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Lucid Words A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom by Candrakīrti Translated by J.D. Dunne & S.L. McClintock DRAFT TRANSLATION (8/22/01) Not for Citation

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© John D. Dunne and Sara L. McClintock All Rights Reserved

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Critique of Causation ............................................................................................................1 Critique of Motion ...............................................................................................................12 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties ...........................................................................................25 Analysis of the Aggregates ..................................................................................................27 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus).......................................................................................28 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous ...................................................................................29 Analysis of the Conditioned ................................................................................................30 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object.................................................................34 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action]................................................................35 Analysis of Fire and Fuel ................................................................................................36 Analysis of Beginning and End.......................................................................................38 Analysis of Suffering........................................................................................................40 Analysis of Saṃskāras......................................................................................................42 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga)...............................................................................43 Analysis of Svabhāva........................................................................................................45 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation ..............................................................................47 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect ....................................................................50 Analysis of the Self...........................................................................................................56 Analysis of Time...............................................................................................................78 Analysis of Collocation ....................................................................................................80 Analysis of Origination and Extinction .........................................................................82 Analysis of the Tathāgata................................................................................................85 Analysis of Error..............................................................................................................87 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths ...............................................................................89 Analysis of Nirvāṇa..........................................................................................................93 Analysis of the Twelve Links ..........................................................................................95 Analysis of View...............................................................................................................97

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Critique of Causation
Homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī! He has destroyed the indwelling in the dwelling of the twin extremes; he has won birth in the ocean of awakened wisdom.

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Out of compassion he spoke the deep meaning (bhāva) of the true dharma’s ocean in the way he had truly fathomed it. Even today his philosophical flames burn like wood the notions of those who espouse something else, as they burn too the mental darkness of the world.

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The flood of arrows that are the words from his peerless wisdom pierces the entire army of saṃsāra, bestowing on him glorious rule over the three dimensions of the world to be disciplined, along with the gods. To him, Nāgārjuna, I bow, and on his verses I will now write an exegesis, one that is bound with extended, properly composed statements; unshaken by sophistic winds, it is clear.

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In this regard, the treatise to be discussed is that one that begins, “Not from self, nor from other; not from both….” And first of all, one might ask, “What is its subject matter? What is the purpose? What is the relation [between the two]?” [We say] that, as in the explanation given in Guide to the Middle Way, Ārya Nāgārjuna first created the cause for the wisdom of a Tathāgata; that is, he produced the initial awakening mind, which is adorned with nondual wisdom and preceded by great compassion. Having practiced in such a way, Ārya Nāgārjuna, who had understood the correct interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom, compassionately composed a treatise so that others might understand. And this, [his composition of such a treatise in such a fashion], constitutes the relation [between purpose and subject matter] of the treatise: It controls (śāsti) all your enemies that are your afflictions, and it protects (saṃtrāyate) you from bad rebirth and saṃsāra. Since it controls (śāsanāt) and protects (trāṇāt), it is a treatise (śāstra). Those two [qualities] are absent in others’ thought. Moreover, the Master (ācārya) himself wished to demonstrate the entire subject of the treatise that he would speak, as well as its purpose. Demonstrating this, he wished to proclaim the Tathāgata’s greatness in terms of his correct elucidation of that [subject]. Thus, he wished to compose, as a motivation (nimitta) for engaging with the treatise, a stanza of homage to the Tathāgata, the highest guru, who is not excluded from having such a nature. Desiring to do so, he said: [Verse of homage]: I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers, who taught that interdependent origination involves no cessation, no production, no annihilation, no eternality, no plurality, no unity, no coming and no going; he taught that it is peace, the calming of conceptual structuring. Here, the treatise’s subject is interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) qualified by eight qualifications, beginning with noncessation. The treatises purpose is shown to be nirvāṇa,

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characterized as peace, the calming of all conceptual structuring. The homage is, I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers. Such, first of all, is the overall meaning of the two stanzas. Now, however, I will discuss the detailed meaning. 5 … {LVP55.11} At this point, some thinkers make the following objection. «You have had an indubitable cognition (niścaya) that “things are not arisen.” But does this indubitable cognition come from an instrument of knowledge or not? If it does come from an instrument of knowledge, then you should say which instruments of knowledge you have used. What, moreover, are their characteristics? What are their objects? Are those instruments of knowledge arisen from themselves, or from something else, or from both, or causelessly? If, on the other hand, you maintain that your indubitable cognition does not come from an instrument of knowledge, then that cannot be correct because [as Dignāga has said], knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge. This is so because, without instruments of knowledge, it is not possible to know an object that one has not yet known. Hence, if the object cannot be known because one lacks the instrument of knowledge for doing so, then how can your belief that things are not arisen truly be an indubitable cognition? Thus, it is not correct to say that all things are not produced. Or else the very reason due to which you think that things are not arisen is exactly the reason due to which I think that all things exist. And the way in which you indubitably know that all elemental things are not arisen will be exactly the way in which I indubitably know that they are arisen. On the other hand, if you do not have an indubitable cognition that things are not arisen, then it is pointless to compose your treatise, since you cannot make others understand what you yourself have not indubitably cognized. Therefore, all things have not been refuted.» In response we say the following. If we were to have some indubitable cognition, then it would come from an instrument of knowledge or not. But we don’t have an indubitable cognition. Allow me to explain why. In this regard, if a dubitable cognition were possible, then, in dependence on that, its opposite—an indubitable cognition—could occur. But if for is there not even a dubitable cognition, then how could there be an indubitable cognition that stands in opposition to it? [I ask this] because it would have to be independent of that to which it is related, like the shortness and longness of a donkey’s horns. Thus, there is no indubitable cognition, and if that is so, then we would conceptually fabricate instruments of knowledge in order to justify what? So, how many instruments of knowledge are there? What are their definitions and objects? Are they arisen be arisen from self, from something else, from both, or without causes? We do not need to state any of this. «If you do not have any indubitable cognition at all, then why do have we come across your statement that is in the form of something indubitably known (niścitarūpa), namely, “There are no things at all that have arisen from themselves, from something else, from both, or without cause.”» We respond that it is by the world that this phrase is indubitably known through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by the world, but such is not the case for the Noble Ones. «So the Noble Ones do not employ rational arguments?» Who has said that they do or they don’t? The ultimate is noble silence. Therefore, how in that case could conceptual fabrications such that there would be rational argument or the lack thereof? «If the Noble Ones do not give rational arguments, how then will they awaken the world to the utlimate?»

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The Noble Ones do not give rational arguments by means of worldly conventions. Rather, in order to awaken others, they provisionally accept (abhyupetya) those rational arguments that are commonly accepted from a worldly perspective. Having provisionally accepted those rational arguments, they then use them to awaken the world. For example, the body is impure, but lustful persons, being filled with confusion, do not see that this is the case; instead, they impute the image of beauty [onto the body in question]. Doing so, they become caught up in negative mental states. To remove those persons’ lust, a deity or an entity emanated by the transcendent one might say, “There are hairs on this body!” Saying this, they would reveal to those persons the faults of the body that had been hidden by their belief that it was beautiful. Thus freed from their belief in the body’s beauty, they would become free of lust. Such is also the case in regard to the present issue. That is, the Noble Ones do not perceive any essence in things whatsoever. Nevertheless, because their intellect’s eye is impaired by the cataracts of ignorance, ordinary persons impute a false essence onto things, and in some cases they also impute some particular quality. Through such imputations, they become even more caught up in negative mental states. Now the Noble Ones awaken them through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by them. For example, it is accepted that, in the case of producing a jar from clay and so on, one does not do so with a jar that already exists. Likewise, one should realize that there is no production of something that exists prior to its production precisely because that thing already exists. And to give another example, it is accepted that a sprout does not arise from things that are essentially different from it, such as flames and burning coal. Likewise, one should realize that a sprout does not even arise from those things that are intended [to be its causes], such as a seed. Someone might object: «This is our experience [i.e., that sprouts arise from seeds].» This is also incorrect because experience itself is false because it is experience, just like the case where a person with cataracts experiences two moons and so on. Thus, since [the truth of] experience is equally in need of proof, it is not reasonable to refute us by appealing to it. Therefore, [Nāgārjuna] said, “Things are not produced.” In this way, the first chapter was composed first of all to counteract the imputation of a false essence. Now, the remainder of the treatise is composed so as to refute some [additional] qualifications which are imputed in some cases. That is, the rest of the treatise is composed so as to demonstrate that every single qualification for dependent origination—such as being the agent of motion, the locus of motion, or the action of motion—does not exist. Someone might object: «The convention that governs an instrument of knowledge and its object is worldly (laukika), and this is what is explained by the treatise.» What would be the point in explaining that? «By stating distorted definitions, Sophists have destroyed (nāśita) the worldly convention concerning instruments of knowledge and objects. We have stated the correct definition of them.» This is also incorrect. If a distortion in the definiendum—namely, the world—resulted from the sophists’ statement of a distorted definition, then it would be useful to make an effort for the purpose [of refuting] that. But that is not the case. Moreover, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, [Nāgārjuna] pointed out a flaw in the section that begins, “if knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge, then what is it that determines those instruments of knowledge?” Since the opponent has not rebutted this criticism, it is not the case that they present a correct definition [of instruments of knowledge and their objects]. LVP59.7

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Therefore.” and so on. something other than itself. it is “peace. If the essence [of those things which are effects] does not exist [in their causes]. then there is no production from that which is essentially other [than the effect]. the self-essences of things do not exist in their conditions. this immediately preceding cessation of the cause is a condition for the production of the effect. [then the conditions are not] essentially “other” [because “other” requires “self” or “selfessence. Hence. sickness and death.3 The essence of any thing does not exist in its conditions and such [prior to its production]. hence. and post-production conditions [mentioned by certain Buddhist philosophers] are included in these four. mind and mental events do not function with regard to it. But it is not possible for any thing to exist prior to its production. For example. existed prior to its production in the aggregated. Therefore. and the controlling condition. 1. Suppose that some thing. [Before the effect arises. one can also say:] if the essence [of the effect] does not exist [at the time of the cause]. If that were the case. it is something coming into being. is completely stopped. “a primary cause brings about something. [In addition to this last sentence. And if there is no self-essence.Wisdom Page 4 5 … When āryas see that interdependent origination is the way things really exist. “production” would be meaningless [since the thing already exists]. Conditions such as a Creator God and so on are not possible. then it would be apprehended. it is devoid of all problems. he says “There is no fifth condition. moreover. 10 15 20 In accord with the definition. he says that it is the calming of conceptual structuring. or neither itself nor something other than itself.1 There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. and as such. Furthermore. 1.2 There are only four kinds of causal conditions: the primary cause. There is no fifth condition. such as the pre-production. simultaneous. it is something of which there is production. which are other [than the thing produced]. an effect. conceptual structuring defined as “the signified. then that thing would arise from those causal conditions. Other conditions.” which has been shown to be unreal]. [then] that latter thing is the controlling condition for the former. That being the case. the supporting condition.” “the signifier. or individually aggregated collection of the primary cause and other causal conditions.” Thus.” one thing is the primary cause of the is that support or basis by means of which a thing that is being produced is produced.” 1. If it were to so exist. then there is nothing that is essentially other (parabhāva) [than the effect such that it could serve as its cause]. both itself and something other than itself. The term “essentially other” can thus mean “production from another. the cause ceases]. “production from something other than itself” means production of things from these conditions. since all conceptual structuring about it ceases. all of which are other than that thing which they produce. These are the four causal conditions. the immediately preceding cessation of the seed is the condition for the production of the sprout. 25 30 35 40 . the preceding condition.” That does not exist. individual. A “thing” is something that has an essence. it is incorrect to say that things arise from that which is other than those things. such as birth. To rule out such conditions. [If] one thing comes into existence when another thing exists. and the convention of “knowing” and “thing known” does not occur with regard to it.

Wisdom Page 5 5 10 15 Or [one can read as follows]: things such as sprouts that are effects do not have an essence when their causes. the process of producing awareness. 20 25 30 If there were some process. Since there is no use for the word “other.” This is also wrong. But there is no process. then how can it exist without conditions? How.” It also makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has not yet been produced because. what do you need the process for? As I have said in Encountering Madhyamaka. one claims that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced. someone who claims that the effect is produced by a process thinks the following. on what does the “otherness” of the conditions depend? Two presently existing things. is itself the producer of awareness. as such. has not yet been produced. Otherwise. Now. as I have demonstrated in Encountering Madhyamaka. Why? In this case. Therefore. “There is no qualification without something that is qualified. That process produces the awareness. such as the people Maitreya and Upagupta.” Nor is it possible for there to be a process when something is being produced because there is no “being produced” without “already produced” and “not yet produced. “It makes no sense [to speak of] producing something that has already been produced.” [In other words. if the essence of the effect does not exist. “The conditions.e. It makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced because the process is what produces the thing [i... Now. [that is. something being produced is not produced. pot and so on do not cook the rice. “[this man]. or is being produced.” You cannot say. the son of a barren woman. for “there is no process without the conditions. This is like the process of cooking rice. the awareness]. can it be 35 40 ..16) Since the process of production is impossible in all three times [i. . Therefore.4 There is no process that has conditions. But such simultaneity is not the case for a seed and the sprout it produces. There is no process without conditions.” For. the essential otherness of the seed and so on does not exist. when claiming that there is a process. And so he says.e. such as seeds. He has thus refuted those who claim that the effect is produced by the conditions. which [is produced by the aforementioned] conditions.”] As has been said: Since a thing that is being produced is already produced. If the thing is already produced. “production without an agent [that is being produced] is not reasonable. then it would have as its conditions the eye and so on. present and future]. it does not exist. it would produce awareness. as I have said. past.” there is no production from that which is other than the effect. rather. exist without changing because one would have to conclude that [those effects] are uncaused.” If it does not exist as something that has conditions. The conditions are not the producers of the awareness. everything would be being produced. then there should be a process without the conditions.” Opponent: “If that’s the case. in other words. do not directly produce ocular awareness. the fire. nor are there conditions with a process. There are no conditions without the process. has cows. (CŚ15. such as the eye and the material form.” We respond: 1. Instead they are called ‘conditions’ because they establish the process of producing ocular awareness. it is not possible for something to be neither “already produced” nor “not yet produced. are “other” with respect to each other. the process that they create cooks the rice]. “there is no process that has conditions..

It is irrelevant because things such as consciousness are produced in dependence upon causal conditions.” If there is no process. how can the conditions be the producer without the process. “Nor are there conditions with the process. there is no production from a process. Why? 40 1.” In response. he says. The signifier “production” is therefore empty of meaning [or “devoid of an objective referent”]. are discussed in the same way that the process of producing awareness has been discussed. the author means that they are not conditions. then the conditions themselves must be the producer of the thing. conditions without a process are conditions devoid of a process. how then can there be a process that pertains to the conditions? One should know that other processes. The same concern thus pertains to that [other condition]. just as sand does not produce oil.” In response. and this idea is therefore incorrect. Opponent: “Then the conditions with the process are the producer. “awareness.” is not yet produced? [The question is rhetorical]. they are thus causeless conditions [one might translate this as: conditions that cause nothing].e. Opponent: “If that’s the case. such as a hyperprocess.. But that other condition is a condition for that [thing which is not yet a condition to become a condition only] if [that thing which is not yet a condition] is [already] a condition.6. But why are they not non-conditions as long as [the effect] is not produced? 25 30 35 If the eye and so forth are called “conditions” because awareness is produced in dependence on them. he says. Concerning this line. why then are the eye and so on not non-conditions as long as the effect.6. the eyes and so on are thought to be the conditions for awareness.” This is also incorrect. “nor”] means that the possibilities are exhausted. but they become conditions in dependence on some other condition. At this juncture someone else objects. Therefore. He expresses this by saying: 1. “Before [the effect arises] they are not conditions. “Your analysis of the [theories concerning the existence of] the conditions with the process. Therefore.1 A condition for either an already existent thing or a not yet existent thing does not make sense.Wisdom Page 6 5 10 15 20 causeless? One cannot claim that a cloth is made from vīraṇa roots just because it makes no sense for it to be made from threads.” The negation [implicit in the word “nor”] is applied [from the previous line] by context. one might think.” This does not make sense. but are they considered to be conditions for something that is already existent or for something that is not yet existent? Neither option makes sense. “There are no conditions without the process. Hence. for: 1. such as the eye. and awareness and so on are produced by those conditions. the eye and so on are causal conditions. is irrelevant for us. [The effect] does not come from things that are not the conditions. and so on. it has already been stated that the process does not exist. In response. Furthermore. the process does not produce the thing. Another condition is thought to be the condition for that thing which is not yet a condition.5 It is alleged that these are conditions because [the effect] is produced in dependence upon them.2 A condition for something already existent is a condition for what? And what would be the purpose of a condition for something that already exists? . The disjunction [i.

At this point someone objects. being the generator. such as the mind and so on.” is incorrect. He has thus far pointed out that the conditions as a group are not conditions because they are incapable of producing the effect. nor a nonexistent thing. the primary cause also does not exist. then what is the use of thinking that it is related to some support? Hence. nor a thing that is both existent and non-existent is produced. how can it be correct to say that the primary cause is a producer? 20 25 Here. would produce it. 30 35 40 . if the thing is unsupported. “producer” means “generator. Concerning these possibilities. “Although the conditions are [allegedly] impossible the conditions are established to exist because their definitions are stated. Concerning these possibilities. Since there is no production of the effect. This being the case. such as material form. but. Now he shows that the individual conditions are not conditions. the above statement. But it is not produced because there is no thing to be produced that is existent. in order to refute the supporting condition. you say that it has a support. meaning something that is not now existing? One might object that it should be called [a condition] because the effect will come into being. and the thing is already existent before the support. For something is thought to be a support in order for the thing to be produced. “What are the supported things? Mind and all mental functions. In addition. then the primary cause. Now. or both.” The supporting condition of mind and mental functions is that suitable support.8 [You] teach that an existent thing that has no support [is supported]. how can there be a support? In the scriptures it says. by means of which mind and mental functions or produced. has no support. meaning a currently existing thing. an existing thing. the future existence of the [effect] does not presently exist [and is thereby insufficient reason to call something a ‘condition’]. “The primary cause exists because it is possible to give a definition. he says: 1.” is appropriate] because [the effect] will come into existence. any relationship between a support and the thing. however.7 Neither an existent thing. an existent thing is not produced because it already exists currently.meaning something that is presently existing. it is pointless to think of something as a condition for something that exists -. For example. [“condition. A thing that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no unitary thing that has mutually contradictory [properties] and because all the above stated problems with the first two possibilities would apply.” In response he says that the primary cause would exist if it had a definition. just as it makes no sense to describe the son of a barren woman. But I have explained the problem with this position in Encountering Madhyamaka: You assert that the appellation. but lacking the capacity [to causally impinge on things in the present]. 1. due to your own expectations. Or. non-existent. A non-existent thing is not produced because it does not presently exist. that being the case.” If some thing to be produced were produced. There is not. But since.’ And it makes no sense to state a definition for something that is not presently existing. [Form and so on] are thought to be the supporting condition either for mind and mental functions that currently exist or that do not currently exist. the primary cause. if the thing is established to exist by itself. a supporting condition for something that already currently exists is meaningless. is defined as follows: ‘a primary cause is a producer.Wisdom Page 7 5 10 15 How can there be a condition for something that does not exist.

does not now currently exist—then how much more so should the support [be considered non-existent]? The idea is that the support is non-existent because the supported thing is non-existent. the cessation of the cause has not yet occurred. Production has already been refuted with the third verse. something other than itself….” 40 In this context..9 Cessation does not make sense for things that have never arisen. “When this exists. The meaning is as follows. what would be the condition?” On this reading. therefore. if the thing. the other thing exists. something that does not currently exist has no connection to a support. such as a seed.” Moreover. then how can there be something defined as a cause with the phrase. what would be the preceding condition for the sprout? One might claim that the seed has ceased even though the effect has not yet arisen. Hence. this latter phrase would be interpreted as above.” The words “you” and “supported” should be supplied. he says. This also makes no sense because it just has no support. The word “how” indicates the reason.” By doing this.. “If it has ceased. what would be the condition for the cessation of the seed? Both would have to be causeless. one gets the following reading: “And if it has ceased.” How can there be something defined as the effect with the .” And if all things lack an essence because they are all interdependently produced. therefore. being non-existent. if that were the case. he says: 1. Now. the preceding condition does not make sense. “When this exists. have not yet arisen. in order to refute the preceding condition. such as the sprout. what is the condition? The preceding condition is therefore incorrect.” With this in mind. how can there be a support?” The word “if” indicates a question. cessation is not reasonable. When the sprout and so on have not yet arisen. It is not reasonable for the cause. “and if. what would be the condition?” The word “and” refers back to “not yet arisen. The preceding condition is defined as the immediately preceding cessation of the cause. not ultimate reality.” He stated the verse the other way for the sake of composition.10 Since things without essence have no existence (sattā). the preceding condition makes no sense. then when the seed has ceased—which means that the seed is non-existent—what is the condition for the sprout? Moreover. that exists. then both would have to be causeless. “If the thing is unsupported. “You teach that a thing that has no support is supported. and that cessation is a condition for the production of the effect. How then can mind and mental functions have supports? There is no problem if one says that the definition [of a support] is given in terms of conventional reality. “There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. If the thing is unsupported—that is.” Or one can give the following interpretation.Wisdom Page 8 5 10 On the other hand. And if it had ceased. to have ceased when the things that are effects. it means the following: “If one claims that there is the cessation of the seed and so on when the sprout has not yet arisen. “If it were ceased. one might think of something as a support for a thing that does not currently exist. “If things are not [ever] produced. nor any other [condition]. what would be the condition? 15 20 25 30 35 In the second half of this verse one should note that the word order is inverted. the preceding [condition] is not capable of being what has ceased. in order to refute the controlling condition. That is to say. The word “and” is out of order and should be read. it is not correct to say. Now. he says. therefore.” Hence. a controlling condition is defined as follows: “One thing is the controlling condition for another in that when the one thing exists. So. I analyze this in the following manner. he says: 1. Therefore. the verse says.

But they have or partake of the essence of their atoms.” 1. the conditions have the essence of things that are not the conditions]. which comes from threads that themselves do not have their own essence. since there are many causes. There would thereby be a cloth if the threads were established by virtue of their own essence. such as the threads. the conditions do not essentially exist. [In other words.” In response. “If the effect were one thing and the causal conditions something else. 1. then [one’s position] is not correct. It is not correct because the conditions also do not have the essence of being themselves. Therefore. [therefore]. loom. “Having perceived that things such as cloths come from things such as threads. You say that the cloth has the essence of the threads. they too must have the essence of their causes]. then one could have the qualm. So how can an effect. how can that which does not exist in the conditions come from the conditions? The cloth does not exist in the individual conditions. which means that it is a permutation of the conditions. does not intrinsically [svarūpataḥ] exist. “that exists. Here someone objects. as effects. since the effect does not exist. there is no intrinsic production of the effect. In other words. At this point someone says. such as the threads. namely the cloth. it partakes of the essence of the threads. The cloth also does not exist in the conglomerated conditions. such as a cloth. one does not prove by reason of the definition that there is a controlling condition. they are simply a permutation of their atoms. the cloth does not have its own essence. How can an effect that comes from conditions which are not in essence themselves have the essence of the conditions? 30 35 40 If one asserts that the effect has the essence of the conditions. he says: 1. either individually or conglomerated.” Therefore. spreader. ‘Does the effect exist in the conditions or not?’ But there is no effect separate from the conditions. instead.13 “The effect has the essence of the conditions. we say that the production of an effect.” But the conditions do not have the essence of being themselves.11 The effect of the [conditions] does not exist in the conditions. how then can one prove that the conditions are conditions? To establish the way in which there is no production of an effect such as a cloth. Someone might think. because it does not exist in any of them individually and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that the effect would arise piecemeal. [in other words. In short. such as vīraṇa grass? Thus. the threads are not established by virtue of their own essence [because. because it is not perceived there and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that there would be many effects. so why should a cloth not arise from things that are not its causal conditions.Wisdom Page 9 5 phrase. instead. shuttle and peg. one says that the threads and so on are the causal conditions for things such as cloths. the cloth is essentially the threads]. which means that they have the essence of [their own causes] which are not the conditions. the effect has the same essence as the conditions. have the essence of the threads? As it says in the Śūnyatāsaptati [Seventy Verses on Emptiness]: “The cloth is established .12 “What if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist [in them]?” Why then would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions? 10 15 20 25 The effect also does not exist in things that are not its causal conditions.

they are unaware. [there is no effect] that has the essence of the conditions. the cause is established through some other cause.14. firm and stable.Wisdom Page 10 through its cause. It also says: Introducing hundreds of beings to this [reality]. Therefore. That which does not essentially exist anywhere will never have something else as its cause.1 Therefore. nor do they arise. All things are unmoving. but these are not its conditions. there is no production of things by virtue of their own essence. trouble-free and peaceful. That which does not have any essence at all is not obtained by anyone through the 10 15 20 35 . The Victor taught that reality is this way. 5 “There is no effect” is supplied from below. namely a cloth or a mat.2 There is no effect that has the essence of something other than the conditions. the leonine human.14. taught that a thing is that which is not produced.14. “these are its conditions. the effect does not exist. As it says in the āryaratnākārasūtra [“The Holy Sūtra of the Jeweled Source”]: For one who knows emptiness. But there is a definite rule for establishing what is and is not a condition.” In response.” But when analyzed. for if there were an effect. 25 Something of which the essence is never reached has no essence. ‘if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist in them. just like the path of a bird in the sky. If there is no cloth that has the essence of the threads. 30 Things can never be shaken. They do not cease. like the paths of the sky. how can other things be its conditions? What essenceless thing would the other thing produce? The Buddha taught this reasoning. we say that there would be an effect if there were things that are conditions and things that are not conditions. like an unshakable stony mountain. how can something which is not established through itself produce something else?” 1.” Therefore. how can there be conditions and non-conditions? [In the original Sanskrit] the compound conditions/non-conditions means “conditions and nonconditions. would not be conditions if there were no effect. such as threads or vīraṇa grass. then one could say. the effect also exists. how can there be a cloth that has the essence of vīraṇa grass? Now someone says. Suppose then that effect has the essence of something other than the conditions? 1. no thing exists anywhere. then why would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions?’ The conditions. they are unchanging. he says: 1. “Very well. does not cease and does not age. The unknowing world is confused about this. You yourself say.3 Since there is no effect. Hence. the Buddha. there is no effect. does not arise.

“Free.” 5 . nor externally. the Lord introduces [the world] to this. The Sugata said that this state is peaceful. liberated from states.Wisdom Page 11 essence of something else. thinking. there you will live. and no state whatsoever is obtained. I will free many beings. Nor is it obtained internally.

how can it be a spot where one has not yet walked? Furthermore. Quite possibly he is thinking of the practice of walking meditation along a caṅkrama. it is nearly impossible to arrive at a clear and readable English translation of this chapter if one translates all forms of √gam as “to go” or even as “to move. “to go”) and “to know. “One is walking where one just walked. But in isolation from the walked upon spot and the not yet walked upon spot.” The phrase “where one has LVP93. and the spot that he has not yet traversed is for him a not yet walked upon spot. «By negating production. Second.” It is incoherent to speak of “where one just walked”—meaning the place where the action of motion has just ceased—with the phrase “one is now walking. So too. namely. we do not see any third spot that would be “the currently 1 20 25 30 The phrase. That which is now affected by the action of walking is expressed by. since the future and the present are completely distinct. someone says.1 At this point. Throughout this chapter. the currently walked upon spot is thus not being walked upon.” Our motivation for doing so is twofold. Nevertheless.” This is in part due to the complicated nature of the argument. one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. But none of this makes sense. one is also not walking where one has not yet walked. you must state an additional argument to refute the action (kriyā) that is going to and fro (gamanāgamana). Candrakīrti will at various points pun on the dual meaning of the Sanskrit verb √gam. “one is now walking. then one would necessarily conceive of walking in relation to the spot on the path where one has just walked. “one is not now walking where one has not yet walked. in order to prove that interdependent origination has neither coming nor going.” If one has not yet walked upon it. there is no action of walking on the currently walked upon spot because “without the spots where one has already walked and where one has not yet walked.» In response. you have established that interdependent origination has the quality of not being ceased and so on. it is not the case that one is now walking where one just walked. the spot that the walker has traversed is for him a walked upon spot.” is added here because we will be interpreting the verb “to go” (√gam) as “to walk.1.” which expresses a connection with a presently existing action of walking. “One is now walking where one has not yet walked. the currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known. Therefore. First. The phrase “one is now walking” expresses a present action of motion. it is incorrect to say. Hence. “which is exemplified by walking. for the sake of clarity and simplicity. or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one has not yet walked. how can one be now walking on it? And if one is walking on it. 0000). which is commonly accepted in the world.2 Here. First of all. the forms of √gam have been translated as “walking. So he says: 15 2. it is clear that Candrakīrti understands the action of “going” (gamana) here to be best exemplified by the action of walking.” 2 . or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one is currently walking. which is based upon the peculiarities of Sanskrit grammar (see the introduction.” etc. a short walkway dedicated to that purpose. “where one just walked” expresses that part of the path on which the action of walking has just ceased.1 were to exist.1 not yet walked” expresses a part of the road where a future action of motion has not yet occurred. it does not make sense to say. exemplified by the action of walking. and so as to reflect Candrakīrti’s interpretation. Therefore.” The phrase “first of all” indicates the order in which the various possibilities are negated. “to walk” (or literally. and without the spots where one already walked and where one has not yet walked.2 Critique of Walking 5 10 LVP92. we say that if going (gamana).” In this context.

2. na gamyate (i. one instance of the word gati means “knowledge”.2.1 states that the action of walking occurs only in the spot where there is the physical movement of the moving walker. since one has no knowledge of it. nor can it occur where one has not yet walked. Hence. Therefore. there is also is no action of walking even in the currently walked upon spot. there is knowledge (gati) of the currently walked upon spot. See above (5).e. In this verse. “is not being walked upon”) is taken to mean “is not known. if someone says that the currently walked upon spot is the spot that one has halfway walked upon. there is no currently walked upon spot without being either a spot already walked upon or one not yet walked upon. «One is indeed walking on the currently walked upon spot. so should one analyze the atomic particles in terms of the relation between their front and back parts. that spot is not affected by the activity of motion. “physical movement” refers to the raising and lowering of the feet. the currently walked upon spot is known. “there is knowledge of the currently walked upon spot. Hence. and that spot is affected by the action of walking. which is known! This is so because 2. relative to that atom. the other means “motion toward another area.»4 LVP In this verse.” .3 Therefore it is established. The translation of the last phrase follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation. which he cited in his commentary on MMK1.Wisdom Page 13 5 10 15 walked upon spot. He gives the reason: 2. There is no physical movement where one already walked or where one has not yet walked.3.” Here. someone objects. It is not possible for one’s physical movement to be occurring at the spot where one has already walked. Moreover. but the spot in front of an atom located at the back of the heel is included in the spot not yet walked upon.” Even if one thinks that the above is the case.3. then one uses the answer that has been given in the analysis of production. How could it make sense for there to be the action of walking at the currently walked upon spot.” And since that is the case.1. The objector94. Therefore. there is no currently walked upon spot. «There is a spot that is tread upon by the feet of the walking walker. Thus. the author says: 20 25 30 35 2. according to the objector. if “the currently walked upon” is unintelligible without the action of walking? 3 4 Candrakīrti is referring to CŚ15. Therefore.” At this point. it is not currently walked upon. “one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. that is. “The currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known. The area behind an atom located on the tip of the toe is included in the spot already walked upon.16. That is the currently walked upon spot!» This is not the case because the mover’s feet are a conglomeration of atomic particles.” That is. And just as one analyzed the feet.. but it could be rendered: “the action of walking is at the currently walked upon spot. Therefore. But someone might say. the currently walked upon spot is still not walked upon or known.4. Feet cannot exist without the atomic particles of which feet are composed. relative to that atom. the currently walked upon spot is where on observes the action of walking. There is walking (gati) where there is physical movement. and there is physical movement in the currently walked upon spot.” Therefore.

If it were to act as a warrant for that as well.1 the action of walking. it is already acting as a warrant for that term. see the introduction (0000).1 walked upon.” Hence. That is. however. that spot on the path gains the designation. In any case. One might. the action of walking) serves as a warrant for both the patient (gamyamāna) and the verb (gamyate). “is being walked upon. it follows that the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking.4. it follows that there is the “currently walked upon” even in the absence of the action of walking. part of the argument here is that there is an exclusive relation between the action and what it warrants. one cannot say.Wisdom Page 14 5 10 Here. This would be so because for him “the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon. the particle hi means “because.” even though that which is so designated is devoid of the action of walking.” For that theorist.” This so because the action is linked to “is being walked upon. then it follows that there are two actions of walking. then the meaning of the statement. “is being walked upon” is not intelligible without LVP95. This would be so because the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.” If this were the case. 15 20 25 A theorist might hold.” In the verse. It is absent because one action of walking is connected with “the currently walked upon. The second is the walking that has that currently walked upon spot as its locus. “walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. however. If walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. the “currently walked upon” would be devoid of the action of walking.”6 One might. one cannot given an adequate account of how the sentence could mean what it appears to mean. “currently LVP96.” Such are the two actions of walking that ensue when walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. claim that the action of walking is related only to “is being walked upon. inasmuch as the same entity (namely. the meaning of the sentence would again be incomplete. One can only say “the currently walked upon.” he means that it “is being walked upon. One is the walking in relation to which that spot is “currently walked upon.” That is one of the actions of walking. by virtue of this second action of walking. . and yet it “is being walked upon. “the currently walked upon spot is being 5 walked upon” is incomplete. then there must be two activities of motion. Nāgārjuna says: 2.” Even so. If one accepts that walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. The idea here is that. if one presupposes that the various grammatical and referential relations entail absolute connection. however. then the verbal action would have no relation to the term. that spot on the path “is being walked upon. For someone who holds such a position. “is walked upon” (gamyate). that verbal action cannot also act as a warrant for the verbal phrase.” That theorist maintains that the action of walking is the basis for the designation “currently walked upon. claim that the action is connected to both “currently walked upon” and “is being walked upon.5. if the phrase. 5 6 That is.” Hence. then on the opponent’s realist approach to semantics. when he says.” and there is no second action of going.” Since there is no second action of walking. 2. “the currently walked upon.” And “without the action of walking” (vigamana) means that the action of walking is absent. The grammatical issue here is that the action of walking (gamikriyā) is at least part of the warrant (pravṛttinimitta) for the term “the currently walked upon spot”(gamyamāna). For more on this issue. Clearly. then it would follow that there would be a currently walked upon spot even in the absence of the action of walking. “the currently walked upon. Since. 30 Through its relation to an action of walking. the sentence “the currently walked upon spot is walked upon” does not have a clear meaning. the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking.” and the other is that which is the “walking” there.

«Walking does exist because the one possessed of walking7 is called such due to the walking. but as is demonstrated by the statement. let there be two actions of walking? What’s wrong with that?» There is a problem. «Suppose that John Doe. Therefore. how can there be the walker. walking does not exist when the walker is negated—that is.» This is not so. the walker is related to walking. And the action of walking. In this way. it is not intelligible to say. when the walker’s existence is denied. two actions might pertain to a single agent.7. is speaking and also seeing something. Even so. «That may be so. If it follows that there are two actions of walking. Hence. «But there is just one substance [that is John Doe].1 observed that a single person acts simultaneously as the contributing factor for two similar actions. 5 Why must there be two walkers? Nāgārjuna says. Moreover. the substance does not do so.Wisdom Page 15 «Very well. Therefore. someone objects. How so? Nāgārjuna says: 2. Therefore. because in the absence of the walker. and it differs when the action differs. the action of walking makes no sense. there are not two actions of walking. This would be the case if there were a walker who served as the locus of walking. since there are not two agents. someone responds.1. often called the “relation of the container to the contained” (ādhārādheyasambandha) is one typical strategy employed by South Asian realists to overcome the . being located in the agent.2.” walking is still observed in relation to John Doe as the walker. “The currently walked upon spot is being walked upon. the substance is not a contributing factor for the action. and as such. then. for whom there would be no warrant. such as a particular. standing still. and as a result of being so 7 10 15 20 25 30 35 The term “possessed of” translates the possessive suffix –vat. In this case. it is observed that a single agent is involved in multiple actions. depends upon the agent. Here. But there is no such walker. two actions of walking do not pertain to one walker. walking does not exist.» We respond as follows. the capacity is. If that is the case. John Doe is not a “speaker” by virtue of his action of standing still. if there is no walking. Therefore. “John Doe is walking. This suffix is often used in connection with a particular theory concerning the relationship between a distributed entity such as a universal and the entity.» Let us suppose that this is the case. in which that distributed entity is instantiated (see Dunne 2004a). 2. it would be nonexistent. how can there be the walker if there is no walking? We have said that without a walker. the capacities that are the means for accomplishing those actions must also be different. instead.” Someone might try a different approach saying. the walker—exists. since 2. there is no second agent.6. walking would have no locus. At this point. The capacity (śakti) is what serves as a contributing factor (kāraka) for the occurrence of the action. And due to the difference in the actions in question. then it also follows that there must be two walkers. it has not been LVP97. An action necessarily depends upon its own means of accomplishment (sādhana). This relationship. And therefore. In that case. walking does indeed exist because the locus of walking—namely. But when there is only one agent such as John Doe who is walking. If walking makes no sense when the walker is negated. whether that be a patient (karma) or an agent.6.

just the walker is walking.” then he is not a non-walker. if he “is walking.”» This is not so. someone objects. it is not possible to speak of the “walker. for warranting the expression. Therefore. “is walking. The non-walker also is not walking. first of all. a non-walker also is not walking. is not walking. This is so because there is no second action of walking. This is like the case where.” to him.8. If walking did not exist. But. the word “walker” is used to mean “is walking. without walking. the walker. and due to the presence of that action one uses the expression. there is the phrase. Nevertheless.» This is not so. “walker.” In this phrase. and what other. On the other hand.” to him. «One who is neither “is walking. as one who is a non-walker. Therefore. and the way that LVP98. LVP99. “The walker walks.1 That theorist asserts that walking pertains to the walker. “staff-bearer.Wisdom Page 16 5 related.” However.” So let us grant that one can say.9.” there is only one action of walking. Hence.” Nāgārjuna says. one cannot apply the expression.» We answer as follows. one would not use the expression.10. in someone has no staff. One who holds that “the walker walks” must conclude that there is a walker without the action of walking. cannot be the “walker. since there is no second action of walking. There would be walking if “is walking” were indeed an [intelligible] expression.” problems of identity and difference that plague such relations. 10 15 20 25 30 35 . Why? Because: 2.” there is no second action of walking. 2. and for him the expression “walker” is related to the walking. for him “the walker is walking” without walking. At this point. it is not correct to say. How is it intelligible to say. “there is a walker without the action of walking. and the phrase “is walking” is employed for that which has a relation to the action of walking. A theorist might hold that there is a “walker” because he is connected to the action of walking. third [agent] which is neither walker nor non-walker is walking? The walker is so-called because he is walking. how is it that he “is walking?” Or. «The non-walker is not walking.1 he is not walking will be shown by the next three stanzas. 2. he is walking. and here is why: what third agent—one who is neither a walker nor a non-walker— is there such that you think that he “is walking?” Therefore. one could not apply the expression.” Nevertheless. “The walker is walking. since he claims that the action of walking pertains to the walker.” That being the case. who is not walking. Instead.” if the walker is unintelligible in the absence of walking? In the statement. But that is not the case. the walker might be qualified by the action of walking because he is related to that action. The walker. a non-walker is devoid of the action of walking. “is walking. it is not reasonable to say. he is not walking. then in the case of some John Doe who is possessed of walking. Indeed. Therefore. “the walker is walking. there is no walking. “is walking. first of all.” so it is not reasonable. nor is the one who is neither.” In the verse. “the walker is walking. “is walking.

” That is one action of walking. one would be forced to conclude that there are two actions of walking.13.e. Nāgārjuna says.” Someone might say. one must conclude that there are two activities of walking: one is the walking through which someone is characterized as the “walker”. one would have to begin it either on a spot where one has just walked. the other is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking. or on a spot where one has not yet walked.” does exist! Therefore. One does not begin things that do not exist. the expression. Hence. nor is there a spot where he has just walked such that either 5 10 15 20 30 35 . he says: 2. [on the opponent’s theory.. “John Doe is walking. the action of walking exists.Wisdom Page 17 One might then claim that the action of walking is related to both “walker” and “is walking. or on a spot where one is currently walking. someone is characterized or called the “walker. there is no currently walked upon spot. the walker walks. one does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked because the action of motion has ceased on a spot where one has just walked. on the other hand.11. that from this it follows that there should be two walkers. If walking were to begin on that spot. namely. Prior to the beginning of walking. And how could there be walking where one has not yet walked? 40 When John Doe is standing still. If. Walking also does not begin on a spot where one has not yet walked because the present and the future are mutually exclusive. John Doe eliminates the state of standing still and begins to walk.1 made from tortoise hairs.” Even so. And before he begins to walk. and one would be forced to conclude that there are two agents of walking. he is walking? Or as a non-walker? Or as something distinct from both a walker and a non-walker? None of these possibilities make sense. nor is there a spot where one just walked such that either of them could be the spot where one begins walking.] there is no expression.» This is not the case because the following qualm is focused on John Doe: is it that.” In this way two activities of walking absurdly follow from the opponent’s position. i. nor on a spot where one has not yet walked. it would not be a spot where one just walked. Concerning these possibilities. One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked. “is walking. someone objects. he is not beginning to walk. «Even so.” Due to a connection with the action of walking. In this way. hence. such as a robe LVP100.12. there is no spot where he is currently walking. Therefore. then since the past and the present are mutually exclusive. The other is the action of walking that the walker is doing. it is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking. so where does one begin to walk? 25 If walking had a beginning. one also does not begin to walk on the currently walked upon spot. «Walking exists because its beginning exists. But: 2. At this point. one should state a critique along previously mentioned lines. 2. Nor does one begin walking on the currently walked upon spot for three reasons: that spot does not exist.” We respond that walking would indeed exist if it had a beginning. one does not observe anywhere a beginning to the action of walking. “So where does one begin to walk?” To demonstrate the way that walking is not possible. as a walker. So much for that objection.

2.15. First of all. So too. However. LVP102. The non-walker also does not stand still because he is already standing still. which literally means “standing” as in “standing still. as is the case with light and darkness. the walker does not stand still. And if something has an opposite. But how can one conceive of a walker. And if walking were nonexistent. does one think that some spot is already walked upon? Does one think that some spot is currently walked upon? Does one think that some spot is not yet walked upon? If no beginning of walking is found at all. Nāgārjuna asks. sthāna will at points also mean to “stop. and what third kind of agent—someone who is neither the walker nor the non-walker—is there that is stands still? 35 The next stanza will explain how it is that the walker does not stand still. it would not make sense for them to exist. walking begins there. Walking would indeed exist if they existed.1 Someone might claim. «Walking does exist because its opposite exists. the not yet walked upon spot would be where the action had not yet occurred. then why would one falsely think of those three spots? And how could the action of walking be the warrant for those three expressions? It would make no sense. «Although. which is to say that it is a spot where the activity of walking has yet to begin. Therefore. in the argument that follows.”8 In response we say that walking would indeed exist if its opposite. one would also be forced to accept that there are two agents of that action.1 20 25 30 2.” 8 . far and near.14. then due to one action of standing still he would be a “non-walker. a non-walker. prior to the beginning of walking. It is incoherent to say that walking begins at that spot.” However.» We respond by asking. the non-walker does not stand still. and doubt and certainty. Why would he need another action of standing still? If he did.” existed. if there is no beginning to the action of walking. or something else as “standing still. those spots nevertheless do exist. then. If the action of walking is not discovered at all. the not yet walked upon spot.” This does not make any sense at all. This is so because one would think that the walked upon spot was the spot where the action of walking ceased. there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the just walked upon spot.Wisdom Page 18 5 10 15 spot is where he begins walking. since there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the spot where he just walked.” Since one would have to conclude that there were thus two actions of standing still. given that it had already begun. The opposite of walking exists—it is “standing still. “standing still. How can there be walking where one has not yet walked? The spot where one has not yet walked is a spot where one’s activity of walking has not yet occurred. LVP101. Hence. The The term here is sthāna. then it exists. “How could there be walking where one has not yet walked?” «Even though there is no beginning to walking on either the walked upon spot. the start of walking is not at either either of those spots. there is the spot where one has not yet walked. or the currently walked upon spot. Now someone objects.” and due to the other one would say that he “stands still.» We respond as follows. And the currently walked upon spot would be where that action was currently occurring.

. someone says. walking is explained to be the same as in the action of walking. nor does one who is other than both a walker and a non-walker. “He stands still. Here. since: 2.” Nāgārjuna levels a critique against the action of standing still that is adduced as evidence to prove the action of walking. in the verse that begins. 10 15 20 25 30 35 In this regard. Hence. “First of all. there is no stopping the action of walking. And in the absence of the action of walking. This is so because the opposite of standing still is walking. it is the walker himself who stands still. there is no walking. Walking. how then would it make sense to say.2. But it does not.17. as shown by this critique. there is no third type of agent who is neither a walker nor a non-walker. we prove that there is standing still. As for this verse.15-16). because: 2.1 not exist.” does LVP103.16. Here someone says. He also does not halt and stand still where he has not yet walked. “The walker stands still. standing still—also does not exist. Instead. standing still does indeed exist because its opposite exists. nor on the spot just walked upon. It is in this way that. first of all. «So. nor on a spot not yet walked upon. If the walker without walking does not make sense. “The walker stands still?” When one says. one does not apply the expression “walker. And thus.” Therefore. “The one standing still is not walking…” and so on (MMK2. the walker does not stand still…. “Walking does exist because stopping exists. walking does not exist because its opposite.17. as in. then in order to establish that there is walking.” This is not so. But if walking were nonexistent. So too the walker does not halt and stand still on the currently walked on spot because such a spot is not found. it has the same problems as the action of walking. Therefore. the one is stopping the action of walking begins the action of standing still. someone says. then how could one stop doing it?» We respond that walking would exist if stopping to walk existed. since 2. One does so by restating the two stanzas with the appropriate changes. “standing still. does not pertain to him. «The non-walker does not stand still. the “walking” that is mentioned so as to prove that there is the action of “standing still” is the same as in the action walking—in other words. and also because there is no action of walking there. Likewise. beginning. Therefore. For example. it is unintelligible to say. which is the contrary of standing still. and this is also the case because there is no walking there. Likewise. And in this regard.” Here.1. and that exists. But if that is the case. its opposite— namely. and since it does not exist. here as well one should apply the same critique to walking when it is adduced as evidence to prove the action of standing still.» This is also not right. standing still also exists because its opposite exists.” then the action of walking. One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot. the walker does not halt and stand still on a spot where he has just walked because there is no action of walking there.Wisdom Page 19 5 problem is as stated previously. and stopping—each case is the same as in the action of walking. And walking is proven when standing still is proven.

John Doe. And how can that which is begun not exist?» We respond as follows. the critique is the same as in the action of walking: One does not depart walking on the currently stood upon spot. then one would be forced to accept that agent and activity (karman) are identical. That is. 20 25 30 Thus. “The walker is different from the action of walking.17.1) Likewise. “The walker is himself the action of walking”. who is standing still. it does not exist. If there were no action of standing still. One might object. one should make it clear that stopping the action of standing still is the same as in stopping the action of walking. Hence. Neither case is at all possible for those who examine the issue. Thus. It does not make sense to say. if it is not different from the walker—then agent and activity (kriyā) would be identical. nor on a spot where one has not yet stood.” Likewise.1 the beginning of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. «The action of standing still does exist because its cessation exists. nor on the spot not yet stood upon. «Standing still does exist because its beginning exists.” (MMK2. a critique of walking was stated by the line that says. so where does one begin to stand still? 10 15 In this way. Moreover. nor on the spot just stood upon.” Why does it not make sense? 35 2. standing still—exists have no proof for the action of walking because standing still does not exist. “One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot. nor on a spot not yet walked upon. However.Wisdom Page 20 5 But suppose someone says. stops standing still and begins to walk.” That is. the critique as the same as in the action of walking. then it would have to exist either in exclusion from the walker. in the case of stopping the action of standing still. one should make it clear that LVP104.19. those who hold that the opposite of walking—namely. by making the appropriate changes to the three stanzas. Nāgārjuna says: 2. nor on the spot just walked upon. then one could not stop that action. if walking were to exist. If the activity of walking does not exist in exclusion from the walker—that is. by suppressing walking.» We respond that the action of standing still would exist if the stopping of that action existed. previously the verse that began “One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked…” (MMK2. nor does it make sense to say. or not in exclusion from the walker. One should say that beginning the action of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. one also does not begin to stand still where one is currently standing still. in this case as well. If the walker were himself the action of walking. In the case of stopping the action of walking. there would be no . That is.18. That is.12) refuted the beginning of walking. one begins standing still. since it is “the same as in the action of walking. One does not begin to stand still on a spot where one just stood.

2. This is most likely the point that Candrakīrti means to make with his example of walking to a destination. is engaged in—that activity of walking through which he is characterized as the “walker. there would have to be the walking without the walker and the walker without the walking.” Indeed. that by definition an agent is someone engaged in the 9 10 20 25 . the activity of cutting is not identical to the cutter. the walker. because he is not the walker before walking. since: 2. someone says. it is established just in the way that these are established: “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action. If you think that the walker is something different from the action of walking.” However. the point being made here is simply that an agent is by definition one who is engaged in some action.1 . it is not correct to say. It would be established as distinct.1 That is. Therefore. just as a cloth is distinct from a jug.22. he does not achieve that action. LVP106.3.9 In the commentary on this verse. If the walker were established prior to the action of walking.2.” is commonly established for the world (lokaprasiddha). “Someone walks to some destination. It also makes no sense for the walker to be something other than the walking. in what other way could they be proven to exist? And so.” The aforementioned critiques do not hold.22. This being the case. how then can there indeed be any proof of these two at all? 15 There is no proof for these two—the walker and the action of walking—as being either identical or different. But it is not the case that the walking is apprehended distinct from the walker. Nāgārjuna asks. the walker “is walking” —i.” Thus. then he would engage in that walking. “John Doe. as has already been shown. Nāgārjuna says: LVP105. If the walker and the walker were different. which is not yet existent. And except for those options. the walking would be apprehended independent of the walker. This is so 2. such that one could say “This is the agent” and “This is the activity. that is. 30 “Before walking” means prior to the action of walking.Wisdom Page 21 distinction between the two. since someone engages in some walking. There is no proof whatsoever that these two exist as either identical are different. «A statement such as. In order for the “walker” to exist prior to the action of walking.20. thus.1 5 2.21. The walker does not engage in the walking by virtue of which he is characterized as “the walker. is walking. then the walker would exist independently of the action of walking. in other words. Candrakīrti appears to suggest that this line should be read. he does not do it.22. the walker would have to already be engaged in that action.e.” To show how there is also no difference between the walker and the walking. a “walker” is engaged in walking.» This is also not the true. That is.” John Doe does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the walker. This is so 2. “How can there indeed be any proof of these two at all?” His intention is that there is no proof for the walker and the action of walking. So too. At this point. “The walker is himself the action of walking..

that is. This dispels the objection based on statements such as “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action. The walker does not do an action of walking that is different from that walking by virtue of which he is characterized as the “walker” because when there is only one walker.» This is also not true since 2.Wisdom Page 22 5 It is observed that someone such as John Doe walks to some village or city. ‘coming’ is a state of moving inward. That is. Such is the gait (gati) of the Āryas: it is without coming or going.” that walker who engages in that action does not exist. which Candrakīrti has interpreted heretofore as “the action of walking. “Going. nor that which is being walked upon exists. 10 15 LVP107. Thus. The first of these has been rendered as “state.” 2. nor the action of walking. two actions of walking cannot apply to one walker. but the current translation captures the main point of the argument.2. In three ways. which is other than himself. someone says. there is no coming or going. an unreal walker is not engaged in any of these three kinds of walking. nor does the object of that action.1.” 10 25 action in question. 20 In this verse. unreal walking or walking that is both real and unreal.” although its numerous other meanings include . 30 LVP108.25. Since that is the case. One would be the action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker. nor is a walker who is both real and unreal. the prior to that action of walking due to which he is called the “walker. 10 The full flavor of this passage is difficult to render into English because it involves a deliberately ambiguous use of two key terms pada and gati. Where there is no state of moving inward of outward.” and the other would be the action of walking that he engaged in—these are the two actions of walking that would absurdly follow.” To make matters worse.24.1 The walker does not engage in an action of walking that is different from the one due to which he is characterized as the “walker” because two actions of walking would absurdly ensue.’ venerable Śāriputra. is a state of moving outward. he engages in another action of walking. And as has already been explained.1 As the Teachings of Akṣayamati says.-2.” can also mean “destination. «The walker does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker. in Nāgārjuna’s usage. 2. Such is not the case here. a real walker is connected with the action of walking. nor yet the action itself. the term “walking” means “that action of walking which is engaged in” (gamyata iti gamanam). it does not make sense to have two actions of walking. and one that is both real and unreal has the nature of both possibilities.” Rather. A walker that is both real and unreal does not do the walking in three ways. the term gati.25. This will be explained in the “Analysis of Factors of Action and their Object” (MMK8). “is walking. the agent of walking does not exist. And in this regard. An unreal walker does not do the walking in three ways.” The complexities— and the pun involved—cannot be fully rendered in English.23. a real walker does not do the walking. The main problem of translation here is that both the destination and. an unreal walker is devoid of the action of walking. At this point. “Venerable Śāriputra. a real walker is not engaged in real walking. So too. One should know that the walking can also be related to the action of walking in three ways. neither the walker. Therefore. This also will be explained in that same chapter. the action can occur in the accusative as that objects of the verbal construction.

nor is it something other than that. and not a sprout. the same as a flash of lightning in the sky.” “destiny. we have translated it as “gait” in the sense that it is the way that the Āryas proceed. And production does not pertain to causeless things. and no one dies. know that all things are like that. it will give a black or bright result for the one cycling in saṃsāra. which is the basis for the terms “coming” (āgati) and “going” (gati). There is no accumulation of karma. conditioning is neither annihilated nor eternal. nor arrival [from the last life].Wisdom Page 23 If the seed itself were to be transferred into the sprout. nor yet does it come from something else. In this world no human dies. However. the Blessed One said: 5 The sprout of an existent seed is not itself the seed. no living thing or human. he said: When children see an ornamented female face on the surface of a mirror or a pot of oil. then that would be a seed. they feel desire for that face. nor will one experience what another has done. There is no transference [to the next life]. Hence. It is not eternal. nor does anyone pass on to the next world or go there. Yet LVP110. the fault of eternalism would also ensue.” and “understanding. in the King of Samādhi Sūtra it says. Yet. having done it. the sprout were to come from something else. In this way. one will not fail to encounter it again. It is not the “place” and “word. 20 No being is encountered here. then the fault of being uncaused would ensue.” Here.1 karma is not wasted once it has been done. Things are like froth or a plantain tree. akin to a mirage. but the seal itself is not seen to be transferred there. its nature (dharmatā) is to be neither annihilated nor eternal. But if there is no transfer of the face into the image. the face will never be reached. but it is not annihilated. they urgently seek to get it. it is formed from the verbal root √gam. the interpretation of pada as “word” is not wholly implausible as part of a vague play on words. and desirous. They are like illusions.” “abode. nor is the seed that. no one is born here. such as a donkey’s horns. confused beings develop desire. it can also mean “state. And: 10 A seal is seen in its impression. It is the verb that has been translated throughout the chapter as “to walk. the Tibetan translators take it to mean “word. on the other hand. As for gati. In this way. In this way. nor is the impression in the seal. which is wholly unconvincing.” all of which may again be part of a deliberate if vague play on words. They are like the moon in water. Nevertheless. Likewise.” but then one would have to argue that there is no coming and going because there is no word for coming and going. Likewise.1 15 25 . But if. The faultless Victor with Ten Powers uttered this best of meditative states: “the world of existence (bhava) is like a dream.” Indeed. nor perdurance. LVP109.

positive qualities and LVP112. nor will something go elsewhere. [Mind-] streams are always empty and signless. 5 10 .1 character. It is not that something has come here. a signless place—such is the realm of the Sugatas. spells. Power.1 and are impermanent like an illusion. The three realms of saṃsāra are like a dream. supreme in magic and miraculous action. wisdom and spells. they have no core. state or place. such are the qualities of the Victors. Here there is no purity of view. supreme power of good qualities. and the Ten Powers’ strength—such is the supremacy of the bull-like buddhas: a myriad of excellent.Wisdom Page 24 case that all exists. They quickly fluctuate LVP111. Unarisen. There is no place where beings become tranquil through their actions. peaceful. they have the best way to obtain the five superpowers. nor does it not exist.

and the not yet traversed. If that is the case. since it does not depend upon seeing. hearing. and without what has been seen and the not yet seen. if a not yet established seer depends upon seeing. The six sense-faculties are sight.6. a not yet established seer does not depend upon seeing.4.5. there is no seer.3 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties 3. as such. it is said that visual awareness arises in dependence upon the eye and visible matter. “seeing sees?” 3. how can there be . then since it is not yet established. when seeing is not excluded. 10 Modifying the first verse in chapter 2.1.3. Thus: 3. And due just to this analysis in these four verses of seeing. one is not seeing what has not yet been seen. if seeing is not excluded. a seer not excluded from seeing does not exist. the already traversed. suppose that the seer is asserted to be dependent on the seeing—that is. 15 3. the four factors in the twelve links starting with awareness also do not exist. Seeing does not see. Likewise. 5 3. Sight does not see itself. existent—seer? This makes no sense because that which is already established is not established again. By means of our analysis of the being traversed.” how can it make sense to say. a seer who is already established does not depend upon seeing. Hence. And since there is neither the object of seeing nor seeing.1. would he depend upon seeing or not? In this regard. smelling. we have already responded to claims about the reality of fire’s burning along with the act of seeing. the “being seen” is not seen. It is said a child is born in dependence (pratītya) upon mother and father. tasting. When seeing is excluded. then. What would dependence upon seeing do for an already established—that is to say.7.2. 3. but we respond: The example of fire is not suitable for proving that sight sees itself. 35 3. a seer excluded from seeing also does not exist.6. there is not seer. we ask: if there were some seer. the seer is like the son of a barren woman. In this way. touching and the mind.8. then does dependence on seeing apply to something already established to exist or not yet established to exist? Concerning these possibilities. there is no seer. How can there be seeing and the object seen if there is no seer? 3. one can critique seeing as follows: First of all. If there is no seeing of what is not “being seen. 20 25 30 Here. one is not seeing what has been seen. And has as been stated before.2. What might say that fire burns itself. nor does non-seeing see. On the other hand. How will that which does not see itself see something else itself? 3. one must admit that the seer is also explained to be impossible. In this whether or not seeing is excluded. Their objects are the visible and so on.

such as the hearer and the heard. just by the critique of seeing. tasting.Wisdom Page 26 appropriation and such? 3. One should realize that. just by the critique of seeing. 5 .9. and one should realize that. touching and thinking. smelling. we have also explained the objects and agents. we have explained hearing.

4. 4. However. Causeless visible matter? No. “The effect is not similar to its cause. all that he offers as proof has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. Therefore.” It does not make sense to claim. the cause of visible matter makes no sense. one who responds with criticism has not criticized anything at all.1. conditioning. The same sequence of arguments applies in all ways to sensation.6. and indeed to all things. If there were visible matter separate from the causes of visible matter. It does not make sense to claim.8.3. and separate from visible matter. and there is no cause without effects. it does not make sense. When torn apart by emptiness.9. one who utters a defense does not defend anything.2. 4. 5 4. If visible matter already exists. the cause of visible matter does not make sense. 4. mind.4. When explained away by emptiness.Wisdom Page 27 4 Analysis of the Aggregates 4.7 . one should not invent any concepts at all that have to do with visible matter. the causes would have no effects. all that he offers as proof of his criticism has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. “The effect is similar to its cause. recognition. and there is no causeless thing anywhere. if the causes of visible matter existed separate from visible matter. no. 4. the causes of visible matter are also not seen. 20 .5.” 15 4. Visible matter is not perceived separate from the causes of visible matter. If visible matter does not yet exist. visible matter would be causeless. 10 4.

If the characterized does not make sense. and the defining characteristic does not exist. space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent. If there is no thing without a defining characteristic. 15 5. Therefore.” 5. the characterized does not exist. 10 In the verse above the verb “to apply to” can be translated as “to be present in. how does he know either the existent or the nonexistent? 20 5. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic. Nor does it apply to something other than what has or does not have a defining characteristic.1. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present. 5 5. then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)? And [if] the analyzer that has neither the quality of existing nor not existing. 5. 5. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic.7 .8. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do not see peace. And an existent (bhāva) does not exist without what is characterized and the defining characteristic. which is the quieting (upaśama) of what is to be seen. . Therefore. it would have no defining characteristic. If there is no existent (bhāva).4. then the defining characteristic is not possible. There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. if it were prior to its defining characteristic. nor does it apply to what already has a defining characteristic. then to what does a defining characteristic apply? 5.3. And the other five elements are the same in this regard as space.6.2.5. it is neither the characterized nor the defining characteristic. then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized.Wisdom Page 28 5 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus) 5.

5 6. their co-occurrence is not established. And if they are different. arise together.9 . then why do you imagine that they arise together? 20 6.6.10. desire is not established either with the desirous or without the desirous. . to establish that they occur together. Which exists separately such that you assert that they arise together? 25 6. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are identical. you again claim that they are separate! 6. then desire would exist in dependence on the desirous such that when the desirous existed. there would be desire. 6. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are different. then do they arise together because they are established separately? 6. Thus. Since they are not established to exist separately. 10 6. And as with desire. none of the elemental things (dharmas) are established either together or separately. grogs). You expect them to arise together because you think that they are not established separately.3. existed before desire. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion (sahāya.5.2. And if they were identical. they would not arise together (sahabhāva) because a thing cannot occur with itself. If desire and the desirous are established separately.8. 15 6. how can they arise together? 6. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion. while different. How could there be desire without the desirous? This same analytical procedure applies to the desirous in the case where there is or is not desire. If desire and the desirous.Wisdom Page 29 6 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous 6. If the desirous. in exclusion from desire.1. It is not possible for desire and the desirous to arise simultaneously because desire and the desirous would then not depend upon each other. And yet.7.4.

If such is not the case.3. occurrence (jāti or utpāda).9. “Occurrence-occurrence is the occurrence of only the first-order occurrence. and “cessation-cessation” (vyayavyaya). etc. then they are not conditioned. according to you. One of the oddities of this theory is that occurrence.2. and it is not present where there is lamplight. If.. 7. Moreover. then the three characteristics would be conjoined to it. were capable of producing the [occurrence-occurrence]. how would it cause the [first-order occurrence] to arise if it has not [yet] been produced by the first-order [occurrence]? 7. how does it cause the [occurrence-occurrence] to arise? 20 25 30 7. If the production [of things] were conditioned.e. if the [first-order occurrence. Darkness is not present inside of lamplight. some things (dharmas) are “conditioned” (saṃskṛta) in that they are produced by causes and conditions. which is a thing’s continuity over a series of distinct temporal instants. then [inasmuch as] the first-order [occurrence] has not yet been produced by the [occurrence-occurrence].] 7. if production is not conditioned. then it is necessarily qualified by three characteristics. according to you. perdurance and cessation are themselves considered to be conditioned things.” 7. and this leads to the invention of things (dharmas) such as “occurrence-occurrence” (jātijāti). perdurance and cessation. namely. Since light is [defined as] what eliminates darkness. if a thing is conditioned. If there is another characteristic of the conditioned for occurrence.” 7. Of course (kāmam). The three [characteristics] starting with occurrence are not individually capable of acting as characteristics for the conditioned. 7. occurrence-occurrence is what causes the occurrence of the first-order occurrence. the [occurrence-occurrence] causes the first-order [occurrence] to arise [after] having been produced by the first-order [occurrence].6. “Just as lamplight illuminates [both] itself and what is other than it. On the other hand. If. what would lamplight 35 .). bhaṅga.8. These oddities are in part what Nāgārjuna critiques. perdurance and cessation. and how can [those three characteristics] together apply to one [thing] at the same time? 7. they too must be qualified by occurrence. According to this theory. while being produced the [first-order occurrence] could produce the [occurrence-occurrence].7 .4.Wisdom Page 30 7 Analysis of the Conditioned 5 10 [NOTE: This chapter is based upon a particular theory found within Abhidharma philosophy. then on your view. even though] not yet produced. likewise occurrence produces both itself and what is other than itself [i. “perduranceperdurance” (sthitisthiti).5.1. then how can it be characteristic of the conditioned? 15 7. occurrenceoccurrence]. The first-order occurrence in turn produces [its] occurrence-occurrence. and cessation (vyaya. hence. perdurance (sthiti). then an infinite regress [ensues].

namely. you have thereby contradicted the highest Dharma. [namely. sir. then why would [occurrence]. as [described] in the scriptural passage: “One who sees interdependence sees the Dharma. in and of itself. by admitting that things have essences. On the other hand. I have explained entirely the Blessed Tathāgata’s mother. the Buddha’s philosophy. but if no such entity exists. [Candrakīrti’s comments:] You. if you admit that things have essences. it does not reach any darkness. which is not yet arisen.] which is other than itself.15. maintain that any thing that exists has a svabhāva—in other words. that arises in dependence on some [other] thing. “In relation to occurrence.” How. how can it arise? 10 20 25 30 . how can you maintain that they are dependently arisen? Thus. the sprout is the cause. then. 5 7.12.10. Since that [essence] exists. nor does the not yet arisen. have shown the following: any thing. is an effect.11 . namely.1.” I.]. interdependent origination. on the other hand. such as a sprout. if darkness that is not reached [by the lamplight] were eliminated by the lamplight. Hence. Whatever exists dependently is essentially (svabhāvataḥ) pacified (śānta). 7. 7. produce both itself and something else. 7. The currently arising does not arise.2.16. you have contradicted interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) in every way. 7. And how could darkness be eliminated by lamplight in the process of arising? [Such cannot be] because while lamplight is in the process of arising. then the lamplight located here would eliminate the darkness of the whole world. [need to] be produced again? 15 7. then darkness also would undoubtedly obscure [both] itself and [lamplight. [the thing] contains its own changeless essence (svabhāva). it does not depend on anything else.Wisdom Page 31 illuminate? 7. nor does the already arisen. If some not yet arisen entity (bhāva) existed somewhere. being already produced.] which is other than itself. How could occurrence. Therefore.13. occurrence-occurrence]? And if an occurrence that has already arisen produces [them].17. Moreover.16.” that is. can one speak of “the arising” in dependence on occurrence? 7.14. this is that which is arising. If lamplight eliminated [both] itself and [darkness. such as seed. then it could arise. Having shown this. Both are “pacified. both that which is arising and occurrence itself are pacified. they are devoid of essence [and] interdependently arisen. This has been explained in the case of the not yet moved. 35 7. the already moved. one who sees the Dharma. It does not make sense (na kramate) [to say. nor is it produced. and the currently moving. sees the Buddha.

the cessation of any entity does not make sense.Wisdom Page 32 7.18. what unarisen [entity] ceases? 30 7. an entity that has not yet continued to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. An entity that is currently ceasing to exist does not cease. The occurrence of the existent does not make sense. which ones.26. And in any case. If an occurrence that was in the process of arising were to cause [some entity] to arise. The cessation of an entity (bhāva) that is continuing to exist does not make sense.27. nor does the occurrence of the nonexistent.19. This has been previously demonstrated. always continue to exist? 7. There is no occurrence of occurrence by virtue of [an occurrence] that is identical to it or different from it Likewise.23. And in any case. Among all things that have the qualities of decaying and dying. 20 7. the occurrence of any entity does not make sense.24. it does not make sense [to theorize] the continued existence of continued existence by virtue of a continued existence other than continued existence or by virtue of that [continued existence] itself. 10 7. The occurrence of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense. Nor can such be the case of what both is existent and nonexistent. lacking those qualities. nor does a state of existence cease by virtue of some other state of existence. An entity that has already ceased to exist does not cease. If another occurrence produces this [occurrence]. then occurrence is an infinite regress. An entity that has already continued to exit [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. in the [aforementioned] manner.25. then everything arises [anywhere at any time]. [This is so] because a state of existence does not cease by virtue of that very state of existence. 5 15 25 . what unarisen [entity] continues to exist? 7.29. The continued existent of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense.20. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. 7. 7.28. then likewise.21. then which occurrence would cause that occurrence to arise? 7. If. 7. An entity that is in the process of continuing to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. 35 7. 7.22. And if something without occurrence is arisen. an entity that has not yet ceased does not cease. but it does not make sense [to speak of] the cessation of an entity that is not continuing to exist.

7. [This is what the Buddha] has said. how can one establish the unconditioned? 7. the cessation of a nonexistent entity does not make sense. there are no conditioned entities. such is continued existence.30. neither existence nor nonexistence would make sense. Also.Wisdom Page 33 7. And if the conditioned is not established. Like an illusion. like a dream. First of all.31. There can be no cessation either by virtue of a thing itself or by what is essentially other [than that thing]. just as there can be no occurrence by virtue of a thing itself or by something essentially other [than that thing]. 5 7. such is cessation. 10 7. continued existence and cessation are not established. the cessation of an existent entity does not make sense because. if [existence and nonexistence applied to] the same [entity]. like the city of the elves — such is occurrence.32. just as one cannot decapitate [a human] for the second time. Since occurrence. .34.33.

one would have to conclude that all actions are pointless. [You] do not accept an unreal entity as a factor. The factor occurs in dependence on the object. nor do you accept an unreal entity as an object. I see no other way to establish [them]. how can they [occur in or] as the same [entity]? 8. An unreal [object] is not acted upon by a real agent. . the effects that arise from those [kinds of actions] do not exist.6. and a path to heaven does not make sense. and [if the object were real]. then a path to liberation does not make sense. 8. there would be an agent without any object. nor object exists. 15 8.10. 8. 10 8.Wisdom Page 34 8 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object 8. a real factor does not act on an object that is unreal or both real and unreal.5. If there is no effect. then there is neither the virtuous (dharma) nor the nonvirtuous (adharma). A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on [an object] that is both real and unreal because. 8. then there is neither effect nor cause (kāraṇa). an unreal factor does not act on an object that is real or both real and unreal.8.9.11. 8. Action does not belong to a real [object]. For the reasons stated above. Action does not belong to a real [factor]. 30 8. there would be an object without any agent. 20 25 8. And if there is neither the virtuous nor the nonvirtuous. 8.3.4. an agent would have no cause [due to which one calls it an “agent”].7. If an unreal factor acts on an unreal object.2. an object would have no [semantic] cause (hetu) [due to which one calls it an “object”].12 . and [if the factor were real].13. since the real and the unreal are mutually contradictory. For the reasons stated above. A real factor (kāraka) acts on a real object (karman). nor on a real object. All remaining entities are explained by [the analysis of] object and agent. one should realize that such is also the case for reliance & appropriation (upādāna). One should understand this for the aforementioned reasons. 5 8. If action and so on are impossible. Likewise. nor is a real [object] acted upon by an unreal agent because all of the flaws [stated above] would ensue in that case. If there is no cause (hetu). Since object and agent have been refuted. nor agent. and the object occurs in dependence on the factor. then neither action.1. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on an unreal object. If there is neither [cause nor effect]. 8.

so too. 9. 9.4. If the agent of seeing were himself the agent of hearing and himself the agent of sensation. If there is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing. Indeed.7. . such as seeing. Well. then they also do not exist. then. the enjoyer] is made evident by one among [the possible perceptual acts]. however. At another time. “There is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing. If that [entity] is established without seeing and such. In regard to him. 9. 25 30 9. some do say the following: “There are [Perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing. and some [act] is made evident by some [enjoyer]. then he might exist before the individual acts. The [enjoyer] who is before seeing and such does not exist then.Wisdom Page 35 9 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action] 9. that the agent of seeing is one [entity] and the agent of hearing is another. then there is no doubt that those [perceptual acts and such] would also be established without that [entity]. nor later.6. then how can there be one that exists prior to the individual [acts]. If there is [enjoyer] to whom pertain [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]. makes no sense. such as seeing? 20 9.12. the concepts “he is” [and] “he is not” have ceased.” 9. the agent of sensation is yet another. 9.10.9. Some [enjoyer] is made evident by some [act]. it is made evident by another [of the acts].5.3. the entity that exists before them is established.8. In that case. nor now. This. [Suppose]on the other hand. The [enjoyer] also does not exist even at the time of those element (bhūta) from there are [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them].” 9. How can seeing and such pertain to an entity that does not exist? Therefore. The one who comes before them exists. [Rather.11.2. and there is also the sensation [that accompanies them].1. the agent of hearing would exist while the agent of seeing was still present. How can some [enjoyer] be made evident without some [act]? How can some [act] be made evident without some [enjoyer]? 15 9. 5 9. by what means does one identify the entity that is established before [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]? 10 9. and the Self would be multiple.

fuel exists. then what burns the fuel? 10. 10.6. Not burning. 20 10. and a man closely touches a woman. it would remain with its own mark (liṅga). We would admit that fire. how then can it depend [on some thing]? If. then fire would exist even without the fuel. just as a woman closely touches a man. the [part] already moved over. 30 10. If it is other than the fuel. To start [a fire] would also be pointless. In relation to fuel. being already established. is that on which fire or fuel depends? 10. If fire exists in dependence on fuel. it depends [on that thing].3. being established first. “fuel is what is burning from the [fire]. It is not the case that. .” But if [fire] is nothing more than merely that [burning of fuel]. Not going it. and that being the case.11. fire exists . without depending on fuel.10. Since it does not depend (nirapekṣa) on anything else. 10 10. still touches it. fire exists. starting it would pointless. depending on fuel. A thing that is dependently established is not yet established. “Fire. And if such were the case. 25 10. still touches the fuel.12. 10. the remaining [critiques] have already been stated through [the analysis of] the [part of the path] being moved over. and if fuel [exists] in dependence on fire. It is not the case that. What is not touched [by fire] would not burn.9. it would have no object [that it burns]. [fire] would not be caused by the burning [of fuel].1. the fire would not go out. It is not the case that. fuel exists. And inasmuch as it would always burn. In this regard. If that in dependence on which a thing is established is itself established in dependence on that very thing. It is not the case that without depending on fire. then [fuel] would establish [the existence] of what has already been established [to exist]. If fire [exists] in dependence (apekṣya) on fuel. 5 10. 15 10. then its dependence makes no sense.4. Fire does not exist in fuel or when there is fuel. one might think. If fire is fuel. fuel would exist without fire. while other than fuel. then which.5. then what is established in dependence on what? 10.Wisdom Page 36 10 Analysis of Fire and Fuel 10. [Fire] would burn always. [Fire.2. and it would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. Fire does not come from something else.] being other [than fuel].7. then the agent and the object [of the act of burning] would be identical.8. depending on fire. while other than fuel.” 10. would not touch it.13. if fire and fuel were to exist in mutual exclusion.

fuels do not exist in fire.14. Fire is not fuel.16. I do not think that they have understand the meaning of the Teaching. 5 10. 10.15. Through [the analysis of] fire and fuel. all procedures [for allegedly establishing] the Self and appropriation have been completely explained. 10. Some point to identity and difference in regard to the Self and in regard to things. . and in relation to something other than fuel. nor does it exist in them. Such is also the case for jugs.Wisdom Page 37 and the [part] not yet moved over. there is no fire. Fire does not possess the fuel. cloths. and so on.

At this juncture. he said that saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. the Blessed One said. it is only for them that saṃsāra is cognized to be beginningless and endless. However. If the Self were nonexistent. For such [persons]. then how could he have said this: ‘Therefore. aging and death is beginningless. However.” You are being ridiculous.” Since it has neither beginning nor end.1. And that one is the Self. “Although saṃsāra has neither beginning nor end. Hence. obscured by ignorance. is that saṃsāra is just a mere label (saṃjñā) [intended for] those whose minds are under the influence of error (viparyāsa). as in the case of a torch-wheel. someone objects. the following remains the case: saṃsāra does not exist because neither its starting point nor its ending point are perceived. saṃsāra exists because its middle exists. ‘Let us practice so as to put an end to saṃsāra. part (bhāga) and locus (deśa). according to the Buddha’s teaching. then the one cycling in saṃsāra exists. monks. Hence.” An end is a termination. Therefore. It is called “what comes before” or “the first. Thus. such is not the case for those in whom the wind of the wisdom of suchness has uprooted the tree that is ignorance’s obscurations. the Great Sage said.Wisdom Page 38 11 Analysis of Beginning and End At this point. thinking. it nevertheless has a middle because [a middle] has not been refuted.1. you should train yourselves. that which does not exist does not have a middle. … Someone now objects. The whole tree that is the root and imprints of all their afflictive mental states has been incinerated by the fire that is the wisdom of a transmundane path. bound with thirst’s tether.’” We respond as follows. it is endless.” The beginning and end of saṃsāra have been refuted. There would be a Self. so how could it have a middle? The idea. it is called an “ending point” or “extinction. In other words. fettered with thirst. the Blessed One said: 5 Monks. How so? Since 11. has the Blessed One not clearly taught that saṃsāra itself does not exist? Therefore. Good sir. If that is the case.2. if saṃsāra were to exist. saṃsāra exists. as in a tortoise’s pelt.” [In response] we say this. on might think. consider this: 11. no beginning point is discerned for beings that cycle in saṃsāra. then there would necessarily be that which is prior to it and also that which is after it. it is known that [saṃsāra] does indeed have an end.” He said so because saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. the cycle of birth. what would cycle compulsively through the coming and going that is the continuum of birth and death? Indeed. nor is its ending point.” If saṃsāra were to exist. “If the Blessed One has refuted both the beginning and end of saṃsāra. as is in the case of a vase. “Its starting point is not known. “The Self (ātman) exists because saṃsāra exists. Hence. [the Buddha] applies the following specification [in the aforementioned statement]: “beings …obscured by ignorance. the cycle of births and deaths has neither beginning nor end. it is just a label because it is devoid of 10 15 20 25 30 35 .” and so on. it has neither start nor finish. then. how can it have a middle? A start is a beginning. The following are synonyms: point. If something has neither start nor end. Starting point means “starting locus. “Monks.

20 . as is the case with space and a torch-wheel. It is not just that saṃsāra has no starting point. .2. the Self also does not exist. Thus. In this fashion. after. and for this very reason. whether they be causes and effects. in this case it does not make sense for them to be in a sequence [such that one is] before. How can there be the causeless aging and death of one who is unborn? 11.5.2.Wisdom Page 39 5 beginning. and so on. there is no sequence [whereby one is] before. after or simultaneous with [another].4. he said: 10 11. then aging and death would be first. and both would be causeless. since saṃsāra does not exist. If birth were first.11. 15 11. or simultaneous [with the other]. in the case of birth. 11.8. feelings and the one who has them. and an immortal would be born. Moreover. definitions and what they define. birth cannot reasonably occur (***) with aging and death. after or simultaneous with [birth] cannot possibly apply to aging and death.3. Therefore. Rather. If birth were afterward. saṃsāra has no beginning. then aging and death would be later. Birth would be devoid of aging and death. or termination. Demonstrating how it is that it does not make sense. the idea is that. there is no starting point for any [such] things.7. middle. saṃsāra does not exist. aging. death. The one being born would die. or any [other such things that seem to occur in sequence]. after. middle or termination. or simultaneous with [aging and death] cannot possibly apply to birth. The sequence of being before. [Nāgārjuna] said: 11. So why would they conceptualize it as birth? The sequence of being before. Therefore. Also. So why would they conceptualize it as aging and death? 11.6.

… Or someone might object (atha syāt). Demonstrating this. suffering cannot be what is produced or made. Therefore. What must also be conceptualized is the person by whom. these aggregates [to be born] would be made by those [aggregates that are dying]. by both. and it is the Self. there is a locus of suffering. then suffering would be produced by something other [than itself]. by both. “It is produced by both [itself and something else]. if the person who is appropriating . is made by the person himself.” Yet others claim.1. And if suffering were to exist. it should not lack a locus (āśraya). is that suffering is made by that person that the suffering indicates (prajñapyate). then without suffering. on his own (svayam). ‘Suffering is made by itself. the five appropriative aggregates are called “suffering. Some maintain that suffering is produced (kṛta) by itself. there is no suffering that could be produced [in any of such fashion]. [The point.” Some hold the opinion. then one must state distinctly. by something else. which are other [than those to be born]. the suffering is made by that person himself (svapudgala). Moreover. 12.” We respond as follows. If these [aggregates to be born] were different from those [that are dying]. and this is the maker of that [suffering].3.” But being posited in any of these ways. since (hi) the aggregates [that are coming into existence] arise in dependence on those aggregates [of the previous life]. by something other than itself. If suffering is made by its own person. It is merely theoretical (pratijñāmātraka). [Nāgārjuna] said: 12. In this regard. it has not been given [to the present person] after having been made by some other person. that suffering should pertain to something.2. “We are not saying that suffering is ‘self-made’ because suffering itself creates suffering. or else that it is causeless.] first of all. Instead.” and it exists. he said: 12. “Suffering has arisen causelessly. “The Self does exist because the suffering related to it exists.’” In response. someone objects.” Others maintain. 10 15 20 25 30 35 What is conceptualized here is that this human suffering. If that is the case. then (tataḥ) it would not be the case that the [present suffering aggregates] arise in dependence (pratītya) on [the previous suffering aggregates]. defined as the five appropriative aggregates. If suffering were existent.” Well. that suffering is made. And it is not possible for the [suffering posited in this fashion] to be caused. we say 12. or else causelessly. Establishing this. it would be produced by itself. what ‘own person’ is there such that the suffering has been made by that person itself. then there would be a Self.Wisdom Page 40 12 Analysis of Suffering 5 At this point. “It is produced by something else. And in whatever way one asserts [its production]. If it were produced by itself. or if those [that are dying] are different from these [that are to be born].4. In this regard. “This is its suffering. “Suffering is produced by itself. some theorists are of the opinion. It is in this sense that we say.

the persons are not different. 15 .8. If suffering is arises from another person. then without suffering. rather. suffering is not self-made because that [suffering] is not made by that same [suffering]. then that [suffering] has not been made by its own person. what ‘other person’ is there who. the fourfold [establishment of all] external things does not exist. rather. while there is a difference in terms of the appropriation [of either human or divine suffering]. It is not just that the fourfold [establishment of] suffering does not exist. how is there one to whom that suffering.Wisdom Page 41 5 suffering of human has made the suffering of a god. And if something else is not self-made. having been made by another. Suffering would be made by both [self and other] if it were made by each. suffering is not created by its own person. this is not the case because it is not possible to demonstrate a person who is distinct from the appropriation [of suffering].7. then without suffering.6. One might assert that. However. how can suffering be made by something else? 12. having made the suffering.9. would be given? 12. That being the case. First of all. 12. would hand it over to another? 10 12. it has been made by another person.5. And how could there be causeless suffering that is not made either by itself or by something else? 12. If suffering arises from another person.

Things are essenceless because it is observed that they change.8. “What has a deceptive quality is deceptive. If change pertains to a thing itself.5. The Blessed One has said. what other than milk becomes yogurt? 15 13. Hence. The victors have said that emptiness is the death of all views. nor to something other than that change because the youth has not become aged. . there is no entity that is or has a non-essence. 13.2. then about what is it deceptive? Rather. then of what is there change?” If there were an essence.1 .3 .6. Due to the emptiness of things. there is no cure. Change does not pertain to a thing itself.7. On the other hand. they are all deceptive. of what would there be change? 10 13.Wisdom Page 42 13 Analysis of Saṃskāras 13. “If there is no essence. nor has the aged one become aged. then yogurt would be milk.” 5 13. but they said that. If there were some [entity that is] the non-empty. 13.4. 13. If that which has a deceptive quality would be deceptive. the Blessed one stated this as [a means to] indicate emptiness. how could there then be the empty? 13. There is no non-empty. All saṃskāras have deceptive quality. then there would be some [entity that is] the empty. for those whose view is emptiness.

seer. Also. 14. and the one seeing—these three do not enter into binary conjunctions with each other.2. the otherness of any thing from any other thing does not make sense. 5 … Just as there is no binary or group (sarvaśaḥ) conjunction in the case of the seen. Conjunction is of one thing with another that is other than it. “If a cloth is different from a vase. the [action of] seeing. Thus. Yet another [instance] expresses the usual sense [as in “other” or “different”]. confusion and so on. the vase is also other.” If a real thing 30 35 . And [the media]—as ear.2. the desirous.4. and [the act of] desiring.Wisdom Page 43 14 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga) 14. one should see that this is also the case with desire. and that otherness does not exist in the case of the seen [object] and so on. and there is no conjunction of desire with desiring. And it does not make sense for one [thing] to be other than to which it is relating.1. in these three forms (traidhena). then it would be ‘other’ even without that other [thing] One [instance of the word] “other” (anya) stands for what is being pointed out. Why is there no conjunction of them? [Nāgārjuna] said: 14. If one thing (anyad) were other (anyad) than another (anyasmād). … Here. the remaining afflictive mental states and the remaining media (āyatana) 15 do not enter into mutual conjunction. in these three ways—as anger. the angered and [the act of] being angry—[do not enter into mutual conjunction]. As in the case of these [three]. 10 There is no conjunction of desire with the desirous. rather. nor do they all together enter into conjunction with each other. that one thing is not ‘other’ without the other. The remaining afflictive mental states are anger. and if in relation to that separate (pṛthagbhūta) cloth. Hence. hearer and sound—[do not enter into mutual conjunction]. The [object] to be seen. someone objects. And it is not just in the case of the seen [object] and so on that otherness does not exist. One [thing] is other in relation to (pratītya) another. so too. and seeing. they do not enter into conjunction. 14.1. then what is the problem?” We respond: 14.3. 20 25 14. and another [instance] refers to what is other [than the aforementioned thing]. there is no simultaneous conjunction of the three.5. 14. there are three uses of the word “other.6. likewise.2.

To be specific. if there were [that specific universal. Therefore. “The one is not other than the other. then the vase.2. otherness is a specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa). Also. the vase itself does not depend on that other thing. But that application of the term ‘other’ is established without otherness since otherness is being conceptually constructed for a thing to which one has already applied the term ‘other. the cloth. The conjunction of a [thing] with that [same thing] is not reasonable (na…yujyate). for the establishment of its reality (svarūpa). This would be the case. independent of the cloth.] otherness. Rather. which is without any dependence & relation to a cloth. This means the following (tatra). such as] a cloth.” one must clearly accept that the one that is ‘other’ in relation to the other is not other than that other thing. And if that were the case. if the vase were ‘other’ even without that other thing.8. That is. someone objects. and the agent of conjunction do not exist. [Nāgārjuna] said: 14. “If the cognition of one thing (padārtha) as ‘other’ were dependent on some other thing. . 20 25 30 … 14.1 . Demonstrating this. This is so because that which is ‘other’ than the other is established without that other [thing]. would be ‘different. it must be conceptually constructed either in relation to what is other. then there would be this flaw.Wisdom Page 44 5 10 15 called a “vase” were other than another—i. the cloth.7. the [act of] conjoining. then neither the ‘other’ nor that [thing] itself exists. the cloth. you conceptually construct otherness for the purpose of establishing the application of the term ‘other’ (anyavyapadeśa).” We respond as follows. 14. Therefore. “There is otherness in what is other. And if otherness does not exist. “It is other. in saying. we do not see any ‘otherness’ of a vase independent of [something else. a cloth—then the thing called a “vase” would be ‘other’ even without that other thing. nor does it exist in what is not other.2 . the thing (padārtha) in which it adheres is called “other” even without any dependence on or relation to another thing.’ However.e. [the object] conjoined. and it does not make sense either way. the problem that you have discussed is not applicable to our position. namely.7. Otherness does not exist in what is other. when conceptually constructing this otherness. In this way. nor is the conjunction of one thing with another. [If] one has the notion. or in relation to what is not other.1. then there would be the otherness of a solitary vase. … Here.8..” But this is not what we are saying.” then what is the point of conceptually constructing otherness? That is.’ … 14.

” and both. then nonexistence would not [ever] apply to it.’ 15.2. innate] intrinsic nature would have no relation to or dependence on what is other than it. Indeed. The origination of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) through causes and conditions is not reasonable. And if its essence does exist. but it existed previously.” Thinking this.2. 10 15. An intrinsic nature originated through causes and conditions would be manufactured. They who see intrinsic nature.1.7.4.8. without extrinsic nature and intrinsic nature. extrinsic nature.1. [To think.5. how can there be [any] existence (bhāva)? [There cannot be] because existence is established when there is intrinsic nature or an extrinsic nature.2. how could an intrinsic nature be manufactured? 15.1.1.10.” is an annihilationist view. of what would there be change? 15. Moreover.2. If there is no intrinsic nature. of what would there be change? 25 15. 15.1.11. If its essence does not exist.9. “It is not the case that what exists by its own intrinsic nature does not exist. “It exists. refuted [the positions].8. 15. the Blessed One. Therefore. say that nonexistence [means that] existence becomes something else. [This is so] because it never makes sense for an essence to change.” “It does not exist. 5 15. 15. 15. one is forced into [the belief in] annihilation.10.9.2 . 15. how could there be nonexistence. who discerns the existent and the nonexistent. 15.2. In his discussion with Kātyāyana.” Thinking this. 15 15.6.Wisdom Page 45 15 Analysis of Svabhāva 15. 15. the discerning do not resort to either existence or nonexistence. one is forced into the [belief that things are] eternal.1.3. existence and nonexistence do not see the reality in the Buddha’s teaching. 30 . [To think].. And an uncreated [i.2.1. And if existence is not established. “Now it does not exist.e. If existence applied to [some thing] essentially.] “It does not exist. “[The essence] exists” is to be eternalist. how can there be extrinsic nature? For the intrinsic nature of what is by nature other is called ‘extrinsic nature. 20 15.

Wisdom Page 46 .

like a barren woman’s child.’ If things do not have an essence. there is also no flowing together (saṃsāra) of impermanent [mental conditions]. then since it has abandoned the previous substratum. 16. if saṃsāra were existent. nor are they impermanent. and impermanent [things] are observed to be active (skriya). what is this thing that would flow? 30 35 In this regard. the Skt. it does not exist. would either go on to the divine substratum after having abandoned the human substratum.3.” When it is sought in five ways in relation to the aggregates.. What. “The essence of things does exist because saṃsāra exists. media and elements. permanent [things] do not flow together because they are inert (niṣkriya). … 16. [the Self] would be devoid of those [aggregates]. What comes of this? Well. so it would be causeless. and since it does not yet have a new substratum.1. then it would necessarily be [the flowing together] of [mental] conditions or of a being (sattva). hence. someone objects. saṃsāra must exist.e. What would undergo saṃsāra? 25 … Moreover. lacking any substratum. And that which has no substratum lacks . First of all (tāvat). flowing from substratum (upādāna) to substratum. without samsaric existence. but it does not exist. this Self. 16. The saṃsaraṇa [of the aggregates] i.” We respond as follows (ucyate). how can impermanent [mental conditions] go to any [next realm of existence]? Thus. then of what would there be saṃsāra? Of who or what would there [this] flowing together? It is not observed that the [mental] conditions (saṃskāra) of a barren woman’s son are flowing together. if one believes.e. going from a human substratum to a divine substratum. “The person undergoes saṃsāra. it would be without any substratum in between those times. Hence.2. That which has no samsaric existence—i. then. And since. then it is not the case those conditions that are flowing together are permanent. there is a problem with either [possibility]. [In the verse. [the Self]. That is.Wisdom Page 47 16 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation 5 10 At this point. term] vibhava [without substratum] means to be devoid (vigata) of samsaric existence (bhava).” then do they flow together as permanent [things] or impermanent [things]? Among these [possibilities]. The same steps [of this argument] apply to the being. it would not have the cause that is the substratum of a name (prajñaptyupādānakāraṇarahita). if impermanent things [are what is flowing together]? Well. 15 20 In this regard. then things would indeed have an essence. those [things] that are impermanent are destroyed immediately after arising. Samsaric existence is the five substratal aggregates. they do not exist. “It goes on after having abandoned [the previous substratum].. would be without samsaric existence (vibhava). hence. Therefore. If saṃsāra were existent. [their] flowing together (saṃsṛti)—[their] movement from one realm of existence to another—is called ‘saṃsāra. if [you] say. or else it would do so without having abandoned the human substratum. Nāgārjuna said. If [mental] conditions flow together. “Mental conditions are flowing together. things’ essence does indeed exist. that which has no substratum—would be devoid of aggregates.

6. it is unmanifest. … 30 16. 16. If the substratum were the binding (bandhana). Nāgārjuna said: 16. What [kind of] thing is that? It is not anything at all. In other words. one should know 16.9. bondage should also exist. And that which has no substratum is not bound.5. but it does not bind [anything].” Those who grasp [onto nirvāṇa] in this fashion grasp tightly to the substratum. As for the remaining problems in this context.4. and without that which is bound and that which is not bound.Wisdom Page 48 any indication [of its existence]. it is causeless. Demonstrating how it is that [the substratum] does not bind anything. and so forth. that which is currently being bound is not bound.7. mental conditions. and as such. I will pass into nirvāṇa [i. but it does not [exist before it]. The substratum would itself be the binding if it bound something. then that which possesses the substratum would not be bound. If that which is bound were being liberated. Nor is a being bound or liberated. In no way is it possible for mental conditions to obtain nirvāṇa. which have the quality of ceasing [when they] arise. are not bound. nor does [it] bind that which is not yet bound. then bondage and liberation would be simultaneous. “Devoid of the substratum. desire and such. do exist. [The verse in chapter 2] should be applied in this manner. So in what state is [anything] bound? 20 16.. it does not exist. Indeed. As in the previous [argument].2.8. nor are they liberated. And since that [substratum] exists. one should apply it as follows: 25 [The binding] does not bind that which is already bound. 10 … Here. By changing the reading of the verse [in chapter 2]. in no way is it possible for a being to obtain nirvāṇa. and that which is not bound is not liberated. [then] will I have obtained nirvāṇa. the binding would bind [that which is to be bound] if it were to exist before that which is to be bound. … 5 16. 16. extinction]. that which has not yet moved. which are called ‘the substratum’ (upādāna). the remaining [faults] which have been stated through [the analysis of] that which has moved.e.” We respond as follows. That which is bound is not liberated.1. 15 35 . “Although there is no bondage of either mental conditions or a being. someone objects. and that which is now moving.7.

Wisdom Page 49 16.10. Where nirvāṇa is not imputed and saṃsāra not denied. what notion is there of nirvāṇa. what notion of saṃsāra? .

17. In this regard. someone objects. “Saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result.1. “As in this twofold classification of demonstrative [karmic forms]. if there were no saṃsāra as described here. In this regard. [all motion]. however. [One] thinks. Therefore. If. Among these. However. and the one that is said to follow intention is corporeal and vocal [karma].e. then a karmic action that has been committed would be related to a ripened result even in another rebirth. the non-dispassionate [karmic form] named ‘undemonstrative’ and likewise the other undemonstrative [karmic forms.Wisdom Page 50 17 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect 5 10 At this point. It is the seed of an effect in a future rebirth and/or here [in this life]. If the Self or mental conditions were to flow in this fashion.. “The highest sage said that there is karma that is intention (cetanā) and karma that follows intention (cetayitvā). the state of mind that cares for others. saṃsāra exists. and intention. as in the following (iti kṛtvā): undemonstrative [karma] defined as non-dispassionate. Motion is movement of the body. undemonstrative [karmic forms]. virtuous or unvirtuous—i.e. “The various types of karma are widely known. the merit that has continuity with use and the non-merit of that type. then since the mind would cease immediately after arising..” From the moment that one decides to [engage in] sinful (pāpa) karma. then there would be a relation between karmic action and [its] result. and undemonstrative [karma] defined as dispassionate. “Speech and motion.3. also.] those recorded to be (smṛta) dispassionate. there simply would be no relation between karmic activity and [its] result. whose cause is that decision to 25 30 35 . speech is the enunciation of clear & manifest syllables. an example of undemonstrative [karma] defined as not dispassionate is as follows. the undemonstrative is also [thus classified].2. and since there would be no ripened [karmic result] when [rebirth] is projected by karma. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be manifestations of karma (karmāñjana). “From today forward I will kill beings and steal [from them].5 . saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result. virtuous or nonvirtuous—i.2. “speech. and a kind & loving (maitra) state of mind are [each] Dharma.” “What are those karmic actions? And what is the result? With the intention of stating the difference between them. the mental conditions or Self flows in saṃsāra (saṃsaraṇa) through an uninterrupted continuum that is the sequence of birth and death. which is [their] occurrence in the relation of cause and effect. [these objectors] say the following: 17. namely. “The state of mind (cetaḥ) that holds oneself back.” Likewise.1. all speech. 17. Hence. establishing & motivating (samuthāpika) an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms called. establishing & motivating an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms apprehended to be motion. “It is recorded (smṛta) that among these. 15 20 17. “Concerning these [verses]. 17.4 . it would not be contradictory for karmic actions to have a relation to [their] results. that is how I will make my living..2.17. the karma called ‘intention’ is mental [karma].

Also (ca). there is] a problem in that the mental conditions are impermanent because of ceasing immediately upon occurrence.” At this point. merit that has continuity with use. some [Buddhists] from another tradition present another response. In this way. These [karmic forms] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a dispassionate character. And without the seed. “So too. even when one is not doing that [unvirtuous act]. I completely refrain from taking life and so on. ‘If it has ceased [before the maturation]. ‘Use’ (paribhoga) is the employment (upabhoga) on the part of the Saṅgha and such of an item that has been given away (parityakta). the virtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative. even when one is intoxicated and so on. they are undemonstrative. undemonstrative [karmic forms] arise in them even when they are not engaged in those [deeds]. starting with the time that fishermen and such engage in deeds such as setting their nets. [suppose that one engages in] the demonstrative [acts] of body and speech. [and that continuation] is an accumulating of virtue. For example.” Just as there are these [types of undemonstrative karmic form]. they do not demonstrate & indicate [anything] to others. “The result comes from a continuum beginning with the sprout that proceeds from the seed. having a dispassionate character. this means the merit—the virtue—that is continuous with use. some [philosophers] object as follows. there arises in the continuum of those who built it the non-merit continuous with use. [With that employment this karma has] continuity (anvaya)—in other words. there is [karma that has] continuity with use. then having ceased.Wisdom Page 51 5 10 15 20 25 30 engage in nonvirtue. non-merit that has continuity with use. “And there is intention. defined as the mental karmic act of conditioning the mind. are by nature virtuous. that is.” Starting with the completion of those demonstrative acts of body and speech. the nonvirtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative. there is also nonmerit of that kind. how does it produce an effect?’ We respond to this as follows: 17. [consisting in the ritual of reciting the formula]. Hence. 17. From the use of that temple in such ways that beings are killed there. first of all.6.7.e. virtuous and nonvirtuous motion. these are the seven types of karma: virtuous and nonvirtuous speech. they are indicated & made manifest as karma—they are defined as karma (karmalakṣaṇa). arise ceaselessly. undemonstrative [karmic forms] that are by nature accumulating merit arise in one. [but this problem] does not apply to us. that continuum does not occur. “In sum. does it remain until it matures? Or does it not remain because it ceases immediately upon arising? If. that has continuity with use.. . If it has ceased [before the maturation]. These undemonstrative [karmic forms discussed in these two examples] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a non-dispassionate character. And you have said. “From today forward. karma remains until it matures. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be karmic manifestations. there is a continuation (anugama) arisen in the continuum (santāna) of the giver. then having ceased. how does it produce an effect? 35 40 … At this point.” Although they are by nature form (rūpa) and action (kriyā). “[For others’ theory of karma. there are also the other undemonstrative [karmic forms] that. then it would be permanent. This karma that [you] have stated to be of various types. An example is the construction of a temple where beings are killed. unlike demonstrative [forms]. likewise [undemonstrative karmic forms]. And [there is] the non-merit of that type—i.

the mental continuum proceeds from a state of mind [involving an intention]. and by nature it is karmically neutral (avyākṛta). “From the seed comes a continuum. “leaves” and so on. 25 30 “And what is that idea? We say.” “shoot” (kāṇḍa).. as such. In terms of realms. inasmuch as it has gone out of existence.9. That is. Moreover. it is of four kinds. “The imperishability (avipraṇāśa) is like a contract. it is demonstrated that the seed is the cause of a result which is the continuum starting with the sprout. “stalk” (nāla).12 . [for those two reasons]. 17. 17. the effect does not occur. This being the case. it is a continuum that bears the names “sprout. Dharma’s result is the five objects of sensual desire (kāmaguṇa) in this [life] and the future. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal. it goes out of existence immediately after occurring. 17.Wisdom Page 52 5 10 “In this [verse it says the following]. 17. but it does not follow that. And from the continuum starting with a sprout that proceeds [from the seed]. and the result comes from that continuum. however.8. the seed]. therefore. “The ten forms of pure karmic action are the means to accomplish Dharma. without the seed. “From the state of mind comes a continuum. and it does not occur when there is no [seed].13.” It is like the contract for a loan. They say. that continuum starting with the sprout does not occur. Therefore. And without that state of mind (citta). although it is small. [the result] occurs when there is [the seed]. … Such is the way that some answer the objection [that a ceased entity cannot have a karmic effect]. Therefore. Even though the seed is momentary. Therefore. one should know 35 . if one were to have this idea (kalpanā) [about karma]. “Therefore. regard to those [who have just given the above answer]. the effect is preceded by karma. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal. this host of effects arises provided that the supporting conditions are not incomplete. Others. 15 20 17. [when] a virtuous karmic act is committed. the one described by the buddhas. and from that [continuum] comes the [karmic] effect. at that very time there arises in the karmic agent’s continuum an unassociated entity (viprayukto dharmaḥ) which is called that karmic act’s “imperishability. raise problem[s] and offer [their own] answer to the objection. the effect is preceded by the seed.11.14. [This does not follow] because when that karmic act is committed. pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas. “In this regard. 17. and karma is like a loan. this idea does not make sense in this context. The seed. then ceases. having become that cause.10. a vast host of effects arise from the cause [i. its result would also be nonexistent. “There are numerous and severe problems. 17. “I will tell you the idea that is applied here.e. and the effect arises from that continuum. it is by nature the cause of a continuum that has the distinctive capacity to produce a distinctive future effect of the same type.

“It is not abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. Therefore. rather (vā). which are of two kinds. whether [those committed karmic acts] be similar or dissimilar. the [imperishability might] remain. “The imperishability is not [on of the afflictions] to be abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing].Wisdom Page 53 5 10 15 that the imperishability is like a contract. “An [imperishability] ceases through the transcending of a result [on the path] or through death. “Therefore. as in a consummated contract. Moreover. this “imperishability.18. [Rather]. “Furthermore.16. through establishing [by that karma] another entity called “imperishability. 20 25 30 17.1. it is only to be abandoned [on the path of] cultivation. 17.15. having given [its] matured [effect]. is stated in other sūtras to be of four kinds in accord with the realm [of the karmic agent]—that is. 17. … 17. 17. “For all [karmic acts].2. One should classify an imperishability as either contaminated or uncontaminated.19. it cannot cause another payment. The word “rather” (vā).15. The karmic actions of an ordinary person are abandoned through the path of seeing. an imperishability is not destroyed even though the karmic act has been destroyed. Instead. even though the karmic act of that [kind of imperishability] is abandoned. there is rather the abandoning of the imperishability through the path of cultivation. a [karmic act’s] imperishability. that [creditor] is connected to a sum of wealth with compounded interest [to be paid at] another time. the creditor does not lose his investment even if [all of the lent] wealth has been used. Likewise. a single [imperishability] arises for all of the [committed] karmic acts of the same cosmological level. Likewise. [when] a loan contract has made the lender receive his payment and been consummated (nirbhuṅkta). or [one who is of the] uncontaminated [realm]. cannot connect the karmic agent to another matured effect (vipāka). This being the case. Through establishing a loan contract. although the karmic act has ceased. 17. but even āryas have the karma of an ordinary person. means that [an imperishability] is to be abandoned only after transcending the realm [in which its karmic act was performed].17. karmic acts’ effect arises through [their] imperishability. in terms of the distinction of being [an agent] acting in the desire. the imperishability is not abandoned through the path of seeing. 35 . Even though [the effect] has ripened.” the karmic agent is connected to the result caused by that [karmic act]. “If [the imperishability] were to be abandoned through the abandonment [on the path of seeing] or through the progression (saṃkrama) of [its] karmic act. regardless of whether or not that [imperishability] still exists. And one should know that the karma—of which that entity called “imperishability” has arisen—is like a loan. regardless of whether or not [the contract] still exists. “When connecting across lives (pratisaṃdhi). then the faults of karmic dissipation and such would absurdly ensue.” which we have stated here. used in the sense of an alternative. form or formless realms. an [imperishability] arises in the current life for each respective act.

24 . it does not cease.25. the Buddha taught that imperishability of karma is an elemental thing (dharma). but annihilationism does not. what despite will there be about [the emptiness of] bodies? 17. how could there an agent who experiences it? 17. There is no doubt that [through your view of karma. we say the following.30. then how could there be an effect arisen from karma? And if there is no effect. emptiness [makes sense]. There is no karma arisen from conditions.] all conventions are contradicted. … 17. Saṃsāra [makes sense]. then without any doubt it would be eternal. obscured with ignorance and fettered with thirst. And since it is unarisen. that being is not different than the agent who did [the karmic act].” 5 … At this point. And the fault of not living as a brahmacarin would also absurdly follow for this [position]. Why? Because it is essenceless. 17. 20 17. nor is there karma established without conditions.28. Therefore.Wisdom Page 54 17. is the agent that experiences [karmic effects]. Karma is of the nature of afflictive mental states. 17. Karma does not arise. Moreover.23. If karma and afflictive mental states are empty. “[In terms of this theory of karmic actions’ imperishability]. 10 17. then there would be the fear of experiencing [karmic results] for something that one has not done. nor is he the same as that [karmic agent]. how can karma be truly [karma]? 17. 25 35 . If karma were unmade. but they are not truly (tattvataḥ) afflictive mental states.31 . 17. and that emanated emanation may again emanate another emanation. Through his perfection of miraculous power.” 30 17.26 . If there is neither karma nor agent. Since these [alleged afflictive mental states] are not truly afflictive mental states.21.22. If karma has an essence because it is established (vyavasthitha).29. there is also no agent that commits karmic acts. “A being. If karma [existed] essentially. Karma and afflictive mental states are said to be the causal conditions for bodies. and any distinction between those who do good (puṇya) and those who do evil (pāpa) is impossible. since the eternal is not made (kriyate).then the ripened result of a [karmic action] would again be ripened. but eternalism does not.27.20. 15 17. Karma would also be unmade (akṛta)]. the Teachers may emanate a [buddha] emanation.

and as for the karma that it did. bodies. Likewise. the karmic agent is like the emanation.33.32. Afflictive mental states. karmic acts.Wisdom Page 55 17. 17. karmic agents and effects — these are all like . it is like another emanation emanated by an emanation.

like the cloud-city of the Sprites and so on. 1 .1 In this regard. whereas here there are only two theories?» The answer is that the five theories are already enumerated in those two contexts. (MAV 6. although they are not ultimately real. both internally and externally. however. whether internal or external. and having realized that the Self is the object of that belief. he intends to present a refutation of the Self only through these two theories. He also sees that through the nonperception of a Self. And since Nāgārjuna wishes to state a concise argument. But if this is the case. since they are enumerated elsewhere. he does not present them again here. If the Self were the aggregates. In other words. through the nonperception of all things whatsoever. that yogi examines the situation by asking. the yogi refutes the Self. one stops all afflictive mental states. can be subsumed under the theories that the Self LVP341. nevertheless. Rather. one can raise these possibilities: (1) the Self is based on the aggregates as its foundation.1 5 10 At this point. five theories are presented.1 . then what is ultimately real? Moreover. and he realizes that the Self is the focus of that belief. namely. and that by eliminating that belief. how does one encounter the ultimately real?» In response. Candrakīrti will restrict himself to the portions of that analysis that are presented by Nāgārjuna in this chapter.20) 15 20 25 30 Encountering reality should be understood in detail from this and other verses in Encountering Madhyamaka.1 and aggregates are identical or that they are different. consider the yogi who wishes to encounter the ultimately real and who wishes to eliminate all afflictive mental states and faults. but I will just discuss the position presented here.18 Analysis of the Self LVP340. he concisely presents the above two theories. someone objects. and effects—all of these are not ultimately real. As for encountering ultimate reality. (2) the Self is the foundation for the aggregates. Therefore. These theories. agents. in both the ‘Analysis of the Tathāgata’ (MMK 22) and the ‘Analysis of Fire and Fuel’ (MMK 10). one eliminates that belief in a transient assemblage as the Self. or (3) the Self is the possessor of the aggregates. “What is the root of saṃsāra?” Examining it in this way. the ultimately real is the utter cessation of the habitual sense of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra) and the habitual sense of ‘My’ (mamakāra). although MAV has a more extensive analysis. embodiments. which are thus based on the Self. then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. 35 One might ask. «Afflictive mental states. he first investigates the Self as follows: “What is this so-called Self. that the Self and the aggregates are the same or that they are different. we say the following. In this context. or as distinct from the aggregates?” Here. then it would partake in occurrence and destruction. With this in mind. If it were something other than the aggregates. they appear to childish beings as if they were ultimately real. which is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’? And when conceiving of this object of the habitual sense of ‘I.’ does one think of it as essentially the aggregates. «Why is it that elsewhere. Encountering Madhyamaka says: Insightfully seeing through his intellect that all afflictive mental states and flaws arise from the belief that a transient assemblage is the Self. he sees that its root is the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. actions. he says: 18. Understanding that afflictive mental states are eliminated in this fashion.

On this theory. one produced by causes and thus capable of producing effects—necessarily endures for only an instant (kṣaṇa). if the 20 25 The term for cessation is nirvṛtti. 3 Since the karmic agent would thus cease every moment. Here. 4 3 2 . being previously nonexistent. because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta). then it would follow that the Self would partake in occurrence and destruction—that is. if one were to maintain that the Self were identical to the aggregates. Candrakīrti here refers to the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). the Self. The aggregates are known to be causally efficient. and it would not be incorrect for the term “Self” to refer to a substance. in the first place. but it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates.4 Therefore. it must be contradictory to maintain that the Self is the aggregates. it would follow that the Self is a substance. would not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. the Self would be numerous.. According the ontology of Vaibhāṣika Abhidarma. so I will not again offer any extensive elaboration now. the aggregates cease in Nirvāṇa. then a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed. and the karma accumulated by one Self would be experienced by another. which here refers to Buddhist nirvāṇa. (See AK: 0000). the substratum arises and ceases. it would become something that arises and ceases— since the aggregates partake in occurrence and destruction.12) And he will also say: 10 The Self is not the substratum. If it were to arise. the Self is not the aggregates. there would be no karmic result for him. For if the Self were something other than the aggregates. then since the aggregates are numerous. arises. a horse. And it is not accepted that the Self arises and ceases because various problems would absurdly follow. And since the opponent here accepts that the cessation of the Self in this fashion would amount to Annihilationism (ucchedavāda).e. all conditioned entities (saṃskṛtadharma) are conditioned in part because they are subject to the causes and conditions that produce them. any causally efficient entity—i.Wisdom Page 57 5 In this regard. (MAV 6. Likewise. Being produced from causes.127-128) LVP343. how could that which relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? (MMK 27. then it too would endure only a moment. if one thinks that the Self is the aggregates. and cessation (nirodha).1 Also. For example. See MAVBh (296a). then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. when it is conceived as different from the aggregates. and thus they endure only a moment.1 This position should be understood through studying this section of Encountering Madhyamaka. the Self would also cease. the aggregates arise from causes and conditions and their defining characteristics are occurrence. they have three defining characteristics: arisal (jāti). if the Self were identical to the aggregates. such an entity comes into and goes out of existence every moment.2 and in every moment prior to cessation it would arise and cease. (MMK 27. 15 If the Self were the aggregates. The point is that. hence. which is different from a cow. or else the Self would have arisen causelessly.6) LVP342. one should understand this position through the analysis presented in Encountering Madhyamaka in the section that begins. as Nāgārjuna will later explain when he says: It is not the case that the Self. perdurance and decay. And so. then since according to Candrakīrti’s Buddhist interlocutor. does not have a cow as its defining characteristic. perdurance (sthiti). In any case. The Self would necessarily be annihilated in cessation. In the same manner.

they become confused by what is merely spurious inference. Someone objects. because it is unconditioned. The Self is not. he refutes the above notion of Self in even conventional terms. It is true that the Tīrthikas state a defining characteristic of the Self separate from the aggregates. or it would be like nirvāṇa. just as consciousness is apprehended as established with a defining characteristic distinct from material form. as you maintain. through not properly understanding dependent designation. they do not realize. there is an image of one’s face. “If the Self were different from the aggregates.1 of its defining characteristics. that the Self is merely nominal. ‘I’ am not seen. Nāgārjuna LVP345. the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. In the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (MMK 8).Wisdom Page 58 5 10 15 Self does not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics.” These are the defining characteristics of the five aggregates: (1) malleability. here is another meaning of the statement. then the Self would be established with a distinct defining characteristic. 20 25 30 35 40 Since the above has already been stated. And the way that the Tīrthikas speak of a separate defining characteristic for the Self is stated in the following verse from Encountering Madhyamaka: The Tīrthikas conceive of a Self that is by nature eternal. they depart even from conventional reality. they conceptually construct a Self due to their confusion.142) We respond as follows. As such.1 says that the Self and its substratum are established in mutual dependence on each other. hence. it is an experiencer without being an agent. without relying on the aggregates. Not realizing this. due to their fear. it is not really anything at all. and they then state its defining characteristic. the image of one’s face is not seen. It is also said. and by saying this. (4) conditioning. . then the Self would not have occurrence. As such. it would not be called the “Self. there is the habitual sense of ‘I. The Tīrthikas’ system has come to be further divided in terms of this or that distinction in the qualities predicated of the Self.’ but like the image of one’s face. Alternatively. (3) the apprehension of an object’s sign. however. apprehended in that fashion. and due to their false concepts. and (5) representation of an object. it is observed that. it would be apprehended as being established with a distinct defining characteristic. perdurance and decay as its defining characteristics. Hence. it is devoid of qualities and inactive. Thus confused. it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. there is no Self distinct from the aggregates. but in reality it is not anything at all. It is observed that. and they thus speak LVP344. in dependence upon the aggregates. I will not labor to demonstrate this point here. «The Tīrthikas know of a Self separate from the aggregates. the Self would either be like a sky flower.’ Therefore. Without relying on a mirror. (2) experience. but they do not state its defining characteristic after having perceived the Self in its actuality. so too. Likewise. just as consciousness is asserted to be different from material form. this way of refuting the Self does not refute them. And in that case. because it does not exist. Rather. If. the Self were asserted to be different from the aggregates.» (MAV 6. in dependence upon a mirror.” nor would it be reasonable for it to be the object of the habitual sense of ‘I.

intent on searing the rough and dry earth. they are far from seeing the suchness of the entities that are the Self and the Self-owned in accord with the way those entities are established. (RV1. 5 20 25 30 35 . but being signless like a mirage.Wisdom Page 59 5 Imbued with the error of ignorance. Likewise. A form that is viewed from afar is seen clearly by those nearby. even though a series of statements might be false. when the yogis realize the essencelessness of the Self. who dwell LVP347. beings obsessively apprehend the Self. but it is not water. while it may indeed be the case that no thing can arise from an unreal seed. Perceiving the rays of the shining sun. if a mirage is actually water. 18. if the Self does not exist.1. one might reasonably say that much can come from a false seed. A mirage seems to be water. and as such.29-30)5 In the summer. the aggregates do not arise again. however. those seeking liberation do not perceive it in this manner in terms of some essential existence. the habitual sense of ‘I’ is ultimately unreal. wishing to climb to the middle of a cloudless sky.. and the focus of that obsessive apprehension is that which is being just dependently designated. false entities—namely. how could the Self-owned (ātmīya) exist? LVP346. the mirage induces a cognition. the five aggregates. thus.e. they may still motivate action — they might even lead to a war. that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is a false belief) and the unreality of that statement of belief (i. but they are not the Self. Likewise. The problem is that. wavers slightly. due to their distorted vision. nor is it real. nor are they even real. As the Master has said. if a chariot is burned.e. “The five aggregates appear to be its substratum. the aggregates seem to be the Self. To those. it is not seen by those nearby. Indeed. As Nāgārjuna said in the Ratnāvalī: 10 15 The aggregates arise from the habitual sense of ‘I’. that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is asat. however. induce such a cognition in those who are nearby.52-54) Due to the non-perception of the Self and the Self-owned. and its blazing rays. Likewise. Hence. is it then defined by the aggregates or not defined by the aggregates?” Investigating the Self in every way. then its parts are not perceived because they have been burned. they do not appear to be real. “unreal”). Those who seek liberation should examine that focus by asking. the imputations that are the Self and the aggregates—appear to be real to ordinary persons due to their ignorance. (RV1.1 Since the Self is not perceived. living in saṃsāra. one all the more easily does not perceive the Self-owned.1 near the vision of those entities’ suchness. one forsakes the habitual sense of ‘I. the final month’s midday sun. and in that cognition dark blue water appears. In those people who are far from it.’ And since it has been forsaken. which are the basis for that designation.. people perceive a mirage that looks like water. necessarily Note here the slippage between the truth value of a statement or belief (i. just then do they necessarily realize also the essencelessness of those Self-owned entities. How can anything whose seed is unreal be ultimately produced? Seeing that the aggregates are thus unreal. why do those nearby not see it? Those far away who view the world see it to be real just as it is. The mirage does not. the yogi dwells near the vision of the ultimate. are like the spouting flames of an intense fire. That is.2. for them. and focusing on a rough and dry place. the aggregates.

his Self is established. As the Blessed One has said. as are his aggregates. thinking. they are the five aggregates.” is a child following a faulty path.2.1 30 Even the one who practices is essentially empty: this is so for the wise. LVP349. Empty things are proclaimed through words: with words it is said.’ then one does not see. LVP348. Internally and externally.Wisdom Page 60 18. The Blessed One also said. See that the internal is empty! See that the external is empty! Even the one who meditates on emptiness does not exist! He likewise said.» This is not so. the aggregates. he is without ‘mine’ and without the habitual sense of ‘I. As a result. how could some other entity exist such that it would lack ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’? In contrast. And hence. so know that things are unthinkable. The aggregates are essentially empty and void. thinking.4 . “Quieting” them means that they do not arise. because: 5 10 18. He who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’ does not exist. the yogi becomes one who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’.’ then one does not see reality (tattva). “They are beyond words. i. The Self is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’. birth ceases..1 The ‘Self’s possessions’ (ātmanīna) are that which aid the Self.3.” One who ponders things. 25 All mental sophistry (cittavitarkaṇa) is conceptual structuring (prapañca). the Self-owned. when [the thoughts] “I” and “my” have ceased. In no way is the essential reality of the Self and aggregates perceived. appropriation (upādāna) ceases. fully extinguished. fully extinguished. one should realize that if one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. . If one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. and inasmuch as he exists.’ due to quieting the Self and the Self’s possessions. Through the cessation of appropriation. are the objects of the habitual sense of ‘my’. “They are extinguished. not the childish. In other words. the Self-owned. the Element (dhātu) is essentially empty and void. 15 20 One who ponders things. «But this yogi who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’ does exist. 18. that being the case.e. “They are extinguished.2. that they are not perceived.” is one whose mind has not arisen and does not exist.

And from eliminating appropriation comes the end of birth. cot and tot. ordinary person. Conceptual structuring. ascetic vows. mukuṭa (“diadem”) and ratha (“chariot). and so on. I know your root: you are born from conceptuality. 20 This is so because afflictive mental states such as desire arise in one who. The process of stopping birth is established in this fashion. fame and obscurity. one form of mental elaboration consists merely in the association of sounds in one word with the sounds in another. instrument and action. come from concepts. then. one eliminates the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self.1 which has appropriation as its causal condition. the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self is the root of all afflictive mental states. is that thing due to the cessation of which karma and afflictive states also cease? You should say what it is.Wisdom Page 61 5 According to the sūtras.5. namely. Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptuality (vikalpa). views. there is no more saṃsāric existence. or to put it another way. And if saṃsāric existence has been stopped. and error. their cause. they cease when one sees that all things are empty of essence. 10 15 This is so because. and so they do not cause conceptual structuring to The actual examples here are ghaṭa (“water-pot”). as a childish. desirous men do not perceive a barren women’s daughter to be elegantly beautiful and youthful. ceases in emptiness. lot. Through eliminating that belief. decay. and that comes from conceptual structuring (prapañca). The point of this litany is simply that the words contain similar sounds in Sanskrit. and therefore it is established that 18.1. No longer will I conceptualize you. that is.5. the babble of language. thus. karma and afflictive mental states. female and male. object. it is their origin. LVP350. when one has eliminated appropriation. praise and blame.» We respond: 18. and confusion come from conceptuality because they arise in dependence on the beautiful. the ugly. (MMK 23. agent. it is established that through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. for example. one eliminates the four kinds of appropriation. This is so because.1) And it is also said in a sūtra.2.1 . linguistic referent and linguistic expression.6 material form and sensation. is improperly conceptualizing material form and so on. Through the nonperception of the Self and the Self-owned. how could birth. however. 25 Desire. paṭa (“cloth”). first of all. aversion. In this manner. and thus. death and so on occur? Thus. 6 30 35 LVP351. pot. you will no longer be in me. the appropriation of desire. defined as repeated existence in saṃsāra (punarbhava). happiness and suffering. As Nāgārjuna will explain: It is said that attachment. and Self-oriented philosophies. «What. How so? Because the aforementioned web of conceptual structuring occurs [only] if one perceives a real thing. And the concepts arise from various kinds of conceptual structuring to which one has become conditioned throughout one’s beginningless saṃsāric existence. through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. gain and loss. All of these worldly conceptual structures cease in emptiness. Those various kinds of conceptual structuring include: knowledge and the known object.

And through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states. dwell in the practice of nonconceptual wisdom? And hence. in short. How much more so is the case for the great bodhisattvas who. non-harm. then I-making will not occur. And through the cessation of concepts. [on the part of the saintly śrāvaka] there is no determination of something in its real nature that is an “I” devoid of I-making and Mymaking. they are neither the Self nor the Self-owned.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states.” As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: The Transcendent Ones have said that the Dharma is. they do not experience saṃsāra. aging and death. they do not experience the jungle of saṃsāra. all karma and afflictive mental states cease. “One who is my-less and lacks I-making does not exist.” LVP352. In the same manner. they do not engage in virtuous. which is called “birth. there are only these two. they do not focus distorted (ayoniśaḥ) conceptuality on that object. wailing. suffering.23) 25 In contrast. Therefore. and when the Self is [known to be] nonexistent. And without having concepts. And due to the elimination of conceptual structuring. Hence. from resorting to emptiness. the Self is the object of I-making. I have already explained how it is that this master is not following Master Nāgārjuna in regard to this issue.” what is born and dies is merely elements (dharma). And not engaging in karmic actions. those men do not produce the host of afflictive mental states. emptiness itself is called. And without focusing conceptual structuring on that object. Yogis in the state of seeing emptiness do not perceive an essential reality of the aggregates. decay and death. seeing that all conditioned things are unarisen. a saintly śrāvaka has the realization. “Nirvāṇa. they do not engage in karmic actions. (CŚ 12.1 30 35 In Encountering Madhyamaka. Mymaking does not make any sense with regard to any internal or external thing. they do not produce the host of afflictive mental states.” That is to say. since it is defined by the cessation of all conceptual structuring. that single web of the grief. Master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness as explained above. which have the nature of satkāyadṛṣṭi. except for a conventional designation. Nāgārjuna says. from the imagined determination of “I” and “My.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states beginning with satkāyadṛṣṭi.1 . I presented my critique in the passage beginning. Instead. he says: The aggregates are a mere collection of conditioned entities that arise in one moment and cease in the next. they do not cause conceptual structuring to occur with them as objects. nonvirtuous or immutable karmic actions. from the imagined determination of “I” and “My. Scrutinizing that collection of entities in that fashion. there comes the elimination of all conceptual structuring. And without doing karmic actions. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi.” Hence. and that emptiness itself is nirvāṇa. And without focusing conceptual structures on that object. distress and confusion that comes from birth. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi. extensions or elements. Not perceiving an essential reality of things. “And at the LVP353. In our view. the web of concepts. concepts cease.Wisdom Page 62 5 10 15 20 occur with her as an object. birth ceases. they do not have concepts about it. And just by virtue of the absence of that. which is defined as the peace that is the quieting of all conceptual structuring. “Since there is no entity that is called a “Self. And without focusing a web of concepts on that object.

. but not of things). or “I will be a Dharma King!”: one who wishes to do such things cannot succeed. If that is the case. 15 LVP354. 20 The Self is the Self’s savior. but there are elemental things with their causes. whereas the śrāvakas have a less extensive realization (i. How are the above statements. not contradicted by your position?» We respond as follows. he said: Positive and negative karma does not just disappear. which go on at length. If he does not resort to this tolerance. it will be experienced by one’s Self. Having been done by one’s Self. On the same issue in the Eight Thousand Lines on the Perfection of Wisdom. someone objects.Wisdom Page 63 stage called ‘Far Advanced. The gist of the argument in Candrakīrti’s commentary on this verse is that if it takes until the seventh stage for a bodhisattva to exceed a śrāvaka in intelligence.”7 Hence. and if a bodhisattva at the first stage (where emptiness has been directly realized) is already superior to the śrāvakas in some other regard. then the distinction between bodhisattvas and śrāvakas cannot be that the former has a more extensive realization (i. one who wishes to awaken to a pratyekabuddha’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom And Subhūti. One does not transfer the karmic result to someone else. then how does it not contradict this statement by the Blessed One: The Self is the Self’s savior. they realize the essencelessness of things).1 At this point. Translation by Huntington (1989:150).1 25 MAV 1.8cd. one who wishes to awaken to a śrāvaka’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom. nor does it occur causelessly. And in the King of Samādhi. «Suppose it has been established that suchness (tattva) is the nonoccurrence of conceptual webs concerning the internal or external as “I” and “My.” and that this nonoccurrence comes about due to the nonperception of external and internal things. Subhūti.e.e. good and bad. Is it not so that the Blessed One also said this: There is neither a being nor a Self here. I will not go to the effort of critiquing him again now. what other protector could there be? For the Self is the witness to one’s deeds. 7 . And did he not likewise say: LVP355.. they realize only the essencelessness of persons. the Blessed One said: 5 Subhūti. or “I will become a pratyekabuddha!”.’ he will surpass them in intelligence as well. And he also said: 10 “I will become a Sugata’s śrāvaka!”. what other protector could there be? For it is through a well tamed Self that the wise reach heaven. the great bodhisattva who wishes to awaken to complete and perfect awakening should practice this Perfection of Wisdom. just as one cannot cross the river if one fails to see the ford.

Thus. namely. and denying that. 5 And did he not also say that all things are Selfless? But how then could there be no contradiction between these passages and the preceding passages? Hence..1 . “Self.” and “wind. we should seek the intention of the Blessed One’s teaching in these contexts.” and they have also taught. In some persons.” “water. they entirely cure the enormous sickness that is the negative mental states.6. Some disciples. method and great compassion.” Through these denials. the buddhas are intent upon fulfilling their promise to uplift every world of beings. and so on.” Even though they fly far. “This world does not exist. which are divided into the definitive and the interpretable. grain mush. they are intent on describing the names. and even though they engage in positive karmic acts and shun negative ones.Wisdom Page 64 The Self is not material form. Chapter 8. however. There is no such thing as spontaneously born beings.1 The intention here is as follows. nor does the next. like the perceptions that come from an intoxicant with a special intoxicating and stupefying capacity that is caused by its production from the mere ripening of certain substances. the distinctive and desired result that is heaven or emancipation. Hence. The Self is not in material form. they are always and constantly engaged in conditioning themselves with nonvirtuous karmic acts. they reject the next world and the Self by saying things such as. even though those things are not beyond the scope of pure worldly vision. Hence. for the inferior disciples who are engaged in nonvirtuous karmic deeds. The peerless friends of many worlds (jagad). There is no such thing as the maturation of the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds. The Self is not in consciousness. above) and also from the Encountering Madhyamaka. they are headed for a fall into the great chasm of hell and so on. and they do so fully equipped with wisdom.” “fire. the great kings among healers. …The Self is not consciousness. are like birds bound with a cord that is tough—due to the difficulty of the belief in a real Self—and very long—due the love of “I” and “My. These buddhas desire to care for disciples of inferior. and the Self is not that which possesses material form. the eye of the intellect is entirely covered by the thick cataracts of inferior theories that are mistaken about the unreality of the Self and the Selfless. Hence. and this can be learned in detail from the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (i. 18.” LVP356. they do not see the various things of the world. the buddhas have used the label. nor is consciousness in the Self. middling and great capacities. elements and measures of “earth. nor is material form in the Self. such as roots. In order to eliminate those beings’ false view. Doing so. they deny what has come before and what will come next.1 behavior. “the Selfless. As such.1 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . being bound with that cord LVP358. the buddhas conform to the mindset (āśaya) of each world of beings which are of eighty-four thousand different kinds in terms of beings’ minds and LVP357. the blessed buddhas in some cases make it known in the world. I will not make any further effort here for the sake of refuting that view. The blessed buddhas are like never-setting suns intent on making the host of lotuses that are the disciples’ minds bloom with the extensive sunbeams that are their great compassion. methods and awareness. nor is the Self that which possesses consciousness. Doing so. While established within just conventional reality. they do this so as to turn those disciples away from nonvirtue and so on. In general in their sayings. they reject what leads to a certain kind of result.” They thus say that minds have just arisen from the mere ripening of the elements in the embryo and so on. a leavening agent.e. There is also an argument to refute those who reject causality. “It is so—there is a Self”.

Last one refutes all. so too its opposite—the view that there is no Self—is also not ultimately true. the Buddha taught the Dharma in accord with his disciples’ abilities. In this way. These excellent disciples are devoid of Selflove.Wisdom Page 65 5 they are still unable to pass beyond the Three Dimensions and obtain peaceful nirvāṇa. 18. its essence is wisdom and compassion. It is for this reason that Āryadeva said. and it is the LVP360. and “Selflessness” is a second extreme. nor any non-Self whatsoever. however. At first. To some. the Master said. or to negate non-Self. Next one refutes the Self. Kāśyapa. deep words. As for what one sees. and so on. and they have the capacity to plumb the depths of the actual meaning of the king of sage’s highest. Having determined that these disciples have that distinctive aspiration. it cannot be marked. he taught a profound Dharma that terrifies the timid. This is as it says in the Āryaratnakūṭa: 10 15 Kāśyapa. due to the various intentions of lesser. A grammarian will make some students recite even the alphabet. wishing to take care of those disciples. In some disciples. 35 He taught to some a Dharma not based on duality. (RV2. the buddhas have taught. For these middling disciples—so as to cool their attachment to the belief that the transient collection of mind and body is a real Self. hears.6. The Dharma he taught to some is for the purpose of stopping negativity. the teaching of the blessed buddhas’ dharma occurred in such a way as to negate the Self. where there is neither decay nor death.” There is. so too. the true discernment of things.” Just as the view that there is a Self is not ultimately true (atattva). he taught one that is based upon duality.1 20 In this way. (CŚ8.3-4) 25 In this way. a seed that is an intense aspiration for the profound dharma—an interest obtained through the distinctive qualities that come from previous habituation. LVP359.1 . “Self” is one extreme. The one who knows this is wise. the Great Sage refuted both the belief in Self and in non-Self. neither is real. The middle that is between these two extremes is cannot be indicated (arūpya). that seed has ripened and they have drawn close to nirvāṇa. it cannot be shown.2. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. It has neither location nor appearance. “There is no Self. neither Self nor non-Self is ultimately perceived just as it is. taught. And to some. It cannot be represented. it is aimed at the practice of virtue. there Mādhyamikas do not contradict the scriptures. Likewise. they taught that there is neither any Self. And to some. the Sage did not call them either real or unreal. or to negate both. and so as to engender within them a yearning for nirvāṇa—the blessed buddhas. because from a thesis comes its antithesis. it is called the middle way. Thus.15) 30 Likewise. middling and excellent disciples. And in the Ratnāvalī it says. Therefore. Therefore. one refutes the absence of virtue.

“Good sir. through their reasoning see no Self that would be an agent of continuity [from one life to the next]. they assert that there is no Self. it has been said. all wishing (praṇidhāna) is pacified. The ‘pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence’ is a synonym for the pacification of I-making and My-making. “Oh Blessed One.” 15 As it says in the Tathāgataguhyasūtra. And through the pacification of all wishing. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. so too the buddhas do not at all see any real entity (vastusvarūpa) such as a “self. flies and so on that are perceived by those with cataracts. 10 But just as those without cataracts do not at all see the hairs.6] is as follows. pacification. The ‘pacification of eternalism and annihilationism’ is a synonym for the pacification of the belief that the transient constituents of mind and body constitute an essential Self. another meaning [of MMK18. the term ‘pacification’ is a synonym for the pacification of the negative mental states. ‘pacification. these thinkers posit a Self [so as to provide some basis for that relation]. And so. LVP361. The ‘pacification of ideas. all negative mental states are pacified. all of its branches. all negative mental states are pacified.94-96) Alternatively. Through pacifying the belief in the transient constituents as the Self. all beliefs are pacified. concepts. Śāntamati.Wisdom Page 66 means to attain awakening.1 5 20 25 30 35 40 . They do so with statements such as. (RV4. The ‘pacification of the negative mental states’ is a synonym for the pacification of ideas. this is what the learned say. leaves and fruit wither. For example. There is a person just to the extent that there is an object of the senses. when a tree’s root is cut. Oh Bhadrā. Not seeing such things. there is no relation between karmic acts and their results.” or a “non-self” that is imagined by childish persons. The ‘pacification of causes and perceptual conditions’ is a synonym for the pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence. and it is a jackal’s foot. and conceptual constructions’ is a synonym for the pacification of recognition and mentation (manasikāra). all those negative mental states arise from the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. by pacifying the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Perceiving this. So too. The ‘pacification of recognition and mentation’ is a synonym for the pacification of error. The ‘pacification of error’ is a synonym for the pacification of causes and perceptual conditions.’ But what is this ‘pacification’? And from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One answered. Therefore. the bodhisattva Śāntamati said this to the Blessed One. Śāntamati. concepts.2] so too. in the case that karmic imprints (saṃskāra) go out of existence every moment.6. on the other hand. The Lokāyatas. Hence. [18. some negative mental states occur in a way that is connected to the belief in perceptual conditions and causes. The ‘pacification of I-making and My-making’ is a synonym for the pacification of eternalism and annihilationism. and conceptual constructions. the buddhas have taught. Through the pacification of all beliefs. Śāntamati. Some thinkers such as the Sāṃkhyas perceive that.

if the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is not recognized. For example. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is also the fact that. That is what is called “peace. but without perceptual objects. Śāntamati. unceased. “Oh Blessed One. Such is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. of wishlessness. it is the non-occurrence of a person. In this regard. it is the non-occurrence of beings. «If the blessed buddhas taught neither ‘Self’ nor ‘notSelf. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. they do not adhere. But when the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is recognized. then all appropriation and affliction do not arise. it stops. Not burning it is said to be pacified. they do not accumulate. it is not put together. that is not made. fire burns in dependence on its fuel.” Śāntamati said. the mind burns.’ But from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One said. one does not apprehend that belief. all appropriation and affliction arises. of signlessness. to recognize the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is to know that this unlocated view has no location. Śāntamati. what is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self?” The Blessed One answered. it stops. it has been said. they are unreal. They do not come together.Wisdom Page 67 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Śāntamati. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is the non-occurrence (asamutthāna) of the Self. it is not conceptualized. that is not imagined. Like nirvāṇa.7. What is not imagined and not conceptualized. Śāntamati. due to perceptual objects. it is the non-occurrence of views. “Through perceptual objects (ārambana).” through the view of emptiness. The one that does not repeatedly take perceptual objects does not burn. That belief is not located at all. but without depending on its fuel. of non-conditioning. So too. they do not cause harm. it is the non-occurrence of a living thing. “Śāntamati. ‘pacified. that belief is not located internally. of the unknown. At this point. they are imagined. someone says. Śāntamati. Śāntamati. From the very beginning. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is a synonym for emptiness. Moreover. LVP362. they do not come apart. one does not apprehend that belief. And what is unreal and imagined. through the tolerance conducive to emptiness. Śāntamati.1 LVP364. Śāntamati.1 LVP363. pacified. of nonoccurrence—through this view. that which is to be named has ceased. Śāntamati. is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. the “transient constituents” are not constituents. the one who is purified by the perfection of wisdom. Śāntamati. the mind burns. as for “transient constituents. This too. nor is it located externally. “But Blessed One. When the mental object has ceased.’ then what did they teach?» We respond: 18.1 . the bodhisattva with skill in means. they do not conglomerate.” Śāntamati asked. yet he does not pacify the perception of the root of virtue. it is not determinately known. it is not made to occur. that bodhisattva knows the pacification of all perceptual objects.

how could words refer? Therefore. it dries up the ocean of decay and death. “When the mental object has ceased. humanoids (kinnara). then to what would a semantic sign be attributed such that words would refer to it? Demonstrating why it is that there is no mental object. through the nonperception of any external or internal real thing. Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama). humans. the essence of things (dharmasvabhāva). the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. An object (gocara) is an object (viṣaya). will pass into final nirvāṇa. LVP365. If there were some object of the mind. For this reason. that which is to be named has ceased. why is it that what is to be named has ceased in the ultimate? Why is it that the mental object has ceased in the ultimate? Nāgārjuna says.1 20 25 30 35 40 . “when the mental object has ceased….” The explanation of this line as given before should be added here. and it embarrassingly outshines the mass of rays that come from the seven suns which cause the fire in the eon LVP366. And when the mind is not engaged. the nature of things (dharmaprakṛti)—is established to be unarisen.” Like nirvāṇa. that which is to be named has ceased. and one night the Tathāgata. Between these two nights. namely. “When the mental object has ceased. ceases in emptiness. however. «Previously. it remains entirely the case that the buddhas did not teach anything at all. both internally and externally.” In this phrase. when there is no object of words—then the buddhas do not teach anything at all. “Like nirvāṇa.4]. unceased. the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere. and so on. the Tathāgataguhyasūtra says. But what kind of thing is this ultimate? Can it be expressed or known?» Therefore.1 There might be. How. another objection: «It has been said [at 18. Someone objects.” But how is there the cessation of conceptual structuring in emptiness?» Our response is as in the one given just above. And there is yet another interpretation of the verse (atha vā). unceased. what must be supplied is “in the ultimate” (tattve). if there were some real thing to be named. the ultimate (tattva) is the complete elimination of I-making and My-making.Wisdom Page 68 5 10 15 Here. But in this regard. sorcerers (vidyādhara). Such is indeed the case. however. adepts. nor will the Tathāgata do so. That light banishes the mental darkness of this and that being. The Tathāgata never spoke a single syllable. it is a perceptual object (ārambaṇa). “Conceptual structuring. That being the case. Śāntamati. it was said that. did the Blessed One give various kinds of dharma-teachings to all gods. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen.” and so on. the dharmatā—that is. Nāgārjuna says. Nāgārjuna will say [at 25. For this very reason. in this context. it makes blossom a forest of many different kinds of lotus-minds. how can there be the attribution of a semantic sign? And since there is no semantic sign. then through the attribution of some semantic sign (nimitta) to it. Through uttering just an instant of speech. in other words.” Mental object (cittagocara) means an object of the mind (cittasya gocaraḥ). Nāgārjuna says. the mind does not engage with it. demigods. But when that which is to be named has ceased—that is. “Like nirvāṇa. But when it makes no sense for there to be an object of the mind. no longer appropriating [the aggregates]. Why has that which is to be named ceased? Nāgārjuna says. unceased. one night the Tathāgata awoke to complete awakening. then that would be taught. then.5]. words would apply to it. there arises a great light like the autumn sun. the Tathāgata never uttered even a single syllable.

«The Mādhyamikas are nothing but nihilists because they say that all virtuous and non-virtuous karmic actions. Mādhyamikas are none other than nihilists. They describe this entire world and all future ones as essenceless because those worlds come into being relying upon—depending upon—causes and conditions.» This is not so. in the peaks and the crags there will be the sound. 5 Likewise. for the sake of the world. Echoed sounds are not located either internally or externally. Likewise. it is made by the ripening of the gods’ karma. it is said: From a single of your sounds flows forth. every one of them. then in the grasses and the thickets. Why? Because Mādhyamikas hold the theory of interdependence. mechanical chimes are caused to make a sound. the Āryasamādhirāja also says: 20 When the Buddha has become the Dharma-King.” Then each of the world’s sounds. 25 And so on and so forth. To that same extent flows forth the melodious sound of the Transcendent One.Wisdom Page 69 of destruction. due to previous purification. he who disciplines the world. There is no speaker here. by nature they are but froth. and yet sounds still come forth. the result and also the entire world—all these are empty of nature. “Things do not exist. Moved by the wind. so too. not one is real.1 LVP367. the agent of those actions. the speech of the Lord of Men is not located internally or externally. some raise the following objection. but in doing so. To each the Victor has said something different. the sound of the drum descends from the sky: “All desirable things are impermanent. the Buddha has no conceptuality. not eternal! They are unstable. Likewise. perishable.1 15 35 . 10 For instructing the gods there is a divine drum. the sage who elucidates all dharmas. they are the moon’s reflection in water! All things have the nature of a dream!” The drum that has resounded proceeds with Śakra and the gods to the dharma-gathering. and for the gods it gives a dharma-talk that leads to peace and freedom from lust. the sūtra says. The nihilists do not realize in this way that the next world and so on do not exist in the sense that the next world and such are empty of real essence LVP368. in the trees and among the herbs. Likewise. It also says. 30 At this point. But he has spoken with a smile for the sake of what is relevant. a sound for beings of various inclinations. Nihilists also say. They alike illusions and mirages. is unreal. the Buddha’s speech comes forth when moved by the aspirations of all beings. A god having known that he was in a state of heedlesness. “This does not exist!” Therefore.

even though there is no difference in terms of the nature of things. For example.Wisdom Page 70 5 10 15 20 25 30 because they are interdependent. “He committed the robbery!” Another person.1 (yathāvad) known by Mādhyamikas. How so? Mādhyamikas accept that things exist in conventional terms. unceased. the philosophies are not the same because of the difference in the one who is knowing things as not really established.1 35 40 One should first engage with whatever is pleasant for the [audience]. their philosophy is similar to yours because they realize the nonexistence of that which does not exist with the essence of a real thing. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen.» This is not so. there is no difference in reality concerning whether or not a robbery was committed. there will also be a difference between Mādhyamikas and nihilists. Likewise. there is no similarity—in terms of knowing and speaking—between them and the nihilists. Seeing things in this way. «Nevertheless. he falsely says. the nature of things is properly LVP369. one is called a liar. but the other will not. in the present context. in order to introduce the disciples to the essence of things. but the nihilists do not.» Although the position that things are not established really is the same. one person will be besmirched by calumny and nonvirtue. because one who has been harmed cannot at all be an appropriate vessel for the holy dharma. there is no similarity. even though they are similarly restricted to being in a particular place such as a treacherous precipice. «They are the same in terms of the notion that things are not really established. Nevertheless. Therefore. and that neither words nor thought engages with the essence of things. who speak about it and understand it. accuses him. the following verses merit mentioning: LVP370. Therefore. The masters of old (pūrvācārya) maintain that. even though the deliberate equanimity and non-deliberate equanimity of the Arhat and the ordinary person are similar in that they are both equanimity. who do not properly know the nature of things. «It may be that Like nirvāṇa. Instead. consider the case in which one person does not actually know that another person has committed a robbery. and they do not see those things as having come from another world or as proceeding to the next world. but spurred on by his enmity toward that person. they perceive the various things of this world as essentially [real]. they incorrectly deny (apavāda) those other things which are similar to the things that they have perceived in this world. The sequential teaching (anuśāsana) of the Buddha is this: “Everything is real in itself” (tathya).8. In this case. Nevertheless. But enough with this excursus! Now I will discuss just the topic at hand. being a direct witness. just as there is a great difference between a person born blind and sighted person. someone says. if it is not taught. however. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself”. and also “Everything is unreal in itself” (atathya). When properly investigated. say what that teaching is!» We respond: behold and know the blessed buddhas’ sequential teaching for introducing disciples to the deathless nectar of the ultimate: 18. therefore. there is nevertheless a great difference between them. people will not be able to know it. As such. there is a difference in terms of the ones who are knowing whether that is the case. So. At this point. there must be some sequential teaching of it in dependence on conventional reality. while the other is said to be speaking the truth. In this same way. “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. [And]: .” Concerning this verse.

all of their teachings are designed as means to introduce beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate (tattva).” the “spheres. Thus. taught that those things that they have perceived are real in themselves. “And also everything is unreal itself. Or. LVP372. likewise. in relation to childish beings.” In this regard. It is a “teaching” (śāsana) in that it leads one away from the wrong path and sets one on the right path. In the same vein. Later. in relation to their philosophy.e. he is all-seeing. For those beings. Indeed. “The world argues with me. and in their case only some small amount of the root of the tree that is the obscurations has not yet been uprooted. in a scripture the Blessed One said. and they know the methods to use. He has taught them along with their widely varied varieties. and “Neither. And conditioned things do undergo change because they perish every instant. he teaches those beings. Like a doctor who treats an illness with the medicine that is appropriate to it. at the very outset the Blessed One. they are unreal in themselves. He did so in order to make the world respect him. abiding. Whatever is considered to be not existent in the world is.1 The Blessed Ones have great compassion.” the “extensions” and so on that are imagined to be real by those who have the cataracts of ignorance. a “sequential teaching” is one that proceeds in accord with the disciple’s nature. they teach a Dharma that is appropriate to the disciples out of a desire to care for the disciples. however. for me. since change occurs. dissolution and so on of both the vessel-like world and the beings within it—everything up through the peak of existence. is omniscient. he taught. “Unreal”. but I do not argue with the world. As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: They said: “Real”. the verse means. the Transcendent Ones do not utter any statement that is not a method for introducing beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate. as real in itself].” That is. the world cannot understand without what is worldly. also considered to be not existent.” To some disciples. Whatever is considered to be existent in the world is.1 In this way. “Real and Unreal”.. But in relation to the Āryas. Here. their causes and results. as when they think. Some disciples. beginning with the wind-sphere all the way out to the elemental realm of space.” and also “Everything is unreal in itself. that which is real in itself does not undergo change. in beings to be disciplined there arises the belief (buddhi) that the Blessed One is omniscient. He has unerringly taught the arisal. “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. everything is false (mṛṣā) because they do not perceive anything in that way [i. for me. there are beings to be disciplined who have desires that come from hearing about the analysis of different kinds of things that are well known to them—things such as the “aggregates.Wisdom Page 71 The barbarian (mleccha) cannot understand when addressed in another language. their enjoyments and miseries. also considered to be existent. both of these possibilities are rejected. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself. “Everything is real in itself. “The Blessed One. just as one would reject the question of whether the son of a barren woman has a light or dark complexion. A teaching that proceeds step by step is a “sequential teaching” (anuśāsana).” In order to eliminate that small degree of obscuration. one should see that the word vā (“or”) occurs with the meaning of ca (“and”) in the sense of a demonstrative conjunction (deśanāsamuccaya).” LVP371. Therefore.” 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 .” Thus. To them he taught. Such is the sequential teaching of the Buddha. have for a long time studied and practiced the philosophy of the ultimate (tattvadarśana). everything is real in itself. who knows the entire history of the world.

from the instructions of the person without cataracts all that they understand is. to mention words?” In this way. “conceptual structuring” is speech because it is what conceptually structures and multiplies the objects to which it refers (prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā). [18. its referent is divided into multiple things.1 And it is also “nonconceptual.Wisdom Page 72 In relation to an illness. that is. non-plural—this is the definition of the ultimate (tattva).1 it through another. As it says in a sūtra. but just as with the acceptance of worldly reality (laukikatathya) in accord with conventional reality. That which is not plural is non-plural. unstructured through conceptual structuring. they know the essential reality of the hairs and such through the practice (yogena) of not seeing it.” But when their eyes have been treated with the ointment that removes cataracts and they no longer have cataracts. it is not to be understood through another’s teaching. then what more is there to ask? «That may be so. “This is false. it is to be known (√adhigam) only on one’s own. In other words. That which has a diverse referent (artha) is plural. it is “unstructured through conceptual structuring. persons with cataracts see unreal (vitatha) things that have the form of hairs. Not known through another. They are unable to know—in the way that persons without cataracts are able to know—the properly construed essential reality (svarūpa) of the hairs by using the procedure (nyāya) of not seeing it. you should also state a definition of it through the use of imputations (samāropataḥ).” Here.» Nāgārjuna says: 18.” LVP374. For example. In other words. “Which is the ultimate reality? It is the one in terms of which there is no activation even of awareness (jñānasyapy apracāra). They cannot do so even with the instructions of a person without cataracts. Concerning this verse. When their intellects’ eyes have been thus treated and the awareness of the ultimate (tattva) has arisen. that which is to be named has ceased. it is devoid of an essential nature as when a person without cataracts does not see hairs. nonconceptual. In other words.9. Since it is devoid of that. even though the Āryas teach the ultimate (tattva) through the use of imputations. then they know the ultimate (tattva) on their own through the practice of not knowing it. For this same reason. Instead. and so on.7ab] If this is the case. it is nonconceptual. Thus.” Conceptuality is mental activity (cittapracāra). is everything medicine? «The Blessed Ones give a teaching of the ultimate in order to introduce beings to it. but what is the definition of this ultimate?» We have already said: 5 When the mental object has ceased. As it says in the Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra: 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . persons who are not Āryas do not thereby know its essential reality. Thus. But the eyes of those persons’ intellects can be treated with the ointment that is the view of emptiness—an ointment that eliminates the cataracts of ignorance. And it is of a quieted nature. the essential reality (svarūpa) of things which is not known through another is their ultimate reality (tattva). then. What need. quieted. mosquitoes. “not known through another” means that there is no realization of LVP373. “unstructured through conceptual structuring” means “not articulated through words. flies. Likewise. its referent is not differentiated. the ultimate (tattva) is nonconceptual.

all things are without pluralization. the qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in that way. a sprout of rice arises in dependence on a LVP376. Here.1 rice-seed and the causal complex consisting of soil and so on. For the Āryas who have done what needs to be done so as to eliminate the saṃsāric cycle of birth decay and death. Why? Because ultimately all things are utterly unproduced. the qualities of the learners (śaikṣadharma) are the same in that way. the five heinous crimes are ultimately the same in that way. in terms of these equalities.10. all things are ultimately the same in that way. mental affliction is ultimately the same in that way. That (x) which exists depending on this (y) is not itself this (y). the qualities of ordinary persons are the same in that way. which one is true application (saṃyakprayoga)?” Mañjuśrī answered. The theoretical constructs are the same in some way. reality in itself (tathatā). it is not possible . the following is said: 18.” 20 Mañjuśrī said: “All things are ultimately the same in not being produced. Nirvāṇa is the same in some way. nor is that (x) something other than this (y). this (y) is neither annihilated nor eternal. thus. Ultimately. which is also ultimately utter non-production. “Devaputra. there is ultimately no plurality at all. Likewise. purification is ultimately the same in that way. For example. the theoretical constructs are the same in that way. “Mañjuśrī. the Dharmadhātu and utter non-production are ultimately the same in some way. Purification is ultimately the same in some way. The monk (bhikṣu) who has applied himself in this way to the equality of all things is said to be ‘truly applied. purification is ultimately utter non-production. The qualities of those beyond learning are the same in some way. Saṃsāra is the same in some way. [And the pattern continues] on up to nirvāṇa. Devaputra. affliction is ultimately utter nonproduction.” 5 10 15 LVP375. saṃsāra is the same in that way. all things are ultimately the same in being utterly unproduced. the qualities of those beyond learning are the same in that way. The qualities of ordinary persons are the same in some way. ultimately all things are the same in being nonexistent. 40 That effect arises depending on this cause—for example.Wisdom Page 73 Then Devaputra said. The qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in some way. Successive later explanations should be understood to apply here. Concerning that effect. Saṃsāra is also ultimately utter non-production.1 25 30 35 One should realize that this non-plurality is a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the ultimate (tattva) because in terms of emptiness it is of one flavor. Therefore. all things are ultimately the same. Devaputra. nirvāṇa is the same in that way. “It is in terms of which equality that all things are ultimately the same in that way that purification is ultimately the same.’ Devaputra said. such is the character of the ultimate (tattvalakṣaṇa). in terms of a worldly definition of the ultimate (tattva). The five heinous crimes are the same in some way. the space should not be pluralized. Also. Why is that? Because. However. Mental affliction is ultimately the same in some way. The qualities of the learners are the same in some way. Devaputra. on the basis of them being utterly unproduced. the space inside of an earthen vessel and the space inside of a jewel vessel are just the space element.

then the one would exist even without the other. That is. “That which is the seed is itself the sprout. one would also not apprehend the sprout. it is not born eternal. and so on. and also that it is not eternal. burning suffering of birth. it is by nature the extinction of all the suffering of existence . not plural. Nor is the effect something other than the cause. one would apprehend a seed even in the state of being a sprout. the sprout is not other than the seed because one would have to conclude that the sprout could arise even without the seed. just as one does not apprehend a seed in that context. In this way. just as one apprehends a sprout in that case. As Āryadeva said: Since a thing occurs. They thus rain down great rains of the deathless nectar that is the true dharma. the cause in dependence on which an effect arises is not itself the effect. Thus. Not singular.25) And in the Lalitavistarasūtra. fruits and blossoming vines that are the crop from the disciples’ root of virtue. Hence. one can establish that the cause is not annihilated. And as a result. these perfect buddhas are great Nāgas who grant worldly protection to the unprotected and provide shelter to those who are homeless. they wish to nurture in appropriate ways the rapid growth arisen in the grain. And since they would not be different.11. With those streams of the teaching’s nectar. the world’s saviors. it is not born annihilated.1 20 25 30 35 The perfectly awakened ones are intent upon relieving the intense. Or else. They constantly and tirelessly send forth streams of the nectar that is the teaching of the true dharma that appropriately counteracts being’s behavior. This is so for the reason expressed in: “If the one were other than the other. the nature of things (dharmatā) is neither annihilated nor eternal.” Nor is that (x) something other than this (y). it says: For example. not annihilated. one would incur the faults of pre-existent causality (satkāryavāda). Nor is it something other than that. And the seed would likewise be permanent because one would have accepted that it is not destroyed when the sprout comes into being. not eternal—such is the deathless nectar that is the teaching of the buddhas. one would be forced into eternalism.” One would be forced to accept that the seed was not annihilated even in the context of the sprout being already produced. Therefore.” That which is the seed is not itself the sprout because one would unacceptably conclude that the productive cause and the produced effect were identical. but the seed is not itself the sprout.Wisdom Page 74 5 10 15 to say. a sprout comes from an existent seed. for these reasons. Since a thing ceases. a father and his son would also be identical. in the manner that has been explained: 18. decay and death that beats down upon the world from the intensely blazing sun that is involvement in the host of negative mental states such as desire. LVP377. “That is itself this. (CŚ 10. Therefore. it does not make sense to say. These lords of the whole world have a deathless nectar that is the true dharma. and a whole host of great problems would ensue because one would be forced to accept the nonexistence of karmic cause and effect. They thus entirely cover every single region throughout all space with the great cloud that is the method of their great compassion. Hence. and as such. first of all. Therefore.

2. “Previously. Subhūti. previous life. Thus. 15 18. without regard for his life. Nevertheless. it is devoid of either eternalism or nihilism The śrāvakas who have practiced that deathless nectar—the Dharma’s quintessence—and who proceed through the sequence of learning. 20 25 30 35 . they definitely have the realization (adhigama) of that nirvāṇa whose nature is the extinction of decay and death. And somehow.12. one should realize that it is not pointless to employ this medicine—the nectar which is the true Dharma’s quintessence—that has been taught by the perfectly awakened one.1. did that great being. it is proper for the wise to seek out the true Dharma’s quintessence. knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas continues without social contact. Even if the awakened ones have not arisen in the world and the śrāvakas have disappeared. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping sought out the Perfection of Wisdom without any interest in his body. Blessed One. As it says in the Hundred. contemplating and meditating. Since that is the case. they somehow do not obtain liberation in a way LVP378. the bodhisattva called Ever Weeping (Sadāprarudita). even at the risk of their lives. favor or fame. he entered a forest and he heard sound come from the sky. Along these lines. that is. in the manner described. then there would be no realization of the nectar that is the Dharma’s quintessence because the conditions would be lacking. that great being. One should realize that. “How. the self arisen 18. caused by their study of the Dharma’s quintessence in another. the pratyekabuddhas have the realization of the Dharma’s quintessence even when there is no LVP379. the great king of healers.1 Buddha [whose teaching is active in the world]. And this is so even though they do not resort to a teacher in this life or world.12.Wisdom Page 75 5 10 (bhava) in the three worlds. by reason of not being in social contact. Seeking out the Perfection of Wisdom. To be “without contact” is to be isolated in body and mind. He will certainly obtain effortlessly in a future life. seek out the Perfection of Wisdom?” Thus addressed. there would be no Spiritual Friends who teach the saintly path of the truths. If even though they have listened to this dharma-nectar. have experienced the taste of the nectar that is the three collections of morality (śīla). Hence. the Blessed One answered the elder. Subhūti. they nevertheless will certainly achieve the definite accomplishment of liberation in another life due to the previous causes that they have established in this life. like karma. the Blessed One recounted the following in the blessed and holy Eight Thousand Lines: Subhūti asked. Hence. and rely on the causal condition that is just their devotion to isolation.1 visible in this life (dṛṣta eva dharme) because their root of virtue is not matured. Go to the east. Even if the one who knows reality does not attain nirvāṇa in this life. meditation and wisdom. good child! There will you here the Perfection of Wisdom! Go in such a way that you do not think of physical exhaustion. without concern for gain. or it means that one does not seek out a Spiritual Friend. it is devoid of either singularity or differentiation.

“Well.Wisdom Page 76 Go such that you do not think of fatigue and drowsiness. that great being. One who loses his balance and leaves these behind is one who distances himself. west. east. The tale continues up to the point where [Ever Weeping wishes to keep sprinkling the ground with water for the sake of lessening the dust where a bodhisattva named Dharmodgata is to teach the Perfection of Wisdom. one who is absorbed in one-pointed concentration. Go without looking to your left.” The passage continues to the point where it says: 5 Go such that you do not direct your mind to anything at all. Go such that you do not think of food. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping experienced the kind of pleasure that. Then. and he sprinkled the ground all around with his own blood. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of presumptions because all things are devoid of presumptions. whether internal or external. 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 .” … Thereupon. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: one should realize that the equality (samatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the equality of all things. upon seeing the great being. but not in these kinds of circumstances. the freedom (viviktatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due the freedom of all things. Distances himself away from what? Distances himself from a buddha’s qualities. nor recognition. nor will he obtain it. And this was the teaching on the Perfection of Wisdom given by the great being. Then.1 himself from a buddha’s qualities is engaged in saṃsāra. Go without looking south. I will just pierce my body and sprinkle this area of the ground with my blood. nor consciousness. the evil one. which by nature necessarily disintegrates? It is better that my body be destroyed through engaging in this kind of activity. and go without looking to the right. And he who is engaged in saṃsāra does not engage with the Perfection of Wisdom.1 is experienced by a Mendicant (bhikṣu) who is absorbed in the first meditative absorption. in any case. And in life after life in saṃsāra. The Perfection of Wisdom is unproduced because all things are unproduced. Go such that you do not lose your balance and leave physical matter. nor lose your balance and leave this transient assemblage. the great being. Good child. And one who distances LVP380. go in such a way that you are not thrown off balance by your self. LVP381. for example. decided to obstruct Ever Weeping by making all the water in that area disappear. What. The Perfection of Wisdom is limitless because all things are limitless. The Perfection of Wisdom has a single flavor because all things have a single flavor. north. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. nor sensation. at this point. good child. Why? Because this place is very dusty. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping grasped a sharp weapon and pierced his body all around. will I do with this body. The Perfection of Wisdom is unshakeable because all things are unshakeable. we rejoin the tale] at the point where Māra has made the water disappear: Ever Weeping thought. The Perfection of Wisdom is not inflexible because all things are not inflexible. Māra. and particles of dust from this area should not land on the body of that great being. Look not also in the intermediate directions [such as southeast and so on]. many thousands of my past bodies have disintegrated as a result of desire or due to desire. rather than through some type of useless activity. nor conditioning. up or down.

The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of motion (niśceṣṭa) because all things are devoid of motion. The Perfection of Wisdom is boundless in that space is boundless. And so on to this point: one should realize that the Perfection of Wisdom is not conflated because all things are not conflated. The inconceivability of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the inconceivability of all things. The Perfection of Wisdom is equal in its dissolution because all things are equal in their dissolution. The Perfection of Wisdom is imperceptible because all things are imperceptible.Wisdom Page 77 5 The Perfection of Wisdom is without cessation because all things are without cessation. .

then the present and the future would exist in the past. such as material form and so on.” We respond as follows. we say the following. present and future.” If having arisen. Therefore. then it would have length. 19. things’ essential existence. also exists. “past.]. someone objects. That which does not exist has no length..1. if time were to depend on an existent thing (bhāva). without depending on the past. But they do not exist. complete day (ahorātra). there is no establishment of those two. second (lava). Therefore. Since: 19.” We respond as follows. daytime. then it is called “present. it is taught that the three times are based upon things’ essential existence. then would the present and the future be dependent on the past? 19.6. Things’ essential existence would be the warrant for identifying (prajñapti) the three times if the three times that you have theorized (bhavadabhimata) were to exist. is established by its own essential existence. And time does have length in terms of measurements such as instant (kṣaṇa). Through this procedure (krama).5 . fortnight (pakṣa).” And that which has not yet come into existence (alabdhātmabhāva) is “future. 19. Instead. however. like the horns of a rabbit. That is. since it has a length. the present and the future do not exist. and a static time. someone objects. hour (muhūrta).19 Analysis of Time 5 10 At this point. If the present and the future were dependent (apekṣya) on the past.3. those three times exist. If this were so. “Time does exist because it has length [i. the Blessed One has taught three times: past. the present and the future do not exist in the past. duration]. the remaining two permutations should point out [the nature of triads] such as ‘superior.1. nighttime. “It is true that there is no such thing as permanent time that. someone objects.e. time—the referent of the words “instant” and such—is identified in reliance on (upādāya) conditioned entities. 15 20 19. time does exist.4. etc. Therefore. Moreover.2. month. but it does not exist.” In response. they are based upon what exists (bhāva) for the following reason. that is. inferior and middling’ and also the singularity and such [of these ordered triads. it has not ceased but still exists. does not exist. Moreover. Nonstatic time is not apprehended. there is no problem [with claiming that time truly exists]. Therefore. If time were to exist. A thing’s essential existence (bhāvasvabhāva) that has arisen and then ceased is called. their foundation. then how could there be 25 30 35 . “Things do have an essential existence (svabhāva) because it is the warrant (hetu) for the identification (vijñapti) of the three times.” In this way. Nāgārjuna says: 19. At this point. how is time identified (prajñapyate)? … Here. and demonstrating the way that they do not exist. which would be apprehended. and year. being distinct from material form and such. If. And without being apprehended.

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time without an existent thing? You assert, “Time exists in dependence on an existent thing.” If you do so, then if there were no existent thing, time—which is warranted by existent things—would necessarily not exist. Demonstrating this [Nāgārjuna] says: 5 19.6.2. And there are no existent things at all for reasons that have already been extensively demonstrated and because of refutations that will be stated [later in this text]. So there is not any existent thing. That being the case, for you 19.6.3. How could time exist?

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Analysis of Causal Collocation (sāmagrī)
20.1. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect exists in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation?

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20.2. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect does not exist in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation? 20.3. If the effect exists in the causal collocation of the cause and conditions, then it would be apprehended there, and it is not apprehended in the causal collocation.

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20.4. If the effect does not exist in the collocation of the cause and the conditions, then causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions. 20.5 . If the cause, having contributed its causal [functionality] (hetukaṃ…dattvā), ceases, then the cause has two essences—that which has been contributed, and that which has ceased.

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20.6. If the cause were to cease without having contributed its causal [functionality] for the effect, and if the effect has then arisen when the cause has ceased, then the effect is causeless. 20.7. If the effect were to become manifest along with the causal collocation, then it would absurdly follow that the producer and that which is produced are simultaneous.

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20.8. If the effect were to become manifest prior to the causal collocation, then the effect, being devoid (nirmukta) of causes and conditions, would be causeless. Others, however, say, “Only the cause produces the effect; the collocation does not. And since it is not the case that the cause is one thing and the effect another, it does not follow that there would be an absurd consequence whereby one would inquire, ‘Does the cause cease having contributed its causality to the effect or without having done so?’ Rather, the ceased cause itself is established as in essence the effect (phalātmanā).” We respond as follows. If this were so, that is: 20.9. If, when the cause has ceased, the cause transforms (saṃkramaṇa) into the effect, then one would absurdly conclude that the cause, which has already been produced previously, would be re-produced. 20.10. How can a cause that has ceased and disappeared produce an effect that has arisen? And even if the cause remains, how can it produce [anything] without the effect?

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20.11.1. If the cause were not involved with the effect, then which effect would it produce?

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20.11.2. Neither a cause that is observable produces an effect, nor does one that is unobservable. 20.12. A past effect never meets a past cause, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has arisen. 5 20.13. An effect that has arisen never does not meet a cause that has not arisen, nor does it meet a cause that is past or one that has arisen. 20.14. An effect that has not arisen never meets a cause that has arisen, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has ceased. 20.15.1. If they never meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 10 20.15.2. If they do meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 20.16. If the cause is empty of the effect, then how does it produce the effect? If cause is not empty of the effect, how does it produce the effect? 20.17. A non-empty effect would not arise, a non-empty effect would not cease. A nonempty effect would be unarisen and unceasing. 15 20.18. How would an empty [effect] arise, how would an empty [effect] cease? One must absurdly conclude that an empty [effect] is unarisen and unceasing. 20.19. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be identical. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be different. 20 20.20. If the effect and the cause were identical, then the producer and the produced would be the same. If the effect and the cause were different, then a cause would be the same as a non-cause. 20.21. How would a cause produce an effect that essentially exists? How would a cause produce an effect that does not essentially exist? 25 20.22.1. [If something] is not producing anything, that it does not make sense for it to be a cause. 20.22.2. And if it does not make sense for [the cause] to be a cause, then [the effect] would be the effect of what? 20.23. And the collocation of the cause and conditions does not produce itself by itself. How then would it produce the effect? 30 20.24. The effect is not made by the causal collocation, nor is the effect not made by the causal collocation. How is there a causal collocation without an effect?

“Time essentially exists because it is a factor (nimitta) in origination and disintegration.10. Nāgārjuna says: 21.2. 21. time does exist because it is a factor in origination and destruction.1.2.1. Therefore. it is in terms of some specific time that things such as sprouts originate—i.6. There is no disintegration of a destructible entity. 20 21. 21. How could there be origination without disintegration? It is never the case that impermanence is not present in things. How could there be origination with disintegration? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. they do not exist.Wisdom Page 82 21 Analysis of Origination and Disintegration 5 10 At this point. There is no origination of a destructible entity (kṣaya). It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are the same. 21. The origination and disintegration of that which is empty does not make sense. 21. . How could destruction exist without origination? There would be death without birth. 21. are destroyed.7. There is no destruction without origination. 15 21.3.” We respond as follows. are produced..9. Destruction does not exist either with origination or without it.10. 21. there is no destruction of an indestructible entity.e. There is no origination of an indestructible entity. 21. That is. there is no real thing without origination and destruction.. The origination and the disintegration of that which is not empty do not make sense. There is neither origination nor disintegration without a real thing (bhāva).e. 25 30 21. Origination does not exist either with destruction or without it. someone objects. even while a collocation of causes and conditions is present. How could there be destruction with origination? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way.2. and demonstrating how this is the case. And it is in terms of some specific time that they disintegrate—i. [Origination and destruction do not happen] all the time.8.4.1.5. Time would be a factor in origination and destruction if origination and destruction existed. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are different (nānā). How could there be any establishment of two [things] that are not established as either in mutual relation (anyonya) or not in mutual relation? 21. However.9.

the annihilation of the cause would absurdly ensue.15. 21. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible (na…yujyate). 21. If the last (carama) samsaric existence has ceased.2. there would be annihilation because the continuum of samsaric existence is extinguished. An existent thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself. it is neither annihilated nor eternal.1.14. 10 . the beliefs in eternalism and nihilism will absurdly follow.18. Existence (bhāva) does not arise from existence.12. 21. Then since that which has ceased does not arise again. nor does it arise from something else. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible.1. If samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation— that is. how does it arise? 21.16.2. 5 21. It is not reasonable (na…yujyate) for essentially existent to nonexistent.16. For one who has accepted the existent (bhāva). Nonexistence does not come from nonexistence.14.17. 21. Since the existent must be either permanent or impermanent.Wisdom Page 83 21. “Why? Because 21.15. 25 21.2.1.2 . 30 21.13. [If] it does not come from either itself or something else. “For one who accepts the existent. nor does nonexistence come from existence.17. “Samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation. But origination is experienced because of confusion (moha). Since 21.19. and the arising one would be another.1. then the cease [samsaric existence] would be one thing. nor does existence come from nonexistence. 15 21. It might occur to you that origination and disintegration are experienced [as happening]. If the initial existence [in the next life] arises while the last is ceasing.1. Moreover.” 20 21. when nirvāṇa [is obtained].11. If the last samsaric existence has not ceased. and so is disintegration.2.11. if such is the case— 21.

21. and [ceasing and arising] together [all] do not make sense. 21.21.Wisdom Page 84 21.21. the continuum of samsaric existence 5 theorized by you 21.20.1. 21. Thus. How can there be a continuum of samsaric existence that does not exist in the three times? 10 . If ceasing and arising.3.2. is not possible in the three times. then how is it that [a being] is born in [or as] those very aggregates in [or as] which it died.

e.1..e..6.2. If some Tathāgata were to exist [previously] without relying (anupādāya) on the aggregates.3. nor is he different from the aggregates. Without existing as essentially itself [i.6. the aggregates].9. That which is sought through the fivefold [analysis] does not exist as either the same or different [than the aggregates]—how could it be reliantly designated.1. a Tathāgata] or as essentially something else [i.4. And there is no such thing as a substratum (upādāna) without [anything] reliant (upādatta) on it. The aggregates are not in the Tathāgata. It is correct (upapadyate) to think that [something] which depends on [something] essentially other (parabhāva) is essenceless. How can that which does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvataḥ) exist as essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 10 22. “Tathāgata?” 22. there is no Tathāgata at all because one would absurdly conclude that [the Tathāgata] is causeless.7. The Tathāgata is not the aggregates.2. This substratum also does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvāt). how can [it] have an existence as essentially [something] else (parabhāva)? 15 And if there is neither the existence [of a thing] as essentially itself nor [its] existence as essentially [something] else. then [a buddha] is not essentially [a buddha].2 .1.1. And without relying on the aggregates. then he now would rely on them. 30 22. If a buddha is [a buddha] in reliance (upādāya) on the aggregates. So what Tathāgata is there here? 22. how would it rely on [that substratum]? 20 25 22. The Tathāgata is also not possessed of the aggregates. And in no way at all is there a Tathāgata without a substratum (upādāna) [on which it relies]. therefore. 22. If [a thing] has no existence as essentially itself (svabhāva). he would reliant (upādāya) [on the aggregates].Wisdom Page 85 22 … Analysis of the Tathāgata 5 22. then 22. what or who would be a Tathāgata? 22.5.1.2. And [if an entity] does not exist without relying [on some substratum]. 22. and how could that which is essenceless be the Tathāgata? 22.8. and he is not in the aggregates. .7. 22.4.

1.” 22. Having grasped onto heavy grasping.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one (śānta)? “[The Tathāgata is] finite.2. [that person] believes. who is beyond conceptual structuring (prapañca) and imperishable. “The Tathāgata exists!” Concerning [the Tathāgata] who has obtained cessation (nivṛtta). 22.” “He is not finite. 20 .2. Those who conceptually structure the Buddha. 22.13 .16. “The Tathāgata does not exist.” 15 22. nor should one think.Wisdom Page 86 22. 22. 10 22.14 . “The Buddha does not exist after cessation”—[this thinking (cintā) does not make sense if the [Buddha] is essentially empty.11. are overwhelmed with conceptual structuring.17. In this way. However.10.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one? 22.2. “[It is] empty”. 22. none of them see the Tathāgata. And how can an empty Tathāgata be emptily designated? 5 22. nor. And how can that which is not essentially itself be essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 22. “[The Tathāgata is] eternal. “[It is] both”. On should not say.9. “The Buddha exists after cessation”.11. as is that which relies on it. That which is the essence of the Tathāgata is the essence of the world.12. “It is not empty. the world is essenceless.” Nor. these statements are made.15 . for the sake of designation & communication (prajñapti). one thinks. “[It is] neither.1. the substratum is empty in every way.10.” “He is not eternal. The Tathāgata is essenceless.

25 23. How could beauty or ugliness exist in those [things]. and error. the ugly and error do not exist as essentially themselves (svabhāvāt). 23.2. how can the existence or nonexistence of the afflictive mental states be established? 10 23. 23. they are essenceless. tactile objects. 23. the afflictive mental states do not [exist] ultimately (na tattvataḥ). Those [entities] that arise in dependence on the beautiful. scents and elemental things (dharmas).1.8. The afflictive mental states belong to something.2. It is theorized (vikalpyate) that attachment.9. how could there be aversion? .8. how could there be attachment? And if ugliness does not exist. beauty makes no sense.12. in five ways these afflictive mental states do not exist in relation to the afflictive [Self or mind]. Without it. tactile objects.4 .1. The Self’s existence or nonexistence is not at all established. Therefore. If they are essenceless. like reflections.5.3.1. sound. 23.6. scents and elemental things The word mere (kevala) means that they are merely conceptuality constructed.6. and no such something is established. 5 23. aversion (dveṣa) and confusion (moha) come from conceptual thought (saṃkalpa) because [they] arise in dependence (pratītya) on the beautiful. The beauty in dependence on which we identify ugliness does not exist without ugliness. 30 23. aversion and confusion have six kinds of real things (vastu) [as their objects]: material forms. then how are they perceived? We say. They are like (-ākāra) the city of Gandharvas. which are like (kalpa) a person [created through] magical illusion. 23.7. there are no afflictive mental states belonging to anything. sounds. It is said that attachment (rāga). they are like illusions or dreams.11. So what beauty. As in the belief that one’s own body [belongs to the Self]. 23.2. 23. ugliness just does not exist. Therefore.Wisdom Page 87 23 Analysis of Error 23. the ugly. And if beauty does not exist. Without that something.10. in five ways the afflictive [Self or mind] does not exist in relation to the afflictive mental states. Mere material forms. ugliness and error do the afflictive mental states depend upon? 15 20 23. the ugly and error do not exist essentially as themselves. 23. Therefore. The beautiful. The ugliness in dependence on which we identify beauty does not exist without beauty. As in the belief that one’s own body [is a locus of the Self].

13. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates an essence? 23. 25 23. If the Self. If apprehension does not exist. then [apprehending] the Self.22.19. the impermanent and the unpleasant (duḥkha) do not exist. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates the unreal? 30 . the pure. 23. ignorance ceases through the cessation of error.23. the permanent and the pleasurable do not exist. then who is making an error? Who is not making an error? 23.20. If there were some essentially real afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something. 10 23.17. conditioning and the other [phases in the wheel of existence] also cease. Therefore. Errors are not possible for one who has not made errors.18 . then nonSelf. then why would the apprehension of the empty as “the impermanent” not be an error? 23. the impure. 20 23. In this way. the permanent and the pleasant exist. Errors are not possible for one who is making an error.Wisdom Page 88 23. Errors are not possible for one who has made errors. then why would [this] apprehension be an error? 5 23.15.24. the apprehender. the permanent and the pleasurable is not erroneous. Ask yourself this question: for whom are errors possible? 15 23. That by which one apprehends.” How could this be erroneous? 23. nor does it arise from itself and something else. [and if] the impermanent does not exist in the empty. And when ignorance has ceased. How indeed could errors be unarisen? If errors are unarisen.25 . 23. there is no apprehension (grāha).14.21.16. who is in error? 23. and that which is apprehended—all of these are extinguished (upaśānta). If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error. nor does it arise from something else. the apprehension. If the Self. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error. the pure. whether correct or false. If there were some essentially unreal afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something. the pure. “A real thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself.

25 24. the Sage..3. as when one says things such as]. 24. you do not know the meaning of emptiness nor emptiness itself. 24. One who does not know how to distinguish between these two realities does not discern the profound tattva within the buddhas’ teaching. Without understanding ultimate reality. the Dharma does not exist. 24. 10 24. the persons who are in those states do not exist. 24. you deny that things have a real effect. If the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. then the Saṅgha [i. And since the four holy truths do not exist.4.12. you reject the good and the bad. And if those eight kinds of holy people do not exist. If everything is empty. emptiness. there is no occurrence and no cessation. 30 24. And if the Dharma and the Saṅgha do not exist. and attaining cessation are all impossible. 24. nor do the persons who are about to attain those states.9. when incorrectly understood.6. [Buddha.5.11.1. the Community] does not exist. you are only refuting yourself. then understanding the nature of suffering. how could there be a Buddha? In speaking of emptiness.e. 24. Ultimate reality is not taught without relying on conventions. 24. In response we say that you do not know the purpose of emptiness. 20 . someone objects: 5 24. all world conventions means [cognitive and linguistic interaction with the world. devastates the simple minded. you spurn the Three Jewels. then the four states that result from practice do not exist.2.. developing oneself in meditation on the path.Wisdom Page 89 24 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths At this point. the other is ultimate reality. 24..10 . In speaking of emptiness. You would be forced to conclude that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. Like a poisonous snake when held incorrectly or a magic spell when improperly used. And if those four resulting states do not exist. “Do this!” “Cook that!” “Eat!” “Wait!” “Go!” “Come!” . The buddhas teach the Dharma by relying on the two realities. eliminating the causes of suffering. If they do not exist. Hence.8.. One is the reality of worldly conventions. deciding that unintelligent people would find it difficult to 15 . Dharma and Saṅgha].. nirvāṇa is not obtained. Thus. and you refute all worldly conventions.7.

25 … 24. 5 24. 10 24.13. We call that which is interdependent origination ‘emptiness. there would be neither production nor cessation. then you are experiencing causeless things. you reject agent.. Interdependent origination means the coming into being of things like sprouts or sensory awareness in dependence on causes and conditions. If everything were not empty.21.” or “is coherent. [the Blessed One] said that suffering is impermanent. you refute production and cessation. Why would [suffering] that exists essentially arise again? Therefore. all these things [mentioned in the last two verses] are possible. instrument and action.19. 15 .. 24. To a person for whom emptiness does not make sense. it is the middle way. nothing makes sense. He who knows emptiness is heedful. If you experience things to be truly existent by virtue of their essences. hesitated to teach the Dharma.15. Why? Because: 24.” “is possible.Wisdom Page 90 penetrate his Dharma. As the Buddha said: That which is produced through by causal conditions is not produced. 24. there is no thing whatsoever which is not empty.20.17. But for us who maintain that all things are empty of essences.16.”] 24. you are like a person who. 24. but those objections actually apply to your own position. 30 24. 24. has forgotten where her horse is. I call `empty’ anything that depends on conditions.22. [and] that [which is impermanent] does not exist if [things] have an essence. The objection that you raise against emptiness does not force us into a conclusion that contradicts our position. that [kind of coming into being] is not a case of production by virtue of an essence.14. You would be forced to accept that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. for one who 20 . There is no production of it by virtue of its essence. How could there be suffering that has arisen independently? Indeed. [”makes sense” can be replaced with “is reasonable. You object to what we say. Your objection does not apply to emptiness. and you refute results. The non-production of things by virtue of their essences is emptiness. having mounted her own horse. Therefore. There is no thing whatsoever which has arisen independently.18. To a person for whom emptiness makes sense. everything makes sense. You deny cause and effect.’ That [emptiness] is reliant designation.

For you. whose essence was previously unknown. then what path would be obtained through the cessation of suffering? 10 Now.Wisdom Page 91 denies emptiness. the true Dharma (saddharma) does not exist. the realization [of cessation]. is later known. the four results [along the path] are impossible.32.27 . One who is essentially unawakened would never obtain awakening. then the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path would be impossible. 24. Therefore. how could there be a buddha? 30 24. How can 15 20 .33. which is to be hot. nor do those who are entering the result. to demonstrate how it is that full knowledge of suffering and such is not possible for the other [who denies emptiness]. then the Saṅgha does not exist. for you it would absurdly follow that there is awakening without any relation to the awakened one. That is. 24. which previously had an unknown nature. then [this belief] is wrong. Why? Because its essence is allegedly established. even though he applies himself to the bodhisattva’s practices for the sake of awakening. If [things] had essence. an essence is allegedly established in the world. There is no cessation of suffering that exists essentially.31. Since the Saints’ Truths do not exist. And if an essence does not change.25. 24. If suffering. For one who clings to essence. 24. 5 24. Nor would one ever do the proper (dharma) or improper (adharma). so too.24. those who abide in the result do not exist. 24. for you it would absurdly follow that [there is] an awakened one (buddha) without any relation (apratītya) to awakening. 24.26 .29. you refute cessation. If you imagine that suffering. its essence is supposedly (kila) established. If these either [types of] persons do not exist. if according to you the path is cultivated.23 . And if neither the Dharma nor the Saṃgha exists. would later be known. how is it possible to obtain a result that is essentially unrealized? 25 24. Likewise. Also. the knowledge of suffering is also not possible.28. and the cultivation [of the path] are likewise not possible (na…yujyante). there would be no origin [of suffering]. how will it be known? Indeed. If it is essentially unknown. On the other hand. [and] it cannot undergo change. [its] origin and [its] cessation do not exist. then [it] does not have an essence. Nāgārjuna says: 24. then it does not make sense that suffering. as in the case of fire’s [essence]. If there is no result.30. Through positing (paryavasthāna) essence. elimination [of suffering]. 24.

37. the world. You contradict all worldly (laukika) interactions (saṃvyavahāra) in that you deny the emptiness [of/which is] interdependent origination. 10 24. would be unproduced and unceasing. If [things] are not empty. Of if.35. For you a result. exists. 15 . an essence is not made or done. according to you. For one who denies emptiness. One who sees this interdependent origination sees suffering.38. and there is no elimination of all afflictive mental states. cessation. and the agent would not be acting. a result caused by proper and improper [actions] exists. according to you. And for you. there would be no object of action. 24. If it has an essence. even without the proper and improper [actions]. a result arisen from proper and improper [actions] is non-empty? 24. it would be static. devoid of its various states and shapes (avasthā). 5 24. then there is no obtainment (prāpti) of the not yet obtained (asamprāpta). 24. then how is it that. 24.34.39. a result caused by proper or improper [actions] does not exist.Wisdom Page 92 the non-empty be done? Indeed. the origin.40. 24. and the path. that which puts an end to suffering does not exist.36. no action would be underway.

4 . The uneliminated.13. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent. the unobtained.8.Wisdom Page 93 25 Analysis of Nirvāṇa Here. . nirvāṇa.12. If nirvāṇa is a nonexistent thing. nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva) because decay and death would absurdly become its characteristics. 25.6. Therefore. 25. «If all this is empty. and that makes no sense (na yujyate). If nirvāṇa were an existent thing. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent. 25. it is correct to think. 15 25.11. If [you] accept in this way that things have essence. then how would it [occur] without reliance.” 25. 25. First of all. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent? Nirvāṇa is unconditioned. the not annihilated.7. the unceased.2. since there is no nonexistent thing that occurs without reliance? 25 25. without dependence or reliance. then liberation would be both existent and nonexistent. then how would nirvāṇa [occur] without relying [on something] (anupādāya). since no existent thing (bhāva) exists without decay and death. whether through elimination or cessation? 5 10 25.5.1. If nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva). it would not be unreliant. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained]. how could nirvāṇa be nonexistent (abhāva)? How could there be a nonexistent thing where there is no existent thing? 25.3 .” 30 25. the unarisen—this is called “nirvāṇa. The teacher said that [one should] abandon samsaric being (bhava) and nonbeing (vibhava). whether through elimination or cessation?» To this we respond as follows. 25. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained]. then there is neither origination nor destruction. then there is neither origination nor destruction. If nirvāṇa were an existent.10. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. then: 25. nor is it nonexistent. since no there is no existent thing that is not reliant [on something]? 20 25. then nirvāṇa would be conditioned (saṃskṛta).9. since no unconditioned thing of any kind exists anywhere. someone objects. the not eternal. since both of these are reliant. If all this is not empty. A reliant or dependent entity that comes and goes is.

then what is infinite? What is finite? What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite? 25 25. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent. 5 25. the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere.18. since those two [qualities] are not present in a single [locus]. If all things are empty.Wisdom Page 94 and the existent and nonexistent are conditioned. This is not apprehended: “While remaining [in this world]. he both exists and does not exist”. and a finite beginning (pūrvānta).17. 10 . This is not apprehended: “The Blessed One exists after cessation. the Blessed One exists. who would make the clarification.” would be established if the existent and nonexistent were established. 25.15.23. 25.16. There is not the slightest difference between them. Saṃsāra is not at all distinct from nirvāṇa.” 15 25.14. That which is nirvāṇa’s limit (koṭi) is saṃsāra’s limit.22.” Nor are these: “He does not exist after cessation” “He both exists and does not exist after cessation”.21 .” 25. “It is neither existent nor not existent?” 25.20. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. Nirvāṇa is not at all distinct from saṃsāra. The clarification. “He neither exists nor does not exist after cessation. If there were nirvāṇa that is neither existent nor nonexistent. Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama). 20 25. just like light and darkness.” Nor are these: “While remaining [in this world]. the Blessed One does not exist”. “While remaining. 25. 25. he neither exists nor does not exist. a finite end (aparānta). What is identical (tad eva)? What is different? What is eternal? What is not eternal? What is both eternal and not eternal? And what then is neither of these? 25.19. The extreme positions (anta) [concerning the state of the Tathāgata] after cessation and the views of eternalism and such are based upon nirvāṇa.24 . “While remaining. it is not nonexistent.

7. 5 26.9.3. When name and material form have been moistened. 26. 10 26. the unwise are karmic agents (kāraka). whose causal condition is conditioning (saṃskāra).10. the six sense-media originate. Therefore.2.3.-26.2. along with their sensations.1. the samsaric existence (bhava) of the appropriator occurs.1. 26. name and material form are moistened. [and] the unwise create karmic conditionings. Thus.2.9.1. The one who has thirst appropriates & relies on the substratum (upādāna) in four ways. consciousness and the eye.6.8. Such is the origin of this mere heap (skandha) of suffering. . When there is appropriation & reliance (upādāna). Consciousness thus occurs in dependence on name and material form. If there were non-appropriation. That samsaric existence.2. namely.6. 26. What is contact. The root of saṃsāra is karmic conditionings (saṃskāra). 26.3. moreover. the wise are not. 26. because one thirsts for the purpose of [having or avoiding] sensations. death and such. and how does it occur? Explaining this.8. material form. then [the being] would be liberated.-26. enters into a realm of rebirth. The six media having developed. Consciousness. One obscured with ignorance goes to a realm of rebirth (gati) through the karmas that are the karmic conditionings (saṃskāra) for rebirth which he develops in three ways.1. [Nāgārjuna] says: 26.5. birth occurs.Wisdom Page 95 26 Analysis of the Twelve Links 26.1 . and attention (samanvāhāra).4.3.5. Thirst is causally conditioned by sensation 26.8. Due to samsaric existence. Contact is the conjunction (saṃnipāta) of three [things]. is the five aggregates. 26. From birth comes the grievous experiences of aging.-26.1. since they see ultimate reality (tattva). and there would be no samsaric existence. And when consciousness has entered [the rebirth].2. from birth also come mental agitation and anxiety.2.2. 26. 15 20 26. 26. [Contact arises] in dependence on the eye. 25 30 26.2. Sensation (vedanā) occurs from contact.1. contact occurs. material form.6.

Thus. 5 26.11. The cessation of ignorance comes from the meditation on that very [interdependent origination] with knowledge (jñāna). When ignorance has ceased. .12. Through the cessation of this and that. karmic conditionings do not originate.Wisdom Page 96 26. this mere heap of suffering is correctly stopped. this and that do not occur.

30 . 27. namely.4.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) is eternal. or else the Self would have arisen causelessly. Indeed.4.1. Without the substratum. “In the past I did not exist.1. then in that case a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed. You might think. 20 27.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite beginning (pūrvānta). “In the past I existed”. nor is it [identical with] the substratum.” This does not make sense because this [Self in the present] is not the one in past lives.12. “I did not exist in the past”—this does not make sense because this [Self in the present life] is not different from the one in past lives. 27. “That one [in the past] is the Self [of the present]. 25 27. the experience by one person of [the results of] karmic acts committed by another. the Self does not exist. And [thus]. 15 27. 27.5.8.7. Moreover.1. 27. Various other consequences would absurdly follow: the annihilation [of the past Self]. 27.2. 10 27. being previously nonexistent. the Self is not different from the substratum.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite end.2. the Self does not exist. If it were different. It does not make sense for the Self to be different from the substratum.6. And that [past Self] might still exist. then it would be apprehended without the substratum.Wisdom Page 97 27 Analysis of View & Belief 27. If it is determined that there is no Self without the substratum. A Self that is the substratum does not cease and arise.” 27.8. It is not the case that the Self. then it would exist even without that [past Self]. Nor is there this certain determination. how could that which appropriates & relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? 27. what Self would you have without the substratum? 27.3. In this way. then the Self is [identical to] the substratum. etc. “I existed in the past.10. or an immortal would be born.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) has an [absolute] end.2. “[The Self] does not exist. If this [present Self] were different [from the past Self]. 5 27. “I will not be in the future” “I will be something else in the future.” But the [appropriated] substratum is distinguished. arises.11. If it were. and likewise. etc. for you. the dissipation of karmic acts.9. and it is not apprehended [in that way].

27. “I will exist in the future”.26. 27. On the other hand (atha). “It is not eternal” and also.14. then the lifeworld would [both] have an end and not have an end. having come from somewhere.24.” 15 27. and that [same person] was a human.16. “It is not noneternal. since an eternal [person] is not born.21 . then how could there be the next lifeworld? 27.22. then how could there be the next lifeworld? If [one’s] lifeworld has no end. the following views make no sense: “”I existed in the past”. If the human were different from the god.13. it is not possible for it to have and end or be endless. “I will not exist in the future. “I did not exist in the past”.” These views are the same as [the views about the past.25. how could there be a noneternal one? How then could there be [something both] eternal and noneternal? And how could there be [something] devoid of both these two? 27. 27. 27. That [someone or something] does not exist. If it partially had an end and partially were endless. If someone or something. and this is not possible. were to go some place. “I both existed and did not exist”. If [one’s] lifeworld (loka) has an end. then beginningless saṃsāra would therefore exist. 27. The continuum of the aggregates occurs like the flame of a lamp. 27.17. the [human] is eternal. “I neither existed nor did not exist. In this way. If there is no eternal [thing]. this is not possible. if the aggregates in the past were not to disintegrate. this makes no sense. then the lifeworld would have an end. “That [person] is a god. If [the being] is partially a god and partially human. then a continuum [across lives] would not make sense. First of all (tāvad).Wisdom Page 98 27.” In this way. then the lifeworld would be endless.15. therefore. 25 27. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. and the god would be unborn. how could part of the appropriator be destroyed and part not be destroyed? In this way.” This would be the belief in the noneternality [of the Self]. 27.23. It would be established that [the Self is] both eternal and non-eternal if it were established. 27.20. then it would be both eternal and noneternal.18.” 5 27.19. “The human is different from the god. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not to arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. If the aggregates in the past were to disintegrate. 10 20 30 .

due to the emptiness of all things. . And how could part of the substratum be destroyed and part not destroyed? In this way. he taught the true Dharma so as to eliminate all views. and also. He is Gautama. 27. To put it another way (atha vā).Wisdom Page 99 27.” 5 27. and to him I pay homage.29. “It is not endless. what views of eternalism and such would there be for whom for what reason about what? 27. It would be established that [the Self] both had an end and was endless if these were established: “It does not have an end”.28. Relying on compassion.27. this makes no sense.30.

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