New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century Author(s): Barry Buzan Source: International Affairs (Royal

Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 431-451 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2621945 Accessed: 17/10/2010 14:46
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of New patterns globalsecurity in thetwenty-frst century

BARRY BUZAN

has writes Buzan. He analyses The twenty-first postbegun, Barry century already and the of Cold War,post-East-West powerrelations traces consequences changed in ') relationships between greatpowersof theNorth(or 'centre forstates the the is he and the South (or 'periphery').The centre now more dominant, argues, sincedecolonization more subordinate it thanat any time to began.In periphery has and thatsense,Western capitalism triumphed bothcommunism Third over he are Worldideology. of Amongthepossibilities outlines thedevelopment a as civilizational 'cold war' between Northand Southin thecoming decades Islam to rankofopposition Western continued hegemony; is pushedto the front recedes thedistant into in militarization theSouth; and, as decolonization past, an as Societal assaulton post-colonial boundaries there, we saw in theGulfcrisis. he are on agendathat concerns, writes, likelyto assumea prominence thesecurity states the of European theyhave notheldsincebefore establishment themodern system. of This is a speculative article.It tries sketchthemain features thenew pattern to of of global security relationsthatis emergingafterthe great transformations it and the first I989-90 post-Cold War crisisin the Gulf. In particular, triesto of identifythe likely effects changes in what used to be called East-West relationson the security conditionsand agenda of what used to be called the Third World.' Because itsstarting-point thenatureand impact of changesin is the North, it does not pretendto offer comprehensive a pictureof the South.2 the fourkey Aftersetting out the analyticalframework, articlewill identify in relationships between the major powers in the North and suggest changes what theirconsequencesmightbe forthemajority states theSouth. It goes of in on to examine in more detail the impact of theseconsequenceson the security
2

I should like to thank Pierre Lemaitre, Morten Kelstrup, H. 0. Nazareth, Barbara Allen Roberson and Ole Wxever for comments on an earlier draftof this article. In order to look ahead in a systematicfashionand to avoid being swamped by detail, some theoretical frameworkis necessary.The study is based on a combination of a broadly structural realistapproach and a centre-periphery model of the internationalsystem.However, it does not demand prior knowledge of these frameworks.See Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The logicof anarchy:neorealism structural to realism(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, forthcomingin I992); Johan Galtung, 'A structuraltheory of imperialism',Journalof Peace Research8:2 (I97I), pp. 8i-i i8.
43I-45I

International Affairs 3 (I99I) 67,

societal and environmental. I989 markedthe end of the postwarperiod. In this sense.3 the In absence of a Second World now that the communist system has largely how can therebe a Third? What now unitescountries diverse as disintegrated. two world wars. nineteenthin having. International Affairs 66:4 (I990). military. without recourseto misleadinggeographicalimages. Specifically. Into the twenty-firstcentury One immediateproblem is thatso many of the termsin which a discussionof thiskind would normallybe cast have become obsolete. 432 . This approach capturesthe key elements of hierarchy that now shape international relations.4 and politicallyweaker economies. the Cold War that followed them and the process of decolonization that accompanied all three already begin to look like a selfcontained historicalperiod. necessitating and openness The ending of the Cold War has createda remarkable fluidity and qualityof international relations.The bottom line of security survival. 'The North-South JohnRavenhill. by The more robustand developed statesin the periphery forma semi-periphery. in International Organization See specialissueon 'Dependenceand dependency theglobalsystem'. The security lens used here is a broad one. what security consequencesthispatternof relationships among the major powers in the centrewill have for the statesin the periphery.What does 'West' mean when it includes or Japanand Australia. as South Korea. It seemslikely will also come to markit as theend of thetwentieth The thathistorians century. thebest excludesAustralia?AlthoughSouth is a better available set of termsto capturethe relationships the I99OS comes fromthe of centre-periphery approach elaborated in the dependency literatureof the 'Centre' here impliesa globally dominantcore of capitalist I960s and I970s. economic. 745. we are already in the twenty-first thatthenew century will be like the There are quite strongindications century.Romania and theSoviet Union. whose aspirationis membershipof the core. India. Malawi and Bahrain thattheyshould be referred as to a distinct 'world'? Geographicallabels are not much more helpful. theyrepresent changesof such magnitudethat it is appropriateto talk of the end of an era for the international systemas a whole. My question is.but it 3 4 balanceof power'. or 'South' when it includesKorea and termthanThird World. neither a major ideological divide nor a dominating power rivalry. 'North' when it includes Albania. financially statesoperatingwithina set of relationships largelyconstructed the centre. at least among the great powers. p. 'periphery'a set of industrially.Barry Buzan agenda of the South in termsof five sectorsof security-political. 32:I (I978). in the whole pattern Althoughthe events of I989 were centredin Europe. Securityis takento be about the and societiesto maintain of and theabilityof states pursuit freedomfromthreat their independent identityand their functionalintegrityagainst forces of is change which theysee as hostile. It is a commonplace to observe thatthe term'Third World' has lost nearlyall its content.

I99I). defensive capabilities states. systemsof and the ideologies thatgive themlegitimacy. see also Ken security studies the in post-Cold and security (London: Harper-Collins. is One major questionforthe statesin the periphery how theirown security agenda will be affected the new patternsof relationsamong the major by powers. Warera(HemelHempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.New patterns global security of also reasonablyincludesa substantial range of concernsabout the conditionsof existence.ed. Booth.In the opening yearsof the twenty-first thereare alreadystrongsignsthatthe security century agenda among the great powers will be much less dominated.Economic security government. issuesare pushingtheirway into the top economic.including the use of force) and becomes partof theeverydayuncertainties lifeis one of thedifficulties the of of concept. international security militarized and highly polarized ideological confrontationbetween the divided theindustrialized North into theFirst superpowers. as thearmed political/military confrontation between theUnited Statesand theSoviet Union is wound down. concerns access to the resources. BarryBuzan. Environmental security the local and the planetarybiosphereas the essentialsupportsystemon which all other human enterprises depend. by and issues. all are woven together a strongweb of linkages. anotherworldin which things are ordered(and disordered)in ways quite different fromthoseof theadvanced countries ? industrial ' For a fulldiscussion thesethemes.People. concernsthe two-levelinterplay thearmed offensive of and Militarysecurity of and states'perceptions each other'sintentions. societaland environmental ranksof the international security agenda. of Political securityconcerns the organizational stabilityof states. and international see states fear:an agendafor of I99I).The Second World has disintegrated.and political/military dominated the securityagenda.Quite where thisrangeof concernsceases to merittheurgencyof the ' security' label (which identifiesthreatsas significantenough to warrant emergencyaction and exceptional measures.5 was dominated by the highly During the Cold War. dangerof war was real. This political/military emphasis was transmittedinto the periphery the use of arms transfers both superpowersas by by a means of exploitingalready existinghostilities withinthe Third World as a vehicleforpursuingtheirown rivalry. perhaps not dominated at all.and religiousand national identityand custom within acceptable concernsthe maintenance of conditionsforevolution. Societal securityconcerns the abilityof societiesto reproducetheirtraditional patterns language. Each defines a focal point within the security but in problematique. New thinking strategy international about 433 . These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. culture. or will echoes of theterm'Third World' continueto demarcatea major divide.and a way of orderingpriorities. Will they share the shift away from political/military priorities towardsa more non-military security agenda. of association.This confrontation World (the West) and the Second World (the Soviet bloc). Because their concerns the rivalrywas intense.finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.

If one moves away from the strictrealist (and neo-realist)conception of economic and politicalstrength power as aggregatedcapabilities(i.arguablyleaving it as the last superpower. an West and generatedthe distinctive ideologies of Non-Alignment and tiersmondisme. which mightbe seen as the contemporary equivalentsof regional great or powers such as Italy.The precipitate economic and politicaldeclineof the Soviet Union has clearly removed it from this category. however. The centre-periphery approach captures much of what remainsconstant fromthepast and is a usefulframework within which to consider the impact of changes in the core on the securityof the The identity 'Third World' signified oppositionalstanceto the periphery. despite its still formidablemilitary strength. The decline of the United Stateshas been much less severe.e. the particularly consolidationof theEuropean Communityas an economic and politicalentity.Japan and the EC are strongcandidates. Pierre Lemaitre. Despite theirpolitical oddities. N. Ifone thinks how this term was used before I945.the aspirations of the periphery more collaborationist are than confrontational. Russia still qualifies. 1.7 and towards the disaggregatedview of power taken by those 6 7 See BarryBuzan. Austria-Hungary the Ottoman Empire before I9I4.6 seemstimeto revivetheterm'great power '. The United Statesis undoubtedlythe greatestof the great powers.But the rise of Europe. The riseof a multipolar in powerstructure place oftheCold War's bipolar one The term 'superpower' has dominatedthe language of power politicsfor so for many decades thatone is leftfloundering wofds to describethe new power that structure is emerging. all together). So do China and India. But in the centre-periphery perspective. ElzbietaTromerand Ole Wever. The term in superpower.At thisearlystagein thenew era one can withsome for confidencesuggestfour definingfeatures the new patternof great-power relations. largelyremoves(and in thecase of theSoviet Union inverts) the spheres of influencethat were one of the key elements in the claim to It superpowerstatus. I29-3I. TheEuropean order security recast: scenariosfor post-Cold the Warera(London:Pinter. Changes in the centre In order to understandthe securityconsequences of being in the periphery decade of the twenty-first during the first one first needs some sense century. military. Theory international of politics (Reading. of thechangesat thecentre. I979).: Addison-Wesley. pp.Barry Buzan There are of coursesome massivecontinuities theinternational in positionof theex-ThirdWorld (now periphery) thatare largelyunaffected the changes by in the top ranksof the greatpowers.MortenKelstrup. Mass. Kenneth Waltz.seemsno longer appropriate a multipolarworld with so many independentcentresof power and so few spheresof influence. I990).albeit stillmore obviously in the economic thanin the military and politicalspheres. is betterto be the It lowest member of the centrethan the highestof the periphery. 434 .

technologicalinnovation. Jones and Little.theywill project theirown conflicts peripherymuch less forcefully and systematically than under the zero-sum regimeof the Cold War. gave birthto fascistand communiststate challengersto the liberalcapitalist West.Local greatpowers such as India. A multi-centredcore offersmore competing points of contact for the At fromtwo superpowersto several great periphery. Because regionsare less constrained the impact of by theirconflicts the global scorecardof two rival superpowers.the second round of saw the Western and communist powers combining in I94I to eliminate fascism a seriousideological player. of section one. multipolarity suggestsa centrethatis both less rigid and less sharply divided within itself than under bipolarity. rivalries unleashed wars-both 'hot' and 'cold'.New patterns global security of who thinkmore in termsof interdependence. on local rivalries and antagonisms will probablyhave more autonomy. the same time. the shift powers should mean both a reduction in the intensityof global political concernsand a reductionin the resourcesavailable for sustainedintervention. A multipolarcentrewill be more complex and more fluid.The thirdround (of cold war) saw a long as of period in which the military paralysis nucleardeterrence theemphasison put competitionin arms racing. Aftersome uncertainty alignment. looseness of the new centreis a much reduced Complementingthe structural level of ideological conflict. and ideological wars unleashedideological rivalries During thisshortcentury. This in turnpointsto the riseof regionalpolitics.The twentiethcenturymight well go down in as history the era of wars between the greatpowers about industrial ideology. The logic anarchy.8 thenglobal multipolarity stands out even more clearly. This competition ended peacefullyin I989 with the comprehensive collapse of the communistchallengein the face of a decisively superiorWesternperformance. China and perhaps Brazil should also find their regional influence increased.and may well allow for the developmentof militarily hesitant greatpowers.Because the greatpowers are spread across several regions and do not include a dominatingideological or into the power rivalrywithintheirranks. The defeatof fascism and communismas alternative ideologies foradvanced industrial thatit is hard to imagineeitherof them societyhas been so definitive 8 Buzan. The militaryinhibitionsof Japan and the political loosenessof Europe count forless in relationto theirstandingas major poles of strength stability theglobal politicaleconomy. The firstround of war. A muchlowerdegree ideological and rivalry division of 2. in starting I9I4. Althoughnot all six great and in powers are withinthe global core. 435 .economic growth and societal attractiveness. such powers can afford-as Japannow does and as the United Statesdid beforeI94I-to resttheirmilitary on security theirabilityto mobilize massive civil economies. If military threats are low.

9This is a different in some ways more profoundquality than the and collectiveexpectationand preparation use forceagainstsomeone else thatis to the essence of alliance relationships. the main military lensesforit to come clearlyinto focus.the Soviet of than the Western-a looming void seems to be appearingat ones much faster theheartof theinternational security system. or disguised as.whethersinglyor collectively. The decliningsalienceof military threats among the great powers makes it unlikelythat thisvoid will be filled by new alliances.and in itslatter daysit was maskedby.this further reduces political and military incentives for competitiveintervention into the periphery.Barry Buzan revivingtheirchallenge. especially if the European union is viewed as a single international actor (even thoughit is stillwell shortof being a singlesovereign structure thenew era requiresthe viewer to of state). standing back to back-gives the Western powers an immenseadvantagein theglobal politicaleconomy.forit is inversein form put on different to traditional alliance structures. Because theydo not have to competewitheach othermilitarily. with all itswell-knownfaults. The existence thiscapitalist of security community-in effect.During the Cold War this security community grew up within. Politicalcommunity theNorthAtlantic and area (Princeton. Burrell. North America. The communistpowers were conspicuouslyunsuccessful establishing similar a in security communitywithintheirown bloc. NJ: Princeton UniversityPress. A. Europe.The relativeease with which the a United Stateswas able to construct military(and financial)coalition to take 9 Karl Deutsch and S. The global dominance a security of community amongtheleading capitalist powers As thealliancestructures the Cold War dissolveinto irrelevance. the Westernalliance system.But equally importantis that they dominantreasonsforeliminatingthe developed independentand increasingly use of military forcein theirrelationswith each other.but no serious rivals. or prepare for. The difficult marketeconomics has many critics. I957). theycan meet otherchallengers more easily. 3. now commands a broad consensus as the most effective and desirable form of formula of political pluralismplus political economy available. 436 . the use of militaryforce in theirrelationswith each other.The factthattheywere able to expunge military fromtheirown relations was a major factorin rivalry their ability to see off the communist challenge without a 'hot' war.Liberal capitalism. conjunction with the shiftto In multipolarity. This development means thatthe centreis less ideologicallydivided withinitselfthanit has been since the firstspread of industrialization. The dominantfeature thepost-Cold War era is a security of community among the major centresof capitalist power.Indeed. The capitalist powers had good reasonto form an alliance against the communiststates. Japan and Australia. This means a group of statesthatdo not expect.

preparedto accept supporting but UN Security Council resolutions.Within these five circles stood the great and all themajor powers. some of whom (such as Denmark) also sentsymbolic forces. and containedthose preparedto vote and speak in favour of the action. and othersof the periphery(principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Jordan. but unipolarized in the sense that thereis a single dominant coalition governing internationalrelations. In the centrecircle stood theUnited States. The example of the Second Gulf War suggestsa model of concentric circles to complementand modifythe raw centre-periphery idea.would generateunstablepatterns alliance and periodiclapsesinto in wars. driven by a plethora of antagonismsand security shifting of dilemmas. and the ability of the centre to isolate aggressorswho threatenthe recognized political order and the workingsof the global economy. mainly verbally and by voting. This containedCuba. This model does not offer hard image of the future. The strengtheninginternational of society This last defining featureof the new centreis the least certainof the four. nor is it likely to recur. centre-periphery 4.Yemen. circle were those prepared to oppose.It also includedthe Soviet Union and China as well as a mixture military of centreand periphery states. In the seventh circle stood those preparedto resist-Iraq.In the fourth circlewere those preparedto supportbut not to fight or pay. and a numberof Arab states. But it does suggest the general nature of relationsin a centre-dominated security world. and should defuse or perhapseven eliminatemost of theseold hazards.which was willingto lead only iffollowed and to fight only if given wide support and assistance.One danger of multipolarity least in its pre-I945. pre-nuclearmanifestations) was that a (at balance of power.In the inelegant jargon of of systemstheory. In thethirdcirclewere thosepreparedto pay but not to fight. primarily Japanand Germany. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson definedinternational societyas: 437 . neither nor opposing theventure.but it is a plausible product of the other three.one could describe the new structure power relationsas multipolarin the sense thatseveralindependentgreatpowers are in play.New patterns global security of on Iraq shows both the potentialof such a security structure how it might and work to meet otherperiphery challengesto the stability the global political of economy.In the second circle were others prepared to fight-some members of the centre (principally Britain and France).It is not a permanent a coalition. The capitalistsecuritycommunitythatunderpinnedthis coalition acts as a major moderator to the new multipolar power structure. But a multipolar great-power system which the threestrongest powers is are also a strongsecurity community somethingquite new. This group was large. In thesixth majorityof theinternational community. It is the single coalition that gives force to the model and makes the new situationunique. the mechanismsavailable.The fifth circlecontainedthosestatessatisfied to be neutral.

the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Theexpansion international (Oxford:OxfordUniversity of society Press.10 The distinction between systemand societyis central.eds. Theanarchical society (London: Macmillan.where ordermeans'an arrangement social life such thatit promotescertaingoals or values. will be a powerful society. I. 438 . ch.thedevelopmentofglobalinstitutions and regimeswas obstructed the Cold War. Others. " HedleyBull. recognize in commoninterest maintaining these arrangements. But the EC.Old Marxian argumentsthat the capitalists were keptunitedonly by theircommon fearof communismseem to have been overriddenby the global scale and deep interdependence earlytwenty-firstof of to century capitalism. have been more restricted.These included the IMF. As a rule.If thisoccurs. theWorld Bank. theybegin and for facilitating desired to work out rules for avoiding unwanted conflicts exchanges. largely reflecting elementin the security environment the periphery. see also Buzan. states ch. i.Systemis the more basic and prior idea. political communities) form system.international societyis thusclosely associatedwith of theidea of international order.Barry Buzan a a groupof states moregenerally. the GATT and theGroup of Seven. of 1 HedleyBull and Adam Watson. alsohaveestablished dialogue consent of by of and their commonrulesand institutions theconduct their for relations.a stronger international Western norms and values. has now become so deeply institutionalized that many are beginningto see it more as a single actor than as a systemof states. As Societycan be seen as a historical responseto theexistenceof a system. The top end of and contemporaryinternationalsociety is the whole range of institutions regimeswith which groups of statescoordinatetheirbehaviour in pursuitof common goals. it does not seem unreasonable to expect the extension of the Western networks towards more universalstanding. almostthe only exceptionbeing by superpowercooperationin the promotion of nuclearnon-proliferation. though only regionalin scope. the Law of the Sea regime.The eagerness theex-Soviet-type systems join theclub is a strongpointertowardsconsolidationof Westernregimes. as it is inherentin the significant interactionamong states.91 The foundation moderninternational of societyis themutualrecognition by statesof each other'sclaim to sovereignty. thesense in that behaviour eachis a necessary the of whichnotmerely a in but and factor thecalculations theothers. such as the European Community.As Bull argues..People. states recognizethepermanenceand importanceof theirinterdependence. With theendingof the Cold War and of thesystemic dominanceof theWest. I977). the OECD. During the Cold War the Western states established particularly a richinternational societalnetworkof institutions and thatthey the regimesto facilitate relatively open economic and societalrelations wished to cultivate.I984). groupof independent (or. andfear. p. 4.as is thedramatic upgradingof theUN SecurityCouncil as a focusforglobal consensus-building and legitimation seen in the Gulf crisis. Some of these institutions and regimes are already nearly universal-the United Nations. This establishes themas legal equals and provides the foundation for diplomatic relations.

thoughit also exposed them in to unwanted intervention theirown domesticinstabilities.enmityand rivalrydo not depend on input fromthe centre. It is usefulto look at thesechangesin terms of the five sectorsof security sketchedabove. There will of course be many continuities.New patterns global security of These four developmentsat the centrewill reshape the way in which the centredominatesthe periphery. post-colonial postures. Non-alignmentwas a reactionto the Cold War and provided many Third World eliteswith a moral and political positionfromwhich to play in the game of world politics. many periphery undermined the collapse of communism.In general. especially in the locally rooted dynamics of regional of security. the unfolding In order of the twenty-first centurythere will be little or no ideological or incentivefor great powers to compete for Third World allegiance. strategic This loss of leverage will be accompanied by the loss of Non-alignmentas a for usefulpoliticalplatform theperiphery. Implications for the periphery These massive changes in securityrelationswithin the centrewill have both directand indirect effects security on withintheperiphery.People. Third World alignments were important symbols of success and failure in the global competition between the United Statesand the Soviet Union.But with theending of the Cold War. 439 . stateshave found the legitimacyof theirone-party Further.12 But as suggestedabove. 1.So long as the communist systems by statessustainedtheirchallengeto theWest. Anti-Westernism now has no great-power supporter no convincingalternative politicalmodel.During the Cold War. and has narrowedsharply.they seem likely to diminishthe standingand the influence the periphery of states. theyopened up a politicalspace for The existenceof a Soviet superpower authoritarian Third World governments. thereis no longera divided centreto be Non-aligned against.and for provided a handy complementarity thoseThird World stateseager to take up anti-Western. formof government statecontrola legitimate made centralized elsewhere. statesandfear. many aspectsof relationsbetween centreand periphery will change. It remainsan open questionwhether in will fareany betterthanauthoritarianism theunstableand in many pluralism 12 See Buzan.One immediateconsequence of thisis as to lower thevalue of periphery countries eitherideological spoilsor strategic assetsin great-powerrivalry. This factgave Third World a governments usefullever on the divided centre. 5. ch.With the conceding by the leading thispolitical space communistpower of the virtuesof pluralismand markets. whose patterns amity. Politicalsecurity Perhaps the most obvious political impact of the end of the Cold War is the demiseof bothpower bipolarity and ideological rivalry central as of features the centre'spenetration into the periphery.

Mar.As decolonizationrecedesinto a former the distanceof many periphery era.difficult. decolonizaAs in tion becomes remote. 'Liberalization and the African state system'.This norm has even been reinforced the Organization of AfricanUnity.post-colonialpattern. without the support of the colonial rationalizations that might once findit increasingly to evade or parrythe have forgivenit. The two Germanies 13 James Mayall. For position. p. As the twenty-first century unfolds.seemsunlikelyto be successful '. becoming old ratherthan recenthistory.Barry Buzan of ways unpromising politicalenvironment many Third World states. Nationalismand international society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A more difficult period is now in prospect in which the euphoria of has independencehas faded and the realityof continuedinferiority reasserted itself. CA.San Diego. 440 . is governments increasedfromthe event thatnot only definedtheircountries but also provided them with a convenient. Decolonization was a high point in the epic and on-going struggleof the rest of of the world to come to termswith the intrusion superiorWesternpower. comes from states A further blow to thepoliticalpositionof manyperiphery the fact that the twentiethcenturywas also the main era of decolonization. I99I. long-termand oftenviolent business so underany circumstances-especially forpoorly placed and poorly endowed latecomers underpressure conformto normsthathave alreadybeen reached to naturallyby more powerfulstatesin the international system. paper for SSRC conferenceon 56. Herbst.many governments theperiphery will findthemselves increasingly labouring under the weight of their often dismal performance record. The Cold War ran in parallel with the development of a strongnorm cultivatedin the UN that global boundaries should remain very largelyfixed in theirpostwar.the ending of the Cold War is opening up boundary questionsin a rather have been unified-eliminatinga state.13 Although thereis no clear link between the Cold War and the attemptto fix boundaries. Experience stronglysuggests is that state-building a tricky. periphery difficult sustain legitimacy thecolonial boundariesthathave so signally to the of failed to define viable states.As James Mayall has noted. a body by whose membershipcomprisesstateswhose colonial boundariesare among the in most arbitrary the international system. in statesmay also findit Particularly Africaand the Middle East. I990).Only thosefew that such as Taiwan and South Korea. can have made it into the semi-periphery. escape thisfate.it will become fortheperiphery in most Afro-Asiancountriesdecolonizationnow lies one or two generations the past and is therefore beyond the personalexperienceof a large and rapidly growingproportionof thepopulation. excuse for in the many failings theirpoliticaland economic performance. with the West in a dominant the states post-decolonization era. territorial divisionof theworld is concerned. and Jeffrey foreignpolicy consequences of liberalization. They will difficult and risingcontemptof both foreigners theirown citizens. major way. this and 'at least so faras the attemptto freezethe politicalmap is unprecedented.and sometimes justified.Theory does not tellus much about the relativevirtuesof democraticversuscommand approaches to the early stages of state-building.

redrawboundariesor to redefine The consolidationof theEC can also be read as an exercise in changing the significance. International Affairs 67:I (I99I). albeit underpinned by an older religious antagonism between Christendomand Islam. thatsome of the restraints boundary change have been weakened by the ending of the Cold War.The Middle East-which is the oldest core of civilization and which has been a major centre of international power for five millennia-remains divided.But it boundariesthatis under assaultor only the practicein specific is clear that this norm is vulnerable to the counter-normof national selfand on determination.of boundaries."4In part. fractious and weak. Islam is centredin the to only one of the four classical areas of power and civilization that has not itself a significant as world actorsincethe retreat the of managed to re-establish Westernempires. partthiscan be seen as a straight and spiritual values. It is not yet clear whether it is the norm of fixed locations. If it does. Strongrevisionist pressures Union and EasternEurope (and especially. If the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshapedin the Firstand Second Worlds.Islam could become the leading carrier anti-Western in the periphery-though it could just as easily be kept impotent by the of fierceness its own numerousinternalsplitsand rivalries. this old divide may nevertheless North and South in the coming decades. It is notable that Saddam Hussein's attemptto eliminateKuwait and more broadly to unifythe Arab world was an explicitassaulton thepost-colonialboundaries. 44I .it has to be seen as a kind of civilizational resistance the hegemonyof the West. A further possible impact of changes in the centreon the political security agenda of the peripheryis the pushing of Islam to the frontrank of the opposition to Westernhegemony.Arab nationalism and Islamic communalismmake a heady anti-Western politicalbrew thatcould wash away territorial boundaries stronglyassociated with the divisions and humiliations of colonization.while Islam has a large constituency Africaand in define a major political riftbetween Asia. The anti-Western credentialsof Islam are well establishedand speak to a large and mobilized In clashbetweensecular politicalconstituency. 7-I3. exponents of Islam will embrace the task with relish.Both Chinese and Hindu civilizations have consolidatedlarge and quite powerful stateswhich give them at least an acceptable position in international society. and dissolving the most potent a existwithinthe Soviet boundaryof the Cold War. 'Christianity and Islam'. though not the position. But since the West now dominatesthe centre. one resultwill be a security 14 See Edward Mortimer. it will become harderto resistthe in pressures tryto findmore sensibleand congenial territorial to arrangements the ex-Third World. pp. this combined legacy of historical frustrationand ideological Given of sentiment antagonism. These changesat the centrehave littledirectconsequence forthe periphery. but their symbolic consequences may be large.New patterns global security of reasserting nationalistpolitical principle. Yugoslavia) eitherto theirsignificance.but not only.however. The collapse of communismas the leading and many anti-Western ideology seemsto propelIslam into thisrole by default.

costly.The ending of the Cold War thus largely turns off the political mechanismthatso effectively pumped armsinto the Third World all through the I960s. At the time of writing.other to things being equal. lessideologicallydividedand more multipolar centre will have less reason to compete politically to supply arms to the The ending of the Cold War reducesthe strategic salienceof many periphery. domesticand even regionalpoliticalrivalries withintheperiphery should.and does not give riseto long-termchaos in the region.Barry Buzan problem for Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia. Under such conditionsthe sanctityof existingboundaries would be reinforced.and more reasonsto see them as fewerreasonsto see periphery liabilities. and lowers incentivesto use arms supply as a military The outcomes of way of currying ideological favourwith local governments.efforts change international to boundariesby force would be firmly The United Nations SecurityCouncil would become resisted. I970S and I98os. and peripheryleadershipsput on notice that while broad tolerance for internal nastinesswould continue. thenthe West may well take a more isolationist view of the periphery. to 442 .and judged a failure. 2. thisquestionis an open one. and puttingup the shutters local rivalries leavingit more or lessto itsown devices. be of lessinterest the greatpowers thanpreviously. The local roots of many regionalrivalries. or whetherit will seek to subjectit to stronger collectivesecurity and regional managementregimes. but they will certainlybe societal-an aspect to be explored further below. In places where great-power interventionin regionalconflicts veryheavy (as in south-east was Asia) or wheretheideological constructionof the Cold War stronglyunderpinneda local conflict(as in Southern Africa) the ending of the Cold War points to an easing of local confrontations a significant and military mediatoryrole for the greatpowers.a precedentwill have been set fora more managerialand interventionist global collectivesecurity regime. are so deep that the ending of the Cold War in the centrewill make littledifference them.Under theseconditions. But ifthe outcome is messy. If the allied is intervention eventuallyseen to be a successat a reasonablecost. bases in the periphery. But thisprospectraisesan importantquestion about whetherthe West will to use its new pre-eminence neglectthe Third World.The security issuesraised may or may not be militaryones. for both share a huge territorial boundary with Islam. Military security Developments in the centrecan easily be read as pointing to a lowering of in A militarization theperiphery. and in the case of the Soviet Union this boundary is inside the country. especiallyin South Asia and the Middle East. The longer-term outcome of the Gulf crisiswill powerfullyaffect which directionis taken. and power balances would come into play withouteven the restraint imposed of by the global interventionism the Cold War. greatpowers will have statesas assets.In the the absence of ideological disputesamong themselves. a clearinghouse and legitimator a global collectivesecurity for regime.

443 .perhaps even quickly. Inasmuch as one of the key tensionswithin it was the failureof the superpowersto make much progresstowardstheirown nucleardisarmament. the tensionbetween haves and have-nots.15 If the economic complementarity betweencivil and military nuclearpower collapses. and almost no one doubts that Israel is already a nuclear-weaponsstate. and the strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. significant which has been the most vigorous promoter of civil nuclear power.Even in France. The nuclearnon-proliferation regimehas attracted verywide supportdespite itsinherent inequalityas a small club of nuclearhaves and a large one of havenots. I99I.which much reducesan independent pressure thespreadof militarily for civil technology. 73-4. once a key threshold it state. Several thingsfavoura consolidationof the regimeas the Non-Proliferation Treatyapproachesits I995 renewalconference.New patterns globalsecurity of A loweringof great-powerconcernand engagementwould by definition give more leverage to local powers to reshape the political environmentof their regions.In Latin America. This scenarioof neglect cannot be pushed too far. both India and Pakistan are on the brink of going public as nuclear powers. the costsof maintaining leaving the military by nuclear power will rise.an in abiding interest oil will keep the West engaged in the Middle East.the once worriedabout nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina is evolving steadily towards a regional inspectionregime along the lines of Euratom.Iraq's obvious nuclear ambitionsunderlinethe salienceof the issue. 2 Feb.but neitheris it obvious how the change to 15 TheEconomist. In South Africa. There must also be a concern that too detached an attitudetowards the periphery might eventually. large-scalemilitary But there are other developmentsthat put even the existingregime into jeopardy. the ending of the Cold War and the consequentmassivereductions strategic in forcesshould point to a strengthening the regime.Both these interests were at play in the response to Saddam Hussein. two specificmilitarysecurity issuesarise either of way-control of the arms trade. seemshighlyunlikely thatthewhiteregime either needs thereassurance nuclearweapons any longer. pp.thoughby no means eliminates. technological and economic problems are mounting alarmingly. In South Asia.but at thisjuncturethe fateof the non-proliferation regime is unclear.or wantsto takethe of riskof having to hand controlof them over to a black-led government. generatemilitarythreatsfrom these countriesto the centre.Civil nuclear power remainsin the doldrums. sectorunsupported a civil one. Whether the centre attemptscomprehensiveor selective in intervention the periphery.Among otherthings. The fictionof a closed club of five nuclear-weapons statesthus cannot be maintained. The successor failureof of thisregime will have a big impact both on security withinthe periphery and on militaryrelationsbetween centre and periphery.The winding down of the nucleararmsrace at the centrereduces. UN organizations are generally emergingfromthe Cold War twilightinto sunniertimes.

In countries addition. is hard to imagine thatIran would not 'eat grass as '. Libya's leader makes calls for an Arab nuclear weapon which Saddam Hussein was It doing his best to fulfil. Apr.drivenby an ever-increasing numberof suppliers.Even more seriousin some ways is the problem of what to do about violatorswithinthe regime. I99I."6 Meanwhile North Korea soldiers on with suspiciousnuclear activitieswhile continuingto evade its legal obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. in order to match the nuclear capability of its main regional enemy should Saddam Hussein be able to re-embarkon his previous course. wartimehangoversgreatlyrestrict All Japaneseand German participation.Franceand the United States. Israeland South Africaincreasingly have the means and the will to compete in 16 Sunday Times.severalindustrializing includingBrazil.fixed-term commitmentby the nuclear-weaponsstates to a comprehensive test-bantreaty.Buzan Barry eight can be incorporatedinto the regime without seeming to reward nonto complianceand open thefloodgates otherclaims. 28 444 . Greatercontrolof the conventionalarms trade between the centreand the is periphery anotherdevelopmentthatmightbe expected fromthe end of the Cold War. either through the Security in Council or unilaterally the styleof both the Israeliand Anglo-Americanair attackson Iraqi nuclear facilities. and the United Statesand Britainarguing the need for continuedundergroundtesting. These three struggle to compete with Japan and Germany in civil but have an easier time in the militarymarket.This logic also appliesin lesserdegree to Britain. is the armstrade. with Mexico leading demands for a strong. and so need exports to sustain their militaryindustries. India.In the fiercecommercialcompetition of the post-Cold War world. most eager and some desperateto sell theirproducts. The implications thiscan of already be seen in China's willingnessduring the I980s to sell almost any military technology(includingnuclear-capableballisticmissiles)to almost any buyer.This disputewas seriousenough to wreck what would otherwisehave been a productive and positive final document.If pushedtoo far. Algeria has become a focus of speculationas the source for an Arab bomb. where old manufactures. but the likelihood is thattwo powerfulmechanismswill continue to supporta substantial flow of military The first capabilityinto the periphery. While Iraq is temporarily down. South Korea. Pakistan did.it could have seriousconsequencesfortherenewal of the NPT in 1995. arms exports will remain one of the very few industrial areas of comparativeadvantage for the Soviet Union and China. On top of theseparticular problems sitsa more general one arisingfroma and nuclear-weaponsstatesover moves disputebetween non-nuclear-weapons towards a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. as well as some smallerstatessuch as Czechoslovakia. five armsproducersface shrinking domesticdemand as a resultof the end of major the Cold War. These challengesfromwithin raiseseriousquestionsabout thelong-term viability theregimein theabsence of of some firmermechanisms for enforcement. At the I990 Review Conference a serious split developed on this issue.

so adding to the numberof armssuppliers. then the massivepoliticalchanges of the past few yearsmay well make littledifference 445 . The ending of the Cold War should resultin some diminution of the flow of armsforpoliticalmotives. and thereis no way of capabilityinto the periphery. they did in South Africa. Libya. Any countrythatcan make basic industrial can also make poison gas.there is fierce plant.finance and markets necessaryto sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Pakistan. security 3.South Africa. Any regimewith access to cash will stillhave access to suppliesof modern weapons. In all these industries. As a consequence.and all but the most extremeGreenswelcome it as an essentialingredientin the development of human civilization. Israel. aircraftand shipbuilding. many of the technologiesfor making weapons are now old. Economic If economic securityis about access to the resources. control of pull and the sheerdiversity sourcesof supply. means that The combined effectof the arms trade and industrialization militarycapabilitywill spread by one mechanismor the other. vehicles. is permanentlyout of the bottle.New patterns globalsecurity of combined with strongdemand the arms trade. Any that can make fertilizercan make high explosives.but thereis no reasonto thinkthatit in will eliminatethe problem of militarization the periphery. Whoever can make trucks. also applies to engineering. The concern over Iraq. Competition among suppliers. with its militaryprogeny.military security will remainan elusive objective posing difficult policy choices. The second mechanismarisesfromthe unbreakablelinkbetween industrialization and the ability to make weapons.Any stopping the spread of industrial-military into directopposition attemptto do so would put the goal of arms restraint with that of economic development. The knowledge and skillsfor ago. In the I99Os.The industrial genie.But the armsindustry not separatefromthe civil economy: thinkof how the United is Statestransformed itself frombeing a largelycivileconomy to being thearsenal of democracyin just a few yearsduringthe I940s. technologies industrialized countries such age.Brazil and other stateshas as much to do with their industrializaon as with theirdirectimportsof arms. makingpoison gas and machineguns were developed more thana century As and even nucleartechnologydates back nearlyhalfa century. Industrializationis spreading inexorablyacross the planet. Attemptsto as at efforts military block the arms trade will intensify industrialization. bulldozers or airliners can make armoured cars.make any systematic of the arms trade unlikely. Any country competitionto export both productsand manufacturing has it everything needs possessinga fullcivil nuclear power industry virtually chemicals to make a nuclearbomb. tanks and bombers. technologyis especiallyobvious in The overlap between civil and military but the case of the nuclearand chemicalindustries. theybecome easierto acquire even forlightly as Iraq.

It mightalso be argued thateconomic aid will dwindle as the Cold War political motivesthatfuelled it subsideand as Westerncapital turnsto the redevelopmentof the ex-Sovietattitudesalready point towards a futurein which the type systems. thoughsome more diplomatictermwill need to be foundto describeit.The periphery will increasingly able to call on theself-interest the be of centrein relationto the meetingof global environmental standards. Liberia).theremay evolve a kind of de factoinstitutional recolonization. for Tanzania). There are many potentialcandidatesforthisin Africa. Both these levers are discussedin more detail below. in Nigeria).18 The politicallooseningand diffusion power withinthe centremay evolve of into a seriesof regionaleconomic spherescentredon Europe. Peru. and togetherthey may well suffice to maintainor even increasethe flow of economic aid. One is environmental and the other societal. People. Ravenhill. otherwords. ch."7These are indicatedin the cruel truthcapturedby the aphorism. 73I-48.Western allocation of aid and investmentis conditional more on the rectitude of economic policy than on fading notions of strategicvalue. 6.The idea of economic is security riddled with contradictions and paradoxes. Bangladesh. however. 'The North-South balance of power'.economic securitypoints to the persistent structural disadvantagesof late developmentand a positionin the lower ranks of wealthand industrialization. They will also be able to threatenthe centrewith unwanted migrationunless welfare standardsare maintained and development prospectskept alive.and some in South and South17 18 Buzan. But it is not clear thatbeing transferred froma global periphery into a regionalone would make much difference eitherto the structural positionor to the economic security most periphery of countries. statesandfear.successful strategies the centreto divide and rule. greater divergence of interestamong the developing countries. The periphery. consequencesof such weaknessrangefrom The inabilityto sustain the basic human needs of the population (as in Sudan. notably those where both importedstate structures and economic developmenthave failedtotally. It is not impossibleto imagine thatin some partsof the periphery. Against this.'The only thingworse than being exploited is not being exploited'.and the loss of comparative advantage from cheap labour to smart automationtechnologyin the advanced industrial countries. Argentina. through the disruption of fluctuatingand uncertainearnings from exports of primaryproducts (as in Zambia. the acute vulnerability the debt by of crisis. to inabilityto resistthe policy pressuresof outside institutions return needed suppliesof capital (as in Brazil. pp.Barry Buzan to the economic securityproblems of the periphery. trade. There seems no reason to expect any fundamental change in the overall problem of in the periphery occupying a weak position in a global marketwhose prices.Japanand North America. To the extentthatit has any clear meaning in relationto peripherycountries.financeand technicalevolution are all controlledfromthe centre. in Some argue that itspositionwill continueto deteriorate because of decliningcommodityprices. 446 . Ethiopia. standtwo new motivesforaid. will remainthe periphery.

from peripheryto centre. is and vulnerabilities era.2" But at the beginningof the incentives risingformore permanent mass population are twenty-first century movementsin the other direction.New patterns global security of East Asia.Palestiniansfear about Jews (and vice versa). Francois Heisbourg. than it has been duringthe Cold War centreand periphery. of often rising standardsof living. communal identity and cultureby directly Migration threatens alteringthe ethnic. Baluchs about Punjabis. oftenfallingstandardsof 2 19 The Economist. 58.Too great a foreigninfluxwill threatenthe abilityof the existing societyto reproduce itselfin the old way. harshrealities economic the of and political failureand the strengthening global institutions a Westernof dominated international society.. Assamese about Bengalis. up to a point. Affairs Jonas Widgren. pp. 'Population movements in post-Cold War Europe'. Uncontrolled immigrationeventually for swamps the existing culture.. 20 Mar.But beyond some point. East (London: Black Swan. Most societieshave resultedfromearlierhuman migrations and already represent a mixture. the cultural diversitythat further migrationbrings. about Russians. Immediately to their south lie dozens of peripherycountrieswith high birthrates and low. I99I. which can easily create a political constituency immigrationcontrol. 'International migration and regional stability'. Given the waning of postdecolonizationsensitivities about independence. I989).19 worst peripherystatesup to the point at which they could compete in the international economy. Survival 33:I (I99I). 4. Societalsecurity Societal securityis likely to become a much more prominentissue between and withinboth. This is one way of looking at the European fromthesixteenth onwardsinto North and South America. 21 For a graphic and penetratingaccount of this phenomenon see Pico Iyer. International 66:4 (I990). 3I-43. migrations century New Zealand and South Africa. such efforts could at bestbringthe consumption.forexample. The two issues most prominently its on agenda at the beginning of the twenty-first century in centre-periphery relationsare migration20 and the clash of rival civilizationalidentities.culturalreligious and linguisticcomposition of the population. p. A residuumof this remainsin the culturalimpact of mass tourism. Bangladesh. There are hintsof thisin the international schemes for Cambodia and in the influenceof IMF and World Bank 'advisers' in many places. For the past fivecenturies has been mostlymigrating it Europeans thathave posed threats(and not just societal ones) to otherpeoples. and so on.It is what Estoniansand Kazaks fear Australia. 749-66. Many welcome. fromthe not-so-far and other reports 447 . migrationbecomes a question of numbers. Central America and the Caribbean. Societal security about the threats thataffect patterns of communal identityand culture. Video nightin Kathmandu. depends on the IMF and foreign aid for all its development budget and some of its current Even iftheywere successful. pp.The advanced industrial cultures Europe and North Americahave low birthratesand high.a subtle returnto 'managed' statusfor the most hopeless peripherystatesmay well occur.

or disorganized or or and so erodestheirstatus and legitimacy. uncivilizedor primitive) The tremendous wealth. The treatmentof migrantsas a kind of criminal class creates easy ground for antagonismbetween the societieson both sides. also to emphasizeitsdifferentiation it seeks to exclude. It is much more from the centre to the peripherythan the other way around. over Western domination of the post-colonial partlyto do with resentments of and politicalstructuring theMiddle East.Here the threattravelsmostly in the opposite the direction.inventiveness organizational and energy. thisis partlyto do with secular versus religious values.reflecting older order of Western dominance. partly to do with the historicalrivalry between Christendom and Islam. deeplyinto weakersocieties it both insertsalien styles. of An acute migration problem between societies can hardly avoid raising barriersand tensions between them. The worldrevolution Westernization: twentieth of the century global perspective in (New York: Oxford University Press.Barry Buzan living. country not only to construct a has legal and physicalbarriers to but fromthe societywhose members entry.In a few places these hopes have been but most face a bleak futurein which they seem likely to fall ever fulfilled.In the case of Islam.and partlyto do with thebitterness humiliation of the invidious comparison between the accomplishmentsof Islamic and Westerncivilizationduring the last two centuries.Some even facefalling behindthedismalstandards theirown present.partlyto do withjealousy of Westernpower.and identities betweentheWest and mingledin with. Questions of statusand race are impossibleto avoid. In defending itselfagainst unwanted human influx. Transportation not a significant is barrier. underdeveloped. As the Vietnameseboat of risk people demonstrated.It occurs alongside. As it does so. even a substantial of deathor an unpleasant reception are weak deterrents determinedeconomic migrants. As noted above.the West makes all others look bad (i. this threatis compounded by 22 Theodore von Laue. or backward or poor.and a perceived threatof 'fifth column' terrorism. ideas and aspirations-'Coca-Colaization'-and corrupts bringsinto questionthe validityand legitimacy local or of customs and identities. though the existenceof immigrant communitieswithinthe centredoes mean thatthereis some real threatfrom peripheryto centre. The economic incentives for large numbersof young people to move in search of work are high. not to mentionits crassmaterialism and hollow consumerculture. 448 .concepts. repressive. The clash between civilizational identities is most conspicuousbetween the West and Islam.e. I987). and the markets the centrehave a demand forcheap labour. Substantial immigrant communities fromthe South alreadyexistin the North.High incentivesto to migrateare sustained the fadingof hopes thatpoliticalindependencewould by bring development and prosperity.22 By its conspicuouseconomic and technologicalsuccess. further behind the still rapidly evolving political economies of the capitalist centre. cannothelp but penetrate worldwide. The migrationproblem does not exist in isolation. The last point is true as between the West and all periphery societies. dynamismof the West.theclashof rivalcivilizational the societiesof the periphery.

Turkey is anyway the naturalinsulatorbetween Europe and the Middle East.which might otherwisebe morallytroublingin liberal societies.New patterns global security of geographicaladjacency and historical antagonismand also the overtlypolitical role thatIslam playsin the lives of itsfollowers.A societalCold War with Islam would serveto strengthen European identity the all round at a crucial time for the process of European union. it would confront European Communitywith a challengewhich both fellwithinits the mandateand which it could handle withoutmuch help fromthe United States. and specifically between the West and Islam.but it would fit the country'srecenttraditions and give it a greatlystrengthened hand to play in negotiatingits relationship with the European Community. Slavophile. positionon the front line of a Europe-Islam Cold War would not be withouthazards. it will certainly leave behind it a vast reservoir heated and easily of mobilized anti-Westernfeeling among the Arab and Islamic masses. by providinga common foreignpolicy issue on which a strongconsensuswould be easy to find. Such a developmentwould put Turkey into an extremelycentralposition. but to adopt policies thatencourage it. but most of the elements necessary it are alreadyin place. increasefriction between theexistingIslamicimmigrant communities and their host societiesand help to legitimizea tougher attitudetowards immigration controls. This civilizationalCold War could feed into the massive restructuring of relations going on within the centre consequent upon the ending of the East-West Cold War. There is no certainty thatthisscenario will unfold. The resulting tensioncannotavoid feedinginto themigration issue. inter alia.and much will depend on the performance (and supportgiven of to) moderategovernments withinthe Islamic world. not only geographically but also culturally (non-Arab) and ideologically Its (Islamic. A similarkind of bufferrole is available for Mexico. For all these in reasons and others. In combination. If therewas a generalheatingup of the boundarybetween 'Christendom' and the Europeanizing tendencieswithin the Soviet Islam. I have drawn particularattentionto societal securityproblems between centreand periphery. in which Europe would be in thefront line.It will.migrationthreatsand the clash of culturesmake it rather easy to draw a scenariofora kind of societal cold war between the centreand at least part of the periphery. though between North and Latin Americatheissueis more purelya migrationone. Whateverthe finaloutcome of the Second for Gulf War.but with a strongsecularstatetradition). it would strengthen Union and weaken thosefavouringa more isolationist. and much lessa civilizational Cold War.Rivalrywith theWest is made more potent by the fact that Islam is still itselfa vigorous and expanding collectiveidentity.theremay well be a substantial constituency the West prepared not only to support a societal Cold War with Islam. 449 . than is the case between Europe and the Middle East.position. itis important note thatsuchissueswill also be very but to much on security Both the agendas withinthe centreand withinthe periphery. It could well help European political integration. To the extent that it was seen as a securityissue.

23Where to environmental issuesthreaten overwhelmthe conditionsof human existence on a large scale. this could easily become a transcendent issue.and the mass migrations would be triggered would quicklyfeedinto the societalissuesdiscussedabove. 'The case against linking environmentaldegradation and national security'. Environmental security Much of the environmental agenda falls outside the realm of securityand is more appropriately seen as an economic questionabout how thepollutioncosts of industrialactivityare to be counted.There may also be some advantage in treatingas international securityissues activitiesthat may cause substantial changesin the workingsof the planetaryatmosphere. by mass movementsare easilystimulated famine. by is The clash of civilizationalidentities just as strongon the otherside of Islam. 46i1-76. where it abuts Hindu civilization.war and politicalrepression. Withintheperiphery. The holistic quality of the planetaryenvironmentwill provide the centre with in in reasonsforwantingto intervene theperiphery thename of environmental and The periphery will gain some politicalleverageout of thisinterest. the Horn of Africa. centreforhaving createdthe problem will continueto blame theindustrialized in the first place. thereare alreadymassmigrations in theMiddle East and South Asia in searchof work and away fromconflict (both illustrated Iraq). Quite a few peripherycountriesare vulnerableto virtual obliterationby sustaineddrought and desertification by risingsea levels. then casting such issues in securityterms is of appropriate. environmentalissues look set to become a regular featureof centre-periphery dialogues and tensions. pp.The recentfloodingof Bangladesh gives a small foretaste what could well be quite literallya risingtide of disaster.see Daniel Deudney. assesshow quicklythiswill happen and how intensethe pressures If serious climatic changes begin to occur soon. security. or that Their abilityto cope with such changesis small.Barry Buzan European integrationproject and the breaking down of the Iron Curtain between Eastern and Western Europe will unleash considerable migration insidethe continent. is much harderto of will become.and South-EastAsia. In Bangladesh. or exploitativeor polluting activitiesthat threatento diminishthe supply of oxygen to the atmosphereby killing off forests and plankton. This exchange may well staywithinthe politicalframework 23 On the risksin the idea of environmentalsecurity. MillenniumI9:3 (I990). 5.adding to thepressures as on boundary maintenance.as between Islam and the West. 450 . as in the case of countriesvulnerableto extensiveinundation from modest rises in sea level. It seems safeto predictthatthiswhole agenda is going to risein importance It as the density human occupation of the planetincreases. Even lessdrasticchangesthatdid not threaten obliteration mightput such stress on weak statestructures to cause politicalbreakdown. Barring such dramatic developments.These might includethemassproductionof greenhousegasesor chemicalssuchas CFCs that erode the protectiveozone layer. controlled and paid for.

theWest has triumphedover both communismand tiers-mondisme. in theeconomic sector. 'The North-South balance of power'. 70. 24 i6 Ravenhill. othershave pointed out. 748.24 bit of local conflict * agenda of the periphery It is apparentfromthisbriefsurveythat the security fromthe one different countriesin the I99OS and beyond will be significantly of a polarized centreby one we have been used to since I945. The Economist.of New patterns global security But it could also become of below the threshold security. Dec. like a promotionfromthirdrankto second. I989.and the periphery more subordinate.This is most obviously likelyin remainfamiliar. but thisis only a superficial The deeper realityis thatthe centreis now more dominant. p. The replacement to seemsalmostcertain weaken community security dominatedby thecapitalist in thepositionof theperiphery relationto the centre. much to say thatalmostthe entirerange of centre-periphery from boundaries and bases to aid and alignment.The theywill become a major partof the security biggest changes are most likely to come in the political and societal sectors. of interdependence. Extensive shiftsboth in prevailing political norms and in the nature of seem entirelyplausible. 45I I8 IAF 67 .particularly withinthe periphery. entangled with the broader debate about development in such a way as to of As seriousconflicts interest. The change in terminologyfrom 'Third World' to 'periphery' may look view. The changes in the centrewill have a substantial relations-in both directionsnot only centre-periphery They will redefine Some aspectsof thesecurity agenda will withintheperiphery. environmental trigger controlover water supplies. Societal concernsalso seem destinedto riseto a positionof prominenceon the of securityagenda that they have not held since beforethe establishment the modern European statesystem.In thissense. It does not seem too political interests international politicalrelations. but also relations albeit with some new twists. than at any time since decolonizationbegan.is open for redefinition.thoughtherewill also be many continuities themilitary increasein importance.look likelyto generatequite a issues. Environmentalissues will certainly agenda is more questionable.but whether one. p. impact on the periphery.

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