Possible Reactor Safety Enhancements from Sample Examination and Evaluation at Fukushima Daiichi

J. Rempe (INL), M. Farmer (ANL), M. Corradini (UW), L. Ott (ORNL), R. Gauntt and D. Powers (SNL), and M. Plys (FAI) International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Headquarters Vienna, Austria March 2012

Photo Courtesy TEPCO

Fukushima

Fukushima Daiichi Whats Known

Multiple large seismic and flooding events Extended loss of power Operators/staff faced adverse conditions
Degraded instrumentation Several building explosions Some reactor fuel damaged
3/15/ 22:31 6 4/11 17:16 6.6

3/12 4:46 6.2

3/11 15:08 6.7

4/7 23:32 7.1 3/12 3:59 6.3

3/11 14:46 9.0

Multiple-unit event damage

3/11 15:25 7.7 3/23 7:12 5.7

Most (if not all) fuel in unit 4 storage pool intact

3/11 15:15 7.9

Photos and Graphics Courtesy TEPCO

Fukushima

Fukushima Daiichi Much Unknown

Amount of water addition Cooling system operation Component failures

Fuel damage extent Seawater addition effects Final core material location

CV SFP RPV

Core

S/C

Post-accident examinations and evaluations needed

Photos Courtesy GE and TEPCO

TMI-2

Many Improvements Instigated by TMI-2 Post-Accident Evaluations

Control room design Operator training Plant data sharing and assessment Insights and knowledge about severe accidents and source terms Plant modifications Emergency response planning Increased use of risk assessment Revised regulations Revised regulatory organization

Containment Pressurizer

RPV SG SG

Core

Photos Courtesy GPU

TMI-2

Plant Instrumentation Information Difficult to Obtain, Incomplete, Inaccurate, and Difficult to Synthesize

TMI-2 Control Room

Daiichi Unit 1 Control Room

Some plant instrumentation data inaccurate

Photos Courtesy GPU, and NHK, and TEPCO

TMI-2

TMI-2 Core Degradation Observed Three Years Later

for the first time, (we recognized that) five feet of the core was gone. That's when we really saw that the core had been severely damaged.
Robert Long, former GPU vice president, regarding First Look Examinations on July 21, 1982

Core melting not known until 1986.

Photo and Videos Courtesy GPU and PBS

TMI-2

OECD TMI-2 VIP Provided Insights Regarding Relocating Melt /Structure Interactions

Photo and Videos Courtesy DOE and NRC

TMI-2

OECD TMI-2 VIP Provided Data for Model Assessment

Photo and Videos Courtesy DOE and NRC

TMI-2

TMI-2 VIP Data emphasized need to improve PWR Vessel Failure Models

20
Estimated time of global vessel failure TMI-2 reactor coolant system pressure

2.5E3

15

Major relocation

Pressure (MPa)

10

1.5E3 1.0E3

Block valve closed

0.5E3

10

12

14

16

18

0.00

Time after scram (h)

Pressure (psi)

2.0E3

TMI-2

Subsequent Tests with UO2-ZrO2 Confirmed Postulated Crack and Gap Cooling Mechanisms

FARO Test Facility

SSWICS Test Facility

Thermally-induced cracks and furrows observed in relocated debris (in-vessel and ex-vessel conditions) Intermittent contact between relocated debris and test plate (in-vessel conditions.
Photos Courtesy Nuclear Engineering and Design and ANL

TMI-2

Combined Insights from Examinations, Analyses, and Plant Data Essential for Improving Simulation Tools

Fukushima

Fukushima Offers Unique Opportunity to Improve Severe Accident Models

BWR fuel assembly degradation
More than 40 PWR-specific tests as opposed to 9 BWR-specific tests No BWR full- assembly tests opposed to some full length/full assembly PWR tests

Salt water on reactor fuel, cladding, and structural materials

BWR-specific tests: PWR-specific No data Large scale tests (LOFT, Most and concrete TMI-2) spent fuel storage pool Salt water tests focus on in-core within degradation (DF-4, CORA) Debris beds (MP) No data Fission product release One in-pile test (DF-4) series Interactions with BWR support structures (core plate), lower (PHEBUS) No tests with irradiated fuel head Most tests focus on in-core and vessel skirt penetrations, vessel, Out-of-pile tests (CORA and and degradation (notably CORA XR) PWR-specific TMI-2 evaluations and tests in 1/10th scale facility QUENCH) No XR focus is on lower 1 m of core features, data to account for BWR-specific (includingcontrol blade drive mechanisms and In-pile with irradiated fuel rods such as 185 core plate) Reactor (LOFT, TMI, PBF, FLHT, PHEBUS) building massive structures outside RPV lower head. Out-of-pile tests Mark I (CORA and QUENCH) liner/melt interactions CV No full-scale data with prototypic materials SFP
RPV Core

Photo Courtesy: GE

Core-concrete interactions
MACE large-scale prototypic data available No full-scale data with prototypic materials

Pedestal

S/C

Mark I liner

Photo Courtesy GE

Proposed Program

TMI-2 Post-Accident Examination Experience Offers Planning Insights

Effort Evolved with Knowledge

Initial small GEND (GPU/EPRI/NRC/DOE) effort to cooperate on development of sample extraction effort, reactor recovery, and accident research Expanded as knowledge about relocation increased

A priori effort needed to assure appropriate focus

Plant instrumentation data Operator interview information Smaller-scale separate effects tests with well-defined conditions Refinement of severe accident models based on separate effects data, Post-accident inspections and sample extraction related to in-vessel phenomena, vessel failure phenomena, and ex-vessel/containment phenomena

Photo Courtesy GPU

Proposed Program

Well-Organized Efficient International Program Advantageous

Key knowledge for program definition

Subsurface debris sampling device

Simulations to estimate of core material endstate location (separate effects needed a priori to reduce uncertainties) Video examinations Based on expert opinion of possible benefit in reducing uncertainty in predicting accident progression Ensuring appropriate methods available and tested a priori Ensuring appropriate methods available to obtain required data available a priori JAPAN: SAMPSON EU:ICARE2, ATHLET/CD and SVECHA package US: MELCOR and MAAP Materials interactions

Sample type and number definition

Sample extraction effort

Surface debris sampling device

Sample analysis effort

Analysis effort

Separate effects tests

Shielded canister for sample retrieval Photos Courtesy MPR and DOE EDM lower head cutting electrodes

Program closely coupled to D&D efforts

Proposed Program

Initial Author Ideas on Information Possible From Daiichi

BWR-specific melt progression and vessel failure:
End state (mass, composition, distribution, morphology) and peak temperatures of undamaged, damaged, and relocated core materials Evidence of interactions between fuel, cladding, fuel channel, control, and instrumentation materials Evidence of stratification within once-molten materials Physical characteristics affecting debris coolability (particulate, cracks, gaps) Peak temperatures and deformation of the lower head, lower head structures, and penetrations Size and location of any vessel failures Impact of saltwater (structural corrosion, chemical interaction with core materials, fission product retention) End state, peak temperature, and location of ex-vessel debris Physical characteristics affecting debris coolability (particulate, cracks, gaps) Evidence of debris-water interactions Evidence of physical interactions and heat transfer between ex-vessel debris and structures below the RPV Evidence of damage to drywell structures and penetrations Ablation of concrete and structures by ex-vessel debris Evidence of in-vessel non-volatile releases from deposits on RPV internal structures Evidence of ex-vessel fission product release from aerosol deposits in containment Evidence of interactions between in-vessel and ex-vessel sources from aerosol deposits Evidence for the roles of structural material and concrete material aerosols

Ex-vessel phenomena (if vessel failure observed):

Outer Oxide (Fe3O4)

Back scattered electrons image

Inner Oxide (FeCr2O4)

Fission product behavior:

Stainless Steel

Photos Courtesy GPU, DOE, NRC and Sandia

Summary

Fukushima Daiichi Offers Unique Opportunity to Improve Severe Accident Simulation Capabilities
Final insights may not be obtained for many years Full understanding requires combination of:
Plant instrumentation data Operator interview information Separate effects tests with well-defined conditions Validation of models with test data A priori severe accident simulation to guide inspections, and Post-accident inspections, AND Updated simulations with enhanced severe accident tools.

Internationally-funded effort needed to reap safety benefits from Fukushima post-accident evaluations!!

Photos Courtesy: TEPCO