to 38. especially in the past decade. a demographic transition to low fertility is clearly under way.4 22.0.5 29. from just above 2 percent a year in the early 1960s to 2. and is now about thirty-four per thousand. population growth rates are generally above 3 percent.6 +0. for example.7 1. Until this group has completed its childbearing years. In these generally middle-income economies.1 31. Cuba.0 18. overall birth rates will remain high. Israel.1 Percentage decline in crude birth rates and in total fertility rates.6 61. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the birth rate has barely fallen and exceeds forty per thousand. and Turkey).3 7. even if actual family size is small.5 6.0 22. In Brazil and Mexico birth rate declines have been more modest than in East Asia but have still been rapid. had there been no change in the marriage rate and marital fertility. the total fertility rate has fallen even more (see Table 4. the birth rate would have risen by 1.1 percent in 1982.) the mid-1960s mean that in developing countries today 2. where fertility has declined little or not at all.7 22.7 24.5 17.5 percent. and Nicaragua. Thailand. In South Asia the birth rate has fallen barely enough to offset some further decline in the death rate.0 26. Morocco.4 51. of ~~Philippines 32. In most countries where the crude birth rate has * fallen.7 20. Lebanon.0 0. Rep.3 28.8 20. In Bolivia and Peru the growth rate is still about 2. Tunisia.4 34.9 East Asia and Pacific China ~~~~~~~~~~~ Thailand Indonesia Korea. and Jamaica birth rates have also fallen. population growth has increased.0 43.2 42. But in the poorer countries. it fell by 3 points as marriage age rose and married couples had fewer children. more than 50 percent of the population is younger than fifteen.4 1965-82 3.9 18.3 25.8 6.2 10.3 12.6 21.6 14.8 18. including El Salvador. which has slowed the rate of population growth.9 increase in the proportion of women of marriage and childbearing age. birth rates have fallen more than death rates. Birth rates have also fallen in other countries of East Asia-in Hong Kong. In Africa and much of the Middle East (with the exception of Egypt. because of the .7 30. but much less in others. Korea.6 31.4 3.2 54. and Singapore by more than 30 percent. compared 65 countries is now of childbearing age.6 12. from 36. the total fertility rate is the number of children a woman would have if she experienced current age-specific fertility rates of all women (see Box 4.0 0. The high fertility and faIling Infant mortality of proportalioyin ofetodays population in devealonge proportion of today's population in developing about 40 percent of populations are aged fifteen or younger. birth rates are still more than thirty-five per thousand and population growth rates close to or greater than 3 percent a year. The total fertility rate has fallen more because high fertility and declining moralit the bease and f9tls mand taalarge TABLE 4.8 8.9 15.0 1.8 Middle East and North Africa Algeria Egypt Iran Sudan Zaire E3.1). India's birth rate has fallen markedly in some states. Sri Lanka is the only country of the region with a birth rate less than thirty per thousand.1 points from 1971 to 1981.0 16. In India.

. r ~-r J.1 rd .c *r 1ril a 1.i I. 1 I tir.i.t. I Ii.up4 r- iz r. rri..-n.. The economic implications of this growth are discussed in the next chapter.: .r. .hil' n r.r.rrh4 ind .ti. Develping couentriveshnde rural-ubnmga urban migrlation. . t tiIrp. t hr n1ud rI h. I l-.J t-. . r.. bn rud J. [ i.~ ~ I-i rrtn *i-ir. The age structure in developing countries means that birth rates will remain high for some time even if each mother has fewer children.rF. n. lk.: Ii I. r. .in lie Netherir .r I F F it r-d rrd.p.s - :r.Ith H .iIh r:. r . r.1 ~ l'-. there are roughly two people of working age to support one who is either too old or too young to work.id r.-rtiI.r *i Id-t -. the working-age population will increase from 15 million in 1980 to almost 25 million in 2000. tlii! rrb*. ti. I it r. tl-u. .ur.i..u t . d ..tvn.r. rr. -r i.. from 48 million to 84 million. . tth b--.- p. 1 4j4.n ni. ir. IFt .Ti-n ri r... 'h h. 3.-. n i r.. -r.h nr-...Li.. I P. i.v. Inurba Colombia... Fr. mu. p r. rndi t:im pr.: Ii..F.-1 h. Li I 1.. :. For countries where fertility began to fall in the mid-1960s.7~ fer-l-.-0.e r i sr r- 1.: ...p:i Ii rc.-ir.a ih.1 -.. 4 n. *y nit.1t-.r ri I I Fin .c p .iI rIb.- *i. only one in five is younger than fifteen.j IF. hj.. Although the proportion of old people is smaller in developing countries. ni.: ame is .n. t. p I.a Neiuther iternopl nritration Higiiration alowh offersti ral populationi increase account more for the rapid prut f iisi peeopncutre thndesrrl Maharashtra state (India). ir. . -. r. in Kenya.nrrr'.rh-. ..rr. hAd I h-.Ld L.I . rtI itr.i ri. though the absolute number of new workers will continue to increase until after the end of this century.i ~ d i. n t1. t. The number of people older than sixty-five will almost double between now and 2000 in developing countries. income per person in Japan would nevertheless be at least 30 percent higher..t.r -.7. Historically...i inrm. In developed countries the number will increase by about a third (but by about 85 percent in Japan).n. .u.F .i n.IhI pl..b. In Japan. n. Despivte extnsivea arurasfl-urbancomiga tsian. d F-r . rL.. In 66 growth ofgcitieson. a. %ui. -* r. the dependency ratio-the proportion of the population under fifteen and over sixty-four to those between ages fifteen and sixty-four-is on average higher.J. -~. I rII r. .. the ratio is less than one-to-one. Fi-..-. In Bangladesh it will almost double.r.i.. 'nn:. -r-hi.h nrA J.rnvi--ri. ryr. F.dveopn consiutires asalpoprino teppltoso eeoigcutis Cities in developing countries are growing at almost twice the rate of overall populations (see Table 4.Box 4. iir.i rh.1I t.. .r.p.h.d. it: iCr a ~. -.I it t-irrrih - . il r 'u h.i-cause the I. Thepreent scaltempofay iontentionesal smigallpootion.r.-I -i II ii.r d~ r r. pi . rI-..p-Fuii. -rud.. -rr rhu. Other things being equal. iir ni: pq7ur..2 ih. .. population growth in developing countries will be higher than in developed countries.. Even within the sarm-e country there are comparable differences in age structure-and hence in dependencyburdns-amng fmilie. 1 I-d 1- rd duiO ic- rth. the rate of growth of the labor force is now just starting to decline.-' ic over sixty- nirr ri . I Alternative measures of fertility and mortality p.l ir. nr m:nr-i inin time exr group or ni. .. .t. In other age groups as well. . rr I tF.-ud. tha -trrm ri ruckt :birth r3r. -. .r i-t. - h..-li .3). in the richest 20 percent. ul.r. .> . ji. i l t *1 M..t . u-p r..rp.F. ~ -~ r. .i h t- k.uin .-r.2).. about half the people in the poorest 10 percent of households are younger than fifteen. in ih.i-if -. *fp. *.-r th. for example.rrh. I.- :.iir ~r-'I.4 ..rti-m .rtiliii. versus 7. h-.r 1.i .-s have iirrdIi r3t : in that . I-i ii L-k~ ih.C- with only 20 to 25 percent in developed countries (see Table 4.. . I th:rri nd- I.iii. :1in F: d. I.r I Iril r.-.3 in the ~ Ft-rr i m i... r-.. t- LI. surIrri .rt. l-FI..b:. if income per worker were identical in Japan and Kenya.ri. -I r-nun -.I in1.V ' . .n. populato grothiin ruer aerceas of low-incomear als Asia andseAfricalestillavernagesna2peircetior more apear.. It also means the number of young people entering the labor force will continue to increase for the next two decades.. . -r. I.d.t .bt per inaet pouandtemo ary..rr.: r3ir .. I.. rn-Fnt I. -r. ....'r it. for example. ~ r ni .r r-. d P.I.1 1.ii q. nPI. I..:ir.:' Ilii.-.Nihrntna oriteainl"igtonfes 3. -I i .-I r .. h s been .1.Irii. I th-: 1--ahrib i. hni- Tiruol. :- . I I iiFrr I>I.r h~. .: -ri. i-prr du. .I. rn-.I -itI.. i Ji-rih rFin Ill t. death rate !---l-r than the 1 4 pmr. t I. .i FtL-.i 4 ~ II.. -...-r.. nu[. . ir:. v -..:ri ui. . _ i. i-. t.rh r-A I .il.. ilh. t. Fr. r. More than half the increase is due to the balance of births over deaths. dem .ir-.[ .rul.. r .I.L. r tIn~ rhr. the rest is due to migration from rural areas and the reclassification of rural areas to urban status..rir .rk F.hIrti. r. r . 1... I1. ii r udJ. irn .- -ri t i rir.i. 1.p.. the . p o.- it. I 1-r.

the world's second TABLE 4. the urban population of the United States increased at about 6 percent a year between 1830 and 1860.1 15.6 14. and Naples.0 1.2 75.2 31. Weighted average.0 4.3 19.0 0.9 8.1 1.1 4.5 4.7 2.2 Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries.7 11.8 1. 16.9 2.1 0.3 8.7 25.0 1..9 59.7 41.7 15.0 100.7 57.4 65.0 3. a.1 54.9 57.1 4.0 100.3 31.0 100.6 1.8 6.2 .4 -0.6 46.2a 43. In 1980 about two-thirds of its people were urban dwellers.5 0. Lowincome Asia and Africa are still overwhelmingly rural.6 7. of Colombia Bangladesh Kenya a.3 . Detroit. b.4 24.1 77.-1.7 66.7 4.5 34.0 17.1 India Africa Middle-income East Asia and Pacific Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and Caribbean Southern Europe Industrial countriesb Not available.7 19.7 3.6 10.4 19.7 25. so the absolute increases are much greater.9 28.0 100.. Sao Paulo.1 4.6 1.9 46.3 23.5 16.0 urban populations of some of today's developed countries have grown even faster-for example.9 22.5 13.7 61.9 2.8 1.3 7.8 3.9 1980 28.8 1.9 1..1 4. Rural Excluding China Low-income Asia China 22.8 4. 1980 Age distribution (percent) Countrygroup All developed countries Japan United States Hungary All developing countries Korea. Urban 3.0 100. which by the year 2000 could well be the world's second largest city (behind Mexico City).5 1.TABLE 4.9g 1. 1950-2000 Percentage urban population Average annual percentagegrowth 1950-80 1980-2000 Country group All developing countries 1950 18.2 10. But today's developing countries have started from a much larger base.8 3. a level reached in today's developed countries only in 1950.4 62.2 7.4 24.1 3.9 55.8 0.9 100. 1.4 15. Excludes East European nonmarket economies.4 2.0 13.0 100. 0-4 5-14 15-64 Over 65 All ages fertility rate 7.5 1.3 47.3 64.3 Rural and urban population growth.4 3.7 33.9 1.7 2000 .9 10.8 5.2 5.3 2. Rep. Latin America is the most urbanized of developing-country regions.6 27.8 2.2 35.0 3.5 2.0 62. growing at a rate of 15 percent a year.7 0.3 83.2 . Government estimate for 1979.0 100.6 2. was smaller in 1950 than Manchester. London.9 4. their current urbanization level of about 25 percent was reached in the developed countries before 1900. 3. Between 1950 and 1980 the proportion of urban dwellers in developing countries in cities of more than 5 million increased from 2 to 14 percent.5 -0.0 4.0 67 .7 Urbani .0 35.5 22.9 2.3 8.2a 3.0 100.9 1.8 49.6 65.9 41. From 1950 to 1980 the urban population of all developing countries (excluding China) increased by 585 million-compared with a total urban population in the developed countries in 1950 of just over 300 million.8 1. The world's biggest cities are increasingly in the developing countries.1 11.6 67.0 13.4 Rural 1.

1 16. tempotmoayB o rary foreign workers in Europe. will not even rank among the twenty-five largest by the end of the century (see Figure 4. Despite the rapid growth of cities. a large low-income country. present-day permanent emigration rates are small: between 1970 and 1980 emigration absorbed about 3 percent of population growth in Europe and Latin America.7 11.7 11. 1975. constituted 30 percent of the work force in Luxembourg. Yokohama 10. Permanent emigration has only a limited effect on reducing the work force in developing countries.6 New Jersey Rio deJaneiro Calcutta Seoul Cairo.8 Shanghai Beijing Greater Bombav Jakarta Los Angeles.3). temporary emigrants constitute only a small proportion of the Sao Paulo New York. Giza. 1980. Compared with rates of intercontinental migration from Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both the rates of growth and the increase in numbers greatly exceed those of today's developed countries in the nineteenth century. and Portugal. so that a considerable growth of numbers will continue in the countryside for the rest of this decade and beyond. But. less than 2 percent of the projected growth in population in the low-income countries between 1982 and 2000 would have emigrated.6 10.rc. Canada.5 million._______1980____ 68 . New Zealand. Togo.4). Argentina and Venezuela had about 2 million workers from Bolivia.largest city in 1950.9 12.1 Long Beach Madras Greater Buenos Aires Karachi Bogota Tehran Baghdad Si.2 12. By contrast. France.7 19.8 19. and about 8 percent in Belgium.2 11. as with permanent emigration.0 24. In the major labor-importing countries of the Middle East. the period when overall population growth in those countries was highest. For India.2 London London Tokyo. such immigration would 1950 1975 2000 account for 22 percent of the projected natural (millions) 1950 New York. numbering about 6. By 1974. and 2000 Dev oping countries 0 Developing countries p! i h the relatively better-off. In India.7 14.3 Urban agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants: 1950.7 New York. Thonburi Delhi Paris Istanbul Osaka. middle-income countries: Greece. and these tend to be FIGURE 4. Paraguay. l r | Ba . middle-icome countries. Kobe 12.8 31. and Germany.4 10. The rural population of all developing countries is likely to increase by another billion people by the middle of the next century.1 Manila Bangkok.2 13. the urban share of today's developing-country populations is not increasing especially fast. the rural population will still increase by 130 million.9 11. northeast 25.9 17. The past three decades have seen a marked increase in temporary migration. northeast New Jersey Mexico City Los Angeles. even if 700. and in low-income countries from a large base. and all came from Developed countries i .8 11. more than 18 percent in Switzerland. 19. the emigration rate was only 0.2 percent. northeast New Jersey 1975 (millions) 12. mostly from Mali. To take a simple example.000 immigrants a year were admitted to the major host countries up to the year 2000.3 11.. 14. Hong Kong. and Colombia.7 11. United Nations.2 increase in population of the industrial market economies and 36 percent of the projected increase in the main host countries: Australia.9 Long Beach 2000 Mexico City Tokyo. and the urban population could increase by 170 million. for example.3 11.0 16.3 11. though urban rates of population growth are likely to be about four times higher than rural rates in the next two decades. 22.1 S___-_______U__ited_____Nations. c : 1111low-income countries. Only for a few countries are permanent emigration rates high. less than 1 percent in Asia and Africa (see Table 4. Yokohama Shanghai Sao Paulo 10.4 17. and Upper Volta.8 11. about 2 million foreign workers constituted more than 40 percent of the employed work force in 1975. They came mostly from nearby. and the United States. Ghana and the Ivory Coast employed about 1 million foreign workers in 1975. -. Imbaba 22.1 11. This is because not only urban but also rural populations are growing rapidly.

and Africa. educational advances. The relation between average income and the total fertility rate in developing countries is shown in Figure 4. and higher incomes. India. yet India's per capita income is still below $300 a year and its literacy rate 69 Note: Numbers are calculated from data on gross immigration in Australia. About 2 to 4 million immigrants were living illegally in the United States in April 1980.0 0. In an individual country.30 2. and Morocco.9 1. Rising incomes and associated improvements in nutrition and sanitation have in general played a lesser role. better health. the lower its fertility and the higher its life expectancy. higher life expectancy (about sixty years). Source: Swamy. and how they interact. the same average income is associated with lower fertility and higher life expectancy in 1982 than in 1972. Life expectancy in India was fifty-five in 1982. and Sri Lanka. and Thailand are .4 and 4. These exceptions demonstrate the importance of the availability and distribution of health and educational services. Some countries have moved faster than others: Brazil. 5. But for Bangladesh and India as a whole.04 0. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent (Bangladesh.4 2. temporary workers are a large proportion of the emigrant country's labor force. Since the 1920s. the higher a country's average income. Average income is only one of the factors involved. and Pakistan) have the highest levels of fertility and mortality and the lowest incomes.3 0.03 0.1 0. Some of the 100 countries used in the analysis are identified in the figures. Indonesia. At the other extreme.0 1.5 associated with lower fertility and mortality.7b 5.5.10 1. The reasons for the importance of these other factors. and even with its recent decline in fertility. For example. By contrast. countries with relatively high fertility (given their income) include Algeria.1 0. those with higher income tend to have more edu- 1881-1910 1911-40 1940-60 1960-70 19.01 Latin America' 0.4. southern Europe. Korea. The association across countries also tends to hold within countries. the extent to which adult women enjoy a status independent of childrearing. however.4 Africa' 0. China. Mexico. that countries must get richer before they can lower fertility and raise life expectancy.3 some of the countries that achieved relatively large reductions in fertility between 1972 and 1982. fertility averages five to eight children per woman. Venezuela. and Sri Lanka have relatively high life expectancy. has shifted over time. Examples include China. Countries of East Asia and Latin America have lower fertility (three to five children). the main reasons for rising life expectancy in developing countries have been better public health systems.2 0. despite income and education levels that in many countries are still lower.5 0. some countries have significantly lower fertility than the norm for those with their income level. Jordan. As a result. At most they would have constituted 8 percent of Mexico's total labor force in that year. More often than not.4 Permanent emigration as a percentage of increase in populations of emigrants' countries Period 1851-80 Europe 11. Colombia. and life expectancy is as low as fifty years. As Figures 4.7 Asia' 0. about half of them from Mexico. As Figure 4.5 show. b. It is wrong to conclude. India. Thailand. and the access of the poor to family planning services.5 14. 4. The total number of temporary workers abroad in 1980 was between 13 and 15 million. Emigration only to the United States. a quarter of Sri Lanka's decline in mortality after 1945 is attributable solely to the control of malaria. and between income and fertility. The relation between income and life expectancy. life expectancy is higher in developing countries than it was in today's developed countries at the turn of the century.TABLE 4. the proportion is less than 1 percent. and the United States. The same is true even of illegal migration. Mexico.8 cation. and between income and life expectancy in Figure 4. and especially since the end of World War II. current fertility and mortality rates are inversely related to income-but this rule hzas many significant exceptions. In general.01 0. Indonesia. Costa Rica. and the greater political stability that permitted these.4 shows. and-for women-more opportunities to work in modern sector jobs. New Zealand. fertility rose slightly in a few African countries. Canada. For some countries in the Middle East. labor force in developing countries. 1984. As Chapter 6 emphasizes.9 1970-80 4. are discussed in Chapter 6. The periods from 1850 to 1960 pertain to emigration only to the United States.2 0. a. most countries of sub-Saharan Africa. these characteristics are all 0.

1982 Kenyal India vordan 50 Ethiopia .4 Fertility in relation to income in developing countries. 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 8 Kenya Jordan 7 Bangladesh H * \ 1972 1982 Morocco Ethiopia. 1972 3 2 Greec Hong Kong Yugoslavia Norm for 98 developing countries. 1972 60 Sri Lanka t Thailand Korea Egypt Norm for 98 developing countries. 1982 1 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) $4000 $5000 $6000 FIGURE 4. 1972 and 1982 Life expectancy at birth 80 Costa Rica Greece Malaysia Yugoslavi 70 re Trinidad and Tobago N China Philippi " z h < ey I.Algeria s Norm ~~~~~~~~~~~~for 92 developing countries.Morocco Indnei* 71 /Tanzania Nigeria Sudan 1972 * 1982 | 40 Upper Volta 30 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) $4000 $5000 $6000 70 . .5 Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries.Idnei\ Thailand Sri Lanka Colombia Costa Rica Trinidad and Tobago China Korea Singap * 4 \ i \ Brazil_- Norm for 92 developing countries.FIGURE 4. 6 Sda igeria hiippines Mlexico Tanzania \El Salvador Nepal ZIre India 5 PeruX Trkey ~~~~MalaysiaVneu.

and most Korean couples want at least one son.5 in the 1950s. Colombia.5 in 1970.0. It is lowest in Java. so improved contraceptive services could reduce fertility. 6. while older women favor even more. But there is considerable variation. But there is also a new cause for concern. Sweden. But Sri Lankan women have one child more than they want. Lower mortality and fertility can be achieved even in the poorest countries.3 per year.7 in 1981. although average income (in 1982 dollars) was more than $1. England. to 4. India. total fertility rates rose only a little above 3 even during this baby boom and have declined to less than 2 since. where the Green Revolution has brought agricultural modernization. has been declining in many developing countries faster than it did in today's developed countries. More important.000 (in 1982 dollars). Life expectancy in England. but very slowly. Indonesia's total fertility rate fell from 5. Between 1972 and 1982 there was a further downward shift in the income-fertility relation. This cause of lower fertility may therefore now be exhausted. Fertility is also declining at lower levels of income. and Costa Rica have exceeded one point per year. on average. once fertility started falling in today's developed countries. Mortality has declined everywhere.below 40 percent. when the government began a vigorous family planning program. In India the total fertility rate in 1982 was 4. where fertility levels are still relatively high (though low given income levels in these countries).4 to an estimated 3. parents still want more than three children-an average of 3. Marital fertility started falling in most European provinces between 1880 and 1930. infant mortality lower. and the United States it took about fifty years to go from birth rates of thirty-five to twenty per thousand. Fertility fell as women married later. Some couples will have two girls and go on to another pregnancy. In many countries fertility continues to fall without interruption. The use of contraception has not increased since 1976. from 3. But even there it is still about 4. The family planning program has flagged recently for lack of political support.0 in 1960 to 3.8. and fertility has started to decline in many countries.6. modern communication has increased the speed with which the idea and legitimacy of fertility control can spread. most of the decline has occurred in a few southern states in which female literacy rates are higher. In contrast. and in some regions and countries the declines now seem to be stalled at relatively high levels. Education and income growth have been rapid. Marriage is universal. Korea. Except for the northern state of Punjab. actual fertility will not fall to replacement level even if the ideal number of children falls to two. especially in the 1960s. The country's marriage patterns are sensitive to economic conditions. But in most. the 71 . These long-term changes encourage optimism. Birth rate declines in China. Until that attitude changes. although knowledge is widespread: 98 percent of married women know of a source of modern contraception. and the barriers to continued declines may not yet have been reached. The fertility of uneducated women has fallen. Fertility.7 in 1982. especially male employment. so an economic revival in the late 1970s may have been the cause. Almost all countries outside Africa have experienced some fertility decline in the past two decades. and Sri Lanka. For Austria.000 and the literacy rate exceeded 80 percent in all three countries. In Costa Rica the total fertility rate fell dramatically from 7. and modern contraceptives have lowered the costs and increased the effectiveness of individual fertility control. It has continued to fall. when average income already exceeded $1. but the marriage age for women now averages twenty-four and is unlikely to rise further. down from about 6.7 in 1978. In Korea fertility is already low-a rate of 2. One analysis indicates that life expectancy in the developing countries in 1970 would have been about eight years lower had it not been for the improvements in public health. say women in their early twenties. But it has fluctuated around that level since. Though fertility rose in Europe and the United States for two decades after World War II. but each still has about five children. But since 1974 the total fertility rate has remained the same or even risen. and family planning services better run than in other parts of India. too. compared with half that figure when fertility decline began in Latin America and much of Asia. But since 1975 the decline seems to have slowed and even stopped in countries such as Costa Rica. rates are still high. The reasons fertility has stalled vary from country to country.3 in 1982. an average decline of 0. where the program has been most active. it went on falling more or less continuously. and the United States was still below fifty in 1900. Sri Lanka's initial decline in fertility was partly due to increases in marriage age.

but they were greater in China and probably also in India. ind-tr.:. 4.ni n 3 B../. x .h. .t pp.irb3 .: nt. r .nrnull. Filanrinth. rises are naturally slower in coming.hi.n3.1 '-. z mr. But in some developing countries. di h3. . Box 4. beyond that..1 percent a year.o..- . nL el-e .n marird 1-..kl . The average. Judging from recent research on desired family size in many developing countries.l`rr ir.b.. hrc 1m Is the rise in life expectanc) slowing too soon? in h~ clh3rr cI.lara di-r J. Much of the gain in life expectancy has come from various public health programs such as vaccination and antimalarial spraying. -rtr de. EunTr. where the fertility rate of 4. Trends in llle e%pedtnc-: mhiee de%hoping coudrtriei and the mean tend L.i i:'UT Ibu: CUrT rr le. rh.. this may well be the case.t:e n -* ccu.t - p' ire.ur. il. .s 'r he Th-.d..:r. easily met demand for contraception has been largely saturated at a level of fertility that is lower than it was.d ihi*h-xi-.I.rcenr..1. In iTr.. n m:.Žn er:.Trinidad3nd i D. population growth will remain rapid.-. l--. . ..nms. . or Ihit. 1971 :.h ik..nr T nr.-ndi .. Take the example of Indonesia.51 in L w.--d.nd d EI .n/ .3 outperik.I!a..si. '1 3 r pec3rn.l.5 Th. In the late 1970s parents still wanted about four children. Irl The . and 3..c .. < rhir ii h . This is especially true in Latin America. -i r.rit U .al r.r it 4ho .z.I. for example. t..t.7 by 1990... was 4.-..:r Eari.. life expectancy rose steadily until it reached about sixty...urittrhr l U1 ra3. .an . . :<.ll .min3il1. .:ri.3 is close to the desired family size..1. In Asia. 1'.LduMI.13le.h'rr i.dUn th it-. tre r .j.. 0-. even in those countries in which fertility had initially declined.s tr c.I. t ii?. The chart does indicate that gains t-II . t hilhhr. along with greater efforts to bring better family planning services to more people.lilghrI r Sri Lanka in the 1960s.t rp!e-.I nme. Nite ..-ac.1. t..uch llc arcdit-a40. fertility will fall further only with more social and economic change. d ru. ri7 I :': unrier .uc:h Duri. \car.c l-Q'i 3nd 1c1ii I.I.-'. dircic. . riac in sub-Saharan Africa.h. ir.nd to be sure.eIed :ailu. Yet stalling could also mean that initial.c maccl.it .rnredt rhe t..I.'n t Irn er.r Th.ut.Lr. count.ia ire Ii .: - x: . r . jI..' C.e -. m i" *0 1975.4 in the Philippines. LI i.cuir it k.a.r .er el e h-re d t. .r.:e. 1..-arch F'ur. 3 tlZ r e :raounir. -n fl paipecn: r. nd yr rm 1-1 l.r le..6 l'FE up- rmrrn. *1candard reFrr.. r.ni their all. r cti. t puiled! 1-4 . e pE. .e> -ucr modest..urn. cur.-e:.E c..nd ir.7 in Thailand. was probably n short of the standard in .E .n.tanc. .i c in .'rwnd ch.in.i prncr.L ri Lini. *.pr. Yet if each couple in a country has four children.. .. ind . In developed countries.cer-xlt. 1 _r-. rcT Ir -n.- h.. t h . -i' on.. the cain... . indird at it .1 in Colombia and Indonesia..1 4- 1963..r."u...:.. -r inhl hc c . It is of course possible that the stalling may be temporary.. progress has not been so steady (see Box 4.. 4iar. Some slowdown could also have in A. r. Luniro-1 The rhe ..z*. The crude birth rate is thirty-four per thousand and the death rate thirteen per thousand. in iilk c p-.' irnd . 4.n:-. akvr. ihat [ .au.' -. and particularly in East Asia. b. lo..rr. tht cur.1. . . elb :m.the d... .government goal is a nationwide rate of 2.5). In countries in which desired family size is four or more.ed th. a. rV.. In Korea fertility decline was checked for a while in the 1960s and then resumed. which generally made a bigger difference in the 1950s and 1960s than in the 1970s. There is also some evidence that improvements in life expectancy are slowing down. but a level that is still relatively high. K. .tirmnriaI gain. . -eFra ar.u:h .7 1 '1.cer- de l.unrr.. ill F-qlc Irn Pvr"O. m .ent-c nirnil ii Thc r-ord T. h.-.... so Indonesia's population is growing at 2.~ cl.d a..al . E e.enr. * .:h.!'ni.r rh...h..'.1978. 72 .nn-ill..

as mortality declines. But since the 1950s. The 1980 UN projection for 73 . though still high compared with developed coun- tries. Long-range population growth is less dependent on the addition of people whose lives are saved than on the number of children they subsequently bear. In Africa slower economic progress (in some countries. the remarkable gain in life expectancy in China-from forty-one in 1960 to an estimated sixty-seven in 1982-shows what can be achieved. increasing life expectancy seems likely to depend more than ever on improved living conditions. When fertility is high. To extend the life of someone sixty years old is to keep the population just one person larger than it would otherwise be. It accompanies malnutrition and is exacerbated by poor sanitation. are closely linked to economic and social welfare. and Sri Lanka-income tends to be more equally distributed than in other developing countries. fewer deaths usually mean fewer births (though the net effect is a somewhat larger family on average). 216 great grandchildren. * Infant and child mortality. the size and duration of the baby boom after 1945 in the United States was unexpected. so life expectancy has gone on rising steadily. Cuba. lack of elementary health services. even regression) has slowed the rise in life expectancy. By contrast. * In countries with life expectancy higher than might be expected from their average incomesCosta Rica. Rural mortality tends to exceed urban mortality. For the future. saving a baby's life adds a great deal of reproductive potential. as is and will be the case in most countries. and projections of world population in the year 2000 have hardly changed since 1963. But as fertility declines. The purpose in making projections is to illustrate what the future could be. and so on. Finally. however. 7. even by a largely rural society. and better health care for the poor. Three indicators lend support to this view. programs that reduce mortality are likely to reduce fertility as well. It is the assumptions that determine whether the projections will match reality. when the United Nations began producing systematic projections of world population. In 1963 the United Nations projected a 1980 population of 4. * Mortality from diarrhea in the developing world is two to three times higher than it was in today's developed countries when overall mortality levels were similar. In India in the past decade. so does the amount of extra reproductive capacity. grows up. Mortality declines affect population growth less when fertility is falling. primarily of poor children. In part this is because mortality. demographers have done well in predicting future trends. and a strong health care program. and gives birth to 3 instead of 6 children has 27 rather than 216 great grandchildren (assuming that each of her children will follow her pattern).economic development has been rapid enough to offset the declining contribution of public health improvements. more and more deaths are shifted from younger to older ages. Korea. But projections for particular regions and countries have varied. In Latin America infant and child mortality rates are five times greater among children whose mothers have no schooling than among those with mothers having ten or more years of schooling. through a combination of education. Demographic prospects and goals Demographic projections should not be treated as forecasts. only a shade off the 4. In addition. education for women. and lack of the basic education that might allow parents to take the necessary precautions to prevent it. given certain assumptions. For most of the developing world. as Chapter 6 will indicate. the major contributors to low life expectancy in developing countries. Furtherdeclines in mortality rates will boost population growth much less from now on than they did in the 1950s and 1960s. so a slightly slower pace of urbanization in the late 1970s may also have slowed progress against mortality. Diarrhea is a disease of the poor. poverty and illiteracy in rural areas of the north seem to have kept infant mortality high.3 billion. income gains. has already fallen considerably. Some projections have been wide of the mark. slowing any further rise in rural life expectancy despite economic growth. Furthermore. because further mortality declines depend more than before on progress in women's education and on improved living conditions and health care. The infant girl who survives. not to boost it by that person plus descendants. lower mortality contributes directly to lower fertility. the time when declining mortality produced surges in population is passing rapidly. To save the lives of an infant girl and boy who will go on to have 6 children is to add those people plus (perhaps) their 36 grandchildren. Illiteracy is also lower and health services more widespread. But there are other reasons.4 billion suggested by the latest estimates. for example. For the individual family.

where the proportion of young people is higher and where fertility is still high and would take longer to decline to replacement level. rapid mortality decline is based on the experience of fourteen countries.2 a year. Three points are clear from these projections. As shown in the figure. against today's total population of 18 million. replacement-level fertility would not be attained until 2030. and family planning efforts. and today's population of 18 million would increase to almost 70 million by 2050. Even with rapid fertility decline. Cuba. China. Singapore. For most developing countries. population there in 2050 will be reduced by about 50 million compared with what it would otherwise be. and the Middle East.North America's population in 2000 is 16 percent below the 1963 projection because fertility is lower than expected. However. Under any assumption. The pace of population growth need not be taken as givenit also depends on policy. and Kenya's population would grow to 120 million by 2050. The consequences of these "standard" assumptions for the population of all developing countries are shown in Figure 4. Kenya would not reach replacement-level fertility until 2015. the developing world's population would more than double by the year 2050. 0 Even with rapid fertility (and mortality) decline. By the year 2050. depending on current fertility levels. They ignore the possibility of any major catastrophe. for example Nigeria.5 shows. As Figure 4.5). When that will occur obviously varies from country to country. And the way societies cope with a growing population depends on economic and social policy as well as on how fast they grow. where fertility has fallen more than expected.4 billion (see Table 4. a few countries. fertility matters more than mortality.6 shows. recent trends. it is projected to be reached later. rapid fertility decline . the 1980 projection for Asia as a whole is 3 percent above the 1963 projection because fertility has fallen less than expected (even though the projection for one country.7). a few. As Table 4.9 billion. This is naturally a cause for concern. including Colombia. where at times the total fertility rate declined by almost 0. Central America. these projections essentially continue the trends that are already well established in the ten largest developing countries. where life expectancy increased by at least one year every two years between 1950 and 1980 (and at a faster rate where initial life expectancy was lower).8. such as war or virulent disease. have yet to experience fertility declines. that of Bangladesh from 93 million to about 230 million. In contrast. rising to 6. however. Rapid mortality decline combined with standard fertility decline would produce population in developing countries 7 percent larger in the year 2050 than that resulting from the standard mortality decline. for most countries in Africa and the Middle East. Two critical assumptions guide the World Bank projections of each country's population. The potential effect of policy can be illustrated by comparing population projections under the standard assumptions with two other paths: "rapid" fertility decline (with standard mortality decline).6). For most of the largest developing countries. including Kenya and Nigeria. but not for despair (see Box 4. and Kenya. and "rapid" mortality decline added to rapid fertility decline. If fertility falls sooner rather than later in Kenya. * Mortality will continue to fall everywhere until life expectancy for females is eighty-two years. the increases would be much greater. El Salvador's population would still grow from 5 million to 12 million. With rapid fertility decline. * Fertility will eventually reach and stay at replacement level everywhere. For countries of Africa. Hong Kong. for those countries projected declines are assumed to start in the near future (see Figure 4. the projections of declining fertility essentially extend declines that have been happening for several years. the populations of most developing countries are likely to increase by 50 percent or more by 2000. replacement level is projected to be reached between 2005 and 2025. Rapid fertility decline is at a rate equivalent to that achieved in certain periods between 74 1950 and the present by eleven developing countries. will almost double. the differences will be huge. is below the 1963 projection). and Thailand. Country projections and the assumptions behind the standard and rapid paths are explained in detail in the Population Data Supplement. Similarly. the increases still to come are likely to exceed what has happened so far. Korea. the difference in population size between the standard and rapid declines is not great in 2000-less than 20 percent in most countries. including Costa Rica. Under the standard declines. The population of Indonesia would still increase from 153 million to about 300 million. and that of India from 717 million to 1. 0 In determining the ultimate size of world population. * Population growth beyond the year 2000 depends critically on falling fertility in the next decade or two.

'.FIGURE 4.0 6. Source: Adapted from Demeny.- - - 6 1980 3 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 4 / Sub-Saharan Africa ~~~~~~Fertility decline decline Mortality d / Standard / _ 2 Rapid S ~~~~~~~~~~~~Rapid tandad 1 1900 1950 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 75 . FIGURE 4." USSR'|\ 5 japan a Bangladesh 40 / .'/------ ~~~~~~~~~~~~--2000 2050 V X 30 2. 2000 2050 2100 The countries shown were the world's largest in 1980.0 60 / I / vo | / ------ ----------. / ~~~~~~~~United States.7 Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the world's ten largest countries. 1950-2100 Total fertility rate 80 8. Source: Adapted from Demeny.2ti / India Indonesia 6.8 Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility and mortality Billions 103 All developing countries 3 South Asia Billions 8 6~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ - - - .0 ' China India 70 * I' China -----// . 1984.0 ' 50 /P|at .0 1950 2100 1950 " \ " G- The countries shown were the world's largest in 1980. 1950-2100 Life expectancy at birth Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's ten largest countries. 1984.6 FIGURE 4.\ \ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~Nigeria Bangladesh United States ~----USSR Japan I\\' ------ ~ pt / ~~~~~~ Brazil N rlustan 2 A\ \ \ \ \4.

.n flt nat. - in th.l ulir. th. Jr-L4-. CI rle _.. ~i iL Ihi p r. third tur-r It began from a ut nm 'rth 1 bc-it--iT- 1 k i-p -nc -4 r-~--Ptili --r..r. 'ha .. arid i.a miuch m. n irL-m ib. U1 hr.-.tI.p. I: ih -. ige3 4mkrik gl rtt.ft diiopirher. curi rids of b.: p ai'n Uc.rt' 'in tk3hi..1cim icc-i-ran . th.rtim rre.r up. n -rc:.:-r h--r. the in c.. Combined with rapid mortality decline.lue nji .1ri .T i i chi.r nt: r cr a>i. -.-n tr t~u r u. lh--r.L rat-' zr..c'i p. . I. the combined rapid path for both is more realistic.-rm.ih The cl-.J TI1-i Ii .i.tq it I B C i. rh puttr t Th.cl rel irn rit. Insofar as mortality and fertility declines are linked..tr.I !ciC tr'A!r. pai in the p~r qIuarter :-intury. age l *a itiri i darn~at IL in'crca 1: %relii3 --n pat--ii. -.Erent -i.. rh lit.i~dud tim. ii r*n Tlw t--p ch-artf .II .Ilih . thm-i-1. *A ti r A _xI. r im -u in crc tM ti -I Iitrat-.fl n~cqu. would produce a population 25 percent smaller in the year 2050 than that resulting from the standard fertility decline.. ird b-ut r h. tir. h *:. Time h7--FFrI:-r Igure it until it ' aO. nuiddl. pll1tIiULh rhrer ~h-ch.fl al 3r. I uii - I uttierlinfr .:-piaI c~rc. cha-rt . In Latin America and in East Asia.fl. 1-ciadde ~.-.In rh I rzt r.Ii~ 111111 much higher base and has covered a eri-Ii L~u' a... Lins -rdIt thiL il orl Ike *-utn rsi. irn ri p. 1_1 and Is).n: arId Ai- hurh:--tndrl.p IF--rm birth rates or an unwelcome rise in death liIt calls attention to the need to i-e ul..:t :ik iir t I~rrn. -lI. -.ridu . the b-:cinr-in..-i--bI be-r .. nipren' 1 . I r .rt-nc.nth :e_ntar. rh.. .--r [FE l_.6 Three views of population change pr--. i t-out ii 4 p-ercErrt i:rcp. itt-t ai. l-. a. Itvr 1i`1I .ru-clta t i tr -I taptr rpi air4-A .rF Th.-ruIa. rn-iI 311l -. .in the ntnIn-it I he niidile c:hart 'hr.pc-pFulatc.ini *n Edi From.. -'rie -if-Lu1 ition ~idiuL-LJ rih %.! -7. ntl ibiftiae-air r. d adlr:Iie r 1-. -eI i-. i ri:. '[ w r---iII--w n rd p-rlii rtI *n *-r ' 'he it3 IIe-mrr ..Ia:i t C':I l - ih.r th- 'I'D' l'L . c..E iense ch irt hizhlgi-hr.I-3ti-tt . However.r-'Ih rites.rent p~r.-L r.rr irt rhe ile -.k to I mflls-n F . i ti7 ri The Th.-'~ ir.the hurri.t-r.Žr iittt-lt \nn . that limp: hr.. it illustrates the relatively small effect that rapid mortality decline would have on population size.r hav-.Ji 1 rid th~n r.C h-. lin-itr 0 ' addcrd l:i.. -ca i.u-brtinrr.tp-g-iaiIjij.:.bniri ? ii .tual I . 'cenrt r t'**iripr ri.n r penr. ht. pa4ii flU ~.e'lar. rc tr t e~tprt.i.n-ird trrend in t' h3r IlilCIl lmi c 1 S- -iC. h-t lertim : li ill.l re3e~Id r .c infli .* p'-:paI. jii ht1ch LIrh [.irt I '_ hac.ii~ . t rld pi-pultii r-r-i rjid -i) .ree Kirh:w. r... flu'I rI I.r'cI pc-publl *r.LkIk thin *n th~ tir.r Ti- p in ni-'ll-.by a decline in birth cha-rt Tim buIrr. I- ' I'In -nL. where mortality 76 is already low and fertility has fallen.p up. ri1UIL LIIriI It F.-a..h.~~~gnnnv -rn-lint-~~~ F-c.p-. But where mortality and fertility remain high-as in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia-rapid mortality decline combined with standard fertility decline would produce a population in 2050 about 10 percent greater.aIl n ti i- . But even that difference is much smaller than the difference between rapid and standard fertility decline: South Asia's population would be more than 20 percent smaller and Africa's about 50 percent .-i .r.. -iii ha Cr i fl t rif -n . t h mI nt -p...i h tiri r/t p.IBox 4. -It h.t rhr pre-ent aLt .rt.8).i. 'hc chVa _.-pulthani-..*i r.r t sh -.tlb-' .-. the implications of a faster mortality decline are not the same for all regions.I 4 -n.rI ern -rp .. iCTIculturilA.--n -ri r-r n- oi t h.. *.nd *lh th-s Jt-p ihiin fi. u" II ~~ * p. a-- *nd b r. a[-. cut. .. especially ff fertility is falling.lit 1 .dr:i.ri Irn. the population would still be 20 percent smaller (see Figure 4.* -L 'I d1 --. the population in 2050 would be only 2 to 3 percent greater if rapid mortality decline were added to rapid fertility decline.r-puLlrid th.

there would be almost as many young people as there are today because of the momentum effect of today's young people becoming parents in the next two decades. the elderly. for Brazil it implies a rate of 2.6 percent in Kenya (compared with 3.2 percent in India. And since its current fertility is high. Rep.8).7) today.6 under the standard assumption and about 3. In fact.5 Projections of population size in selected countries. But the pressure on land (reflected in the projections of agricultural densities). of Mexico Nigeria 93 127 44 5 717 153 18 39 73 91 157 181 63 8 994 212 40 51 109 169 136 168 58 8 927 197 34 49 101 143 139 169 58 8 938 198 35 50 101 147 357 279 102 15 1. These rates are below those in China (now about 2. The rapid paths of mortality and fertility decline would be difficult but not impossible to attain. With rapid declines in both fertility and mortality. Of course. were fertility rates to decline rapidly. the number of people under twenty would be 31 percent of the population instead of 32 percent in the year 2020 (see Figure 4.6 percent in Brazil. For India a rapid decline implies a total fertility rate of 2. the differences between the two projections are especially large. in principle.9).2 in the year 2000 (compared with 2.313 285 69 63 155 243 230 247 88 13 1. in the year 2050 there would be 100 million fewer people of working age.513 330 120 67 182 471 212 239 84 12 1.9 under the standard assumption and about 4. 2000 and 2050 (millions) Population in 2000 Standard fertility and mortality decline Rapid fertility decline and standard mortality decline Rapid fertility and mortality decline Standard fertility and mortality decline Population in 2050 Rapid fertility decline and stancdard mnortality decline Rapid fertility and mortality decline Country 1982 Population Bangladesh Brazil Egypt El Salvador India Indonesia Kenya Korea.8 today). it would be higher than now in the year 2000 but would then begin to fall. Bangladesh is just one example. under the rapid assumption.7 percent under the standard declines-in either case still less than the 12 percent obtaining in the United States today. this does not happen. Rapid mortality decline would mean. The implied declines still produce relatively high annual rates of population growth in the year 2000: 1. 1. Table 4. far fewer new jobs would need to be created if fertility declined rapidly. The effects of a rapid fertility decline on the age structure of a country could.2 percent of the population in 2020.TABLE 4. would constitute 9. and 2.9 today). Under both. Though the number of people of working age would continue to rise under both scenarios. would more than double by the year 2050 under the standard assumption. whereas their grandmothers had five or six. but it does so in both projections. their proportion does increase rapidly.6 shows what would happen to its population density and the size of its school-age and workingage population under the standard and rapid assumptions about declining fertility.9 percent in 77 . or a shrinking of the work force. These differences between rapid and standard declines in fertility have far-reaching consequences. It is often thought that rapid fertility decline causes a sharp rise in the ratio of old people to young. As for old people. They require that girls who are now growing up in families of about four children have only two children themselves. life expectancy in the year 2000 of 73. already high. if rapid rather than standard fertility decline is assumed.1 (compared with 2. compared with 69 in the standard projection.3) and Korea (2. In India life expectancy would be 65 in 2000 instead of 61. To take the example of Bangladesh. be a concern. now about 4 percent of the population. the number would still increase by 50 percent by the year 2000 but would then stop increasing. In Brazil. In absolute numbers. for Brazil.406 298 73 65 160 265 smaller with a rapid rather than a standard decline in fertility (see Figure 4. compared with 7. The number of school-age children would almost double under the standard fertility decline by the year 2000. population and average density will increase for the next seventy years.

_ 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 the standard projection. and Indonesia for a rate of 2. FIGURE 4. India is aiming for a crude birth rate of 21 per thousand by 1996. Millions 78 . They take no real account of national differences in the seriousness of the population problem. and administrative possibilities in dealing with it. already a goal in China. 2020 Age group 75+ F.090 13 157 35 122 43 84 944 12 136 30 106 33 85 2. These are the subjects of the following chapters.472 9 212 134 78 30 139 Urban and rural population (from the table above) 200 150 Urban 100 50 Millions 0 50 Rural 100 150 200 1982 2000 Standard declieRapid decline-{ F-ll b 2050 Standard __. Farmland is defined as arable land plus land under permanent crops. Urban population is assumed to grow at a constant rate of 3 percent a year between 2000 and 2050.0 in the year 2000. ' 'targets ' 1 l l & - 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 .l.1 - Male - Female 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 39 3530-34 1 |. because fertility is very high in Kenya and other African countries. But for the next several decades most developing countries will need to make a concerted effort just to reduce population growth to a rate closer to 1 percent. dIre . The rapid declines in mortality and fertility provide only one possible set of goals.7 by 1990. !r.479 22 357 157 200 55 246 1. b. lower than the rate assumed for it under a rapid path of fertility decline. Some countries have chosen to set quantitative based on feasible target declines in mortality and fertility (see Chapter 8). Sources: FAO. World Bank data. or of the social.6 by 1986.. 1981. the area is assumed to remain constant throughout the projection period.9 Brazil's age pyramid. Rapid decline I a.___. Thailand is aiming for a total fertility rate of 2.r. political. 1982-2050 2000 Indicator 1982 Standard decline Rapid decline 2050 Standard decline Rapid decline Population density Persons per square kilometer Rural population per hectare of farmland a Population size (millions) Total population Urbanb Rural School-age (5-14 years) Working-age (15-64 years) 646 9 93 11 82 23 51 1.TABLE 4. it will probably take more than two decades for population growth rates to fall to 2 percent).i.6 Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions. Bangladesh has already adopted a goal of a total fertility rate of 2. In the long run many countries may wish to reduce population growth to less than 1 percent.

and production. There are several reasons why population growth in developing countries is today a greater economic burden than it once was in today's developed countries: * Population growth is now much more rapid. As Chapter 4 showed. in Europe. As Chapter 4 showed. * Many developing countries whose economies are still largely dependent on agriculture can no longer draw on large tracts of unused land. the long-term benefits of having more people must be weighed against the immediate costs of coping with rapid growth. economic. human and physical capital are less built up. and North America economic growth has been accompanied by moderate population growth. Hong Kong. Some developing countries could benefit from such economies of scale. combined with extra spending on education. depending on their current social. population growth has been accommodated. particularly among the large numbers of the world's poor. especially in rural areas. if politically feasible. social services. large-scale emigration from today's developing countries is not possible. immigration from neighboring countries. * Compared with Europe. Singapore. Next it reviews how rapid population growth affects the economy as a whole through savings and investment.5 percent a year. Rapid population growth in developing countries has resulted in less progress than might have beenlost opportunities for raising living standards. countries such as India and China can seem to benefit from the sheer size of their domestic markets. and in some countries political and social institutions are less well established. and Switzerland-shows that urbanization and trade provide other means to achieve the scale economies of a large population. it is to improve people's lives. common in most developing countries today-acts as a brake on development. The conclusion that rapid population growth has slowed development is by no means straightforward or clearcut (see Box 5. In sparsely populated countries. Moderate labor force growth. is faster than that. faster population growth shortens the time required to reach the population size that provides economies of scale in transport. Japan. It then considers the experience of countries 79 . and North America in their periods of fastest population growth. can also mean continuous upgrading of the labor force with better educated workers. in industrializing Europe it seldom exceeded 1. But the goal of development extends beyond accommodation of an ever larger population. * Unlike nineteenth century Europe. Most developing countries are experiencing growth that. and political conditions. would be less costly and more effective than a fast natural rate of population growth. In that strict sense. And a big population can increase a country's economic as well as political and military power. by historical standards. which may have stimulated demand. And the economic success of many small countries-Denmark. compared with the 2 to 4 percent that most developing countries have averaged since World War II. In those few countries lacking the people to exploit their natural resources. population growth can be accommodated: in the past three decades many countries have managed to raise average income even as their populations grew rapidly. in a world of economic and political uncertainty. encouraged technological innovation. Up to a point. But these benefits derive from a moderate increase in population.5 The consequences of rapid population growth This chapter shows that rapid population growth-at rates above 2 percent. This chapter begins by emphasizing that the implications of population growth differ considerably among countries. and reduced investment risks. Even in uncrowded countries. Under certain conditions moderate population growth can be beneficial. Japan. communications.1). income in developing countries is still low.

1 that . - If:--i.tin lii n *:ll.blems. t' *. le A r tt-it.---n. A Ji Fra.r-rri capacit.ra.mtrnr-t hat trIn-L-mt..-pulatrii- human it.'h- ali tr2rrr-:naC Ii a1r--. ri--uLirIt Fen4I nc..-Vt r:I -t Iir-t5..-ill-' inJ tn-ac~.t-enet..nir% I. iurri. Throughout this 80 discussion of the effects of population growth on countries.-neerri -.aiE:e and rt. fajtirt nc--n-i:- L . -nap.-nc ---d lim-ited that c tt 'r-ealtd fi-t.lIabtili. .rlrrad inuput p r -.thr b--Cm: r. t hat t r Ihe r-acn I *:n ur-.p.land I-ad. - rh-V n: --t tlhe Lirat-fitc-d:re pr.it. .c.. Th.Pee..I.i Ih i . d-d i..rI h nc prn-b. r-rI tCCEn I ur.tr~-i :. -dIarr I r . But ntither . - . t riian-inltn-u raikc rht rnqu-re.. rtdIi-.:. -:ritu:-ii Ii-.ia. F.-.-tl u--a...-.tnim.--h-. r.. - ~~~~~k id 1 iturn.h r.-.-5 -iCILI 11 II-.iLnt _d Ii in-1 ir-erl mr---. Buyt h e-'a~ .. kdge Ptr c~apita nteasurcs - il.. I -1 lani A. ri--I -ta-e an-i in that p e . n -. r-i ehrn anLi rthr.Ic el t-I.th. in-:-:-ni .puIa .itir.r.n-a ha a d n L rte-d balIane. lulain . i. n tii t ..iv.-.pc%puIaiiinf i - t:1 Tin utirnate re-. c..titL. TFht I ..-muaTi-. ..r i.: it-.ta-d cI .-r-ui p-.h ir .Il b-.rC rn-:-t riiir-c..-ti -i on i-rn. .-i i. .bLIt 'hat I - . the i anal . --.p--)pulIat r-:.-a-n:i--h~ '-iPl. ha . c. c nrribi.i ru n'h~ wt. pulation gr tinii-sr..ut iii... 1-rtia'rh~r.-n arguA th:-.eia3u-.-.. .rhitr-. r-l-~ni.pLal - L~~-hair-L-Thi i. a nd vnc--i. -.. taria thaith. LL-ntr-t1I rhT-.:nt tI-n .irih r.r bie uj--W r.i--nc u ne-rc.--i h-ire hich tertlit r 5.Lpk mfpl-si ---. the na. pi.l.. an-:' tpo tl-n rtilt ni -l-- 17'kill n. r myanr 'ii P-rq.r.i-u r..--- ---Id r I arnlii. 1 .p-idP:. hi In .. ir-:nmrnitl p-:-luti--n I Ii1-.rtp..ite atch i.--- f-r -Ii I h-. ~pirired hert LIf and hi-petul pec. ill-i ir(.*ur.t natural rt-c'urc-:t.t..di IrA -n -h- mle ihi.l c pitai 0 .r-r-h-a dt.i p. siraijn-d p-.are s iL-:imaritair.htne rrturn: -.i. d-t.-4 Labor I.-.ur-:: I..:.tiUi lard ar.ail t-.etrer:t.ci4t-- ~-li: te-Ada rip-idrp -put -- ri-. r.-pututi--ri -h iir.:acrI-ut uti.1-i-i. ~r:..ih a A .-api -r-.a.'rYpr.:ai. ri-ih ad~...:t-. ari ihek athei n a-ei dp h.-'t I/r- that ra-pidl piualbisi-t that A.. -r.lh in and That the int.uli r..In P. jrkcued -..tFIpie r niriin-1 F-. r-L-iIa t. this chapter will touch on a theme introduced in Chapter 4: the implications of high fertility for poor people and for income inequality.in-:tal and al ' irm- himiri:i -upplie- ch..t -.r cputa-3 cr--ail IIt-n-... L)II.i:sis i-hclcim:z.h itr -Ub-iiai . late:r ran up- ~atr..-n .r I he. tL-if ni-i.. -t i r-.r ihr. a ailabiit.-dIl .1.-/Isdi ibat r-:nIccl ad .aril . pi-aJ an-.are tL ne. the effects on their natural resources.tcs Ir I hahi.-rtunr. rh-i t.tIanT . ---u 'iii nr nd ..ep-r her--re ri.-1 litil. iThi.:a I.rtis--urctm n-_-irhin.t.a.Ill I-.. r1--r .il1.. ldr--r.rr. r-.i I. tn--ar>car.due rnaiurai r. na-in-.-air i -. .ir---i--e I7.at-.lilt n11-ri.. ittr s. -.r 1tic.rna e nib -1t -t-bI.. Er r. -0-u:es ai It-3.-a ne..-rncr--.:rcu--e -- -ui I Lii..-n1. tine.pin -nI tn-n *iiitiiL ch n-.I I- 4rc--.:. r.. .ipt rapidi atlint. r--t--r- r-.i.-ri..r -4 an14~d hor thus tr thI--rin. lL i:al chang. -. -: -.'-1i airhu.: Tuie dilti-ultzit p.-rcr -par-i -rng rart-:. rant an-i an. prL-bl--n h.m~ p r ice * -. J-i IF.._m. .. TI.pulaee.r and s-:here it . T.c-. na-tura~l t po-lluti--n -- --ŽdJ`r-s eIJrih t i-n ic-cd i.th b-~-aus p-.: tWykr etrulatire. .t_ n ihr Itr Ii n .ther h-:-pd1.pular-m-n r..htiri7.-cc-n -nc. t--.... w-p-int ejLh :.. pupI -n . .me ratI.n.I .-t 'ap"i- a flia. art ri-:-t ririat ura31 - r-rut it.pi ill ai IeOuti i.r 4.ln.arc. I t.itr.it least nt. -n-I oitni N.c.-i -.r dati.pialari.-.aI 3 ra . .-r iruc trY *:--unrr. -tij. I'- h.t rint a - sr-alkIIr jn. -.. .ii.-..c-.arc-. inh .71 . I- Ilittle du-iU pr--blurf t.: bec CUeus the: lab.t -t a.-_ [F--. .thL tgn .- r.n.wp.h.. i'arr tial iitt the denc-mtnaicr Lit . in.~m4da-.r put -. *-r. lirmit.Ell br in.f-.r ultimatA he:-d Inri.i adi-a:md ni.r. ra. ndl rni .it: ~~~~t. i' *- The trad!tioinal I laithusian a. er---. ti- dninsFr. hth-a Cut.ih .r.CieL-urc..-iJ.d .tn.-.. budit n-..m-h 1 futru. I. 0. Because the poor are usually last in line for jobs.v nd r L i.h are nut prrn. . ta nnid th-r-ir meet leads r-:.- r h-_I..urc:~ lrimi! hF.-.rtne i. dLtnyrir.n-i--dnt...iard --tII.ii.-. ii- p rici andr-ihat pri-:-. a -ug V.:hr..s t d-ec.-: It:.iu. L I1--i an-d ni.Box 5.m.n bt-u Ian J .r-~ I r Inth ppu I-n r n.in.l hr -I pi-pu Titsr ' n l it 1i-ng ranFi:tn-.uir Nilu-t -t ihr 1i. thati is uitt.s nr it'rl.. a F-ri. and Clb r.:rena. R.t h-A-I..ii-tIer .r.rtFL p-ali.:-ll. -~u ntnti...:. -'-i...ipt rNu.'r . p. I -- tAld inra ILthe'pi-.. ihrtF..llutt--rin-el.s iiLnt: rme Cre...limit.rt r lire i. n-i I. IL-n.pp.-.. l -id.t itnic'hi b-c -&LI.uIat--flr ir-.-. I h t o-s-rg:.the adt..r ihK-. -eachr-bult -imulnticin a r-tit.rl-M. e-. . - n- c -r-:n-uat.: in coping with rapidly growing populations-their efforts to achieve food security.thu.land L-nrc -- ..rit ir . -I-.t--cr-h.-1..-r t.n i Th/. . r.-.ia Il. iiI- l t.cn-nr-r *. able.Fp-errI i tr _ it rrr m dc -. cr--i - pk--.... i-a arretc.-ir th- all b.. -atrr . .r' ipc-pu1ulatnn n p -p-ulari-_-nr. Ths. -:e p.r.- --ia:harne.utiii - -an c -nrtriburt -.:-nr. the pressures of internal migration and urban growth. and the options that the international economy provides.i rrth Fitt Esa.. din--iist-irie intuit --:an-C.trlie tie %hIt -.e-. - .t-dual-r.tlii.n j tlt lAm imit _--or n. tIn ar~i IFr.t art-it :i. dti-jw t-..a. J.Ii .n e -n i--u-i..-t at *.I h. T Ljc In cc-un. iht .ni ''.t-. lIrnrtN -ritinuallrn.unh- b-at ni- e.ate ib--.i. arL. ere--. Consequences of population growth: conflicting views re .I . Iruih' -init t.i.4 i - Fc..--.5 . r -lep-ri iL r--ih r. -r-I i--tructural I--nt-I-n n.ryti r i-.aii -.ght-.-n4uin pr-dJu-tr.r ~-e :ntua:Il.diner s.--rn. thiirdl and o.i-I-.a.-udh titecd art rn.:i ur: ..I.-f-~ F b.I UE .. -. tiatnM.Fi E AtIth .a.-np-i -n-i i--r it--nr n P-i-. r-yii-t1 iI- i i ri-at --.urm-nt e ..:.rr -'-ntAl -I relai-.: ditc~r-r. tl tir run p-:.Iri natural1 Liu tht ur-i.-..l r.

there is no evidence that a large or rapidly growing population has itself been influential in promoting new technology. But throughout the modern technological era. The money and research skills needed for important advances-the Green Revolution. But both solutions require costly investments. In Brazil. In most middle-income countries GNP growth has been much faster-between 5 and 6 percent a year-so that even with rapid population growth. Nepal. for example-are overwhelmingly in the rich countries where population growth is slow. But the long-run relation is more complex than that 81 . in others. but their low population growth-1 percent a year or less-meant that their increases in per capita income were in general almost as large as in the high-growth. and more recently Malaysia and Thailand. these advances have brought laborsaving. for any given amount of resources. These increases came on top of much higher initial incomes. Malawi.school places. change becomes easier if technology is advancing rapidly. In some areas crop yields are still relatively low. The middle-income countries have shown that rapid population growth can go hand in hand with substantial gains in per capita income. not labor-using. But it does show that within most countries. per capita income grew by about 3 percent a year. Singapore.1). Natural resources are not by themselves sufficient (or even necessary) for sustained economic growth. Between 1955 and 1980. In any society. Although adjustment and technical progress can accompany population growth. India. differences in population growth rates since the 1950s have helped to perpetuate international differences in per capita incomes. development of new institutions. the development of unused land will require large complementary investments in roads. GNP grew at about 4 percent a year in the low-income countries. middleincome countries. they are more likely to be penalized by rapid population growth. Countries where education levels are already high. public services. in many of the poorest countries-Bangladesh and most of sub-Saharan Africa-economic activity slowed considerably in the 1970s. Countries with untapped natural resources could in the long run support more people. accelerating) population growth. are well equipped to cope with rapid population growth. But rapid population growth makes it hard for them to develop the human skills and administrative structures that are needed to exploit their resources. this economic slowdown resulted in stagnating or declining per capita incomes. China. Where the amount of new land or other exploitable resources is limited-as in Bangladesh. * Kenya. In earlier centuries it may even have helped provide the minimum population required to support a small religious or artistic elite. However. innovations. Korea. slower population growth would permit them to raise average incomes all the faster. Egypt. Industrial countries achieved only sluggish GNP growth during the 1970s. Macroeconomic effects of rapid population growth In a crude arithmetical sense. for example. population growth itself helps to bring about technological change: in agricultural societies it may help spur the development of new farming methods needed to maintain per capita output. and Zaire." as in the fast-growing East Asian economies such as Hong Kong. This is true whether or not their natural resources are limited or their countries already "crowded. Burundi. leaving room for rapid growth in agricultural production. This growth in general produced modest increases in income per person (see Table 5. so that the absolute gulf between them and the rest of the world widened considerably. The chapter does not treat a reduction in the rate of population growth as a panacea for development. Differences among countries The implications of population growth differ considerably among developing countries. If anything. and numerous economic and social adjustments-all easier if population is growing only slowly. But these tend also to be countries where population growth is now slowing. the expansion of manufacturing industry could provide exports to pay for extra food imports. Java in Indonesia. and drainage and other agricultural infrastructure. and Rwanda-the shortrun difficulties are more obvious. and public health services. Ivory Coast. a slower rate of population growth would help to promote economic and social development. where much investment in transport and communications systems is in place. From one point of view. and where political and economic systems are relatively stable. macroeconomic and sectoral policies matter at least as much. Coupled with rapid (and in some cases.

9 GNP 1955-70 5.5 3. the bulk of monetized household savings in developing countries is produced by relatively few wealthy families. A second reason for the apparently weak link between savings and dependency burdens is that banking and credit systems are not well established in developing countries. they are more likely to "save" by accumulating land. There are several ways population growth can affect economic growth: through its influence on savings per person. they probably could not without paying a steep price in terms of low real interest rates for saving and high rates for borrowing. If parents have more children than they want. so their savings are little affected by the burden of their dependents.1 2. the question is whether a rapid pace of population growth helps or harms economic growth.4 2. Includes high-income oil exporters and industrial nonmarket economies.3 4. 1955-80 (averageannual percentagechange) Population Country group All developing countries Low-income China India Other Middle-income Industrial market economies Europe Japan United States World' 1955-70 2.2 1.1 2.6 5. so savings per capita should fall. or in security for their old age. that simple division implies.3 1.implied by a simple division of total income by numbers of people.2 2. their high fertility contributes to their poverty.3 4. Even if families wanted to save in good times (say.1 1. In contrast.5 6.4 1.2 2.2 2.8 0.4 4. within limits.1 1970-80 5.4 5. 82 do have is harmed.1 1. on the amount of capital invested per person. Corporate and government savings do not seem to be related in any systematic way to variations in population growth.1 0. though its effects on monetized savings are small. as explained in Chapter 4.1 3.4 2. Recent empirical studies find only minor support for this view. that people are the problem.9 1970-80 2.1 9. First. the majority of families are poor and save little. Indeed.2 2.4 0.1 1.2 2. or other assets.2). One question is how population growth affects the distribution of income within countries. Populationgrowth and private savings A country's savings are generated by households. Whether they are restricting investment in their farm.8 GNP per capita 1955-70 3.7 2. At any given level of output per worker. Poor families (and even the not-so-poor) are unlikely to have financial savings that show up in national accounts.0 1.7 5. GNP.1 2. They tend to have few children. tools. they might simply consume a bit more themselves. their ability to make best use of the resources they TABLE 5.1 1.4 6. More generally.0 3.7 1. that household savings-usually the largest component of domestic savings-should be reduced by the high dependency burdens associated with rapid population growth.0 2. greater numbers of dependents cause consumption to rise.0 4.3 3. by farming their land more intensively than can be sustained in the long run.0 3. and on the efficiency with which the economy operates. Parents have no choice but to pay for what their children consume by reducing their own consumption or by "dissaving"-for example. But many factors account for the weak link between dependency burdens and savings in developing countries.4 4.2 2.0 3. But even with fewer children.6 4. Instead. and especially growth in income of poorer groups (see Box 5.8 10.0 4. businesses. wrongly.9 a.1 2.4 3. and the public sector. however.7 4.4 3.4 1. governments can. poor parents might not increase their savings.3 0.6 3. irrespective of demographic conditions. use fiscal and monetary measures to change a country's savings rate.6 1. all point to the probability that high fertility is indeed a burden. before children are born or after children are old enough to work) and borrow in difficult times.1 1.7 3.4 2.0 1.0 3. A third reason.8 2.1 1970-80 3.1 Growth of population. or in their children's education. Theory suggests. and GNP per capita. is that .8 2.

Saharan art . populaticn -. .n tti rnt in .nt or the p ipulanin number ci p. mn%-tmert the number ci-utd be alrost lil vten-n-although at 321 milli.ni. it clearly affects the demand for savings.t iitteertn .decline bi berteen . 1980-2000 Ister decline . ihar u puttr the . in nccime di'triburtion ' The e\etrXie 'h-it-ed that the predicted 'hare .n.th rart ba'edt cr a >t. Zi)it.. 411W Miill-in in 2LhIi. i turt n pot rr. .rv-t. .:oamir .mile gro.e er becaute ol income cru.r' IBut some 'imple astumpt:.-.. capital per person (including "human capital.l ichici 'inten In China c-juih and F3as A' a etconomi.an in -ia rtdtt. Asia ieludrng Chinat idrd trtlit pe.and 1i perettn N.ople . belom SI3. To maintain income.." that is. .indard derlint in tertiltif idte4ribed tn Chapter 4i the number a1t poor in these i-ti.vh in each ot Icnt countries comprtving S0 perc....ncome tor th.i..t fountriesv The hnd .i. derined as those cent annual pter :apita in-ime.er.-r %-.-ple in Banrlade-h. For example. they do become indirectly linked as development proceeds.u. v.:on the e -per*ence or rmank countries prit.:r.rth Aitica-n-here anmd in 'raic. 2 sij.--nm to.I.cted in-.pid China l Ii. health.it .tant lSil dollarsi Ba-ed .' and an incrt:.-ciated .. th 11%orld Bank cc. the i. .unirn pr-te pcpul. substanti.v ih aielct ihr number k. family savings tend to rise and fertility falls.nt in 'tli0 The io est. tith lI.t inc. ic-tal number ct p. These reasons explain why high dependency burdens reduce household savings rates in industrial countries but not in the developing world.4umtd In the prrulecti-f ind a mor. d .tel. and skills) must be maintained.ith L .n r.L'.pc-irest groups bined ti.lin. tin c.rcient in I%CiO 15 perce.. rapid eirminarion ot pci ertx n.ndard point In-an increase in poi. health. But slower population growth releases investable resources for "capital-deepening"-that is. end r.L.:b It-rh3n 2ui percent-in tht circumsta3nc- 1: !.ciomic cia.r. r. pr. as urbanization proceeds and financial markets improve.ng a In E:.p. I l eRgno.. aIl in lteriltit iht poor %. . ere assuri.:POV-err.. Of course.4t.nr arc letet th. lin.ill till in:rta4e b..gether Latin America the tuturt shiut. %\ih a rapid it FiFIplt? the .cn itould still e-.z i the r. In a t ..r.mic proTper 1uL. though there is no direct link from fertility to household savings.el. &an)e art b-telr cot de.. d-cine 1il ri--n n .r and N. dJcline im reduc.dine the re't at A\tTica-rapid ttriliti decline could help 1o reduce the number in pc erri ti 70 percent -\ tair China nhere teriltiti tI atread.iine C'imaiatc.in.n be expet:ed i:.t pFmr prople in the %eat 2i1Jii' Mani other tco n imic poltical .:en tp theI under difrerent tertilih assumphons.-n' . e. eltect .rld Banki srud.ng 1c-T rtl - tertilit% d. population .i p-cr c:. nearl.tiino grew th to .ia u-td to cc. at th.. as more women work in the modern sector. there may be economies of scale in the provision of schooling.: b.ceed th...-nd p-t Frr in agem' relti-.mated number oc poor pe.o limited income than a.ti.mulatt couid be r_duced ii alm:-st 41. prcbabl..ould Prospects for poverty and population growth. In mi IQa) t. ert% it tertilit% dechlne protection-and cr n that inipliec >iderabIe deilint-the nulnTiber E t b p h 2 k. iii = dli' .1 ..be a.tanircL wi nd ripd t.:1 an be aniipdied Ii3ndard e-n co-nipuit' the change in . "capital widening" is needed to maintain capital per person.n.n popula--.:eni *-ould hardli liddJe EU.2 Hi t. -pects e-. Nigeria and Pakistan toda% . Latin %nmerica pu . And as populations grow.l ditterences are %eorth emph-a- Thtse mipi' a more equal distributiin poor people may see children themselves as a way of "saving" for old age. r *A fastr rtduc:tirn i ikelk n:.-rrIr.ng th.ill inluence: irnca that Ai prtLIe:ilnms oni onaursa. Capital widening Although rapid population growth does not seem to influence the supply of financial savings.nd tactr tticial ini addii c. ipid druid'. 1tt the number ..:-r p)ert% in the ne.%ih a narrvv inglofi ditterince. underslates the tertilts Is .c prine ..r3pid rtrtili .t With J rapid decitne in tentilitmrlicin iiit d.nc.ns alklt dluir.. b% region Sub-Sahajan Atrita rd. ..C' .in educati.n.lint Mliddle East. and jobs in factories 83 . monetized savings rise and fertility falls.. North Attica.amll reduction ir the numbtr . :id ti the p-i...nal t '. percent ho%-:-eer ntih a rapid tall In tertulltr Groupin4 rt.uld increat. ZT. increasing capital per person. a person's education. ould tall hov.:-mt g. the poorczt 4 :hranee tTrim 14 pere. In developing countries.-dar iI.r counrries ituld all Ir.Box 5. r.-ar The e'er.n hs i) milit.

spending must be spread over a larger group of school children (to the detriment of the quality of education). as the children of poor parents were least likely to have been enrolled before. Over the past twenty years. In 100 Korea 1950 1960 1970 '-K. secondary. the Middle East and North Africa. For the developing countries as a group. but some of the lowest-income countries-Sri Lanka. As most developing countries want to improve their schools quantitatively and qualitatively. and university levels in almost all developing countries. for example. or are fast approaching. over the next two decades (see Figure 5. otherwise a growing number of children have to be excluded. even if the objective is just to maintain current enrollment rates and standards. Tanzania. The same is true of those developing countries. power and transport. The budgetary downgrading of education. If a country is unwilling FIGURE 5. they will have to generate more national savings or curtail other investments in. Countries such as Kenya face a doubling or tripling of their school-age population by the end of the century. such as China.1 percent of government budgets. school-age populations are expected to grow slowly. As a share of educational budgets. textbooks. But it increased only slightly in the 1970s. REQUIREMENTS AND CAPITAL WIDEN- In industrial countries. the poor probably benefited most from the spread of education. enrollment rates have increased at the primary. (1950=100) 700 600 school-age and working-age populations.+" ~'~' 1990 2000 1950 1960 1970 1980 Index (1950=100) 600 Kenya 500 . But the proportion of GNP allocated to education declined slightly over the 1970s. especially in South Asia. Colombia. This allowed enrollment rates to rise.9 percent in 1974. the situation could not be more different. For high-fertility countries. But the evidence on education suggests that capital-widening-spreading resources over more and more people-can be counterproductive. public spending on education increased from 2. universal primary education.) In some cases. where fertility has already fallen substantially. and so onfell in eight out of ten Latin American countries. More school-age children require more spending on education. Such achievements have substantially raised the fiscal burden of education. SCHOOLING ING. (The enrollment rate is the number of students enrolled in schools as a percentage of the school-age population. the number of school-age children doubled between 1950 and 1970. as did the share of education spending in government budgets.and on farms. One study showed that in Latin America public spending per primary student fell by almost 45 percent in real terms between 1970 and 1978. soo 400 300 200 population 400 / . 1950-2000 or unable to make these sacrifices.3 percent of GNP in 1960 to 3. In Colombia. Index of Index selected countries. Education tends to spread as per capita income rises. has reduced the quality of education in many developing countries. spending on nonwage items-chalk. These awkward choices come after a period of considerable progress." Colombia Korea ~h 100 _-S=iR- i n a China/ Hungary 7"^~v_. and Latin America.1). Viet Nam-have already achieved. 1980 1990 2000 84 . and Korea.. and from 11. The main implication is clear. because fertility had started to fall in the late 1960s.7 percent to 15. / Working-age 400 population / ' Colombia - 300 _-200 China Hungary led with slower economic growth. maps. if at all. /t' Kenya School-age . coup- orual1 omk hs sciie pnigms . progress has been remarkable.

8 26. Costs excluded from the projections-for instance. Developing countries have little scope to reduce educational quality any further.0 35. The poor are more likely to attend schools of lower quality (and to leave school sooner). outlays for teachers' training and school buildingswould also fall and thus boost these savings. 1980-2015 (millions of 2980 dollars) Saving Standard Rapid witd rapid fdecliney (percent)a * ences in skills between rich and poor. Year fertility decline (1) (2) fertility decline (3) (4) As lower fertility slows the growth of the schoolage population.a. Not applicable. Less rapidly growing enrollment produces considerable financial savings.9 17. and the Ivory Coast. This gap seems to be widening. for instance. Bolivia.twenty-five of fifty-four developing countries surveyed. Fewer births in the early 1980s due to a 1980 1995 2000 2005 9.6 40. spend less than $2 a year on classroom materials for each child at primary school-compared with more than $300 per student in Scandinavian countries. with the rapid decline.3 47.8 19. these can be used to improve school quality.6 9.2).5 26. With the standard decline in fertility described in Chapter 4. the Malawi government could afford to enroll the country's total school-age population in 2005 for less than it would cost to enroll 65 percent if fertility did not fall.6 9. In a study of Brazil. Absolute cost savings 85 .7 percent in 1980 to about 1 percent in 1995 if the economy of Malawi were to grow at about 3 percent a year. These differences in educational quality are clearly reflected in student achievement. it can ease the pressures on the education system. an OECD country spent fourteen times more per primary school student than did any of the thirty-six countries with per capita incomes below $265 (1975 prices). One projection. its spending per pupil could be doubled in real terms by 2015 without increasing the share of the primary school bud- TABLE 5. even if nothing were done to improve the coverage and quality of primary schools.3 17. student-teacher ratios at primary schools have risen. a. Increases in class size often make sense as they raise the productivity of teachers. The quality gap between low.8 54. By 1977 the ratio had risen to 50:1. If the government chose to maintain a 65 percent enrollment rate.9 9.6 17. El Salvador. so rapid expansion of school systems to accommodate growing populations often means that the differ- rapid decline in fertility would decrease the size of the age group eligible for Egypt's secondary schools and universities starting in the late 1990s. With the money saved by lower fertility. Malawi.1 27. With unchanged fertility. started with the assumption that recurrent costs (essentially teachers' salaries) were held constant at their 1980 level of $12. But in the urban areas of Malawi and Kenya. class size frequently exceeds sixty students. Thus the education budget's share in GDP would increase from 0. are persisting because of school quality differences.9 34. The percentage cost savings are the same under both are greater under the assumption of universal primary education by the year 2000. the number would increase by 65 percent.6 23.2 22.3 26. the number of children of primary school age would double by the end of the century. after approximately the same number of years in school.0 na. for example.2 Malawi: projected primary-school costs under alternative fertility and enrollment assumptions. for Malawi up to 2015.and middle-income countries have learned significantly less science than those in industrial countries. In Egypt. seventeen were in Africa. but build up considerably (see Table 5.50 per student. schoolchildren in low. 7 22 34 2010 2015 31. In 1960. Combined with a lack of teaching materials. The difference between a standard decline and a rapid one would be about 2 million fewer children enroledinprimay n theyears2000 scools a year enrolled in primary schools in the years 2000 to 2015. by only 20 percent. Note: Columns 1 and 3 assume a constant enrollment rate of 65 percent. Quality can also make a considerable difference within developing countries. Research on twenty-five countries has shown that. and Thailand. on average.and high-income countries is already enormous. Columns 2 and 4 assume the enrollment rate increases and is 100 percent by the year 2000. assumptions regarding enrollment rates. of those twenty-five countries.1 27. the quality of schools and teachersmeasured by a large number of indicatorsexplained more than 80 percent of the variance in student scores on standardized science tests. the budget for primary education would double about every fifteen years.3 15.5 44 57 nl. though falling in terms of years of schooling. The financial savings from lower fertility would accrue slowly at first. India.8 17. Colombia. if fertility does not fall.8 25. large classes make learning difficult.

if educational levels are rising quickly. Capital deepening involves a growing demand for spending on education. Keeping up with schooling needs is only one way whereby rapid population growth contributes to TABLE 5. Investment in physical Burundi Ethiopia Kenya Zimbabwe 6. Applying actual 1980 costs per student ($300) to that difference gives a saving in a single year of $600 million. Of course. Four African countries-Burundi. Unless this happens. Even a middle-income country such . rapid restocking of the labor force with young. People born in 1980-84 will be entering the labor force in 2000 and will still be there almost halfway through the twenty-first century. and thus incomes. 2000 and 2015 Cost savings Totalfertility Country Korea. The potential for cutting educational costs through lower fertility is obviously largest for those countries with the highest fertility rates. the stock of capital (both human and physical) must continually increase just to maintain capital per worker and current productivity. Compared with standard fertility assumption. As an example. investment needs to grow faster than the labor force. For most countries the same is true of jobs. of Colombia Egypt (percent) 2000 12 23 27 rate (1 981) 3. all or part of the savings could be used to increase spending per pupil or to increase the enrollment rate in Malawi's secondary schools which in 1980 stood at only 4 percent. to ensure capital deepening. Ivstment in al capital per new worker is also much larger in industrial countries because their labor-force growth is slower and their GDP per capita is so much higher. more women start looking for paid employment. the growth of workingage populations is more or less fixed for fifteen to twenty years. The gap in educational quality has already been described. the increases will be smaller (see Figure 5. But improving quality will be difficult until a larger share of the population has access to basic education. Kenya can expect an even larger increase. whereas a rapid fertility decline would reduce educational costs by only 5 percent in Colombia. will then stagnate or even fall. it is also difficult to increase educational spending per child if population growth is rapid. High-fertility countries face large increases in their labor forces. which itself is delayed if the numbers of school-age children are constantly increasing. Productivity. Wages will fall in relation to profits and rents. GROWTH OF LABOR FORCE AND CAPITAL WIDENING. where there is virtually no difference between the rapid and standard fertility assumptions. The returns to using the resources saved on account of lower population growth for improving school quality are likely to be higher than the returns to forced rapid expansion of the system if population growth does not slow. 86 ic been decied. But. China will experience a rise of no more than 45 percent. Even when developing countries manage to raise investment in line with the growth in their labor force.0 3.3). and by even less in China. as shown above. factories. In countries with growing labor forces. each worker will produce less using the reduced land and capital each has to work with. the contrasts with developed countries are striking. the number of primary school-age children in 1980 would have been about one-third (2 million) larger than it was.8 2015 1 5 23 capital widening. and so forth. For incomes to rise. by 1 percent in Korea. Korea's working-age population has already fallen substantially and will change little between now and the year 2000.0 8. But these lower-fertility countries have already gained considerably from slower population growth. ports. better-educated people can be an advantage. In all these countries the actual labor force-people who are working or looking for jobs-will grow even faster if. energy. health. farm machinery. Rep. Malawi. roads. and thus increase income inequalities-another example of how rapid population growth harms the poor. In contrast to school-age populations. selected countries.get in GDP.7 4. for example.3 Potential savings in primary-school costs under rapid fertility decline. For example. about 1 percent of Korea's GDP. These requirements have to be traded off against extra consumption.5 8. Ethiopia.5 6. Nigeria's high fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its workingage population will double by the end of this century. Zimbabwe-could save between 50 and 60 percent of their educational spending by 2015 (see Table 5.1).0 26 25 22 19 56 60 50 48 a. Alternatively. if Korea's fertility rate had remained at its 1960 level. Where fertility has fallen in the past two decades. whose rate of growth starts to slow five or six years after a decline in fertility.

particularly if many new young workers have little education.53 1. Arab Rep.35 461. Ethiopia. It simply indicates that unemployment is not a feasible option for most people. A World Bank study of what determines income growth among countries found that as overall income rises. this fact does not demonstrate any demographic stimulus to job creation.43 2. could provide only $30. Relatively few will receive employer training to upgrade their skills. selected countries. 1980 Gross Countrygroup Developing countries Bangladesh Ethiopia Nepal Rwanda Kenya Egypt. When a large proportion of workers are young and inexperienced.46 1.62 0.80 35. compared with $189. with a high investment ratio of 31 percent in 1980.) If all investment in countries such as Bangladesh. which had an investment ratio of only 18 percent.24 0.68 1.70 0.04 219. At the other extreme.65 0. Although population growth has had a relatively small effect on open unemployment in developing countries.26 1. each person would have had less than $1. Gross domestic investment as percentage of gross domestic product.66 10. the average contribution of individual workers without education falls-uneducated workers contribute (and probably earn) relatively less than they once did.06 52. developed countries can increase the capital available to each potential new worker in 2000 even if investment grows by less than 1 percent a year. Except for those who have more education than older workers.53 149.09 1. Countries with the lowest absolute levels of investment per potential new worker tend to be those also facing the fastest growth in their working-age populations. Just to maintain the current small amount of investment per potential new worker.700 invested on his or her behalf (see * Table 5. b.31 7. Over time. and Rwanda had been allocated to potential new workers during 1980.85 40.4).as Korea.94 204. 87 .96 10. Rep.000 of gross investment available.79 465.4 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker.33 188.99 74 76 78 99 134 68 73 66 45 65 11 19 13 1 15 Note: Countries are listed in ascending order of their GNP per capita in 1982. their starting wages will tend to be lower.12 9. the weight of numbers of the unskilled will hold down their wages in relation to those of skilled workers. of Brazil Industrialized countries Japan Australia France Germany United States Investment ratio' (percent) Gross domestic investment (billions of dollars) Increase in zworking-age population' 1979-80 (millions) domestic investment per potential new worker (thousandsof l980 dollars) Projected increase in vorking-age population 1980-2000 (percent) 17 10 14 16 22 31 27 21 31 22 32 24 23 25 18 1. Nepal. and they must compete with each other.26 0.000 in the United States. new workers in Japan would have had about $535.90 0. * It increases various forms of unemployment.61 1.66 4.62 0.000 of gross investment per new worker.80 0. a. (The investment ratio is gross domestic investment as a percentage of gross domestic product.70 8.34 481.28 0. Open unemployment is typically found most among educated urban TABLE 5. * It is likely to exacerbate income inequalities.21 18. In contrast.33 0.21 0.10 29. Thailand Colombia Korea.18 1. their productivity tends to be lower.36 535.11 0. Rapid growth in the labor force has two other effects. they will have to increase their investment rapidly.16 0.03 6.35 332.37 0.30 0. Age cohort 15-64 years.

if it is assumed that the annual growth of the total labor force is 2. for different rates of growth of the total labor force. In urban areas of most poor countries. Although this example oversimplifies-for instance. where they were relatively FIGURE 5. to industry and services. but the incomes they produce are often extremely low. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION FORCE. Figure 5. Uruguay. If the total labor force were to grow by 3 percent a year instead. * Increases in agricultural productivity-made possible by technological innovations and accumulated investment-allow output to grow with a constant or even declining farm labor force. Their economic growth was helped by a massive shift of labor from agriculture. in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa it was between 80 and 90 percent. Many others are underemployed: "invisible underemployment" (including part-time and low-productivity workers whose skills would permit higher earnings if better jobs were available) is estimated to range from 20 percent in Latin America to about 40 percent in Africa.2 nonagricultural employment is growing at 4 percent a year. is a fairly typical combination in low-income countries). the time required for the When will the number of agricultural workers Annual growth rate of total labor force 4 size of the agricultural labor force to start to decline Kenya w Nonagricultuhraltempoymen 3 3 percent 4 percent in absolute numbers. and Venezuela. many countries will also face the task of absorbing considerably more workers into the rural economy. including Argentina. In 1980 the share of the labor force in agriculture averaged 73 percent in low-income countries (excluding China and India). and as population growth rates slow. it does not admit the possibility of massive urban unemployment-it does seem clear that the size of the agricultural 88 . combined with a 4 percent growth in nonagricultural employment. This double challenge differs from the historical experience of today's industrialized countries.2 portrays a country in which 70 percent of the labor force is in agriculture and in which As shown in Chapter 4. Thus. For example. The effects on the future growth of the agricultural labor force can be illustrated with some hypothetical calculations. hawking. occupations that require little or no capital-handicraft production. Source: Johnston and Clark. who are presumably able to draw on family support while seeking work commensurate with their qualifications or expectations. It shows. while the general concern with the provision of productive employment for urban dwellers is well founded.youths. high. the time required for the agricultural labor Japan. 1982. As average incomes increase in today's developing countries. and personal services of all sorts-are highly visible areas of the so-called informal sector.5 percent (which. already less than 20 percent of the labor force is employed in agricul- OF THE LABOR ture. In some upper-middle-income countries in Latin America. But the transfer of labor out of agriculture has proceeded much more slowly in much of lowincome South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. These occupations have the advantage of using scarce financial capital efficiently. the agricul- 2 "best case" tural labor force would continue to grow in absolute size (though declining slowly as a share of the total) for about fifty years (point x). There are two reasons: their high rates of growth of the total labor force and their low initial shares in modern sector employment. \ approximately 1890 0 150 200 force to start to decline would nearly double to Years until the agricultural labor force starts to decline Assumes 70 percent of labor force inagriculture.3 percent a year. where the amount of capital per worker and average productivity was relatively low. The two principal reasons for this structural transformation of the labor force are well known: * As incomes rise. The rate of growth will increase to 3 percent a year between 1980 and 2000. During the 1970s the total labor force in these countries grew at 2. both urban and rural populations will increase rapidly into the next century in the low-income countries of Asia and Africa. Chile. the number of workers in agriculture should eventually decline. people spend a smaller proportion on unprocessed agricultural produce and a larger proportion on industrial products and services. ninety-five years (point y).

Promoting efficiency often requires policy reform. Between 1972 and 1980 employment in the modern sector grew at 4.5 percent a year in 2001-10.9 8. higher than in Japan in the late nineteenth century but somewhat slower than the growth of GDP (4. under two scenarios.5 percent a year in 1976-2000. efficiency may not come easily. b. In the "worst" case-essentially a continuation of recent trends. which assumes the same growth in nonagricultural employment but slower growth in the labor force after 2000 (implying a decline in fertility starting in the mid-1980s). much slower than in developing countries today (see Figure 5. These constraints are highlighted by the projections in Table 5.8 56. to 1. d. Only about 14 percent of the Kenyan labor force is in wage employment in the "modern" economy and about half of them are in the public sector. In Japan. Nonwage employment-mainly in agricul- ture-absorbed more than 80 percent of the increase in the labor force.5 percent a year in the late 1800s and early 1900s. There was some shift of the labor force into the modern economy.0 24. the number of farm workers began to fall when the labor force was still largely agrarian. The public sector accounted for about two-thirds of the growth in wage employment during 1972-80-the number of schoolteachers rose by more than the increase in manufacturing workers-but its growth is constrained by fiscal limits. Agricultural output and jobs must continue to grow rapidly in Kenya: the effective demand for food is rising at about 4 percent a year.5. Growth of labor force slows from 3. But the rate of growth of the total labor force was very rapid-3. for example.5 percent a year and nonagricultural employment at 4 percent-Kenya's agricultural work force would still be increasing in absolute size even 100 years from now (see also Figure 5. Labor force grows at a constant 3.1 12.5 making better use of existing resources.2). But the shift was small.4 21. the share of agriculture in the labor force in the mid1880s was about 75 percent-much the same as in today's low-income countries. many technological innovations available to developing countries are labor89 . many developing countries have a history of subsdizng capitl subsiies have discourage a. Industry is relatively small and capital intensive.9 4. so that domestic production-or other agricultural exports to pay for food imports-must grow at least at the same pace to avoid draining foreign exchange from other sectors (if constant terms of trade are assumed). since growth in modern sector employment was faster than in the total labor force. so there were never any significant increases in the size of the agricultural labor force. to 2. agriculture must absorb more than 70 percent of the growth in the labor force for the rest of this century. how to absorb these extra farm workers productively is a critical issue in Kenya and in many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. structural transformation proceeds at a faster pace.5 Kenya: projections of employment by sector. with the labor force growing at 3. So only modest rises in nonagricultural employment were necessary to absorb the rise in the rural work force. so its work force is unlikely to expand much. And the rest of the economy has only a limited capacity to absorb labor.5 percent a year.9 percent). c. 1976-2050 (nmillions of7oorkers) sector' Einployment 1976 2000 2025 2050 Nonagricultural employmentb Agricultural employment "Worst" casec "Best" cased 1. But the total labor force was growing at less than 1 percent a year. In western Europe and Japan. Between 1883-87 and 1913-17.2 million workers).9 9.8 3. and nonagricultural employment grew at between 2 and 3.8 3. Kenya provides a dramatic contrast with the Japanese case. the share of the labor force in agriculture fell by twenty percentage points and the absolute number of farm workers fell by some 1 million. For example. Efficiency: allocating limited capital Capital deepening (and associated absorption of labor into the modern sector) is not the only contributor to economic growth. Increases at 4 percent a year in both scenarios. subsidies have discouraged labor-intensive production and led to inefficient use of scarce capital.2 3. Last year's World Development Report highlighted the importance of TABLE 5.5 percent a year in 2011-25. In the "best" case. In these two respects Japan was similar to many low-income countries today. and to 1 percent a year in 2026-50. subsidizig capital. by contrast.0 9. In the meantime.2). Even with reform. It is only after 2025 that the number of workers in agriculture starts to decline.3 percent a year.5 percent. as well as of innovation and entrepreneurship. Even so.- labor force in most of today's low-income countries will go on increasing well into the twenty-first century. Unemployment held constant in all years and in both cases (about 1.

4 billion hectares-is TABLE 5. in part it is because further expansion of the land frontier is constrained in many parts of the world. too.6 1. 1960-80 (averageannual percentagechange) Total Region or countrygroup 1960-70 thought to be of agricultural potential.2 2. Growth rates for decades are based on midpoints of five-year averages except that 1970 is the average for 1969-71.5 2. and twenty-seven of thirty-nine countries in subSaharan Africa. In Asia.saving because they come from the capital-rich industrial world.7 0. In part this is because land reclamation is often more costly than intensifying use of existing land. the number of marginal holdings of less than one economies Nonmarket industrial economies World Note: Production data are weighted by world export unit prices.9 -1.9 3.1 0.2 3. Moreover. increased acreage accounted for less than one-fifth of the growth in agricultural production over the past two decades.3 For developing countries as a whole.6 2.0 1.6 2.1 0.7 2. and in some countries to regulations designed to stop private employers from reducing their work force.8 2. Other African countries-including Kenya.1 0.1 1. and Upper Voltamanaged only a slight increase in per capita food production. adds to national income.1 0.2 0. Crime is tied primarily to poverty and social disorder.3). have had undesirable effects on the environment.6). in India between 1953-54 and 1971-72. For example. insecticides used to control tsetse flies.2 2.7 2. Of this.2 3.6 3.2 0. 1982b. in the 1970s it failed to do so in many lowincome countries.6 2.4 0.6 3. Developing countries Low-income Middle-income Africa Middle East Latin 2. for example.6 Growth rates of food output by region. In sub-Saharan Africa. diverted for the benefit of those who are relatively well off.1 0. In the past. some countries in Africa are reaching the limits of their land (see Box 8.8 2. The output of food in China and India has also exceeded population growth since the mid-1960s. social and political pressure to employ young people has undoubtedly contributed to the large government sector in many developing countries.9 0.8 0. increases in food production were mainly due to bringing more land under cultivation: this is still the case in sub-Saharan Africa and in parts of Latin America. Major campaigns have been undertaken to free parts of the Sudanese savanna country from sleeping sickness. the development of vast areas is pre- America Southeast Asiaa South Asia Southern 2. For that and other reasons. Excludes China. which spread sleeping sickness. Youth unemployment may also contribute to crime and instability and the resulting large amount of service employment as police and private guards in some cities of developing countries. further expansion of agricultural land does not appear to be an option for several countries.2 2.3 2.3 3. including Bangladesh. 90 . World Bank. however. Malawi. a 66 percent increase in the number of rural households was accompanied by only a 2 percent increase in the cultivated area.3 3.5 Europe Industrial market cluded because of such diseases as river blindness (onchocerciasis) and sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis).4 in Chapter 8).0 1.3 0. Nepal.4 0. About 25 percent of the world's land-some 3.9 2. this policy hurts people who are not educated because scarce public spending is Constraints on agricultural production Food production in developing countries has increased rapidly in recent decades but has still just kept pace with population growth (see Table 5.3 1. For example. of course.8 0. so there is little evidence of a global land shortage (see Box 5. 45 percent of all the land in sub-Saharan Africa.3 0.4 -0. But efficiency is even harder to achieve when population growth is rapid. As a result. None of these. but it has not always been possible to prevent a resurgence of the disease.6 3.2 0. Rwanda. but tends to increase wherever there are large cohorts of young people who are unemployed (including in developed countries).9 1. The latter renders livestock production virtually impossible on some 10 million square kilometers of higher rainfall areas. Selective government concern for educated young people in urban areas has led to policies such as Egypt's that guarantee employment to all university graduates. Per capita Percapita 1970-80 1970-80 1960-70 only about 1.8 1. Sources: FAO. As well as being inefficient. a.4 billion hectares (40 percent) is being cultivated. but by only a narrow margin.

rr -i n.oii)rnilIh. iF..1.Icii delicii .e~i.m"in- and ind ii..t-ti.1. i -ta iiua i piiiit-a the.d rniiiun-ipti.gtiiinliii rcnthat '. uggtst thatin in: iictar iliui1..itid cri.r . tiirittiU a Cr ii... ii. ti\pirt.ti rd ..i dio.: ci'nti-r.t ' ahl i-?esn men.. 1rlurt.tibai dt-nannti up 5.it uatn is 1I.main tnt hng nmra4-si ihc- ce~ entuts [itecteni a tar3 repiirt puHi.. ii piirirdprorductin...r m. ~14. rht AItt arran4.rid . e.itiini h.iunititz ha...auth Asia t.BLut there ardi ment.tr ettecti. FB1liii calorie. - health. il.n- hi..I. -ni.i. M bt'he F tCO -.inre.eui iu lltinmalel% ii is r.3n~tter Fir s.n land anti t.hr gibkal tood --tuai -.th in its demand is projected to tnor ha' loi--ked thie ceniur% pi. tigur.Ii icx.d ic crrcil .'rl -nough ti'iod tor tuture g-:neratioin~. indu4trial countries di' ni -quit aleni Iiti tnt ujgh rt -od -i -mit orc. .nie.iriagr Cit ict -. i. oiiintrir-s at.it it tte.tiiin c:iuntrie.fliiiI-. '-i ure F:itnai. Ill prb.I ii.t ttu ihe-a'-~ [hi- ~harp run ind i.ii. inclu1ded pritta-tioni ot hii ted i' annimate ira. itnancr t-ici procie.-d lirid Ci oLld ble incr.iŽ th. lcon indicated that drmand in .Olt On a national anid ho usehltId ha.it inipirndirg di Mort recent %iv~ c-i teichno'kgic:al nJ 31 n cilirnal priduttw n but bec. tn 5rgtz ti.Box 5. the.ni ti-ni- iii and 3 1 perct-ni d itar.iih a chr-ni.e nit s. th-~ matiniLiun gli hdl A. od prwi'r men.unabir.s 21il tIiC -luInalt nt 1-ia ricOt aboiui 2 -A he r . sit per CUF-iti alil-itt du i-ii ir.m. cnn dint-t hge anti den-and te io ecida..Jr-min ii'r grail. alloviiing.nI i-.prpe.-r% .hed bt th.hn. l i' iit mnirt.the FA') reptiri 1 .. :IIL cJiutd U tible again bi "I) hbe ti-ar 2iA3i 'n priductsiln rr.an Bangladesh.utd teev ai bet'.it ineiunt~ k'an annintit gr-n. 'hirt lion tCulti.t the iir. tt tit' the pa-I thirtt -ir. irnrple C nt.:oiitl agre....uCc-:-.*.nicCr-. in i.ied Vi. erthod4 ne i.itgrtnIt sa -sner.s ci m Nnirican ~tud."d intrtr-et nirtrm in \lalthosin pic opoitnt ro the h.cau- ini en--n and .d acii-._ irtdide at ail0 bti.net-c rngine-ting -uld tran-ttirni th. billion -..Žt t'~ Oepartmeiit o A-c7riciuItute taint tii siniolar cii. -ut. aind griin' tir b.a p. [[Ut ~cc. cta-ntrpcrctri a rid-ti.et r-And in. t. ma% aso. Mans. dcc-. and iti.h 41 Outside Atrica the~group 1-t %tcragtdait in i attires pt-r cap. tI. rP.dicuhtintz ~nd rid grain priduoctio'n oiier i-. aiil purpi.here te hnottt-gt i pri'hbitb bhciii il-i inte-rnirdiate ii.tr rht ion heci ire. niirt.Ci dtnnand But their national t. These it -imit'.Cii 1072-74 cr.ai.t'. t a~ to tuna.r . r markic'ing ta~d PT.. -iia. i.:mintnis.i...to teed them-iel..aiue ot their nn.ohat grain priidu-.t li. itning bt~it suppirlitucib lb't It 4 bdhlin p. lua. de-pti-nding i-n - irn -Atnicci.pipur -. tinance ...opie i:ai Thie put- .-.i plant . a it n.ti-d dlrhci.dbe cip iri ugh Fit nit-ru:m.:nt Lon.gap tirt.nt in d~ : ping lugrun pctcntiai tii to-.n[. i I-ar ic anipts Cotuncil .n in de'%l-ping.-. luitIOns Pith cit iiiuld .-rt'i.it'd 1 4 bitiarrt.It cit'ut 3 pericini On [he demnand side t-rlmr [oIsc. c:-rti1 no. Cit ciorntr`c-' mdi%i dual nntidprtiidu.. it in-minti gu--d.ert-1.rding it. rind mn.is-timpiiiri tcir pi-pulatiinm and lnc''me grsor..ill riaqiirt ettrrnat imporit ir. n. alit'..ct.. tair ab-ut 2 oi ieni a iticd crlil.. iiir better dirt' i.in Aticva arih %. anti lieu -. the prtc. tr.nsuniptioni ian-i 'nud-tht eeahi -i-.. - rnpr . [SLr iard no-i th. i~uu-u ciii more than adc_ quate iio tbs i 5. . a tuicd wai b.iping ciuntrie. tink v hE r tineir e nlirmic -t it. iho'ugh their F'itpk maI bt.hi d. th rate .'.bur.kl:.ar- c-iin:um pt i.d i. dvetettp- upport -ibcut huh"l i..:-t ntIs r ingtLnan and mn ire era. Kb 'tapit ic-. rInguihigc 1 ae at .partitularlt be-au-c a-t t. -ii i . sh..uiier ilt [tir rmn tf 'he din eliping iiluntrit' the .d ind blat irndi- nce-specuall.ii in t -tandsu In tciitras.u cliiiin n.is the outl. indu'trial tiorid i.t-act c i:-ncanptiton cmtset -It ptan.ai Zealand i.- I.tn !ri ii...d se-Aictri.ci I lii [Si-itS d.nriirg -the: oirid at ra4t -the * a-~e5 - tran Siti r.Itwntinue to hate . ha.tt3cra reai. 1-IngrIup.-z4tiid --ed ainimraliedrnc trom 3iiiciri.v- mm[rinpro cd arid d nie-asiure-. h~ Id ti [r.. .n in arizproducin.t. -a LL'ntbiriatii'n ih ~-' On .r.Ldt iThe-c ec t[itrt.j rapid.' ance P. i-r hantninhe pa~-t %hile ~ .rnen.at-n to' nn ai thri.r5~i 'FritaliPritduiiicn In th.t 1and %a' nr i-t rural t-.sarni- rhr main i54ut I.ith 1cd-d.tc i-btaine'10 ii u' Mulitphittn M ..iectx aletnlieettI level .-a ths. i c-untrit 'e~ -u tic: uppl.ioid.ll *nea e trailk plann.i it-ile .In \tstratia Nc%. Fm Inc.-dn o in.s o'i liod nation.- pairtic:ulciri.: teirnrair pa tt bet nd the cnd -it Cilland to. n iii ptaot n. ing 4Iigbt in:rra~.t mnd rneat ral. -niutiiin Nfim'.ire rtttni pri -iv-tion ~uig-~ md t hr-at iluiiii4 incluti- .lunate ichInpin .prot.-.. pualiti.h ini pipuLttion atticrd ir beczu4e It inadequjate ar-arr.arid E..-.od imnpout Fur the-t ciuntriv. ti i~ fit nunmh. ii-d -nit u. .-ith human tone2uniption .%-lI -ping c ninire' rnt-t br.iin has doubt~d I It ' distributitng .~i~ teed ii.ilper da% in ..An idditonal added i. the 1nitr rrIiaiinat -Ten-i Lldiit Sa' idcrHaiti and licrdan tnrc-igdti.inn ot _' toee pi:r hiechirt a thee -iiiour. i ln mist ciuntri.k is etn mocre 'aid 'it -N it ti .-irtnimeni tir il-it glihal -liua.ra iduals ti. ii Iii11Oiiia:1l .he connLIutiin that the rise t-irlda-na vh-ic N c3pa1:Ie ti inn the ne' t ci'ntur\.eit - the grit'.3 Thatflii Food supplies for agrowing worid population iden in the d.id.l iii i-.i tir about halt lit-.and land--a-. ih iit gloal tltr ninth-tnt.ith iii r1f ii tin flu it7.n itin~ griinThi. i-I terrjhmzer.mt re'i-ardi i-n .U5C it Ccini-inuc.-iiatgri -ii'ntri.hv2r r. grii.-tn ~ii ltertdlizerx LEtl-J Anic r.Iti-u iii 11 -urre:ni . ear 'tlt- but the capakrt itt iiitin grtiups number pri 'ductu ) k . 1ir. trcp iat- pri 1-.% i' a-ured .hc siuntries..ugh ti--ding partil .d he licd II. r(in.ted rid siati mrart .rh ear..ps~rcrni inz .u..iin -it i.:i iin-anuop. Cit ti.. . is .c patit~ it.trom their aitih input.-.n at InI 0'gt ia intermeudiate ba.intlvi-to-. oi plan.~ iliniplting 5 ink~m5 at i.iiri ~.m ttw tc e htaI.i'id lmprri..\fghani.n..billion hectaric -cdi:. karti-u. hi utte r l ram a.mct package let el .d ecoinomie.tc ior% It `4 ~tl -tIck intitii. becau.l trtnit%-rnin dnc. diet cmn'ugh grain or tcu'd I' satiisi d4 inei.. hzch thi ciencit rt ne.Kied an epher.

their wages have tended to fall in relation to those who own (or even rent) land. about 7 percent of the cultivated land is cropped more than once. In Asia. worldwide expansion of irrigation slowed to just over 5 million hectares a year. including labor. started to run out of land that can be irrigated at an acceptable cost. with the irrigated area increasing from 28 million hectares to 55 million hectares over the past two decades. In many developing countries. More people have been absorbed into agriculture. Another constraint on the use of potential agricultural land is shortage of water. and on more advanced methods of water management. sowing. India has shown the most dramatic growth. Farm studies in Africa and Asia show that. The agricultural system has adapted. More people are probably having to earn a living as landless laborers. but incomes have risen little if at all. however. such as Pakistan. Worldwide. Bilateral and multinational agencies are now trying to arrest the decline in management standards. however. and water transfer projects are being planned on an even bigger scale than those recently built in Pakistan. Bangladesh. and Java in Indonesia. any large expansion of agricultural production would require some form of irrigation. an average of more than 1 million hectares a year. investments in irrigation and drainage.000 to $5.000 per hectare compared with $2. good land may be given less time to regain its fertility. the use of fertilizers. But population pressure is likely to continue.6 million and their average size fell from 0. In the 1970s. However. a 10 percent increase in farming intensity (defined as the percentage of time in the rotation cycle that is devoted to cropping) involves a 3 to 4 percent increase in the amount of labor per hectare.29 acres in 1979-80.14 acres.acre increased from 15. the area under irrigation expanded by almost 6 million hectares a year during the 1960s. This slowdown occurred because some countries. where progress has been limited mainly because of high construction costs ($10.4 million to 35. Less fertile land may be brought under cultivation. under intensive farming systems. In the late 1960s 52 percent of cultivated land was cropped more than once in Korea. and plant protection more than offset the reduction of hoursessentially for land clearing-associated with shorter fallow periods.27 to 0. Poor water management is considered by many specialists to be the most important single constraint to irrigated crop production. Without modern technical packages-including purchased inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds-and effective price incentives.000 to $15. on average. and mechanization. where little or no irrigation has been used in the past. Shortage of water in many parts of India. 92 Easingconstraints Multiple cropping-more than one crop a year from the same piece of land-is a typical way for societies to cope with rising populations. But the combined benefits of more employment and more food do not come automatically. the average land-man ratio in Bangladesh is estimated to have declined from 0. and in China. To take another example. 43 percent of the land was cropped more than once. In Bangladesh in the late 1970s. Labor input per hectare increases because. on the combined use of ground and surface waters. Countries are also putting more emphasis on groundwater development. For some Asian countries the proportion is much greater. As their numbers have increased. weeding. In most developing countries. population pressure has already forced people to work harder just to maintain income in traditional agriculture. This is particularly true for the Sahelian countries. in Brazil. In parts of Africa. but in ways that have probably increased income inequalities in the countryside. especially in some countries of sub-Saharan Africa. To forestall diminishing returns to labor. so that the chief resource required to feed the growing populations of developing countries is provided by the people themselves. the extra hours required for land preparation. and poor project management. and in most of the developing countries is constraining irrigation development. Research into farming systems and increased use of agricultural extension services can help ensure that new farming methods are compatible with available resources. on water economy. remain formidable. labor productivity has been maintained. and an International Irrigation Management Institute has recently been established to promote better use of water.40 acres in 1960-61 to 0. Multiple cropping increases production and uses more labor. however. the amount of labor used can increase faster than output.000 in Asia). The challenge will. where the proportion of potential land under cultivation was an estimated 78 percent in 1975. low farmer response. such measures are possible only where rainfall is favorable-or where water is available for irrigation-and where topography and soils do not . intensification of land use has usually been accompanied by better farming methods. in the Nile Basin.

1950-83 Population (millions) 700 600 500 400 300 1950 Production of foodgrains (nillions of tons) 130 110 90 70 50 s Average annual growth rate 2.impose constraints that cannot be eased at acceptable costs. it is no small achievement to sustain an increase in population on the scale that has occurred.3 Foodgrains and population in India. can sometimes help to induce improvements in agriculture. rising population densities stimulated the development of the transport system during the nineteenth century. marketing and storage facilities. and continues to occur. In rural Bangladesh-one of the most crowded areas in the world-transport. for instance. and increases in food production are just barely ahead of increases in population size. as well as extension services. in turn. 93 . From one point of view. are all inadequate. per capita) 0. Where incomes are low and unequally distributed. Sources: World Bank data. In the United States. Higher population density. But keeping the production of food up with (or even ahead of) growth in population is no guarantee that people have a healthy diet. Data for 1983-84 are estimates.20 Al~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ / 0. An improved transport system. poor people may not be able to afford the FIGURE 5..1pre_ 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Pr. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Years shown are end years for the agricultural season. 1978. rc~~growth 2. greatly facilitated the growth of agriculture by lowering transport costs and by raising the farmgate prices of agricultural products. in many developing countries. average annual ~~~~~~~~~~~~~of. But the potential benefits to be gained from higher population densities are not always realized.7 pe rate e n .10 . by permitting economies of scale in the provision of infrastructure and services. adapted from Cassen.k 110 i 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 Production of foodgrains (kg.

As Figure 5.9 17.1 23.20 4.66 2.6 188.5 105. Kenya Malawi Zimbabwe Tanzania Zambia Asia Bangladesh Sri Lanka India Korea.0 43.89 3. Most developing countries still have potential for yield increases (see Table 5.2 6.2 141.8 Notc: Harvested area covers all cropped areas including tree crops.27 172.25 1.5 532.7 354.82 1.42 1.08 0.50 2.20 1. of Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Thailand Latin America Argentina Brazil Colombia Chile Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Mexico 3.74 1-96 2.72 1. the process of agricultural modernization may take several decades.6 54.40 1. Paddy yields in Egypt in 1979-81 averaged 5.94 2.1 11.85 1.0 18. the landless poor probably went hungry.36 0.2 31. Sources: FAO.6 69.2 30.00 1. For a third group.7 Cereal yields and fertilizer use.33 1.5 193.57 1.02 5.12 2.3 25.51 2.30 2.50 2.4 16.9 3.3 24.1 45.3 3.55 1.0 868. They are particularly vulnerable when harvests are poor.9 115.78 0.04 1.5 9.0 84.50 3.6 1.8 38.85 4.1 47.7).02 5.3 12.72 1.46 2.1 64.77 2.99 0.0 1.21 1.71 1. 1982.3 shows.6 7. Rep.7 53.76 1.3 23.39 1.121.18 1.5 31. But in some landscarce countries-for instance. China.59 1.5 18. 94 . matching what was achieved in Japan.2 177.69 5.70 0. and in bad years when food prices have risen.01 1.61 1. Arab Rep. But output per person has varied considerably.6 tons per hectare.4 10.0 426.9 70.50 1.86 1.52 0. A second group of countries are likely to go on importing food indefinitely because of constraints on land. Although the amount of labor used in farming has risen in most developing countries. and so on.12 1.7 1.04 0. Population and the environment Rapid population growth can contribute to environmental damage.3 65. they need larger inputs of fertilizer to increase food production.7 20.3 61.1 4.4 72.89 4. Egypt.5 331. and Korea-yields are already high. In the meantime.04 4.5 102. selected countries. they may need to increase their food imports.2 192. 1969-81 All cereal yields (tonis per liectare of harvested area) Countrny roup 1969-71 1979-81 Fcrtilizeruse (kilograms per hectare of hlarvested area) 1969-71 1978-80 Industrialized countries United States Denmark Netherlands Japan Developing countries Africa Burundi Cameroon Egypt. although the constraints appear less severe. irrigation.4 331. World Bank.5 104.food they need.0 106.01 1.47 1.34 4.9 48.61 1.2 79. many families have had little or no increase in their income.2 25.4 6.11 0.11 3. Because these countries also use land intensively. especially when combined TABLE 5. India has managed to expand its food production faster than its population has grown.

3 billion people must cut firewood faster than it can be replaced by natural growth.. and noise pollution in some cities. In Addis Ababa.rh 1 L.. Indii. dams often start to silt up.. but it almost always exacerbates the problem.r " .:. 1 fiani.cl..i. thus the economic life of the investment is reduced. Although such pollution is a hazard to public health. irei pp pldflanIrni rr-. 11 al -e C. For example.ng d. x th. mh t.. 11 i. .r I-'.ii. In much of West Africa.... .hi i . -d ptht pU I .rnd \.L .h. ulalirn !r. i ni.. Floods and landslides have become serious problems in steep. p . r -r ..haw p . .. water..:. d.. Iot ':k .... n ...h Indi..aind H.Bu.i.1 .hr h1.'irl I. overgrazing and severe environmental damage have followed.rnv u... ud.lihn. -lr.l'nr gr.E . . families traditionally cooked two meals a day.ci..: t IiI.pl r In thE F p ' v. the useful life of the Ambuklao Dam in the Philippines has been cut from sixty to thirty-two years because of deforestation.nr .. Ul ri II.i-e . the price of wood increased tenfold during the 1970s and now claims up to 20 percent of household income. In dry countries.%tr.' ar-1 .ad. When watersheds are cleared.3rL p.L..c. c3u .3I r.3:d 1 -. il. i rur.i md :Ertll ilr.nfniiaII r th.i ..-.i..-pal i *u . thE o-i.. in th....nr..er . or rh i. rt r 1. i. whose political power was destroyed under colonial rule.t rpt .1311tekr11 11 dan:.rn I-NII.. 12 t_h. Satisfying the demand for firewood is a major cause of deforestation.-r ..n-.iivp..t-.. Undi. ramn.:-..i 1.1l.r ii i t. n. u ti . MA rld Ihr .^ d*ir'i. . rz.nd p.rrr1. r h.-. r.l111 h.hE ...4 fli. r. an unequal distribution of farmland.: . those who are exhausting the forest seldom recognize what they are doing.s ar e .n.. .r-a til u. I : *n .irn 95 . . The scarcity of wood has profound implications for everyday life in developing countries.rh h rr . i-.intnbuin.ng . When there is not enough fuel to heat food and boil water.. n. 1- throu li r .in.: p icpho l.'r'nu...'t tIi. For example. tA. Population pressure is not always the main culprit.a.. Lin.. In China more than 70 million rural households-about 350 million people-suffer serious fuel shortages for up to six months a year when crop residues are exhausted and wood is unavailable in deforested areas.3r g a I rr. iw h.lh cIr..h ms... \i Inh *n1-lun . To meet their daily energy needs. Industrialization and urbanization have already led to severe air.Lk. ..-. In th. Social changes can also bring ecological threats: in Kenya and Uganda pastoral groups.4)..i.r:. .- 3\.I.n..rd r. ri-in hr'e. d.d.l c.i t..nge. ih . 1 .. .. an estimated 1.. hI ..' .. hich p.. inbal thei lo odin-.tiTar PrAd..:I...h. . d . the environmental problems of the developing countries are not confined to the countryside.k mill- Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds r.ntn T....rIp . -n.. Ethiopia.f .r J Fl. ht..ri .nt. n. n *. .-d t t ..zr.u h r. .r . flh:l:i d ih. it..n..I.n .3i'r .. l-h rlm.-d ih. With added population growth.....-p.n`. . In the Gambia and Tanzania population growth has made wood so scarce that each household spends 250 to 300 worker-days a year gathering the wood it needs.i.Ie - -urT. dr i. 1* 1. . by restricting access to better soils. ..pul.ii lndial' Xij. because wood Box 5. r. it does not pose as immediate a threat to the economic life of low-income countries as does deforestation and desertification. Now.: l.. n-.: \... . %.n.with certain nondemographic factors..h.oje(i ill lttump? r. .Il:. r. Of course..-. t h I. Il Ii I-..-.'undin.. these two threats are closely linked.-.. One example is the migration to the Amazon rainforests from rural areas of northeastern Brazil.r..ho.. can help to push growing numbers of people onto ecologically sensitive areas-erosion-prone hillsides.inuai oL t.lr.1 . Deforestation Forests are central to the economic and ecological life of many developing countries. th. r.Iir I.t .-uI. have seen their closed system of communal management converted into open access to their land.Iruniall h.n d. diseases spread more rapidly.. I . h d-. id. 1 . -nul.i l ..i-. particularly in the drier and higher regions where trees grow slowly... . They help to control floods and thus protect roads in mountainous and wet areas. incr.jm n.-r .. deforested areas such as in Nepal (see Box 5..iie ....r ..a!..n nkeni. ir. .>..] .slr. Less electricity can be generated (because less water can flow through the turbines).- ... The depletion becomes apparent only when obtaining adequate supplies requires more physical effort or greater expense.. In th (L3nia. where 6 percent of the landholdings account for more than 70 percent of the land area.l .. thc -. irr.Mt ....r.n.. ir. .h -.1 ar S . semiarid savannas.r lI.. rh a.pi.Ii"i3 i. ... . rith. r . ni path . n h.magx i -utna r'r.ie l. t a .. and tropical forests. Unfortunately. .ur.. Forests also protect power production from hydroelectric schemes. d:.n rv.T.. thr. p.

But droughts. In some developing countries. In Ethiopia. are exceptionally nutritious. when the rains return. and the Middle East. perceptions of the problem of the distribution of population vary considerably among developing countries. sewerage. With desertification. Some see the countryside as overpopulated in relation to its natural resources. estimated rates of return on investments in rural forestry are on the order of 23 percent. Others complain of labor shortages in remote but resource rich areas. Although some 100 countries are affected by desertification. As a result. no matter how severe. water. But the returns from forestry development can be high. however. thereby exposing it to erosion from the sun and wind. a destructive and unsustainable process. Urban life requires a complicated set of services-housing. land may remain unproductive for many generations unless costly remedies are taken. substandard housing. the process is most serious in subSaharan Africa (particularly the Sahel). While drought can help to turn land into desert and make the effects more obvious to people living there. and have grown well. and so on-that cannot quickly be scaled up as population grows. They would have done better to have concentrated on rural .is so scarce. even normal rainfall cannot fully restore the land. and so on-they soon tend to become eroded and infertile. These direct causes themselves spring from the pressures of rapid population growth. Unless these marginal lands are given much commercial attention-fertilizers. They require local testing and adaptation. For example. and may anyway lack the managerial skill to cope with a city that doubles its size in a decade. According to the FAO. growing numbers of people frequently overstretch the carrying capacity of semiarid areas: keeping production high during drought reduces the land's natural resilience and sets it on a course to permanent degradation. deteriorating public services. overgrazing. City administrations are usually short of money. The direct causes of desertification include overcultivation. are ephemeral. crime. Where this happens. congestion. agricultural growth involves clearing more than 11 million hectares of forest a year. Desertification The effects of gradually spreading desert are often confused with those of drought. They are a new crop. and adequate economic and institutional incentives. threat of famine. large numbers of trained staff. The human costs of desertification often include malnutrition. these and other measures are not easy to introduce. Most commonly. A more specific example is that of soybeans in Upper Volta. An overriding concern with the negative aspects of urban growth. rapid urban growth has undoubtedly caused serious administrative difficulties. being expensive and ineffective in the soil and rainfall conditions of many tropical areas. the land's inherent productivity is restored.000 square kilometers-an area larger than Senegal-are reduced by desertification to the point of yielding nothing. Similar experiences have been reported in Haiti. fuelwood plantations. pollution. However. Managed village woodlots. In extreme cases. These practices strip vegetation from the topsoil and deprive it of 96 nutrients and organic matter. Another major cause of deforestation is the expansion of agriculture. Every year an additional 200. or more efficient wood stoves could do much to ease shortages. and dislocation of people who must abandon their lands to seek employment elsewhere. they can do so only once a day or once every other day. and deforestation. northwestern Asia. where fuelwood shortages have become critical in some regions. And the process is accelerating: more than 20 percent of the earth's surface-now populated by 80 million people-is directly threatened. many governments have chosen to carry out costly-and often economically inefficientprograms to redistribute population. primarily in response to popuiation pressures. has often led policymakers to overlook some of the benefits to be gained from internal migration and urbanization. six times the yield of an unmanaged natural forest. a well-managed woodlot planted with fast-growing trees can yield as much as twenty cubic meters of wood per hectare annually. In trying to obtain more food for themselves and their livestock. but they are not popular because they have to be cooked a long time. and so forth. When this happens the settlers clear more forest. most scientists agree that changes in climate are not responsible for the vast areas of semiarid land going out of production each year. irrigation. the results are familiar: unemployment. Urban population growth and internal migration Beyond a common concern. traffic. maldistribution is described in terms of "overurbanization" caused by "'excessive" migration. Fertilizers are often an uneconomic remedy. however.

social disturbances. it would (without a compensating decline in the overall population growth rate) imply faster rural growth. Thus the effect of urbanization on aggregate fertility is limited in the short run. The benefits and costs of urbanization Urban growth gives rise to economies of scale. Between 1925 and 1950 at least 100 million people in the developing countries-about 10 percent of their rural population in 1925-migrated from the countryside to towns and cities. because cities are too big. Against these benefits. There is evidence that the rate of urban growth in developing countries slowed slightly after 1973 in response to the world economic slowdown. Additional evidence from India.000 inhabitants. That decrease could produce a much smaller urban population than shown by the projections. and on development of effective family planning programs to reduce rates of natural population increase. Migration then puts even greater strain on the capacity of cities to cope with rapidly growing numbers. for example-may also exacerbate urban problems by encouraging rural-urban migration without creating enough new urban jobs. has not been clearly demonstrated. Though this would make urban growth easier to cope with. Typically." Moreover. governments reduce the absorptive capacity of cities by intervening in labor markets (for instance. and several West African countries confirms this pattern. the numbers rose to an estimated 330 million. only one (the Islamic Republic of Iran) had a higher rural unemployment than urban unemployment rate. equivalent to almost a quarter of the rural population of the developing countries in 1950. Evidence from India suggests that substantial economies of scale are found in cities of up to 150. in six countries the urban unemployment rate was more than twice the rural rate. especially because migrants tend to be of childbearing age. congestion. the shift of people 97 . have undoubtedly involved even more people. raising the number of births in cities even when the rate of fertility is lower. Malta. differences within countries between urban and rural fertility tend to be small (see Chapter 6). Natural population increase is estimated to account for 60 percent of the rise in urban populations.3) are not meant to predict what will actually happen-merely what would happen if historical trends continued. crime. National economic policies-which provide fiscal incentives and low- interest loans to promote capital-intensive industry. In broad perspective. the Middle East. Projections of urban growth (which were shown in Table 4. unemployment tends to be higher in urban than rural areas. all three were governments of small island nations: Barbados. The point at which diseconomies creep in. and Nauru. and by pursuing inappropriate pricing policies for public services. Although fertility rates are on average lower in urban than in rural areas. and licensing requirements and restrictions on small businesses). But these problems are often aggravated by poor urban management. and temporary migration. which allow savings in communications and transport costs. The role of internal migration Current high rates of urban growth in developing countries are only partly due to rural-urban migration. Natural increase in urban areas is therefore substantial. As such. projections are sensitive to small changes in trends. differentiated labor markets and may help to accelerate the pace of technological innovation. on elimination of price distortions (such as keeping food prices low) that encourage urban population growth. and low-income Asia: virtually all governments in these regions considered population distribution either "partially appropriate" or "inappropriate. more than three-quarters of all respondents stated that they were pursuing policies to slow down or reverse internal migration." As a remedy. They also allow economies of scale for such services as water supply and electric power to be exploited. Concern was greatest in Africa. on improvements in urban policies and management. although their numbers are not reliably known. Kenya. In a survey of fourteen developing countries. During the following twenty-five years. through minimum wage legislation. Industries benefit from concentrations of suppliers and consumers. and similar problems also increase disproportionately with city size. Large cities also provide big. Population movements within rural and urban areas. A 1983 UN survey of 126 governments of developing countries found that only 3 considered the distribution of their populations "appropriate. Whatever the cause. the drift from countryside to city is a concern to governments.development in areas already settled. according to a UN sample of twenty-nine developing countries. Perhaps another 8 to 15 percent is attributable to the reclassification of rural areas to urban status. Surveys confirm that air pollution.

from rural to urban areas mainly reflects the process of industrialization and the changes it brings in the demand for labor. Certain conditions in rural areas-unequal land distribution, landlessness, agricultural mechanization, natural calamities, and, in the past, forced labor migrations-have strongly influenced population movements in many countries. But, by and large, people move to towns and cities for higher incomes and better job opportunities. For individual families, these attractions can be considerable. Once in the city, perhaps three out of four migrants make economic gains. A move from the rural Northeast of Brazil to Rio de Janeiro, for example, can roughly triple the income of an unskilled worker; the family income of a manual laborer in Sao Paulo is almost five times that of a farm laborer in the Northeast. The higher cost of urban living may narrow rural-urban wage differentials in real terms, but urban dwellers also generally have much better access to basic public services. To take one example, in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa only about 10 percent of the population has access to a safe water supply, compared with 66 percent of the urban population. Most studies conclude that migrants are assets to the urban economy. They are mostly between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine and are better educated and more motivated than those who stay behind in the countryside. Evidence from Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Korea, India, and Malaysia shows that migrants with long urban residence compare favorably with urban-born people in terms of employment and income. A World Bank study of Bogota, Colombia, found that migrants earned more than nonmigrants at all educational levels. Overall, income and employment levels are more a function of age, sex, and education than of whether a person has migrated or not. Evidence about the impact on rural areas of emigration is mixed. Emigration seldom causes a drop in farm output. In villages of East Kalimantan, Indonesia, for instance, women have adjusted to the departure of male emigrants by working harder at rice and vegetable production. Other reactions include shifts to less labor intensive cropping patterns, increased use of wage labor, and agricultural mechanization. Urban-rural remittances clearly benefit rural households. Village studies in India, Malawi, and Thailand, however, show that net remittancesmigrants receive as well as send money-usually account for only a small proportion of rural incomes. Returning migrants can be an important
98

source of innovation, but only if opportunities exist to exploit their ideas. Studies in Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Tanzania, for example, have shown that returning migrants can introduce new crops and techniques. Other studies have found that experience gained in modern factories is largely irrelevant to the needs of small villages. Redistribution policies Governments have employed many different approaches to the task of slowing down ruralurban migration, ranging from direct controls on population mobility to efforts to improve economic conditions in the countryside. Few of these policies have achieved their demographic objectives, and their social and financial costs have been high. Moreover, they have often been undermined by national policies in agriculture, industry, and foreign trade. Direct controls on mobility have been most common in centrally planned economies. China, for example, has employed controls since the early 1950s in an attempt to stabilize its urban population. These controls have taken the form of travel permits and food ration cards that can be used only in specified areas; also, restrictions have been placed on labor recruitment in rural areas by urban industrial enterprises. In some cases large numbers of city dwellers have been exhorted to move to the countryside. The "rustication" program, for instance, resettled some 10 to 15 million urban secondary school graduates in rural areas between 1969 and 1973. Administrative measures have probably helped to slow urban population growth: the proportion of the population in urban areas has changed only slightly over the past thirty years. But the costs were high to individuals, and the economy also suffered from misallocations of labor. Less stringent controls have been used in Indonesia and in the Philippines. Starting in 1970, migrants to Jakarta had to comply with an array of bureaucratic requirements, including cash deposits and licenses for various business activities, however informal. To limit the growth of Manila, the city government in 1963 decided to charge migrants a sizable fee to enter the public school system; free education was available only to bona fide residents. In both cases, the controls proved hard to enforce, gave rise to petty corruption, and failed to slow urban growth significantly. A variant of such controls has been periodic expul-

sions of unemployed migrants from cities, a practice that has been attempted in parts of Africa, notably the Congo, Niger, Tanzania, and Zaire. They too have had little visible impact. Population redistribution is commonly a major objective of land-settlement schemes. The transmigration program in Indonesia, for example, aims to ease population pressures in rural Java-with only limited success, it seems (see Box 5.5). Similarly, Brazil's TransAmazon Program did little to further the goal of reducing population growth in the semiarid Northeast. Evidence suggests that the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) settlement scheme in Malaysia has succeeded in slowing down intrarural and rural-urban migra-

tion. But costs have been high (about $15,000 per family in the 1970s), and "second generation" problems-increasing social differentiation in settlement areas, and renewed pressures on land as settler families increase in size-have begun to appear. Although land settlement may have important political and social objectives, a review of World Bank-assisted schemes concluded that, in economic terms, it is usually more efficient to intensify production in already settled areas than to move people elsewhere. Governments have also tried to modify population distribution by making small and mediumsize towns an attractive alternative to the major cities. Evidence from India, Peru, Thailand, and

Box 5.5
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.disF.r-;d
mi

en: ',r..d .p.n..rn...r. s-n;.. rr .- -limiti. J n I6, '.

p.-

,n.,,lirrrI nra-'.'...T....rr. p.
.Iriru
i.-xn. t

irai-micr3,nn
hl' pFrnIIrIi I.si

r--n -. Ir r. eli. 1b. r. .l

Ir.

ari .,. c.'nr nililir-

ria di 4- p-:r;.

-r rur.l 1,.narn.s-,cr-

. -r.

--s-Wr lin.: - p.is.i.r......ii

I mtIr.hsm pe.pI.e .imc.1i vi lran-mm.rri nrr.pF .. U, t"..i rs ,n , r:m,.ar, ..tu:ie.i .-it *u : ini, itI' iqu,, .ieni .'i .1 1 -i.a,iT. ' r lli"h

.

rnnicni pr-.r.mi4 ni.

-rr'a3ui -ri .

F I-l it can d.. i . alvkxiat

99

other developing countries suggests that this objective is seldom achieved. One exception is Korea: through the introduction of special tax and credit incentives in the early 1970s, industrial activity and people were successfully attracted to smaller cities. One result was that population growth in Seoul slowed from 9.8 percent a year in the 1960s to 4.5 percent a year in the 1970s. But this achievement was helped considerably by a combination of circumstances possibly unique to Korea: a rapidly declining rural population, a stable government, a wide range of social services, and a booming economy. Population growth and the international economy Demographic change is tending to increase economic disparities between developed and developing countries. Between now and the year 2000, for example, the number of people aged twenty to forty will increase at about 2.6 percent a year in the developing countries, roughly ten times faster than in developed countries. In absolute terms, the difference is even more striking. Numbers in the twenty to forty age group will increase by 19 million in developed countries, less than one-third of the increase from 1960 to 1980. In developing countries the increase will be 600 million, one and a half times the 1960-80 increase. The size of the working-age population in China and Indiawhich was about 60 percent larger than the total for industrial countries in 1960-will be more than 150 percent larger by 2000. Even if per capita income grows faster in developing than in industrialized countries, the absolute income gap will not decrease significantly because the initial difference in per capita income is, for many developing countries, so large. To what extent can international migration and trade reduce these disparities and alleviate the problem of rapid population growth in developing countries?
International migration

a cause of migration. Despite the growing income gap between rich and poor countries and the widening gap in the size of the labor force, the scale of present-day migration is relatively small and unlikely to increase dramatically (see Chapter 4). The most important reason is the immigration policies of host countries. Their policies vary according to their economic needs, but they generally place some limits on immigration because of the effects on the wages of natives and because of social and political tensions that are often created by largescale immigration.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RECEIVING COUNTRY. In general, immigration becomes controversial when new workers reduce wages-usually because the demand for urban labor is not rising fast enough to ensure that an added supply of labor will not cause wages to fall. For example, increased resistance to immigration in the United States after the 1890s was partly the result of a decline in the growth of farmland, retardation of capital accumulation, and technological change that favored capital- and skill-intensive sectors-all of which reduced the growth of demand for unskilled labor. More recently, restrictions on the use of migrant labor in western Europe increased when the 1974-75 recession began. Host countries generally benefit from immigration; in the Middle East migrants form an indispensable part of the labor force. Host countries can also select immigrants whose skills and qualifications suit their pattern of demand (see Box 5.6). Immigration, often from developing countries, thus provides a flexible source of supply, enabling receiving countries to adapt more quickly to changes in demand than they could do without immigration. But the economic gains to host countries must be balanced against social costs. Immigration can create social tensions, often concentrated locally: whole neighborhoods exist in

The motivation for most international migration is the same as for internal migration-higher wages. Historically, some migration may have been directly related to population pressure, but today wage differences are the main driving force. For example, in the late 1970s, an unskilled emigrant worker from Bangladesh earned up to ten times more in the Arab gulf states than he did in his own country. To the extent that population growth affects those differences, it is, of course, indirectly
100

European countries and in the United States where adults are predominantly first-generation immigrants. Of France's 4 million foreigners, 40 percent live around Paris; in some sections of the city, more than half the primary-school children have foreign parents. One response of host countries has been to shorten the stay of immigrants through temporary recruitment rather than permanent immigration. These efforts are not always successful: in western Europe, for example, the same workers returned, and the average length of stay increased.

As immigrants increase as a proportion of the population, they receive increasing attention and public resources. In the long run, these factors are likely to be more important than purely economic factors in maintaining limits on immigration.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SENDING COUNTRY. A substantial part of recent migration has involved unskilled workers. Migrant workers from the Yemen Arab Republic (constituting more than 30 percent of the national work force in 1981) were practically all unskilled. So were a large proportion of emigrants from other countries that sent labor to the booming Middle East in the 1970s-ranging from about 30 percent for Bangladesh and Jordan to about 50 percent for Egypt. About 50 percent of immigrants into Ghana and the Ivory Coast are employed in agriculture, usually as laborers. Unskilled laborers in western Europe and the United States may be more skilled than those in the Middle East, but they comprised 30 percent of migrant manual workers in Germany and more than 40 percent of temporary workers admitted to the United States in recent years. Illegal workers in the United States are largely uneducated and unskilled. In some countries emigration has contributed to substantial increases in wages of the unskilled at home. For example, real wages of unskilled construction labor in the largest cities of Pakistan increased at an annual rate of more than 15 percent a year between 1972 and 1978 (faster than the rate of growth of wages of carpenters or masons), after remaining stagnant for several previous years. In the Yemen Arab Republic, which experienced heavy international as well as rural-urban migration, real wages of agricultural labor increased almost sixfold between 1972 and 1978. During 1975-79, they rose from 56 to 63 percent of urban . wages; urban wages rose from 45 to 67 percent of those in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt the rate of increase of real wages in construction was about 6 percent a * year during 1974-77, after stagnating in the previous ten years. Considering the low wages that the unskilled earn (for example, less than $2 a day in Pakistan in construction in 1977-78, less than $5 a day in Egypt in 1977), these wage increases must be considered beneficial, particularly since there is no evidence that output declined. An additional benefit is the money that emigrants send back home. It serves not only to increase the incomes of their families but also to help finance their country's trade deficit. Workers' remittances increased from about $3 billion in 1970

to $27 billion in 1980. In 1980, remittances provided almost as much foreign exchange as exports did for Pakistan and Upper Volta; they were more than 60 percent of exports for Egypt, Turkey, and Portugal, and about 40 percent for Bangladesh and Yugoslavia. Many countries have special schemes to attract remittances. India and Yugoslavia allow foreign currency accounts, with interest and capital withdrawable in foreign currency. Bangladesh issues import permit vouchers, which carry a special exchange rate and may be freely negotiated. China, Korea, and the Philippines have mandatory remittance requirements. Migrant workers tend to save a lot. The average propensity to save by Turkish emigrants was 35 percent in 1971 (compared to a gross domestic savings rate of 16 percent), and as high as 70 percent for Pakistanis in 1979 (compared to a gross domestic savings rate of less than 10 percent). The average propensity to remit, which may be more relevant to the emigrant country, was lower, but still 11 percent for workers from Turkey and about 50 percent for workers from Pakistan. With this new source of income, the living standards of many families improve significantly. A large part of remittances (about 60 percent, according to one survey in Pakistan) is spent on food, clothing, rent, and other standard household items. Many of the consumer durables are imported. Beyond using remittances to increase their current spending, families tend to repay debt and invest their extra income, mostly in urban real estate, and in agricultural land and housing. A survey conducted in 1977 in the Indian state of Kerala showed that land and buildings accounted for an average 75 percent of the value of assets owned by emigrant households. In Pakistan 63 percent of investment from remittances went into real estate, including agricultural land; in Turkey 58 percent of migrants' savings went into housing and land. Investment in equipment and financial assets has been relatively small, although in Mexico and Turkey some remittances have been invested in family-owned commercial and manufacturing businesses. How remittances are used depends on the same factors that determine other private consumption and investment decisions. In short, emigration by the unskilled generally leads to no loss in production, and if there is a scarcity premium on savings and foreign exchange (generated from remittances), then net benefits from emigration are likely to be large. In fact, it may even be beneficial for countries to facilitate
101

emigration by providing information to potential emigrants and organizing recruitment on an official basis. Many countries, including Bangladesh, Korea, and the Philippines are in fact doing this. However, emigration is not totally costless. Temporary migrants and their families often suffer long periods of separation, although there is evidence that women left behind efficiently manage the household and family assets, including agricultural land. Emigration has led to a rapid rate of mechanization in Yemen Arab Republic without a significant increase in productivity, and neglect of infrastructure has led to a collapse of farm terraces. In Oman underground water channels have deteriorated. Emigrant countries may also lose when skilled and professional workers emigrate; these

form a large part of both temporary and permanent migration (see Box 5.6). Internationaltrade: growth and limits Trade offers more opportunities for reducing international disparities and absorbing labor in developing countries than does international migration, but the effects of increased trade on labor absorption have, until now, been limited to only a few countries. Unlike international migration, world trade has grown rapidly in the past three decades, at 6.7 percent a year, compared with less than 4 percent a year in 1800-1913, and only 1.4 percent in 1913-50. Trade has provided developing countries with

Box 5.6
E... tl
.
..

The brain drain and taxation
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by the loss of the money
.1 their services. Emigration also

prIri i,.. Fri.
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p tu :i,. '. .rd areas within a-,. -

"p. -r.rrlt ir,,rl \1...

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ld

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c.sts are hard to quantify and each economy's institutional

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jar.-l.id r.Our._. rd J .vr
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K-vm. of them can be reduced
rm 1 change in the policies 6f little justification in subsidizing

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n.: r.-nk .1 - p.: r n. I i... . ... *:r,l
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ndlng countries. There is, for

. .imnplr

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elite, or when the probabilih- r emigrating is high. Govern-

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*.t,,-. *-, ,1-.,, 4 p.-r. nt .i r r... .-rn.1 ~.r,-lir I h Ir.,r ..mrn,n: I.- rhn*n . n. I Itj1 ri. t.- r r ,-,
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hi,!r3h- nirc.3r,l, in ni r I.- ,. riM in t re-,hnI I ,. leir F pii ti.r th, I- fn ti

nn.-nt n-iy also feel that they have a r.khi r. rax the incomes of skilled emir . r.i.nllr if emigrants remain citn:. .1 Iheir home country. The United -lc. i

:.nn. v r-. s.rl
: Z h-. .rnZ. .: I.nil Iri.--.

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, -n.t Philippines, for example, tax

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ri.emr,,.-n.-nswhentheyliveabroad. Ttr-

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90

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.u*,.'ould be raised by taxing emi-

pl. n- I.in rl,.-d1

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rr

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it is assumed, however, that

r:rrd3 rI

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r.-.i 1.
:,

sf all
er.

professional immigrants

nh.. , L;ri.-.

,-.1 rr,.n, .rnn,l* 11 'c Lr .:r.l r ln' r.
.:| r

mr.In. ' rmi.rn
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dnwg

Am-irr-i.1 ['Jn" -' 1-r-gr-n,, -r hir-,

to the United States during ich

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r. 11

2' r.-r.Frif.,11

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still there in 1979, and that major occupation they
; .-i_~n-

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hit

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of Ameri-

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ings 1979 in been about $6 billion. A 10 r.nrh,i .- n nr u. ul' nbui have yielded i

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percent of Offii.Si-r;-.- from the

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-i:

102

extra jobs, directly in the export sector and indirectly as demand for inputs and services has increased. In Korea an estimated half a million jobs in 1970 (about 60 percent of them in manufacturing) were attributed directly and indirectly to exports. For all developing countries, however, manufacturing exports have added few jobs in relation to the increases in the size of the labor * force. Most of the increase in manufactured exports (and thus in total exports, since nonfuel primary exports have grown less rapidly) has been * in the (now) middle-income countries. Between 1965 and 1980 manufactured exports of all developing countries increased by $128 billion, but middle-income oil-importing countries, with a population of 600 million (out of 3 billion in all developing countries), accounted for 80 percent of that increase. Five countries-Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Yugoslavia, with 200 million people-accounted for 55 percent of the increase. Manufactured exports of low-income countries, with a population of 2.2 billion in 1980, increased by only $14 billion, and those of lowincome Africa by $0.5 billion (see Table 5.8). Total exports of low-income countries also grew slowly, reflecting (with a few exceptions such as India) their dependence on primary exports, which grew at only 6.8 percent a year in volume. To the extent that export revenues determine imports, primary exporters have gained little, particularly in the face of large increases in population.
EXPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT- Export success does not rely solely, or even necessarily, on a large labor force and low wages. Of greater importance are an outward-looking trade policy and a relatively skilled labor force. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, exports of many countries have been inhibited

by inward-looking trade policies and price distortions. Ironically, employment has suffered as a result: there is now ample evidence that industries geared to import substitution create fewer jobs than do export industries. Evidence from Brazil, Indonesia, and Thailand, for example, shows that labor employed per unit of value added was twice as high in export industries as in import-substitution industries. In Korea in 1968 manufactured exports were 33 percent more labor intensive than domestic manufactures, and 50 percent more labor intensive than import-competing industries. The unskilled labor component in export industries is also generally high-50 to 100 percent higher than in import-competing ones. The accumulation of human (and physical) capital necessary to expand export capability is, as shown above, made more difficult if population is growing rapidly. Even simple manufactures such as textiles and clothing (the commodities that developing countries typically export to start with) require skilled workers and versatile managers and entrepreneurs who can keep up with changing fashions and preferences. Modern textile plants tend to use expensive equipment: fixed capital per employee in Indian firms using nonautomatic power looms in 1963 was $1,600, more than seven times the per capita income in that year. Table 5.8 gives some indication of the differences in human capital between low-income Africa, the least successful exporter of manufactures, and middle-income oil importers, the most successful. In both groups the labor force has grown at about 2 percent a year. But in 1960 the (now) middleincome countries had, on average, a higher adult literacy rate, a higher index of human skills (defined as the secondary-school enrollment rate plus five times the enrollment rate in higher educa-

TABLE 5.8

Export structure and human capital
Percenttage of mnanufactures Exports Countriy group 1965 1980 GDP 1960 1981 ValueRoftmanu factu red exports (billions ofdollars) 1965 1980 Aduilt literacil rate 1960 1980 Index of humani skills' 1960 1979 Rath of grtorforce (1960-81)

Low-income Africa Low-income Asia Middle-income non-oil Industrialized countries a. b. c. d.

9.8 37.4 23.0 69.6

9.3 41.8 51.6 73.5

6.2' 13.00 22.0 30.0

8.7k 17.0' 25.0 25.0

0.2 1.9 4.3 86.9

0.7 15.4 108.9 902.3

15 36 58 96

39 53 72 99

2.4' 19.0 30.0" 58.4' 38.0 109.0 144.0 274.0

2.0 1.8 2.2 1.3

Defined as the secondary school-enrollment rate plus five times the enrollment rate in higher education. Based on a limited sample. Secondary-school enrollment rate. Excludes China. 103

.>ilc. i .p-ir * -uminic ueldei.:cli it prr-cnl p.. ttr .r. rth. at - child rrpla:emtrnt reln. popul.1 .. tr. l depenirnn. -. V iJd ia.:rktiic I I teen 1.ni II...n the pr..i t. : p r-iih rI. -e. b..raII n th r. pled4td t. cr.i.1a m. F.*.upp.j.. * ntttecn-ee.un . ri.01r in 2 l.ur d uble th. u5i. :.rt thin .in-.re-JdIIjIi In h 'F'P' rraphi. lv p. e ni..th a r:. -wuld b..er rnanz.bdirti Ilk ull t.m '-r. thc elderi. .h.t-i e .c -.:..urile J. a. c:h. I Ih..:.c .iarn' ..uinrr-r.. rai-' l d-. ab..mg ardreo *1.li rhie ctntir'.rl * rin h ir parn.: ..l:.rtr ltl ri .:. l.-.-ite '7.k .m r be rearcr . lit rm n s'lI.i.n t.i' -ul re.h 1th* War. - ] j .lJ rieee B. 'iu.r Etlerl.Jin .: :.r.t p the a3b.rkc r . ih..p... L i - I ... p.1 pre . JiA..1 i .in r Buin. i-Au 4 asrt ..an in . tr. I.n.. 1i hich . _I I _ LL j _ . ihen a ti.i L ih. thiilepuipirili nr :1 prsons i n r r.tr.-irding t.' eh. in.it. rtplacmenit i- let I1II 2i .r Ir.rn ir... rn.' 1 r rein. .iid I 2 bil- ah. tlt htre hit Pro-.pd C dei t.n b.' r. ill be crral ..: i.lI ar. Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China but the pirrlhn milliin p.d pmnelinn :r thc n F'pFit t *tc.ne ih *-rnr at tilt 3C . art ur.. in. China I'.'- . urr:i .:-r.. rrtirrm-n rtunlii I.-nr 104 ..-lit -thirdJ.rti.A-aet' h ni. ccr...t uli re!m'ni.. n :tar..d lratr. -F'' l....ll.irr. ti- ti.ld l l'p. n i -ni.ar 'I. n.ti -t in... .rkers il hi.a3i . I.lnflt r ru' .pul.'-t .1d0 4 4 44 uld P .itbet 1e . u S i.t n.unprl-td?nrcd t ri luni..n .: t it-ung a3dults ri ill. meill-n-t e ur. prh. . ziIrL.:rI . a.. . ii.i 'till b.r e l. ... mu.upp.rl til l.1 I lfrtr I 4 I 4 l.n a nd I .ldrer. _ F | [ L f Lp L ___ _ _ the dtpen-d.r.: . zmp. Ti.n.l-:p uI. ar: p'. :4 . r.:ul c d t n.--11ij cuple' ha...ilitl 1 1.. dteai'nt in rhi tri 2J t-3.r h. L ! . and ionf tii It'.ige.. 4 .th putl rI t..e. al.ii r'err:.pLii.i but ihit tcriilirr .tj't.. Cr pi-iulillin gr. . t'urdtnn tre E n-.C ilt lbi. pr.tf ..tii1irir.urn.: . .n -upp..adiciupnre iding *u-ltic.-ri r ii.:.l ptrt-.ne IIIl.i . call' 1r.: n ' I t.Box 5. re IjIair pLr.. rheir r3 lr Llnil-d rMats eharil i i h. thil InImz ru Fl rl-*Zlttl tr.li.rtnrIvl.p..n. .i ..-hat . irt nlIrt and lntcrne . .. *ur-tr.t 4 r.'rld Fiai. . norlf . atnm dra-aiit.. .-r tir. ihk itar rr . ! gin rI. and lF -. number' pe l pie ha. . 1.nt ir.[. d . r.. srrttd- .. :1 per.d tit leer. the . precent tev. 1j -di1 n- etitur.and..ri per.rtr _- J JI F [ [ ..i...h fe'.i.irin tb .t.i ralit . - b' ut nl. . bel.id.ldabt i. F.n rhc-e regilni I' h-re haie 3air..p.rl.i:r.li.-i: and I Thze 1-tl cidcr * dJpt ndnrw ...ct .. nil pnr-14 ilu I and on I% t . i Is j -pi-.-.. rt and h-. r ri. . .'duc..1 I1ir-.iri ' rin3 ni-.r. in IFh . lime' :! Fri ii .. L I the rleIlvlI i = a.r trl lerill. pt:oIlt i.irk-1 - dmlterrnt-i..lilal .rln :ip... trr. Cr Irtn ni.i r -.e. rate rr i an iiiiii hIr. trce'nl in I pan tI..p d rker hna n! .. *. IcfOand 205" 'c I i.7 dJ.. 9 L i .n4 IF.i r-tt.lr r.n rheot ... .n. . -t. I....t. ear .: pL. i- h i-rr'"ii - mg-age t.ed. . mph .' ll ie- mra3ne:-upFie Population p%lamids.e :tl. -.nt .il. decline nI:.flC. p. . n. China aid Lned Stale.i*: . \I hlt are the I-:..1 Th.:1' ia..rot .1 iir% E. ig *i... ..rimi(. tI 'f.rItli' i e and o". tr. c. h:r.r.d ne. hc.. ech a iia. r lrh r .lilr i hia' 'a '-i no n.urt I ald 15 p'nce Firtin t hi e 1 n iF.rtt Penr. Batr It- depe nidetic -..tti . chIld lanluIltt r.r. Il il thilrtirE . p. r a.Je:d th. r.. ... erirr ri..a . ul rarphic gi'ai' arev in de eiop:d ti.'ndart r 1 r -r.1r t- The dLclines *¾ ocred ar. veil rm-minder t.ttJ c r.i . '. r..Ih can hilp i:.nd . er.Uirnic.t .sIinza . lhbIr :ei a are c:... khina .no gIrriliit. u 11 r.prl.. thit 2n1l-.rldL ' ltil rh -.d ri.: not u .iil 3 ac..rnuc len:iinr i.r the la-t te -lnnir. .. . mnill... cr i IIIr.rt *UF itnn aId ratht r than Inr..une pliullt'X tC Ilulr 4.e n rural a*e.-h !arc:r pri .-pularic. I ee n:. r J s. t i.. n niim rr it-ch n' Ith14 Ic le ..-ra pT..t . % %.l. (Ch.luid be ncr.e *ubztriSiial lun ..-I I Ii3r th..rel'. l t. I I II _f a:..Eml Ir.hrtlrIc pcrcrnt ir at Chin.ne -1 = ril . I-r rh--: t* jd.. I.. -n l t uld rP..nt^e :.illiCtS.ll reai.: ri h.ad.'re -.. :u-t ..iin 1. o. Ihtr.fl * ins 'i'iiuld be allcledi i l ar' hal rn ire rap...ni be .

for example-when public services cannot keep pace with population growth. At the family level. failure to address the population problem will itself reduce the set of macroeconomic and sectoral policies that are possible. in 1960 it had a nearly comparable level of human skills and a higher share of manufactures in exports than middle-income countries. and demographic setting. for example. The complexity of the subject makes it tempting to be agnostic about the consequences of rapid population growth. some countries have fared better and others worse than their skill index in 1960 might suggest. there are various nondemographic measures by which countries can ease those development problems made more difficult by population growth. would increase agricultural output. and so forth. the evidence discussed above points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that population growth at the rapid rates common in most of the developing world slows development. It makes it harder to tackle poverty. because poor people tend to have large families. then work their way through to benefit society as a whole. and because they benefit less from government spending on the programs they use most-health and education. Slow population growth itself requires new adjustments to support the growing burden of dependent elderly (see Box 5. Moreover. will cut the growth of the labor force only after fifteen to twenty years. 105 .tion). Conclusions Population and development are intertwined in many ways. cultural. The comparatively slow increase in exports of manufactures from low-income Asia is as much attributable to inward-oriented policies in the two largest countries (China and India). not all of them fully understood. discussed in the next chapter. In short. But it does not follow that slower population growth will be an immediate panacea for developing countries. depending on the institutional. In the meantime. Low-income Asia occupies an intermediate position on most indicators. these comparisons show that factors such as a literate and educated labor force. At the societal level. the effects of population growth may vary widely. agricultural research and extension. Population growth eventually slows as parents decide to have fewer children. Even among the successful exporters. The factors behind parents' decisions. at least until recently. accumulation of physical capital. it weakens macroeconomic performance by making it more difficult to finance the investments in education and infrastructure that ensure sustained economic growth. economic. and economic diversity are important for growth of manufactured exports. high fertility can reduce the amount of time and money devoted to each child's development. policies to reduce population growth can make an important contribution to development (especially in the long run). Declines in fertility. Pricing policies in agriculture and more resources allocated to rural credit. as to any lack of export capabilities. At the same time. Nevertheless. and a larger share of manufactures in output than low-income Africa. and permanently foreclose some long-run development options. but their beneficial effects will be greatly diminished if they are not supported by the right macroeconomic and sectoral policies.7). as this chapter has emphasized. Nevertheless. The adoption of trade and exchange rate policies that do not penalize labor and the dismantling of institutional barriers to creating jobs would ease the employment problem. These simple correlations should not be carried too far. as Chapter 4 showed.

This chapter examines the forces behind their success and considers the role of public policy in strengthening such forces. tvomnen's status .ontrr1 . delerminanis ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~labr-rniarke s~ I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c . rapid industrialization. Despite high average incomes. 1~~l hdlfrn *:hddfrr.. _ Fertility 106 . and-. r tIr . and incomes rising to levels enjoyed by today's developed countries.rk in-. a shift from production in the household to factory production. and the alleviation of poverty.entEi es !or -du. many developing countries cannot afford to wait for fertility to decline spontaneously. shc. 3Inc.s.e.I. .r ri Famrd% planninr Iarer ianPi*es 0 in. But fertility declines beginning in other developing countries in the late 1960s..ar0mon) D Fjnanciaf and Proximate of fertilih. because current rates of population growth are so much greater in the developing world than they were at comparable income levels in today's developed countries. have been related to a different kind of development: education. a Availability ot h servic*e§ A 0.duC varl! ~laatdI . I Pnrnar. ! rhjr.ae iSt c oRr~e3fEdin: o c. This association is not surprising.m.1 How government decisions influence family decisions Famil$ decisions l_ Govemment decisions Polm. and Hong Kong.n-n 'rulu OiChildren j Lxprogr. 5 . Thailand. l. cU trT3rr..rk i ci01Id. . which were largely confined to the industrializing economies of Korea. Singapore.n ard3 ':. and Turkey.6 Slowing population growth Experience has shown that as development progresses fertility falls.hon nhat evcsPomt t:d 1.d . helth C C 0 U. and fast economic growth. _ 0 Educatlio. and spreading to more in the 1970s. This message is not without hope. because some developing countries have already shown that fertility can be brought down significantly. birth rates fell less in Brazil and Venezuela between 1965 and 1975 than in Sri Lanka. however. industrialization. z i. . health.n o F3mLIs a.t 11 .cr Fei.r 5 N.. Birth rate declines have been much more closely associated with adult literacy and life expectancy than with GNP per capita. rdrri. Yet.rn1 TSending Socioeconormic enviromnen. _ . parents are willing to devote more money and time to edu- FIGURE 6.. .ate ien:.e hp h.. Ci Educabtinal D T Oi. This view seemed to be confirmed by the fertility declines of the 1960s. e^3-.nrrcpi)D -.se Ln~~~~~ B1erlireedirns O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c C :..'zrv . where income gains and social services have been more evenly distributed.tvr. . It was once assumed that reducing fertility in developing countries would require a typical sequence of economic advance: urbanization.i.rr. When their children have a better chance of surviving and of enjoying a wider range of opportunities.

Figure 6. for example. Income gains often coincide with an increase in opportunities for women outside the home and for the poor. The effects of taxes and subsidies can differ depending on the situa- But such changes come only gradually. credit and make laws and issue proclamations. therefore. for example. The complexity of these relationships is both a By taxing and spending in ways that provide virtue and a drawback. and it can ingly when they work alone. for example. and life expectancy. and expanding family planning programs. would pRca. children. such charges are holds. and the relachoe.1.cng lerv fertilit qickly. that clarify social goals about marriage age and All the more reason. government policy can also effects that enhance their overall impact on family affect fertility in the short run. and sending them to ing the gap between actual family size and what sool. children are more likely to attend school if likely to encourage people to have fewer children their mothers did. credit and labor markets are working well. indirect. But government influence is cially because some of these changes also take time likely to be stronger and more enduring when it is to lower fertility.ae . Indonsia Tai s breastfeeding. by narrowworking. cannot be transformed overparents from sending children to school and so night. Whr afoaml planning services are widespread and affordable.eiin: aigcnuig support for family planning programs. they work only halttion for loss of work and travel costs. regardless of family income in order to give them a better education.dict. taxfree allowances for children and fees or subsidies on services that children use. Taxes similarly affect behavior through. whether to use contraception.cating them. The gap between the private and social costs of children narrows where income gains are widely shared. improvements in education. for example. This is clearly true of family planning offer "rewards" for women who defer pregnancy. through various entitlement Other complementarpolicieand tax programs. Education. tage. how long to send children to school. for health and education-has great potential for affecting such decisions. which in turn affects longer breastfeeding can reduce the birth rate at people's decisions about marriage.1 also shows that all these influences alter fertility through what demograecnmies progress aloneia. When various proprovide insurance and old-age security schemes grams all work together. mother's work. programs and other development programs.al sentgou to couples wol wan if thycudmoeesl school. and the same time it raises welfare. But once it influenced by their level in the past. Nationally. Expanding opportunities for women relies in Some of the ways in which government can part on educating women-but this occurs more influence family decisions are illustrated in Figure slowly where parents see only limited opportuni6. ldTico and abortion. Many of the signals sent out by governcooules wouldcwantr iferthyquicould moere easily ment affect fertility by altering the decisions about children's education. These indirect effects are so powerful the same timelopitnraises welarie. Government can behavior. A the t experienc because fertility itself is but one of a set of interreof many developing countries shows that public hoshl . they make possible the for parents who restrict the size of their families. It is a virtue because specouples wvith specific incentives and disincentives cific government programs can have multiple to limit their fertility. Tuition and book charges might discourage tion. raisin children. And the experience education. Each of these public policies works through sigsteep declines in fertility achieved by countries nals which influence individual and family decithat have simultaneously benefited from rapid economic growth. Promotion of later marriage and and economic environment. Mexico. The influence can be direct-government can ties for their daughters. contraceptive use. But the complexity is also a disadvanwhether and how much family members work. and people are receiving a fair return to effort and skills. Main ohiesn. labor markets cannot be transformed overnight. government can affect the social Other compalementary policies can have more immediate effects. -for example. no one program or policy is enough to reduce The level and pattern of government expenditure 107 . Such it can compensate people who undergo sterilizaefforts work best in concert. and associated changes substitute for the benefits of having many children. level. rising sions-when to marry. in houseis clear that education is valuable. to act now-espechildren's schooling. fertility has declined more rapidly than social and tive attractiveness of spending now or saving for one's old age. age at marriage. In rural areas. Education and primary health care account for between a fifth (Malawi) and a third (Tunisia) of public budgets in low-income and middle-income countries. CostaeRica. Somphers call the proximate determinants of fertilityeamplTs ar l. literacy rates today are strongly indirectly contribute to higher fertility.

Alternative uses of time-earning money. it is not higher Reduicing infant and child mnortality High infant mortality is part of the setting that promotes high fertility (Chapter 4).feTtility. Family planning services are an obvious example. particularly to women who are primarily responsible for bringing up children. Within the same socioeconomic group. Parents start to want healthier and better-educated but fewer children. * The policies and programs that reduce fertility are more than ever those which will also reduce mor108 . this is often so: among small farmers. and parents are willing to spend more on their children's health and education. They can be offset by the social changes that accompany economic growth-such as education and family planning programs-and that work to lower fertility. by increasing the effectiveness of contraceptive use. it leads them to want a smaller family as well. This Report focuses on measures to speed the decline in fertility for three reasons: * Fertility will henceforth have a much stronger influence than mortality on population size. family planning can be a major contributor to lower mortality-both of infants and of mothers (see Box 7. nor is it easy to judge the importance of one program compared with another. The 1980 World Development Report reviewed policies and programs to improve health and reduce mortality. those with more land often have higher fertility (although their fertility is lower than the fertility of the landless-see Box 6. Rising incomes are also associated with decreased breastfeeding. children receive more attention from their parents. And children's work becomes less important to family welfare. Raising income Since children are a source of satisfaction. Parents who expect some children to die may insure themselves by giving birth to more babies than they want or expect to survive. thus completing the demographic transition. weaken the mother and the baby and make it harder for the family to afford health care and food. As shown in Chapter 4. Many children. With improved chances of survival. depending on the setting. born close together. * High fertility and unplanned births contribute to high infant (and child) mortality. In the short term. A rapid fall in fertility is all the more urgent to ensure slower population growth without compromising efforts to reduce mortality. tality. developing and using skills.1 in the next chapter). Where marriages are delayed by the need for a dowry. The same is true for the education of women. so the interval between a birth and the next conception may be shortened if a baby dies. In short. But the main reason for wanting slower growth is to improve people's well-being-to move quickly toward a balance of low death and birth rates. Lower mortality not only helps parents to achieve their desired family size with fewer births. enjoying leisure-become more attractive. a greater awareness of alternative investments. Higher income means an increased surplus to invest in land or other assets. which raises fertility unless contraceptives are used. But effects in the long term are more important.1). Education of children becomes more attractive as job opportunities depend less on traditional factors-class origin or family background-and more on education and associated skills. But these effects are transitory and may be avoided altogether. Women's education is also a major contributor to lower mortality. or by the costs of setting up a household. and by giving women ideas and opportunities beyond childbearing alone. women's education can lower fertility by delaying marriage. Socioeconomic factors and fertility One possible remedy for population growth can be ruled out at the start: accepting a rise in death rates. or even a slower decline than is possible. This relation adds up to a well-established fact: in the long run. Though primarily seen as a way to reduce fertility. High death rates do slow population growth. rising incomes permit earlier marriage and earlier childbearing-and thus higher fertility. further progress against mortality requires changes in people's behavior. for example. and the spread of social security and pension schemes that guard against destitution in emergencies or in old age. Thus lower infant and child mortality leads to somewhat larger families and faster rates of population growth than otherwise. many of the less difficult ways to reduce mortality-through antimalarial campaigns. the prevention of ten infant deaths yields one to five fewer births. people with more income want fewer children. one might expect richer parents to have more of them. for example-have already been exploited. this was discussed in Chapter 4. High infant mortality can cause high fertility for biological reasons as well: breastfeeding delays the return of regular ovulation.

rri. hi m ...' py-rc nr -hi . TTrtF l:.r trd i-rd Ior.-IJ r ld or hr. increases in income are associated with higher fertility (see Figure 6.l. ..s. it is influential only to the extent that poor households usually have higher absolute incomes incomes if their share of the total is higher. ind 1:-rt 1'. many families are below that threshold. 1 . in.Ik .-.. . There is.r h.1) IrrI..d 5.r.. .L hrl. TlI l. Ilk I . . I .n i . r I'rdr n. income itself.n I.lrL.j. I. ci r *. rn I - .. W niulr. L.r.? *.l..n .lu.c. ur i h. . ..311:d Ir ..t.mmun'ilrh .urr. t.r .IriIdr...2).- :li .11:r..r..r-. I-d I . I ..-.r -. II.rf i Ir.. I . tirradl -r.: 7I irh . J Ir... rI r..di nIr.rrrr .rl.^u. .n - Ir ..I 1 ..1.c .'r. 1: .. ..t a .l :I c .r nri ..l-..r..r\ r% * C. .l-'rr r.rr ..: L.n rI I. . iih n. * r 7pi I . .-r J.ir 1.h 4 . fnl..nd-_nr I tit.r.rrri. r. but the changes it brings to people's lives..:I r.-..rni..-in i Th l-. b. .riI.Box 6. .. .in :z I.r.rl ill. . in hIm :'r...- ferinity Educating parents More education for women is one of the strongest factors in reducing fertility.Irl. i1.: *.il I -.-. 1. rr7.uI 1. women with a few years of primary schooling have slightly higher fertility than do women with no education at all.1 I . r jr.. rur. t -r r..1 hod . tn. rIrrr. l l 7r.-UI| .. W.l. r.r.ird I -.. . .n in -r:rr. iln - nd.I lr... i rr.r1I . II. In all countries.ih r. .j... r.*LIf...1. r -... .-. . * VIrI -.fln li'.r'...hr. the reduction is greater for low-income groups.-. tI ..r.lr.. r II .ril .. the effect of education in reducing fertility becomes increasingly clear.r TrrtillL.'. r. in poorer countries. .I. r. lf'I -ri fl... I rni Th.i -r.:7 L. jr r n .tr * .. LI ..rk r n.1 tr rr.r: rii h.h . rrt.. r ..!tui. I rr n.. further increases in income are associated with lower fertility-for a given increase in income..r.r .ne..bt. The association of income and fertility varies according to absolute levels of income. that lowers fertility.nJ-h 1 ir.I. r - l.. l r i Lill ?I.uidM. h..r.. r .ri .. .J . 'rk L.rlr-r rJn..hidri Irar..r.. t .t.p..ir.nd Ik.I . h. .nd ...| 'r. r....rrI1rn 1i.1 I. -.r II.. E.r-! ..Tin) Er..j hn. d r......t . t.r.i.nt. and it often leads to a decline At diminishing rate Income per person Source Birdsall. di..Ii. women who have completed primary school have fewer children than women with no education.l.hr. .1980 109 .. . dre n ..rrd I r' ..prd r .h r.l. hIip..r. rn nl Ih . rhIj L..:r th. .Trd l.r :d . ir. . In the poorest countries of Africa and South Asia.r. ri-i. r rh h ..rim!ir ly- II I r. hib p . r . - ...rr. in.1.lr. . .r r . ... .I.Indr rh.i-i I... .r. l. *iu-.h.rLid I Iabct t. ...r 1 .l .Idh ..nJ .. . . *u.r-rt... I3 i. 1ii.r in. rr n h.juI -rti1 * rriri'...i.I .IIid 1_. Raising the incomes of the rich (be it of in breastfeeding not offset by greater use of contraceptives.. n.r.. .n -tl. y-r ..p -!l.r T. n.r ..IjrehiI * rb. Above that threshold.r. .t.t ch. I V 1 . . Below some minimum income. ..-.nr -..1-.- r. . Landholding and fertility. JI.-..:-r n 1 U th. u l u..r'. : ..Fr . .d r-. r.it . I.r 4 .n *urthrr... .I -1 nl.. -. 1Dir. .d rhi..rur.ot-. ni.. n:aI r'u r. I o . : .t. ..1 eurrrb. rh1 J 1i'.. l. .. -. r1 n lt. b ir r..1 ind i .. IFT .h. however.nd .. .rli r7.. . It is true that. r 1 .lrrn-r . I . 1-. In time. rIIT..e.iJ . I..nit-.niil d nr.Ci-.r..... n- ... h I I. rv 3r .J f:..r ....1& .rrrr. Some education may be associated with a lower rate of sterility.l I.lIr . r h. i .I r.r.d .rnVi ri.. tLr.r. especially in rural areas. .i. Fertility Threshold ~~~~~~~~~~ fertility ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Increasing Declining ..iL.r ..n.. Ii . V..r . t*.. C--iI.. .. nrIh.I-r r.. 1111.rir I hl.lI*. I.. .i 1.rt - ri. ..r.n ..r 1.. r.r*l.d ml t jr J .rnr. no good evidence that the distribution of income has an independent effect on fertility.n L. n.: .. and everywhere the number of children declines regularly (and usually substantially) as Relation between fertility and income per person rich countries or of rich groups within countries) reduces fertility less than does raising the incomes of the poor.1 n r-n r . . *r. r -l..h hr.-.r .-nJ:rr T *n . 1. h rI. . 11r t 1.. .Ir ..-Ph Ind ilnnr. .1rn.i r I r-. .IiIh .rr .: A t I rf .-ir *u.r r . lb. . n a.I.. in C |:.*t r.Irr n I ..r. C e. however.n..n.. t l. Ih. ..1 :. ..

either because marriage is put off during schooling or because educated women are more likely to work or to take more time to find suitable husbands. the delay in the start of childbearing reduces population growth by extending the interval between generations. 1978 Source: Adapted from Casterline and others. 1976 Philippines. modern jobs. more job opportunities should affect the fertility of all women indirectly.the education of mothers increases above the primary-school level. In addition. 1974 110 . This is seldom true for peasant women in developing countries. selected countries Total fertility rate l l Years of education of wife ZI 0 1-3 m 4-6 m 7+ U 6 4 2 Kenya. They restrict fertility in part by using contraceptives.3 Womez's employment and status To women in developed countries it may seem that employment leaves little time for childcare. Educated women are also more likely to know about and adopt new methods of birth control. 1983. Such differences among education groups are only slightly reduced when other socioeconomic characteristics are taken into account.5 years later than a woman who has never been to school.2). Family agriculture and cottage industries keep women close to the home and allow considerable flexibility in working arrangements. including access to family planning methods. for example (see Figure 6. The more educated the woman. FIGURE 6. There are several plausible reasons for this. village life often ensures that there are many other people. Even if they eventually end up with the same number of children (which is generally not the case). But these conveniences do little to modernize a woman's outlook or to develop a commitment to continued employment that would discourage high fertility. research tends to show that urban women who work full time. as opposed to only 7 percent of those with five or fewer years of education. Fiji. Nepal. Colombia. Children cost women more than they do men. Studies also show that educating women makes a greater difference than does educating men in reducing family size. In ten out of fourteen developing countries studied. according to one study of five Asian countries. who can look after babies while mothers are working. by Total fertility rate by education of wife. a woman with seven or more years of education marries at least 3. and Korea). In towns and cities women have less scope for resolving the conflict between childcare and work. and Pakistan) or very high (Costa Rica. The contrast between these countries is due to other factors. Kenya. Delay seems to affect even informal unions: a study of Jamaica confirmed that women who experienced no prolonged unemployment on leaving school entered informal unions later than did other women. 1978 Korea. in time and energy (see Box 6. Although there are many exceptions. Although employment seems to have an independent effect on fertility only for women in wellpaid. The differences can be largeabout four children between the highest and lowest educational groups in Colombia. particularly in "modern" jobs. the more opportunities she gives up if she chooses to stay at home to raise children. Education delays marriage for women. But of equal significance is that they delay marriage-by one and a half to two years. have fewer children.3). In Kenya 22 percent of those with nine or more years of education use contraception. In Mexico the comparable figures are 72 percent and 31 percent. The differences in contraceptive use among education groups tend to be small in countries where average use is either very low (Bangladesh. young and old.

. ...hn.r.... Such a preference is likely to raise fertility.I n. Fit .. ..rnd rJdue. Pakistan.r.ur te. rL .mr.rc._. a d . is -Kh \\rr -n rh. divorce. rI. I . h n ... hir r.. .a. Typically.hId . .milarli. Th.t.rn II.i Iininj. 1hr...Knr4...i rl-. Hi.-n D'i' l rw r.r. r.ir rrrn.. ih' crie.U -' -r . n n.11 .m3 r i..-. mi.ah-ri.i. rir. *r..-rini ..\ ri] ir . ..' rhirni-J. -> _ m . L . Ih.nI ien ths hild un&r .. b... \ h....1 r .I. Indonesia-female education and female employment tend to rise together.n thi. t .. -r.-.-nw T h.li .n-. bs age . -.-l.Lu4i. k.urchiid .h-. .r. Widowhood.r. 3 * rm p.n dr. v.. T rhqI increasing the incentive to educate girls.ur. r r -r. h.I.: . tn h.. Philippines.r. -i.. re jir. -iii .du: .r..-r tF* .. .ci-d . In northern India.. I .2 r Women's use of and control over their time JDailJ time allocation for %ormen in Laguna. ut in z ib. . rI inm. Urban residence Urban dwellers generally enjoy many advantages over their rural counterparts.r*' r... Although a significant number of women use contraception without the knowledge of their husbands. . particularly if a target number of sons is considered essential.. li. she cannot inherit property from her husband's family. v.n.p...Box 6. In other Muslim countries-for example. **rl..i. 1t r.. open discussion leads to longer and * more effective contraceptive use. h1 1.... much will be done to reduce fertility.. er .in . litigation... In addition to encouraging better education and work opportunities for women.If -r. :. irr - . -rk .r. rr *.o r i- .r-. in that way she most effectively secures her own position in her new family...JL: . each government can lay the groundwork for improvements in women's status by guaranteeing women certain rights-of inheritance. .id i... 5 h... nor can she pass it on.rI. undler hi.r.-' -n -. The proportion of girls enrolled in school is low in many countries of the Middle East. Irhr. *F'e' - nI r .. -1. .:r..ncr-i.-. ur..J .rlr. They have access to . rr.r .. a woman is separated from her own family at marriage and required to develop new allegiances to her husband's family.: id urd. This ensures that she will not become a liability to her own family. thrTc..-n.. ... Once they are able to earn an income..r z -.3:e d ' hj: to a dt. The most obvious insurance against the risk of losing the economic support of a husband is to have several sons.-... .r nijr.|rk . d. .'re (i. divorce..r: -r.. r.....u...I Th. .. and property...i p . in rhI' h.I t1 -r..1Ih.: j *rEn h.:p '. Often.:_ t .o soungeut child 0% -rk Chidxirc drv.' . marriage.ni n . Bangladesh. r. Economic dependence on men entails special risks for these women.. hI`1l1r h.. .. ..|.. 1: W. h.. In other areas.Ih.. ri.Idrzn ri3:. ibe h .. h. l. h il-. r. t r.. I. too-such as the right to participate in the choice of a husbandmuch remains to be done to reshape deep cultural beliefs so that women can play their full part in the economic and social life of their countries. k Iv. V. ..ut -Al hr r.n t . - ik. 1. i.P- r :1.. separation.. her chief role is to produce sons. e t Tht . irz r.itiun.t hl : e t..4: .. Her personal contacts and relations with strangers are limited. .- rt ur h..m Ir. risks that go beyond the natural disasters or the process of aging to which both men and women are exposed. women may acquire higher status in the home.L.. The "status of women" is a phrase covering numerous social and economic characteristics that affect a woman's life.! -jr p . to|u! . and many countries of the Middle East. .. rkr.-h Ih.. i.. t'.. In the process.n c..n hnr .. hIlIl p... incapacitating illness of the husband-these are serious threats when women have few ways to provide for themselves.) . where employment and other activities outside the home are extremely limited for women.rnw.:r . 1. r .-t .n.m -rk...e . r L r -2 n... n.r. rl. a nImU r . rb ih.d's. h.. n. ri. thus enabling them to talk more openly about birth control with their husbands. hr..r- p.tc '""-'....

better education and health services. as does the increasing scale and interpenetration of rural and urban life. to judge by the declines in fertility in rural areas of China. which are largely rural. however. and mote avenues for self-improvement and social mobility. and for many goods enlarge and diversify. Living in small towns does less to reduce fertility than does living in larger cities. In both India and Malaysia. come into the picture. differences in fertility between urban and rural areas are small anyway. Their greater regional mobility makes them less dependable as a source of support. it has been regulated significantly-by methods that have included contraception and abortion. other measures that complement and speed socioeconomic change can hasten a decline in fertility. it is clearly futile to wait for urbanization alone to reduce fertility. Trustworthy institutions gradually establish themselves and offer means to save and borrow. In India participation in a provident fund is associated with later marriage and. recent evidence shows that migrants in Colombia. the urban woman marries on average at least one and a half years later than does the rural woman. Information about programs to provide insurance and security should probably be directed more to women than it is currently. the logic of investing in children. . It is only in the already more urbanized societies of Latin America and East Asia that further urbanization will lower fertility quickly. Nor is it even necessary. and contraception Where fertility has fallen significantly. when socioeconomic differences between urban and rural women are taken into account. Local moneylenders who 112 charge exorbitant rates are undersold by banks and credit unions so that the price of credit comes down. marriage timing and breastfeeding practices can reduce fertility. and Thailand (and immigrants in the United States) often have even lower fertility than that of their urban counterparts of comparable education. There is little question that socioeconomic change in the long run lowers fertility and slows population growth. in nuclear households. As a result. At the same time. Indonesia. on average by between one and two births per mother. They also face higher costs in raising children. such as provident funds and social insurance. women more so than men look to children for support in old age. In much of Africa and South Asia. That many of these changes take time to have an effect only underlines the need to begin them now. Apart from these advantages. for capital. security. And. Better transport helps this process along. Markets for labor. At the same time. contacts and kin matter less as guarantors of jobs and of help with the harvest. breastfeeding. In ten out of fourteen developing countries studied. These encourage people to search more widely before opting for a marriage partner. In addition. a wider range of jobs. but not eliminated. urban fertility is lower than rural fertility. perhaps because they are particularly interested in providing education for their children. First. Indeed. the evidence is that socioeconomic gains from a low level do not slow population growth much-and can even raise it. with lower fertility. and so forth-can occur just as well in the countryside. and other instruments for old-age security. The changes that do lower fertilityincreased education. by being exposed to new consumer goods. But living in towns and cities is certainly not a sufficient condition for lower fertility. A study of a rural area of southern Mexico where a social security program was extended to cover sugarcane workers demonstrated that program coverage of half the working population led to a 10 percent decline in fertility. a couple of years of primary education lead to slightly larger families. Greater market efficiency affects fertility in several ways. A small drop in infant and child mortality results in more mouths to be fed. In some settings. Employment of women in cottage industries or in other low-paying part-time jobs permits households to support additional children. Second. Markets. especially in their education. is there a purely urban effect on fertility? One feature of urban life is wider and more varied personal contacts. Marriage. In largely agricultural countries. The benefits of education in leading to higher income emerge. Korea. becomes clearer. andfertility One feature of development is that markets become more efficient. urban people are encouraged to delay or limit their childrearing to increase their incomes. In the early stages of falling fertility. children become less important as safeguards in times of disaster and as old-age security. and Sri Lanka. the gap is shortened. for land. better opportunities for children. Colombia. in urban areas the idea of controlling fertility and the means of doing so is spread more quickly. This is true of migrants from rural areas as well as of long-term urban residents.

and Mexico. In Bangladesh the mean age at marriage for women is sixteen. Of the reduction in total fertility of almost 5 children over the whole period. If Bangladesh could immediately adopt the Sri Lankan marriage pattern. Increased use of contraception contributes the most. has been an increase in contraceptive use. about 4. significantly increasing the birth rate. breastfeeding. delay in marriage contributes a reduction of about 1. Indonesia. and Nepal the pattern is similar. Later marriage reduces population growth by lengthening the interval between generations. such as Thailand. roughly offsetting the effect Theoretical maximumrnI111I fertility 15 " I' !11 I 1 111IlI 11 I Il 40 -I III I| 50 Of oi less breastfeeding. which are below four. Fertility would be even higher except for lengthy breastfeeding. They lose the chance of longer schooling and of employment. Delays in marriage have con- tributed to the decline. Even without directly altering desired family size. Still. In Tunisia only 5 percent of women aged fifteen to nineteen have been married. in the Middle East and North Africa the proportion is close to a quarter.5. Bangladesh has the longest period of breastfeeding (twenty-nine months) and the youngest average age at marriage for women (sixteen years). Korea. i 7 I Korea. reduced breastfeeding works in the opposite direction. Over time. in Libya more than 70 percent.5. but later marriage partly compensates. delayed marriage contributes little. Modern t developed I I HistoricalIadeaemaraeacutfoasutnil Euro ean ] Traditional developing ' L ll I in Sri Lanka breastfeeding is also important. early marriage means a shorter gap between successive generations. It falls to less than 20 percent in Latin America and in East Asia. the earlier they start childbearing and the longer they are exposed to the risk of conception. married. Their respective contributions have been calculated for twenty-nine countries covered by the World Fertility Survey (see Table 6. Averaging indices I 20 I 25 Il 30 35 Woman's age 45 for many countries provides a composite picture of change over a long period (see Figure 6. and increased abortion contributes about 0. however. In Bangladesh. 1983. reductions in breastfeeding have slowed the decline in fertility in India.5). In Costa Rica and Sri Lanka delayed marriage accounts for a substantial part of the low fertility rates. Pakistan.4 illustrates how the childbearing span is affected by age at marriage. raising fertility by about 1. In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa about half of all women aged between fifteen and nineteen are. and to less than 5 percent in Hong Kong and Korea. made possible by contraception and abortion.FIGURE 6. breastfeeding does not last so long. In the five African countries. Figure 6. and Thailand. variations among the countries in each region are considerable.4 Average timing of reproductive events in selected types of societies society Conception Birth Marriage Y eation ! F sterility - measured). complemented in some instances by sexual abstinence. and fertility regulation. breastfeeding accounts for the bulk of forgone fertility (sexual abstinence was not . In addition. Traditional developing societies achieve high fertility through marriage that is relatively early and waiting times to conception that are mostly short. and contraception virtually nothing.4 children. All these factors have played some part in reducing the number of babies per mother from the theoretical maximum of seventeen. 113 Source: Bongaarts and Potter. with no other change in fertility practices. it also reduces high infant mortality. they can help make the goals of individuals more compatible with those of society at large. where total fertility is high. Today's developed economies achieve low fertility by later marriage and long periods between births. The major factor in fertility decline in all four countries. Breastfeeding reduces fertility by suppressing fecundity. Raising age at marriage The younger women marry.1). In other countries. in Sri Lanka it is twenty-five. it also fosters a climate that encourages women to expand their horizons beyond the family. or have been. and they enter marriage with less motivation and fewer personal resources to plan their families successfully.5 children.

In Korea the tradition of early marriage was substantially undermined by considerable migra- .70 3.83 1.45 2.04 1.97 2.02 3. when mean age at marriage was rising at a rate exceeding two months a year.67 5.98 3.97 3.47 0.74 2.40 5. North (1979) Latin America and Caribbean Colombia (1976) Costa Rica (1976) Dominican Republic (1975) Guyana (1975) Haiti (1977) Jamaica (1975-76) Mexico (1976-77) Panama (1976) Paraguay (1979) Peru (1977-78) Trinidad and Tobago (1977) Venezuela (1977) South Asia Bangladesh (1975-76) Nepal (1976) Pakistan (1975) Sri Lanka (1975) East Asia and Pacific Fiji (1974) Indonesia (1976) Korea.27 6.23 2. Between 1925 and 1975 the average age for a woman at marriage rose from 16.18 4.28 3.20 1.77 0. Parentally arranged child marriages.39 4.25 3.90 4.72 4.69 3.43 6. still common in parts of South Asia.47 2.21 4.21 1.17 1.62 5.82 1.20 6.49 2. the long-run effect of these arranged marriages is to reduce young women's exposure to opportunities outside the family and to encourage them to have many children.1 Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinants of fertility.23 4. practiced in parts of Africa.54 3.62 4.10 3.77 0. has a mixed effect on fertility.74 1.32 0. age at marriage has changed most in Asia. Rep.78 5.52 2.44 4.10 3.20 0. Among developing regions in the recent past.12 4.31 1.56 5.22 7.TABLE 6.60 2.15 4.14 4.83 3.27 3.67 6.05 1.43 4.95 2.42 4.80 4.99 2.86 2.63 1. This rise started slowly and gradually picked up speed.24 2.36 5.7 years.72 2.26 5.29 1.12 6. Polygamy.71 3.24 3.05 3. Marriage practices vary widely from country to country.6 to 23. of (1974) Malaysia (1974) Philippines (1978) Thailand (1975) Middle East and North Africa Jordan (1976) Syria (1978) Souzrcc: Computed from WFS data.34 4.62 2. though consummation is often delayed and fecundity is lower among very young girls.31 4.93 4.59 3.22 0.60 3.02 2.16 2.38 2. common in the Caribbean.51 4.33 4.17 4.2 fewer children.99 3. selected countries and years Total Reduction from total fecurnditl due to Counitry and year Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana (1979-80) Kenya (1977-78) Lesotho (1977) Senegal (1978) Sudan.55 2.26 3.87 3.90 5.94 1.99 2.63 7.53 2.39 6.06 0.70 4.93 4.92 3.96 6.55 5.50 2.84 6.09 1.45 1.32 2.60 1.19 3.66 2.43 4.09 4.87 1.86 0. while in such unions.61 3.84 4. women tend to have few children. Informal unions.25 2.73 4.01 2.27 3.52 4.71 4.48 4.26 1.12 0.53 0.70 5.99 2. are 114 typically transitional stages preceding legal marriage.18 2. especially in the years between 1955 and 1966.43 2.55 7.67 0.88 4.97 1.12 2.24 families would have an average of 2.72 2.65 3.84 3. contribute to higher fertility.22 4. Korea provides a striking example.35 3. fertility rate Marriage delay Breastfeeding Contraception All octher factors 6.68 0.46 2.17 5.51 5.55 1.18 1.

Tunisia introduced legal minimums of fifteen for women and twenty-one for men in 1956 and raised the minimum age for women to seventeen in 1964.exntL. liberation..2 4. t t. China legislated minimum ages for marriage of eighteen for women and twenty for men in 1950 as part of an overhaul of marriage laws and an attempt to provide equal rights for men and women.oe .sntT--_Ph1. as well as by the social unrest connected with World War II. Manufacturing has provided more and more jobs for women.e t-thi .. recognizing the limited FIGURE 6.lu. These and other factors.:. such as heavy emigration of male workers. and educational opportunities for women were expanded.It._drng .:d 1 ~. 3 2 4 4 30 16 115 . . These changes were accompanied by legal and social measures affecting women: polygamy and repudiation of wives were outlawed.4 41 41 50 11 -58 -77 -38 -17 114 134 53 86 ..5 6. Development itself serves to raise the age of marriage. Increasing educational opportunities for both men and women and compulsory military conscription also played a part. as does improvement in the status of women. -I 1 kl'rE in.fs'tu h we ..ai r.0 3. 5._ 6 5 Reduction in fertility rate i`. contributed to a decline from 42 percent in 1956 to 6 percent in 1975 in the proportion of women married in the age group fifteen to nineteen.1 6. so that the proportion of girls enrolled in primary and secondary schools rose from 27 to 47 percent during the 1960s.~ tre R-cIu.6 5.'n I. The Chinese considered raising the minimums again in 1957 but. the partitioning of Korea. family planning services were gradually provided.5 Accounting for fertility decline Composite of 31 countries Total fertility rate 7. 1984 b. . The president was a strong supporter of these reforms and a stern critic of keeping women in seclusion. in a society where factory work has been considered incompatible with marriage but quite compatible with continuing to live at home to contribute to the support of parents.tion into and out of the country and from rural to urban areas.1 5. and the Korean War. I. t.6 4..ed 'dl-t.r.)rIntnbutng tactor 4 at aspra5.-n .duocnon b%. Those governments which have tried to raise the legal minimum age for marriage have usually done so in conjunction with other measures that would work in that direction anyway. Initial fertility Final fertility Percentage of reduction by contributing factor Reduced More use More induced breastof contrafeeding ception abortion Selected countries and years Country and period Initial fertility rate Final fertility rate Higher age at marriage All other factors India (1972-78) Indonesia (1970-80) Korea (1960-70) Thailand (1968-78) not available Source: Bulatao.

15 percent in Peru. but not an absolute. although this proportion is falling. between 1969 and 1979 mothers reduced the average length of breastfeeding from 22. instead increased institutional and community pressure for later marriage. How long they continue to do so varies widely. about 7 percent of women conceive without having resumed menstruation. Malaysian women who had recently been employed off the farm tended to wean their children completely at an earlier age. breastfeeding avoids the considerable health risks connected with bottlefeeding-particularly where the powdered milk may be improperly prepared. Filipino women in a semiurban setting breastfed if they worked close to home. In countries where early marriage is common. and families cannot afford an adequate supply of powder. In Malaysia 116 . in-laws. At least 70 percent of women in developing countries initially breastfeed their children.5 months in rural areas and from 12. and they believe bottlefeeding is more "modern. breastfeeding has a well-established reputation in developing countries. which affect fertility indirectly.4 to 17.effectiveness of existing laws." In Malaysia women who live with parents. the mother's and infant's health is unlikely to sufferas long as families can afford proper nutrition and couples can use contraception to avoid an unwanted immediate pregnancy. and it may have contributed to a recent increase in marriage and a spurt in the birth rate. of a year or more. guarantee against pregnancy. continued breastfeeding still benefits a baby's health. and 20 percent thought it made it impossible. a working mother's income more than compensates in improved health care and nutrition for the family. is a way for governments to encourage social support for later marriage. where medical opinion did not clearly favor Providing informationabout breastfeeding Full breastfeeding and frequent suckling are good guarantees that resumption of menstruation will be delayed. in another. and the percentage breastfed more than three months dropped from 75 to 53 percent. or other adult relatives are less likely to abandon breastfeeding. This was interpreted as a relaxation of controls on marriage. declines in breastfeeding in the last three decades slowed the decline in infant mortality. Aside from its effect on fecundity. Though after four to six months mother's milk should be supplemented with other food. for example. Only ten years ago breastfeeding provided more months of protection against conception in the developing countries than did family planning programs. With the possible exception of China. Some decline in the duration of breastfeeding is a natural consequence of economic development and may be a reasonable choice-if for example. But especially where breastfeeding is being shortened only moderately from long periods.4 months in the cities. employment may lengthen periods between sucklings. Legislation. and governments can link the idea to specific programs. from two months in metropolitan Malaysia to twenty-nine months in rural Bangladesh. 60 percent of Malaysian women knew it made conception more difficult. In addition. In 1980 the government raised the legal minimum ages to twenty and twenty-two-less than the widely and officially propounded minimums of twenty-three and twenty-five. yet that is biologically implausible for all but a few women. Some mothers switch to bottlefeeding because they lack guidance and information about the health benefits of breastfeeding. But evidence shows that in many cases breastfeeding is being curtailed simply because mothers do not know how to do it. though protection decreases with each month after childbirth. As a basic form of contraception. The trend is toward less breastfeeding: in Thailand. giving women more rights and encouraging men and women to support expanded women's opportunities within the household as well as in society at large. Studies show that mothers' employment in itself does not affect whether mothers initiate breastfeeding. but started mixed feeding earlier if they worked in a different area. adequate sterilization is not possible. leading to a briefer amenorrheic period. governments need to go further. In Malaysia the percentage of infants initially breastfed dropped from 89 to 74 percent between 1960 and 1974. efforts to raise the age at marriage by persuasion and edict have not been particularly successful. In one study three-quarters of Guatemalan mothers knew that it could postpone conception. Women who breastfeed and who want to avoid pregnancy are 10 percent of all married women in Mexico. Failure to menstruate is a good. especially schooling for girls. say. but employment may affect how long they continue to breastfeed. the chief reason given for stopping breastfeeding is insufficient milk. Evidence that behavior will change in the light of information comes from the industrialized countries. and 16 percent in Honduras.9 to 8. however.

where programs were also established 117 . education. Under these circumstances. some of the continued decline might have occurred even without official programs. been patchy and inadequate. Apart from providing more information on the advantages of breastfeeding. for example. In Malaysia government family planning clinics that encourage breastfeeding have a positive effect. lower infant mortality.5. reducing the duration of breastfeeding from an average of three years to one month could double a mother's fertility from five to ten children. The rest of this chapter examines the evidence that support for family planning services (delivered by both public and private agencies) has helped to reduce fertility. Making conttraception easier As shown in Figure 6. since use is related to people's fertility goals and does not indicate the difference services alone would make to people who now have no access to them). Papua New Guinea. psychological. contraceptive use there would have had to double to prevent fertility from rising. risking an additional child may seem less costly than preventing a birth.breastmilk until the late 1960s. until recently. and even infanticide. and even the stated "desired family size" may be higher than it would be if birth control were easier. and life expectancy in the same period. analysts must estimate how fertility would have changed in its absence. In the United States. In Indonesia. in the case of traditional abortion. They do so in several ways: by making it easier for couples to have only the children they want. Such information has. In Port Moresby. But use of contraception is also related to its costs. it was not surprising that a decade ago policymakers and planners could not completely agree on the relative importance to a fertility decline of the supply of family planning services versus the "demand" factors-increasing education. People have regulated family size for centuries-through abortion. As the advantages of breastfeeding became better known. and the like. Use of contraception is partly a function of a couple's wish to avoid (or to postpone) additional children. But these methods are all costly in terms of reduced emotional. if all mothers in Thailand had started menstruating three months after each baby was born. to the costs of limiting or postponing births. contraceptive use would have had to more than double. Hong Kong. by spreading the idea of birth control as something individuals can do. In other countries (such as India and Pakistan). physical well-being. college-educated women are now most likely to start breastfeeding and continue it for the longest periods. the number of children desired is related to the social and economic factors discussed above. except for complete abstinence and infanticide. breastfeeding seems likely to go on declining. between 1975 and 1977. which may itself alter desired family size. that is. withdrawal. and by providing information about the private and social benefits of smaller families. changes in hospital practices and restrictions on the advertising and distribution of powdered milk increased the proportion of breastfed children under two years old from 65 to 88 percent in just two years. in Bangladesh it would have had to increase sixfold. information on the change in the availability of family planning services is needed (not on change in the use of services. all other things being equal. and other areas of East Asia had been established in countries where a marked fall in fertility was already in progress. In this case-unless contraceptives are used more widely-fertility will rise. As an example. OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS ON Measuring the impact of family planning programs is less straightforward than it seems. fertility declines everywhere have been eventually tied to increasing use of contraception. Moreover. Legislation to control the promotion of powdered milk can also be effective. Without such efforts. women who give birth in nearby private maternity clinics are less likely to breastfeed. That requires systematically eliminating other possible causes of a country's fertility decline-such as increases in income. It fo]lows that programs to provide publicly subsidized information and access to modern methods of contraception can reduce fertility. In addition. EFFECTS FERTILITY. The next chapter looks at how family planning programs can be run to best meet people's needs for safer and more effective contraception. medical authorities in developing countries can restructure hospital and clinic routines that discourage breastfeeding by separating mother and child and offering unnecessary supplementary bottlefeedings. they do not always work. and. Early family planning programs in Korea. In the mid-1970s. To distinguish the specific impact of a program. Given these analytical difficulties and the lack of good information. and in Pakistan eightfold. sexual abstinence. breastfeeding increased among better-educated women.

The existence and strength of early programs is closely related to the proportion of educated women (itself a measure of demand for services). such as the availability of many contraceptive methods. although family planning programs are in part a response to preexisting demand. recent studies show that such programs do have an independent effect on fertility. Up to 70 percent of Chinese couples of childbearing age are estimated to be using modern contraceptives. and of the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (CPS) project in about fifteen countries. The current figure. fertility was changing little during the late 1960s. along with indicators such as literacy. had been operating for only two years by 1972. and most of Latin America. These two sources. They leave little doubt that the programs work. either through government programs or commercially. for the average country. But these factors do not completely explain differences in the family planning index. it has been more clearly the result of government initiatives. previous fertility decline accounted for 33 percent of the total fall in fertility between 1965 and 1975. In China and Indonesia. countries are classified into groups by this index as of 1972 and 1982 in Table 6 of the Population Data Supplement. as in Brazil and Turkey. * Household and community surveys conducted within countries during the 1970s provided information on the distance and travel time to services for household members. and Singapore. as in India and Indonesia.in the 1950s and 1960s. but governments have made a concerted effort to bring family planning services to the villages. and GNP per capita in about 1970. because similar questions were asked everywhere. Indeed. but it would still be well below current rates in South Asia. may slightly understate the actual birth rate. adequacy of the family planning administrative structure. It was based on countries' performance in 1972 on fifteen criteria. Furthermore. Korea.) The same results emerged from using measurements of socioeconomic change from 1970 to 1977 rather than levels at one point in time during the period.000 people. where socioeconomic development was relatively advanced and family planning programs were strong. down from forty in the 1960s. analysis does show that in the early 1970s family planning programs were more likely to be instituted and were more successful where demand for contraception already existed: Korea. have provided the basis for careful analyses of the effects of family planning programs. socioeconomic change accounted for 27 percent. life expectancy. and to the degree to which fertility had declined in the late 1960s. In China the birth rate at the end of 1982 was estimated to be nineteen per 1. and Singapore. indices were stronger or weaker because of other factors-political leadership. family planning services provided by the government may simply displace traditional methods of contraception or modern methods already available through the private sector. STUDIES WITHIN COUNTRIES. nationwide samples and. the family planning index accounted for more than either: 40 percent. to some extent. inclusion of fertility reduction in official policy. One objection to this type of study is that the family planning index may itself be the result of a demand for contraception that already existed as a byproduct of development. * A country-level family planning index was developed in the mid-1970s. per capita income is low and the population still overwhelmingly rural. There was a modest decline in birth rates (10 to 16 percent) where development was relatively strong but the family planning index was weak. But family planning programs spread rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Those carried out as part of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) project in over forty countries. supplemented by the results of small experimental field studies. now one of the world's strongest. Hong Kong. are largely comparable among countries. for example. And the change in country effort between 1972 and 1982 is not at all related to earlier declines in fertility or to levels of development. based on birth registrations rather than on a census. In this case. The index has been updated for this Report to 1982. The cross-country studies are complemented by several examples of apparent family planning success in individual countries. Using the family planning index. Africa. research in the late 1970s found that birth rates declined most (29 to 40 percent) between 1965 and 1975 in countries such as Costa Rica. (Indonesia's family planning program. CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES. and use of mass media and fieldworkers. The government believes that its family 118 . There was also a modest decline where development levels were low but the family planning index was moderately strong. Cross-country analysis shows that. and more systematic information on them is now available. have several advantages: most are representative. the reference year for the family planning index.

In urban areas the proportion of married women using contraception increased from 43 to 53 percent between 1969 and 1976. 119 . Fertility had begun to fall by 1965. In several low-income countries family planning programs have not been effective in reducing fertility-for example.6 shows. Public programs accounted for virtually all of the increase. Of course. mainly because of sterilization. in rural areas the proportion doubled. similarly. and Pakistan.planning program is critical to reducing fertility. Indonesia's current birth rate is estimated at thirty-four per 1. fertility began to fall a few years before the establishment of extensive family planning programs. with a big switch from less effective methods. although fertility levels are still higher among those with less education. as in Colombia. the drop in fertility for Colombian women with little schooling has paralleled that of better-educated women. The government adopted a policy to reduce population growth at the end of 1973-an abrupt shift from its earlier pronatalist position. a 10 percent increase in the number of extension workers raised acceptance rates by 4 to 6 percent. even among women with little or no education. Mexico. Other developing countries and regions have also had remarkable increases in contraceptive use and rapid fertility declines. For the four years prior to the project. Philippines.7 in 1970 to about 4. and from 7 to 25 percent in the area covered by the project. village workers (including midwives and FIELD PROJECTS. In one district in India a 10 percent increase in the number of clinics per hundred thousand people was associated with a 3 to 4 percent increase in the combined acceptance rates of intrauterine devices (IUDs) and sterilization. (Colombia has a somewhat lower per capita income than does Brazil or Mexico. In Colombia a strong private family planning program was under way by the late 1960s. In Java and Bali. As Figure 6. from 15 to 30 percent. Contraceptive use rose from 5 to 9 percent in the surrounding areas. a largely inaccessible part of Bangladesh. Over the period. fertility rates for these villages were comparable with those for seventy-nine other Matlab villages. the fall in fertility accelerated. to pills and IUDs (although the increase since then has slowed). * On the island of Cheju. and the government began supporting family planning in 1969.000 people. In Mexico. Experiments conducted in widely different communities have also revealed numerous examples of the effectiveness of family planning programs. even when differences in development levels are taken into account. the percentage of married women of reproductive age currently using modern contraception more than doubled between 1974 and 1976 (11 to 24 percent). Comparisons within countries show the difference actual availability can make. fertility in the surrounding areas fell by 29 percent. In Colombia and Mexico work opportunities and household incomes of women with little education were probably increasing in the 1960s and 1970s. rates were 22 percent lower (see Box 7. family planning services have provided couples with the means to respond. Korea. maternal and child health services and contraceptives were delivered to individual households in 1976-77. Kenya. Rates of contraceptive use among married women aged fifteen to fortynine more than doubled between 1973 and 1976. which also encouraged the use of contraception. before family planning services became widely available. such as rhythm and withdrawal. In China the government has exerted considerable social pressure and adopted economic incentives to reduce fertility. * In San Pablo Autopan. trained local women provided comprehensive family planning services in seventy villages. by 1982 they had reached an estimated 48 percent.6 in 1982. Thailand. both private and government-sponsored. and by 1983 had reached an estimated 53 percent. which is a notable drop from an estimated forty-four in 1960. from 11 to 29 percent. but it declined faster in Colombia in the early 1970s than it did in Brazil or Mexico. family planning staff distributed oral pills and condoms through home visits in 1976-79 and also referred to clinics women who wanted IUDs and subsidized sterilization.6). Korea. * In Matlab. the availability of family planning services has not been the only reason for falling fertility in these countries. in Cheju it fell by 35 percent. and India contraceptive use is higher in communities with more sources of family planning supplies. over the two subsequent years. but as those programs gained momentum. * In some parts of the island of Bohol.) In Mexico. nearly doubled again to 42 percent by 1980. Lack of demand has been a factor. where family planning services were less widely available. Ghana. and similar literacy and urbanization rates. but so has limited availability of services and weak government support for the programs. the two most densely populated islands of the country. The total fertility rate fell from 6.

No education ~ l---. Birdsall.6 Fertility dedine within female education groups in selected countries Completed family size 9 Total fertility rate 9 Jordan ---------..1 or more years --------.--.FIGURE 6. Merrick. 1980. 120 . 1984. 1983.1-4 years --------- 5 or more years 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 1970 Total marital fertility rate 9 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 Total marital fertility rate 9 1972 1974 1976 1978 India (rural) India (urban) Illiterate Literate below secondary-school level Completed secondary Illiterate Literate below secondary-schoc level Completed secondary 3 3 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 Sources: Cochrane. Zachariah.Illiterate Colombia *_ 6 U --------.Secondary school 3 3 Completed prinmary 0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1970 Total fertility rate 9 1972 1974 1976 1978 1967-68 Total fertility rate 9 1972-73 1978 Brazil (rural) Brazil (urban) ---------.Primary and secondary school 6 Did not complete primary school ---------.No education 6 --------. 1984.

The decline in fertility in Kerala. as in Kenya. lower mortality.1 to 2. At low levels of education and high levels of mortality. Similarly. experiments such as these are difficult to replicate. Analysis of fertility change across countries done for this Report shows that between 1972 and 1982 family planning programs have had minimal effect where female education is low. For the single goal of reducing fertility. By increasing the supply of services. COST EFFECTIVENESS OF FAMILY PLANNING PRO- GRAMS.a traditional birth attendants) provided maternal and child health care. low-mortality setting will induce a greater increase in contraceptive use. and the infant mortality rate less than half the national rate. Equally. India. Indeed.objectives in their own right. spending on family planning services turns out to be more cost effective (that is. * A comprehensive rural health program was undertaken in an area in Maharashtra. and infant and child mortality rates have been lower. more important. increased education. female education has had minimal effect where family planning services have been unavailable.7 between 1972 and 1978 in Kerala (compared with a fall from 5. in part because it is difficult to operate such programs without some educated women to staff them. Education levels have been higher in Kerala than in most other Indian states for many years. it leads to the same fertility reduction at lower cost) than does spending on education. the underlying demand for family planning will be low. In the program area.9 for India as a whole). Korea. provides a good illustration. fewer than 10 percent of eligible couples used contraceptives in 1976. and the crude birth rate in 1976 was twenty-three per thousand. However. Emphasis on the cost effectiveness of family planning should not obscure the third point noted above: that family planning and social development complement each other. in part because investment per capita in family planning in Kerala has been high. and the crude birth rate was thirty-seven per thousand. it fell by 9 percent. the effect of reducing infant mortality and of providing more schooling for children can be rapid-but these cost more in most settings to produce the same effect on fertility. and -(3) that these different approaches are not really alternatives but complement and reinforce each other. Incentives and disincentives To complement family planning services and social programs that help to reduce fertility. family planning programs reduce the cost of using contraception to potential users. not all field projects work well. Unfortunately. Of course. health (which reduces fertility by reducing infant mortality). by closing the gap between actual and desired family size. The same amount spent on a program in a high-education. In those areas. But where mortality is high and demand for family planning is limited. couple. elsewhere on the island. where contraceptives were easily available). India. they may work because of the intense involvement of research and other staff. governments may want to consider financial and other incentives and disincentives as additional ways of encouraging parents to have fewer children. fertility declined by 15 percent. and the Philippines family planning programs are estimated to be five times as cost effective as health programs that reduce fertility through reducing mortality. But this investment would have had much less impact in less favorable conditions of education and health.8 to 4. Incentives may be defined as payments given to an individual. and other social changes increase the demand for contraception. at times almost as great as in Hong Kong. one study concluded that family planning programs were at least seven times as cost effective in reducing fertility as were nutrition programs or education schemes for rural women. Brazil (the only project conducted exclusively in an urban area. (2) that family planning has other benefits-including reducing mortality. In a nonprogram area. independent of 'effects in fertility. In Bangladesh. as well as family planning services in 1974-79. reducing infant mortality is a more cost-effective way to lower fertility. from 1971 to 1978. this comparison does not take into account (1) that education and health programs have other . contraceptive use rose from 3 to 51 percent. effects of projects were small in a condom-marketing scheme in Kenya. or group to delay or limit child121 . One reason family planning is cost effective is that it has an immediate impact-at least where there is underlying demand. With respect to the single goal of reducing fertility. and nonexistent in one in Rio de Janeiro. By contrast. and other programs. They often cost more than a government could spend on a nationwide effort. The fertility rate fell from 4. But the results still suggest that good services reduce fertility significantly. the effect of the two together has been powerful. Around 1980 the literate proportion of Kerala's population was twice that of India's as a whole. and in part because of lack of demand for contraception.

Box 6.3
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Examnpies and experience

usually offered to all clients regardless of family Some population programs also provide bonus payments as incentives to family planning workers; they are meant not to increase demand
services but to improve supply, and are discussed in the next chapter. Incentives and disincentives give individuals a
-for

Although various forms of incentives and disincentives now exist in over thirty countries in the developing world, it is still not possible to estimate
exactly howv much influence they have had on fertility. In countries in which they have been tried, they have been accompanied by social change,

choice. They provide direct and voluntary tradeoffs between the number of children and possible rewards or penalties. But choice will be preserved only if programs are well designed and carefully implemented. The ethical questions raised by

family planning services, and (in the case of China)
various social pressures that make it impossible to distinguish their separate effects. Disincentives built into benefit or tax systems are the most common. Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan,

incentives and disincentives are touched on here but discussed more in Chapter 8.

and the Philippines limit income tax deductions, child allowances, and maternity benefits beyond a
123

few births; to encourage spacing, Tanzania allows working women paid maternity leave only once every three years. But these policies affect only the small minority who are public employees or who pay taxes. Singapore has disincentives which affect more people because of the country's higher income, comprehensive health services, urbanized setting, and extensive public housing. Singapore's disincentives include limitation of income tax relief to the first three children, restriction of paid maternity leave to the first two pregnancies and an increase in childbirth costs after the first two deliveries. Singapore also gives children from smaller families priority in school admission and ignores family size in the allocation of state housing, so smaller families enjoy more space per person. Attitudinal studies suggest that these disincentives, particularly the school admission policy, are much more influential in Singapore than are the more common tax disincentives. Disincentives were introduced gradually in Singapore beginning in 1969, more than a decade after fertility had started to fall. The timing and pattern of the fertility decline thereafter suggests that they have had some impact. In 1984 the Singapore government shifted the emphasis of its population policy. While it still encourages most women to have only two children, women university graduates are encouraged to have more. If graduates have more than two, the government will now give their children priority admission to state schools. This approach is based on a belief that highly educated parents are more intelligent than those with less education, and that children inherit intelligence from their parents. Were this the case-since better-educated parents have typically had fewer children, at least for the past 100 years-the average intelligence of humankind would be falling. But it does not appear to be. In any event, local newspaper polls indicate that the policy is not popular, even among women who could benefit from it. Many such women have said that priority in school admission is not enough to persuade them to have more than one or two children. China has the most comprehensive set of incentives and disincentives, designed (most recently) to promote the one-child family. Since the early 1970s women undergoing various types of fertilityrelated operations have been entitled to paid leave: in urban areas fourteen days for induced abortion; ten days for tubal ligation; two to three days for insertion or removal of an IUD; and in the case of postnatal sterilization, seven extra days over the
124

normal fifty-six days of paid maternity leave. Since 1979 the central government has been encouraging, even requiring, each area and province to draw up its own rewards and penalties. Sichuan, for example, provides for a monthly subsidy to one-child families of five yuan (8 percent of the average worker's wage) until the child is fourteen years old. The child will have priority in admission to schools and in obtaining a factory job. In rural areas in Hunan, parents of only one child receive annual bonuses until their child is fourteen years old and private plots and housing lots big enough for a two-child family. In some urban areas, a single child is allotted adult food rations. Most factories and other work units give preference in the allocation of scarce housing to single-child families. In some cases, medical and educational entitlements are granted preferentially to parents whose only child is a girl-one way, the government hopes, of overcoming the preference for sons. Penalties for excessive fertility also vary by area in China. In some places, couples who have a second child must return any bonuses obtained for the first child. A couple having a second child may be required to pay for the privilege. (In one brigade in Beijing studied by foreign researchers, several couples have been willing to pay more than twice the annual collective income distributed to each brigade member in order to have a second child.) Parents may have to pay a higher price for grain that they buy for a second child whose birth has not been authorized under the planned-birth program. Some areas and provinces impose taxes, which can be as high as 10 percent of family income, only on third and later-born children. Similarly, mothers may not be entitled to paid maternity leave for a third child, and parents may have to pay all its medical expenses. In 1983 the State Family Planning Commission proposed a tax of 10 percent of family wages on urban dwellers with two or more children, unless one or the other partner is sterilized. In addition to China and Singapore, Korea is the only other country with a national system of rewards and penalties for individuals to encourage parents to have few children. Korea offers free medical care and education allowances to twochild families provided one of the parents has been sterilized. Incentives do not have to be provided just by the state. A private group in Thailand offers technical assistance in farm production and marketing to contraceptive users or to those who commit them-

selves to birth control. Rates of contraceptive use have risen to as high as 80 percent in some villages that receive, or hope to receive, the benefits of this program. Qualifiers have been given credits for livestock, feed, and construction materials, and have been offered lower prices for fertilizer, seed, garlic, dressmaking, hairdressing, and medical treatment. Some communities have also been allowed to use a "family planning bull" for servicing their cattle. The scheme also offers pig-rearing contracts: a woman acceptor gets a piglet to fatten over a period of eight to nine months and is given a share of the profits. Should she become pregnant, the pig is not taken away, but she may lose the opportunity to get another one in the future. In the past decade, a few countries have started offering small-family incentives to communities. The Indonesian program gives prizes and popular recognition for meeting fertility targets or for performing better than other communities. In Thailand the government rewards villages that achieve certain targets with anything from a biogas plant to a cooperative store. Community incentives work where there is a well-organized, communitybased family planning system and where the village or hamlet is an important social or political unit. Several other countries, including Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, have offered rewards to people who volunteer to be sterilized, primarily to compensate them for the cost of travel and loss of work time. These programs are easier to administer than incentive systems tied directly to lower family size. In most cases, volunteers have been carefully screened to avoid any possibility of coercion or of changing their minds when it is too late. In Sri Lanka, for example, the couple must have at least two children, the youngest at least a year old. These facts must be certified by the village head and reviewed by a medical officer at the clinic where the operation will be performed. The volunteer must sign a statement of consent; he or she receives the equivalent of $20. At their peak in 1980-81, sterilization payments cost an amount equal to 3 percent of total government spending on health; that much could easily have been saved in the costs associated with abortion and unwanted births. Unresolved issues Payments and penalties raise a host of issues not yet resolved. Some people may be willing to defer pregnancy or to have fewer children even without

an incentive, yet they cannot be stopped from claiming it; and they may be those least in need of an incentive. Disincentives that work through tax and benefits systems affect only a few people, yet broader disincentives might unfairly burden the poor, who gain most from children. Disincentives tied to school admissions may affect children who have no control over parental decisions. Verification (was a child born and not reported?) can be administratively difficult, and the money to reward compliance may be improperly used. Payments for sterilization have little impact on fertility if families have already had four or more children. The cost of incentives is also a consideration in judging their effectiveness. From a national accounting point of view, incentives are transfer payments and in themselves do not use up resources. Their economic impact will depend on the savings and consumption patterns of those who are taxed and those who receive payments. The principal question is likely to be a budgetary one for the government: is money available and might it be better spent in other ways? If conventional incentive schemes absorb funds that might better go to investments, the cost to an economy in terms of long-run investment and growth may also matter. This is clearly a problem in China, where incentives large enough to ensure one-child families would become a heavy burden on the economy, unless those who received them in turn used the incentives for saving, say, for their own old age. Deferred incentives Deferred incentive schemes overcome some, though not all, of the difficulties of conventional incentives. They have not been tried on a national level, but two local experiments demonstrate their feasibility. A township in China began a deferred bonus scheme in 1971, offering to pay the highschool education of children of two-child families. No specific family planning service was involved, but parents had to show that they agreed with the terms of the entitlement when their children were ready to enter high school. Two-thirds of families enrolled in the program; its effects on fertility could not, however, be differentiated from a general decline in fertility. A no-birth bonus scheme developed on three tea estates in India also provided a deferred payment. Each woman worker had an extra day's pay credited to an account for every month she was not pregnant. Her benefits were suspended for a year

Box 6.4
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for each pregnancy and she forfeited a part of her account for each birth beyond two. She could claim the proceeds when she retired. An evaluation conducted several years after the start of the program showed that it had helped to accelerate the declining trend in fertility. Both these programs were designed to cover their costs and to produce some saving-through lower educational expenses in the first case, and through lower child care, medical, and work-loss expenses in the second. Deferred incentives have an immediate financial advantage: the payments by government to bondholders come in the future, at the time when the saving to society from fewer births is being reaped. However, they can still be costly. For example, an incentive scheme proposed in Bangladesh would provide a bond for all couples who agreed to sterilization and who had only two or three living children. To fully fund the scheme nationwide, the government would have to set aside a substantial proportion of its budget now (see Box 6.4). There are also practical arguments in favor of deferred schemes, especially for sterilization. The first, alluded to above, is that a deferred payment avoids the risk of people volunteering simply because they need money immediately. If they later regret their decision, they can do nothing

about it. If many people were do this, they might provoke a general reaction against sterilization. The second merit of a system with delayed payments is that it avoids the need for a large number of cash payments to be made by junior officials and thus minimizes the potential for corruption. Deferred incentives, however, are not without their own problems. For example, it is not certain that potential recipients would trust the government's ability and willingness to provide benefits in the future. The administrative requirements of a deferred system are also considerable. For schemes not tied to sterilization, individuals would have to be registered and their births monitored. For many developing countries, keeping track of all births in circumstances where parents, may wish to conceal them would require a more effective administrative system than now exists. Despite these possible shortcomings, deferredincentives have much potential. If they could be made to work, they could provide for a transfer oL income to the poor that would reduce fertility. Nepal is trying deferred incentives in a few areas, and Bangladesh is now considering such schemes. They could also be tried in those rural areas of India and Indonesia where family planning services and administrative systems are adequate.

126

7 Family planning as a service

Some eighty-five countries in the developing world, representing about 95 percent of its population, now provide some form of public support to family planning programs. Tremendous progress has been made in improving couples' access to information and services. But in all countries more could be done. Nearly all programs still fail to reach most rural people; even in the towns and cities the quality of services is often poor and discontinuation rates high. In many countries the potential of the private sector to provide family planning services has hardly been tapped; in others the gap in services provided privately can be filled only by enlarging public programs. Twentyseven countries have yet to introduce family planning programs. Almost half of these are in Africa, where incomes are the lowest in the world, population growth is the highest, and the potential benefits from family planning may be greatest. The benefits of family planning, moreover, do not depend on the existence of demographic objectives. * Family planning improves the health of moth-

who are often caught in a vicious circle in which too many children mean too few opportunities for other kinds of activity, and vice versa. By enabling women to control their fertility, family planning frees them to become better educated and to increase their own and their children's contribution to development. * Family planning offers the greatest potential benefits for the poorest people, whose mortality and fertility rates are usually the highest of any group. For all these reasons, programs to support family planning deserve a central role in the social and economic strategies of governments throughout the developing world. Properly designed, programs need not be particularly expensive. But lack of finance is one of the reasons family planning is

TABLE 7.1

Percentage of currently married women aged 15 to 49 using contraception, by region and for selected countries
Region and country Total Urban Rural

ers and children. Both infant and maternal mortality in developing countries could be substantially reduced if pregnancies were spaced at least two years apart, and if pregnancies among teenagers and women over forty were prevented (see Box 71) C l th to family lannin serv
7.1). wouples witn access to ramlly planmng serv-

Sub-Saharan Africa Ivory Coast (1980-81) Kenya (1 77-78 )b 9

(6)a 3 7
(22) a 24 20 (65) a 36 57 (40) a 49 39

4 12
40 34 47 64 54 51

2 6
12 5 31 55 37 27

ices can prevent unwanted pregnancies that might otherwise result in poorly performed abortions and the risk of serious, even fatal, complications. Family planning services were recognized as one of eight essential components of primary health care by the International Conference on Primary Health Care in Alma-Ata in 1978. Family planning makes responsible parenthood easier. Parents can have the number of children for whom they know they can provide adequate food, health care, and education. * Family planning enlarges the choices available to people, a central purpose of economic and social development. This is particularly true for women,

Middle East and North Africa Egypt (1980) syria (1978) East Asia (1978) Thailand (1981) Latin America and Caribbean Colombia (1980) Mexico (1979)

Philippines

South Asia
Sri Lanka (1982)

419)

((9
55

36
57

17 54

Note: Numbers are based on recent surveys, except for India

and Indonesia, which are based on recent program statistics. a. Average weighted by population for all countries in region

bwEver-marred women aged 15 to 50.
Source: World Development Indicators, Table 20. 127

r.r * .. nfl .birth 'I~ mi.h . . 'II In Jr.id.' ind p.. ii1n...ni . [wnrc nil gn. and this estimate excludes many countries in which use is negligible but data are unavailable. ~hdd .nir. '... and in Egypt it is less than a third. Kenya. ti :. Aid donors have a major contribution to make in ensuring that family planning programs receive the money they need to be effective.r.ic th.' r i r.IdrE:r.d. nc ri-.fnil int.ih. rid. In most.T-n Ior 1iacir c -i .Ind r.3-.-ih iarbl. and Mexico.3. h I do ri-ttn.preniu.r n ..rr ..k.Jfl-ui- -i . p .up. whereas the proportion in the Middle East and South Asia is only 128 about 25 percent..hnr In lri - np m.n. I. ii being neglected in some countries and is making only slow progress in others. . 4i-i ir *.i ni'rer.r rI- -.rAlt. In East Asia nearly two-thirds of the married women in that age group use contraception. Di.:. women were using contraception in 1978.r . 1i-ei-n Ine.r ir. .. . tl -.-r Jr.Id m u t i-~ tentil .-ni.r. p. I-r. at less than 10 percent of married women. lh.:hddri-n I nIart 3nd iiler ne1 -i. pr rh. -nhiln ip3rt ir.4 riI-ri.e ill1 -it. r~ In nieni m. ni:.1li..4 . r-ent...-nr- pri-cin. .rr charti Th.Ir i- thr.r r. -i.e I i. 1-J th. ri he.1-urie.e*rn * L.:in . . a higher proportion of urban than rural couples use contraception.rlei-. ins. n I.h.l in. h.r oni-I Ihr.tr nt. h.ei:.. a.. hglti-. the distinction is particularly stark in Syria.. ih-.tr.:h t..ini rhi.u! ri. t.rr I h.r! 2I -un.. I niIr.r *-h.ria. m..rI. b~~~~~_ birth prrn.~. r..-grani.th. t J. j hji.t...idl till b.-d -Idl I:--l.irt I' lul .nt ~r.~r . Latin America has reached about 40 percent.ti -n Kn i .rt -ti' rcae.-at-r . inl-r%al ' Piri-irrin..-'Jun b% iin -ra- Ii . In Maharashtra and Gujarat ..t. v. Contraceptive use is lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.- rnithi-r )nd d. .r llne. Ji.rrl. thr.-uoh r. h.Ie I.d - i .r.i-1i-i t..l in-hr'i -ci.enr. lr.ldiru.hen mn.n. b..r n b3e.: the.ph ..nir ii-.CIl.alr i *..i. 1 i leI L. ir.II Iir I . ri ri-..-cii-rn d. hirr.t rlw. ti rniu. rr thni .nhrhnd . but only 5 percent of rural. i..p. cc Jr-i nd Lvib i..r-ilr.i nituur t.S-ri TV r..rn.*r 11.: cbdd ' '-ni h. .t th..u .rt. b.ur ri.i 'hir. r.bi J. npnrari ' it J..uid r ed tr.rrh.- ti. r * -alle u credJ -- monc :-in..&I.eprd iJc-.k. In the Ivory Coast.lnuri -ruii *n gait-l r.n inr o -t. per lOOt) Ii%e birlhis.C. r.n.nten rnd sh..rIF-..3i1 tr kthb rht ni-. nn -n .1 Family planning for health Iniant mortalih. .r: I h..r. rn. rl ii. th I. fnt. in China.t-pl....rCrh.g .irre l.n ri-tilrh~iri ucL n tIh.1).hi1d1be3r.ie iu.-. CuC.h ncr -I i Ih. pru-Ne ni hiiiina -l'.3rd ih . 3nd Ih . hat 3ii.r nr h.n . r IT1 ir..z C.r2_r1-. i-prid .--I.d un. hul--i : ~ r.. tn r I r Izi:n1.w. where 34 percent of urban.r:* IA-: ti-rh i. contraceptive use in rural areas is roughly half the rate in urban areas.. h.irn i Thexr.:i-n pri-cran~. hrth.lI.hre t Icur.: c.Box"7. m.ni. n alt. The use of contraception Surveys of married women of reproductive age (fifteen to forty-nine) show wide variations in contraceptive use among developing regions (see Table 7.~ o ...r ra 4t a I.t Ir I t -ur..ei. -adud be 1.. rr 1. .i n e planari.r. *ur zr. *-nl p INh.i: i-rk Iin F'h.-ii. contraceptive use ranged from 53 percent of couples on the islands of Java and Bali to only 16 percent in some of the outer islands in 1983. Peru Earl.lnked iclo ..nin. . c nTa hi.rbriI.rr.:.ir-r. niiie n r . 4. Hong Kong. hi ..d-I.punr it L. lhirlv *Si\ mrnr. thi-ir I ir. r . . i i IOL! n13-.ii- u ii.Ir : s . :wd *J. ri:i hild rP3.r i-Ju. impnii Ior ed is-ni th_ i h.in 3n i.xh-h . Regional differences are also great: in Indonesia...r ih-ci 1 O t'.-rrn ~1-r l1.r I-r.r hi t-e.t.squ. hi ari.i4ihuIt ti -t'. lIlII ii. r hth -r.q .I r in.. as high as in the United States and western Europe. ar. ir rid 1 -. Sr.Z chiddrEn and n-.rn t-A% .rie i-a -r : t.i. ii rhihb '' .in i ..r-rder ne ih. -..der...*.i 14'1 Pi.r1ed in g inrh.T r.eni-J to r.1 l-..t E rinI c tr r 4i..i . . .... mirtni -n dzi ..M r . n ic utiriL.. Contraceptive use varies widely within countries as well...ir . r.. rn.~ -.r. mrn. . pr..rit.r..r in .~t .rhen or rLr.. and Singapore the proportion is 70 percent or more.

Ir.il V-..rrmaJ mort31ih.rn .. r. Tin.r ir. pr.h.p. If' rn Inln .r.. rt .. such as douche. .. There may also be underreporting by some women of the use of contraception by husbands.Irtr.nr r.ri h.-. -.:.1..th.nr...tr.-r-t P..-ri.:'nr .j trh r luc h T1 .d1..1 ri:n rr.rL TlI- rit.n r tree. T p..:. . rnnj. * B. t h.iir.-. 1'.-r I I-.d .- r..pr. . l . d Ai. .. s .nr rn I.rt.rtilitr.. ii.2). . Ir..untrri. :.I II rL 1.i t-s nrn '. h L.j hlnr-..Jr sItn3l :r..ti... 5-r s. r.rrrr..-r rn_.H..… in :Ct -iL-rn-n -. - ilt. .. -r.1 1 nr. i.I lrh. .r In.. t. r - n-d V ItI lh .dirr.r. ... t .:... r-. cr nip.. Li 1iii - irnr-.. r... .. uIr r. 1. 1: riil inn.. spermicidal foam. uz r.iL.r r.jfl tir. .i n n :r.rr.a..h1kd Inn . r.I . .rn.iir - . -r r.-rr : mr ... rh. -'1ri.rrn. and the diaphragm. r t uII. rr ir...d tll.. tr..L Phi1. .-.n rrnrl in . -Lr 4..ut .C ^i1 Ii l ' a nht r. 35 percent of couples were using contraception in 1981-82.n. these figures may overstate the number of people protected by contraception because not all couples using a method are equally protected from the risk of pregnancy..i j hr t d n. *r r n.ton'l nil n-. . Lrrh -L-rrt i Ih. . 1 t. r .n.s\rnrr . F.-. r rt..h. 11Z.rrhi. condoms. r..rrIr. . * ulLih. mn -i.r:rirrd ...I- 4nr- .I ur.-urili . . and some respondents may be reluctant to admit to using contraception themselves.r .. 1 I.I-ni- 'l. 1.d . th-. ...rr isi l iniL rc rn I .rl C .. .._-rpl..ur rt... - a..ul. In Peru.d - t -.. '1 .:i *- *livit.. .rIrsrrtr.r.l -r -r.' - II h' . iir'r--r.. dl IIrTT I-.... compared with only 11 percent of couples in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.r.rr. r-n- ir rirx li i11.-li.: i h . rh.t.. . .rt..-v r.-. r: nt ..J i. r.r. . r . . Among countries for which more than one survey estimate is available.:rcd - p m.rpn.i.hI.r [In.1 1.Vd b. C-n rn ... with contraceptive use increasing by about 1 percent of couples a year in Nepal..rri Urn . .-r. n:ir.nrpprr t 1..trnnn. :rr'i ur. n[.r1. rl l .. ir.~lL t' .nr u rhr.:r i1r--. At the same time.r t.r n... &:ma.ed r ..Iir it.L..rril I-r r. ..lrz-'r' . the pill. In Egypt and Kenya contraceptive use has remained unchanged...nd I .r hird Ti. r.| states of India. for example.3h hrrrt...rrh..dr .:.Ir s :1 A' 4r.h. t - h. ... . &-ri..rr 1.r.r-. the IUD.rl. pr.. .I.. :-: - T1 nir . ninr..rrrniA IIr-.. 'tri- cl-rid In I 1..uArn..I r. nr . nt-.. g:.n It all L.11 n I . :r..L irj ni..' arr.tr. .inn. :- .hr .-rr.ld LLr *.... Progress in South Asia has been slower...1 j J d- r- r11r1r trn..1 n-n npirrrr it .. I. hL. and withdrawal. . Some are using "efficient" contraceptive methods such as sterilization.. but not at all in Pakistan... r I.. if. r.l 11111 (IrI hr r nurtlr :nrd hl.... i ijr. contraceptive use has increased fastest in East Asia and Latin America (see Figure 7. I..i.. t ni. .. .. more quickly in Bangladesh.I ________________________________________ rn-. nunrnL.tl. r' .J.rii. It ru II ..-r. . - . pr. m ri.rnInr . i't-.. .n S :11.:r.r c..i.r 11r:!t.rU ..ni.. ri rI.. r-I in r bar h . Fxer (ItlhitJL)O M1atlab.-.- Th..z 1 pollr.' n.. t -. rr ihw ihitIF. t. :.. pr.n.r * JEt Irn p.r..pii.I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I. i n i-.nl%.. iIj \ 11-1IL: -n i. -r -1t L-. r::p.n tr Im rm.stlIltjr.. 'r. to 59 percent in 1981.rilr t r.rl ts r .r:1.. h.rchiCcU. But others are using less effective methods.Ob . F d-ln.n.I. 3ul ntr.d..:r1 .pir. nrr [. ur.--ri . rrrr 'uld rI r.r1r.'ri..-.n :.. * .l I'i..:l ri trn.. ..r...I .r rtr. dt liii 1 .i...d : .'"' ...n. r..-L -t -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r ri l in . .1.r . Ti-.rnr kLI.-.1ik 3w.r :.-uir hv. r.inl . I . In Thailand.rr :r.. -.. in I hr. :.....i.r..r - [r 'I. despite longstanding public programs. . In r ... ur :ii. rn-r-n il_ . h l .h4 n.-n-i..-r-. 1 rhr 1 -n.: F.1 LrT.z r p..-.. iItgiIl )r.d t..Ir .II i . cd .runndi. ..-pr . Ir Li. It.v... r.Iiiri.r .J.-int..rrmrn-ed rItrr 1 t ti ..-r p. .1i. rh ...pn I tUr ha. $ .ntr rr..iiz1 ii. l-ar f. I L I.t.d ni'd riur.d ih r-f. r-I r. i Lri.r.. n n rLn. ..d.urni. rr. rnut. --Lc7 I-I.trr. ...r.: Inr-rn-.Ljlt fh.d h. rhythm....r thid [ i-. ?. I . .r ..1. injectable contraceptives. or are abstaining (see Box 7. :rrr......n p1 r.f.-rtl h r ..r. n.t . . :Ir r ...f-ll-. an.._ . rr r. r t all r. nto h .r ht. r.ir ..... t. Inl..Ll. BangW e. !.rairnl iTh.-r- n-Ir: iu.Ir. ind chii. .ill.rr . i lj.. . lh.. the proportion of married women aged fifteen to fortyfour using contraception rose from 15 percent in 1970. L . .. n.ii n..1).. nr i i nrrd Fr. These survey-based estimates may underestimate contraceptive use because they do not include use among unmarried men or women and sometimes exclude use among couples in informal unions. Ilt rI|r . pcr. . Lr. m .c-I .d rh.lrr.. the year the official family planning program was launched..irliu..11`.r .. r.CI.r b 1--a t- r..11...rrrn! rn.- r. I. . .n 1. 53 percent of those using 129 ..1-I- r l1:-id 'hrd h .mr TIIi 4 ar .- I- .. [Ii.31. n1. r.11 . .-r.l n 1r wrid r tin- . -rud... t1 InIrri Iive birth-. -s ih u ni_.II ... .5:u-r r.

Unmet need 50 _Clmi 50 KoTea' 40 / / 7use wMexico olombia In the surveys from which data on contraceptive have been drawn women were also asked whether they would like to have more children. safe and effective contraceptive methods. The 1978 Philippines Fertility Survey found that 36 percent of married women of reproductive age used some method.FIGURE 71 Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 197043. 6 to 12 percent of women of childbearing age in Egypt. and eastern Europe. but only 16 percent used an efficient method. In Bangladesh. Ever-married women. Kenya. 16 to 33 percent of women of childbearing age have unmet need for contraception. more than 40 percent of women in Bangladesh and Peru have unmet need for limiting and spacing births. rhythm or withdrawal had an unwanted pregnancy within three years after a birth. even where it is illegal. Contraception is not the only method of birth control. or their husbands are away. or injectable contraceptives. and 32 percent 20 Banglades 10 Kena_ Pakistan 0 1970 1975 1980 1983 Nepal in Guatemala said yes. Estimates for other a. for others. the number of women of childbearing age who want no more children exceeds the number using some kind of contraception. If women who are breastfeeding and those using inefficient methods of contraception are also considered to have unmet need. Sourres: For Egypt. from 50 to 90 percent of women want either to limit or to space births. high estimate). compared with only 29 percent of women who used the pill. and 29 percent in the Philippines have unmet need for contraception only to limit births (Figure 7. selected countries Percentage of married women aged 15-49 using contraception 60 hailand' 88 in Romania (1979). the USSR. at least not immediately. where both limiting and spacing questions were asked. China and India are major exceptions. In contrast. and access to. Korea. 10 percent in Kenya. and Pakistan. b. Kenya. in the Dominican Republic in 1975. In countries where both questions have been asked. and Peru. Induced abortion is widespread. and who are exposed to the risk of pregnancy-are said to have "unmet need'" for contraception. who are not using contraception. Nineteen percent of women of. Others are unable to conceive. By this definition.2. Forty to 75 percent of married women of childbearing age in East and South Asian countries and in Latin American and Caribbean countries want no Egypt / 30 more children. Resort to both legal and illegal abortion often results from lack of information about. There may be as many as 30 million to 50 million induced abortions performed annually worldwide. Some of the women who want no more children or who wish to delay a pregnancy are not using a method because they are currently pregnant or because they have been breastfeeding for less than one year and therefore are afforded some (but not total) protection. 25 percent in El Salvador. low estimate). childbearing age in Bangladesh and Thailand. Japan. so they do not need contraception. These women are not "exposed" to the risk of pregnancy. Legal abortion rates per thousand women of childbearing age range from 11 in Canada (1981) and 25 in the United States (1980) to 84 in Japan (1975) and 130 . and the Philippines have unmet need for contraception to limit births (see Figure 7. Illegal abortion carries with it a high risk of complications and death and can affect future fertility. Korea. Elsewhere legal abortion is an important method of birth control-in Cuba. the IUD. In virtually all countries surveyed. CPS and WFS data. The remaining women-those who would like to space or to limit births. contraceptive use was 32 percent for all methods and 26 percent for efficient methods. In a few countries women were also asked whether they wished to delay their next pregnancy for a year or more. this wide range is due to uncertainty about the number of illegal abortions. 22 percent of women in Egypt.2. In many developing countries abortion is illegal under any circumstances or is permitted only to save the life of the mother. UN 1983. Wife aged fifteen to forty-four.

FIGURE 7.2

Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception, selected countries, 1977-81

Unmet need for
limiting births
-. + > .'i.--ziL .! -::

The charts on this page show unmet need for contraception among married women aged 15 to 49. In the limit births is shown among women who want no more children. In the bottom pie and bar chart unmet need is shown for women who want no more children or who want to postpone a birth. In each case, the low estimate of unmet need is the pencentage of women using no contraception. The high estimate is the percentage using an inefficient method (withdrawal, rhythm, and the like), breastfeeding (within a year of a birth), or
using no method. R pie and bar chart, unmet need for contraception to itop

:-;

ln.o

93nt

~~~'ni~~~~~~~~ ~~~~,
Egypt

,~~~~~~~~h

Percentage of married women aged 15-49

~~~(percent)
-

Estimate of unmet need

High 22. 4
24

Low
1.

(1980)

~'1

12.3

Kenya
(1977-78)

t
|
-

.

9.9

5.9

Philippines
(1978)

.,,. .I

.

..

.

29.0
40

11.1

'

l

;':

Unmet need for limiting and spacing births

0

10

20

30

Key

methd

lhrs' "i

-

K-Low
mor,. ch-kirts L

~ ~

~~~~~~~High
Estimate of unmet need

Estimate of

unmet need
(percent)

Percentage of married women aged 15-49 Bangladesh | |
,

-.

High 41.3

Low 32.6

,,:4;'

Korea
(1979)

|

|
.

1 ;i^, iN ;^¢-;

26.2

16.1

Pe9ru

|
0 10 20 30

-5. ..
40 50 60

46.2

16.3

Source: Boulier, 1984b.

131

Box 7.2

Birth planning technology
plc childb-tatir.c a,;, Thi-m 31 i-r ti- thii4 palttirn are 7-pairw, hal., arid the E.;te-rr. Ei,r,pe:ar. c.-uritr-i-~ At ' FItjriza,r, I %. ltcrc ,I hdrfl%.'--d hthmli .r abltrin-ncc x,, still th, rn'.'t pre' al.'rt n'etho'd'
.:' 1*C--t.n \mhingJde-.e1upin4 ciuritrie! r , r.ii.7.
:ic-fl' it

-t.cril mit Fei,dz --- birth c,introl ha', e hi-tn pracliced lthroughe-ut humian 111; rcor% -abt-tiri-n c at-irtion ti--r.-d hrE,,ttle-dtng a-rd c.'tiur ilttrruptur tit. Atdrai-. ili-but %. uncertain et& ith ro,ne'- and pa hica rd h-ialth daia C-C.ntra..'piii C re.,atch in the pacti thn-,% '.'ars hi.; made aati a MUCh gret'atr r-. 't MLcrc t mni_thids; L-mbinwd estrcg,en and p's' ge;incrat fi'taipi' pill I th jt~d de i.c'I LE'

c-)frr,.Ilcd 4rtidi,, in de'. i1,-Ii,.,ed

[, tt~ n, ttc' cn :. t4li-tc e*r, pre'. rtn,n pr rn 'in,:. i-fol , liii_ pr-cc'nr t..,r mt-.i. 1it-iri thie t'ticc p,il anti iniei-t altec p,§rcti. fit lr the

~an-usnirutrin

ti.-r it thi- ntc'-l co ilm..r. Itt -cit rf n rtetc niehi-d in BanclIadi-ah El td.'r India kc're:i Ne.pal Pa,-~rian rar-ania -7-rt Lankl,a Thailand and funi--.a Thepill t- thi- ni. -t ta.I red nicihod iaE.p

~-.i

L Et andJ a- much iazc, perc- Tit ti-r the .:.n-jo..rirand ihi-.t, ham 1 i. . .ni-. ear ue Biut utethi'tc'ft.nirAd I-tude' -n c metrhid, .:arn F-- 'igniticantl'. eta viretc-ct".e - n itlitCt in. *n'i'rent iu-c In iih, L r,tt..3 M at.:s, rtin IIIci-p. 'iCtcpl 'l

~.I

-tc the tir-t nflute-r breakthr-'i'ghs in the late l~i,and earl, l%i3e1&incc i her. ether ritehiidJ 'ta%t L'cen de' :-Jpi-d inletabk IntL IA c epi 0 iti,-Kt tc-r I.. tc- thre-in. nhs moCrK tcc c c.oppi-r and I *n*n.-rol-.t-i ILiEz nien-rrira ri-ataimi artnIcint- as0 piratton -I the: utri .'. thn't-' i. ti-urteenl da .' t : rnit-- Ic per-cdi raale stntrdaa,t -n- ai-n pItted irliTr hi til- apanir,: F'-ar-ij mttnilap-it.-m -, it-c--trorgen pill, ith eicie-r .,di- ttec' i a prii 'etr-nk -rn' mr..p'l BarriLr mc'thi 'd, cuLh i- 'he- r,'nd -m liaphr.a$ntl andI

l rdaart'. n,,ra much o-t Latin \n'eric.i Niala, -- i nd Ir-Jdint ;ii Ir-iicc.&ib.-i iracipro c .t: ir.dl usi-i in l3rn-iic ill!p.:r,..:ri -1 ltbki 'mentEiThtad t7percenti) Trinidad a,nd T.ibtag. i petc,-nr I and Mc 'i':. 3 pc r.c~ni i th-..
mi-tbh-d -. r.:r iS. .--r.-. er-nri
ti'u'-

precnanrc% a' hin on, -ata n'.-re~ a thanr ipe u4tr-'. the ILILi i. using the -ni -m or iliaphrani aind ri- "ni;i u'grh, [hr., ina hi-, Fhl'lippn'. rnice than, thre .c.ntn -UtIt_ liiit,usin etihi-r 11 he giE). r tht pi an-1 t-rt'r, -thri-.:'- ia'ing
.

~lic

t,n rur at

r

. thn.

.i1-c

n

pri:Friinrt t-. thin

nd Unliki- lit pill cit ni-t intert,rc -iih Iicarlatin K. rh tih,eN'..rid H'ealth Ort a.n- ration ard ii'i'F h.)' appr'.. .d wtr't itali .-teal in mn-rr- thanl lii 'r'uriri--bt r-Tatcn u'e tIDdi c-Iiarant ''p'n rf '[ninrsris ii' thi r-cmoh-adc limite,_d a.alhlTi Thc'

Thc 'Ti-t i'ic c.v .iiF7.le t-pi -tntpncgnan.'-, 'a imr-. riant *ni the. tIc'tti' enit .:.tr.tt es (' Luple'~ hi .-.
car
.atit

ritiEih
*,

n -.nt-..rc i hitldr,:ra arc tik-,lur. u-c' I d- nit- Itt'..cII el - Thar. rh.'e
-pae'F'ciflkbirths

f'.l tj-

lb !'

~-ral

-icle lI

-i-at' a

-pctrnti'ride; hir aI r.- beet; iniri. i-i 1 n-ij Malt, the rniaiirr .In the m.i-t cinrmonli uTcd m.cthItiSil diin.r .-. rltu' Lit- i-ann. d-r1.rti-' mirit. I i ,d' .Ii btrth c.-ntrrd -trld ti e , irrttr -abli-aie tn retire p -Ii.:. F-riil,airand the pill .rm.'ng dcli eloped hibtbir 2ucppi; oii drug- ii spr ' ti i c-tnni hr-- pl11 ii tht nii-'t u-ed d-rm~;.c u ii nit,hi,d F-ut ;teril'zatt, n has vained in Pcoi tecr, jt.' rc? .tc.ia p.puiar.t. -in th~ L nited StaItarid in .picinh.d'n-n'-a. atlable 1 ha-et l.. Crej,i britan -tca it :icc."a1nt - t.n.r at-,ur hc,h-rr~n..ict t 3 cjtiJtt~ -'iaiu-K anl-ino nticI -I -w Fri ,t--iL n-ii-r hI-l 'delr A-ni

min noiiriCi iab''f thrtfc-flCp ' i. r zvtc-p usi'-, c.ra, Fiic i.a.in-,m ni-ath r 'h,cl'n-.r hea,lil ri-k, it p-n.' I n 7.ric.Liac arc unkni'i' n NMih-t.dm su.rh ; ihe. I'D andi mi-ttial-' %i hi.I.i aitcr -lttrptciat''' 4.trug bt i-e-rt peri,.. -d creased .. li-r, imt.' 1'. i a .r amr,rrrh- a-nia. - u,trlu nai.piLabe - rt,tt. -r hi- c-t .ic at u-er'

Box 7.3
(ti, --icep hIIa F''rp,-t'
-;

Nleasuring unmet need for family planning
tai.111 'mI It iu'ilI. ite- a. ti. ii,, riun.b-.ai Ji-ildrer- i-Žu a-r' ni -ite hi mar,'. -i-nii uld that he' i ThcL,h-ra contain -znriti ant tap-tb. qi, :a ii..ln i'ntr. .. cant-i,

LI n..irinn , used,, in rt'k -it pr-mm'n.. -;t' :'aid.j c-'It b,ed .I I tn-:.uiJ't.i-t-r the~m tF...I h.~. -- r, 'Ius.nc am.-. aki-k-i -- mrnri,-.J ,i 'nicn in tpeiaa t -..- ntr acepiti ncit 'd -cPer, dihrad l.~jiIt- innnti- ni i de a-ar%i-.s~ during the: pa at ha,-n, unnici rn-cd t..r si-e'.1: Firithil-na-dc Ic, n-irthan,r tor. cc.n'rntri-n-inii-a.r, ha. ,-ig-rt' j

~inni-

-i-re m5k-cJ l - a- it ant iddtti-'tial childrt.'ner -'I-c' \mc'rag it n' .;I-d ii he rI it -ncrarr 1 th.at i' Ill,% -er-. riitt.t,r pregnant n.-r rite.rtteiv -i'm-c -t-iiFat rih, -. did n-it a,a,nr
i e re
i-..;i

-men

thatIrep..n'' r.. auch ciJ'"n .,r. an, I-t-t ctI . I tati- n II c a.nn-i. mean-n~l~-~ er ii hisi ttrareliahhm~ Th~'.Unr.hetIc"crThh l-r -n,ichrldrlti-h.. airl a :'tehFat na.ni iiirci - d 1-'c-pin.: hi,. and'act -niag,ni-atrctCIi i r'iin art n-- icit-'d ipwnig -,l c,tti.ri,, dittereni linan-l 'i.-. 'hi-i ta riai are utim--ni-rntI1. 1 r iepnnari uch- 1 ttin ar..r.t c--n'&--tt

,i-i hId,renl k' ! ina,i min

i-em th.-'s

i- h.-

c.nt racr-pm1.i--

tici~h,d -. clitit-ti a- Fhattniz unnti-t r.i,--, t.ir '-a. 'rirbt, In '-.me -un ci'. e- .- .uiiri.: r n i -me.,:n-i crc la. .ICed [I. .'''i i. I h tI - dela, p-rt-nanc:. t-ir aear i.mi.r re' \mn-nt: v--m,-ntr ai

~c-re'

~.J ll

hI-i-

31-atci the nun;-bt-r
i-rtiaiht

appl. ni.-..

4lrc.ngl,

r.. i,nit ri tluetttiin' ii prei-t bir,th,'Tha~tect. .rem

1, irnTi 1tam-il.5d

itup-'

r-centi; marrir-d arid r nil'l I--i-F-a lust Ithc nurnb-eroct chddrlti- ii -u lit' n-a,n. "''uli that 1-C i arnd A-k,rid

ntii cin - hi-n ----ire n at- jaked ihi.. at i Ii i,-tI. -r at Litei -II~ rIt i ,c r I Fr e'tpm rlid.rii:;.at -'ro 4r'p-i.n. i -mter retnm,r.r- 'i'd ti-jr rimnrith; Atti-t an, inta r r,a1 -u% ung, an .,I. r-,- I' i p'-i'criat- U' 'ti -nn deir-tn IantI'. 'L'& trn a rir-ilar 'ti-Id'. 1'ciihfrt: -- l.. n
5i5r'

132

\%orldwide expendirure on reproducit'e

research and conbaceplie detelopment,

r,.-'I -Iciltic 14,' I121 ,.-'-_' 1. '-. ant

1i ,-'
,~~~~

ire -mpIttrcr ltiNE tuil Ia' t1h-c rctrirn t.- tertihi' t.ir -At ralnr.,.nth S -1....,;*rit.iiii, T. . i ak-ir.tnr. and ;rTlL-aLlori are rO'!l-,u-' ur Ejil.mnacccp'at--lr'Trrtr. mc, 1 iraIk r -e, ird .c.nl% 1 tmintn.-

ni.riur4i.-1 cheia)m, stertizi-m:-n t,rr nm.r. Ind "-mren a matl p.i an-i an 1t.preonancl. ' ,i-ne h,r . -'men -m ci them_ ne.:mr:h .dsu-h a; th.-: Liar. nn lmrI.in i the arnm, niprro- ed

!

-. rh,thn-. . r n

L

;

~

pUic
fDrIi;'r4 ilr-ill lcrii

-i-mna.,:tPt3tie .n.d

h ainl . . ng Žr- ca-.t p diaphraJm; . htch rel-t r.ermi 'ther, uch a. n:-. i and an anriprgn.nci

ride-...............l rnrtr ... x., In.deli a. ada'Ihe inthe nira lit'

," / .

nil~

~ ~ \_ ~ ~~~~~~r ~ 1:

at

it..

iiid " c-rnent r-uire- ,Ltld medical .r ... rurier-it par.,mmeit,il .italti ho are- -tien *,lC in d- el i 'lpinet-ILIntrie Th- iTTD inttctable- and the pill require t endt-I bac3Ckup it. r .-. m.Ii.h:at. n-

/

:

ml,t mra -in' rr1 i4urt nriuh mn-re r.iar,i h and are unhleh ht b niarL he,n-.l-lr. t e rhi, -r,lur.i dJ/I I triU, t.sitl I Ilr. _r3,t7.h L !-A'5Tn i-l; ird,iadhL rh, n-c-it thc c-n' .. -:it-t- a F-il and ptrn'icd3l thr pa.-- r.t tchnr -Itg;,c der.IcFmt I; tanm rT.:L3urv ., g-.d ni:.t--rL. oI euppl i .n .,'rld.-.-dt tundtm: I.-r c'ntrapintrlt-pil 'n-n Ae1d r-Eren:h -.'l I; r t a millir.r N.. inirur, *If_l4Icmtth.v1 *'t c.ir;vtFrc pi' -n ,,3......r...Kr. bitt Ii:; '1-d )uK dr1Intrri; riI rtal 1, iprnr.rr;att -;thenrr.dt .r all p|t.:pl n.-r tctin4mi flCci'- i 'i :hcirr .'r" ut 3') ,..ne rh' t- crplerl, -3te p-rctnt h-i al L.fl triVia;
*-d' r;r'rr.ibtc ctt'cti\l e inrd 11'.I.n rt N -' ,. such r *d-. ,Imt,.ds rh 1 i inmh, nc-i t.-- nt

lutiuc

I jr.~ llrn

r

-'

-1

--

-

~

~.,

rCn-t

ie tI
,eir-

ii.cr .1rtnii dcrelr. a re .t t. - trainingrn

-- *.ih. a

',

teF

i.n hum.,r. rcprc.du'.rrc.in

-tudie the -- reierch t-.-nw -. p-r-

Farn,l), planningm

* In. 'c ;-'i...> . B3rncr mr:hi.dm ih-nr , dimn dt.ipl'rnm -p,rrn'ici-i F-.-e- trbu.- -td ac:h Ktm,- c.:upk r,3 .nirtar .rIr,r- In h-.u- Il i l-pii c--u-c' pitt.c; .nd drlphta,Zim ,r.-i: cult tc .ir, rnd c-ndn-rni dirlfuli i.- dt-p.-Sei'it-i
ctit-nt-

* icn.-, '-P-*k. ster.I.?atii'r s hr,it. e [abut rmre-. ri-,riIttnirt.bi-

pr- 'gran; t ill ha.re *. ret'. Kr.; - ne--t .! 4ti;rin; n,Th-:-id- an. a Ic:'.-. fle- rir; *r.-hi,-e etc lprntnt I Ir--d ;i11I 3d'n. 1 incd .hare - r-taK .- t'-i.Z e'n..-r'rrte.d in r%. ' 1r: mpn-'.. I; n IE-.;.rt c ie -i itt -pan .'t! _ |rtirni nrlth,lrcr uch r.h- ID_ pil in.-rlt, '. ard tn:.), bjrr.,r meth.-d and it'. Ln.F'in nith;--d. ;ticK r .r.h rn.'rhl, pUtl w-. induce nttrr.tru.i- r-r' bln d.-.;raia h.-rn;.nal irrplirt- -. - -ntrn

cent .- th-. t.ril . . ;pcnt r. rhr Lrn.t.:d n ttatr-- *. -t Sil pr ' it ith t--t.1 i.a1 i.In-n d r: thc F-'' li -ctc-r rrdu;tr 1 ha-hrur1, trrn 32 pc rcem i IIj i-:' Ic-- thai, 3 leillnt -per.,l icinm nd Irr ,p-r-duct-labrlitpri blern; ha.-. len,tlrcnid rr. tn', bet.rr F-r.cduic ducl ci p. n-i .nd iJtrng ned ih- -r,Lr. .I rl:pu pr-di.tJ --. ar, d ni-t th-- uturt Fri tiiart-.it i r.c. mirKn .rtatn t r prin at, tirni-

It

r,c :rt .. i' -- rcint-r. ,---. I h cd atar r \-.- r FFtrni. . -tre'. :c-nir.-: rpt u t .-- ur - itn.;tiirr . at-c..' ir l.LT -u. -n i*. nr, monith an. ,r.n identi:a.l r-i -:-t.r .. mir. -.. rrn .Kh-. tI m, d fut1i-- rnri, u.rc ttitudt-ti, hIrr t.i-i-ri 4' -- p u qi.,t ._.r. ri F-rt:rr-.. ria l . 'ic -m I ri.ri ci,ldr,i, ci-n,-ttrn'. c-iecded ul,r ha ,..t--etr-.i.l.c.X.i..-.d.'he ditrcr. r- *r In .:,.ntra -c-nmitr, r-p-tnd c--n- -ianiimn-ri i-Tin -. |nnir. cr Jidre-n Lw t 1nhem ticnd, r.- e anll rhut i. tr t'.r ., pt-c 'rur. .- -. r 1lt,-i r %)t-i r,u-i n- l . .,11 n -.h.K. .rnt i,. it-e, art dtit-r nc-. - ir-r r,t c r. ri -. nt tbI. .3nt aldit-cnal .-hildrvi- arid r ni-r, _ic-lttdcn n crntrac.ptir.n and - pcr.r.hii- iii huljdren pi,, .ra.i 1their r. plirt. a-tl i prd,,r.nct at) Ten...-n -- tnr tv-. 11uni,t th n .rr.d ent--- - h.ld.l -. %ini ut: - -r 1 i ..- ,. ci-ntrie:F-Fri h FIF u ., and .i ran-, abe.rnn.c ..hil.irn hur-vnC Ir r 1`c--.-. c rupt tuture Itntitl. -The I ',-r.ular.-n Dara tra1 lt-rmi. a-I-curt t.mr th-r d .1tihr ih-r plai-. F-.urth cer.- nhitcrn

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133

TABLE 7.2

Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among those who want no more children
Residence and education Urban Country and family planningindexI Strong or very strong Korea, Rep. of, 1979 Colombia, 1980 Moderate
Malaysia, 1974 37
. .

Rural No educationl Seven years' education or more

No education

Seven years' education or more

58 35

62 69

61 30
27

63 52
49

Thailand, 1981 Philippines, 1978 Tunisia, 1979 Bangladesh, 1979 Mexico, 1978 Weak or very zneak Nepal, 1981 Egypt, Arab Rep., 1980 Ecuador, 1979 Pakistan, 1975 Venezuela, 1976 Kenya, 1977-78 Honduras, 1981 Ghana, 1979-80

72 22 50 21 40 40 53 17 17 53 13 53 11

83 45 60 55 71 71 72 60 35 67 44 58 30

53 15 45 16 17 15 24 6 6 18 12 15 8

58 38 37 53 45 70 58 17 54 32 49 25

Note: Efficient contraception includes male and female sterilization, pills, IUD, injectables, diaphragm, and condoms. Women who are pregnant or infecund are excluded from this table. . . Not available. a. Family planning index is interpolated from 1972 and 1982 data to year shown. See notes for Table 6 of the Population Data Supplement. Souirces: CPS and WFS data; Lapham and Mauldin, 1984.

countries are shown in the Population Data Supplement, Table 3. These high and low calculations of unmet need provide rough estimates, given existing preferences for family size, of the potential for additional contraceptive use. Some analysts, however, have questioned the validity of estimates based on the responses of married women to survey questions (see Box 7.3). Others have noted that even women who are pregnant may have had unmet need in the past that resulted in an unplanned pregnancy, and that such women may shortly be in need again. Nor do these surveys include unmet need among unmarried people. Clearly, use of contraception depends not only on accessibility and cost, but also on how intensely a couple wishes to avoid a birth. This factor is difficult to measure in surveys. Whether unmet need can ever be completely satisfied is debatable. But in the United States, where contraception is widely available, unmet need for limiting births was estimated at only 4 to 8
134

percent of married women of childbearing age in 1976. The concept of unmet need is not static. Unmet need may decline as more people have access to contraception or as the nature of services changes. It may increase as people want fewer children, or as the better availability of services raises interest in regulating fertility faster than new services can meet new need. Many women who say they want more children might be potential users of services if given the chance to plan their births. To some extent family planning programs do more than simply satisfy unmet need; they actually generate and then fill such need. In this sense "demand" for contraceptive services is not easily measured; it is partly a function of their supply. In most countries women in rural areas and with less education are less likely to want to stop childbearing than are urban and more educated women. But of the former, those who do want to stop are less likely than their urban and educated

counterparts to be practicing contraception. Government plays a central role in narrowing these gaps, especially between urban and rural areas (see Table 7.2). In Colombia and Korea, which have strong family planning programs, rural women who want no more children are as likely as urban women to be practicing contraception. In Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan, which have weaker programs, the contrast between rural and urban areas is much greater. Reasons for not using contraception Couples who wish to plan their families face certain costs-financial, psychological, medical, and - time-related costs. If these exceed the net costs of additional children, couples will not regulate their fertility, even if, ideally, they would prefer to postpone or to prevent a pregnancy. To individuals, the costs of contraception include: * Information-the effort to find out where contraceptive methods can be obtained and how they are properly used. In Kenya 58 percent of married women aged fifteen to forty-nine who are exposed to the risk of pregnancy do not know where they can obtain a modern method of contraception; in Mexico the figure is 47 percent. * Travel and waiting time-the money and time needed to go to and from a shop or clinic and to obtain family planning services. Average waiting times are as high as three hours in hospitals and family planning clinics in El Salvador. Family planning programs in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka compensate sterilization clients for their transport costs and lost wages. * Purchase-the financial cost of either contraceptive supplies (condoms, pills, injections) or services (sterilization, IUD insertion and periodic checkups, menstrual regulation, and abortion). * Most public family planning programs provide supplies and services free of charge or at highly subsidized rates. Purchase costs from private suppliers and practitioners may be substantially higher. - * Side effects and health risks-the unpleasant and sometimes medically serious symptoms that some women experience while practicing contraception. Users of the pill may gain weight or feel ill. The IUD may cause excessive menstrual bleeding, persistent spotting, and painful cramps. In addition, in some countries women are forbidden for religious or cultural reasons from cooking during their menstrual periods; spotting and heavier menstrual flow caused by the IUD can further

restrict their activities. Some methods increase the risk of developing serious health problems; higher risk of pelvic inflammatory disease among IUD users and of cardiovascular disease among users of the pill have been reported. (These risks, however, are small compared with those associated with pregnancy and childbirth.) * Social disapproval-the private nature of family planning and the difficulty of discussing it with providers of services or even with spouses. Family planning may violate personal beliefs, create marital disharmony, or be socially, culturally, or religiously unacceptable. Surveys of contraceptive use in ten countries asked married women not practicing contraception why they were not doing so. Unless they wanted another child or were pregnant, their reasons included lack of knowledge of a source or method of contraception, medical side effects of methods, religious beliefs, opposition from husbands, and financial costs. In Nepal lack of knowledge of a source was the main reason. In Honduras, Mexico, and Thailand half of the women who did not practice contraception but were exposed to the risk of pregnancy either knew of no source of contraception or feared side effects. In Bangladesh, Barbados, and Nepal as much as a quarter to a third of all married women were not using contraception for these reasons. Contraceptive prevalence clearly could be increased by better information and services-directed to men as well as to women. Discontinuation rates tell a similar story. According to surveys in thirty-three countries, as many as 30 percent of married women of childbearing age have used contraception in the past but are no longer doing so (see Table 7.3). When contraception is being used to space births, some discontinuation is normal. But many who discontinue contraceptive use do not want more children. As the second column of Table 7.3 shows, as many as 10 percent of all married women are discontinuers who want no more children and are at risk of getting pregnant. In Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Korea, and Pakistan, the proportion exceeds onethird (column 3). Follow-up surveys of women who have accepted contraception typically find that much discontinuaton is due to medical side effects. In a follow-up survey in the Philippines, for example, this reason was cited by 66 percent of those who stopped using the pill and 43 percent of those who stopped using the IUD. Reducing discontinuation among women who want no more children could increase contraceptive use by at least one-fifth in eight countries (column 4). 135

TABLE 7.3

Discontinuation of contraception, recent surveys
Percentageof marriedwomen aged 15 to 49 Used contraception but are not current users ("'discontinuers'") (1) Discontinlued use, exposed' and want no more children (2) Percentageofall discontinuers who are exposed and zwant no more children (2 divided by 1) (3) Discontinuers who are exposed and want no more children (2), as a percentage of clrrent users (4)

Country

Sub-Saharan Africa
Cameroon (1978) 6 (.) 1 2

Ghana (1979-80) Kenya (1977-78) Lesotho (1977) Sudan (1979) Middle East and North Africa Egypt (1980) Jordan (1976) Syria (1978) Tunisia (1978) South Asia Bangladesh (1979) Nepal (1981) Pakistan (1975) Sri Lanka (1975) East Asia Indonesia (1976) Korea, Rep. of (1979) Philippines (1978) Thailand (1981) Latin America and Caribbean Barbados (1981) Colombia (1980) Costa Rica (1980) Dominican Republic (1975) Ecuador (1979) Guyana (1975) Haiti (1977) Honduras (1981) Jamaica (1975-76) Mexico (1978) Panama (1976) Peru (1981) Paraguay (1979) Trinidad and Tobago (1977) Venezuela (1977)

30 25 18 8 17 22 14 15 9 2 5 14 12 24 23 21 28 20 23 18 20 22 17 15 26 15 21 20 21 27 20

2 2 2 1 4 3 1 3 3
(.)

7 7 10 8 25 12 9 18 30 8 43 29 16 33 19 26 36 22 14 17 20 34 15 10 36 20 17 14 12 28 19

23 24 33 15 18 10 6 9 21 2 42 12 7 16 12 9 21 9 5 8 12 22 14 6 24 8 7 7 7 14 8

2 4 2 8 4 5 10 4 3 3 4 8 3 2 9 3 4 3 3 8 4

Note: Figures in columns 1 and 2 were rounded after computing columns 3 and 4. (.) Less than half of I percent. a. Not pregnant or infecund. Souirce: Ainsworth, 1984.

Supplying family planning services Family planning programs have evolved in various ways, but a typical pattern begins with services being provided only by private family planning associations and a few concerned doctors and nurses. These groups gradually show that family
planning is feasible and acceptable and start press136

ing for government support. Once persuaded, governments typically provide family planning through the public health system. But because health care is often underfinanced and concentrated in urban areas, and because family planning competes with other medical priorities, the quality of services is uneven and available to only a small
proportion of people. Eventually programs are

in part because of opposition from some religious authorities. Indonesia. and twelve countries still provide no official backing for family planning. like all public programs. Private associations are delegated major responsibilities within the national program for certain services or target groups and continue to test new ways of providing services. only nine have demographic objectives. the Dominican Republic. Colombia. * South Asia. Mexico. First. family planning programs can be effective only to the extent that they meet the needs of individuals. and Trinidad and Tobago do so to reduce fertility as well. Commercial organizations are also encouraged to provide family planning. which makes it difficult for them to seek out family planning services.extended to the countryside. and working with community leaders to encourage local support. those who are married and unmarried. Contraceptive use is highest in Sri Lanka and several states in southern India. * East Asia. Potential clients include men and women. cultural. The demand for contraception is still constrained by high infant mortality and by a preference for large families. recent surveys have revealed substantial unmet need for both limiting and spacing births. * Middle East and North Africa. only Turkey's program seeks to reduce fertility. Official commitment to reduce fertility is strong. In a few Middle Eastern countries. and those who 137 . Guatemala. those of different social. the capacity for training and supervision. particularly in rural areas. operate within certain constraints: the availability of manpower and finance. Governments have a longstanding commitment to reduce population growth. As traditional ways of child spacing (prolonged breastfeeding and sexual abstinence) erode. Government support was weak. The personal nature of family planning services has several important implications for designing and managing programs. The management of family planning programs Perhaps more than any other social programs. Public family planning programs are now at different stages of development in different regions. often by paramedical and semiskilled staff with backup support from health centers. Morocco. providing follow-up services to clients. both for better information about the benefits of controlling fertility and for better services to facilitate doing so. pharmacies. The 1970s saw a growing interest on the part of governments and a greater tolerance by religious authorities. Most programs have yet to achieve the rural spread found in East Asia and have tended to emphasize sterilization. they are provided through health care systems that have only limited coverage. and sometimes basic health care. for example-have long-established programs to reduce fertility. Contraceptive use has increased dramatically during the past decade. In rural areas. and infant mortality is high. Barbados. Jamaica. and is lowest in Nepal and Pakistan. in villages in China. cultural practices often confine women to their households. El Salvador. and Thailand. Private organizations have helped to demonstrate that demand and to press for government support. Some countries in North Africa-Egypt. and in the longer term to ease such limitations. the demand for modern contraception increases. Throughout Africa couples want large families. Medical backup is necessary to deliver some contraceptive methods. Haiti. primarily in urban areas. The challenge for family planning managers is to address individual needs within the confines of these constraints. Most governments now support family planning services for health and humanitarian purposes. and Tunisia. At the same time family planning programs. Most governments that support family planning do so for health reasons. programs must be able to accommodate local and individual needs and a variety of users. Large numbers of field workers have been recruited to provide family planning. Programs that include home visits by family planning workers are not well developed. There is some demand for family planning but it is poorly met by existing programs. widespread demand for family planning was met largely by private doctors. or religious backgrounds. Other methods have been largely supplied through subsidized commercial outlets. and the transport and communications infrastructure. At the same time. About half the countries in the Middle East provide family planning to improve child spacing and to promote health. At first. access to services is still inadequate in most countries. * Sub-Saharan Africa. but results have been mixed. * Latin America and the Caribbean. They have been extremely successful in improving access to family planning services and in widening the range of contraceptive methods available. More attention is paid to increasing the range of contraceptive methods. In others. economic. Of forty-one governments for which data are available. and nonprofit organizations. Where services exist. contraception is illegal.

n re .ztrictr in ih *tai31 . Special services have also been targeted for specific client groups: adolescents.t outIne :'tudiez in sho. untorm3tli-n r. sensitive to the individual needs of clients. thei cu-mplcts and are subhmtted on timre and reporimti ..o%.sstem the daia .:eptor rates ind c:haracteri. btrn reduid considAn assistant nure-mtdi tie s ith the nes mn3ragemenrr an' ntcirm3aion . dropouts. and aailahilNts FheTe data all.in man% *:untrie.sas tc mak reg. iuh c.r and reporting ha. er used A T. Iteurd 1c1ds-e-.iNll-t . .id~ ine are no%% being taken in recommending that all 'taies neis KIP1 indhra The number ct registers reduced Irom 3 ieldsorker.perttrmance and the health mini. ihe pnmars health cernters Also ranked crnters on rhe ta.:c!U* 3nd reiiable imtcrnaiion that is colleted aSa matter o. ere replsced t a .es not direcil% rtlated tn delering rhtir ser ices keeping rec.:c. Managers need information not only on new acceptors but also on continuing users. mretings %.n mnalara conirohl :nd %. and familiar with local customs and beliefs.7h i htr thi.rds and 3rtend.I immunia3tionand IItIh number it srcr.1.gram nianager.g intormation that is ne'. . as well as spread information about the proper use of methods.:c31 neWd ct ps toe. Medical backup and referral is critical.sdiced erabls the timt spent .il nni u..2nrrhra t Pr-d. rupplie stattmng patterns. plan ning statf %serc n.ciicn ind interprrtation )t An 3s'ist.pand the si tem t.nt nurse-midi. spacing between children.tics.ur a da . ed ii ples and children. it n dted b% managers Lo ma3e decisions The rural h..-r states.n ztem %%hich rganizet l the da3t the% .et lce.erethe m *.uch as the rumb. quarterly follow-up surveys of acceptors.-i.. .-sod records and to.1ristics For afamily plan an Nllc could include r3rgtt group size and ness and continuing jsist birth mainrtaind ti ent- and prepartd tssei e rep-rts a month The untu.A total ot tn *si reilsters t ere mair. programs must create an awareness of services and their benefits.ter ot elh.ld imrr'edi3te1 hci.h3Iiatons 3Sa psrcentage ot annual r3rgetIn thre d.ter resie ming intormation on hiring and depl%ment ot statl are both usingan \11ning propgar.irs 3nd manager4 nor did ti curkers nith oihers maintain and sem is ere recei%e ans s%stematic teedhack on the.t thre rronths behind schedultI and managers ite retsp:cdin: beCitcr I.r iio reiords . In societies in which people marry young.eport tr:m each primarN health enter F3mil.pending asmuchas il! percent mt their tirre on 3in ti. *a-:h riieldschrker each uptriscor an a sciln.mine target- IP Wc predetvr- personnel untrained to mAke u-e cit the . Indonesia is one country with an effective monitoring system.alth . and by making special efforts to hire female workers. numr bers and ispes ot tollcns up rStes -.. a stock and issue register and a diari ot dailk acti%. 7ti at -rir.rnmtErt ot India Is adopt thE criarcs in India Karna. sis a.n.inglc r..rburdened .ut halt an h.n haratl3r3.r pert. ing a re%iereccurdkeeping stre3rilined kept bs to-rtL-u t.upErni. Exarrple rso's spends inlk abL. effective use is easier if information and support regarding side effects are assured.. Iack .te itpes *t The rTangenmenr. a .. This requirement has been addressed in several ways: by selecting staff from local communities. hours beo-tre Pe g. Information and education activities are necessary both within and outside the system for delivering Box 7.. a range c1 sublects tamil planning maternal and child health immunuiati... and the opportunity to switch methods is available.nsider3ble uuorlap reccrded ai-rn.uring r.t reliable intormaijon on.encourvt.t3tl and o . and nonparticipants (see Box 7.may be delaying a first pregnancy.4).tn indJia3t.ible .:..-eptng t.ther diztrcts reporting is abh. including acceptor records.t common e%traieous actiities.ions Requiremenis tor data collection are imposed on .. the%i %ere mea. prc. ot ion teedtack repc. elds%orkers tamiied bLs i. resupply is convenient.%s managers decisucins based on up to-dare .ed b% medical or other technical repcris ton irrded i'.ed bh superi ..are plagued b.nmpet- relating tc. rep-Jrt regOtlarl on iime Follc. Third. and periodic sample surveys of households in which information on fertility and contraceptive use is collected.r.'I1. because information about the benefits of family planning and of small families may not be widespread. as is the capacity to follow up on clients.uprrtis. or preventing additional pregnancies. Prolonged.ic report b.sinlm nmrothk report b. and mothers with young children.rtz irom lh d.4 Management information systems for improved service delivery health and tamil plnning s-erx ic* %tre . 1 . tric to. Staff must be discreet.spent collectr.r re% ie%uing 3 ulker.niormatinrr \Iud tIre .s% stem comar i p3red us th tsc. programs must encourage clients not only to accept a method of contraception but also to use it effectively and continuously..ihich to base m3r3gement dei. by training staff in the environment in which they will work. couples who are spacing and limiting births may have to use contraception for twenty years. a maternal and child health register 3 r-port on blood srmears r i malaria a birth and death register. r3. women who have just given birth.3 and Lrrtar l'r3desh in the mid 1lt!s that tieldcs orkers pros iding 138 .rrnmuitn 'a..ties The tarious separat. Pradesh and the g.amance compared There %sa3 little incenti%e t. tIr pri iding tamili planning s. Second..

as in Kenya. family planning workers provide services through clinics administered by the ministry of health. In Mexico the semiautonomous Coordinacion General del Programa Nacional de Planificacion Familiar monitors and coordinates all family planning activities. and problems of rapid population growth as part of school curricula can inform young people before they marry. If an integrated delivery system employs single-purpose workers. produces information and education programs. and Malawi). Some of these responsibilities are often delegated. When services are provided through a maternal and child health program. as in Bangladesh. But integrated services also present difficulties. salaries. refer clients. family planning. but are responsible to some other body. and medical staff may give priority to curative rather than preventive services. Program staff recruit potential clients and offer information on proper use of methods. important client groups may be overlooked: men. adolescents. In Pakistan primary responsibility for family planning lies with the Population Welfare Division of the Ministry of Planning and Development. There have been obvious advantages in integrating health and family planning in the delivery of * services. using the division's own specialized facilities and workers. seniority. friction may arise over differences in training. Joint delivery can reduce unit costs. or they may be responsible for general health or maternal and child health services in addition to family planning (that is. such instruction can also be offered through nonformal education. and in countries where family planning is controversial. in addition to their salaries. and Indonesia. discussed in Chapter 6. for example. The mass media can be used to inform people of the benefits of small families and how to obtain contraceptive methods. to create demand for smaller families. These personnel issues can seriously affect worker morale and performance. or to coordinate public. to develop mass media programs. Although family planning programs need some link with health systems. Botswana. through a special department of family planning (as in Egypt) or as part of preventive or maternal and child health services (as in Botswana. Health ministries are often understaffed and underfunded. family planning workers have sometimes received incentive payments based on the number of acceptors they recruit. it is located within the Ministry of Health but has direct access to the president and works closely with the National Population Council (CONAPO). Because of the need for medical services for provision or follow-up of many contraceptive methods. and set up community distribution points. such as adult literacy programs. as "multipurpose" workers).ing age-is the same. integrated services make the program more acceptable. to information or education ministries. nongovernmental. Multipurpose workers who are overloaded with responsibilities will do none of their tasks well. whereas health workers receive only salaries. Ministries of health may be poorly equipped to organize social marketing schemes (for subsidized commercial distribution of contraceptives. Many programs have boards within or outside a ministry to coordinate the wide range of family planning activities. family planning services need not be confined to them. and has its own fieldworkers who promote family planning. In Kenya family health field educators (with family planning responsibilities) were paid more than the enrolled community nurses to whom they were to report. Staff may specialize in family planning (that is. The nature of these links varies among countries and has often changed. For both services the main target group-married women of childbear. In some countries these family planning boards are also responsible for overall population policy-a role discussed more fully in Chapter 8. there is no simple formula for the best organization of family planning programs. unmarried women. Instruction on human reproduction. Workers in India deliver both 139 . a separate body responsible for population policy. These efforts complement other economic and social policies. In conclusion. and India.services. For example. most family planning programs are linked to the public health system. and commercial activities. coordinates activities. In some programs. Kenya. discussed below). and promotion. responsible parenthood. and nonpregnant women. as "single-purpose" workers). Heavy demands for health care may eclipse the provision of family planning services. The health benefits for mothers and children of spacing and limiting births clearly establish family planning as a valuable component of maternal and child health services. Pakistan. private. In Indonesia the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) is an autonomous body that collects data. Elsewhere family planning is directly administered by the ministry of health. they cannot always mobilize the political and administrative wherewithal to implement an effective family planning program. Programs that differ widely in structure can be equally successful.

and in most African countries contraceptives are available only in urban areas. Other significant factors in the success of programs are the degree of political commitment and the overall administrative capacity of government to coordinate the deployment. supervision. family planning methods are available within an hour's travel from home. Of those women in rural areas who know where to obtain contraceptives. they receive careful training on screening for contraindications. * Paramedical workers have been trained to provide many methods formerly provided only by physicians. and 62 percent in Nepal live more than an hour away from the source of supply. and referral procedures. The advantages of outreach are considerable: fieldworkers take less time and money to train than do medical professionals. Such local outlets in Mexico and Indonesia assist the work of field staff and reduce costs to clients. 42 percent in Hon140 Today many large family planning programs have succeeded in using their health centers as a springboard for taking services and supplies into the villages. In Honduras about a quarter of women are unaware of either method or outlet.5). To reach the rural areas. how to deal with side effects. health staff can spend more time on health care than they other- . In Costa Rica and Thailand most people in rural areas are also less than an hour away from services. In urban areas of almost all of thirty-six countries examined by the World Fertility Survey (WFS). 0 Official outlets have been increased by organizing local supply depots for nonclinical methods. But there are still many countries and areas in which information and travel costs are major obstacles to satisfying the unmet need of clients. Elsewhere nonmedical workers distribute the pill. and spermicidal foam. EXTENDING PUBLIC SERVICES THROUGH "OUTREACH. all programs need some health backup. In twenty-three of twentynine developing countries in which surveys have taken place. 15 percent of married women of childbearing age said that they would like to use contraceptives but did not know where to get them. more than 80 percent of married women are aware of at least one effective method of contraception. training. but also uses single-purpose fieldworkers responsible to the BKKBN. Indonesia provides family planning as part of maternal and child health services within the health system." Until a decade ago almost all public family planning programs provided services from centers-usually clinics-and relied heavily on medical staff. In some cases fieldworkers also supervise local volunteers. In Nepal half of married women do not know of a method of contraception. Fieldworkers periodically visit homes and outlying communities to refer clients to service outlets. 32 percent in Colombia. Because health services were not well established in rural areas and medical staff were scarce. These barriers-lack of information and distance-are particularly high in sub-Saharan Africa: more than half the eligible women in Senegal and Sudan are unaware of modern contraceptive methods. improving service quality. and availability of staff. No matter how service delivery is organized. * Staff based in clinics have been supplemented with fieldworkers who provide a link between the clinic and the community (see Box 7. In Thailand. These influence the effectiveness of three program strategies for expanding contraceptive use: increasing access to services. family planning programs have placed special emphasis on extending the work of health centers into communities and households through the use of fieldworkers and other outreach staff. The Chinese program relies on joint personnel in the health system but has a separate policymaking body for family planning and overall population policy. Increasingaccess duras. Brazil. Furthermore. condom. Perhaps the greatest achievement of family planning programs in the past decade has been to make information and services more accessible to those who need them. about 15 percent know of a method but not of an outlet. auxiliary midwives insert lUDs and administer injectable contraceptives. and ensuring social acceptability. and to reassure users. According to household surveys in Guatemala and Piaui State. for example. Access has also been increased in many countries by encouraging the private sector to provide family planning services.family planning and maternal and child health services and are under the general guidance of the Division of Family Welfare within the central Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. proper use. most public programs provide services free of charge or at heavily subsidized rates. to distribute nonclinical methods such as the pill. access to family planning as well as to medical care was limited.

c .lit-Ctii. ient. uple'i T-.r: i - £a~ IC-rk-r rec..ribur.Nirnitta * P.un-:triain..Tnial.: icer r'~ ~~and nr-t . r.i (iih 1.-ai ri.-' --all retturi-d n'.-d tC.ni-.u -tr-a.i -hag:tot antil .he r ni.ioi- urr-.r. tanila plaiio nri. i n the I l..h. cilK -*..- health . .d aid pill..t inging br FJu cn. ti.r.-driT.-itI~. ki- T Idid... ta3r. Th. and community-based fieldworkers are often most aware of local needs.t. I.ir..n arid jalt I--.lUdr ni. r .d ler -._ iii: I--ri-i. re.1 n.amil Ir bthi .cr. I i a ila r. cou tradittnil-rinImi.ii rptcr.u ..tread i-. . *i tie lii.. They must be trained well at the outset andi must receive periodic refresher courses to maintain the quality of services...n Hv-aith a. rati.. n o.tf' h-nr tIIire t i ..:t . n. as arapidl ti-.be d. ii ct h. ni~~~rI~er.a-l Ii ' rann i- 'r-in lg. rIi' ri :-ONit 1 rut'. In utErrci u.IT it inial'.-Iionen p.pri.ttd1 Iiti. lmnifnufldt t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rite. pecred a TbaItt.-r. art hpprliTLh t-hi .kti-. .:~pi i.~t. rc.I nearla halt di th. p-ill and -~-iii r-'.inn.t tih.--r .: Iwiid-.ari.-a.cau.-.gned iu h. 2h1legiN in.. utt c u L n t II r:..:ied-.at-.t.t r -iii I i-I..rtinat.all -...lat 1'..t.>c Femak .11i matatii-n .ughi a N I.. c. ilablE serict" reach ad-...I.-aitP are ¾ z.ilrur..hoi I-.. supportive supervision.tv Itriarici. at -i srkcr at The lanmik center * Plhi-Ii'p'?.2'sp. ure..ii.ni.dI I ha-3..ld.wi. a. it-It.)ilttt .. J dirt. drii .t.~ 1 ~flt r.a.L]. pr-niarm ii.hiov-. .-mnpar-d i..ni p-l. ilUit-tht-...lit.- I. - IT...-iran.rh. h.i..1.m .. ni-i-i..nan - h cira.n .' ii.-t -n. rmi. n di.liit---hcOupir.n .d.~i.r ihv Ch-p-tn r.ri. in.i...'r - i.. niana~-r..r.a ull-iimt iii .-nm-roai -ant ...._ muiLJtipu.li:. . ic.gular It..--..r ~ub. a Tha. rt-i.-.ip-utIva.ii-Ntetranir i-. t health cirrirmzittcs ti. -.i.riticil. I pI-nnIng rcri.1 -rk-:rI race F.. Pt..: r ILr riand .ur dii. fl.roni rib.ra-epi.rd.4-n.tre~ a di'..1prsaa ol H. planning u T.ah iau..an-i p -ia ic ri-c..-igtr r h.ahers-t.. andtit.--tnmc-tir 1.i %tiunri-er-mnciudinA . They should concentrate on a few main tasks.tl.t..:gh.-n.nr.J i-.and tr IbalI arEa a iri I t Indi JIa tI I I. nl...-i ttlI n paid iiliir-.. tra-rine Full-tnme Faid iamil. altar.- in rest ot thte c-untr.t..--.r-. de.r pe imp.n -urJ..n.5 rz . narri.if-mil r-lr.ho- Tih.atistied T.n *iaa-. -_-. ni-it ..pra. ramil. Li.r nir-i.atre Fl" --1 i.il. er'.rnid planning * ir ~.arid wise would.d irained and onr lrmale -ilittI cente-r. .rtTi-I prc-i itk ni.iith rare . u-:r-..-..Ilii in tI-i.'r.pt-:.h aic. in"ITIprkirp-l...lni. tr.tI-.-reent c. ni * * - h. n-n male aind -. faiiIi . -n.ni planiii.liid-d1 r-.n ii -'tian-iid ra..--- p ij sen.. n)i.. ii ... liii an. ti.CItktc -. t 6 na.-en ac-. .ard .-rl. n-tnttnIttit.)urler: oii r h.. c -nleer mai..- ireu ln l'$is the -timn -.nflr th elan-n icTr I .itra- Ii.. as rnaal it.i. h. n"-tic -ld1..r.In . acnd-~ur-rr-. TI-.: plann-tnns -- ~ 'el :-'-3 I-.i..rnnienl ~pr-id 1.ii-T.-al pr.- t gl-ate..d.nAit: I.. ua t-urittir- rllu.Ii5iiii rn 3. toaiiiid it.ut 3iuii tuil-tinme sizer.r . t .-aru a... iji ad r at- mid.- Th-. ere and. arindorzanc_in.pr.-.' . ii. aiiid -tler -a -- r..nl lo-cal .i-il.'-raz. plan.-r irtnr % in iu. cundint-~eind p11'~ and ret. b-au.-atit ding~ and c:hiidspa ing diisrithu nltiiilinical .z g~-'ap mee fh1K ali- lit-_ut 3 ie t. -. under III...-.rd 1-cil g. 'n-..-uppl.n -i..i ~ i.c-i ml .I -b rtdj hi mialt and in rle d p.n . illap- tr-nt tI trlu'ttgrai-dl Fani e-. aklut .'i Iri. land.. suppla .%hich the. .. tr-l-r~.r' and moake~ retenral. -ti p.aLntractpir' e pr. I.Box 7.'.a- Tht IJ hid.~r si-'cta a'd ha-j ab.-i ~~t II . ha. . -irani 1i. 7upp.. pr.Trnl. dmi: ba-ed t3iulth -A un. h. rhr--rig Fanail l'Ia'rnin. I' Ill t.thr.1'percent In lth nc:-'ura:e hr.i.rir rIir3tiirain-.in and disiribiate H r.-..en rraii-JI I-. ' Ie ha F-3itaii i-nt'~ 1:arb-r.-n ld.rŽ- hi-.ij dIv.: 5t'.-a-l d %F hiL .rr. r ptr .-a-i tlir..i f-:n-:~ has Co.aith rr. ri ll. tnt .uppl. pr--cr3mnit -I \iIner ri-r. iuCl..i ide rN' fluiher- 1. lan-ai.-ri.ae r.--woi atin and -uppbe.. In .1. en and a irk- IMht Lli'I-2IIIct0F-i- in rural area..f.'nim itrati t-. arni -IInhJIr. -rau-ie ..ptii es t r-.iair'r h preigran -.ri.r--ir-r .5 C'itrr-..ic-. i-. :r b-.i)nixirm about a-.-nal pr-otani ha' -n mulipurp.-c c:iitamil .aith it.upl. Fieldworkers also require a good medical backup and referral system so that any side effects that 141 ..I thb.i iiel.4 r.r.J aln.... .-rI-i't elgiht.nt~ T.iz:ii hre~-j.I Ia. -t 1 ru.rI-t-r' A~ r.lgbe. anl plann. h .--. pr-..ri:t i-i ni. andi ret-jr c:I.t-..rtI- jt.a pr.-t i111. liar'.t -p['td upc~r'. -m v.I I .fi i.rnmLinttier n-i .r dis- the natic-n oI3 'thr pe The lunar. d. .r dric. -.ruit.i It-ithc I-cA uriiutc. .i ir : atler -I b. .i ' lml i_rarran Pti mai anrd ti-...rr - ThE olunt-aer. : %_. ih.minate hra%-. train.. trnniair.-~idJr pill. tial. -aard ii.-i.n-. rin-rm.ai than in.rit 1 Flipulatii.. has r.eld.--.Iz: an-n cli. ut-aipi-rm i.dvt-nt -.v r'L . O.iiril-h. rit li-triOur . "-rouc-.djl.I-tt i-il train 3rt. -Y. Pr d : iYb. Family planning fieidworkers ee.lc..-rIt'. 'ig i.-ta r.ertr Ci-mmur'ith r-i... .ch -.i-nhUt . n r. n: -e. tpat:ir-4 arni -40lot-r. ach mnnrth niak'rir sir.lini. pro4rtiti.r. inc-:ni.cne . N. But the extensive use of fieldworkers requires regular. . ca-nJa)n-~ arnd -lac~ i paid rhcr ba. ri-.rd.tn.Jmri-n ' I 5'. r t1hin ihIr.1 prt.rn Th. lacaih .ugl-. .tltr a nt-i. I i..-u kh t.'i. tri3. pr. :.ncth..n.t pr-. I'ME .I... ii-'1-r.g. It-_ nI. additional responsibilities must be introduced only gradually.i'.ar i.. a..ui- vzi-. prit tdc planning tr-ilirmati. ~-ral -nmtr:c. nta.I.Jn h~ 1l-t. t.bi..-kr-i :dii-.-:ruit ni.e pa-.. and a:-i'irt.-r.lt Ii.t-:rnAl lundin: I.

NGOs were operating 374 out of 1. bazaars. and vending machines. without prescription. and Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh the social marketing program supplied about one- quarter of couples who used contraception in 1983: it accounted for 67 percent of total condom use. coordination of NGO and government services to assure maximum coverage and allocation of responsibilty for critical functions or services in certain regions to NGOs. In 1981 about half of all pill users and 80 percent of condom users in Sri Lanka obtained supplies from the social marketing program. supervisors and fieldworkers must travel frequently. yet the whole strategy depends on extensive travel and good logistics. Colombia. Access to services has also been increased by collaborative efforts between government and NGOs. Thailand.clients may develop can be promptly treated. Since 1973 the Brazilian Family Planning Association (BEMFAM) has worked with the governments of several states in Brazil to establish community-based programs for low-income groups in the Northeast. Spermicides. however. and contraceptive supplies must be made available in an increasing number of remote outlets. Korea. The private nonprofit program in Thailand acts as an extension of the government's rural health service and recruits local distributors to promote family planning and sell subsidized contraceptives donated by the government and international agencies. The public sector still has to provide advertising. in the form of suppositories. distribution. and removing legal and other barriers to private and commercial provision of contraception. ENCOURAGING PRIVATE SUPPLIERS. as has been done in Jamaica. This strategy makes fewer demands on scarce public funds and on administrative capacity. for example. social marketing schemes have been limited to methods that do not require clinical services for distribution. government services are allocated to rural areas. although in 1978 about 60 percent of rural townships still had no authorized physician. coordinating with and encouraging private nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). And in Bangladesh there are plans to test-market injectable contraceptives through social marketing arrangements. pressurized foam. creams. The first social marketing scheme was in India. some system of referral or prescriptions must be developed. Another way in which governments have increased access to family planning services is by encouraging wider private involvement. Reliance on commercial distributors does not lift all the burden off the public sector. sometimes several brands. abortion. selling subsidized "Nirodh" condoms. groceries. Until recently. 12 percent of oral contraceptive use. and foaming tablets are also commonly sold. Nepal. In Korea more than 2. In Sri Lanka some 6.000 commercial outlets sell subsidized condoms and pills-more than five times the number of government family planning outlets. and medical backup. some governments also subsidize IUD insertion. Some training is necessary for commercial suppliers to dispense oral contraceptives and to advise clients how to use them properly. contraceptive supplies. Social marketing makes family planning supplies more easily accessible by increasing the number and variety of outlets through which they can be obtained: pharmacies. and 70 percent of spermicide use. By mid-1978 there were some 10. Subsidized provision of contraception through commercial outlets-often called social marketing-has been tried with some success in at least thirty countries. one-third by the client.000 distributors covering onequarter of the 600 districts in Thailand. and sterilization by private physicians. street hawkers. Almost all countries with such schemes sell condoms. but the cost of IUD insertion is shared-two-thirds by the government. In the late 1970s social marketing schemes accounted for more than 10 percent of total contraceptive use in Jamaica. Social marketing programs use existing commercial distribution systems and retail outlets to sell. Policies include subsidizing commercial distribution of contraceptives.204 rural 142 .300 physicians have been trained and authorized by the government to provide family planning services. In Kenya in 1980. Finally. contraceptives that are provided free or at low cost by governments or external donors. and at least seventeen are known to sell oral contraceptives. leaving NGOs to provide a large share of urban services. The involvement of private physicians has been a crucial factor in the success of the Korean program. The government pays the entire cost of sterilization. But Egypt now sells subsidized lUDs through private doctors and pharmacies. This collaboration has taken many forms: subsidization of or grants to NGO services. Failing that. Money for transport is often first to be sacrificed when budgets are cut. and Thailand. Although government subsidies to the commercial sector are usually provided for contraceptive supplies only. In Bangladesh and Indonesia. promotion.

Women using the pill tend to be younger and to have had fewer births than those protected by sterilization. Additional options are likely to increase acceptance. Morocco. and program follow-up-have contributed much to program success (see Box 7. who are breastfeeding. the diaphragm. the information and choice provided. Some women cannot be properly fitted with diaphragms. For example. In Egypt the sale of oral contraceptives through private pharmacies does not require a physician's prescription. * Couples' preferences are influenced by their fertility goals-postponing a first birth. or heart attack. the availability of other methods improves the chance that couples will switch rather than stop using contraception altogether. such as sterilization and the IUD. the Philippines. in Matlab Thana. Three ingredients of quality-the mix of contraceptive methods. sterilization is illegal in several countries. Two-fifths of the world's countries. In the late 1950s and early 1960s. Once programs are well established and accessible. more than a third of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine had used three or more. India. although this method carries higher risks of unwanted pregnancy. Today. permit switching. and communications. Oral contraceptives should not be prescribed for women who are over . and beomeasilyof supplied therougicomer pillsnth pills that can be easily supplied through commercial outlets. programs should provide information on proper timing of abstinence. Other options for stimulating the private sector include removal of import tariffs on contraceptive supplies (Korea recently eliminated a 40 percent tariff on raw materials for domestically produced contraceptives). while the latrhvcopedteifmles * Some methods of fertility control may be religiously or culturally unacceptable. A new project is creating family planning service delivery points in at least thirty of the NGO facilities. Bangladesh. The number and characteristics of available contraceptive methods affect the ability and willingness of clients to practice birth control. or limiting family size. Several countries-including China. education. quality counts because other costs of family planning-such as physical side effects-have replaced access as the factor limiting the success of the program. spacing between children. Some governments still promote a single method because such an approach is easier to administer or because certain methods. and only 7 percent offered part-time services. and reduce discontinuation rates. active goveminment promotion of condoms. But less than 1 percent of the NGO facilities offered daily family planning services. * If the side effects of one method cannot be tolerated.health facilities. In the early stages services are new. both government and NGO representatives will sit on a National Council on Population and Development that will coordinate national efforts in population information. For religious reasons. most national programs offer a wider variety of methods. Improvingquality forty years old. the Indian program had to rely on rhythm. early family planning programs offered only a limited range of contraceptive methods. comprising 28 percent of its population. spermicides. When couples regard periodic abstinence as the only acceptable form of birth control. or who have a history of stroke. Until recently. Governments have also removed legal and regulatory obstacles that restrict commercial distribution. liver damage. and Thailand-allow pills to be distributed in facilities other than pharmacies or health centers. who smoke and are over thirty-five years old. The IUD is undesirable for women with pelvic infection or a history of ectopic pregnancy. either prohibit abortion completely or permit it only to save the life of the mother. THE METHOD MIX OF PROGRAMS. For example. and the condom.6). and contraception still lacks social legitimacy. and Sri Lanka continue to emphasize sterilization. Korea. and training of private pharmacists and physicians who frequently have little knowledge of modern family planning methods. are viewed as more 'effective" and require less follow-up over the long run than do other methods. And a study in the United States showed that married white women aged twenty-five to thirty-nine had used an average of more than two methods. Indonesia had almost 143 The quality of family planning services matters in all phases of program development. cancer. many of the former are spacing births. although their provision through government clinics serving rural areas does. 36 percent of women had switched methods within sixteen to eighteen months after initial acceptance. * Some women have medical conditions that rule out certain methods. Mexico. Due to sheer lack of alternatives. In addition. although the number available at any given outlet is often fewer than that implied by official statements. thromboembolism.

T hi'. Bangladesh di' . n-.ilk r'latinn'R .. n. tiiI.-nthr.J d.s..r*tF.Box 7.<.Tr flirrrr.h pri.-. ab 31lm. ii-nli ii. Tl.. h-. ..d i.-... -.r. r1 . r. since some donors can supply only certain types of contraceptives. t Fl p.ndu. .i oi rird.. .i. B-ngl:dc-h . L .. l5 42 per.:. r... -.-:n exclusively promoted the pill but now is giving more emphasis to the IUD. ti..l.red r.l-i.rit* ' h. at 'I ri. ptrf.- i. l ahi ah'lii ..1'i-. n ld .tt .I 'ter'c. India.. .ft and B t licrm a fmlIg in the T.ro.1th-..m r.:ied .. 1.. rur. nIca-ur. D'u'inc n. -u I 11 -n.. hr A ir' -'..n der-ni. tamil.d In a g.i .1 n.Jo.e r.7 -. r'. 1h-n. i.. II| r...-. . ..'r...... r. poor transport and logistics for timely resupply. *-rirr.18-24 months. 4l.r r..nIn ir.i.up - ... h . r.rit.ng .epti'e acceplance and user rates in the fir.. IL. .tn in r .t reeupplp king t- a3rn t-..Zenrrr tl:'r l).n.ir liwn..rii ih 'cl ['ler. r hLdui h i h ni.ai'... U.t. ... At a. ..r1 hut -.Fpor . -'I kiitili.ail -h ...:i r n1 ..'.r '.e ndi- acI . i..b..ntl.....aill 'tit j I..J-cn-:d IL. h. .1i.ai-ar.ui 'art' . Frl.hin.epr -r d. b.. .:i .l ' Th. r..r BnarB h unmett tadr>-.:. . pr-ic. r.r i "i.ir. F and h. u '-'*:rl ..ni '..t ni .:t *. nl .ri'.. .... ai *. ti-iil ma eaca h.tr.. which produce most of their own contraceptives.:vni .:*jr*' ' r-n..-n-. the.nal '. ....6 .I . an injectable contraceptive.' r.r.ln..rF nate F 1A A.rDrA "..mndu'.3on..pa.. p.. -t The impact of service quality: NIatlab Thana. 3 .r.. :1 i hr. i. 1 t juN --l r.-. ed 't' .P. Supply constraints also limit the availability of different methods.'n r : .p'F -Žr ' u u. .ir-..ici-mi-il Air 1... l h* Sh ..: I rI ruLiii :.-cIt i..lat..t ptr..iJ.t hut ..d . Icr.l -ept.i. p. tr..PLz rrlnm n .:er. pll. and Korea.. I 1 rI 17 ` pr-. m itrici ' -r.r.c.tIn r..r-a lhad lle iluh -t. since the hormonal makeup of oral contraceptives varies from one manufacturer to another.ilaI' Thana 1.ldrer. and the great distances that clients must travel to obtain some methods.i-ira..-L. nr ..I. I. pi.l end-.. per atuare mile i "dirt..1P.1. Fi - I u i... -I.r.tp t'. %. Nl. raising the prospect that many clients would have to switch methods or discon. r ic ' i iart nit.i'..... r-. rw.'lX-.. I..I-. are major exceptions...ri l. 4 p .. u rL^ u :ci area lumped i i'.1. rr rt-.l i ..aiin aD'FHi b Tran..i [.. ct. ..tU .at i. r. and -J...1 ten .12 . th ri.rrr 1"'>.- F..v. I .-r....m-n dldl.. because it has not been 144 approved for use in the United States..n fl pin lld.rt't 'N' 11(ik r'pIl 1i rtr3l areai Comparison of the cumulatsse conba.F. r oi.c 1 1l .1 r..tinue altogether...:pularw.-nir.'.r utl Pilitti ditn nri .d.he '1131.'.p. Difficulties can also arise if donors change suppliers. n-r ...tr-.ri pil r¶i.z.*I Id p.. . a .'nal aril cepti. male . r.:..i-L.: ..... Thailand almost exhausted its supplies in 1982. torehe sample household Contraceptise Distribution Project tCDPa and the Famili Planning-Health Serices Project IFPHSPi danxldL-h p'..i il.7 t.. I.nhrnt .L . 1.-WiLe 'ei i... * . rtt .n. Irl ...1' 1-'5 th. -nirat pi'*n cniark .. 1'-and l'"Al thf Inierna..lcIept'...n ' IlrariF.l 4 PJr. ... Because of the limited number of donors that supply injectable contraceptives.i -.''.. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is legally prevented from financing abortion training or services and does not finance Depo-Provera.1 -! 't I. I . II-1!.. Other factors restricting method mix include shortages of trained staff to perform sterilizations.:d a.tn that r-t . .9-.n r \ lifi r nr:. mrr.d l.-.. r..i .. 1.-. .. China. r.1. - e ca.. uir1.n..:. h-U . To improve the method mix of programs.3and tarmine arc thr Bl:1.nn r. . ..nt I .. . in I -. .e311-t .tla to.Uri. .. plArIr. v. ' -' t'i.-r. -n l t-xp r l.l .n I i.n . rcnit *:n. -'ag. iiar . pr.l I .ar :. or [-er..-.-u n nil'. t n3u nll..t rii..*:.r..rni....'d.r trla ''..td . nnrarcrpi. j tr en c. .. I Ruair. t -^ r&13rl3b Thana 1-an adntin..r.m- Pr .. mnn.larr...:l.c~ -r' ..-ar. U.-n... h'rt .l d i. l ..t.n. P..|l. c--rd--i .I I /W I' .i rc !.g lhe 'ainm 'r- . -.. th. Most contraceptives are imported and are often provided free or cheaply by donors. Ihi . i anti nd * tirr . narr. 1.re. nr ! . 11 ptr--i.:'d 'i-It it 3 3I nai 2 bl iat -.d !. -. In 11HI pcKjl.r. h t..:h Ih quilj -tit:' 1 -. Heavy reliance on one donor can cause problems..tt- and -impi.

r in n tra re-ucuree4 una..-.. nt heMlth . pr ier:t ara r.3 r rraI rhan.ur.-.orker.I Li BangiadEh and htl.. v . -n.uld -.r n-I'rr..rap..pri. 3t4 nrac. .d r.inre ild b.ntirw-d t. er.1. an. . .d. i Ia th.rIod I..p.1'~kp it-.. .ni -r .amr-r.i-n. Although family planning workers may know more about the advantages and disadvantages of each method.:n an n1 f ire -renvrn ar n. mar .i ld..r -mb.. and commercial sources. Nlaui._...i-.iflal.i l the tnr.bi*u.1 ' but thb i* F-' r .er a ctunta*ilit. Frt-lt n rhn-rinh han r ir tranin.. Th .n.... r -.t id..ri. . .that hid prt .. nt t . ire 3pF.mri proFect rt.. r r arcI . -r. d .in tht proicct recei.. art3 Ll.. governments can sponsor local research on the effectiveness.rite niarried c-ntinu u.rloc rtr: . *. FFH t-1 pr ~toir lialt ailn-.. i...in-rirr. Finally. [r:iet ar. ZI prr:.*...... . .r-r.aged in u4t in timelI c.id ...as- Irequent rieib. urt u hlt r i-trr.ntr-.d-I h-I . rned1Lal relkrT 1I -r tr. t. side effects..rt-.:.....id 4r-pn-ii.T an.o ai.lup.- *r I. raNri rrar.. tii .. p.-r trrriliti Th. the rire c.pri. :rker4 sh..i'rn n. tniii0 plannin*. Paramedical workers can be trained to provide the IUD and injectable contraceptives in clinics and even in homes. r . rt>3rdle. r rci. in rht thai cura...I pr-.nr air .nil .. .-r-.ni nth' into tht prc:-rani ent-i hI-red oni lin.. *I.ltr....:nt ..kt pro r-ri:a liI .reb.. ir.iI and hangt nl.... however.pt.ite Sn a lareer caIe be.-r.. n 3.t.I n.ir.qpuiie u-e tan r r:. r nd thandth.ul rur n.h-ic e i'gd rieihid.r1 bI St-. private. din. ot reanu ad n en . INFORMED CHOICE.n . Lprmnl...tnd..rsert cmpared th: iIII. p-rcrnr .t u-..ird t.p-:rcal - philland c.-r. h.an rr-rr-ri t.. n 1iH.a n t .bi.. .rall round rh.d I. r...d.. knt -.. c. inIatl C'. -Ir. mea3 ure ih.m. pr-ur p.dra. eS i rr th.r un [p.n.I. *. I-F'rt-i-' hid 3c.n..rnedrcs and ..an e'rtnl tourd in nil.rnd *rgani Mr3anirl l .crt4 rnadru. -. replic. n3ar.n-br . fr r.-:i littlr . the tirli trt.. n..r.et I .r i'.d .. d.e sala..Ilct .nt ci lh-..i.ntrac:..tai.-.ul-in Itlrnc.lit.-.n.pr. p . p. ttr.b pr... .sha: r- .:-rkr in tht nralirnal ..i In l-' O .th are much hicher Th..ilh r-n 3 .>.. nirtnua.ie:t r s Ihr go. rkrnpriine r . r. ha-. io hou. -t cdna-:C 4iarl..: -d0:hini rran.nu an... ue.n.:... arid nr.n .n nd .lF-.n rart . m.nl r. -. urn.t .alar..i had sitr -.-n tablo: planning .n n also . and proper use. ni. r.u-cd . I... ti--n d- Ir th.umrr.i for ih.critracep- Bangladt.Nttr a thri-... -.-.rr%-.-ir.i 1-b..i.n %ar Tht proi. aiii1-d 1 rch1ninr. mIprt'hn . h dra3n:-n th.:ni L. Referral procedures can be strengthened so that clients are informed about all methods available from public.. ne AutiriL uted tirt. t-frtd houh..nl% 14 p.. .n ot -. clients are best equipped to choose what suits them-provided they have information on effectiveness..rI ii w-. ..InEd tb. n...r.' h. rraininc tg-d raccrdl-ping ni . Ci -air r...UP-sUrti'II..:.t -t the.. ...idmini -.-rn ..rnmevl . nr. the side effects of the IUD were not fully explained.rcludd nrii ..in icr.and And mrn The .. idd t IertdIit had i4. rie. prtlect akl.. rhcn mrh .i-d rpT.. Careful attention must be paid to providing followup services in the case of complications. and acceptability of methods that might be introduced into the national program.tar:h rarel. thtir 4up.-tr -. d.pack 1gr i -.and Ir add. In riF tin-u Ihrhe nmionrh§ .t 4upe.e.eh'ld.in n4.rtratieF rtchingi and t. ni ai. ra.d L.:d .- and female sterilization and IUDs can be made more readily available through mobile facilities (such as sterilization vans in Thailand) or periodic "camps" (such as vasectomy and tubectomy -camps in India and IUD "safaris" in Indonesia)...p. 11 Io 1.:. rmpa.n I.m m n.-:ptd -..-r.: ..r much bktr r IL* rlii. In the early stages of the Indian and Pakistani programs.r . rih B. %...i an.. S. their hu-band.ru u r.rr-c..cntinu. Ic th fminr prcrgram rie.cn. F.i... Ir. ': p. l NII h-. pical uI rural de.. nl. tt en. Private suppliers can be encouraged to offer contraceptive methods that are in short supply or that cannot be offered by the official program. rt usi. lrnr. rr-. ni-n3l -ru.per:ent .r mdni FP.... b-.1.nrC -4 p-rc.r i ?i-. t l -t nt r id.i ninal-inrnt Ir3. . Vuildinis and TILh FPHP 1i' . hi' ih. lift nr d-rn nr:rhold.ni.ainn 'i: . n iI. nr. . a2eni.nd irn rh.-c-ur.1 thc nmanage mrint technhM.i:e % en. n -uptrs Ti.. L. rht Itr. pr. rl Ir..r .n dd.mz -r. -nIra: pii-.n ..-tur. i..-rcd .n and .. -rr.fnditionf t. hld-. r i^n ind meidi*.. dr. '1 CR' national lamil" plan -anmpkl athc.:rlkrarnd ranre ci d.:..ler.nb . side effects.d1 i.m-t i.nnnv r. r. ..rnati..rh.t 41 perel r-:i. i... hr aith . tield.nlraliztd 1.. Ll..nd.rh.ch ot the . r.th. rterr.Ill rnake j arw :oritracaPri ind pr-gr.h But it mn3abe h.u4h nmiL in.nntnrr c:re chart) 1[.. . r-or. .Ot.rnm . -.ri- Iprr %-r! r and .r . a 145 .uh rea44urancr..-...u.dbo:at re.ause the FPHSFP -a' abIl I..:.ed ind n. lit.t rhr. spe:1l3 n-ed. er .h.-dred a'pirir. -uii.rmin ..:clin-d h'2 7 %... in -icr-i4in. \sti.n.i. reversibility. p--r I liii I p-plevrr-c.ral . cI.nce a t-ratnighi hether couFplt t-. dlec.nrrac..lect gk vernm.nr.. gaining sul.. ng..rk.e ule3kni t .vrte rjlf . and . .-.r.-cted t3mil pre. m r"Fr-o-l tamilite EIhut .rrt. nic.EL' ir -s r. . iedJbackt--.ti.riient Jit-ni' tht n.r. n but %xnh Unlik. tal - . ng t. -h(h .ide ttrct *trt r-r-.irn drarrai-AlII 1 pr. nz. nal pri.-UtrI rts.n}nial iriu:iipurs inn..-.

But in areas in which family planning is still regarded with suspicion. With or without an extensive field network. A study in Calabar State. and side effects. Virtually all family planning programs provide some information to clients about methods.int Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in the mid-1970s found that workers felt that their training in methods had been inadequate. sales of contraceptives increased. With a fuller explanation of side effects and greater care paid to screening and medical backup. staff must receive prompt training. the IUD is now regaining popularity. IUDs were shunned. Some programs have managed this by having fieldworkers deliver health services as well. The incentive structure might also be altered by offering financial or other awards (such as educational opportunities or additional training) to the worker 146 who attracts and retains the most clients for a variety of different methods. A survey of the Dominican Republic. For years afterward. 0 They can change policies that encourage staff to recruit new acceptors but not to follow up on them. When private pharmacies in Colombia provided their customers with pamphlets explaining effectiveness.. Family planning workers still tend to doubt the ability of couples to use effectively methods such as the condom and pill. It is now obvious that sustained use cannot be assumed-follow-up support is needed. thereby discouraging their use. who are likely to return to the family planning center only if they are living close by or if they experience severe side effects that they cannot correct even by abandoning contraception. UnFPAd . From the manager's viewpoint. Follow-up support includes medical backup and referral for side effects.theinfrmaton rovided to clients may be biased. Nigeria. encouraging clients to change contraceptive methods if their iitial choice has caused problems or if their needs have changed. reassuring them that they are using contraceptives properly. and there was little in the way of treatment or referral for side effects. Kenyt. the information pront o ut methds oters. A hey . According to a survey of contraceptive acceptors. Training must also emphasize follow-up procedures. Follow-up is most important in the first few mo st incertant is whe side months after acceptance. proper use. As new contraceptive methods are included in programs. the Philippines. but fully informed choice is still only an ideal in many countries. and only 53 percent were using the pill three months later. Follow-up is best provided by fieldworkers and by community-based services.medical examination was not always conducted before insertion. since this is when side effects are first experienced. what are the critical requirements for better information? First is appropriate training. Informal explanation works better than formal presentations that use technical or anatomical terms. r stherilizatin. Sth y dispo suchmas th metho o n. In their early stages. and when they need reassurance in the face of social disapproval. Sometimes clients are ive inccurte r icomleteinfrmaion bause famenilypannurateoringcstaffparetheirmse no properly informed about methods and their side effects. and reminding them of the benefits. A lack of concern with follow-up is believed to be the major contributory cause of the low continuation rates among IUD and pill users in Korea. Korea. Workers must be trained to explain properly the methods available to clients and to encourage them to participate in the choice. rather than only on the basis of the number of new acceptors. Follow-up cannot be left to clients. Staff may also fail to mention megthodefwic h. FOLLOWING UP ACCEPTORS. Korea's program sets targets for the number of acceptors. only 24 percent weefloe'pathm rrtre tohat were followed up at home or returned to health centers for consultation on side effects. family planning programs can improve follow-up. family planning programs devoted much time to recruiting new clients. p P bte Uominited Ntio Fuaand f Pop l pionAes . and Turkey demonstrated the strong influence of providers of services on clients' choice of method: clients given a thorough explanation of all available contraceptive methods chose a very different mix of methods than did those prior to the study. when clients are learning to use methods properly. . who had not been given this information.Wen inctvs are offered to staff for recruiting acceptors of some methods but not of others. A study in India. Second is more and better supervision of workers to ensure that they are not holding back information on methods because of their own prejudices or because they are receiving financial incentives for encouraging some but not all methods. Targets and incentives can be offered to staff on the basis of the number of current users of contraception or of the number of checkups. found that 11 percent of pill acceptors never took even the first c ent of ill p accep ne s do n percent month's allotment of pills. some clients would like to be spared the embarrassment of a follow-up visit from a family planning worker.

family planning programs must have the support of the clients and communities they serve. encouraging local contributions of money and labor. of reassurance for acceptors. and the Philippines family planning services are organized in factories. the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea pioneered the highly successful mothers' club program. volunteers. they are less likely to see family planning as being imposed by outsiders. In the Philippines some outlets for contraceptives are organized and run by local volunteers. of smaller families. because it is a personal matter and may conflict with social norms that favor high fertility. At first these clubs served as sources of contraceptives. just as South Asian programs offer compensation to acceptors of sterilization for the costs of transport. and. * The quality of follow-up can be monitored by periodic sample surveys of acceptors. The absence of links to the local community can be a weakness for family planning in particular. skilled managers and fieldworkers who can identify local leaders. food. sometimes. or of longer child spacing intervals. financial incentives might be offered to clients who return for a follow-up visit within a specified period of time. Finally. Use of traditional midwives and volunteers. Mothers' clubs have also been used by programs in Indonesia and Bangladesh. The media can also be used to reassure acceptors about side effects and to encourage them to return for checkups. technical and organizational expertise to support local organizations. and local contributions in cash or in kind also reduce the cost of services. and local volunteers on the islands of Java and Bali. where more than two-thirds of Indonesia's population lives. Both the Indonesian and Chinese programs have used strong political organizations. Services introduced by an "outside" agency with few local links and little appreciation of local customs and needs may not be readily accepted. including family planning. The Honduras Family Planning Association includes a planned parenthood theme in its communitybased adult literacy program. decentralized. India) and as part of the nationwide Integrated Rural Development Project in Pakistan. Private family planning associations are well suited to implement these approaches: they are small. India. But these strategies require certain managerial qualities not always found in larger public programs: decentralized decisionmaking. religious leaders. there may be little evident demand because potential clients are not aware of the benefits of the service. For example.000 in Allahabad (in the state of Uttar Pradesh. supervise volunteers. and reconcile local needs with program capabilities. social acceptance of family planning takes time and is a continuous process. and are less confined by the bureaucratic constraints of government. family planning is promoted for child spacing as part of a maternal and child health project. workers who are technically competent in more than one field. well staffed. which extend into rural areas.planning acceptors to reinforce effective use and to engage in other community development projects. In China. and organizing groups of family . stimulate community activities. Where communities and clients are involved. have greater control over service quality. consulting and training traditional midwives and healers. There is no benchmark for 147 . Private family planning associations and NGOs have led in experimenting with new ways to involve clients and communities. and clients. establishing local management or review committees. In communities where there is no apparent demand for family planning. Ghana. to provide many economic and social services. extended its services to the countryside through the National Federation of Coffee Growers. and work time lost. programs can experiment with various ways of encouraging clients to seek appointments. the private family planning organization in Colombia.* Where the burden of follow-up rests on clients. But many of these approaches have also been tried on a larger scale. and of information on the benefits of family planning. it can be introduced jointly with services in greater demand. Ensuring social acceptability To be successful. For example. In Awutu. Their strategies have included consultation with local leaders. They now have merged with the Saemaul Women's Association and are also involved in agricultural cooperatives and community construction projects. The national program in Indonesia has successfully involved village headmen. But in communities in which modern family planning has never been provided. It has been offered through the resettle- ment schemes of the Federal Land Development Authority in Malaysia and through women's rural credit cooperatives and vocational training in Bangladesh. Family planning is provided with agricultural extension to a population of 100. training local people as paid or volunteer workers. highly motivated. Profamilia.

5 percent of total government expenditure. like programs in education and health. is not always imputed to the population program-nor are contributions by local government.2 percent for health and 13. in the form of food supplements and reimbursement of travel costs.4).1 percent for education. about two-thirds of this amount was for family planning and related programs. The most severe constraint is the need for . Three out of four countries with programs less than five years old were contributing less than 10 percent of the costs of their programs. to holders of one-child certificates ($0.21 per capita. Although governments finance a large share of their population programs. The figures are even lower in Korea (0.2 percent) and in Malaysia (less than 0. The prospects for increased assistance are not good: UNFPA. government and foreign donors each contribute about 50 percent. and IUD insertion. But these estimates probably understate the true government contribution. are heavily subsidized. Private spending Important constraints limit the growth of private suppliers of family planning. and services are often offered free of charge.1 percent). In realterms. These costs amount to $213 million annually. and close to 80 percent of the total in India.30 per capita. Nepal is one of the rare exceptions: the share of domestic government financing fell from 80 percent of its spending on population in 1975 to 40 percent in 1980. the amounts spent are still trivial-both in absolute terms and in relation to other government outlays (see Box 7. prefectural. population assistance grew at almost 6 percent a year during the 1970s but fell 3 percent in1980 and 6 percent in 1981. with approximately half its population-spent roughly $1. Health workers and midwives probably spend more time on family planning. spending fell within this range (see Table 7. where contraceptive demand is limited and health services are weak. spending to rise by barely 1 percent over the next four years. The cost of health workers.45 per capita in Costa Rica. Finally. The estimate for China of $1 per capita includes 148 the amount spent by its formal layers of government-central.42 per capita in Sri Lanka. Population assistance from donors is discussed further in the next chapter. a major channel for population assistance. public finance will continue to be critical.4 percent of total current spending.71 per capita in Korea. In China the state budget for the family planning program absorbs only 0. Foreign donors spent an estimated $491 million for population programs in developing countries in 1981. Adding all these contributions together produces a figure for family planning expenditure in China of nearly $1 per capita. reimbursing service fees for sterilization. For all other developing countries combined. compared with 5. In addition. on population programs in 1980. and county-on providing contraceptive supplies free to users. Practically all spending on population in China. in contrast to an average of 54 percent among twenty-seven countries with programs at least ten years old. In most of three dozen developing countries for which rough estimates are available. additional time is spent by barefoot doctors on family planning work (though not much: in Shandong Province they allocate an average of 1. is financed from domestic resources. valued at approximately $3 million). especially in rural areas. about $0.measuring social acceptability. respectively. Ptiblic spending China and India-the two most populous countries in the developing world. provincial. abortion. whose functions often include family planning. Domestic budgetary outlays in 1980 are estimated to have been $0. about $0. the rural collective system finances the family planning staff at the commune or brigade level (at an estimated cost of $0.7). The government share tends to rise the longer a program has been in existence. expects its. Although the private sector makes a significant contribution to providing services in some countries. especially in low-income countries and in backward regions.15 per capita). If other developing countries with programs were spending equivalent amounts. Financing family planning Public family planning programs. Even among well-established programs there is wide variation in government spending. and providing training and information on family planning.5 percent of their time to family planning. In India and Mauritius spending on family planning in 1981 accounted for only 0. the total spent on population activities in all developing countries in 1980 must have been about $2 billion. or easy formula for ensuring it.00 and $0.34 per capita) and pays incentives.25 per capita) and to individuals undergoing sterilization ($0. and $1.

66 1.1 5.7 1.3 1.TABLE 7.3 4. 149 . of Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Latin America and Caribbean Bolivia (1977) Brazil Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Rep.6 8.3 8.27 0.31 0.89 0.1 226.8 1.09 0.28 0. (1976) Jordan Morocco Tunisia South Asia Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka East Asia China Hong Kong Indonesia Korea.9 34.18 0.3 0.9 10.40 0.77 0.22 1. Contraceptive prevalence rate unavailable or close to zero.30 0.06 0.6 2.42 0.60 0.72 0.3 1.71 1.0 4.3 8.1 0.70 0.5 13. a.31 1.18 0.8 6.8 2.8 11.8 28. 1984a. Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Jamacia Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru 2.2 27.69 0.4 37.3 45.42 1.8 3.75 1.3 3.6 24.9 3. 1980 Total public expenditure (millions of dollars) Per capita public expenditure (dollars) Expenditure per current contraceptive user (dollars) Region and country Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana Kenya Liberia Mauritius Sierra Leone Swaziland Tanzania Zaire Zimbabwe (1978) Middle East and North Africa Egypt.1 3.81 2.77 1.19 0. Islamic Rep. Rep. including (but not limited to) family planning services.1 9.44 2.81 1. selected countries.78 0.30 0.5 6.5 1.0 86.4 Public expenditure on population programs. Arab Rep.4 2. Iran.34 0.32 16 68 a 24 a a a a 13 22 38 21 a 32 26 10 69 33 7 10 3 11 9 19 11 7 7 a a 4 15 11 15 35 47 27 20 27 15 26 13 5 Note: Expenditure includes funding from domestic and foreign sources on population activities.88 2.24 0.03 0.6 2.6 1.59 0.74 0.1 50.8 61.2 979.1 16.71 1.81 0. Source: Bulatao.1 10.51 0.3 3.78 0.00 0.45 0.

Mexico. '. including price controls.7 \Iitir. In urban areas some commercial suppliers may be displaced by publicly subsidized contraceptives: half of the initial users of an official program of oral contraception in Piaui State.4ha r nmateihtr- E'4penditures on detense eduaation. In some regions private spending is greater: in Latin America it may in fact be slightly above public spending.illi the par Ienr'.Ihn . where government strongly supports birth con-' trol. programs).n deEn-. The cost of a year's supply of oral contraceptives averaged $25 in 1980.| and 11". Linited Tent aim'.ti - mvre 'than pF.. such as Korea.art that In vFn. rene 'n and I. the proportion is as high as 63 percent.m tr. data for twenty developing countries show that private sector prices can be high enough to absorb a significant fraction of household income. Despite these constraints. . male and female sterilization.5)..e. whereas the ability to pay for commercial services is low.. especially among urban consumers. IeI l gi-Al'.n j er-n-tantl tli bti mnt.. me. rid qu. the import of contraceptives.1 0. making condoms and oral contraceptives available through nonclinical suppliers such as pharmacies. and Thailand. in 150 the state of Sao Paulo. Private suppliers cannot appeal to the national interest the way governments can to stimulate demand for contraception and cannot use community institutions and pressures to spread family planning.n defen.a perrc-niageni lGNIP ' l41i %erar go%ernrmeni per capita r%perndilure e . private suppliers provided more than 20 percent of all family planning services in more than two-thirds of the countries studied in recent surveys (see Table 7. In Korea 42 percent of all contraceptive users are supplied by pharmacies or physicians. . -I . nuJe r edu. P t.n ifN 2 b'ili. * penm mtire than 4 Q per -nt . ranging from $5 in Mexico and $6 in Egypt to as much as .:arr.1 t.n ~~~~~~t. in 1979 had shifted over from the private sector.ar.ed *--untri. Although charges for publicly subsidized services are usually low or nonexistent. 1-. I-. Private spending on family planning services as a consequence equals about a fourth of public spending on these services in the developing world. iart- PtrkeF.N' n 1r''.nJ hoalth . drxd. the development of private supply is often inhibited by a combination of government policies. the demand for IUDs. Yet private suppliers do benefit from family planning advertising financed by the government.'p .:-t a. The activities of private suppliers demonstratethat many people in developing countries are willing to pay for contraceptive services.i :At. Brazil. :Ialun kte ^Wit'!" bho.r t.n IEl In !. h34 ri-.i1l &i. and abortion can be met only by trained health workers. In some countries private suppliers play a major or even dominant role.I -G:eri in4 ..rn 31m.nding Il. or tariffs on.-urE arrdic.d chirtI medical backup for providing contraceptives. pendiLiur. I. n npt i it GNP .Box 7. Although prescription regulations have been liberalized in nineteen countries..n J L.p-irli - aid th.. Finally. the cost of providing family planning services is high in rural and marginal urban areas. .:'r..r . 1. Very few of them work in the private sector.] rr. but no central government. .1 L'.%t Iixb' Joillar..IIh. Brazil (a country with some state. especially sterilization and abortion in Muslim and Catholic countries. In Jtt I.:n in th.. har..rnhn. perCfentl_ I-p-np-. spent . and health a. prohibition of.. . li m.F-. Iiout II t--'cpn..adrupled tr. L. It is probably not a coincidence that they flourish in several countries. 1.d tr.e educartion and health. 1.dl.rl. mn $I1 .ni . .s billi.n .ur. l Military versus social expenditure n :a4% I. iprX tari ThŽ irr. . 6.5t. and restrictions on certain kinds of family planning services.1 a. In addition.

$90 in Nigeria. Across countries. so the weighted average is lower at $11. Rep.5 Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands 1| .. the retail price of a year's supply of oral contraceptives in 1979 was equivalent to only 0. and roughly equivalent to the $0.5 percent in Brazil. but it shows a widespread willingness to pay for contraception. research and evaluation. Adding private expenditures could easily double the TABLE 7. Private spending on this scale-which understates the total because it excludes access costs-is not typical of all developing countries. the cost of buying commercially available contraceptives is small in relation to average income per capita (although even in those countries the cost may be relatively large for the poor).70 per capita across all developing countries.|. of (1979) Thailand (1978) Latin America and Caribbean Brazil Piaui (1979) Sao Paulo (1978) Bahia (1980) Rio Grande do Norte (1980) Colombia (1978) Costa Rica (1978) El Salvador (1978) Guatemala (1978) Jamaica (1979) Mexico (1978) Panama (1979-80) Paraguay (1977) North Africa Tunisia Jendouba (1979) Sou rces: Morris and others. exclusive of foreign donor contributions. or about 3 percent of total income for the average household. for example. But in low-income countries the cost can be prohibitive-equivalent to 17 percent of per capita income in Bangladesh.t of current contraceptiveusers) Government programs Other publicly funded or subsidized programs Private sector No source or other' Regiion and countrjil East Asia Korea. For each contraceptive user. All these figures understate the real cost of obtaining family planning services. 1981. and 18 percent in Zaire. their total outlay being several times what the government spent. In Peru about 300. about $0. information-education-communication activities. But most users are in China and India. In Korea some 1. 1984. With all public spending on family planning taken into account. For example. Progressively smaller shares are taken up by general program administration. In the better-off developing countries. Applies to rhythm or withdrawal. whether private or public.3 percent of per capita income in Mexico and to 0. where programs spend less per user. other may include contraceptives obtained from a friend or in a foreign country. 151 . the various forms of contraception cost an average of $20 to $40 a year.2 million users bought contraceptives commercially in 1979 at an average annual cost of about $12-a total outlay of $15 million. a I .42 per capita spent on the domestic government budget.40 per capita for Korea's entire population. 36 37 0 35 42 18 22 10 59 16 27 57 21 57 73 44 63 42 71 41 0 0 1 0 27 0 8 11 27 2 0 8 23 63 48 22 33 28 12 26 7 36 19 28 18 21 24 21 19 15 6 18 3 20 10 22 91 0 5 4 a. and personnel training. spending is much higher-around $21 a year. expenditure averages about $0. because people also have to pay for the time and travel needed to obtain their contraceptives. Merrick.000 users of commercial sources of contraception spent an average of $30 each in 1981. Allocation of public expenditures The bulk of public spending on populationalmost 50 percent in seventeen countries reporting details of expenditures-goes directly to providing contraceptive services.

such an increase would require another $l billion in public spending (see Table 7. World Bank projections indicate that the number of married women of reproductive age in all developing countries will increase from about 500 million to more than 700 million between 1980 and 2000. $6. as Table 7. rapid fertility decline would generate per capita savings in education expenditure in the year 2000 of $1. Cost per user tends to be very high in the first few years of a family planning program.80 in Egypt. In South Asia. achieving this fertility decline will require an increase in the rate of contraceptive use to 58 per152 cent. current cost per user is a conservative guide to costs at higher levels of use. About 40 percent of these women used contraception in 1980. it then falls sharply as the rate of contraceptive use rises above 5 percent. Obstacles to program expansion If the financial resources to expand family planning services were made available. could they be put to good use? Program expansion may be difficult for a variety of reasons. Average real increases in spending of 2.5 percent a year would be enough to meet targets in East Asia as a whole (though not for individual countries). Marginal costs could rise if new users are in inaccessible rural areas with high delivery costs.6). and assuming 1980 costs per user. $3. cost per user fluctuated (with little apparent trend) between $7 and $13 (in constant 1982 dollars). though they could also fall if services are more intensively used. With constant enrollment rates.6 billion (in constant 1980 dollars) by the year 2000-a rise in real terms of 5 percent a year. In many countries the required increase in public expenditure for family planning would be more than offset by reductions in public expenditure in other sectors. scarcity of personnel. Between 1965 and 1980. and in sub-Saharan Africa as much as 16 percent every year to support a rapid decline. and limited demand. lncreasing spending by 50 percent could fill "unmet need" today. and sub-Saharan Africa. population spending would have to grow 8 to 10 percent every year to achieve a standard decline in fertility. but larger increases will be needed in the future.30 inKenya.4 shows. Only about 1 percent of official aid now goes for population assistance (and only a part of that for family planning). For the projections of a "rapid" decline in fertility.00 in Korea. while contraceptive use in Korea rose from 12 to 30 percent.3 in developing countries in the year 2000. and 5 percent would be enough for Latin America and the Caribbean. At higher rates the cost per user tends to stabilize. including local salaries and program efficiency and quality. which imply a total fertility rate of 2. The administrative and logistical obstacles include many of the same constraints that hamper .4 in 2000. including administrative and logistical obstacles. small increases could go a long way toward meeting the requirement for higher spending.costs per user. contraceptive use would need to reach 72 percent. but not expansion itself. To ensure the rapid decline. depending on many factors. Growth in spending will have to be much greater in some regions than in others. Public cost per user varies among countries. In any country with contraceptive use of at least 5 percent. spending would need to total $7. total public spending on population programs would need to reach $5. These tend to limit the rate at which a good program can be expanded.60 in Zimbabwe. That extrapolation suggests a possible increase in the rate of contraceptive use of 13 percentage points. Because spending on population currently represents less than 1 percent of government budgets. The same is true for external assistance.6 billion by 2000. and $6. however. country by country. If it is assumed that the fertility effects of later marriage and of shorter breastfeeding will largely cancel each other out and that the abortion rate will stay constant. If the public cost for each additional user were the same. or perhaps to rise slightly. the Middle East and North Africa. Fuiture financial requirements What would it cost to satisfy the unmet need for limiting births? Some idea can be obtained by extrapolating levels of unmet need-the proportion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy who want no more children-in thirty-five developing countries in the mid-1970s to cover the developing world as a whole. a rise of 7 percent a year in real terms. In the next two decades total spending for family planning programs will need to increase because of the growing number of women of childbearing age and the increasing proportion of them who are likely to want modern contraceptives. How much would this cost? To achieve the standard decline in fertility. The 'standard" projections in Chapter 4 imply an average total fertility rate of 3. as the cost per user in 1980.

77 274 With unmet need filled 1980 Under standard decline 2000 2.29 112 20 0. Souirce: Bulatao.94 726 Under rapid decline 2000 2. and nonclinical.10 1.43 51 1. and 1 supervisor for every 8 fieldworkers. a.39 74 2. but they can become important when an attempt is made to extend services on a larger.03 Under standard decline 2000 5.35 315 1980 4.15 38 0.59 209 3.43 812 South Asiab Current estimate 1980 5.14 5.42 67 1.32 72 1. a program could be fully staffed at these ratios by about a tenth of a single year's primary and secondary school graduates.16 74 1. 1984a. Includes Republic of South Africa.54 52 0. 1980 and 2000 Expenditures Fertilitytargets Total fertility rate Contraceptive prevalence (percent) Percapita (constant 1980 dollars) Total (millions of constant 1980 dollars) Region and scenario Year All developing countries Current estimate 1980 4.70 24 0. regional estimates include country rates which were estimated based on various social and economic data.07 538 Note: The fertility targets and per capita expenditure figures are population-weighted means.95 513 Under rapid decline 2000 2.591 Sub-Saharan Africaa Current estimate 1980 6.98 35 1.04 1. Desirable ratios are about 1 fieldworker to 300 families. a country with extremely low literacy.238 72 1. clinical.77 688 With unmet need filled 3. roads are poor. a family planning program will be extremely difficult to implement.6 Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures.22 20 0.30 58 1. a family planning program requires a system for obtaining.81 24 1.87 1. For Upper Volta.569 Under rapid decline 2000 2. Includes Afghanistan.36 39 0.66 7.02 61 0.28 75 1.28 40 0.72 2.TABLE 7.04 222 Under standard decline 2000 3. Because of lack of data on contraceptive prevalence for many countries.015 Latin America and Caribbean Current estimate 1980 4. even the best-run programs will appear inefficient and incapable of sustained expansion.76 297 With unmet need filled 1980 6. If a program attempts to provide a mix of methods.66 142 With unmet need filled 1980 4.50 1.022 Under rapid decline 2000 2.69 73 3.90 2.353 Middle East and North Africa Current estimate 1980 5. and communications slow.016 With unmet need filled 1980 3.480 With unmet need filled 1980 2.07 791 Under rapid decline 2000 2.80 63 0.09 2.873 East Asia Current estimate 1980 3.59 11 0. In areas where health services are scant or nonexistent. it may require more than one distribution network-commercial. this system can become complicated.62 2.08 2. For example. These limits may not be evident in small pilot projects.517 Under standard decline 2000 Under rapid decline 2000 2. b.53 51 0. other development programs.27 Under standard decline 2000 2. Where overall government administration is weak.17 72 1. The conclusion becomes less 153 .961 Under standard decline 2000 3.73 59 1. and distributing contraceptives. national scale. storing. The personnel requirements for an extensive family planning program are not large in relation to the supply of educated people.

more effective programs in 1980 had 40 percent or less foreign funding. however. Program expansion also depends on the demand for contraceptive services. as it continues to be in China. In other programs it has played a catalytic role-for instance.50 per married woman on family planning programs and were still producing contraceptive users at acceptable cost-under $20 each. and be favorably disposed to contraception. linguistic. A principal task of programs is to generate some of this demand itself. If finding appropriate fieldworkers in each area is difficult. The Pakistani program has faced recruitment problems of this sort. In the late 1960s only a seventh of the midwives assigned as fieldworkers believed in the efficacy of modern contraceptives. as do the quality improvements discussed above. and to limited public interest. but where initial interest is low or nonexistent this task can take time. Many of the obstacles to expansion of family planning can be overcome with sufficient commitment. and most of them cannot be overcome without it. adult literacy rates as low as 20 percent. most of the older. Culturally acceptable solutions to administrative and personnel problems. In the early 1970s they were replaced by a group including many unmarried women from urban areas who did not have the confidence of the villagers. belong to the appropriate ethnic. as soon as one takes into account specific requirements for fieldworkers: for instance. eventually becomes critical. Bangladesh.sanguine. through stimulating pioneering research of demographic problems. 154 . or caste group. But in every part of the world where an effort has been made. however. For one thing. Pakistan. many of the factors that hamper effectiveness can be overcome as a program develops. Foreign funding has been largely absent in the early stages of some family planning programs. local finance demonstrates political commitment to family planning. Furthermore. finding higher-level supervisors can be even more of a problem. and. there has been progress. and infant mortality rates as high as 150 per thousand-spending on family planning was effective and economical. these limits to rapid expansion might seem to suggest that programs could not make good use of more money. During the 1970s India. they should be village-based rather than city-based. Taken together. Despite the unpromising conditions-per capita GNP between $100 and $300. Sri Lanka were spending as much as $2. the subject of the next chapter. in some years much less. take time to develop. Local finance. But such a view would be wrong.

Countries such as Indonesia and Mexico have developed strong programs in a short period. In every part of the developing world during the past decade some governments have made significant progress in developing a policy to reduce population growth. Morocco. population policy is concerned with population distribution as well as with population growth. inaction is itself a choice which has implications for both future policy and the room for maneuver that a government will later have. Family planning programs provide information and services to help people achieve their own fertility objectives. What distinguishes countries with a population policy from those without one is an explicit demographic objective and the institutional mechanisms to translate that objective into effective policy. It employs a wide range of policies.1 summarizes the current state of population policy in twenty-six developing countries with 15 million people or more. and Panama-family planning indices have declined by as much as half in the past decade. to change the signals that otherwise induce high fertility. the main policy issues in each region of the developing world. In its broadest sense. But foreign aid for population programs can help developing countries meet their population policy objectives and can increase the impact of aid in other parts of the economy. In contrast. and how aid donors can complement the efforts of developing countries. In five countries not shown in the table-Chile. Policy steps Table 8. Countries in which the policy to reduce population growth is recent tend to have taken fewer of the policy steps listed in the table. Choosing from policy options is a matter for local decision. and within regions in order of their 1982 family planning "index. Countries are listed by region. Developing a population policy takes time. direct and indirect. Others-China. Fiji. By contrast. But there are important exceptions.8 The policy agenda "Population policy" is the province of government.1). By choosing how many resources and how much political authority to invest in a policy." explained in Chapter 6. an x shows those countries which have already taken a particular policy step. But religious and cultural characteristics do not rule out effective action. And it requires clear direction and support from the most senior levels of government. programs in Egypt. Kenya. In the area of fertility reduction. Costa Rica. This chapter examines the elements of an effective population policy. Population policy A population policy to lower fertility needs to be distinguished from public support for family planning services. actions culturally and politically acceptable in one country might be rejected in others. Effective policy requires action by many ministries. irrespective of their effect on fertility. Religious and cultural conditions cannot be ignored in designing an effective policy to reduce fertility. In the table. and Pakistan have made little progress for more than a decade. Jamaica. India. population policy involves explicit demographic goals. and thus an interministerial approach to setting policy and monitoring its results. a government determines the policy's effectiveness. Progress can also be reversed. and Sri Lanka. In some countries population policy aims to increasepopulation growth (see Box 8. 155 . Family planning programs and other socioeconomic policies that can reduce fertility are often pursued by governments to achieve overall development objectives. for instance-have had longstanding policies and tend to have taken more steps. Korea. Family planning support has wider social goals than fertility reduction but more limited population goals than overall population policy. This chapter discusses population policy to reduce population growth.

6 5. B Official policy to reduce population growth expressed by high officials and in a national development plan. For explanation of index.9 4.6 4.6 3.moderate.3 3.5 OL L E El I _ x x x x x x x x x x 4.7 3. M Policy to set quotas on the nunmber of births permitted annually in a community under which couples must obtain permission to have a child. of Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Philippines 8. and contraceptive use (such as WFS or CPS) less than ten years old. Rep. Democratic Republic of Korea.6 6. and evaluate results of multisectoral policies. South Africa. oversee implementation. family allowances. 1 . free or subsidized health and education services). E Government financial support of private family planning associations. = weak. such as a population commission. K Incentives to individuals or communities to have small families.1 7. U . Venezuela. G Family planning outreach.9 6. sometimes including specific demographic targets.1 Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more Policy indicators Incentives Family planning Region and country TFR 1982 index Demographic data Political comnmitment Institutions and dismcenFamilil planning E F C H I tives X Birtl7 quotas 1982 A B C D K L M Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya Tanzania Nigeria Zaire Sudan Ethiopia Middle East and North Africa Egypt Morocco Turkey Algeria Latin America and Caribbean Colombia Mexico Brazil Venezuela Peru South Asia Sri Lanka India Bangladesh Pakistan Nepal East Asia China Korea. Islamic Republic of Iran. 156 .3 6. H Active use of mass media for information and education to promote family planning and small family norms.8 6. D Existence of a high-level coordinating body.0 FL Cl Fl El x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3. see wl Population Data Supplement Table 6 and notes. TFR = Total fertility rate. I Publicly subsidized commercial sales of contraceptives. such as reduced services or an income tax for third and later-born children.0 6. Burma. to set population policy.6 4. mortality.5 L L DI El FL x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 3.3 4. F Public family planning services.5 6. and Viet Nam. Argentina. Fl .7 4.2 U * U L L El x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xxx x x x x x Notc: The following countries with greater than 15 million population were omitted because of lack of data: Afghanistan.3 5.8 4. Key: * = very strong index.4 4. L Strong disincentives to discourage more than two births per woman.strong. including community-based distribution svstems and!or fieldworkers. 1 Elimination of all explicit and implicit subsidies that encourage large families (tax reductions for each child.very weak or none.8 63 L L FL 1F L x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xx xx 2.3 2. A Published census data and data from other household surveys on fertility.TABLE 8. C Existence of a population planning unit that integrates demographic projections into current economic plans and considers the effect of policies on demographic parameters.

- ir'.s.- Fu i-'-p.rai raiIn.F .-...'unrI.r rni'-. r FrFC1**i ul- - U . i . p .itr . n.F.r-' i i 1 .i-r. h. It -U a F.i '.rp:.:. J. ri .Fr. .rTiF F * r.Fi.rlitiwA-.~l pr.:.isr.ng r .ritcn .Tin-'s I r..a r. rn L-s-rl-ir. develomentIo p the following steps ultopolicy includes-r r.li I . r.I.. ii' T--iF sFrd pr11. 'g i. h... .c iF. h...- r i-. r. - Biurnro F Fi F Icc ii.r..r~ r i'. birth.-'r -r-.i 3. .RnmTn i T-ih.h '4it..Ih-n c f..-.ssi..-r. n--iF Fr-r-'i ' rn4nr..ai 1FirtiliT..-~~~~ rr.:. 1 .1 -r r. .iI. i .tr ITrT r ~..r- -irl -Ia J .... n~ih... i rcj l. U'.ic Fr incl 71 c.Fin. (SFF _hInr.r 1-ab-l.F pro it. I -ni h .r.-tr3~~pIt- .. Ir..-. fi.diFF c tll- I u 1 I ITrs..and h doumnt jr.-. 8. d .iI.. -r ag Lint . '.-.noicplnn I ). :e.sn-t hd-r~lr..t o edrs t lwe rwh ng. p1 sI it.2 ifi[.I tion (seedBox.I 'Ir 'I-I Il:IT r.id.lrrtIr F 'a4 .1 r raI-N---ir.F'1. T h.c TIiFr.d r.c ha'.. 5.r...i.r.ts.iFu .Fr ncrdau-I Fn-n. .it-c I .ii r f -C 1 i.r 1 h.7t. I-F-u The.r.-.--T-.c-.pro. i. include% n r pbise . r:U ' n.ri IrsI.d IA 4 -i .A . iraF r.r-Ii F. iF.--i-' .n T .iFL FL rum. r. 1 hoiF- Ir. i-~t - tp5c h-- 1-n sr -:ndain . Fr..1 I.1. rw:. h I. w -r .._-r 'F in. IrrF. F._rt.-i r--FF. o n IIr r.F r.. npu. r'.-''s hn-r -.-. Data need III.r Hir:..lo i'm-s -. .. l ri ..iI.IF- gurowth and allowm. % coseuncs Thisinoratoniscrti I cal toI.. g-.i. ia -rnThfn. i JnT. ardJ 1<.n. 11 i hFr. rF-.IpolIcytr formulation Ind4r eau-I . l.. - st ii-U -1.- Fnih rFi.-A ..i*i'I m . s ..r .1-a tHungair% Ti'.. sA -.r -. L-n-UrTime:In ':- i. . p. .hC-A I -I..1 biiTr '-. I ri tdji.LITr "s t.Ar-.r- F.r Th.- -Urh .rH u ''---id r F~'.rd'...1. i..is.1 In r.nF ir d.. -.-r frtili dTy11r sie Th eIstneo rapi mortalityn.I -'-' FI.:.r rFsi. . tr. i.r.r'--iir. FiFri J d .A.Box 8. I n ir.rAr I'-i- F. t I.-. n s in '.-- h'.rirm il. -tr.-jec.l ....b.f n - -ralEur.:F r..tni c. In h:rcFr.I. T.. Tt 1'.WH t... Pronatalist policies c.i. ss.' r.irac. n.kFFIL..311.. *. I.rrji. I..unl-t. n-Fi i- Tun-u -r.n... ui rInn.LIIII uInii...:1is- r .' r. i.. irn':tEa: 3rn njrum F.1. ii :.-r bit . r i -lhIT E l t-~.mr-.1..tF.n n-..n tion oF...:r.n'i5 Fr. 14..i i.t'rtt.~ L hr.. t. iIII.-tFsd~ r- c-i.1. in.r. P. t .: id u iii: I *-r .~ . nal d . Hoiil i Tri-i:r.Lu'r'nH-.J.:r~rd .t i.-is-.. .:i r. h.:d iVrhvil 5-i-tii.u rsrI - hi . rtio rsiT-I. H.. .i F nrI.:Irii aI trId iIia r-. LU t r'. i. r Ih-U F I.. '. n 3 il.rr. I IT.U.ir. h i.i h .:ei '-. : '..-r-ra.r. F h licr.iEr.F rit . s .h r i. IIT-. h..I.T T h-'Fti.1 ur::. . 1-u. I i- FuF Ib.2.'. n ... -IT . i. ai..I. In 1-17. .n IJ rr.r. Fr.pi* pv.-'- FIT in lAd~ l' I.rr Fr. th ir . \b.. .tirF d5 r.nt-. I.'.in . ri- . i.-Fr..r i.i..rs- -.A :in -u...r a sIFI r-i. ai . r-. p I'-. rr: itn F' -ri r.1.r. rimi.1 i.r.rt . t7rhe poliTica :rl cm mt-itmen--..t . ri n-u-h r.. 1-.'t s rc. ... r .uor.ii ho 1 i.n. -. I tal- I.inr'h. r.g.dAs ... n.lt.4.iiirn.t n.)i e-riF. F.. .:'r -'2- sr'.. .-'.)j- Fertilih and abortion in Romania I I Ih.I F... ti-. -.-.FT--r i'.r.I'i.s . rh F.11:0'''pI r'ns . 3.th am ti5rc'l-i K..r. .'3 ir. ir l nrd IUP F CII Iujr~rc . . p t IIsrn I 't. iii' ri.* iar.-A rrn.17 popula tion.l P-v'. t -td . - pe r. ns~n.*r i'il~ ..\-_p. .td geertig ndsutanding.. - LiF 'c-sit--~.I hi Frn . FL . b-u' ri.1i~ii i.. BUt ithad ialhrn baL.1 7'3LI n'LT-Fc F. iru-i-r.Ih. g i.ZE c it ing. .rtF-rrsFr ab~.. p&-i.1. uiii'. h - in dirnt J..r i.F aric-.

r. tn . jj p pulat.ur Fo-r but rit.1k .inn. ...:.r.:rthe .n ir.rcbi .1 suggests the importance of institutionalizing two functions: * Relating demographic targets to the policies and resources necessary to achieve them..4 r ur :. er halt -'t rl.. r.3r ~U rnm h.. hr.:..fll birlh . : k J..t c.p. POLITICAL COMMITMENT. Lack of reliable demographic data has hampered the growth of political support for population policies in sub-Saharan Africa.:.-. here .d rtIe: m r.b.. The role of institutions is to translate political commitment into effective policy.eedlaci. n..:i'..rt.ri.A at*t pr.: r -'n.d.. r. China's census: counting a billion people 3Th. 5-pitniNr M*ultil rtir . say.d .n-.r. ncr . down to those who are in immediate touch with the public.. i hn-n -..leio.ith.. arc-.. health.irJ . g ...me..... C. I.-rr. p. * bci. -np1renf n tF-. But as population policy becomes more complex. pe.rnri I'. than a .r pic. ad ancd C.2 t.r nrnm. .. and contraceptive use at more frequent intervals (item A in Table 8.. .i..t . such as the Manpower Board of the Ministry of Finance and Plan in Ghana.ec-.n.. .i.:'...3.. %Ir.on st3Ii ti e. A .!unt in 1'.rd hrn1 2 2 in I'" rhc moderr era There |D. * Coordinating and evaluating the implementation of population policy.r..n to publish *. n.rnnrn p.r-t4ien. .r.. Ss of e.r h. .A.-:aid ajmin.. nr . Countries with strong policies have been able to mobilize visible and sustained political commitment..p.'pulai-n. F..n .d. in. 3nd I:..it er-I Ji.kFtinF th. |ir.:. bhemad.. n. ... irr. INSTITUTIONS.-..lul.'i.*rr.3).%: and ni.m b. t er 4111 minilkn Ch. mortality.:. ii.e- and c. r.n. car. rt. r. irit-'r .d c.-puialion rN.'IIl.. b..u.L'tC iI Th. .:hi.r. A population policy should include consideration of the demographic benefits of a wide range of social policies.'.uTri. C Ina . e. not only at the highest levels of government but throughout the political and administrative hierarchy. Support for slowing population growth has been expressed in public statements by the head of state and other national leaders.. ri th. . . .r.... ..t1p-.. . -in.. -al -c3...nnend hndir. mnil l-'ik n h. -:l* uhih eouit. .ti. l-C.n- ouniiin'l. necessary to monitor trends and the effect of policies over time.l. -impl. count ir.. in education..- ii.. r. p.n taminn . i i rt. " and analyzed census data not more than ten years old and other national sample surveys documenting current fertility.re . i- lund rb:.: .- 1 . ih-. .h .:.. 1I i..n and -. such as a national development plan (item B).n. !o-. p ron.uper'.. ih *u:h : rapidi .-rc J rn r under -iII1million In ihe t Ihinme.. This may require few new institutional arrangements if the scope of population policy is limited to.. been rni-..1: l ph.r... .n 1' k .lS2 thr I r. .. an.uF.r r..cu:E China that n. 5 ..r-n t.d th. .reicr her ni.ear mn.iragt not .iratd in . *:nwu. . i--' n I'n-.e-. . nlu re. undtrral inc ...-. .r .n S... itilt ih Iii.. it is likely to involve the joint efforts of other ministries: education (for population education and female literacy)..: .ng jir n ......:e u. .b-ut I h.rew lie .unllri un. r pc.it tvlri ' ili. -' -t p pu.blrt LI ]h d in..... di tlh.ur e.i ri. .".n th re' fdhrn.r -i... .r Ih.p.:..A -ub r. inr -. the policy coordinating body may be the one that also coordinates multisectoral family planning activities. ai . and in written statements of national priorities.nr. - a 1r. It is usually the responsibility of a specialized unit within a planning ministry.i p. ..t t \JFF ih.b: nore ih.r.r..ai.ri. and social security..hing back to the Zhou d.t.ntil lt'. n in rh.r ilhe .'.tal r-Lt ..hJed a p.:.'.. r.Jd . pr. and the Population Planning Section within the Planning Commission in Bangladesh..rd n1 L-.r. These statements can range from a general commitment to reducing population growth to specific demographic targets (see Box 8. wider provision of family planning.1). as well as in family planning. -. M.. in..n F. rnd d.nl...ree ce taikernd th-ir Epn'eu.have in such ...n'uz r.. ha. iI' -onan...ni-.:Ir. tip.. t mi'l ripid hand-pr.in .:.d ctraT:ii I.ti:. in-rn.uz .E . This commitment helps to forge cooperation among the numerous sectors and ministries involved in population policy..njilihL. The 158 experience of countries shown in Table 8. daia le a. ' rr . It should also consider the complementarities among these policies...3n 1-. t*idu'.r.. ri-.nn rnment rnr-hllied a 1niliic..rk oth. hi-tori.ibc. In this case.. .-..hn r. pulan...:.id at ..r.n.n. r. bead . tilhnon pers.-. 5... .t.. .r... ih.ni re Ii rl. *L. one which relates demographic variables and policy alternatives (item C). . h ln ctt-. IuSI In tha . llpr.:-heetn r I rc 'ull. This is fundamentally a planning function... n.on *1 iu.n..t..e Ner1i t.... rie. r1 %r i -n.'rwi. -.h Ir i. h . .ir.in. .r.a tronm Thc I'n rJeaI ed .. had rea"d..-rdr ThL .t ir.iti-tac..Box 8.e cenl iu9 iAI. u.pliled1 . rr r-. arc.t .z e.. 11-..z' . e.de-p. ..had Ic.-rol .. I. tel.:arr.:. information (to encourage breast- . Data collection and analysis is a continuous process. i o r ' Inmatt e. nit ...er h. it. |U*u' U I But dt ri..r .-.-tan. d ran . .i -' i a .rit n ih.i inror t.r .n.

n.ui -' 4 41 . total njitr a b. aI rpIc d d :hni ttIII I . hnd i-chi.-r..n . H mo. .. th-:4t -c rFr. and cooperatives (integrated population and development projects). jrpro. J ti h'.para *|.t p-p...1 .unRr ii. very few countries now give much priority to raising the legal age of marriage as part of demographic policy-more likely because the institutional framework to do so is poor than because the costs of implementing such a policy are high.UnL .r aclti. I . -marriage. pir.-ih Ihr-bh Pt. an extraministerial committee (Egypt. HZF 'r TsIr.' TI I ~~ -ph Ind.-1l i ith3ptr 4i Irh Lil.ttii. or a separate ministry devoted entirely to multisectoral population policies (Indonesia).1"'@l ' i'm" 1 l ^.a 21ri 22 *I'l 'r L utin Andi F. 1. par th. '2ili-ii Fr tnii-h .-tI P . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2 .i."i p.:.: Utu§ c r.dcrriLnlpalt 1.|r F11ud :i . Ti tjr4l. tn. ra.r *.-pr inrt : tn. ItIn nbc rtl.'pulitl .nir.r.crurde birth rai rinc . l. cm.1t :. I . I. *iWrI.' *rn in r.ipiid LiŽartd{ a c-rr t ..rp*p'H t'.-. (FR2' * T2 2' 21 -'4~~~~~~~~~~4'i . iihI. thl r SpI.p.1 .lh ..-. ' T.un. .n-.. 159 ..IF .r. kRA rpal r [ot.:t1' 'ii1 i rl1.. Gh lln1I'n. .r. r burI1a.i 2i0I: r e iL'n 2u 34 .nlr Fr .u.3 r I rtn u tI an I1.n . ' ~ 'V!'' c-t to (T i (r' -..: .a pt--p tar I 12 L . d ir..r.I I 12r. selected countries and i-ears i n' - Pati^ia P ~~~~~~~~.IIt..'.- 2i1u....3 tl r.. r 1 ..t.:h i .r F-Psin .tu.-i i. nili...'PUI itr ii .i .r I rt.n.ttn Demographic targels and projections of fertility declines. sustained political commitment seems to matter more to the outcome than organizational structure.rmn. liti.n I. rth rI: rtrl.1%v1tE IUNn it it I 2l% 21411 2' 'AI 2' 4 34 11 4n I n ii . X t ICr . b rih i - V.n . i I I.l.ulr . Panama). .. n. fl . n . women's affairs. -r. 211 p rccnt - n iiil . .i4 . 22 2 ' '' 2'' 24 uk.d id.di Ind. rI-pr -.a.I. feeding and use of family planning). nI nfl a t.|: 5 'J 2 21 * 23 ln- 2hI -. 'urlrmt I I i.Ittlt. -nrid Kink . . rI lr .d *h.a! r. 21[ '-.I lr. ''...rk rar.d ' 1ti.cil..pcn . dIticrni nr Itrr. The institutional arrangements vary: a unit within an existing ministry of health or planning but with representatives from many ministries (Tunisia.rh ib i- .Ia I ~ ~ ~ ~ 2111 rFra nd I.ir hr r'r .nts.. Mexico).r tRiR i.nijracr a ci- n %rar Thh.% rcpr. -nL-.l" a rd d.iccrapli.!t ctntririn plcp -hiat i II. r. r..1 :' I 22 2' 2 2n' 4 2I It 2 F .i e.rn. in .-Qernflf . tittr . . r. I-.i :it n' 4 2 "_ ih. Ir.Box 8.n .. 4 4. For example.t. i~ r F ~ h. ' l' *un..- pirih ulit r-d t~rkriin ric.-r.1 *.lti 1U tt -'IIt .. it hIp. Chl'.in rl -i t 1 in t. Ir r a IiItI . rural development. tu.-1t1nt`i * r. ri ree u thr-. hanri. -I r -I n.-I r.. ih..ial -r in -hima.. pl.-r-:' r-... S dhl.s. ar.-il d-ain-i r sta0da1.n. lheb Q.i]..r Tat. n 1 . the responsible body may need an inde- pendent base in the government (item D)..ar tn.i-...r. zrc. There is no consensus on what works best. r1 tir 1..hm :1-m:- i.iti rn I!:1it u idevelopmen . rEt 'Iy I I. )i un. justice (age at incentives and disincentives). la-il. As the task of coordination becomes more complicated. IFRI.3 \i Demographic policy objectives ..n hr. Ir..Žr: -. *. separate from the delivery system for family planning. .

The system of quotas. Subsidized commercial distribution of contraceptives is not widely used. it cannot be reduced simply by providing more family planning. are an additional policy "step" over and above the extensive system of incentives and disincentives. they pose no obvious tradeoff between present and future welfare. Nigeria. However. educational and informational activities (item H). Sudan. Incentives and disincentives. offering financial or other incentives for small families (item K). governments can slow population growth. superior to any "good" which might be bought and sold. there is "unmet need" for family planning. Virtually all countries in the table could reduce their fertility by increasing the availability and quality of family planning services. however. fail to cover the entire population. and the accompanying pressure to have an abortion when a woman becomes pregnant without permission. family planning outreach (item G). many with stronger programs. but these are generally mild and affect only a small part of the population. As political commitment increases. Procreation is held by many to be a right which is personal and fundamental. The tradeoff between the rights and welfare of the current generation and those of future generations. Government programs are often preceded bv private family planning organizations which eventually receive government financial support (item E). Virtually all the programs to lower fertility recommended in this Report would also improve individual welfare. and who are older. within most countries. and imposing disincentives for large families (item L). By ensuring that people have only as many children as they want. have more broad-ranging incentives and disincentives. China is the only country to have implemented a system of assigning to communities (sometimes employees of a particular factory) a quota of births to be permitted each year (item M). can also meet the criteria of improving 160 . providing public services (item F). Policy steps E to I help couples have the number of children they want. They may take some time to have an impact on fertility. allowing couples to realize their own fertility objectives and improving the health of mothers and children. and subsidized commercial distribution of contraceptives (item I). family planning policies tend to evolve in similar ways. In many countries current fertility exceeds desired family size. the methods they use require careful and continuous scrutiny. and subject to challenge only by some other right. even among countries with relatively strong programs. it has a moral and a cultural dimension. insofar as a tradeoff exists. As noted in Chapter 7. including outreach. BIRTH QUOTAS. Becoming a parent is both a deeply personal event and-in virtually all societies-central to community life as well. even among those with the strongest programs. Family planning programs expand the options available to people. Countries with moderate and weak programs have yet to generate any outreach services. and must recognize the distinction between encouraging lower fertility (by changing the "signals" which influence people) and coercion. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES. In many countries-such as Brazil. Governments need to recognize that once they are actively involved in reducing fertility. and Tanzania-subsidized family planning is provided as a basic health measure for mothers and children although the government has not formally adopted a policy to reduce population growth. Economic and social policies are indispensable to reduce this gap in the long run. If a private-social gap still exists. Programs to raise education and reduce mortality raise welfare. Only a handful of countries. with prioritv given to couples who have followed the recommendations for marrying only after a certain age. Items I to L are policies that close the gap more quickly: eliminating all implicit subsidies for large families (item J). Individual couples within communities are then given permission to have a child. government assumes a bigger role.FAMILY PLANNING. will differ in different settings. But regardless of setting. this might not be enough to bring privately and socially desired fertility into balance. But once the objective of reduced population growth has been established. support for family planning services intensifies. A large number of countries have disincentives built into their tax system and their benefits system for public emplovees. Based on estimates of "unmet need" described in Chapter 7. a public policy to reduce fertility must be sensitive to individual rights today as well as to longrun social goals. Policy anld ethics Birth control is not just a technical and demographic issue. carefully designed. there are about 65 million couples in developing countries who want to limit or space births but do not have effective access to family planning services.

individual welfare is improved. Such payments are usually quite small. In subSaharan Africa. Some benefits from an incentive program are bound to go to people who would have deferred pregnancy or limited births anyway. When payments are offered as an inducement to sterilization-which is usually irreversible-care must be taken that the poor are not being tempted to act out of short-term economic necessity contrary to their long-term interests. Those who accept payment for not having children do so because they find this tradeoff worthwhile. since those seeking sterilization may find it hard to make even one trip to a clinic. Many countries set performance targets for family planning workers in recruiting new acceptors. operating on a strictly voluntary basis. a commitment to achieve lower fertility must not mean a willingness to achieve it at any cost. are profound. Incentives compensate individuals for the economic and social losses of delaying births or of having fewer children. Even policies that are theoretically voluntary can be implemented in a coercive fashion if not properly monitored. and 161 . they increase the cost of having many. At the other extreme. since they are meant to compensate for time and travel costs. Like incentives and various socioeconomic pro- grams. yet the poor may have greater need of children. however. disincentives alter the balance of costs and benefits of having children. and to create conditions that enable people to realize their potential. and the payment can also be a safeguard-though in inaccessible rural areas a waiting period may be impractical. both in their demographic situation and in the evolution of their population policies. And children. as in the case of educational bonds or an old-age security payment. few countries have yet to take the first steps in developing a population policy. the party in power lost the next election. excessive pressure to achieve unrealistic targets threatens the voluntaristic nature of programs. and have imposed criteria that potential clients must fulfill (such as having several children already). the ultimate goal of public policy is to improve living standards. It is essential to design disincentives so that they avoid inequality. While some criteria for evaluating workers' performance are clearly necessary.welfare and allowing free choice. to enhance individual choice. But community pressure always exists. bear the costs of certain disincentives-those which give preference in schooling to the first born and which heavily tax family income. have the advantage of building in such a safeguard. and usually influences couples to have many children even when they would prefer not to. with care. The successful experience of many countries already indicates that it need not. Consequently. however. Lower fertility is only an intermediate objective. There is the danger that. Policy priorities in developing regions The differences among developing countries. Deferred incentives. In Indonesia and Thailand community incentives are only loosely tied to actual use of contraception and are thus primarily promotional. Incentives that offer schools. not only * in their implementation but also in their design. increasing literacy. in closely knit communities. public subsidies may therefore benefit the rich unnecessarily. They have therefore the disadvantage that they might unfairly penalize the poor. Care must be taken that the benefits of community incentives are distributed equitably. To repeat an important point noted in Chapter 1. The rich will find it easier to accept the additional costs of more children. This is the lesson of the Indian Emergency of 1976-77. But incentive and disincentive programs require extra care to avoid unfairness and abuse. In all regions there is scope for reducing mortality. this program. they need be no more objectionable than any other taxes or subsidies. the sterilization. who have no choice in the matter. some couples will be pressured to use contraception against their will. In more recent years. Governments that offer them have generally established procedures that make written consent mandatory. when workers were subject to extreme pressure to achieve high sterilization quotas and many people were pressured to be sterilized against their will. has proved very successful. and governments offer incentives for couples to have small families. Rather than raise the benefits of having fewer children. To the extent that all members can benefit from community incentives. A waiting period between the decision. or a tubewell to communities where contraceptive use is high also directly link lower fertility to increased welfare. in East Asia family planning services are accessible. they are compensated for some of the public savings from lower fertility. low interest loans. Similarly with disincentives: those who elect to pay the higher costs of additional children compensate society as a whole for the private benefits of more children. however. political commitment is high.

Number of females enrolled in primary school as a percentage of all females of primary-school age. 162 . eastern Nigeria. and largely rural population are taken into account. as well as inappropriate domestic policies. femialc' 1982 Cooitry yroup (dollars) 1980 (perce(lt) 1982 1981 (perce77t) (years) 49 50 59 60 Sub-Saharan Africa Low-income Middle-income All low-income countries All middle-income countries 249 777 280 1. In a few East African countries population is growing at 4 percent or more a year. Kenya. while population rose 2. FIGURE 8. Sub-SaharanAfrica: how to increasepublic commitment Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest population growth rate and the highest fertility in the world.1).8 percent a year. 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 9 * 1972 * 1982 8 Kenya Ethiopla - udan l . Of the thirty-three sub-Saharan countries with more than 1 million people. it declined. Nigeria Norm for 92 developing countries. 1982 3 0 $1000 $2000 Income percapita (1980 dollars) $3000 The poor economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa cannot be blamed on rapid population growth alone. Malawi.520 38 35 52 65 57 70 81 95 Note: Averages are weighted by 1982 population. Fertility in most countries is higher than income alone would predict (see Figure 8. thirty have a total fertility rate of 6 or more. Probably fewer than 10 percent of married women of reproductive age are using modern contraception. About a third of the adult population are literate in sub-Saharan countries.7 percent a year. and in which population growth is expected to accelerate in the next decade. But when Africa's high mortality. Kenya. if Nigeria is excluded. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in which fertility has not begun to fall. up from 2. Rwanda. compared with half of adults in all lowincome countries and two-thirds in all middleincome countries (see Table 8. The region's gross domestic product stagnated in 1981 and 1982. fertility is not unusually high. nor will slower population growth solve all its economic problems.5 percent a year during the 1960s. Life expectancy at birth is forty-nine years. have contributed to the region's economic crisis. with a per capita income averaging only $482 in 1982-or $354 if Nigeria is excluded. External economic shocks. low literacy. 1972 6 Zaire 5 4 Norm for 98 developing countries. and parts of the TABLE 8 2 Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries Per capita i)coC01e Adult literacy Lifet cxpectaicsl Primaril-school Cenrollminent ratio. The strains are acute in a few countries and areas that are already overcrowded-Burundi. But rapid population growth is creating severe strains in some countries and. Rwanda. ten years less than in other countries at the same income level. During the 1970s per capita income grew in real terms by just 0. But in taking the next steps in population policy. it is holding back improvements in living standards. each region faces a different set of issues. throughout the region as a whole. Between 1970 and 1979 population increased at 2.7 percent in each year.improving the availability of family planning services. Africa is also the poorest region. a. and Zimbabwe have fertility rates of 8 or more.2).1 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa..

Even if these factors were less important. but need extra skills. In this atmosphere couples who wish to use family planning services are discouraged from doing so. Nigeria. Depending on the country. Mauritania. Yet census results are important in demonstrating to political leaders the need for population policy. Gabon. Ghana. About half the governments in sub-Saharan Africa provide family planning services for health and human rights reasons. this pressure can cause local resentment. and Zaire are not known within a reasonable degree of certainty. with poor coverage of rural areas. the Ivory Coast. Human development in all its forms is essential to future economic progress but. but reached less than two-thirds of primary-school-age children. Kenya was the first to adopt such policies in 1967. That much is almost inevitable. Madagascar. What explains the limited development of popu- lation policy in sub-Saharan Africa? Population control is a sensitive political issue wherever religious and tribal groups are competing for resources. Only a tiny fraction of the people can obtain modern medical care. fecund women wanted no more children. Guinea. The World Fertility Survey. Most are in Francophone Africa-Chad. Recent surveys in six countries found that women wanted between six and nine children in their completed families. The 1960 census was a catalyzing factor for population policy in Ghana. This prompted the president to create the National Population Commission in 1978 to consider a population policy and family planning services. The real question is whether populations will merely triple in size in the next half-century or increase even more rapidly. Twelve sub-Saharan countries neither have population policies nor support family planning. meaning a doubling about every twenty years. Lesotho. conducted in Benin. tragically depriving some women of any children (see Box 8. only 4 to 17 percent of currently married. In all sub-Saharan countries. Cameroon. And. particularly in Francophone Africa. and Zambia-are rich in natural resources. the size and growth rate of population for countries such as Ethiopia. The results of the 1976 Senegalese census implied a population growth rate of 2. Senegal. Few sub-Saharan countries have explicit policies to reduce rapid population growth. such as Ethiopia and Upper Volta. Ghana followed in 1969.2 percent annual rate in the 1960s. and most of them had already had at least six. and Sudan.5). Government revenues are growing slowly as a result of slow or no economic growth. A few countries-such as Angola. Zaire. population growth makes it hard to achieve. Policy development and political commitment are constrained throughout the region by a lack of recent and reliable demographic data needed to demonstrate the magnitude and consequences of rapid population growth. has made an important contribution to improving demographic data 163 . Malawi.4). which are elsewhere active in lobbying governments for public involvement. and Zimbabwe. so countries have had to struggle not only to provide jobs but to provide basic services such as education. As a result. as Chapter 5 showed. Modern contraception is poorly understood and lacks social legitimacy. There are recent indications of heightened concern about rapid population growth in Burundi. Guinea. Nigeria. Many African countries. infertility affects a disproportionate number of Africans. do not have a long history of census-taking. Rwanda. the labor force is growing rapidly. the results have never been published because of political controversy. In much of the region the concept of self-determined family size is unknown. In some countries where censuses have been conducted. because sub-Saharan Africa's current population of 385 million seems set to double by the year 2005. Ivory Coast. Nigeria.Sahelian countries (see Box 8. and Upper Voltawhere anticontraception laws from the colonial period are still in effect. Kenya.9 percent a year. and Mauritius in the early 1970s. by more than 3 percent a year in most countries. Mauritania. politicians would still be hesitant to propose smaller families when the demand for children is extremely high. Niger. Limited services are provided by a few private associations and through an already overstretched public health system. The threat of infertility discourages couples from controlling their childbearing through modern contraception. to five or six times their current size. as well as heavy investment in roads and storage and distribution systems to exploit those resources. These countries have no tradition of private family planning associations. Senegal. Ivory Coast. In 1978 education was taking 16 percent of national budgets. These and other countries. much higher than the 2. but without any explicit demographic purpose. the Comoros. And much of the pressure for smaller families has come from (or is perceived to come from) western aid donors. compared with other regions. These difficulties will remain. have neither the physical capital nor the skills to compensate for a shortage of natural resources.

Box 8.1 cin.-: al I nr.r'.nJine. the education of women-is essential to reduce desired family size..-. Programs in Rwanda.er.j. supporting apactv r ii. -ar- actual population.I hInm.nhri: annul rh.. . d:d at 1 diin th.ni tie n tr..c:< R'r n.-pp-r.ir Is .:. ee:unitk meniar% larnlinl A. .t ..:.r 1i ~~~ ..id tc-cod pr. crt.> .: 'he . I (. - *l . In the short run.-.7i the FAO . nrr.n.. M Th.a .n r. as long as fate seems to govern family size.. -. eClei p.thar 1 .jinrii-n I :.. *aJ .: larm...h. More and better schooling for women will help to lower infant mortality.'le .-t: * -. deniit I 4l-'rT t 1 Ltx.d r Ratio t population ..A'r -. i.n t. t: r-: t hi n. * __ i A Aw.i S r r: o " 'rn-lB .l.3a s Bujt ..l.. both breastfeeding and postpartum amenorrhea are six months shorter in the capital city of Dakar than in rural areas.i Iii-5 ft -:t-r. in rii-~~ nh pr. 51. irr'dm rchn.r. Atri.. td ih~ pt"..niE .. T.it:il.-.ar. reducing the uncertainty about child survival which desired family size is likely to fall first. n 1 I.. l . pronatalist norms will be reinforced and individual choice discouraged. 0 ..-inc matn. crict..rr. An all-out attack on infant and child mortality and on infertility is imperative. that 'I unI i a.i r& . rdricni.-i-es..u'..an.: rin. But spacing practices declining most rapidly in urban appear to be areas-where generally not been institutionalized.lOde. may increase Unless the - keeps family size high.. and Zaire have recently been set up to promote contraception for childspacing... rndrd i all -. R -* i - hrt ..ted Land R-vuurce j IIF-iur " A _ * i L i nortA.>.Ii j ...1 -l i:.r. for example.can p .Bu I_ h.Irw . even in the face of relatively little unsatisfied demand for birth control: * Childspacing.c . traditional childspacing practices are in decline and intervals between births contraception becomes substitute._--_. br. it -ne.-nc ..-nd1rn p.-r man..-ri. In Zimbabwe.x -rnpnrtd -F-i - ~' pLiphilda. *t Ar.. ijraI- -- at ln.. irar.A-l-v%e aInd at" e Data r3i' a ait3ble ur. are shortening.r.v.ur.ien rlc..o. -.pulai. In Senegal.. Tanzania. eraic :r p 'pularlln dtn. mnp... . r1i 1.e . irn 't-I i. iub: 1 terll. ct1 a.d.d Lind Africa: how much land..I..an urndtrp -p .d rE.. In Lagos.i -rnfe .u.- rid X..k. but periodic sample surveys have In the long run..r r IJ . r p..r .n rapp.-t r Fut btnough' her t--'anp-ductn d~..unfl-. r..i" r.i.. uriri..J t.- ~ T~i' . F' L. social development-especially child.r. it i iru. ..on. er. .:lt en'%u:h ' l. Throughout Africa..A 6 tll.. how many people? t A.nlii:-':r** . 1.. -tl crlidr ao.l n.: 5 and in the region.."niirm rh.c..F.. ma.nd it niu-u :ener. .... The principal aim is to protect the health of children and maximize the number who survive. a.- sb-r-ri.i. J | sne--derernined ic to aciu d indl Fr.lr-n.Ltl i A .ii . -i AXlir a' a i-.lien porrra.: n-!d rinc lhc rud- prictiCr in ni-ir . -. the Child Spacing and .e . pr. .-...ain ti.ririnuine lJ.i . there is potential demand for contraception to space births in both urban and rural areas. Extended breastfeeding and sexual abstinence have long been practiced in Africa to guarantee 164 two to three years between each a more readily available and total fertility health of mothers and children may worsen.npleied p .4 utait. :-min.ducti pcritnnal Thi' .ir:. r... *. Nigeria. family planning services could do more on two fronts.

tr-E ii th.O.tiiiiiie-t~iIi ..uniiri.h N . Ih r itrri in ..liar.n.d..tu - i-t. .ni. S sh.. til 1.-'lalp. nj r -Ij in. tt-~iiaiai.hlad a-aia pa3ricularil.pp.Ic-h r.i-oI1'l itr. ihi . d - ta-d L'-i -t .'rc *.n a Mt3- ar- ica ni. 1 rh ii-Ire - i.Li 7a [:piil. Ia ard \a tr -p -nt : iJ h-i_.ii [nina-.tt nli ~. although heavily subsidized by government.1`eaLIi At.h -iiJi ii-fi C - Lrz-ili.rirz pmt1cnI.rJir. reassurance.4 I.-..r ilpuit i \ hiiii .iI .-.ui.>iL..r I: R.-.ii:m !1 [.i in-i n M .i~ -ilrihi-.I glithi F iIm n -r i- ir-J E. hilnd- 'li1-grain."i i-n 4r. mri-rarai -ill n.. rit 7rKOPli art il-dc t. -i jndcrui-o-i r t-.rrUn..Ii. Th.n r.p.i. Bau -.r'-.- .h:n li.1 u 1.iiriciil1Iurai ild ti-u .-.n n iht- l h ih--n.lik. rhi preLsUrt r.n- p uti.- h l.: t--ia !II PerILI.d-1~rihle pr.si:- ir-~. the Council recently became a parastatal under the Ministry of Health and is intensifying its activities with funding from USAID.' htre -uir.i.. .mnd 1.smalle.x. -.nahlt. ratI :r-i rions -- \. p-r Aii lar-d-a.uli0I a.rIr.u. d rostr Ifl .. In many countries-not just in Africa-there has been a sharp rise in premarital adolescent pregnancy.--rci. reversible methods of contraception. Family Planning Council provides 40 percent of national childspacing services.t' Li-U tbh I art-.- r-ri :u4ij.)li i .:Ir-i li I.-...1. ..F\e' rh.--ld i -..riJ -. .' md l14a-n. -n [-tieJ I.rr.tr.nriN-Ill . anila ni--. hil icriu rd -r dc. r. picruiatiwin - -uippuricd \ifr.-iIm. iiL'ilffiieul hi ir iiuditland nr. The emphasis on spacing means that programs throughout Africa must offer effective.ibaI h-l r huunrdi k.nc. hev Lind r ab-! Cat--i rn i niuli-p-i r-.-'. which is still almost universal in Africa but declining in urban areas.n I-F..6).-a.-.I--pa K-n. Middle East and North Africa: rural outreach and expanding women's opportunities The countries of the Middle Fast and North Africa 165 . Eight other sub-Saharan countries are considering this step.-uit . -n uflhiti- I-al1 -.-ulriri.art )ri-Eiit. gr-r . su.ti . -Ud .-ii.ac ti u. [--r.i r-i'. 1 r-.-It i.! he-Ir.r.irri- a ai'-nit.p r r i i'u i.n .fl.it ur.p' -N.<. 4uire I~rd.c.1 niui:h fli. abortions. T IIr u-u:h.r-I I F li. . liK I-er-aii .i fli.:t..eniral i \kiric:a -'il he~re ri. . Oi L.\.i. NI Ia I.imrn.n [L.n.riinc. l-in -.i F hIrI. . iIhi' seairs i.:eri I b~t-U arr h irp.-h1-.aa E il . c i'nid Tthi - al . lInd -a th.-Liri-ri U. a...' and n. :n -Lit.I r r iiaa .rr ~~-ul:-- icn-.h I-aad.-uniru..p i-.itn. *-n 5-nil rni~k. - - ar.aij.. In-ar' .. -. It 'tiri~~~ t. ttiYiiCCi uair h -Iair4tr il.r -r 1 C ri It rti:. Among women of childbearing age..T ut---31.iii. con-traceptive use is estimated at 15 percent. c-un . careful explanation.- It. a doubling of field staff.-'i: e t--.r . an-nrC.I1..un.c ciphit lhi-n ii I. ~nc-.iaIi-. I.- nnrc n. t.na iTtc-IrO -upp.nif.r -d.N.. --. c . Since most people will never have tried modern contraception. uir-h-i-n. -n..r. 1I-.it ii ai-lunar -trrrl \n: s c re I'-di i -1muh m. and health risks. [chine cnr-r.:.:quir r. Family planning services and advice can avert these unwanted births.l : rri...i V Irim- ..uzh t. u ii ErhIF. in addition to inservice training and contraceptive supply procurement for the Ministry of Health's childspacing program.j' i ni hiLth r and hi:rla.rx-ll-fn tn-Lr.airtad lirci. ug:h iritnli hni. rf-. R .r.-r3a..tr t.il it.ii - r-:.puar-'J.-L.-.- r A :.cn. ire iri 1l-Ž. iht-.- a II-'._. recruitment of a full-time information and education staff.n iiul ril I. ril.ruiua 1--1. ..iii.a. li uri-i. " i. r.ihe .ii.rrh.:. fi I i rmin. -I -A~a.it \iri..cLr Ni -crih.c k -. r.1 mnl.ni ri.ZrIai -i a_..-k- land -i.ii.-an it -Ritb J paa.rt .. j i ~ r n.0-1.r.e.. ii1.i arh . ircr It . i er-i .i. *¾. -.tvl~m. 1.ir. .i F\( -. .i'ii!: u-..*r p'-alt I-.I ar.. in. S Adolescents.iiwi :..h.-bi-.- al-n.rcp i--h. cr- r . I Ir 1 i It .piaii-.r r-tn...mli t> n. i.. I ni ~.rair t. In Ghana education about family life is now part of the school curriculum.i ii1'. c-nc-ibid . Ur.Fr.i il-d iN: . Lct.tf ..ullk nia.-L -n F-r. 1t. and sexually transmitted disease (see Box 8. Such programs also provide an opportunity to encourage breastfeeding..- 0 Lhai..e. m-.. . 3-Lire.-I Iie' [-F1~m.n..ra U- -.. ih mri...r -i.l i .r r.re in Bui otil . lrirt hr ni-..Pliib-ui.lii. -ia-ii -i .- il..t3l -iJIPUI V. rC.j I-n up irie- LircolI.p t u r r-ri du- unctrairilt . abortion. lai .. and treatment of side effects will be critical. tr ie and nri-. Formerly a private association. and expanded research capability are planned. wt-rnc. .ire .

reon.le in the rentiring 'i" Ferccnt . hat c3ue. K. dtl.ie -rctni rin-.i a.Krree batncei-.up. p3r are3 ..pcciali-r. e u c and 'Ic-u r an.820.'.atrt-in .r then . r.m .ii I i!iil The i. o . 1-4 rnli-in 3 c:3e.orren Ur . and Algeria have risen strongly but total fertility has remained at more than 7.arch in the Unitl c:n intetlri. pru.ng thi. -the nabil.1. .uall.ert.:.cc-nira:epiin lenpecuall . ing rhe qu3a i cb.. htd rn^pon. an inlcrm couple.-.. dechnE .ire 1 Reputblic 1 Zaire -aharan ciuntrie.1 in the l.lt. in men Bcau.cult e.e-rquence.n ir..du-:icn trearnierrt irainin.h ntertillr\ kecp. rr primar the Cenlral I it elit untreiled rmen *t the and cnmen can be pre%enicd b.a 1an-3n.ne-.e Er_.men i gzd tateer.ngc..et up cnt. -. Tor \ented ar le-. 13 perceri the rid u.a.lv 5uudiem in Ken a i rh appro\..cnt kir intierlii.i Public carnmpain. -1 o-mnn 3ce dJui ' percrnIi tc -r. aditrin larg-e number. c.rh. Aec. imprc.r dlair.e modern c-nirt although hi.-.upie. nl .ndar.e\ual parrner. .r 4i1 pe r:ernr t-oth prt- are quite diverse.. Between 1970 and 1982 their population grew at an average 2. -- percenti C rmer-. h.nir-i Pr... In most countries fertility is higher than would be expected given per capita income (see Figure 8.e.tphili..d Kie rthi. h. inr l-per.n. . Inenr.m . ma..ptrcc nI c.ldldkrne'm I:. m' uall u.ved a. 41in m.econdar.em un an. d.cld -ne - 1%hen the interrilir! i. . ci I acccunts.ntin in-ctic-.. the total fertility rate in 1982 was 5.9 in 1982. -trdlr0ol di3gno.- arc rr.uFrjarnrrn. gental tuberctulo.-.uenis ha e a h..cn.ince th.nIt b-ih pr.p:irc racepticin Thu pract . kther cau e.a.o ihc .ri..9 166 percent a year.r.ince m. rtluctant I.unm. Re-ource.n arv l*e.n. h. In the past decade incomes in Jordan.. Th..iealr in rati-%n.:tctr:iclcare .e3e med.n that can pr-.c h. K.rld. ie. rate et 2 t. n. rtarekd rhit an t-eragee Ar 12 per.. 14 iT.nn 3.Tc nof rcdt.i.:reacric 'c grc.-.pnicad cntrral : republi.drrtcid tr i.rth ti:r i i. -nine . Ir.Box 8..rs in ditrtrent a3metnr-in it public qector Kr.n Dependring nte Huarter treated m.ai .Ph.uttir niertilir.ential that both partner..n.gn. ol a nd in * onher.bting irerr. cjulji trcquenc: ..rmired *.atch b.h h Uran.t pe-ple .. But 90 percent of its 260 million people live in thirteen middle-income countries. ni- lin. ranging from one of the world's poorest (Afghanistan) to five of the wealthiest (Kuwait..a4cand bk c a partICu 3rc malcr eo.prorided arant.! c.e .h nm.nd Cabnin -ni c I 4 tral sear. ot interrilit%' Sccu ill.a.perir bi th re-earch inerlilir uctedLb.-n h.:neŽ: 2'1 per ir par.er-. an carlter hirth Occur .tted dcl. g nicnt . tranmin. i and . t 1rh. t. . Deha.abl c:. .. i-r better d3ta . inierTliht Thougth in-men arE Re>i.. de'elvpinc countri-.ntual lertilit.12 t. Hpre.n in .rmari. a:ed Itt. Al-kui 94 r. e bten Erhicip. rhc a. . rducte t -otal lertilil bn atout 1-ut 3kS i.. aric-u' uter.ubceq.r itenirc I .ghi rculi. All share a common cultural heritage and are predominantly Islamic. trncniirthed di. erc child. % n.ndJr .-upl. intertilt i)ridri inittrr.e r Tlitjal mace' o-cuple.had pa. ere 1 .rrh -arc Three irin.enti.1l-ibnLr.uld be-e% tr.e-.ned ir. r'h again th-u. Iran 'mnwted .eabl1 in ma3.ati. re.% ..rcrmnent r.ghteen .en% .ir intert. c la. Oman.rmi. .-. rnerirliti.nnhea ireteribek ir e..ht rm.e.-n lit prienl .ur.c :. nc-n iln Ihc t. 1rain.a.n rbir prim3ri 3nd . hildle . d pi)-r c-betrical Lear-c anld budanr.. abilt The..'he .gh le. tI. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa have the second highest rates of population growth and fertility in the world.-t NI lnruiitiriir a nal conind cittldetcct.. had a fertility rate of 6. -.Ed their childbeaidng sear ir e. both into and out of the' region and among countries within it. r.rnpt-mr d-ctae . n \..:..h.-. ih inlerrilir Airic3n hildle.' .tarn r. nti.ng .i t[.ei.Lile Idr childles-..a n publ c in . re lor %ornicn hicr mas be iir cd Fear tra3rmt nt rinter iKr Ponpulai r -cracized 3binj.r.er th3n .n.ec.a3haran Mnru.pre\i aenc.llion oIi a total .. t the urinapla.mpar.cd pr.in .ntribure TrcaITi. Iertdio.:ent cit i.e.lt cri tic prc .' anid treatment c-I nilert. c-iutintwrilit ii itrica 4eciindar.. Libya. Income growth in these countries is recent and social development . Syria. cdmnedical carei but cull higb in the in and Uanda P'r-c.. arrlici.-e ual.nit. a. .t thc bulL :iularls .rc rcluciani ti:.. 3nd . . phdili :ius.I dim 4i and rbe a.nal ettori. mdar..nernilt.urid c... arc necded i.e 4Lib.tred d . .h. ii The cc.a and Zannm.4. rt.ubt r%:rEnr Childl a3 crnt centi Za.re and unh' nrrilrn riei .ea. trct. alb-rtion arc additinal ca3ue.c i ccount tiir abour 4iJ percent c: interrilitt c-pmnten %ar increac.the * mptirr. Saudi Arabia.ned cau-.:n thrKouigh linliting c:n- Ps1i tnt .ithciut irrat.I c.e ri then uncerta. cicntracepn. after sub-Saharan Africa..ltwin and ilegtl abortion-can be pre hecauce.icera 5K-tn u. Five high-income oil exporters.r re -3rch . deicren.i .:. and the United Arab Emirates).ciunZer -. . cc. r \ilurtarteriiar-i. thiri% I ur 3rc childle.5 5. with per capita incomes of $14. and ue :Il bNrrier meth unrlenrilrti V..lr: can kLad t! C.ram ' In Lnr.n ieni.le rn imuch cau..r-ned to be mer in partiular .m. 't lnr account . _ t 1`h 1b..e%- Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa and 1ialX ti.c' hi E been ..nal rmid.t 1' lai-pia3n 'jabc in rradre.nhibir..the mutecn-me irn ithe *3u" .age *bt--erical i ncc. utbmit t.2). n airrticn -r |r ind rr.rer 'he nce\t le t -ci en -. rl:fi i- up 1k. d n .. no per cnt CI hi. t i.r cdcE aued b:. 3mn:iunr r. All. t irli. 3.e 3rch inr .carr. endin.au-e.* in-pro. 21 pttcrrnt C:.c rtcan irncniii.r revearch rhe cau. -ide in . lark gcnrrl-rrhea and .-. tar.. Migration is common. rihc . -irk i tre a c..i' anrd 'rearneni u-uall.itl.'s rnEr.re-r 1 niaunched ir lt.ell a.: c.ith ~..iaielt ! L\esr tU cinehiltr malnir dr-ca'. t1.'rldl . I.g-r..thc ai.rigurec ar..i.tillb.

lhdd hx. i.-c' crc .derimti in rhiici..arnrriai and r-ginc-.irh un.c. in all three.rrh. r crinni r I. uni-r l .-Ai ni.i-thj ih.. riler.ne.onr tEin.r Ar'nc _it i.hiTh ~i-tirildar Ih.. m .inr I if -jg.. 2 rarrninl4 p.- b.el Jirn.rnreritp- ihtIr *.-rr irb *: .. Ti. el t.'r. and ability to seek work outside the home.trd. Three countries in Figure 8. ad.ai.nd pr r n Ir ~.a arnd .-A n.a rh3 jrrd ac.6 Teenage pregnancy in.".ln.rir: hŽ ~hi I-Jr.t car.criinabirriri in.it -IAlI ectu.i rr i n crc.t itithi.ba-. it--iurh - n-i rria2.e i-rrrhz and brictdLuairi-r.nnir.:i.~ a.r.cin de.cenr tiiie ri-ar p. .-t pi..r Iltutra.r rhejr .i-p.d.ri . -. t._urhPT Fe*cuPtrae *un2.E d-% i rt nar.-flfI * The ac and ti-i.~ ul . t . . fertility has declined more modestly.'hr i. tpinc curiric.-i.pcd ariA A-: .. rh.t ia'. re are: o. hr it tl..n :h c.t Iuppir and1 3inch. mcn' n.ir-I prc.rn.til hi-.. 3 l di-r eli ... .r n iin. r-oi-n .. hiihl.iif rp-ri *di.anrii. 'hrih in rd -n ci nrri.% ..Iiri .ani11 ar pw. a 3l'~.ri . di-r.r pr-~n.ri.iient' reci.:. . r.rrci.i4rr.i. r iare'. t . rights within marriage. and 41 percent in Tunisia are practicing contraception. flin t hr *. pat.:n tectau~eci-urI. prinlTer. i.p.t r.rhtr..-c. l.c-di lt..d.ccr.: 3CC: a.id. the decline was from 33 percent to 22 percent.-. rcr.l i. fl r . Tunisia.:r r-c-r-irirt ti a 'u ic mtih. e--.ar and acatr. i. redraci. nc-rv.nirt--inr In. nrc. i. ith. iccn r r r id. .-*i-eri-lr.. B.iiTpi. 38 percent in Turkey.tiAre icntr. -hr'3 i-~iiaiit.. ' ad thn:.-r.ctr-.-1-1i1.in in. . kC. -r. h. I ar-ru.. Pio.v.r-. -.t Ci. rh. the -.nz . d i an acr h-r thi-r * i'lirr-ri C hildien It.. ira.idcr r.I 'c-eflg..ha--.nz c'niinucd ndu-. . ideanrinc chlcr.p.-t *c-ren i rc n. Box 8.d a int:them to rr-c-. i. 14iKi .rthan iccitaZi-r7 -c.:c~ Inr i" i it r u fr'.nd a..nd *_npl.hch *h* -. rii Te. d Ihr [hilippirir K. rr c i.n It . -it ui-riae prrŽ~riant .race reenanci . c.. I 1.r aI'r.1.d pcrcani nrant- . It) .II .t ttcrnag. *Unlike most other countries in the region.. -and Government family planning programs began in 1964 in Tunisia.rairc. rirt tht - '!iiud~- .. ri hire *nrnahii-r I. i nt*_rn-arr. ha. it prenr-.. trmmrnhinrcd h.C nanjr nanca.r in.jc- jUcir111 i J.iti E1ri . in 1965 in Egypt and Turkey. rea-. - iii'trait dan- c c..- cnrrcr run.. Also responsible are cultural.jpre .rict ch. tdn.has come more slowly.l' \'. earlier ni.-.'nure ii i-i' t7' hinither. ~ lIr -Id c J.e .I-t---rii ni-.n.. Cha r -. piarnrin ar-c rrrpKn. h.'n.. ii ra -I rhi..a: f t. in Turkey.f-n. u-!.'itlain itr r.er. 24 percent of married women of childbearing age in Egypt.-- ..:r. Turkey-have had a marked fall in fertility in the past decade..-n IQr i* irthan ir -ridr . .1.hF are -r.iii. irl. n-. ch-Aai r.trr. hi-nt . Vi hcr. an in'wr. tcc t'i ncc uKrr' .M 'inc. kt rt. It?> --Men -..[ Iri hie cip-i. jrrn-.ar r.i-ndcd pr. i. religious.* ah*. . rr4~ 'ititt * rindma.i n '4~ c *uinirre tcrnd r.n anc-.t.i. The change has been most dramatic in Tunisia.--1n1.i'lhizrc-r X0AhirI' hi ..-~ ti Lit ti' r Ccc pr cn.r .Ni-h *' t.j An .ace.11 ii :ctn' an.ita-r are.ari.t at nrair.hildr 167 .3 .. *r r-mtrir tlii .C! iT- dizrriar .I rod ten-3i.-%e c-ini it. rh.i..-.nMtryr i ci:. r I-e A ri-i. 4 outi U'i c'imp-Ic k-m.urrnr-n hbib: htrnid titurteic..mi.ingie~ i. rI.-rtal.: t-iridr.. pre4nan-.. fertility is now below what would be expected for their income levels.t nicirn-rdc. :. .i'rii. tctrd. r~and rhitdreri * i _ tiJdhirih 1..irae..-. nr _ .tcr-d at hi' -cenit. ii. Brira.i th r-I ir Iedui:ric..ucnicc 'icrt-. Lag. .~ipij-d <canir.. rorNEari . In Egypt the proportion fell from 32 percent in 1960-61 to 21 percent fifteen years later.'h iInt.t -ha-. .B-)Mh.. untcnre le i.. i. and legal pressures that confine women to the home and restrict their property rights. artria .e .ri.t . Iw-E ira ch:i-its1 .'nc. Mu. tit K 4ti' ii ttcnace '3 i.i--bl ~d ~-.1 %i crc .i- a cri-.IP.--t.r rd *ia..ur'd n -irria2i---ndin 4. cd.-n i -d It.r~crian.. riac n.r.:-ha.n r.L rlv. arc mrirti c.cr p ri-trnarIur Ic-a Irth i. t. r.c t:cr ibrdinnan-tcl !.I prine ti chiidrrn Ii d. '. 'it n Ii p.a.i . cin.reri.A..'ic -t. In Morocco. thari arc parilk iriribultadic I. 1'..it . IuT~I.m ! . t dt. F-ei. ih. t .u ['i- tan1aicar.card.. _-n:-cjtderriic i an i--nrniT.edi-1.. Tie maternal nrd prn-.i iii tii hc nunr*c-r anti aci.t.idr. wintr. Oi 'h.-.urei.. a t riturn.c.. irtib.e Jrn icr -I.ri .t tt-rh. where the proportion of women aged fifteen to nineteen who are married fell from 42 percent in 1956 to 6 percent in 1975.cn C i.rrlaerip. fl precnaii:ri:r in the Lnuic 3i.C- D-.r ii.flac - *[uJp-.rc toi un-.ncrt arcd . and 1.hcd Faimil.r'u. these four have policies to reduce population growth. b-. C. According to recent surveys.irat and eiinin. In i:t. lLre r. -ai-r h-. p. urritir ri-. i rainin4 hc-. li-cl C~flhti.iina pr 'ip .'irrrci Li-.in'i *ir -irrioiia R-n'(r3 r ida. .nt I .r.ci[c it.-pari. nac. tIl Tn. ctiidrcn . rc :n inca ira-..ih i-urat-. raicc.ibi..nitarn [Rcputh..-I.iairir d. m n' n ditrenr-i. -. .iUd..hildtc _-r a r.2-Egypt.itiiv:fl rPt ih-.r _.or hun.4 .p *:hid.3dn'irre.. and in 1966 in Morocco.Calru'Ai u' pierct nn ha.i 1 5 rr.n ~ itirit. Later marriage has also contributed to fertility decline.II bii: -..-idl-.11ab.npl-. -d i-i2r-%r r the ac. parr l I..I unittI. . Low literacy (particularly among women) and high infant mortality help to explain high fertility.

46 percent of women who were not using contraception wanted no more children. nurses were only recently Despite these achievements. is still 4 to 5 in Egypt. and about 6 in Morocco. an increase in the proportion of women of childbearing age has kept the birth rate high. Only one brand of pill is offered. The limited range of contraceptives available in Egypt and Morocco also restricts their use. In contrast. Sterilization is legal but not promoted by the official program. abortion is prohibited. Increasing the number of educated women could do much to reduce fertility in the region. * Family planning programs. Yet experience in South and East Asia as well as in Latin America indicates that carefully trained paramedical fieldworkers can deliver many methods and increase contraceptive prevalence dramatically. Services in Morocco and Egypt rely heavily on physicians and are clinicbased with little outreach. The few outreach workers in place are not permit$30 4 Norm for 98 developing countries. In the Sfax region of Tunisia.2 upper Egypt want no more children but are not using contraception. both programs favor the pill. * The status of women. There is ample evidence of unmet need for family planning services. Continued progress in reducing fertility in these countries will depend both on better family planning services and on measures to improve the status of women. female sterilization. 1972 douba. One study found that 82 percent of married women in rural areas of 168 authorized to insert IUDs. In Egypt and Tunisia. Total fertility. In certain areas unmet need is even higher. IUD. In Morocco. Low and high estimates in Egypt ranged from 12 to 22 percent of married women of childbearing age in 1980. and the rate of population growth has changed little. The rate of contraceptive use has remained at about 25 percent in Egypt for several years. Tunisia. the Tunisian program has made the pill. When women in Marrakech. household distribution increased the rate from 7 to 18 percent. and 22 percent said that they would like to space the next birth. and Turkey. increases have been slow in Turkey and Morocco. Morocco. but poor economic conditions in Europe have reduced emigration from Tunisia and caused many emigrants to return. and nonclinical distribution of the pill is still frowned upon. although reduced. Population pressure has been eased in both countries by emigration. population growth remains rapid and acceptance of family planning slow.FIGURE 8.1982 0 $1000 $2000 ted to distribute contraceptives and are supposed Income per capita(1980dollars) to motivate only women who already have three children. In Egypt only physicians may prescribe the pill and insert the IUD. The Tunisian program has had difficulty reaching a dispersed rural population. Mortality has declined. Tunisia. and abortion (in the first three months of pregnancy) more widely available. Only onequarter of outlets in Egypt are staffed or suppliedto provide IUD insertions. were offered supplies of oral contraceptives through home visits. The number of new acceptors of family planning has barely risen in Tunisia for about five years. Enrollment rates for girls in 1980 . Although the IUD and condoms are theoretically' available. which includes half of the married women of reproductive age. and that more than half of these women would like to use a method. the rate of contraceptive use rose from 18 to 43 percent. Access to services in rural areas is still restricted. 1972 Total fertility rate 8 Jordan Algeria 7 \ 6 \\ 1972 Tunisia * 1982 Norm for 92 developing 5 Egypt / *Turkey countries. In Jen- Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Use of the media to promote family planning and small families has been limited in Morocco: not until 1982 were the Ministry of Public Health and the private family planning association permitted to broadcast family planning messages and show films.

F. and Nicaragua. Trinidad and Tobago..' . 40 0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~F. El Salvador.. It can exceed 100 percent because some pupils are below or above the b. with the exception of Cuba. F . primary enrollment Females. Morocco. 0 -- -M. An important exception is Jordan.particularly limited in rural areas. The highest fertility in the region is in six lower-middle-income countries: Bolivia. Honduras. At the same time. 1960 and 1980 Enrollment ratio Enrollment ratio 120 Egypt 120 Morocco 80 -M Males. Mean weighted by 1960 and 1980 population (includes high-income oil exporters). secondary enrollment …----Females. In four countries with per capita incomes exceeding $2. Sozxrce: UNESCO. pnmary enrollment Males.3 Gross enrollment ratios by sex: selected countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The legal minimum age of marriage for women in Tunisia was raised to fifteen in 1956. Fertility is high in the Caribbean. and Uruguay-population growth has slowed to below 2 percent a year and total fertility is nearing replacement level.- 1960 official primary-school age. Total fertility in these countries exceeds 5 and population growth ranges from 2. Mr 40 ____ 0 40 ---. -. and then to seventeen in 1964. Guatemala.. 80 Mr F. Ecuador. and Tunisia universal primary schooling for girls has yet to be achieved. Chile. M. were still only two-thirds the rates for boys at both primary and secondary schools (see Figure 8. In Egypt the increase in primary-school places has barely kept pace with population growth.FIGURE 8. Women's status can also be improved by raising the minimum age of marriage and by changing laws that restrict women's social and financial rights.. the primary-school enrollment rate has remained low and access is . but emigration moderates population 169 . The legal minimum age in Morocco and Turkey is still fifteen. but with great demographic diversity.-0 .. where fertility is high. much has been invested in expanding secondary schooling. 40 . secondary enrollment -----40 . and the male-female gap has been somewhat reduced. 80 Jordan M F... In Egypt.. .... m FM.5 to 3.F. World Development Report 1982.3). Latin America and the Caribbean: reducing social inequities Almost all of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are middle-income. M. 120 Entire region 80 F. 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 a Enrollment ratio equals the number enrolled as a percentage of a particular age group. In Turkey other legal changes are under discussion: the repeal of a husband's automatic status as head of the family in favor of a system of "joint responsibility of spouses" and abolition of a husband's right of consent for his wife to be gainfully employed. in twenty years the gap has not narrowed. 1980 1960 Enrollment ratio' Enrollment ratio 1980 1960 Enrollment ratio 120 Tunsia 80 120 M.. . 1983. Female primary enrollment has increased steeply in Tunisia..500-Argentina.4 percent. where primary-school education is now universal and about three-quarters of secondary-school-age children of both sexes are enrolled.

and Mexico. where BEMFAM is active. Provision of family planning services is also greater in urban areas. where BEMFAM does not operate. in contrast. By 1976 contraceptive use had doubled. Urbanization will slow somewhat from its recent fast pace. The extent of these differences was described in Chapter 4. and Uruguay. The Mexican government adopted a population policy to reduce fertility in 1973 and began providing family planning services in 1974. account for 60 percent of the region's 370 million people. One aim of public policy. In both Brazil and Colombia. Brazil. Between 1970 and . In Bahia. As development proceeds. and Mexico-but population will still double in about twenty-five years in Mexico and in about thirty years in the others. and Venezuela) 80 percent of the people are already living in cities. Chile. By combining low-key public support with private family planning programs. only 40 percent use contraceptives. Similar differentials occur in Mexico and Colombia. but (except for central and southern Brazil) less advanced than Argentina. urban teachers have on average more than eleven years of education. most of Central America and the Caribbean. widening income and wealth differentials.growth. the poorest 20 percent of households have almost one-third of all children-but only 4 percent of total income in Colombia and 2 percent in Brazil. Populations are projected to grow by at least 2 percent a year in most countries. public subsidies to rural health are less than one-seventh the national average. have 10 percent of the children and 60 percent of the income in Colombia. compared with six years for rural teachers. These differences are far greater than those in such countries as India. 8 percent of the children and 64 percent of the income in Brazil. per household. Literacy rates in rural Brazil are 48 170 percent. does provide services to the poor. In the well-to-do southern state of Sao Paulo. a major characteristic of these countries is their urban-rural contrast. As is true elsewhere in Latin America. and Malaysia. In Brazil current spending on education is as much as ten times greater per child in urban than in rural areas. Because of inequalities of income and wealth. Population policies have helped to reduce fertility in Latin America. especially in Brazil. almost 60 percent of women use contraceptives. compared with 78 percent in the towns and cities. Colombia. As economic growth accelerated after 1950. and research that included family planning. some areas and socioeconomic groups benefited more than others. This is difficult or impossible in rural areas. those differences may start to narrow. Thailand. Chile. Economically and demographically they are more advanced than the northern Andean countries. so most users rely on private suppliers. is to promote equality of opportunity. population growth is rapid throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and will remain so until the 1990s at least. Life expectancy for urban Colombians is sixty-four compared with fifty-eight for those in the countryside. No single issue is so important in Latin America as the manner in which opportunity and access are shared. Three countries. millions of people still live in poverty. In Colombia health facilities are concentrated in the urban areas. Population programs have a related role to play: they can improve the chances of the poor by making it possible for them to devote more resources to each child. closer to 3 percent in much of Central America. The richest 20 percent of households. but in some countries (Argentina. The Brazilian Family Planning Association (BEMFAM). In 1966 Colombia's Ministryof Health signed an agreement with a private medical association to provide a program of training. The national government has not assisted or promoted family planning services. The labor force will grow by more than 2 percent a year until the end of the century. Surveys in Brazil indicate that poor rural women bear twice as many children as do women from the upper 40 percent of urban households. almost entirely because of public programs. Brazilian women who neither have paid jobs nor have completed primary school have more than twice as many children as working women who completed secondary school. In the poor states of Rio Grande do Norte and Piaui. How is population growth related to inequality in these countries? Fertility is consistently and inversely related to household income and to education. and Uruguay will growth rates be lower. Uruguay. a private nonprofit organization. 63 percent of women obtain contraceptives through a private doctor or a drugstore. Fertility has declined in the three largest countries-Brazil. Colombia. The well-to-do are able to spend more per child than are the poor and they have fewer children. and despite rapid economic growth in the past quarter century. Only in Argentina. particularly in health and education. Chile. the Colombian government has helped facilitate a rapid fertility decline. In short.

0 by 1982 given its income growth.5 percent rate of the 1970s. Colombia. long tolerated by the government. Whereas Colombia and Mexico managed a sharp decline in fertility in relation to income growth. 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 8 * 1972 * 1982 7 < 6 \) ~~~~~~~Mexico * ~~Peru\ Venezuela 5 ColombiaR! 4 Norm for 92 developimg countries. With a population policy no more vigorous than that of Colombia and Mexico during the 1970s. in fact it was 3. Colombia and Mexico need to extend public family planning programs to the rural poor. and Mexico are not the only countries in Latin America where population policies could be effective against poverty and inequality. If Brazil had followed the pattern of Colombia and Mexico. a country in which the national government had not committed itself to a population policy or program (see Box 8. and to do more to integrate population policy into the overall framework of development planning.6 million between 1965 and 1975. it could extend family planning coverage to the 40 million people of its poorer regions. its total fertility rate would have fallen to 3. Brazilian fertility might now be one-quarter lower than it is. Brazil's fertility decline was more modest (see Figure 8. 1982 2 0 $1000 $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) $4000 $5000 $6000 1980 fertility fell in both Mexico and Colombia by about one-third. in the 1980s the number of children in the primary-age group will grow by less than a million. Looking ahead. Most of the difference would come from lower fertility among the poor. Brazil's popular private sector programs. Paraguay. This contrast becomes even sharper when it is noted that per capita real incomes nearly doubled in Brazil but were up by only 50 percent in Colombia and Mexico. do not have adequate resources. in contrast.7). Brazil.4). it declined by less than 20 percent in Brazil. By 1990 the Colombian labor force will be growing by 2. With fewer new entrants to the labor force.FIGURE 8. well below the 3.4 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. since it is they who would be assisted most by a public policy. 1972 4~~~~~ 4 I Costa Rica ~ ~ ~~Braz Chile ~ __ 3 Norm for 98 developing countries. Ecuador. Peru. Brazil spends more than 4 percent of its GDP on health. a larger proportion of them can expect to qualify for high-wage jobs. easing the strain on the education budget.2 percent a year.9. and the Central 171 . In Colombia the number of enrolled primaryschool students increased by 1. The advantages of lower fertility are already becoming apparent in some Latin American countries. There is significant unmet need for family planning in the poor Northeast. by devoting a tiny share of that budget to family planning.

.irc. i- Pia.Ih..d E t I2.'I.iiti.i-n Irn. r nj-.lI i' i>. .' .h- tr.-urr .ni.. *rr.d..4 i it. 1 . .. _. . IiUri. C run-h r-i '1Mirli..n.i-K r.#rliir.3 a-i. -TO --.. rT .' tK. r .r.ilti.'Ir. rt.3 iIrijr.riliii n h'u.nr In .1:.j. (Fir iL.7 h n .e er.iir.'~ l.r...Box 8. J. F' .%r.jlr'-[--r l. [-"4 i.*( rn. ''l1.iifj i itrjl.rrda I1 n .iri-i ir n i .i.-. r.r..r. ti'['id rt. pEr.ii. . .. 'r.I.r' h idi* .i'..i .. n.. .. :.] c ph..3 .l pE. .-i. ii i. iFirn1 r I rh.-.i. i r [ri r -mr'..r Y.r.. - flr3r -['-r.irrI... . n] p.h rn ri hAn. n.. n riwit P. Ii aridA lardt: itr -.l. -3 1 .n ii ..-- -i .i.i r Fr-I NJi.I.hT pii 1 'r on.tj-r" Idtii.J ir -ri m p '.rli.p . i.J.-njI Lie..h. b . p''uar. n - In --:ar n i-lih rid i r Jr-I'r r I.Ind In'id S .... -a hrni p~'rrrun. iiir .I t iripi.r Ip'i.i ( nra~. 'iii J('4 r. . -AIn r h.: lii p l:rI . T r r.-. a ri-iar.s~ 'ii Ii.1 nl.. .n i i I ltrid r. 1 I-iiI ni. riu l n-tF.I..T rh .I.ini. rl.Ld .r. r: rc.ri. t .4n-ii . r--. i.e'rrn-cicJ th-.cI .' '---a. ifi T.p.z .. T'I. uS -.mumi-I hI.i- P.ri. i.-. l.-I-ird . -i i-i Ir !.t ale iiTu ib-I...:. ir_pr~'m iin Fu.-.rI in ..r.un1 ' rii.. i' I lim r ir-ui lpr .r nEtod LI lb ri..l..i.. I. '.' i. T n.I :'d er i:nr'ar .I h .:d tI'...iiiln1in Sra af-1---rn ..nifi ir. nti-. nrei. h---I -ri h. uI ri ~ t'fii- 3rI1i.r i :i---cT r. i r . '- ruM r ' at n-.i *.[.n' i..i-.] Iin . lhir: .nri.n. .n ht I... ialii 1. ir. ho .r..Iii.i r'.u r. Ir.) frI Inr.r .C rh..n ill.ni.h I-' -.i.F-i T. -Il -ririri.IT hat B i-r.i-r .n. . tr.ni-II I.i. .-..i.r:ri'~ "' El3r:i. ". -x.ir-1 'l.in. 'r.ai rh-al C.lu Iih.nre i a lir .nil'...I -r..Iriitiiiii.*r-ii V thrill K-rIm n 3----. rin Ad 1..r n hanil-.]- I r-..rAJ idrlb MI I. ri'it r. .. h-rTh .ic1t. ITi rii:r F... IthF. f . n i.-"dt rh. tr vd.'...3 I i-x.'ir.ii..r.i T i U.r. 'r . ]. . .iti. ii ir.i.3r un nd. 'qrit i.T.i' o-. w. p r'I F' . rh.. O tP .41 irrr lb.. .:i.~ .urt .r.-'.r-i . Ir .-.- I i.nd .iri T.npI:r. 3uI p. . . . pi-rinin Iii' 3rd -.iir I ir.i.-.p.l rd hl ir.iir ' d .iI -ir.:h.-. 'iii n iilli. rai. . y. ifl-l. ri-i.-. -l..iran.r i-i Ir'' '.. i i1 'rIr m i rl. IT - nirJhl I. i.r [I. (jTi. iii.r. runtJ a d 1 r i m'. t II.E 'Jilt' -A I i.pirlr -i .jr*-.l oFri Fri. . . n r -.l. iu rV.t..r. .I i1-lrt1. ri H aI i h i.. r F-- ridi -ii -Iui -' > lIiri -- ii'i .3r..i A zin . i.rin. d In.r a 1.n- h1 pr-.I.. . - i-.pIitf i' Itii T I pm. . -X [V. 1 - 1 Ltiuld [.-. L.-..l iii-' hi i....rI. -'iahlI'1r..r pro.fl .. Iti.irli..-... ir n . r.:. Plannr. 1Hit'1 in ir a. .rl. enir. . rI rrd v3er .. ia -ri in.J i'.ii.. - Fan-ij .lr. 4 i: itrifr Ena:. . Mr rh.1rw. r...'' -rT-~ p.d -i ri rn ThI: i r ri. II-.7 Changing policies and attitudes toward family planning in Brazil i?ina ....ii.'i ..nd-I.i.r..i. n p.0h pnirli ri L. .r i. ir hi. r ...-rr i.-i..rF'nl '3-n -in I - in ih.h i TI h .I -.rh ii.. In . 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III-t -tirt iri I rri r 'c.r rh. 2rM.r. r-. rn-i-i .-I ' r..r.i .irl rn.ii .-ih.-ii..3 .n .T i--in.c r.---:i riLr' air.-Ii.:Fmnl i.......N t 'fir ii Ii i.fli h.in . ih Frail Fir.-f n.Jr II i "In' Illni-id--ri LI .rjIrh.ir-.:I rnr rn-..rrriplicii. i-] r't.nuI I ..j1 h-I r'ii 1r-.~Ii.r- . Threrri 7I i . .. u-_i'. r1ir..ir . I r n . .-iH Jl.irndm 13.n ir it -r I r.r. F'I2 aTCil I AiiiLI I'K" ._w 'I r.r.'rI- tin... i- . riflrng nc -u 'mItTI ci TF-... l r.. r I- o '. rii. I-iii a.i -. ci IT ii r-ni r. I. i.r. - p.i1. rlr...-I t fli~t iri :?r.ala-~ luring K.nr.ni'i it1r . r nix ar -* I%A.:tI ...T IJ.][ It.I r .1 . I .ipr... hul Ir. hr 1 .I-rlda. ji. 1 (i'--'-~Fd in -I-s i rhn .-.3i.i-a lrmiF. l re i.: -. r Pt-l i ivrjhi .ii m r%Iid u (nl pI ri. 'h.i.p.1 I I 1 .h. --ri r.. rl .. dni.. )I rC I 1Inri ila t inf V. r u . .ri. I 'In hi-rl... ar nid rii -tr In iC n] -. II .-rn.n.r Id.r T.Ii. lr.r t r.t mn-.:r K.Fi - Ii' ..i J i-i a .iii.n Rr.r i Ind Fin . Ciiiiil-4 113 *~-iJ . -flit'-mtE 11 rinimurt pr.i n! ' and i.1...: I in .r. w . - .IcIiiir.ntilrn-n.r.iii 'ai .pnr-irii t h-... 'it-ri f r.irc riiiC. ni.'.iri 'i 1 h. ip T hrh r i'h-.r. irfrlJn -hi..r .iridir.n:: .T'I[ . r.-.I .. -ri 1rir iil-.. 'I Jp'ilrii -h 'i.un r. hd yiI: I-ri- ~.-r.n lini mu - 'I. . iri B.I.'Iur i-I I r' . : ri.-\- .iuij ri.1.iut i 1.i ph.. I-..iii' i Ji F.i.-il *.-j f'. -I 2 J PhsrIti ii'i-L. IIT.I. r ii.I Ilia tr r. i f air.-r3 fi p. rapidJ r-puIt *au .-.lan%p'-n. .d. .ilC...i ri.n r . l h. Iriqirr . Ira. .iiirriu u.ir .~~IC *]itri'd I. ~ i.i.dn n 1172- .lini.1 IV..lIa.gr3r.d .id.rlr -2.r...3 hbj II.- hal I i .. 1 frj.i. r-r -. -nii.).' .r. n) ih. Ii h.

1982 $1000 $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) 3 0 Progress in South Asia has not been uniform.8 in 1982. Rapid population growth in El Salvador has been identified by many as a partial cause of its civil war. infant mortality is almost four times higher (171 per thousand). have both been important. a variation which closely corresponds to patterns of social development. Although incomes in South Asia are among the lowest in the world. Despite a per capita income of only $320 in 1982.4.5 in 1960 to 3.5 in the 1950s to 4. population growth has increased in India-its population is now increasing by 16 million a year. and increasing 173 . FIGURE8. including China.7 in 1978). initiatives to slow population growth are among the most urgent policy needs to combat poverty.6 in 1978. No other country at India's level of socioeconomic development-measured by low literacy and per capita income and high infant mortalityhas a lower level of fertility. India's birth rate has remained at 33 to 34 per thousand since 1976. but appears to have made slow progress since then (though the share of modern methods has apparently risen). In Pakistan only about 5 percent of couples practice contraception.5). in the state of Uttar Pradesh total fertility was 5. The rate of contraceptive use (both modern and traditional methods) is 55 percent in Sri Lanka.5 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in South Asia. Of a contraceptive use rate of 55 percent. infant mortality had been reduced to 41 per thousand and virtually all primary-school-age girls were enrolled in school. About 28 percent of couples in India use modern contraceptives. In Bolivia and Haiti. raising the legal marriage age.7 since 1974. the poorest countries in the region. more than in any other country. and female literacy and contraceptive use are. In Bangladesh contraceptive use increased from 8 percent in 1975 to 19 percent in 1981. contraceptive use. Pakistan. the region's fertility has already fallen substantially (see Figure 8. and 32 percent of couples are protected by modern contraception. In contrast. infant mortality is 47 per thousand live births.5 in 1974. The experience in Sri Lanka is similar. which has the lowest total fertility (2. For example. and Sri Lanka comprise one-fifth of world population and one-quarter of the population of developing countries. in the state of Kerala. and in Nepal only 7 percent. the highest in the region. In every country there is considerable scope for reducing infant mortality. Nepal. respectively. In Sri Lanka. The experience in Sri Lanka and in some Indian states suggests that much more could be done to bring about fertility decline. What accounts for this impressive record? Continued progress in raising female literacy and lowering infant mortality.6). however. In India and Sri Lanka mortality has declined as fast as. Bangladesh and Pakistan have had more modest declines. oneseventh and one-third the levels found in Kerala. In Bangladesh 19 percent of couples use either modern or traditional methods (see Figure 8. Total fertility has stopped falling in Sri Lanka. Both of these countries lag behind others in providing health and family planning services. almost two-thirds comprised modern methods. total fertility had declined to 3. as well as a concerted effort to expand access to family planning. 75 percent of rural women are literate. 1972 5 India riLanka 4 S L / Norm for 98 developing countries. steady at 23 to 24 percent since 1976. and rapid population growth is a source of continuing concern. and has been fluctuating between 3. the total fertility rate fell from 5. Within India there is wide variation in fertility and in contraceptive use. India. in India it dropped from 6.American countries could all benefit from stronger policies. 6 Nepa Norm for 92 developing countries. fertility. As a result. or faster than. 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 8 1972 U 1982 * 1982 7 Bangladesh Pakistan South Asia: expanding and improving programs The 930 million people of Bangladesh. although both show signs of a renewed political commitment to curb population growth. has only recently begun to rise again. for example.4 and 3.

is not offered through social marketing arrangements. and an additional 15 percent who are aware do not know where a method can be ~~~~~~~obtained.1 1975 1983-84 1975 1982-83 India 1975 t [ j 1982 Bangladesh Sri Lanka Method Traditional (rhythm. abstinence.000 retail outlets in the social marketing program as well as in family planning program outlets.4). Better family planning outreach could go a long way to increase contraceptive use throughout the region. for contraception among 22 to 27 percent of eligible women. Pilot projects there Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh. Sri Lankan women are having on average one child more than they want. Family planning programs in South Asia have continued to emphasize sterilization to the neglect of reversible methods of contra- vaginalmethods Condom i: Sterilization (male and female) female education-all of which would have a profound effect on fertility. The pill. A few countries are moving beyond schemes that compensate those who adopt contraception to consider positive incentives for small families. * Access. both reversible methods and sterilization need to be. The government plans to meet the need for contraception by greatly 1 . two-thirds in Sri Lanka. According to a 1979 survey in Bangladesh. family planning programs must resolve important issues of access and quality. three to four times the prevalence of these methods nationwide. Access is most restricted in Nepal and Pakistan. About half of currently married women in * 10 w | | | Nepal are unaware of a modern contraceptive method. Since then contraceptive use has stagnated. Bangladesh has contemplated offering bonds to sterilization clients with two to three children and to couples who postpone a first pregnancy or space children at long intervals (see Box 6. A quarter to a half of these women had unmet need for contraception to limit births. made available. Given the high rate of child mortality in South Asia. reversible contraceptive methods may be more desirable for couples who have had two or three children but who do not wish to be sterilized immediately. In Nepal there is unmet need 30 20 . India. these cards would entitle them to preferential access to social services. 1975-83 Percentage of married women aged 1549 60 50 40 have achieved rates of contraceptive use of 35 to 40 percent with modern methods. To maximize contraceptive use. India is considering a scheme to give "green cards" to couples sterilized after two children. which is provided through 400.8). and in 1981-82 was being distributed through only 4. and Sri Lanka. But other forms of contraception are used less. To satisfy unmet need. Sterilization accounts for more than three-quarters of modern contraceptive use in India and Nepal.500 urban out- .FIGURE 8. three-quarters of married _women of childbearing age knew of a modern method in 1975.6 childbearing age have unmet need for contraception to limit or space births. other) - TUD _1IUD - Injectable contraceptives and _ Pill expanding and upgrading services. * withdrawal. as many as 41 percent of married women of 174 ception. largely because they are not widely available. and about half in Bangladesh. actual size averages about 5.500 rural and 2. but only 5 percent were using one. particularly in India and Sri Lanka (see Figure 8.6). * Method mix. Sterilization is clearly in demand among couples who want no more children. The only widely available reversible method in India is the condom. In Sri Lanka 44 percent of women of childbearing age who want no more children are nevertheless not practicing contraception.5. In Pakistan. important in countries such as Indonesia. Desired family size in Bangladesh is now about four. In Bangladesh family planning and greater economic independence of women are jointly promoted through credit cooperatives for women (see Box 8.

.b . n r c. c3rr% tn _ no-~t Ic-:n' ha-. ltd-g and practlce .memrAr t 'ri.-n n.r--r i-: ht 31 ri4 mt pregrnafrc:. i-ttin -rrace.r an tanili.uth ul.ade lint during their rrtl. \il idepu ri-inih..i- .n rca<irdi.ni that need t. .aned rtli. . han .r:ent Ihana-le-. hicil'ire namil-.a It FrIledW *-Il-:er. idhI c. trjnsmri t.ct:-nirac: purchba-e a -* .-n acc :pat3rnct and pten c'nmnr Ih niiu. leader..ind t a.n.rip4 alith -uh the the o-nih ni-rianniblr4 t.miurin Bank h3 '.r.-i mutt tb-e nt.un ir -ri. rt:.3ii ten t3l.L-aId irarried liit ltb rh---r . ingm E:riit.lt agreed ro rtpa. i> ri.rr turn run tticcr4 -u:h as t-h t-r-:edtng en.I i- nrernrl.area in bmih I had pouiilt Iu: plinning . nd in ar u-n4 I-.aiic:i p ulhr.-per-lt-.rnml .the truniber at sharen r-. arI trait -l. r bt in -1I I-r 'mall t. ft. r a-use annr.ed cl tiked rural I 1b42 and i. Although Bangladesh continues to stress sterilization...-It in 1*l Frtpirtiin is zilig t.pc rant mecnLtr.ailabl- .m-m n h.r . nlnvrh1.in *ng s. Such an increase in use of traditional methods attests to growing unmet need for more effective spacing methods. .'ri*rin :r'di rartr . rt tC.000 performed legally..r -ti itie that pr-i: ... el r. hr n--th--d.the-..mciiiin ihiri-.F-rt.rr hi. t..hp 'edit t' -ttrl. and a larier pr-pi-rnti--n .ercil:. . jUt.l.r.-.g:nd.c-cierit.rd..t. fbiIra:k rtpr:t 1 -h .Box 8. tht c en it- thana-le%el T.L.-.l.cperati:t -pe-:te-i it'.hJand Mll pe inur.. capitali mit.o b.e.r. and so on) in 1981. pIwlaninc -.P.in .-.ard ha. but are available at only 120 centers. gr-Li r ntt-rpriset Li-an.I- i..-cr- -nlt rpririr t-rn -uch 3a.tpera- -:hmld-:itinc tor tirtr -t u-r..-et . withdrawal.-. a traditi..r-h t .:ifiu4% the ti . senrd-.h.. almrn..I u I+ Oit.ntrac IB.kntp . thi.met3rrinrg *-el tern pporiunitie the pr-.iiri Ar riiu.3 c Inr. agem nd.. In Sri Lanka 25 percent of married couples of childbearing age were using traditional methods of fertilty regulation (rhythm. Bangihdth iPlan.-ihrr 'hr a.hare 3pitpal -l abu *u3 1*1kmL knm .g mcme r .. l'lalaNl lI- : sidt -lI.e .Jd . i-nr. 9 r mrn.:rltraepr.-t at 1 3 p. al di"-. priNIM -j -Fi n..ith .a- l inr-:re..n Trh 1 ..c lh.rat . .. mrmnt r. -. the pr-le.h a: rI.Z.lr.ir rpmenr c"ip ism.. a mith. ha. Ba.dt. . -. Thti pru.. in .r *:t childbearing aoe.-icc p.t married -lrtir-rait i.ntrer -hip i.-'i th.I nmembrhate in c-mni th tphrai.intilar grtup. public health midwives have not yet been trained to perform insertions.3e a li-n'r -men . 5 turn tak. | to r-du. .h.arwet rilr:l-:.. r-lannin.-e .pi.1 a M prrc tr that enLc-urae pricetaing pajdd i.ing.in.e turmt ri: mu -tard -o:il dal 3:hili ti. .r lcan' tar . rr rt. it-.-grarim.-nnal skill -ucli a.l.i-pen t-.tal 'a' n.ide n:-. -rni. in their millage r rla.r.-It ..n.othr. .3 'ial nr-r 11. h-ihrdI 1 [- 3n111 . n:.ardi demand .*-i dinc raiiili.int ri - -i-.:-ach c: pr.-r busing %-. pr-A. r.rlv and attend .paJd pn.d toindi' -dual.ni h. high ir:.iJ in re.t nibin.:-d ...: i.E3 -:-..i i roug-hl.ir-cr rhe program Vhad -tab*>'t-perati\ lith R 4 3-r.-.ur mezdi. tim r hi-h.e-d 4 .h Irrirh id.i re practit. n.ning ccimprrd 1h tin.mat-. tr .ln-r: r t fib n.:al aitent-n Thc.-r ulio aiitmn In. a doubling of the percentage since 1975. . arl-J -p --n.. .den .: o.8 Family planning and women's credit cooperatives in Bangladesh Tb.-ul. a..r ber' t. plan. nt_ .etdl : i.. n--ceting. they are not yet permitted to prescribe pills. TKh tiing anb'r. t-' mi.ne h.ed r ihire in the *: . .:al help it A cud C.ni:.rnkn .-nniin a-.tianc:ir4 a c imtpinem n.. planninmng p-e. safe abortion is still difficult to obtain. p..-...p-pldc. Only 664 centers offer the IUD. . :'.g ing and ir. pt'rThe. Injectable contraceptives are popular in rural areas because of their convenience. bn rp. and marnwritardening F3mil.g and 'ncc.rial -atu..-. '-ut Trh ditL \inc.runt in ...-n: prec -.nra.-.but taktr' n--an-. i 1w. -rcJup. There are plans to train health and family workers to insert IUDs.rtn.ing_alde.-irpndi -.-t -planning lets.irnil% pl3nning .nz imr.o tarnil-.-ult.'n the . L - ac ThefSr rrp-rc.n. ..hetrining ..-tnt3n i' -.u.i m mencrnbrt nrar.r-nerat m. -.1nd a.it amne am. it..1ar '. hr .- - -:..ag.munt 3rr.n'armt.:men *dt-pndrn-:: on h.n t I 'r.--an c:-nrrta-prrI J ridte t I-ftc.ramr.-rint plot -rol p u-lir rai.eiimC-ili a3r..: alId all 1. nd .tt. trll a' r-.rtlI..n:.dmr--:-n lIr-.: entri- t ral m mrh'm tr-1 'he-art trained in health and and -.jr*tiin rt.a -hirri r-nre 'c.l bckgrui'd.p-:al trairin. planrn-n4 lianp p-lc IJ-.e int. th. e at 1 liili Nlrnitb r In c. r.id LW elB.111 pertent 1.ultr-.tm.uirng and d an1 nitde.l 1 . t it:.nil pri-ceIurivnlnttr in i --- r lrcl t- . rna. An estimated 4 million to 6 million abortions were performed illegally by unauthorized persons in 1981. ri ritfr :. ati. r..nt .-t.: . its social marketing project has made avail175 .: -at t.-: g--n.tc rrrurn cr. r ran: im.ingr . eiand in p -n- t-:. pi:r statu4 l. all ni3rmt--.-ng!lide'h Rur. .r.gram jor.r :. p.ri .c I-an pr.or lengti *r mnrmbtv-r.u :. tr-. .- plannd pat-: nib:. menltrhIr-n i-mn . rli.id' lr*. Although access to abortion was liberalized as a backup service for contraceptive failure more than ten years ago.: -ne -c--man t. hjna nx nan-. and -p-01n-.irin at ire in tht chmldb-rinc.t .mrnmtd. cr i1 1 riICe. populati-n prc-ii" e-:t.tintrd u. art I. ntra t ab-ut 1 per-.p.mm'i. been u.I-a-.d ti.tt alt a:. been J rrrcen e ha. -pmin. ht .a rainima planning ard reealth : .is. compared with 376.t ra.. their memrbher...r N.-r m-p iudtr: u I t:nimt. in.:. and hi-... T.

And the program has recently put more emphasis on IUDs by offering financial incentives to staff and compensation for travel and lost wages to acceptors. and Thailand have also experienced remarkably rapid falls in fertility with only modest increases in income. The program in Pakistan has also recently undergone a major reorganization. In most countries. pills. then integrated. Hong Kong. and not all of those who are have received adequate training. despite a per capita income of only $310 in 1982. Whenever there are such upheavals. have been highly successful in improving socioeconomic conditions favorable to fertility decline. irrespective of level of income. Nevertheless. and Thailand.5 to 2. infant mortality has been reduced by half or more over the past twenty years. 2. 176 East Asia: incentives for small families The countries of East Asia have experienced marked declines in fertility in the last decade (see Figure 8. * Follozv-up. the population of the Philippines will increase by half (25 million people) by 2000. 63 percent in the Philippines. further substantial reductions could be made in Indonesia (where the rate exceeds 100 per thousand live births). At present. At its current growth rate of 2. Thai-land. The most dramatic reductions have been in China: total fertility dropped from 7. but are available on only a limited basis under the supervision of a physician. In Bangladesh. Despite dramatic declines in fertility.able several types of condoms. Lack of follow-up services greatly reduced the acceptability of the IUD throughout South Asia in the 1960s. the Philippines. then divided. health and family planning services were initially separate. China's population will .2 percent. the Philippines. Programs will have to adopt new performance criteria and incentive arrangements to stress regular contact with clients. and lack of supervision have also lowered morale and performance. for example. family planning staff are judged (and are rewarded) according to the number of acceptors they recruit. Singapore. Injectable contraceptives have proved popular in pilot projects. and spermicides. staff morale and performance suffer. Burma. Korea. with an annual increase of 1. not by the number of users they assist. As South Asian programs try to meet the demand for a wider range of reversible methods. recent declines in fertility have occurred in countries where fertility was already lower than would be expected. Indonesia.3 over the past two decades. Total fertility (less than 3) and rates of natural increase (about 1. In almost all countries. incomplete staffing patterns. supervision takes the form of enforcing accountability and targets rather than supportive training and advice. According to the standard projection. secondaryschool enrollments are also high in a few countries-53 percent in Malaysia. population will continue to grow rapidly for a long time because of the momentum of past growth.4 percent a year. Population policy is more developed in East Asia than in any other region. but this system carries the risk that follow-up services will be neglected. Family planning services have undergone major reorganization in some countries. But neither incentives nor targets can substitute for better training and supervision-the two requirements that are critical to improving the performance of family planning programs in South Asia. Ninety percent or more of all girls of primaryschool age are enrolled in China. and 85 percent in Korea.2 percent excluding China) are the lowest of any developing region.7). but not all fieldworkers are in place.5 percent a year. it has only recently regained public approval. Hong Kong. and Viet Nam. population in the region will double in about forty-five years. and Viet Nam all have annual rates of population growth of at least 2 percent a year. and Singapore has risen to seventy years or more and in most other countries exceeds sixty. In some cases salaries are so low that staff have to take on other work to support their families. Malaysia. The emphasis on sterilization has meant that staff have had little continuing contact with clients. Other problems are manifest in all programs. Many governments. Indonesia. Inadequate training. Where it exists. given the region's income. Even in China. Indonesia. and Viet Nam (about 50). following up acceptors will become even more critical. with outreach to rural areas and a reasonable mix of contraceptive methods. the Philippines. political commitment to reduce rapid population growth is high. the Philippines. and are now reintegrated. Overall. Program managers have tried to overcome problems of morale and supervision in two ways: by paying workers according to their performance in recruiting acceptors. For the most part. Malaysia. and by setting high program targets. Life expectancy in China. Certain administrative and operational difficulties also need to be resolved. Family planning programs are well established. China (with a rate of 67). There are plans to train more fieldworkers in IUD insertions and menstrual regulation.

improving the effectiveness of traditional methods and promoting more effective alternatives could have a substantial effect. Replacement-level fertility is still a long way off for Burma. Though contraceptive use is higher in East Asia than in most other developing regions. where onethird of the country's population lives. Sometimes they have relied on individual incentives (such as giving priority in 177 .7 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia. for example. is less than half the level on Java and Bali-in some places much less. Actual family size exceeds desired family size by one child in the Philippines. There are also marked regional disparities in access to services in the Philippines. 15 to 26 percent in Thailand (1981). In addition. 1972 4 Indonesia l 3 Thail\nd Thailand \ \\ Malaysia Norm for ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~98 developing countries. at 2. Among the countries of East Asia. 1982 i l China 2 0 $1000 ~~~~~Korea $2000 $3000 Income per capita (1980 dollars) $4000 $5000 $6000 increase by almost half. In the Philippines. Malaysia. the Philippines.6.45 billion by 2050. and as much as 30 percent in Korea (1979). The potential demand for spacing methods is demonstrated by the high resort to abortion in Korea. Low and high estimates of unmet need are 19 to 49 percent of married women of childbearing age in the Philippines (1978). The Indonesian program. wider promotion of spacing methods might also lower fertility. Thailand and Viet Nam. In some countries family planning programs have not achieved complete geographic coverage. Injectable contraceptives have been much favored in Thailand but are only recently gaining ground in Indonesia. More than half of eligible couples who want no more children are not using any method of birth control. with total fertility rates of at least 3. In Indonesia. is also still above replacement level. Yet this method has been very popular in South Asia. and to a lesser extent Korea. and some Latin American countries.FIGURE 8. 20 to 31 percent in Indonesia (1976).7. for example. have made greatest use of measures to promote small families. contraceptive use in the outer islands. there is still considerable unmet need for contraception. more use could be made of incentives and disincentives. Indonesia. Singapore. does not offer sterilization. some countries have overlooked potentially important methods. And among the 36 percent of Filipino couples using a method. Thailand. China. more than half are using less effective methods such as withdrawal and rhythm. 1972 and 1982 Total fertility rate 8 * 1972 * 1982 7 6 Philippines N 5 for 92 developing countries. The Korean program has emphasized sterilization. to 1. Korea. total fertility in Korea. Given the relatively advanced state of population policies.

ht ri l. lumi. ru'. rn a per capita ha-.ui aienr r.rc. .-n-i irn ic'-na area' : land t:-r h. a11-. nianticide ~i tID ma.rt ior ithee n-~r ind e'i-.icr-.. .en the . rlI and trchdiren.ldr~ n en ..rc than I.HL -nc-tnt. an mi"n.p:tcai. eI.'br. r itnotrnaili..r tinanc.rtli Th~ prcr.ibearin.-n' adr..t.i.. information.r... lu ci nct.~r c -rIed upFice.nl ha. deli cr their ol..housing schemes to parents with only two children). i ifct~ nd e -Tnen -..fl paid h...rc ch.~ha-~ nrc. e menu la)ur. e-t atk-ut . -prread ucttc'w..4'.Ia cd. and birth quotas to promote a one-child family (see Box 8. China's one-child family policy h-tn . 'Id.eJ I.e-inernt h a. rujral prcuin '.. t rrEen 'it- th.iicd bcr.e prc...' parcnt -. Im: chtid crantedana e..-..ni norna -_al in urban art. inAnhu. hich tiiurt -.Y m. rcrnain the.. Most governments have not chosen to promote such drastic measures as those in China. e.-r it. governments need public information campaigns and legal reforms of inheritance. The same bias in favor of sons exists in Korea.nt . birth. p't. cn:-fir:cid Eb-'..uc-d 1e .ld P tIc' r.. Some countries have also offered incentives to whole communities that reach specific targets for contraceptive use..lic.. and has been partly responsible for keeping total fertility..tr . hadi mn. * ha. -'-tII nc.-ill.. 'it r marri late bt. nter-.r' -. p -u t.. ptedzinz n tIn rPr. r -:cumlt . . cMFlZ ta. tr qepricing trrpi'fc ..h .htld i ard the t'd rc. i. from declining to replacement level.'-plc b. _I'ecti.-ur.. c' nu.e.percent ita.*. Some governments also penalize those who have more than a certain number of children-for example.utc -.F"-.i.r actie i.u that.c:ipattttcr'-Bcjijng . n-ie-child cii Th. -Je- nut the -. n birth.nal r'. it' rat ta3c tc-re 3r~ -- crkifnic .. China has a complex structure of incentives. anr cp.'c. i-.I..nierpr.h-.J. t.n tc. by the withdrawal of maternity benefits. h~a'...r.curit TI.r'.cre -L..n C niH-tn n-uch ---.. -na.i.7. are 'Ii i.tt.ui .t'-.-- cent in cac' Tinl-adi But 'c cLtura'npd: in..Lbc- chii.-au..T tah. it d ulatp. . and to assist governments in developing population policies as part of Box 8..-ttr tic . I -'nc-child I ram.in ith... rt:r-.rccnt ri n-r..a..Ira .rih...or two-child families with girls. .percent in lw a4l tr-r.p'tr nren ei. disincentives.i'hi-..-n Se itemr appitee OnL'.n. c*n *n re . chilld I. aled from ictat btrtb. in I' tanu anilk r. a. h. pliarcc p .d -Il.-fnal pr-Mit'.rl.. .crrr.cen I2bIllio:n p.. 't. i..d -J.42 cen. .t birihe e'ce'1d e-i -it h th. it became. -.. Donor assistance policies International aid for population programs has two major objectives: to assist governments and private organizations in providing family planning.r iau 'rh 'it tcc.c-ui-Jd ha'.h Ir.9 Birth fitha. health rat -th.rl% Ii prc-idc t. had .. a d-b.ult age (rtiht.rthat c-('rO .n tahit.. ....nce~ eand municipali- c..'-. lund' e.3C.I.. .rce 'n-.. -r. -a ah bi-a n . And few have the administrative control necessary to implement national schemes of deferred payments or social security to promote smaller families.ri' tall.3 .ai *nc'n'c-u L-a.. rna p-at. rural mat. ait capected nir i tcn.~t. i. c.niiral dtanil. .hr zc.o. *th ra.reas. -...-.i in C.:mnpemnt ruch ~rcI - dittcct -zcntcincc~r... Ea.trc c-e hr 1ah.t. *.chc.tA e v...irgiechi the. i.r v. 1pren i r i rye it al ot rh~ pta-lie.-% and -di a'. anice~ and aep~a in r.ntr%-de~ .. etr . in '-K o. 11iii i ritncc ri' at .t.th-at -.a. trnm ot e.'ut *~~t ncr.'tr. 42 percent in 1%)l B'.' -. zrot-cwci that -e.a rceuit th rm.cn n-hig anJI 4. l' a p.re 14 1 ~ iuc ad ~rte at tŽ. property rights. t. ri-.-prem.hate. r. a.I p.ua't l tir... Idt.-'r the.mttr . eti.c . rh.dc.hildrEni ..m ha' rf in. '-~.ar'tl. * Lt.n iht' Y%\ and .ct. ...--t -h. ari..'n t tr.. rr.ng F. . itin oluntt -.ritlo r'. Incentives might also be offered to one.. r. p-tic.3arati. ir'at e 2 -rr'enmcier chit- c'-'n.u. h. ure.u-hc.i-ree lar4.t hich hc. ail.titnd that ri.t.r pr"-_ .. .r .n): d.%..-.-.4 n i tti. pa.ut i`b. -me an elit-mt to ccontL'at h-. citar.IF.iU-tchuaf ha~.iht~-:..t -Id~-a.. Sia n c h:.Wl In.. it.9).nti-e.p. ~e. .. th.ud not r_iu:du 'tie rate .-n . Ah : ..i mun.'n beca1me a nti-. and I m lenu I.rc .fc pcr-nr t ha the ''fI h~ lat. percuadei mrt.eni n ithe Inr%) u3n-r:-.:-..n ir ti. ~.n. ur.p. To counteract this bias. now at 2. a pii.and I. such as lower educational and medical costs or preferred access to schooling.ha. bar. e in.. the vr~chrt'ilhd pc.rc car Jti.*ii h. . *th a t. l-... -hiidr... ltcpid The.nE h. nu.a.o..i' c it.. aea tnr. had irntr'-dJu :d tnt It' pr -nr-it.- drcr.Thi.Zaif zan -.r uniorlc - (hnt rI.c InEt~r .ri iug '. and employment.c -:'ni'. rheiag. In China the one-child policy has been challenged by an apparent preference for sons.ri acce~ Ic' mi.-n-ttule at ft'i brireade'..re a3nd In addi. pen.aii catd .m. t''rrh 178 . i-n a .urn ~-me r-..1taed a. cn It.ca i pr. imin i-ie.rntit d then-i P. pn. -t. 'ta i 1 rm curput rc the r'at. .- dcE'-I ?ned Ii.'. Zrcma .p' t i Ftr their '.c in. Upcr. i reepcn-itbtit.. ptn. h. cite' -n. 'ltI adult oriiratflall. A 1-zurx -. I n rtEring -I past ht4h r. '..e . It-C. -. I pcrc.-ncvrrn bTh lc.r.e a it. 1fln-. urban.it..ld.ad den-ne~-ch IId nir anacr it 2 reduced a.- i. e .I.minrod.-mtc d tc.nalie.cd U-.-di. n local C4 a ar-i' r..t' 1a 2! t birth.th andt tailing mcr:'ralir.re and pe.in.pcrtic.. brd3 . tIr * .u'eh-..u. n-.c'.-n. rr C-trce chdl- .-puiatirwniorc.c .' Vet.. met ri~ tie' nati. and services.ne under hi --ebad.I \ cL'mr-pulzo.n.

over half of which came as contributions from OECD countries. 1983. UNFPA. and poor demographic information. It receives requests for assistance that far exceed the money it has available. Japan is the second largest donor. operations and social and economic research. the -absence of local institutions. about two-thirds of population aid is devoted to family planning and related maternal and child-health programs.9 percent of OECD aid and about 1. At its peak. About 100 developing countries have requested and received UNFPA assistance. About one-quarter of the population aid from the US government is administered through more than twenty nongovernmental organizations in the United States. particularly universities and research institutions. donors have transferred more than $7 billion in population aid (in 1982 prices). To guide its programming. India. About $150 million is spent by donor governments for research on reproductive biology and contraceptive technology. in Latin America and Africa about 60 percent. A nongovernmental body of more than one hundred national family planning associations. vide a local base for social and economic research as well as for contraceptive research. * Thle International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Development of local capability must continue to be a priority for donors. information and education activities. along with private American foundations.1 showed. As shown in Chapter 7. Countries receiving its largest grants in recent years are Brazil. UNFPA has assessed the needs of more than seventy countries. The main role of donors has been to provide supplies and training for family planning and related health programs. over 80 percent of assistance goes toward family planning services. data development is often an early step in heightening consciousness about population -issues. including Canada. Since Sweden's first population grant in 1968. program development is often constrained by limited training.8). Colombia. But its contribution has been falling in real terms since 1972. the year of the World Population Conference in Bucharest (see Figure 8.2 percent of OECD aid. In Asia and the Middle East. Donors also support basic data collection.5 percent of OPEC aid. such research contributes to methods that can be adopted in developing countries as well. Population assistance now amounts to nearly $500 million a year. provides about 40 percent of all aid for population. the Federal Republic of Germany.2). almost a fifth of assistance is used to finance data collection. IPPF had a 1983 program budget of $90 million. equal to about 1.I 1981 Source. Donor support could hasten development of institutions to pro- dollars (millions) 100 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 0. the Netherlands. and policy and institutional development. In terms of per capita receipts in the developing countries. 20 ably larger-2. and Sweden. Norway. Japan and other donors. All gave $10 million or more in population assistance in 1982. Developing countries could benefit from larger sums spent on research and product development. and Korea. Support by donors is critical since spending by the private sector in developed countries has fallen (see Box 7. as Table 8. Mexico. Donor assistance is provided both directly to country programs and through multilateral and nongovernmental organizations. the population assistance share of aid was consider- FIGURE 8. More than 130 countries contribute to its annual budget of about $140 million. The two largest organizations are: * The United Nations Fund for PopulationActivities (UNFPA). About one-third of its budget support is raised by member associations in their own countries. have increased their share of the total. assistance for population programs was lower in 1981 (the latest year for which complete data are available) - 400 300 / \ nstantdollars (per capita) 200 than in 1974.8 External assistance for population programs in developing countries Dollars per capita Current dollars 500 (1982 constant prices) 0.their overall development strategy. The United States remains the biggest supporter of population programs-its government. In sub-Saharan Africa. They cooperate with organizations in developing countries in service delivery 179 .

and multilateral-means that their priorities may not always coincide. India has for many years paid for a large share of its program. provides population assistance in more than forty countries. $7. Indonesia. their numerous activities may not be complementary or represent the most efficient allocation of resources. the great number of donors-private. Korea. India. With the expected growth of industrial . especially for Africa and South Asia. The "standard" decline would require $5. Assuming these proportions do not' change. The World Bank supports population activities through IDA credits and loans to borrowers. Since Africa and South Asia are the poorest regions and most in need of external assistance. Further. followed by Latin America (20 percent). This trend toward self-financing makes it possible to reallocate aid budgets to countries that are only starting to develop their population programs. For example. the Bank has committed $355 million for population projects. the share of the UNFPA's budget going to Africa rose from about 12 percent during the 1970s to 23 percent in 1983. Given the emerging pattern of needs described in Chapter 7. The predominance of foreign assistance within the population sector in many countries means that the attitudes and priorities of donors become significant. and Thailand. which are spent on innovative family planning services. by no means an unmanageable addition to aid budgets. almost a quadrupling of 1980 spending. World Bank finance is not available on terms as easy as most population assistance. which together accounted for more than 90 percent of Bank lending for population. and Thailand are picking up a progressively larger share of the costs of their population programs. spending for population programs in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia should have been more than double what it was. The Bank cooperates with other UN organizations.4 million in fiscal year 1983 itself). and China has always completely financed its own program. One sign of the success of international assistance is that many local governments now help pay for programs that only a few years ago were supported by international grants. These small programs. Indonesia. women's programs. with a budget of $16 million from both public and private sources. and had disbursed $215 million by the end of 1983 (including $38. Asia continues to receive the bulk of population assistance (51 percent of the total). At the same time. official. If developing countries are to achieve a "rapid" decline in fertility. the bulk of the extra program support would have had to have come from international aid. a branch of The Planned Parenthood Federation of America. the Philippines. The Population Council. provides technical assistance and supports social science and contraceptive research. Over the past three years the largest disbursements have gone to Bangladesh. bilateral. and population policy development. population assistance will need to triple (standard decline) or quadruple (rapid decline) its current level. a substantial increase in assistance is needed. in research and analysis requested by member governments.and training. To meet unmet need in all regions in 1980 would have required spending $3 billion rather than the $2 billion that was actually spent (see Chapter 7. Table 7. and biomedical and operations research. data collection and analysis. especially UNFPA and the World Health Organization. They may send conflicting signals to host governments. fueling internal controversies. nonetheless.6). Colombia. much of which is given in the form of grants.6 billion. foreign aid now supports about 25 percent of all family planning costs in developing countries. Coordination among donors and with the host government is therefore 180 extremely important for effective use of population assistance. and similar programs in other countries. By the same yardstick. Pathfinder manages about $7 million in public and private funds. The analysis in Chapter 7 led to two estimates of required public spending for population programs by the year 2000. The Pathfinder Fund is an example of smaller nongovernmental organizations. total aid for all assistance programs would increase by 5 percent. would be needed. Africa (15 percent). With two-thirds of external population assistance going to support family planning. and the Middle East (14 percent). special projects. add to the flexibility and responsiveness of population assistance. A quadrupling would raise population assistance to an annual level of $2 billion (1980 dollars) by the year 2000.6 billion (in 1980 dollars). With no other changes in official development assistance. Family Planning International Assistance. Over a period of fourteen years. the American affiliate of IPPF. The World Bank also supports an active program of economic and sector work aimed at enhancing understanding of how population growth affects development prospects and how population programs can contribute to overall development. Egypt. Bank operations grew in real terms by more than 5 percent a year between 1977 and 1983.

make a big difference in population change. Thus. given effective policies in recipient countries. however. expanded population assistance would by the year 2000 need to equal 3. 181 .countries as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3.3 percent (to achieve rapid fertility decline) of total concessional assistance. requires not just donor funds.3 percent (to achieve standard fertility decline) or 4. and aid as a constant share of their GNP. Sustained progress. it also requires a commitment by the international community to population programs as a critical part of the effort to improve people's lives. small differences in financial assistance from donors can.

Most have also cut back on imports. The contrasting performance of these two groups of middle-income countries is the result of their contrasting policies. East Asian countries have in general adopted policies to promote exports. This group includes many of the poorest countries in the world.9 Ten years of experience Much that is new about the two themes of this Report has been revealed in the past ten years. in resisting any protectionist measures that would hamper the debtor countries' exports. and has not made foreign loans seem attractively cheap in domestic currency terms. A third group of developing countries has experienced only slow economic growth in the past ten years. The most successful-Korea and Hong Kong. their capital inflows are largely in offi- - . slowing down to about 6 percent a year in 1980-83. but they do point to one general conclusion of great importance. differences among countries are largely attributable to differences in policy. Their future prospects depend largely on their maintaining the same successful mix of policies. mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. the problems of big debtors should not obscure the achievements of 182 another group of middle-income countries. They have had difficulties in servicing the little commercial debt they have. there was debate about the relative merits of development and family planning programs as alternative ways of slowing down population growth. In 1974. have managed to maintain rapid economic growth without running into serious balance of payments difficulties. investment. can be restored to healthy levels. Economic adjustment Much attention has been paid to the difficulties of developing countries that borrowed heavily in the 1970s but then found that they could not service their debts. This short-term cost has underlined the priority of their longer-term task-to redirect their economies to earn more foreign exchange so that growth. The achievements of the developing countries have been much more varied. which have encouraged domestic saving and have ensured that investment has been directed to the areas of highest return. Prominent though they are. along with external accounts. These countries have been badly affected by slow growth in the industrial world. Although they increased their external debt in the past ten years. a reduction that has improved their external accounts but at considerable cost to economic growth. Many of them. In 1974. neither economic pessimism nor the development-family planning dichotomy captures what has actually happened in developing countries. and employment. But those policies will achieve their full potential only if the industrial countries eschew the trade barriers that would hold back exports. at the World Population Conference in Bucharest. largely by maintaining competitive exchange rates. both these issues are viewed in a different light. principally in East Asia. with oil prices quadrupled and the world sliding into recession. they expanded their exports so rapidly that their debt service ratios never rose as much as did some in Latin America. Many of those countries have had to seek the support of the IMF and the collaboration of banks and governments in rescheduling debts and arranging new credits. has restricted imports on the basis of price rather than by quota. above all. and its future looks little brighter than its past. which has weakened the prices of many of the primary commodities on which they still depend for about 90 percent of their export earnings. Today. both in providing aid and trade credits and. In both economic growth and population. for example-had GDP growth of more than 10 percent a year in 1974-79. East Asian countries have also tended to maintain positive real interest rates. Their efforts deserve the support of the international community. This has enabled them to expand their exports rapidly. there was pessimism about the economic prospects of the non-oil developing countries.

It is higher in rural areas and among the less educated. and India has lower fertility than Pakistan. Without sustained improvements in living conditions. high real interest rates resulting from the conflict between monetary restraint and relative fiscal laxity. desired family size could remain around four-implying population growth rates at or above 2 percent.1 in 1972 to 2. In many areas where services are available. the industrial countries have been unwilling to tackle the rigidities in their economies. the prospects for the world economy will remain clouded. discontinuation rates are high-often 183 . some have done better than others. The diversity that has been such a prominent feature of the world economy in the past ten years seems likely to persist. Indonesia. Within that total. and in general by using prices rather than government directives to allocate resources. and substantial foreign assistance must be forthcoming to finance the effort. contraceptive use rose from 11 percent to more than 50 percent and total fertility fell from almost 5 to about 4 between 1974 and 1980. Egypt has lower fertility than Morocco. by subsidies or by restricting imports. But there is also evidence that further fertility decline. Thus Sri Lanka has lower fertility than India.3 percent a year in 1985-95. African countries could do much to improve their prospects by reforming their policies. Even among the poorest countries. The second is that family planning programs.cial aid. successful as they have been. will not come automatically. and the initiation of decline where it has not begun. not much above the rate of growth of population. The evidence accumulated in the past decade is especially convincing. To varying degrees. In Kerala state of India. They are also related to availability of family planning services. Their macroeconomic policies caused. and the income of poorer groups.8 percent a year. Part I of this Report argued that many of the failings in the world economy have their roots in the industrial countries. One is that in most developing countries desired family size is about four. Colombia has lower fertility than Brazil. GDP in the developing world as a whole would grow at only 4. but female literacy is high and family planning services are widespread. The problems of sub-Saharan Africa are of a different order from those faced by the middleincome countries. The need for adjustment is not confined to the developing countries. female literacy. They have maintained capacity in obsolescent industries. largely by raising producer prices to farmers. Contraceptive use tripled and fertility fell by 30 percent in Mexico between 1974 and 1979. Countries which have made a substantial and sustained effort in family planning have achieved remarkable success.7 in 1978. GDP growth of 3. Until the industrial countries correct these underlying weaknesses. At the other end of the scale. per capita income is low. Most African countries still lack the institutions and human skills that are prerequisites for rapid economic growth.1 percent a year if industrial-country growth is weak. by maintaining competitive exchange rates. Differences in fertility among and within countries are related less to income per person than to life expectancy. first.7 percent a year in 1985-95. growth in sub-Saharan Africa would be as low as 2. whose financial and economic weight greatly influences economic prospects in the developing world. Nevertheless. a rapid inflationary buildup in the 1970s and then. There are two points to bear in mind. and Brazil has lower fertility than Peru. middle-income major exporters of manufactures would enjoy GDP growth averaging 6. so that people in many of the world's poorest countries would get steadily poorer. Even with faster growth in the industrial countries (and no change in domestic policies). In virtually every country surveyed. Population change: success and new challenge The accumulating evidence on population change in developing countries underscores the strong link between fertility decline and the general level of socioeconomic development. Africa's prospects would not brighten much. which has risen in real terms at only 6. Among developing countries as a group. have by no means reached their full potential.5 percent a year in the past ten years. without an improvement in the performance of the industrial countries. and the contribution that family planning programs can make to slowing population growth. In Java. many couples who say they want no more children do not use contraception-usually because they have poor access to modern services. where education is widespread. the total fertility fell from 4. This is less than the likely rate of population growth. improvement in domestic policies could raise growth to 5. the success is even more striking.2 percent a year in that region in 1985-95 would not be enough to raise per capita incomes. Some scenarios presented in Chapter 3 suggest that. These resources need to be developed as a matter of urgency. in the past three years of disinflation.

maintaining but not increasing per capita output. to bring higher levels of living in the future. It brings at best only the gradual adaptation that is typical of agriculture. But for the next five or six decades. where population growth is slow. to higher numbers. or if rapid population growth itself inspired technical change. if technical change could be guaranteed. high fertility means extra resources must go into agriculture just to keep pace with food requirements. poor parents make a reasonable choice in having many children. and in some families children suffer directly from having many siblings. In this Report rapid population growth is associated. those children carry their disadvantages into the next generation. there is little or no unused land that can be cheaply brought under cultivation. especially of the poor. world production and income have grown too. worse off in the end. for example in children's schooling. redistribution policies offer little relief at high cost. the problem goes beyond one of global resources and is less easily amenable to any technological fix. with slower progress in raising living standards. even assuming substantial declines in fertility. innovations. and in many countries of the developing world. a mismatch that leaves many of the world's people in a vicious circle of poverty and high fertility. rapid population growth exacerbates the difficult choice between higher levels of living now and investment. But the turnaround to slower growth has been slow and has not occurred everywhere. and modern contraceptives may be unavailable or expensive. In cities. and especially children. at household and national levels. and because follow-up services are limited. caught by the poverty of their parents. Population growth would not be a problem if economic and social adjustments could be made fast enough. two or three sons. In such a context. the slow pace of change and its uneven incidence point more than ever to rapid population growth as a central development concern. not labor-using. On the one hand.because few effective methods are offered. In today's developed countries fertility was never as high as in developing countries now. 184 which in turn means new investments just to maintain per capita output. On the other hand. as more children survive childhood disease. populations will triple in size by the year 2050. The very idea of planning pregnancies may be unknown. It is the poor who have many children. There is a gap between the private and social gains to large families. High infant and child mortality and poor educational and job opportunities mean that parents with few children cannot feel secure about their own future until they have had four or five babies-including. each. in some settings. as children . individual family's decision to have another child seems rational. But rapid population growth. Population growth rarely exceeded 1. rural population growth had virtually ended by the beginning of the twentieth century. The process of economic development itself generates new signals that lower fertility. in the very long run. At the national and the family level. makes adjustment more difficult. World population has grown faster. rapid population growth heightens the organizational and administrative difficulties of managing urban growth. The gap is caused in large part by poverty and the resulting lack of access to opportunities that would encourage small families. It is a mismatch between population and income-producing ability. Yet added together. Two decades after the turnaround. For some countries and many rural families. In many countries still largely dependent on agriculture. If anything they produce labor-saving. Increases in population size are projected to mount for another two decades. so job creation for many years will be a formidable task. It has been almost two decades since the peak of population growth in developing countries was passed.5 percent a year. Appropriatepolicies Part 11 of this Report dwells at length on the meaning and implications of a paradox. and mortality fell more slowly. history may seem to vindicate Malthus and the problem of population may indeed be one of numbers outrunning world resources. the social costs of large families are high. Decisions change as women become more educated. raising production means increasing yields on existing land. these separate decisions make all families. The future may be more difficult. A development problem The focus of this Report has been different from neomalthusian descriptions of population as a problem. if anything. The money and research skills needed for modern technological change are overwhelmingly in the rich countries. Still rapid population growth in most countries-2 percent to more than 4 percent a year-means up to 50 percent of populations are under age fifteen. than Malthus would have imagined.

Quadrupling the funds by the year 2000 is necessary to bring the "rapid" fertility decline described in Chapter 4. to reduce mortality. For the poorest countries. development may not be possible at all. so that a sustained decline in fertility can be realized in the long run. and as information about the possibility of birth control spreads. Virtually no developing country is yet doing all it might to promote later marriage and to inform people of the health and fertility benefits of breastfeeding. But it has also noted that measures to raise living standards take time to lower fertility. This Report has shown that economic and social progress helps slow population growth. and inequality can persist independently of population change. The gap between the private and social gains to high fertility provides additional justification for governments to act in areas that already merit government action. On the other hand. where backup health systems are poor and information about birth control spreads only slowly. but the desired number of children is still high. even before higher real incomes would bring down fertility spontaneously. and spend more on their health and schooling. And in countries in which parents have only as many children as they want. but it has also emphasized that rapid population growth hampers economic development. At the same time. This Report has emphasized policy measures to increase people's welfare as well as (and as a means) to reduce fertility: education (particularly for girls) and more primary health care for mothers and children. and has done so to some extent in urban areas. On the one hand. equivalent to about 5 percent of all aid programs in 1982. it also means that other actions with a more immediate payoff are desirable. These targets are ambitious but not hugely expensive: quadrupling the foreign aid spent on population programs would mean spending a total of about $2 billion (in 1980 dollars). Though the private sector might be expected to fill this need. But evidence described in this Report seems conclusive: because poverty and rapid population growth reinforce each other. Parents time the births of children. donors and developing countries must cooperate in an effort to slow population growth as a major part of the effort to achieve development. it would be possible to meet the need that more than 65 million couples now have for family planning services. and better communication between providers and clients. to reduce discontinuation. poverty. if current public expenditures on family planning in developing countries were increased by 50 percent. In middle-income countries. 185 . new data on fertility and contraceptive use show that many couples still have more children than they want and do not benefit from adequate family planning services. this underscores the need to act now to improve education.- become less valuable as workers and sources of old-age security. emphasizing easier access through outreach programs. carefully designed financial incentives provide an additional mechanism to encourage lower fertility. No one would argue that slower population growth alone will ensure progress. follow-up of clients. A new generation of programs is now building on the past. and. As Chapter 7 showed. and to improve women's opportunities. a continuation of high fertility among poor people could prolong indefinitely the period before development significantly affects their lives. These programs are not expensive but will require new financing to reach growing numbers of users. greater choice of methods. poor economic growth. have fewer of them. unless slower population growth can be achieved soon. The gap between actual and desired family size means that a public policy to provide family planning information and services will bring fertility closer to socially desirable levels at the same time that it helps couples have the number of children they want. it cannot make much progress in rural areas. It is therefore imperative that governments act simultaneously on both fronts.

Population data supplement The six tables and two maps in this Supplement provide demographic and policy-related data in addition to those presented in the World Development Indicators.) indicates less than half the unit shown. (Fertility in industrial countries already below replacement level was assumed to rise to replacement by 2000. the age distribution of migrants was obtained from a model on the basis of their overall sex ratio. The latter are listed in alphabetical order. at the end of the table. On the basis of this. and the current female life expectancy. to the female population. Table 1. mortality. a year for reaching replacement-level fertility (constrained to fall between the years 2000 and 2050) was calculated for every country. These births enter the population as the youngest cohort. scaled to agree with the given total fertility rate. For the standardprojection. Migration assumptions were entered in the form of the number of net migrants in each five-year period by sex and age. and mortality assumptions in the form of expectations of life at birth or mortality levels based on standardized life tables. . Figures in the colored bands are summary measures for groups of countries. classified by age group. The symbol (. each cohort grows older in accordance with assumed mortality conditions. All data are subject to the same cautions regarding reliability and cross-country comparability that are noted in the World Development Indicators. . regression. the proportion of couples using contraception. Births for each period were cal186 culated by applying a schedule of age-specific fertility rates. two years of those specified. The letter w after a summary measure indicates that it is a weighted average. in italics. except for those for which no GNP per capita can be calculated. Tables 1 and 3 through 6 include only low. Figures in italics are for years other than. countries with fewer than one million inhabitants are listed under a separate heading in ascending order of 1982 income per capita. the future path for fertility is based on the experience of a group of countries for which a judgment regarding the future year of reaching replacement-level fertility could be made with relative confidence. for the period.) For each country a curve was mathematically fitted for the course of the total fertility rate between the current year and the year of replacement-level fertility. The sources of data for base-year population estimates are discussed in the technical note to Table 19 of the World Development Indicators. In the tables of this Supplement. in italics. An alphabetical listing of countries and the reference numbers indicating this order can be found in the key to the Indicators.and middle-income countries for which data are available. The assumed year for replacement-level fertility in these countries was regressed on several predictors: the current total fertility rate for each country. and migration assumptions on future population size and age structure in successive five-year periods. Migration assumptions do not vary for alternative fertility and mortality scenarios. not available. the letter t that it is a total. These are listed in alphabetical order. but generally within. not applicable. the change in this rate over the previous ten years.a. except for those for which no GNP per capita can be calculated. Populationprojections The population projections here as well as in Table 19 of the World Development Indicators were made on the basis of a World Bank computer program that uses a modified cohort-component method to simulate the effects of various fertility. The fertility assumptions were entered in the form of total and age-specific fertility rates. at the end of the per capita income group into which they probably fall. and n. The curves were chosen to pro- - . Tables 19-25. but for most countries net migration was assumed to reach zero by 2000. countries are listed in ascending order of 1982 income per capita. In Tables 3 through 6.

Colombia. and Mexico (1978). abstinence.vide accelerating decline early on (in some cases after a few years of constant fertility). including China. that have had rapid fertility decline since World War II. and those with percentages of 70 or more (including developed countries). This second curve provided the time path for rapid mortality decline. and the like). Other methods include rhythm. separately for two groups of countries: those with female primary-school enrollment percentages under 70. with the added proviso that decline ends when replacement level is reached and fertility thereafter stays at replacement level. Panama (1976). as well as those breastfeeding less than one year. Surveys in three countries did not achieve national coverage: Sudan (northern population only). Tunisia (1978). The dependency ratio for 2000 is derived from the standard World Bank population projections used in Table 1 of this Supplement and in Table 19 of the World Development Indicators. not pregnant. Populationcomposition The dependency ratio is the combined population under fifteen and over sixty-four years as a percentage of the population between those ages. Data for contraceptive prevalence and unmet need are all from nationally representative World Fertility Surveys (WFS) and Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS) for the years specified. in addition to the above.5). Fourteen countries that substantially outperformed this curve (and had initial life expectancies above forty) were used to derive a second logistic curve. or breastfeeding more than a year). The total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and were to bear children at each age at prevailing age-specific fertility rates. Summary measures for country groups may differ from those in Table 19 of the Indicators because projections were not computed for all countries. Alternative projections build in more rapid fertility and mortality decline. Guatemala. Summary measures are weighted by population in 1982. The loul estimate includes married women of reproductive age who want no more children. Jamaica (1975-76). A constant linear decline at the average pace of these eleven countries provides the path for rapid fertility decline. The high estimate includes. Thailand. Sterilization includes both male and female sterilization. Once fertility decline began in these countries. For rapid mortality decline. Jamaica. Low and high estimates of unmet need for contraception are calculated only for women who want no more children. Figures in italics refer to earlier years than stated: Bangladesh (1979). Contraceptive use and unmet need Current use of contraception is expressed as the percentage of currently married women aged 15-49 using each method of contraception. For rapid fertility decline the future path of fertility is based on the experience of eleven developing countries. The rate for 2000 is given under the assumptions of both standard and rapid fertility decline. not breastfeeding. and in some cases douche and folk methods. Vaginal methods include spermicides and the diaphragm. they do not include women who wish to delay a birth. a logistic curve was derived to represent the trend in life expectancy among developing countries between 1960 and 1980 (see the chart in Box 4. Table 2. The future path for mortality is based on the assumption that increments to life expectancy depend on the level reached. Mauritania (sedentary population only). 187 .2-every year. The figures for contraceptive use may differ from figures in Table 20 of the World Development Indicators because more recent estimates. Fertility is assumed to remain at replacement level once it has been reached. Korea.tion. Table 3. are fecund. the total fertility rate fell by a roughly constant amount-about 0. those who are using less effective contraceptive methods (rhythm. and Thailand. withdrawal. withdrawal. for Kenya and Sudan it is ever-married women aged 15-50. The sum of prevalence for each method may not add to the total because of rounding. followed by decelerating decline as fertility approaches replacement level. and Malaysia (peninsula only). Estimates of one-year increments were obtained by dividing the estimated ten-year increments from these two equations by ten. are not using any method of contraception. and Venezuela the base is currently married women aged 15-44. Panama. For El Salvador. Sri Lanka (1975). based not on surveys but on family planning program statistics. are included there. Changes in female life expectancies between 1965-69 and 1975-79 were regressed on the initial life expectancies. The rate of natural increase is the difference between births and deaths per hundred popula. and are exposed to the risk of pregnancy (that is. Summary measures are weighted by 1982 population.

. as well as legal marriages. 12. Ross. InternationalEncyclopedia of Population (New York: The Free Press. Kenya. 14. as cited in the notes for Table 4. Status of women The ratio of adult mnale to adult female literacy is the 188 percentage of males aged fifteen and over who can read and write divided by the percentage of females aged fifteen and over who can read and write. United Nations. forthcoming. The percentage of women aged 15-19 ever married includes common-law and consensual unions. The figure on percentage of women aged 15-19 ever married for Indonesia is from the 1979 National Socioeconomic Survey. 1982". availability and quality of family . ed. Table 5. "Children Ever Born. Governments are characterized as providing support for demographic and other reasons (that is. Venezuela (aged 15-44). Desiredfamily size is based on the response to the question: "If you could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life. Lightbourne and Alphonse L. John A. "Marriage Dissolution and Remarriage. Population Division. 1982). 23. forthcoming. as well as for other reasons). Indicators of support and year the official family planning program started are based on the following sources: Dorothy Nortman and Joanne Fisher." WFS Comparativye Studies no. It is derived using life-table techniques and survey data on current breastfeeding status for all births. Table 6. specifically to reduce population growth. Both the number of living children and desired family size generally pertain to all ever-married women aged 15-49. Data are from the US Bureau of the Census. Hazel Ashurst and John B. Smith. 1982. with the exception of Sudan and Kenya (aged 15-50). Figures in italics are for years other than those specified: Bangladesh (1975-76). "Breastfeeding Differentials." WFS Comparative Studies: Additional Tables. MacDonald. on average. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. It is calculated using data on the proportion ever married in each age group of the current population. 1980. if she followed current practice. "Age at First Marriage. 87. 1982). and World Bank sources. and various WFS country reports. Costa Rica and Panama (aged 20-49). Korea (1974). Desired family size figures for Ghana and Turkey are for currently married women. Casterline. or no support. how many would that be?" Figures are the means for survey respondents who gave numerical answers. The percentage aged 15-49 ever enrolled in primary school was estimated by assigning past primaryschool enrollment rates to five-year age groups of the 1980 population aged 15-49 and weighting these rates by the proportion of each five-year age group in the total 1980 population aged 15-49. Mean duration of breastfeeding is the number of months a woman would breastfeed. An average of three respondents per country assessed such factors as official political commitment." WFS Comparative Studies no. "Socioeconomic Differentials in Current Fertility. 1980. Smith. students. The family planning index for 1972 and 1982 is adapted from the background paper by Robert Lapham and W Parker Mauldin. Sources for this table are WFS and CPS surveys for the years specified." WFS Comparative Studies no. Data are from UNESCO. WFS. and CPS. The singulate mean age at marriage is the mean age at first marriage among people who marry by age 50. The sources for this column are Smith (1980) and Balkaran and Smith (forthcoming). Population and Family PlanningPrograms:A Compendium of Data through 1981 (New York: Population Council. "Population Policy Briefs: Current Situation in Developing Countries and Selected Territories. Robert E. They assigned a numerical index to countries on the basis of responses to detailed questionnaires of individuals familiar with family planning activities in each country. and other inactive groups. Benoit Ferry and David P. and Nigeria are for all women of childbearing age. and Mauritania (aged 12-50). The economically active population includes the armed forces and the unemployed but excludes housewives. and thus does not reflect the experience of any particular age cohort. Factors influencing fertility The mean number of living children includes children living at the time of the survey." WFS Comparative Studies: Additional Tables. David P.Table 4. Living children data for Barbados. 1983. "Familv Size Preferences. Smith. as reported in country reports and in the following publications: Maryson Hodgson and Jane Gibbs. Famnily planning policy Support for family plantning exists if a government subsidizes family planning services. Indonesia (1979). support for health and human rights reasons." WFS Comparative Studies no. and Tunisia (1980). and for Barbados for all women of childbearing age. and Sundat Balkaran and David P.

for example. though effective modern methods generally >-<-Ax2F!-->2W . 04 ecn 35-59 percent - ~~centage U Colors on this map represent the perof women of reproductive age (15 to 49 years) who use any type of contraception. These charts show the prevalence of Sterilization specific contraceptive methods in three Fml developing countries. * _L 60-100 percent Daantavial aant vial low. withdrawal. The data are from Table 3.-w f ~ - .'ii\ Pill / predominate. 40 to 59 percent as C.. and record keeping and evaluation. Contraceptive prevalence . based on data from private sources and surveys in several states. method mix. The method mix Ml varies greatly across countries. use of mass media. -. 20 to 39 percent as D. The range of contraceptive prevalence for Brazil has been estimated. 60 to 79 percent as B. and other . Countries that received 80 percent or more of the maximum possible index are recorded as A. Colombia 1978 Sri Lanka 1982 Thailand 1978 /. outreach. have fewer than 10 percent of married women using A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8 contraception..planning services (public and commercial). and Table 20 of the World Development lndicators. and 0 to 19 percent as E.- r _ 0-9 percent _ 10-34 percent _. across developed countries. Countnies colored yel- which also gives prevalence rates by type of contraception.6f ¢ IUD t - spermicide Rhythm. a_ --- |i Jo ~~.- '-C. Similar variability exists \/ . local financial support.

4 4.'.. St. Paraguay U ruguay nnwai AIrra n | PeerJ .a i-.I I 2 rR |>.r 3 to4. | E I. Panam = lG[me Trinidad and Toba C m CGa e ?C r ... --- E.ry Romania| Bahamas FC: .Births and total fertility =Iceland = nada IrelandEl United Kingdom United States a Norwa Swede 2 [ _ I_ 0 F~~~~~~~~~~~~rance .r I t g Lt 2 Puerto Rico (US) garia Turkey -...000 - 50... .9 |6 or more Number of births -1.al : . |..Irv.- |~~~~~~~~~~- tr.. ~ ofrrt i hs ..rnP. Lur Grenadae.'.5 to 5..000 190 .. 1 at ~~~~~~~~~~~~r3rl-.. It r rgent ~ na ~ Number 3to4.s :. Colombia Venezuela Argentina er -i Lr Larazil I L<L | ll ger & f ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Etroox...^tp. .000..nn- . .zh3r L r Chile| | .tt3 hilrana . Spam Czechoslovakia ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SwitzC Pusg. ?.

The colors represent each country's total fertility rate. o MC. and China.. with more than 24 million births.. which corresponds to the number of births a woman would have if during her childbearing years she were to bear children at each age in accord with current age-specific fertility rates. Thus India. appears as the largest country. . with about 21 million births.. .I I_ 1. GAram (US) leoi Ko~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rNewa Western Saa U Fili c3New Caledonia Countries on this map are drawn in proportion to the number of births in 1982. z . '. . Australia (Fr) []New Zealand 191 . . is slightly smaller.| z' ! ~~~~~Chin Re.

0 w 2.911 t 3.276 t 1. 1. Lot%er-middle-income 35.9 1.0 2.2 2.8 2. Population projections Projected population (millions) Population (millions) mid-1982 Low-income economies China Other low-income 1 .9 2.0 1.0 2.3 5.8 7.9 5. 31.5 45. Egypt.9 3.1 6.2 1.1 2.2 2.2 3.1 2. 41. Burma Zaire Malawi UpperVolta Uganda India Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Somalia Haiti Benin Central African Rep.5 3.225 t 1.313 17 10 51 8 10 9 5 1.4 1.1 2.917 t 4.023.1 1.196 1.0 3.5 1.4 5.2 1.8 3.7 2.5 1.3 w 2.o45 r 3.8 2. 35 t 93.0 1.120 t . 34.9 2.7 4.6 1.3 1.0 5.0 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.1 3. Mliddle-income economie.4 3.7 1.9 2.1 6.185 8 9 14 20 4 21 122 35 4 25 2 9 5 20 81 1.5 0.9 2.9 3.0 3.7 2.0 3.0 2.1 3.571 t 7 157 57 24 12 53 55 12 10 25 994 11 7 36 7 7 7 4 1. China Guinea Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone 2.4 1.4 2.5 1.3 6. 40. 39. .t 1. 14.3 1.2 4.1 3.4 2.0 2. 15.4 4.3 2.9 w 5.9 7.4 14. 42.9 2.8 3.4 Rapid fertility decline 2.8 6.1 1.4 2.0 2. 23.0 6. 21.2 .8 2.0 6.9 2.0 2. Honduras 46..513 34 20 93 16 13 18 10 1. 10.Chad 2. PDR Liberia Senegal Yemen Arab Rep.1 2.6 5.008 6 6 9 15 3 12 87 18 3 17 1 7 4 13 57 1.2 3.9 1.1 3.0 2. 2.8 2.1 3. Mali 6.5 2. Sudan Mauritania Yemen.1 2. Lesotho Bolivia Indonesia Zambia Afghanistan Bhutan Kampuchea.2 3.321 r 4'.6 w 2.4 1.1 35 3.3 3.0 2.450 1. 27.3 2.6 1.450 11 15 22 28 7 36 181 69 6 38 2 4.1 w 1.5 4.8 3.1 2.0 1. 33.092 t 2.6 w 1.9 5.0 2.3 Standard projection 2000 2050 Rapid fertility decline only 2000 2050 Rapid fertility and mortality decline 2000 2050 2.2 6.462 12 16 24 28 7 39 197 73 7 42 2 13 8 35 130 2!43' l j.2 2.3 2.7 2.73 1 20 2 2 2 6 8 1 6 153 6 4 44 5 Rate of natural increase.1 4.0 w 2.9 2.4 5.1 1..5 3.6 5. 19.40h. 43.450 20 29 42 31 13 66 302 120 11 55 3 6 136 48 21 10 48 45 10 8 21 927 9 6 31 6 7 6 3 1. 38.9 3. Nepal 5. r 9 12 5 8 20 33 81 125 1.0 1. 24.. 26.9 3. Lao PDR Mozambique Viet Nam 10 17 6 14 24 63 88 154 1.4 2. Bangladesh 3.3 4. 44. 7.9 3. 16.5 1.8 3.450 1.9 6.5 2.7 1. 6. 20.3 1.7 2.1 3.491) t 32.4 2.021 t 1.144 1 1. 11.2 2.931 t 1. Dem.7 1. 30.0 1.7 1.2 2.2 2. 13.6 6.542 t 2.2 2.1 6.6 3. 12. Ethiopia 4.0 5.4 1.1 5.9 5.3 2. 36.1 4.2 5.0 & 2.406 19 11 55 10 10 10 5 1.2 1.1 3.7 2.1 2.721 t 2. 37.4 1.1 5. Arab Rep.4 3.268 t 5 93 33 15 7 35 31 7 7 14 717 6 4 20 5 5 4 2 1.196 1.4 3.185 1.2 1. 17.1 2. 28. 2000 Standard projection 1.8 6.0 6.3 1.0 3.5 4.9 3. 18.5 1.6 1. 9.6 5.9 3.0 3.3 1.4 .5 1.1 2.2 w 1.7 1. 47.8 7. 8.196 7 9 14 20 4 20 120 34 4 24 2 8 212 77 31 16 73 73 17 13 35 1. Rapid fertility decline 1.1 3.763 t 9 230 84 35 17 77 79 19 15 39 1.642 t 1.9 0.9 2.2 2.3 1.1 3. t 1Mt 86 6 9 10 26 32 5 18 330 29 14 102 15 34 3 3 4 10 12 2 9 212 11 7 63 8 29 2 3 3 9 11 2 8 197 10 6 58 8 46 3 5 5 14 17 3 13 285 16 11 84 12 30 2 3 3 9 11 2 9 198 10 6 58 8 50 3 5 6 15 19 3 14 298 18 12 88 13 1.2 1. El Salvador 192 .196 9 11 16 21 5 24 140 40 5 25 2 17 357 164 54 31 99 136 35 25 67 1.0 3.6 2.1 6.2 1.462 2.3 1.008 1. 2.746 t 6 139 50 22 10 48 46 10 9 21 938 9 6 31 6 7 6 3 1.Table 1. Total fertility rate. 22.107 t 5. 2000 Standard projection 3.5 2.4 2.3 1.7 3.4 1.3 1. 25.1 1.3 6.0 1.9 6. 29.3 1.

6 1.9 1. 84. 79. 14 2.3 2.5 1. 70.4 4. 83.7 2. 59.1 2.3 1.8 1. 56.1 3. 67.3 2.6 2.4 1.8 I -.3 1. 62. 85.5 2. United Arab Emirates 1 3 10 2 1 2 7 19 3 2 3 17 49 5 3 2 6 17 3 2 3 10 27 4 2 2 6 17 3 2 3 11 29 4 2 2.5 1. 2000 Standard projection 2. 93.3 1.9 57.7 1.0 4.2 1.gh-incomeoilexporlers 95. 81.1 2.7 7.3 1.3 3.8 2.7 2.7 0.7 0.3 1.1 2.8 6. Thailand Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo.2 3. People's Rep.5 2. 76.7 0. 51. 57.4 1.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 1.1 2.9 1.1 6.4 5. 52.1 . Jamaica Ecuador Turkey Tunisia Colombia Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea.8 2.1 2. 54.0 2.7 2. Iraq Standard projection 2000 2050 68 102 5 8 73 116 16 49 169 471 31 59 17 50 5 10 17 44 12 22 3 8 3 5 26 44 8 14 3 4 13 24 65 101 10 17 38 57 5 8 13 32 12 14 27 42 3 5 3 5 b1 1.4 1. Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep.6 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.4 3.0 2. 71. 65.5 2. t Rapid fertility and mortality decline 2000 2050 64 92 4 7 68 103 14 30 147 265 29 49 14 25 5 8 15 26 11 18 3 5 3 5 24 36 8 12 3 4 12 19 61 89 9 15 35 51 4 7 12 19 12 15 25 37 3 5 3 4 01 I Q4'1I Rapid fertility decline 1.0 2.2 2. 73.2 2.- 3.4 1.0 1.1 4.4 1.2 2.4 1.5 2. Dem.1 2.7 3.2 1.7 1. 53.b 2.1 1.2 4.2 3. 74.3 1.4 I 3 Rapid fertility decline 2.4 2.4 193 .5 1. 92.6 1.1 I I Rapid fertility decline only 2000 2050 64 89 4 6 68 100 14 28 243 143 29 45 14 23 5 8 15 23 11 17 3 4 3 5 23 34 8 12 3 4 12 19 60 86 9 14 35 49 4 6 11 17 12 15 25 36 3 5 3 4 b1I 1. 2000 Standard projection 1. 80. Rep.1 1. 60.5 1.0 2.4 3.6 1.1 2. 68.7 3. 58.4 4.2 2.1 2.0 3.4 1.5 1. 87.5 2.5 1.6 2.3 1.6 3.2 1.4 2.3 6.4 1. Saudi Arabia 98. Libya 97. Rep.7 1.7 1. 69.1 2.4 3.7 6.2 2. 4.9 0.0 0.2 2.0 5. 55.1 48.1 3.2 4.8 3. 91.5 2.5 1.1 0.1 2.4 1.7 1.1 3.4 1.9 2. Total fertility rate.9 32 32 H.3 2.6 2. 75.1 2. 89.9 1.6 2.1 2.3- Lipper-mididle-income 10 3 15 39 2 12 127 73 20 28 3 30 17 4 5 3 1 41 14 1-t 17 6 21 51 3 15 181 109 39 36 3 52 26 5 7 3 2 70 26 3It 37 14 31 67 4 20 279 182 97 50 4 106 43 8 8 3 2 139 57 -..4 1.l1. 50.2 2. Islamic Rep.0 6.2 1.8 6.1 2.Projected population (millions) Population (millions) mid-1982 49 3 51 8 91 20 9 3 9 8 2 2 17 6 2 8 47 7 27 3 8 10 19 3 2 44 l Rate of natural increase.8 1.2 1.1 2.5 1. 63.3 2.3 2.4 1.7 4.0 Ls .2 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.4 2.3 1.1 2.4 2.4 2. 66.1 2. 64.2 2.2 2. Lebanon Mongolia Syrian Arab Rep. 90.3 3.1 1.1 2.0 6. 77.2 3.r 17 6 19 49 3 14 168 101 33 34 3 44 24 5 7 3 1 61 23 30i 32 10 28 63 4 19 239 155 58 43 4 67 36 7 8 4 2 97 39 4bt 17 6 19 50 3 14 169 101 34 34 3 44 24 5 7 3 1 62 23 30r 33 11 28 65 4 19 247 160 62 44 4 69 37 7 8 4 2 102 41 .2 0. 49.1 2.3 1.2 2.1 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.9 3. 78.0 1.8 0. of Panama Chile Brazil Mexico Algeria Argentina Uruguay South Africa Venezuela Israel Hong Kong Singapore Trinidad &Tobago Iran. Kuwait 99.3 3.6 1.1 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.3 3. Oman @96.5 2.1 2.5 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.4 3.4 3.8 1.2 2.2 2.0 4. 94.3 3. 61.4 2. Jordan Malaysia Korea.2 2. 72.

63. 62. 41. 54. 58. Rwanda 13. 27. 91 88 95 81 90 96 83 88 82 103 102 76 95 77 90 82 113 99 96 91 99 87 88 95 73 85 88 87 92 76 82 75 93 99 98 102 93 97 92 74 60 102 80 62 71 55 67 58 121 103 72 106 78 94 69 108 55 65 61 62 70 61 67 57 58 61 63 52 59 55 61 59 66 54 50 65 53 62 62 57 50 58 59 58 53 41 58 54 69 60 59 77 58 65 69 78 164 161 151 180 175 147 161 140 124 194 152 120 132 107 134 117 207 177 133 174 145 186 141 200 117 133 120 101 137 113 115 115 59 67 67 53 63 63 67 64 64 59 56 59 54 55 67 56 54 64 63 65 53 42 52 63 48 56 53 76 58 61 63 51 191 172 207 214 188 200 182 179 157 207 210 166 198 172 166 179 261 219 187 216 215 218 185 210 173 172 182 155 193 167 183 159 65 62 74 54 66 60 68 65 65 54 42 54 52 51 57 56 56 59 49 57 56 55 49 59 46 72 61 54 60 49 75 54 207 183 237 260 207 212 185 187 199 214 226 202 222 207 177 180 278 240 185 194 222 339 222 230 228 175 206 137 190 195 224 213 90 75 . 66 74 64 75 57 47 67 35 69 53 97 56 67 55 58 81 55 63 64 69 54 61 58 57 57 87 53 71 81 80 63 51 . 52. China 20. 60. Dem. Guinea 21. Burundi 14. 9. 24. 49. Chad Bangladesh Ethiopia Nepal Mali Burma Zaire Malawi Upper Volta Uganda 76 90 87 74 86 69 89 92 84 86 84 89 83 84 87 81 87 73 78 81 90 81 84 87 89 93 101 82 82 79 89 77 78 .. Somalia 16. 55. 8. 42. 46. 48. 36. 47. India 12. 61.. Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep. Sudan Mauritania Yemen. Index nutmbers for relative sizes of age grouips (size of age group in 1980= I00) Aged 65 Aged 0. 31. 37. 28. 194 207 185 Nliddle-income economies I o% er-middle income 35. 22. 5. 32. Benin 18. 44. 19.. PDR Liberia Senegal Yemen Arab Rep. 64. Tunisia 66. 43.. 135 179 133 77 58 . 59. 39. 57. 26. Tanzania 15. 33. 178 184 209 205 196 188 222 134 183 208 204 223 200 212 187 157 201 189 203 157 211 202 200 215 238 178 229 175 183 170 215 217 175 11. Lesotho Bolivia Indonesia Zambia Honduras Egypt. 71 58 66 68 64 70 62 59 70 60 61 56 73 59 57 75 62 74 64 73 54 65 61 61 62 57 51 73 66 77 . Lao PDR Mozanbiqiuze Viet Nam 60 50 . 3. Population composition Dependency ratio (percent) 1960 1980 2000 Lows-incomne economies 1. 30. 45. Colombia 194 . 86 96 79 102 92 103 85 92 81 91 99 65. 10.14 Aged 75-64 and over 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 64 63 63 59 56 61 61 56 65 55 64 55 69 51 58 68 57 66 82 68 50 60 78 55 56 53 47 66 58 74 . 56. 23. 38. Haiti 17. 6. Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenva Sierra Leone Afghanistan Bhutan Kampuchea. El Salvador Thailand Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemnala Congo People's Rep. 34.. Jamaica Ecuador Turkey 88 87 91 92 84 84 76 83 78 90 91 83 92 90 77 91 93 . 4. 29. Central African Rep. 53. 7. 171 191 198 178 186 173 207 200 173 215 162 203 191 212 164 160 194 179 141 170 196 196 155 207 230 191 245 172 175 167 . 50. 40. 51. Arab Rep.Table 2. 2. 78 83 93 85 100 82 93 96 96 102 78 94 89 99 88 89 99 83 68 89 92 96 70 98 101 89 117 82 89 77 55 98 90 87 87 86 95 85 99 71 99 108 95 104 60 114 96 100 87 63 102 95 41 86 101 98 56 101 106 82 120 86 82 77 71 91 100 68 151 159 167 147 158 137 170 191 147 172 116 208 164 178 158 123 188 164 75 145 182 170 117 169 188 146 231 146 143 135 . 25.

122. 99. of 77. United States 60 64 63 70 61 47 56 67 116. Hungary Romania 51 59 51 56 58 49 Albaniia llulgaria Czechoslovakia Gennan Deni. 103. 70. Syrian Arab Rep. 97. 197 233 246 176 144 169 143 165 186 237 116 132 116 184 113 188 108 151 133 127 150 216 224 202 265 233 227 241 70 53 89 63 56 60 55 46 52 63 72 48 66 62 59 39 56 32 27 31 66 71 51 50 80 41 34 . 224 180 260 205 206 191 189 212 187 184 126 181 150 197 155 247 127 148 200 191 225 190 256 214 336 239 506 200 94. Austria 106. 120. Rep. Denmark 1 Y5. 114. 98. Ireland Spain Italy New Zealand United Kingdom 73 55 52 71 54 52 56 55 70 58 55 58 56 56 48 53 52 51 54 46 55 51 55 51 55 55 52 49 53 50 48 51 46 46 50 46 52 49 48 48 53 51 55 84 85 100 89 103 99 103 106 137 108 82 105 100 101 107 108 100 101 99 105 101 95 96 100 96 90 98 97 96 106 110 99 95 94 105 97 96 94 83 83 91 70 95 96 76 92 85 75 67 66 82 92 89 72 92 87 84 136 116 103 118 101 104 109 102 102 109 125 121 110 98 104 116 104 108 101 85 63 64 72 75 74 54 80 58 65 65 63 74 66 68 68 68 68 64 ill 138 118 124 108 97 174 i11 121 123 150 153 111 104 104 125 103 103 113 105. Dependency ratio (percent) 1960 1980 2000 97 86 59 80 89 91 64 63 49 89 78 59 87 84 62 Index numbers for relative sizes of age groups (size of age group in 1980=100) Aged 65 Aged 0-14 Aged 15-64 and over 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 62 126 58 180 59 191 60 160 67 185 59 200 76 94 73 133 50 151 64 122 56 170 54 191 71 102 67 143 83 149 84 93 94 95 86 93 77 86 96 91 59 57 56 81 58 95 53 69 78 83 89 96 94 . 84. Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119. 87. 88.. 86 102 III 74 60 79 61 72 93 104 57 62 59 75 52 82 57 72 46 45 65 91 97 66 82 100 55 49 54 50 58 63 104 54 58 58 83 50 60 57 53 48 42 59 81 89 54 48 55 65 82 64 82 63 54 53 99 81 91 61 102 53 100 59 88 101 101 52 51 115 162 172 105 103 109 103 123 123 178 101 109 101 179 101 135 102 116 120 102 112 141 160 57 55 59 55 57 57 62 58 53 62 90 74 89 60 78 45 88 55 52 56 67 52 52 54 47 46 26 . Rep. 121. Oman Libya Saudi Arabia Kuwait United Arab Emirates 87 96 86 79 45 70 94 92 55 58 49 42 42 16 . 102. Jordan 75.67. Korea. Belgium 108. 154 193 180 168 183 90 85 59 .. Islamic Rep. Netherlands 110. 81. 89. Lebanon 72. 83. 96. Rep. 124. Panama -78. 93. 86. 69. 92. 104. 71. 68. Chile Brazil Mexico Algeria Portugal Argentina Uruguay South Africa Yugoslavia Venezuela Greece Israel Hong Kong Singapore Trinidad and Tobago Iran. Japan 107. 125. -74. 79. 82. Rep. 80. Fed. 101. France 113. 123. 195 .. 91. Australia I'l. Malaysia 76. Poland USSR 52 57 86 51 56 53 65 60 55 59 73 52 58 54 52 52 52 55 52 56 52 51 51 52 ill 93 64 105 103 109 115 100 97 100 110 99 99 101 104 105 93 83 55 89 90 105 76 77 102 115 164 103 113 106 116 114 64 58 62 57 62 88 49 58 116 145 177 141 112 94 141 147 Not available. Finland 109. 126. Germany. Canada 112. Irail High-irncme oil exporter~ 95. 90. Norway 118. InduWtiai market economies 100. Monigolia Lipper-middle-income 73. Sweden 117. 85. Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea Dern.

Ghana 26. 9 29 26 49 48 58 68 59 . Mauritania Senegal Yemen Arab Rep. 36. 45. 43. 12 9 15 21 22 17 29 8 1 18 23 6 .) (.) (.. 73. 46.. 64..) 1 . 4. Sudan.) (. Thailand. Age or marital status differs from that specified. 54. . Bangladesh Nepal Haiti Benin Sri Lanka 1983-84 1981 1977 1981-82 1982 1979 1975 1977-78 Other methods 5 (.) 7 23 6 8 35 10 7 5 19 14 12 12 16 7 20 16 16 25 18 9 8 18 2 2 3 9 24 6 1 8 25 6 8 12 5 7 10 11 4 6 12 9 6 7 5 2 1 3 11 41 12 25 26 19 24 17 15 17 23 23 6 18 5 12 10 8 (.) 56 69 39 44 48 51 77 66 61 56 . 23.. 67.) (..) 14 17 25 4 1 2 28 27 30 31 8 27 10 67 20 50 25 18 5 17 6 25.) Year Low-income economies 2. . Lesotho Indonesia Honduras Egypt. 5 1 4 1 5 26 27 24 34 59 36 27 . of' Panama' Mexico Venezuela' Hong Kong Trinidad and Tobago 1979 1981 1978 1979 1977 1976 1981 1980 1978 1981 1978 1982 1980 1978 1980-81 1978 1981 1981 1975 1979 1979 1978 1983 1980 1979 1978 1976 1974 1979 1979-80 1979 1977 1977 1977 1975 1974 1981 (. Kenya' 1 1 - Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. 6 8 55 75 56 67 59 . see technical notes.) 2 1 1 2 2 4 ... 90. Jamaica' Ecuador Turkey Tunisia Colombia Paraguay Syrian Arab Rep. 77.) 21 1 1 1 4 1 4 (.. 18 22 22 19 29 15 19 58 62 55 53 14 23 10 . 1 2 6 13 21 21 13 10 7 9 7 7 15 . (. 62.) ... (.... 48. Upper-middle-income 2 3 20 30 9 8 19 6 9 16 14 9 14 10 . 16. . 74..1 3 3 3 1 2 3 20 .) Total 19 7 19 17 55 10 5 7 Percentage who want no more children 50 41 50 . 52. El Salvador.) (. . 53. (.) 1 6 4 2 2 5 3 13 8 5 1 2 1 10 4 6 7 3 3 6 5 4 1 10 2 4 7 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 6 3 2 6 17 20 (. 76. 80.... 63.. (. 75.) 3 2 1 (.) 1 (.) (. 47.. Not available.) (.) Less than half of 1 percent. a.. 60.) 6 2 4 3 4 2 .. 17.) (.) (. see technical notes.) (. 8 5 10 9 12 13 11 . . (. 66. Unmet need for contraception Low High estimate estimate 25 22 13 . 59. (. Philippines Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Ivory Coast Guatemala" Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep.) .. .) (. 65. Countries with less than one million population Guvana Fi)i Barbados Note: Figures in italics are for earlier vears than specified. Jordan Malaysia Korea. 196 . 40.) 1 (. 3 1. . 57. . 39. (.) 4 3 1 3 1 (. (.) . Contraceptive use and unmet need (Percentage of currently married women aged 15-49) Current use of contraception Condom and SteriliPill and vaginal methods zation injectables IUD 7 5 (. 61. (.) 3 (. 92. 87. 14 11 2 (. 6 .) 2 (.) (.. 56. Rep.) 1 1 15 12 17 9 27 5 . 23 12 .) 3 .Table 3.. Arab Rep..) (. Pakistan 27. 41. 6 19 2 3 18 65 41 32 55 34 38 41 49 36 20 25 33 54 61 39 49 72 52 31 41 46 (. 50.

Haiti 17..9 4. see technical notes. 46.0 .2 3. of 1979 77.3 6.5 7. Trinidad and Tobago CounIries ith le.. 4 20 28 12 52 3. 59.9 2. See technical notes.-. . 63.1 7. Pakistan 27.1 3.2 5. .1 6.3 2. Bangladesh 4.5 4. 5.8 6.5 . Syrian Arab Rep.8 4.1 2.3 . Year Lc. 56.3 3. 61.7 8.3 8. 64. 6..3 5. Peru Dominican Republic Jamaica Ecuador Turkey' Tunisia Colombia Paraguay 1979 1981 1978 1979 1977 1976 1980 1975 1978 1982 1980 1978 1980-81 1976 1977-78 1975 1975-76 1979 1978 1983 1976 1979 3.5 3. . i -i: .6 4.ome esonomies Lower-middle-income 1981 1976 1977 1981-82 1975 1979 1975 1978 4.2 4.2 7. 53. 8 7 10 .8 6.8 3.9 3.3 7.7 3. 6.5 7.2 8.8 2. 60. 4.3 . Sudan' Mauritania' Senegal Yemen Arab Rep..0 8.7 . 4.1 4. 197 . . 66. 52.3 2.4 2.0 4.0 6.*-income economie4 Percentage of women aged 15-19 ever married 63 59 16 44 7 31 38 28 Mean duration of breastfeeding (months) 29 25 16 19 21 18 19 16 Total fertility rate among women witlh Seven years' No schooling schooling or more 2. .6 3..8 3.5 4. Factors influencing fertility Among ever-married women of childbearingage Mean number Desired of living family children size 3.1 3.2 7. 62.7 3. Hong Kong 1976 1977 92.8 17 5 13 9 8 12 14 9 11 12 11 6 16 7 9 7 .2 4.8 9. 7. Korea. 3.6 3. .5 3. 6. Not available.3 .8 . a.9 3.2 8.4 .9 4.8 4. 3.7 3. 40.8 4. Mexico 1976-77 87.8 5.1 7.5 .1 3. 2.. 43.7 2.9 .3 9.7 5.. Lesotho Indonesia FPvpt Arab Rep.5 3.1 4. Sri Lanka 25.0 2.6 6.7 3.2 .7 3.5 . 3. M¶iddle-in.0 ..8 3. .7 2. 23 39 59 61 32 29 22 16 7 44 22 53 56 15 14 28 27 19 16 5 15 17 23 19 11 3 20 19 20 16 16 11 20 24 19 19 13 18 15 .7 3. Ghana.0 4. 36. .4 4. .1 5.5 4.6 2.1 5. Benin 23. 54.7 4.3 5.. Jordan 1974 75..1 .8 2.5 6.9 3. 41. 5.4 7. 1975-76 80.1 3.5 .5 8.8 .7 4.9 4.2 6. -26..0 3. Kenya.1 3. 2.1 6. Nepal 16.3 35.0 2.6 ..5 3. 48.2 4.6 2. 3. Panama.1 .5 3.4 4. 1978 1976 74.8 3.3 2.Table 4...3 5. Lipper-middle-income 73.. 67. 2. 65.2 . 39. 3.5 4.J Philippines Nigeria' Morocco Cameroon Ivory Coast Costa Rica.5 1. 6.4 Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified.2 4.4 6.1 7.1 2.5 . Malaysia 76. 3. 50.2 3. Rep. Venezuela' 1977 90.s than tone million populal ion Guyana 1975 1974 Fiji Barbados 1981 3.

..0 9 0. 16 13 26 20 53 23 .. .6 1. 7.... Malawi 9.... China Guinea Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenya 1. 17. .. 13.. ..3 . 22 26 19 92 39 . . ..9 1. Burma . Lao PDR 33.. .. 47. 6 12. . 1. Zaire 8..... ... .... 69 .. 16. . Zimbabwe 52. ... Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Somalia Haiti Benin Central African Rep.. .1 3. 24 . 26. Bhutan 32.3 83 11 1. 14. 25. . 9 54 16 27 17 50 70 44 ..1 . 29...3 1... 28 ....Table 5.7 .. 49. 33 . 15... 19 65 63 25 25 Il. . Bangladesh 3. 10 7 35.4 1... PDR Liberia Yemen Arab Rep.0 .. Sin gulate mieani age at marriage 1977 Male Female 24 ...... 46 45 26 . . Lesotho Bolivia Indonesia Zambia . 19 48 25 . 34 26 26 21 18 . 23... 21 7 ... ..7 . 49 46 44 100 85 . 41. 24. 6 4 7 39 3 4 4 2 2 3. India 12. lkliddle-income economies Low er-mnid die-incomne 35...5 .0. Sudan Mauritania 'Yemen.. Upper Volta 10... 32. .. 51.. Viet Nam 1. Status of women Number enrolled in secondary school as percentage of age group. .. Niger 2. 30 45. .. 37. 64 19 30 17 58 18 39 21 27 8 68 13 79 55 80 27 .. . . Arab Rep. . 4-4. 20 15 16 24 29 16 4 11 42 19 . 17 20 84 89 79 84 83 . .. 1981 Male Female 24 16 6 8 Ratio of adult male to adult female literacy. 46. 14. .5 .. 18. .... Percentage economically active among urban population aged 10-64 1978 Male Female 16 17 6. .9 .. Senegal 18. 48 49. 20. El Salvador Thailand Papua New Guinea Philippines 1.. 43.. 56 22 198 ... . 19.. 27.3 2.. 25 . Afghanistan 30.7 5. 7... 21 . 23 25 66 73 ... 13 37 36 21 29 2 20 31 24 22 25 58 68 . Morocco 54.. 18.. Nigeria 1... 22 9 53 .4 2.6 1. . Honduras Egypt. Il 8 58 .4 2. 40. Mozamnbique 34. .. Cameroon 31 25 20 13 71 .. .. 21.. 2... 28 .. 20 20. 23 . 53. 19 27 27 23 17 2 7 15 4 1 14 4 43 54 74 . 36. Nepal 6. 20 1 2 2 . 48. 42.. Uganda 11. 9 21 .. 19 . . 38.. ... . 25. 23 15 84 75 32 47 8. Percentageaged 15-49 eoer enrolled in primary school 1980 Male Female 68 21 40 32 9 9 ........ .... . 1980 [ov%-incrnme economies 2.. . 27 39.. Ethiopia 4. .. 50.

.. .. . 22. 62 65 54 78 30 68 65 35 40 13 100 100 ..6 .2 .1 80.... 92 100 100 96 . 63 34 90. .. Panama 78.. 94. Kuwait 99. . 9 8 ... ... 21 22 1.. .. . 23 23 21.. Rep. . . Venezuela 89..9 ... United Arab Emirates 2. Brazil . Argentina 1.19. Tunisia 66. . 26 26 25 . ... 97 100 . Cuba 71... 37 80 57 24 71 66 .. Uruguay 87... . Israel 54 41 69 61 38. . . .. 199 .. Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified.... .. ..l ... . Iran..... . .. .. 26 26 . 56. 59. . of 77. 57 100 100 98 .. ... . Jordan 75. Algeria 83..n secondary school as percentage of age group. . .. .. Lebanon 72. 60. 18.. 2. 97. 33 33 19 57 21 41 52 60 81 61 63 ..... . Turkey 65. 53 84 97 99 100 92 51 100 .1 .. 80 100 ..... Saudia Arabia 98... 1......2 . Korea. 1980 55. Colombia 69.... ... see technical notes. 2.. .. 22 . 49 29 63 24 . Hong Kong 91. ..... 36 26 . 73..... 71 32 -62...... ..0 ... .... . Mongolia Uipper-middle-income 1. . Singapore 93.. Mexico 81. . Syrian Arab Rep. . 95 .. . 57 37 45 72 60 85 28 23 51 77 56..4 . 59 79 56 89 60 3 54 42 54 37 76 53 80 69 62 ... 1. . 61.. 22. Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemala Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep.1 ..... Number enrolled i. .. Ecuador 26 . 64 62 . Iraq High-income oil exporters 95. 57.Ratio of adult male to adult female literacy.. . 1.... . . Malaysia 76. 28 26 24.. ... 74.9 . .. 64.74 99 100 100 100 97 79 . . . Percentage economically active among urban population aged 10-64 1978 Male Female 27 46 100 86 98 77 63 97 .. 1981 Male Female 38 45 25 9 17 15 44 51 62 52 54 39 62 41 Percentage aged 15-49 ever enrolled in primary school 1980 Male Female 76 78 . Singulate mean age at marriage 1977 Male Female .... . Not available. ... 1.9 ..... Islamic Rep. . Oman 1. . Jamaica 63. 84. 22 72 38 2. 20 .. Chile 79..0 . .... . 7 27 8 61 25 40 49 64 90 54 75 .. . Cou ntries %% ith les-~ than one million populat ion Guinea-Bissau Comoros Gambia Guyana Botswana Swaziland Mauritius Fiji Barbados Bahrain Qatar 9uriname 1..

1974 17 1968 1974 1966 1965 1974 1970 1968 1970 1968 1970 E E E E E E E E C E D D C 13 E C E F E E E D E E E E B E D D3 B C D C D3 E Honduras Egypt. 47. 1973 1973 1976 n. 1970 1977 1982 1969 1978 1962 n. 56. 54. Family planning policy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Support for family planning Health and Demographic and other houman righits reasons reasons only No support Low-inc_ome _economies 1. 24. 1965 1975 1969 1960 1967 1978 1970 1979 x 1977~bF B E E E E E E A E E E C E E D D E E B D F D E D3 E A E E E B E E C D E E E x x x x x x x x x 30. Kaniipuclzea. 52. 23. 6. 25. Lesotho Bolivia Indonesia Zambia x x x 1976 b 1977 1977 E E B E E C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 1970 n. 51. 5. 43. Haiti Benin Central African Rep. 57. 7. 22. 2.a. Lao PDR 33. 21. 20. Viet Nami Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 35. 1967 n. 1971 Family planning indear' 1972 1982 E E E D E E E E E E E C E D E E E E E E Burma Zaire Malawi Upper Volta 10.1'.a. 41. n. Rwanda 13. Tanzania 15. 8. Costa Rica 1966 n. 55. 29. 9.a. 48.. India 12. 17. 39. n.a. 31.a. 3. Arab Rep.. 42. 37. 27. 59.a. 50. China Guinea Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone 11'. 44. 1975 1976 1968 E E E E 13 F B 13 E F E 13 E 13 x x 5 x 200 .'x x x x x x x x x x S 1952 1981 n. 28. 26. I. a. Chad Bangladesh Ethiopia Nepal Mali x x x x x x x x x x Year official family planning program started n. 45. El Salvador Thailand 49.a. 40.a. Sudan Mauritania Yemen. Dem. People's Rep. 32. 19. 46. Uganda 11. 18. Mozamnbiqjue 34. PDR Liberia Senegal Yemen Arab Rep. Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaraguia Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo. B3urundi 14.Table 6.a. 53. n. 4. 1971 1981 1966 1972 n. 36.a. 38. Somalia 16. a. 58. 1973 n.

South Africa 87.. . n. 62. Not applicable.a. Ecuador 64. C E E E E C A C C C D E E E B A B C 1970 n. Colombia 67. Year in which previously existing program was canceled. A = very strong. a. D B A C E D B A C E x x x x x x x x x 1972 n. Brazil 80.IslamicRep. 1966 1968 1973 1965 1967 E E E C B D . Peru 61. Dem. Chile Support forfamily planning Demographic Health and and other human rights reasons reasons only No support x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Year official family planning program started 1976 1968 1966 1968 1965 1964 1970 1972 n. Algeria 83. n. . Libya 97.60. n. 1976 1978 1969 E E E E .a.. n. Israel 90. Paraguay 68. C = moderate. Saudi Arabia 98. n. Iran. Korea. 71. Uruguay 85. . Venezuela 89. .a. Kuwait 99. Argentina 84. Vincent and Grenadines Solomon Islands Guyana x x x 1972 1970 1977 D St. Rep. 74. Trinidad and Tobago x 93. . .a. Dominican Rep. Turkey 65. % less than one million population ith Guinea-Bissau Cape Verde Gambia x x x x x x x 1974 1974 1971 n. United Arab Emirates Counirie. 1974 1976 1966 1961 1969 1979b 79. . E b. see technical notes. Lebanon 72. Jamaica 63. 1975 1970 D . 1972 1982 E D C C B C D C D D C C C B E E .. Mexico x 81. Not available. . . Oman 96.. . Lucia Grenada Botswana x x x 1975 1974 1970 D B C D Slwaziland Mauritius Fiji Barbados Cyprus x x x x x 1975 1965 1962 1967 n. n. For explanation of the index.. Panama 78. Hong Kong x 91. Mongolia L'pper-middle-income 73. Iraq High-income oil e%porters 95. D = weak.a.a. Malaysia 76. B = strong. D St.a. very weak or none.. Gabon x Seychelles Western Samoa x x = n. Korea. Singapore x 92. .a. Syrian Arab Rep. a. 201 . of 77.a. Jordan 75. Familyplanning index. . Angola 69. Rep. B B . Tunisia 66.a.a. Cuba 70. 94.

Work on causes of mortality decline includes DaVanzo and Habicht. see Lal and Wolf. The stall in fertility decline in selected countries is analyzed in Gendell.2 on protection in industrial countries is based on UNCTAD data. The discussion of debt problems is based on papers by Kindleberger.1 is based on Wolf and others.3 is based on Lal and unpublished work by Srinivasan. The discussion of present trends is based primarily on World Bank and United Nations data. Lawrence. and UNCTAD publications as well as World Bank data. and Bulatao and Elwan.3 are based on Bank macroeconomic modeling work summarized in Sanderson and Williamson.5 on Latin American debt problems made use of the background papers by Sjaastad and others. Box 3.4 and Box 3. The discussion of IDA lending in Box 3.4 draws on the Bank report IDA in Retrospect. Selected sources are briefly noted by chapter below and listed alphabetically by author in two groups.1 comparing the 1930s to the present draws on Maddison. The views they express are not necessarily those of the World Bank or of this Report. For a review of public expenditures and budget deficits in OECD countries. OECD. Box 2.3 is in Mitra. For additional sources and evidence on the advantages of children in poor communities.1 on the isolation paradox draws on the writings of Sen and of Cassen. The discussion of the problems faced by developing countries in a volatile world economy is based on internal 202 Bank documents and Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and Programs. and economic work on individual countries.Bibliographical note This Report has drawn on a wide range of World Bank work as well as on numerous outside sources. The second group consists of selected other sources used in the preparation of this Report. sector. Preston. United Nations data to 1950 and World Bank data thereafter Historical data on andcor Ban dataewed theMcGreafter.2 was assembled with the help of Peter Lindert and members of the Graduate Group in Demography at the University of California.2 on the engine of growth is based on Riedel and on Lal. Mortality trends are. Quantitative analysis of the link between budget deficits in industrial countries and global "crowding out" is in Lal and van Wijnbergen. historical discussion is based on sources cited in Cassen and in McGreevey. Most include extensive bibliographies. Alternative views on macroeconomic stabilization are surveyed in Haberler. and Cochrane and others. Box 2. and the effects of protection. The analysis for Box 2. see Cain. Box 4. Box 2. the causes of the productivity slowdown.3 draws on data assembled by the European Fertility . Historicalpdaa oThe income areviewe McGreevey are in . analyzed in Hill. and by Lawrence. these reports synthesize relevant literature and Bank work. and by Sjaastad and others. by chapter Chapter 1 and. for this century. The first includes background papers commissioned for this Report. Outside sources include research publications and the unpublished reports of other organizations working on global economic and population and development programs and issues. the sources cited in these papers are not listed separately. IMF. World Bank sources include ongoing economic analysis and research. Box 3. Those issued as World Bank Staff Working Papers are available from the Bank's Publications Sales Unit. Box 4. For analysis of the extent and effects of labor market rigidities in the economic performance of OECD countries. Box 3. Chapters 2 and 3 Data used in these chapters draw on GATT. see Hakim and Wallich. as well as project. Berkeley and Davis. The evidence on international migration is surveyed in Swamy. Box 2. Selected sources. Box 4. Chapter 4 The description of the setting for high fertility is from Birdsall (1980).

1). unpublished papers produced by the Fertility Determinants Group at Indiana University. and quality-are discussed in Ainsworth and in Jones. Freedman. Chapter 5 The literature on macroeconomic effects of population growth. Kirchner and others analyze the links between population and natural resources. are cited in Ainsworth. 203 . 1981 (Box 6.3. Bank work on Africa.2.7 was prepared with help from Judith Bruce of The Population Council. Demographic policy objectives in Box 8. Chapter 7 On contraceptive use and unmet need see the papers by Ainsworth and by Boulier (a).4) include that of Frank.6. is based on Trussell and Pebley and other analyses surveyed in Ainsworth. see Muscat. Jones. and Bulatao. Projections of schooling costs are based on Bank data on current costs and a projection model of The Futures Group. and Pingali and Binswanger. The discussion of population policy uses information gathered and summarized by Lapham and Mauldin. The FAO report by Higgins and others is the main source for Box 8. The background papers by Gendell. Box 7. The Netherlands). who prepared the book ascribed to the Club of Rome. The discussion of food and agriculture is based on the FAO study Agriculture: Toward 2000.1. On the relation between fertility and savings. and Zachariah contributed to the section on South Asia. on contraceptive technology. on the health benefits of family planning. the Pathfinder Fund. Herz summarizes information on donor assistance. The African section is based in part on the papers by Ascadi and Johnson-Ascadi. 1980. access. Easterlin. Bongaarts. and that of Merrick to the section on Latin America. Lindert.2 is described in Kamin.7 onmltr 'xedtrsi ae nSvr an Woldtank data. The incentives section draws on Bank sector work on China. is based on Denton.1 discusses the works of Meadows and others. Essential data were obtained from the World Fertility Survey Comparative Studies series. The structural transformation discussion is based on Porter and on Johnston and Kilby. and the United States Agency for International Development. Wheeler. Sources for Box 7. include Atkinson and others.5) are analyzed in Mahar. Urban population growth and migration are discussed in Linn and in Standing. and Birdsall. and Lapham and Mauldin. and materials furnished by the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Important conceptual contributions include those of Becker. For analyses of the effects of family planning on fertility see Boulier. Boxes in this chapter discuss articles by Stokes and Schutjer (Box 6. and by Faruqee and Gulhati. Work on the international economy as it relates to population is in Sapir and in Swamy. Program issuesmanagement. and Zachariah presents such evidence for India. Some of the information is available in publications of the World Fertility Survey (published by the International Statistical Institute. including the background paper by Bulatao. Data used in this section are from World Fertility Survey and Contraceptive Prevalence Survey data tapes prepared for this Report. the compilation of Bulatao and Lee. on Jacobsen. and of Simon. especially the paper by Casterline and others.3). for related discussion. and Schultz. Examples throughout the chapter come from World Bank sector reports. and on the 1974 World Bank publication by King and others. other background papers. Chapter8 P This chapter draws heavily on Bank operational experience and sector work. Box 8. Merrick presents evidence on family planning and other factors influencing fertility for Latin America. Ho (Box 6. The links between fertility and mortality are reviewed in Bulatao and Elwan and in Gwatkin. Bulatao analyzes the costs of family planning programs. Porter. Chapter 6 The discussion of socioeconomic and proximate determinants of fertility is based on recent reviews. on the Matlab projects. including effects on income distribution. Box 8.2 are drawn largely from official government statements and development plans. see Hammer. which resulted in the book edited by Coale and Watkins. is surveyed and reviewed in McNicoll.Transition project at Princeton University.1. Box 5. Studies on infertility in Africa (Box 8.2). and the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment study. Box 7. Redistribution policies (including Box 5. Policy recommendations affecting marriage are discussed especially in Henry and Piotrow and on breastfeeding in McCann and others. The analysis used for Box 5. Cain analyzes the link between the status of women and fertility. on pronatalist policies. Sources for Box 7.

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"Family Planning Programs and Contraceptive Availability: Their Effects on Contraceptive Use and Fertility. Projections." In Ainsworth and Jones.` Lluch."t Sjaastad. David."t DaVanzo. "Debt. and Sustainable Development. Ken. Jones. Ian. and Distortions: Problems of the Global Economy. Family Planning."t Gwatkin.' Bulatao. Debts. "The Slowdown of the World Economy and the Problem of Stagflation: Some Alternative Explanations and Policy Implications.'" In DaVanzo and others. "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview and Assessment. the Real Interest Rate.' Birdsall. "Unmet Need for Contraception: Evaluation of Measures and Estimates for Thirty-six Developing Countries. and Mexico. a. Rodolfo A. Family Structure. Thomas W. Sanderson. "Government Deficits. "Family Planning Programs: The Client's Perspective. Bryan.. Julie. Jee-Peng. Charles. Fertility Decline."t King. Geoffrey. and Fertility in Developing Countries. and Huw Jones. "Female Education.. Leonardo. Martha. Denton.' Boulier. and LDC Debt: On Global Crowding Out. Bryan. "Developing Countries in the 1930s: Possible Lessons for the 1980s. Constantino. "Family Planning Programs: Client and Management Perspectives. Robert J. Nancy." In Birdsall. * An asterisk after a citation indicates a background paper that will be published in a volume provisionally entitled "Perspectives on the Global Economy. "Schooling and Demand for Children: Historical Perspectives. and Savings: Structure and Trends. "Population Growth and Agricultural Transitions. "Carrying Capacity and Rapid Population Growth: Definition. Davidson. "Taking Thought for the Morrow: Prospects and Policies for Aging Populations.Hakim. Angus." t Sapir. "National Family Planning Programs: A Management Perspective. "Financing Family Planning Programs. Gurushri. Lawrence. "Some Aspects of Population Growth."t Cain. "The Impact of Family Planning Programs on Infant. Income. "What Accounts for the Decline in Infant Mortality in Peninsular Malavsia. 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Bhatia. eds. George T. Henry.. ed.) Bongaarts. "The Proximate Determinants of Fertility. 1983. 4. 1980. no. PotentialPopulation Supporting Capacities of Lands in the Developing World. M. and others. 1975. New York: Academic Press. Lee. and others. Agriculture and Structural Transformation. D.C. 1:1-17. 2:203-11. Jacobsen. 23. N. Rodolfo A. Alice. "An Economic Analysis of Fertility. Robert H. * Higgins. and Susan Watkins." Social Forces 58. 1983. "Rapid Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Policies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press." Demography 18:1-25. 1980. Series M." Studies in Family Planning6:54-63. Lindert. "Theories of Fertility Decline: A Reappraisal. Rome. Johnston. 1983.: Johns Hopkins University Press. The Poverty of "Development Economics. Agriculture: Toward 2000. Susan H." Population and Development Review 4:105-32. Baltimore. World Fertility Survey. C.: World Bank. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1984. Chicago. and Ronald D." Family PlanningPerspectives 12. 1983. "A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility. J. A. "Demand for Children and Spacing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Richard. E. Washington. Clark. D. 1981. 1983. "Time Costs of Child Rearing in the Rural Philippines. Timothy. Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. 1982. "The Matlab Family Planning-Health Services Project. "Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Population:An Analysis of Data. "The History of Literacy in Sweden in Comparison with Some Other Countries. -1981. John B. Princeton. no. "The Changing Economic Costs and Benefits of Having Children. 1983.Selected bibliography Ascadi. Rome: FAO. Johansson. 12.: Johns Hopkins University Press.. 5. 1979. 1975. Washington." World Bank Staff Working Paper no. "Maternal Mortality in Rural Bangladesh. Ronald." Background paper for the "Report on Population Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa. Becker.C." PopulationReports. Demeny. and Ravi Gulhati. L. 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Biology and Behavior: An Analysis of the Proximate Determinants. Judith. New York: Academic Press. 1979. King. Kindleberger. 1974. World in Recession. and W. "A Perspective on Long-term Population Growth. Atkinson. November 1974. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Gilland. Bongaarts. A. New York: The Population Council. 3:253-96.. 1977." Population Bulletin 35. Bulatao. Population Policies and Economic Development. Frank. 4. 6. "Considerations on World Population and Food Supply. Fertility.. Edward. Bernard.C. and Joanne Leslie. Flieger. 1980. Deepak. "Historical Estimates of World Population: An Evaluation. 1980. Teresa J.. Durand. Rome. Deevey.J." Worldwatch Paper 54. Nancy. Peter H. and Peter Kilby. "Effects of Education and Urbanization on Fertility. 1980. 1973. Berkeley: University of California Press. 104. "The Effects of Education on Health. Rashid.." Washington. " In Studies in Family Planning5. Md. and others. Bruce F. 1980. 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Annex World Development Indicators .

I I .

Commercial energy Growth of energy production bl Growth of energy consumption b Energy consumption per capita bl Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports 232 Table 9. E 212 213 214 218 GNP per capita b Inflation E Life expectancy 220 Growth of production GDP n Agriculture b Industry b Manufacturing E Services 222 Table 3. Industry Share of value added in food and agriculture E in textiles and clothing b in machinery and transport equipment bl in chemicals b7 in other manufacturing bl Value added in manufacturing 230 Table 8. Basic indicators Population rGArea Table 2.Food aid Food production per capita bl 228 Fertilizer consumption El Table 7. Structure of demand Public consumption L Private consumption bl Gross domestic investment b Gross domestic saving z Exports of goods and nonfactor services I Resource balance 226 Table 6. Structure of production GDP b Agriculture E Industry b Manufacturing [l Services 224 Table 4. Growth of merchandise trade Export values E Import values imports El Terms of trade El 234 Growth of exports El Growth of 209 .Contents Key Introduction Maps Table 1. Agriculture and food Value added bl Cereal imports -. Growth of consumption and investment Public consumption E Private consumption El Gross domestic investment Table 5.

Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capital Gross inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium. Terms of public borrowing Commitments 3 Average interest rate grace period 3 250 Average maturity 3 Average Table 18.Table 10. Origin and destination of manufactured exports Industrial market economies : High-income oil exporters manufactured exports 3 I 242 East European nonmarket economies Developing economies = Value of Table 14. Population growth and projections Population growth L Population size 3 Hypothetical size of stationary population 3 Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1 3 Population momentum 254 Table 20. and metals 3 Other primary commodities 3 Textiles and clothing 5 Machinery and transport equipment 3 Other manufactures 236 Table 11. Origin and destination of merchandise exports Industrial market economies 3i East European nonmarket economies 3 High-income oil exporters 5 Developing economies 240 Table 13. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members Amount in dollars 3 as percentage of donor GNP 3 in national currencies 5 Net bilateral flow to low-income countries 252 Table 19.and long-term loans 3 Repayment of principal 3 Net inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium.Net direct private investment 3 Gross international reserves 3i in months of import coverage 244 Table 15. Balance of payments and reserves Current account balance 5 Receipts of workers' remittances . Structure of merchandise exports Fuels. Structure of merchandise imports Food 3 Fuels 3 Other primary commodities transport equipment 5 Other manufactures 5 238 Machinery and Table 12. Demographic and fertility-related indicators Crude birth rate 5 Crude death rate 3 Total fertility rate of married women using contraception 3 256 Percentage 210 .and long-term loans 246 Table 16. External public debt and debt service ratios External public debt outstanding and disbursed 3 as percentage of GNP 3] Interest payments on external public debt 3 Debt service as percentage of GNP 3 of exports of goods and services 248 Table 17. minerals.

Health-related indicators Population per physician per capita 3 per nursing person . Income distribution Percentage share of household income. Urbanization Urban population as percentage of total population 3 Growth of urban population b Percentage in largest city 3 in cities of over 500. Labor force Population of working age 3 Labor force in agriculture l in industry 3 in services L Growth of labor force. Daily calorie supply Table 25.Table 21.000 persons 260 Table 23.000 persons b Number of cities of over 500. past and projected 258 Table 22. Central government current revenue Tax revenue 3 Current nontax revenue percentage of GNP b 270 Total current revenue as Table 28. Indicators related to life expectancy Life expectancy 3 262 3 Infant mortality rate Child death rate 264 Table 24. Education Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group secondary school 3 in higher education 3 266 in Table 26. Central government expenditure Defense 3 Education b Health b Housing and community amenities. social security and welfare 3 Economic services 3 Other 3 Total expenditure as percentage of GNP b Overall surplus/deficit as percentage of GNP 268 Table 27. by percentile groups of households 272 Technical notes Bibliography of data sources 274 286 211 .

Figures in italics are for years or periods other than those specified. in italics. that it is a total. at the end of their group. Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Ivory Coast Jamaica Japan Jordan 90 119 11 43 93 94 100 89 102 56 62 106 74 Not available. economies are listed in their group in ascending order of GNP per capita except for those for wvhich no GNP per capita can be calculated. Afghanistan Albania Algeria 29 121 81 68 83 110 105 2 107 17 30 42 79 Figures in the colored bands are summary measures for groups of economies. that it is a median value. Republic of Kuwait Lao People's Democratic Republic Lebanoni Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea 31 27 70 76 98 32 71 41 38 96 22 8 75 5 36 80 72 53 33 4 109 103 55 21 52 117 95 26 77 49 Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Upper Volta Uruguay Venezuela Viet Namt Yemen Arab Republic Yemen. (. Federal Republic of Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Haiti Honduras 212 . the letter t. Democratic Kenya Korea. DemocraticRepublic of Korea. Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia Iran. All growth rates are in real terms. Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone Singapore Somalia South Africa 67 f40 50 125 82 120 12 97 39 28 91 15 85 Angola Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Belgium Benin Bhutan Bolivia Brazil Bulgaria Burma Burundi Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo. People's Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe 101 23 35 116 118 73 14 48 24 92 65 64 10 126 99 104 115 9 84 87 34 40 37 86 7 44 51 Czechoslovakia Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt.Key In each table. The reference numbers below reflect the order in the tables. the letter m. These are listed in alphabetical order. People's Republic of the Costa Rica Cuba 122 6 13 54 111 18 1 78 19 66 58 59 69 123 114 61 63 46 47 3 108 112 124 113 25 88 57 20 16 45 Kainpuchea.) Less than half the unit shown. Arab Republic of El Salvador Ethiopia Finland France German Democratic Republic Germany. The letter l after a summary measure indicates that it is a weighted average.

All other economies are listed by group in ascending order of GNP per capita.Introduction The World Development Indicators. labor force. Many of the economies included are also classified by domi-' nant characteristics-to distinguish oil importers from oil exporters and to distinguish industrial market from industrial nonmarket economies. Table entries in italics indicate that they are for years or periods other than those specified. external trade. The table on central government expenditure is an expanded version of an earlier table. a by-product of the World Bank's statistical and analytical work. Some of the differences between figures shown in this year's and last year's editions reflect not only updating but also revisions to historical series. In addition. Data for nonmarket economies. are included if available in a comparable form. with the exception of the GNP per capita figures. Most of the information used in computing the indicators was drawn from the data files and publications of the World Bank. This classification is useful in distinguishing economies at different stages of development. For ease of reference. industry. Nevertheless. and other characteristics of the basic data to ensure the greatest possible degree of comparability. is that economies for which no GNP per capita figure can be calculated are listed in italics. 19 industrial market economies. care must be taken in how the indicators are interpreted. Because comparable data for industrial market economies are readily available. 60 middle-income developing economies with a GNP per capita of $410 or more. at the end of the appropriate income groups. variations in national statistical practices mean that most data are not strictly comparable. estimates of GNP per capita are available only for those nonmarket economies that are members of the World Bank. The economies included in the World Development Indicators are classified by GNP per capita. these are also included in the indicators. many of them are subject to considerable margins of error. urbanization. 5 high-income oil exporters. the resulting growth rates are not unduly influenced by exceptional values. in alphabetical order. The data in the other tables fall into the following broad areas: national accounts. The groups used in the tables are 34 low-income developing economies with a GNP per capita of less than $410 in 1982. absolute values are reported only in a few instances. definitions. unless noted otherwise. by using the least-squares method. The format of this edition generally follows that used in previous years. external debt. aid flows. The indicators in Table 1 give a summary profile of the economies. All dollar figures are US dollars. Most growth rates were calculated for two periods: 1960-70 and 1970-82. Every effort has been made to standardize concepts. ratios and rates of growth are shown. agriculture. An important difference. All growth rates are in constant prices and were computed. which are derived by applying the World Bank Atlas method described in the technical note to Table 1. provide information on the main features of social and economic development. and 8 East European nonmarket economies. The data should thus be construed only as indicating trends and characterizing major differences among economies. demography. and is complemented by a new table on central government current revenue. the technical note to Table 1also discusses this problem. derived by applying the official exchange rates. central 'government finances. social indicators. coverage. Most of the data collected by the World Bank are on its developing member countries. Conversion of national currency values in this manner results in some inevitable distortions. energy. a few of which are members of the World Bank. the International Monetary Fund. Note that because of the paucity of data and differences in the method of computing national income. and income distribution. and the United Nations and its specialized agencies. other external transactions. Although the statistics are drawn from sources generally considered the most authoritative and reliable. The 213 . timing. however. Because this method takes all observations in a period into account. or 1970-81 if data for 1982 were not available.

Summary measures-totals.files (NethJ ' ...-Montse-rt t "/ Guadelo.a c le * aragoo -! Netlhesa. AmenanSamoa (US) .. Countries with populations of less than a million are not reported in the tables. median values. -~ . are colored yellow. the letter m.same order is used in all tables. The groups are the same as those used in the 28 tables that follow. .Noe (NZ) Tonga French Pc ysesra (Fr) . S 214 .n. summary measures are separately shown for China and India and for other low-income economies. And because trade in oil affects the economic characteristics and performance of middle-income economies. that it is a median value. . that it is a total. The letter w after a summary measure indicates that it is a weighted average. ' i . Because the coverage of Groups of economies The colors on the map show what group a country has been placed in on the basis of its GNP per capita and.ds A. aRi .- I -M_ aS 2 Low-income economies Middle-income oil importers Middle-income oil exporters High-income oil exporters Industrial market economies ElSaladoN: rage Cosa . italics indicate those economies placed at the end of a group due to the unavailability of GNP per capita figures. [Lcre a Babados Grenada. The median is the middle value of a data set arranged in order of magnitude. summary measures are also shown for oil importers and for oil exporters. in some instances. The technical note to Table I shows some basic indicators for 34 small countries that are members of the United Nations. largely for lack of comprehensive data. the World Bank. its distinguishing economic characteristics. Because China and India heavily influence the overall summary measures for the low-income economies. or both. the group of middle-income economies is divided into lower and upper categories to provide more meaningful summary measures. The weights used in computing the summary measures are described in the technical notes. The alphabetical list in the key shows the reference number of each economy.Its-Nead : P .pe (Fr) N aDomn-ica Argerrsa U tMat~.. Western o Samoa . the letter t.. . and they include only the 126 countries with a population of more than 1 million.. those with a GNP per capita of less than $410.AoaMgua andBatSada I UK) . or weighted averages-were calculated for the economy groups only if data were adequate and meaningful statistics could be obtained. a East European nonmarket economies Z Not included in the Indicators Tokelau (0NZ.ue(Fr) St.. all low-income economies. For example. Moreover..uerto RKri (US) Xb S St BolWv.

The technical notes should be referred to in any use of the data._. life .economies is not uniform for all indicators and because the variation around central tendencies can be large.Burma ' .. h . - F VoAa 6 \ |S daldives | LanKa 8 |j . ' ' iE ..- * fa nar -. * Tust Territory the o Pacioc Lslaods a Leo G--. and the boundaries shown. Chna > -. . Ca 215 . These notes outline the methods.' .'~~ 1~ Vanuatu Maurilius e.Maca Port .. and the share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP). --. The Eckert IV projection has been used for these maps because it maintains correct areas for all countries. which contain comprehensive definitions and descriptions of concepts used. The bibliography gives details of the data sources. the denominations used. and data sources.ioopeZae ad sRep oMfthe Co ngo Equatorial Guiea §W~~~ ala Son "" . .. concepts.New Culedania (Fit P. groups. i' " .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . eN _ .* D Ethiop.1 3 a TogoTome P. The World Development Indicators are prepared under the supervision of Ramesh Chander.t _ t~~~~~~~Ron _~~~~. .a ' a'-'.. readers should exercise caution in comparing the summary measures for different indicators.. The maps have been prepared exclusively for the convenience of the readers of this Report. X t.i Guam tUS) ) T A .>lr'1.. The maps on the following pages show population. . distance. . ..\t1. do not imply on the part of the World Bank and its affiliates any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.expectancy at birth.' /'r-iba rirlat UaiSeeychelles Ji r _' Solomon lands Tuvalu t S t . The first map shows country names and the groups in which economies have been placed. r n3 . though at the cost of some distortions in shape. r -. and direction.. definitions. and years or periods.~r ~~~~~~~~~NepalBhtn2 BangladeshP India Zong Kong(UK) .: !:..~~~~~~~~~~ -* *: . .e S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e ¢ . ~~~~~~~Comoros ~~. This year's edition includes four world maps. .

2000 I Shares of total population. Note that Table 1 gives the popu- lation for each of 125 countries. The bar chart at right shows population by country group for the years 1960 and 1982 as well as projected population for the year 2000. excluding countries with populations of less than 1 million.e L I 2000 Fao Eur-.1982.l' ~-' . 1982 _ _ _ Millions 3000 2000 j l 1982 ! s .pin ICe 1960 1000 Oeconomies Low-income economies 216 .S I =' C' -.onn. H _ million = 0-1S 15-50 million 50-100 million 100+ million Data not available The colors on the map show the general size of a country's population. The pie chart at right shows the proportion of total population. Population by country group. t~~~~~~~- It v. accounted for by each country group. For example.. the technical note to that table gives data for 34 more countries with a population of less than 1 million. - . "Other" refers to high-income oil producers. 1960. countries with a population of less than 15 million are colored yellow. The country groups are those used in the map on the preceding pages and in the tables that follow.Population I~~~~ - * S: ~ -- ' X .

For example. 09percent :S _># I -Thevaueadedbyaoutr'sagi' . Share of agriculture in GDP * --- .- ' arcloedds-. l. .- £ Sp value added by a country's agricultural sector divided by the gross domestic product gives the share of agriculture in GDP. The shares say nothing about absolute values of production. For countries with high levels of subsistence farming. life expectancy at birth is less than fifty years in countries colored yellow. -_ L m 50-49 years yeas =pectancy 50-59 60-69 years 70+ years not available Data not available L4 The map classifies countries by life exat birth-that is. by the number of years a baby born in 1982 can expect to live. countries whose shares of agriculture in GDP range from 0 to 9 percent are colored dark green. the share of agriculture in GDP may be underestimated due to difficulties in assigning subsistence farming its proper value.- 3.- .Life expectancy -~~~~ ~~~~~~ -K_ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . 0-O9 percent 10>19 percent 20-19 percent 20-39 percent _ 40 + percent S ~The Data not available z 217 . For example. The map classifies countries by those shares.

6 924 Morocco 20.5 781 For data comparability and coverage see tnetechnical notes.267 587 66 57 239 804 583 72 648 47 280 290 300 310 310 310 310 310 320 320 340 360 380 390 390 .5 9.099 490 500 510 570 5..8 18. 1710LI 638 8 669.5 2.0 14.6 33 12 1 11 5 13 3 88 39.0 42 1.5 391 Nigeria 90. 43 Inoonesia 44 Zamnba 45 Honduras 46 Egypt.4 1.9 9.6 5. 38 45 46 69 47 55 50 57 38 36 43 11 9 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea. 11 9 12.8 13 7.0 40 44. 44 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 92.3 -0..52.4 6.240 0.5 .5 13.5 52 3.7 47.3 9.5 3. 330 43. 440 470 470 490 ' 139 12 7' I17 15.3 4. 17 342 Costa R ca 2.5 12. expectancy at birth (years) 1982 59 51 China andlIndia Other low-income 1IChad 2. .5 21 32 1. Arab Rep 47 152 6 6.3 677 2.7 85 79 150 11..1 7.4 0.4 1.8 4.5 6.345 118 274 236 3. .6 1.3 1.0 5.9 2. 43 51 64 1 520 57.919 753 112 1.7 49 Jamaica 2.9 322 Guatema a 7.8 . 52 39 54 48 48 67 1. 30' i28 .0 1.4 59 196 195 30 1.330 1.561 246 1.7 2..9 4.1 0.6 2.56 60 w 57 w 63 z' zw 47 45 46 54 44 44 53 51 53 51 6.8 48 47 46 45 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda I11 lndia 12 Rwanda 34.7 48 3.7 35.5 40 1.2 14 5 34 4 73 63 63 218 .1 3.181 945 638 28 113 623 9. Dem.9 -0.5 17 2.7 29.1 122 .6 16.0 8.6 2. -0. .222 141 1.284 290.8 .8 2.7 10.8 1. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oillexporters Oil importers Lower rmiddle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen.2 5.8 0.430 1.6 660 690 1.0 3.6 2.3 3.7 5.4 1.8 62.5 -1.1 1..4 27 2.8 40 5.2 2.9 32.4 -0. 1.6. 3030 29 3.2 8.1 6.2 05 1.5 55 50 44 44 47 55 46 47 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Burundi Tanzania Somalia Haiti Benin Central African Rep China Guinea Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan 19.506 1.9 (.7 109 Congo. 3 2.0 284 Turkey 46.6 92 96 12.65 1 72.8 9.8 8.5 4.3 1.9 9.7 11 9 60 57 48 49 50 5t 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Note El Salvador 51 21 Tha land 48 5 514 Papua New Guinea 3.008.0 8.1 2.1 2. Basic indicators GNP per capital Average Life Population (millions) mid-1 982 Low-income economies Area (thousands of square kilometers) 12 849 991 t Dollars 1982 2030 annual growth rate (percent) 1960-82b '3 Average annual rate of inflation' (percent) 1960-~70c 1970-82d 1 32 4.i 541 3.0 1 1583.288 26 28 190 190 210 210 230 260 260 280 1.130 1.3 475 Nicaragua 29 130 Ivory Coast 8.4 40 61 5.9 154 7.7 2.9 237 802 ..3 2.6 8.0 75 1.1 462 Philippines 50 7 300 Zimbabwe 7.8 1.3 447 Cameroon 9. 4.001 580 640 4. 250 140 140 170 180 80 35 11 -2.7 . 8410.3 51 Peru 17..7 3.6 06 0.7 8.6 2.9 4.8 12.2 15.285 Dominican Rep.7 5.9 30.5 2.4 134 12.4 1.6 .0 27 995 r 20.4 8.2 87.9 1.7 1.350 1.2 11 Ecuaoor 8.031 333 1ll 36.5 -0.1 1.2 21 2.3 2. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 3.t 519 5.6 16 248 1 1.180 1. 700 790 820 820 850 860 870 890 920 950 1.9 8.2 -0 1 7.9 104 21 10 8 9.0 3.1 144 1.6 0.031 1 '5 036.1 -1.4 144 83 107 143 124 101 10. 2.9 2.Table 1.0 2.8 1.9 2.7 6.4 25 9 19.370 0.2 16.3 -1 3 2.330 1.2 7.1 12.8 1.3 1.9 18 4.310 09 45 2.952.1 13.6 37 2.6 12.- 3A 1260.2 .8 63 63 53 64 56 50 52 53 58 47 60 60 74 58 62 1.6 II 7.b 35. People's Rep.1 40 2..8 28 0.1 18.i 20 2 1. 5.3 1.5 3.1 .5 717.1 1.4 37.

490. b.7 3..5 39. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.6 29 2..5 37. Figures in cs are for are tori1 ital 1970-81.2b 8 Average annual rate of inflationa (percent) _ 1960-70e 1 9 7 0 . 3.9 174 136. 6.7 9.270 2.0 46 1 35 27 3..1 7. .3 3.1 69 7.221 256 912 132 21 1 1 5 1.5 .0 59.687 9.2 24 6 54 4 61.0 12.079 i GNP per capitaa Average annual growth rate Dollars 1982 1.1 4.6 16.4 16. 73 74 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 I11 112 113 tl114 115 116 117 1l18 Italy New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Japan Belgium Finland Netherlands Australia Canada France Germany. 4 1.240 2.7 26 1..4 3.7 .150 18 84 16.3 44 44 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgarna 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem.2 23 422 i 93 238 29 ill.670 2. 1.0 54 31 31 42 3.2 32 7.- -0 3 17 5 1.7 22.9 4.1 3.973 2.1 3.6 4.4 4.160 14.4 11 32 0.340 5.9 30 93' 70 505 43. Life expectancy at birth (years) 1982 61 64 65 43 75 (millions) mid-1982 6..690 1.430 16.2 185 98 330 98 77 757 8.680 1.0 6.2 71 71 72 72 72 270. .010 2.6 41 37 5. 128 2. 66 64 67 67 71 70 64 65 57 71 70 73 63 71 68 74 74 75 72 68 59 58. .150 5.080 10.4 9.760 10. not 1970-82 219 .4 30 2. 63 51 .Population 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.3 3.7 3.4 16 0 131 14.0 7..9 22.1 28. .560 .6 1.976 547 249 43 6.090 5.0 21 4 50. 94/Irap High-income oillexporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia Area (thousands of square kilometers) 164 1.1 301 269 245 84 372 31 337 41 7.5 17 12. .2 17 0 1.363 450 324 41 13.9 15.460 1.1 3.210 2.840 7. Rep.450 2.290 5.8 75.6 3.. 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 10.5 126.610 (percent) 1 9 6 0 . Figures in c.72 .0 15 6 9 9.4 3.3 16.6 .2 9.402 .2 d 8 3.6 1.5 2.2 6.6 118 4 99 48 14.270 2..382 92 2.1 12.73 .3 42.1 8..140 4. in figures italics periods other than that are far specifiea.1 20. 5. Rep 125 Poland 126 USSR 383 3.512 1.2 6.4 9.4 1.1 19..4 2.139 407 1.680 12.2 19..7 3.767 176 1. 69 a.0 108 313 22.920 9.1 2.040 14.5 3.10.4 17 8 .910 6.2 30 12.1 11 7 74 11.1 49 99 7.9 43 6.0 5.4 0.000 19. 14. Because cata for early the 1 960s are not always avaliable.0 98 18. ot 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.6 3.4 15 4 52.8 '188 7'i 47 3.7 2.0 3. See the technical notes.460 12.8 4.800 4.9 10.0. .0 1.520 2. 5.4 15 2. 9.650 2.2 6. italics 961-70.350 2. Denmark United States Sweden Norway Switzerland 56. 7.280 17.470 3. Rep.510 56.7 36.7 27.4 3.4 2. 1 .648 435 4 312. 52 57 56 14 820.8 73.6 87 11.0 48 74 73 74 73 77 73 73 76 74 75 75 73 75 75 77 76 79 231. . Fed.2 25 1.7 .60 .5 4.3 1.5 83 4.760 1.910 2.840 .2 14.3 12 8 20. not 1960-70 a...390 1.660 9.1 6.247 115 121 10 1.9 4.9 5. 300 1.3 15. . 5. 16 0.. .2 4.320 11.9 13. .0 22..1 36 6.9 2.120 2.8 1.3 10.9 8.9 1. 64 65 i64 65 65 2.880 10.1 41.1 2. Dem.4 31 .770 II1070.3 99 9.2 . Rep.9 11.6 1.2 55 8 7. 71 Lebanon 72 Mon golia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.870 23.870 10.090 8.7 33 2.6 5.0 39 61 3.3 75 144.3 86 5.4 22.1 14.140 11.930 11.0 71 71 7229.860 1.9 30.2 2. Islamic Rep.6 7. 4. 3.2 6.565 22.5 33.5 -0.8 3.

0 5.2 55 -2. .7 8..7 59 4.5 0. 13 5. 30' 8 3 1.7 4.2 0. .0 1. 21 5.4 11.3 ..3 5.5 11. -2.4 3.4 1.8 5. 6. 34 Viet Nam 3.7 -0. .2' I SS 34 4 2' 4 5.4 2.2 3.8 -2.7 2.5 4. 58.0 0. .5 68 59 Costa Rica 6.5 3.7 6.5 78 11.3 28 .8 33 03 4.4 11.0 -0 1 . 32-" 2.7 Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1960-~70a 1970-82b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-701 1 9 7 0.6 8.6 -4. 67 .3 6.0 4. 41 3.3 37 38 19 2.0 2.0 .1 3.2 2.2 38 50 7.1 64 Turkey 6.9 8. 49.4 .2 -0 9 5.1 2.4 6.Table 2.1 .3 2.9 7.5 2.3 1.3 2. 2.5 2.0 -0.7 2.5 40 5.9 42 84 2. .9 7.4 2.4 2.3 8.8 -0 7 4. 9.2 1.8 2.3 5. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesotho 42 Boliv a 43 Indonesia 44 Zambia 45 Hlonduras 46 Egypt. io 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Mal Burma Zaire Malawi Upper Volta Uganda India Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Somalia Haiti Central African Rep China Gu nea Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Ghana Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone 3.4 03 3. .2 6.0 2.4 . 1.7 .9 5. . 19 . 60.0 9..0 5. -1.2 5.5 2.6 6.2 2.4 4. 6.7 4.5 41 1.8 . -0.6 3. 4..8 3.7 -2.7 11.1 .0 -1 9 9.8 .2 2.6 82 .3 . 0.1 8.9 -3 5 11. .4 2.4 59 81 -3..4 5.4 30 20 4.1 14 2.8 13.2 2. 73 40 8.6 ..7 4.1 12.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 5. . 10.4 6. . 4 9:.0 5..2 2.Arab Rep 47 El Salvador 48 Thailand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Pnil ppines 51 Zimbabwe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 Necaragua 56 Ivory Coast 1.4 . 4. .2 ..2 1. 5.6 70 .9 35. 4. 4.2 29 -75 6.5 34 0.7 5.3 3.2 57 Guatemala 5. 45 4 5.0 0.. . 49 .0 39 4.7 29 .6 12 0 61 3. i8 1 23' 8 3'6 3 ti' 52".1 4. .2 5. .0 .6 50 58 Congo.3 10.4 2.5 19 23 0.0 5.. 14.6 .5 4 5.9 5..6 10 6 5.6 0.9 220 . 60 ..5 5.3 286 3.7 3. -0 6 -0.8 2b 22 23 6 6pit 4. . 3' 55. 08 16 3.' 5'71 5 2' .5.9 30 5.4 4. 46 47 6.3 4. .2 6.4 11 2 13.1 54..3 2... 8. 2. .4 2.8 -3 5 -0. 5' 68B. 69 51 4.7 6.6 10.1 13.4 25 5.2 .3 7.7 .9 4.9 55 6.2 4.4 9..7 3. 74'. 7 4" 8' 5.8 9. 94 .8 ..1 2. ..0 6. .0 29 85 66 3. 10..0 5.7 3. 45 48 8. .' 63.8 57 () 17 Benin 19 5..6 48 1.7 7.9 8. 49 0. 4.7 53 50 46 .5 91 5.7 2.8 4.9 6.2 5.6 1. 3.2 7.9 -2.7 67 5. 58 9.3 3.9 3.7 9. Derm 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozamnbique.. 5. .0 0.7 4.4 -0. . 54 48 . 54'.4 .8 -0. 53 6.5 6.8 11 4 .9 .7 04 5.9 29 4.4 50 Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen.1 2.7 83 20 93 4.6 4.3 5' 48..8 4. 75 -4 3 4..3 54 3.5 2.7 4. Growthi of production Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP 1960-70a 1970 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Cnad 2 Bangladesh 3 Etniopia 4 Nepal 8 2b' 4 5. ..3 6.6 -0 4 6. 52 52 39 5.3 4.7 51 45 31 44 3..2 1.7 73 8. Middle-income economies Oillexporters Oillimporters 6.0 3.8 5.6 15 .0 60 49 .6 21 1 2.0 14 56 38 34 0.6 0. -8. .7 . 27 2 3' 66"m 4 0'.6 .. 4. '4. 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea. People's Rep. 0' 62.8 5. 62 5.6 45 2.0 -3 2 -5.3 8.4 3. 58.7 0. 5 96. 53 54 8.3 60 25 5.3 3.6 .1 Note: For data comparability ano coverage see the technical 4. 2.3 10.3 5.2 4.4 5. 1.5 4.5 2.' 45.5 39 14 1 .. .4 5.9 6. .. 3 4. .4 4.1 3~8 .1 4. 76" 29" 5' 30.2 .3 1.5 .2 2.6 3.2 54 3. .'.4 -1.:.4 44 13 4 14 5.0 ...5 64 05 .8 -0.0 8.0 61 Dominican Rep. 6 3". 3.3 12..' .2 7.4 74 5. . 7..5 45 60 Peru 49 3. .0 54 54 .5 36 5.0 62 Jamnaica 4. .4 -1.5 notes. .9 3.9 8. -2..0 8.1 63 Ecuador 8.2 .7 5.3 4.2 45 08 13.5 30 -0.3 9. 3' 7I 7" 6o .0 2.1 3. .1 .4 6.4 5.9 30 5..6 5.2 . 3.6 4.8 11 2 55 4. 10 0 .5. 7.3 .2 11 1.8 5. 24 -100 -1 5 5.7 ..9 04 5. 5. -8.3 11 9.4 9.5 5.3 -0 2 29 3.

7 43 0.5 86 6. 125 Poland .4 .9 38 1.8 20 29 2.4 9.5 3. 16 -1 8 12 5 .8 5. .6 2.3 7. 4.3 12 4 96 51.0 33 5.4 10.7 2. 4. 89 77 4..6 82 72 7. 6.6 55 -3.3 40 ..3 4.9 8.4 4.0 2..2 13 6 44 0..8 0. .0 .3 59 4. . 5' 13. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia..6 62 4. 13 4 4.3 9..3 8~6 48 76 32 1.4 7.1 1 6.1 36 5. 74 Jordan 75 Ma ays a 76 Korea.8 6. 17. 70 Korea.0 .8 52 4. 66 31 5.8F 11.8 22 12 3.8 35 5. .4 5. . 4~2 71 55 36 2.0 1. 49 .1 9.2 b 1960-7Oa 1 9 7 0 -8 2 b 1960-70a 1 9 7 0 .5 66 78 44 5.4 45 43 44 4.2 51 29 20O 31 4. Figures in italics are/for 1961 -70.3 7.5 2. 114 Denmark 115 United States . .4 14 7 6. 5 8" 10 9 10 6 14 5 2.1 . .4 13.7 12. Dem.8 22 31 17 -038 1..5 57 6. 57 .3 13 .2 2.. Rep. Based on net matarial prodouct b Figures ir italicsare for 1970 81 not 1970-82. 17 2 99 44 .8 2.. 0.8 9.2 6.116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarKet economies 119 H-un g a-r y 120 Romania' 121 A/bania 122 Bu/garia 123 Czechoslovakia 5-.1 5. .7 S61 .2 72 24 3. .Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1960-70a 1 9 7 0 .1 3.5 01 13 18 1..4 3..5 4.3 27 77 6.9 4. 9.5 92.1 3.0 0. .4 10 4.9 80___H _7.9 6.8 2 b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-70 1970-82b 8 47 7.1 4.9 73 71 77 10 0 8.8 95 4 17.7 6.5 4. 18'.5 60 4.1 4.8 44 10 2 46 50 5.8 51 2. 4.1 40 55 50 4. .0 6. ___10'.8 21 28 o 3.2 5. .4 11.1 31 35 29 41 4.4 84 7.0 4.4 6.2 1.1 10 0 88 40 11.6 4.4 57 SC.6 10.8 23' .1 5.5 1. not 1960-70 of GDP d. .9 1. .2 46 9.1 .9 . 126 USSR a. 10 5 5.8 3.0 0.66 5.9 866 6.9 33 5.9 32 24 38 4.1 27 1.5 15 3.0 59 2 .6 8.6 .9 3.8 65 Tun sa 66 67 68 69 Colombia Paraguay Angola Cuba. . .6 4. 8.6 22 33 12 16 23 2.8 b3.0 5.6 2.1 66 55 68 7~8 54 5.8 31 28 18 15 3. Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.5 9.2 8..0 55 52 68 59 6.3 6.apan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netheriands 110 Aistral a 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany.1 6.9 Sq'" 61 .4 47 43 5.5 0. 5.5 4. Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income oillexporlers 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saud Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 UJnited Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Span 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 J.9 85 55 2 E. 4.8 89 5. .0 84 . .9 69 4.3 46 27 30 24 31 3.0_~b -3. .2 56 5.5 32 26 41 -08 32 6~6 23 38 1.7 -0 4 7.4 3.8 3.2 5.4 2.2 34 82 4~8 48 9.. 7.8 58 12 . .7 32 5~1 6.9 1.1 . 14.4 6.2 12 21 -0 5 0. 6.6 5. Rep.8 8..2 3.5 53 4.0 3. c Serv ces ncude tne unallocated snare 221t . 9 . 19S5 24 4 .5 .4 0.1 89 2. 5 .6 10. 10~1 7..3 09 2.3 62 43 12 63 58 6. .2 15 ) 43 2..5 4.2 24 2.9 -0.2 13.5 01 0.7 866 47 19 76 6. .9 07 48 8. 5 3 4.2 13.5 6.of 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Alger a 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidadand Tobago 93 Iran.4 3.5 55 .0 48 124 German Damn Rep. .0 1.8 10 9 45 -0.2 12 8 5. 124.. 44 5.9 1~5 25 2..2 46 44 39 50 3.6 1.0 .7 10 7 7.7 5. .5 -0.1 17 2.5 2.6 6. Fed.Rep.5 57 6.6 6.4 27 0.8 20 25 16 1.6 4.3 -1 1 5. 5. .

400 3.48..700 26 54 11 37 30 32 40 49 26 18 63 23 . 27 39 36 27 34 20 28 .850 5.760 1.160 3. 32 21 37 38 200 1.. 17 26 14 27 20 22 22 .' i7. 29 36 22 26 23 12 21 .220 3.. 3. 400 10...640. 25.660 5. A4 .900 5.. 36 25.180 12.170 900 410 270 1. 30 14. Structure of production GDpa (millions of dollars) 1960c 1982d Lo-noeeconomnies China and India Other low-income iChad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 1 Rwanda 2 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 7 Benin 18 Central African Rep 19 China 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kainpuchea.530 . 44 35 37 41 31 41 27 23 51 31 33 32 7 8 ...160 9.280 130 160 200 540 29.. 48 ..I. 15 7.500 730 .630 150.350 39.340 1.. 28 25 17 22 7 12 7 ..560 2.160 90.330 49.130 69 37 32 55 41 46 38 .230 3. 17 . 14 22. People's Rep Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep.620 7.8 11 7 12 10 12 27 10 16 12 20 6 1 1 8 11 330 16 7 14 16 10 13 24 16 4 26 22 1 7 15 13 19 41 9....24.900 4. 23 7 . 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 1. 38 40.550 120 190 550 160 270 160 110 42..680 36. 26 12 5 20 24 16 16 12 22 55 43 60 54 49 50 54 54 38 47 51 42 48 53 54 61 49 46 23 26 18 27 10 26 41 10 14 24 17 15 16 13 Note.170 2.980 24 43 ..61 35 .. 27.. .750 1. 23..010 2..960 780 3. 32.. 222 .830 2. 37 . 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen. .790 2. 45..290 24..720 14. 32 35 14...510 3. 22 15 22 18 25 14 63 19 24 19 19 13 28 35 11 26 . 9 10 20 15 1 0 16 1 8 . .... Dem 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique Agriculture 1960c 19820 37. 15: . . 36. 48 -42 s. 37 36 23 35 55 43 40 31 36 30 14 .770 400 250 540 1. 27 21 26 6 25 8 18 7 11 21 21 14 17 20 33 23 36 20 21 32 23 52 27 39 28 32 40 31 16 7 .380 1. 9. 5 3 3 3 4 4 15 8 1 2 9 .110 4.580 21.210 300 630 44 .. 40 29 39 36 47 39 44 43 14 41 32 27 33 43 46 22 55 33 30 50 55 52 50 80 . El Salvador Thailand Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemnala Congo. 830 660 260.38 56 35 50 46 46 58 50 42 50 39 51 42 36 35 39 31 31 20 17 5 16 24 25 6 16 11 53 Morocco 550 340 570 1.400 800 31. 28. "1 29 180 3. Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Industry (Manufacturing)' 1960c 26.7 416 .520 26. 23 30 15 27 29 8 25 22 20 2 8 15 6 5 17 13 5 22 53 48 30 49 38 44 36 39 44 46 48 41 44 45 48 1. 15 8 4 13 20 15 13 4 14 13 19 17 27 15 19 .730 2. 4 5 6 5 8 13 5 9 9 14 1 .320 1.670 680 300 3.190 . . 30 24 .940 7. 52 57 65 . 46 35. 25 27 3 .. .o5 17...Table 3. 1982 Services 19600 1982 d . 22 . For data comnparability and coverage see the technical notes.260 1.1_ .23. 64 47 49 43 48 32 I 41 82 33 46 56 52 .000 8... 39.400 1.150 2..880 570 2. 15. Jamaica Ecuaoor Turkey 460 8.500 120 1.220 24.510 1. 8 . . 46 36 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep.550 230 6. 640 950 2. 6 59 49 32 26 44 46 49 41 46 47 26 51 53 56 55 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Bolivia Indonesia Zambia Honduras Egypt.030 5. 1960c 13 Q 19 8 2 cd d 49 .810 7..410 720 700 970 8. Li20 iT.040 130 510 2. 21 14..040 7.900 71.. 4 7 11 5 9 3 1 2 4 16 16 10 9 .370 2.. Arab Rep..560 8. aI . PDR 90 . 35.940 4. 48. 57 71 55 51 470 .. 41 Lesotho 220 610 .

.970 300 5.860 7. 20 .020 .57 45 42 29 35 37 52 .870 68. 40' 26 ....000 69.850 Agriculture 1960c 1982d 24 34 36 15 26 26 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Industry (Manufacturing)b Services 1960c 1 9 8 2 d 1960c 1 9 8 2d 1960c 1 9 8 2 d1 18 36 8 13 58 49 26 31 17 21 40 42 20 26 17 16 44 48 71 Lebanon 830 11 20 Ii.580 23.340 12.120 6..430 37.920 85.500 25. 8 13 6 19 5 .. .060 74 . .240 3. 7.910 14. 94/Iraq 18.18 18 20 35 29 35 36 28 40 45 22 26 32 31 29 30 39 34 38 55 44 .590 20. .290 64.. Pep.950 98.190 24.820 473... 123 Czechoslovakia 124 Germnan Dem.060 72. .490 33.210 289..000 11.540 12. 125 Poland 126 USSR a.1 90 3.930 60.100 5.. 60 53 57 65 57 54 63 57 63 59 67 62 52 71 12 . .490 24. Manufacturing isa part of tne industrial sector. .770 11.270 44...080 9 4 33 41 21 15 58 55 118 Sw tzerland 8.009.570 3.9 . Rep.. . 50 310 . Fed..370 39.170 1..440 6.090 3. High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait I. 13 . .930 21.570 537. 46 43 65 56 49 50 64 47 45 60 55 39 44 59 42 52 52 60 62 46 21 10 35 . 2 1 1 68 77 61 . . GDPa (millions of dollars) 19601 1 8 0 9 2 770 7.000 22 .300 3. c Figures in italics are for 1961 not 1960 d Figures in italics are for 1981. Ž22.730 . 41 ~ 25 .140 248.470 171.. .040 2. ..250 344. Islamic Rep. . b.65 Tunisa 66 67 68 69 70 Colomb a Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea. .650 6.810 420 3.710 28 21 39 45 .240 48.. 15.980 9..8.. .330 68.180 181.260 662.. 3 11 13 6 17 9 12 6 11 6 11 6 6 O 2 4 4 2 8 4 6 4 4 2 5 41 43 47 45 41 35 46 40 34 39 53 31 34 41 33 33 39 42 35 35 33 35 29 34 46 24 31 .740 2. See the tech nical notes.11 .. . 30.520 164.270 44. 122 Bulgaria . 14 18 28 .. .630 56.010 11. Dem.440 14... .. . f Based on constant price series. 24..110 2. .8 1 .. 890 2290 3. 22 29 25 19 27 30 25 24 24 20 16 25 35 17 54 52 47 54 42 42 53 48 45 48 60 50 41 58 61.940 71.990 57.38 9 14 10 21 26 19 8 29 21 21 36 . Serv ces include the unallocated snare ofGDP 223 .770 7 3 40 31 27 21 53 66 117 Norway 4. 57 25 121 Albania .32 6 .870 6.600 4 3 38 33 29 22 58 64 1l16 Sweden 13.960 17.420 4. of 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazi) 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentna 84 UJruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidac and Tobago 93 Iran.280 5.. 36 .120 1.930 136.580 16..220 66. . 3 4 7 30 22 38 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 Ireland Spain Italy New Zealand United Kingdom Austr a Japan Belg um Finland Netherlands Australia Canaca France Germany. .110 28. 32 35 34 30 23 34 28 23 29 40 21 115 United States 505.950 20.970 . 19 7 36 37 17 9 16 16 16 25 16 19 12 24 6 23 11 4 4 8 29 17 23 16 . . not 1982 e Based on net mater al product. 3. Rep.640 1. 18 .360 153. 55 49 39 46 53 48 31 72 51 57 78 47 38 32 39 18 45 33 51 1 2 16 23 26 12 24 10 26 13 .030 950 700 470 4.69 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.790 74. 1.35 7 6 12 . Rep.550 96. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. but its share of GDP is snown separately because it typically is the mostodynamic part ofthe industrial sector. 26 32 16 18 .. -33 34 120 Romania 53.580 33 . . . . 33 . .061.780 34.450 9. East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary' 20. 18 .. Denmark 29. .

3 m 4.4 c 8. 3 .1 62 c 85 4.9 11 0 53 c 64 47 ElSalvacrer 48 Thailand 49 Papua New Gu nea 50 Philippines 9.7 42 1~3 98 30 54 66 11~1 -31 69 10 3 .9 35 -0.1 28 -4 0 22 3.3 118 4.7 15.4 -22 32.7 i0 6 98 65 63 53 4.4 47 31 27 51 34 -05 26 40 -0 4 5.7 9. Growth of consumption-and investment Public consumption -1960-70a 19 7 0 . 07 33 65 38 4.7 m 3~3 m -1. 7.3 ' 32 Gross domestic investment -1960-.1 29 ..I'' 123-25 ) 78 31 31 33 87 8.2 7.3 Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importeFS 63.ic E4.5 53 1' 9 10 6.4 80 47 1.9m 3.7Oa 1970-82b .3 20 2 -1 0 0.- 29 07 31 94 57 20 32 -680 53 14~9 15 0 3. 62' 6* Lower middle. . PDR Liberia Sene-gal Yemen Arab Rep Lesotno Bevia Indonesia Zanbia Hionduras Egypt.1 59 15 73 88 9.6 -14 11 0 63 -5 1 33 21 1.1 71 10 11 4 78 88a _____ 64 32 93 25 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameronn Nicaragu~a Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo People sRep Costa Rica Peru Dominicar.5 c 10 8. 67 51 ___ 36 -2 1 10 1 56 12 2 2.5 1. Rep Jamaica Ecuador Turkey 100 44 61 22 11 8 4.' 0 :3.2 mn -3 8 c 77 6.0 48 90 3.4 -1 4. . 61 33 49 29 15 8 23 2 8.8 4.2 mn -5. .6 rn 23 5.1 91 .7 22 c 20 30 c 67 7.5 4.9 34 71 -7 6 88 56 Note For data comparability and coverage see tne technical notes 224 .3 10 0 .0 4. Dern Lao PDR Mozambique Viet Nam -1 0 49 3.5 -33 4. 16Hait 17 Benin 18 CentralAfrican Rep l 9 Chna 20 Guinea 21 N ger 22 Madagascar 23 SrLanka 24 Togo 25 Ghnan 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Pak slan Kenya Sierra Leore Afghanistan Bhutan Kampuchea.4 88 93 9 12 7 79 1.13 62 70 57 47 .7 60 5.0 63 19 86 .4 56 -0 2 (1 89 0. 99 'I 7 4. 4.7 7.3 28 28 35 37 56 3..8 42 27 44 4.4 20 c 94 5.0 71 63 30 .2 11 19 2 c 37 c 1.6 61 ()10 53 46 03 35 3. a.3 32 66 04 11 2 5.8 67 57 46..3 4.0 2.7 34 4. .2 c C 26 -29 c 2.5 39 19 21 76 1. h.1 ~ .9 6.7 40 8.20 -39 11 20. 3.3 5.7 49 36 96 15 4 75 468 35 43 968 43 1.2 3.5 64 6.Table 4.8 54 12 4 59 06 41 27 76 5.inconie 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 Sudan Mauritania Yemen.7.9 4.6 c -0.6 46 10U6 10 2 31 35 90 66 21 8 22 2 19 6 -1 9 13 7 10.4 80 12 2 .7 5.9 m 3.3 66 24 _32 . 1 ___ __ c6.8 4. c 26 .1 6.ArabiRep ~ 8126 2.0 87 c 7.4 c 50 8.2 b 8 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Chad Bangladesh Ethiopia Nepal Mai Burma Zaire Malaw U pper Vo ta Uganda India Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Somalia 4 0 Average annual growth rate (percent) Private consumption 1960-7Oa 19 7 0 ~ 2 b 8 32 .4 8.2 7.5 64 12 3 15.

c Separate figures are not available for 225 .7 4.0 61 8.9 14.9 38 4 1 3.0 0.3 62 c .7 13.5 7.7 5. not 1970-82.5 55 78 51 3. 10.2 1.2 59 7 0 4.4 6.7 4 1 59 50 5.3 -08 -0 3 -0 6 c . .5 3.5 68 10. a.3 02 01 -1.4 5.3 11 -20 1. Rep of 77 Panama 78 Chle 79 Brazil 80 Mexco 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trnidad and Tobago 93 Iran Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income oilexporters Average annual growth rate (percent) Private consumption 2b Gross domestic investment 1960-70a 19 7 0 -8 2b 1960-70 5. 76 75 23.4 3.8 lO.9 3.3 18. 15.0 7.7 71 2.0 41 5.9 19 7 0 -8 1960-70a 19 7 0 -8 2b 8.3 6.6 8. Fed Rep 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norwvay 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Adbana 122 Bulgara 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem.8 70 6 1 33 24 4.9 20. 5. .0 1.2 4 1 74 .8 78 11.0 106 6.7 54 70 2.2 5.6 41 44 35 3.0 113 37 32 5. Figures in italics are for 1961 -70.5 53 8.3 27 15 1. pubic consumption.1 73 86 54 4.1 33 1.0 10 0.9 9.2 6.9 3.3 4 2. 2. b. Rep.3 4.4 4.0 32 40 1.0 23 31 3.6 10 4 5.5 53 7.4 3.9 5.4 2'.2 57 50 2.4 5.6 63 6.6 29 21 3 7 45 39 5..9 02 77 40 -1 8 9.6 12.2 30 7 3.1 62 4.0 3.7 19.5 49 12 9 187.Public consumption 65 Tunisia 66 Colomba 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.7 8.8 7.6 2.6 13 8 8.5 7.3 2.8 1.2 1. 3.2 5.7 10.8 25 17 34 1. 7.8 7.3 9.3 12.7 71 82 108 82 3. 125 Poland 126 USSR . which is therefore included in private consumption.6 124 99 6.8 1.5 -2. 40 3 1 3.2 4. Rep 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.9 09 -0.7 10.7 5 8 7. 216 11 4 11.4 63 6.0 39 10.6 13.4 5. Dem.1 9.0 26 5.2 8.3 4. 4.1 34 27 29 27 3.0 4. ' 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 NewZealand 104 Unted Kingdom 105 Austr a 106 Japan 107 Begium 108 Fnland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany.6.6 4.1 5.0 38 40 59 5.9 4.8 4.2 10 0 6 2 83 .5 6.1 .2 7.2 55.3 1.2 4.5 6 42 07 06 -0.9 67 17.7 11 44 7.6 60 41 74 6.3 3.3 55 45 13 62 95 5.6 60 63 2. .6 c 101 3 2'.7 35 5 17.3 4.5 80 11 0 2.4 3.1 2.8 1.2 5.7 7.6 10 8 0 5.0 6.7 6.2 3. 58C9. not 1960-70.1 0.4 62 48 1.5 4.7 43 3.6 c 160 81 10.7 4.3 5. .3 5. Figures in italics are for 1970-81.

_5 8 11 9 11 21 -4 -4 16 14 8 5 19 6 7 9 9 24 12 5 9 4 17 5 17 13 79 89 61 87 94 75 79 82 92 72 86 93 75 72 76 - 14 12 12 10 9 11 17 6 6 14 10 9 15 20 23 - -25 -3 3 9 -4 15 10 13 -9 5 22 8 1 8 2 -9 30 35 8 12 I1- -6 -1 -5 -1 9 -14 -13 5 -3 2 -1 5 -4 -2 -6 -11 1 -34 -17 -8 -19 -8 -6 --7 -24 -3 -3 -1 19 6 29 21 14 5 6 12 9 11 - - -1 -12 -9 -37 ---8 1 2 4 1 -10 -_19 -21 c 13 12 a 17 9 15 8 17 7 10I 19 9 - 79 75 78 88 73 84 72 - 98 87 97 70 66 79 81 80 78 92 85 64 92 - 11 37 9 28 ) 13 26 14 31 26 1 17 22 12 17 12 4 12 5 1 5 17 -1 - 12 11 14 11 24 12 20 - 9 12 44 19 28 8 31 4 15 30 18 10 28 21 13 27 28 2 10 25 14 ( -6 -5 -7 -7 -7 -3 - ( -_-12 -5 -13 c - 87 - 16 -3 - -- - - Middle--inc-onmeeco-nonies Oillexporters Oil importers -11 II I..3. . 4 19821) 8 10 -136 8 12 c 18 17 10 9 7 10 3 9 8 c 16 19 c 9 20 13 8 10 11 I11 - I 1 1 82. i - 196Oa L-Co-w-income economies China andlIndia Other low-income Tbndhad 2 Bangladesh 3Ethiopia 4Nepal 5 Ma. 23 21-6 41 22 20 43 29 14 23 17 16 30 11 21 29 29 27 25 23 25 19 24 14 56 23 17 21 20 25 22 -1 9. i 7. 1960. l 9Clh.. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique34 Viet Nam 19 82b 1960a 19821. I C4 14. 7. 20-l. 27 13. 70.. 825 - 70 -89 64 57 74 95 146 73 71 65 72 64 80 66 66 70 59 71 70 65 69 58 82 37 58 71 74 69 63 73 ¶. 27 I1 7 23 10 9 12 20 55 18 9 26 5 12 13 30 13 20 12 23 4 - .. Arab Rep. Lower middle-income 3_5_ Sudanr 36 Maurtlania 37 Yemen. - 108 86 80 48 77 71 79 76 71 76 67 87 77 -. . ?t 2 ..i 6Burmna 7Zaire 8Malawi 9 Upper Volta l0 Uganda 11India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep. 69.. 68. 18 0 10. Demn.Tadble 5. 78 -7. -4 - 1 0. 82 86 81 I. 9 43 46 31 10 14 14 22 27 27 32 22 25 36 16 19 20 31 15 39 15 55 43 19 14 40 21 11 1-3 31 23 20 27 31 13 10 30 13 21 15 13 27 9 20 13 22 8 24 18 8 15 15 15 10 23 13 11 -81 71 58 68 - -1-1 4 35 15 -25 7 8 41 12 12 11 14 1 16 22 7 11 12 17 8 -12 13 28 19 26 11 13 -25 20 6 -22 -77 14 19 5 15 15 5 21 7 21 21 16 8 27 7 24 10) 48 27 14 16 8 24 16 -1 5 15 39 40 12 13 13 56 21 20 20 17 16 11 - 2 -34 7 -1 - -1 -3 -2 -14 -64 -106 () -4 -12 -1 -15 -6 () -22 -6 -9 -15 2 -12 1 -4 -8 4 -3 -5 -12 -1 -6 7 17 17 7 12 11 11 17 10 10 28 8 11 6 12 . 71. 2(1 . 238 16 c 25 a c 16 20 a 11 17 13 22 . 18. I 2 14 8 25 14 13 15 16 13 16 23 13 10 15 15 10 53 18 25 12 30 14 16 -27 -7 1) 16 -2 -1 -4 -2 -12 (~-8 1 -6 1 - 14 24 24 37 13 21 21 20 24 34 16 3 ~Peru 9 10 8 15 10 9 13 7 11 11 79 73 84 97 77 63 68 67 78 76 -3 2 -2 -65 -5 3 7 -4 -3 -3 Note 226 For data cornparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes. 86 -102 95 81 91 79 85 90 71 89 95 67 75 86 70 - 211 24. 19. 70. 11.. People's Rep 59 Costa Rica 60 61 Domninican Rep 62 Jamaica 63 Ecuador 64 Turkey 1I. 17.4 . _9 14 11 15 15 23 16 20 15 8 25 22 14 20 . 1960a 19- 1982b 19601 1 9 8 2 b. 24 25.na 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea. Structure of demand Public consumption Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor consumption investment saving services Resource balance 1960a 1982b -. 4.. . il -2. 21 15 18. 3. B 13. 73. _9 38 28 16 . I11 7 12 . PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesotno 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 44 Zambia 45 H-onauras 46 Egypt. -J I 1. 47 ElSalvador 48 Tnailand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Philippines 51 Z)mbabwe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 Nicaragua 56 Ivory Coast 57 Guatemala 58 Congo. 64. 24 . 1-4 Q 18.

. Figures in Italics are for 1981. 85 . 62 84 78 79 67 76 60 77 70 79 64 49 53 77 68 87 95 61 69 48 86 54 63 56 77 81 61 46 76 60 75 51 61 69 60 67 48 69 .. 22 18 20 21 12. -11 . 11 15 11 9 12 6 15 11 9 9 9 19 14 12 18 7 8 9 10 18 25 21 13 21 15 c 11 15 16 18 13 16 14 18 34 8 11 c .. 2-. 21 16 18 25 23 20. . 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. High-income oil exporters 95 96 97 98 99 Oman Libya Saudi Arabia Kuwait United Arab Em rates .. 16 . Islamic Rep. 53 46 56 30 . .7 ..Public consumption 1960a 1982b 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 17 6 8 16 9 7 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of goods Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor consumption investment saving services 1960a 1982i' 1960a 19820 1960a 1982b 1960a 19820 76 73 76 61 69 78 17 21 17 33 26 26 7 21 16 23 22 15 20 16 18 37 11 8 Resource balance 1960a 19820 -10 (.... Industrial market economies 100 101 102 103 Ireland Spain Italy New Zealand 15. 20 25 19 20 . . 125 Poland 126 USSR . ... 12 7 13 11 18. 38 23 1 . 21 12 18 18 63 77 72 63 68 62 57 70 62 61 . 14 11 16 14 22 20 42 19 22 18 22 36 21 19 26 18 11 28 17 20 46 34 26 29 10 19 21 38 27 19 15 34 26 23 21 29 46 34 . . not 1982 tion. . Rep. . 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Uppermiddle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. -11 25 24 23 8 19 28 39 8 22 12 33 25 13 6 25 41 31 . which istherefore included in private consumpt on c Separate figures are not available for public consump- 227 . . Fgures n talics are for 1961. 5 21:. Rep. . .. -1 . -57 13 -10 -5 -2 -1 -2 -17 -7 -1 -6 5 -4 12 -8 -12 -12 -14 2 4 14 -9 -2 -6 -2 27 1 11 12 21 18 25 12 21 12 27 32 33 11 14 6 -3 30 21 34 54 3 31 14 5 10 31 17 10 15 30 14 32 9 14 82 163 37 18 42 () 7 1 -19 3 -3 -1 -1 -10 -15 -4 -5 -3 23 25 18 37 100 196 36 ..I 32 10 14 22 19 62 18 27 29 1. 26 32 25 23 . Rep.. 229 24 50 . . .. 10 74 61 28 .) 2 1 1 -4 1 3 -2 4 -4 2 -1 () 1 -3 -2 2 3 -1 () -1 -2 () -1 -1 6 iT8 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 9 13 62 62 29 24 29 25 29 35 (. Iraq 10 12 . . 2 14 31 7 ii. 27 20 20 25 2 11 21 24 21 21*. . 65 57 68 59 .. Denmark United States Sweden Norway 17 13 8 13 12 13 10 14 13 13 13 17 16 13 22 19 10 19 20 18 18 21 16 21 28 19 29 19 66 59 59 69 60 59 65 65 62 57 62 64 60 59 58 57 59 67 55 61 62 56 67 55 55 66 54 49 19 28 33 19 28 27 28 23 23 27 26 19 25 30 18 23 30 17 24 18 22 19 21 22 17 16 18 26 17 28 33 18 28 28 25 21 25 30 25 19 24 28 20 24 31 13 25 21 20 23 17 24 17 15 17 32 21 25 11 33 23 48 15 18 15 19 32 5 23 41 27 42 15 69 32 58 15 27 21 31 36 9 33 46 -2 () (.. 6' 6' . . -5 3 -1 -2 -. of 77 Panama 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 Chile Brazl Mexico Algeria Portugal Argentna Uruguay South Africa Yugoslavia Venezuela Greece Israel Hong Kong Singapore Tr nidad and Tobago Iran.. . . 29 29 26 29 . Dem. 5 -2 () -4 104 United Kingdom 105 Austr a 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 1-14 115 116 117 Japan Belg um Finland Nelherlands Australia Canada France Germany Fed.) -1 -10 -4 -11 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea. . 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 4 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem Rep.) 1 c . a.. . 27 18 2. 49 51 39 40 22 9 17 30 27 13 15 . . b. not 1960.

1713. Costa Rica Peru Dom nican Rep.406 1.479 397 181 217 1.~7: 1982 29 26'.591 345 3 682 451 152 205 625 401 46 550 12.183 369 2.) 22 P.475 1.247 236 .926 28 962 239 842 357 5. 4.086 297 354 886 '23 166 70 239 60 480 132 537 8 1 514 375 471 718 262 454 92 84 102 77 107 114 81 100 87 104 90 101 115 1.836 1.725 732 265 876 93 338 2. 1.0291t 13 2.671 479 311 262 1.274 15 72 23 53 62 1.913 117 70 592 105 6' 7 75 4 164 1.Table 6.565 394 291 1. 96 66 2.W I01 27.877 75 97 71 817 56 219 271 109 492 560 III 293 1.854 41 418: I' 361 194 124 75 32 75 27 298 322 619 2 10 10 0 226 '3 34 6 368 '15 29 93 1 44 1)4 126 41 4e.719 118 19 281 26 343 17 99 37 5.8851t 4941 3.279 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 SriiLaaka 24 Togo 25 Ghania 26 Pakistan 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan Bhutan 3258 706 192 . PCR 38 L beria 39 Senegal 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 Yemen Arao Rep.ger a Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua ivery Coast Guatema.286 1. 0 43 ~1 211 027 1.280 1.022 196 914 11.11 60 - 87 117 142 491 221 48 348 7.691 8.919 93 52 3. Middle-income economies Oil exporlers Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 316 Maur tania 1.282 1.391 t 25 076 178 10 67 5 93 2 82 49 416 13 9 254 175 90 8 2 78 41 71 78 195 5 46 1981 581wzt 772wzi 187wEi 13 436 33 94 64 165 12 106 19 1 338 3 8 56 12 65 15 6 1 50. Lesotho Bolivia noonesa Zamnba Honduras Egypt Arab Req ElSalvador Tnailand Papua New Guinea Pnlooines Zimbabwe 115 149 42 341 158 49 207 1. 86 25 42 77 13 34 44 107 100 34 1 952 132 5 54 () 55 20 1 17 13 119 71 160 1.952 33.442 () For cate cornparabD lity and coverage see the techn cal notes 22t .417 389 891 81 44 172 138 34 110 637 252 340 152 1 276 2. 50 1. Jamaca Ecuador Turkey 9.358 152 65.696 278 312 2. People's Rep.220 177 326 324 682 1)73 92 88 93 93 84 100 117 87 79 85 97 138 99 124 87 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Note N.367 2..1 76 63 155 114 951 6 '77 () 120 44 235 440 691 841 145 2.402 21 20 360 406 '97 115 29 20.128 260 1.365 110 120 392 461 61 211 1 Food aid in cereals (thousands of metric tons) 97 4 /7 5 b Fertilizer consumption (hundreds ot gram s of plant nutrient per hectare of arable land) 1970c 184wzt 230wzt 85 it 7 142 4 30 29 34 8 52 3 13 114 3 5 30 31 4 33 11 418 18 56 496 3 9 Average index of food production prapita (1969-71 = 1 00) 1980-82 110wz 114 w 97wzi 95 94 82 83 83 113 87 99 95 86 101 105 96 88 60 85 100 104 124 89 88 94 154 89 72 ~1981/820) 3.134 367 1.912 225 89 6.683 328 3. Benin)23 Central African Rep China Gj nea 246 9. 57 1.837 466 6.421 108 436 2.a Congo. il- Kampuchea GDem Lao PDR Mozambi quae Viet Nam . 18 10 23 769 24 112 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Chad Bangladesn Ethiopia Nepal'01 Mali Burma Za re Malawi Upper Volta Uganda India Rwanda Burunde Tanzania Somalia Hart.593 325 422 31878 374 5.375 273 23 143 14 323 668.611 t .058 . 4.342 685 37 Yem-en.048 76 76 214 466 6 88 92 47 43 151 20 744 166 176 2..540 647 327 729 1.178 183 2.2 477 7 -ji IC.261 3 7 431 42 83 8 7 9. 46' :225r A8 1: 'I 15371 168 224 13 24 13 27 512 06r 15 53' 344 19 46 '105 88 81 96 107 55 122 68 '14 () 11 62 45 117 409 j 2f.563 1.061 1. Agriculture and food Value added in agriculture (millions of 1975 dollars) 1970 1982a Cereal imports (thousands ot metric tons) 1974 2? --I '447 8 3.232 667 199 628 7.5 .130 59 0 114 14 0 16 1.127 3052 .524 302 405 327 546 3 4 9 2 1 37 16 1 13 70 1 1 465 11 103 i 'I () 45 76 59 78 5 3 130 28 184 71 224 112 1.475 1.703 179 '33 164 '287 3 48 38 3 28 0 14 22 301 1 31 610 4 0 89 .4Ž3 125 6_11 ~4i 66303: 2 290' 1>4 :1 : I541 50 - 238 - C.223 ..582 19 6 148 110 25 9 1 49 75 7 271.

639 3.902 1.471 3.336 6.442 2.305 09e8 1.513 7.843 9 904 2.459 2.183 2. 1981 180 504 48 35 1...194 331 31 18 3 317 169 246 202 375 666 98 133 104 952 2.362 2.622 1.297 4.639 2.506 3.573 114 103 101 Spain 102 ltaly 103 New Zealand 104 Un(ted K(ngdom 7.584 1.006 112 470 232 53 923 3. 388 616 30 612 482 101 132 849 5.033 4.584 439 282 64 44 () () 375 602 5.108 2.184 118 119 119 127 127 2.714 417 423 141 75 73 122 109 193 126 95 131 107 71 91 62 itl 87 .541 Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Gem Rep.Value added inagriculture (millions of 1975 dollars) 1970 1982a 65 Tunisia 66 ColomTbia 67 Paraguay Cereal imports (thousands of metric tons) 1974 1982 307 503 71 149 Food aid incereals (thousands of metric tons) 1 9 7 4 /7 b 5 Fertilizer consumption (hundreds of grams of plant nutrient per hectare of arable land) 19700 82 310 58 45 1. .173 5. 1.049 3.185 7.504 0 122 302 1. 95 96 97 98 99 Libya Saud Arabia Kuwait United Arab Emirates 126 331 20 .402 6.284 388 1.881 1.819 272 3.755 12 397 681 3. 50 406 O35.486 1.943 93 595 962 8. .208 2.599 54 0 31 5 0 0 174 411 24 392 425 766 165 858 1. Fed Rep 114 Denmark 11.494 r 66 103. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.977 377 4.557 4.501 565 13. c.984 91 107 107 120 98 119 121 112 France 113 Germany..030 4. not 1982. 74 Jordan 75 Ma aysia 76 Korea.793 1..370 1.737 2.393 126 109 114 126 129 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 Austria Japan Belgium" Finland Netnerlands Australia Canada 1..330 125 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Nor-way 118 Switzerland 46. 48 649 1. () 171 166 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.447 5.521 2. 47 63 1 234 3 1.849 5.017 3.400 460 301 713 1. Averageforl1969-71.188 3.430 7..012 1.676 15.024 1.816 1..484 1.114 2.641 3. 8 73 429 3 24.739 123 65 .165 246 192 2.458 18A43.492 2.094 127 9 industrial market economies 100 Ireland .241 585 .386 9.446 2. 682 208 2.327 3. Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 100 80 3.335 1. Ljuxemboourg.506 22 3.593 821 .831 3.538 1. of 77 Panama 1.812 I 191 6. 631 386 955 3.517 672 1.481 826 104 127 120 129 93 101 .000 2.202 1. 354 28 529 100 21 .. 168 70 150 125 103 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Chile Brazi Mexico Algeria Portugal Argentina Uruguay South Afr ca Yugoslavia Venezuela 440 8. 1.120 3.510 .296 2.313 4.743 8. 946 886 38 311 1 28 10 0 . d Includes 229 . 65.017 2.711 .675 8.737 8. 67 20 436 2.689 15.848 419 816 4.812 248 339 171 1. .538 110 849. 11 5.872 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea...381 2. b.300 55.375 2.667 640 76 35 1 379~ 7 371 r .575 717 1.093 5.296 2.551 .313 4. 147 152 2.270 1.218 25.585 222 7.493 1.485 559 10-. .861 3.402 3..738 5..122 EsEuropean nonmarket economies 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 Hiungary Romania Albania 1. 3. Figuresarefortnecropyearsl974/75andl1981/82.254 4.076 870 879 1.995 193 132 3.424 3.485 2.842 1.279 18 243.875 2.851 . 399 112 726 1. 408 1.860 0 70 127 992 1.325 24.351 5.938 7 674 279 419 2.199 2 1.931 7.425 4. 52 217 58~ () 467 395 42 .539 Average index of food production per capita (1969-71 = 1 00) 1980-82 128 124 1l1 77 113 480 2.517: 595 92 2.133 1.821 4.633 10.676 425 5.566 40.872 4.806 2. . Rep.176 657 3.164 654 462 24.466 391 3. Rep.242 3. 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 53 () .686 1. Dem. 262 767 27 333 904 1. Poland USSR .156 800 1.172 1 2.39.996 6.880 i 426 668 1.567 20.025 4.523 387 .679 63 28.219 1. a Figuresinitalcosareforl1981.715 437 1.619 .854 2. 1. .482 3.077 1.541 7.770 17. 24 1.100 92 7.429 12.267 2.341 1.394 .108 417 745 1. 1981182 b 96 3 1 68 .924 4.945 14.. .513 521 132 134 95 ¶15.241 3.409 165 19. ..107 6.618 3.

19 China 66 .. 62 Jamaica 27 72 . 17 21 .26 .... 1. 421 36 59 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep. 15 5 14 4 14 11 32 41 26 38 50 33 51 ..22 ..911 483 429 5... ()2 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 27 46 50 28 46 24 .. 31 . 81 96 87 16.56 47 11 44 54 295 556 30 591 1.190 106 44 202 23 190 1 Somalia 5 16 Haiti 17 Benin 42 35 . 20 14 2 .678 887 6. 7 12 44 50 . 1 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 1 Uganda 0 11 India 2 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 54 74 54 1 3 58 . . 2 ..261 2... 8 22 14 22 26 11 19 18 12 . 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Maurilania 37 Yemen..517 319 138 1..290 349 55 456 163 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire ...998 444 254 4... 15 8 78 34 25 276 25 3 237 39 298 102 10 390 ... 25 . 36 8 21 35 40 11 .232 ......253 .. 7 10 1 14 15 10 10 12 9 2 .. 12 14 7 10 3 7 11 11 10 7 45 38 31 34 .636 132 49 Papua New Guinea 40 19 33 31 41 52 . .. 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 22 43 ..675 71 5.038 956 359 63 Ecuador 64 Turkey 27' 24 322 3.191 1.. 1 . 21 1.020 1..492 167 29 172 272 714 14 505 2... ....Table 7..72 22 14 10 7 33 16 6 17 27 ..25 31 Kampuchea. 43 44 45 46 47 48 50 51 52 53 54 55 Indonesia Zambia Honduras Egypt.1 38 27 14 10 7 25 18 .. 1975 prices) Machinery Textiles and Food and and transport Other agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1981a 1981a 19810 1981a 1981a ~~~~~~~Value added i auatrn (millions of 1975 dollars) 1981 1970 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1Chad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal.138 199 262 73 2.. 4 16 2 4 . Arab Rep.. .. 39 10 28 .544 270 4. 230 .835 252 1. .... 10 1 10 15 11 5 7 12 38 42 38 18 4...398 . Industr Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent..186 37 647 236 44 287 44 67 222 10.7 ...960 477 360 706 56 Ivory Coast 57 Guatemala 58 Congo.... El Salvador Thailand Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua 28 16 47 20 31 .706 969 4.532 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes...... ...44 . 10 . PDR . 104 531 60 Peru 61 Dominican Rep..816 564 1.. 59 Costa Rica 37 . 21 . Dem. 49 30 27 34 .. People's Rep.496 531 37 18 Central African Rep....

309 11 12 .832 3. Rep..612 960 12.542 280 2.355 252.112 118. 10 12 . 231 .419 2.800 3.760 25.918 10. not 1981.403 14.531 4. .346 204 1.139 446.164 8.125 6.206 25.734 52. 21 . 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Austral a 111 Canada j112 France 113 Germany. 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.109 10..684 20. 40 28 . .984 25 7 18 5 12 16 9 10 19 11 16 38 34 32 29 6 8 9 9 6 37 38 29 35 42 a Figures in italics are for 1980. 16 . . 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. .726 368 544 3..677 9.113 5. . 29 33 .138 6.161 40.200 16. . 1975 prices) Textiles and clothing 1981a 20 15 14 .581 19..748 75. Islamic Rep.386 5.743 5. .919 23.568 986 23 13 10 24 13 15 7 18 12 19 17 14 17 10 24 11 10 16 20 10 14 15 11 8 9 5 8 8 4 7 7 7 5 7 6 3 4 8 13 17 29 16 34 24 39 27 25 28 22 23 33 37 25 33 35 27 21 15 10 8 4 10 7 8 12 8 13 8 7 7 10 8 12 7 7 13 39 46 38 45 35 45 41 35 47 36 46 49 36 38 36 38 45 46 38 .907 182..620 827 404 2. Rep..260 183 430 29 32 8 23 12 5 10 8 16 18 11 23 11 14 6 26 12 . 10 15 .556 434 5 14 14 22 3 4 20 22 55 9 10 ..244 . 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden '117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem. 125 Poland 126 USSR Food and agriculture 1981a 20 32 34 .540 4. 30 43 33 47 32 29 54 38 41 47 34 41 32 46 42 51 36 40 33 66 56 56 Value added in manufacturing (millions of 1975 dollars) 1970 1981 222 820 1. 4 18 18 2 14 24 20 10 22 23 11 18 20 8 9 25 .819 14.115 3. 36 23 27 21 16 51 15 15 19 24 12 12 26 14 15 27 20 15 . of 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algera 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.601 522 1.592 1.331 58..318 286 2. 14 4 9 . 17 5 Other manufacturing 1981a 36 30 38 3.496 10.717 8..540 1.700 18.978 104. Dem.673 31.322 28.379 36. 17 65 96 74 154 1.. Fed.963 13. 5. 575 91 941 2.858 328.6 Machinery and transport equipment 1981a 8 11 10 1 Chemicals 1981a 16 12 4 1. . 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. 6 11 6 12 13 12 3 14 13 8 11 9 8 9 8 4 7 . Rep.636 18.800 149. 18.693 726 4.068 3.881 18.Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent.605 5.966 2. Rep. . 4 . 3.

Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oillimporters Lower middle-income 35 36 37 38 39 40 11 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Sudan Mauritania Yemnen. Yemnen Arab Rep Lesotho Boliva Indonesia Zamnbia Honduras Egypt.1 14.3 35. PDB Liber a Senegal. 8.5 1. 27 44 24 77 31 9 -09 66 381 171 85 . Arab Rep E Salvador Thailand Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimnbabwe N geria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo.1 82 87 3. 36 6 20 1..3? 3.2 12.15 78 3 38 71 52 49 23.5 -3.. .2 3.0 69..4 -1 2 0.9 27 79 10 6 23 158 18 15 5 11 . 5. 80 20 23 10 21 59 76 46 22 1981c 12.82 55 57 ..Table 8.2 5.8 46 68 4.. 65 55 -3.3.5 2. 52. 1.3 51 280 12.4 17 16 1 -01 7.4 19. 3162. -38 -6 80O.9 19 8 1.4 .3 30 5 58.. 24.0 17.40 8 18 10 27 43 .1 9.3 29 .3 27 122 15 72 97 114 74 16 41 123 125 161 179 147 121 48 59 65 85 103 9 8 10 7 17 18 11 12 9 11 13 45 18 52 63 92 9.. 54. 4 3 10 12 8 12 7 9 7 9 7 12 5 12 25 7 4 . 84.9 41.0 13. 1960-74a 6 2. 14 3 57 57 65 117 5.2 2..6 2.3 4.3 -15 73 53 1.9 25 2 25 -23 47 554 5.3 50 .1 84 -01 51 4.5 2.. .2 5. 146 40 12 . Demn LaoP8DR Mozambique Viet Nam 32 .5 10.2 9.6 ..6 29 5 53 13.9 .5 10. Energy imports as a percentage of merchandise exports 1960 I11F 10.1 20.4 20 118 61 125 50 124 89 208 315 108 449 151 170 13 41 21 62 7 21 1 51 11 2 16 1 83 Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.8 25 -0.4 ..0 -0. 6 2 8.7 .15.0 9.5 8 1 20 4 19. 844.6 6. 25.4.1 26. 14.1 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sr Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan 72 10 1 .106 -8. Bhutan Kampuchea.9 15 8 9.3 10.1 148.6 7.4 24. People's Rep Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep Jamaica Ecuiador Turkey 124.6 5.6 73 165 17. -58 7.0 ()3.5 11 13 4 3 .4 .1. 9..0 56 7.7 . 7 7 3 10 41 65 . 96 . 17 44 10 14.5 -0.2 11 76 .0 9.4 .0 32. . 5g. 13.9 37 57 77 6. 8 39 3 8 7.0 2.4 102 197 98 44 37 109 .6 3.8 63 14. 29..02 122 88 . Commercial energy Average annual energy growth rate (percent) Energy consumption Energy production Low-income economies China andlIndia Other low-income 1 Chad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mal 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malaw 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11I India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 17 18 19 20 Haiti Benin Central Afrocan Rep China Guinea Energy consumption per capita (thousands of kilograms of oil equivalent) 19600 140.3 82 15 1 -7..4 2.2 12.3 4.8 .5 3.6 8.8 ..7 10.8 59 73 46 56 17.8 70 10. 10 1 -0.8 64 10 3 .9 51 55 2.1 3.5 1. 307. 45 23.2 8.5.5 5. 5. 23 .. 317..5 03 79 50 18.5 6..7 . 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 5 9. 64. -4.4 8.9 .. 29 4 9.5 97 9.2 7.9 . 45 50 9. 232 .6 38.4 149 6.50 81 10.8 8.0 10 8 10 2 37 10 0 30 11 29 26 20 191 35 3 50 90 55 38 33 412 54 31 4 16 12 7 6 2 1 23 27 1 14 1 62 15.68 11 4 44 132 12.35 1981 253. - 92 79 4.9 4.1 26. 13.182 571 569 93 921.2 8.8 62 5. 70 131 791 373 206 57 326 191 443 206 448 210 284 240 281 578 143 283 122 271 191 199 139 592 534 349 1.1 15 0 ..9 10.2 5.2 13 6 5. 67 11.8 -07 19. 9.1 20 9 9.

2 4. 19. 20 4 a.8 1. 3..1 Energy consumption per capita (thousands of kilograms of oil equivalent) 1981 1960b 119 497 355 54 46 624 833 512 364 540. Jordan Malaysia Korea.2 1.8 71 4. not 1960.9 7.512 659 2.0 29.2 6.540 6. Figures ~n are for 1980.847 1.354 1.6 4.7 -1 4 -0.4 -1.1 10.863 3.8 20 6 -1.4 14..138 16 7 15 8 16 33 23 26 36 25 3.1 13.8 1.003 2.0 5.051 2.0 21 5.378 808 855(.0 5.6 5.2 53 6 0.1 .964 2. . 4.480 1.5 14.1 9.8 8.3.104 2.6 5.5 41.8 1.0 4.844 2.6 19 18 1 1.4 1.198 4. Rep.8 11. .7 14 1.400 1. Poland USSR 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 40.367 914 2.114 1-2 17 22 18 7 14 12 18 11 11 15 30. 44.5 16 209.4 5.2 2.2 9.0 4.340 931 1. b Fgures in italics are for 1961.3 8.9 1.304 2.5 3.192 754 740 1.0 7.5 19.0 3.3 3.3 10.1 3. 94 Iraq High-income 93 86. 20 67 41 20 14 25 48 23 40 25 2.5 11 3 5.756 2.7 18.145 1.9 9.4 5.576 5.616 7.0 -2.4 -1.9 5.5 2.029 3. Figures in itai)cs are for 1961-74.5 10.7 10 4 2.6 4.636 5.8 4.985 4i-985.8 9.5 59 2. tO.4 -7.392 1.2 5.7 3 5.59.5 2.161 1 Upper middle-income Syrian Arab Rep.4 9. Islam-ic Rep.3 3. 16 79 2 70 .8 2. 218 130 222 143 306 569 264 540 221 363 808 703 1.1.442 2.0 4.5 5.6 3 6'.295 1.6 20 9 7.6 3.2 5..914 5.9 14 7 40 8.087 4.755 15 10 13 14 nonmarket economies 5 2. 5 Industrial market economies Ireland Spain Italy New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Japan Belgium Finland Netnerlands Australia ill Canada 112 France 113 Germany.541 3.8 -0.8 3.3 17 6 4. 288 1. .673 3.0 6. 3.9 4. not 1981.736 .1411~ 1. . of Panama Chile Brazl Mexico Alger a Portugal Argentina Uruguay South Africa Yugoslavia Venezuela Greece Israel Hong Kong Singapore Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.0 2.8 6.7 11.208 12 9 15 11 5.793 4.6 5.3 10 0 4.0 07 19 1. 1.0 171.398 40 5.3 9.6 4.7 4.65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 80 89 90 91 92 Tunisia Colombia Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea.5 8. not 1960-74. 27 101 18 37 125 20 52 2 58 11 44 35 46 36 9 44 37. 10.3 1. 1.492 10 21 3 14 17 14 35 9(.7 9. -0.7 3.8 7.1 7.4 4.398 3.2 9. c.773 5.305 3.1 8.1 11.6 .056 362 935 4. 35.5 15.10.7 1.448 Energy imports as a percentage of merchandise exports 1960 1981c 15 3 3 6 68 31 25 690 172 210 1.3 5.5 9.289 899 4.0 4.4 2.863 3.5 37.6 6.3 57 0.4 17.6 1.8 20 -0.1 0.0 -1..4 4.8 4.9 78 90 6.7 3.5 0.7 11.3 -39.6 7.2 5.4 23 -19.765 3.7 3. italics 233 .7 4.6 . .558 3.7 6.2 1.420 522 411 6.1 1.445 853 2.176 361 932 443 1.5 5.6 -21.8 5.2 8. 3.645 1.0 5.4 2.6 3.9 2.4 8.902 2.5 21.3 5.271(. 26 17 5 17 2.2 4.2 5. 7 1 (.4 55 3.. 2.342 3.8 0.122 3.0 4.7 3.7 78 5. 8 1(. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway -118 Switzerland East European 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 Hulngary Romania Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia German Dem. 13.5 6.439 1.309 3.8 36.619 4.9 1.2 3.7 -0.9 1.6 2.0 13.9 11.218 667 1. Demn Rep. Fed Rep.8 .083 3.6 2.1 07 47 9.9 9.9 23 40 -0.0 0.4 771 706 689 1.054 812 1.151 4.9 3.8 14.3 16 9 12 1 8.7 -1.2 2. 1.8 -1.790 1.6 1..908 9.173 4.685 880 2.1 5.908 35 1 32 oillexporters 09 a -1.7 -2.3 7.8 10. .1 14.6 1 983.4 5.9 10. Rep.2 4.3 9.2 22.5 1.3 9.7 3.326 6.1 5.164 13 7 17 19 09 1.6 4.261 4. Lebanon Mongolia Average annual energy grow th rate (percent) -Energy production Energy consumption 1960-74a 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 72.2 6.2 6.3 53 i 5.1 16.8 7.314 4.5 0.5 . 95 96 97 98 99 Oman Libya Saudi Arabia Kuwait United Arab Emirates -2.9 9.2 5.3 3.8 5.2 2.1 5.0 -6.841 8.699 1. 198 874 .4 4.4 12.5 6.

285 67m 2..3 -4.3 4. Dem.193 477 974 1. -4.787 1.4 6.3 8. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemnen.9 3.683 298 6. 84 91 59 3 6 'n 7 4 .5 1.9 2. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep.298 1 101 769 404 46 146 380 569 262 56 371 8.396 1.090 1.2 10.108i 54 5. 100 96 139 107 99 113 ill 113 103 118 88 105 116 115 99 112 103 126 108 136 99 98 74 102 86 81 106 97 74 96 63 86 111 3. 776 .6 .300 787 252.2 6..8 2.6 -1I 3'ii 4 0 P~ 79 .6 2.205 1 33 097 i 23.5 102 96 98 .0 -3.9 8.2 2.9 7.120 704 6..120 923 872 3.6 3.6 5.3 2. 12.1 7.3 -6..8 -3.1 16 13 -6.1 3.8 5.4 4.685 20.2 9.2 6. -14.446 90 88 480 317 380 34 106 21. 180.9 4.9 0.009 296 442 522 1.1 7.4 .341 5.3 6.9 3.540 i 62 83 792 637. 67 98 119 103 119 92 74 97 99 83 107 70 125 103 98 71 64 91 71 110 88 89 82 85 98 89 64 Turkey Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.6 9.1 9.5 3 3 a.4 1.059 998 406 2.3 -6.235 1.1 -9.1 -0.4 -0.0 62 -0.3 4.6 -1.5 3.6 -4.015 213 873 2.0 2.4 -0.1 0.8 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 2 Bangiadesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep 19 China 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 42.6 2.6 2.5 2.908 1 I119 668 t 1.3 3.2 -0.2 -0.812 66 2.1 8.9 -5.9 -2.294 1..6 -0.5 2.7 -3.010 663 273 1.8 08 9.2 -1. 332 408 480 314 346 339 14. 16 -5 1 "i 6. 3.9 2.5 -1. 234 .8 2.9 6.7 11.2 5.059 654 3.4 7.6 1.2 6.315 1.7 75 90 89 80 85 112 61 5.7 2.1 9.2 11.6 -1 5 'ii 12 -3.4 1.6 20.3 4.0 1.5 45 12.7 7.44 -?I -13.230 768 726 2.4 14 4.2 8.362 970 887 3.6 0.Table 9. 0.7 16.5 1.1 99 96 31 Kampuchea.5 3 9 .1 0.8 -3.5 4.7 8.7 7.6 2.821 4.9 6.4m 57 w 03 02 .0 . .3 2.205 776 2.9 8. Growthi of merchandise trade Merchandise trade (millions of dollars) Exports Imports 19 8 2 b 1982b Average annual growth ratea (percent) Exports Imports 1960-70 1970-82c 1960-70 1970-82c 5.5 6.5 4.6 -0.0 5.484 2.9 4.5581t 149.029.2 11.301 1 .6 5.4 11. 6.855 499 235. -1.1 71 1 5 3 P' 53.2 47 2.3 9.8 9..8 . -8.7 7. Arab Rep. 1 5 -i 104 .5 0..4 97 3.5 5.088 286 214 1. 97. '.372 2.0 73 116 100 95 99 121 112 81 108 72 81 105 69 78 83 105 72 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo. 19 9.. 2.3 .5 0. -5.3 -12.3 -1.i99 8 7".1 . 47 El Salvador 48 Thailand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Philippines 51 Zimbabwe 40 24 303 188 329.229 704 -0.1 4.6 5.7 -0.. 4.1 17 2 47 5.9 .9 -11.7 -7.6 11.4 2. People's Rep.8 1.8 4.8 9. 41 Lesotho" 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 44 Zambia 45 Honduras 46 Egypt.2 4.1 .875 411 333 433 1.256 1. Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep Jamaica Ecuador 19.4 "i .4 9.548 1. 8.4 10.6 5..6i9 t 30.6 8.8 i108 5 8'1 07 P 132 2.6 1.0 15 3. 380 2091i 144.9 9.i 87'.771 526 705 5.987 496 16.189 8. Terms of trade (1980=100) 1979 1982b f 108 87.3 91 0.7 14.3 6.0 -3.6 .046 378 525 889 91 19.1 4..1 30 -2.8 .1 8.6 5.0 72 -1 0 10.6 10.5 -1 5 3.403 979 111 56.945 799 5.321 i 12.1 36 9.9 5.3 .3 10.4 -5.3 2.4 1.078 883 8.6 -2. 1043 85 9 85 232 580 531 477 44 832 22.1 6.0 8.01 8.8 101 121 110 77 97 92 89 76 18.1 -2..859 831 712 9.7 11.7 -2 6 119 108 121 93 87 84 373 .9 8.

3 99 6. 9. 14.2 9.428 15.583 24.2 -7.015 753 3.3 9.3 11.251 309 1.2 9. 107 101 83 95 84 -4.883 2.1 2.8 1.1 .2 10.0 1.788 3.9 .3 9.685 138.703 i 260.654 8.4 Terms of trade (1980=1 00) 1979 19820 79 99 90 92 133 87 74 104 90 68 96 100' 73 102 97 127 94 1.337 1.527 212.182 76.9 .4 -3.2 9. 12.5 10.8 -3 9 9.0 10.5 6.479 28.8 ~ 6 0..3 4.2 9. Rep.814 94.0 99 97 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgania 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem Rep. 235 .5 8.937 4.091 115.960 3.5 3.1 2.478 330 581 1. 4.7 10 9 15.554 Average annual growth rate' (percent) Exports imports 1960-70 1970-82c 1960-70 1970-82c 4. of * 77 Panama 78 Cnile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico * 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 Soutn Africad 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong Merchandise trade (millions of dollars) Exports Imports 19 8 2b 19 8 2 b 1.414 40..167 3.5 9.6 4.1 34.932 58.8 7. Dem.9 2.9 .381 13.561 16. 3.985 7.6 1.5 14 87 10.3 6.0 9.1 3. Nam bia.4 8. 94 Iraq High-income oillexporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 KLwait 99 United Arab Emirates 20.6 12.3 75 24.8 -2 9 P.5 4.9 10.1 18 106'i 92 117 107 112 99.3 5.3 6.042 12.8 2.8 97 98 118 4. 86 92 95 98 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 .1 19 3~ 12 9 32 3 15.2 5 5.670 4.6 b.9 12.0 3.281 15.969 15.8 8.6 3.539 86.569 3.7 8.8 6.102 67 98 118 100 112 103 93 95 91 S ngapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.2 4.2 6.2 4.2 14. Botswana.3 4.346 16.960 23.884 27.9 5. -5.618 20.7 2.3 43 .042 17.9 44 3. 148 808 i 1 212 975 i 7.522 31.419 67 67 68 73 105 125 115 113 Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 1.3 3.7 10.1 6.752 94 .2 9.557 131. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.028 15.017 20.4 7.3 5.1 94 5.2 23.3 8.825 8 5'n 7.4 -13.591 15.2 0.5 3.4 19.1 10.132 66.387 62.328 1.767 150i004.543 21.8 20.391 79.4 8.1 2.5 13.4 -0.024 99.8 5.1 11.241 11.0 6.7 1.836 246 2.5 17 11.9 7.5 1.8 8.476 77.2 2.1 56 4.0 9.095 5.2 11.5 5.403 20.001 1.3 18.6 4.8..231 21.490 5. Islamic Rep. Denmark United States Sweden Norway Switzeriand 97.65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.0 6.3 7.4 5.023 1.313 7. c. Trade between the component terr tor es is excluded e.210 133 379 r 28.670 4.8 5.7 3.8 -4.0 8.5 1.541'. 11.627 19.8 3.2 5 4.8 5.0 77 91 85 6.8 4.4 15.6 -0.6 -0.0 8.9 6.533 10. not 1970-82.535 73.8 4.936 21.7 10.8 5.I.006 15.4 .645 155.7 11.3 -0.6 3.567 37 29 231.0 17. Rep.9 74' 92 96. Rep.4 33 5'u 66.5 00 3.7 -15.7 67 7.8 11.8 13.9 3. not 1982.' 8. Figures in italics are for 1970-81. d Figures are for the South African Customs Union comnprising South Africa.115 116 117 118 Japan Belgium' Finland Netherlands Australia Canada France Germany.2 .4 6.415 843 899 923 3.1 7.629 176.7 9.037 13. .379 11.6 2.7 5. See the technical notes.9 5.7 4.8 9.4 0.4 5.4 10.2 5.213 5.730 1. 8. 2.5 4. 8. Figures in italics are for 1981.817 17.697 11.111 9.5 24 3 1 5.714 267 1.856 17. 95 60 69 (. 86 91 8.8 5.026 4.0 7.743 13.7 10.196 15.4 3. 5.5 7.443 11.297 10.4 -1.682 15.7 9.6 11.023 5.9 9 5.8 4.0 8.162 254.723 19.4 7.294 3.798 5.2 2.6 13.2 101 7.123 16. and Swaziland.4 6.956 10.8 9.982 9.7 9.265 13.499 92.1 36 2.7 39 5.595 26.8 2.022 68.1 -6.7 9.6 17.1 11.249 86.0 7 1' 5.187 55.3 13.3 -11.0 10.3 87 2.8 7.597 18.2 4.8 9.5 10.637 21.2 56.3 102 104 125 104 112 102 103 99 107 106 107 111 100 86 109 97 99 106 94 100 103 100 94 98 100 99 107 99 115 112 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 160 258.1 3.822 3.322 22.911 52.7 5.5 7.421 16.789 12. 125 Poland 126 USSR a. -8.529 18.2 4.4 6. Fed. Lesotho.7 -7.912 9.2'11t 4.853 24.101 120 114 77 64 102 119 74 84 106 106 90 80 7.0 8. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.6 5" 8.9 6.072 16.042 9.275 26. Includes Luxembourg.0 8.101 .

0 6 .0 Other manufactures b 1960a 15.0 . 1I 0 0 .. 1. 0 23 0 41 . 20 2 9 1 20 12 35 17 83 6 69 7 8 .99 28 64 88 82 69 4 67 19 79 13 .) 1 2 7 14 10 ... . . 0 0 . 3 1 . 28. 10. 1981 b 9 3 0 . 2. 48. People's Rep.0 .. ....65 . PDR 38 Liber a 39 Senegal 4 45 3 69 67 52 1 31 29 0a 20 1 2.. 20. and metals 1960a 1 9 8-1 b L. 80. 3 Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 20). 19 8 1 1960. .14 . 1960a . Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oillimporters 30.1 2 1 )93 (. Costa Rica Pertu Dominican Rep Jamaica Ecuador Turkey 33 . 21 1 5 42 4 (1 3 58 100 0 0 II0 0 1 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 logo 13 14 52 90 99 89 79 65 33 1 0 3 4 16 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 .)0 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 .. Structure of merchandise exports Fuels. minerals. 1 I 14 i 1I I 3. ( 6 8 ()13 ( () 2 0 8 10 0 35 0 2 23 . . 4 0 5 10 3 5 I3 1 11 25 26 27 28 31 32 33 34 Ghana Pak.. 94 100 0 C.) 0 0 0 . Arab Rep 47 El Salvador 48 Thailand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Pholippines 51 Z mbabwe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemaia Congo......a 16 Haiti 17Benin 18 Central African Rep. 0 43.. .)0 1)0 .wincome economies China and India i Chad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Other and primary Textiles transport commodities and clothing equipment 1960a 1981b 70 . 49 67 93 84 94 91 92 86 25 54 77 95 98 95 84 95 50 92 45 89 13 83 23 56 65 .0 . 1 1)0 4 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen. 0 (12 G) 3 5 3 1 16 . 0 I .0 44 33 2 8 2 90 1 64 2 81 . . 1.... 1 0 0 0 1 1) 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 1 1 3 5 ()5 1 2 0 () ()2 ()2 3 3 2 8 3 3 3 6 2 1 2 5 1 2 3 1 3 9 5 22 6 24 7 18 4 14 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 1)0 1 . 83 73 87 20 100 40 52 . 3. 0 0 . 25 1( I.. I 9Ch na 20 Guinea 21 Niger 0 4 42 .Table 10.96 .1 3 12 29 Afghanisran 30 Bhutan ()82 . 0 .. ()32 8. . 6 . 10 5 87 88 100 80 . 8 (). 31 26 94 100 95 57 100 85 . 76. 1981b 21. Lao PDR Mozambique Viet Nam. 1 9.0 2 2 (4 4 2 1 1 4 7 56 19 Note For data cornparabi ty ano coverage see the tech n cal notes 236 . 1. 59.... 5 4 0 7 0 10 71 8 38 19 3 1 2 7 0 49 6 50 0 8 9 3 1) 1 I () . 100 . 1 4 2 0 6 0 1 10. ( 55 94 0 1 1 11 40 Yemen Arab Rep 4 1 Lesotho' 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 44 Zamba 45r-Honduras 46 Egypt. 33. Dern... 4. . . 13. 10. -18 6. 7 0 1 15 7 36 .. 1 1 7 24 0 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta lO0Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 4 Tanzan a 15 Somai. 5 3-9.89 39 ..9 92 45 8 33 0 0 1 0 ( 9 7 28 5 () 0 0 1 0 12 .. (). iS. 13. 76 94 74 23 17 ()86 24 81 0 0 7 ( C 0 a)8 0 II3 )1 4 0 1 26 27 ()1 ..stan Kenya Sierra Leone Kampuchea.2 2 ?2: 0 56 91 69 0 .0 7 . . .

Botswana.) .) (.3 27 1 13 1 11 .Fuels. 5 .28 8 . Dern.. 5 5 2 2 1 7 44 19 35 31 10 30 34 ..Rep of 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazi 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africa' 86 Yugos avia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israe 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. ()0 . . .) 8 19 (< 29 18 74 9 4 5 1 82 88 97 1 20 72 69 13 15 . 71 Lebanon. 98. 18 13 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 Itsly New Zealand United Kingdom Austr a Japan Belgium' Finland Netherlands 110 Austral a I11 Canaoa 112 France 8 () 7 26 11 15 3 15 13 33 9 8 5 23 5 1 14 8 27 33 26 8 19 97 9 22 10 9 50 34 79 37 18 9 74 9 11 2 12 20 24 42 22 19 17 0 8 10 28 12 1 8 . 125 Po/and 126 USSR 3 20 . Denmark United States Sweden ~117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarkel economies 119 Hungary 113 114 115 116 120 Romania 121 Albania 9 2 10 10 22 2 18. 6 7 . 29 w . Lesotho.) 8 0 0 0 18 0 21 2 4 1 8 45 5 0 0 6 3 30 3 ()0 2.3 24 44 8 67 25 45 . 7 12 () 7 . i . 4 6 6 4 3 7 34 4 8 23 18 (1 8 51 31 14 4 35 5 38 6 4 . Rep. . minerals. Islamic Rep 94/Iraq High-income oillexporters 95 Oman 19 0 2 2 5 . Namibia. Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 79 100 93 70 90 0 0 1 8 0 (1 0 3 0 2 0 4 17 5 () 38 0 0 20 30 . 11 . 96 74 56 4 89 64 81 37 95 71 42 45 26 81 35 15 73 14 18.) 33 36 2 24 65 14 99 9 8 1 14 6 97 18 2 1 29 90 . . Rep.. . 1 9 32u 32 40 11 5 21 23.6 38 31 . not 1960. ... 35 20 (t0 1 7.4 21 27 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem.1 94 96 Libya 97 Saud Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 UJn Arab Emirates ted Industrial market economies 100 Irelana 101 Span 100 95 100 99 84 12: 3 9 0 5 ()0 1 4 .81 46. 22 26 30.. Includes Luxembourg 237 . b. 1 .) 11 3 4 10 4 7 7 4 1 1 5 29 44 16 23 13 13 18 3 8 25 () 32 4 33 27 57 22 21 16 6 28 34 27 3 32 26 28 51 33 25 5 21 38 40 14 31 47 36 45 44 29 18 23 34 1 10 Germany Fed. 31 14 15 70 39 2 29 56 37 26 5 0 i .Rep. 6 7 45 52 47 25 26 29 21 17 ... and metals 196Oa 1981 b 65lTunis a 24 57 Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Other and primary Textiles transport commodities and clothing equipment 1960a 1 9 8 1 b 1960a 19810b 1960a 19810 66 10 1 15 1 2 Other manufactures 1960' 1981b 8 16 66 67 68 69 70 Colomboa Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea. a. and Swaziland Trade between the component countries is excluded. .)0 ()6 13 5 2 2 29 1 5 19 18 26 3 . 8 . 4 2 37. 6 . (10 1 13. 4 12 ' 92 8 24 12 8 1 (.. not 1981 a FiguresaretortheSouth Afroan Customs Union comprising South Africa.... 67 57 4 8 5 ~ 29. 14 ..75 27 .)0 4 15 1 2 4 7 0 00 28 17 2 15 2 20 6 42 4 1)0 .. 7 5 7 9 60 3 4 63 27 29 34 8 33 28 .21 45 25 44 42 13 34 39 13 25 29 32 48 36 26 24 35 17 52 8 . 24 1 .. 7 39 23 12 9 4 4 3 3 1 2 12 3..1 ()1 () 3 .4 2 0 . 72 Mon golia.9 .21 a Fgures n ta ics are for 1961.. 0 0 (.. 10 17 2 12 22 2 18 (). Figures in talics aretfor 1980. (/0 (0 5 .

14 . 28 . 21. 13 6 5 . . .. i6 . 12.... 59 Costa Rica 60 Peru 61 Dominican Rep 62 Jamaica 63 Ecuador 64 Turkey 14 27 20 9 18 12 16 13 16 . 21 9.23 14 39 34 19 22 25 18 28 36 27 28 12 26 . 1 8 28 2 3 . 19 . 3 3 7 2 3 2 1 1 I. 18 23 15 32 26 27 27 15 14 23 28 .. 21 16 23 14 19 26 . 27 30 7 . . 26 22 8. 10 34 17 4 . 43 46 . 23 . 15 16 .. 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania l5 Somalia 17 Benin 21 6 21 . 17.4 4.. Structure of merchandise imports Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Fuels commodities equipment 1960a 1981b 1960a 1 9 8 1 b 1960a 1981b 7 21 z. 12 . 15 27 17 4 10 0 2 . 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam 24 17 39 16 19 22 12 23 14 14 8 . 9.. 4 18 53 9 . I3. 22 13 7 19 9 3 8 3 11 27 12 20 22 38 14 16 1 33 33 1 44 6 7 3 5 2 7 1 6 5 9 9 16 9 2 1 2 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 6 24 33 42 19 34 21 22 16 23 22 49 20 15 49 22 Note For data comparability and coverage see the technicalinotes.. Peopie's Rep. Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen. 9. 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea.z. I. 17 24 25 26 25 36 24 19 17 22 27 26 31 26 37 . 40 20 3 Ethiopa 4Nepal 5Mali 6Burma 7 Zaire 9 . 5 6 7 6 5 10 11 12 7 15 11 25 8 .... 34 27 26 40 23 21 .. 21 4 .. . . 14.Table 11. 21. 19 . 238 .. . . . 19 . 17 5 . Food 1960a 1 9 8 1b Low-income economies China andlIndia Other low-income iChad 2Bangladesh Other manufactures 1960a 1981b 22 24-..38 58 50 39 44 37 24 23 36 34 45 29 46 32 35 22 43 40 34 37 42 49 27 26 30 37 25 16 30 . 29.. 27~ 37. 3S.. 6. 24 25 34 24 13 35 35 ... 11 . 4 . . 18 18 51 48 49 51 34 43 46 39 42 45 61 18 Central African Rep. 19 Cnina 20 Guinea 15 .. 13 .. . 8 . 29 44 20 14 ... 9 . Dem. P.. 31 31 31. 8 25 . . 18.. 51 Zimbaowe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 Nicaragua 56 Ivory Coast 57 Guatemala 58 Congo. 4 8 6 . 56 ... 18 5 4 . 23 9 18 20 6 19 9 19 18 5 8 8 10 6 10 6 6 5 . 32.. i 2. 7. 26 .17 35 32 . 16 3 21 30 . 21. 8 23 11. ( 2 ... Middle-income economies Oil exporters 15 19. 19 22 28 28 .. . 5 9 11 6 11 5 10 . 32 31. 217. 21. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesothoc 42 Bolivia 44 Zambia 5. . 10 . ..i 6 1.. 45 51 25 45 43 34 51 39 52 54 47 45 44 49 37 37 42 24 13 23 17 10 30 15 . 21. 28.. .4 3 16 6 11 5 . 8 3 4 5 . 39 40. 9 13 33 .54 . 29. 45 21 1 . 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta lobUganda I lIndia 12 Rwanda.-.4 4 3 5 3 2 8 5 4 28 34 8 2 . 7. 43 Indonesia 45 46 47 48 49 50 Honduras Egypt. 6 2 6 4 8 .. 26.. Arab Rep El Salvador Thailand Papua New Guinea Phil pp nes 23 .. 41 50 53 32 25 28 27 40 37 32 32 30 42 27 28 8 3 4 3 20 4 3 3 3 - 30 . 4 2 . 30 ..

.. c. Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Fuels commodities equipment 1960a 19810 196Oa 1 9 8 1b 1960a 1981b 9 21 4 8 23 27 3 14 15 6 43 37 .. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. 36 52 14 26 44 17 37 37 36 44 28 10 7 18 . 18 1112 28. Rep. 3 30 28 20 37 24 . 9. not 1981. Demn. Other manufactures 19600 198101 44 30 31 33 70 Korea. 13 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 13 . . 5 . a... . 24 . 6 12 25 26 18 24 5 7 10 12 12 8 10 9 17 8 12 10 14 12 29 24 24 31 16 12 25 28 11 25 4 6 8 9 7 7 31 36 14 10 23 10 39 47 22 20 21 26 37 31 19 28 36 31 38 28 31 35 36 28 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden _117 Norway 13 12 7 7 14 9 25 15 13 13 6 7 26 36 27 34 34 30 35 37 118 Sw tzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 18 9 i 0.. Rep.1 7 3 .I 29. and Swaz land. 40 . . 28 28 35 31 . 33 41 43 42 40 . Lesotho. . 11 27 14 28 . Figuresen talicseare for 1961. . . Namibia. 34 1 37 . 15 24 11 9 4 6. . Botswana. . 15 . .) 13 10 2 28 11 46 9 25 10 16 18 16 38 4 4 5 9 6 5 4 12 4 7 7 5 5 33 37 23 21 33 28 46 52 . . 2 2 2 2 2 . of 77 Panama IS. 5.. 8 12 22. 2 .18 13 6 16 . 125 Poland 126 USSR 12 . 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland - 13 1 1 1 11 10 . . . ...1 .. 18 14 14 11 11 13 . Rep. 3 5 15 1 14 12 22 19 4 10 13 24 7 5 1 8 7 3 15 51 2 24 11 32 (. 8 16 7 10 . Trade between the component territories s excluoed. Figures are for tneSouth African Custom s Union compris ng South Africa. Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income o. 22.30 .65lun sia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola.. 7.. . 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep..48 33 ....113 Australia Canada France Germany Fed. 43 . 29 10 15 17 13 12 17 17 30 78 Chile 79 Brazl1 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 84 85 86 Argentina Uruguay South Africa' Yugoslavia 14 4 26 15 3 5 10 15 9 . 21 38 31..5 I5 . Includes Luxembourg a. 21 26 40 47 3 35 14 18 21 8 9 3 10 18 12 . 11 .ilexporters 95 Oman 16 14 13 . . 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem Rep. 39 38 40 41 32 . 69 Cuba Food 196Oa 1 9 8 1 b 20 14 8 10 .2 31 18 13 25 1 . not 1960 239 . 18 23 22 . 10 . 18 32 54 21 29 8 41 22 35 21 27 44 19 30 18 34 24 35 24 50 30 35 32 31 52 26 21 16 5 7 4 6 17 11 12 12 7 38 27 43 32 42 28 43 28 24 23 28 6 11 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 18 11 20 27 21 24 1 22 26 8 34 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran. 28 ... 39. 41 101 102 103 104 Spain Italy New Zealand United Kingdom 16 20 8 36 16 12 12 6 14 7 22 14 8 11 10 43 35 20 14 19 25 31 16 27 20 9 11 5 10 9 22 13 29 8 29 17 20 32 26 27 15 22 39 18 25 19 22 37 36 38 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belg UMd 108 Finland 109 Netnerlands 17 15 13 12 7 15 17 10 10 13 51 20 31 26 49 26 20 14 16 10 7 6 9 21 33 22 7 22 27 19 8 28 24 33 13 36 28 34 13 18 110 111 112 . 17 28 23 20 .4 36 b Figures in italicsare for 1980. .61 25 25 1 . 36 2 27 22.. .

15 54 28 65 7061.. () i 3 ()65 71 25 7..) 3 (17 ()7 )1 ()7 ()4 ()8 12 17 Note. ()1 0 0 18 0 11 0 33 0 2 . 3.. Arab Rep El Salvador Tha land Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe Nigeria Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua IVory Coast Guatemala Congo. .. Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep Jamaica Ecuador Turkey Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) East European nonmarket High-income Developing economies oil exporters economies 1960 1982a 1960 1982a 1960 1982a 52 a-21 :. 2 .)5 (4 0 0 . .)(. 4 I. 39.Table 12. ... 36. 0 1 . 2 0 61 8 0 1 3 0 7 4 0 0 28 ( )0 ()0 ) 25 15 2 8 25 9 26 22 38 23 24 . 59 89 42 100 89 46 88 54 77 26 88 47 . Origin and destination of merchandise exports Industrial market economies 1960 1982.) 23 0 )42 0 . 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economies Oillexporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen.. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.)23 29 I) 1 56 1 1 36 12 . (). . PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Bolivia Indonesia Zambia Honduras Egypt. 23. 94 95 74 93 91 84 94 93 93 84 92 96 91 71 87 53 74 55 89 73 49 89 68 89 68 71 55 81 68 72 70 75 50 42 1 0 13 ()0 0 2 3 3 . 1 ... 0 1 3 1 () 2 I () 0 () 6 23 6 6 6 6 2 7 (. 38 95 53 64 65 27 34 75 74. 22 27 (. J. 2 19 4 ()1 1 ( 60 8 26 36 10 20 39 24 38 16 3 18 17 51 13 24 37 46 36 13 37 42 20 19 85 43 .. 3.0 () . 0 0 2 0 96 38 25 . 60w 44 38 66 50 62 35 92 74 64 88 61 61 76 57 16 97 82 83 43 87 76 57 46 63 77 40 53 80 30 . 49 51 24 50 37 24 7 3 )1 0 0 2 8 0 1 68 0 0 .)2 5.. . ... 4' 6. 68. ..)20 4 ()26 . 1 (. 5. 93 23 89 . 25. 7 1 7 C). 0 10 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 I 2 0 6 () () . People's Rep. 0 0 7 . 74 85 98 90 83 14 63 74 79 75 74 88 56 77 99 48 48. 4?2 30.)1 0 0 0 0 () 0 .I 1 4 .2?1 39..)9 ()1 0 0 0 () () 6 3 ()0 ()0 0 0 0 0 1 12 2 2 11 5 1 5 ( 0 1 0 0 . 69.0.7 0 4 1. 69 .. ~ 8 0 () 6~ 2.' 66. 7 0 . (10 4 ((1 0 6 4 1 10 4 1 0 50 () 2 . Dem. (. 4 62 66 . 33 5 20 35 35 50 62 25 25 13 31 26 38 i 24 49 9 23 11 26 26 42 19 30 26 19 20 49 41 4 (.. 3 0 4 1 1 ()4 39 12 48 . 6. .- Origin Low-income economies China and India Other low-income i Chad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 UJpper Volta 10 Uganda 11lndia 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep 19 China 20 GuLnea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sri Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea. 0 3 (.)17 74 1 . 240 . 2 . 73. 2. 4 0 0 0 0 .28.. . 19:1 28 27 1 . 51 .. 73 .. 29 68 68.. . 29~ 27 . 28 27 9 .

0 2 .) (. Rep. . c. 4 () () 30 a 4 18 27 10 35 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 Spain Italy New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Japan 0 Belgium Finland Netherlands 2 4 1 3 13 2 2 19 1 2 3 6 2 11 3 2 29 2 2 5 2 () 8 2 5 2 () 2 3 8 2 1 2 29 4 38 18 51 18 12 20 25 27 23 17 42 13 10 13 () () 1 1 110 111 112 113 . 39 1 58 89 99 91 81 93 93 56 75 82 71 48 62 65 76 54 38 80 62 85 83.. Figures are tor the South Afr[can Customs Union comprising South Africa.)7 31 62 35 11 1 9 13 7 29.) 0 0 3 55 4 21 23 59 33 44 30 14 32 I I. 67 74 . 241 . 1 11 0 4 0 3 1 3 5 45 57 34 ()20 16 35 51 18 20 44 21 33 20 54 31 29 10 ()14 i.80 22 20 1 61 52 . (. 27 a. 3.. of 77 Panama 78 Cnile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Africab 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.66 . and Swaziland Trade between the component territories isexcluded. b. ()0 0 5 45 9 67. not 1982.Origin 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.)0 9 23 1 10 1 1 1 .. Figures in italics are for 1981.28 .68 64 49 . 0. Lesotho. Rep. .. 18 61 45 25 23 26 33 9 6 0 2 5 7 1 31 0 21 1 (.. 0 .. Rep.. 96 80 65 95 57 69 45 79 69 78 66 a3 87 58 64 65 70 69 47 83 60 83 (.() (. ()I (. 2 2 17 17 31 34 22 . (. ..) 3 1 21 9 44 12 1 () () 4 4 3 5 3 44 25 13 37 17 27 19 17 39 15 1 1 5 16 24 10 23 East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romana 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dam. 1 . Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income oil exporlers 95 Omanr) 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland Industrial market economies 1960 19828 76 94 61 64 72 21 Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) East European nonmarket High-income Developing economies oil exporters economies 1960 19828 1960 19828 1960 1982a 3 1 0 2 19 8 73 73 41 67 43 . 4 ()0 0 70 0 ()26 26 .. Dem. 35.1 1 53 17.)20 42 11 28 20 13 23 0 1 1 0 1 1 ) ) 50 ()0 2 0 3 ()38 8 1 1 (. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep. 10 1 4. 0 91 80 66 44 12 7 0 .114 115 116 117 Australia Canada France Germany Fed Rep Denmark Un ited States Sweden Norway 75 90 53 70 83 61 79 80 72 19 a59* 118 Switzerland 49 84 66 73 79 54 79 88 69 3 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 1 2 3 1 3 1 (1 1 .. 19 16 34 55 43 I. 67 .' 19 11 7 0 0 () 18 11 3 ()0 (..() () (. Narmibia. 11 26 0 0 () . 2 4 0 (.93 .13 . 1 ~.. Botswana. 125 Poland 126 USSR 22 24 .) 2 0 0 4 ()5 19 39 34 9 39 ..7 17 14 6 22 13 16 19 29 18 0 67 54 51 19 .. 1 2 22 8 ()() 0. () () 1 6 () 6 . 63 a 55 5 51 65 76 72 60 91 93 81 43 39 82 27 56 60 66 77 40 69 55 47 56 11 6 .0.. Incluces Luxembourg..

439 210 25 Ghana 46 22 96 96 30 35 31 51 12 . 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 . 50. 4.11 0 42 0 (G() 0 0 ()24 7 . . 47 24 59 . . 7 81 24 39 1 0 .8 5. (... 8: 1 7 37 3. 57 555 52.869 2.. 5. 27. 36 37 73 1 0 2 I .66 2 (. 11 4. 1 1 7 I .. . 59 39. 8.56 .).)0 1 .C . 0 0 (. . I 1 3 5. 0 .1 0 0 3 1 5 6 1 12 29 296 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 26 29 Guinea Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Pakastan Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan 7 67 63 44 39 (j0 1 (.16 7 Zaire 6 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 2 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 7 Ben n 168Central Atrican Rep. 3.. 69 30 73 83 9 .0 0.. 16 6 22 0 38.(t (j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (. PDR 36 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 YemenArab Rep 41 Lesotno42 Bolvia 43 Indonesa 44 Zamora.Table 13. 19 Cn na 93 33 0 19 51 60 56 .0 .(.2 110 12 33 33 37 7 59 . 12 . 48.)0 .12 3 . () () 0 1 26 4 2 2 6 14 9 5 4 20 4 . . 75 50 42 448 )27 .0 2 .. .3 46 99 39 99 49 9 9 2 2 69 733 63 276 181. 2. 50 ..69 .. 0 0 5 0 0 0 18 .. (). 61- A8. 53.21 97 11 9 30 Bhutan.0 1 0 .2 1) 3 5 4 4 13 0 1) 0 ...0 . Arab Rep 47EFSa. 7.0 1 0 35 0 () 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 5 0 6 0 7 . 6 Burma B 12 0 6 1 . Dam . 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Ma.54 40 3 21 36 Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes 242 .12 81 85 37 tO 0. 31 3' 31.. 424_ 75 I.t 1 . 3..2 . 20 93 35 56 50 28 31 70 26 16 90 .3 . People's Rep 59 Costa R ca 60OPeru 61 Dominican Rep 62 Jamaica 63 Ecuador 64 Turkey 52 25 55 61 46 66 78 53 98 73 46 73 45 77 2 34 4 88 11 45 80 74 . 35 62(.28.0 . 55 44 1 .0 . ()0 2 6 .90 53 76 26 81 . () 0 9 0 .vador 0 3 0 0 11 46 Thailand 49 Papus New Guinea 50 Pn: ppines 51lZmbabmve 52 Nigeria 51 97 91 44 91 76 ... 0 0 1 1 ~) 8~ . .5 50 47 262 325 64 322 38_6 1866 611 1 748 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 Nicaragua 56 Ivory Coast 57 Guatemasa 56 Conigo.16 53 75 34 62 67 15 93 34 21 37 23 96 66 96 12 89 53 20 17 .- 1. 45 Honduras 46 Egypt. 21 4 26 31 34.0 I 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam 0 . 37 98 94 76 82 52 1 23 1 5-. 8 1 . 630 16 (10 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 . 10a 0 .552 65.. 31 Kamnpuchea. 7 0 7 1 11 67 19 15 56 90 93 61 16 76 . 0 ( 0 ()13 1 0 10 25 218 32 1.0 1 Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Vaurtania 37 Yemen.3 .0 5. 1 29 0 0 . 1 13 7 . Origin and destination of manufactured exports Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Industrial East European market nonmarket High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies 19620 1 9 8 1 b 1962a 19810b 19621 19810 1962a 1 9 8 1b 5? 61 19 47 33 5B Origin Low-income economies China and India Other low-income IlChad Vaualtured exports (millions of dollars) 19620 19 8 1 b 50 14 . 70 65 43 . ()39 () 0 9 0 0 46 75 45 54 12 22 47 2 27 10 2 0 6 .

961 1.. ()32 57' 24 65 21 33.359 19. 4 1 1 19 38 11 15 69 11 2. 5 10 0 0 a.043 8.005 73. Includes Luxembourg. 70 51 29. 8.533 24. 1 3. 2 5.0 . b. 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgiumd 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France '113 Germany. 1 I 5 36 2 10 1 2 31. Traoe between the component territories isexcluded. .. 68 56 .947 931 4. d.820 14.. 1 . 25. Poland USSRP.) .. 123 124 125 126 Czechoslovakia German Demn. 0 . . 13 62 62 11 29 43 . . 12. 16 .21 .574 417 2.. O. 56 . not 1962. 32 (.66 High-income oillexporters 95SOmar. Botswana.. 14 . not 1981. ()0 0 0 0 0 46 89 17 76 37 29 44 35 12 46 38 6 39 31 36 94 51 55 1 36 2 5 6 .957 1. O..623 627 13. . 1 .317 58 10 1 20 39 122 23 205 39 7 344 158 27 184 642 328 13 44 2 201 2.983 a Figures in italics are for 1963. c.ordan 22 Sc' I 4 58. 94 Iraq 73 Syrian Arab Rep 74 J. F gures are for tne Soutn African Customs Union cornprisng South Africa.465 49 2.443 263 1. 58 79 45 45 25 59 53 66 77 49 72 .590 20. ir 68 12 28 63. O. Figures in italics are for 1980. Nam b. 10 16 4 6 1 835 838 319 .340 3.769 1..052 1 O. O.. .591 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria .' 1: O. 10 1 2 12 3 2 31 2 ) 7 3 7 2 1 28 10 37 15 50 14 13 134 205 4.. 39 3 11 33 58 721 2.a.. 4 ()0 3 ()1 12 (O .490 23 8. 114 Denmnark 115 U nted States 116 Sweden -117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romnania Cc W-1i. and Swaziland.31 7 11.712 315 ~..257 608 62. 25 9. Islamlc Rep.)0 6 2 2 O. . 2 2 . uesotho...959 33.800 363 15..115 13. Fed..675 151. .8 15 0 3 4 ()61 .d 57 65 90 58 67 45 83 56 78 62 89 63 74 76 48 76 81 74 53 61 72 62 67 47 83 57 79 30 88 63 70 74 54 74 73 69 5 0 3 18 4 2 31 2 0. 3 .16 70 Korea. 35 3 1. t. 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwat 99 Uniteo Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 1 68 64 (1 76 63..738 5.574 10.. 69 Cuba 34 1 4 83 43 16 62 60 414 66 . 0 0 0 G H 30 23. 3 13 30 0 6 3 0 0 0 O .694 5.888 157.096 70. Rep. 12 11 83 24 45 60 71 50 56 62 75 54 31 94 52 66 63 4 39 45 26 13. 1 (f () 4 4 2 6 4 1 1 4 33 21 16 51 18 17 22 30 22 22 40 19 23 24 5.. 3 4 2 3 3 3 O.635 40. ()0 ()12 (. 20 5. 1 O. 23 . mauactured exports (millions of dollars) 19620 19810 0 0 0 14 (.076 11.453 3.320 26 27 29 18 43 13 11 3. .0 . 0 0 () 6 18 49 49 .268 35.. Rep. O.697 . 42 52. 1 1 51 36 28 88 69 55 .266 4. 1 . Rep of 77 Panama 78 Cnile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 Souith Africa' 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trnodad and Tobago 93 Iran. 1 1 O.573 4 4 8 6 2 3 O. ..958 442 2. (. Rep.)50 1 (.217 22.255 146.. ._ 243 .) 1 0 4 (.317 53 (. . Dern. () 18 21 .971 17 ...188 31 737 9.Origin 65 66 67 68 Tunisia Colombia Paraguay Angola Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Industrial East European market nonmarket High-income Developing economies economies oil exporters economies 1962a 1 9 8 1 b 1962a 1 9 8 1 b 1962a 19810 1962a 19 8 1b 64 68 0 2 7 7 29 23 57 84 33 0 0 1 . 32 () 0 0 3 0 0 O. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 75 Maiaysia 76 Korea.. . 0 3 18 41 28 34 20 46 28 .

.142 35 20 23 94 .2 .189 72 94 1 18 207 277 268 25 328 312 29 67 73 8.644 -442 -403 25 29 .0 60 Peru 61 Dominican Rep 62 Jamnaica 63 Ecuaoor 64 Turkey 202 -102 -153 -113 -44 -1.1 -1 13 19 15 12 10 0. 6 O. 223 141 81 49 119 1. O. 02 2. 5 3 7 .. . .4 0. 1 2.3 9 .927 540 81 171 1.59 .144 -487 -3. . () 17 2 () . 2 .9 1.7 34 02 -16 . .. 1 . 1 . 131 2 411 . 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Tanzania Somalia Haiti Benin Central African Rep..813 248 8 699 4..86 -113 .. ..0 0. 185 84 253 7 46 160 515 20 165 64 912 .0 1. . 1 52 17.4 . 1 .6 0.4 14 650 .187 Note For data comparabnlity and coverage see the technncal notes.1 2. 39 .2 0.. 1 60 . 3 ..37 22 Madagascar 23 Sr Lanka 10 -59 -369 -574 10 290 () 3 64 - 43 35 380 173 03 5.706 -7. Cnina GLinea Niger -36 -6 2 -1 -12 .674 374 2.9 3.. 4 -610 -50 -92 -737 -252 -228 -2.6 19 24 Togo 25 Ghana 3 -68 -152 83 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Pakistan Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan Bhutan Kampuchea.987 2.Table 14. .356 1.023 8 65 21 4 16 -256 -2..5 0. People's Rep 59 Costa Rica -8 .29 .002 -849 273 2. 2. . .696 . 19 -632 -196 .I 30O. 243 4 7.. . 76 31 79 9 23 351 42 26 70 33 59 16 339 250 1. Lao PDR Mozainbique -667 -49 -16 -811 -509 -158 .1 -1..3 0.9 01 5.1 11 05 0. 21 .580 1 68 31 14 8 21 65 60 6 58 194 220 39 49 318 1. .15 .42 . -32 . ..324 -1.6 30 29 255 59 2. . 244 . .74 -379 -320 -200 .4 . Dem.876 -525 15 240 2 849 21 -29 .293 1 . -2 -63 -64 -35 9 20 -394 7 .. 29 .90 -268 -177 -93 -39 5. 2. ()2 .074 .3 -317 -375 -78 . 15 . Arab Rep 47 El Salvador 48 Thaiiand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Philppines -310 108 -64 -148 9 -250 .. 25 558 48 563 6. 51 Zimbabwe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Carmeroon 55 Nicaragua 56 Ivory Coast -368 -124 -30 -40 -38 .109 128 37 2.. . .. Balance of payments and reserves Receipts Current account of workers' Net direct balance remittances private investment (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a Low-income economies China and India Other low-income lChad 2 Bangladesh 3 Etniopia 4 Nepal 5Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malaw.. .608 . . .. 9 20 95 .19 .4 4. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal -42 -5 -4 . .4 5 40 Yem'en Arab Rep.4 30 15 14 19 2. .6 6. 190 75 . 616 .36 . 329 ..216 -250 -1.645 1 0..98 . 29 57 1. .3 4..248 157 120 1 809 277 2.. .. 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesia 44 Zambia 45 Honduras 46 Egypt.79 .7 39 1.573 320 27 I 7 63 () 205 20 16 is 5 31 358 79 1 .0 3.4 04 ... . . -248 -252 -221 . . -48 . 416 Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen.6 34 Vijet Nam .3 57 Guatemala 58 Congo. 9 () .2 6. . 113 1 . .22 22 3 21 144 271 8 4a 3 9.7 24 3. 9 Upper Volta lO Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanaa 13 Burund Gross international reserves In months Millions of of import dollars coverage 1970 1982a 1982a 7' 61.118 1 -76 83 -297 8 43 - 24 37 133 .89 72 161 58 -1 -16 60 150 32 139 76 440 171 109 797 2.. . 6 2 18 .

322 2.3 -572 -109 -507 105 -1.547 798 3._6_ 2.125 5. - .Current account balance (millions of dollars) 1970 1982a 65 Tunisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.786 . 1. .652 -230 2.2 3.280 -318 698 2.051 7.679 -64 -454 -91 .625 11.589 -198 111 902 -2. . 21 3 . 358 -2.085 1.822 I 15 38 33 1.565 682 186 579 1. . 33 67 .979 3.995 130 350 .815 2.511 18 39 5.. 32 469 446 .230 -77 37 365 2.093 258 . 6 .833 2.199 13.915 10.9 12 0.425 34.1 0. 1.0 10 6. oi 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 Soutn Artica 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad andoTobago 93 Iran. . High-inco1me1 oil exporter 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 645 71 .0 7. 1.532 10.946 101 2.047 318 452 1.6 4.6 10 7 45 8.010 143. Fed Rep.130 -104 32 23 East European nonmarket economies 119 H-ungary 120 Romania -25 -397 1.5 49 20 34 18 0 .152 3.6 109 N'etnerlancos 110 11I 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 Australia Canada France Germany. .012 43 217 472 3.- 6 216 447 2.2.382 -837 -16.605 699 1982a 2.ngdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Beig um 106 Finland 1.9 59 7.317 12.596 670 209 .505 -45 -235 -1.552 646 21.24 .540 4.1 9.997 1.919 14.7 43 51 09 19 New Zea and -29 1..504 -3.2 121 Albania 122 Bu/garia 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem Pep 125 Po/and 126 USSR a Figuresin italicsareforl1981.623 .4 154 .480 3 369 2.278 283 .1 1.073 1.286 7.499 9.362 1..1. 71 Lebanon 72 Mon golha Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.124 1.414 53.5 2.376 -222 129 1. 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 320 3.794 1.928 88.040 . .019 215 1 .318 441 .630 4.944 1.215 .265 -388 405 6.258 53.449 . 1.320 -265 -242 72 3..8 15 44 3.504 1.445 -623 -2.2..947 455 19..251 3.855 -372 -465 -104 -3.083 2. 139 134 .544 -2 255 -11.544 2.877 14.391 386 13 - 209 201 189 22 -439 233 -2.332 -1. not 1982.949 34.912 -943 104 -260 93 -4. 123 211 .891 -562 -2.147 -4.491 -718 -22 .190 756 352 1.470 -12. 245 .977 45.975 -75 -1. 7 . 11 56 1.098 2. 2 1.733 5. Denmark United States Sweden Norway Switzerland -483 -837 821 50 850 -544 2.447 2.551 868 -1 136 266 -14 57 258 667 610 16 392 1.422 .445 6.150 -5.8 -69 -493 -20 -336 8 -3.2 1970 1982a 29 6 372 1 1970 16 39 4 1982a 339 268 44 -53 -293 -16 -657 -2..335 8.350 () 94 66 33 -79 407 323 45 . 4.378 4.323 283 11 84 566 248 -290 75 . ..057 143 333 .5 2.547 258 2.576 104 United K.635 . Rep.977 -2.879 488 15..597 3.806 4.851 5.227 -163 -2.103 .460 -8.208 9.3 13.328 44. 1.456 -402 -1. 140 1.778 -125 85 -3.404 6.1 28 35 3.709 30.084 5 126 13 .068 -2. Islamic Rep 94/Iraq Receipts of workers' Net direct remittances private investment (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) Gross international reserves In months Millions of of import dollars coverage 1970 60 207 18 1982a 692 5.658 -1.2.429 55 13.073 6 48 6.765 3. 389 140 -41 -15 785 1. .248 -2. -1.. Dem.607 41 4.980 717 -239 6.25 -23 50 40 93 83 254 437 10 2.573 . Rep..696 1. 43 .. -6.187 179 498 204 1.237 775 813 5.777 5.

) 593 89 68 124 334 110 39 65 39 1.) 62 163 28 44 77 37 35 30 148 38 15 42 328 419 215 172 59 212 261 42 162 4.196 22 3 () 12 5 () 17 59 33 3 247 6 23 () 72 5 36 36 4 17 27 20 6 21 101 7 6 16 128 68 16 40 19 38 45 4 95 1.114 1391.102 214 151 1.309 344 523 184 2.730 25 49 221 114 48 73 19 33 50 208 416 39 56 567 212 49 60 4 1 7 15 () 54 441 351 29 302 8 51 25 128 I.702 156 1.310 Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes 246 .. 62 Jamaica 63 Ecuador 64 Turkey 6 27 1 21 16 31 38 2 26 890 1 50 4 4 2 2 90 12 10 61 5 40 484 30 8 34 () (.123 254 144 -267 1.Table 15.405 28 52 241 124 58 92 21 88 116 278 484 50 94 893 390 57 2 15 2 () 18 28 3 2 4 307 () () 10 () 4 1 2 10 1 5 27 2 12 114 16 10 15 63 33 3 3 68 65 33 13 57 675 3 3 20 9 11 19 2 55 66 70 68 11 38 326 178 8 .250 311 202 2. 351 199 132 41 174 216 38 68 3.148 97 51 1.420 171 1.387 466 1.246 1. Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capital Public and publicly guaranteed medium. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 40 Yemen Arab Rep 41 Lesotho 42 Bolivia 43 Indonesa 44 Zambia 45 Honduras 46 Egypt.and long-term loans (millions of dollars) Repayment Gross inflow of principal Net inflow' 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 Low-Income Economies China and India Other low-income 1 Chad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiop a 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawf 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burund 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep 19 Chna 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 Sr Lanka 24 Togo 25 Ghana 26 Pakistan 27 Kenya 28 S erra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea.105 395 259 273 2.880 517 1.178 181 302 1.864 2. () 3 13 -2 21 -2 3 36 (.) 22 583 () 1 40 4 1 1 -1 79 10 5 34 3 28 370 15 -2 19 (. 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambique 34 Viet Nam Middle-income economres Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen. Arab Rep 47 El Salvador 48 Thailand 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Phnl ppines 51 Zimbabwe 52 Nigeria 53 Morocco 54 Cameroon 55 Nicaragua 56 IvoryCoast 57 Guatemala 58 Congo. Dem.) 656 122 71 127 402 175 72 78 96 2. People's Rep 59 Costa Rica 60 Peru 61 Dominican Rep.215 132 1.39938 134 810 310 342 129 1.487 24 306 31 494 51 618 779 143 168 499 34 181 54 982 141 115 539 886 39 1 1 -4 10 () 37 382 318 26 55 2 27 25 56 -5 26 127 24 28 50 17 29 9 47 31 9 26 200 .

Rep..203 . 30 3 45 198 24 163 255 476 33 63 342 47 . 78 .422 574 . Rep.296 7. 231 ..and long-term loans (millions of dollars) Repayment Gross inflow of principal Net infIowa 1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982 87 620 45 290 42 330 252 15 1.908 8..915 11. Jordan Malaysia Korea.163 2. 978 225 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem..893 798 1. Dem. Islamic Rep. Iraq oil exporters 58 8 940 63 826 1. 1.238 3..353 503 445 331 1. 281 132 241 1.100 990 -7 146 1 85 South Africa 180 224 164 410 (. 71 Lebanon 12 15 2 45 9 -30 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 SyrianArabRep.) Iran.695 2. 410 374 2. Denmark United States Sweden Norway Switzerland East European nonmarket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania .314 1.883 3.108 19 267 39 . of Panama Chile Brazil Mexico Algeria Portugal Argentina Uruguay Yugoslavia Venezuela Greece Israel Hong Kong Singapore Tr nidad and Tobago 59 14 43 441 67 397 886 772 292 18 487 38 . Rep 125 Poland 126 USSR a Gross nflow less repayment of principal may not equal net inflow because of rounding 247 .070 71 380 1.218 276 78 7 305 39 174 7 913 237 68 Angola 69 Cvba 70 Korea.924 1.642 2. 153 Industrial markel economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 1i 14 115 116 117 -118 Italy New Zealand Unted Kingdom Austria Japan Belgium Finland Netherlands Australia Canada France Germany Fed Rep. 168 42 61 25 () 6 10 235 18 52 -2 705 46 High-income 95 96 97 98 99 Oman Libya Saudi Arab a Kuwait United Arab Emirates .007 3.153 449 814 3.nisia 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay Public and publicly guaranteed medium.112 2.118 27 121 37 30 12 -1 242 44 234 631 297 259 -45 146 -9 12 183 102 385 () 129 242 2.090 -654 2.982 731 1.073 2.829 282 482 4.593 596 1.

854 7.4 2. El Salvador Tna land Papua New Guinea Philippines Zimbabwe N.3 10.) () 48 22 3 5 52 72 32 7 10 476 2 2 1.5 08 .6 2.3 20.6 30. 3.8 6. I15. Dem.620 1.359 370 .5 1.443 623 90 1.7 146.4 6 24 26 3 38 4 16 1 23 5 20 23 4 7 11 6 3 7 44 4 6 7 42 0.9 94 3.9 2.9 9.0 13. 39 2 29. 24 5 259.5 80.1 1.5 36 8 15.~5 1 2 12 1 12 76 44 42 68 22 27 213 06 0.0 6.0 0.9 .8 29.6 .960 4.0 12.1 26 4. )1.6 .565 1.2 2..1 1.0 11.370 2. 248 ...6 11. 42 46 38 7 .059 603 1.7 10. 11.3 17.7 4.5 0.6 43.1 5.9 0.9 1 4 20 Gu nea 314 1.5 17 0.2 03 1.7 48 18. 32 .8 1.6 1. I?.8 74 ..2 52. 6 2 .9 2.160 88 97 391 27 483 63 535 95 722 615 121 120 476 54 92 82 548 109 128 561 932 1.2 49.1 14 06 06 % 068 3.8 5.8 5. . 319 27 1 158 98 .2 14.gera Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemala Congo.4 33 8. 42 77 31 11.2 1.8 .8 12.8 2.3 Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes. . 20 5 14.9 5. .5 08 4.1 .0 3.5 10.9 4.230 47 4 76. .3 5.969 819 1..2 25 Ghana 26 Pakiatan 27 Kenya 28 Sierra Leone 29 Afghanistan 30 31 32 33 34 Bhutan 316 59 547 2.9 0.810 4..644 88 324 36 572 233 480 711 131 155 256 106 135 134 856 212 154 217 1. PDR Liberia Senegal Yemen Arab Rep Lesotho Bolivia Indonesia Zambia Honduras Egypt. 11 24 8 14 64 10 3 165 1.0 22.511 3. .4 25.030 1.8 20.206 746 8.3 13. 159.353 875 297 822 1.5 9.Table 16.8 21 22 23 24 Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo 32 93 317 40 489 3.5 3.9 3.3 1. Lao PDR Mozambique Viet Nam .8 100.1 5.119 1..8 22 2 17. i5. 83 68 9.1 16.1 19. 16 9 19.5 36..5 34.4 62 7.6 12.ilimporters Lower middle-income 35 Sudan 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 56 59 60 61 62 63 64 Mauritan a Yemen.8 16. 39 1 21.2 6 (3 (1 () 33 10 8 28 2 24 1. 20)9.. 12 2 9 147 2 .1 0..8 47 1 27.7 1.7 20.221 6. 75 11 8 6.475 6.6 5.4 13.9 0. 6l.8 2.5 4. .178 8..381 1.0 09 1. 0..8 19 6 27 . - 10 0 11. 27 12 1 I154.3 3. .6 14.2 48 51 72 51 2.6 4.. 1 6.940 2 7 248 77 40 41 24 .087 692 335 587 19.0 22 8 22.4 10. 13 () (.8 Kampuchea.3 16.487 189 201 1.4 7.1 19 73 41 2.7 1.6 49 5.912 15.9 23. 1 38 20 28. .9 13 95 2.3 71 3.9 4.4 32 8 22.085 9.556 18.2 68. Middle-income economies Oil exporters O.3 88.5 54 0.7 3.0 12.116 9..7 10. . (.7 1 5.2 6.4 13. 47.861 1.659 944 405 556 222 .7 .1 15.8 41 8 104.900 1.2 49.312 123 2.4 1. I1 E.6 22.7 64 14 22 4 1 2.1 () . 1.4 48.6 3.0 57.2 0.0 67 5 111 7 33 5 21.8 11 6 79.2 9.1 20. 169 3 238 101 311 122 21 138 7. 1 9 China As percentage of GNP 1970 1982a 1'0.001 761 641 1.093 1.7 50.9 28 28 7 3.1 2.5 19.1 4.3 0. 5.1 16.3 58.912 2. Exports of goods and services 1970 19821 13 8 57.. 5.8 0.3 53.9 . 54 99 20.9 50 .2 14..329 1.836 1. W6 59 0 38. Costa Rica Peru Dominican Rep.6 0.2 40 2.2 15 8 44 7.a 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep.4 10.9 10 13.8 2. . 101I I'2 6.385 15.0 16 0.1 37.0 36..3 11.7 18 7 16 8 30.1 09 0.3 29.2 4.7 18. 93.7 .0 -4 04 83 6 (1 () 3 9 3 () 4 189 (.5 13.933 15.6 0. Arab Rep. .2 0.6 0.1 74. People's Rep.6 84 10 2 12.3 2.5 22.468 801 6.1 40 2.6 36 9 6. 189 4..3 02 18 38 3..7 17.3 8.6 19.8 13 9 .4 24.9 34.4(. . .8 2.5 78.7 02 04 11 4 1.7.7 78.1 66. .3 12 0.421 2.8 9.1 55.6 31.9 3. 23 7 2 7 2.8 6.4 16.7 22 11 16 12 4.0 32.4 33 29 2. Jamaica Ecuador Turkey 12 3.3 02 09 21 21 0.2 .2 0.1 87 60 8 26. External public debt and debt ser-vice ratios External public debt outstanding and disbursed Interest payments on external Detsrceaprengeo Debt__service_as_percentage_of Millions of dollars 1970 1982 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income 1IChad 2 Bangladesh 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Voilta 10 Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzan.2 8.3 6.5 40 2 56.5 17.a public debt (millions of dollars) 1970 1982 GNP 1970 1982a 1.0 97 3.1 20..4 33.6 14 5 11. 8 479 2.

412 13.686 7.External public debt outstanding and disbursed Millions of dollars As percentage of GNP Interest payments on external public debt (millions of dollars) Debt service as percentage of: GNP 1970 1982a 4.n talics are for 1981.887 332 551 5.8 42.. 1982 3.820 5.274 2 152 101 2.5 21.9 1. 30 . 8.2 .589 50.626 12.8 0.6 23.423 651 .1 .6 84 2.783 14.2 1..206 937 485 1.8 82 111 8.6 133 20.5 1.9 2. 18 .472 6. Rep.5 20 2..4 195 25. 0.4 .004 940 .0 0.061 2.7 1.2 1. .. Islamic Rep 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spain 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 Un ted Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finlano 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany Fed. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmaiket economies 119 Hungary 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem.8 18.272 156 519 1.066 3.1 9.. 1970 18 44 4 .9 5.7 16.6 20. 12.239 47.7 18.9 29 5 20.2 15.8 7..9 30 5 28..8 08 29 6 6 85 9 06 19 30 0.9 2.1 42.2 61 5.900 267 1. . Exports of goods and services 1970 1982a 17.0 170 a Figures .797 194 2.0 24 5 13. -23 15.616 1.001 22 114 63 . 30.9 7.4 17.) 92 61 479 1. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea.4 16.1 31.1 2.0 0.7 169.368 904 1.0 10.8 8.0 0.8 3. 10.9 11 9 15.9 12 2 20.5 23.9 06 44 12. Rep.2 .671 20.5 1..6 19 4 7..9 12. 22 . 6 2 21 70 7 78 133 216 10 29 121 16 72 40 41 13 (.3 64 6 1.2 15 2.122 6.3 70.829 5.896 5.557 588 1.0 9.6 3.8 18 .9 17 30 3.1 13 1 13.. .739 .1 19.9 41. Rep.6 1.598 15..3 7.1 29 5 24.198 728 905 2.5 55 98 7.- 213 42 108. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Uppermiddle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.2 15.2 18.8 19.9 2.5 4. 44 22 4.1 30 0.5 .9 43. Rep Of 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Afrca 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.878 269 1. 1982a 42.8 17.7 () .7 1. 1970 65 Tunisa 66 Colombia 67 Paraguay 68 Angola 69 Cuba 70 Korea.. 21.0 . Dem.8 6. 6..8 4.6 8. .4 46 15.6 3.2 () () .897 9. -10..9 .0 8.9 31.5 11.4 64 . 1982 196 569 41 .2 0.780 1. 1970 38.4 2.2 2.8 1 19 232 118 390 1. 14.8 22.7 3.8 10 0 20..892 1. 808 . .293 112 .5 103 5. 125 Poland 126 USSR 541 1. .4 4. .3 01 7.236 3.1 17.6 3. 677 11. not 1982 249 . .2 9.193 274 2.

753 60 7. 6 36 Mauritania 37 Yemen. 701 22.3 6.0 70 47 3. 4 21 17 30 57 257 13 9 12 933 9 1 283 2 5 7 7 158 18 23 79 3 41 935 41 24 19 Average interest rate (percent) 1970 1982a 8 4.3 3.094 65 () 26 18 44 43 3.4 4.2 4.4 2.2 54 2.6 47 68 49 Papua New Guinea 50 Phil[pprnes 51 Zimbabwe 52 Niger a 58 158 .8 36 70 1.3 2. 19 11 7 1 74.1 5.869 325 2.5 3. Peope's Rep.5 38 2. . 14 16 16 9 8 2 6 6 5 5 4 - 79 5. 1~ Ii.3 30 46 2.777 420 147 2. 6 0.8 0. Arab Rep El Salvador Thaiand 13 518 555 23 246 12 106 54 4.197- 6 0.3 94 11 21 19 28 5 25 26 34 23 30 14 23 19 20 28 32 32 18 23 18 15 21 29 24 19 19 3 11 5 8 3 2 6 9 6 7 3 6 4 4 6 7 8 4 5 7 5 6 7 3 5 6 40 Yemen Arab Rep.4 5.4 5.1 58 52 10.Table 17..6 16.4 .9 11. 41 Lesotho 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 Bolivia Indonesa Zarriba Honduras Egypt.3 89 94 68 64 81 5.8 17 53 54 55 56 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Congo.5 88 88 11. PDR 38 Liberia 39 Senegal 7 62 11 8 9 .118 715 2..0 3.4 Lwncome economies China and India Other low-income I Chad 2 Bangladesn 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mali 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Hait 17lBenin 18 Central African Rep 19 Cnina 20 Guinea 21 Niger 22 Madagascar 23 SniLanka 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Togo Gnana Pak sran Kenya Sierra Leone Afghanistan Bhutan 308i 207-1. 13 5 113 89 13 9 24 11 .2 5. 3.2 59 127 64 20 29 18 19 26 11 18 14 12 13 4 8 4 5 3 5 3 4 57 Guatemala 43 58 125 20 24 78 487 497 265 2.5 1.j10 204 100 126 441 313 145 5.0 5. 65 472' 3 (lii 118 42 558 i 32g745.7 2.. 166 2.8 2.11' 7F 551 3.9 5.3 4.794 347 334 1.4 72 35 3. '3 7 4.4 . .1* 14 I6 .746 406 317 407 1.9 12 () 6.2 51 37 27 42 4. 49 39 9 2 7 6 11 4 4 6 8 7 8 11 2 11 4 1 7 8 6 8 9 5 4 10 12 8 6 9 9 32 27 27 16 13 30 37 28 35 50 5 40 4 9 32 36 15 40 39 27 17 39 32 36 27 26 40 40 30 39 34 36 33 27 45 23 32 22 43 21 32 27 22 23 26 30 29 33 30 25 . 43 2. Terms of public borrowing Commitments (millions of dollars) 1970 1982a lC.4 8.684 80 90 234 84 64 140 75 86 164 218 642 12 48 965 524 50 37. 30 4.8 5 10 9 8 8 7 8 7 7 9 6 8 5 9 4 7 7 5 6 6 8 8 8 7 5 31 Kampuchea. 16 21 A.9 5.4 2. Ii.8 1.253 194 46 47 7.9 2.33 32. e6362t 21 1. 6 0.1 36 10..577 3.5 1.036 107 107 234 662 268 51 168 251 3.8 30 35 17 0~8 1.0 2.6 74 25 60 6.8 . Costa R ca Peru Dom nican Rep Jamaica Ecuador Turkey 182 41 23 71 50 1.7 18 2.3 37 2. Average maturity (years) 1970 19823 31 29 7 ..6 12 2.3 17 28 13 28 16 20 19 8 20 10 17 17 18 13 6 6 6 4 5 3 4 5 4 2 7 3 4 5 7 4 NVore For oats comparabritiy and coverage see tne technical notes 250 .2 9. Average grace period (years) 1970 1982a 9 7 d 30. Derm 32 Lao PDR 33 Mozambrque 34 Vietnam Middle-income economies Oil exporlers Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 Sudan iCi565i1 .4 0.

Dem. .9 5.Figures intalics for are 1981.) 13 2 6.. .7 6 9..759 552 1. .4 60 11. 17 20 12 13 11 8 11 6 8 8 11 8 10 8 10 20 12 1 4.316 1 2.1 . 1.371 383 . Islamic Rep. Rep. 21 .8 7.4 7.0 65 4.868 i 218 245 2.362 826 288 59 488 72 198 198 242 439 (.010 450 490 2.5 17 6 12 6 13.6 . 1970 3. 17 10 12 11 11 9 . 13 43.863 3.9 13.9 14.712 10.7 4. t 14 33 83 677 111 343 1.4 3 9 6. Fed. 1970 6 5 6 1982a 4 5 4 70 71 72 Tunisia Colombia Paraguay Angola Cuba Korea.2 73 (.3 7.9 11.9 7.1 14.) 4 4 4 5 6 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 4 2 4 5 4 3 6 Upper middle-income 73 SyrianArabRep. ot 77 Panama 78 Chile 79 Brazil 80 Mexico 81 Algeria 82 Portugal 83 Argentina 84 Uruguay 85 South Afr ca 86 Yugoslavia 87 Venezuela 88 Greece 89 Israel 90 Hong Kong 6 875.9 13.964 2.1 6.4 13.1 8. 1970 27 21 25 1982a 18 14 16 . . 94 Iraq High-income oil exporters 95 Oman 96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 69 3 1.9 11.7 10.1 14.446 1. 114 Denmark 115 United States 116 Sweden 117 Norway 118 Switzerland East European nonmarkel economies 119 Hungaryb 120 Romania 121 Albania 122 Bulgaria 123 Czechoslovakia 124 German Dem..2 3.1 1.442 2.591 1..7 9. 125 Poland 126 USSR a.799 1. 4. .0 6.. 9 12 19 19 15 12 14 12 10 17 12 12 17 8 9 13 (.) 91 Singapore 92 Trinidad and Tobago 93 Iran.9 6..0 14 8 8.8 b Includes only debt in convertible currencies 2511 . 4 1 3 2 99 United Arab Emirates Industrial market economies 100 Ireland 101 Spa n 102 Italy 103 New Zealand 104 United Kingdom 105 Austria 106 Japan 107 Belgium 108 Finland 109 Netherlands 110 Australia 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany..5 6. 74 Jordan 75 Malaysia 76 Korea. 1982a 7.3 10. Rep Lebanon Mongolia 141 362 14 ... not 1982 . Rep. 13 10.1 .4 5. 7 .) 11.9 7..Commitments (millions of dollars) Average interest rate (percent) Average maturity (years) Average grace period (years) 1970 65 66 67 68 69 1982a 566 2.432 10.117 11.1 82 7. Rep.1 .5 13.3 11.342 28 432 148 6.' 2 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 2 4 3 3 6 2 4 5 (. .6 7.

458 8.155 1.172 309 354 Summary 19 99 22.181 3.82 99 . Rep.59 .024 286 1.023 38 11 12 6.49 20.474 1970 1975 2.236 1. nominal prices) 4.54 .52 .75 77 74 .18 16 .23 .702 Sweden 7 Norway 5 Switzerland 4 Total 4.28 .51 ODA (billions of US dollars.601 157 3.85 .192 443 3.761 477 153 1.484 2 711 7.52 48 .412 844 1.353 3.46 .680 466 25.15 .861 2.628 OECD 102 Italy 22 103 New Zealand ..153 4.35 43 37 .58 .425 1.ons of kroner) 35 115 United States (millons of dollars) 2.936 189 421 514 563 585 566 867 353 895 1.258 667 27 53 37 27 37 7 52 1 01 Note.177 4. 1965 47 I1 .36 21.347 3393 3 567 3.85 .713 1.35 .47 76 48 73 .364 854 3. 138 4.178 4.34 .189 2 871 5 782 4.77 32 .03 1.080 1.16 09 38 .000 13.41 .101 1 3 54 53 66 74 78 86 208 407 763 1.465 2.07 21 27 19 23 48 . 169 260 88 5.00 7.195 754 1. Official development assistance from OECD & OPEC members 1960 OECD Italy 77 New Zealand United Kingdom 407 Austira Japan 105 Belgium 101 Finland .324 2.992 22.060 1.209 1.852 2.016 796 1. 104 United Kingdom 56 105 Austria .056 1.60 .663 4.82 .13 58 .675 3.~60 3 90 . Rep.531 .40 .201 3.19 .400 424 27 27 .146 2.050 108 Finland (mnillions of markK<aa) 109 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 133 110 Australia (millions of collars) 53 111 Canada (millions of dollars) 73 112 France (millions of francs) 4.62 .635 27.37 111 Canaoa 1 9 112 France 1.08 .48 .768 3.074 1.59 33 91 49 .31 114 Denmark . nominal prices) 90 GDP deflatorb .189 1.138 5.41 57 .685 3.28 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 60 472 10 244 102 2 70 119 96 752 456 13 4.66 .22 .32 40 37 45 .99 7.100 6 253 106 104 3. 109 Netherlands .75 82 .04 OECD 101 Italy (billions of lire) 48 103 New Zealand (mil[ions of dollars) .34 18.'599 7.039 165 341 466 588 760 699 753 6.202 117 566 783 988 962 919 980 37 184 355 429 486 467 559 30 104 173 213 253 237 252 6.847 19.38 28 31 7 24 ..255 92 1.53 48 .820 27.684 7.55 .950 5. 106 Japan (billions of yen) 38 107 Belgium (millions of francs) 5.11 . Fed.31 110 Australia .538 2.075 1.02 36 .47 .97 .257 1.27 32 28 .140 2 425 5.393 8.20 .27 38 .845 As percentage of donor GNP 16 .23 .202 6. 827 61 1.73 .53 116 Sweden .09 115 United States .65 55 .971 12.24 .705 3.219 2. Netherlands 35 Australia 59 Canada 75 France 823 Germany.837 8.689 2..90 .27 .76 .20 . constant1980 prces) 16.32 Amount 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Millions oI US dollars 147 182 376 273 683 666 814 14 66 55 68 72 68 65 500 904 1.11 118 Switzerland .Fed.38 .265 25.89 6 50 92 6.64 4.376 2.163 59 205 388 461 481 403 415 3.05 117 Norway .023 197 79 52 6 48 .17 1 9 24 23 52 .60 . .24 88 110 .449 4.24 .38 27 27 7.350 962 268 13.191 1.85 .156 1.684 3..161 2.61 .824 90 4.32 66 90 .303 5.15 2 00 .28 36 .028 599 1.653 2.44 . 104 United Kingdomlmrillions of pounds) 145 105 Austria (millions of scnillings) .480 10 .20 1.474 212 552 588 629 667 650 882 337 880 1.24 107 Belgium 88 108 Finland .19 .14 .63 ODA as percentage of GNP .38 4.162 4.792 11 79 154 131 178 314 354 458 1.Table 18.97 79 83 102 .236 1.98 1.123 3.813 893 24.64 35 25 82 7 30 .915 3 181 394 7.755 29.069 2.98 1983.968 13.161 5.43 .82 .43 42 .538 4.950 779 584 318 27.33 . For data comparability and coveragje see the technical nots 252 .400 21 350 22.57 .751 2.41 GNP (tirllions of US dollars.063 113 Germany.510 1.93 .09 5.207 14.57 50 59 60 .630 1.197 971 2.237 1.975 4.31 1.700 26.023 120 378 536 643 595 575 501 7 48 55 90 111l 135 144 196 608 1.53 .25 National currencies 92 119 319 227 585 757 1.70 83 24. Fed Rep (millions of deutsche marks) 937 114 Denmark (m~ll.27 .702 116 Sweden (millions of kronor) 36 117 Norway (mnllions of kroner) 36 116 Switzerland (millions of francs) 17 OECD ODA (billions of US dollars.093 2.23 23 .477 5. 223 Denmark 5 UnitedoStates 2.24 .472 1.241 3.08 1 08 .663 4.35 24.953 3.608 512 27.27 20 27 .21 .055 2.902 16.215 2.001 6.22 .891 29 177 226 351 414 583 694 710 1.852 17.19 .782 8.30 .153 605 264 131 6.171 3.589 22.29 46 59 .880 18.64 73 75 . 106 Japan .19 1 30 .35 113 Germany.06 .53 .714 6.424 3.674 17.33 33 29 28 41 39 .

04 .464 847 105 4.777 7.01 11 21 08 29 08 13 10 .30 108 Finland 109 Netnerlands 19 . 1981 .88 3.86 2.02 .01.43 5.34 .06 .04 37 .10 .95 .12 .816 As percentage of donor GNP .046 338 5.13 101 102 104 105 106 107 110 111 112 113 j14 115 116 117 1t8 Italy New Zealand United K ngdom Austria Japan Belg urn Australia Canada France Germany Fed.26 07 .13 .664 19820 58 128 216 -178 43 4. Islamic Rep.44 A40 1 11 3.33 57 5 24 8.24 .47 1.65 Net Bilateral flow to low-income countries 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 OECD ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__P_e_r'cen_tag'e0o1 ~ ~ ~ d-ono-r _G_NP__ ' 1960 .09 .804 08 81 Algeria 87 Venezuela .07 .07 08 .88 7.58 3.09 3 40 3 30 4.052 978 885 971 970 1.154 811 1.14 .22 01 .07 .04 531 1.41 25 .12 .708 6.82 4. .04 00 07 .08 .10 11 21 .09 6.26 21 .11 .55 3.06 .92 22 .03 3.33 34 .622 9.428 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Qatar Total OAPECd Total OPEC OPEC 54 Nigeria 2.699 8.29 7.08 .56 3.01 .03 .140 909 1.55 2.96 2.28 . 94 Iraq 96 Libya 1976 83 54 108 753 231 94 3.10 .25 .15 .04 11 .10 98 287 7.76 7.08 .295 563 195 5.415 8.33 .01 .098 19 189 5.75 2 87 18 2.24 .28 .24 10 29 32 93 Iran).824 6.943 1981 141 97 67 -157 148 293 5.39 1 18 5. Rep Denmark U nted States Sweden Norway Switzerland Total 06 .11 .08 .466 .02 .11 .18 a Preliminary est mates.690 .13 .86 2 06 3.09 .09 28 03 41 .15 .14 .1 0 7.18 3.32 1.02 . Provisional.021 1.22 .50 5.21 1 93 1.0 .27 06 .756 946 1.36 .01 .02 . .22 .42 Total OPEC 2 92 2.40 11 68 15 58 5.01 .46 3.95 4.154 6. Islamic Rep.23 7. 08 .22 .63 8.01 .028 1977 50 42 24 169 62 101 3.1975 ObPEC 54 N geria 81 Algeria 87 Venezuela 93 Iran.33.08 07 20 03 31 .04 02 20 10 .80 2.24 .239 .01 . 1965 .23 .39 5.08 .73 1 16 1 44 63 6.26 .31 .130 7.25 09 37 06 12 .05 .09 08 .08 28 03 34 .04 269 9.0 06 .76 79 8.06 13 07 .22 .54 2.16 .56 15 05 .238 1980 33 103 125 -90 876 382 5.12 .10 .02 .0 07 .292 1.03 .067 .21 .23 04 .08 17 08 07 .14 12 12 05 13 20 08 .04 248 8.39 .20 251 6.601 6.09 10 . b See the tecnnical notes c.12 1.086 14 41 31 593 215 259 Amount 1978 1979 MilinsolSdll 26 29 41 281 87 107 240 -19 172 139 5.11 11 1982 .11 .62 2.24 08 32 .22 .33 . 94 I raq -96 Libya 97 Saudi Arabia 98 Kuwait 99 United Arab Emirates Qatar Total OAPECdJ 1. 01 . d. 23 06 . .12 27 . Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 253 .46 6 35 3 38 4 69 2 53 .01 13 .09 .

9 36 3 1 20 2.For data comparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes.2 2.0 S2lr 642.I 544 i 683 ' 907' 6 119 42 19 9 43 40 8 8 17 844 7 5 26 5 6 5 3 1.5 24 27.0 1.1 2.461 28 40 54 32 17 83 377 153 16 76 4 19 82 171 2040 2035 2045 2040 2040 2025 2030 2040 2040 2035 2010 2040 2040 2030 2045 2025 2035 2040 2000 2045 2040 2035 2005 2035 2030 2035 2030 2045 2045 2035 2040 2035 2015 18 19 1. 17 _________ Population (millions) 1982 1990oa 2000a 2 269r 1 Hypothetical size of stationary population (millions) Assumed year of reaching net Population reproduction momentum rate ofl1 1980 2 3.0 1. 25 2 2 3 8 9 2 7 179 8 5 52 6 57 4 61 11 119 25 12 4 12 10 2 3 21 7 3 10 55 922: 1 023 673.4 22 2.4 3.6 3.4 2.9 19 1.4 3.9 19 20 20 19 1.1 17 I3 26 20 2.6 19 18 Note. Middle-income economies Oil exporters Oil importers Lower middle-income 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Sudan Mauritania Yemen.5 29 31 2.9 19 1.0 1.0 2.6 37 30 2.8 16 2.t 309r7 725 i 1 938.6 2.3 32 18 3.5 2.4 2. 20 4 .8 1.6 2. 25.3 2.0 2.9 Afghanistan Bhutan Kampuchea.0 2.6 3.3 3.' 816.3 3.2 .9 1.8 19 18 1.5 24 1.0 39 4.5 2. 621.0 2.7 22 1.5 34 31 22 30 36 2.8 19 19 18 2.54 .7 2. 2.4 19 36 3.0 19 2 1 19 1.3 2.3 20 24 2.9 17 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.6 1.8 10 2.1 3.1 4.8 1.8 18 19 20 2. Population growth and projections Average annual growth of population (percent) 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 Low-income economies China andlIndia Other low-income 1 Cnad 2 Bangladesn 3 Ethiopia 4 Nepal 5 Mai.6 1.2 23 2.8 3.3 22 3.9 22 2.9 2. 6 Burma 7 Zaire 8 Malawi 9 Upper Volta 10 Uganda 11 India 12 Rwanda 13 Burundi 14 Tanzania 15 Somalia 16 Haiti 17 Benin 18 Central African Rep.0 2.8 1.3 25 19 2. 2. Honduras Egypt.3 3.008 6 6 9 15 3 12 87 18 3 17 1 4 13 57 1.Table 19.8 1.5 2.9 2.6 2.5 22.i' 190.8 21 2. 1.2 2.9 2.0 4.2 23 2.8 3.707 47 27 117 23 14 23 13 1.1 1. PUP Liber a Senegal Yemen Arab Rep Lesotho Bolvia Indonesia Zambia.7 2. 19.6 2.5 3.7 4.7 3.4 1.8 2.9 1.6 3.4 2.7 2.ppines Zimbabwe N ger a Morocco Cameroon Nicaragua Ivory Coast Guatemaia Congo.8 2.0 3.8 2.6 1.2 35 27 3.9 2.3 26 14 27 2. 23.4 20 33 2.7 7 7 4 1.5 30 24 21 2.4 33 29 29 1.9 31 30 25 2.3 1.4 22 3.8 3.7 2.4 2.7 2.196 9 11 16 21 5 24 140 40 5 25 2 6 24 88 '819: 22 454 231 71 42 115 172 48 35 89 1..9 1.8 29 2.0 20 25 20 2.2 1.5 24 1.163.8 19 1.4 2.4 30 23 2.8 1.8 1.5 31 2..8 2.1 3.6 2.8 1. 2 5.4 3.0 2.0 2.9 I.0 4. People's Rep Costa R ca Peru Dominican Rep J~amaica Ecuador Turkey 26 26t.6 2..0 1. 1 404r 1 41 76).2 3.4 24 23 2.1 2.6 2.0 2.2 1.3 3. Demn.9 1.0 17 19 19 2. 20 2 2 2 6 8 1 6 153 6 4 44 5 49 3 51 8 91 20 9 3 9 8 2 2 17 6 2 8 47 34 3 3 4 10 12 2 9 212 11 7 63 8 68 5 73 16 169 31 17 5 17 12 3 3 26 8 3 13 65 112 8 12 12 36 43 7 22 370 37 17 114 17 il1 10 127 62 618 70 65 12 58 25 10 5 49 15 4 27 11l 2035 2035 2040 2030 2040 2040 2030 2030 2010 2030 2025 2015 2015 2010 2030 2010 2030 2035 2025 2035 2025 2035 2020 2025 2005 2020 2010 2005 2020 2010 18 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.0 1.094 7 8 12 18 4 17 107 26 4 20 1 4 17 70 6-1 5 93 33 15 7 35 31 7 7 14 717 6 4 20 5 5 4 2 1.4 26 2.8 20 1.3 25 25. Lao PDP Mozambique Viet Nam 2.2 2. 7 157 57 24 12 53 55 12 10 25 994 11 7 36 . 19 China 20 Guinea 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Niger Madagascar Sri Lanka Togo Gnana Pakistan K(enya Sierra Leone 2 3.9 17 1. 5 2 3. 29 26 3..9 1.6 2.9 25 22 2. Arab Rep ElSalvador Tha land Papua New Guinea Pn l.5 35 30 37 26 38 2.2 2.

9 3.4 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 111 Canada 112 France 113 Germany.1 2. 11 07 01 0.5 2.1 56 8 118 10 5 14 15 25 54 62 5 56 8 123 10 5 15 16 27 56 61 5 57 8 128 10 5 15 18 29 58 60 5 59 8 128 10 5 15 21 33 62 54 5 292 8 4 6 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 1. ini b.8 0.2 0.3 20 18 1.6 13 0.5 1.1 3.0 1.4 0.7 1.9 0.3 4.9 2.8 19 1. 71 Lebanon 72 Mongolia Upper middle-income 73 Syrian Arab Rep.2 0.9 4.2 1.1 01 0.6 1.556 288 5.8 2.9 2.7 0.65 66 67 68 69 unisia Colombia Paraguay Angola Cuba 70 Korea.4 16 14 1.4 127 73 20 10 28 3 30 23 17 10 4 5 3 1 41 14 152 89 27 10 32 3 39 24 21 10 5 6 3 1 53 19 181 109 39 11 36 3 52 25 26 11 5 7 3 2 70 26 304 199 119 14 54 4 123 29 46 12 8 8 3 2 1