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Militia Mao Tse Tung on Guerilla Warfare

Militia Mao Tse Tung on Guerilla Warfare

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F’MFRP 12-18

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare

U.S. Marine Corps


140 121$300 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 5 April 1989 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18,Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which were published commercially and are no longer in print.

This reference publication is Mao Tse-tung’s thoughts and philosophy of guerrilla warfare. It gives the reader a chance to learn about this type of warfare from one who lived and fought as a guerrilla for most of his adult life. It is important to understand his philosophy of guerrilla warfare because it is the basis of today’s guerrilla forces. The book was translated and published with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), in 1961. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVAN Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia



Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare translated, with an introduction by

Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Retired). Reprinted with permission of Mrs. Belle Gordon Nelson Griffith.

INTRODUCTION 1 11 111 W The Nature of Revolutionary Profile of a Revolutionist Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics in Revolutionary War Some Conclusions Guerrilla War 3 12 20 27

Yu CHI CHAN (GUERRILLA WARFAIW) Translator’s Note A Further Note 1 2 3 4 5 What 1s Guerrilla Warfare? The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations Guerrilla Warfare in History Can Victory Be Attained by Guerrilla Organization for Guerrilla Warfare Operations? 37 39 4J

58 66 71 71 77 82 85 88

How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed ~he Method of Organizing Guerrilla Regimes
Equipment of Guerriks Elements of the Guerrilla


6 7

The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan APPENDIX



. . . the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China
today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle, but will be world-wide. –MAO TSWXUNG, Chi Chan, 1937 Yu

consume checked



of elecand

tronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily tapes, Scientists confer in air-conditioned offices; missiles are men who move about them silently, countdown begins, a tired man wearing a his knees, feet, is the with 3

data and spew out endless


by intense

almost reverently.

In forty minutes,

At the other end of this spectrum, greasy felt hat, a tattered

shirt, and soiled shorts is seated, between sandaled

his back against a tree. Barrel pressed between butt resting on the moist earth a Browning canvas Draped automatic sacks—one around holding three rifle. Hooked

to his belt, two dirty bombs, tube ammunition.

home-made cloth

other four magazines

loaded with .30-caliber a sausage-like

his neck,

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


three days’ supply of rice. The man stands, raises a water bottle to his lips, rinses his mouth, looks about him carefully, of the Browning and disappears ambush. It is probable tionary dozen in nature, countries that guerrilla during war, nationalist few years. and revoluThese outspits out the water, He slaps it again twice, In forty minutes, prepared corks the bottle, slaps tile stock

three times, pauses,

silently into the shadows.

his group of fifteen men will occupy a previously

will flare up in one or more of half a the next

breaks may not initially be inspired, organized, or led by local Communists; indeed, it is probable t]lat they will not be. But they will receive the moral support encouragement circumstances as well. As early as November, China’s Number 1949, we had this assurance Liu Shao-ch’i, Unions Trade from when, Two Communist, of international permit, Communism, expert advice and material and vocal and where assistance

speaking before the Australasian in Peking, revolutions he prophesied that would follow

Conference pattern. We

that there would be other Asian the Chinese of eighty-one that the up. A month

paid no attention In December, and Workers’ of liberation” ary 6, 1961), esting

to this warning. 1960, delegates Communist of “wars later (Januresolved tempo


should be stepped liberation

the Soviet Premier,

thority on “national interesting 4 answers:

an unin]peachab]e auwars,” propounded an interhe provided equally

series of questions

to which


1s there a lilielihood of such wars recurring? Yes, there is. Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur? Yes, they are. But wars of this kind are popular uprisings. Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the CUPof the popular patie7ce overflows and they take to arms? Yes, there is such a likelihood. What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings? A most favorable attitude. . . . These uprisings are directed against the col-rwl)t reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholehearted y and without reservations. * Implicit ment is the further infiltrated and assurance captured that any popular by the Communists tin@, movewill in ol}r

develop an anti-Western own hemisphere coloration.

cl]arocter de~nitcly

at least, with a clistinctive

anti-American that severs] peo-

This should not surprise us if we remember hundred millions less fortunate haps reluctantly, ples are dedicated at the conclusion to the perpetuation

than we have arrived, perthat the Western of the political, social, to America, Britain, or

and economic status cpo. In the not too distant past, many of these millions looked hope[ully France for help in the realization achieved only by a desperate Kwolutionary of their justifiable aspirathat

tions. Bllt today many of them feel that these aims can be revolutionary strug~]e we will probably oppose. This is not a hypothesis; A potential ensure situation where the government consistently it is fact, to

exists in any country fails in its obligation of life for the

at least a minimally

decent standard

* World

Marxist Review, January, 1961. 5

Mao Tse’tung great majority organization, of its citizens.

on Guerrilla


If there also exists even the is needed: the instrument

nucleus of a revolutionary for violent revolutionary In many countries, and the miserably small middle engineers—lacks ceasing factional program, form of liberal rejected destitute,

party able to supply doctrine and action.

only one ingredient there

are but two classes, the rich the relatively lawyers, by unIts to bankers, doctors,

poor. In these countries, leadership,

class–merchants, forceful quarrels,

is fragmented

and is politically democracy, intellectual

ineffective. is anathema who

which usually posits a socialized society and some parliamentary It is also move and

the exclusive and tightly knit possessing minority. by the frustrated it represents youth, irrevocably toward violent revolution. a package

To the illiterate

of promises

that experi-

ence tells them will never be fulfilled. People who live at subsistence of religion, understand basic: land, freedom level want first things to interested in freedom as we rags free enterprise better than be put first. They are not particularly of the press,

it, or the secret ballot. Their tools, fertilizers, something

needs are more

for their children, houses to replace their shacks, freedom from police oppression, medical attention, primary schools. Those who have known only poverty have begun to wonder why they should ments. They glasses–examples lose?” When continue to wait passively not always through for improveRed-tinted the struchave we to is incipient. see–and

of peoples who have changed and they ask, “What guerrilla situation

ture of their societies,

a great many people begin to ask themselves

this question, a revolutionary 6

Introduction A revolutionary of military existing with action. war is never confined within the bounds

Because its purpose is to destroy an society and its institutions and to replace them new state structure, the constituent political, any revolutionary parts, in varying social, and with a dYtrue of to the orthodox

a completely

war is a unity of which importance, psychological. namic quality wars, whatever revolutionary are military, and

economic, in depth

For this reason, a dimension

it is endowed


their scale, lack. This is particularly guerrilla war, which is not susceptible frequently

type of superficial military treatment by antediluvian doctrinaires. It is o[ten said that guerrilla generalization

advocated This


is primitive,

is dangerously misleading and true only in the technological sense. If one considers the picture as a apparent, and the primitive than war is of logistical It can be form is understood to be in fact more sophisticated navies, and air forces. Guerrilla highly organized computers.

whole, a paradox is immediately nuclear ventional complex conducted

war or atomic war or war as it was waged by conarmies, for success on the ef%cient operation devices,

not dependent


systems, or the accuracy of electronic in any terrain,

in any climate,

in any weather;

in swamps, in mount ~ins, in farmed fields. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines. I-Ie is endowed Guerrilla warfare man’s admirable with qualities intelligence, emotions, with, and will. ones, is dlercfow suffused and reflects,

as well as his less pleasant

While it is not always humane, it is human, which is more than can be said for the strategy of extinction. 7

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla In the United out of soldiers. cally educated A trained


States, we go to considerable Guerrillas do exactly



keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politiaware of the issues at stake. is much more than a guerrilla

and thoroughly

and disciplined

patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-rnacle bomb. His indoctrination accurately, intensely Guerrilla ganization, than Mao begins even before he is taught The to shoot is an and it is unceasing. loyal and politically end product

alert fighting man.

leaders spend a great deal more time in orwork instruction, agitation, and propaganda for their most important “We must with patiently monotonous “persuade,” job is to says “conin explain,” “discuss,” regularity

they do fighting, Tse-tung.

win over the people,


vince’’—these words recur many of the early Chinese has aptly compared water in which right, proliferate. guerrilla

essays on guerrilla

war. Mao is and


to lkh, and the people to the temperature will thrive concern

they swim. If the political few in number, the principal

the fish, however

It is therefore

of all

leaders to get the water to the right temperature

and to keep it there, More guerrilla urgently than ten years ago, I concluded with the further an analysis of

warfare demanded

suggestion that the problem “serious study of all historical

experience.” and much 8

Although a wealth of material existed then, more has since been developed, no such study

lnwoc?zxbz has yet been undertaken aware. In Indochina in this country, so far as I am

and Cuba, Ho Chi Minh and Ernesto

(Che) Guevara were more assiduous. One rather interesting result of their successful activities has been the common identification But guerrilla for centuries, Revolutionary a martial

of guerrilla


with Communism. by the Communists; fighters. “the Swamp Fox.’)

warfare was not invented there have been guerrilla hero Francis Marion,

One of the most accomplished

of them all was our own

Those present at his birth would probably not have foretold future for him; the baby was “not larger than a England lobster and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot.” Marion grew up in South Carolina and had little formal schooling. He worked as a farmer. the In 1759, at the age of twenty-seven, raised to fight the Cherokees, borders of the Carolinas. the course much British When accepted Regiment. the Revolution a commission broke out, Marion in the Second immediately Carolina of the war to a very profithe sought that at first South that of these was later hostilities to be put he joined a regiment

who were then ravaging stored

He served for two years and in away in his mind the to good use against

By 1780, he had seen enough were overlooking warfare. of partisan permission

realize that the Continentals able field-that and obtained consisted


to organize a company The appearance considerable

of twenty

ill-equipped assortment

men and boys (Castro’s of this group, jesting among

“base” was twelve men). with a heterogeneous

of arms and ragged and

poorly fitting clothes, provoked

Mao Tse-tung the regulars of General Gates,

on Guerrilla but





not long in proving that the appearance is not necessarily Marion’s guerrilla were continually

of a combat soldier soon told

a reliable criterion of his fighting abilities. activities in South Carolina especially Cornwallis, Operating by them. Marion’s bases, which whose plans tactics were frewith the greathe changed

heavily cm the British,


those of all successful guerrillas. est speed from inaccessible quently,

he struck his blows in rapid succession at isolated was always him.

garrisons, convoys, and trains. His information timely and accurate, for the people supported

The British, unable to cope with Marion, branded him a criminal, and complained bitterly that he fought neither “like a gentleman” such ubiquitous, nor like “a Christian,” intangible, and a charge orthodox antagonists operations as on a soldiers are wont to apply in all lands and in all wats to deadly Francis Marion.* However, grand Spaniards the first example of guerrilla scale was in Spain between 1808 and invading 1813. The army to the

who fled from Napoleon’s

* Bryant, in the “Song of Marion’s Men,” wrote some lines that showed that he had a better understanding of guerrilla tactics and psychology than many who have followed more martiaf pursuits: Woe to the English soldiery, That little dreads us near! On them shall come at midnight A strange and sudden fear; When, waking to their tents on fire, They grasp their arms in vain, And they who stand to face us Are beat to earth again; And they who fly in terror deem A mighty host behind, And hear the tramp of thousands Upon the hollow wind.



were patriots

loyal to the ruler

whose crown of the French.

had been taken from him by the Emperor

They were not revolutionists. Most did not desire a change in the form of their government. Their single objective was to help Wellington Spain. A few years later, peasants pushed again harried it, stumbling, the cudgel thousands starving of Russian and freezing, Cossacks and Napoleon’s Grande Arrm$e as Kutuzov down the iceas Tolstoi of anyone’s with stupid force the Frefich armies to leave

covered road to Smolensk. later wrote, tastes

This dying army felt again and war, which, and majestic

of the people’s

“was raised in all its menacing itself about no question no until fine distinctions, consistency, about perfect

power; and troubling or rules, with simplicity, belabored

it rose and fell and army had

the French

the whole invading and a quarter people.

been driven out.” A little more than a century feel the fury of an aroused were those who wielded were patriotic Only when Russians. Lenin came on the scene did guerrilla warlater, Hitler’s case They armies fell back along the Smolensk the cudgel road. They too would But in neither revolutionists.

fare receive the potent political injection that was to alter its character radically. But it remained for Mao Tse-tung to produce twenty-five authority the first systematic that deservedly study of the subject, now endowed almost the years ago. His study, with

accrues to the works of the man in history, will continue

who led the most radical revolution

to have a decisive effect in societies ready for change. II

PoLitical power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

TSK+TONG, 1938

Province, dustrious


AO TSE-TUNG, the man who was to don the mantle of Lenin, lvas born in I Iunan in central China, in 1893, His father, an into acquire several acres, and peasant. He was a

farmer, had managed

with this land, the status of a “middle” strict disciplinarian, The boy was in constant an ally in his mother, described pealed Chinese educational her methods to him. were But then opportunities able

and Mao’s youth \vas not a happy one. conflict with his father but found tactics” (as he once her husband) his rebellious a tiny minority Nlao’s prinxmy ap son of and of coping the father that with gave only whose “indirect

to enjoy.

secondary schooling was thorough. lHis literary catholic; while a pupil at the provincial normal read omnivorously. nese philosophy, translations ~iograpl~ers. 12 His indiscriminate poetry, history, history Western and romances historians, and political

taste was school he Chiand paras well as

diet included novelists, sciences

of many However,




to him; in them, he sought, but without liberalHistory political, and China

success, the key to the future of China. His studies had led him to reject both democratic ism and parliamentary Time, would he realized, not accord her socialism as unsuited was running change, the privilege out for China, of gradual to his country.

social, and economic orderly evolution. had to change, how? Shortly

of a relatively


To survive to change

in the power jungle, to change


fast. But

after graduating

from normal

school, in 1917, Univer-

Mao accepted a position as assistant in the Peking

sity library. Here he associated himself with the Marxist study groups set up by Li Ta-chao and Ch’en Tu-hsiu; here he discovered sky’s explosive Engels. Lenin, read his essays, pored over Trotand began to study Marx and and Communist speeches,

By 1920, Mao was a convinced his mission:

a man who had discovered China according The China the CCP was organized in the accepted

to create a new

to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. When in Shanghai, in 1921, Mao joined. was not a nation China was, China Mao decided to change

sense of the word. Culturally, 400 million

of course, homogeneous; was chaos. The peasants, day to day at subsistence holdings The

politically and economically,

of them, lived from tiny

level. Tens of millions of peasant food to

families owned no land at all. Other millions cultivated from which they scraped out just enough peasant was fair game for everyone. robbed by landlords sustain life.

He was piland usurers, 13

laged by tax collectors,



on Guerrilla


at the mercy of rapacious blights, problem others droughts,

soldiery and bandits,

afflicted by stark

floods, and epidemics, died of disease,

His single and

was simply to survive. The slowly starved,

tough ones did. The in the fierce tens of froze to death.

winters of North thousands existed, running sewage

China and Manchuria,

It is difficult for an American of small communities in which water, disposal. there The no electricity,

today to conceive

in which no public services no schools, no streets, and no communities officials who in his own plot beneath within no paved

were no doctors, inhabitants illiterate;
and winter

of these

were with few exceptions called them out summer expressive idiom,

they lived in constant

fear of army press gangs and of provincial tary roads and dikes. The Chinese peasant,

to work on mili-

“ate bitterness”

from the time he could Dormant

walk until he was laid to rest in the burial the cypress trees. This was feudal China. this society were the ingredients to pieces. An external factor had for almost a century the unrelenting in exacting

that were soon to blow it contributed and greed of into and Russians j~lridical, and China record in these and

to the chaos of China: vied with corrupt financial one another concessions


of foreign powers. French,

British, Germans, commercial, American

from a succession

and feeble governments colony. (The

that had, in fact, turned

an international the China feudal.” 14

respects was a reasonably he knew He was right,

good one. ) Mao once described as “semicolonial

in his youth


Shortly National Hunan



Kai-shek Army, in

took command 1926, Mao campaign

of the went to


to stir up the peasants. in his native


he waged requisite in was

for land reform China how was then, Reduced


can be described to solve the land who fastened

as almost a one-man question. themselves stances, Naturally, nese

show. The fundamental to elementary

as it had long been,

terms, the problem landowners

to get rid of the gentry constantly

to the peasants like leeches and whose exactions impoverished. and redistribution eager such to retain the stabilizing a radical In the circumthis necesof the land. the support in Chisocial

kept the people sary reform: of the gentry society), dynamite. revolution While

there was only one way to accomplish expropriation the Nationalists, (historically considered and until eliminated. himself extremely north

element solution

But in Mao’s view, there could be no meaningful unless the power of this class had unpopular armies to

been completely

Mao was making

with the landed gentry in Hunan, of the Kuomintang Wuhan, was established rated a number the vanguard were marching

the revolutionary

from Canton Government

on the Yangtze, where a Nationalist in December, of Communist divisions in March, 1926. These elements.

armies incorpoBut by the time the outwas and

of Chiang’s

army reached

skirts of Shanghai, executed to purge

1927, the honeymoon secret police captured elements.

almost over. In April, Chiang’s the army

the radical labor leaders in Shanghai of its Communist

and began In the 15

Mao Tse-tung meantime up. The the left-wing Communists this period,

on G~{errilla Warfare in Wuhan the had broken advisers their was

government walked



packed their bags and started for home. During literally the Communists were having own troubles, and these were serious. The movement Those a rugged

on the verge of extinction. at Ching Kang Shari,

WI1O managed area in the As various Mao and to

to escape Chiang’s assembled haven groups Fukien-Kiangsi drifted

secret police had fled to the south and One of the first to reach this from Hunan. stronghold,


was the agrarian


in to the mountain local bandit

Chu Teh (who had arrived in April, 1928) began to molcl an army. Several more extensive. ganda patriotic operations supposed nature, chieftains were induced gradually join the Communists, District whose operations became landlords under Red


these activities were of a propawere “asked” to make secure base area, troops who were clirective was Committee directive o(fensive that in On

soviets were established; Gradually, the territory

were dispossessed; wealthy merchants contributions. commenced to suppress control expanded,

and from a temporarily against provincial the Reds.

In the early summer

of 193o, an ominous

received at Ching Kang Shari from the Central of the Party, then dominated required followed the Communist armies to take the

by Li Li-san. This

against cities held by the Nationalists. were not entirely of that month, successful a serious Communist the thirteenth 16 defeat at Changsha

The campaigns and culminated in September.

the single most vital decision

Introduction in the history of the Chinese the ultimate responsibility shoulders Communist for it rested Party was taken; equally on the

of Mao and Chu Teh. These two agreed that the was to abandon immediately Comin

only hope for the movement devising. munist Moscow Tevolution Marxist peasant? correctly vinced number

the line laid down by Moscow in favor of one of Mao’s own Basically the conflict that split the Chinese Party wide open and alienated revolved dogma gauged about this question: on the to be based Was the traditionalists

the Chinese proletariat—as and had was conThis deciout with Mao was that the


prescribed–or their

was it to be based on the potential,

Mao, who knew and trusted the peasants, revolutionary that the Cl]inese and too apathetic Party, consistency. wrong. of Kremlin urban proletariat

were too few in

to make a revolution. to be carried that

sion, which drastically Communist vigorous right, doctrine

reoriented History

the policy of the Chinese has proved

was thereafter


And it is for this reason is so frequently



by Peking. In October, belief 1930, the Generalissimo, with great fanfare was launched really were in the misguided with no difSuppresHow to become by Supa “Bandit was now that he could crush the Communists

ficulty, announced weak troops pression the

sion Campaign, ” This Nationalists The campaign by companies, Campaigns, apparent. platoons,

in December.

was a complete to the by battalions.

flop. Government Communists Three more

ran away

or surrendered all failures,


this fiasco. Fi-

Mao Tse-tung nally, adopt in 1933, the plans

on Guerrilla

Warfare y decided to

the Generalissimo of his German well-trained, and methodical by artillery every village

reluctant advisers


to commit divisions southof the Com-

well-equipped, to a coordinated munist-controlled ward, supported peasants hundreds from

and loyal “Central” compression

area. As the Nationalists and aviation, and town wired-in

inched and

they evacuated constructed blockhouses. for the

of mutually

supporting converted,

The Communists,

isolated from the support of the peasants found themselves deprived of food and informathe Commumorale sagged. It was to shift the base to march

they had laboriously tion. Chiang’s in this context Shensi Province

first time almost completely

troops were slowly strangling that the bold decision

nists. For the first time, Communist

was taken, and the now celebrated

of almost 6,000 miles was begun. This was indeed one of the fateful migrations its purpose, nist Party. Reds fought lished. columns mountains Tibet How many pitched during however, of history: the to preserve the military power of the Commubattles and skirmishes this epic trek cannot air attack. They now be estab-

It is known, were under

that for days on end their crossed innumerable and subboth tropical

and rivers and endured

arctic climates.

As they marched toward the borders of and swung north, they sprinkled the route with situations, but they were

cadres and caches of arms and ammunition. The Reds faced many critical tough and determined. as usual, Every natural obstacle, and there were many, was overcome. Chiang’s provincial troops, ineffective 18 were unable to bar the way, and the




of the Reds eventually



in the loess caves of Pao An. Later, after the base was shifted to Yenan, Mao had time to reflect on his experiences embodied in Yu Chi Chum and to derive from them the guerrilla war which he theory and doctrine of revolutionary


The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy.


control of the state, but only that it is a possible, natural, and necessary development in an agrarian-based revolua to tionary war. Mao conceived series of merging organization, base areas situated


AO HAS NEVER CLAIMED that guerrilla alone is decisive in a struggle


for political

this type of war as passing phases, the first of which and preservation and difficult

through of regional

is devoted terrain.


in isolated


volunteers are trained and indoctrinated, and from here, agitators and propagandists set forth, individually or in groups of two or three, to “persuade” and “convince” and to ento supply the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside willing

list their support. In effect, there is thus woven about each base a protective 20 belt of sympathizers


food, recruits, and information, The pattern of the process is conspiratorial, clandestine, methodical, and progressive. Military operations will be sporadic. and tertorism elements” multiply; In the next phase, direct action assumes an ever-increasing importance. collaborationists Acts of sabotage and “reactionary are liquidated.

Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts; weak columns are ambushed. The primary purpose of these operations other essential radios. equipped ceed with As the is to procure particularly guerrilla improve, arms, ammunition, medical force political supplies becomes and and better material, growing

and its capabilities indoctrination

agents pro“liberated”

of the inhabitants

OE peripheral

districts soon to be absorbed into the expanding area.

One of the primary objectives during the first phases is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement, so that it gradually designed acquires the quality of “mass.” Local “home guards” or militia are formed. The militia is not primarily equipped guerrillas. to be a mobile fightand bettering force; it is a “back-up” for the better-trained nated and partially lantes, They “voluntary” Their

The home guards form an indoctritrained reserve, They function as vigiforce merchants particularly to make obnoxious kidnap

collect information, contributions, is to protect and liquidate

local landlords, function Following preservation)


and collaborators.

the revolution.

Phase I (organization, consolidation, and and Phase 11 (progressive expansion) comes of the enemy. It is dur21

Phase 111: decision, or destruction

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


ing this period that a significant guerrilla establishment capable of engaging

percentage the enemy

of the active in convenfor

force completes its transformation

into an orthodox by “negotiations.” with the

tional battle, This phase may be protracted Such negotiations opposition. are not originated rarely the purpose of arriving at amicable Revolutions are made only to further then, is undertaken to buttress a position

by revolutionists arrangements


compromises time Few,

the strategic design, Negotiation, of gaining political, social, economic) from the

for the dual purpose (military,

and to wear down, frustrate, if any, essential revolutionary concessions

and harass the opponent. are to be expected

side, whose aim is only to create conditions line and guarof a “victorious situation.” guerrilla What bold, and

that will preserve the unity of the strategic antee the development Intelligence operations. his supply,

is the decisive factor in planning is the enemy?


In what strength? intelligent,

does he propose to do? What his morale? or stupid expect and imaginative soft? Guerrillas detailed pervasive.

is the state of his equipment, Are his troops

Are his leaders and impetuous?

tough, efficient, and well disciplined, the members service to provide questions. intelligence In a guerrilla nets are Guerrilla the answers

or poorly trained

of their intelligence

to these and dozens more tightly organized and excep-

area, every person without an agent—old priests,

tion must be considered boys driving storekeepers, 22

men and women, scavengers.

ox carts, girls tending schoolteachers,

goats, farm laborers, boatmen,



local cadres “put the heat” on everyone, all conceivable it they do. guerrillas deny all information



gard to age or sex, to produce And produce As a corollary, fog. Total inability Campaigns, characteristic thousands

information. of themcomand is a him,

selves to their enemy, who is enveloped to get information during plaint of the Nationalists of the French

in an impenetrable was a constant in China This The

the first four Suppression and Algeria. wars,

as it was later of the Japanese in both Indochina feature of unseen of all guerrilla eyes intently he strikes


stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around study his every gesture. his antagonists Because gage under superior When

his every move,

are insubstantial, information,

out, he hits the air; as intangible as fleeting guerrillas always because enof

shadows in the moonlight. of superior conditions of their own choosing; discomfiture.


of terrain,

they are able to use it to Guerrillas heavflows

their advantoge

and the enemy’s

fight only when the chances of victory are weighted ily in their favor; if the tide of battle unexpectedly

against them, they withdraw. They rely on imaginative leadership, distraction, suTrise, and mobility to create a victorious Sihlation before battle is joined. The enemy is dcccivcd and again deceived. Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious, nature; enemy to agitate importance and of short duration. to dislocate Many are harassing The in others designed and confuse than the enemy’s plans and mind of the Mao once re23

his commanders.

and the will of his leaders is a target of far more the bodies of his troops.

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


marked, expert situation enemy Usually

not entirely at running






away since they do it so often.


avoid static dispositions; least expects designed

their effort is always to keep the Only in this way can they reof action. trap, to from an “running are must of in into a baited

as fluid as possible, to strike where and when the them. and so be assured of freedom to lure the enemy or to distract his attention offensive. over a wide region commander to commands and applies take advantage

tain the initiative

confuse his leadership,

area in which a more decisive blow is imminent, away” is thus, paradoxically, Guerrilla necessarily be familiar local subordinate operations decentralized. with The This conducted

Each regional same

local conditions

opportunities. districts.

decentralization because

is to some exlack a But has

tent forced upon guerrillas well-developed system

they ordinarily communications.

of technical

at the same time, decentralization many advantages, and bold. particularly

for normal operations

if local leaders are ingenious

The enemy’s rear is the guerrillas’ front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical fashion: equipment, problems are solved in a direct and elementary source of weapons, Mao once said: We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy’s own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke. 24 The enemy is the principal and ammunition.


If it is a joke, it is a macabre payers are concerned.

one as far as American to tile Communists



Chiang Kai-shek’s American-equipped divisions were numbered in the tens of thousands. When they surrendered, they arms, turned jeeps, in mountains tanks, guns, of Americanimade bazookas, mortars, individual radios, and


weapons. to examine Mao’s strategical to military concept and tactical action of the of Yin-Yang. and male, of the and pervasive. and aggression. In terms

It is interesting This

theories in the light of his principle seems to be an adaptation Chinese philosophical they ancient of

of “unity of opposites.”

Briefly, the Yin and the Yang are elemental opposite polarities, represent is endless. dark and light, Their reciprocal dialectic, cold and heat, interaction recession


they may be likened postulate strength

to the thesis and antithesis theory is that

from ~vhich the synthesis is derived, An important concealed weakness, of minutes. within strength. of the Yin-Yang there is weakness, and within that they

It is a weakness of guerrillas

operate in small groups that can be wiped out in a matter But because they do operate in small groups, rear they can move rapidly and sec~etly into the vulnerable of the enemy. In conventional struction; tactics, dispersion

of forces invites deboth the illusion that the infantry 25

in guerrilla

war, this very tactic is desirable

to confuse the enemy and to preserve guerrillas are ubiquitous. It is often a disadvantage

not to have heavy

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


weapons available, them has until roads and well-used

but the very fact of having recently tied conventional tracks. The guerrilla

to transport columns to

travels light and

travels fast. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes an ally of tropical rains, heavy snow, intense heat, and freezing and dangerous, an unsuspecting found. The cold, Long night marches are difficult to but the darkness enemy. disadvantage, is equally some advantage true: In each The


his approach

In every apparent converse advantage

is to be apparent is not

lie the seeds of disadvantage.

wholly Yin, nor the Yang wholly Yang. It is only the wise general, said the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, who is able to recognize dlis fact and to turn it to good account. Guerrilla Chinese tactical doctrine pronounced may be summarized
“Sheng Tung,

in four
Chi Hsi,”


which mean “Uproar

[in the] East; Strike [in the] West.” the all-important principles of dison the other; to

Here we find expressed fix the enemy’s attention least anticipates Guerrillas

traction on the one hand and concentration the blow.

and to strike where and when he and disdiscon-

are masters of the arts of simulation

simulation; they create pretenses and simultaneously guise or conceal their true semblance. Their tactical cepts, dynamic pattern.

and flexible, are not cut to any particular is always governing.

But Mao’s first law of war, to preserve oneself and

destroy the enemy,

Historical experience is written in blood and iron.


movements content taneity; guerrilla

HE FUNDAMENTALDIFFERENCEbetween patriotic partisan is that resistance and revolutionary gtlerrilla the first usually lacks the ideological of spon-

that always distinguishes is characterized is organized it begins and then movement is rarely

the second. by the quality and then begins. and terminates when movement terminates A revolutionary

A resistance

is organized.

A resistance only when government Historical


the invader is ejected; a revolutionary it has succeeded or is liquidated. experience suggests that

in displacing there

the incumbent is very little

hope of destroying a& it has survived
sympathetic lation. The

a revolutionary guerrilla movement the first phase and has acquired the
segment of the popu-

support of a significant

size of this “significant to an appealing


will vary; a

decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. In addition port, such factors as terrain; program and popular supthe quality communications; 27

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


of the opposing


the presence

or absence


material help, technical aid, advisers, or “volunteers” from outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent government movement are naturally relevant to the ability of a situations will to survive and expand. guerrilla for example,

In specific aspects, revolutionary had been objectively analyzed

of course differ, but if the Cam-o movement,

in the light of the factors

suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough “expectation of survival and growth” might have looked something like Figure I. Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart somewhat like Figure H. Here Determinants guerrillas, in balance. superior tuary. Two others, tactical A, B, H, and I definitely Castro) favored the who also (unlike Although ability the had an available sanchad demonstrated an experi-

C and F, might have been considered Vietminh in guerrilla situations,

enced observer might have been justified in considering “military efficiency” equal; the French were learning. While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castro’s chances of success might have been estimated These analyses may be criticized ated after the even~ outcome

as approximately four to three. my belief have that been


to two, Ho Chi Minh’s as approximately it is, however,

as having been formulthe precould

in Cuba

and Indochina







Introductwn dieted emerged Phase I. At the present the development restricted week: +
new and fiendishly ingenious antiguerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. It’s a delayedaction liquid explosive, squirted from a flame-thrower-like gun, that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. Seconds later, fed by oxygen from the air, it blows up with terrific force.

some time






from the stage of organization

and consolidation—

time, much attention of “gadgetry,” to the problem

\s being devoted


A good example was reported

of this in News-


Apparently veniently admirals up, squirt, one even doctrine

we are ensconce armed

to assume themselves awaiting





in readily the arrival

identifiable guns”

holes and bunkers” with

of half a dozen to march and

“flame-thrower-like acquainted guerrilla There with

and retire to the nearest of%cers’ club. To anyremotely the philosophy war, this sort of thing is panaceas. operabe and sur-

of revolutionary funny.

not hilariously

are no mechanical

I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equiPment will not play an important made to improve cally reduced communication, there part in antiguerrilla food, medical, tions, for of course they will. Constant gical “packs.” Weapons in weight; and ammunition efforts should

must be drastirifle weigh-

seems to be no technical automatic

reason why a sturdy, light, accurate
“ July 3, 1961, “The Periscope.”


Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


ing a maximum

of four to five pounds cannot be developed.

And the search for new and effective weapons must continue. But we must realize that “flame-thrower-like guns” and bullets challenging are only a very small part of the answer and complex problem. in a revolutionary and scope of the has become matter; would of reto a

The position of active third parties guerrilla war and the timing, nature, assistance sponsibility however, given great importance, Basically,

to one side or the other to intervene

this is a political

for a decision

naturally The role

devolve upon the head of state. Any assistance given should, stop short of participation be restricted training. of aid is often critical. If extended to the aid must be given while it is still the movement; if to the during the is vulnerof life and operain combat. of a third party should and technical The possible timing incumbent revolutionary to advice, materials,


to isolate and eradicate

side, aid must be made available quite literally a matter

same critical period, that is, when the movement able and its existence death.

From a purely military point of view, antiguerrilla and eradication. In the brief definitions

tions may be summed up in three words: location, isolation, of each term, it are not terrain and possePawill be well to bear in mind rigidly compartmented.

that these activities careful

of base area or areas requires of the movement.

studies, photographic sibly infiltration 32

and physical reconnaissance,


Introductwn ration of guerrillas from their sources of information movement and resettlement reliable fl~xibility and presupposes and

food. It may require communities. and demands mando-type

of entire information a high com-




degree of mobility.


and helicopter-borne

troops are essential. must be used against effort must be made the guerto induce They must be constantly Every harried and con-

The tactics of guerrillas rillas themselves. stantly attacked. defections

and take prisoners. intelligent, with

The best source of informaand bold speci~c leadership qualities is absoin mind. under different ineffective

tion of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation. Imaginative, lutely essential. must
Co7nrnanJers and leaders at every echelon

be selected


Officers and NCO’S who are more than competent normal conditions when confronted situations Finally, will frequently with of guerrilla be hopelessly and totally warfare. the dynamic


there is the question counterguerrilla

of whether

it is possible flourish guerof the are the his sug-

to create effective of fish, each intent

forces. Can two shoals of the other, on this point; he is experiences

on destruction that

in the same medium? convinced White history they rilla war” is impossible. Russians (which valid criteria, occupation

Mao is definite If the guerrilla he cites)


“counterrevolutionary or of Mikhailovitch hand, during

he is correct.

But, on the other in Greece certain

of the movement indicates

the German This 33

that under


thesis will not stati

too close an examination.

Mao Tse-tung gests the need for a careful factors in each individual Mao Tse-tung considered predictable. contends

on Guerrilla Warfare political

analysis of relevant

situation. that the phenomena (and I believe them. about we have it is or, if guer-

are subject

to their own peculiar

laws, and are he is),

If he is correct

possible to prevent they do, to control experience

such phenomena and eradicate

from appearing, revolutionary

And if historical

teaches us anything

rilla war, it is that military measures

alone will not suffice.


YU CHI CHAN (Guerrilla Warfare)


warfare. pattern

N JULY, 1941, and Japan features

the undeclared

war between has been

China of the the orguerrilla the in in

will enter

its fifth year. One for unlimited

most significant ganization

of the struggle people

of the Chinese The development

of this warfare has followed and his collaborators

laid out by Mao Tse-tung

the pamphlet was published “Free China”

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla at 10 cents a copy. a member political


in 1937 and has been widely distributed of the Chinese commissar

Mao Tse-tung, Party and formerly

Communist Red

of the Fourth

Army, is no novice in the art of war. Actual battle experience with both regular him as an expert. The influence of the ancient thought military philosopher Sun Tzu on Mao’s military will be apparent to those and guerrilla troops has qualified

who have read The Book of WaT-. Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise, and deception were the primary essentials of the attack and his succinct
Hsi” (“Uproar

advice, “Sheng Tzmg, Chi is no

[in the] East, Strike [in the] West”),

less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2,400 years ago. The tactics of Sun TZL1 are in large measure tics of China’s guerrillas today.

the tac-

Mao Tse+ung

on Guwrdla



says that






time and space factors, established This seems a true statement torical ganized examples of guerrilla from the military, nothing

a new military

process. orpoint and

since there hostilities political, but

are no other hisas thoroughly

and economic primitive

of view as those in China. as yet encountered strictly limited guerrilla I have tried to present as the Chinese language dium for the expression

We in the Marine relatively

Corps have

war. Thus,

what Mao has written but me-

of this new type of guerrilla

war may be of interest to us. suitable

the author’s ideas accurately, is not a particularly of technical thought,

the transla-

tion of some of the modern idioms not yet to be found in available dictionaries is probably arguable. I cannot vouch for the accuracy the liberty purely repetitious. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH Captain,
Quantico, 1940 Virginia

of retranslated


I have taken matter that was

to delete from the translation




h works.


tWenty-One with one Problems was issued

years ago, but I see no need to amplify it. is frequently essays entitled

Yu Chi Cbz


of Mao’s later ( 1938)

K’attg Jih Yu Chi which

Chaiz Cheng Ti Chan Lueh Wen

T’i (Strategic

the An ti-jizpanese GuerrilLz

in an English version in 1952 by the People’s Publishing IHousc, Peking. There are some similarities in these two I had hoped to locate a copy of Yu Chi Chan in the Chinese to check my translation so. Some improvement from the Chinese. standard Japan; English but have been unable to do with is always possible in any rendering

I have not been able to identify titles all the works cited by Mao. there are, naturally, Mao’s fundamental moment numerous thesis.

Mao wrote YZJChi Chan during China’s struggle against consequently referThese For inences to the strategy to be used against the Japanese. in no way invalidate stance, when resistance of ultimate dissociates victory Mao writes, “The

that this war of itself from hope he might have

itself from the masses of the people that it dissociates Japanese,” over the

is the precise moment

added, “and from hope of ultimate

victory over the forces 39

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


of Chiang at that illusion



he did not do so, because

time both sides were attempting to preserve the of a “united front.” “ Our basic policy,” he said, “is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front.” Party then, or at any other time. Its basic policy guerrilla by Mao was the basic weapon in the pro-

This was, of course, not the basic policy of the Chinese Communist was to seize state power; the type of revolutionary war described tracted and ultimately

successful process of doing so. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.)

Mount ]Z@,

Vernon, 1961




stances, natural. dented

N A WAR OF REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER,@lerri]]a operations are a necessary China part. This is particuof a people a nation

larly true in a war waged for the emancipation who inhabit a vast nation. whose techniques and victorious characterized This are undeveloped imperialism.

is such a nation, confronted Under

and whose communicawith a strong these circumwarfare

tions are poor. She finds herself Japanese the development warfare

of the type of guerrilla be developed

by the quality must

of mass is both necessary and to an unprecewith the operations

degree and it must coordinate

of our regular These

armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it operations must not be considered struggle. as an They

difficult to defeat the enemy. guerrilla independent form of warfare. result They are but one step in the oppressor of their at a time

total war, one aspect of the revolutionary are the inevitable and oppressed extdurance. Japanese said: when the latter reach

of the clash between the limits began and

In our case, these hostilities imperialists. Lenin, in People and

when the people were unable to endure “A people’s insurrection

any more from the revolution 41

a people’s

Mao Tse-tzmg on Gwmrilla Warfare

are not only natural operations cause they, themselves Guerrilla lacking

but inevitable.” the quality

We consider gue~illa are of to agin

as but one aspect of our total or mass war beof independence, and objectives incapable of providing warfare has qualities may employ When a solution to the struggle. peculiar

itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment gressor nation. against a more powerful pierces deep her territory in general the invader into the

heart of the weaker country a cruel and oppressive manner, ditions of terrain, climate,

and occupies and society

there is no doubt that conoffer by the

obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage those who oppose him. In guerrilla advantages enemy. During develop the progress into orthodox of hostilities, guerrillas to the purpose warfare, of resisting and defeating

we turn these


forces that operate

in conjunction

with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached velopment revolutionary war. There that level of decombine to form the military power of a national can be no doubt that the ultimate and in its method of application, distinctive of guerrilla resistance characteristics. warfare We to national must have a political

result of this will be victory. Both in its development guerrilla policy. country first discuss the relationship Because warfare has certain ours is the

of a semicolonial

against an imperialism,

our hostilities

clearly defined political goal and firmly established responsibilities. 42

Our basic policy is the creation of a national

Yu Chi Chan [Gawn-illu War/are)



front. This policy we pursue people. There

in order emancipa-

to gain our political goal, which is the complete tion of the Chinese steps necessary in the realization 1. Arousing 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. There and Achieving Establishing Equipping Recovering Destroying Regaining and organizing internal bases. forces. national strength. strength. enemy’s national lost territories. guerrilla accord warfare with

are certain fundamental of this policy, to wit:

the people. politically,


is no reason to consider conducted in complete

separately antiof of

from national Japanese guerrilla political

policy. On the contrary,

it must be organized national question point guerrilla and not a

policy. It is only those who misinterpret hostilities is purely a military matter

action who say, as does Jen Ch’i Shari, “The one.” Those who maintain

this simple

view have lost sight of the political effects of guerrilla defeat. What is the relationship a political cause the people to lose confidence

goal and the political and will result in our warfare warfare to the peomust fail,

action. Such a simple point of view will

of guerrilla goal, guerrilla

ple? Without aspirations warfare

as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the of the people and their syrnpath y, cooperation, be gained. The essence of guerrilla On the other 43 in character. and assistance cannot

is thus revolutionary

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


hand, in a war of counterrevolutionary place for guerrilla hostilities. Because


there is no warfare by them, itself from therefore do


basically derives from the masses and is supported it can neither their sympathies not comprehend not understand guerrilla on guerrilla action, nificant Shari). have exist nor flourish and cooperation, guerrilla say: action, “Only There the distinguishing if it separates There and regular who

are those who do of a people’s can carry because insigCh’i who,

qualities are others warfare

war, who


operations.” say:

they do not believe mistakenly

in the ultimate “Guerrilla

success of guerrilla is an (Jen in which

and highly specialized Then

type of operation

there is no place for the masses of the people” there are those who ridicule by wildly asserting of the war undermine Ch’ing, resistance that

the masses and the people (Yeh

no understanding for one),

of resistance

The moment

that this war of resistance

dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment victory What that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate for guerrilla warfare? Though over the Japanese. is the organization bands that spring from the masses of the peoat the time of their

all guerrilla

ple suffer from lack of organization

formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units, Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; from an admixture people, 44 of regular they may be formed groups of the intact. army units troops with

or they may consist of regular

Yu Chi CJzan (Guen-illu


And mere quantity hundred

does not affect this matter. of several thousand and fobust.

Such units of several men. in their men selfThese

may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion men, or a regiment All these must have leaders who are unyielding policies–Iesolute, must loyal, sincere, be well educated in revolutionary


-confident, able to establish cope with counterpropaganda. be models for the people. leaders will gradually strengthening Thus eventual Unorganized of banditry of guerrilla Ch’i Shari), repute, indulge

severe discipline,

and able to such which

In short, these leaders must As the war progresses,

overcome the lack of discipline,

at first prevails; they will estabhsh discipline them and increasing guerrilla warfare victory will be attained. cannot

in their forces,

their combat efficiency. contribute to vic-

tory and those who attack the movement and anarchism action. They hoping militarists,

as a combination the nature is a haven (Jen into disguerrillas,

do not understand say: “This movement vagabonds

for disappointed

and bandits”

thus to bring the movement

We do not deny that there are corrupt in unlawful activities. that Neither might

nor that there are people who under the movement of organization, were we to judge and temporary study the corrupt has at the present symptoms guerrilla phenomena

the guise of guerrillas do we deny that of a lack be serious We should to eradicate and to inis indeed

time symptoms

warfare and guerrilla “This

solely by the corrupt attempt warfare,

we have mentioned.

phenomena efficiency.

them in order to encourage crease its military

is hard work, there

no help for it, and the problem


be solved immedi45

Mao Tse-tung ately. The whole people must

on Guen-ills Warfare try to reform themselves

during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla undisciplined
On Guerrilla


but only in the unorganized said Lenin,

and in

activities that are anarchism,”


is basic guerrilla

strategy? Guerrilla mobility, situation,

strategy must and attack. the terrain, It the the

be based primarily must be adjusted weather,

on alertness, to the enemy

existing lines of communication, and the situation In guerrilla attack stronger

the relative strengths,

of the people. to come from the west; avoid the solid, withdraw; When deliver a lightning engage a harass guerrillas

wart’are, select the tactic of seeming attack;

from the east and attacking the hollow; enemy, blow, seek a lightning


they withdraw

when he advances;

him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable and there hausted he must be harassed, Only and annihilated. spots are his vital points, attacked, dispersed, exin this way can guerrillas guerrilla there action and can be no armies. But, in of command. we have men-

carry out their mission of independent coordination victory Guerrilla spite of the most complete if mistakes warfare preparation,

with the effort of the regular are made in the matter based on the principles

tioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in which
“ Presumably, Mao refers here to the essay that has been translated into English under the title “Partisan Warfare.” See Olbis, II (Summer, 1958), No, 2, 194–208,–S.B.G.


Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


communications dously sequent towards

are inconvenient ultimate defeat

will contribute of the Japanese people.

tremenand contwo types guerrilla is imAs hos-

emancipation distinction warfare.

of the Chinese The

A careful of guerrilla warfare possible itself mean

must be made between fact that revolutionary of guerrilla

is based on the masses of the people does not in that the organization units in a war of counterrevolutionary the Russian Revolution; against character.

examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla tilities during in China; of the Abyssinians the Italians

those of the Reds for the on

past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese in China guerrilla war that is carried today. All these struggles have been carried on in manpower, and all have development. policy.

the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national been in accord with the laws of historical

They have existed and will continue The second type of guerrilla the law of historical units organized by the Japanese; churia here cite the examples furnished by Denikin

to exist, flourish, and to national directly contradicts Russian guerrilla those organized in Abys-

develop as long as they are not contrary warfare development.

Of this type, we may

by the White and Kolchak;

those organized

by the Italians

sinia; those supported by Chinese They

by the puppet governments in Manand Mongolia, and those that will be organized traitors. All such have oppressed the to the true interests of the They are easy to in the people. 47

masses and have been contrary people.

must be firmly opposed.

destroy because they lack a broad foundation

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


If we fail to differentiate rills hostilities arrive might mentioned, ate their effect when guerrilla


the two types of gue~ We might

it is likely that we will exaggerby an invader. “the invader that can organize warfare.


at the conclusion well diminish

units from among the people.” Such a conclusion our confidence in guerrilla

As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles. Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely “class” type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, carry on a guerrilla national without regard to class or party, of the than the much broader struggle that is an instrument

policy. Its basis is, therefore, said: “When

is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been organizing extent guerrilla a nation is invaded, people become sympathetic guerrillas to one another and all aid in to what the

units. In civil war, no matter

are developed,
(Civil War

they do not produce The

same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners” feature perhaps lutionary of internal necessitates of internal
in Russia).”

one strong is its quality and revoThis

of guerrilla purity.

warfare One

in a civil struggle

class may be easily united in a national class groups. units are faced with

fight with great effect, whereas war, guerrilla unification of different

the problem

the use of propaganda.

Both types of guerrilla

WPresumably, Mao refers here to Lessons of Civil War, by S. I. Gusev; first published in 1918 by the Staff Armed Forces, Ukraine; revised in 1921 and published by GIZ, Moscow; reprinted in 1958 by the Military Publishing House, Moscow.-S.B.G.


Yu Chi Chan (Guem”lka Warfare)

war are, however,


in that

they both



same military methods. National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions of the Opium War, since the Mukden ducted Spanish by the incident, Moroccans These differ. The guerrilla and those employed The guerrilla the against French aspects those of the fighting in Manchuria in China conthe and warfare

today are all slightly diflerent.

was not exactly similar to that which we conduct differences express the characterAlthough fact we “Wars in of all these peoples in different periods.

today in China. istics of different there is a general there struggles, every


in the quality wrote,

are dissimilarities Clausewitz independent

in form, This in On War: forms and

must recognize. period conditions, dependent tionally discover



and, therefore,

every period

must have its init is uncondiin order to

theory of war.” Lenin, requisite that history

in On Guerrilla

fare, said: “As regards

the form of fighting, be investigated of environment,

the conditions

the state of eco-

nomic progress, Again: abstract

and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.” “It is necessary formulas to be completely unsympathetic to and rules and to study with and economic aspirations. sympathy situations These

the conditions in accordance and the progressive

of the actual fighting, with the political of the in conditions people’s

for these will change

realization changes

create new methods.” the historical

If, in today’s struggle,

we fail to apply

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


truths of revolutionary error of believing impact of Japan’s has lost its historical olden days, guerrilla with

guerrilla Tou

war, we will fall into the Hsi Sheng army, “the that under the unit % guerrilla

mechanized function.” warfare

Jen Ch’i Shari writes: was part of regular


but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today.” These opinions are harmful. of the characteristics rived placing national peculiar war, but insist on applying from past history, our hostilities guerrilla struggles. If we do not make an estimate to our anti-Japanese to it mechanical guerrilla deof formulas the mistake

we are making

in the same category

as all other

If we hold this view, we wilI a stone wall and we hostilities. war of resistance war, which, atof and the extent strength, the decision,

simply be beating will be unable against Japan? although alone To summarize:

our heads against What

to profit from guerrilla

is the guerrilla of producing

It is one aspect of the entire incapable diminishes

tacks the enemy in every quarter, assists our regular pure expression military separable strength

area under his control, increases our national ments used to inflict defeat organized on our enemy.

armies. It is one of the strategic


It is the one and inwith we can-

of anti-JaPanese

policy, that is to say, it is special weapon which

by the active people and without

from them. It is a powerful

which we resist the Japanese not defeat them.



organization, matter JVhen



that is, the war of position and the war of movefrom guerrilla warfare. There differences such as those in supply, tactics, com-

ment, differ fundamentally are other readily apparent armament, mand; in conception of military considered


of the terms “front” and ‘(rear”; in the responsibilities. from the point of view of total numcombat units, of several score of organ-

bers, guerrilla

units are many; as individual men, to the battalion This

they may vary in size from the smallest, or several hundred several thousand.

or the regiment,

is not the case in regularly

ized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other depends guerrilla groups, units. As a result of this, organization In the case of is of a low primarily largely upon local circumstances. of equipment

the standard

order, and they must depend

for their sustenance

upon what the locality affords. 51

Mao Tse+ung The

on Guerrilla



of guerrilla in orthodox

warfare operations,

is manifestly

unlike There is

that employed

as the basic tactic

of the former is constant is nothing characterizes formation situation opment There comparable orthodox

activity and movement.

in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there to the fixed, passive defense war. In guerrilla general general war. also in the matter of leadership warfare, into a positional features deployment, that the transdefensive and develare

of a moving situation never arises. The

of reconnais-

sance, partial deployment, not common in guerrilla

of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are differences

and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. but In orthodox warfare, particularly of initiative command highest all supporting in a moving situation, subordinates, a certain degree in principle, to the guerrilla Stratewith those

is accorded

is centralized.

This is done because all units and must coordinate warfare, adjacent Only this is not

arms in all districts but impossible. their activities

degree. In the case of guerrilla

only undesirable

units can coordinate of the regular with adjacent strictures units. When

to any degree.

gically, their activities can be roughly correlated forces, and tactically, units of the regular by the quality

they must cooperate activity nor is it prima-

army. But there are no of cooperation of many

on the extent of guerrilla

rily characterized

we discuss the terms “front” that while guerrillas

and “rear,” it must do have bases, their

be remembered, 52

Yu Chi ClIan (Guerrilla



field of activity is in the enemy’s rear areas. They

themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile* of certain march of the Red Army or as in the case in Shansi Piovince), it cannot can. units operating

operate as guerrillas

As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken communication; independent large forces; to attack enemy bases capable lines of to establish operations of supporting all these battle

in the enemy’s rear; to force the and to coordinate armies on distant of differences warfare,

enemy to disperse his strength; fronts. From the foregoing between guerrilla seen that it is improper the Eighth campaign summary

activities with those of the regular

that exist it can be dis-


and orthodox to compare

the two. Further

tinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While Route Army is a regular army, its North is essentially guerrilla in nature, Eighth China Route for it operates forces to of orthoat P’ing

in the enemy’s rear. On occasion, however, Army commanders dox mobile Hsing warfare have concentrated were evident


strike an enemy in motion, and the characteristics in the battle Kuan and in other engagements.

On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection,

* It has been estimated that the Reds actually marched about 6,000 miles. Sea Introduction, Chapter 11.–S.B.G.


Mao Tse-tung

on Gu-mills


the precise out guerrilla temporary identity necessary orthodox temporarily Likewise, gradually

character operations activities,

of Generalissimo should be recalled. these orthodox


instruccarry their

tions to the effect that independent

brigades units

would retained

In spite of such

and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, they not only lines but often found it of the fact that in the situation, may to do so. This armies may, function guerrilla develop is an example to changes formed units

were able to fight along orthodox due units

as guerrillas. from the people and, when operating to

into regular as guerrillas, exhaust

as such, employ the tactics of orthodox these units function innumerable gnats, which,

mobile war. While

they may be compared him. They gigantic make and

by biting a giant both in front themhateful but our worry of cruel

and in rear, ultimately selves as unendurable

as a group

devils, and as they grow and attain practically guerrilla While operations, to Imperial perishing. activities Japan. to confuse

proportions, that

they will find that their victim is not only exhausted It is for this very reason are a source of constant orthodox mental

it is improper

with guerrilla

it is equally improper

to consider that there is a do exist, similarand this fact must be clearly the relationship as a warfare and with the minimize

chasm between appreciated between

the two. While differences

ities appear under certain conditions, if we wish to establish or if we confuse of orthodox the function

the two. If we consider both types of warfare guerrilla

single subject, We exaggerate 54

mobile operations

war, we fall into this error: of guerrillas

Yu Chi Chan (Guen-illu Warfare) that of the regular armies. If we agree with warfare
to emancipate


Tso war

Hua, who says, “Guerrilla strategy of a people seeking

is the primary

or with

Kao Kang, who believes that “Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppn?ssed people,” we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla operations hostilities. What these zealous friends niche, we cannot I have just quoted them do not realize is into their proper Then, not of our responand that

this: If we do not fit guerrilla promote only would mine those who oppose would


us take advantage be led to assume discharge

varying opinions sibilities they

to turn them to their own uses to undernot successfully

us, but guerrillas could

sllo~lld properly be carried out by orthodox forces. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of coordinating activities only with the regular were forces would applied, be neglected. warfare regular in purpose, is our forces and the Furthermore, strategy if the theory that guerrilla actually we would be divided would decline.

would be weakened, guerrilla hostilities form the regular our first reliance

If we say, “Let us transand do not place expect to see as war of resistance. from those of the warits to end beyond

forces into guerrillas,” we may certainly warfare

on a victory to be gained by the regular of the anti-Japanese can be divorced from beginning

armies over the enemy, a result the failure The concept that guerrilla regular

that guerrilla activities

is an end in itself and

forces is incorrect.

If we assume that guerrilla

fare does not progress elementary guerrilla hostilities

forms, we have failed to recognize can, under

the fact that develop 55

specific conditions,

Mao Tse-tung

on Gawrrilla Warfare An opinion that admits of such war. guerby and pracneces-

and assume orthodox characteristics. the existence Equally the purely of guerrilla

war, but isolates it, is one that that condemns is often

does not properly estimate the potentialities dangerous orthodox. is the concept This opinion corrupt their rilla war on the ground

that war has no other aspects than expressed phenomena behind which of some certain

those who have seen the guerrilla regimes, observed have seen them persons have indulged

lack of discipline, and other corrupt

used as a screen in bribery

tices. These people will not admit the fundamental sity for guerrilla

bands that spring from the armed people.

They say, “Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations,” This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people’s guerrilla war. A proper tween essential. operations ticularly conception effort of the relationship and that of the that exists beregular forces is guerrilla during insofar

We believe it can be stated this way: “Guerrilla the anti-Japanese become as the enemy’s war may for a certain feature, parHowbecause its paramount

time and temporarily

rear is concerned. importance,

ever, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular Guerrilla decision. operate both conditions, respective 56 warfare Orthodox as guerrillas, develop forces are of primary it is they who are alone capable of producing assists them in producing forces and may under the latter regular may, certain the decision. this favorable conditions certain own However, their under

to the status of the former. forces have


forces and


and their proper combinations.”

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


To clarify the relationship orthodox agreement war and guerrilla With guerrilla


the mobile aspect of of our strategy we may at

war, we may say that general element

exists that the principal the war of position. hostilities.

must be mobility. times combine sisted by general battlefield that this situation such combination

the war of movement,

Both ~f these are asIt is true that on the positional; it is equally evident it is true true that after the For

mobile war often becomes may be reversed; will become

each form may combine prevailing example, standards

with the other. The possibility of more have been raised.

of equipment

in a general strategical


to recapture

key cities and lines of communication,

it would be normal

to use Loth mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. cannot arrive at the victorious while we must promote solution guerrilla If we deny this, we of the war. In sum, as a necessary we must neither as conducted by


strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, assign it the primary orthodox forces. position stitute it for mobile and positional warfare

in our war strategy nor sub-






UERRILLA WARFARE is neither China nor peculiar historical suitable

a product


to the present day. From of wars and opprespossibilities. of

days, it has been a feature conditions, it has great

fought by every class of men against invaders sors. Under The difference, many guerrilla wars in history characteristics,

have their points

their peculiar

their varying proc-

esses and conclusions, the experience What China

and we must respect and profit by gained durof

of those whose blood was shed in them. wars waged hostilities But by the peasants that

a pity it is that the priceless experience cannot be marshaled today to guide has been that

ing the several hundred experience in guerrilla

us. Our only gained should

from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialisms. experience help the fighting Chinese rilla warfare and should ,ultimate victory. 1812, the Frenchman all of Europe, totaling several Napoleon, hundred in the thousand Russia was invaded Russia at the ln September, recognize the necessity for guerconfirm them in confidence of

course of swallowing head of a great army infantry, 58 cavalry,

and artillery.

At that time,

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


weak and her ill-prepared most important on guerrilla of Cossack cavalry

army was not concentrated. of peasants


phase of her strategy and detachments

was the use made to carry the Ruspeasants, the


After giving up Moscow, of organized

sians formed nine guerrilla men each. These, carried French on partisan Army. When with warfare

divisions of iibout five hundred and continually harassed

and vast groups the French regular

Army was withdrawing, blocked the way and, carried out counterthem. anand defeating

cold and starving, in combination

Russian guerrillas troops, rear, pursuing

attacks on the French

The army of the heroic Napoleon nihilated, and the guerrillas cannon, and rifles. Though various factors, and depended army, the function the regular extremely country

was almost entirely

captured many officers, men, the victory was the result of largely on the activities of of the partisan groups was

important. “The corrupt and poorly organized that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army and won the war guerrilla groups her ability to organize

led by the most famous soldier of Europe in spite of the fact that were hindered ment regimes was not fully developed. in their operations and arms was insufficient.

At times, guerrilla

and the supply of equiPIf we use the Russian ‘the fist and the

saying, it was a case of a battle between ax’ “ (Ivanov).

From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition internal to organize and intervention themselves of foreign imperialisms territories and the disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced and fight a in the rear of the army 59

in occupied

real war. In Siberia and Alashan,

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


of the traitor Denikin

and in the rear of the Poles, there

were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy’s rear but also frequently occasion, White the guerrillas prevented completely his advance. destroyed been defeated On one by regular a retreating

Army that had previously

Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were front. “Thus poverished ever-moving The reached several forced to withdraw was the

regular enemy’s unable at that old,



the im-

not only guerrilla”


but he found himself of guerrillas there in strength,

to cope with the time had only groups aged, of and

lVatw-e of Gu.erriL!u Action).

development thousands

the stage where

were detached micldle themselves

young. The old men organized

into propaganda

groups known as “silver-haired units”; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups children. These, guerrilla demned secondary Among the leaders were determined on general they political opposed work among

for the

Communists the people. of extreme amlies are units are of the

who carried

although warfare,


were quick and principal

to oppose

those who con-

it. Experience

tells us that “orthodox power; guerrilla

the fundamental

to them and assist in the accomplishment Many of the guerrilla until in battle

mission assigned the regular
War in Russia).”

forces” (Lessons of the Civil regimes in Russia they were able to dis-



“ See p. 48 n.–S.B.G. 60

Yu Chi Chan (Gwen-ilk charge functions of organized




army of the

famous General During

Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas, from

seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians political reasons’ that there were disparty, and of the

lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeat–aside the most important sentient unstable war political groups, There with no strong government

policy—was the failure

to adopt a positive policy guerrilla a purely operations. passive deto defeat the is a was con-

of mobile warfare. of movement Ultimately, Italians. relatively tributory.

was never a combination large-scale adopted

the AbYssinians

fense, with the result that they were unable In addition Even small and sparsely populated

to this, the fact that Abyssinia country

in spite of the fact that were not modern, Italian

the Abyssinian she was able for

Army and its equipment to withstand seven months. scale guerrilla Moreover, ing 140,000 During operations

a mechanized

force of 400,000

that period, there were several occawas combined with largetotalsteadto strike the Italians heavy blows. and casualties been Had this policy

sions when a war of movement

several cities were retaken were inflicted. winner, be solved,

fastly continued, the ultimate continue tions can probable.

it would have been difhcult to have named At the present time, guerrilla and if the internal an extension of such activities quesis political

in Abyssinia,


In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought Taiping Uprising, the English; War, guerrilla again from 1850 to 1864, during tactics were employed the and for a third time in 1899, in the Boxer to a remarkable 61

Mao Tse-twzg on Guerrilla degree. when Ch’ing Particularly guerrilla was this so during were

Warfare War, the

the Taiping and


most extensive exhausted

troops were often completely

and forced of guerwere not or per-

to flee for their lives. In these wars, there were no guiding rilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla with regular carried out in conjunction victory guerrilla was not gained

principles hostilities operations,

haps there was a lack of coordination. activity but rather

But the fact that of any lack in of

was not because

because of the interference of conquering

politics in military affairs. Experience ence is not given to the question

shows that if precedthe enemy

in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory. From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese most continually At the very and employed beginning, a positive Red Army fought policy alguerrilla tactics constantly. was adopted. bands, the As these over

Many bases were established, Reds were able to develop armies fought, new guerrilla regimes a wide area. These those of the regular

and from guerrilla into regular coordinated armies.

regimes were developed

their efforts with for the

forces. This policy accounted

many victories gained by guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. combined guerrilla both strategically The leaders of that They period properly primarily operations and tactically. with a war of movement depended

upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations. They developed 62

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla their guerrilla mined


bands into trained innumerable



then deterwhich

upon a ten-year

period of resistance difficulties


time they overcame lately reached

and have only in the anti-

their goal of direct participation

Japanese war. There is no doubt that’the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact and that the experience gained during our internal imperialism. struggles to us are There has proved many to be both necessary against Japanese and advantageous

in the struggle valuable

lessons we can learn

from the experience political leaders

of those years, Principal

among them is the fact that guer-

rilla success largely depends upon powerful

who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. SLlcb leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy. After September 18, 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three northeast provinces. cruelties Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the at the exand deceits practiced by the Japanese

pense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven periods. exploded years, The struggle can be divided guerrilla Ma Chan Salvation irito two activity Shari Army During the first, which extended 1933, anti-Japanese in all three provinces. from September

18, 1931, to January, constantly

and Ssu Ping Wei established Heilungkiang. Li Tu and the Self-Defense respectively.

an anti-Japanese

regime ,in

In Chi Lin, the National In Feng Tien, Chu

Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Lu and others 63

Mao ‘Tse-tung on Gt{errilla


commanded was great.

guerrilla They



influence political military

of these forces unceasingly, but goal, improper commancl and army, the


the Japanese

because there was an indefinite leadership, failure to coordinate operations to delegate whole unified. enemy. During January, improved. cided Chinese finally warfare, portant guerrilla the second period, proper political result

and to work with the people, and, finally, failure functions to the was feeble, and its strength was not the camby our from of

organization As a direct

of these conditions,

paigns failed and the troops were finally defeated which has extended

1933, to the present time, the situation by the enemy

has greatly have deof the have

This has come about because great numbers because of the participation units. The guerrillas

people who have been oppressed to resist him, Communists educated

in the anti-Japanese

war, and because of guerrilla or eight platoons after

of the fine work of the volunteer the people and in the northeast, and powerful regiments

to the meaning Already

it has again become an imseven of independent after them


and a number to send troops

have been formed, for the Japanese month. inspire These

and their activities

make it necessary month and undermine activities

units hamper

the Japanese

their control in the northeast, a Nationalist are not merely of transient contribute kIowever, National 64 to our ultimate

while, at the same time, they in Korea. Such but directly

revolution victory.

and local importance

there are still some weak points. For instance:

defense policy has not been sufficiently developed;

participation organization

of the people is not general; internal political is still in its primary stages, and the force the Japanese and the puppet policy governments is continued ExperiBut if present

used to attack tenaciously, proportions and people,

is not yet sufficient.

all these weaknesses

will’ be overcome.

ence proves that guerrilla the many methods

war will develop to even greater they have devised to cheat the

and that, in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese extinguish provinces. experiences such of China and of other counnatural and prove that in a war of revoluare possible, if the present anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in the

they cannot

three northeastern The guerrilla tionary necessa~. nature They

tries that have been outlined prove that


war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously. experience is written in iron and blood. We campaigns being waged Historical in China present

must point out that the guerrilla Their influence

today are a page in history that has no precedent. will not be confined solely to China in her war but will be world-wide, anti-Japanese



the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation of all elements The of our own strength particulars of such a comparison and are comparison with those



one phase


of the enemy, lute monarchy. industrial

several, First, the strong Japanese During she had made comparative production

bandit nation is an absoin the techniques of

the course of her invasion of China, progress and in the development of excellence monarchy her raw

and skill in her army, navy, and air force. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains endowments. an absolute of inferior physical Her manpower,

materials, and her financial and insufficient to maintain to meet the situation a vast area. manifested Added

resources are all inadequate her in protracted warfare or by a war prosecuted feeling over now


to this is the antiwar

by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the soldiers is not Japan’s army. Furthermore, China

by the junior officers and, more extensively, of the invading 66

YIJ Chi Chan (Guerrilla only enemy. Japan is unable in the attack on China; in excess of that number opponents. be victorious area. Their speedy tions, the invading strategy Japanese must

Warfare) to employ her entire strength at most, spare more as she must hold any other possible considerato a vast primary

she cannot,

than a million men for this purpose,

for use against bandits

Because of these importaqt in a protracted

can hope neither

struggle nor to conquer be one of lightning

war and or more


If we can holcl out for three

years, it will be most difficult for Japan the strain. In the war, the Japanese lines of communication routes for the transport portant considerations and peaceful brigands

to bear up under must depend upon

linking the principal of war materials. The

cities as most inlbe in-

for her are that her rear be stable to wage war over a vast She cannot of places, and

and that her lines of communication lines of communication. and fight in a number

tact. It is not to her advantage area with disrupted disperse her strength her greatest ruption powerful organized manpower advantage

fears are thus eruptions

in her rear and disIf she can maintain points to engage important them our Japa-

of her lines of communication. forces speedily at strategic


she will be able at will to concentrate

units in decisive battle. Another in captured areas and with strength. Certainly,

nese objective is to profit from the industries, her own insufficient

finances, and to augment

it is not to her

to forgo these benefits,

nor to be forced to dis-

sipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons 67

Mao Tse-tung that guerrilla territory warfare conducted

on Guerrilla


in each bit of conquered

over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at

the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei has absolutely China country backward. country facilities a country established is a country that This the truth of this assertion. half colonial and half feudal; and conclusion. it is a

is politically,


economically It is a vast population, and the of these factors

is an inescapable the terrain

with great resources in which for communication

and tremendous is complicated All are poor. operations.

favor a protracted of innumerable

war; they all favor the application The establishment the anti-Japanese bases behind

mobile warfare and guerrilla

enemy’s places

lines will force him to fight unceasingly expends people; his resources.

in many

at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly We must unite the strength we must strike of the army with that of the spots in the enemy’s of of

the weak

flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal his strength. change Thus will become of his forces and dissipation in the relative position the time will come when evident a gradual

ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning Although The 68 of our ultimate victory over the Japanese. is great, it is unorganized. invaded our country not

China’s population bandits have

This is a weakness Japanese

which must be taken into account.

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla merely to conquer and territory

Warfare] but to carry out the violent, policy of their government, regard to race. For this comwithout

rapacious, pelling


which is the extinction reason,

of the Chinese

we must unite

the nation

to parties or classes and follow our policy of resistance the end. China Abyssinia. China

today is not the China of old. It is not like today is at the point of her greatest hisof Communists strengthened and

torical progless. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement Nationalists war front has laid the foundation that is constantly being for an anti-Japanese and ex-

panded; government, strength

army, and people are all working with resources and the economic nation. are waiting to be used; the unor’ toward the goal of pro-

great energy; the raw-material of the nation ganized people is becoming

an organized

These energies must be directed

tracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. iNot only must those behind in every part of the country. Japanese as fathers oath that have taken our lines organize The for resistterritory those who to abject ance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied are few in number, they would prefer and death

traitors who accept the

slavery arc many. If wc resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours? The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivi-

lized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose tllc po]icics of their governnlent, as do vast international 69

Mao Tse+.wzg on Guerrilla Warfare groups. On the other hand, because China’s cause is righteous, our countrymen countries, win. The progress Chinese people guerrilla of the war for the emancipation of the will be in accord with these facts. The will be in accord correlated with these of operations with those of to guerincluding of all classes and parties are united. in many foreign the even Japan itself. This is perhaps to oppose the invader; we have sympathy most important

reason why Japan will lose and China will

war of resistance

facts, and that guerrilla

our regular forces will produce rilla hostilities.

victory is the conviction

the many patriots who devote their entire strength



1. 2. 4. These How 3. What What

OUR POINTS MUST BE CONSIDERED under subject. These are: bands formed? of arming guerrillfi band?


are guerrilla

How are guerrilla elements

bands organized? bands? constitute pertaining in guerrilla a guerrilla

me the methods

are all questions

to the organization which


armed guerrilla

units; they are questions

those who

have had no experience stand and on which indeed, How The ways: they would

hostilities do not undermanner to begin.

they can arrive at no sound decisions; not know in what

GUERRILLA UNITS ARE ORIGINALLY FORMED unit may originate in any one of the following

a) From the masses of the people. b) From regular army units temporarily purpose. c) From regular army units permanently detailed for the

detailed, 71

Mao Tse+urzg on Guerrilla d) From the combination unit recruited f) e) From the local militia. From deserters of a regular


army unit and a

from the people. from the ranks of the enemy. and bandit groups.

g) From former bandits In the present hostilities, employed.

no doubt, all these sources will be unit is formed from the people, assemble the

In the first case above, the guerrilla the people. This is the fundamental of the enemy most valorous their leaders call upon elements, them

type. Upon the arrival

army to oppress and slaughter to resist. They arm them the nation

with old rifles or bird that call upon the peoand for and aid In some or the call many of a among approve

guns, and thus a gtterrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout ple to form guerrilla other such where combat. movements, units both for local defense cannot fail to prosper. leaders

If the local governments they the local government all fled, the on the sympathy

places, where masses (relying upon

is not determined of the people

its officers have

and their

sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country) the people to resist, and they respond. units are organized. teachers, men, blood. Shantung, In circumstances usually Thus, guerrilla

of this kind, local to the Hopeh, Kiangsu,

the duties of leadership young students, soldiery, last drop Chahar, 72 fixed profession, Suiyuan, professional of their

fall upon the shoulders other educators, and those without in Shansi, Anhwei,

professors, artisans, Recently,

who are willing to exert themselves Chekiang,

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla










out. All these are organized

and led by patriots.

The amount

of such activity is the best proof of the foreThe more such bands there are, the better be. Each district, each county, of guerrilla should be squads, which, or, “I am a arts.” You that between

going statement. will the situation

able to organize a great number

when assembled, form a guerrilla company. There are those who say: “I am a farmer,” student”; the farmer “I can discuss literature There This is incorrect. is no profound

but not military difference

and the soldier. You must have courage. and if you have education,

simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, is so much the better. When military units. hostilities are the university times valiantly of war, and after and aggressively, several you take your arms in hand, you become

you become soldiers; when you are organized, Guerrilla

you have fought well-known Without directly

you may become a leader of troops, and there will be many regular question, soldiers who will not be your peers. of guerrilla warfi~re units the fountainhead

is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla from themselves. The second type of guerrilla ized from small detached commenced, guerrilla units

unit is that which is organ-

of the regular forces temporarily for the purpose. For example, since hostilities many groups have been temporarily A regiment warrant, of the regular detached

from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned duties. army may, if for the 73 circumstances be dispersed into groups

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla operations.


puTose Excluding

of carrying

on guerrilla

As an example China.

of this, there is the Eighth as an army, it is divided on guerrilla coordination hostilities. of guerrilla

Route Army, in North

the periods when it carries on mobile operations into its elements and these carry unit is essensituations, the operations This type of guerrilla activities

tial for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare is necessary. Second, until guerrilla missions but regulars. regular of guerrilla of regular Historical hostilities

with regular

can be develshows us that the hardships The leaders must be

oped on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla experience army units are not able to undergo campaigning units engaged over long periods. in guerrilla


extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the units utmost importance. is but temporary, to the organization after the departure As the guerrilla status of regular

their leaders must lend all possible support of guerrilla units from among the people. that they hold together of reguof the regulars. assigned guerrilla duties.. This

These units must be so disciplined

The third type of unit consists of a detachment lars who are permanently

type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organizathe borders of tion, we may take the Wu Tai Shari district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi these provinces, 74 area. Along units from the Eighth Route Army have

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla established a framework


for guerrilla



these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which of supply, cannot withdraw there is a possibility this system should of cutting be us?d. the enemy’s lines Severing enemy that forces

supply routes destroys his life line; this is one feature be neglected. conduct If, at the time guerrilla the regular from a certain

area, some units are left behind, operations operations in the enemy’s in the Shanghaiof regular forces.

these should continuing Woosung

rear, As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now their independent area in spite of the withdrawal

The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular or a company, guerrilla commander. forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, in miliwhich is placed at the disposal of the local If a small group experienced affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the applied, the intensity of guerrilla warfare

tary and political local guerrilla and if properly can be extended. methods militia,

unit. These several methods are all excellent, In the Wu Tai Shari area, each of these above is formed from the local home guards. In every North

has been used. from police and

The fifth type mentioned

China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued a mandate to depart county, to the effect that the people are not from war areas. The officer in command of the the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the to obey this mandate. They 75

chief of police are all required

Mao Tse-tting cannot stations retreat

on Guerrilla

Warfare at their

with their forces but must remain

and resist. from troops that ‘(traitor troops” Chinese

The sixth type of unit is that organized come over from the enemy—the employed disaffection ganda by the Japanese. and foment

It is always possible to produce mutinies among such troops.

in their ranks, and we must increase our propa-


Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, built politically and reorganized been accomplished, and the units reOnce this has units. guerrilla militarily.

they become successful

In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance. The seventh type of guerrilla from bands of bandits organization This, is that formed although difand brigands.

ficult, must be carried out with utmost vigor lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantage. pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, correct their political beliefs to convert In spite of inescapable types of guerrilla great mountain a vast sea of guerrillas. differences Many bandit groups to them. in the fundamental said, “Tai Shari is a and it is only necessary

bands, it is possible to unite them to form The ancients because it does not scorn the merest handAttention paid to the enlistof guerrilla that

ful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams.” ment and organization every source action will increase of guerrillas of every type and from is something

the potentialities war. This

in the anti-Japanese

patriots will not neglect,

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES Many activities of military knowledge, regimes of those who decide do not know to participate in guerrilla For

the methods

of organization.

such people, as well as for students affairs, the matter

whq have no knowledge is a problem of guerrilla type of such

of organization

that requires solution. Even among those who have military there are some who know nothing they are lacking The subject because in that particular

of experience. but includes As an

of the organization within

regimes is not confined the regime functions.

to the organization activities

of specific units the area where we may take a and individual with the sub these, are apcommander Under

all guerrilla

of such


geographical comfjanies divisions.

area in the enemy’s rear. This area may comIt must be subdivided formed to accord or battalions

prise many counties.

To this “military commissioners

area,” a military are appointed. there

and political the necessary pointed. sonnel.

ol%cers, both military headquarters,

and political,

In the military These

will be the of staff, who In

staff, the aides, the supply are controlled with acts in accordance organization, The locally,

officers, and the meclical perby the chief from the commander.


the political headquarters,

there are bureaus

of propaganda

people’s mass movements, areas are subdivided with local geography,

and miscellaneous into smaller districts the enemy situation Each 77 of

affairs, Control of these is vested in the political chairmen. military in accordance

and the state of guerrilla


Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


these smaller



the area is a district,


of which may consist of from two to six counties.

To each

district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters in accordance able. Although correspond functionaries guerrilla harmonize committee with are organized. Tasks are assigned troops availof the number of guerrilla

the names of the officers in the “district” “area,” the number assigned in the former case should be reduced to handle and to affairs, a the memsources,

to those in the larger

to the least possible. In order to unify control, troops that come from different military operations of from seven to nine members This and local political committee,

should be organ-

ized in each area and district.

bers of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters. All the people in an area should arm themselves organized bat group, the other a self-defense and be into two groups. One of these groups is a comunit with but limited guerrillas are organized first of these second While type is the unit

military quality. Regular combatant into one of three general three

types of unit. The The

is the small unit, the platoon or company. to six units may be organized. the battalion fundamentally than its own,

In each county, One such

of from two to four companies. in each county.

unit should be organized

belongs to the county in wllicb it was organWhile in areas other with local their it must operate in conjunction

ized, it may operate in other counties. units in order to take advantage 78

of their manpower,

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


knowledge information

of local terrain of the enemy.

and local customs,

and their

The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufhcient manpower is available, a ‘guerrilla brigade of from two to four regiments tion. A squad, leader. the smallest may be formed. of organizaof from unit, has a strength

Each of the units has its own peculiarities nine to eleven men, including rifles, with the remaining manufacture, assistant signed work. such squads form a platoon. leader, a political The platoon and when

the leader and the assistant with rifles of local

Its arms may be from two to five Western-style men armed bi~d guns, spears, or big swords, Two to four This, too, has a leader and an acting independently, it is aspropaganda the

officer to carry on political may have about

ten rifles, with


of its weapons

being bird guns, lances, and big which, and a an assistant leader,

swords. Two to four of such units form a company, like the platoon, political has a leader, ofhcer. All these units are under commanders

the direct super-

vision of the military they operate. The battalion and its personnel from company units entirely

of the areas in which organized is formed

unit must be more thoroughly than the smaller units. not deprive should be superior. If a battalion units, it should

and better equipped

Its discipline subordinate of

of their manpower

and their arms. If, in a corps, a branch units should not be

small area, there is a peace-preservation the militia, or police, regular guerrilla dispersed over it.


Mao Tse-twzg on Guerrilla




unit next in size to the battalion

is the

regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squads per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions form a brigade. vice-commander, In North lished. These to the regiment. and a political guerrilla may be regiments Two oficer. of from two to four comare comfrom the are shown of such regiments a Each of these units has a commander, cavalry units should be estab


panies, or battalions. All these units from the lowest to the highest batant guerrilla units and receive their supplies central government. in the tables. * All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defense units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must both military arresting suppression and harass combatant procure arms, then they must Their the be given and political and training. responsibilities of the enemy, of a guerrillaweapons hinder, They assist the Details of their organization

are: local sentry duties, securing information traitors, preventing armed enemy propaganda, When


the enemy launches

drive, these units, him. Thus, the They

with what units

there are, are assigned guerrillas,

to certain have

areas to deceive, other functions.


furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide

See Appendix.–S.B.G.


Yt4 Chi Chan (Guerrilla


the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defense the people. guerrillas organization unit as we have described, Thus the people the traitors canthe peace of to assist the step in not hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb will continue

and supply manpower of self-defense of universal

to our re~ular armies, ‘(The is a transitional forces.” for some time in The youth organizafor the purpose of conscription. Such units are


the development There Shansi,

reservoirs of manpower Shensi, Honan,

for the orthodox and Suiyuan. They

have been such organizations were formed

tions in di{Eerent provinces of educating However, not This the young.

have been of some help. and the confidence organizations was almost These were

they were not voluntary, and which their effect

the people was thus not gained. widespread, system was, therefore, cooperation

negligible. of


by the new-type of the members of these them-

organizations, voluntary

are organized When

on the principles the members

and non separation

from their native organizations


are in their native towns, they support

selves, Only in case of military to remote places, and when a weapon even if the weapon

necessity are they ordered

this is done, the government is only a knife, a pistol, a

must support them, Each member of these groups must have lance, or a spear, In all places where the enemy operates, these~lf-defense units should or revolvers, locality, 81 organize within themselves a small guerrilla to leave its native group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols

This group is not required

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla self-defense

Warfare units is menfor the and politbe organvol-

The puToses

organization of inculcating

of these

tioned in this book because such units are useful the people with military These groups should ical knowledge,

keeping order in the rear, and replenishing

the ranks of the regulars. in China. untarily. ineffectual.”

ized not only in the active war zones but in every province “The people must be inspired This is extremely 5.+ anti-Japanese to establish military organization a system of military important. to cooperate We must not force them, for if we do, it will be The organization army similar to that we have mentioned

of a self-defense is shown in Table In order

to control

as a whole, it is necessary

areas and districts along the lines we have indicated. The organization of such areas and districts is shown in Table 6. EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS In regard to the problem of guerrilla be understood which ment require is based simple equipment. upon the nature The equipment, standard it must of equipthe

that guerrillas are lightly armed attack groups, of duties assigned;


of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are as-

signed the task of destroying railroads are better-equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, or even what available they need, but must be based on what cannot be furnished is for their use. Equipment

“ Unfortunately, this table, as well as Table 6, was omitted from the edition of Yu Chi Chan available to me.—S.B.G.


Yu Chi Chan (Guen-illu



but must

be acquired




points to be kept in mind. The question ply, distribution, blankets, munition eventually. furnished Other for propaganda is established, with of equipment includes the collection, supand replacement of weapons, ammunition, materials, The supply transport, and facilities and ambe solved big work. but ‘of weapons can bird always guns,


is most difficult, particularly this problem pistols, Guerrilla

at the time the unit in the people are spears,

bancls that originate

Ievolvers, weapons

swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. elementary are added and as many newAfter a period type rifles as are available 0( resistance, transport successful ment by capturing companies attack, are distributed.

it is possible to increase the supply of equipit from the enemy. we will capture be established hand In this respect, the for in any transport. disare the easiest to equip, the enemy’s

An armory should production Guerrillas

in each guerrilla and

trict for the manufacture of cartridges, must not depend

and repair of rifles and for the grenades, bayonets. too much on an armory. The

enemy is the principal For destruction in enemy-controlled gether demolition preparation must be organized As for minimum one suit of winter

source of their supply. territory, it is necessary to gather tounit

of railway trackage, bridges, and stations materials. Troops must be trained and a demolition in the

and use of demolitions, in each regiment. clothing clothing,


these are that uniforms,

each man shall have at least two summer-weight

two hats, a pair of wrap put 83

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


tees, and a blanket. coat. In acquiring captures maintain and rilla made from

Each man must have a haversack this clothing, the enemy, in guerrilla should may we cannot depend

or on for

a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overfor it is forbidden

captors to take clothing high morale equipment district.

from their prisoners.

In order to by the from

forces, all the clothing be furnished stationed confiscate clothing in each guer-

mentioned These men


of the government

traitors or ask contributions them, In subordinate Telephone

from those best able to afford are unnecessary. with from is not necessary in lower up are equipped by contributions

groups, uniforms

and radio equipment can be obtained

groups, but all units from regiment both. This material the regular In the guerrilla forces and by capture

from the enemy. and at bases in par-

army in general,

ticular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. general, Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy supplies, they must, in If Western medicines China for some portion depend are not available, The problem of their medical upon contributions. lccal medicines of transport

must be made to suffice.

is more vital in North

than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments manders furnished nature 84 and brigades will find them necessary. Comup should be and staffs of units from companies

a riding animal each. At times, two officers will

have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor do not have to be mounted.

Yu Clai Clzan (Gwen-ills Warfare)

Propaganda guerrilla


are very important.



unit should have a printing

press and a mime~

graph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They mirst be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In ‘guerrilla areas, there this should be a printing press or a lead-type press. instructions,

For the purpose of printing training material is of the greatest importance. In addition accomplished to the equipment guerrilla to have field glasses, compasses,

listed above, it is necessary and military of guerri]la maps. An these things. hostilities of the National-

group will acquire

Because of the proved importance in the anti-Japanese ist Government with what and tile colnmanding

war, the headquarters

officers of tile varito get for

oLls war zones sl]oLlld do their best to supply the guerrillas they actually I-Iowever, themselves. need and are unable be repeated themselves. equipment guerrillas it must that guerrilla

will in the main depend If they depend

on the efforts of the on higher officers too the guer-

much, the psychological rilla spirit of resistance.

effect will be to weaken

ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY The term “element” refers to the personnel, war, entire its officers must loyalty as used in the title to this section both officers and men, of the guergroup fights in a protracted men whose qualibe b~ave and positive

rilla army. Since each guerrilla is dedicated

to the cause of emancipation so that in spite of any 85

of the people. An officer should have the following ties: great powers of endurance

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla



he sets an example

to his men and is a model for

them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla officers of this caliber would be unbeatable. that every guerrilla of such qualities. group with officers enduring I do not mean

group can have, at its inception, which can be developed The most important

The officers must be men naturally

dowed with good qualities the course of campaigning. ity is that of complete cipation. not present, particular habitants civilians. with nothing If this is present,

natural qualif it is

loyalty to the idea of people’s emanthe others will develop; can be done. When officers are first

selected from a group, it is this quality attention. of the locality in which relations In addition,

that should receive

The officers in a group should be inthe group is organized, them and the local be familiar are not enough between

as this will facilitate conditions.

officers so chosen would there

If in any locality

men of sufficiently high qualifications qualities may be developed There

to become officers, an ofEcer mabetween

effort must be made to train and educate the people so these and the potential terial increased. can be no disagreements

officers native to one place and those from other localities. A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition but only men bear the hardships war. 86 or position is no consideration, and determined can in a protracted who are courageous of guerrilla


Yzt Chi Chan (Guerrilla

Warfare) breaks regulations must be dis-

A soldier who habitually

missed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, ditioned advantage and a soldier who cannot upon keeping of certain break himself of the habit should be dismissed. It is a fact that during and patriotism the purpose continually and induce of betraying educate Victory in ‘guerrilla the war the enemy war is conmay take for

the membership

pure and clean.

people who are lacking in conscience them to join the guerrillas them. Officers must, and inculcate therefore, patriotism and

the soldiers

in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered punishment been should and expulsion by them. meted influenced summon and expelled, out to those who have

In all such cases, the officers

the soldiers and relate the facts to them,

thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating with dleir elimination Chinese nments and bandits traitors in the army begins goverbe from among the people. who have been converted should

soldiers who have served under puppet

welcomed as individuals treated and repatriated. their reorientation

or as groups. They should be well But care should be used during those whose idea is to

to distinguish

fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.





N CHAPTER 1, I mentioned troops should goal of the struggle

the fact that guerrilla of the organization

have a precise conception and the political

to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political that are the life of both the guerrilla tionary warfare. First of all, political trination mitted of both idea of anti-Japanism. activities Through depend them, upon leaders the indocwith the military and political activities armies and of revolu-

the idea is trans-

to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-

Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, of the enemy war of long duration, become shaken we may succumb to the temptations In a that the peoare likely to to understand or be overcome with discouragements.

those whose conviction is not deep rooted

ple must be emancipated the general education 88

in their faith or actually that enables everyone

revolt. Without

our goal of driving out Japanese ing a free and happy China, viction The political goal must


and establishconindiof

the soldiers fight without be clearly and precisely explanation

and lose their determinant ion. of guerrilla Hence, zon’es and their national a concrete not only to guerrilla with the realizahas issued a
for Organization

cated to inhabitants consciousness


the political systems used is important tion of our political pamphlet entitled
War, which should

troops but to all those who are concerned goal. The Sys&nz of National be widely distributed that should




rilla zones. If we lack national the essential unity and t}le people. A study and comprehension

organization, exist between of the political troops,

we will lack the soldiers objectives of imare some

this war and of the anti-Japanese portan t for officers of guerrilla militarists minded only in the profession militarists exists between is a method

front is particularly There

who say: ‘(We are not interested

in politics but that action military

of arms. ” It is vital that these simpleaffairs. Military goal. While

be made to realize the relationship

politics and military

used to attain a political

affairs and political affairs are not identical, to isolate one from the other. It is to be hoped pared or are preparing that the world of human

it is impossible

is in the last era of

strife. The vast majority

beings have already pre-

to fight a war that will bring justice

to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are 89

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla



today for the emancipation happy, and liberal

of the Chinese China that

is a

part of the war for the freedom the independent, A conception militarist plained There sidered to him. are three under the additional broad activities,

of all human

beings, and we are

fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. like this is difficult for the simple-minded be carefully must exto grasp and it must therefore matters


be conactivities. to


of political

These are political second, as applied unification spiritual

first, as applied problems

to the troops; as applied

to the people; and, third,

the enemy. The fundamental unification

are: first, spiritual the army; second, concrete in detail Political

of officers and men within

of the army and the people; and, last,

destruction of the unity of the enemy. The methods for achieving these unities are discussed in pamphlet


4 of this series,


in Anti-Japanese


A revolutionary

army must have discipline democratic

that is estabobedi-

lished on a limited

basis. In all armies, discipline,

ence of the subordinates for guerrilla \Vith discipline

to their superiors must be exacted. but the basis conscience. is ineffective. must be the individual of compulsion

This is true in the case of guerrilla guerrillas, a discipline

In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline in guerrilla forces, the necessity is self-imposed. for discipline Although exists. This discipline ranks is not as severe as in the ranks because only when it is, is the soldier

of orthodox

must be self-imposed, 90

Yu Chi (Xan



able to understand must obey. l-his within strength


why he fights and why he becomes a tower of

type of discipline the relationship

the army, and it is the only type that can that exists between of%cers is externally officer and imposed, man is

truly harmonize and soldiers.

In any system where the relationship characterized that


exists between

by indifference

of the one to the other. The the

idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal conception feudal type will one and is not in accord with discipline. internal Discipline and unity of a self-imposed destroy of the fighting charof

strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary acteristic of a democratic system in the army. A secondary liberties accorded characteristic is found officers and soldiers. enjoy political but discussed, the soldiers live under of the emancipation

in the degree

In a revolutionary and the quesmust too as of the people must

army, all individuals tion, for example, be encouraged. not only be tolerated


and propaganda must not differ


in such an army, the mode of livtrue in the case of guerrilla the same conditions

ing of the officers and troops. OKlcers should

much, and this is particularly

their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration war. It is incorrect the hardships the unification both horizontal and confidence so vital in in all to that to hold to a theory of equality of war. Thus

things, ljut there must be equality of existence in accepting and dangers within we may attain of the ofhcer and soldier groups, the group a unity

itself, and vertical, 91

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


is, from lower to higher unity is present that combat factors. There


It is only when



can be said to be powerful

is also a unity of spirit ihat should exist between The Eighth Route Army put Rules and the a code known as “The Three

troops and local inhabitants. into practice Eight Remarks,” Rules:

which we list here:

1. All actions are subject to command. 2. 3. Do not steal from the people. Be neither selfish nor unjust.


1. Replace the door when you leave the house.* 2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7, 8. Be courteous. Be honest in your transactions. Return what you borrow. of women. Replace what you break. Do not bathe in the presence Do not without authority search the pocketbooks

of those you arrest. The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.
hlany people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear.

Such a belief reveals lack of com-

+ In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds. –S.B.G. 92

Yu Clzi Chan (Guerrilla prehension of the relationship


that should exist between


people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? ciplined We troops who make the peo~le further our mission who, like the fish out of its native element, of destroying propagandizing his troops, by treating It is only undisenemies the enemy and by cannot live. soldiers we their

his captured

with consideration, strengthen

and by caring for those of his wounded If we fail in these respects,

who fall into our hands.

the solidarity of our enemy.



question example,

T HAs BEEN DEFINI~LY DECIDEDthat in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla orthodox methods. activities of the regular guerrilla strategy must If this were out army and

be auxiliary to fundamental a small country,

coLdd be carried

close to the scene of operations directly complementary be no question of guerrilla and able speedily

to them. In such a case, there would strategy as such. Nor woLlld the were as strong as Russia, for to eject an invader. a weak country The quesof vast size, has by the

arise if our country

tion exists because China, today progressed guerrilla

to the point where it has become possible war characterized such is not actually Although these may at first glance

to adopt the policy of a protracted operations. seem to be abnormal case. Because Japanese the territory garrison functions exterior 94 troops. or heterodox,

military power is inadequate, is without the such are three: circumstances

much of suflcient primary a war on

her armies have overrun Under

of guerrillas

first, to conduct

lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


establish guerrilla purely Such

bases; and, last, to extend participation local guerrilla war, with

the war areas. Thus, strategical conestab is

in the war is not merely a matter of tactics but involves

siderations. its vast time and space factors, Iishes a new military process, the focal point of which

China today. The Japanese are apparently recall a past that saw the Yiian extinguish the Ch’ing conquer of the British as China fantastic equipped the Ming; that witnessed to North Central America Empire

attempting to the Sung and the extension that As far are and India;

saw the Latins overrun

and South America.

today is concerned,

such dreams of conquest

and without reality. Today’s China is better than was the China of yesterday, and a new type hostilities is a part of that equipment. of the situation, If our disand makes

of guerrilla too optimistic aster. Though war strategy tilities Each methods

enemy fails to take these facts into consideration an estimate

he courts

the strategy as a whole, from

of guerrillas

is inseparable


the actual conduct of orthodox peculiar

of these hosoperations. to itself, and guerrillas. war, it


the conduct has methods

type of warfare

suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with that confront aspects of guerrilla

success to the special situations Before we treat the practical on which strength.” all military A military

might be well to recall the fundamental “Conservation of one’s own strength;

axiom of combat of enemy

action is based. This can be stated: destruction policy based on this axiom is con95

Mao Tse-tung sonant with a national of a free and prosperous of Japanese demanded imperialism. that government

on Guerrilla


policy directed Chinese

towards the building of this policy Is the sacrifice are necessary ourselves; the

state and the destruction

It is in furtherance

applies its military strength.

by war in conflict with the idea of self-preserthe enemy and to preserve

vation? Not at all. The sacrifices demanded both to destroy

sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations from this axiom. Its application and strategical conceptions of military action are derived is as apparent in all tactical as it is in the simple case of

the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position. All guerrilla methods should development listed below: 1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned defense; tactical speed on exprotracted; tactical operations units start from nothing we select to ensure of our own strength and grow. What and of

the conservation and the destruction

that of the enemy? The essential requirements

are the six

tactical attacks in a war of strategical in a war strategically terior lines in a war conducted 2. Conduct of operations regular 4. army. establishment of bases, A clear understanding 3. The between 6.

strategically on interior lines. to complement those of the

of the relationship

that exists

the attack and the defense. of mobile operations.

5. The development Correct command. 96

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrillu


The enemy,



weak, is strong in the we, on the other in the devel-

quality of his troops and their equipment; hand, are strong numerically considerations

but weak as to quality. These

have been taken into account on exterior is defensive

opment of the policy of tactical offense, tactical speed, and tactical operations cally nature, speaking, lines in a war that, strategiin character, protracted in lines. Our strategy

and conducted

along interior

is based on these conceptions. in the conduct Although dox warfare, the element

They must be kept in mind

of all operations. of surprise is not absent in orthoto apply it than hostilities. of guerrilla In the latter, speed is troops must be secret must be taken can be no of

there are fewer opportunities

there are during guerrilla essential. The movements and of supernatural unaware, procrastination of a negative


the enemy

and the action entered in the execution or passive

speedily. There

of plans; no assumption dispersion The basic method is the

clefense; no great

forces in many local engagements. While

attack in a violent and deceptive form. there may be cases where the attack will extend an enemy group), an attack action with it is more profitable maximum speed. to over a period of several days (if that length of time is necessary to annihilate launch warfare. conditions, and push tactics of defense The

have no place in the realm of guerrilla is necessary, such places as

If a delaying

ckLles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable for it is in sLIch places that the enemy’s arrangeand he may be annihilated. than we are, and it is true 97 ments may be disrupted

The enemy is much stronger

Mao Tse-tung

on Gz~en-i!la Warfare

that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although able to concentrate the principle weaker enemy tracted tactical in order to destroy to guerrilla positive guerrilla an enemy. warfare. of it a prolightning-like in proper on exterior If we and warfare desirThus, is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes of concentration is applicable by gaining by employing

of force against a relatively and make

\Ve can prolong war only decisions;

this struggle

our manpower and by operating

concentrations cannot

and dispersions; whole

lines in order to surround surround destroy them; if we cannot

and destroy armies,

our enemy.

we can at least partially w’c can calJ-

kill the Japoncse,

ture them. The total effect of many local successes \vill be to change the relative strengths destruction international tionary of Japan’s military sympathy evident imperialism, alertness, and the matter in warWhat is meant by initiative of the opposing forces. The power, combined ~vitb the to cause and tile revoluwill be sufficient

for China’s in Japan,


destroy Japanese of careful

We will next discuss initiative, planning.

fare? In all battles and wars, a struggle the initiative ;l~hen goes on between the- side that ilolds the initiative role becomes destruction.

to gain and retain sides, for it is its and

the opposing

that has liberty of action. it loses its liberty; of defeat

an army loses the initiative,

passive; it faces the danger

It is more difficult to obtain the initiative ing on interior 98

when defendon exterior

lines tl~an it is wllilc attacking

Yu Chi Chan (’Gwen-ills Warfare)

lines. This

is what


is doing. manpower


are, however, One of

several weak points as far as Japan these is lack of sufficient is tl)e underestimation sulted in the differences in turn, direction gradually operations have been of her military compelled is her cruelty to the inhabitants

is concerned.

for the task; another areas; a third which mistakes has rein the cliques, which, she has been in China in the over plans of strengtl],

of conquered military of many

of Chinese between productive to increase

forces. For instance,

her manpower

while, at the same time, the many arguments and disposition loss of good opportunities are frequently for improvement

of troops have resulted

of her strategical the Jalmncse more than of rcsourccs, that Fler offensive pointed Sl]e can never alrea(ly has

posi(ion. This exp],]ins tllc fact that although able to surround military

large bodies of Chinese is thus being \veak-

troops, they l)ave never yet been able to capture a few. The Japanese ened by insu~]cicncy the barbarism continues conquer When suing passing JapanH!. has Characterized machine of manpower, ina(lequacy

of l]er troops, and the genera] stupidity tile conduct of operations, in extent. but because 0[ the weaknesses day will come-indeed,

unabated, China. The

out, her attack must be limited in some areas—when

she will be forced into a passive role. China was passit’e, but as we warfare, with both guerrillas from the

hostilities commenced, a strategy of mobile

enter the second phase of the war, we find ourselves purand regulars operating on exterior lines. ThLIS, tvitll each of initiative

day, we seize some degree


Mao Tse-tung

ow Guerrilla


The matter of initiative lar troops. The Guerrillas in mind superiority

is especially

serious for guerrilla unknown to reguand the lack of if they keep of the

forces, who must face critical situations of the enemy unity and experience within

our own ranks may be cited. of the enemy. guerrillas Because

can, however, the weak points because gain the

gain the initiative

enemy’s insufficient vast territories; guerrillas countrymen; ers, guerrillas Both guerrillas can


can operate over and a barbarian, of their

he is a foreigner confidence

of millions

because of the stupidity and regulars must

of enemy commandexploit these enemy

can make full use of their own cleverness.

weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla advantageous enemy’s unable obtained When rear. With by orthodox groups are small makes it desirable to appear liberty and disappear such activities, forces. with more than the initiaof into to the enemy of action and for them in the is simply be

to cope, A similar

can rarely

the enemy attacks the guerrillas

one column, the situation

it is difficult for the latter to retain

tive, Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas unable a passive role. They will then find themselves beat off the attacks of the enemy. It is apparent arrangement pessimistic 100 that we can gain and retain of the situation and political only by a correct estimation of all military estimate

the initiative and a proper factors. A too

will operate

to force us into a passive

Ya~Chi Clzan (Guer-rillu Warfare) position, with consequent mistic estimate, duce the same result. No military leader is endowed to seize the initiative. so after a careful arrangement When a guerrilla by heaven with an ability leader who does and on factors involved. of the situation a poor estimate is to extricate on the situation. It is the intelli~nt and political either loss of initiative; an overly opti-

with its rash ordering

of factors, will pro-

study and estimate unit, through

of the military

the part of its leader or pressure into a passive position, No method employed situation can be prescribed

from the enemy, is forced itself. to be One the

its first duty

for this, as the method

will, in every case, depend

can, if necessary,

run away. But there are times when

seems hopeless and, in reality, is not so at all. It and seizes

is at such times that the good leader recognizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative, Let us revert to alertness. realize that to operate in gaining the initiative tive situation To conduct

one’s troops with Leaders must factor

alertness is an essential of guerrilla


alertly is the most important

and vital in its effect on the relaour forces and those of adjust their operations and to prevailing to local

that exists between commanders to the terrain,

the enemy. Guerrilla the enemy situation, conditions.

Leaders must be alert to sense changes modifications The leader them.

in these

factors and make necessary tions to accord with fisherman, who, with and to pLIll them water, the strength obstructions

in troop disposimust be like the of the of any controls 101

his nets, is able both to cast them of the depth or the presence

out in awareness of the current,

that may foul them. As the fisherman

Mao 7’se-tung on Guerrilla


his nets through maintains fisherman commander. position–it strength.

the lead ropes, his position,

so the guerrilla over his units. constant

leader As the of

contact with and control must change Dispersion,

so must the guerrilla change guerrillas employ their


is in these ways that

In general, guerrilla 1, When sufficient 2.

units disperse to operate: is in overextended defense, him. disperse to and

the enemy

force cannot encircled the nature

be concentrated

against him, guer-

rillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize When by the enemy, guerrillas of the ground withdraw. 3. When rillas disperse. 4. When the availability disperse

limits action, guer-

of supplies limits action, they
mass move-

disperse. 5. Guerrillas
ments over a

in order to promote

wide area. of the circumstances caution that prevail at the time in certain matters: as a not be

of dispersal,

must be exercised large group should


A relatively

be retained

central divided

force. The remainder

of the troops should

into groups of absolutely

equal size. In this way,

the leader is in a position that may arise. 2. Each dispersed Orders

to deal with any circumstances have clear and definite to

unit should should

responsibilities. 102

specify a place to which

Yu Chi Chan [Gwerrilla Warfare)

proceed, method

the time of proceeding, of assembly.

and the place, time, and

Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity ,to fall upon him and destroy enemy him. Concentration is on the defensive may be desirable and guerrillas when the wish to destroy

isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term “concentrate, ” we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary remaining guerrillas are assigned and delaying of conducting In addition When generally the enemy, of destroying for the task. The of hindering isolated groups, or of forces, he will guerrillas missions

mass propaganda. to tile dispersion and concentration of guerrillas, them. The what is termed “alert shifting.”

the leader must understand the enemy

feels the danger

send troops out to attack

must consider the situation

and decide at what time and at

what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. group has destroyed may be shifted second detachment. to another For example, area to attack after a guerrilla at one place, it and destroy a an enemy detachment Sometimes,

it will not be profitable

for a unit to become engaged case, it must move immediately. When Their the situation

in a certain area, and in that must move the enemy.

is serious, the guerrillas

with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack 103

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


him from the east and north,

and they must then


him from the west and the south. They rapidly disperse. They must move at night. Guerrilla initiative is expressed

must strike, then concentraare stupid and we operations, on the

in dispersion,

tion, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas and obstinate, however, field severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla

they will be led to passive positions understanding intelligence the things that

lies not in merely The quick

have discussed but rather in their actual application of battle. watches the ever-changing the right moment and thoughtful Careful guerrilla understand planning observers. is necessary of guerrilla situation


and is able to seize on

for decisive action is found only in keen if victory is to be won in method do not action. A plan is necesa prudent studied, include

war, and those who fight without the nature

sary regardless of the regiment. then

of the size of the unit involved; The situation of duties must be carefully made. Plans

plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case an assignment must

both political and military instruction; and equipment, civilians. Without and the matter

the matter of supply with local it is impossible

of cooperation

study of these factors,

either to seize the initiative that guerrillas The initiative

or to operate alertly. It is true plans, but even so, only followThe attack must must be considered. and retained

can make only limited can be secured

the factors we have mentioned

ing a positive victory that results from attack. must be made on guerrilla not permit 104 themselves initiative; to be maneuvered

that is, guerrillas

into a position

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrillu


where they are robbed of initiative careful planning

and where the decision

to attack is forced upon them, Any victory will result from and alert control. Even in defense, all our toward a resumption of the attack, our enemies is entirely of our efforts must be directed

for it is only by attack that we can extinguish useless as far as extinguishing of only temporary forces is concerned. rillas and regular This troops.

and preserve ourselves. A defense or a withdrawal

our enemies is concerned and is valid both for guerare of degree of execution. guerrillas and the

value as far as the conservation principle The differences

only; that is to say, in the manner The relationship orthodox Generally between forces guerrillas speaking,

that exists between is important there and are three


be appreciated.

types of cooperation

and orthodox groups. These are: cooperation.

1. Strategical 2. 3. Tactical


Battle cooperation. who harass the enemy’s rear installations are weakening of resistance. spirit They and

Guerrillas hinder the national

his transport

him and encouraging are cooperating in Manchuria with orthodox had forces

strategically. no functions

For example, of strategical

the guerrillas cooperation

until the war in China started. Since that time, their function of strategical kill one enemy, an)munition, cooperation make is evident, expend group for if they can one round of in its advance 105 the enemy

or l~inder one enemy

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla



our powers

of resistance

here are proportion-

ately increased.

Such guerrilla

action has a positive action Another Chin-P’u, the period example who Tungwhen

on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages of strategical operate our own countrymen. is furnished P’ing-Han, during cooperation by the guerrillas

along the P’ing-Sui, attacked,

Pu, and Cheng-Tai the invader when he held garrisoned our regular

railways. This cooperation continued

began when

cities in the areas, and was intensified forces counterattacked, of tactical cooperation, when guerrillas in an effort to we may cite the both north and

restore the lost territories. As an example operations at Hsing-K’ou,

south of Yeh Men destroyed the T’ung-P’~1 railway and the motor roads near P’ing I -lsing Pass and Yang Fang K’ou. A number organized of Honan. guerrillas Guerrilla of small operating bases were established, guerrilla action in Shansi complemented Similarly, during the south Shantung in the frve northern commanders provinces on the Hsuchow front. units disposiand to indecotheir and the

activities of the regular forces both there and in the defense campaign, with cooperated

the army’s operation mand of regiments must cooperate function tions, undermine pendent, would operation 106 to harass their

in rear areas and those in comwith the situation. their transport, action were It is their

assigned to operate with orthodox weak points to disrupt in the enemy

in accordance them,

to determine


If guerrilla result

the results to be obtained be lost and those that greatly diminished.

from tactical cooperation from strategical

In order to accomplish

Yz~ C/Li Clzan (Gwn-rilk


mission units

and improve

the degree with

of cooperation,

guerrilla com-

must be equipped

some means

of rapid

munication, mended. Guerriila

For this purpose,

two-way radio sets are recombattle area are responforces. Their transport, and sentinels. prinEven of the that to gather

forces in the immediate are to hinder and instructions enemy

sible for close cooperation cipal functions information, without regular The contribute importance. a strategical until tured precise

with regular

to act as outposts

from the commander

forces, these missions, problem of establishment

as well as any others

to the general success, should be assumed. of bases is of particular can be restored only by carry out some be capConsequently, This is so because this war is a cruel and procounterattack, and this we cannot indeed, and become guerrilla most of it–may warfare

tracted struggle. The lost territories the enemy

is well into China.

part of our country-or, by the enemy task to develop Thus the enemy intensive

his rear area. It is our over this vast front. In

area and convert the enemy’s rear into an additional will never order to subdue the occupied to become increasingly A guerrilla territory,

be able to stop fighting.

the enemy will have

severe and oppressive.

base may be defined as an area, strategically

located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without istic of guerrilla without a rear area is a fundamental over a long period characterof time shows u: I07 action, but this does not mean that guerof base areas. History

rillas can exist and function the development

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


many examples and it is fanciful ized by banditry guerrilla prehend The consider:

of peasant

revolts that were unsuccessful, characterSome could succeed in this era are preswar, if we

to believe that such movements, and brigandage,

of improvecl communication ent in today’s movement, the importance subject

and military equipment.

leaders seem to think that those qualities

and before such leaders can comof base areas in the long-term understood

their minds must be disabused of this idea. of bases may be better

The various categories of bases, Guerrilla areas and base areas. of bases. of bases.

2. 4.

3. The establishment The development


bases may be classified accor{ling to their locabases; second, plains bases; and, of bases in

tion as: hrst, mountain mountainous

last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages lished are at Ch’ang are strongly protected. P’o Chan,

areas are evident. Those which are now estabWLL Tai Shari, T~il~eng

Shari, Tai Shari, Yen Shanj and Mao Shari. “Il~ese bases Similar bases S11OU1LI established be not satisfactory for guerrilla warin in all enemy rear areas. Plains country operating fare cannot be established Hopeh case, Whether 108 is generally bases, Lut this does not mean that guerrilla flourish in such country there. The extent of guerrilla we can count development

or that bases cannot to be the

and west Shantung

proves the opposite

on the use of these bases

Yz.tClzi Ckan (Gz~errillu Warfare) over long periods of time is questionable. establish small bases of a seasonal our barbaric This we can do because not have the manpower run and because in plains country crops are growing. when advances, We can, however, nature. enemy simply does

or temporary

to occupy all the areas he has overof China anywhere. is so numerous Seasonal when bases when the

the population

that a base can be established

may be established Temporary

in the winter

the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer the enemy is otherwise the guerrillas occupied. When

bases may be established the enemy bases in the their with-

who have established him. Upon

plains area are the first to engage

drawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they place the next. and this is one little attenexamples of the establishment must be one place one day and another There are many historical aspect of our activity tion. Red guerrillas Lake region. We

of bases in river, bay, and lake country,

that has so far received establish

held out for man y years in the Hungtze should bases in the Hungtze in territory

and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses con trolled by the enemy There guerrilla occupied is a difference by the enemy free use of, the water routes. between

so as to deny him access to, and the terms base area and surrounded by territory Tai Shari, of Wu Tai of base areas. is a guer109

area. An area completely

is a “base area.” Wu Shari are examples

Tai Shari, and Taiheng On the other hand, Shari (the

the area east and north border zone)


Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


rills area. Such areas can be controlled while they actually physically departure, rather there, control reverts to a puppet

by guerrillas

only their area by

occLIpy tl~em. Upon pro-Japanese


nment. East Hopeh, Eventually, from

for example, was at first a guerrilla government the people, organized mountains, and inspired assisted

than a base area. A puppet the WU Tai of this guerrilla

functioned in the



area into a real base area.

Such a task is extremely diilcult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain tiguous garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones conthe guerrillas out. These are unable to drive guerareas remain to the railroads,

the Japanese

and puppets

rilla areas, At od~er times, base areas might of the enemy.

Ixxwll]c guer-

rilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to dle activities Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one of three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese between to see that either is assured. in the establishment of bases tl~c ar!nct] gtlermust be used and to train to Japan, to arm and puppets; Guerrilla or it may be divided leaders should endeavor last of these situations Another point is the cooperation the combatants.

the first or the


that must exist between of armed resistance self-defense

rilla bands and the people. All our strength to spread the doctrine the people, to organize units,

guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Jap:~nese groups. l“lleir political 110 instincts must be sharpened and their nlar-

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla


tial ardor increased. of liberty, Japanese can the young power. are not organized, eliminate

If the workers,

the farmers,

the lovers

men, the women,

and the children

they will never realize their own antiOnly the united strength of the people recover the measure of political and improve what factors in our the economic be proprotection


power that has been lost, and conserve we still retain. We have already touched What

on geographic economic

discussion of bases, and we must also mention aspects of the problem. adopted? to commerce

policy should “reasonable

Any such policy must offer reasonable and business.
tiJe interpret

tection” to mean that people must contribute money in proportion to tile nloney they nave. Fanners will be required traitors, to furnisl~ a certain is pro}libited. over the entire periphery share of tllcir crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of businesses run by

Our activities must be extended thus strengthen opportunity furthering of protracted

of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy’s bases and and develop our own. This will afford us equip, and train the people, thus policy the policy as well as the national to organize, guerrilla

war. At times, we must emphasize

the devel-

opment and extension of base areas; at other times, organization, training, or equipment of the people. Each guerrilla of attack guerrilla base will have its own peculiar In general, the enemy, his gains, will attempt numerous and defense.

problems in an en-

deavor to consolidate over a number

to extinguish

bases by dispatching of different

bodies of troops

routes. This must be anticipated 111

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla



the encirclement


by counterattack.

As such and and isolate

enemy columns are without devote our secondary effort

reserves, we should plan on usto continual hindrance

ing our main forces to attack one of them by surprise harassment. At the same time, other forces should When one column

enemy garrison

troops and operate on their lines of supply has been disposed In a there are to one of the others. Guerrillas

and communication.

of, we may turn our attention four or five military

base area as large as Wu Tai Shari, for example, subdivisions.

in these subhe came, while take

divisions must cooperate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which a secondary force harasses and hinders the enemy After defeating him.

in any area, we must

advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. tions to relatively When tions may traitors in those places. the inhabitants be extended have been inspired, equipped, and organized, cities and to include ne~v volunour operalines of All teers accepted, trained, communication We must confine our operaand small areas and destroy the enemy

not strongly

held. We may hold these at periods.

least for temporary

(if not for permanent)

these are our duties in offensive strategy. Tl~eir object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. expanded; attacked 112 Then our military activities and our organization the masses of the people It is of great must be zealously of the enemy that importance and with equal zeal, the strength and diminished. work among

Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla



units be rested and instructed, may be carried out.


such times

as the enemy is on the defensive, rest and instruction The development desperate conquer

the troops may get some

of mobile warfare ‘is not only possible war is a struggle. If China were able to of long-term

but essential. This is the case because our current and protracted the Japanese there bandits would speedily

and to recover her

lost territories, war on a national of the relation ment. Exactly

be no question warfare

scale. Hence, there would be no question and the war of movethe case. In order and qualmore trainbe hostilities into mobile Primarily, Political is actually

of guerrilla the opposite

to ensure the development warfare of an orthodox ity of guerrilla md standards

of guerrilla


both the quantity

troops must be improved. of training must be improved.

men must join the armies; then the quality jng must be emphasized nique The of handling Our improved. a gradual regimental internal from

of equipment the tech-

and our organization, discipline guerrilla must

our weapons,

our tactics—all must be strengthened. There politically.

soldiers must be educated change organization. must

must be and staffs,

formations bureaus

to orthodox At the same of suitable of equip Corn’ Orthodox

The necessary be paid

both political time, attention

and military,

must be provided. to the creation

supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards munication standards equipment of discipline must not be forgotten.

ment must be raised and types of weapons increased. must be established.


Mao Tse-t~tng on Guerrilla Because


guerrilla cannot


act independently of armed centralized. c[rective,

and beformations,

cause they are the most elementary command be too highly

If it were,

guerrilla action would be too limited in scope. time, guerrilla coordinated, cerned, activities, to be most with regular not only insofar

the same


be in

as they themselves is a function

are con-

but additionally

troops operating

the same areas. This coordination zone commander and his staff. In guerrilla for strategical general purposes

of the war-

base areas, the commancl must be centralized and decentralized command units, for tactical purtakes care of the their coordinapolicy regmding of commmd units,

poses. Centralized management tion within will result


of all guerrilla

war zones, and the general in interference with

guerrilla base areas. Beyond this, centralization subordinate situations


naturally, determined
true lower and

the tactics to apply to concrete only as these various
warfare echelons tvill provide when break higher policy activity. guerrilla area into is divided subdistricts. and while The the nature into


can be

in orthodox

communications strategy

In a ~vord, proper and inde-

guerrilla pendent Each turn

for unified





are divided


subdivision plans may alc

has its made the

appointed by higher by inferior

commander, commanders, commanders.

general of actions former

is determined su~~cst

natul-e inferior

of the action groups have

to be taken more

but cannot

(~c[;nc it. 1 llLIs local control.

or less complete



1. Each squad consists of from 9 to 11 men. In case men or arms are not sufficient, the third platoon may be dispensed with or one squad organized as company headquarters. 2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting. 3. If there is insufficient personnel, the medical section is not separately organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel, they may be attached to the administrative section. 4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks, any member of the company may be designated to prepare food. 5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifle. If there are not enough rifles, each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances, and big swords can also be furnished. The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions are assigned to platoons, it may be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others. 6. The strength of a company should at the most be 180, divided into 12 squads of 11 men each. The minimum strength of a company should be 82 men, divided into 6 squads of 9 men each.




Political Mobile

t Officer Propaganda Unit



Company Headquarters Message Section Administrative Section First-Aid and Hospital Intelligence Section


Platoon I Squad Platoon I Squad Platoon 1 Squad

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, RA~ Company Leader Political Officer Executive Officer Company Headquarters Message Section Chief Signal Administrative Section Public Relations Duty Personnel Barber


COMPANY ARM Pistol Pistol Pistol

PERSONNEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1


Rifle Rifle

Medical Section Chief Assistant First Aid and Nursing Intelligence Section Chief Intelligence Platoon Leaders Squad Leaders Nine Squads (8 each) TOTAL

1 1 4 1 9 3 9 72 122

Rifle Rifle Rifle Rifle Rifle 3 Pistols 98 Rifles




GUERRILL4 Battalion


Officer Headquarter’s

Executive and Three Companies


Battalion I Intelligence Section

I Machine-Gun Section
Message Center

I Administrative Section
Medical Section

First Company Second Company

Third Company

-——— —-----i I


Fourth Company

1. Total headquarters of an independent guerrilla battalion may vary from a minimum of 46 to a maximum of 110. 2. When there are 4 companies to a battalion, regimental organization should be used. 3. Machine-gun squads may be heavy or light. A light machine-gun squad has from 5 to 7 men. A heavy machine-gun squad has from 7 to 9 men. 4. The intelligence section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads, at least one of which is made up of plain-clothes men. If horses are available, one squad should be mounted. 5. If no men are available for stretcher-bearers, omit them and use the cooks or ask aid from the people. 6. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. The remaining weapons may be bird guns, big swords, or locally made shotguns.




TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA REGIMENT RANK Regimental Commander Political Officer chief of Staff Operations Section Operations Officer Clerks Intelligence Section Intelligence Officer Personnel ‘E RSONNE1 t 1 1 1 1 15 1 36 1 36 ARM Pistol Pistol Pist 01 Pistol

Pistol — Pistols Pistol Carbines Pistol Pistol

—— Personnel Administrative Section A~ministrative Officer Clerks Runner Transport Section Chief of Section Finance Traffic Manager supply Drivers Medical Section Chief of Section Doctors Nurses Total, Regimental Headquarters Three Battalions (441 each) TOTAL

1; 1 1 1 1 5 1 2 15 137

Pistol Pistol

60 Pistols 36 Carbines 124 Pistols 300 Rifles 184 Pistols 936 Rifles




OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA (INDEPENDENT) PERSONNEL 1 1 1 2 1 1 10 2 3 1 Carbine Carbine Carbine Pistol Pistol Pistol

BATTALION RANK Battalion Commander Political Officer Executive Officer Battalion Headquarters —. Signal Section Administrative Section Section Chief Runner Public Relations Duty Personnel Barbers supply Cooks Medical Section Medical O~ficer Stretcher-Bearers Nursing Intelligence Section Section Chief Intelligence Machine-Gun Section Total, Headquarters

I 6 4 1 30 As Available Pistol Pistol As Available 34 Pistols 12 Carbines 9 Pistols 288 Carbines 43 Pistols 300 Rifles


75 366 441

Three Companies (122 each) TOTAL

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