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TREX-00081

TREX-00081

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REPORT OF SURVEY BHP SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT

Semi-sub DEEPWATER HORIZON
Prepared for
BHP BILLITON
Houston, USA
By
ModuSpec USA
Inspection dates: 11 - 15 March 2005
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010353
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ......... ... ..... ... ..... .. ........... .... ....... ... .. ...... .. ...... 2
2.0 INTRODUCTION ....... .......... .. ..... ....... .... ... ................... ..................... . 4
2.1 Rig Data .. ... ......... ......... ............................................................... ...... 4
2.2 Survey Workscope .......... .. .............................. ......... ........... .. .. ...... ... . 4
2.3 Applicable Standards .... ... .... .............. .. .. ... .. .... ......... .. ............. : ......... . 4
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating ............. ... ... ... ... .......... ... ................. .. ... 5
3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................... ................ ................ ........... .. ... 7
3. 1 Executive Summary ............................................... ... ....... ............. ..... 7
3.2 Conclusion ........ .... .. ........ .. ..... ................................................ ............ 8
4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS ................. ... .................. ..... ..... .... 10
5.0 DRILLING EQUIPMENT ... .. ...... ..... ............. ........... ... .. ... .... ...... .... ... 13
5.1 .... ...... ........ ......... ................... .. .. .. ... ............... ... ... .......... . 13
5.2 Rotary Table .......... ..... ..................................................................... 13
5.3 Top Drive System ........................................................................ .... 13
5.4 Crown Block/Travelling Block ...................................... .. .. ............. ... 15
5.5 Hook ...... ..... .. ......... ........... ... ..................... .. .............. ...... .. ..... .. ........ 15
5.6 Dril li ng Instrumentation ............. ... ... .. ........... ..... ........ ........ ... .... ........ 16
5. 7 Drill String Motion Compensator .. .... ... ... ...... .. .............................. .... 16
5.8 Derrick .. ......... ... ...................................................................... .. ..... .. 16
5.9 Casing Stabbing Board ...... ..... .............. ........ ....................... ....... ..... 18
5.10 Tuggers and Sheaves .. ... .. ......... ......... .. ....... .. .......... .. .. ....... ............ 18
5.11 Man-Riding Winches .......... .... ............ .... ..... ............. ... .................... 18
5.1 2 Tongs ..... .... ........... ............ ... .. .. .. ... .................................................. 18
6.0 MUD SYSTEM ... ..... ............................ ........ ..................................... 19
6. 1 Mud Pumps .... ................ .... ........... .. ........... .... ........... ............ .... ...... 20
6.2 Mud-Mixing System ...... ........ .. ..... .. ..... .. ..... .. .. ... ...... ...... .. ................. 20
6.3 Trip Tank System ........ ...... .............................................................. 20
6.4 Base Oil System ....................................................... .......... .... ....... .. 20
6.5 Standpipe Manifold ....................................... ... .. .. .. .. .. ..................... . 20
6.6 Cement Manifold ........ .................. ...... ... ... .. ...... .. ........................... .. 20
6. 7 Cementing Unit.. ..... .. ................... ....................... .... ... .. ... .. .... ....... .... 21
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 2
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010354
r
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
8.0
8.1
8.2
9.0
9.1
9.2
10.0
10.1
10.2
10.3
11.0
11.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
11.5
11.6
11.7
11.8
11.9
11.10
11.11
11.12
11 .13
11.14
11.15
11.16
11 .17
11.18
11.19
11.20
Page
WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT ...... ..... .. ..................................... .. . 22
Ram- and Annular-Type BOPs .......... ..... ...... ..... ... ..... ... ......... .. .... .. .. 22
Choke Remote-Control Panel. ............................. ......... ......... ....... ... 22
BOP-Handling Equipment .. .......... ........... .......... ... ....................... .... 23
Surface BOP Control Unit... ... ........ .. ........ .... .... ....... .................. ....... 24
BOP Control System .. .......... ... ....... ... ...... ... ... .. ..... .. ......................... 24
MARINE SYSTEMS .................. .... ..... ..................... ....... .. .... .. ......... 26
Ballast System ................. .... .. .. .......................................... .............. 26
General Operations ... .. .... ................................................................ 28
POWER PLANT ........................................ ....... .................. ............. 30
Diesel Engine .................................................................................. 30
Cranes and Power System .............. ............... ... ... ..... ..... ... ........ .... .. 32
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ....................... .... ... ...... ......... .......... .... 33
Elmagco Brake ............................... ... ... ... .... ................ .................... 33
General Items .... ..... ... ........ .... .. ..... ............ ... .... ..... .. ..... ....... ... ....... ... 33
Hazardous-Zone Electrical Equipment ..................... ..... .................. 33
SAFETY EQUIPMENT .... ... ....... .. ..... ......... .. .... ...... ...... .................... 34
Safety ........................ ...... .. ..... .. .............. .... ...................... .... ...... ..... 34
C02/Halon System for Fire Control. ........................ .... .... ................. 34
Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems ............ .. ....... .......... .................... 34
Portable Extinguishers and Fire-Fighting Equipment.. .. .. ....... ... ... ... 35
Lifeboat. ............. .. ........................................................................... . 35
Life-Raft and Ring Buoy ........... ......................... ..... ........ ... .............. 36
Escape Routes ........................................................... ..................... 36
H2S and Hydrocarbon Gas Detection .............................................. 36
Hel icopter Landing Area Equipment.. .............................................. 36
Drilling Facilities Safety ............... ................................................ .... 36
Dangerous Substances ....................... .............. ................ .. ...... ...... 37
Dangerous Machinery ..................................................................... 37
Lifting and Handling ............................................................. ... .. .. .. ... 37
Pollution Control .................................. ............................................ 37
Housekeeping ................................... ................... .............. .. ........ ... 37
Walkway and Railings ..................................................................... 38
Decks and Stairways ....................................... ..... ........................... 38
General Safety Items .............. ......... .. ....... ....................................... 38
Gas Bottles .................. .. ........................... ....................................... 38
Work Permits ................................................................................... 38
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 3
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010355
2.0
2.1
Floater
Owner
Built
Drilling depth
Water depth
Location
INTRODUCTION
Rig Data
Inspection dates
References - Project No.
2.2 Survey Workscope
DEEPWATER HORIZON
Transocean Sedco Forex
2000
30,000 ft
10,000 ft
Gulf of Mexico
11 -15 March 2005
KC/MG/dw[js/ss- US1328.1
In accordance with the instructions received, we attended the DEEPWATER HORIZON
to complete a visual inspection of the rig, equipment and systems according to the
safety critical checklist and management system audit as developed by BHP Billiton and
ModuSpec.
The aim of this survey was to determine the present general condition and state of
maintenance of the equipment, in order to minimize downtime caused by mechanical
breakdown during drilling operations and to ensure that the equipment is kept in safe
working order.
The survey was conducted in good faith, but the inspection of individual items of
equipment was subjected to time and operational constraints imposed by rig operations
at the time of the survey.
2.3 Applicable Standards
The inspection criteria which have been used as reference during this survey are
international ly recognized standards, local legislative requirements, customer's safety
and operating standards, the original equipment manufacturer's maintenance and
operating specifications and accepted oilfield operating and safety practices.
Report of Survey- SS Deep-..;ater Horizon 4
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010356
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating
The ModuSpec Equipment Rating (MER) is a unique system to:
• measure the condition of an individual rig,
• visualize the strengths and weaknesses of an individual rig,
• use as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent accidents and downtime.
The added value of the MER system is that it visualizes and measures the present
condition of a rig and its equipment.
A series of bar charts representing the inspection results of the rig is included in the final
inspection report. These bar charts are only applicable to the scope of work as stated in
section 2.2.
The MER is presented as an average figure for the entire rig (chart 1) and for each
individual section of the inspection program (chart 3).
A low MER is an indication that steps must be taken, for instance:
1. address the recommendations made in the report,
2. effect structural improvements to the mai ntenance management system,
3. conduct a recheck after the recommendations made in the report have been
addressed.
The following charts are included in the inspection report:
Chart 1: Rig Averaae Inspection Rating
This chart shows:
• the percentage of the ModuSpec inspection program which was completed for the
ri g,
• the average MER for the entire rig.
Chart 2: Percentage Inspected
This chart shows the percentage inspected for each section of the ri g.
Chart 3: Detailed MER Results
This chart indicates how the rig is rated from a maintenance and safety-
qualitative point of view.
Chart 4: Detailed Critical Ratina
This chart shows the percentage of critical non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program. This chart is an important indication of the risk to encounter
a fatality or serious accident on the rig, and the possibility of environmental damage
caused by the rig.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 5
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010357
r
Chart 5: Detailed Major Ratina
This chart shows the percentage of major non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program. It is an important indication of the risk to encounter major
equipment damage and/or operational downtime of the rig.
Chart 6: Detailed Minor Rating
This chart shows the percentage of minor non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program. It is an important indication of the risk of lost-time incidents
and it visualizes the overall safety and maintenance standards on the rig.
Note: Charts 4, 5 and 6 indicate the probability for the rig to encounter accidents and
operational downtime measured against the industry average. These charts are very
important indicators to establish whether or not the rig is capable of operating in a safe
and reliable manner.
Validity of the MER
The MER is valid for the duration of one year after completion of the initial inspection.
If a recheck is conducted and completed within four months after the completion of the
initial inspection, only the non-satisfactory and non-inspected items wil l be checked
again. The MER is then valid for all equipment items which were inspected and found
satisfactory during the initial inspection as well as during the recheck.
Revalidation of the MER must be completed within a year after completion of the initial
inspection. An extension is possible for a maximum of three months after the expiry
date so as to establish the revalidation of the MER, provided that:
• the inspection is completed within this three-month period,
• the inspection is requested prior to the initial expiry date.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 6
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010358
r
3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 Executive Summary
We attended the self-propelled semi-submersible drilling rig DEEPWATER HORIZON to
conduct a survey based on the BHP requirements. The rig was drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico for BP and operating in a water depth of 9,570 ft with a completed drilling depth
of 28,639 ft. At the time of the survey, the BOP was being function tested, mud was
circulated through the hole and coring was in progress.
The purpose of the survey was to evaluate the condition of safety critical equipment and
review the management systems. The condition of safety critical equipment was
observed through visual inspections, function testing and the PMS system as per the
available opportunities.
The management system was implemented through controlled and uncontrolled
documents. There were well documented policies for HSE management, maintenance
management and inventory and procurement management. During our survey we
reviewed and conducted spot checks on these systems.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 7
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010359
3.2 Conclusion
At the request of BHP we conducted a survey of safety critical equipment and
management system review on the DEEPWATER HORIZON. The rig had been on
contract for BP from the time it left the shipyard in 2000.
The unit was an ABS classified, DPS 3 vessel operating in the Gulf of Mexico and
capable of operating in a water depth of 10,000 ft, with the abilit y of drilling up to 30,000
ft hole depth.
The rig was equipped with a Dreco 242ft tall 2,000 kips derrick. The drawworks was an
AHD 1000 unit with 2" drill line. The drawworks performed the function of heave
compensation and the top drive was a Varco TDSBS. There were four Continental
Emsco FC 2200 mud pumps and the power plant consisted of six Wartsila engines with
a total capacity of 43 MW.
The Class Il l Kongsberg-Simrad system was installed in compliance with ABS DPS-3
requirements. The system consisted of a triple redundant dynamic positioning system
and accepted input from the Hipap Acoustic Positioning System with four DGPS based
on correction signal inputs from different sources, three gyrocompass, three vertical
reference units and three wind sensors as well as the operator input power
management system that interfaced with the integrated alarm and control system.
The maintenance management system was based on company wide installed
Enterprise Maintenance Planning and Control (EMPAC) software. This software
integrated inventory management and procurement actions into the system.
During the survey we conducted spot checks and limited function t esting of the
equipment along with random auditing of the maintenance management system. The
major observations were:
• Malfunctioning of the fire detection system
Implementation of permit-t o-work system
• Lack in utilizing EMPAC for trend analysis
We would like to thank the rig management for their extended cooperation in allowing
access to the documentation systems that made it possible to conduct a meaningful
survey within the scope. It i s encouraging to note that the rig management is looking
f orward t o a full condition survey.
Judging from the teamwork and attitude in maintain the rig we were confident that the
crew will perform the job for BHP in the safest possible manner.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 8
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010360
Conducted by: Kamesh Chittella and Mike Gautier
MODUSPEC USA
15 March 2005
20501 Katy Freeway, Suite 215
Katy, Texas
USA
Tel. No.
Fax No.
E-mail
Website
: 281-398-3998
: 281-398-8694
: usa@moduspec.com
: www.moduspec.com
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon
CONFIDENTIAL
9
MODUSI 01 2 010361
4.0 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations in this report are defined as follows:
Priority
Class ifi cation
SHE-Critical
Major
Minor
5.0
5.8.1
Minor:
1.
2.
3.
6.0
6. 1.1
Critical:
1.
Minor:
2.
Definition Potential Consequences
I
Time table for Corrective
Action
Condition or deficiency vital Loss of life I assets I Before commencing
to safety, health or the significant harm to the operations, unless
environment environment mitigating action has been
taken
Condition or deficiency that Serious injury, significant
I Before spud or running
could impair drilling damage, some BOPs
operations or efficiency environmental damage
Condition or deficiency that Lost time One month, or as otherwise
would improve drilling agreed
operations I efficiency but
not essential to immediate
riQ operations
Drilling Equipment
Derrick:
Repair the defective lights especially at the upper finger board level.
Replace the defective air pressure gauge at the intermediate finger board
level.
Remove the dope and grease containers from the finger board control
box. (Completed)
Mud System
Mud Pumps:
Provide suitable anchors on the relief valve discharge lines to prevent a
hazardous condition due to sudden discharge or piping movement. (API
RP 54 section 9.13.2).
Ensure that all the gauges are able to be read during regular PMS tasks.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 10
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010362
7.0
7.3.1
Minor:
7.5.1
Minor:
8.0
8.1 .1
Major:
9.0
1.
2.
1.
2.
1.
2.
9.2.1
Critical:
1.
Minor:
11.0
2.
3.
11. I. I
Critical:
I.
11.19. 1
Major:
1.
Well Control Equipment
BOP Handling Equipment:
Make available the wire rope inspection document from 2004.
Install the wire rope on auxiliary hooks.
BOP Control System:
Troubleshoot and repair the problem of regulator adjustment from remote
control panel located on the bridge.
Troubleshoot and rectify the pod mismatch condition on the remote control
panel.
Marine Systems
Ballast System:
Review the emergency stop sequence for all ballast pump motors.
Rectified during the survey.
Cross check manual ballast tank soundings with the computer
driven calculations more frequently.
Power Pl ant
Cranes and Power Systems:
Make available the wire rope report for the year 2004 and perform the
recommendations.
Perform the necessary repairs on the camera of the starboard crane.
Replace or repair the defective boom light on the port crane.
Safety Equipment
Safety:
Repair the fire detection system. Perform the full system PM earlier than
the scheduled May 2005 annual PM.
Gas Bottles:
Install overhead protection for the nitrogen bottles stored on the main deck
forward center line.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon I 1
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010363
11.20.1
Minor:
1.
2.
Work Permits:
Have one central permit desk for accurate monitoring and tracking of work
permits.
Ensure that all the permits are closed after the completion of the job.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 12
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010364
r
5.0 DRILLING EQUIPMENT
5.1 Drawworks
The rig was equipped with a Hitec AHD (Anti-Heave Drawworks) 1000 unit. The rated
continuous horsepower was 6,900 hp with 2" drill line. The functioning of the unit was
observed during tripping operations and observed to be satisfactory. The anti-collision
system could not be function tested due to ongoing operations.
5.1 A view of the drawworks brake.
5.2 Rotary Table
The rig was equipped with a Varco 60-Y2", 1,000 ton capacity rotary support table with
an anti-slip mat in place around the rotary. The unit was visually inspected and no
abnormalities were noted.
5.3 Top Drive System
The rig was equipped with a Varco TDS 8S top drive with a swing-out parking system.
The functioning of the unit was observed during the tripping operation. The last major
third party inspection was performed in January 2005 during which time the load collars
were inspected. The function of I BOP was observed during BOP pressure test and
observed to be satisfactory. The purge loss alarm was functioning and the link tilt
cleared the monkey board. The function test of the torque could not be performed due
to ongoing operations.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 13
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010365
5.3 Top drive.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon
14
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSI 01 2 010366
5.4 Crown Block/Travelling Block
The rig was equipped with a Dreco 1, 000 ton crown block. The unit was visually
inspected for wear and damage and observed to be in satisfactory condition. The
bumper blocks were in good condition and the heavy duty steel sheet covering the
bumper blocks was in place. The sheaves were regularly greased as part of PMS
tasks. The last third party inspection was performed in January 2005 and relevant
documents were available.
The travelling block was a Shaffer 1,000 ton capacity. The unit was visually inspected
and no deficiencies were observed.
5.5 Hook
A 1,000 ton Varco hook adaptor was used and regular maintenance checks were
performed as part of PMS.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 15
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010367
5.6 Drilling Instrumentation
The drilling instrumentation was provided by SDI. Various parameters were observed
satisfactorily during operations. The general condition of the deadline anchor was
satisfactory however the hook load was sensed at the crown block. The sensors were
visually inspected and observed to be in good condition.
5. 7 Drill String Motion Compensator
The drill string motion compensator system was part of the drawworks system. When
the driller selected the anti-heave mode on the dri ller' s joy stick, the drawworks would
either pay out or haul in the dril l wire based on the heave motion. This function was
observed in the monitor to be working satisfactorily.
5.8 Derrick
The rig was equipped with a Dreco 2,000 kips, 242ft tall derrick. The derrick was
visually inspected up to the crown assembly and the condition of the racking fingers was
satisfactory. The derrick was equipped with a remotely operated pipe racking system.
The functioning of the pipe racking system was smooth and the snatch blocks were
properly located and safety slings for lighting fixtures were in place. The derrick was
being inspected for any potential dropped objects at regular intervals as part of the
DROPS program. The areas at various heights were visually inspected and it was
observed that at some locations the lights were not operational.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 16
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010368
5.8. 1
Minor:
1.
2.
3.
,
I
~
Derrick Recommendations:
Repair the defective lights especially at the upper finger board level.
Replace the def ective air pressure gauge at the intermediate finger board
level.
Remove the dope and grease containers from the finger board control
box. (Completed)
Report of SuNey - SS Deepwater Horizon 17
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010369
5.9 Casino Stabbing Board
A pipe racking system was used in place of a casing stabbing board.
5. 10 Tugaers and Sheaves
The drill floor was fitted with two utility winches. These were visually inspected and
were load tested as part of the annual third party inspection in January 2005 and the
reports were available. The general condition of these units was satisfactory. The
foundation pedestal and bolts were in good condition and the sheaves were fitted with
safety slings below the crown platform.
5.11 Man-Riding Winches
The drill floor was equipped with tvvo man riding winches. These were load tested and
the related documentation was observed to be satisfactory. The control valve returned
to the neutral position on release and was provided with auto and manual brake units.
5.12 Tongs
A visual inspection tongs confirmed them to be in order.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 18
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010370
6.0 MUD SYSTEM
6.1 Mud Pumps
There were four Continental Emsco FC-2200 mud pumps available with an operating
pressure of 7,500 psi. Pumps Nos. 1 and 4 were equipped with rupture disc-type
pressure relief valves whereas pumps Nos. 2 and 3 contained pep-off type relief valves.
The discharge of the relief valves was not anchored to prevent movement due to
sudden discharge of fluids. As per API RP 54 section 9.13.2 the relief valve discharge
lines should be anchored to prevent a hazardous condition due to sudden discharge or
piping movement.
Save-ails were placed around the mud pumps to contain any spills however the glasses
on the lube oil pressure and liner wash down pressure gauges were not clean and
therefore not able to be read.
6.1.1
Critical:
1.
Minor:
2.
Mud Pumps Recommendations:
Provide suitable anchors on the relief valve discharge lines to prevent a
hazardous condition due to sudden discharge or piping movement. (API
RP 54 section 9.13.2).
Ensure that all the gauges are able to be read during regular PMS tasks.
6.1.1.2 Unreadable pressure gauge.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 19
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010371
6.2 Mud-Mixing System
Low-pressure mud system:
Mud pits
The mud hoppers were observed to be clean and were in good condition. The safety
locker was equipped with aprons, rubber gloves and other required equipment and the
eye wash station was in good condition. The shower was function tested successfully,
the pallets were stacked neatly and harmful chemicals were stored separately.
6.3 Trip Tank System
Two trip tanks, each with 50 barrel capacity, were located in the substructure. The trip
tank pumps were visually inspected and observed to be i n order. The gauging system
in the trip tank was monitored by data logging. Each of the tanks was provided with two
floats for different types of sensors.
6.4 Base Oil Svstem
The OBM loading hose was visually inspected and no abnormalities were noted. The
shut-off valve at the manifold was of a half tum type. There were separate hoses
provided for loading oil based mud and base oil. Provisions were available to back load
oil based mud to the boat.
6.5 Standpipe Manifold
The standpipes were sufficiently fastened to the derrick, the safety cables were in place
and all of the chiksans were anchored with a safety sling. The company had a policy of
using only 1502 chiksans throughout their fleet of rigs. A connection of rigid pipe was in
place connecting the choke manifold and standpipe manifold which was provided with
two valve isolation.
6.6 Cement Manifold
The cement manifold consisted of chiksans and two valve isolation was provided
between the choke and cement manifolds.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 20
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010372
6.7 Cementing Unit
The cementing unit was visually inspected and observed to be clean and tidy. The
pumps, which included pop-off valves, were function tested as part of the PMS tasks
once every three months. The instrumentation was calibrated every three months and
related documents were available. Sufficient communication facilities were in place
between the cementing room and drill floor and the weight indicator system was in good
condition. The ventilation was adequate and an eye wash station was available in the
cementing unit.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 21
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010373
7.0 WELL CONTROL EQUIPMENT
7.1 Ram- and Annular-Type BOPs
During the survey we witnessed the BOP function test and the results were reviewed
and observed to be satisfactory. The gate valves which included hand wheels and the
kill and choke lines were flushed with drilling fluid.
The last accumulator test was performed on 25 January 2005. The pressure remaining
was 3,000 psi and time was taken for accumulators to perform all tests. We witnessed
the BOP pressure testing and the results were reviewed and observed to be
satisfactory. The choke and kill lines were equipped with safety clamps and the PMS
tasks were reviewed. The stack was equipped with Cameron 28" super shear ram.
7.2 Choke Remote-Control Panel
The remote choke control panel was visually inspected and no abnormalities were
noticed. The unit included an air operated back up system.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 22
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 01037 4
7.2 Choke remote control pane.
7.3 BOP-Handling Equipment
The BOP crane was visually inspected. As per company policy, the wire ropes were
inspected by a third party company for wear and tear to determi ne the necessity for
replacement. The reports for 2003 were reviewed. The staff informed us that the
annual inspection for the wire ropes was performed for 2004 however the relevant
certification was not available on board. The controls were clearly marked and the wire
rope f or auxiliary was not in place.
7.3.1
Minor:
1.
2.
BOP Handling Equipment Recommendations:
Make available the wire rope inspection document from 2004.
Install the wire rope on auxiliary hooks.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 23
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010375
7.4 Surface BOP Control Unit
The BOP control unit was checked at regular intervals. The last pre-charge in the
bottles was inspected in 2004. The pressure limits were function checked satisfactori ly
at the remote panel located on the bridge. The PUMP ON indication operated
satisfactorily. The cut-in and cut-out pressure for the triplex pumps was inspected and
the functioning of the gauges was satisfactory. There was a backup nitrogen system
available for the actuators. The pump up time from pre-charge was last tested on 25
January 2005 and the time recorded was 2 minutes 25 seconds.
7.5 BOP Control System
The BOP function test was conducted during the survey. The system was equipped
with a battery backup system and the general condition was observed to be satisfactory.
The function lights at the remote panels were working nonmally and the functioning of
the gauges was satisfactory however, the regulator pressure could not be adjusted from
the remote control panel and a pod mismatch condition was observed during the
function test of the BOP.
7.5.1
Minor:
1.
2.
BOP Control System Recommendations:
Troubleshoot and repair the problem of regulator adjustment from remote
control panel located on the bridge.
Troubleshoot and rectify the pod mismatch condition on the remote control
panel.
Report of Survey- SS Deep-.vater Horizon 24
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010376
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 25
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010377
8.0 MARINE SYSTEMS
8.1 Ballast System
Ballast pump No. 4 was operated from the control room Simrad Kongsberg system and
all of the parameters were in good operating condition. We observed the operation of
ballast pump No. 3 locally at the pump motor and the emergency stop switch was
operated. The emergency stop tripped the MCC breaker which had to be reset at the
switchboard before restart. This e-stop was tested again four hours later and worked
properly. The electrician was scheduled to check out this malfunction.
All of the tank gauges were in good or new condition and remote controls and position
indicators for the pumps and valves were tested monthly. Bilge and flood alarms were
last tested 24 November 2004 and were scheduled for testing every 180 days.
Manual soundings and stability calculations were cross checked with the computer
driven calculations every 180 days but were recommended to be checked more
frequently. A leak detection system was fitted to the cross-tubes and diagonals
whereas manual sounding was scheduled at 180 day intervals.
The control room had the capability of controlling the watertight doors only to close the
doors individually, by quadrant or rig wide. This operation was tested on a monthly
basis. Ballast valve operation was timed on a monthly interval as part of the planned
maintenance program. It was observed that local position indication was not easily
determined due to the plastic covers being faded and discolored due to age.
Recording of deck load changes were documented in the control room on a daily basis
with input from the crane operators, mud engineer and driller. Load-outs were also
entered. A weekly deck survey was also performed by the control room operations
personnel.
8.1.1
Major:
1.
2.
Ballast System Recommendations:
Review the emergency stop sequence for all ballast pump motors.
Rectified during the survey.
Cross check manual ballast tank soundings with the computer
driven calculations more frequently.
Report of Survey - SS Deep'Nater Horizon 26
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010378
8.1 Ballast pump No. 3.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 27
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010379
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8.1 Bilge pump gauges.
8.2 General Operations
During the survey a fire drill was conducted on 13 March 2005. The Marine Operations
Manual was complete and up to date reflecting any changes made to the rig since being
put into service. The last dead-weight survey was conducted 4 January 2001. We
reviewed the record kept of all modifications since the last dead-weight survey that
would affect lightship displacement.
Control room operators were suitably experienced with a rig of this class and were last
trained in a USCG Approved 38-1/2 hour Stability and Ballast Control (Stability I)
session on 25 February 2005 at the Transocean P1 0 Training Center that satisfied the
training requirements of 46 CFR 10.470; 10.472 & 10.474.
Emergency drills that were scheduled on a yearly basis were conducted as follows:
• Fire- Weekly
Collision - Quarterly
• Punch Through -Quarterly
• Well Kick - Weekly
Blow Out- Weekly
Flooding in lower hull- Quarterly
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon
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MODUSI 01 2 010380
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 29
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010381
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9.0 POWER PLANT
9.1 Diesel Engine
A visual inspection of the engines confirmed them to be clean and well maintained. The
engines were operating on light fuel oil as requested by the client. The bilges were
clear of oil and debris with the exception of one oily rag that was found in the bilge of
engine No. 2. Floor plating was in place and secure and warning signs for the use of
hearing protection and the remote operation of machinery were in place.
Forced ventilation could be shut down from a remote panel and fuel tank quick closing
valves were in place.
The main engines were scheduled for major PM at 24,000 hours. None of the engines
were noted to have reached this point. It was noted that the main engines were classed
as low critical equipment in the EMPAC system by the corporate office.
Engine Running Hours Last Overhaul Next Overhaul
No.1 14,209 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
No. 2 19,480 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
No.3 13,614 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
No.4 13,551 hrs Not AQplicable 24,000 hrs
No. 5 15,856 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
No. 6 15,240 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
Stand-By 124 hrs Not Applicable 24,000 hrs
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 30
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010382
0
I

....
.. .• •
'A

e ...
9.1 Engine No. 2 panel.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon
CONFIDENTIAL
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MODUSI 01 2 010383
9.2 Cranes and Power System
There were two 1 00 ton, 150ft boom cranes in use located on the port and starboard
sides of the rig with a whip line capacity of 15 tons. The limits such as boom, whip line,
and main line were function tested satisfactorily. The engine emergency stops were
tested without any abnormalities. There was an annual wire rope inspection (for loss of
strength) program performed by a third party company. This report formed the basis for
wire rope replacement rather than by actual service life. Based on this report the
following wire ropes were replaced.
PORT CRANE
Wire rope location I Date of Change
Whip line 12001
Main line I 2001
Boom line I August 2002
STARBOARD CRANE
Wire rope location I Date of Change
Whip line I February 2005
Main line 12002
Boom line I August 2004
These replacements were performed based on the report from 2003. Though we were
informed that an inspection was performed in 2004, the relevant documentation was not
available. During the survey it was observed that the camera system on the starboard
crane was not functioning and one of the boom lights was not functioning on the port
crane.
9.2.1
Critical:
1.
Minor:
2.
3.
Cranes and Power Systems Recommendations:
Make available the wire rope report for the year 2004 and perform the
recommendations.
Perform the necessary repairs on the camera of the starboard crane.
Replace or repai r the defective boom light on the port crane.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 32
CONFIDENTIAL MODUS! 01 2 010384
10.0 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
10.1 Elmagco Brake
Not applicable.
10.2 General Items
Exit signs were the reflective type and were all in good condition. Battery boxes and
lockers were well ventilated and marked with the appropriate warnings and had available
PPE stored locally. The Safety Management System was in place and all department
heads had available the current document revision dated 8 September 2003.
The last audit was conducted 24 January 2005 and the reported non-conformance items
were being corrected which was an ongoing process.
The storeroom and warehouse was observed to be clean and orderly. The material
tracking system was computerized (EMPAC). All work areas, corridors, stairways,
ladders and walkways were properly illuminated. Battery backup emergency lighting was
fitted to the escape routes.
10.3 Hazardous-Zone El ectrical Equipment
Only explosion proof equipment was used in the hazardous areas and electric motors
were fitted and adequately secured with external grounds. All electrical hand tools and
extension cords were regularly inspected and documented by the electrical department.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 33
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010385
11.0 SAFETY EQUIPMENT
11 .1 Safety
The fire detection system was tested by using smoke to activate a smoke detector in the
battery locker located port forward of the main deck. This smoke detector did not
respond to the smoke. We then moved to the adjacent Kongsberg processor room to
activate the smoke detector and again there was no response. We had the same result
in the next Kongsberg processor room.
The Preventative Maintenance System (EMPAC) documented the fire detection system
monthly check dated 23 February 2005 and the annual full system PMS was dated 21
May 2004.
11 .1.1
Critical:
1.
11 .2
Safetv Recommendations:
Repair the fire detection system. Perform the full system PM earlier than
the scheduled May 2005 annual PM.
C02/Halon System for Fire Control
Third party inspection of the C02 fire control system was performed within the last
twelve months and the documentation was observed. A visual inspection of the system
was also conducted and observed to be in order.
11 .3 Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems
Hoses for the system were inspected for dryness, proper storage, availability of
wrenches, and any damage to the threaded ends. There were no defects observed and
all of the equipment was in good condition. Operation of one of the hoses was
performed satisfactorily.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 34
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010386
------
11.4 Portable Extinguishers and Fire-Fighting Equipment
The fireman's outfits were stored in suitable containers however there were no
instructions posted inside of the container. Weekly exercises were performed where
putting on the suits was part of the exercise. The containers were located in pairs and
readily accessible from the heli-deck with a posted list of the contents which was
checked weekly and the observations were documented.
A third party inspection of the portable extinguishers and fire fighting equipment was
performed annually. The last inspection was 18 July 2004 and the documentation was
observed. A visual inspection of the system was also performed and was observed to
be in good condition.
11 .5 Lifeboat
A visual check of the lifeboats confirmed the general condition to be good. Maintenance
was covered by the EMPAC PM System and included a monthly inspection of the
provisions and loose equipment. A weekly inspection included running the engine,
operating the davit winch and limit switches and a structural inspection.
The falls were only scheduled for a complete replacement every four years and
replacement was due 29 March 2005.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 35
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010387
A launching procedure and a regularly updated comprehensive muster list were clearly
posted adjacent to the life boats in the center of the embarkation area which was free of
obstructions.
11 .6 Life-Raft and Ring Buoy
Servicing of the life rafts was in progress and was performed annually. The rafts were
each fitted with a hydrostatic release unit. Life rings situated around the deck perimeter
were in acceptable condition and the number of life rings fitted with smoke and lights
corresponded with the emergency equipment plan.
11.7 Escape Routes
Luminous arrows and battery operated emergency lighting was fitted along the escape
routes. Hatches, water tight doors and seals were in good condition. The escape
routes were also free of obstructions.
11.8 H2S and Hvdrocarbon Detection
The H2S and combustible detection system was tested 2 February 2005.
11.9 Helicopter Landing Area Equipment
The helicopter rescue box was readily availably and fully equipped with an inventory list
posted inside the box door. There was no heli-deck netting however the deck was non-
skid and the perimeter safety netting was in place.
The floodlights and perimeter lighting were in operation and were of the proper color. A
wind sock fitted near the heli-deck was in good condition.
11.10 Drilling Facilities Safety
Communications from the driller's house to the monkey board, cement room, pump
room, mud logging unit, and BOP control unit were in good working condition. All safety
lockers located at the mixing platform, battery locker, caustic mix tank and chemical
store were supplied with the appropriate equipment and the contents were recorded on
the bridge.
Regular safety drills were conducted with all members of the crew involved. The results
of these drills were observed to be well documented. Third party units were fitted with
general and fi re alarms.
Report of Survey- SS Deep-.vater Horizon 36
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010388
11.11 Dangerous Substances
Dangerous substances such as radioactive sources or explosives and flammable
substances were stored at approved identified locations as far from the accommodation
as possible on the starboard aft main deck.
11.12 Dangerous Machinery
All moving parts on machinery were protected with fixed guards to prevent accidental
contact.
11.13 Lifting and Handling
The personnel basket was observed to be in satisfactory condition. A system was in
place and used to prevent uncertified lifting equipment from being used. Any damaged
lifting equipment was recorded and disposed of immediately.
11 .14 Pollution Control
There were two oily water separators operational and in use with one each located on
the port and starboard sides. It was possible to pump the waste oil into portable
shipment tanks and provisions were made for the use of oil based mud t o ensure that
spillage to the water was minimized. There was a dedicated station on the starboard
side for drains that could be contaminated with oil base mud, drill f loor drains and shale
shaker room drains which ran directly to it. This station was tested annually.
11. 15 Housekeeping
There were no damaged, unsafe, unpainted, or obsolete pieces of equipment,
machinery or f ixtures lying around or any air, gas, oil, water or coolant leaks noted.
There were no cluttered aisles, with boxes, waste boxes, storage racks, tote pans or
skids lying around.
There were no dirty floors and walls; no dirt and oil on work benches, on f loor, in aisles,
on machines, racks, desks and there were no cigarette butts, papers, bottles on floors,
work benches and aisles and no hazards such as, nails, rough jagged corners, broken
glass or hanging wires observed.
The housekeeping was wel l maintained throughout the rig.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 37
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010389
11.16 Walkways and Railings
Walkways and railings were in place and in good condition with kick plates installed
where required. The crane boom and derrick lighting was working and deck plate and
grating was in place and properly secured. No areas were observed to be overloaded.
11 .17 Decks and Stairways
Deck surfaces had non-skid walkways and walkways above 2 meters had toe-boards
and three handrails to at least I meter above the walkway. All ladders were equipped
with fall protection devices.
11.18 General Safety Items
Loading hoses were visually inspected and were in good condition. Inspection of the
hoses was scheduled at 90 day inteNals in the PM system.
High pressure gauges were securely fastened and identified and eye guards were
installed on grinding wheels in the workshops and the grinding equipment was in good
condition with guards in place and no badly worn wheels obseNed.
11.19 Gas Bottl es
Oxygen and acetylene bottles were fitted with flash-back protection valves, properly
store in a designated area port aft of the main deck and chained separately. Nitrogen
bottles stored on the main deck forward center line were not properly protected from
overhead lifts of tote tanks stored adjacent to the bottles.
11.19.1
Major:
1.
11.20
Gas Bottles Recommendations:
Install overhead protection for the nitrogen bottles stored on the main deck
forward center line.
Work Permits
A properly implemented permit-to-work procedure was in place. The system was being
adhered to by rig personnel as well as third party contractors however during the suNey
some discrepancies were noted.
The permits were issued from two locations namely a central permit desk and the
bridge. The details of permits issued were recorded in separate log books at these
locations. As a result the system was being operated from two locations and the
tracking of permits was not accurate and some of the permits were not closed even long
after the job had been completed.
Report of Survey - SS Deepwater Horizon 38
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010390
- ~ - - - -
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Though the validity of the permit was for 24 hours as per the policy, it was stated during
the induction program that they were valid for 12 hours. Though each permit had four
copies, there were no distribution details printed on the bottom of the permit. The lock-
ouUtag-out system was reviewed and observed to be in order and all the locked stations
were logged in a single log book.
11.20.1
Minor:
1.
2.
3.
Work Permits Recommendations:
Have one central permit desk for accurate monitoring and tracking of work
permits.
Ensure that all the permits are closed after the completion of the job.
Consider printing the distribution details on each copy of the permit.
Report of Survey- SS Deepwater Horizon 39
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSI 01 2 010391

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