P. 1
Yamagishi on Mutual Knowledge Im Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Yamagishi on Mutual Knowledge Im Prisoner's Dilemma Game

|Views: 17|Likes:
Published by Mayor Quintos

More info:

Published by: Mayor Quintos on Mar 23, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

10/26/2013

pdf

text

original

Asian Journal of Social Psychology

Asian Journal of Social Psychology (2008), 11, 196–207 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-839X.2008.00258.x

Exchanges of group-based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner’s dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand
Toshio Yamagishi,1 Nobuhiro Mifune,1 James H. Liu2 and Joel Pauling2
Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan; and 2Department of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
1

Japanese (N = 48) and New Zealander (N = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner’s dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another’s group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner’s cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group. Key words: cooperation, culture, generalized exchange, ingroup bias, prisoner’s dilemma game.

Introduction
Ingroup-favouring behaviour in the minimal group It is commonly observed, within laboratories as well as in everyday life, that people treat their own group members more favourably than members of other groups. Such ‘ingroup favouritism’ occurs even in the minimal group, a collection of people who share a trivial category and yet lack any form of social contact or interactions (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In the minimal group, participants are divided into two groups based on a trivial feature shared among them. Examples of minimal groups are groups of people who tend to over- or underestimate the numbers of dots displayed on a screen, and those who like Klee’s paintings over Kandinsky’s paintings and vice versa. In a typical minimal group experiment, participants allocate monetary rewards between one of their ingroup members and an outgroup member (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971). Given the benign and nominal nature of the minimal group, there is no reason to anticipate that participants of the minimal group experiment should allocate more monetary reward to

Correspondence: Toshio Yamagishi, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, N10 W7 Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan. Email: Toshio@let.hokudai.ac.jp Received 25 May 2007; accepted for publication 9 December 2007.

the ingroup member than the outgroup member. Yet, ingroup-favouring behaviour, giving more money to the ingroup than the outgroup member, was observed in the original study by Tajfel et al. (1971) and a large number of subsequent studies (e.g. Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, 1975; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979; Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). Similar ingroup-favouring behaviour has been frequently observed in the study of experimental games such as the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG); players of a PDG cooperate at a higher level with members of their own minimal group than with those from the minimal outgroup (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 1991; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993; Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Kollock, 1997; de Cremer & van Vugt, 1999; van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999; Simpson, 2006). The finding of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group was seminal in deriving a theory of identity-based construction of inter- as well as intra-group processes, called social identity theory and its subsequent elaboration Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The standard explanation for ingroup favouritism in social psychology for the last few decades is the one from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), according to which people treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members in the minimal group situation in order to enhance their social identity. The theory begins with the assumption that people have two types of identity. One is an

© 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association

yet. 1999) is a set of beliefs and decision rules (or rule of thumb) that people use. In a generalized exchange. The group heuristic induces people to behave in a way to minimize the risk of exclusion from a system of generalized exchange. Kiyonari. 1985. distinct from other individuals. We deviate from the standard conception of a heuristic as a rule of thumb in one respect: We consider use of heuristics not simply as a means for conserving cognitive resources. participants of the minimal group experiments provide more monetary rewards to their own group member than to a member of the comparison group as a way to make the comparison favourable to their social identity.Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 197 individual identity defined by unique features of individuals. by default. We agree with Gigerenzer (2000) in seeing some positive. resource sharing). (ii) they behave in a way to minimize the risk of developing a bad reputation among the members of their group.e. defined by features shared among a group of people of which the individual is a member. 1999. Yamagishi et al. yet. Yamagishi. It is accessible if carefully prodded. Jin. no direct reciprocation of help between particular partners takes place and. and one important feature of it is the belief that the group accommodates a system of generalized exchange. without deliberate thinking). 2000) for those whose survival depends on resources provided by systems of generalized exchange (i. Jin. Yamagishi. & Kanazawa.. 1982. Assuming the existence of generalized exchange. According to the group heuristic: (i) people facing a group situation assume. Most generalized exchange. i. 1999. 1954) where other relevant categories are used as a means of understanding the value of their own category membership. people have a naïve theory of how groups operate. We summarize our view on this issue as a means for ‘error management’ to be presented below. can expect to receive blood from someone else. Being nice to other members of a system of generalized exchange so as to avoid accumulating the reputation of a free-rider (and eventually being ostracized from the system) is a basic principle for group living from this perspective. is thus an ecologically rational strategy for those whose livelihood depends so much on generalized exchange (see Yamagishi et al. Because the only possible comparison available in the minimal group is through monetary reward allocation.. and eventual ostracism from the system. Cosmides & Tooby. people who give out benefits to others receive benefits from someone in the system. people come to define themselves primarily by the socially shared features of the group. & Kiyonari. that social interactions that take place in the group involve generalized exchange. 2000. Erroneously assuming the absence of generalized exchange and behaving in a selfish manner incurs a risk of developing a bad reputation. 2000). takes place in naturally occurring groups. This risk should be minimized even at a cost of behaving in a cooperative or altruistic manner when no reputation is at stake. 1996. 1989. by default (i. Given the fact that humans have lived and cooperated in small bands throughout most of their evolutionary history (Cosmides. from the person to whom their blood went and. When group members behave in such a way. Yamagishi & Kiyonari. in which individuals’ personal identities are completely anonymous to each other. & Miller. except those formally organized in industrial societies such as blood banks. their social. How critical resource sharing is for human survival is easily seen in the miserable situation of people who are denied access to resources shared among members of the community. but in practice the use of a heuristic is so spontaneous that people often do not deliberately think if they should adopt the rule. To adapt to such group living. 2002. One important implication is to behave in a cooperative or altruistic manner toward members of their own group without © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . Generalized exchange is a system of sharing help in which people unilaterally provide help without expecting direct repayment of the help from them. Terai. and thus. 2005). The tendency among the participants of the minimal group experiments to define themselves in terms of the shared social category leads people to the process of social comparison (Festinger. Jin. adaptive role in the use of heuristics – behaviour that follows heuristics is often ecologically rational. thus. they eventually end up receiving help when they themselves are in need. Blood donation is a good example. Yamagishi.. Those who donate their blood do not receive blood. 2007. Yamagishi & Kiyonari. their category membership. The group heuristic is ecologically rational (Gigerenzer. rather than individual.e. 1997. And. In a typical minimal group experiment. Group heuristic Yamagishi and colleagues provide an alternative account of ingroup favouritism in minimal group studies that claims that the presence of a salient ingroup activates a ‘group heuristic’ or a ‘default’ decision strategy to be adopted by people who face a group situation (Karp. 1993. One important function of groups is that they serve as venues for generalized exchange or resource sharing (Woodburn. The group heuristic (Yamagishi et al. According to Yamagishi and his colleagues.e. Yamagishi. & Kiyonari. identities become salient. 1992) as well as in contemporary societies. Another type of identity is social identity. when they are in need. Jin. Mifune. 1998. & Shinotsuka. Kiyonari. it is no surprise that they have acquired a default decision rule that is to be used when they face a group situation. for the logic of this ‘error management’). it is safe to assume that a system of generalized exchange with mutual monitoring exists when one faces an unfamiliar group situation. Kaplan & Hill. when facing a group situation. when they face a group situation. Jin & Yamagishi. by default. Yamagishi.

. Jin and Yamagishi (1997) succeeded in eliminating the ingroup bias in cooperation by making the lack of within-group generalized exchange salient in this way. The group heuristic is thus adaptive in a group situation. Jin et al. In a well-known paper. it should not matter whether rewards participants themselves will receive are dependent on other members. Kramer & Goldman. (1996). Kramer et al. 1984. 1993. participants in the minimal group experiments practice ingroup-favouring behaviour when and only when they feel that other group members potentially provide benefits to them through generalized exchange. Once admitted. each participant allocated money to one ingroup member and one outgroup member. While Jin and colleagues succeeded in demonstrating the validity of their argument. but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. they will not practice ingroup-favouring behaviour when it is made clear that they do not receive favourable treatment from other group members. In the ‘unilateral-knowledge’ condition they newly introduced. The finding that making the participants’ own earnings independent of the behaviour of others eliminates ingroup bias was successfully replicated by two additional experiments by Jin et al. In the ‘mutual-knowledge’ condition. Not cheating at all in a group situation is a certain way to minimizing the risk. condition of producing ingroup-favouring behaviour. Karp and colleagues eliminated dependence on other participants for their reward. This meant that a favour given to an ingroup member by the participant could not be ‘returned’ by someone else in the group. Kramer. they were in the situation of being allocated money from ingroup and outgroup members. Participants in the unilateralknowledge condition were unable to expect ingroupfavouring behaviour from other members of their group. In the original minimal group experiment. They first successfully replicated the ingroup bias in a PDG observed in earlier studies in which PD players cooperated more with ingroup members than with outgroup members (Kramer & Brewer. Jin and colleagues demonstrated that only those who expected a favourable allocation from their own group members gave more to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member. 1995). (2005. see Experiment 2. © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . albeit not from the particular others to whom they allocated money. Jin and Yamagishi (1997) (reported in English in Yamagishi et al. The elimination of ingroup bias in reward allocation in the fixed-payment condition could thus be attributed to the ‘fact’ that participants did not share group membership with their own minimal group members (although this alternative explanation of their findings cannot explain why only those who expected favourable allocation from their own minimal group members gave more money to them. people can enjoy the benefit of generalized exchange when they are in need. Another means by which Yamagishi and colleagues used to make the absence of generalized exchange salient is the manipulation of commonality of knowledge. minimizing the risk of being caught for cheating is adaptive. participants knew the group membership of their partner. (1996). but not a sufficient. For example. they found an ingroup bias in cooperation in the standard. What is critical to the production of ingroup-favouring behaviour is the intuitive perception of the situation that generalized exchanges potentially take place. even egoists who do not want to pay the fee may yet refrain from attempts at free-riding when there is a chance of being detected for such cheating behaviour. As all participants faced the same situation. although it requires the extra cost of paying the fee even when one can possibly free-ride. they faced a potential problem in their design that paying the participant a fixed amount of money creates a third group of ‘money allocators’. they succeeded in eliminating this ingroup bias by manipulating membership information. but failed to do so in the unilateral-knowledge condition.. Brewer & Kramer. In one of these experiments (Experiment 2). 1999) were the first in this series to demonstrate that making the lack of within-group generalized exchange salient eliminates the ingroup bias in cooperation. cooperative or altruistic behaviour is a kind of ‘admission ticket’ to a generalized exchange system. It should be noted that within social identity theory there has also been considerable theoretical activity to define when and why ingroup favouritism will be observed. the same finding has been replicated by Kiyonari (2002. (1971). 1986. using nationality as the ingroup with Japanese and Australian participants). reported in English in Kiyonari & Yamagishi 2004). Through this manipulation. necessarily making conscious calculations about the benefit of such behaviour. ‘mutual-knowledge’ condition. Abrams and Hogg (1988) noted problems with the self-esteem explanation for ingroup favouritism as posited by social identity theory.198 Toshio Yamagishi et al. According to this approach. they turned to a new methodology to support their argument. 1991. According to the group heuristic approach. sharing a salient social category is just a necessary. Conversely. In a recent review. Since this initial experiment. Thus. both players knew one another’s group membership. because they did not know that the participant was a member of their own group. and Yamagishi et al. 1992. If ingroup favouritism relied only on a desire to positively distinguish the ingroup (or liking of ingroup members). Karp et al. More specifically. (1993) replicated the basic design of the original minimal group experiment by Tajfel et al. When the cost of being caught for sneaking in without paying the fee is extremely high (as in most historical and modern societies). Then. Wit & Wilke. Karp and colleagues showed that the ingroup bias in reward allocation observed in the standard minimal group condition disappeared completely when participants were paid a fixed amount of money instead of being allocated money from other participants.

their study involved nationality as the group category rather than minimal groups. Brewer & Kramer. The cost of failing to cooperate with ingroup members and. 1998. and O’Brien (2005) have provided alternative accounts attempting to rescue the social identity explanation of ingroup favouritism. While the primary goal of this study is to provide support for the universality of the group heuristic account of ingroup-favouring cooperation. according to Yamagishi’s (1988a. Yamagishi & Yamagishi. As the national identity of the Japanese is known to be weak.b. 1999. They argued that the importance of group-bounded generalized exchange is universal. there are bases for predicting relative strength in either direction. and Willis (2002) confirmed that evidence for such an explanation was mixed: ingroup favouritism is by no means universal. Cox. whereas Yuki and colleagues’ argument of the category-based (vis-à-vis relation-based) nature of groupness in the West leads to the opposite prediction that the predicted ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition will be stronger in New Zealand than in Japan.. Kramer. However. According to them. as discussed above. Yamagishi. 1986. Rubin. those who have been expelled from the current group have a hard time being accepted by another group and receiving the benefit of generalized exchanges in the new group.Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 199 Hewstone. the defining feature of a collectivistic society is in the degree according to which generalized exchanges are confined within tight group boundaries. This leads to the prediction of a stronger effect of the knowledge manipulation as well as the stronger ingroup-favouring behaviour in the mutual-knowledge condition in collectivist societies than in individualist societies. and so is the adaptive advantage the group heuristic provides in inter. we hope that cross-cultural comparison of the effect of the knowledge manipulation will provide useful information for further theoretical development. and the lack of interaction among group members. the weaker effect of the group heuristic among Japanese participants in Yamagishi et al. Authors such as Grieve and Hogg (1999) and Hunter. conducted byYamagishi and colleagues (Jin &Yamagishi. because. However. In short. the institutional view of collectivism predicts that the predicted ingroup bias in the mutualknowledge condition will be stronger in Japan than in New Zealand. Kramer & Goldman. we predict that the effect of the knowledge manipulation will be observed both among Japanese and New Zealanders. Kiyonari.. eventually being expelled from the group and shared resources in the group is greater in collectivistic societies than in individualistic societies. Hashimoto. 2002. Behaving according to a default decision rule or heuristic that favours cooperation within one’s own group and thus reducing the possibility of being expelled from the group is more adaptive in collectivist societies in which the cost of being expelled from the group is larger than in individualist societies. Maddux. 2008) institutional view of collectivism versus individualism. Based on Yamagishi et al. in either experimental or survey research. Kramer et al. 2005) that social categories are more salient and play a more prominent role in Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. Australia. than in Japan. Yamagishi et al. This leads to the prediction that the effect of the group heuristic triggered by the minimal group is stronger among Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. 1984. whereas the perception of group-ness among the Japanese is based on interconnectedness (relationships) among group members. & Schug.1 We thus decided to replicate Jin and Yamagishi’s (1997) study both in Japan and in New Zealand using minimal groups. 1993. As the minimal group is characterized by a shared category. Brewer. This is because most groups in collectivistic societies are closed to outsiders and. We do not have any specific prediction concerning the relative strength of the knowledge effect in the mutual-knowledge condition. A completely opposite prediction to the one based on the institutional collectivism can be made concerning the effect of the knowledge manipulation based on an argument by Yuki and colleagues (Yuki. 2003. 1995) will disappear when the lack of generalized exchange in the group is made salient. and found that it was stronger among Australian than among Japanese participants. can explain Yamagishi and colleagues’ findings. None of these revisions.and intragroup situations (Yamagishi et al. as a consequence. 2007) argument about the adaptive value of the group heuristic. (2005) examined whether the effect of the knowledge manipulation was stronger or weaker in a Western culture. 1997. Wit & Wilke. East Asians and Westerners The goal of the present study was to replicate the series of PDG studies with the knowledge manipulation. Yamagishi et al. Yuki. 2005) that supported the group heuristic account of ingroup-favouring behaviour. it is more of a group in Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. Hypotheses We test the hypothesis that ingroup-favouring behaviour in the PDG observed in previous studies involving the minimal group (Kramer & Brewer.. (2005) may be unique to the social category of nationality. sharing the same social category is at the core of Americans’ perception of groupness.’s (1999. 1994. 2007). thus. and the lack of the ingroupfavouring behaviour in a unilateral-knowledge condition in © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . we predict ingroup-favouring behaviour in a mutual-knowledge condition in which the partner knows that the participant is in the same group and thus the participant expects ingroup-favouring behaviour from the ingroup partner (Hypothesis 1). & Takemura. 1991. Specifically. however. 1992.

once in each of the within-subject conditions to be explained below. but the partner did not know it. but the partner did not know whether the participant was a member of the same group or the other group. Participants in the unilateral-knowledge condition also knew the fact that the partner did not know which group the participant belonged to. The laboratory at each location consisted of several compartments for the participants and a control room. thus. No feedback was provided about the partner’s behaviour after each game. both of them knew that their memberships were different. Each participant had no chance to interact with other participants. Japan. Procedure The experiment was conducted at Hokkaido University. However. and that the ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition will emerge only among those who perceive the minimal group as a venue for generalized exchange (i. the participant received twice the amount of contribution made by the partner.or herself by not contributing to the partner. the partner in this condition did not know whether the participant was a © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association .00 or 200 yen and then was asked how much of the endowment to provide to the partner in increments of 10 cents or 10 yen. the participant knew that the partner was a member of the same group. those who identify with the ingroup). We further examined the precise means through which ingroup-favouring behaviour occurs through mediation and moderation analyses using expectancies for ingroup-favouring behaviour from other people and degree of identification with the ingroup. each receiving NZD 4. Six or eight participants participated in each session in Japan. the more he or she saved for him. member of the same group or the other group. the participant was provided with an initial endowment of NZD 2. Upon arrival at the laboratory. Specifically.00 or 200 yen. which the partner does not know that the participant is in the same group and. two to five in New Zealand. In the mutual-knowledge condition. The participants first took a ‘picture preference test’ in which they evaluated 28 pairs of paintings displayed on their computer monitor and indicated Method The basic design is a replication of Jin and Yamagishi (1997). Each participant then played a PDG four times.00 or 400 yen. it is predicted that the effect of the expected ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition will be mediated by expectation of the partner’s cooperation. The amount provided by the participant was doubled in value and was given to the partner. Prisoner’s dilemma game The PDG used in the current experiment took the form of resource exchanges rather than the standard form involving a payoff matrix. participants were informed that their partner also knew which group they belonged to. Finally.or herself. each participant was immediately led to his or her compartment and asked to wait until all the participants arrived. if the two participants adopted this dominant strategy of not contributing any. In addition to these four games. No feedback of the partner’s decisions was provided after each transaction. The amount of money contributed by the participant to the partner was doubled by the experimenter before it was given to the partner. the participant could keep the endowment to him. In each of the four PDG. In the IN-UK (ingroup/unilateral-knowledge) condition. not contributing any was the dominant strategy. In the Out-MK (outgroup/mutual-knowledge) condition. Similarly. participants were informed of the summary results at the end of the experiment. participants first played the same PDG in which neither the participant nor the partner knew each other’s group membership. Thus. Participants were first divided into one of two minimal groups. Design and participants The experiment was a 2 ¥ 2 ¥ 2 mixed design in which participant nationality (30 male and 18 female Japanese students from Hokkaido University. in the Out-UK (outgroup/unilateral-knowledge) condition. which is half of what they could have earned if they both contributed the maximum. each participant was given 200 yen (or NZD 2. Participants played the PDG to be presented later with a member of their own group (ingroup condition) or with a member of the other group (outgroup condition). In the In-MK (ingroup/mutual-knowledge) condition. New Zealand.00) as an endowment and was asked how much of it to give to the partner. the participant knew that the partner was a member of the other group. participants played the four experimental games in a random order. That is. the less he or she contributed to the partner. Following this practice session.200 Toshio Yamagishi et al. as a practice. and Victoria University of Wellington. In each of the four within-subjects conditions. Thus. they each ended up with the original endowment of NZD 2. and 23 male and 32 female New Zealander students from Victoria University of Wellington) was crossed with the 2 ¥ 2 within-subjects conditions (the knowledge conditions and the ingroup/outgroup conditions). both the participant and the partner knew that they shared the same group membership. the joint profit was maximized when both contributed the most. the Klee group and the Kandinsky group. Each compartment was equipped with a computer. However. which was networked to a host computer.e. the participant cannot expect ingroup-favouring behaviour from the ingroup partner (Hypothesis 2).

2 After the assignment of the participants to one of the two minimal groups. which was about the average cooperation level based on the previous studies.b. among Japanese. closeness etc. The production of the two minimal groups through the picture preference test was thus demonstrated to be successful for both Japanese and New Zealander participants. After the participants had completed all five trading periods. Then. importance. and the mean difference score was used as the relative ingroup identification score (i. was subtracted from their responses to the ingroup. The mean relative ingroup identification score among Japanese participants (Cronbach’s alpha = 0. the experimenter collected the envelope containing the filled out decision sheets (both their own contribution level and their expectations for their partner’s contribution level).. how strongly they identified with the ingroup compared to the outgroup). and the knowledge information (whether the partner was told the group membership of the participant) were given. Yamagishi (1988a. SD = 0. 1978. among New Zealanders vs 0. took approximately one hour.32. who identified themselves more with the ingroup than with the outgroup. instead of the computerized method. we measured participants’ expectations of their partner’s level of contribution on the second decision sheet by asking how much they expected their partner would contribute.38. t(95) = 2. participants completed five ‘transaction periods’. Manipulation check We first tested whether the computerized picture preference test successfully created two minimal groups.e. & Stech. Information about the group membership of the trading partner for the period (whether the partner in this trading period was a member of the Klee group or the Kandinsky group). was to give participants the feeling that they were actually interacting with other participants. h2 = 0. based on their true relative preference for the two artists’ paintings. 0.Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 201 which painting they liked more of each pair.30. each participant was paid on the premise that each of their partners contributed an average of 40%. were significantly greater than zero. p < 0. The use of the paper-and-pencil method. similarity. Each transaction period started when the experimenter delivered an envelope that contained a decision sheet. including the practice session. No feedback about the partner’s decision was provided after each decision.192).4 Participants were individually paid in their own rooms and separately discharged. 1998) provides an institutional explanation for this cross-cultural difference in the cooperation level. 1988a. 2005). No significant difference in relative ingroup identification was found between New Zealand and Japan (t(95) = 1.51. The whole procedure.33. the participant was asked to decide how much of the NZD 2. This difference is consistent with the previous findings that Japanese PDG or SDG (n-person version of PDG) players were less cooperative than those from Western cultures (Toda.81). they were asked to answer a short questionnaire involving a scale to measure the level of their identification with the ingroup and outgroup based on Grieve and Hogg (1999). according to which a high level of cooperation in the Japanese society is maintained not by their cultural collectivism or the priority they give to the group interest but by collectivistic institutions that monitor members’ behaviour and provide formal and informal sanctions. Instead.66). After reading the instructions. and found that New Zealanders tended to be more cooperative than Japanese (0. Participants were then assigned to either the Klee group or the Kandinsky group. Cooperation levels in the practice session We first analyzed the cooperation level (proportion of the contributed amount to the endowment of 200 yen or NZD 2.89. including instructions and post-experimental questionnaire. p = 0.55. to which participants identified themselves sufficiently.045.00) of the Japanese and New Zealander participants in the practice session.56. Participants’ decisions were not actually matched with the partner’s for each condition in determining the amount they were paid.03. In the laboratory group in which no institutional Results Five of the New Zealand participants were born in nonEuropean countries and were ethnically non-European.70 (SD = 0. depending on their own group membership) on liking.54 (SD = 0. and 0. Participants’ average response on a seven-point scale concerning their feelings toward the outgroup (either the Klee group or the Kandinsky group. Yamagishi. t(47) = 5. Then. SD = 0. Shinotsuka. additional New Zealand participant was found not to understand the PDG and did not remember which group he belonged to.3 While the picture preference test was given on each participant’s computer monitor. An © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association .04). Yamagishi et al. These six participants were not included in the following analysis. the PDG study was conducted using paper-and-pencil decision sheets and collecting participants’ responses written on the sheets. t(48) = 8. This was because there was no real counterpart in decisions in the unilateral conditions. McClintock.67. p = 0. p < 0.00 (or 200 yen) to provide to the partner (in increments of 10 cents or 10 yen). The participants’ levels of identification with the ingroup and the outgroup were measured with 18 items based on Grieve and Hogg’s (1999) identity scale.001) among New Zealanders (alpha = 0.001). In addition. they completed a postexperimental questionnaire assessing participants’ possible concerns for evaluation apprehension and demand characteristics.

16.95) = 8.09. p = 0. between-participants factor) ¥ 2 (partner’s group: ingroup or outgroup.2 0. h2 = 0.3 0 .3 0.85. as predicted. F(1.88. F(1.001.6 0. No other effect was significant. outgroup partner. . . F(1.6 0. were also significant. and the previous findings mentioned earlier. the main effect of the group. p = 0. accordingly.37.7 0.07.95) = 42. as predicted.2 0 .95) = 0.95) = 9. h2 = 0. F(1.5 0 .202 Toshio Yamagishi et al.001. h2 = 0. p < 0.6 0 . The significant main effect of the participants’ nationality. p < 0. We conducted the same anova as in the analysis of cooperation level.08. F(1. within-participants factor) ¥ 2 (knowledge information: unilateral or bilateral. and a highly significant group ¥ knowledge interaction.68.3 0 .95) = 62. F(1. h2 = 0. F(1.5 0 .03. A set of additional planned comparisons5 on the effect of the partner’s group within each knowledge condition indicated that the ingroup-favouring behaviour was significant only in the mutual-knowledge condition.001. h2 = 0. Expectations According to the group heuristic account of ingroupfavouring behaviour. Figure 2 Average expectations of the partner’s cooperation in each within-participant condition broken down by the nationality of the participants.2 0 .4 0 . The significant group ¥ nationality interaction. h2 = 0. the following two effects were significant only in the analysis of expectations.1 0 0 Mutual Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Knowledge Condition Japanese Knowledge Condition New Zealanders Knowledge Condition Japanese Knowledge Condition New Zealanders Figure 1 Average cooperation level in each withinparticipant condition broken down by the nationality of the participants.792. h2 = 0.001.6 0 . h2 = 0. within-participants factor) mixed design anova on cooperation level in PDG. and not in the unilateral-knowledge condition. It is clear.001.4 0 . monitoring and sanctioning are provided. Participant’s nationality had only the main effect in the above anova.31.12.95) = 13.51.001. In addition to the above effects that were significant in the analysis of cooperation. h2 = 0. p < 0.001. .14.5 0. as predicted by a combination of hypotheses 1 and 2. The main effects of partner’s group.08.3 0.360. and not in the unilateral-knowledge condition. people behave more favourably toward ingroup members than outgroup members when they expect similar ingroup-favouring behaviour from other ingroup members. F(1.7 0 . and found the same significant effects: a main effect for nationality. it did not interact with any of the other variables including the knowledge ¥ group interaction.95) = 41. p = 0.31.95) = 0. F(1. Analyses with a set of planned comparisons indicated that the effect of the group was significant only in the mutual-knowledge condition.1 0 0 . p < 0.68.2 0.005. F(1.5 0.36.08.1 0 0.004. but these main effects simply reflected the elevated cooperation level in the In-MK condition. and not in the unilateral-knowledge condition (Hypothesis 2).004. F(1.7 0.4 0.95) = 17. Additional support for the group heuristic model can thus be obtained from participants’ expectations regarding their partner’s cooperation.7 0. and group ¥ 0 . h2 = 0. p < 0.4 0 . The pattern shown in Figure 2 is almost identical to the pattern of cooperation shown in Figure 1.003.84. from the graph. p = 0. p < 0. We conducted a 2 (the participant’s nationality: Japanese or New Zealander. a main effect of the partner’s knowledge.79.40. Ingroup partner. F(1.31. and partner’s knowledge. that ingroup-favouring behaviour took place only in the mutual-knowledge condition (Hypothesis 1). © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association .95) = 32. p = 0. cooperate at a lower level than the Westerners. . h2 = 0.95) = 18. F(1. Hypotheses testing Figure 1 reports average cooperation level for each condition broken down by the participants’ nationality.26.17. p < 0.1 0. The knowledge ¥ group interaction was highly significant.95) = 8. is consistent with the results of the practice session. Ingroup partner.95) = 8. Japanese feel less secure about other participants’ willingness to cooperate than Western participants and. outgroup partner. p = 0.

0001. whereas the effect of the expectation was highly significant (b = 0.10). F(1. p = 0.93) = 3. p = 0.3 0 . in Japan.93. the rest were classified as low ingroup identifiers. p < 0.93) = 4.730. and found that relative ingroup identification did not have a significant effect either among Japanese participants. Approximately 96% of the effect of partner’s group was mediated by expectations in Japan. p < 0.5 0 .Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 203 knowledge ¥ nationality interaction. it did not enhance ingroup bias in cooperation.043.113.0001.4 0 .04) and the knowledge ¥ group ¥ identification interaction (F(1. p = 0. © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . ingroup bias in cooperation existed only in the mutualknowledge condition among high-identifiers.93) = 8. Knowledge also had a significant effect on expectations (b = 0.770. As shown in Figure 3. When both partner’s group and expectations were entered as independent variables.0001.051.2 0 . h2 = 0. t(46) = 0. . participant’s nationality (F(1. p = 0. outgroup = 0).04). p < 0.178.004. and the second interaction term indicates that this pattern existed only among high-identifiers. h2 = 0. in Japan.03). the knowledge ¥ group interaction (F(1. in NZ). While relative ingroup identification exists for both Japanese and New Zealand participants.370. in NZ).05) and NZ (b = 0. a within-participant factor) anova on cooperation level. b = 0. Ingroup partner. p < 0. b = -0.4 0 .90. p < 0. p = 0. The regression effect of partner’s group on cooperation was significant both in Japan (b = 0. and 100% in NZ. the only statistically significant effects were the main effect of partner’s group (F(1. in Japan.140.0001. h2 = 0.299.1 0 Mutual Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Knowledge Condition Low-identifiers Knowledge Condition High-identifiers Figure 3 Average cooperation level in each withinparticipant condition among low-identifiers (left panel) and high-identifiers (right panel). p = 0.806.7 0 .077.5 0 . p = 0. whereas the effect of the expectation was highly significant (b = 0.86.070. Did bias in expectancies mediate bias in cooperation? The group heuristic model predicts that the ingroup favouring cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by the enhanced expectation of the ingroup partner’s cooperation in this condition.51. t(46) = 0. we classified our participants into high ingroup identifiers and low ingroup identifiers based on the relative ingroup identification.0001.002.003) and NZ (b = 0.0001). h2 = 0. in NZ).09). High ingroup identifiers are those whose ingroup identity score was higher than the outgroup identity score. While the above analysis shows that relative ingroup identification does not have a direct effect on ingroup bias in cooperation. h2 = 0. b = 0. the effect of partner’s group was reduced to a non-significant level (b = 0. To demonstrate this. p = 0.001.115.033. in NZ).046. in NZ).05. outgroup partner.27. b = 0.93) = 10. in which partner’s group was used as a dummy variable (ingroup = 1. .294.02.280. together indicated that the expectation of ingroup favouring cooperation was stronger among New Zealanders than among the Japanese. in Japan. In a knowledge (unilateral vs mutual) ¥ identification level (low vs high) ¥ participant’s nationality ¥ partner’s group (in vs out.167. h2 = 0. p < 0. p < 0. p = 0.370. Partner’s group also had a significant effect on expectations (b = 0. b = 0.20.6 0 . p < 0.001). b = 0. We conducted a mediation analysis of the effect of the partner’s group on cooperation. and 75% in NZ. A similar mediation analysis was conducted to demonstrate that the effect of the knowledge manipulation on cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition was mediated by enhanced expectations for cooperation from the ingroup partner. p = 0. p < 0. or among New Zealand participants. The regression effect of knowledge on cooperation was significant both in Japan (b = 0.056.93) = 4. p = 0. the first interaction term indicates the pattern predicted by the group heuristic model.721.95) = 4.6 0 . Among low- 0 .184.092.036. the effect of partner’s group was reduced to a non-significant level (b = 0.09.614. in NZ). Approximately 70% of the effect of partner’s group was mediated by expectation in Japan.634.2 0 . p < 0. When both knowledge and expectations were entered as independent variables.004.002. in Japan.1 0 0 . in Japan. p = 0. Identity and ingroup bias in cooperation and expectation We tested if relative ingroup identification explains ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition (where ingroup bias in cooperation was observed) by regressing the level of ingroup favouring cooperation (cooperation level with the ingroup partner minus cooperation level with the outgroup partner) on relative ingroup identification.0001. b = 0. the following analysis suggests that it works as a moderator for ingroup bias in cooperation. b = 0. p = 0.042.3 0 . p = 0.7 0 . The main effect of the knowledge was marginal (F(1.

The mere fact that people share a group membership is not sufficient to make them treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members. Discussion The results of the current experiment clearly support hypotheses derived from the group heuristic model. 4).1 0 Mutual Unilateral Mutual Unilateral Knowledge Condition Low-identifiers Knowledge Condition High-identifiers Figure 4 Average expectation in each withinparticipant condition among low-identifiers (left panel) and high-identifiers (right panel). Konno. . . the effect of the knowledge manipulation was more pronounced.2 0 . © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association .00 (SD = 0. the default decision rule of cooperating with the ingroup as a means to adapt to the group life was irrelevant. outgroup partner. and Yamagishi (2007) and Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) compared the levels of ingroup identity and outgroup identity in the two knowledge conditions and reached the conclusion that the same knowledge manipulation as the one we used in this study did not affect relative ingroup identification. Branscombe. Those who failed to identify themselves with the ingroup were most likely the ones who did not see the minimal groups as meaningful groups and.05 (SD = 0. it was shown to be critical that the two need to know that both are aware of this fact (i. relative ingroup identification is an indicator that one is subjectively facing a group situation.3 0 .7 0 .10) in the unilateral-knowledge condition. it is like paying an admission fee to enter a theatre where no play is performed. In the unilateral-knowledge condition. the lack of commonality of knowledge prevents group identity from being fully attained. From this perspective.g.5 0 . it is very clear that the ingroup partner will not treat the participant as a member of a generalized exchange.6 0 . The group heuristic account of ingroup bias in cooperation asserts that people adopt the default decision rule catered toward adapting to group life when facing a group situation. the commonality of the knowledge that the two share the same group membership). Ellemers. Among highidentifiers. thus. but not in the unilateral-knowledge condition. as the knowledge was manipulated as a within-participants factor. Ingroup partner. In addition to sharing a same group membership. Spears. suggests that the group heuristic operates when participants see the minimal groups as meaningful.1 0 0 .7 0 . identifiers. The finding in the present study that the pattern predicted by the group heuristic – ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition. generalized exchange cannot take place in the group in the unilateral-knowledge condition.17 (SD = 0. The moderating role of ingroup identity for the ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition. the only way to examine if the knowledge affected ingroup identity was to administer identity scale in each within-participant condition.4 0 . where high identifiers act differently than low identifiers (e. First. the finding indicates that ingroup identity 0 .4 0 . Whether this was actually the case cannot be ascertained with the current experiment. and not in the unilateralknowledge condition – emerged only among those who showed relative ingroup identification adds new evidence in support of the heuristic account of ingroup-favouring behaviour. thus. This finding is consistent with the literature derived from social identity and selfcategorization theory. which would have been heavily affected by carry-over effects.2 0 . simply put. treating ingroup members favourably is a total waste. Participants in this study did not treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members in the unilateral-knowledge condition where it is salient that the group is not a venue of generalized exchange. Given the void of generalized exchanges in the group. 1999). The group heuristic prediction of ingroup bias in cooperation specific to the mutual-knowledge condition was found only for the participants who saw group-ness in the minimal groups they faced.204 Toshio Yamagishi et al. the average levels of ingroup favouring bias in cooperation (cooperation level with the ingroup minus cooperation level with the outgroup) were 0. However. conversely. based on the results from previous studies in which the same knowledge manipulation took place as a between-participants factor.24) in the unilateralknowledge condition.6 We provide an alternative account of the critical role that commonality of knowledge plays in engendering ingroupfavouring behaviour.13) in the mutual-knowledge condition and 0.e. Almost identical pattern was observed with regard to expectations (Fig. that the knowledge manipulation we used in this study likely had no effect on the participant’s identity with the ingroup and the outgroup.5 0 .6 0 .26) in the mutualknowledge condition and 0. the participant is not an ingroup member from the point of view of the ingroup partner and. Suzuki. & Doosje.3 0 . we are assured.03 (SD = 0. Why is the commonality of knowledge critical for the ingroup-favouring behaviour? One possible answer is that commonality of knowledge enhances group identity or. 0.

’ 4. At the same time. as Yuki and colleagues suggest. they should be catered towards adaptation to what is going on in the group. not the empty container per se. the current study does not provide sufficient data to test this argument. for whom minimal groups were perceived as meaningful groups (i.5. 2. Unfortunately.5. 0. Acknowledgements The research reported here was supported by a grant-in-aid from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grantin-Aid for Scientific Research. New Zealanders were found to be more cooperative than Japanese in the practice session and in the overall level of cooperation. for a similar results showing that Americans were also more cooperative than Japanese). since from our previous experience that some of the participants were actually able to discern the two artists’ paintings. asking which of the two groups the participant wanted to belong to. without deliberate calculation when no salient cues exist indicating lack of generalized exchange. was also used in the regression analysis using the first. 0. second. For the four cells. Suzuki et al. that is. in the first comparison. Another independent contrast. only 22.’s (2005) findings in which Australians were found to be more cooperative than Japanese (see Yamagishi.Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 205 per se does not produce ingroup bias in cooperation in the unilateral-knowledge condition. 2003. The group categories are simply containers of various forms of social interactions (Yamagishi & Kiyonari. This difference seems to suggest that the operation of the group heuristic is stronger among New Zealanders than among Japanese. More important is the fact that the pattern predicted by the group heuristic model was observed both among Japanese and New Zealand participants. All of the findings from this study consistently indicate that ingroup bias in cooperation is a product of group heuristic – a default decision rule encouraging cooperation within groups in a group situation. 3.7% among the French in 1999. Yuki et al.5% among the British in 1999. those who exhibited relative ingroup identification). © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . The random assignment would have raised serious suspicion among those participants about the use of deception. in-MK.5% among Canadians in 2000. and out-UK. In contrast. the above finding suggests that the pattern of ingroup bias in cooperation predicted by group heuristic did in fact emerge for those. including various forms of social exchange. However. Ingroup identity is insufficient as an account of ingroup bias in cooperation unless and until it provides an account of why it does not enhance cooperation with the ingroup in the absence of shared knowledge of group membership. Japanese participants may show such a pattern of behaviour more strongly than New Zealanders when cues suggest the presence of interpersonal ties. 2007.8 % of Japanese replied to ‘How proud are you to be [Nationality]?’ by ‘very proud. no participants would have cooperated with any partner regardless of the knowledge condition.5. 2008). #14201014. 2000). This is consistent with Yuki and colleagues’ argument that identity with categorical groups plays a more prominent role in the Western societies than in the Japanese society (Yuki.. in-UK. In the World Values Survey (World Values Study Group. 0. in the second comparison. It should be remembered here that the same knowledge manipulation used in this study has already been demonstrated not to affect the level of ingroup identity (Suzuki et al.1% among Americans in 1999. If New Zealanders are more sensitive to social categories than Japanese. 0..e. whereas this figure was 72. and only for those. If this was the case. out-MK. We avoided the use of random assignment. 0. 2000). -0. This is certainly an important topic for future study. implying that minimal groups are perceived as more real by New Zealanders than by Japanese.. what matters is what is inside the container.’ in 2000. and no future return could be expected. what is important is not the group as a category.5. End notes 1. Groups are important to human life because they are where we get resources that we need. 66.1% among New Zealanders in 1998. 2005). (2007) and Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) manipulated the knowledge condition as a between-participant factor. The PDG used in this study was a one-shot game. The last item of Grieve and Hogg’s (1999) identity scale. 65. were assigned -1. Obviously. It should be emphasized here that the operation of group heuristic does not imply that the decision is a result of deliberate calculations of the probability of future return. 1. and Toda et al. 1988a. they are more likely to activate group heuristic than the Japanese when they face a minimal group situation in which no actual face-to-face interaction exists and thus produce the pattern of ingroup favouring cooperation predicted by the group heuristic model. 50. Yamagishi & Mifune. -1. Rather. 39. The only significant crosscultural difference in this respect was that ingroup bias in expectations in the mutual-knowledge condition was more pronounced among New Zealand participants than among Japanese. 6. 5. 1. This strongly suggests that whatever psychological mechanisms humans have developed for our survival. to Toshio Yamagishi. groups are of critical importance to human life. This finding is consistent with Yamagishi et al. and thus they were able to measure the level of relative ingroup identification in each condition. third contrast as independent variables. favourable behaviour towards the ingroup is a default decision that is taken by default. -0. 1978. and 0. None of these items revealed threats from evaluation apprehension or demand characteristics. was dropped from the analysis presented below in the process of constructing the ‘relative ingroup identification score.

& Kramer. 53. M. Context. R. (1973). 37. 135–151. Ellemers. & Augoustinos. 190–198 (in Japanese with an English abstract). C. M. K. Worchel.. M.. A. L. 12.. In: P. Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes.. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.. Jin. eds. A. B. A. In: J. Social identification effects in social dilemmas: A transformation of motives. The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. C. Y. T. Oxford: Blackwell. L. Raising the minimum in the minimal group paradigm. M. 44. Fischer & D. 17–24 (in Japanese with an English abstract). (1997). Transforming social dilemmas: Group identity and cooperation. J. Spears & B. 223–246. 5. domain-specific self-esteem and intergroup discrimination amongst minimal and national groups. 35–58. Gigerenzer. Choice behaviour in social dilemmas: Effect of social identity. M. et al. Threats to group value. European Journal of Social Psychology. I. P. Japanese Journal of Psychology. 231–240. Hewstone. European Journal of Social Psychology. Billig. (1993). ed. European Journal of Social Psychology. H. The context and content of social identity threat. J. (1999). eds. M. Ellemers. G. M. pp. D. D. The Japanese Journal of Psychology. (1999). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. 179–193. D. & Shinotsuka.. 78. Cosmides. Research in Organizational Behaviour. Brown. & Tajfel. R. & Brewer. Cosmides. N. 33–47. 575–604. Intergroup bias. & Hill. H. age. N. Cosmides & J. European Journal of Social Psychology. Budescu. J. Billig. Monterey: Nelson-Hall. M. M. In: W. H. (2006). P. Japanese Journal of Psychology. F. V. Cognition. T. & Yamagishi. O’Brien. Oxford: Blackwell. G. 186–210. P. (2000). Jin. S. (1995). © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . (1988). J. E.. M. Barkow. Kramer. 18. Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. G. Schroeder. & Newton. The effect of social categorization on cooperation in three types of social dilemmas.. R.. 73. (1975). 149–178. M. 18.. M. Cox. 329–353. In: R. D. (1991). 25. C. 1044–1057. H. New York: Oxford University Press. (1986). The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. European Journal of Social Psychology. 926–940. L. Simpson. R. and decision framing. (2005). Branscombe. Content. Rubin. C. B. 633–654. 3. G. Austin & S. (1979). The minimal group paradigm: Categorization into two versus three groups. & Willis. 67. Food sharing among Ache foragers: Tests of explanatory hypotheses. Pommerenke. & Yamagishi. J. Human Relations. Group heuristics in social dilemma.206 Toshio Yamagishi et al. S. Festinger. M. Ingroup cooperation and the social exchange heuristic. Wit. Social comparison and group interest in ingroup favouritism. Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. M. Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas. T. pp. N. Konno. In: N. Tajfel. 26.. Kramer. Kaplan. Kramer. & Hogg. (1989). 825–839. D. 27–52. M. M. Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individuals and Groups. R. 317–334. Hunter. van Vugt. Suleiman. References Abrams. Expectations of a generalized exchange system and ingroup favouritism: An experimental study of bounded reciprocity. 587–599. Leadership in social dilemmas: The effects of group identification on collective actions to provide public goods. & Tooby. T. B. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Modeling Rational and Moral Agents. (1985). ed. 187–276. Intergroup relations and organizational dilemmas: The role of categorization processes. H. M. Turner. (1984). H. Current Anthropology. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 46. Kramer. and social comparison. A. (2007). (1992). & Wetherell. Bundy. & Tajfel. D. The Psychology of Intergroup Relations. A theory of social comparison processes. H. Hogg. 13. T.. Development of competitive behaviour as a function of culture. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 7.. (1987). 31. L. J. T. pp. T. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Social identity and cooperation in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Oakes. Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. (1954). 9. (1993). Yamagishi. Turner. & Stech. (1971). pp. 36.. (1999). S. Brewer. 191–228. Yamagishi. de Cremer. 32. & Kiyonari. H. M. Bilateral dependency and the minimal group paradigm. M. N. (1992). 269–286. Journal of Economic Psychology. (2004). Subjective uncertainty and intergroup discrimination in the minimal group situation. Ingroup bias in trusting behaviour: A choice of allocator experiment with minimal groups. 25. 1–9 (in Japanese with an English abstract). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. (1997). C. & Doosje. & Wilke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. T. N. 593–604. Japanese Journal of Social Psychology. M. Kollock. (1988). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. R. eds. In: D. 46–67. (2002). Kiyonari. 77–85 (in Japanese with an English abstract). C. Danielson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.. H. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. (1979). Grieve. (2002). & de Cremer. & Turner. Suzuki. & Yamagishi.. D.. & Goldman. R. Toda. Shinotsuka. British Journal of Social Psychology. & van Vugt. J. L. Spears. L. Social categorization in intergroup behaviour. 29. A. (1999). P. K. Reicher. & Flament. Commitment. Hartstone. pp. London: Routledge. 13. Helping the group or helping yourself? Social motives and group identity in resource dilemmas. 871–893. 187–204. European Journal of Social Psychology. Rationality and Society. 1. 50. 117–140. N. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. R. A. (1996). Messick. 443–470. R. CT: Praeger. eds. Westport. McClintock. Doosje.. Effects of social identity and interpersonal accountability on negotiator decision making. pp. J. & Abrams. A. Kiyonari. Turner. group size. Annual Review of Psychology. Jin. A. Social Identity. (1995). H. Hogg. P. B.. 76. (1978). Rediscovering the Social Group: A SelfCategorization Theory. R. & Hogg. Tooby. European Journal of Social Psychology. M. Karp. 5–34. J. Tajfel. 163–228.

M. Motivation and Emotion. 129– 166. W.org/ Yamagishi. N. (1988a). N. H. 24. Yamagishi.. J. Makimura. Psychological Science. (1988b). T. Yamagishi. Maddux. (2008). S. (1982). The group as the container of generalized reciprocity. Hashimoto. World Values Study Group. Kiyonari. A. M. 173–190. T. Y. 66. (1994). T. T. & Schug.. Mifune. 116–132. M. 19. Cross-cultural difference in relationship. T. T. 17. and reputation. T. (2007). T. The Structure of Trust. Yamagishi. M. T. Social Psychology Quarterly.. Exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the public good problem in the United States and Japan. M. Preferences vs. T. Jin. Yamagishi. Comparisons of Australians and Japanese of group-based cooperation. B. Egalitarian societies. Yamagishi. © 2008 The Authors © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association . Yuki. MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICSPR). Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 48–62.. T. (1999). Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 20. Terai. T. 18. Ann Arbor. Kiyonari. Yamagishi...worldvaluessurvey. Asian Journal of Social Psychology.. World Values Survey. W.. K. Jin. 16. Yamagishi. (1998). 63. Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. & Kiyonari. Yamagishi. (2000).] Available from URL: http://www. (2005). 315–328. & Kiyonari. The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States and Japan. Foddy. [Cited 20 March 2007. Social Psychology Quarterly. Matsuda. (2003). J. S. Social Psychology Quarterly.Ingroup bias in Japan and New Zealand 207 Woodburn.. 8.. Yamagishi. (2008). Does shared group membership promote altruism? Fear. Bounded generalized reciprocity: Ingroup boasting and ingroup favouritism. 431–451. 530– 542. M. Advances Ingroup Processes. Rationality and Society. strategies as explanations for culture-specific behaviour. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. J. 259–298. & Yamagishi. Yamagishi. 31. Man. (2000).and group-based trust. Yuki. M.. 32–42. 19. N. 1999– 2004. Ingroup favouritism and culture of collectivism. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. The social exchange heuristic: Managing errors in social exchange. 1. 166–183. Rationality and Society. (2005). & Mifune.. T. 51. (1998). & Kanazawa. Intergroup comparison versus intragroup relationships: A cross-cultural examination of social identity theory in North American and East Asian cultural contexts. & Miller. & Platow. T. 161–197. greed. N. 5–30. 578–83. & Takemura. S. Brewer. T.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->