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use of force in fighting Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. Generally the chapter will endeavour to critically examine the counter-piracy efforts, especially the use of military intervention mechanisms. The aim is to assess the efficiency and success of counter-piracy efforts in the East African coast.
Background The East African Coast, which includes the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, has seen the largest share of global piracy attacks in recent years and the problem seems to be growing. In 2009, more than half the global piracy attacks were ascribed to Somali pirates with the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reporting the most significant escalation. In May 2009, IMB report indicated that pirate activity off the coast of Somalia jumped from a total of 111 incidents, including 42 hijackings during the twelve months of 2008, to 114 incidents with 29 hijackings during the first four months of 2009.1 Other areas of piracy risk include the Gulf of Guinea, the Malacca Straits and off Nigeria.
The recent wave of piracy began with seizures of vessels off the Somali coasts in 2002 and since then the pirates have been emboldened, targeting larger vessels including tankers on the high seas.2 Until recently, piracy was a phenomenon in decline, but attacks peaked at roughly 350 to 450 reported attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, and then dropped by almost half in 2005.
“Pirate attacks off Somalia already surpass 2008 figures.” International Chamber of Commerce; Commercial Crime Services, (2009). http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-somalia-alreadysurpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51, Accessed 7 February 2011.
Deccan Chronicle, ‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York, Friday, January 14, 2011 (http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2011/Jan/piracy_costs_world_economy_up_to_12_bn_a_year.aspx), Accessed on 7 February 2011.
Maritime piracy is a rather violent. The East African situation is unique in that almost all of the piracy involves kidnapping for ransom. compared to other areas like the Caribbean.3 Piracy is once again on the forefront of the international community’s attention. but of late it is progressively getting violent on either side. and a pirate leader was later quoted saying that 3 See Middleton. Maritime piracy is an organized operation because hijacking and ultimate commandeering a ship at sea without being detected requires considerable planning and some specialized expertise. as maritime trade is threatened and ransom payments to Somali pirates have risen to the millions of dollars. has been relatively less violent with captors seeking only ransom and sparing the crew. the first is robbery or hijacking. 2. Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade. Armed with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades.This reduction was attributed to effective and coordinated international action against the pirates. a US flagged ship. the patrol navies as well as the pirates themselves. Chatham House Africa Programme Briefing Paper No. which is transnational because a ship is considered the sovereign territory of the nation whose flag she flies. almost entirely. For instance on April 2011.S rescue operation of MV Maersk Alabama. three pirates were killed by snipers in the U. cargo vessels and luxury boats. The rescue operation triggered retaliatory use of violence by pirates as was the case when Somalia pirates attacked another US flagged ship MV Liberty Sun. feeding local wars. The term “piracy” encompasses two distinct sorts of offences. acquisitive crime. and the second is kidnapping. pirates in rickety skiffs have often carried out brazen hijackings. seizing massive oil tankers. where the vessel and crew are threatened until a ransom is paid. where the motive of the attack is to steal a maritime vessel or its cargo. Roger.3 2 . in 2008-2009. Niger Delta and East Asia. East African coast piracy.p. to the dramatic increase of such activities off the Coast of Somalia. 2008. piracy figures again sky-rocketed due. However.
6 4 Agence France Presse (AFP). 2009 Fox. Elleman. Prussia. 6 Bruce A. each of which dealt in some measure with the problem of Chinese pirates. China engaged in signing bilateral treaties with foreign nations to control piracy. which began in 1869. Andrew Forbes. 1832–1869. 1861. Rhode Island Newport Paper Thirty-five. ‘Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter. Grace. 1863. 1869. Denmark. Historically on its own initiative. was the greatest blow ever struck at piracy as it brought within legal restriction the haunts and stores of the robbers and the native dealers in marine supplies.’ April 14. However. 1865. and Austria-Hungary.:Hyperion. pp. and David Rosenberg (eds). the 1866 decree.4 This trend has subsequently necessitated the use of force to counter piracy. Piracy and Maritime Crime Historical and Modern Case Studies. 1863. but had sent a team with special equipment to destroy any ship flying the US flag in retaliation for the killing of their friends. By exposing merchants who bought pirate spoils. the registration of Chinese ships. amended in 1867 and re-stated in 1868. China negotiated agreements with six other Western nations.145– 82. Italy. Spain. Newport. 1973. January 2010 5 3 . between 1861 and 1869. Westport. Center for Naval Warfare Studies. and it proved an extremely effective deterrent. Conn. Belgium. 1864. the Netherlands. British Admirals and Chinese Pirates.they were not after the ransom. this is not the first time military intervention has been used to fight piracy. 1866. meant that vessels caught assisting pirates could be impounded and that piracy losses were spread to the other “members of the same shipping division in proportion to the degree of their responsibility. Meanwhile.”5 This mutual responsibility system exerted real social pressure within China to halt piracy.
For example. only Yemen and Kenya have at least rudimentary maritime patrol capabilities.cusnc. the coastlines alone of the greater Horn of Africa and Yemen totals 5. “Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean”. And warships from the navies of the United States. Spain. in the region in question. Germany.mil/articles/2009/089. US 5th Fleet. No. 4. (2009) “Combined Maritime Forces Works with International Navies to Counter Piracy. France.. 33. 491. 8 Brian W. Use of Military Force against East African Piracy A diverse and growing number of nations are now are now involved in joint efforts. July. the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1851 in December 2008. 4 . and others now participate as Combined Maritime Forces in patrols to disrupt and intercept pirates. Vol. Worse still. Hence three large coalitions of naval forces conduct counter-piracy patrols in the vast area. the EU’s NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atlanta). by monitoring and tracking their progress throughout their respective areas and coordinating military responses when necessary. trial and punishment as part of repression efforts “unprecedented in scope and authority for the international community to counter a threat in the maritime domain. 2009. Found at http://www.7On a similar note. NATO has established the NATO Shipping Centre to act as an information clearing house for news and information concerning pirates and best practices for merchants. This has necessitated the need for a multinational force to be deployed in a joint effort to fight piracy. mainly military. Accessed on 7 February 2011.International Intervention. and Commander. Combined Maritime Forces of NATO (Operation Ocean Shield). the resolution provided for the deployment of naval forces and the investigation. to reduce East African piracy.510 miles. p. China. The East African coast is very expansive. Strategic Analysis. authorizing states to take actions aimed at combating Somali based pirates. Naval Forces 7 Schaeffer N. Turkey.”8 The International Maritime Organization has established the a global network of Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centers to enhance the protection of merchant ships.navy..” Press Release.html.
helicopters. representing the first naval operation under the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).1-11:3 10 Ploch. Whereas Task Force 150 has responsibility for sea-borne counter-terrorism efforts in the Red Sea. et al. Rotberg. and naval vessels to these three task forces and to the NATO and EU efforts in 2009 and early 2010.000 miles east of Somalia.3 5 . the Gulf of Aden. Task Force 152.9 In August 2008. DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528. whose mission is the interdiction of terrorists and related materials. EU NAVFOR deployed up to twelve ships through December 2010 to: “Employ the necessary measures.S. Policy Brief #11. operates in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf from a base in Abu Dhabi. Task Force 151 is responsible for the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin and is the primary counter-piracy operation of the allied effort. ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’. In December 2008. 2009. and the Gulf of Oman. drones. The MSPA has been credited in part with lowering the success rate of Somalia pirates in the Gulf of Aden transit zone.16 11 Ibid. p. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Lauren. Task Force 151 ranges beyond the Gulf of Aden and well into the Indian Ocean in response to increased piratical attacks more than 1.10 Until 2008. World Peace Foundation. the Dutch-led task force CTF 150 and partner forces agreed to the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden to serve as a dedicated. prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be 9 Robert I.U. Since it has extensive geographical authority. p. January 26. dedicated manner.11 In support of Operation ATALANTA. more secure transit zone for merchant vessels. including the use of force. 2010:pp. Forty-five nations contributed service men and women. to deter. the international community did not respond to the threat of piracy in the waters off of Somalia in a coordinated.” Washington. the European Union launched EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA. Central Command in Bahrain. serving as Commander Maritime Force for Combined Task Forces (CTF) 151. fixed wing aircraft.
Operation Allied Protector.committed in the areas where they are present”. and numerous ladders. has improved arrangements for surveillance and information sharing among participating navies. p. http://www. naval patrols in the East African waters is credited for the relative reduction in the number of vessel capture. Lauren. the responses to piracy off the Horn of Africa include multinational naval patrols and the establishment of a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden. et al. 2009. DC: Congressional Research Service( CRS) Report R40528.eunavfor. 13 Ploch. Policy Brief #11.12 In addition to the United States and European Union. Also 12 EU NAVFOR. The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor protected by warships. In 2009. “European union naval operation against piracy”. Rotberg. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa. January 26. The combined operations also destroyed 42 pirate vessels.13 These combined. hundreds of small arms. grappling hooks. the option of escorted convoys.eu/about-us/mission/ (accessed 20 November 2009).” Washington. 2010: pp1-11:2 6 . defend against and disrupt pirate activities’ as they transit the region. According to NATO. in March 2009. nearly fifty rocketpropelled grenade launchers. and other assorted equipment. NATO launched its second anti-piracy mission. mobile phones.14 Generally. though not well coordinated. World Peace Foundation. Mission Statement. delivered 269 pirates for prosecution under prevailing legal interpretations to Kenya and other jurisdictions (of whom 46 were jailed). and killed 11 pirates. which is being carried out by Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1). the combined maritime operations of NATO and allied forces disrupted 411 pirate operations of the 706 encountered.17 14 Robert I. confiscated 14 boats. ‘Combating Maritime Piracy: A Policy Brief with Recommendations for Action’. GPS receivers. the forces participating in Operation Allied Protector will ‘deter.
hiiraan. 18 Donald R.16 It has been observed that despite all these measures. director of the London foreign-policy think tank Chatham House research project is quoted by press to have said that though piracy costs were increasing tremendously. at www.imo. ‘Somali Piracy costs world economy up to $12 bn a year’ New York. during 2008. January 14.org) 7 .series of IMO meetings with littoral states have promoted cooperation and developed a Code of Conduct among the countries covering matters such as the prosecution of offences.org/home. all manner of small ship or casual dhow can and do evade land-based and now sea. No. What is clear is that the current defences used by merchant shipping are not effective enough. 2011 (http://www. 129. Accessed on 7 Feb 2011.15 Limitations to Use of Force However. the challenge is that still.asp?topic_id=1178. “Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia”.17 To illustrate this.aspx). 16 Deccan Chronicle. and to a large extent in the Indian Ocean off the Kenyan and Somali coasts. and these attacks have continued into 2009.com/news2/2011/Jan/piracy_costs_world_economy_up_to_12_bn_a_year.crimesofwar. More than 60 ships were seized by pirates off the Somali coast. The number of vessels captured increased month on month throughout 2008. Crimes of War Project’s website. Maritime Piracy and International Law. principally in the Gulf of Aden. Accessed on 7 Feb 2011. February 24th 2009 (www. Anna Bowden. Rothwell. a gradual upsurge in pirate attacks occurred off the east African coast. 17 Liam Bellamy. Friday.and air-based surveillance efforts. with only two dozen patrol ships on station.gr). ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper. March 2009 (http://www.18 This indicates that the naval operations have several 15 IMO. what was more concerning is that all counter-piracy efforts are simply treating the symptoms and almost nothing is being done to treat the root cause.rieas. attacks in the waters off the East African coast especially the Horn of Africa continue. Accessed 7 Feb 2011.
p. the seas off the coast of Eastern Africa represent an attractive environment for pirates. An even cheaper option would be to use civilian aircraft under charter perhaps to the United Nations. but there are insufficient military patrol aircraft. constantly adapt and react. The most serious limitation. Disarmament Forum. 2000. but these do not provide a visible deterrent to pirates. with their sophisticated military equipment. there are the individual merchant ships. Audit Report no. Coastwatch: Australian Customs Service. Australian National Audit Office. 66. Comprehensive air surveillance is a basic requirement. Cheaper and less well-armed coast guard vessels and aircraft would be quite sufficient for the task.19 Finally. there are the pirates themselves. an assessment by this study reveals a number of different angles or levels from which the counter-piracy measures can be looked at. there are still slow and vulnerable vessels sailing in the area independently of the escorted convoys. Canberra. 2010 8 . 19 The Auditor-General. Most warships have restrictive rules of engagement and they lack the national legal authority to arrest pirates and bring them to trial. are in many ways too much resource for anti-piracy operations. however. modern warships and military aircraft. Then there are naval escorts with their associated weapons and aircraft. Then there are limitations imposed by the environment and by the nature of international law. for example. Maritime Security. The United States has deployed surveillance drones to the Seychelles. 38. Sea piracy: some inconvenient truths. 20 See Sam Bateman. who as a group. Finally. By their very nature.20 In a nutshell. However. is the lack of resources in terms of the number of ships and surveillance aircraft covering the piracy-prone waters. many merchant ships fail to take all appropriate precautions against attack. First.limitations.
bbc.S. pirate attacks continue. http://www.’” BBC (2009).org/thenews/newsdesk/LD681364.”23 Comparison of Case Studies on the Efficiency on the Use of Force 21 “FACTBOX-Somali pirates risk choking key world trade route.alertnet. The solution lies ashore. Accessed 7 Feb 2011. Accessed 7 Feb 2011. the closest naval vessel. and military supplies transit.20 23 “Piracy ‘cannot be solved at sea.22 As Rear Admiral Peter Hudson.uk/2/hi/africa/8115662. DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40528. the new commander of the European Union’s anti-piracy operations. 2009. natural resources. 22 Ploch. governments around the world are contributing to attempts to secure it. When the MV Maersk Alabama was attacked on April 8.” Reuters. For example. Lauren.S. 9 . as merchant ships move further out to sea. p. pirates increase their range via the use of larger more sea worthy mother-ships from which smaller raiding boats are launched. Found at http://news.htm. 2009. the area is simply too vast to prevent all incidents. Bainbridge was only able to arrive on the scene of an aborted 14 April 2009 attack on the MV Liberty Sun a reported 6 hours after the attack ended.co. the U. told the BBC in June 2009 “Illegal activity off the coast of Somalia is not necessarily something which will get solved at sea. Seaborne counter-piracy efforts are mired by the very size of the ocean and pirate tactics that adjust for defensive measures.(2008). has deterred some attacks.stm. For example. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.The Gulf of Aden represents a vital conduit through which vast quantities of finished goods. Bainbridge. et al. Similarly.21 Given this area’s importance to the global economy. was approximately 300 nautical miles away. Most defense analysts acknowledge that while the unprecedented level of naval patrols in the area.” Washington. Yet despite the fact that naval vessels from a host of countries now patrol some two million square miles of the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. conducted by more than fifteen nations. the U.S. 4% of the world’s daily oil production passes through the area as does 18% of the US and Europe’s combined yearly oil imports.S.
coordinating initiatives with other concerned littoral states and international organizations needs to be emphasized as much as possible. 2006. maritime terrorism and securing the Malacca Strait. This may be primarily due to the fact that East African coastal states are logistically and financially challenged with maritime enforcement only affecting the seaward side of the littoral. 29-30. 10 . and a better use of technology aimed at the detaining pirates at source rather than in the high seas. and Thailand. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. An example of local multilateral cooperation is the “Eye in the Sky” initiative inaugurated in 2005 among Malaysia. Indonesia. In spite of the efforts of the international community the number of pirate attacks in East Africa has increased. The idea ostensibly 24 Ong-Webb and Graham G. in the Strait of Malacca the affected littoral states are also able to exert control over the landward side of the littorals. pp. whereas those of the Malacca Strait have tremendously reduced.A comparison of strategies of anti-piracy measures in the East African coast and those of the relatively successful Malacca Strait show similarity in concept on use of force. In short the counter-piracy policy for the Malacca Strait is stronger enforcement. In whatever capacity initiatives to support or promote anti-piracy and related terrorism measures. has more regional cooperation. Singapore. On the other hand. Piracy. The East African counter-piracy efforts apparently need local multilateral cooperation. Further. The similarity is that both are involved increasing the amount of maritime patrol and enforcement. some states in the East African coastal region have weak internal structures aggravating piracy and lawlessness. Pasir Panjang. but a difference in tactics.24 Any landward efforts in Somalia for instance have provided no significant result. (eds). The difference is that in the Malacca Strait the patrols were performed by the three littoral states concerned and in the East African region the patrols have been performed by a coalition of warships from the international community..
Piracy.26 25 Chalk P. 2008). and Challenges for the United States (Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation. and the Challenge to International Law. 26 Mario S.aims at providing limited airborne surveillance over the Malacca Straits and builds off the earlier Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia (MASLINDO) accord. there must be a genuine link between the State and the ship. Virginia’ Journal of International Law.25 Legal Considerations Despite significant. ‘Somalia: State Failure. Therefore.. It is clear that the current legal regime is not comprehensive with respect to the enforcement of either international law or domestic criminal law against those responsible for pirate attacks. Vol. Under the initiative. The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism. considerable legal challenges remain.. unprecedented moves by the international community to address the growing threat posed by maritime piracy. and commit to flying two sorties a week over the Straits. 50:3 11 . The jurisdiction of a State over acts of piracy is based upon nationality or territoriality. or between the State and the waters on which the offences take place. The ability of a State with a ship in Somali waters to apply and enforce its own laws with respect to piracy and sea robbery will depend on whether the pirate ship or the pirates have the nationality of that State. Piracy. It will also depend on the extent to which the national law of the enforcing state makes piracy a universal crime which can be subject to arrest and prosecution anywhere throughout the world. the responsibility for enforcement will predominantly fall upon those members of the international community whose ships are currently patrolling off the coast of Somalia. for every seven days there will be at least 16 hours of continual coverage over the waterway. Thus unless Somali courts are willing and able to conduct prosecutions. That is. each participating country will make two planes available.
28 Other countries like Portugal. while UK and U. Canada and many others have boarded vessels with ample evidence of piratical attacks.3 Ibid Ibid 29 30 12 .29 France and Netherlands have by-passed Kenya’s Mombasa piracy court by trying pirates directly. or a more tangible Chapter VII mandate of UN continues to vex political leaders. 27 Hulbert M.30 Nevertheless.3 28 Ib Id. all States need to have the capacity under international law to prosecute persons who perpetrate acts of violence against foreign ships in all settings. 55.. but can only hold pirates until a judicial authority can formally arrest them. the question of whether this is ultimately a police mission. Centre for Security Studies (CSS). the Seychelles and other prospective countries that have facilitated the handing over of captured pirates for prosecution.. except within the internal waters of other States. ‘Making Waves: Piracy Floods the Horn of Africa’. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ETH Zurich No. due to domestic legal constraints. For instance French commandoes have used force to free hostages.27 This indecision is not only hampering deterrence. the reality is that. The EU has however. entered an agreement with Kenya. some states will be reluctant to seek to prosecute the offenders either because their legal regimes are inadequate or for political considerations. but also the prosecution of hijackers. p. June 2009. but then merely returned pirates to home shores rather than sealing prosecutions.S prefer to work through the Kenyan courts. as has occurred in Somalia. p. Counter-balanced against this however is that while states may be prepared to offer their military support to ensure the safety and security of shipping lanes.Although there is sufficient legal scope for robust anti-piracy measures.
As Ross et al says. despite the large international response in the fight against maritime piracy in the East African coast. There are significant obstacles to using international law to address the problem of Somali piracy. 50:3 13 . or prosecute pirates operating within its jurisdiction. Furthermore. Through this arrangement. most nations have been reluctant to take pirates into custody for prosecution in their own domestic courts. Vol. Although UN maritime law makes piracy on the high seas illegal throughout the world. this law has proven to be ineffective. detain. On January 16 the United States and United Kingdom signed agreements with Kenya allowing for the transfer of suspected pirates to Kenya for trial. There are also proposals to consider the creation of a specialist international criminal tribunal to deal with pirates.Some new initiatives are being explored to address these issues. as evidenced by the dramatic recent increase in piracy in the Horn of Africa. Piracy. “It seems involvement in piracy is 31 Mario S. ‘Somalia: State Failure. the US naval forces in the Gulf of Aden have on different occasions detained more than a dozen suspected pirates who have subsequently been arraigned in Kenyan courts for trial. These arrangements are designed to facilitate prompt detention and transfer of suspected pirates to the Kenyan criminal justice system. piracy attacks have still continued to plague the East African waters with the Horn of Africa being the epicenter. although the Security Council resolutions authorize the pursuit of pirates into Somali waters. and the Challenge to International Law. The Somali government lacks any means to investigate.31 Conclusion In conclusion.. Virginia’ Journal of International Law.
S. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa. social. where drought means agriculture is nothing more than subsistence farming.chathamhouse. et al. p. on 5 March 2009: “Ultimately. Shani. 2008 (http://www. “Somalia piracy: an escalating security dilemma. DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R40528.” Briefing paper. The improvement of security in the territorial and high seas of the coast of East Africa coast particularly Somalia is not enough. and political factors should be directly addressed in a strategy to combat piracy at the East African coast. and economic opportunity in Somalia.”35 The quote emphasizes the fact that the economic. as well as solidifying political progress by forming a unity government and advancing the peace process. piracy is a problem that starts ashore and requires an international solution ashore. feeding local wars.34 Vice Admiral William Gortney.. Chatham House. and Joshua Ben-David. “Piracy in Somalia--threatening global trade. and instability and violence make death a very real prospect. 32 Ross.”33 It is generally understood that in order to combat piracy in the East African Coast. Naval Forces Central Command. because it seems pirates weigh the risks of engaging in piracy and benefiting from massive rewards and non-engagement in countries “where legitimate business is difficult. 2009. October. 34 Ploch. much emphasis should be placed on the inland causes of piracy. org. is quoted from his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. U. a strategy that addresses the problems other than security is required: It is argued that a durable solution for ending piracy in the Horn of Africa will require improving security. stability.” Harvard Africa Policy Journal 5 (2008-2009): 55-70:58 33 Middleton R.” Washington.seemingly worth any perceived risks”32 Besides use of force. Commander. Lauren.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/665/ (accessed 18 November 2009). The anti-piracy plan should addresses the economic aspect.27 35 Ibid. 14 . We made this clear at the offset of our efforts. rule of law. We cannot guarantee safety in this vast region.
but the practice is spreading elsewhere too and hence it may as well prove to be a test case. united front. Whether Special Forces will be allowed to operate openly on dry land and use 'hot pursuit' and how International Law and Rules of Engagement should be applied are more of political than military decisions. but through a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a strong. 129. ship owners can only address the immediate problems thrown up by piracy. Navies can only do as much as their political masters will let them .gr). It is governments and IGO's that must make the final choice about the extent to which they wish to deal with piracy. ‘What Can Be Done To Counter Somali Piracy?’ Research Institute for European and American Studies (Rieas) Research Paper. Maritime security efforts in the Persian Gulf.rieas.term ability of international intervention to eliminate these threats is less certain in the absence of committed and capable regional and local actors.Furthermore. 36 Liam B. In conclusion. While short term results in containing other transnational threats have proven to be achievable. is Somalia might be the worse area for piracy. local partnership and significant coordination in order to be successful. the Caribbean. March 2009 (http://www. Basically. Military intervention and foreign assistance require political consensus. the waters of West Africa and the Strait of Malacca have had the same requirements. these are decisions that can only be taken by governments and Inter-governmental Organizations. political will.and that in itself may not be enough to do more than contain piracy to within tolerable levels.36 A broad guiding principle of the Strategy for Maritime Security in the East African coast is that success in securing the maritime domain will not come from a state acting alone. Accessed 7 February 2011. But what should be borne in mind. 15 . the long. legal provisions are another limitation to the extent to which use of force and international naval interventions can be applied. No..
This is why the next chapter will comprise of the case study which will be the impact of the Somalia situation on the fight against Piracy in the East Coast of Africa. 16 . in spite of significant international effort. anarchy.The view held is that the current strategic plan to combat piracy by use of force only is incomplete in that it does not acknowledge fully the factors contributing to piracy. demonstrates that the strategy is not effective. Issues of failed state. conflicts and terrorism will emerge in this proceeding chapter. The fact that the total number of attacks has increased. makes the strategy of vast international flotillas at sea combating piracy not conclusive and productive. in particular Somalia will not be easy. Central to this drawback is the Somalia country whose political fragility and extreme poverty for instance. Somalia is at the heart of the East African coast piracy. In the Horn of Africa. The problem of piracy in this region must be addressed both at sea and land.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?