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The Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series - The Office of Scientific Intelligence 1949-68 (Vol. 1)

The Directorate of Science and Technology Historical Series - The Office of Scientific Intelligence 1949-68 (Vol. 1)

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I

The Directorate of Science and Technology

Historical Series
i

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7

I

,

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The Ofice o Sckntifiu IntelligenU; 1949-68 f

VOLUME ONE

(INCLUDING

ANNEXES It IIt

AND

III)

c

THE DD/S&T HISTORICAL SERIES

OSI-1

THE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, 1949-68 VOLUME
ONE
(INCLUDING

ANNEXES 1, 11,

AND

111)

bY

Kart H. Weber June 1972

Carl &. Duckett

Director Science and Technology

HISTORICAL STAFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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PREFACE

1

I n p r e p a r i n g t h i s account o f OSI's h i s t o r y , f u l l u s e w a s made o f two e a r l i e r c o m p i l a t i o n s .
The first covered t h e p e r i o d 1949-52 and w a s pre-

pared b

y

l

w

h

o w a s i n OS1 a t
The second

t h e t i m e of i t s p r e p a r a t i o n i n 1953.

w a s an u n o f f i c i a l document prepared by t h e O/DCI/
H i s t o r i c a l S t a f f t h a t covered t h e p e r i o d 1953-60.
These r e p o r t s c o n t a i n much d e t a i l , a good deal of
which p r o b a b l y h a s l i m i t e d l a s t i n g value.

I t w a s decided a f t e r r e a d i n g t h e above documents
t h a t t h e p r e s e n t v e r s i o n , covering t h e p e r i o d 1949-68,

would be w r i t t e n i n somewhat d i f f e r e n t f a s h i o n ; i . e . ,
t h a t t h e main body of t h e h i s t o r y would attempt t o
h i g h l i g h t o n l y t h e s i g n i f i c a n t e v e n t s , t r e n d s and
'

f e a t u r e s i n t h e l i f e of O S 1 w h i l e annexes would c a r r y
the d e t a i l s .

I n accordance w i t h t h i s f o r m a t , t h e

f o l l o w i n g annexes have been prepared by t h e a u t h o r s i n d i c a t e d and are attached t o t h e c e n t r a l t e x t :

-

iii

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The O f f i c e of S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e , 1949-68

CONTENTS Page
I.
11.

Background

....................
.. . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Establishment of OS1 and The Machle P e r i o d , 1949-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The C h a d w e l l P e r i o d , 1950-55
The S c o v i l l e P e r i o d , 1955-62

8

111.

19 40 59 62

IV.

V.
VI.

The Wheelon P e r i o d , 1962-63
The Chamberlain P e r i o d , 1963--

........... ...........
. . . . . . . . . .

VOLUME I
The O f f i c e of S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e , 1949-68

(Basic Text)
I

Annex

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P e r s o n n e l , Budget, O r g a n i z a t i o n OS1 and Atomic Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e i n c l u d i n g t h e J o i n t Atomic Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee
C o l l e c t i o n Support A c t i v i t i e s of OS1

Annex

I1

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Annex I11

V L M I1 OU E Annex

IV
V

The S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee and t h e S c i e n t i f i c Estimates Committee OS1 and ELINT OSI's Role i n Medical I n t e l l i g e n c e OSI's E l e c t r o n i c s I n t e l l i g e n c e Role

Annex
Annex

Annex

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VOLUME I 1 1

Annex VI11 Annex Annex IX X

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OS1 Publications

OSI's External A s s i s t a n c e Program The I n t e r a c t i o n Between OS1 and t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Agency

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I

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The O f f i c e of S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e , 1949-68

I.

Background

WW I1 s a w t h e first s t i r r i n g s o f U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e
i n t e r e s t i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . L a r g e l y under t h e impetus of

German development o f radar, missiles and d i v e r s e weapons-related t e c h n o l o g i e s , t h e separate armed s e r v ices and v a r i o u s committees o f t h e Office o f S c i e n t i f i c
Research and Development (OSRD) became customers f o r

s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e on f o r e i g n activities. I n these w a r t i m e y e a r s i n f o r m a t i o n on

such s u b j e c t s w a s most o f t e n o b t a i n e d through combat i n t e l l i g e n c e and t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of c a p t u r e d materiel,
w i t h o c c a s i o n a l assists from c l a n d e s t i n e and i n t e r c e p t

operations.

B r i t i s h s u c c e s s i n fathoming German secret

weapons programs c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e awakening of i n t e r e s t i n U.S. o f f i c i a l circles.

I n t h e e a r l y 40s, however, no discrete U.S. o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d be labeled an "off ice of s c i e n t i f i c intelligence". S c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e

was more an o f f s h o o t o f t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e research
and development (R&D) e l e m e n t s t h a n an e n t i t y i n i t s
I
I

own r i g h t .

I n rather d i s t i n c t c o n t r a s t , t h e B r i t i s h

had an i d e n t i f i a b l e u n i t under Dr. R. V. Jones i n t h e

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I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch, A i r M i n i s t r y which p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e w a r t i m e e f f o r t s a g a i n s t G e r m a n a i r c r a f t and secret weapons programs. One e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s g e n e r a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s
i n t h e U.S. w a s a f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e ' u n i t , t h e
I
1

I 1

Foreign I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch, in t h e Manhattan Engineering
D i s t r i c t (MED), t h e w a r t i m e agency under General
Leslie Groves concerned w i t h n u c l e a r weapons develop-

ment.

I t may be recalled t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e fear w a s

f e l t i n some q u a r t e r s , as t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f n u c l e a r

weapons seemed i n c r e a s i n g l y a s s u r e d , t h a t t h e Germans might be c a r r y i n g on a n u c l e a r weapons program.
It

was r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e e a r l y experiments on atomic
f i s s i o n had been performed by Germans, n o t a b l y t h e Nobel Prize winners O t t o Hahn and L i s a Meitner, and hence German u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s of n u c l e a r weapons was as great as o u r s .
Attempts to

e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of a German program through

c l a n d e s t i n e o p e r a t i o n s were n o t a l t o g e t h e r r e a s s u r i n g . Anxiety c o n t i n u e d throughout t h e w a r in t h e West and even i n t o t h e f i n a l stages of t h e w a r a g a i n s t Japan.
A t t h e c l o s e of t h e war, w h i l e t h e s o u l - s e a r c h i n g

i n t o t h e P e a r l Harbor disaster w a s t a k i n g place, t h e

assets of the O f f i c e of S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e s (OSS) were
t r a n s f e r r e d i n 1946 t o an i n t e r i m agency, t h e Central
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r
I n t e l l i g e n c e Group ( C I G ) , under t h e g e n e r a l s u r v e i l l a n c e of a N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A u t h o r i t y .
This

w a s t h e f i r s t a t t e m p t t o c o n s o l i d a t e and c e n t r a l i z e
t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l i n t e l l i g e n c e f u n c t i o n s of t h e U.S.

Government. I n C I G t h e a n a l y t i c a l f u n c t i o n s were c e n t e r e d i n t h e O f f i c e of Research and E v a l u a t i o n (Om).* Under t h e p e r s i s t e n t u r g i n g of t h e J o i n t Research and Development Board (JRDB),**
t h e peace-time s u c c e s s o r

t o t h e OSRDl

I

1

Through an

agreement be tween General Groves and General Hoyt S . Vandenberg, t h e Director of t h e C I G , t h e F o r e i g n I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch of MED was t r a n s f e r r e d t o *The O f f ice of Research and E v a l u a t i o n , o r g a n i z e d 22 J u l y 1946, w a s renamed t h e O f f i c e of Reports and E s t i m a t e s on 27 October of t h e same y e a r . **Eventually a n agreement, e n t i t l e d "Program f o r JRDB-CIG c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f i e l d of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e , " w a s s i g n e d by Gen. Hoyt S . Vandenberg and D r . Vannevar Bush on 10 January 1947. The agreement followed much d i s c u s s i o n and i n v e s t i g a t i o n by JRDB. I t w a s perhaps t h e first h i g h - l e v e l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of combining i n t e l l i g e n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h s c i e n t i f i c and m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s i n t h e p l a n n i n g of weapons R&D i n t h e U.S.
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In its teatimony before t h e Eberstadt Conmitee of
t h e Hoover Commission* i n 1948, t h e JRDB voiced

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its general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e

support i t was r e c e i v i n g .

Prompted by t h i s view,

which one can imagine was presented w i t h vigor by

Dr. Bush (Chairman, RDB) backed up by Ralph C l a r k ,
t h e Eberstadt Committee i n t u r n expressed its view

as follows:
ed o v e r t h e n a t i o n ' s inadequacies i n t h e f i e l d s of s c i e n t i f i c and medical i n t e l l i g e n c e . There are d i f f i c u l t i e s p e c u l i a r t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n which t h e Committee has n o t over-

"The Committee is p a r t i c u l a r l y concern-

looked. Y e t the v i t a l importance of reliable and up-to-date s c i e n t i f i c and medical i n f o r mation is such as t o call f o r f a r greater e f f o r t s t h a n appear t o have been devoted t o t h i s e s s e n t i a l need i n t h e past."

P e r s i s t e n t JRDB prodding of C I G and C I A may w e l l have been t h e m s important e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e l e a d i n g t o ot
t h e e v e n t u a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t of OSI.
With t h e passage of ' t h e National S e c u r i t y A c t

of 1947 and t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e CIA, t h e heretofore
I
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u n c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e CIG gave way t o t h e s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d mission of a greatly s t r e n g t h e n e d and c e n t r a l k z e d i n t e l l i g e n c e s e r v i c e , t h e CIA.
The

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change t o a more encompassing r o l e f o r C I A and t h e growing capabilities of t h e m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e

More p r o p e r l y named t h e Committee on t h e National S e c u r i t y O r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e Commission on Reorganization of t h e Executive Branch of t h e Government.

*

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a g e n c i e s prompted Admiral H i l l e n k o e t t e r , who had succeeded General Vandenberg, t o ask D r . Bush i n
1948 w h e t h e r t h e o l d JRDB-CIG agreement s h o u l d

n o t be s u p p l a n t e d .

Bush's r e p l y was b o t h a s s e n t

and complaint f o r h e f e l t t h a t t h e Agency had never r e a l l y begun t o s a t i s f y JRDB's needs.
He a g r e e d ,

however, i n a l e t t e r of 26 March 1948 t o s e t a s i d e t h e
formal agreement.

I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g and estimate producing f u n c t i o n s of t h e new Agency were more f i r m l y r o o t e d and its r e s o u r c e s g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d o v e r those of t h e o l d . More o r less c o n c u r r e n t l y ,

t h e p e r i o d of u n c e r t a i n t y about t h e

true intentions
Doubts

of t h e USSR and its t h r e a t t o t h e U.S. ended. a b o u t t h e r e a l i t y of a U.S. monopoly i n n u c l e a r

weapons were f e d by r e p o r t s of S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n
t h e advanced technology a c q u i r e d from t h e Germans.

There w a s an i n c r e a s i n g s e n s e of urgency a b o u t s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e p o s t u r e .
A t about t h e same t i m e as t h e Eberstadt C o m m i t t e e

w a s making its review f o r t h e Hoover Commission i n
1948 a n o t h e r and s e p a r a t e review w a s being conducted

f o r t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Council (NSC) by a team c o n s i s t i n g of A l l e n W . D u l l e s , W i l l i a m H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa. The l a t t e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n
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r e s u l t e d i n t h e s o - c a l l e d D u l l e s Report of 1 January 1949 which had t h i s t o s a y about s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l ligence:
" W e b e l i e v e t h a t there is an obvious need f o r more c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e . Where c e n t r a l i z a t i o n is n o t p r a c t i c a l there s h o u l d be t h e c l o s e s t c o o r d i n a t i o n among t h e e x i s t i n g a g e n c i e s through t h e u s e of committees s u c h as t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l atomic energy

would be t h e l o g i c a l focal p o i n t f o r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n and appropriate c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e . There appears o overridinn re o r the segregation within t h e O f f i c e of S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s , t o r e a t t a c h t h i s Group t o t h e even though some y f o r s e c u r i t y reasons."*
"To f u l f i l l its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as t h e c h i e f a n a l y t i c a l and e v a l u a t i n g u n i t f o r

s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e , and c o n s e q u e n t l y a s t h e p r i n c i p a l g u i d e f o r c o l l e c t i o n , t h e Branch would have t o be s t a f f e d by s c i e n t i s t s of t h e h i g h e s t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . W appreciate t h a t i n e s u c h a Branch i t would be impossible t o o b t a i n a l e a d i n g s c i e n t i s t f o r each of t h e many segments of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
* e u n d e r s t a n d t h a t s i n c e t h i s r e p o r t was w r i t t e n W steps have been t a k e n t o c r e a t e a separate O f f i c Scientifi l l i g e n c e which is t o i n c l u d e t h e

e
. .

(Author's Note: The f o r e g o i n g s e n e n c e o e t o t h e D u l l e s Report. NSC a p p r o v a l of t h e p o r t i o n s of t h e D u l l e s Report d e a l i n g w i t h t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e d i d n o t come u n t i l 7 J u l y 1949. CIA i n t h e meantime had moved t o e s t a b l i s h OS1 w i t h o u t w a i t i n g f o r NSC a c t i o n . )

kpf_

b u t w e b e l i e v e t h a t a s t a f f of moderate s i z e and of high q u a l i t y can cope w i t h t h e normal research and e v a l u a t i o n , coo p t i n g , where n e c e s s a r y , p e r s o n n e l from s u c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s a s t h e Research and Development Board and t h e A t o m i c Energy Commission. lt Under t h e impetus of t h e Hoover Commission and
Dulles r e p o r t s , t h e p r e s s u r e on C I A and t h e DOD t o

g e t on w i t h s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e mounted.

The

way was paved f o r a s t r o n g e r C I A s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l ligence e f f o r t .
11.

Establishment of OS1 and The Machle P e r i o d ,
1949 50

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A major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of C I A took p l a c e i n
1948 under t h e t e n u r e of t h e t h e n DCI, Admiral

Roscoe H i l l e n k o e t t e r .

The p r o c e s s o f s p l i t t i n g up

t h e former ORE, w h i c h c o n t a i n e d p o l i t i c a l , economic,

and s c i e n t i f i c u n i t s , among o t h e r s , w a s begun.*

I

I

The a c t i v a t i o n date f o r O S 1 was
1 January 1949.

* I n t i m e n o t o n l y OS1 b u t a l s o t h e O f f i c e o f Research and Reports (economic, b a s i c and g e o g r a p h i c ) , t h e O f f i c e of C o l l e c t i o n and Dissemination ( f o r e r u n n e r o f OCR), t h e O f f i c e of N a t i o n a l Estimates, t h e O f f i c e of C u r r e n t I n t e l l i g e n c e , and t h e O f f i c e of I n t e l l i g e n c e C o o r d i n a t i o n emerged. **See Annex I.
I

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Because of mounting f r u s t r a t i o n and h i s longi n g t o r e t u r n t o what d o u b t l e s s were i n h i s view more l e g i t i m a t e p r o f e s s i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s ,
l e f t C I A i n f a l l of 1948 j u s t before t h e

1 establish-

ment of OSI.

His successor i n C I A w a s Dr. Willard Machle,

who became t h e f i r s t A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r f o r S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e on 1 January 1949.
Machle was a dynamic

person of wide interests w i t h degrees i n s c i e n c e and
p h y s i o l o g y , teaching experience, many y e a r s i n

i n d u s t r i a l medicine, a Colonel’s commission i n t h e
Army, and wartime experience as t h e D i r e c t o r of

Research and Commanding O f f i c e r of t h e Armored Medical
Research Laboratory.

Faced w i t h a h a l f - f i l l e d T/O,

Machle s e t o u t t o r e c r u i t s t a f f t o implement h i s new

OS1 c h a r t e r .

In 1949 t h e problem of r e c r u i t i n g q u a l i f i e d
s c i e n t i s t s and engineers for government s e r v i c e was d i f f i c u l t a t best. Not only were such people i n

s h o r t supply as a r e s u l t of t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n of e d u c a t i o n a l programs during t h e War b u t a l s o many
of t h e younger g e n e r a t i o n had had enough of govern-

ment s e r v i c e i n t h e m i l i t a r y and were more i n t e r e s t e d i n i n d u s t r y or education under t h e GI B i l l .
! ”

Thus,

I

t h e build-up i n personnel s t r e n g t h w 8 8 slow and there

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were compromises in t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of many of t h e
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individuals hired.

The mounting demands imposed

by t h e ever-worsening Korean s i t u a t i o n , however,

s i m p l y d i d n o t p e r m i t t h e more o r d e r l y growth t h a t
might have l e d t o a s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e com-

ponent of greater i n i t i a l d e p t h and competence.
With a f a r from i d e a l f i g h t i n g f o r c e , Machle

began to take on t h e j o b of c a r v i n g o u t a working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n t h e Agency v i s - a - v i s

os0

I

ORE and

as

w e l l as i n t h e community a g a i n s t t h e burgeoning
t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t s of t h e departmental agencies. E v e n t u a l l y t h i s over-commitment l e d t o

h i s undoing and d e p a r t u r e from OS1 a f t e r f o u r t e e n

months of s e r v i c e . I n January 1949 t h e f i r s t o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t

w a s c o n s t r u c t e d as a framework a g a i n s t which t o
a l l o c a t e t h e 100 p o s i t i o n s a s s i g n e d t o OSI.
The

o r g a n i z a t i o n reflected s t r o n g l y Machle's c o n c e p t s of t o p i c s d e s e r v i n g emphasis and c o n s i s t e d of f o u r

s.taf f s and seven d i v i s i o n s .

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The i n t e r n a l i s s u e s b e s e t t i n g O S 1 involved

b o t h t h e form and t h e s u b s t a n c e of i n t e l l i g e n c e . On t h e one hand t h e c u r r e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of ORE were i n a p p a r e n t con-

f l i c t (or so it seemed t o Machle and others) w i t h
t h e o v e r a l l r e p o r t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e

f l e d g l i n g O S 1 which was anxious t o e s t a b l i s h an
image as a s t r o n g producer i n t h e e y e s of i n t e l -

l i g e n c e consumers.

I n t h e n u c l e a r energy f i e l d , Under t h e

p a r t i c u l a r l y , OS1 f e e l i n g r a n h i g h .

* See Annex I f o r a series o f o r g a n i z a t i o n charts whenever s i g n i f i c a n t changes o c c u r r e d .
11

-

s t r o n g leadership of t h e r e d o u b t a b l e u s i n g s u c h means as t h e c o n t r o l of T i a n

d o t h e r s , OS1 m a i n t a i n e d its h o l d on

r

nuclear intelligence.

Also i n t h e f i e l d of in-depth

i n t e l l i g e n c e research, ORE w a s performing a n a l y s e s
t h a t a t t i m e s appeared t o OS1 t o reach t o o f a r back

i n t o t h e R8zD phases of weapons systems development,
c l e a r l y a n OS1 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
I t may be w e l l t o c o n s i d e r f o r a moment such

q u e s t i o n s as:

what c o n s t i t u t e s s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l -

l i g e n c e , a t what p o i n t does i t c u t o f f and economic o r m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e take o v e r , and what i f any

are t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e
and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e ? Within OS1 t h e (Iguard-

house lawyers'' were i n c l i n e d i n these e a r l y days t o
take a rather broad and a l l - i n c l u s i v e view of t h e

scope of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e .
!t*

Broadly p u t , it

c o u l d c o v e r any development i n f o r e i g n s c i e n c e and technology which c o u l d pose a threat, immediate o r e v e n t u a l , t o U.S. n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . In another

s e n s e , s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e w a s h e l d by some t o emompass any a p p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n c e and technology
I

_

_

~

COO 629617

T,.-%Y,

E w,;..'
8,

n*'-Tyr
& .. -h . i I .

t o t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o c e s s , be it c o l l e c t i o n o r
analysis.

Obviously, t h e bounds of t h e l a t t e r

concept were almost l i m i t l e s s and well-nigh unmanageable i n practice.
To some e x t e n t , however,

b o t h views were implemented, or a t least a t t e m p t s
were made a t implementation, i n OS1 o p e r a t i o n s .
The second q u e s t i o n , t h a t concerning t h e c u t -

o f f p o i n t i n t h e scope of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e ,

was of c o n s i d e r a b l e concern t o OS1 and t o t h o s e
producing i n t e l l i g e n c e on p r o d u c t i o n of m i l i t a r y goods and on m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . Such terms as

"research and development" were t o o ambiguous t o

a f f o r d c l e a r - c u t . l i n e s of demarcation.

Many

weapons are modified or "developed" throughout
t h e i r l i f e h i s t o r y and each m o d i f i c a t i o n may i n -

v o l v e a good deal of s c i e n c e and technology i n o t h e r words "research and development".

-The

B r i t i s h evolved t h e n o t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l -

l i g e n c e would be concerned w i t h t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments through t h e stage a t which a p r o t o t y p e i t e m is produced, s t o p p i n g short of t h e s e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n
phase.

For want of something better, OS1 tended

t o adopt t h i s concept as w e l l b u t it w a s f r e q u e p t l y found n e c e s s a r y t o b o l s t e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h

-

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a s p e c i f i c agreement w i t h ORE on a g i v e n f i e l d .
For a young and p r e r o g a t i v e - c o n s c i o u s ,

but not

y e t v e r y capable, OS1 s u c h s p e c i f i c agreements

were perhaps t h e best s o l u t i o n .
OSI's view on t h e t h i r d q u e s t i o n w a s , of c o u r s e , of primary i n t e r e s t t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies. In their zeal t o confine

OSI's a t t e n t i o n t o n o n - m i l i t a r y f i e l d s , i t would
have been o f c o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e t o them t o
be able t o e x c l u d e OS1 by d e f i n i t i o n backed by a

directive.

T h i s w a s e s s e n t i a l l y what t h e y suc-

ceeded i n doing i n DCID 3/4 as w i l l be s e e n .

The

DOD concept w a s t h a t s c i e n t i f i c meant basic science

-

and t e c h n i c a l meant a p p l i e d s c i e n c e .

Since a

m i l i t a r y weapon is p a t e n t l y an a p p l i c a t i o n of scie n c e , t h e y c o n s i d e r e d themselves t o be e x c l u s i v e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r coverage of a p p l i e d or t e c h n i c a l intelligence. OSI, i n t h e i r view, s h o u l d be con-

f i n i n g its a t t e n t i o n t o basic s c i e n c e , medicine, and s c i e n t i f i c resources not o b v i o u s l y related t o

a m i l i t a r y weapon o r weapon s y s t e m .

OSI, of c o u r s e ,

wanted a broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e " s c i e n t i f i c "
p a r t of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e .
The DOD view pre-

v a i l e d i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of DCID 3/4, t h e d i r e c t i v e

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14

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t h a t so s e v e r e l y circumscribed OSI's a c t i v i t i e s .

OS1 was a long t i m e in undoing t h i s b i t o f semant i c skull-druggery, f o i s t e d upon an acquiescent

Agency management, t h a t r a t h e r completely obscured
t h e s t a t u t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e DCI and C I A ,

For its p a r t ORE was p e r t u r b e d by t h e OS1 monopoly on nuclear energy i n t e l l i g e n c e and made unsuccessful a t t e m p t s t o c a r v e its way i n t o t h i s
field.

Again using t h e 1

1

mechanism and o t h e r s , r l s u c c e e d e d i n fending o f f ORE.

In ONE t h e f a c t t h a t t h e important

annual NIE on t h e Soviet n u c l e a r energy program
w a s d r a f t e d in OSI, approved by t h e J o i n t Nuclear

Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee, and presented
d i r e c t l y to t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e Advisory Committee

without ONE/BNE p a r t i c i p a t i o n became an increasi n g l y i r r i t a t i n g thorn-in-the-side.
Despite

o c c a s i o n a l attempts by Sherman Kent t o have t h e
I

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h i f t e d , it was n o t u n t i l 1965
..

t h a t ONE assumed t h e d r a f t i n g role on t h e annual

. . .

..

n u c l e a r energy NIE.*
-

Another i n t e r n a l issue, t h e one t h a t u l t i -

mately l e d t o Y a c h l e ' s r e s i g n a t i o n , concerned t h e
..........,

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c

*

See Annex 11.

u
,

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,

.

. .

.

. ..

.

. . . .

,.,

.

.

.

..

.....

.

..

COO629617

i n t e l l i g e n c e information.

No doubt aided and
h e 1

r
possibilities

abetted by t h e o l d hands i n t

Machle q u i c k l y realized t h e

importance of information i n p u t s t o t h e accomplish-

ment of t h e O S 1 mission.

In t h e summer of 1949 he

made t w o t r i p s t o Europe t o survey c o l l e c t i o n

Armed
w i t h some f i r s t - h a n d information, he r e t u r n e d t o take on OS0 in a s t r u g g l e t o have t h e OS1 charter

broadened so as e s s e n t i a l l y t o include t h e respons i b i l i t y f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n , as w e l l as a n a l y s i s ,

of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e information.
Several months of l i v e l y debate and jockeying

f o r p o s i t i o n a t Machle's l e v e l , and lower l e v e l s ,
culminated i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of "white papers" on
both sides.

Machle, in h i s , made t h e p o i n t very

f o r c e f u l l y t h a t without information t o analyze OS1
w a s completely unable t o produce t h e f i n i s h e d i n t e l -

l i g e n c e expected o f t i t .

The answer, he s a i d , l a y

in g i v i n g OS1 a f a r greater v o i c e in t h e s e l e c t i o n
.. .. .. -I

and guiding of o p e r a t i o n s .

The matter made its way

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. . . . . ....
I .

. . ...

,

,

..

.

.. ...,.. . ,

.

..

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COO629617

t o Admiral H i l l e n k o e t t e r who made h i s d e c i s i o n i n
February 1950.
The OS0 charter w a s upheld and,

because of his deep personal involvement i n t h e s t r u g g l e , Machle resigned from t h e Agency e f f e c t i v e
1 March 1950.

Among Machle's moves i n h i s attempt t o s o l i d i f y
t h e O S 1 p o s i t i o n i n c o l l e c t i o n w a s one t h a t stemmed

from h i s 1949 European t r i p s mentioned above.

7

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While the'intra-Agency

struggle for position

was in f u l l sway on t h e C I A f r o n t in Washington,
t h e DOD w a s m a n i f e s t i n g growing concern about OSI's

i n c u r s i o n s i n t o what f t regarded as its p r e s e r v e weapons i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
Machle m e t t h e i n c r e a s i n g

--

DOD attempts t o circumscribe OSI's a c t i v i t i e s in
t h i s f i e l d by invoking t h e D C I ' s s t a t u t o r y respon-

sibilities for coordination.

I n 1949 t h e first DCID

governing c o o r d i n a t i o n in t h e s c i e n t i f i c and techn i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e f i e l d was drafted in O S I .
This

d i r e c t i v e reflected OSI's concept of its role as
t h a t of planning, s u p p o r t i n g and c o o r d i n a t i n g U.S.

s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e of the
other agencies of the I n t e l l i g e n c e Advisory Committee
(IAC).
t h e IAC

The d i r e c t i v e w a s approved as DCID 3/3 by

on 2 1 October 1949.

Among its p r o v i s i o n s

was the estkblishment of a S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e
Committee.** The first S I C Chairman w a s t h e C I A
m e m b e r , Willard Machle.
T h i s first attempt t o

* see Annex 7 ITT. Annex IV.

- 18 ... . . . .
. . I

. . .. . .. . . . . . . .

..

. . . . . . . . .

. . . .. .. . . . . . .

COO629617

implement a rather l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
C I A c h a r t e r b a r e l y o u t l i v e d Machle's s h o r t s t a y .

i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e business. More or less embattled on a l l f r o n t s , Machle's
b r i e f s e r v i c e i n C I A saw only t h e first f a l t e r i n g

steps i n t h e c r e a t i o n of an e f f e c t i v e OSI.

Hampered

by s e r i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the information i n p u t s and i n t h e c a l i b e r of its personnel and beset by opponents i n s i d e and o u t s i d e of t h e Agency, O S 1 could by e a r l y 1950 show l i t t l e o u t s i d e t h e n u c l e a r
f i e l d t h a t could be s a i d t o r e p r e s e n t progress.

111.

The Chadwell Period, 1950-55

In February 1950 H Marshall Chadwell from .
t h e New York O f f i c e of t h e Atomic Energy Commission

became A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r , OSI.

In sharp c o n t r a s t

w i t h Machle, who had a d i s t i n c t f l a i r f o r i n t r i g u e

and behind-the-scenes

a c t i v i t y , Chadwell w a s by
H e was i n

n a t u r e mild-mannered and c o n c i l i a t o r y .

many respects w e l l chosen f o r t h e role of peacemaker.
A s he took o f f i c e i n 1950 CIA began a massive build-

up i n response t o t h e requirements f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e i n s u p p o r t of t h e Korean War e f f o r t . Because of t h e

many i m p l i c a t i o n s t h i s c o n f l i c t held for S o v i e t and Chinese Communist weapons development programs, and

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..

.

. ..

. . . . . .

...

. .

.

.

. .

.

. ... .

. ...

.. .

.

..

..

..

.

. . .. . ..

..

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I

hence t h e demand f o r more S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e t h e

os I
T h i s l e v e l w a s i n realism w e l l beyond

OSI's a b i l i t y t o r e c r u i t and t r a i n a n a l y s t s .
Hence, t h e O f f i c e found i t s e l f p o o r l y s t a f f e d t o produce i n t e l l i g e n c e and a t t h e same t i m e keep
its rather p r e c a r i o u s h o l d on a v i a b l e m i s s i o n .

For, i n t h e h e a v i l y m i l i t a r y atmosphere of t h e
t i m e , t h e DOD w a s l i k e w i s e b u i l d i n g up i t s tech-

nical intelligence strength

--

and i n c r e a s i n g l y

c h a l l e n g i n g CIA'S r i g h t t o engage i n m i l i t a r y , and e s p e c i a l l y t e c h n i c a l , i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o d u c t i o n .
I t w a s perhaps i n e v i t a b l e t h a t a series of

head-on clashes s h o u l d occur between OS1 and t h e

DOD f o r c e s l e d by t h e J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee
(JIC) of t h e JCS.
A t DOD i n s i s t e n c e t h e IAC i n

e a r l y 1952 created a n i n v e s t i g a t i v e group, headed
by L o f t u s Becker ( t h e n DDI of CIA) t o review t h e

s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e s c e n e and make recommendations on t h e apportionment of responsibilities i n this field. Many meetings of

t h e review group were h e l d d u r i n g t h e s p r i n g and

summer of 1952 as OS1 and t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g
o r g a n i z a t i o n s argued f o r t h e i r views on t h e p r o p e r s p l i t of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .

-

20

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1

- 1
The r e s u l t w a s a new d i r e c t i v e , D C I D 3/4
dated 1 4 August 1952.

This d i r e c t i v e rescinded

D C I D 3/3 and r e p l a c e d t h e SIC w i t h a S c i e n t i f i c

E s t i m a t e s Committee (SEC).

I n an annex i t s e t

f o r t h by d i s c i p l i n e s t h e primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f C I A (OSI) and t h o s e of t h e m i l i t a r y d e p a r t mental a g e n c i e s .
The SEC, u n l i k e its p r e d e c e s s o r ,

was t o c o n f i n e its a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n
of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o N I E s and w a s i n e f f e c t barred

from o t h e r w i s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f
t h e member a g e n c i e s ,

The many subcommittees of

t h e SIC i n f i e l d s of m i l i t a r y i n t e r e s t , p u t t o g e t -

h e r under OS1 prodding o v e r three y e a r s of arduous

n e g o t i a t i o n , were wiped o u t ,

By terms of t h e Annex

t o DCID 3/4, OS1 was a s s i g n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y essent i a l l y o n l y f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e b a s i c s c i e n c e s , medicine and s c i e n t i f i c r e s o u r c e s .
The m i l i t a r y

m e m b e r a g e n c i e s were a s s i g n e d primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of m i l i t a r y hardware and p r e c u r s o r developments i n a p p l i e d s c i e n c e ( t h e "technical" i n technical intelligence). Even i n t h e

=21

n u c l e a r energy f i e l d OS1 l o s t ground w i t h t h e a s s i g n -

ment of e q u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o a l l member a g e n c i e s .
DCID 3/4 was a s t u n n i n g r e v e r s a l f o r OSI.

No

o t h e r s i n g l e e v e n t had a more t r a u m a t i c e f f e c t on

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COO62 9 6 1 7

OS1 i n its f o r m a t i v e years, and t h e r i g h t i n g of
t h i s I1wrong"

--

as it s u r e l y w a s i n OSI's view

--

consumed more of its energy i n t h e n e x t f i v e
y e a r s t h a n d i d any o t h e r s i n g l e i s s u e .
If t h i s view of t h e impact of DCID 3/4 on
OS1 s e e m s e x t r e m e , one must

consider t h e atmosphere

then prevailing.

I n t e l l i g e n c e w a s not y e t a widely

admired c a l l i n g nor w e r e consumers y e t convinced

of t h e i n t e g r i t y of i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates o r t h e i r producers, T e c h n i c a l c o l l e c t i o n means had n o t y e t

reached t h e stage o f s o p h i s t i c a t i o n p e r m i t t i n g

spectacular r e s u l t s . f o r c e s i n Korea.

The US w a s a t w a r w i t h Communist

Thus, many p r e s s u r e s f a c e d OS1 and

t h e threat t o t h e achievement of its p l a n s , repre-

s e n t e d by DCID 3/4, w a s t a k e n w i t h perhaps more t h a n normal s e r i o u s n e s s .
O S 1 w a s l i t e r a l l y b e i n g excluded

from many f i e l d s of h i g h e s t i n t e r e s t t o policy-makers.
T h e loss of s u p p o r t which i t w a s feared would r e s u l t

might w e l l mean the end of t h e O f f i c e i n its i n f a n c y .

The immediate effect of DCID 3/4 was a d r o p i n morale

of g r a v e p r o p o r t i o n s .

.. Only i n t h e n u c l e a r energy f i e l d d i d OS1 have

,

i
i

much t o show f o r its efforts i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 ' s .

To u n d e r s t a n d t h e f e e l i n g i n OS1 i n these t i m e s it

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is necessary t o back up i n h i s t o r y f o r a moment.
S h o r t l y after its transfer t o C I G (later CIA)

i n 1947, t h e
became responsible f o r t h e issuance through t h e

J o i n t Nuclear Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee twice
y e a r l y of an estimate of Soviet nuclear weapons

development progress.
stated(be1ief

By mid-1949 t h e estimate

t h a t t h e first Soviet atomic

test could occur no earlier than mid-1951 and more
probably not u n t i l 1953.

Hardly had t h e mid-1949

estimate been delivered t o its consumers than t h e

S o v i e t s tested
roots, r
/ O

I
S

pn August 1949.

Shaken t o its

I looked long and h a r d a t ways

of obtaining and analyzing information.

One r e s u l t , described i n some d e t a i l earlier, was t h e f r o n t a l attack on OS0 by Machle f o r its
f a i l u r e to provide raw information.

.....

. .. . .

-

23

. .. . ...

. .

.. . .

. .

. . .. . .

,

,

..

. .

.... .

.

. . . .,

.

. ........., ..

.,

,

.

..

COO629617

I t has already been noted i n f o r e g o i n g pages
t h a t OS1 faced a s e r i o u s problem i n r e c r u i t i n g competent

staff members i n i t s e a r l y y e a r s .

More t h a n any o t h e r

single factor

--

s a v e perhaps f o r t h e obvious p u b l i c

r e l a t i o n s v a l u e of i n f l u e n t i a l s c i e n t i f i c f r i e n d s

--

t h i s d e a r t h of s t a f f s c i e n t i s t s caused t h e management

of OS1 t o t u r n t o t h e U.S. s c i e n t i f i c community f o r

-

24

-

support.

The number of c o n s u l t a n t s g r a d u a l l y i n -

c r e a s e d u n t i l by t h e m i d - f i f t i e s a sizeable group
of eminent U.S. s c i e n t i s t s had an i n f o r m a l , i f

n o t formal, c o n n e c t i o n w i t h O S I . Perhaps t h e most dramatic example of c o n s u l t a n t s h i p w a s t h e formation of a group known as t h e

Boston S c i e n t i f i c Advisory P a n e l (BSAP) .

Late i n

1950, one of O S I ' s c o n s u l t a n t s i n the Boston area

y

i

p

r

o

p

o

s

e

d t o Chadwell t h a t a

group of cleared and knowledgeable s c i e n t i s t s i n
t h a t area be banded t o g e t h e r t o form a "Boston C e l l " .

According t o h i m , these men shared a concern a b o u t
t h e i n a d e q u a c i e s of U. S. s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e and

would be w i l l i n g t o s e r v e t h e i r c o u n t r y i n s u p p o r t

of OSI.

The o f f e r w a s a c c e p t e d and i n e a r l y 1951

BSAP began t o meet a t i n t e r v a l s w i t h Chadwell and
h i s t o p people.1

I

I During
t h e first f e w y e a r s a l l BSAP m e m b e r s were g i v e n con-

s u l t a n t s t a t u s and BSAP i t s e l f s e r v e d a u s e f u l f u n c t i o n i n e v a l u a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n and a c t i n g as a sounding board f o r O S 1 f i n i s h e d i n t e l l i g e n c e o u t p u t . I n t i m e , however, a number of i n f l u e n c e s began

t o work a g a i n s t t h e BSAP o p e r a t i o n .

I t s members were

of c o u r s e much i n demand i n Washington and elsewhere

-

25

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1

.

COO629617

and i t became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o assemble enough o f t h e m a t any g i v e n t i m e t o make a meeti n g worthwhile.
The burden on OS1 from p r e s e n t -

ing b r i e f i n g s on very involved s u b j e c t s w a s considerable. I n r e t u r n OS1 r e c e i v e d l i t t l e u s e a b l e

c o n s u l t a t i o n ( f o r obvious r e a s o n s when one c o n s i d e r s
t h e s k e t c h i n e s s of t h e evidence and t h e complexity

of t h e problem a g a i n s t an exposure t i m e o f t w o o r
t h r e e hours!).

OS1 i n t e r e s t began t o wane.

By

more o r less mutual c o n s e n t t h e i n t e r v a l s between meetings s t r e t c h e d .
A f t e r a f i n a l meeting i n 1959

t h e BSAP d i e d a q u i e t d e a t h .

I n l a t e r y e a r s i t became popular i n OS1 t o s p e c u l a t e about t h e BSAP and i t s worth t o OS1 .
B y any measure t h e p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s b e n e f i t came

foremost f o r , i t s h o u l d be n o t e d , t h e f i r s t three P r e s i d e n t i a l S c i e n t i f i c Advisors (James R. K i l l i a n and George B . Kistiakowsky Jerome Wiesner

--

P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower,

--

P r e s i d e n t Kennedy) were i n t e r e s t e d That t h i s f a c t had more

and a c t i v e BSAP members.

t h a n i n c i d e n t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e may be deduced from
t h e knowledge t h a t K i l l i a n was t h e f i r s t Chairman

of BSAP and was s t i l l a c t i v e i n its a f f a i r s when P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower named him t h e f i r s t S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t f o r Science and Technology

-

26

-

i n November 1957.

Both Kistiakowsky and Wiesner

r e t a i n e d t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n OS1 throughout t h e i r tours i n office. I n t h e e a r l y 1950s OSI's involvement i n a n o t h e r o f its p r i n c i p a l f i e l d s of a c t i v i t y , ELINT, began i n earnest. This s t o r y deserves treatment a t such length The

t h a t it can be t o l d f u l l y o n l y i n an annex.*

account here w i l l t h e r e f o r e be b r i e f .

In t h e s t i l l -

s h o r t h i s t o r y of U.S. s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e i t may be
s a i d t h a t t h e development o f f e w f i e l d s has been

accompanied by more p u l l i n g and h a u l i n g , i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l t o CIA, t h a n t h a t o f ELINT. Beginning w i t h a

c o n f l i c t o v e r a d e f i n i t i o n of t h e term (was i t t o b e "ELectronic INTercept"

-

-

,

s u g g e s t i n g a narrow c o n c e p t , o r

"ELectronics INTelligence" -

-

,

connoting a f i e l d as broad

as e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c r a d i a t i o n i t s e l f ? ) and c a r r y i n g

through t o a s t r u g g l e over. what agency s h o u l d p r o c e s s
w h a t p r o d u c t of what f i e l d o p e r a t i o n , t h e p a r t i s a n s of

ELINT waged t h e c o n f l i c t a t a l l l e v e l s of government. Though ELINT began w i t h B r i t i s h a t t e m p t s t o u s e s i g n a l s i n t e l l i g e n c e t o u n d e r s t a n d and f r u s t r a t e German weapons systems of WW 11, a c t i v e U.S. involvement i n t h e f i e l d began i n e a r n e s t somewhat l a t e r .
W h i l e n o t involved w i t h what w e would now c a l l ELINT,

*

See Annex V.
,

- 27 1

COO629617

t h e s t o r y of t h i s c h a l l e n g i n g f i e l d of i n t e l l i g e n c e

may be said t o have begun w i t h SovBloc jamming of

Voice of America broadcasts (as w e l l a8 those of
BBC) in t h e l a t e 1940s.

E f f o r t s of t h e Western

A l l i e s t o broadcast behind t h e I r o n C u r t a i n were

being f r u s t r a t e d and there was mounting o f f i c i a l concern over the b l u n t i n g of one of t h e f e w Cold
W r weapons in u s e b y t h e U.S. a
There were also

ominous i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e v i a b i l i t y of U.S. long-haul m i l i t a r y communications in t h e e v e n t of
war.

On 31 March 1950 t h e IAC established an

ad hoc committee t o review matters and m a k e recom-

mendations f o r a course of a c t i o n t o be p r e s e n t e d by t h e DCI t o the NSC.

AB E x h i b i t One on t h e

s u b j e c t of t h e d i f f i c u l t y of o b t a i n i n g agreement

on an ELINT matter, it may be recorded t h a t t h e ad
hoc IAC conrmittee d i d not report t o t h e IAC u n t i l
28 February 1951 and its recommendations were never

e f f e c t i v e l y implemented thereafter. Despite t h i s u n c e r t a i n beginning, t h e place of ELINT in s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e took shape under t h e urging of such men as Ralph C l a r k , who
l e f t JRDB and j o i n e d OS1 i n late 1944
For s e v e r a l years after its e s t a b l i s h m e n t , t h e Agency
had no direct p a r t in e l e c t r o n i c i n t e r c e p t .

1
Quite

- 28 -

;

. .....

. .
'

..

.

.: .

. .

.

.... .

...

,

I

-

__

__

.

COO629617

e a r l y , however, t h e s e men recognized t h e v a l u e
of e l e c t r o n i c i n t e r c e p t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o i n t e l -

l i g e n c e on S o v i e t e l e c t r o n i c s .

Unofficial but

c l o s e working l e v e l c o n t a c t s were e s t a b l i s h e d and m a i n t a i n e d w i t h t h e elements of t h e Department of Defense t h a t d e a l t w i t h d i v e r s e a s p e c t s of e l e c t r o n i c i n t e r c e p t t o ensure t h a t a l l i n t e r c e p t p r o d u c t s were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Agency and t h a t
t h e best

intelligence

use w a s m a d e of t h e m .

E a r l y i n 1951 OS1 w a s convinced t h a t ELINT (now c l e a r l y d e f i n e d as e l e c t r o n i c i n t e r c e p t ) was one of t h e most e f f e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e s o u r c e s on S o v i e t e l e c t r o n i c s and t h a t t h e v a l u e of its contributions to national intelligence f u l l y w a r r a n t e d a c t i v e s u p p o r t of i n t e r c e p t e f f o r t s by
t h e Agency.

IA

p r o g r e s s i v e build-up of s u b s t a n t i v e

ELINT competence took p l a c e w i t h i n t h e

COO629617

Agency, both a t t h e Headquarters and abroad.
1953 the Agency was i n v o l v e d i n ELINT d e e p l y

By

enough t o w a r r a n t an E l i n t program of its own, and a n Agency E l i n t Task Force w a s e s t a b l i s h e d t o f o r m u l a t e a s u i t a b l e Agency-wide p l a n .
On

29 May 1954 t h e first Agency E l i n t program w a s approved by t h e D C I . Thus, by t h e t i m e t h e first

US n a t i o n a l E l i n t p o l i c y was f o r m a l i z e d i n NSCID
# 17 of 16 May 1955, t h e Agency w a s ready t o join

t h e n a t i o n a l E l i n t community as a f u l l - f l e d g e d

partner. Since t h e e a r l y Agency ELINT projects and a c t i o n s w e r e sponsored and s u p p o r t e d by O S I , t h e
O f f i c e became the first f o c a l p o i n t f o r E l i n t

a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Agency.

I t r e t a i n e d t h i s role

u n t i l 1962 when a separate O f f i c e of E l i n t w a s
e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n t h e newly formed s t r u c t u r e of
t h e Directorate of Research, later t h e Directorate

of S c i e n c e and Technology.

OSI's o r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g t h e Chadwell period
resembled i n many r e s p e c t s a c o l l e g e f a c u l t y and

c o n s i s t e d of t h e f o l l o w i n g D i v i s i o n s :

- 30 -

L

COO629617

The r e s u l t was n o t o n l y vio-

l e n c e t o good management c o n c e p t s r e g a r d i n g s p a n of c o n t r o l by t h e head of a n o r g a n i z a t i o n b u t a l s o

a c o n s i d e r a b l e b l u r r i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s caused
by i n h e r e n t over-lapping o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s
w i t h t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s t o weapons s y s t e m s .

Such

o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses c o n t r i b u t e d l i t t l e t o

OSI's b a t t l e s t r e n g t h i n d e a l i n g w i t h DOD a t t a c k s .
The f o r e g o i n g remarks about o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

basic as was t h e effect of t h e l a t t e r on OSI's

p o s i t i o n , s h o u l d be a m p l i f i e d .

Applied S c i e n c e

i n t h e O S 1 l e x i c o n was a c o v e r name for weapons
system a n a l y s i s .

I

1 OS1 j u s t i f i e d
leffort on t h e grounds t h a t s u c h work w a s
DCI i n h i s coordination r o l e .

the

I

required t o provide proper staff support t o t h e I n l a t e r years it

became known as 'keeping t h e S e r v i c e s h o n e s t ' i n
their i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates.

-

31

-

COO 629617

1 OSI

was

i n e f f e c t c o v e r i n g t h e basic s c i e n c e s as called f o r i n DCID 3/4 w i t h its l e f t hand b u t u s i n g its s t r o n g e r r i g h t hand t o c o v e r areas a s s i g n e d by
DCID 3/4 t o t h e m i l i t a r y a g e n c i e s .

lproblems c e n t e r e d around t h e fact t h a t it t o o w a s performing B a n a l y s i s W
~

( a l b e i t on t h e medical aspects) a t t h e t i m e
DCID 3/4 w a s e n a c t e d b u t was having d i f f i c u l t y

i n d e f i n i n g and producing i n t e l l i g e n c e on other p o r t i o n s of i t s m i s s i o n . Thus, t h e D i v i s i o n w a s

n o t o n l y i n disagreement w i t h t h e Army Chemical
Corps and t h e O f f i c e of t h e Surgeon General about

its p r o d u c t i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b u t was s t r u g g l i n g
w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l i n f e a s i b i l i t y of producing

f i n i s h e d i n t e l l i g e n c e from a m i n i s c u l e s u p p l y of

-

32

-

u s a b l e information as w e l l .

Despite a rather

s t r o n g recommendation f o r more medical i n t e l l i g e n c e by t h e so-called Hawley Committee i n
1948, p r e c i s e l y what w a s called f o r w a s not

d e f i n e d e x p l i c i t l y and u n c e r t a i n t y as t o its mission continued t o h a r a s s l k o r many y e a r s . *
From its earliest days OS1 could claim

preeminence in a t least one f i e l d other t h a n n u c l e a r energy i n t e l l i g e n c e . electronics intelligence.
That f i e l d w a s

Such men as Ralph C l a r k ,

before h i s n e a r l y t o t a l d i v e r s i o n t o ELINT,

1
I

learly i n t h e game provided
t h e nucleus of a n a l y t i c a l s t r e n g t h around which

t o b u i l d a capable s t a f f .

I

1

I

A t first electronics

i n t e l l i g e n c e w a s combined o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y w i t h
p h y s i c s , mathematics and even geophysics i n t e l -

l i g e n c e b u t its r e l a t i v e rate of growth i n Importance led t o its being assigned as t h e sole b u s i n e s s of
,

i n 1955.

As

*

See Annex VI.

- 33 .
. ..

. . .

...

. .

.

.. .

.

...

COO629617

t i m e went on e l e c t r o n i c s i n t e l l i g e n c e became i n c r e a s i n g l y involved w i t h d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s , s u c h as a i r d e f e n s e and a n t i - m i s s i l e s y s t e m s ,
and i n 1962
L

I
I

1

I n consequence of t h e wide divergence of views about S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c c a p a b i l i t i e s (were
t h e y m i d g e t s or 10 f e e t t a l l ? ) , a good d e a l

o f OS1 e f f o r t went i n t o s t u d i e s of t h e S o v i e t e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m , t h e numbers of g r a d u a t i n g s c i e n t i s t s and e n g i n e e r s , and t h e i r u t i l i z a t i o n .

1
f i e l d of coverage.

Almost a l o n e among OS1 d i v i s i o n s , t

h

e

7

1

l i v e d i n comparative
Its

harmony w i t h t h e DOD i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s .

p r o d u c t s were w e l l r e c e i v e d and d u r i n g t h e e a r l y
5 0 ' s there was l i t t l e o u t s i d e c o m p e t i t i o n i n its

I n c r e a s i n g awareness of t h e

S o v i e t build-up i n s c i e n t i s t s and e n g i n e e r s l e d t o a f u l l - d r e s s b r i e f i n g of t h e NSC on t h i s s u b j e c t

i n October 1953.

Perhaps t h e h i g h p o i n t o = f

l i f e w a s reached i n June of 1954 when A l l e n D u l l e s

used as his commencement topic a t Columbia U n i v e r s i t y " S o v i e t S&T Manpower1' w i t h t e x t s u p p l i e d by

c

With t h i s s p e e c h and t h e d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of much

I

F . - 34 -

information

8s

i t s aftermath, t h e problem i n c r e a s More and

i n g l y s l i p p e d i n t o t h e p u b l i c domain.

more scholars and research i n s t i t u t e s took on t h e problems of numerical and q u a l i t a t i v e assessment

of S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c and e n g i n e e r i n g manpower.
-]once preeminent p o s i t i o n d e c l i n e d .

E v e n t u a l l y about f o r t y able young c o l l e g e g r a d u a t e s ,

g e n e r a l l y w i t h bachelor l e v e l t r a i n i n g i n t h e A r t s
and S c i e n c e s , were r e c r u i t e d and g i v e n

1

I

lpublished a number of s u c h s t u d i e s " , as t h e y came t o be c a l l e d , and c o n t r i b u t e d

a good deal t o t h e growing fund of knowledge on
S o v i e t S&T c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n e x o r a b l y , however, t h e

impingement on t h e other OS1 d i v i s i o n s i n c r e a s e d as

I
35

-

-

COO629617

I

I
by t h e other d i v i s i o n s and
ished.

I

I

land as[

I

a n a l y s t s dug deeper and deeper i n t o c o l l a t e r a l . Gradually t h e more capable of them were r e c r u i t e d

[/output

dimin-

In its l i t t l e more t h a n three years of

productive e x i s t e n c e l b o n t r i b u t e d much, i f
l a r g e l y o n l y a a t r a i n i n g ground f o r OS1 s

analysts.

I t f i n a l l y passed o u t of e x i s t e n c e

i n t h e g e n e r a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of OS1 i n 1955-56,
A g e n e r a l lack of cohesiveness i n OS1

became i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent i n t h e e a r l y 5 0 ' s .
By 1953 t h e q u e s t i o n of programming the O f f i c e

production a c t i v i t i e s as a means of reducing overl a p and i n c r e a s i n g t h e o u t p u t of r e l e v a n t f i n i s h e d

i n t e l l i g e n c e w a s being e x t e n s i v e l y discussed a t
t h e management l e v e l i n OSI.

Chadwell first com-

missioned Ralph C l a r k t o organize an effort on
t h i s problem and some work w a s accomplished i n

late 1953 and early 1954. For many reasons, n o t
the least of which w a s C l a r k ' s ever-growing pre-

occupation w i t h ELINT matters, t h e effort bogged down i n the sheer complexity of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g

I
I

a common matrix for so many fields of p o t e n t i a l

inte l l i g e n c e i n t e r e s t .

- 36 -

...

,

.

.

,

F i n a l l y , i n mid-1954, C h a d w e l l became conv i n c e d t h a t an Office-wide program o f f e r e d t h e
best chance of s t r e n g t h e n i n g OSI's p o s i t i o n i n
t h e community.

H e directed t h a t an accelerated

e f f o r t be i n i t i a t e d under t h e

7 1

1

1 Progress w a s d i f f i c u l t
amidst t h e p r e v a i l i n g c o n f u s i o n f o r , among other

t h i n g s , a n I G i n s p e c t i o n w a s i n p r o g r e s s and a l l l e v e l s of OS1 were involved i n t e s t i m o n y and d i s c u s s i o n of OSI's m u l t i t u d i n o u s problems. F i n a l l y , i n June 1955, t h e first O S 1 P r o d u c t i o n
Program w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y advanced t o be p r e s e n t e d

for Chadwell's c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s e a r l y programming

e f f o r t and its f a v o r a b l e effect on O f f i c e u n i t y (though some may d i s p u t e t h e l a t t e r a s s e r t i o n ) may
be i n f e r r e d from t h e fact t h a t many of t h e c o n c e p t s

first developed t h e n persist i n 1968.

The e s s e n t i a l

e l e m e n t s of t h e p l a n were a s t a t e m e n t of W r i t i c a l S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e O b j e c t i v e s " t o d e f i n e and
e s t a b l i s h research and p r o d u c t i o n goals, an-'

annual program or l i s t i n g of research projects t o s e r v e as g u i d e p o s t s i n t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e goals, and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an OS1 I n t e l l i g e n c e , B o a r d t o review s u b s t a n t i v e l y p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e research

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37

-

The programming e f f o r t s s e r v e d t o h i g h l i g h t

two i n t e l l i g e n c e problems t h a t were p a r t i c u l a r l y p e r p l e x i n g and p e r s i s t e n t i n t h e e a r l y 1950s

--

d i d t h e S o v i e t s have an a c t i v e o f f e n s i v e BW pro-

gram and what p r o g r e s s w e r e t h e y making i n t h e

development of guided m-siles?

A organizational n

experiment w a s attempted i n 1954 i n an e f f o r t t o c o r r e c t t h e rather bleak i n t e l l i g e n c e p i c t u r e on
these s u b j e c t s ; namely, teams of a n a l y s t s were

assembled from v a r i o u s d i v i s i o n s and p u t under a

team leader.

These groups were known as Task

Force Able on BW and Task Force Baker on guided

missiles.

The former w a s headed by
y l I

the latter b

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , n e i t h e r Task Force produced s t a r t l i n g new c o n c l u s i o n s a f t e r s e v e r a l months of i n t e n s i v e w o r k n T h e y d i d , however, s e r v e t o p u l l t o g e t h e r what was known up t o t h e moment and t o

teach OS1 management l e s s o n s of l a s t i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The l e s s o n s , simply stated, were t h a t (a) t h e banding

-

38

-

together of a n a l y s t s w a s n o t a panacea f o r over-

coming gaps i n c r i t i c a l l y needed i n f o r m a t i o n and
(b) t h e t e c h n i q u e tended t o produce s e r i o u s man-

agerial s t r a i n s which v i r t u a l l y foredoomed t h e

effort t o failure.

The key i s s u e s i n t h e manage-

ment problem were t h e d i v i d e d l o y a l t y of t h e a n a l y s t
between h i s D i v i s i o n and t h e Task F o r c e , t h e un-

c e r t a i n t y of t h e a n a l y s t w i t h respect t o h i s f i t n e s s r a t i n g i f he s h o u l d p l e a s e h i s Task Force leader b u t a n t a g o n i z e h i s D i v i s i o n C h i e f , and u n w i l l i n g -

n e s s on t h e p a r t of O f f i c e management t o g i v e
complete a u t h o r i t y t o t h e Task Force leaders d u r i n g
the e x e r c i s e .

I t is s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t no comparable

e f f o r t s , even approaching Able and Baker i n s c o p e , have e v e r been a t t e m p t e d i n OS1 s i n c e . The effort t o s y s t e m a t i z e t h e programming and p r o d u c t i o n of O S I ' s i n t e l l i g e n c e o u t p u t f o c u s s e d a t t e n t i o n on s t i l l a n o t h e r facet of t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e
I
I

process

--

t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of r e s u l t s .

Before

,

1954 f i n i s h e d i n t e l l i g e n c e i s s u e d i n a v a r i e t y of

forms and s u c c e s s i v e r e p o r t s may or may n o t have
resembled each o t h e r i n format, s t y l e o r even c o v e r .
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e OS1 I n t e l l i g e n c e Board

created a mechanism n o t o n l y f o r t h e review of s u b s t a n c e b u t form as w e l l ,
I t w a s not long b e f o r e

1
39

-

-

moves toward s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , even b e a u t i f i c a t i o n , occurred. The need t o convey judgments i n terms

u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t o laymen became more and more c l e a r
as d i d t h e need f o r s t a t i n g views c o n v i n c i n g l y .

A p u b l i c a t i o n philosophy began t o develop under t h e
c r i t i c a l impetus of t h e IB.*
I t c a n be s e e n from what h a s been s a i d t h a t

a good many of t h e p r e s e n t day c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of

OS1 began t o t a k e form i n t h e C h a d w e l l p e r i o d . The s t a f f was a c q u i r i n g e x p e r i e n c e and becoming
more c o n f i d e n t of its a b i l i t i e s .

Information t o

analyze w a s s t i l l w o e f u l l y s h o r t i n many f i e l d s b u t
OS1 w a s doing something about i t by encouraging t h e

development of c o l l e c t i o n schemes i n more and more
areas.
S t i l l , t h e g e n e r a l impression of OS1 i n

t h o s e days c o u l d best b e d e s c r i b e d as i n c o h e r e n t

--

a f e w s t r e n g t h s , some weaknesses, t o o many f r u s t r a t i o n s .

Many of its problems stemmed from t h e i n a b i l i t y of

its leaders t o p u l l t h e team t o g e t h e r and g i v e g r e a t e r

purpose t o its e f f o r t s .

IV.

The S c o v i l l e P e r i o d . 1955-62

The cumulative weight of e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s from DOD and i n t e r n a l c o n f u s i o n and weakness e v e n t u a l l y
made r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and s t r e n g t h e n i n g i m p e r a t i v e .
*See Annex VIII.

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40

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I

1

I

A c r i t i c a l I . G . r e p o r t of e a r l y 1955 recommended

new l e a d e r s h i p and thorough o v e r h a u l i n g of t h e O S 1 structure.
I

I

/and D r . Herbert S c o v i l l e , t h e n T e c h n i c a l
Director of t h e A r m e d F o r c e s S p e c i a l Weapons P r o j e c t ,

became AD/SI i n August 1955.

i

I n e a r l y 1955 s e v e r a l of t h e s e n i o r members of

os1
a c t i n g l a r g e l y on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e

because of t h e c r i t i c a l need, d r a f t e d a revamped o r g a n i z a t i o n chart and p r e s e n t e d i t t o S c o v i l l e shortl y after h i s a r r i v a l .

Upon h i s a p p r o v a l it was p u t Primary goals o f t h e

i n t o e f f e c t i n October 1955.

r e o r g a n i z a t i o n were t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e p r o d u c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y of t h e o f f i c e through t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

of s t r o n g e r f o c i f o r t h e a n a l y t i c a l work and to reduce t h e number of p e r s o n s r e p o r t i n g t o t h e AD/SI

so as t o f r e e him for s u c h important e x t e r n a l c h o r e s
I

as c o o r d i n a t i o n and b r i e f i n g s on i n t e l l i g e n c e f i n d -

+

- _-.

COO629617

With its i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e improved and

s t r e n g t h e n e d , OS1 t u r n e d t o t h e j o b of e l i m i n a t i n g
DCID 3/4 i n e a r n e s t .

S t a f f s t u d i e s and w h i t e papers

poured f o r t h .

I n these, OS1 expressed its b e l i e f

t h a t t h e a r b i t r a r y e x c l u s i o n of OS1 from weapons

i n t e l l i g e n c e i n DCID 3/4 was c o u n t e r t o C I A ' S basic statutory responsibilities.
I t w a s argued t h a t

l i m i t i n g OS1 t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of basic s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e made it i m p o s s i b l e f o r C I A t o coord i n a t e S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s i n a broad, n a t i o n a l s e n s e o r t o a d v i s e and make recommendations

t o t h e NSC on i n t e l l i g e n c e matters r e l a t i n g to t h e
national security. S t r i c t adherence t o DCID 3/4

would p r e v e n t OS1 from d i s c o v e r i n g gaps i n t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e p i c t u r e a r i s i n g from d e f i c i e n c i e s

i n t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l a g e n c i e s , as r e q u i r e d of C I A by
law.

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COO629617
c

I

E a r l y attempts t o argue t h e OS1 p o s i t i o n were

not conspicuously s u c c e s s f u l .

.

For example, t h e

Clark Committee Task Force of t h e Commission on

Organization of t h e Executive Branch of t h e Government (Hoover Commission), w i t h considerable coaching by
O S 1 it should be noted, recommended in May 1955

t h a t WID 3/4 be r e v i s e d so as t o reestablish t h e

S I C and p e r m i t e f f e c t i v e interagency c o o r d i n a t i o n

in S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e .

Unfortunately f o r OSI, these

recommendations had l i t t l e immediate effect on t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community beyond adding a c e r t a i n amount
-

of f u e l t o t h e f i r e .
I t w a s not u n t i l s e v e r a l years had'passed,

during which t h e debate f l a r e d a t t i m e s in t h e IAC under one heading or another, t h a t a g e n e r a l overhaul of DCIDs was undertaken and DCID 3/4 came under review. In 1958 t h e IAC and t h e U.S. Communications

I n t e l l i g e n c e Board (USCIB) were merged i n t o t h e new
USIB and t h e NSCIDs and DCIDs were d r a s t i c a l l y re-

vised.

I n t h i s g e n e r a l f l u x , DCID 3/4 w a s .super-

seded by DCID 3/5 (New Series), t h e SEC w a s abolished

and a rechartered S I C was established.
The language of t h e t w o d i r e c t i v e s p o i n t s o u t
t h e change in d i r e c t i o n w i t h abundant c l a r i t y :

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COO629617

DCID 3/4 The SEC s h o u l d " i n t e g r a t e s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , a s and when r e q u i r e d , f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e " and " c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e o p i n i o n ( o t h e r t h a n t h a t f o r which t h e JAEIC is r e s p o n s i b l e ) a s and when r e q u i r e d f o r t h e purposes o f n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , and o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y assist i n t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n of o t h e r i n t e l l i g e n c e i n s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l f i e l d s . I 1 I n i t s Annex DCID 3/4 d e l i n e a t e d f i e l d s of p r i m a r y conc e r n f o r C I A and t h e m i l i t a r y a g e n c i e s . DCID 3/5 (New Series) The S I C s h a l l " f o s t e r , develop and m a i n t a i n a c o o r d i n a t e d community approach t o problems i n t h e f i e l d of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e ( e x c e p t f o r atomic energy and guided m i s s i l e s and a s t r o n a u t i c s i n t e l l i g e n c e ) , t o promote i n t e r a g e n c y l i a i s o n and t o g i v e added impetus and community s u p p o r t t o e f f o r t s of i n d i v i d u a l agencies

--

--

.

The i n s u f f e r a b l e Annex t o DCID 3/4 was r e s c i n d e d .
The S I C

-

SEC

-

S I C s t r u g g l e had i t s p a r a l l e l i n t h e

a t t e m p t s t o e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r a g e n c y guided missiles

i n t e l l i g e n c e committee.

In t h e e a r l y 1950's t h e

guided m i s s i l e s account was handled by subcommittees o r working groups of t h e SIC/SEC.
The o b v i o u s l y

i n c r e a s i n g importance of guided missiles i n t e l l i g e n c e o n l y s t i f f e n e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e DOD a g e n c i e s t o
OSI's work i n t h i s f i e l d .

Having l i t t l e s u c c e s s i n

p r e v e n t i n g such work, however, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
these a g e n c i e s undertook t o p r e v e n t CIA from estab-

l i s h i n g a c o o r d i n a t i n g committee under t h e IAC

--

r e a s o n i n g very l i k e l y t h a t a g r e e i n g t o s u c h a committee

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45

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I

COO629617
was tantamount t o a g r e e i n g t h a t C I A had a r o l e i n
this field after all.

-4lFwMF

By 1955 t h e b a t t l e was i n

f u l l sway. Feelings r a n high,
The IAC f i r s t asked t h e

SEC i n June 1955 t o c o n s i d e r t h e problem o f

c o o r d i n a t i n g guided m i s s i l e s i n t e l l i g e n c e .

The

SEC d u l y r e p o r t e d back t h a t i t could w i t h p r o p e r

s t r e n g t h e n i n g take on t h e job i t s e l f .

' T h i s sug-

g e s t i o n proved t o be popular w i t h few, even i n
CIA.

Thereupon, t h e IAC e s t a b l i s h e d a review com-

mittee i n J u l y 1955 t o attempt once a g a i n t o f i n d

a c c e p t a b l e terms f o r a c o o r d i n a t i n g mechanism.
I

P r e d i c t a b l y , t h e r e p o r t of t h i s ad hoc s u r v e y committee which c a l l e d f o r C I A p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n . a

community-wide c o o r d i n a t i o n e f f o r t c o u l d n o t be a c c e p t e d by t h e DOD members of t h e IAC.
Dulles' n e x t move was t o t a k e t h e i s s u e t o t h e

S e c r e t a r y of Defense as t h e p e n u l t i m a t e s t e p b e f o r e r e q u e s t i n g t h e NSC f o r a r u l i n g . In h i s l e t t e r t o

S e c r e t a r y of Defense Wilson, t h e D I made i t p l a i n C t h a t t h e o b s t r u c t i o n i s m of t h e DOD members, w i t h
t h e l o n e e x c e p t i o n of t h e A i r Force r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,

was p r e v e n t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s u i t a b l e

means f o r improving i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h i s most i m p o r t a n t of s u b j e c t s , In a triumph of g r e a t s i g -

n i f i c a n c e t o t h e s t i l l - y o u n g C I A , on 9 J a n u a r y 1956

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--lIRwm
t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense i n no u n c e r t a i n terms

s u p p o r t e d t h e D C I and s n u f f e d o u t t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e d i s s i d e n t IAC m e m b e r s . Thus was t h e Guided

Missiles I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee (GMIC) born on
31 January 1956

Interagency c o o r d i n a t i o n i n t h e atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e f i e l d w a s characterized by somewhat
less of t h e p u l l i n g and h a u l i n g t h a t t y p i f i e d c o o r d i -

n a t i o n of t h e o t h e r elements of S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e . Perhaps because a u t h o r i t y f o r U . S . atomic energy a c t i v i t i e s was lodged i n t h e AEC, n o t t h e DOD, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e l a t t e r were more o f t e n consumers t h a n producers of i n t e l l i g e n c e w i t h a n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n or two.
The f i r s t of t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g groups i n atomic

energy i n t e l l i g e n c e was t h e J o i n t Nuclear Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee ( J N E I C ) which o p e r a t e d i n t h e 1947-49 p e r i o d under D i r e c t i v e No. 9 of t h e N a t i o n a l Intelligence Authority.
With t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of

t h e SIC i n 1949, t h e J N E I C became t h e J o i n t A t o m i c

Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee ( J A E I C ) and f o r a p e r i o d of about three y e a r s (1949-1952) o p e r a t e d a s
a working group under t h e SIC (per DCID 3/3).
With

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COO 629617

t h i s e x c e p t i o n J A E I C has e x i s t e d as an i n d e p e n d e n t

committee under t h e IAC o r U S I B .

Its a u t h o r i t y i n
It s u r v i v e d

its f i e l d has been w e l l n i g h a b s o l u t e .

a v e r y c r i t i c a l review of its f u n c t i o n i n g a t t h e

t i m e of t h e first S o v i e t n u c l e a r t e s t i n August

1949

-

an e v e n t t h a t J N E I C had j u s t pronounced un-

l i k e l y t o o c c u r u n t i l mid-1951 a t t h e e a r l i e s t and

more l i k e l y t o o c c u r two years t h e r e a f t e r . U n t i l t h e mid-1950's
J A E I C w a s i n fact t h e

s o l e d r a f t i n g body of one of t h e most i m p o r t a n t of
t h e N I E s , t h a t d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e

S o v i e t n u c l e a r weapons program.

The procedure w a s

f o r J A E I C t o d r a f t and c o o r d i n a t e a paper which w a s

t h e n submitted t o t h e IAC f o r a p p r o v a l , by-passing
t h e ONE/Board of N a t i o n a l E s t i m a t e s r o u t e t a k e n by

a l l o t h e r NIEs.
1 -

I n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e fact t h a t

t o t h a t t i m e t h e S o v i e t program was predominantly

:

1 -8

i n a research and development p h a s e , t h e J A E I C
s i n e c u r e d i d n o t appear u n r e a s o n a b l e t o t h e o p e r a t i n g

i

i , .
i

\

heads of t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community.

Though Sherman Kent (Chairman, BNE) had first
I

i

4

raised q u e s t i o n s about t h e p r o p r i e t y of J A E I C ' S
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the N I E i n 1953, i t was n o t u n t i l

i

i i

December 1955 t h a t t h e IAC approved a m o d i f i c a t i o n of
the JAEIC charter.

:I

The procedure f o r h a n d l i n g t h e

- 48 1

. . ...

..

.

.. .

., . ,

.

..

, .

..

.

.

--

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COO 629617

S o v i e t atomic energy NIE w a s r e g u l a r i z e d and a t
t h e same t i m e J A E I C w a s r e l i e v e d of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e on d e l i v e r y s y s t e m s " o t h e r t h a n on t h e n u c l e a r warheads o r n u c l e a r p r o p u l s i o n syst e m s associated t h e r e w i t h . "
When t h e new series

of D C I D s w a s i s s u e d i n January 1959, t h e J A E I C

charter was r e i s s u e d as DCID 3/3 ( N e w Series) and
made t o correspond w i t h those of t h e GMAIC and

SIC.

A s O S 1 is t h e component p r o v i d i n g t h e b u l k

of t h e s u p p o r t t o JAEIC and its o p e r a t i n g o f f i c i a l s ,
t h e atomic energy thread is i n e x t r i c a b l y woven i n t o

OSI.
where.

T h i s s t o r y i s t o l d i n greater d e t a i l else-

*

Amid t h e g e n e r a l f l u x of d i r e c t i v e s and chang-

i n g m i s s i o n s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e first h a l f and
m i d d l e of t h e decade of t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s , i t would be e a s y

t o m i s s t h e v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t improvements i n c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s t h a t began t o take place.
I

Dur-

i n g t h i s t i m e OS1 began to mature as an o r g a n i z a t i o n .
!

The m a t u r a t i o n w a s reflected i n t h e i n c r e a s i n g sophis-

t i c a t i o n 6 P i t s p r o d u c t s and its growing i n f l u e n c e i n
<
)

t h e community as t h e b a t t l e of p r e r o g a t i v e s w i t h t h e
DOD s u b s i d e d .
.#

:
i

1

I

4

j

*

Annex 11, l l O g I and A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e " .

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n

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w e can u s e t h e u l t i m a t e i n s c i e n c e and technology t o improve o u r i n t e l l i g e n c e take.
?I II . t h e r e a l l y c u t e tricks are so c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t i e r of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge t h a t t h e y remain unsuspected f o r months and even f o r y e a r s . A research program producing a stream of new i n t e l l i g e n c e t o o l s and t e c h n i q u e s would be inv a l u a b l e . ''

. . . . . . .

Much of t h e t h r u s t of t h e r e p o r t was aimed
a t research and development.

I n its recom-

mendations for an i n t e l l i g e n c e research l a b o r a t o r y
t h e TCP w a s i n effect a d v o c a t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

of a DD/R o r DD/S&T some s e v e n y e a r s before t h e
fact.

When K i l l i a n as head of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s

F o r e i g n I n t e l l i g e n c e Advisory Board convinced McCone i n 1962 t o e s t a b l i s h a DD/R, he w a s merely f o l l o w i n g through on t h e TCP recommendations.
The importance t o O S 1 of t h e TCP exercise w a s

t h a t f o r almost t h e first time t o p - f l i g h t US s c i e n -

tists were asked t o s u p p o r t i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s n o t as j u d g e s of i t s p r o d u c t s b u t as i n n o v a t o r s o f c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s schemes.
The i n f l u e n c e of

TCP members, and t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o commit t h e i r
own t i m e and t o e n l i s t t h e a i d of t h e i r fellow

s c i e n t i s t s , provided a good deal of t h e push needed t o g e t new a c t i v i t i e s underway.

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One of t h e schemes t h a t t h e TCP s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d , t h e U-2, ment.
w a s t h e n b a r e l y under develop-

By mid-1955 t h e top o f f i c i a l s o f OS1 were
As t h e moment of oper-

made aware of t h i s f a c t .

a t i o n a l r e a d i n e s s neared, OS1 was asked t o perf o r m v u l n e r a b i l i t y s t u d i e s of t h e a i r c r a f t i n t h e

h o s t i l e S o v i e t environment t o be p e n e t r a t e d .

Under

S c o v i l l e ' s l e a d e r s h i p OS1 was v e r y much a part of
the picture.

(Earlier,(I

had l e f t OS1 t o

become t h e "ramrodtt on t h e development team under
Richard B i s s e l l ) .

By r e a s o n of t h i s involvement

a t an e a r l y stage, OS1 w a s b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t h a n i t
would otherwise have been f o r t h e o n s l a u g h t of p h o t o g r a p h i c evidence t h a t t h i s remarkable c o l l e c t i o n
platform began t o p r o v i d e i n 1956.

I t is safe t o

s a y t h a t no o t h e r body o f i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n
had so immediate and widespread a n effect on

OSI's

substantive efforts.
That t h i s s h a r p i n c r e a s e i n e v i d e n c e came when

it d i d w a s f o r t u i t o u s .

Growing concern about S o v i e t

thermonuclear weapons d e l i v e r e d by B i s o n heavy bombers or b a l l i s t i c missiles began t o be reflected i n more and more demands for d e t a i l e d estimates of Soviet c a p a b i l i t i e s .
I n e a r l y 1957 a n o t h e r s u b j e c t

began t o t u r n up w i t h i n c r e a s i n g frequency i n spec-

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u l a t o r y a r t i c l e s about t h e f u t u r e of s c i e n c e
earth s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e s (ESV).
The pros and

--

cons of investment i n s u c h s e e m i n g l y impractical experiments w e r e b e i n g debated i n t h e p u b l i c
press and s c i e n t i f i c l i t e r a t u r e .

In June 1957

OS1 went on record i n a Congressional b r i e f i n g
w i t h n o t i c e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s c o u l d a t any t i m e

thereafter launch an ESV.

When i n f a c t S p u t n i k I

b u r s t on t h e s c e n e on 4 October 1957, however, n e i t h e r O S 1 n o r government leaders had f o r e s e e n
t h e tremendous impact t h i s S o v i e t accomplishment

w a s t o have on the whole q u e s t i o n of U.S. i n v e s t ment i n s c i e n c e and Uefense p r e p a r a t i o n s .
More t h a n any S o v i e t achievement s i n c e t h e i r
f i r s t thermonuclear d e v i c e of 1954, Sputnik I dramatized
t h e r e s u r g e n c e of S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c

-

and m i l i t a r y

-

capabilities.

There w a s even a good deal of extrap-

o l a t i o n by US d e f e n s e e x p e r t s of S o v i e t I C B M c a p a b i l i t i e s on t h e rather meager base of their f i r s t

ESV experiment.

N o t since the investigation i n t o

c a u s e s of t h e Pearl Harbor disaster t h a t l e d t o t h e c r e a t i o n of C I A i n 1947, perhaps, had so much s o u l s e a r c h i n g i n t o t h e s t r e n g t h s and aims of t h e U.S. been carried o n .

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The e f f e c t on O S 1 of t h e l i v e l y debates and

d i s c u s s i o n s i n Congress, A d m i n i s t r a t i o n circles and t h e p u b l i c press was an immediate r i s e i n t h e r e q u e s t s f o r b r i e f i n g s and estimates on S o v i e t S&T c a p a b i l i t i e s , For almost t h e first time most

components of OS1 were s t i r r e d t o produce papers, s u p p o r t f o r b r i e f i n g s , and newly scheduled N I E s ,

or t o p r e s e n t t h e i r f i n d i n g s t o a v a r i e t y of consumers.
The effect on O S 1 morale w a s g e n e r a l l y

salubrious.

I t was s t i m u l a t i n g t o most a n a l y s t s

t o f i n d t h a t t h e p r o d u c t s of t h e i r l a b o r s were a t

l a s t sought after and found applicable t o problems
of n a t i o n a l importance.

S c o v i l l e responded vig-

o r o u s l y t o these demands and w i t h great d r i v e and d e t e r m i n a t i o n s u p e r v i s e d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f many i m p o r t a n t s t u d i e s and c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o estimates.
As time went o n , he became more and

more f r e q u e n t l y

t h e Agency spokesman i n t e c h n i c a l f i e l d s a t White
' i

House S t a f f and c o n g r e s s i o n a l l e v e l s . Among t h e many o f f i c i a l groups t o be e x t e n s i v e l y
b r i e f e d by t h e D C I , t h e D D / I ,

or t h e AD/SI i n the

1958-59 p e r i o d w a s t h e S e n a t e Preparedness Committee,
chaired by then S e n a t o r Lyndon B . Johnson.

The

Committee w a s much concerned about t h e a p p a r e n t U. S. gap i n numbers of s c i e n t i s t s and e n g i n e e r s b e i n g

-

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g r a d u a t e d and a p o s s i b l e d i s p a r i t y i n ICBM capab i l i t i e s , n o t t o mention t h e lag i n space explo-

r a t i o n which t h e CIA-adduced evidence i n d i c a t e d .
There can be l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t OS1

-

and t h e

Agency

-

b e n e f i t t e d from t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o show

its wares.
I n a more s u b t l e way t h e e x t e n s i v e exposure

of t h e a n a l y t i c a l s i d e of t h e Agency l e d t o changes
of l a s t i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s demanded of t h o s e who were to perform t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y complex and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - g r o u n d e d tasks of c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s .
The U-2 w a s o n l y t h e first

i n a s u c c e s s i o n of i n t r i c a t e l y e n g i n e e r e d platforms
t h a t c o u l d c o l l e c t i n a s h o r t f e w hours enough i n f o r -

mation t o t a x t h e a n a l y t i c a l r e s o u r c e s of t h e Agency and Community f o r months thereafter. Advances i n t h e
~

I

followed

photography so t h a t t h e need f o r s c i e n t i s t s and engineers i n the i n t e l l i g e n c e business rose steeply.

No l o n g e r c o u l d g e n e r a l i s t s do many of t h e tasks now
imposed on O S I .
Amid a g e n e r a l s t i m u l a t i o n of

r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r s c i e n t i s t s and e n g i n e e r s i n t h e U.S., OS1 w a s hard p u t t o r e c r u i t and r e t a i n enough q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 ' s t o do t h e job.

The

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aftermath of S p u t n i k was t o a large e x t e n t a b i g
headache f o r OS1 i n p e r s o n n e l r e c r u i t m e n t .

I n t h e l a t e 1 9 5 0 ' s OS1 found i t s e l f providing leadership i n t h e technical c o l l e c t i o n f i e l d
as w e l l as i n a n a l y s i s .

1

1

I
extent.

Through h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h such groups as

the A i r Force S c i e n t i f i c Advisory Boardl-kas

i n a p o s i t i o n t o o b t a i n advance.knowledge of new p r o p o s a l s and t o i n f l u e n c e their development t o some Perhaps because i t housed one of t h e larger

groups of s c i e n t i s t s / e n g i n e e r s i n i n t e l l i g e n c e , OS1 throughout i t s h i s t o r y has been e x t e n s i v e l y involved i n collection support.
d e t a i l elsewhere.*
S a t e l l i t e s were n o t long t o be j u s t o b j e c t s f o r
T h i s s t o r y is t o l d i n more

analysis.

When t h e a d a p t a t i o n of t h e ESV t o i n t e l -

l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n began i n t h e l a t e 1950s, OS1 began preparing f o r the product, S c o v i l l e established a

small group
t o c o n s i d e r how r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r

*

See Annex

m.

T

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56

-

t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e a n t i c i p a t e d photography

c o u l d be o r g a n i z e d and f u l f i l l e d by t h e N a t i o n a l Photographic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Center ( N P I C ) .
b i t of f o r e s i g h t p a i d o f f .

This

OS1 w a s w e l l prepared

t o make t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e modest flow o f U-2
photography I

I
-

With t h e i n c r e a s i n g t e c h n i c a l complexity of

weapons s y s t e m s and t h e r a p i d expansion of worldwide s c i e n c e
t h e direct r e s u l t i n many r e s p e c t s

o f t h e coming of age of computers and data h a n d l i n g systems

-

there came a n o t i c e a b l e change i n t h e

demands on i n t e l l i g e n c e t o up-date its methodologies i n b o t h c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s .
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s

t h a t opened up f o r new approaches t o o l d problems i n

i n t e l l i g e n c e had t h e i r impact on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l

features i n C I A .
A f t e r some months of s t u d y f o r M r . D u l l e s , upon
t h e u r g i n g of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s F o r e i g n I n t e l l i g e n c e

Advisory Board, S c o v i l l e s u b m i t t e d a p l a n f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a new directorate i n 1961 t o be
called t h e Deputy Directorate f o r Research.
The p l a n

w a s a c c e p t e d i n its p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s by t h e new
D C I , M r . McCone.

On 19 February 1962 S c o v i l l e was The m i s s i o n of the new

himself a p p o i n t e d DD/R.

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D i r e c t o r a t e was t o provide a f o c u s f o r t h e techno< l o g i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Agency o t h e r t h a n t h o s e housed i n t h e T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n o f DD/P,
t h e O f f i c e s of Communications and S e c u r i t y o f DD/S,

and OS1 t h e n of D D I .

I n its first f e w months of

e x i s t e n c e , t h e DD/R c o n s i s t e d of l i t t l e more t h a n

a s t a f f component and

7 1

which had

been t r a n s f e r r e d t o it from OSI.
The f l e d g l i n g DD/R t h a t S c o v i l l e had p u t to-

g e t h e r w a s no sooner established t h a n i t s s t r u g g l e f o r p o s i t i o n i n t h e Agency and Community began.
While t h e D C I gave it c o n t r o l of t h e now-compromised

U-2 assets of t h e Agency and a t o e hold i n ELINT,

l i t t l e else w a s forthcoming w i t h o u t a knock-down-

drag-out b a t t l e , e i t h e r w i t h i n o r o u t s i d e t h e Agency and v e r y o f t e n b o t h ,

I n June of 1963 a d i s i l l u s i o n e d

and d i s h e a r t e n e d S c o v i l l e r e s i g n e d from t h e Agency and Colonel Edward B. G i l l e r , USAF, became Acting
DD/R.
The period of more t h a n s i x y e a r s d u r i n g which

S c o v i l l e directed t h e O f f i c e can be described as
t h e time of coming-of-age

of O S I .

Although a number

of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ideas, p r o c e d u r e s and c o n c e p t s

f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h e OS1 m i s s i o n had t h e i r g e n e s i s
b e f o r e h i s a r r i v a l , it remained f o r someone w i t h

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COO 629617

h i s enthusiasm and energy t o g e t O S 1 moving. convinced Robert Amory ( D D I ) and D u l l e s o f t h e need f o r s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e and o b t a i n e d
t h e i r support.

He

When t h e t i m e came f o r O S 1 t o be

up f r o n t b e f o r e t h e W h i t e House and Congress, S c o v i l l e himself was ready and h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s
were motivated t o back h i m up.

Few i n O S I , t h e n ,

would d i s p u t e t h e f a c t of h i s i m p r i n t on t h e O f f i c e and its p r o d u c t s .
If one l e s s o n was l e a r n e d

from t h e s e y e a r s i t w a s t h a t i f O S 1 w a s good enough i n its j o b , no one c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y d i s p u t e its r i g h t t o be doing i t . E f f e c t i v e DOD o p p o s i t i o n

t h a t had so t y p i f i e d t h e opening of t h e decade of

t h e 1950s was v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t a t i t s c l o s e .

V.

The Wheelon P e r i o d , 1962-63

D r . Albert Wheelon of Space Technology

Laboratories r e p l a c e d S c o v i l l e as AD/SI i n June 1962.*
A s t h e DD/R was s u f f e r i n g its growing p a i n s ,

Wheelon was revamping OS1 own image.

-

i t may be s a i d i n h i s

A very keen and dynamic t h e o r e t i c a l

p h y s i c i s t i n h i s own r i g h t , Wheelon was very demandi n g of h i s newly a c q u i r e d c o l l e a g u e s . The g r a d u a l l y

i n c r e a s i n g stress on s t a f f p e r s o n n e l w i t h s t r o n g
*Weber w a s Acting A D / S I from February to June 1962.

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backgrounds i n t h e p h y s i c a l sciences and e n g i n e e r i n g , mentioned e a r l i e r , w a s a c c e n t u a t e d s t i l l f u r t h e r almost o v e r n i g h t . programs i n

1

H e established t r a i n i n g

1 primarily for

a n a l y s t s i n missiles, s p a c e , and n u c l e a r i n t e l l i g e n c e .
He dug d e e p l y i n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e adequacy of
t h e s o u r c e material a v a i l a b l e t o OS1 and s p e n t count-

less hours d i s c u s s i n g , and a l l b u t i n v e n t i n g , new
ways of i n c r e a s i n g t h e f l o w of new d a t a . Eventually

he began t o c h a l l e n g e t h e c o l l e c t o r s t o do better.

S h o r t l y a f t e r Wheelon's EOD w i t h C I A , t h e i s s u e of t h e chairmanship of GMAIC f l a r e d again.

I t w i l l be remembered t h a t up t o t h i s t i m e GMAIC
had been chaired by a DOD r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .

When

Colonel E a r l MacFarland, who had been Chairman f o r f o u r y e a r s , w a s r e a s s i g n e d by t h e A i r Force i n 1962,
t h e f i g h t f o r t h e chairmanship between C I A and DOD

w 8 6 on a g a i n .
I

Although t h e p r e c e d e n t l a i d down by

Mr. D u l l e s in January 1956, as p a r t of t h e price of
peace w i t h DOD on t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of GMAIC, called
I

i

for a DOD chairman, C I A now f o r t h e first time had
a c a n d i d a t e w i t h rather overpowering q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
i n Wheelon and he w a s d u l y a p p o i n t e d .
_I
I

Both t h e

i n t e r n a l r e s o u r c e s i n O S 1 and t h e Community mechanism

r\
I
.
.

of GMAIC were under h i s c o n t r o l .

N o t without s t r a i n

- 60 -

i. . . .

I
,,

. . . . ... .

..

.

. .

. .

__

_ A

_ I _

--

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COO 629617

and heartbreak, i t may be s a i d , he began a f o r c e d
d r a f t m o d e r n i z a t i o n of t h e s t a f f s , t h e methods

and t h e p r o d u c t s of b o t h .
I n t h e m i d s t of t h i s W h e e l o n - i n i t i a t e d f l u r r y
of remodeling t h e Cuban m i s s i l e crisis broke.
He,

r!
s p e n t long hours a t t h e N a t i o n a l Photographic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n C e n t e r (NPIC) p o r i n g o v e r U-2 photographs of Cuban landscape i n search of S o v i e t missiles.
A parallel

as t h e Chairman of GMAIC, and many members of t h e

e f f o r t w a s manned by J A E I C under Chamberlain's
leadership.
I

T h i s able s u p p o r t t o t h e Kennedy

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s acknowledged i n w e l l d e s e r v e d commendations, Wheelon's t e n u r e w a s l i t t l e more t h a n a y e a r .
Y e t h i s e f f e c t on OS1 i n t h a t s h o r t t i m e w a s rather

surprising.

H i s emphasis on s t r o n g t e c h n i c a l qual-

i f i c a t i o n s among s t a f f p r o f e s s i o n a l s has been main-

tained ever s i n c e .

H i s i n s i s t e n c e on r e l e v a n c e i n

OS1 p u b l i c a t i o n s set s t a n d a r d s t h a t are s t i l l b e i n g followed.
H i s p e r s i s t e n t demand f o r s c i e n t i f i c

i n t e g r i t y i n a n a l y t i c a l approach, though d i f f i c u l t
f o r t h e g e n e r a l i s t s t o embrace, c e r t a i n l y had lasti

i n g e f f e c t s on t h e q u a l i t y of OS1 f i n i s h e d i n t e l ligence. These g a i n s were n o t achieved w i t h o u t cost,

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61

-

i n t h e form o f c o n s i d e r a b l e u n e a s i n e s s and w o r r y on t h e p a r t o f his s u b o r d i n a t e s , b u t t h e i r e x i s t ence is u n d e n i a b l e .
VI.

The Chamberlain P e r i o d . 1963

--

When i t became a p p a r e n t i n t h e s p r i n g of 1963
t h a t D r . S c o v i l l e ' s t e n u r e as DDR was n o t t o l a s t

l o n g , Wheelon emerged as a r a t h e r l o g i c a l candidate
f o r t h e DDR j o b .

I n August 1963 h e r e p l a c e d t h e

Acting DDR,--Colonel G i l l e r .

Dr. Donald F. Chamberlain,

I replaced
the.

D r . Wheelon a s AD/SI a t t h i s

Only t h e n was i t made known t h a t , as p a r t of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g between McCone and Wheelon t h a t l e d t o
t h e l a t t e r ' s acceptance of t h e DDR assignment, OS1

was t o be t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e DDI t o t h e DDR

(renamed t h e DD/Science and Technology).

The move of

OS1 t o t h e DDS&T meant n o t o n l y its t r a n s l o c a t i o n b u t
a l s o a s u b s t a n t i a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n of its r e l a t i o n s h i p

t o o t h e r Agency components.

Throughout Its h i s t o r y

OS1 had been a l i g n e d i n t h e Directorate of I n t e l l i g e n c e a l o n g s i d e t h e o t h e r f i n i s h e d i n t e l l i g e n c e components
(ORR, O B I , ONE, X I ) .

I t took many y e a r s o f p e r s i s t e n t

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e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h p r o d u c t i v e working r e l a t i o n s h i p s
w i t h these o f f i c e s , o c c a s i o n a l l y w i t h t h e p e r s o n a l

involvement of t h e D D I h i m s e l f .

Many i n O S 1 were

concerned about t h e effect on these arrangements t h a t

a c r o s s i n g of directorate l i n e s might have, e s p e c i a l l y
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r a t h e r open a n t i p a t h y between t h e t h e n D D I and t h e new DDSM'.
A good deal

of back room

d i s c u s s i o n of t h e merits of t h e s h i f t i n g of O S 1 t o
t h e DDSW took place (and still goes on some f i v e

years later).
O t h e r changes began t o o c c u r .

It w i l l be remembered

t h a t , because of t h e s t r a n g e n e s s of s c i e n c e and tech-

nology t o many c o l l e c t o r s , OS1 had b u i l t up a rather unique c o l l e c t i o n s u p p o r t c a p a b i l i t y c o n s i s t i n g of s u c h elements as a

l

l

f

o

r l i a i s o n and

r e q u i r e m e n t s purposes , 1

I

n

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The process of p a r i n g O S 1 down c o n t i n u e d .

A

t o t a l of

I
lwas removed f r o m OS1 t o f i n a n c e new

I

I

components of t h e DDS&T s u c h as t h e O f f i c e of Research and Development (ORD), S p e c i a l Projects S t a f f (OSP), F o r e i g n Missiles and Space Analysis C e n t e r (FMSAC) , and o t h e r s .
The most s i g n i f i c a n t of these, i n terms

of e v e n t u a l e f f e c t on OSI w a s FMSAC.

There ensued a determined e f f o r t toward e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t and out-placement of s u r p l u s i n d i v i d u a l s
that s u c c e s s f u l l y removed t h e excess p e r s o n n e l .
OS1

c o u l d take small c o n s o l a t i o n i n t h e fact t h a t considerable dead wood was pruned away d u r i n g t h i s e n f o r c e d

reduction i n strength.

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As t h e g e n e r a l u n e a s i n e s s i n O S 1 began t o

s u b s i d e i n 1965, t h e afore-mentioned t r a n s f e r of

I

ko FMSAC w a s announced by Wheelon t o be e f f e c t i v e

25 October 1965.

With i t went a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n

of t h e t r u l y n a t i o n a l l e v e l s u b j e c t matter of S&T intelligence.
To O S I ' s problems of l e a r n i n g t o work

across d i r e c t o r a t e l i n e s w i t h e r s t w h i l e colleagues i n
t h e D D I were added t h e problems of c o o r d i n a t i n g S&T

i n t e l l i g e n c e r e l a t i n g t o b a l l i s t i c missiles and space i n t e l l i g e n c e a c r o s s office l i n e s . Reductions i n size meant r e d u c t i o n s i n b u d g e t s . Wheelon i n h i s s h o r t t e n u r e as AD/SI had p r o j e c t e d an e x t e r n a l a n a l y s i s program t h a t r o s e t o t h e / l e v e l i n f i v e years. Though he succeeded i n s e l l i n g

I

t h e concept t o C I A p l a n n e r s , f e d e r a l economy moves

o v e r t o o k t h e p l a n before i t c o u l d be implemented t o

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any great e x t e n t .

Hence, i n Chamberlain's first

year o r two he was f o r c e d t o manage w i t h less

e x t e r n a l c o n t r a c t money t h a n seemed l i k e l y t o be a v a i l a b l e a t t h e start of h i s t e n u r e .
As can be s e e n from t h e f o r e g o i n g a c c o u n t , t h e f i r s t t w o y e a r s or so of Chamberlain's d i r e c t o r -

s h i p of O S 1 were rather d i s c o u r a g i n g .

The loss of

p e r s o n n e l and c e i l i n g p o s i t i o n s meant less freedom t o l o o k i n t o p o t e n t i a l new f i e l d s of i n t e r e s t and n e c e s s i t a t e d hard l o o k s a t t h e scope of s u b j e c t

matter t o be covered w i t h fewer p e r s o n n e l .

Similarly,

c a r e f u l review of e x t e r n a l c o n t r a c t programs w a s r e q u i r e d as t h e O S 1 budget l e v e l e d o f f .
A general

t i g h t e n i n g up of o p e r a t i o n s w a s called f o r .
A series of moves was i n i t i a t e d by Chamberlain

t o e n a b l e OS1 t o l i v e w i t h i n its p e r s o n n e l and budget limitations. Perhaps t h e most basic w a s a p a i n s t a k i n g

examination of t h e p r i o r i t i e s attached t o t h e numerous

areas of coverage f o r which OS1 w a s for one r e a s o n
o r another responsible.
A s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n of

coverage i n g e o g r a p h i c a l and t o p i c a l areas f o r which s i g n i f i c a n t customers were n o t r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e

was a c h i e v e d .

T h i s review had many r a m i f i c a t i o n s .

F o r example, i n some i n s t a n c e s p e r s o n n e l c o u l d be

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COO62 9 6 1 7

s h i f t e d so as t o b o l s t e r coverage of important t o p i c s t h a t were t o o l i g h t l y s t u d i e d .

Another p r o d u c t of t h e review w a s a comprehensive r e d i r e c t i o n of t h e e x t e r n a l c o n t r a c t program. p r i o r i t y projects were dropped and p r o j e c t s of intermediate p r i o r i t y were reduced i n s c o p e . Major
Low

p r o j e c t s of h i g h p r i o r i t y were given a larger p r o p o r t i o n

of OSI's e x t e r n a l c o n t r a c t d o l l a r t h a n b e f o r e as t h e
t o t a l number of projects dropped.
A c o n s c i o u s , and

l a r g e l y s u c c e s s f u l , e f f o r t was made t o improve t h e

monitoring of c o n t r a c t o r performance by O S 1 project
officers.
The n e t e f f e c t of t h e review of t h e . e x t e r n a 1

c o n t r a c t program, which w a s a c t u a l l y a g r a d u a l p r o c e s s s p r e a d over s e v e r a l years, was t o make more e f f e c t i v e u s e of t h e investment and raise t h e caliber of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n by c o n t r a c t o r s t o OSI's p r o d u c t i o n of
famished i n t e l l i g e n c e .

0231's r e s p o n s e t o a d e c l i n i n g T/O w a s a c r i t i c a l
. .

l o o k a t t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of its p e r s o n n e l and a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t to i n c r e a s e t h e caliber of t h e tech-

..

..

n i c a l staff when f i l l i n g v a c a n c i e s .

Recruitment

Of

t h e best c o l l e g e g r a d u a t e s w a s emphasized.

In the

1965-66 and 1966-67 academic y e a r s p a r t i c u l a r l y proI

grams of assistance t o f i e l d r e c r u i t e r s were l a i d o n .

- 67 I

S e l e c t e d O S 1 s t a f f m e m b e r s went i n t o t h e f i e l d t o work w i t h r e c r u i t e r s , t e l l them about OSI's n e e d s , and assist i n conducting t h e i n t e r v i e w s .
The number

of a p p l i c a n t s r o s e s h a r p l y and t h e best of these

good c a n d i d a t e s were c o n c e n t r a t e d upon f o r e v e n t u a l hiring.
This recruitment e f f o r t w a s highly successful

and achieved t h e desired r e s u l t of upgrading t h e l e v e l

o f competence of OS1 t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l as a whole.
The r o s t e r of p r o s p e c t i v e branch and d i v i s i o n chiefs

w a s immeasurably s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e a d d i t i o n of

sizeable numbers of a l e r t , young s c i e n t i s t s and
engineers.
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of fewer p e o p l e t o do t h e

s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e j o b caused a r e e x a m i n a t i o n
of s o u r c e s and methods.
The premium on f i n d i n g t h e

most p r o d u c t i v e s o u r c e t o s u p p l y t h e most meaningful information increased.
The process of s h i f t i n g from

t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e appraaches i n v o l v i n g

people and places t o t e c h n i c a l data from i n t r i c a t e l y

e n g i n e e r e d and complex c o l l e c t i o n d e v i c e s , set i n motion d u r i n g t h e late stages of S c o v i l l e + s t e n u r e and accelerated by Wheelon, w a s of n e c e s s i t y pushed s t i l l f u r t h e r by Chamberlain.
I t was p a t e n t l y i n

OSI's best interest t o work w i t h c o l l e c t i o n o r g a n i -

zations on r e q u i r e m e n t s and o b j e c t i v e s and t h e develop-

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ment o f t h e DDSW concept brought O S 1 i n t o a s u p p o r t
r o l e vis-a-vis
those d e s i g n i n g and o p e r a t i n g c o l l e c t i o n The r e l a t i v e r e l i a n c e on s u c h

d e v i c e s and programs.

t e c h n i c a l s o u r c e s increased

I

I

1
sources.

While OS1 remained an

a l l - s o u r c e shop, t h e i n p u t s from t e c h n i c a l c o l l e c t i o n
schemes i n c r e a s i n g l y out-weighed t h o s e from t r a d i t i o n a l

Like many o t h e r facets o f OSI's o p e r a t i o n s ,

c o l l e c t i o n s u p p o r t became i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l e v a n t
d e s p i t e t h e loss of t h e O S 1
DDI.

I

--

ko t h e

The s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s a p p a r e n t

anomaly is t h a t w i t h fewer people i n t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
s y s t e m one w a s r e q u i r e d t o c a l l h i s shots more c a r e f u l l y

and t o be as e f f i c i e n t as p o s s i b l e i n t h e u s e of s u p p o r t groups s u c h as t h d

I

Then, t o o , d i r e c t working r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h DDP d i v i s i o n s , always a p r e f e r r e d modus o p e r a n d i i n OSI, were encouraged

as a way of c u t t i n g o u t n e e d l e s s i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and
conserving t i m e

.

One s u c h arrangement, t h a t w i t h F 3 D i v i s i o n , is J
worth c i t i n g as a n example of h i g h l y beneficial

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collaboration.

Beginning i n 1965, p e r i o d i c m e e t i n g s

between t h e management l e v e l s of FF, and OS1 have

been h e l d a t which selected t o p i c s are reviewed f o r
t h e purpose of f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

i m p o r t a n t S&T r e q u i r e m e n t s and s e l e c t i o n of t h e most
l i k e l y c o l l e c t i o n o p e r a t i o n t o s a t i s f y them.

These
As t i m e

meetings f e a t u r e b r i e f i n g s by b o t h p a r t i e s .

has passed, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of FMSAC and o t h e r DDS&T

o f f i c e s have p a r t i c i p a t e d b u t t h e emphasis remains on OSI's interests.
Earlier attempts t o e s t a b l i s h a

somewhat s i m i l a r program w i t h SR D i v i s i o n dwindled
away after t h e f i r s t t w o or three s e s s i o n s .

I n 1968

an ex-OS1 o f f i c e r w a s r e t u r n e d t o OS1 f

r

o

m

7

1

and a s s i g n e d t h e t a s k

of improving OS1 r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h DDP g e n e r a l l y .
Specialized c o l l e c t i o n s u p p o r t has a l w a y s been

a p a r t of OS1 o p e r a t i o n s b u t one arrangement is worth
s i n g l i n g o u t f o r somewhat greater t r e a t m e n t t h a n t h e others.
1

T h i s i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between

7 1

n a d A c t i v i t i e s (OSA).

t h e O f f i c e of S p e c i a l
T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p began w i t h t h e

U-2 o p e r a t i o n s i n 1956, as has a l r e a d y been mentioned.
A h a n d f u l o f s e l e c t e d OS1 o f f i c e r s p r e p a r e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y
1

a s s e s s m e n t s on t h e U-2 o p e r a t i n g i n a S o v i e t environment

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f o r t h e Developmental P r o j e c t s D i v i s i o n (DPD), t h e o p e r a t i n g component. When S c o v i l l e became DDR, he

charged OS1 w i t h p r o v i d i n g t h e same s o r t of s u p p o r t

t o t h e c o n t i n u i n g U-2 and follow-on o p e r a t i o n s which

were s u b s e q u e n t l y t a k e n over by OSA.

L a r g e l y on t h e

b a s i s of a r e p u t a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s work, i n

1 9 6 7 - 6 8 1 1 was r e q u e s t e d by t h e N a t i o n a l Reconnaissance

O f f i c e (NRO) t o do a comprehensive s t u d y of a number

of systems operated under NRO a e g i s

7 1
A

I *
A c o n t i n u i n g problem i n O S I , a l l u d e d t o i n

e a r l i e r pages, is t h a t of p r e s e n t i n g t i m e l y i n t e l l i g e n c e i n a form most u s e f u l t o t h e consumer.

number of experiments have been t r i e d i n t h e neverending search f o r t h e best format. One s u c h experiment

began i n t h e summer of 1964 when a five-day-a-week p u b l i c a t i o n , known a s t h e SURVEYOR, was i n a u g u r a t e d .
A t f i r s t p u r e l y an i n t e r n a l C I A organ, t h e SURVEYOR

w a s a n attempt t o c u l l selected i t e m s of r e c o g n i z a b l e

s i g n i f i c a n c e (up t o a t o t a l of 5 or 6 ) from t h e d a i l y f l o w of raw i n f o r m a t i o n and p u b l i s h a g i s t and comment on them f o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n of appropriate a f f i c i a l s .
The SURVEYOR caught on q u i c k l y and became a n i m p o r t a n t

o u t l e t $or S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e .

With o c c a s i o n a l improve-

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ments it is i n 1968 d i s t r i b u t e d widely i n d a i l y and weekly form a t t w o l e v e l s of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o b o t h
domestic and o v e r s e a s r e c i p i e n t s .
A t Chamberlain's

i n s i s t e n c e t h e S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e Digest ( S I D )
has been s t r e n g t h e n e d to m a i n t a i n i t s place as t h e

primary monthly i s s u a n c e from OSI.

Some 1

I

S c i e n t i f i c and T e c h n i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Reports (STIRS) complete t h e r o s t e r of s e r i e s - p r o d u c e d OS1 p u b l i c a t i o n s .
T h i s f a m i l y of p u b l i c a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s probably t h e

h i g h e s t l e v e l o f . p r o d u c t i v i t y e v e r achieved i n OS1

i n terms of t i m e l i n e s s and p e r t i n e n c e t o t h e needs
of p o l i c y makers.

*

Perhaps because of p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h i n t r a C I A matters, OS1 came through a p e r i o d t h a t might

have s e e n a n o t h e r round of p r e r o g a t i v e b a t t l e s w i t h
t h e Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency ( D I A ) w i t h v e r y l i t t l e

perturbation.

When t h e D I A was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1963,

there was some concern i n OS1 t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e o v e r
t h e d i v i s i o n of S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,

s t i l l f r e s h i n t h e memories of many O S 1 o f f i c e r s ,
might be repeated.
The problems of g e t t i n g o r g a n i z e d

and e s t a b l i s h i n g a working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e S e r v i c e i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s appear t o have so
occupied D I A , however, t h a t f e w q u a r r e l s have been

*

See Annex V I 1 1 "OS1 P u b l i c a t i o n s "

-

72

-

I

-

,

\

--.p

~

engaged i n w i t h CIA and none of consequence t o OSI.
In JAEIC and SIC o n l y minor d i f f i c u l t i e s have a r i s e n
t h a t are a t t r i b u t a b l e t o DIA and t h e g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n i n g

of these two committees a s of 1968 has been a s smooth

as a t any t i m e i n t h e i r h i s t o r y .

Both have been

remarkably s u c c e s s f u l i n r e c o g n i z i n g and accommodating
t h e needs of t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g a g e n c i e s , n o t a b l y DIA.

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T h i s account of t h e h i s t o r y of O S 1 w a s completed

i n i t s p r e s e n t form a t t h e end of 1968. A s t h e y e a r ended, t h e e a r l y phases of r e a d i n g i n a new administ r a t i o n were b e i n g implemented by t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community, t h e Agency and OSI.
M r . Nixon had made known

h i s i n t e n t i o n of r e i n s t i t u t i n g t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y

C o u n c i l procedures f o r review of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y i s s u e s , f o r e c a s t i n g t h e d i r e c t involvement of i n t e l l i g e n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h e workings of t h e NSC machinery. Moves toward c u t b a c k s i n r e s o u r c e s f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e purposes were w e l l underway. OS1 proposes t o do an

annual addendum t o t h i s review of its h i s t o r y i n order p e r i o d i c a l l y t o record t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t e v e n t s , a c t i v i t i e s and t r e n d s i n its e x i s t e n c e .

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74

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MNEX I

P e r s o n n e l , Budget, O r g a n i z a t i o n

CONTENTS Page
I.
11.

Personnel Trends Budget

.......... ........ .

1
3

........................
OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t ,
OS1

Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 F i g u r e 10 F i g u r e 11 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 F i g u r e 15

4
5

Organization C h a r t ,

OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t ,
OS1

6
7
8

Organization C h a r t ,

OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t ,
OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t ,

9

OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t , OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t , OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t , OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t , OS1 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t ,
OS1 Organization Chart,

10
11

12
13

14
15

OS1 Organization C h a r t ,

16

OS1 Budget (Bar c h a r t )

............ ... ....,.

17

O f f i c e of S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e P e r s o n n e l Growth (Graph) ,

18

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....

ANNEX I
.. .. .

..

. .

Personnel, Budget, Organization

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NEXT 15 PAGES DENIED-IN-FULL

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ANNEX I1

OS1 and A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e
r

including the J o i n t Atomic Energy I n t e l l i u e n c e Committee

CONTEXTS Page
I. 11.
111.
IV.

A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t 1944-1946

The Beginning of
The F i r s t Atomic

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CIG-CIA Involvement . . . . . . . Energy Detection System . . . . .

National I n t e l l i g e n c e Authority Directive No. 9 and t h e Establishment of J o i n t Nuclear Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee

its Aftermath
VI.

........... ..............

11

17
20

.............. VII. The Webster Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII. Progress i n t h e Early F i f t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . I X . DcID-----l.. . . 1 . . ............. X. The P e r i o d From 1955 t o D a t e . . . . . . . . . . . Reference L i s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I

The E s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e J o i n t Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

23
24
26

27

33

ANNEX I1
OS1 and Atomic Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e

including t h e

I.

A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t -4 9s A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h e U . S . had i t s

b e g i n n i n g s i n t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t .

In e a r l y 1944

General George C . Marshall, Army C h i e f of S t a f f , d i r e c t e d General L e s l i e Groves, Director, Manhattan Engineering
District,

(MED) t o e s t a b l i s h t h e n e c e s s a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n

within t h e D i s t r i c t t o cover foreign i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h e atomic energy f i e l d .
The i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t t h a t was

formed, as p a r t of t h e MED S e c u r i t y O f f i c e , followed t h e p r e v a i l i n g p r a c t i c e i n MED of b e i n g t i g h t l y compartmented and i s o l a t e d from o t h e r governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s due t o security regulations. For t h e most p a r t i t concerned

i t s e l f w i t h an e x h a u s t i v e c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e - e s p i o n a g e
effort.
The main r e p o r t i n g f u n c t i o n was accomplished

d i r e c t l y t o and by General Groves, p e r s o n a l l y . I n May 1945 t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t was separated

I
I

f r o m t h e S e c u r i t y O f f i c e and began t o f u n c t i o n d i r e c t l y u n d e r General Groves. During World War I1 t h e concenNear t h e end of t h e

t r a t i o n of e f f o r t w a s on Germany.

war t h e emphasis s h i f t e d t o a c t i v i t i e s and s c i e n t i s t s
w i t h atomic energy knowledge who

were S o v i e t o r might

c __..__--

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T
be brought under S o v i e t c o n t r o l .

Thus, t h e USSR

began t o s u p e r s e d e Germany as t h e prime target f o r intelligence exploitation. Operation ALSOS w a s a major Manhattan P r o j e c t i n t e l l i g e n c e o p e r a t i o n as t h e w a r i n Europe came t o an end.

ALSOS teams manned by s c i e n t i f i c p e r s o n n e l

and g i v e n p r i o r i t y a s s i s t a n c e by t h e f i e l d forces, moved i n t o Germany w i t h and i n some cases ahead of
t h e combat forces. Their dual objectives w e r e to

determine c o n c l u s i v e l y how f a r t h e Nazi atomic e f f o r t
had p r o g r e s s e d and t o seize German atomic f a c i l i t i e s ,

r e c o r d s , and key s c i e n t i s t s . accomplished.

These o b j e c t i v e s were

By t h e f a l l of 1945 i t became clear

t h a t t h e S o v i e t s were s u c c e s s f u l l y p u r s u i n g t h e same

o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e German sector occupied by S o v i e t
troops.
Apart from t h e MED e f f o r t , t h e O f f i c e of S c i e n t i f i c

Research and Development d u r i n g World W r I1 carried o u t a

as p a r t of its d u t i e s a g e n e r a l s t u d y of t h e s c i e n t i f i c
l i t e r a t u r e t o isolate names, l o c a t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s of a l l s c i e n t i s t s i n t h e Axis c o u n t r i e s . This effort

- 2 -

COO629617
';,,]"I

ur

.' .-)-7:py

&ibd---

a i d e d i n developing bombing t a r g e t s and r e v e a l i n g

s o u r c e s of m i l i t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , some

e f f o r t was expended on t h e U,SSR, and t h i s material provided a v a l u a b l e tool when t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community t u r n e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e USSR a f t e r t h e war. Although r i g o r o u s s e c u r i t y measures and special

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n s t i t u t e d by t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t
l a r g e l y p r e v e n t e d t h e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n , i n t e l l i g e n c e components o u t s i d e t h e Project became aware of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of uranium, Norwegian heavy water and other materials of atomic energy importance.

Also,

almost o v e r n i g h t , w i t h t h e US explosion of n u c l e a r
bombs and t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of the Smyth report, t h e

s u b j e c t of atomic weapons was no l o n g e r taboo'.l -

i

___

~.

J

During t h e 1946-1949 p e r i o d t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s and other govern- 3 -

\

,

. 1

.

COO629617

mental departments, because of t h e i r d e p a r t m e n t a l r e q u i r e ments, concerned themselves w i t h t h e i r parochial i n t e r e s t s i n atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e .
AS a r e s u l t , i n t e l l i g e n c e

i n f o r m a t i o n and estimates emanated from a number of organizations. Although there w a s some working-level

l i a i s o n , t h e i n t e r c h a n g e of r a w atomic energy i n f o r -

m a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n s w a s s p o t t y and sporadic a t best
and widely d i v e r g e n t estimates of f o r e i g n atomic
c a p a b i l i t i e s appeared.
The task of i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s i s

w a s g r e a t l y complicated by t h e c o u n t l e s s and p e r s i s t e n t

rumors concerned w i t h atomic weapons and d e t o n a t i o n s i n
t h e USSR.

Each r e q u i r e d thorough a n a l y s i s and had t o

be e v a l u a t e d a g a i n s t a growing body of i n f o r m a t i o n , inc l u d i n g a n e f f o r t t o d i s c o u n t a S o v i e t i n s p i r e d propaganda campaign, U n t i l its d e a c t i v a t i o n i n 1946, t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t was the focal p o i n t f o r an e f f o r t t o e x p l o i t
t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r remote d e t e c t i o n of unique t e l l - t a l e

r a d i o a c t i v i t y emanating from atomic energy p l a n t s as
w e l l as s u p p o r t i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n Germany and German-

c o n t r o l l e d areas.

The i n t e r e s t i n remote d e t e c t i o n
- 4 -

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w a s amorphous w i t h l i t t l e o r no o r g a n i z a t i o n .

A

s t e a d y flow of s u g g e s t i o n s were s e l f - i n i t i a t e d w i t h i n
t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t .

General Groves k e p t a p e r s o n a l

f i l e on d e t e c t i o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s , b u t presumably preferred n o t t o p u r s u e these i n any way t h a t might d i v e r t t h e s c i e n t i f i c e f f o r t of t h e Project from t h e p r i m a r y

o b j e c t i v e of producing atomic bombs.
1

I

I t i s n o t clear

whether t h e c o n c e r n w a s o v e r p o t e n t i a l h e a l t h hazards

from Manhattan P r o j e c t o p e r a t i o n s o r p u r e l y t h e develop-

ment of t e c h n i c a l knowledge on t h e b e h a v i o r of released r a d i o a c t i v i t y or t h e development of d e t e c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s

for t a r g e t i n g purposes.

- 5 -

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C O O 629617

The Beginning of CIG-CIA

Involvement

A new factor of major consequence was t h e 1946

l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t created t h e A t o m i c Energy Commission
t o t a k e o v e r from t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t t h e d i r e c t i o n

and o p e r a t i o n of t h e US atomic energy program.

The AEC

Chairman, David L i l i e n t h a l , i n s i s t e d from t h e o u t s e t
t h a t AE i n t e l l i g e n c e should be i n t h e AEC.

He never

became r e c o n c i l e d t o t h e e v e n t u a l l o c a t i o n of t h e AE

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n C I A and remained a v o c a l and acid c r i t i c of t h e AE i n t e l l i g e n c e e f f o r t .

t

I

S t a f f (ICAPS) a memorandum n o t i n g t h a t t h e A w a s F
engaged in[-[experimentation.
H e pro-

posed t h e i n i t i a t i o n of a world-wide s y s t e m of v a r i o u s means f o r d e t e c t i n g a f o r e i g n atomic e x p l o s i o n .

I n September G e n e r a l Samford wrote t h e D i r e c t o r , C I G
about t h e LeMay p r o p o s a l and s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e matter
be c o n s i d e r e d a p r o p e r s u b j e c t for C I G s u p e r v i s i o n

and c o o r d i n a t i o n .

General Hoyt Vandenberg, D i r e c t o r , C I G , addressed
a memorandum t o G e n e r a l Groves i n l a t e September o u t -

l i n i n g t h e needs of t h e C I G f o r i n f o r m a t i o n on f o r e i g n atomic e x p l o s i o n s and proposed t h a t C I G c o o r d i n a t e
interdepartmental a c t i v i t i e s for acquiring the infor-

mation,

General Groves w a s r e l u c t a n t t o -accept the

p r o p o s a l since t h e new AEC w a s s h o r t l y t o take o v e r
Manhattan Engineering D i s t r i c t .

I n e a r l y October,

G e n e r a l Vandenberg and t h e Acting C h i e f of ICAPS m e t
w i t h General Groves t o review t h e p r o p o s a l .

On

30 December 1946, G e n e r a l Groves responded t o General

Vandenberg's memorandum emphasizing t h e need f o r improved d e t e c t i o n hardware and improved communications.
H e e x p r e s s e d h i s beliefs t h a t , i f t h e US atomic e n e r g y

program w a s n o t t o remain under t h e m i l i t a r y as seemed t o be a foregone c o n c l u s i o n , weapons development and
t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e aspects o f atomic e n e r g y s h o u l d n o t

- 7 -

;

b e t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e AEC.

General Groves and S e c r e t a r y

of War P a t t e r s o n had j u s t concluded a compromise w i t h
AEC Chairman L i l i e n t h a l p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e AEC would

b e merely a p a r t i c i p a t i n g agency i n c o o r d i n a t e d atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e .
On N e w Years Day 1947 S e c r e t a r y of War P a t t e r s o n

wrote t h e Chairman AEC t h a t i t was h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e Manhattan i n t e l l i g e n c e personnel and f i l e s
were t o b e t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e C I G .

T h i s a c t i o n took

p l a c e on 25 February 1947.

I n mid-March t h e C I G n o t i f i e d

ICAPS and t h e S e r v i c e C h i e f s t h a t t h e MED Group was now i n t e g r a t e d w i t h i n t h e C I G and would f u n c t i o n as t h e
I

I

111.

The F i r s t Atomic Energy D e t e c t i o n System
On 1 4 March 1947 General Vandenberg i n a memorandum

t o War, N a v y , t h e AEC and t h e J o i n t Research and Development Board urged t h e prompt e s t a b l i s h m e n t of
a committee t o f o r m u l a t e an over-a1
- 8 -

'rn

I

I

L

COO 629617

plan.

T h i s s p e c i a l committee produced its report

i n June 1947.

On 30 June, A d m i r a l H i l l e n k o e t t e r ,

who had succeeded General Vandenberg as Director,

CIG s e n t t h e o t h e r f o u r a g e n c i e s t h e committee report
r e q u e s t i n g t h e i r comments or concurrence w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations of t h e committee.
The J o i n t Research and Development Board f a v o r e d

t h e N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e Foundation o r some o t h e r non-

m i l i t a r y agency f o r d e t e c t i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .

The

A r m e d Forces Special Weapons Project f e l t i t s h o u l d

have t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a n a l y s i s and e v a l u a t i o n
r a t h e r t h a n t h e Army A i r Force.
The AEC concurred

]a t i n t h e report, n o t i n g o n l y t h --dht
s h o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o a s i n g l e agency. The S e c r e t a r y

of War's concurrence i n c l u d e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e
Army A i r Force would assume t h

responsibility.

The S e c r e t a r y of Navy c o n c u r r e d w i t h

t h e report and a l s o t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y assignment t o

I

t h e Army A i r F o r c e .

Two d a y s before t h e l a t t e r became

a separate S e r v i c e , G e n e r a l Eisenhower i s s u e d a

d i r e c t i v e that assigned it the over-all r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r t h e program b u t provided n e i t h e r p r i o r i t y n o r

funds.

Two days l a t e r t h e A i r F o r c e a s s i g n e d t h e

d e t e c t i o n program t o t h e Deputy Chief of S t a f f , Materiel
where i t became t h
- 9 -

I

I

I

,

-.

---

-

Following t h e Eniwetok tests

1-1
1

estab-

l i s h e d an I n t e r i m S u r v e i l l a n c e Research N e t to

d e s i g n and p l a n a d e t e c t i o n system rather t h a n
i t s e l f become a n o p e r a t i o n a l network.

AWS w a s a l s o

responsible f o r o p e r a t i n g t h e associated ground-level

sampling equipment.

A second element w a s a network

of a c o u s t i c s t a t i o n s o p e r a t e d b y t h e Army S i g n a l Corps.
The Coast and Geodetic Survey provided seismic d a t a

from its d i s p e r s e d US-based s t a t i o n s and v a r i o u s contacts w i t h f o r e i g n s t a t i o n s .
The Naval Research

Laboratory undertook t o develop a radio-chemical a n a l y s i s of r a i n water samples and t o b u i l d s e v e r a l
large scale c o l l e c t i o n s t a t i o n s .
A l l surveillance

r e p o r t i n g was f u n n e l e d i n t o a Data and A n a l y s i s C e n t e r s e t up by I l i n Washington.
L a t e i n 1948 t h e

3
lished

S i g n a l Corps i n s t a l l e d a second a c o u s t i c s t a t i o n i n j o i n i n g t h e first t h a t had been estab-

arlier.

As a r e s u l t of these

a c t i o n s a minimum detection network w a s i n b e i n g before

1

(and provided a v a l u a b l e shake-down period f o r c o l l e c t i n g and h a n d l i n g data.
The c r i t i c a l problems of funding of research and

m-

t h e related r o l e of t h e J o i n t Research and Development

10

-

Board r a p i d l y became e v i d e n t .

Although t h e A F w a s

r

assigned t i t u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for

I

they c o u l d c o n t r o l c e r t a i n f l i g h t s The

and u t i l i z e o t h e r assets a t hand o n l y s o f a r .

b a l a n c e of t h e program r a p i d l y became bogged down i n t h e many u n c e r t a i n t i e s and a m b i g u i t i e s of j u r i s d i c t i o n , p r e r o g a t i v e s and b u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r p l a y .
N o t o n l y was t h e JRDB involved as a f o c a l p o i n t b u t

i n v a r y i n g ways a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s t h e J o i n t C h i e f s ,
t h e S e r v i c e s and t h e i r S e c r e t a r i e s , t h e new echelon

of the S e c r e t a r y of Defense, t h e AEC, Bureau of t h e

Budget and C I A were a l s o involved.
For t h e n e x t two y e a r s t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r fund-

i n g , program g u i d a n c e , r e s e a r c h , and scope of a c t i v i t y
w a s waged among t h e Agencies.
aftermath of
I t was n o t u n t i l t h e

I

/that some resemblance of a coordi-

n a t e d d e t e c t i o n program began t o emerge.

IV.

N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Au t h o r i t v D i r e c t i v e No, 9 and t h e Establishment o f Joint Nhclear En e r m I n t e l l i a e n c e C o m m i t t ee During t h e t i m e t h a t t h e special committee was

p r e p a r i n g its r e p o r t
I

the

N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e n u r n o r i t y i s s u e d its D i r e c t i v e
No. 9 on 18 A p r i l 1947.
T h i s D i r e c t i v e was designed

t o . e s t a b l i s h once and for a l l t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e
C I G t o assume t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e f u n c t i o n f o r m e r l y h e l d

i n t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t and t o r e g u l a r i z e t h e coord i n a t i o n of a l l i n t e l l i g e n c e related t o f o r e i g n atomic

-

11

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COO629617

energy developments i n c l u d i n g c o l l e c t i o n , c o r r e l a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n and d i s s e m i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Government.
By May 1947 three estimates on t h e S o v i e t AE program
had been i s s u e d by t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t and t h e

2
I

i n CIG.

Some Agencies took i s s u e

w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s i n these estimates and were

h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of t h e h a n d l i n g of AE i n t e l l i g e n c e .
/had s o u g h t c o o r d i n a t e d views of a l l i n t e r e s t e d

The

a g e n c i e s t h r o u g h an i n f o r m a l inter-agency group b u t w a s hampered by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s were
p e r m i t t e d t o speak o n l y as i n d i v i d u a l s and n o t for t h e i r

agencies.

C o n c u r r e n t l y , t h e AEC Chairman forwarded t o

the N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A u t h o r i t y f o r a c t i o n a r e p o r t

prepared for t h e AEC by A d m i r a l Souers.

The report

c o n t a i n e d s p e c i f i c criticism of t h e assignment of AE i n t e l l i g e n c e t o t h e C I G and recommended t h a t t h e AEC
e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e l l i g e n c e component headed by a d i r e c t o r

who would become a permanent member of t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e

Advisory Board.

The N I A s a w no c o n f l i c t w i t h its

D i r e c t i v e No. 9 and t h u s concurred i n t h e recommendations. However, some v e r y basic elements of c o n f l i c t remained

as f a r as C h a i r m a n L i l i e n t h a l w a s concerned and he
related h i s m i s g i v i n g s t o M r . J. Edgar Hoover.

About

a y e a r l a t e r Chairman L i l i e n t h a l pursued t h e matter

a g a i n w i t h M r . Hoover, t e l l i n g him t h a t u n l e s s t h i n g s

-

12

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COO 629617

improved he "thought t h e P r e s i d e n t ought t o c o n s i d e r

some d r a s t i c changes i n t h e s e t - u p . "
On 7 August 1947, S e n a t o r B . B . Hickenlooper, Chairman of t h e Congressional J o i n t Committee on
A t o m i c Energy, r e q u e s t e d t h e Secretaries of Defense

and S t a t e , t h e Attorney G e n e r a l and t h e Chairman of
t h e Atomic Energy Commission t o p r o v i d e a combined

judgment as " t o t h e e a r l i e s t date by which any n a t i o n , w i t h o u t o u r a i d , may be expected t o produce its first

atomic bomb,"

S e c r e t a r y of Defense Forrestal referred

t h e r e q u e s t t o t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Group as a

matter f a l l i n g under its c o o r d i n a t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The v a r i o u s Agencies c o n t i n u e d t o complain and d i s c u s s
t h e h a n d l i n g of i n t e l l i g e n c e .

A 3 October 1947 memo-

randum t o t h e D C I G , from t h e C h i e f

1

lnoted his con-

c e r n w i t h t h e Souers AEC r e p o r t t h a t implied t h a t C I A

w a s i n c a p a b l e o f e v a l u a t i n g AE i n t e l l i g e n c e .

He also

r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e Department of S t a t e was n o t supplyi n g Ancoming AE i n f o r m a t i o n and t h a t t h e AEC w a s n o t forwarding i n f o r m a t i o n , a l t h o u g h i t was now a f u l l fledged m e m b e r of t h e

IAB, and i t w a s n o t responding
The Chiefipjfeeling

to CIA d r a f t papers.

that CIA

p e r s o n n e l c o u l d no l o n g e r work e f f e c t i v e l y i n view

of t h e w i t h h o l d i n g of essential i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e

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a g g r e s s i v e moves of o t h e r a g e n c i e s i n t o i n t e l l i g e n c e , recommended a h i g h - l e v e l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
A s a r e s u l t , t h e Director of C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e

i n i t i a t e d on 6 November 1947 under N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e

A u t h o r i t y D i r e c t i v e Number 9 , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e J o i n t Nuclear Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee ( J N E I C ) . *
The C I A was t o f u r n i s h t h e Chairman and t h e permanent

s t a f f of t h e Committee,

The proposed membership of

representatives from t h e Departments of S t a t e , A r m y ,

Navy and A i r Force, t h e A t o m i c Energy Commission,
t h e Research and Development Board and t h e C I A .
The

a c t i o n b y t h e Director of C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e s t a t e d
t h a t t h e JNEIC w a s established " t o assist i n guidance

of c o l l e c t i o n a g e n c i e s i n t h i s f i e l d a n d t o c o n d u c t

d e t a i l e d e v a l u a t i o n of a l l r e s u l t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . "

Thus, t h e JNEIC became t h e first i n t e r a g e n c y s c i e n t i f i c

committee w i t h i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e community.

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14

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I n t h e s p r i n g of 1948, when i t w a s thought t h a t
t h e t i g h t s e c u r i t y and other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e

S o v i e t AE program p u t a p a r t i c u l a r premium on c o v e r t operations, t h e m i w a s transferred
This a c t i o n

t o t h e O f f i c e of Special O p e r a t i o n (OSO).

added burdens t o t h e s e c u r i t y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n problems

and f u r t h e r removed t h e Group from its o r i g i n a l p o i n t
of attachment i n

1

1 OW.
Upon t h e

Under t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A c t of 1947 t h e C I G

became t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency.

r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of C I G i n t o t h e newly formed C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , f u n c t i o n s and p e r s o n n e l of the1

(were t r a n s -

ferred t o t h e O f f i c e of Reports and E s t i m a t e s (Om).

T h i s a c t i o n brought together t h e n u c l e a r energy i n t e l -

l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h a l l other s k i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n t o one component, the1

I

l

o

f ORE.

1

A r e p l y to Senator Hickenlooper's request w a s

s e n t on 15 December 1947.

He t h e n r e q u e s t e d t h a t a

f u r t h e r report be made on or before 1 J u l y 1948 or

earlier i f any s u b s t a n t i a l change i n t h e s i t u a t i o n
took place. Although t h e AEC c o n c u r r e d i n t h e c o o r d i n a t e d

estimate s e n t t o Congress on 15 December 1947 i n r e p l y

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t o S e n a t o r Hickenlooper, D r . F i n e and D r . S h e r c l i f f
of t h e AEC i n January 1948 s e n t a memorandum t o t h e
S t a f f of S e n a t o r H i c k e n l o o p e r ' s Committee s t a t i n g
t h a t t h e C I A report w a s t t s e r i o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g . "

In

A p r i l 1948 t h e AEC re-emphasized

t o t h e committee
Thereupon,

its r e s e r v a t i o n s regarding the C I A report.

S e n a t o r Hickenlooper wrote t h a t he w a s " i n a s t a t e
of c o n f u s i o n as t o whether o r n o t w e ( t h e Committee)

have any r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e q u e s t i o n involved."
H e added ''1 am t r u l y concerned t h a t t h e v a r i o u s a g e n c i e s

have a p p a r e n t l y n o t been able t o make a c o o r d i n a t e d examination of t h i s q u e s t i o n and t o p r e s e n t t h e
Committee w i t h a r e l i a b l e and s a t i s f a c t o r y e v a l u a t i o n
t h e r e o f . If

From t h i s t i m e on t h e J N E I C proved to be t h e mechanism f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g AE i n t e l l i g e n c e . The

Committee began i n 1947 i t s semi-annual estimates on
t h e S o v i e t A t o m i c Energy Program. With its semi-

a n n u a l estimate dated 1 January 1950 the Committee i n i t i a t e d t h e practice of o b t a i n i n g t h e a p p r o v a l of
t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e Advisory Committee before p u b l i c a t i o n .

These semi-annual estimates c o n t i n u e d u n t i l 1952 when
t h e estimate w a s made a n n u a l l y .

The Committee r e t a i n e d

t h e s o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and pub-

- 1 i c a t i o n of the S o v i e t estimate u n t i l 1965 when respon-

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s i b i l i t y f o r it was p l a c e d i n t h e O f f i c e o f N a t i o n a l
E s t i m a t e s mechanism.

The N a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Survey

program h a s a l s o been s u p p o r t e d by t h e C o m m i t t e e w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s on atomic energy matters.
The Committee h a s a l s o sponsored s c i e n t i f i c and tech-

n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n programs.

Although t h e

Committee has i t s e l f had no c o l l e c t i o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,
i t h a s provided s i g n i f i c a n t guidance and a s s i s t a n c e

t o the collectors.

The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o l l e c t i o n

has remained w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l a g e n c i e s r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e Committee. Detailed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h e

p r o d u c t i o n o f atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e were s p e c i f i e d

i n Annex C t o WID 3/4 i n 1956, l a t e r r e v i s e d i n t h e
new series, DCID 3/3 d a t e d 23 A p r i l 1965.

I n 1948 t h e A i r Force Materiel S p e c i a l WeaDonsOne, which had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

II
I

1
S e c r e t a r y of Defense F o r r e s t a l i s s u e d a memorandum

I

i n mid-1948 s p e c i f i c a l l y c a l l i n g f o r "a f u l l y opera t i o n a l r o u t i n e s u r v e i l l a n c e , " system t o be i n s t a l l e d by J a n u a r y 1950. The Research and Development Board,

t h e f o c a l p o i n t f o r many problems r l c o n c l u d e

0

4

~

d on t h e other hand, d e s p i t e
17

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I

I

M r . F o r r e s t a l ' s memorandum, t h a t a f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l

s u r v e i l l a n c e system could n o t be achieved before m i d 1953.

I n s p i t e of a l l t h e problems t h a t beset/

l

i t was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e t e c t i o n of t h e first

S o v i e t n u c l e a r t e s t conducted on 29 August 1949.
A s p e c i a l Panel meeting under t h e Chairmanship

of Vannevar Bush w a s called on 19 September t o e v a l u a t e
t h e data c o l l e c t e d .

On 20 September t h e Chairman of

t h e M i l i t a r y L i a i s o n Committee of t h e AEC reported t o

P r e s i d e n t Truman t h e r e s u l t s of t h e a n a l y s i s and
d e t a i l s of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d .
A t 1100 hours

on 25 September, M r . Truman b r i e f e d t h e C a b i n e t and
released a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e USSR had conducted
a nuclear explosion.

On 29 September t h e D C I called f o r t h e convening of an ad hoc committee " t o c o n s i d e r r e c e n t atomic developments," t o examine t h e atomic e n e r g y estimate producing process and t h e o v e r a l l atomic e n e r g y i n t e l ligence situation.

A r e p o r t was t o be s u b m i t t e d t o a

S p e c i a l Committee of t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . I n e a r l y October 1949 t h e JRDB r e q u e s t e d t h e J C S

t o r e - e v a l u a t e its guidance on atomic e n e r g y s u r v e i l l a n c e , g i v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o both d e t e c t i o n and S o v i e t rates of p r o d u c t i o n .

A t t h i s l a t e d a t e t h e JRDB

had concluded t h a t an e x t e n s i v e research and develop-

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ment program would be n e c e s s a r y . Concurrently,

t h e J N E I C s u b m i t t e d t o t h e D i r e c t o r of C e n t r a l

I n t e l l i g e n c e through t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e Advisory Committee mechanism a memorandum on t h e need f o r m i s s i o n r e o r i e n t a t i o n and f o r t e c h n i c a l c o l l e c t i o n
t o support t h a t mission.

The DCI endorsed t h e memorandum t o t h e J C S ,

which i n t u r n referred t h e matter t o t h e M i l i t a r y

L i a i s o n Committee.

In January 1950 t h e Committee

a d v i s e d t h e J C S o f i t s recommendations on t h e "predominating c o n s i d e r a t i o n " i n atomic energy s u r v e i l l a n c e . On 20 January t h e JCS approved t h e Committee's recommendations and charged t h e A i r Force w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g , o p e r a t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a s u r v e i l l a n c e system.
The

JCS s p e c i f i e d t h a t t h e Research and Development Board

was t o monitor t h e development of s c i e n t i f i c means f o r
d e t e r m i n i n g r a t e s of p r o d u c t i o n . Although l a t e r t h e

AEC was f o r m a l l y charged w i t h t h e development of such
means, as a p r a c t i c a l matter t h i s became a c o o p e r a t i v e

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T
e f f o r t i n which the)lCIA

and t h e J A E I C have

c o n t i n u e d a major r o l e , i n i n i t i a t i n g and m o n i t o r i n g advanced t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments,
VI. The E s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e J o i n t Atomic Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee WID 3/3 of 28 October 1949 e s t a b l i s h e d t h e

i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l S c i e n t i f i c I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee
(SIC).

A t its f i r s t meeting on 2 1 November 1949

t h e S I C d i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e J N E I C and formed t h e

J o i n t A t o m i c Energy I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee ( J A E I C ) 3/ as a working committee of t h e SIC. T h i s a c t i o n was

a change i n name o n l y and d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e members h i p o r f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e

Committee.
The ad hoc committee e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D I C

i n September 1949 p r e s e n t e d its r e p o r t on 9 June 1950.
The r e p o r t was a comprehensive and r e a l i s t i c summary
of t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i n g and producing mechanisms

then i n e x i s t e n c e .

The committee formulated e i g h t
These recommendations in-

s p e c i f i c recommendations.

c l u d e d t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p r i o r i t y f o r c o l l e c t i o n , m a i n t a i n i n g and a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g t h e t e c h n i c a l s u r v e i l -

I

l a n c e s y s t e m s , r o t a t i o n of t e c h n i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e
.... ._

p e r s o n n e l t o o v e r t c o l l e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s abroad, augumentation of p e r s o n n e l of t h e Armed Forces S e c u r i t y Agency, d i r e c t and c o n t i n u o u s c o n s u l t a t i o n between

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'

,_..-.I

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.

--

i

groups concerned w i t h c o l l e c t i o n , and t h e consoli d a t i o n of c e r t a i n NSC d i r e c t i v e s t o s i m p l i f y i n t e r l o c k i n g committee s t r u c t u r e and e l i m i n a t e unanimous consent.
These w e r e reviewed by t h e IAC and s p e c i f i c
A summary

comments on each were forwarded t o t h e D C I .

of t h e Committee r e p o r t and t h e IAC comments w a s made
b y t h e DCI t o t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .

Some changes had a l r e a d y been made, others were

undertaken immediately and others took place o v e r a
period of years

.
The JAEIC approach t o t h e AE

i n t e l l i g e n c e problem, endorsed by t h e IAC, r e s u l t e d in1 lbecoming the c o n t i n u i n g focal p o i n t .
The a - m i c

e n e r g y i n t e l l i g e n c e e x p e r i e n c e of many p e r s o n n e l i n t h e
F i t h a t dated back t o t h e Manhattan P r o j e c t , t h e

i n t e g r a t i o n of AE i n t e l l i g e n c e i n a comprehensive s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e program, and t h e d i r e c t access t o assets of C I A w e r e coupled w i t h t h e JAEIC as a going operation. Through t h i s mechanism r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of

o t h e r a g e n c i e s c o u l d b r i m t o bear s p e c i a l i z e d agency
c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e r e s t w i t h o u t d u p l i c a t i n g t h e work-

i n g l e v e l research of t h e r l I t is s u b s t a n t i a l l y on t h i s basis t h a t AE i n t e l l i g e n c e has c o n t i n u e d e v e r since.

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I

In t h e aftermath of(

/atomic energy i n f o r -

mation w a s c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y c a t e g o r y for i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s .

1

Research and develop-

ment proceeded w i t h some p r o p o s a l s t h a t would l e a d t o
s o l v i n g t h e formidable s e c u r i t y surrounding t h e S o v i e t

atomic energy program.

COO 629617

T

S o v i e t n u c l e a r t e s t i n g i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s from 1949 t o 1952 i n c r e a s e d t h e p r e s s u r e on t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e Community f o r i n f o r m a t i o n on p r o d u c t i o n , s t o c k p i l i n g and d e l i v e r y s y s t e m s . Every e f f o r t was expended t o

e x p l o i t each s o u r c e i n an e f f o r t t o p e n e t r a t e t h e S o v i e t AE program. From t h e v a r i o u s programs, r e s u l t s

b e g i n t o show, leads were developed, b i t s and p i e c e s of information begin t o f i t together.

VII.

The J N E I C ( l a t e r J A E I C ) , w a s t h e s o l e c o o r d i n a t i n g body and producer of a l l N a t i o n a l E s t i m a t e s on t h e S o v i e t AE Program from 1947 t o 1965. Although

I

I

1

i n d i v i d u a l a g e n c i e s r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e J A E I C performed a n a l y s i s of AE i n f o r m a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t e d t h e r e s u l t s w i t h i n t h e J A E I C framework, there was some f e e l i n g t h a t an i m p a r t i a l review s h o u l d be made of t h e work of
J A E I C and t h e n a t i o n a l estimates being produced,

As

a r e s u l t , i n 1951, a p a n e l of c o n s u l t a n t s w a s establ i s h e d by t h e DCI. The p a n e l was t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e

best p o s s i b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates were b e i n g made

on t h e S o v i e t AE program and t o a d v i s e t h e DCI (and i n i t i a l l y t h e I A C , l a t e r USIB) on t h e v a l u e of a n a l y s e s
..

.

done and t h e p e r t i n e n c e and v a l i d i t y of t h e conclusions

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reached i n t h e estimates.

T h i s p a n e l became known

a s t h e Webster P a n e l , s o named a f t e r i t s Chairman,
M r . W i l l i a m Webster, t h e n Executive V i c e P r e s i d e n t
of t h e New England E l e c t r i c Company.

The p a n e l

h a s remained i n e x i s t e n c e s i n c e 1951.

I t s respon-

s i b i l i t i e s were expanded i n 1965 t o i n c l u d e t h e work

done on estimates concerning t h e Communist Chinese
A t o m i c Energy Program and a t t h a t time its name w a s

changed t o t h e D i r e c t o r ' s Nuclear I n t e l l i g e n c e P a n e l .
VIII.

Progress i n t h e E a r l y F i f t i e s

The German s c i e n t i s t s and e n g i n e e r s whom t h e S o v i e t s had t a k e n t o t h e USSR f o r work i n t h e i r AE program were b e i n g r e t u r n e d t o Germany.
The f l o o d

of i n f o r m a t i o n as a r e s u l t o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n s , conducted b y r b e r s o n n e l and members o f other i n t e l l i g e n c e
s er v ices

r

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1

provided t h e c o r n e r s t o n e f o r a n a l y s i s of t h e S o v i e t program.
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It was also during this time that unique analytical techniques were attempted.

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Because of t h e t i g h t s e c u r i t y and s e n s i t i v i t y
of many of t h e programs i n i t i a t e d I4 e d n u

guidance, strict compartmentation developed w i t h i n

OS1 and t h e Agency.

The A t o m i c Energy A c t of 1954,

under which c l e a r a n c e s f o r AE i n f o r m a t i o n came under
t i g h t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l throughout t h e

Government, compounded t h e compartmentation.

-w s ] a

responsible for

7 1

Since

informat i o n

w i t h i n t h e Agency, he w a s able t o i s o l a t e 1
i t s people and i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e rest of t h e Agency,

S i n c e i b l e a r a n c e s required h i s personal approval,
he was able t o l i m i t t h e flow of i n f o r m a t i o n and g a i n

p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l of a l l AE i n t e l l i g e n c e .
w a s that1
:.:.. .

The r e s u l t

/ a t times operated h i s D i v i s i o n o u t s i d e

.. ... ..... .. . .

I

t h e purview of h i s immediate s u p e r i o r s and maintained

. I

... .

.

a d i r e c t channel w i t h t h e DCI.

I
J

IX.

D C I C
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X.

The P e r i o d From 1955 t o Date

I n August 1 9 5 5 , r I w a s r e a s s i g n e d t o an important r o l e i n t h e development of t h e U-2 reconnaissance system.
A t about t h e
!

same t i m e , D r . Herbert S c o v i l l e , J r . became A s s i s t a n t

D i r e c t o r of O S 1 and was d e s i g n a t e d Chairman of t h e

JAEIC.

Under t h e d i r e c t i o n of S c o v i l l e , a new e r a

i n t h e handling of atomic energy i n f o r m a t i o n and
method of o p e r a t i o n of

i n terms of p e r s o n n e l took

E Ip lIa cle and

began.

An expansion
t h e c r o s s feed-

i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n and normal l i n e s of command were reinstituted.

. .: . .

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T

During t h e 1956-60 p e r i o d , ) I l S o v i e t h i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e Urals

and i n t h e Far Eastern USSR'were )-Fnalyzed w i t h more c o n c l u s i v e r e s u l t s .

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Beginning i n t h e f a l l of 1961 and through t h e f a l l and w i n t e r of 1962 t h e S o v i e t s conducted t h e i r most e x t e n s i v e series of n u c l e a r tests.

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I n August 1962

Chairman, J A E I C v i c e

H

as designated

Soon thereafter

t h e J A E I C assumed a major r o l e i n p r o v i d i n g i n t e l -

l i g e n c e s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e Cuban missile crisis.
The J A E I C m e t i n almost continuous s e s s i o n s around-

t h e - c l o c k i s s u i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e summaries and b r i e f i n g s f o r the DCI.

I n August 1963,

,

w a s named D i r e c t o r ,

expansion of c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s .

I

IWith t h e s i g n i n g of t h e Nuclear T e s t Ban

T r e a t y i n 1963, more a t t e n t i o n was g i v e n t o methods

of m o n i t o r i n g n u c l e a r t e s t s .

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As t h i s chepter on

OSI's r o l e i n atomic energy

i n t e l l i g e n c e comes t o a c l o s e a t t h e end of 1968, OS1 c o n t i n u e s its dominant role i n t h i s f i e l d . p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e community, v i s - a - v i s
Its

t h e other

i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s as w e l l as t h e USIB, is w e l l established.
The p r i n c i p a l t o p i c s o f i n t e r e s t are

m o n i t o r i n g of n u c l e a r t e s t i n g under t h e T e s t Ban
T r e a t y , p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons c a p a b i l i t i e s

among Nth c o u n t r i e s , d e t a i l s of t h e Communist Chinese n u c l e a r program, and new t e c h n i q u e s of a n a l y s i s and c o l l e c t i o n t o be a p p l i e d t o atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e .

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Annex I11 Collection Support Activities of O S 1

CONTENTS Page I. 11.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Early Involvement in Collection Operations . . . A. OSI-OS0 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction

1
3

4
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............ Centralized Collection Support Effort . . . . A. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Nuclear Detection
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V.

Technical Collection

References Tab A .

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Annex I11 C o l l e c t i o n Support A c t i v i t i e s o f OS1
I.

INTRODUCTION U.S. e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n needed i n f o r m a t i o n on

f o r e i g n s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l R&D can be t r a c e d t o World War I1 days and t h e f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e O f f i c e of S t r a t e g i c S e r v i c e (OSS) and t h e Manhattan Engineering D i s t r i c t (MED). In

1944-45, a f t e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t e x i s t i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n s (G-2 and O N I ) were u n a b l e t o s a t i s f y

its needs f o r i n f o r m a t i o n : o n f o r e i g n AE developments,
t h e MED f o s t e r e d s p e c i a l o v e r s e a s c o l l e c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s by t h e OSS, b r i e f e d f i e l d commanders and s t a f f s , and a s s i g n e d a few selected m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s t o overseas t h e a t e r s

--

f o r t h e purpose o f improving t h e

c o l l e c t i o n of AE-related i n f o r m a t i o n .

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With its establishment O S 1 assumed respon-

s i b i l i t y f o r t h e formulation of requirements f o r

t h e c o l l e c t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l -

l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n and endeavored t o i n s u r e r e c e i p t of a l l materials n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of production requirements.
A t t h e same t i m e , however,

OS0 and i t s T e c h n i c a l Guidance S t a f f ("f.33) c o n t i n u e d
i t s a c t i v i t y i n t h e p l a n n i n g and conduct of o p e r a t i o n s
aimed a t t h e g a t h e r i n g of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e

information.
11.

EARLY INVOLVEMENT I N COLLFXTION OPERATIONS

O f t h e v a r i o u s categories of i n t e l l i g e n c e s u p p l i e d

t o t h e h i g h e s t government l e v e l s i n t h e l a t e 1940se a r l y 1950s, s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e w a s c o n s i d e r e d t o be t h e weakest.
The importance of s c i e n t i f i c

i n t e l l i g e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y atomic energy i n t e l l i g e n c e ,

w a s recognized i n a l l q u a r t e r s .

Organizations specif-

i c a l l y concerned w i t h t h e c o l l e c t i o n and p r o d u c t i o n

of S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e were established, s t a f f e d and funded. B u t , t h e fact remained t h a t w i t h o u t h i g h

q u a l i t y information, t h e required i n t e l l i g e n c e w a s not b e i n g produced.

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Efforts t o secure

p u b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n were hampered by
t h e lack of s u f f i c i e n t competent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n abroad.

In a d d i t i o n , t h e s c i e n t i f i c information t h a t w a s coming i n t o Washington was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y o r g a n i z e d
so as t o permit r e a d i l y t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f d e f i c i e n c i e s

and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of e x p l i c i t r e q u i r e m e n t s and continuous guidance f o r overseas c o l l e c t o r s .
Except

f o r t h e development of s y s t e m s for t h e d e t e c t i o n of f o r e i g n n u c l e a r a c t i v i t i e s and i t s l i m i t e d s u c c e s s i n t h e procurement o f p u b l i c a t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g i n f o r mation on S o v i e t s c i e n t i f i c developments, t h e US i n t e l l i g e n c e community e f f o r t s t o a c q u i r e i n f o r m a t i o n on s c i e n c e and technology i n t h e USSR were c l e a r l y

I

inadequate.
A.

OSI-OSO C o n f l i c t

-- T h e

lack of r a p p o r t between

I

t h e t o p e c h e l o n s o f OS1 and O S 0 d u r i n g t h e l a t e

1940s-early 1950s c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e Agency t o p l a n , develop, and c a r r y o u t e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s aimed a t major
S8rT i n t e l l i g e n c e t a r g e t s .

On t h e one hand, OS1

endeavored t o e s t a b l i s h t h e philosophy w i t h i n its O f f i c e and C I A t h a t t h e s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l a n a l y s t s h o u l d be i n t h e c l o s e s t p o s s i b l e c o n t a c t w i t h those c o n t r o l l i n g t h e sources of i n f o r m a t i o n .
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OS1

viewed its p o s i t i o n as t h a t of c o o r d i n a t o r of

a l l s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e requirements wherein
t h e OS1 a n a l y s t in each f i e l d would know t h e com-

munity needs and would provide clearly stated r e q u e s t s f o r needed information d i r e c t l y t o t h e c o l l e c t o r s .
OS1 b e l i e v e d t h a t direct c o n t a c t w i t h t h e

collectors w a s necessary to t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of its
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e and very much

in harmony w i t h reports being prepared in t h e e a r l y
1950s b y committees assigned t o review Agency

operations.

For example, t h e Eberstadt Committee

reported in 1950 t h a t lfvigorous a c t i o n is imperative

t o improve a l l f a c i l i t i e s f o r e v a l u a t i n g and stimu l a t i n g t h e c o l l e c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e .
Outside t h e f i e l d of atomic energy, t h i s must be done
by i n c r e a s i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y and support given t o t h e

o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e for s c i e n t i f i c i n t e l l i g e n c e w i t h in CIA."1/

On t h e other hand, t h e OS0 scientific and

t e c h n i c a l group and t h e SSET group which served t o a d v i s e OPC on scientific matters i n c l u d i n g R&D a c t i v i t i e s both operated independently of OS1 and e f f e c t i v e l y f r u s t r a t e d t h e attempts of t h e AD/SI, D r . Willard Machle,

t o b r i n g about a coordinated and i n t e g r a t e d s c i e n t i f i c
intelligence effort.

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. . . .

. . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . .. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

OS1 r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e c o v e r t s i d e of t h e Agency were a t t h e i r lowest ebb i n 1950.
The O f f i c e ' s

c o n t i n u i n g disagreement w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c and techn i c a l group i n OSO, t h e T e c h n i c a l Guidance S t a f f , o v e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o l l e c t i o n s u p p o r t becomes significant because
of t h e r e s u l t a n t d e c i s i o n s which affected t h e d i r e c t i o n

and q u a l i t y of s u p p o r t to S&T i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t i o n
o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g e n s u i n g years

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C.

Nuclear D e t e c t i o n

--

A t t h e end of World War I1

and w i t h t h e emergence of t h e USSR s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r

as t h e prime U . S . i n t e l l i g e n c e t a r g e t , t h e need for
i n f o r m a t i o n on S o v i e t atomic energy developments became h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t

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111.

CENTRALIZED COLLECTION SUPPORT EFFORT
A.

Organization

The lack of w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o d u c t i o n goals and p l a n s made it d i f f i c u l t f o r OS1 t o carry o u t i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r c o l l e c t i o n support i n the e a r l y 1950s.
The independent a c t i o n s t a k e n by i n d i v i d u a l

a n a l y s t s together w i t h t h e lack of c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s which c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h a t s u p p o r t were major l i m i t i n g factors, Many a n a l y s t s ,

w h i l e h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d i n t h e i r specialized f i e l d of

s c i e n c e or t e c h n o l o g y , were n o t s c h o o l e d i n the p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s f o r r e q u e s t i n g and o b t a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . They o f t e n made t h e i r needs known i n broad s t a t e m e n t s i n h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l language and f a i l e d t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between what w a s r e q u e s t e d and what w a s a l r e a d y known.

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B.

Programs

Throughout i t s e x i s t e n c e , OS1 has recognized
t h e n e c e s s i t y of p r o v i d i n g s u p p o r t t o S&T i n f o r m a t i o n

collection operations.

I t g e n e r a l l y has devoted

considerable t i m e and e f f o r t i n s u p p o r t of p e r t i n e n t

activities

I

1

1

High-quality s c i e n t i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n ,

as compared t o o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t e r e s t , h a s always been i n s h o r t s u p p l y .
T h i s can

be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y of t h e many

s i g n i f i c a n t and s e n s i t i v e S&T t a r g e t s , e s p e c i a l l y i n
t h e USSR and Communist China; t h e r e l a t i v e lack of

i n t e r e s t and competency on t h e p a r t of many collectors
(why c o l l e c t t h e hard-to-get

S&T i n f o r m a t i o n when

p o l i t i c a l and economic i n f o r m a t i o n is more r e a d i l y available);

O S 1 has always c o n s i d e r e d a l l l i k e l y methods

f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of worthwhile S&T i n f o r m a t i o n

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l e c t i o n methods. t a k e n many forms.

i n c l u d i n g t h e u s e of human r e s o u r c e s ,

7 1

and o t h e r t e c h n i c a l c o l -

I n a t t e m p t s t o improve t h e c o l l e c t i o n

of S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e OS1 s u p p o r t h a s

O f p a r t i c u l a r n o t e were t h e e v o l u t i o n of a more

u s e f u l approach f o r making known its i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s t o t h e c o l l e c t o r s and t h e c o n t i n u a l e f f o r t s of t h e OS1

improve t h e c o l l e c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s and i n f o r m a t i o n evaluation processes. U n t i l t h e l a t e 1950s, O S 1

rto
They were most compre-

devoted c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e and e f f o r t t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and d i s s e m i n a t i o n of g e n e r a l o r guide-type r e q u i r e m e n t s . Such r e q u i r e m e n t s were p r e p a r e d on a v a r i e t y of S&T s u b j e c t s of i n t e r e s t t o OSI.

h e n s i v e and replete w i t h broad s t a t e m e n t s ; also,
t h e y were directed toward a l l possible c o l l e c t o r s b u t

t a i l o r e d t o t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of no s p e c i f i c organization.
While t h e general r e q u i r e m e n t s s e r v e d t o

e d u c a t e many c o l l e c t i o n - a s s o c i a t e d i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s ,

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t h e y were n o t s u i t a b l e f o r s e r v i n g on h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d , special-type sources. Also, t h e y r e q u i r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e

t i m e t o prepare and review and u s u a l l y became outdated v e r y q u i c k l y .

By t h e l a t e 1950s and especially

d u r i n g 1960-62, t h e O f f i c e recognized t h e f u t i l i t y of g e n e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s and g r a d u a l l y e l i m i n a t e d t h e i r u s e i n f a v o r of s p e c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s which were better
t a i l o r e d t o t h e capa
s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s

of t h e

potential collectors I n a d d i t i o n t o i n f l u e n c i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of more meaningful r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e O f f i c e , through i t s

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i i n s t i t u t e d procedures

f o r monitor-

i n g c o l l e c t o r p r o g r e s s toward s a t i s f y i n g O S 1 r e q u i r e -

m e n t s , t e r m i n a t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t became o u t d a t e d

and w o r t h l e s s , a n d i n s u r i n g t h a t responses t o O f f i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s were indeed responses and not merely t h e r e p o r t a n g of low-grade i n f o r m a t i o n o f l i t t l e v a l u e to
the Office.

Also, i n t h e area of i n f o r m a t i o n e v a l l s t r i v e d t o motivate

u a t i o n s t h e O S 1r

O f f i c e a n a l y s t s t o be r e s p o n s i v e t o r e q u e s t s f o r h i g h

q u a l i t y assessments.

The S t a f f ' s p e r s o n n e l were

s u c c e s s f u l i n r e d u c i n g t h e amount of d u p l i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d

i n O f f i c e p r e p a r a t i o n of e v a l u a t i o n reports as w e l l as
i n b r i n g i n g about a more h e a l t h y a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t

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o f t h e a n a l y s t s toward uations.

t h e n e c e s s i t y for good e v a l -

No completely s a t i s f a c t o r y procedure f o r

e v a l u a t i n g c o l l e c t i o n programs has emerged d u r i n g
t h e past 20 y e a r s .

Hence, each c o l l e c t o r r e g u l a r l y

c a l l s upon h i s consumers for a s s i s t a n c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e worth o f h i s a c t i v i t i e s .

Collectors vary i n t h e

q u a n t i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y w i s h e v a l u a t e d , frequency of r e v i e w s , and i n t h e e v a l u a t i n g c r i t e r i a t o be followed. I n view of t h e d i v e r s i t y of OSI's respon-

s i b i l i t i e s and t h e many c o l l e c t i o n programs upon
which i t is dependent, its a n a l y s t s have expended

c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t and t i m e i n r e c a l l i n g , and a s s e s s i n g m u l t i p l e c o l l e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e
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V.

TECHNICAL COLLECTION
The p a u c i t y of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y R&D-related i n f o r -

mation a v a i l a b l e from human s o u r c e s and open l i t e r a t u r e
and t h e low p o t e n t i a l of a g e n t o p e r a t i o n s f o r p r o v i d i n g
h i g h q u a l i t y s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n

f o r c e d OS1 from i t s b e g i n n i n g t o be v e r y much concerned
w i t h t e c h n i c a l c o l l e c t i o n programs.
The OS1 i n t e r e s t

i n many such programs o f t e n w a s more t h a n t h a t of a

consumer of raw i n t e l l i g e n c e .

As an o f f i c e c o n t i n u a l l y

concerned w i t h t h e need f o r improving i t s s c i e n t i f i c
i n t e l l i g e n c e estimates i n a v a r i e t y of f i e l d s , s u c c e s s i v e

OS1 c h i e f s directed O f f i c e p e r s o n n e l t o assist f u l l y i n t h e development of t h o s e c o l l e c t i o n p r o j e c t s having

a p o t e n t i a l f o r p r o v i d i n g worthwhile S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e
information.
O S 1 w i l l i n g l y compiled and made a v a i l a b l e

i n f o r m a t i o n on target areas as w e l l as p a r t i c i p a t e d i n
t h e development of p e r t i n e n t i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s .

In addition, Office s p e c i a l i s t s mathematicians, p h y s i c i s t s , and

-- e l e c t r o n i c e n g i n e e r s , o t h e r s -- p a r t i c i p a t e d

e x t e n s i v e l y i n reviewing proposed c o l l e c t i o n p r o j e c t s ; contP&buting t o t h e development of s u c h p r o j e c t s t h r o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s , meetings, and v i s i t s t o c o n t r a c t o r and m i l i t a r y R&D f a c i l i t i e s

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O f f i c e , were s u b s t a n t i a l .

Its p e r s o n n e l had become

i n c r e a s i n g l y competent i n a wide v a r i e t y of f i e l d s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of S&T i n t e l l i g e n c e . Also, no s i n g l e o r g a n i z a t i o n r e s p o n s i b l e for a l l R&D on p o t e n t i a l c o l l e c t i o n systems e x i s t e d i n the Agency

t o e x c l u d e OSI's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i o n systems
development.
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O S 1 has a c t i v e l y supported t h

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i n t e l l i g e n c e o b j e c t i v e s and assembling t e c h n i c a l d a t a
p e r t i n e n t t o the use of s p e c i a l instruments for

.
n assessing SW

collection.

In a d d i t i o n , t h e O f f i c e h a s maintained

an even closer r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e Office of Research
and Development s i n c e its e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n t h e

Directorate of S c i e n c e and Technology i n t h e e a r l y
1960s.

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The close O f f i c e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h OFtD which has developed during t h e p a s t f i v e y e a r s has p e r m i t t e d
OS1 to c o n t r i b u t e more e f f e c t i v e l y than i n t h e p a s t

to t h e r e s e a r c h and development of worthwhile equip-

ment and s y s t e m s .

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The idea of a v e h i c l e i n space o r b i t t i n g t h e

e a r t h had f o r many years been a f a v o r i t e t o p i c f o r

s c i e n c e f i c t i o n writers and t h e s u b j e c t of a t l e a s t c u r s o r y s t u d y by s c i e n t i s t s of many c o u n t r i e s . Fol-

lowing World War I1 and t h e advent of t h e V - 1 and V-2 rockets, t h e s c i e n c e of rocketry came of age a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e U.S. and USSR v a s t amounts of money, t i m e and energy were allocated t o t h e development of long-range missiles. Concurrent w i t h t h i s

i n c r e a s e d emphasis came more s e r i o u s and c o n c e n t r a t e d
work by a number of s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l groups

on c o n c r e t e s t u d i e s n o t o n l y of possible earth s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e s (ESV's) b u t a l s o of what s u c h v e h i c l e s c o u l d
do t o j u s t i f y t h e i r large expense and what would be

world r e a c t i o n to s u c h an accomplishment.

I n 1950

and 1951, t h e Rand Corporation p u b l i s h e d a series of s t u d i e s on t h e s u b j e c t which r e c e i v e d close attention i n OS1 t h e focal p o i n t of C I A i n t e r e s t i n t h i s f i e l d . These i n c l u d e d among others: The S a t e l l i t e Rocket Vehicle: and P s y c h o l o g i c a l Problems
Political

Annex I I I / T a b A

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a.

.

A S a t e l l i t e Rocket f o r Reconnaissance

I n q u i r y i n t o t h e F e a s i b i l i t y of Weather Reconnaissance from a S a t e l l i t e Vehicle Over t h e next two or three years, a c t i v e s t u d y
work toward c r e a t i o n of an e a r t h s a t e l l i t e system

went forward i n b o t h m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n organizations.
0

The A D / S I d e s i g n a t e d t h e DAD/C and h i s s t a f f

t o monitor t h i s e f f o r t and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r and

I

applications to Intelligence.

Initially,
bssisted t h e

DAD/C and close working r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h
DOD, ONR, t h e N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e Foundation, S t a t e ,

N a t i o n a l Academy of S c i e n c e s , t h e American Rocket S o c i e t y , Redstone Arsenal and others concerned i n
this field.

By mid-1954,

d e f i n i t e proposals had

been developed n a t i o n a l l y i n c l u d i n g :

ONR's P r o j e c t

SLUG, t o p u t an i n e r t body w i t h dipole or c o r n e r

reflector i n t o e a r t h o r b i t (later renamed Project
ORBITER); a p r o p o s a l by t h e American Rocket S o c i e t y

t o the N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e Foundation; Werner von B r a u n ' s

Project ?tAlabamatlu s i n g a Redstone missile w i t h Loki
c l u s t e r s on t h e second and t h i r d stages; and P r o j e c t
M U E (Minimum O r b i t a l Unmanned S a t e l l i t e of t h e OS
E a r t h ) by D r . Fred S . S i n g e r , FVofessor of P h y s i c s ,

U n i v e r s i t y of Maryland.

The U.S.
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c o n s i d e r i n g p o s s i b l e u s e of i t s developing Atlas
m i s s i l e i n such an a p p l i c a t i o n .

Besides i t s poten-

t i a l u s e f o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p u r p o s e s , i t w a s realized
t h a t major s c i e n t i f i c advances c o u l d be made i n such

f i e l d s as meteorology, geodesy, radio communications,

b i o l o g y , astronomy and o t h e r s .

I t was, however, ap-

p a r e n t t h a t , b e f o r e any s u c h project would be i n i t i a t e d and f i n a n c e d i n n e c e s s a r y amounts by t h e government, a v a s t amount of d i s b e l i e f and i n e r t i a a t t h e top l e v e l
of government must be overcome--informal

discussions

normally brought t h e r e a c t i o n " T h a t ' s for Buck Rogers." By c o i n c i d e n c e , p l a n n i n g for t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Geop h y s i c a l Year (IGY 1957-8) was a t t h a t t i m e g o i n g forward r a p i d l y b o t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and abroad and i t o c c u r r e d t o t h e O S 1 working group t h a t t h i s would p r o v i d e a n i d e a l s p o n s o r for t h e first U.S. a t t e m p t a t a n earth s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e launching.- 1
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I t was now

a p p a r e n t t h a t i n t e r e s t b o t h i n t h e government a t s e n i o r working l e v e l and i n t h e s c i e n t i f i c community i n an ESV program had not o n l y developed t o a h i g h p o i n t b u t a l s o was b e i n g w e l l c o o r d i n a t e d b o t h

w i t h i n government and w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c community.
I t was a l s o e q u a l l y e v i d e n t t h a t t h e e f f o r t would
g e t nowhere i f t h e p o l i c y l e v e l of t h e government

w a s n o t brought i n , convinced of t h e f e a s i b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y of s u c h a p r o j e c t , and f i n a l l y

s t i m u l a t e d t o a c t i o n t o get it s t a r t e d and l i t e r a l l y
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o f f t h e ground.

Based on p a s t e x p e r i e n c e , it seemed

t o t h e OS1 group t h a t t h e best approach t o t o p l e v e l a p p r o v a l would be through M r . Richard M. B i s s e l l , Jr., S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t t o t h e DCI f o r P l a n s and C o o r d i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , i n e a r l y August 1954, d i s c u s s i o n s were h e l d

I

bissell's staff.

L a t e r t h a t month, M r . B i s s e l l was b r i e f e d i n d e t a i l , e x p r e s s e d very f a v o r a b l e i n t e r e s t a n d recommended t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y p a p e r s f o r P r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n be p r e p a r e d j o i n t l y by h i s s t a f f and t h e OS1 group.
It

w a s a g r e e d t h a t B i s s e l l ' s o f f i c e would assume respons i b i l i t y f o r coordination w i t h S t a t e while l i a i s o n
w i t h Defense and t h e s c i e n t i f i c community would be

c o n t i n u e d by OSI.

I t was understood t h a t a completely

s o l i d c a s e would have t o be p r e p a r e d and i n f o r m a l t o p l e v e l s u p p o r t g a i n e d i n advance t o i n s u r e u l t i m a t e success f o r t h e p r o p o s a l .
I t w a s a g r e e d t h a t , i f he

approved t h e i n i t i a l p a p e r s , t h e DCI would take t h e m a t t e r up w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , w i t h M r . Robert C u t l e r , S p e c i a l Advisor t o t h e P r e s i d e n t , and w i t h
t h e S e c r e t a r y of Defense.

I n t h e meantime, DAD/C Donald Q u a r l e s ,

i n i t i a t e d d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h 'Mr.

A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r Research and Development and o t h e r Defense o f f i c i a l s t o s e c u r e t h e i r support.

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On 15 September 1954, there went forward t o
M r . D u l l e s , D C I , a memorandum s i g n e d by M r . B i s s e l l
w i t h a s t a f f s t u d y of t h e t h e n comparable U.S. and

USSR t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r launching a n ESV
which stressed t h e keen S o v i e t i n t e r e s t and a l s o

emphasized t h e enormous p s y c h o l o g i c advantage t o
t h e n a t i o n first i n space.

An accompanying d r a f t

l e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower recommended t h a t a

n a t i o n a l requirement be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e development of an ESV i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e IGY; and t h a t
a s e l e c t s c i e n t i f i c group under t h e S c i e n t i f i c Advis o r y Committee of ODM r e n d e r a n o f f i c i a l d e c i s i o n on
t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of t h e p r o j e c t , and implement t h i s

decision, i f favorable.

I t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t these

a c t i o n s be implemented by P r e s i d e n t i a l D i r e c t i v e .
A t t h a t t i m e , i t w a s contemplated t h a t t h e N a t i o n a l

S c i e n c e Foundation would be t h e r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t
w i t h t h e Department of Defense as its e x e c u t i v e

agency f o r t h e development of a c t u a l hardware and f o r t h e launching hoped f o r by 1957.

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A s matters developed i n t h e e n s u i n g months,

however, d i s c u s s i o n s a t t o p l e v e l s of t h e government brought t h e p r o j e c t i n t o t h e purview of t h e O p e r a t i o n s C o o r d i n a t i n g Board and of t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Council which would be t h e s e n i o r i n s t r u ment t o a d v i s e t h e P r e s i d e n t and e x p r e s s h i s d e c i s i o n . C o n c u r r e n t l y , t h e O f f i c e of Secretary of Defense
referred t h e matter f o r a d v i c e t o h i s C o o r d i n a t i n g

Committee on General Sciences.

S i m i l a r l y , a new

American Rocket S o c i e t y p r o p o s a l t o t h e N a t i o n a l
" S e r v.i . e Foundation went t o t h e I G Y N a t i o n a l Comc .

mittee whose c o n c l u s i o n s were t o be referred by
NSF t o t h e OCB. Both of these a c t i o n s brought Shortly

s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e ESV p r o p o s a l .

t h e r e a f t e r , t h e T e c h n i c a l C a p a b i l i t i e s P a n e l of
t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s S c i e n c e Advisory Committee recom-

mended t o NSC t h a t i n t e l l i g e n c e a p p l i c a t i o n s of a s m a l l ESV w a r r a n t e d a n immediate s u c h program, and
t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f endorsed t h e idea, pro-

v i d e d t h a t work on t h e s m a l l s c i e n t i f i c s a t e l l i t e
d i d n o t impede development of a large s u r v e i l l a n c e

v e h i c l e f o r m i l i t a r y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e purposes.

There

was general agreement on t h e major advances t h a t
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c o u l d be made i n s c i e n t i f i c research as w e l l as i n
t h e f i e l d s of m i l i t a r y communications and m i s s i l e

development.

A very r e a l s t i m u l u s was g i v e n t o

t h e program by a S o v i e t announcement on A p r i l 1 6 ,

1955 of t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n t h e USSR Academy of S c i e n c e s of a "permanent, i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l commiss i o n f o r i n t e r p l a n e t a r y communications" and by our own estimate t h a t a group o f R u s s i a ' s t o p s c i e n t i s t s was working on a s a t e l l i t e program. This l a t t e r be-

l i e f was based l a r g e l y on a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l l i t e r a t u r e and a number of Russian a r t i c l e s and
broadcasts d e a l i n g w i t h s p a c e t r a v e l .

The S o v i e t

Academy had a l r e a d y announced i n September 1954 t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Tsiolkovsky Gold Medal t o be
awarded

every

third

y e a r f o r o u t s t a n d i n g work i n

t h e f i e l d of i n t e r p l a n e t a r y communications--the

S o v i e t a l l i n c l u s i v e term c o v e r i n g t h e e n t i r e s c o p e
of exoatmospheric and o u t e r s p a c e research.

On May 27, 1955, t h e P r e s i d e n t approved t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Council p o l i c y paper NSC 5520,
" U . S . S c i e n t i f i c S a t e l l i t e Program."
This called

f o r i n i t i a t i o n of a program t o develop t h e c a p a b i l i t y
of launching a s m a l l s c i e n t i f i c s a t e l l i t e by 1958,

w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e program would n o t p r e j u d i c e c o n t i n u e d r e s e a r c h d i r e c t e d toward large
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i n s t r u m e n t e d s a t e l l i t e s f o r a d d i t i o n a l research and i n t e l l i g e n c e purposes.
I t s h o u l d be endeavored t o

have t h e launching take p l a c e under i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p o n s o r s h i p , s u c h a s t h e I G Y , i n o r d e r t o emphasize

i t s p e a c e f u l purposes--provided

t h a t such a u s p i c e s

were so a r r a n g e d t h a t U.S. freedom of a c t i o n i n t h e
f i e l d of s a t e l l i t e s and r e l a t e d programs was p r e s e r v e d and such programs not be impeded; t h a t s e c u r i t y of U.S.
c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n , such as l a u n c h i n g t e c h n i q u e s ,

would be p r o t e c t e d ; and t h a t t h e r e be no i m p l i c a t i o n of a requirement for p r i o r c o n s e n t by any n a t i o n over which t h e s a t e l l i t e might p a s s i n i t s o r b i t and t h e r e by d i d n o t j e o p a r d i z e t h e concept of "Freedom of Space."
The P r e s i d e n t d i r e c t e d implementation of NSC 5520 by

a l l a p p r o p r i a t e e x e c u t i v e departments and a g e n c i e s
of t h e government, under t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e

S e c r e t a r y of Defense i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e Secr e t a r y of S t a t e and t h e Director of C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e .
I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t on May 17, 1955

p r i o r t o i s s u a n c e of NSC 5 5 2 0 , Governor Nelson A. R o c k e f e l l e r ( S p e c i a l Advisor t o P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower)
wrote t o James S . Lay, Jr. (Executive S e c r e t a r y of

t h e NSC), "I am impressed by t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s

w e l l as by t h e m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e advantages o f
having t h e f i r s t s u c c e s s f u l endeavor i n t h i s f i e l d
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r e s u l t from t h e i n i t i a t i v e of t h e United S t a t e s , a n d
by t h e c o s t l y consequences of a l l o w i n g t h e R u s s i a n

i n i t i a t i v e t o o u t r u n o u r s through a n achievement

t h a t w i l l symbolize s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l advancement t o p e o p l e s everywhere.
The stake of

p r e s t i g e t h a t i s i n v o l v e d m a k e s t h i s a race t h a t w e

cannot a f f o r d t o l o s e . "

These were p r o p h e t i c words.

While t h e m a i n t h r u s t of t h e OS1 and B i s s e l l

e f f o r t had been aimed a t an e v e n t u a l U.S. r e c o n n a i s sance s y s t e m , t h e p s y c h o l o g i c aspects had not been l o s t s i g h t of and c o n s i d e r a b l e s t u d y and i n t e l l i g e n c e research had been devoted t o S o v i e t , U.S. and World probable r e a c t i o n .
Past r e a c t i o n s gave some indica-

t i o n s of what might be expected.

I n December 1948,

S e c r e t a r y Defense F o r r e s t a l , i n h i s Report on t h e U n i f i c a t i o n of S e r v i c e s , made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an "atomic s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e " w h i c h brought f o r t h s u c h world press comments as " W i l l
America p o s s e s s Moons of War?"; " W i l l t h e E l b e

f r o n t i e r be defended from t h e Moon?"; and L i b e r a t i o n

(a French pro-Communist p a p e r ) characterized t h e
s t a t e m e n t as p a r t of a "campaign c a l c u l a t e d t o t e r r o r i z e t h e peoples.'?
The New T i m e s , , i n l a t e

1949, referred t o " t h e m a d man F o r r e s t a l ' s idea of
a n e a r t h s a t e l l i t e as a n i n s t r u m e n t of blackmail."

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These and many o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n s of concern o v e r t h e

m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s of e a r t h s a t e l l i t e s made i t

seem i m p e r a t i v e t o o u r government t h a t any p u b l i c i t y

of o u r i n t e n t i o n t o launch such a v e h i c l e s h o u l d
c l e a r l y and u n e q u i v o c a l l y s t a t e t h e c i v i l i a n and

p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s and c o n t r o l o f t h e program.

It

a l s o seemed a d v i s a b l e t o s t a r t informing t h e p u b l i c long i n advance of t h e a c t u a l l a u n c h i n g , t h u s making
it p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e " p e a c e f u l " and non-

d e s t r u c t i v e n a t u r e of t h e s a t e l l i t e .

Toward t h i s

e n d , t h e OCB e s t a b l i s h e d t h e A d Hoc Working Group

on P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n Aspect of NSC 5 5 2 0 , chaired
by D r .

Alan Waterman, D i r e c t o r of NSF w i t h r e p r e -

s e n t a t i o n from S t a t e , Defense, C I A (DAD/C/OSI), USIA, and t h e White House. T h i s group w a s c h a r g e d

w i t h drawing up a n a p p r o p r i a t e announcement of U.S. p l a n s t o launch a n ESV and develop the p r o c e d u r e s
by which such a n announcement would be made.

The

p r o c e d u r e f i n a l l y a g r e e d upon was two-pronged--the i n i t i a l p u b l i c break of t h e p l a n t o b e made a t t h e s i x t h a n n u a l Congress of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Astron a u t i c a l F e d e r a t i o n (IAF) i n Copenhagen i n l a t e J u l y 1955, t h e second through a much more d e t a i l e d o u t l i n i n g of t h e p l a n i n a l e t t e r from D r . Joseph Kaplan, Chairman of t h e U.S.
I G Y Committee t o

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,

r
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I

P r o f e s s o r Sydney Chapman, P r e s i d e n t of t h e ( i n t e r n a t i o n a l ) S p e c i a l Committee of t h e I G Y t o be made p u b l i c immediately t h e r e a f t e r a t t h e meeting of t h e latter i n Brussels.

m
29 J u l y 1955

The White House announced today t h a t p l a n s by t h i s c o u n t r y are going forward f o r t h e launching of s m a l l , unmanned earthc i r c l i n g s a t e l l i t e s as p a r t of t h e U.S. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Geophysical
Year which t a k e s place between J u l y 1957 and
December 1958.

T h i s program w i l l , f o r t h e

first t i m e i n h i s t o r y , enable s c i e n t i s t s
to m a k e sustained observations i n regions

beyond t h e e a r t h ' s atmosphere.
The P r e s i d e n t has e x p r e s s e d h i s p e r s o n a l

g r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e American program w i l l p r o v i d e t h e s c i e n t i s t s of a l l n a t i o n s t h i s important and unique o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e advancement of science. Additional information

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12

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COO 629617

on t h e e a r t h s a t e l l i t e is b e i n g made a v a i l a b l e t o d a y by the N a t i o n a l Academy
of S c i e n c e s and t h e N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e

Foundation.
T h e world r e a c t i o n was tremendous as i t was realized

t h a t a t o t a l l y new e r a had opened. p r e s t i g e rose immeasurably. i n g cable w a s r e c e i v e d

U.S. s c i e n t i f i c

I

On 3 August, t h e followI'IPresident Eisenhower

has asked m e t o e x t e n d h i s t h a n k s t o you f o r your
cordial message r e c e i v e d today r e l a t i n g t o t h e announce-

ment of t h e s a t e l l i t e v e h i c l e p r o j e c t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Geophysical Year

.. ...

( s i g n e d ) Sherman A d a m s , t h e A s s i s t a n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t . "

Concurrent with t h e Copenhagen and B r u s s e l s announcements,
t h e White House s t a t e m e n t was g i v e n t o t h e P r e s s here as

were t h e j o i n t d e t a i l e d ammouncement by t h e N a t i o n a l
S c i e n c e Foundation and t h e N a t i o n a l Academy of S c i e n c e s and a p r e s s release from t h e Department o f Defense, a l l s t r e s s i n g t h e p e a c e f u l s c i e n t i f i c p u r p o s e s of t h e project.

COO 629617

EPILOGUE

A number of f a c t o r s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s affected
t h e subsequent h i s t o r y of t h e s p a c e program.

First,

t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l impact of t h e announcement t o be

m a i n t a i n e d by t h e U.S. r e q u i r e d a c t u a l l y b e i n g f i r s t i n space,
As i t t u r n e d o u t , f e w a t t h e t o p - l e v e l of

government had any r e a l concept of t h e world w i d e p u b l i c impact of t h e first s u c c e s s f u l e a r t h s a t e l l i t e launching and no amount of forewarning changed t h i s situation. Second, t h e U.S. was committed t o a “peaceAt this time, a

f u l scientifically-oriented” effort.

committee, under D r . H o m e r J. S t u a r t was c o n s t i t u t e d
by t h e Department of Defense t o develop t h e a c t u a l

p l a n s for t h e program. by t h e committees:

Three p r o j e c t s were c o n s i d e r e d

an NRL p r o p o s a l based on t h e

H e r m e s r o c k e t ; t h e A i r Force p r o p o s a l based on t h e

A t l a s missile; and a j o i n t Army ..Ordnance-ONR ( A i r Branch) p r o j e c t u s i n g t h e Redstone missile.
The

S t u a r t Committee reviewed these n o t p r i m a r i l y f r o m

a p o l i t i c a l o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l warfare viewpoint b u t r a t h e r as to which would p r o v i d e t h e m o s t v a l u a b l e
research t o o l f o r t h e least money.
dary f a c t o r !
Time w a s a secon-

Emphasizing t h e p e a c e f u l aura t o be

m a i n t a i n e d , t h e committee e s s e n t i a l l y v e t o e d t h e u s e

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COO629617

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of a l l t h r e e as having t o o much m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n

and i n s t e a d t h e Navy, which w a s g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t e c h n i c a l development and o v e r a l l management of
t h e program, e s t a b l i s h e d P r o j e c t Vanguard under a

c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e Martin Company--in
gram t o " r e i n v e n t t h e wheel."

e s s e n c e , a pro-

P r o g r e s s on Vanguard

w a s slow and f r a u g h t w i t h problems and f a i l u r e s . Meanwhile, OS1 w a s r e c e i v i n g c o n t i n u i n g evidence of

a major s p a c e e f f o r t by t h e R u s s i a n s and i n t h e S p r i n g
1957, w h i l e Vanguard w a s s t i l l f a l t e r i n g , OS1 warned
t h a t t h e USSR might w e l l o r b i t a v e h i c l e b y October

o r November of t h a t y e a r .

On October 4 , 1957,
a n t i c i p a t e d by t h e I n t e l l i -

S p u t n i k I w a s launched--as

gence Community, a massive shock t o t h e American p e o p l e , t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e Western World.

I n t h e S p r i n g of 1954, K e l l y Johnson of Lockheed
A i r c r a f t Corp. p r e s e n t e d t o t h e A i r Force, a d e s i g n

(CL 282) f o r an advanced r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t .

The

proposed d e s i g n w a s s t u d i e d by t h e A i r Force and rejected on a number of grounds i . e . , s i n g l e e n g i n e f o r

over-water f l i g h t , wing l a n d i n g f a c t o r s , n o t m u l t i p l e purpose, e t c .
T h i s r e j e c t i o n d i s t u r b e d a number of

s e n i o r c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s of t h e A i r Force i n view of
t h e e x i s t i n g need f o r some craft of t h i s c a t e g o r y and

i n e a r l y summer, G a r r i s o n Norton, Special A s s i s t a n t
t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e A i r Force, telephoned DAD/C/OSI

t o arrange a meeting on t h e s u b j e c t .

P r e s e n t beside

Norton and Strong w a s F r e d e r i c k Ayers, S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t

t o Trevor Gardner, A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y USAF f o r R&D.
The p e c u l i a r d e s i g n characteristics of CL 282

-

long-

range and extreme h i g h a l t i t u d e c a p a b i l i t i e s

- were

d i s c u s s e d i n t h e l i g h t of t h e US r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r e q u i r e ments and it was decided t h a t Strong s h o u l d take t h e

matter t o Richard M. B i s s e l l , Jr., S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t

t o t h e D C I for P l a n s and C o o r d i n a t i o n , as t h e best
p o i n t for p o s i t i v e a c t i o n .

This was done by DAD/C and

r e c e i v e d a f a v o r a b l e and i n t e r e s t e d r e a c t i o n from
B i s s e l l who asked i f S t r o n g c o u l d g e t f o r B i s s e l l t w o

t o p - f l i g h t s c i e n t i s t s t o a d v i s e on t h e matter.

Dr.

Edwin Land of P o l a r o i d and Dr. James Baker, a n o p t i c a l

I

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COO629617
T
p h y s i c i s t of Harvard who w e r e co-members w i t h S t r o n g on t h e A i r Force S c i e n t i f i c Advisory Board, were cont a c t e d and a g r e e d t o m e e t w i t h B i s s e l l . This w a s

t h e s t a r t n o t o n l y of t h e U-2 program (new d e s i g n a t i o n of CL 282) b u t a l s o of a l o n g s e r i e s of "Land P a n e l s " w h i c h s e r v e d t h e Agency' and t h e c o u n t r y as a d v i s o r s on many advanced i n t e l l i g e n c e t e c h n i q u e s and
problems.

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