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Prevention and Mitigation — Equal Priorities; Prof. Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President

Prevention and Mitigation — Equal Priorities; Prof. Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President

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Plenary Session; 19.03.2012
Keynote Speech - Prof Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President
Plenary Session; 19.03.2012
Keynote Speech - Prof Vladimir Asmolov, WANO President

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Prevention and Mitigation — Equal Priorities

Prof. Vladimir Asmolov WANO President

International Experts’ Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 19 -22 March 2012, Vienna, Austria

Phases of Nuclear Power Development in Post-Chernobyl Period
 

1986 – 2004 2004 – 2008

- the ―survival‖ period - nuclear ―renaissance‖


2008 – 2009

- global financial crisis

2010 – March 2011 - end of recession period and post-crisis development


11 March 2011
2011 onward

- Fukushima accident
- Post-Fukushima actions
2

State-of-the-art in Nuclear Power Engineering
(high degree of globalization)

 

Five countries (U.S.A., France, Japan, Russia and Germany) altogether produce 70% of nuclear-generated electricity in the world. Light water reactors of three types (PWR, BWR, VVER) represent 80% of global reactor fleet. Five countries (Russia, France, Japan, China, India) are developing fast reactor technologies in an advanced phase. Six companies (Rosatom, URENCO, USEC, EURODIF, CNNC, JNFL) are performing commercial-scale uranium enrichment. Six countries (France, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, China, India) have nuclear fuel reprocessing capacities.
3

WANO: Main development milestones

WANO basic working principles:
- voluntariness; - collective responsibility; - independency, and accountability to members only; - confidentiality.

WANO today: - new challenges; - Mitchell’s Commission.

TMI 1979

1989

1986 Chernobyl

2011 Fukushima
4

Purpose of the Commission
The WANO Post Fukushima Commission was formed in April 2011 with a mission to:
―…recommend changes to WANO’s programs and structure to effectively implement lessons arising from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident; and in doing so, to increase the nuclear safety of nuclear power plants and fuel processing facilities worldwide.‖
Commission Charter

5

Commission Strengths
Experience and Expertise

O. Allan Kupcis Past Pres. WANO Former CEO Ontario Hydro

John Herron Pres., CEO and CNO Entergy Nuclear

Yuriy Nedashkovskiy, President, SE NNEGC Energoatom

Vladimir Asmolov First Deputy General Director Rosenergoatom Concern OJSC

Mgr. Ing. Vladimir Hlavinka Chief Production Officer CEZ a.s.

Tom Mitchell, Pres. and CEO OPG

Dominique Miniere, Executive Vice President EDF

William (Bill) Coley, former CEO, British Energy; former Pres. Duke Power Photo Unavailable

Philippe Van Troeye General Manager of Generation, Belgium & Luxembourg Electrabel

Takao Fujie, Pres. and CEO JANTI

Hyun-Taek Park EVP and CNO KHNP

Jörg Michels Executive Director ENBW Kernkraft GmbH

Hideki Toyomatsu Director, EVP and CNO Kansai Electric Power Co.

Photo Unavailable

GAO Ligang, Senior Vice President China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Company (CGNPC)

6

Commission Strengths
Major Companies/Organizations Represented

7

Commission Strengths
International Composition

Ukraine

Canada

Russia

U.S.A. Belgium

China

Czech Republic

France

Japan

South Korea

8

Commission Strengths
All WANO Regions Represented
Tokyo Centre • Japan Nuclear Technology Institute • Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. • Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Atlanta Centre • Ontario Power Generation • Entergy

Paris Centre
• CGNPC • Electricité de France (EDF) • EnBW Kernkraft GmbH (EnKK) • Electrabel

Moscow Centre
• CEZ, a.s. • Concern Rosenergoatom • NNEGC Energoatom

9

Commission’s Scope

Meetings in:  Atlanta  Paris  Seoul  Prague  Tokyo

10

Accident lessons learned SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS
SAFETY CULTURE
- Alignment of priorities - Human factor

TECHNOLOGY
(technical safety ensuring)

LEGISLATION
 Federal laws (responsibility principles)  System of rules and regulation  State licensing authority (independent regulation)

DEFENCE IN-DEPTH PRINCIPLE
 Multiplicity of safety barriers  Variety of levels for protection barriers: - prevention of accidents - mitigation of accident consequences (accident management)

KNOWLEDGE BASE

The main Lessons Learned

The safety fundamentals are correct and shall not be subject to any revisions
11

Accident lessons learned

The key criterion of success: - recovery of power supply - water feed for the decay heat removal

As prompt as possible!

Prompt actions of: - responsible and powerful utility; - trained personnel.

Availability of undamageable portable engineering means for power and water supply in the conditions of NPP isolation

12

Commission Recommendations
Fukushima Related  Expand the scope of WANO programs  Promote and implement a worldwide, integrated nuclear industry event response Performance Gap Related  Achieve peer-review performance improvement within four years  Become more publicly visible  Conduct periodic internal peer reviews

WANO Post-Fukushima Commission Final Report

September 30, 2011

13

WANO scope expansion
Expanding the scope of WANO programmes (Peer Reviews, TSM, Training) to address:
Member emergency preparedness fundamentals Severe accident management, including procedures, training and readiness Fuel pool and fuel storage cooling and contingencies Multiple unit impacts and considerations for mitigation Implementation of design safety fundamentals for the prevention of fuel damage and mitigation of off-site radiation release and public impact
14

Enhancement of WANO Peer Reviews

1 2 3 4 5

• Priority in recommendations is given to SAFETY • Review of the accomplished modernization measures focused on safety improvement

• Assessment of the NPP reaction to the severe accidents occurred
• Assessment of emergency preparedness: - on-site - off-site • Striving to an attitude of obligatory implementation of recommendations related to Areas For Improvement

6

• Assessment of the design base readiness to any new challenges
15

Fundamental change of WANO competence after Fukushima

Before the 2011 event

• The highest priority – to prevent accidents

After the 2011 event

• Equally high priorities – accident prevention and accident mitigation: - implementation of design fundamental; - emergency preparation; - SA management.

16

EQUAL PRIORITY OF THE SAFETY ENSURING GOALS 1. The accident prevention

– – –

Quality of design, justification of design solutions Self-protection – inherent safety features Taking into account both internal and external initial events Quality assurance at all stages of construction, operation and decommissioning

2. The accident management
– Development of measures to mitigate the accident consequences, that is, measures focused on retention of safety barriers integrity

17

Defense-in-depth
Implementation of design safety fundamentals for the prevention of core damage accident:
Evaluation of design features to determine the area of safety improvements based on operating experience

Corrective actions

Safety modernization during the whole plant life time

18

Defense-in-depth

(cont.)

Mitigation (accident management):

Training of personnel
Verifying key elements of emergency response procedures Sharing of operating experience and good practices
19

What we know today about severe accident phenomena?
(Knowledge base after TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima)

20

 Accident prevention

(for all possible initial events NPP design shall justify that destruction limits for fuel elements would not be exceeded)

 Impossibility to take accident
management measures

21

REACTIVITY ACCIDENTS
DIFFERENT MODES OF FUEL ROD FAILURE
FAILURE OF FUEL CLADDING
Cladding crimping at fuel pellet edge locations

High burnt-up (left) and fresh (right) fuel elements

FRAGMENTATION OF THE FUEL ELEMENTS
Bottom plug with solidificated melt

Cross-section of the fuel element in the maximum deformation area Specific bulge with the cladding destruction Fragments of the fuel pellets with melted-out central part

REACTIVITY INITIATED ACCIDENT

Testing of fresh and Testing of fuel and in the burnt up freshrodsburnt up GIDRA, the GIDRA, IGR fuel rods in IGR, BIGR (Russia), Cabri BIGR pulse reactors (France), NSRR (Japan)

Mechanical testing of specimens in hot cell

Development of dynamic computer code neutronics coupled with thermohydraulics; fuel rod thermo-mechanics. Analysis of possible accident scenarios

MECHANICAL PROPERTY DATA BASE FAILURE THRESHOLD DATA BASE COMPUTATION SCENARIO CATALOG

NPP SAFETY JUSTIFICATION UNDER RIA CONDITIONS
23

ACCIDENTS WITH LOSS OF CORE COOLING FUNCTION

Progression of an accident
with loss of core cooling function at a nuclear plant is a sequence of plant states, each of them being more severe as compared to a preceding one due to a greater degree of safety barriers damage

TMI-2
24

Sequence of States (phases) of Accident Progression:
Loss of efficient reactor core cooling
Core melting, relocation of molten core to reactor vessel lower head, formation of molten pool Reactor vessel damage, melt release into the containment Containment damage, fission products release to the environment

25

For each severe accident state its own safety specific goal should be determined, and the accident management strategy and methods shall be focused on achievement of that goal:

Prevention of fuel damage Molten fuel retention inside the reactor vessel Prevention of the containment damage

26

SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION AT A NPP
I phase
REACTOR CORE DEGRADATION
PROCESSES AND EVENTS ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GOAL ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES

To prevent the core melting (To keep the integrity of the Ist and IInd physical barriers)

The recovery of the core cooling

27

CORA – PWR, BWR, VVER PROGRAM
KEY PROCESSES
• Core dry out and overheating
• High temperature oxidation of fuel claddings • Fuel-cladding interaction • Hydrogen generation • Melting and relocation down of core materials • Blockages formation

28

SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION AT A NPP
II phase
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL DAMAGE
PROCESSES AND EVENTS ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GOAL ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES

To retain melt inside the RPV (To keep the integrity of the IIIrd physical barrier)

In-vessel cooling Ex-vessel cooling

29

RASPLAV, MASCA PROJECTS
RASPLAV

MASCA

 Data base was obtained on the melt thermal-physic properties under the temperatures up to 3100К  Data base was created describing the key parameters for the melt pool behaviour  Computational tool was developed

30

SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRESSION AT A NPP
III phase
CONTAINMENT DAMAGE
PROCESSES AND EVENTS ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GOAL ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT MEASURES

To prevent the containment failure (To keep the integrity of the IVth physical barrier)

Development of the core catcher Development of hydrogen safety system Filtered venting system

31

STUDIES OF HYDROGEN DEFLAGRATION AND DETONATION

 Criteria for the modes of the
flame propagation have been developed

 Gas-dynamic computer
codes have been developed (turbulent deflagration and detonation of gas mixtures)

 Hydrogen safety systems
have been developed

600

эксперимент расчет

600

эксперимент расчет

400

400

P, kПa

200

P, kПa
200
0

32

0

0

1

время, с

2

3

0

1

время, с

2

3

SEVERE ACCIDENT KNOWLEDGE BASE SUMMARY

33

Implementation of a unified methodology for severe accident management
1.

Definition of safety goals for every phase of accident progression (safety goals tree)

2.

3. 4.

5.

There are safety functions that ensure achievement of the defined goals Loss of such a function leads to a request on its restoration Based on knowledge of specific parameters of the emergency process a relevant effective procedure of accident management is selected Assessment of preparedness to manage an accident effectively (evaluation of the knowledge level) shall produce a request on additional investigations
34

(request for additional research))

KNOWLEDGE BASE

Additional study based on peer reviews and operation experience
Filtered containment venting Prevention of hydrogen deflagration and detonation Prevention of steam explosion
35

Methodology for the analysis of NPPs robustness to the severe accidents

Reliability

The equipment additional failures Deterministic experience related to BDBA consequences evaluation

36

First step in the robustness analysis
Fire

NPP
1) Total loss of: - electric power supply; - core cooling; - coolant sources 2) Loss of primary circuit integrity
3) No operator’s accident management actions
37

Evaluation of time to degradation of safety barriers on the path of radioactive fission products’ dispersal due to sequential failure of safety functions of regular systems and unsuccessful accident management actions Decay heat removal to the final absorber

Reactor core components integrity
Main coolant circulation circuit integrity Leak-tight compartments integrity
38

Time reserves before reactor core destruction
1.5 – 2 hours 5-6 hours In case of LOCA – for VVER-1000 NPPs In case of absence of LOCA – for VVER-1000 NPPs

24 hours

In case of LOCA – for Tianwan NPP, Kudankulam NPP, AES-2006 In case of LOCA – for VVER-TOI

72 hours

As long as necessary

In case of absence of LOCA – for Kudankulam NPP, AES-2006, VVER-TOI

39

The accumulated knowledge of severe accident processes and phenomena allow us to solve the problem of severe accident management by means of:
• NPP design quality and using operating experience accumulated as much as possible (accident prevention) • A consistent fight for retention of integrity of physical safety barriers while every barrier being considered as a last one on the way of the melt propagation (accident management)

1 2

40

Second step in the robustness analysis
Implementation of the severe accident management allows us to proceed to the second step of the robustness analysis
Cost-benefit analysis

Estimation of reasonableness of investments into the hazard reduction

41

Suggestions to WANO

To develop and implement a mutually recognized generic methodology for analysis of the Defense-in-Depth robustness for different reactor types

To develop additional peer review subprogrammes focused on reviewing of effectiveness of the measures aimed at increasing the existing NPPs robustness to abnormal events
To consider a possibility to establish regional emergency response centres according to reactor types for provision assistance to operating organizations
42

Cooperation Between IAEA and WANO

At the WANO BGM in Shenzhen in October 2011, Director General Amano called for greater cooperation between WANO and IAEA IAEA Fukushima action plan and WANO action plan both call for greater cooperation Revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is being drafted Nuclear safety is best served by a strong WANO and a strong IAEA
43

Involvement in INSAG activities
From Richard Meserve’s letter addressed to the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano:
1. The operator must have engineering and financial capabilities end management authority to ensure its responsibility; 2. The nuclear regulator must have necessary authority, and sufficient financial and qualified human resources to fulfill its responsibilitie; 3. Constructive interaction between regulators and operators is important; 4. A clear delineation of responsibilities must exist between the management structure of the operator, the regulator, and the governmental authorities; 5. A NPP design shall be resistant to any external beyond-designbasis impacts and allow to maintain key safety functions after the beginning of an accident.
44

Areas of Possible Cooperation Between WANO and IAEA
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

New entrants to our industry Common definition for performance indicators Sharing resources between peer reviews and OSARTs Sharing generic issues and trends identified from data reviews Supporting each others working groups (example: review of IAEA safety standards) Attend INSAG meetings
45

Recommendations to IAEA
1. Widen the involvement of representatives of operating organizations in TWGs and SAGNE.
2. Expand the representation of high level experts from operating organization in INSAG to intensify feedback from operating organizations and their experience in safety. 3. Enhance communications between SAGNE and INSAG. 4. Strengthen the Agency’s capabilities to collect and disseminate the best operational practices. 5. Strengthen the Agency’s cooperation and collaboration with WANO. 6. Facilitate interactions between operating organizations of experienced countries and newcomers.

7. Open wider communication of operating organizations with public though IAEA communication tools.

46

Closing Thoughts

Fukushima will offer important industry lessons, but the safety fundamentals are correct and shall not be subject to any revisions Human performance (safety culture) is still the leading cause of core damaging events Our industry (and WANO) must shift its mindset from ―prevention‖ to ―prevention and mitigation‖ Our industry (and WANO) will emerge from the Fukushima event with an even stronger commitment to nuclear safety
47

Conclusions
1. Nuclear safety is not based only on regulators. The prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with operating organizations which have the necessary experience and knowledge. 2. Improvement in safety can be reached through better sharing of operation experience and improvements in technology. The IAEA is to increase interactions with utilities and nuclear industry. 3. The IAEA should declare clearly the recognition of the role of operating organizations and nuclear industry in safe, efficient and sustainable nuclear power development and to strengthen cooperation with them.
48

http://www.wano.info
49

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