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Group 5 Cases: Mandatory and Directory Statutes Case: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc., vs.

Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997 Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision. For unknown reasons, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. In July, 1989, when Soliven, the developer and president of LGVHAI inquired about the status of the corporation, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed the former that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved because, among other reasons, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code.Issue: May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution? Held: No.The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 suggest that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by petitioner. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence of Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.

Case: Reyes vs CA G.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999 Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax ordinances on the following: 1) Ord. No. 87 - imposing municipal tax on business of printing and publication; 2) Ord. No. 91 - transfer tax on sale, donation, barter, or any other mode of transferring ownership or title of real property; 3) Ord. No. 95 - social housing tax; 4) Ord. No. 100 - new rates of business taxes; 5) Ord. No. 101 - levying an annual “Ad Valorem” tax on real property. These ordinances in question took effect in the months of September and October 1992. However, it was only on May 21, 1993 that petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law. Respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time citing Section 187, R.A. No. 7160. Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, providesSec. 187 — Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code:That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:x x x Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. Issue: WON Sec. 187 of RA 7160 on process of appeal is mandatory and failures to appeal within prescribe period renders the dismissal of the case. Held: Yes. Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof.In case the Secretary decides the appeals, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court.But if the Secretary does not act

are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. the Court. was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. 5. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule. . De Mesa. is not an absolute rule in statutory construction.R. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision.thereon. Devera. terrorism and other irregularities in certain precincts. Summons was served on and received by petitioners directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of 10 days. Proceeding ex parte. This.Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. Accordingly. By their very nature. upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. while the case is pending Mayor De Mesa was assassinated. rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done. respondent Guevara against petitioners Gachon and Guevara before the MTCC. the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory. As a general principle. For this reason.”It is clear that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. June 20. 6. or on motion of the plaintiff. Answer. Aggrieved. if they so desired.R. shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: . the court a quo required the protestee's widow and children to appear within fifteen days from notice in order to be substituted for said protestee. however. The MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. even motu proprio. Case: Gachon vs. motu proprio. which allows the trial court to render judgment. Sec. petitioners failed to do so because he was abroad. However. Case: De Mesa vs Mencias G. The MTCC issued a decision resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents. comply. Indeed." For this reason. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons. L-24583 October 29. 1964. filed an election protest against De Mesa charging him of the perpetration of frauds. or certain proceedings taken. Petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. . 116695. However. . Rizal in the 1963 elections. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided. they filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before RTC.These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff . The Rule on Summary Procedure. 1997 Facts: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by. No. however. It likewise denied all other pleadings and MR. RTC likewise dismiss petition Issue: Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied STRICTLY or LIBERALLY. the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. in particular. after the lapse of 60 days. No. on June 11. mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Meanwhile. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Effect of failure to answer. Held: Applied strictly. The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be “non-extendible. Jr. G. on the other hand filed a counter-protest and sought to shift responsibility for irregularities to the protestant and his followers. . these rules are regarded as mandatory. They did not. Protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. 1966 Facts: Francisco De Mesa and Maximino Argana were opponents for the mayoralty of Muntinlupa. the defeated candidate Argana. its nature. the protestant Argana . De Mesa won the election and thereafter proclaimed and assumed office. Sec. object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other.

" SEC. or within such time as may be granted. but instead — in derogation of the precepts of the Rule in question and in the total absence of a legal representative of the deceased protestee. Held: Yes. they are in no wise absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. in its decision of August 10. the trial court failed to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after the latter's widow and children had failed to comply with the court order requiring their appearance to be substituted in lieu of their predecessor. The movants elevated the case to CA on a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 17.) The trial court. 1964 adjudged the protestant Maximino Argana as the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa. . its nature. (Rule 3. without notice to the protestee and/or his legal representative — as indeed none had thus far been named — the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. the court shall order. With the death of De Mesa. It is no argument against this conclusion to contend that the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased litigant is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the mandatory word "shall. proceedings taken by a court in the absence of a duly appointed legal representative of the deceased protestee must be stricken down as null and void. 1964 decision upon the ground that. Nevertheless. Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court connotes a directory or mandatory compliance. said rules. But when they failed to comply at the instance of the protestant. however. upon proper notice. required the widow and children of the deceased protestee to appear and be substituted for and on his behalf and to protect his interest in the case. the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased. the court may order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court. precisely by express mandate of Rule 134 of the Rules of Court. And we declare that unless and until the procedure therein detailed is strictly adhered to. contingency not expressly provided for by the Revised Election Code was ushered in. Considering that. The death of the protestee De Mesa did not abate the proceedings in the election protest filed against him.— After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished. incidentally. within a period of thirty (30) days.reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioners on revision of ballots. its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. . pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court applies to election contests to the same extent and with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions. proceeded with the case ex parte. Ramon Antilon Jr. in the case at bar. and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased." While the ordinary acceptations of these terms may indeed be resorted to as guides in the ascertainment of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions. declared said widow and children nonsuited. it was legally improper for the trial court to have proceeded ex parte with the election case The trial court denied the movants' petition for leave to represent the deceased protestee. and effectively blocked all attempts at intervention and/or substitution in behalf of the deceased protestee. It is our considered view that Section 17. . If the legal representative fails to appear within said time. it will be recalled in its order of May 6. 1964. and order stricken from the record their motion for reconsideration and new trial and their cautionary notice of appeal. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision. for failure to order the protestant to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased protestee after his widow and children had failed to appear. . it may be stated as a rule that an election contest survives and must be prosecuted to final judgment despite the death of the protestee. Issue: WON Sec 17. the trial court. De Mesa’s widow and local chapter of the LP which deceased was member filed a petition which include among others for the reconsideration of the August 10. may however be applied "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. was motu proprio named and then served as commissioner for the deceased protestee. Death of party. And so. in the 1963 elections. With the constitution of the committee on revision of ballots in which. though not generally applicable to election cases.

The Supreme Court had at various times. Such appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of court to which the appeal has been taken. which read as follows: “SEC. on the ground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial court over the case for failure to decide the same within the period of ninety [90] days from submission thereof. Case: Querubin vs. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his case on August 4. or where it invests a public body. relates merely to matters of procedure. but only directory. the accused in said case. And there can be no doubt that said provision. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury to the general public than would its strict application. 540-543). 2581 December 2. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. is mandatory in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case. On the date set for promulgation of the decision. 1948. G. No. Appeal from the decision in election contests. the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case. The lapse of the period of time provided for said section should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests. and for release from detention of petitioner. pp. The provision in question indicates that it falls within the exception rather than the general rule. is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice. 1948. CA G. regardless of cause or reason. Held: NO. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction.R. from promulgating his decision. allowed judges of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases submitted to them. because of the expiration of the three-month period provided for in section 178 of the Revised Election code. On August 23. entitled People of the Philippines versus Bernardino Marcelino. Felipe Mamuri. the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty" (Black. 1983 Facts: A petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent Judge Fernando Cruz.178. Interpretation of Laws. Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction in deciding the election case although the required period to resolve it has expired Held: YES. being a constitutional directive. Jr. The constitutional provision requiring that trial judges shall decide a case within 90 days from submission is merely a procedural rule and is not mandatory. the very instrument to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the allotted term. would make the courts. Cruz. 1948. 1948 Facts: Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of the appeal in the election case of Fidel Querubin vs. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. No. through which conflicts are resolved.the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction. municipality or public officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22. consequently. . – x x x. have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said section. "Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty. Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered beyond the period prescribed in the Constitution is null and void. Isabel. upon proper application and for meritorious reason. concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan. To dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts. counsel for accused moved for postponement. Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 42428 March 18. 1975.R. raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Case: Marcelino vs.” The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22. Jr. having incorporated for reasons of expediency. and that.