The Nicoll Highway Collapse

D. W Hi ht D W. Hight T.O. Henderson + A.R. Pickles S. Marchand

Content
• Background and construction sequence • Observations up to the point of collapse, including monitoring • The collapse • Post-collapse investigations • Design errors • Jet grout layers • Ground conditions and the buried valley • The need for a trigger • Back analyses of the collapse • Relative vertical displacement and forced sway • The bored piles • Collapse mechanism and its trigger • Lessons to be learnt

34m Diameter Temporary Staging Area (TSA) Shaft 35m deep 210m 2-cell cut & cover tunnels 200m cut & cover deep 30m - 33m stacked 4-cell scissors crossover tunnel 3-level cut & cover Station (NCH)- 30m deep 25m

3-level cut & cover Station (BLV)

550m 2-cell cut & cover tunnel and siding (BLS)

C824
Collapse site M3 area
800m twin bored tunnel

35m 2-cell cut and cover tunnel

370m stacked 2-cell cut & cover tunnel 20m - 25m deep

C825

C824 - 2km of cut and cover construction mostly in soft clay - up to 35m deep

Circle Li St Ci l Line Stage 1

Reclamation dates Beach Road The Concourse Plaza Hotel NCH station Cut and tunnels Golden Mile Cover Tower 1930-1940 sMile 1930-1940’sMil Golden G ld reclamation Complex Merdeka M d k Bridge Nicoll Highway 1970’s reclamation TSA shaft Courtesy of Richard Davies Kallang Basin .

31700 54+900 ABH30 NOR RTHING (m) ABH32 M3 ABH85 AC-2 ABH34 AC-4 ABH35 M2 31650 54+812 MC3007 ABH83 M3010 AC-3 ABH84 ABH31 MC3008 AC-1 ABH33 ABH82 ABH28 ABH81 ABH29 MC2026 ABH27 M2064 MC2025 M2065 31600 31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800 EASTING (m) Pre.and post-tender site investigation .

SOUTH 100 Fill Upper estuarine Upper U ABH 31 M309 M304 Fill ABH 32 NORTH Upper estuarine Upper Marine Clay 90 Marine Clay Upper F2 Upper F2 80 Lower Marine Clay Lower Marine Clay 70 Base marine clay Top of OA Lower o e estuarine Lower F2 Old Alluvium Old Alluvium Typical section in M3 .

0 0 0.4 04 Cone resistance.2 12 1. qc (MPa) 0.6 16 2 0 0 20 Undrained shear strength (kPa) 40 60 80 100 AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 10 AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 10 Nkt=12 Depth (m) Depth (m) 20 20 30 30 40 40 Piezocone data for M3 area .8 08 1.

Construction details and sequence .

8m Upper E Upper Marine Clay gp Driven kingpost Permanent bored piles supporting rail boxes 10 levels of steel struts at 3m +3.0.SOUTH NORTH Fill Formation level approx 33m bgl Temporary diaphragm walls.5m vertical centres Upper F2 Lower Marine Clay Sacrificial JGP Permanent JGP Lower E Lower F2 OA SW2 (N=35) OA SW1 (N 72) (N=72) OA (CZ) .

General Excavation sequence for M3 – up to level for removal of sacrificial JGP and installation of 10th level strut .

Tidal sea TSA Shaft M3 Utility crossings M2 Curved walls Nicoll Highway 24/3/04 .

Support beam Shaft M3 No waler C channel stiffener Jacking point Walers Splayed strut Non-splayed strut Kingpost M2 .

Two Struts Bearing Direct on Single panel Single Strut with Splays g y Bearing on Waler for Single panel Struts on Walers .No Splays Gaps in Diaphragm Wall for 66kV Crossing .

South side 13 March 04 .

Events and observations prior to collapse .

.

Plate stiffener C channel stiffener Replacement of plate stiffeners at strut-waler connection strut- .

Strut bearing directly on Dwall C channel connection .

including removal of the sacrificial JGP .Excavation for the 10th level of struts.

Observations on the morning of the collapse .

North wall M301 M302 M303 M304 M305 4 2 3 1 6 7 333 334 H KP 181 335 336 H KP 182 337 338 H KP 183 339 340 1 5 5 5 7 7 M306 M307 M308 M309 M310 1 Order in which distortion to waler noted Excavation to 10th complete Excavation in progress Location of walers. splays and Dwall gaps .

S335-9 S335 9 Strut 335-9 south wall .

S338-9 S338 9 Strut 338-9 north wall 338- .

.

Instrumentation and results of monitoring .

M2/M3 plan at 9th level M2 M3 TSA Shaft GWV24 I 65 All struts at S335 instrumented for load measurements I 104 .

Excavation Front Beyond S335 at the start of Day Shift on 18th April 2004 SG3358 Total Force SG3359 Total Force 5000 4500 Excavation Front Approaches S335 at the end of Day Shift on y 17th April 2004 4000 Excavation Front for 10th Level Advancing from S338 3000 2500 2000 1500 Excavation Front for 10th Level Between S336 and S335 1000 500 15th April 140 130 120 110 16th April 100 90 17th April 80 70 60 18th April 50 40 19th April 30 20 10 20th April 0 0 Hours before collapse Measured strut load (kN) d 3500 .

00 7.00 Time on 20April 2004 .00 16.00 11.00 13.00 14.00 8.00 12.00 15.Change in Measured Load at Strut 335 5000 336(N) & 337(N) 4500 Waler Buckling Observed 335(N) Support Bracket at 335(S) Drops Off Waler Buckling Observed 4000 Me easured strut load (kN) 3500 3000 2500 2000 Strut Load 335-9 1500 Strut Load 335-8 1000 338(N) & 335(S) Waler Buckling Observed 500 0 6.00 10.00 9.

30pm Excavation approaches 9am m .Observed trends in 8th and 9th strut loads Load In nstallation of 9th f 8th Observed 9th + passes beyond S335 5 18 April 2004 20 3.

The trends were consistent with there being g yielding of the 9th level strut-waler connection when the excavation passed beneath but with no f th significant changes i l d i either further i ifi t h in load in ith the 9th or 8th level struts until the collapse was initiated .

Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 200 400 400 Horizontal displacement (mm) 200 I 65 10 April 0 0 10 10 Behind South Wall North Wall 20 De epth (m) 20 De epth (m) 30 30 40 40 50 50 .

Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 15 April 200 400 400 Horizontal displacement (mm) 200 I 65 10 April 16 April 0 0 10 10 Behind South Wall North Wall 20 De epth (m) 20 De epth (m) 30 30 40 40 50 50 .

Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 15 April 17 April 200 400 400 Horizontal displacement (mm) 200 I 65 10 April 16 April 17 April 0 0 10 10 Behind South Wall North Wall 20 De epth (m) 20 De epth (m) 30 30 40 40 50 50 .

Horizontal displacement (mm) 0 0 I 104 10 April 15 April 17 April 20 April 10 200 400 400 Horizontal displacement (mm) 200 I 65 10 April 16 April 17 April 20 April 10 0 0 Behind South Wall North Wall 20 De epth (m) 20 De epth (m) 30 30 40 40 50 50 .

500 Maximum horizontal displacemen mm nt. 400 I104 max I65 max 300 South wall 200 North N th wall ll 100 0 5-Jul 9-Aug 13-Sep 18-Oct 2003 22-Nov 27-Dec 31-Jan 6-Mar 10-Apr 2004 Comparison of inclinometer readings I65 and I104 .

• S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m from excavation front • S335 9 stood for 2 5 days under load and was over S335-9 2.5 8m from excavation front • B th S335-9S & S338 9N b kl d within 10 minutes Both S335 9S S338-9N buckled ithi i t • Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant between 18 A il and i iti ti of collapse b t April d initiation f ll • All C-channel connections failed downwards at both ends • The south wall was pushing the north wall back Key observations .

The collapse .

3.33pm .

33pm .3.

3.34pm .

3.34pm .

3.34pm .

41pm .3.

3.46pm .

Post collapse Post-collapse investigations Design errors .

Errors • Misinterpretation of BS5950 with regard to stiff bearing length b i l h • Omission of splays Effects • Design capacity of strut-waler connection was 50% of strut waler required design capacity where splays were omitted Errors in structural design of strut-waler connection strut- .

• Capacity based on BS5950:1990 = 2550 kN • Average ultimate capacity based on physical load tests = 4100 kN • Based on mill tests. 9 % of connections had 95% f capacity of 3800 kN.4400kN • Predicted 9th level strut load in 2D analyses which ignored bored piles was close to ultimate capacity therefore collapse was considered by the COI to be inevitable Inevitability of collapse .

• Method A and Method B refer to two alternative ways of modelling undrained soil behaviour in Plaxis (Pickles. 2002) • Method A is an effective stress analysis of an undrained problem bl • Assumes isotropic elastic behaviour and a MohrCoulomb f C failure criterion • As a result mean effective stress p’ is constant until y p yield • Method A was being applied to marine clays which were of low over-consolidation or even under-consolidated over consolidation under consolidated because of recent reclamation • Method B is a total stress analysis Methods A and B .

t Cu from Method A Cu from Method B p’ The shortcomings of Method A .

050 Method B 105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -0.3 for S8 Exc to RL 94.000 0.100 0.000 0.6 for S6 Exc to RL 75.150 0.6 for S5 Exc to RL 78.6 for S7 Exc to RL 72.050 0.1 for S4 Exc to RL 81.1 for S2 Exc to RL 87.300 Wall Disp.Method A 105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -0.3 for S10 Exc to RL 98.S th Wall Di l South W ll Displacement t Method A versus Method B .3 for S8 Exc to RL 94.050 0.3 for S10 Exc to RL 98. (m) Exc to RL 100. (m) Exc to RL 100.050 0.6 for S3 Exc to RL 84.100 0.6 for S7 Exc to RL 72.6 for S3 Exc to RL 84.200 0.1 for S2 Exc to RL 87.200 0.3 for S9 M3 .250 0.150 0.250 0.6 for S6 Exc to RL 75.1 for S4 Exc to RL 81.6 for S5 Exc to RL 78.300 0.9 for S1 Exc to RL 91.9 for S1 Exc to RL 91.3 for S9 Wall Disp.

Method A 105 100 95 90 85 RL (m) 80 75 70 65 60 55 -500 0 -3000 -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 RL (m) 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 Method B 0 -500 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 -3000 -2500 -2000 -1500 Bending Moment (kNm/m) -1000 Bending Moment (kNm/m) M3 .South Wall bending moments Method A versus Method B 4000 .

Method M th d A g 3000 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 ( ) 3000 2800 2600 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Method B 2383 2206 Strut Load (kN/m) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Strut Load (kN/m) _ S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 M3 – strut forces Method A versus Method B .

• Method A over-estimates the undrained shear strength of normally and lightly overconsolidated clays l • Its use led to a 50% under-estimate of wall displacements and of bending moments and an under-estimate of the 9th level strut force of 10% • The larger than predicted displacements mobilised the capacity of the JGP layers at an earlier stage p y y g than predicted Method A .

• St t l design errors Structural d i • Removal of splays at some strut locations p y • Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail • Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis • C ll Collapse was an i inevitable consequence of th it bl f the design errors which led to the applied loads on the struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity of the strut-waler connection COI view on the principal causes of the collapse .

• St t l design errors Structural d i • Removal of splays at some strut locations p y • Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail • Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis • C ll Collapse was an i inevitable consequence of th it bl f the design errors which led to the applied loads on the struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity of the strut-waler connection COI view on the principal causes of the collapse .

Post collapse Post-collapse investigations Jet grout .

Excavation of sacrificial JGP in Type H .

JGP quality in 100mm cores from borehole M1 in Type K .

Shear wave velocity measurements in JGP at Type K .

5 Shear wave section 4 Pressuremeter section JGP thic ckness (m) 3 2 Design thickness 1 0 0 2 4 6 8 Thicknesses of JGP in Type K .

Post collapse Post-collapse investigations

Ground conditions and soil properties

BN3 P33 CN3

P36 P42/P48 P41/P47 P40 P54 P45 P52 AN2 TSAN2

31700

DN3 BN2E CN2 DN2E EN2 FN2 DN2W DN1E DN1W BN2W

54+900
CN1

M3

AN1 66KVNI

BN1W BN1E BN1Ea CL-1a

NOR RTHING (m)

M2 31650 54+812
FN1 EN1 CL 3g CL-3g CL-2

66KVS CFVN CTSN CPTNa CPTN FS1 DS2E DS2W DS3E CS3 ES3 DS3W EASTING (m) DS1E DS1W ES1 CS2 CS1

BS1Ea BS1Eb SPTSa BS1W AS1

TSAS2 TSAS2b

BS2E BS2W

AS2

31600
ES2

31550

31600

FS2

31650

BS3E BS3W

AS3

31700

31750

31800

BS4W

BS4E

CS4

BS4Ea

DS4W DS4E

PostPost-collapse ground investigation

0 0

0.4

Cone resistance, qt (MPa) 0.8 1.2

1.6

2

0 0

0.4

Cone resistance, qt (MPa) 0.8 1.2

1.6

2

BN1W qt u2 fs 10

BS2W qt u2 fs 10

North

South

D Depth (m)

20

De epth (m)
0 0.4 0.8 Pore pressure, u2 (MPa) 0.02 0.04 Friction, f s (MPa) 0.06 1.2

20

30

30

40

40 0 0.4 04 0.8 08 Pore pressure, u2 (MPa) 0.02 0.04 Friction, f s (MPa) 0.06 1.2 12

0

0.08

0

0.08

CPT profiles north and south of collapse area

100 φ=28.2o t (kP Pa) 0 0 50 100 150 200 s' (kPa) -50 P-8 P-9 P-24 P-26 -100 φ=35o Kisojiban’s CAU tests on Upper and Lower Marine Clay .5 50 φ=34.5o Ko=0.

P36 BN3 P42/P48 P33 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 CN3 P40 P41/P47 P54 P45 31700 DN3 P52 TSAN2 AN2 BN2E CN2 BN2W Tender SI boreholes Tender SI CPTs Detailed design SI Detailed design SI CPTs Post collapse SI Post collapse SI CPTs Boreholes for bored piles Magnetic logging boreholes DN2E DN2W EN2 54+900 ABH32 M3 AN1 ABH85 ABH34 31650 54+812 CFVN CTSN CPTN CPTNa ABH27 BN1W 66KVNI CN1 WN2 BN1Ea BN1E WN6 WN4 WN8 WN3 WN1 ABH30 WN12WN10 WN7AWN5 DN1E FN2 WN14 WN11 WN9 WN16 DN1W WN13 WN18 WN15 WN20 WN17 WN22 WN19 WN24 WN21 MC3007 EN1 WN26 M3010 CL-1a WN23 ABH83 WN28 WN25 AC-3 AC 3 WN30A WN27 CL-2 FN1 WN29 CL-3g WN32 WN31 WN34 BS1Ea WN33 WS1 ABH84 SPTSa BS1Eb WS3 66KVS ABH31 WN37 WN35 WS9 WS7 WS5 WS11A WS12A WN36 WS13A WS11C WS12C WS15WS13C WS10 WS8 WS6 WS4A WS2 WN38 WS14 BS1W WS11B WS17 WS12B WS12 WS13B WS11 WS13 DS1E WS19 AS1 WN39 WS16 WS21 ABH29 WN40 WS18 ABH82 WS23 WS20 WS25 WS22 CS1 WS27 WS24 DS1W ABH28 WS29 WS26 WS34 WS31 WS28 WS30 ABH81 WS36 WS32 ES1 WS35A WS33 MC2026 WS37 AS2 BS2E WS38 FS1 CS2 BS2W M2064 AC-2 AC-4 NORTHI ING (m) M2 ABH35 AC-1 AC 1 MC3008 ABH33 TSAS2 TSAS2b M2065 31600 31550 MC2025 ES2 DS2E DS2W AS3 BS3E BS3W 31600 FS2 31650 DS3E DS3W ES3 CS3 31700 31750 31800 EASTING (m) BS4W CS4 BS4Ea BS4E DS4W DS4E Evidence for a buried valley in the Old Alluvium .

110 100 90 ELEVATION (mRL) ( 80 70 60 50 Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay Detailed design site investigation Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay Post collapse site investigations Top of OLD ALLUVIUM Post collapse site investigations Section along north wall .

110 100 90 E ELEVATION (mR RL) 80 70 60 50 Section along south wall .

02 WN35 80.51 81.69 NORTH HING (m) M2 31650 54+812 WN38 WN29 WN30A WN31 78.81 WN21 80.53 80.86 80.P36 BN3 77.03 81.84 82.04 TSAS2b 82.13 WN40 83.68 83.39 M209 M210 KP181 CL-2 CL 2 M211 80.68 BS3E 81.36 M302 79.10 79.91 ABH85 81.90 P41/P47 86 90 86.98 ABH35 AC-1 80.43 WN12 DN1E 81.57 WS32 78.58 86.91 Tender SI boreholes Tender SI CPTs Detailed design SI boreholes Detailed design SI CPTs Post collapse SI boreholes Post collapse SI CPTs Boreholes for bored piles Magnetic logging boreholes 54+900 CN1 83.61 DN2E 81.26 81 26 80.20 WS9WS8 WS7 M212 & M306 WS10 76.45 81.60 66KVSSPTSa BS1Eb 74.94 M303 WN23 79.73 AC-4 79.77 WS15 72.23 DS1E WS27 79.19 WN39 81.91 M3010 WN25 80.37 79.00 ABH27 80.23 79.39 WS19 75.33 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 DS4E 79.29 31600 31650 EASTING (m) 31700 31750 31800 BS4Ea 80.25 WN14 81.76 WS29 81.21 WN15 80.17 ABH81 80.69 BS1Ea M301 66KVNI 81.22 81.16 82.07 31700 DN3 81.41 AN1 82.66 WN37 81.97 82.24 Distortion to upper F2 layer caused by the collapse .38 WS23 80.16 BS2E 82.96 BS4E 80.69 WS24 81.76 ABH33 80.38 WN10 WN11 81.27 P45 86.52 WS31 79.48 WS25 79.35 WN6 WN7A 82.95 WN27 80.69 AC-2 81.25 WN9WN8 81.06 80.94 P40 86.83 WS34 WS35A WS37 WS38 81.99 81.93 WS26 80.84 72.39 CN3 82.65 82.25 ABH82 74.42 81.38 81.59 WS28 80.01 78.37 M304 WN17 81.84 P54 86.93 WN24 79.28 WS16 AS1 WS17 81.61 missing82.65 79.58 WN36 80.86 WN20 80.72 WN18 M305 79.20 P52 85.88 WN5WN4WN3WN2WN1 338 CFVN CTSN 81.66 WN16 80.86 WN19 81.25 WS30 78.98 BN2E 82.39 M213 WS18 81.20 73.70 DS2E 80.31 80.71 WN34 78.43 78.28 M2064 79.34 77.15 MC3007 WN26 80.13 ABH32 M3 BN1Ea BN1E 81.02 P42/P48 P33 86.70 76.52 M307 WS4A 78.72 AC-3 83.72 ABH84 M308 M309 M310 WS3WS1 ABH31 WS2 71.69 31600 31550 MC2025 81.09 71.57 80.09 78.98 WS20 WS21 81.88 WN22 80.31 81.95 80.28 CS1 WS22 ABH29 81.55 ABH83 80.07 75.05 WN13 81.30 86.78 79.51 WN32 WN33 77.57 CL-3g KP182 KP183 79.59 82.57 72.

Buried valley in the Old Alluvium .

Buried valley in the Old Alluvium .

Coincidence between buried valley and distortion to upper F2 layer .

• There was a buried valley crossing the site of the collapse diagonally from south-west to north-east • The presence and setting of the buried valley explain the asymmetric conditions and the different collapse on the north and south sides • The buried valley coincides with the major ground distortion on the south side and was clearly influential in the collapse • Below the Lower Marine Clay the buried valley was infilled with estuarine organic clays on the south side and fluvial clays on the north side • Gas exsolution almost certainly occurred in the deep y p organic clays as a result of stress relief. reducing their strength further The buried valley .

9WN28 WN27 I-102 WN25 WN24 WN20 ABH-83 MC3007 CL-3G M3010 KP181 CL-1A KP183 KP182 FN1 WN34 WN35 WN37 WN38 CPTNa CFVN WN40 ABH-28 CPTN WN39 WN29 WN31WN30 WN32 WN33 WN36 AC-3 MC3008 AC-1 ABH-35 BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 I-103 WS27 DS1E ABH-29 CS1 TSAS2 TSAS2B BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 ABH 31 AS1 I-66 ABH-33 WS34 WS35 WS32 WS30 WS31 WS29 WS28 DS1W WS26 WS36 ABH-81 WS37 WS38 ABH 27 ABH-27 I-64 WS33 ES1 FS1 SE A AL W L MC2026 BS2E AS2 BS2W CS2 M2065 M2064 DS2E DS2W ABH-80 ES2 FS2 DS3E ABH-26 ES3 DS3W CS3 BS3E AS3 BS3W BS4E Post-collapse geometry and sequence of excavation superimposed on buried valley .CN3 DN3 TSAN2 BN2E CN2 BN2W AN2 DN2E DN2W EN2 CN1 ABH-32 AN1 ABH-85 WN1 I 67 I-67 AC-2 ABH-34 GA S MA DN1E BN1W BN1Ea I-65 WN10 BN1E 66KVN ABH-30 FN2 AC-4 IN DN1W EN1 WN26 94.

CN1 A GA S S MA DN1E BN1W BN1Ea I-65 WN10 BN1E 66KVN WN1 I AC ABH-30 66kV Cable IN N1W 5 WN24 WN20 ABH-83 MC3007 CL-3G CL 3G M3010 KP181 CL-1A KP183 KP182 AC-3 BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1 DS1W WS26 LL Sequence of excavation in relation to buried valley .

therefore.• The buried valley was crossed without collapse developing • Strut forces would have been a maximum in the buried valley and would have varied across the valley • The collapse was not. inevitable • An external influence (trigger) is required to explain the timing of the collapse and why it occurred after crossing the buried valley Significance of crossing the buried valley without collapse .

5 days under load and was over 8m from excavation front • Both S335-9S & S338-9N buckled within 10 minutes • Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant between 18 April and initiation of collapse • All C-channel connections failed downwards at both ends • The south wall was pushing the north wall back Key observations .• S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m from excavation front • S335-9 stood for 2.

• 3D effects cannot explain why the collapse was initiated at 9am – S338 was 20-24m from the 20 24m excavation face and had stood for 8 days without distress. S335 was 8-12m from the excavation face • Time effects cannot explain why the collapse was initiated at 9am – there was no evidence of load increases in the monitoring Potential triggers .

In nstallation of 9th f 8th Observed Minor additional loading <2mm yielding in 9th 9th + passes beyond S335 5 18 April 2004 20 3.30pm Excavation approaches 9am m Trigger Load Yielding of 9th .

Post collapse Post-collapse investigations Back analyses of the collapse .

• Analyses by Dr Felix Schroeder and Dr Zeljko Cabarkapa using Imperial College Finite Element p g p g Program (ICFEP) • 2D section through M307 (I104) and M302 (I65) • Bored piles are not modelled ( p (enhanced JGP) ) • Upper and Lower Marine Clays. F2 and lower Estuarine Clay modelled using Modified Cam Clay • Coupled consolidation p • Fill and OA sand modelled using Mohr Coulomb. OA-CZ clay/silt modelled as Tresca Geotechnical analyses .

• W ll EI reduced t allow f cracking. b Wall d d to ll for ki based on d reinforcement layout • Bending moment capacities set according to reinforcement layout and ultimate strengths of steel a d concrete and co c ete as supp ed supplied • JGP treated as brittle material • 9th level strut capacity set and strut allowed to strain soften 72 hours after excavation to 10th level. Geotechnical analyses .

North Fill Estuarine Upper Marine Clay F2 Lower Marine Clay F2 OA (Sand) .00 +63.07 Fill Estuarine South Upper Marine Clay F2 Lower Marine Clay +63.OA-CZ OA (Clay/Silt) .00 +67.OA-CZ +71.OA-CZ OA (Clay/Silt) .58 +81.00 +84.57 +57.OA-CZ Stratigraphy assumed for ICFEP analyses .58 +97.58 +85.9 +98.57 +61.57 OA (Clay/Silt) .07 +102.57 +82.58 +102.58 +96.9 +98.OA-SW-1 OA (Sand) .

.

North wall
100

9th

South wall
100

95

95

90

90

measured

Elevation (m RL)

85

predicted predicted measured

85

80

80

75

75

70

70

65

65

60

60

55 50 0

Horizontal displacement (mm)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Horizontal displacement (mm)
55 450 -400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50

North wall
100

10th

South wall
100

95

95

90

90

measured

Elevation (m RL)

85

predicted predicted measured

85

80

80

75

75

70

70

65

65

60

60

55 50

Horizontal displacement (mm)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Horizontal displacement (mm)
55 450 -400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50

Predicted t e ds in 7th, 8th and 9th strut loads ed cted trends a d st ut oads
4500 4000

3500 3000

Prop for (kN/m rce m)

2500

Strut 7

9
2000

Strut 8 Strut 9

1500 1000

8 7

500 0 280.00

281.00

282.00

283.00 ( )

284.00

285.00

286.00

Time (days)

6 hours

Observed trends in 8th and 9th strut loads Load In nstallation of 9th f 8th Observed 9th + passes beyond S335 5 18 April 2004 20 3.30pm Excavation approaches 9am m .

8th and 9th level struts • To match movements and forces at all stages it was necessary to model the jet grout as a brittle material • The upper JGP was predicted to pass its peak strength during excavation to the 6th level and the lower JGP to pass its peak strength during excavation to the 9th level • Th 9th l The 9 h level strut reached i capacity d i excavation l h d its i during i to the 10th level Key findings from geotechnical analyses . and the trends in the forces in the 7th.• The analyses matched reasonably well the build up in horizontal wall movements.

b t a hi l l but hinge did not f t form in th wall until th i the ll til the sacrificial JGP layer had been removed Key findings from geotechnical analyses .• The collapse had to be initiated by allowing the 9th level strut to strain soften – a ductile failure of the connection was not associated with a collapse • The bending moment capacity of the south wall was reached on the first stage of excavation below the 9th level.

Trigger required to initiate collapse Relative vertical displacement between the kingposts and Dwall panels .

V Vertical di isplacement of Dw (mm) wall ) 100 Up 50 Top of southern wall-nolimit Top of southern wall-OA1 Top of southern wall-OA2 p 8th 9th 10th 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 -50 Down -100 Excavation depth (m) Predicted settlement of south wall during excavation .

.

500 Ver rtical disp placement (mm) ts Run 4apfnolimit 400 Run 4apfnolimit_OA1 Run 4apfnolimit_OA2 300 200 100 0 -5 -100 North Wall -200 South Wall 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Distance (m) Predicted vertical displacement of lower JGP layer after excavation to 10th level .

20 Strut 262 no backfill 2 North wall 10 Diff ference in leve l between wall and kingpost (mm) kin ngpost Typical relative displacements of strut between walls and kingpost 1 0 7A 2 7B 3 -10 6A 4 6A -20 5 7A 7B 4 -30 5 1 3 Sout wall th .

• Calibrated FE analyses predict downward displacement of Dwall and upward displacement of kingpost when sacrificial JGP layer excavated • Survey data supports upward vertical displacement of centre of strut relative to ends Relative vertical displacement .

KP180 KP181 KP182 KP183 KP184 335 336 337 338 339 340 9th level Sacrificial JGP Excavation front Lower JGP Kingposts in long section .

Post collapse Post-collapse investigations Structural steel physical tests and numerical analyses. The effect of relative vertical displacement .

12mm stiffener plates 5000 Waler 4000 Axial load (kN) ( 3000 2000 1000 0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Comparison of tests on connections with plate and C channel stiffeners .

12mm stiffener plates 5000 Waler 4000 Axial load (kN) ( 3000 C channel stiffener Waler 2000 1000 C channel stiffener has similar capacity to double plate stiffener but becomes brittle after an initial ductile response Unforced sway 0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Comparison of tests on connections with plate and C channel stiffeners .

5000 Test result 4000 Axial loa (kN) ad 3000 C channel stiffener Waler 2000 1000 0 0 10 20 30 Adjusted axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Calibration of FE model of strut-waler connection strut- .

5000 Test result FE prediction 4000 Axial loa (kN) ad 3000 C channel stiffener Waler 2000 1000 0 0 10 20 30 Adjusted axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Calibration of FE model of strut-waler connection strut- .

5000 Ductile plateau 10-15mm Test result FE prediction 4000 Axial loa (kN) ad 3000 C channel stiffener Yield 2000 Waler 1000 Ductile plateau allows failure to develop at both ends 0 0 10 20 30 Adjusted axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Calibration of FE model of strut-waler connection strut- .

5000 8m strut 4000 Axial load (kN) 3000 2000 C channel stiffener Waler 1000 0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) p ( ) 40 50 Effect of strut length (bending restraint) on brittleness of connection .

5000 8m strut 18m strut 4000 Axia load (kN) al 3000 2000 C channel stiffener 1000 Reduced restraint increases brittleness and reduces d til plateau d d ductile l t 8m strut – effective kingpost 18m strut – ineffective kingpost Waler 0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) 40 50 Effect of strut length (bending restraint) on brittleness of connection .

Test on C channel stiffened connection by Nishimatsu .

Test on C channel stiffened connection by Nishimatsu .

5000 axial load only 4000 Axial load (kN) 3000 2000 C channel stiffener Waler 1000 0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) p ( ) 40 50 Effect of relative vertical displacement .

5000 axial load only axial load+RVD 4000

Axial load (kN)

3000

2000

C channel stiffener

Waler

1000

RVD reduces ductile plateau, increases brittleness, makes stable situation unstable Forced sway

0 0 10 20 30 Axial displacement (mm) p ( ) 40 50

Effect of relative vertical displacement

P

Force, P

Ductile D til

strain

Effect of brittleness of strut to waler connection
2500

Ductile
2000 Run 4apf2100drop Run 4apf2100drop4 Run 4apf2100drop3 p p Run 4apf2100drop2 Run 4apf2100 ( p 1000 500 0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 )

Prop force (kN/m) e

1500

Total axial strain (%)

Effect of brittleness of strut to waler connection 2500 500 Run 4apf2100 R 4 f2100 Run 4apf2100drop2 Run 4apf2100drop3 Run 4apf2100drop4 Run 4apf2100drop Ductile – no collapse 2000 Prop force (kN/m) e 1500 1000 500 6 hours 9 days 0 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 21 days 20 25 Time since reaching excavation level of 72.3m RL (days) .

P Force. P Ductile D til No collapse hours to collapse Several days to collapse y strain .

i.• Th There was relative vertical di l l ti ti l displacement b t t between th the diaphragm wall. which settled when the sacrificial JGP was removed.e. gp relative vertical displacement between the ends and centre of the strut (RVD) • The strut-waler connection was ductile-brittle. which rose. The ductile plateau explains why both ends could fail p p y • The brittleness of the connection determines the time taken for the collapse to develop Trigger required to initiate collapse . and the kingpost.

• RVD reduces the length of the ductile plateau and increases the brittleness • RVD can make a stable situation unstable k t bl it ti t bl • RVD can shorten the time to collapse • Why downward failure at both ends? • Why collapse after crossing the buried valley? Trigger required to initiate collapse .

• Free • Fixed • Forced sway Downward failure at both ends .

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Trigger required to initiate collapse Post-collapse positions of the Dwall panels .

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CN1 A GA S S MA DN1E BN1W BN1Ea I-65 WN10 BN1E 66KVN WN1 I AC ABH-30 66kV Cable IN N1W 5 WN24 WN20 ABH-83 MC3007 CL-3G CL 3G M3010 KP181 CL-1A KP183 KP182 AC-3 BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1 DS1W WS26 LL Post-collapse geometry superimposed on buried valley .

31650 CL-2 TUNNEL SOUTH WALL BS1Ea SPTSa WS10 WS9 WS8 31640 NORT THING (m) WS17 WS13C 12 2.7 WS16 WS15 WS14 WS13B 13.5 66KVS WS12D WS11D 31630 CS1 WS11E WS12E WS11F Post collapse SI boreholes Magnetic logging boreholes Unsuccessful magnetic logging boreholes 2005 boreholes WS13E WS13F 31620 31670 31680 31690 EASTING (m) 31700 Coincidence between inability to advance boreholes and missing Dwall panels .5 WS S11C 14.2 WS12B 15.7 WS13 16 WS13A 26 .5 WS1 12C 12.5 WS11B 1 WS11 19.6 WS11A 13. 12 WS12 9 WS12A 19 17.

11F.WS11E.13F WS11-13A-D Obstruction created by missing Dwall panels . 12E.

Soil flows th 3 S il fl through resulting gap b t h lti between M307 and M308. each side of the gap. Sequence of south wall panel movements . Soil flows through resulting gap between M306 and M307. etc. rotating panel 308. rotating panel 307. 3. back 2.2 3 1 M212 1 Gap 1 M306 1. Panels M306 and M212. and panel 213 fail by toe kick-in and rotate back.

d drag dr rag 5 304 305 drag 4 303 3 302 2 301 1 306 2a 3a 4a Sequence of south and north wall panel movements .

SOUTH NORTH Fill Upper E Upper Marine Clay Differing restraint imposed by bored piles at north and south walls Upper F2 Lower Marine Clay Sacrificial JGP Permanent JGP Lower E Lower F2 OA SW2 (N=35) OA SW1 (N 72) (N=72) OA (CZ) .

• The bored piles had a major influence on the displacements of the Dwall panels during the collapse and on their post-collapse positions • The bored piles restricted toe movements on the south side and prevented failure as the buried valley was crossed • Loads carried by the bored piles contributed to the under-reading under reading of the strain gauges Significance of the bored piles .

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North wall M301 M302 M303 M304 M305 4 2 3 1 6 7 333 334 H KP 181 335 336 H KP 182 337 338 H KP 183 339 340 1 5 5 5 7 7 M306 M307 M308 M309 M310 1 Order in which distortion to waler noted Excavation to 10th complete Excavation in progress Location of walers. splays and Dwall gaps .

CN1 A GA S S MA DN1E BN1W BN1Ea I-65 WN10 BN1E 66KVN WN1 I AC ABH-30 66kV Cable IN N1W 5 WN24 WN20 ABH-83 MC3007 CL-3G CL 3G M3010 KP181 CL-1A KP183 KP182 AC-3 BS1Ea CL-2 66KVS I-104 ABH-84 ABH 84 SPTSa WS10 WS20 ABH-82 DS1E ABH 29 ABH-29 CS1 BS1Eb BS1W WS1 ABH-31 AS1 DS1W WS26 LL Repositioned bored piles at 66kV crossing .

where bored piles had been re-positioned and additional t movement was possible dditi l toe t ibl • Resulting RVD fed back into buried valley Relative vertical displacement .• Upward displacement of KP 180 and 181 accentuated by toe displacement of M306 and M212.

KP180 KP181 KP182 KP183 KP184 335 335 336 336 337 338 339 340 9th level Upper JGP Excavation front Lower JGP Kingposts in long section .

• C channel stiffened connection undergoes brittle failure • Critical length of strut and of load in strut result in minimal lateral restraint to connection • Restraint from rising kingpost results in downward force on connection • RVD results in reduction in ductility of connection and increase in brittleness • RVD makes a stable situation with overstress unstable bl • RVD results in downward failure of connection • RVD was the trigger for the failure Failure mode of connection and RVD .

The JGP was strained beyond its peak and a plastic hinge formed in the wall as excavation of the sacrificial JGP was underway .Overall conclusions • The use of Method A in the numerical analyses to model near normally consolidated soils is fundamentally incorrect • Its use led to under prediction of wall displacements and under-prediction bending moments and so to a reduction in the redundancy in the system.

Overall conclusions • There were errors in the design of the strut-waler connection resulting in a design capacity that was 50% of the required capacity where splays were omitted • The collapse initiated some time after the excavation crossed the buried ll th b i d valley. where f h forces on th under-designed strutthe d d i d t t waler connections would have been a maximum • An additional perturbation or trigger was necessary to explain the timing of the collapse. the downward failure of the walers at both ends and the trends in the monitoring data .

allowing the wall toe to kick-in and cause additional uplift of g p the local kingposts . the permanent bored piles had been repositioned and the JGP layout had been modified.Overall conclusions • The permanent bored piles in combination with the JGP p y played a significant role in p g preventing the collapse as the g p valley was crossed • The collapse was triggered when working in the vicinity of the 66kV cable crossing • At this location.

the potential for relative upward movement of the kingposts has been confirmed by surveys • Forced sway failure red ced the strain o er which the s a fail re reduced over hich connection remained ductile. the form of the observed distortions. introducing forced sway failure • Downward movement of the walls has been predicted by analysis. increased the brittleness of the connection and allowed a stable situation to become unstable • Forced sway failure can explain the timing of the collapse.Overall conclusions • This additional upward displacement of the kingposts relative to the wall fed back into the system. the trends in the monitoring data. data and the speed at which the collapse developed .

which had been linked with inadequate .Overall conclusions • The collapse was not caused by hydraulic base heave and was not related to poor workmanship • Wall rotation. was not the cause of the collapse • Several factors had to act in combination to cause the collapse . q penetration of the wall into the OA.

step increase in 9th level strut load and step increase in wall settlement .Unforgiving site • Deepest excavation in marine clay in Singapore –shortcomings in use of Method A not previously apparent because of depth dependence • Ground conditions – buried valley in OA infilled with soft fluvial and organic clay. removal of which caused p y . rapid variation in depth of marine clay along and across th excavation resulting i an asymmetric section d the ti lti in ti ti p q g q • Curvature of walls in plan requiring more frequent use of walings • Presence of 66kVA crossing • Need to adopt sacrificial JGP layer.

Lessons learnt • JGP is a brittle material • The mass properties of JGP need to be more carefully evaluated • Coring of JGP is not an adequate check • The use of numerical modelling of soils in design should be carried out by specialists and its incompatibilities with current codes needs to be removed • The potential for brittle failure of C channel connections must be recognised tb i d .

Lessons learnt • Temporary and permanent works should be subject to independent checks • The effects of relative displacement between kingposts g and walls should be considered in the design of strutted excavations • Forced sway failure and its consequences should be y q recognised as a potential mechanism in design • Monitoring did not warn of the impending collapse .

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