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Lucid Words A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom by Candrakīrti Translated by J.D. Dunne & S.L. McClintock DRAFT TRANSLATION (8/22/01) Not for Citation

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© John D. Dunne and Sara L. McClintock All Rights Reserved

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Critique of Causation ............................................................................................................1 Critique of Motion ...............................................................................................................12 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties ...........................................................................................25 Analysis of the Aggregates ..................................................................................................27 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus).......................................................................................28 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous ...................................................................................29 Analysis of the Conditioned ................................................................................................30 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object.................................................................34 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action]................................................................35 Analysis of Fire and Fuel ................................................................................................36 Analysis of Beginning and End.......................................................................................38 Analysis of Suffering........................................................................................................40 Analysis of Saṃskāras......................................................................................................42 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga)...............................................................................43 Analysis of Svabhāva........................................................................................................45 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation ..............................................................................47 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect ....................................................................50 Analysis of the Self...........................................................................................................56 Analysis of Time...............................................................................................................78 Analysis of Collocation ....................................................................................................80 Analysis of Origination and Extinction .........................................................................82 Analysis of the Tathāgata................................................................................................85 Analysis of Error..............................................................................................................87 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths ...............................................................................89 Analysis of Nirvāṇa..........................................................................................................93 Analysis of the Twelve Links ..........................................................................................95 Analysis of View...............................................................................................................97

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Critique of Causation
Homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī! He has destroyed the indwelling in the dwelling of the twin extremes; he has won birth in the ocean of awakened wisdom.

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Out of compassion he spoke the deep meaning (bhāva) of the true dharma’s ocean in the way he had truly fathomed it. Even today his philosophical flames burn like wood the notions of those who espouse something else, as they burn too the mental darkness of the world.

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The flood of arrows that are the words from his peerless wisdom pierces the entire army of saṃsāra, bestowing on him glorious rule over the three dimensions of the world to be disciplined, along with the gods. To him, Nāgārjuna, I bow, and on his verses I will now write an exegesis, one that is bound with extended, properly composed statements; unshaken by sophistic winds, it is clear.

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In this regard, the treatise to be discussed is that one that begins, “Not from self, nor from other; not from both….” And first of all, one might ask, “What is its subject matter? What is the purpose? What is the relation [between the two]?” [We say] that, as in the explanation given in Guide to the Middle Way, Ārya Nāgārjuna first created the cause for the wisdom of a Tathāgata; that is, he produced the initial awakening mind, which is adorned with nondual wisdom and preceded by great compassion. Having practiced in such a way, Ārya Nāgārjuna, who had understood the correct interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom, compassionately composed a treatise so that others might understand. And this, [his composition of such a treatise in such a fashion], constitutes the relation [between purpose and subject matter] of the treatise: It controls (śāsti) all your enemies that are your afflictions, and it protects (saṃtrāyate) you from bad rebirth and saṃsāra. Since it controls (śāsanāt) and protects (trāṇāt), it is a treatise (śāstra). Those two [qualities] are absent in others’ thought. Moreover, the Master (ācārya) himself wished to demonstrate the entire subject of the treatise that he would speak, as well as its purpose. Demonstrating this, he wished to proclaim the Tathāgata’s greatness in terms of his correct elucidation of that [subject]. Thus, he wished to compose, as a motivation (nimitta) for engaging with the treatise, a stanza of homage to the Tathāgata, the highest guru, who is not excluded from having such a nature. Desiring to do so, he said: [Verse of homage]: I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers, who taught that interdependent origination involves no cessation, no production, no annihilation, no eternality, no plurality, no unity, no coming and no going; he taught that it is peace, the calming of conceptual structuring. Here, the treatise’s subject is interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) qualified by eight qualifications, beginning with noncessation. The treatises purpose is shown to be nirvāṇa,

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characterized as peace, the calming of all conceptual structuring. The homage is, I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers. Such, first of all, is the overall meaning of the two stanzas. Now, however, I will discuss the detailed meaning. 5 … {LVP55.11} At this point, some thinkers make the following objection. «You have had an indubitable cognition (niścaya) that “things are not arisen.” But does this indubitable cognition come from an instrument of knowledge or not? If it does come from an instrument of knowledge, then you should say which instruments of knowledge you have used. What, moreover, are their characteristics? What are their objects? Are those instruments of knowledge arisen from themselves, or from something else, or from both, or causelessly? If, on the other hand, you maintain that your indubitable cognition does not come from an instrument of knowledge, then that cannot be correct because [as Dignāga has said], knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge. This is so because, without instruments of knowledge, it is not possible to know an object that one has not yet known. Hence, if the object cannot be known because one lacks the instrument of knowledge for doing so, then how can your belief that things are not arisen truly be an indubitable cognition? Thus, it is not correct to say that all things are not produced. Or else the very reason due to which you think that things are not arisen is exactly the reason due to which I think that all things exist. And the way in which you indubitably know that all elemental things are not arisen will be exactly the way in which I indubitably know that they are arisen. On the other hand, if you do not have an indubitable cognition that things are not arisen, then it is pointless to compose your treatise, since you cannot make others understand what you yourself have not indubitably cognized. Therefore, all things have not been refuted.» In response we say the following. If we were to have some indubitable cognition, then it would come from an instrument of knowledge or not. But we don’t have an indubitable cognition. Allow me to explain why. In this regard, if a dubitable cognition were possible, then, in dependence on that, its opposite—an indubitable cognition—could occur. But if for is there not even a dubitable cognition, then how could there be an indubitable cognition that stands in opposition to it? [I ask this] because it would have to be independent of that to which it is related, like the shortness and longness of a donkey’s horns. Thus, there is no indubitable cognition, and if that is so, then we would conceptually fabricate instruments of knowledge in order to justify what? So, how many instruments of knowledge are there? What are their definitions and objects? Are they arisen be arisen from self, from something else, from both, or without causes? We do not need to state any of this. «If you do not have any indubitable cognition at all, then why do have we come across your statement that is in the form of something indubitably known (niścitarūpa), namely, “There are no things at all that have arisen from themselves, from something else, from both, or without cause.”» We respond that it is by the world that this phrase is indubitably known through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by the world, but such is not the case for the Noble Ones. «So the Noble Ones do not employ rational arguments?» Who has said that they do or they don’t? The ultimate is noble silence. Therefore, how in that case could conceptual fabrications such that there would be rational argument or the lack thereof? «If the Noble Ones do not give rational arguments, how then will they awaken the world to the utlimate?»

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The Noble Ones do not give rational arguments by means of worldly conventions. Rather, in order to awaken others, they provisionally accept (abhyupetya) those rational arguments that are commonly accepted from a worldly perspective. Having provisionally accepted those rational arguments, they then use them to awaken the world. For example, the body is impure, but lustful persons, being filled with confusion, do not see that this is the case; instead, they impute the image of beauty [onto the body in question]. Doing so, they become caught up in negative mental states. To remove those persons’ lust, a deity or an entity emanated by the transcendent one might say, “There are hairs on this body!” Saying this, they would reveal to those persons the faults of the body that had been hidden by their belief that it was beautiful. Thus freed from their belief in the body’s beauty, they would become free of lust. Such is also the case in regard to the present issue. That is, the Noble Ones do not perceive any essence in things whatsoever. Nevertheless, because their intellect’s eye is impaired by the cataracts of ignorance, ordinary persons impute a false essence onto things, and in some cases they also impute some particular quality. Through such imputations, they become even more caught up in negative mental states. Now the Noble Ones awaken them through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by them. For example, it is accepted that, in the case of producing a jar from clay and so on, one does not do so with a jar that already exists. Likewise, one should realize that there is no production of something that exists prior to its production precisely because that thing already exists. And to give another example, it is accepted that a sprout does not arise from things that are essentially different from it, such as flames and burning coal. Likewise, one should realize that a sprout does not even arise from those things that are intended [to be its causes], such as a seed. Someone might object: «This is our experience [i.e., that sprouts arise from seeds].» This is also incorrect because experience itself is false because it is experience, just like the case where a person with cataracts experiences two moons and so on. Thus, since [the truth of] experience is equally in need of proof, it is not reasonable to refute us by appealing to it. Therefore, [Nāgārjuna] said, “Things are not produced.” In this way, the first chapter was composed first of all to counteract the imputation of a false essence. Now, the remainder of the treatise is composed so as to refute some [additional] qualifications which are imputed in some cases. That is, the rest of the treatise is composed so as to demonstrate that every single qualification for dependent origination—such as being the agent of motion, the locus of motion, or the action of motion—does not exist. Someone might object: «The convention that governs an instrument of knowledge and its object is worldly (laukika), and this is what is explained by the treatise.» What would be the point in explaining that? «By stating distorted definitions, Sophists have destroyed (nāśita) the worldly convention concerning instruments of knowledge and objects. We have stated the correct definition of them.» This is also incorrect. If a distortion in the definiendum—namely, the world—resulted from the sophists’ statement of a distorted definition, then it would be useful to make an effort for the purpose [of refuting] that. But that is not the case. Moreover, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, [Nāgārjuna] pointed out a flaw in the section that begins, “if knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge, then what is it that determines those instruments of knowledge?” Since the opponent has not rebutted this criticism, it is not the case that they present a correct definition [of instruments of knowledge and their objects]. LVP59.7

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” “the signifier.” 1. [then the conditions are not] essentially “other” [because “other” requires “self” or “selfessence. 10 15 20 In accord with the definition.” That does not exist. [then] that latter thing is the controlling condition for the former.” Thus. simultaneous. Conditions such as a Creator God and so on are not possible. it is “peace. both itself and something other than itself. individual. moreover. and as such. it is incorrect to say that things arise from that which is other than those things. “production from something other than itself” means production of things from these conditions. That being the case. this immediately preceding cessation of the cause is a condition for the production of the effect. then there is nothing that is essentially other (parabhāva) [than the effect such that it could serve as its cause]. [Before the effect arises. 25 30 35 40 . existed prior to its production in the aggregated. then there is no production from that which is essentially other [than the effect]. hence. [If] one thing comes into existence when another thing exists. 1. which are other [than the thing produced]. Hence. something other than itself. There is no fifth condition. since all conceptual structuring about it ceases. an effect. And if there is no self-essence. “a primary cause brings about something. he says that it is the calming of conceptual structuring. or individually aggregated collection of the primary cause and other causal conditions. If the essence [of those things which are effects] does not exist [in their causes]. Other conditions.” and so on. mind and mental events do not function with regard to it. [In addition to this last sentence. it is something of which there is production. the self-essences of things do not exist in their conditions. the supporting condition. Furthermore. such as the pre-production. A “thing” is something that has an essence. These are the four causal conditions. then that thing would arise from those causal conditions. conceptual structuring defined as “the signified.” one thing is the primary cause of the is that support or basis by means of which a thing that is being produced is produced. If it were to so exist. and the controlling condition. one can also say:] if the essence [of the effect] does not exist [at the time of the cause]. the cause ceases]. is completely stopped. But it is not possible for any thing to exist prior to its production. For example. or neither itself nor something other than itself. To rule out such conditions. The term “essentially other” can thus mean “production from another. and post-production conditions [mentioned by certain Buddhist philosophers] are included in these four. all of which are other than that thing which they produce. it is something coming into being. he says “There is no fifth condition.” which has been shown to be unreal]. Suppose that some thing.3 The essence of any thing does not exist in its conditions and such [prior to its production].1 There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. 1.2 There are only four kinds of causal conditions: the primary cause. then it would be apprehended.Wisdom Page 4 5 … When āryas see that interdependent origination is the way things really exist. and the convention of “knowing” and “thing known” does not occur with regard to it. it is devoid of all problems. Therefore. If that were the case. the immediately preceding cessation of the seed is the condition for the production of the sprout. the preceding condition. such as birth. sickness and death. Therefore. “production” would be meaningless [since the thing already exists].

And so he says.. He has thus refuted those who claim that the effect is produced by the conditions. Why? In this case.” there is no production from that which is other than the effect. Now. Since there is no use for the word “other. Instead they are called ‘conditions’ because they establish the process of producing ocular awareness. nor are there conditions with a process. everything would be being produced. “The conditions.. as I have demonstrated in Encountering Madhyamaka. such as the people Maitreya and Upagupta. is itself the producer of awareness. Now. The conditions are not the producers of the awareness. then it would have as its conditions the eye and so on.” It also makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has not yet been produced because. . the essential otherness of the seed and so on does not exist. But there is no process. has not yet been produced.” Opponent: “If that’s the case. then there should be a process without the conditions. the process of producing awareness. “production without an agent [that is being produced] is not reasonable.” We respond: 1. for “there is no process without the conditions. This is like the process of cooking rice. Therefore. present and future]. But such simultaneity is not the case for a seed and the sprout it produces. what do you need the process for? As I have said in Encountering Madhyamaka. it is not possible for something to be neither “already produced” nor “not yet produced. “there is no process that has conditions. if the essence of the effect does not exist. “There is no qualification without something that is qualified.” If it does not exist as something that has conditions. which [is produced by the aforementioned] conditions.16) Since the process of production is impossible in all three times [i.” For. someone who claims that the effect is produced by a process thinks the following. “[this man]. can it be 35 40 . the process that they create cooks the rice]. in other words.4 There is no process that has conditions. when claiming that there is a process. (CŚ15. rather. the son of a barren woman. 20 25 30 If there were some process. do not directly produce ocular awareness.e.”] As has been said: Since a thing that is being produced is already produced.e. Therefore. There are no conditions without the process. Otherwise. on what does the “otherness” of the conditions depend? Two presently existing things. as I have said. it does not exist.” This is also wrong. That process produces the awareness. it would produce awareness. or is being produced. past. It makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced because the process is what produces the thing [i. [that is.” Nor is it possible for there to be a process when something is being produced because there is no “being produced” without “already produced” and “not yet produced. as such.Wisdom Page 5 5 10 15 Or [one can read as follows]: things such as sprouts that are effects do not have an essence when their causes. the fire. are “other” with respect to each other. one claims that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced. “It makes no sense [to speak of] producing something that has already been produced. something being produced is not produced. There is no process without conditions.. then how can it exist without conditions? How. has cows. such as seeds.. If the thing is already produced. such as the eye and the material form.” You cannot say. exist without changing because one would have to conclude that [those effects] are uncaused. pot and so on do not cook the rice. the awareness].” [In other words.

he says.” In response. and so on. the eye and so on are causal conditions. At this juncture someone else objects. Opponent: “Then the conditions with the process are the producer. and this idea is therefore incorrect. “There are no conditions without the process.6. they are thus causeless conditions [one might translate this as: conditions that cause nothing]. It is irrelevant because things such as consciousness are produced in dependence upon causal conditions. the eyes and so on are thought to be the conditions for awareness. and awareness and so on are produced by those conditions.” This does not make sense. Therefore. why then are the eye and so on not non-conditions as long as the effect.” The negation [implicit in the word “nor”] is applied [from the previous line] by context.” This is also incorrect. “Nor are there conditions with the process.” If there is no process. “nor”] means that the possibilities are exhausted. The signifier “production” is therefore empty of meaning [or “devoid of an objective referent”]. “awareness.e. The same concern thus pertains to that [other condition]. In response.” is not yet produced? [The question is rhetorical]. Opponent: “If that’s the case. but they become conditions in dependence on some other condition. are discussed in the same way that the process of producing awareness has been discussed. Hence. for: 1. Concerning this line. “Your analysis of the [theories concerning the existence of] the conditions with the process. such as the eye.2 A condition for something already existent is a condition for what? And what would be the purpose of a condition for something that already exists? . how then can there be a process that pertains to the conditions? One should know that other processes.Wisdom Page 6 5 10 15 20 causeless? One cannot claim that a cloth is made from vīraṇa roots just because it makes no sense for it to be made from threads. Therefore. Furthermore.6. but are they considered to be conditions for something that is already existent or for something that is not yet existent? Neither option makes sense. how can the conditions be the producer without the process. just as sand does not produce oil. He expresses this by saying: 1. But that other condition is a condition for that [thing which is not yet a condition to become a condition only] if [that thing which is not yet a condition] is [already] a condition. one might think. he says.5 It is alleged that these are conditions because [the effect] is produced in dependence upon them. it has already been stated that the process does not exist. such as a hyperprocess. Another condition is thought to be the condition for that thing which is not yet a condition. the author means that they are not conditions. then the conditions themselves must be the producer of the thing. is irrelevant for us. Why? 40 1.1 A condition for either an already existent thing or a not yet existent thing does not make sense. “Before [the effect arises] they are not conditions. there is no production from a process. [The effect] does not come from things that are not the conditions.” In response.. The disjunction [i. conditions without a process are conditions devoid of a process. But why are they not non-conditions as long as [the effect] is not produced? 25 30 35 If the eye and so forth are called “conditions” because awareness is produced in dependence on them. the process does not produce the thing.

[“condition. any relationship between a support and the thing. In addition.” is incorrect. “producer” means “generator. if the thing is unsupported. the primary cause. Concerning these possibilities. that being the case.” If some thing to be produced were produced. he says: 1. just as it makes no sense to describe the son of a barren woman. But it is not produced because there is no thing to be produced that is existent. an existent thing is not produced because it already exists currently. you say that it has a support.” The supporting condition of mind and mental functions is that suitable support. nor a nonexistent thing. an existing thing. due to your own expectations. But I have explained the problem with this position in Encountering Madhyamaka: You assert that the appellation. Concerning these possibilities. Now. For something is thought to be a support in order for the thing to be produced. then the primary cause. then what is the use of thinking that it is related to some support? Hence. would produce it. how can it be correct to say that the primary cause is a producer? 20 25 Here. But since. and the thing is already existent before the support. being the generator. meaning something that is not now existing? One might object that it should be called [a condition] because the effect will come into being. or both. Since there is no production of the effect. This being the case. [Form and so on] are thought to be the supporting condition either for mind and mental functions that currently exist or that do not currently exist. is defined as follows: ‘a primary cause is a producer. the future existence of the [effect] does not presently exist [and is thereby insufficient reason to call something a ‘condition’]. For example. meaning a currently existing thing. but. “The primary cause exists because it is possible to give a definition. such as material form. At this point someone objects. a supporting condition for something that already currently exists is meaningless. by means of which mind and mental functions or produced. 30 35 40 . A non-existent thing is not produced because it does not presently exist. A thing that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no unitary thing that has mutually contradictory [properties] and because all the above stated problems with the first two possibilities would apply. the above statement. has no support. however.7 Neither an existent thing. how can there be a support? In the scriptures it says.8 [You] teach that an existent thing that has no support [is supported]. There is not. but lacking the capacity [to causally impinge on things in the present]. 1. nor a thing that is both existent and non-existent is produced. Now he shows that the individual conditions are not conditions.Wisdom Page 7 5 10 15 How can there be a condition for something that does not exist. the primary cause also does not exist. in order to refute the supporting condition. He has thus far pointed out that the conditions as a group are not conditions because they are incapable of producing the effect. Or. if the thing is established to exist by itself. it is pointless to think of something as a condition for something that exists -. “Although the conditions are [allegedly] impossible the conditions are established to exist because their definitions are stated.” In response he says that the primary cause would exist if it had a definition.meaning something that is presently existing. non-existent. “What are the supported things? Mind and all mental functions.” is appropriate] because [the effect] will come into existence. such as the mind and so on.’ And it makes no sense to state a definition for something that is not presently existing.

he says: 1.” How can there be something defined as the effect with the . The word “how” indicates the reason. that exists. it is not correct to say. The preceding condition is defined as the immediately preceding cessation of the cause. Therefore. the preceding condition does not make sense.” By doing this. the preceding [condition] is not capable of being what has ceased. I analyze this in the following manner. he says. “If it has ceased. if that were the case. How then can mind and mental functions have supports? There is no problem if one says that the definition [of a support] is given in terms of conventional reality. Production has already been refuted with the third verse. If the thing is unsupported—that is. what would be the condition? 15 20 25 30 35 In the second half of this verse one should note that the word order is inverted. then both would have to be causeless. That is to say.” With this in mind. and that cessation is a condition for the production of the effect. what would be the condition for the cessation of the seed? Both would have to be causeless. therefore.. how can there be a support?” The word “if” indicates a question. what would be the condition?” The word “and” refers back to “not yet arisen. “There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. “If it were ceased. “If the thing is unsupported. what would be the condition?” On this reading.” The words “you” and “supported” should be supplied. something other than itself….” He stated the verse the other way for the sake of composition. the cessation of the cause has not yet occurred. does not now currently exist—then how much more so should the support [be considered non-existent]? The idea is that the support is non-existent because the supported thing is non-existent. then when the seed has ceased—which means that the seed is non-existent—what is the condition for the sprout? Moreover. what is the condition? The preceding condition is therefore incorrect. therefore.” 40 In this context. he says: 1. to have ceased when the things that are effects. And if it had ceased. in order to refute the preceding condition. therefore. “and if. the preceding condition makes no sense. The word “and” is out of order and should be read. such as the sprout.” And if all things lack an essence because they are all interdependently produced. “When this exists. cessation is not reasonable. he says. Now. “You teach that a thing that has no support is supported. “When this exists.” Hence. So. the other thing exists.Wisdom Page 8 5 10 On the other hand. one might think of something as a support for a thing that does not currently exist. what would be the preceding condition for the sprout? One might claim that the seed has ceased even though the effect has not yet arisen. then how can there be something defined as a cause with the phrase. nor any other [condition]. Now. a controlling condition is defined as follows: “One thing is the controlling condition for another in that when the one thing exists. being non-existent. this latter phrase would be interpreted as above. have not yet arisen. in order to refute the controlling condition.9 Cessation does not make sense for things that have never arisen. something that does not currently exist has no connection to a support.. It is not reasonable for the cause. Hence. if the thing.10 Since things without essence have no existence (sattā). This also makes no sense because it just has no support. “If things are not [ever] produced.” Moreover. the verse says. one gets the following reading: “And if it has ceased. such as a seed. not ultimate reality. When the sprout and so on have not yet arisen. it means the following: “If one claims that there is the cessation of the seed and so on when the sprout has not yet arisen. The meaning is as follows.” Or one can give the following interpretation.

‘Does the effect exist in the conditions or not?’ But there is no effect separate from the conditions. namely the cloth. such as a cloth.” But the conditions do not have the essence of being themselves. spreader. loom.11 The effect of the [conditions] does not exist in the conditions. instead. he says: 1. instead. The cloth also does not exist in the conglomerated conditions. then [one’s position] is not correct. Someone might think. You say that the cloth has the essence of the threads. the conditions have the essence of things that are not the conditions]. it partakes of the essence of the threads. which means that they have the essence of [their own causes] which are not the conditions. [In other words. since the effect does not exist. Here someone objects. they too must have the essence of their causes]. such as the threads.” In response. as effects. because it does not exist in any of them individually and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that the effect would arise piecemeal. either individually or conglomerated. the conditions do not essentially exist. the cloth does not have its own essence. How can an effect that comes from conditions which are not in essence themselves have the essence of the conditions? 30 35 40 If one asserts that the effect has the essence of the conditions. “Having perceived that things such as cloths come from things such as threads. because it is not perceived there and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that there would be many effects. how can that which does not exist in the conditions come from the conditions? The cloth does not exist in the individual conditions. It is not correct because the conditions also do not have the essence of being themselves. Therefore. [therefore]. we say that the production of an effect.Wisdom Page 9 5 phrase. one does not prove by reason of the definition that there is a controlling condition. there is no intrinsic production of the effect. In other words. the cloth is essentially the threads]. the threads are not established by virtue of their own essence [because. At this point someone says. they are simply a permutation of their atoms. which comes from threads that themselves do not have their own essence. since there are many causes. 1.” 1. such as the threads.12 “What if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist [in them]?” Why then would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions? 10 15 20 25 The effect also does not exist in things that are not its causal conditions. There would thereby be a cloth if the threads were established by virtue of their own essence. then one could have the qualm. the effect has the same essence as the conditions. [in other words. one says that the threads and so on are the causal conditions for things such as cloths. have the essence of the threads? As it says in the Śūnyatāsaptati [Seventy Verses on Emptiness]: “The cloth is established . shuttle and peg. how then can one prove that the conditions are conditions? To establish the way in which there is no production of an effect such as a cloth.13 “The effect has the essence of the conditions.” Therefore. such as vīraṇa grass? Thus. which means that it is a permutation of the conditions. so why should a cloth not arise from things that are not its causal conditions. So how can an effect. “that exists. In short. does not intrinsically [svarūpataḥ] exist. But they have or partake of the essence of their atoms. “If the effect were one thing and the causal conditions something else.

there is no production of things by virtue of their own essence. Hence. no thing exists anywhere. firm and stable. 25 Something of which the essence is never reached has no essence.14. we say that there would be an effect if there were things that are conditions and things that are not conditions. They do not cease. All things are unmoving. That which does not essentially exist anywhere will never have something else as its cause. they are unaware. like an unshakable stony mountain. then why would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions?’ The conditions. If there is no cloth that has the essence of the threads.” In response. for if there were an effect.1 Therefore. the cause is established through some other cause. The Victor taught that reality is this way. You yourself say. As it says in the āryaratnākārasūtra [“The Holy Sūtra of the Jeweled Source”]: For one who knows emptiness.” Therefore. the leonine human. such as threads or vīraṇa grass. ‘if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist in them. nor do they arise. It also says: Introducing hundreds of beings to this [reality]. That which does not have any essence at all is not obtained by anyone through the 10 15 20 35 . taught that a thing is that which is not produced. namely a cloth or a mat. trouble-free and peaceful. how can something which is not established through itself produce something else?” 1. the effect also exists. just like the path of a bird in the sky. “Very well. like the paths of the sky. the effect does not exist.14. how can there be a cloth that has the essence of vīraṇa grass? Now someone says. he says: 1. there is no effect.2 There is no effect that has the essence of something other than the conditions.14.Wisdom Page 10 through its cause. Suppose then that effect has the essence of something other than the conditions? 1. does not cease and does not age. would not be conditions if there were no effect.” But when analyzed. how can other things be its conditions? What essenceless thing would the other thing produce? The Buddha taught this reasoning. The unknowing world is confused about this. the Buddha. how can there be conditions and non-conditions? [In the original Sanskrit] the compound conditions/non-conditions means “conditions and nonconditions.3 Since there is no effect. Therefore. 5 “There is no effect” is supplied from below. but these are not its conditions. they are unchanging. But there is a definite rule for establishing what is and is not a condition. then one could say. 30 Things can never be shaken. “these are its conditions. does not arise. [there is no effect] that has the essence of the conditions.

” 5 . liberated from states. there you will live. The Sugata said that this state is peaceful. Nor is it obtained internally. I will free many beings.Wisdom Page 11 essence of something else. thinking. and no state whatsoever is obtained. the Lord introduces [the world] to this. nor externally. “Free.

it is incorrect to say.” In this context. it is clear that Candrakīrti understands the action of “going” (gamana) here to be best exemplified by the action of walking.” The phrase “where one has LVP93. how can it be a spot where one has not yet walked? Furthermore.” The phrase “first of all” indicates the order in which the various possibilities are negated. or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one is currently walking. and the spot that he has not yet traversed is for him a not yet walked upon spot. the currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known. then one would necessarily conceive of walking in relation to the spot on the path where one has just walked. or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one has not yet walked. for the sake of clarity and simplicity. a short walkway dedicated to that purpose. That which is now affected by the action of walking is expressed by. it is not the case that one is now walking where one just walked.2 Critique of Walking 5 10 LVP92.1 At this point.” This is in part due to the complicated nature of the argument. namely. 0000). you must state an additional argument to refute the action (kriyā) that is going to and fro (gamanāgamana). there is no action of walking on the currently walked upon spot because “without the spots where one has already walked and where one has not yet walked. Therefore. “to walk” (or literally.” If one has not yet walked upon it. the currently walked upon spot is thus not being walked upon. So he says: 15 2. Hence. the spot that the walker has traversed is for him a walked upon spot.” Our motivation for doing so is twofold. one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. But in isolation from the walked upon spot and the not yet walked upon spot. Nevertheless.» In response.1 were to exist. First. which is based upon the peculiarities of Sanskrit grammar (see the introduction. “to go”) and “to know. «By negating production.” etc. one is also not walking where one has not yet walked.1 not yet walked” expresses a part of the road where a future action of motion has not yet occurred. it does not make sense to say. Throughout this chapter. you have established that interdependent origination has the quality of not being ceased and so on. we say that if going (gamana). how can one be now walking on it? And if one is walking on it.2 Here. the forms of √gam have been translated as “walking. “One is now walking where one has not yet walked. it is nearly impossible to arrive at a clear and readable English translation of this chapter if one translates all forms of √gam as “to go” or even as “to move. someone says.” is added here because we will be interpreting the verb “to go” (√gam) as “to walk. we do not see any third spot that would be “the currently 1 20 25 30 The phrase. So too. since the future and the present are completely distinct.” which expresses a connection with a presently existing action of walking. “One is walking where one just walked. in order to prove that interdependent origination has neither coming nor going. Quite possibly he is thinking of the practice of walking meditation along a caṅkrama. “where one just walked” expresses that part of the path on which the action of walking has just ceased. exemplified by the action of walking. and without the spots where one already walked and where one has not yet walked. But none of this makes sense. and so as to reflect Candrakīrti’s interpretation.” It is incoherent to speak of “where one just walked”—meaning the place where the action of motion has just ceased—with the phrase “one is now walking. First of all.1. Therefore. which is commonly accepted in the world. “which is exemplified by walking. “one is not now walking where one has not yet walked. Second.” 2 . Candrakīrti will at various points pun on the dual meaning of the Sanskrit verb √gam. The phrase “one is now walking” expresses a present action of motion. “one is now walking.

there is no currently walked upon spot without being either a spot already walked upon or one not yet walked upon.1.4. He gives the reason: 2.2. so should one analyze the atomic particles in terms of the relation between their front and back parts. In this verse. The area behind an atom located on the tip of the toe is included in the spot already walked upon. relative to that atom. but it could be rendered: “the action of walking is at the currently walked upon spot.” . since one has no knowledge of it. See above (5). Thus. if someone says that the currently walked upon spot is the spot that one has halfway walked upon. It is not possible for one’s physical movement to be occurring at the spot where one has already walked. “The currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known. How could it make sense for there to be the action of walking at the currently walked upon spot. There is no physical movement where one already walked or where one has not yet walked. But someone might say. And just as one analyzed the feet. Feet cannot exist without the atomic particles of which feet are composed. relative to that atom.3. «One is indeed walking on the currently walked upon spot.” And since that is the case. the currently walked upon spot is where on observes the action of walking. nor can it occur where one has not yet walked. there is knowledge (gati) of the currently walked upon spot. according to the objector.” At this point. that is. Hence.e.3 Therefore it is established. then one uses the answer that has been given in the analysis of production.” Even if one thinks that the above is the case.” Therefore.2. and that spot is affected by the action of walking.Wisdom Page 13 5 10 15 walked upon spot. the currently walked upon spot is known. one instance of the word gati means “knowledge”.1 states that the action of walking occurs only in the spot where there is the physical movement of the moving walker.»4 LVP In this verse. that spot is not affected by the activity of motion. That is the currently walked upon spot!» This is not the case because the mover’s feet are a conglomeration of atomic particles. “physical movement” refers to the raising and lowering of the feet. and there is physical movement in the currently walked upon spot. na gamyate (i. the author says: 20 25 30 35 2. Hence.. The translation of the last phrase follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation. it is not currently walked upon. someone objects. Moreover. which he cited in his commentary on MMK1. there is also is no action of walking even in the currently walked upon spot.16. if “the currently walked upon” is unintelligible without the action of walking? 3 4 Candrakīrti is referring to CŚ15.3. Therefore.” Here. Therefore. there is no currently walked upon spot. Therefore. but the spot in front of an atom located at the back of the heel is included in the spot not yet walked upon. “is not being walked upon”) is taken to mean “is not known.” That is. the currently walked upon spot is still not walked upon or known. “there is knowledge of the currently walked upon spot. the other means “motion toward another area. «There is a spot that is tread upon by the feet of the walking walker. “one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. The objector94. There is walking (gati) where there is physical movement. which is known! This is so because 2. Therefore.

the particle hi means “because. 2.”6 One might. one cannot say.” In the verse.1 walked upon. claim that the action of walking is related only to “is being walked upon. “the currently walked upon. Since.” For that theorist. “walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. “the currently walked upon spot is being 5 walked upon” is incomplete. however. that spot on the path “is being walked upon. see the introduction (0000). however.” Even so. One can only say “the currently walked upon. 5 6 That is. Clearly. then the meaning of the statement.” even though that which is so designated is devoid of the action of walking.1 the action of walking. “is being walked upon. then it follows that there are two actions of walking. the meaning of the sentence would again be incomplete.” Hence. . when he says. If one accepts that walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. and yet it “is being walked upon.” That is one of the actions of walking.5. Nāgārjuna says: 2. The second is the walking that has that currently walked upon spot as its locus. it follows that there is the “currently walked upon” even in the absence of the action of walking. then on the opponent’s realist approach to semantics. the “currently walked upon” would be devoid of the action of walking. however.4. one cannot given an adequate account of how the sentence could mean what it appears to mean. it follows that the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking. In any case.” and there is no second action of going. The idea here is that. “is being walked upon” is not intelligible without LVP95.” And “without the action of walking” (vigamana) means that the action of walking is absent. then the verbal action would have no relation to the term. The grammatical issue here is that the action of walking (gamikriyā) is at least part of the warrant (pravṛttinimitta) for the term “the currently walked upon spot”(gamyamāna).” Hence. that verbal action cannot also act as a warrant for the verbal phrase. it is already acting as a warrant for that term. part of the argument here is that there is an exclusive relation between the action and what it warrants. 30 Through its relation to an action of walking. “is walked upon” (gamyate).Wisdom Page 14 5 10 Here. This would be so because for him “the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.” and the other is that which is the “walking” there. by virtue of this second action of walking.” Such are the two actions of walking that ensue when walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. That is. if one presupposes that the various grammatical and referential relations entail absolute connection. It is absent because one action of walking is connected with “the currently walked upon. For someone who holds such a position. then there must be two activities of motion. If walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot.” Since there is no second action of walking.” That theorist maintains that the action of walking is the basis for the designation “currently walked upon. claim that the action is connected to both “currently walked upon” and “is being walked upon. 15 20 25 A theorist might hold. “currently LVP96. inasmuch as the same entity (namely.” This so because the action is linked to “is being walked upon. “the currently walked upon. One might. the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking. that spot on the path gains the designation. the action of walking) serves as a warrant for both the patient (gamyamāna) and the verb (gamyate).” If this were the case. then it would follow that there would be a currently walked upon spot even in the absence of the action of walking. if the phrase.” he means that it “is being walked upon. For more on this issue. One is the walking in relation to which that spot is “currently walked upon. the sentence “the currently walked upon spot is walked upon” does not have a clear meaning. This would be so because the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon. If it were to act as a warrant for that as well.

is speaking and also seeing something. someone responds. walking would have no locus. being located in the agent. it would be nonexistent. Hence. such as a particular. since 2. it has not been LVP97. But there is no such walker. If walking makes no sense when the walker is negated.” walking is still observed in relation to John Doe as the walker. Even so. This would be the case if there were a walker who served as the locus of walking. and it differs when the action differs. the walker—exists. instead. standing still. since there are not two agents. walking does not exist. “The currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.Wisdom Page 15 «Very well. walking does not exist when the walker is negated—that is. walking does indeed exist because the locus of walking—namely.2. The capacity (śakti) is what serves as a contributing factor (kāraka) for the occurrence of the action. but as is demonstrated by the statement. Moreover. In this case. two actions of walking do not pertain to one walker. But when there is only one agent such as John Doe who is walking. If it follows that there are two actions of walking. Therefore. «Suppose that John Doe. then. And the action of walking. and as a result of being so 7 10 15 20 25 30 35 The term “possessed of” translates the possessive suffix –vat. An action necessarily depends upon its own means of accomplishment (sādhana).6. if there is no walking. And due to the difference in the actions in question. how can there be the walker. Therefore. At this point. it is not intelligible to say. it is observed that a single agent is involved in multiple actions. In this way. If that is the case. This relationship. often called the “relation of the container to the contained” (ādhārādheyasambandha) is one typical strategy employed by South Asian realists to overcome the . John Doe is not a “speaker” by virtue of his action of standing still. «Walking does exist because the one possessed of walking7 is called such due to the walking. “John Doe is walking. two actions might pertain to a single agent. In that case.1 observed that a single person acts simultaneously as the contributing factor for two similar actions. the walker is related to walking.» Let us suppose that this is the case. in which that distributed entity is instantiated (see Dunne 2004a). the substance does not do so. the action of walking makes no sense. Here. Therefore. let there be two actions of walking? What’s wrong with that?» There is a problem.» We respond as follows.7. how can there be the walker if there is no walking? We have said that without a walker. This suffix is often used in connection with a particular theory concerning the relationship between a distributed entity such as a universal and the entity. 5 Why must there be two walkers? Nāgārjuna says. there are not two actions of walking. «That may be so.» This is not so. How so? Nāgārjuna says: 2.6. 2. Therefore. «But there is just one substance [that is John Doe].1. because in the absence of the walker. someone objects. for whom there would be no warrant. there is no second agent. the capacity is. when the walker’s existence is denied. then it also follows that there must be two walkers. the substance is not a contributing factor for the action. and as such. the capacities that are the means for accomplishing those actions must also be different. And therefore. whether that be a patient (karma) or an agent. depends upon the agent.” Someone might try a different approach saying.

” However. is not walking. a non-walker is devoid of the action of walking. “is walking. just the walker is walking. “the walker is walking. and here is why: what third agent—one who is neither a walker nor a non-walker— is there such that you think that he “is walking?” Therefore.” In this phrase. “walker. A theorist might hold that there is a “walker” because he is connected to the action of walking. the walker might be qualified by the action of walking because he is related to that action.Wisdom Page 16 5 related. On the other hand. and for him the expression “walker” is related to the walking. At this point.” Nevertheless. one could not apply the expression. Instead. it is not correct to say. «One who is neither “is walking. There would be walking if “is walking” were indeed an [intelligible] expression. it is not possible to speak of the “walker.8. it is not reasonable to say. first of all.” Nāgārjuna says. then in the case of some John Doe who is possessed of walking. The walker. “is walking. This is so because there is no second action of walking. third [agent] which is neither walker nor non-walker is walking? The walker is so-called because he is walking. one would not use the expression. LVP99. a non-walker also is not walking.” there is only one action of walking.1 he is not walking will be shown by the next three stanzas. nor is the one who is neither. as one who is a non-walker.” then he is not a non-walker. first of all. Nevertheless. since there is no second action of walking.” so it is not reasonable.” So let us grant that one can say. If walking did not exist. 10 15 20 25 30 35 .” problems of identity and difference that plague such relations. Why? Because: 2.1 That theorist asserts that walking pertains to the walker.10. and what other.» We answer as follows. the word “walker” is used to mean “is walking. someone objects.” In the verse. 2. cannot be the “walker.” if the walker is unintelligible in the absence of walking? In the statement. he is not walking. “is walking. “the walker is walking. the walker. one cannot apply the expression. One who holds that “the walker walks” must conclude that there is a walker without the action of walking. “The walker walks. for him “the walker is walking” without walking. «The non-walker is not walking. Therefore. without walking. But. Therefore. Therefore.”» This is not so. “is walking. and the phrase “is walking” is employed for that which has a relation to the action of walking. and the way that LVP98. since he claims that the action of walking pertains to the walker. how is it that he “is walking?” Or. in someone has no staff. How is it intelligible to say. This is like the case where. he is walking.” That being the case. Hence. who is not walking. “there is a walker without the action of walking. and due to the presence of that action one uses the expression. there is the phrase. “The walker is walking. there is no walking. 2. if he “is walking.” to him.» This is not so. But that is not the case.” to him. “staff-bearer.9. The non-walker also is not walking. for warranting the expression.” there is no second action of walking. Indeed.

Wisdom Page 17 One might then claim that the action of walking is related to both “walker” and “is walking. he is walking? Or as a non-walker? Or as something distinct from both a walker and a non-walker? None of these possibilities make sense. one would have to begin it either on a spot where one has just walked. Walking also does not begin on a spot where one has not yet walked because the present and the future are mutually exclusive. i. “So where does one begin to walk?” To demonstrate the way that walking is not possible.e. the other is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking. someone objects. then since the past and the present are mutually exclusive.12. Hence. Nāgārjuna says. «Walking exists because its beginning exists. the action of walking exists. the walker walks. One does not begin things that do not exist. it would not be a spot where one just walked. And before he begins to walk.” Due to a connection with the action of walking.13.. on the other hand. «Even so. “John Doe is walking. If. that from this it follows that there should be two walkers. The other is the action of walking that the walker is doing. At this point. there is no currently walked upon spot.” does exist! Therefore. nor is there a spot where one just walked such that either of them could be the spot where one begins walking.1 made from tortoise hairs. and one would be forced to conclude that there are two agents of walking. hence.” We respond that walking would indeed exist if it had a beginning.” Even so. someone is characterized or called the “walker. John Doe eliminates the state of standing still and begins to walk. Therefore.” Someone might say. one also does not begin to walk on the currently walked upon spot. Prior to the beginning of walking.» This is not the case because the following qualm is focused on John Doe: is it that. such as a robe LVP100. as a walker.11. one does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked because the action of motion has ceased on a spot where one has just walked. 2. [on the opponent’s theory. nor on a spot where one has not yet walked. so where does one begin to walk? 25 If walking had a beginning. he is not beginning to walk. In this way. there is no spot where he is currently walking. one should state a critique along previously mentioned lines. One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked. nor is there a spot where he has just walked such that either 5 10 15 20 30 35 . So much for that objection.” That is one action of walking. Concerning these possibilities. one must conclude that there are two activities of walking: one is the walking through which someone is characterized as the “walker”. If walking were to begin on that spot. he says: 2. “is walking. namely. But: 2.” In this way two activities of walking absurdly follow from the opponent’s position. one would be forced to conclude that there are two actions of walking. And how could there be walking where one has not yet walked? 40 When John Doe is standing still. or on a spot where one is currently walking. the expression. one does not observe anywhere a beginning to the action of walking.] there is no expression. Nor does one begin walking on the currently walked upon spot for three reasons: that spot does not exist. or on a spot where one has not yet walked. it is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking.

First of all.» We respond as follows. How can there be walking where one has not yet walked? The spot where one has not yet walked is a spot where one’s activity of walking has not yet occurred. 2.1 Someone might claim. does one think that some spot is already walked upon? Does one think that some spot is currently walked upon? Does one think that some spot is not yet walked upon? If no beginning of walking is found at all. Therefore. then due to one action of standing still he would be a “non-walker. or the currently walked upon spot. And the currently walked upon spot would be where that action was currently occurring.1 20 25 30 2. “How could there be walking where one has not yet walked?” «Even though there is no beginning to walking on either the walked upon spot. a non-walker. However. The non-walker also does not stand still because he is already standing still. Why would he need another action of standing still? If he did.”8 In response we say that walking would indeed exist if its opposite. there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the just walked upon spot. walking begins there.” and due to the other one would say that he “stands still. “standing still. Hence. far and near. which literally means “standing” as in “standing still. then it exists.” 8 . one would also be forced to accept that there are two agents of that action. if there is no beginning to the action of walking. «Walking does exist because its opposite exists. then. Walking would indeed exist if they existed. as is the case with light and darkness. those spots nevertheless do exist. LVP102. the start of walking is not at either either of those spots. the not yet walked upon spot. But how can one conceive of a walker. the not yet walked upon spot would be where the action had not yet occurred. If the action of walking is not discovered at all. It is incoherent to say that walking begins at that spot. prior to the beginning of walking. and what third kind of agent—someone who is neither the walker nor the non-walker—is there that is stands still? 35 The next stanza will explain how it is that the walker does not stand still.” However. So too. which is to say that it is a spot where the activity of walking has yet to begin. The The term here is sthāna. the walker does not stand still. And if walking were nonexistent. The opposite of walking exists—it is “standing still. Now someone objects.” Since one would have to conclude that there were thus two actions of standing still. in the argument that follows. and doubt and certainty.” existed. Nāgārjuna asks. there is the spot where one has not yet walked. LVP101.14.» We respond by asking. since there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the spot where he just walked. And if something has an opposite. «Although. it would not make sense for them to exist. then why would one falsely think of those three spots? And how could the action of walking be the warrant for those three expressions? It would make no sense. or something else as “standing still.” This does not make any sense at all. This is so because one would think that the walked upon spot was the spot where the action of walking ceased. sthāna will at points also mean to “stop.15. given that it had already begun.Wisdom Page 18 5 10 15 spot is where he begins walking. the non-walker does not stand still.

«The non-walker does not stand still. the one is stopping the action of walking begins the action of standing still. But if walking were nonexistent. standing still also exists because its opposite exists. He also does not halt and stand still where he has not yet walked. it has the same problems as the action of walking. “The walker stands still?” When one says. standing still does indeed exist because its opposite exists. “Walking does exist because stopping exists. Therefore. Walking. we prove that there is standing still. And in this regard. and also because there is no action of walking there. since: 2. and that exists. And thus. And in the absence of the action of walking. in the verse that begins. So too the walker does not halt and stand still on the currently walked on spot because such a spot is not found. walking is explained to be the same as in the action of walking. Here. which is the contrary of standing still. does not pertain to him. If the walker without walking does not make sense. For example. «So.” Nāgārjuna levels a critique against the action of standing still that is adduced as evidence to prove the action of walking. But it does not. and since it does not exist. Therefore. walking does not exist because its opposite.1 not exist. its opposite— namely. as shown by this critique.” This is not so.” does LVP103. one does not apply the expression “walker. there is no third type of agent who is neither a walker nor a non-walker.17. since 2.17.” Here. “The walker stands still. “First of all. someone says.15-16). as in. then how could one stop doing it?» We respond that walking would exist if stopping to walk existed. someone says. first of all. there is no stopping the action of walking. nor does one who is other than both a walker and a non-walker. here as well one should apply the same critique to walking when it is adduced as evidence to prove the action of standing still. And walking is proven when standing still is proven.Wisdom Page 19 5 problem is as stated previously. standing still—also does not exist. It is in this way that. and stopping—each case is the same as in the action of walking.1. Likewise. Instead. it is the walker himself who stands still. “The one standing still is not walking…” and so on (MMK2.” Therefore. “He stands still. 10 15 20 25 30 35 In this regard.” then the action of walking.16. because: 2. there is no walking. it is unintelligible to say. One does so by restating the two stanzas with the appropriate changes. the walker does not stand still…. Hence. Likewise.» This is also not right. how then would it make sense to say. This is so because the opposite of standing still is walking. As for this verse. . then in order to establish that there is walking. Here someone says. nor on the spot just walked upon. “standing still.2. the “walking” that is mentioned so as to prove that there is the action of “standing still” is the same as in the action walking—in other words. and this is also the case because there is no walking there. But if that is the case. nor on a spot not yet walked upon. the walker does not halt and stand still on a spot where he has just walked because there is no action of walking there. beginning. One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot.

the critique as the same as in the action of walking.1 the beginning of standing still is the same as in the action of walking.12) refuted the beginning of walking.” Likewise. “One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot. those who hold that the opposite of walking—namely. That is. the critique is the same as in the action of walking: One does not depart walking on the currently stood upon spot. Nāgārjuna says: 2. who is standing still. One might object. It does not make sense to say. «The action of standing still does exist because its cessation exists. nor on the spot just walked upon. One does not begin to stand still on a spot where one just stood. One should say that beginning the action of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. Neither case is at all possible for those who examine the issue. a critique of walking was stated by the line that says. by making the appropriate changes to the three stanzas. one begins standing still. in this case as well.17. or not in exclusion from the walker. if walking were to exist. if it is not different from the walker—then agent and activity (kriyā) would be identical.” Why does it not make sense? 35 2. Thus. there would be no . Hence. one also does not begin to stand still where one is currently standing still. nor on the spot just stood upon. so where does one begin to stand still? 10 15 In this way. previously the verse that began “One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked…” (MMK2. “The walker is different from the action of walking. since it is “the same as in the action of walking. nor on a spot where one has not yet stood. «Standing still does exist because its beginning exists. nor on a spot not yet walked upon. stops standing still and begins to walk. However. one should make it clear that stopping the action of standing still is the same as in stopping the action of walking.Wisdom Page 20 5 But suppose someone says.19. If there were no action of standing still.18. nor does it make sense to say. And how can that which is begun not exist?» We respond as follows.” (MMK2. In the case of stopping the action of walking.” That is.» We respond that the action of standing still would exist if the stopping of that action existed.1) Likewise. That is. then it would have to exist either in exclusion from the walker. That is. it does not exist. nor on the spot not yet stood upon. Moreover. then one would be forced to accept that agent and activity (karman) are identical. John Doe. by suppressing walking. one should make it clear that LVP104. If the walker were himself the action of walking. then one could not stop that action. in the case of stopping the action of standing still. “The walker is himself the action of walking”. standing still—exists have no proof for the action of walking because standing still does not exist. If the activity of walking does not exist in exclusion from the walker—that is. 20 25 30 Thus.

the walker would have to already be engaged in that action. And except for those options. the walking would be apprehended independent of the walker. is engaged in—that activity of walking through which he is characterized as the “walker.” Thus. Nāgārjuna asks. Therefore. the walker “is walking” —i.1 . it is established just in the way that these are established: “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action.20. a “walker” is engaged in walking. If the walker and the walker were different. If you think that the walker is something different from the action of walking.” To show how there is also no difference between the walker and the walking. is walking. how then can there indeed be any proof of these two at all? 15 There is no proof for these two—the walker and the action of walking—as being either identical or different. in what other way could they be proven to exist? And so. Candrakīrti appears to suggest that this line should be read.22. «A statement such as. “How can there indeed be any proof of these two at all?” His intention is that there is no proof for the walker and the action of walking. That is. then he would engage in that walking. “The walker is himself the action of walking. he does not do it. It also makes no sense for the walker to be something other than the walking.Wisdom Page 21 distinction between the two.3.” John Doe does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the walker. This being the case. since: 2.. 30 “Before walking” means prior to the action of walking. he does not achieve that action.” Indeed. This is so 2. as has already been shown. someone says.21. because he is not the walker before walking. the activity of cutting is not identical to the cutter.22. It would be established as distinct.1 5 2. So too. In order for the “walker” to exist prior to the action of walking. This is most likely the point that Candrakīrti means to make with his example of walking to a destination.2.22.» This is also not the true. in other words. If the walker were established prior to the action of walking. the point being made here is simply that an agent is by definition one who is engaged in some action.e.” is commonly established for the world (lokaprasiddha). since someone engages in some walking. there would have to be the walking without the walker and the walker without the walking. the walker. But it is not the case that the walking is apprehended distinct from the walker.1 That is. LVP106. “Someone walks to some destination. it is not correct to say.9 In the commentary on this verse. At this point. This is so 2. thus. such that one could say “This is the agent” and “This is the activity. just as a cloth is distinct from a jug. which is not yet existent.” The aforementioned critiques do not hold. that is. then the walker would exist independently of the action of walking. “John Doe. 2. Nāgārjuna says: LVP105. that by definition an agent is someone engaged in the 9 10 20 25 .” However. The walker does not engage in the walking by virtue of which he is characterized as “the walker. There is no proof whatsoever that these two exist as either identical are different.

a real walker is not engaged in real walking. and one that is both real and unreal has the nature of both possibilities.” and the other would be the action of walking that he engaged in—these are the two actions of walking that would absurdly follow. The main problem of translation here is that both the destination and. “Going. in Nāgārjuna’s usage.” 10 25 action in question. Since that is the case. That is. neither the walker. The first of these has been rendered as “state.” To make matters worse. Where there is no state of moving inward of outward. the prior to that action of walking due to which he is called the “walker. The walker does not do an action of walking that is different from that walking by virtue of which he is characterized as the “walker” because when there is only one walker. A walker that is both real and unreal does not do the walking in three ways. Such is not the case here.» This is also not true since 2. At this point. An unreal walker does not do the walking in three ways. which Candrakīrti has interpreted heretofore as “the action of walking. In three ways. This dispels the objection based on statements such as “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action.-2. nor that which is being walked upon exists. nor yet the action itself. there is no coming or going.’ venerable Śāriputra.” The complexities— and the pun involved—cannot be fully rendered in English. an unreal walker is not engaged in any of these three kinds of walking.1 As the Teachings of Akṣayamati says. And in this regard. One would be the action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker. but the current translation captures the main point of the argument.23.1 The walker does not engage in an action of walking that is different from the one due to which he is characterized as the “walker” because two actions of walking would absurdly ensue. unreal walking or walking that is both real and unreal. 30 LVP108. This will be explained in the “Analysis of Factors of Action and their Object” (MMK8). And as has already been explained. which is other than himself.” 2.24. One should know that the walking can also be related to the action of walking in three ways. So too. Thus.” although its numerous other meanings include . someone says. the term gati. an unreal walker is devoid of the action of walking. Such is the gait (gati) of the Āryas: it is without coming or going. nor the action of walking. he engages in another action of walking. nor does the object of that action. a real walker is connected with the action of walking. «The walker does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker. 10 15 LVP107.1. that is. two actions of walking cannot apply to one walker. 10 The full flavor of this passage is difficult to render into English because it involves a deliberately ambiguous use of two key terms pada and gati. the action can occur in the accusative as that objects of the verbal construction. a real walker does not do the walking.25. 20 In this verse. is a state of moving outward. Therefore.25. nor is a walker who is both real and unreal. the agent of walking does not exist. “Venerable Śāriputra.” Rather.” can also mean “destination. the term “walking” means “that action of walking which is engaged in” (gamyata iti gamanam).” that walker who engages in that action does not exist.Wisdom Page 22 5 It is observed that someone such as John Doe walks to some village or city. This also will be explained in that same chapter.2. it does not make sense to have two actions of walking. 2. ‘coming’ is a state of moving inward. “is walking.

such as a donkey’s horns. confused beings develop desire. nor is it something other than that.” and “understanding. no one is born here. but the seal itself is not seen to be transferred there. nor is the impression in the seal.1 karma is not wasted once it has been done. its nature (dharmatā) is to be neither annihilated nor eternal. nor will one experience what another has done. and not a sprout. in the King of Samādhi Sūtra it says. and no one dies. The faultless Victor with Ten Powers uttered this best of meditative states: “the world of existence (bhava) is like a dream. know that all things are like that. it will give a black or bright result for the one cycling in saṃsāra. one will not fail to encounter it again. In this way.1 15 25 . but it is not annihilated. It is not the “place” and “word. nor is the seed that. nor arrival [from the last life]. nor does anyone pass on to the next world or go there. Likewise. And: 10 A seal is seen in its impression.” “destiny. it can also mean “state. having done it. In this way. akin to a mirage. In this way.” but then one would have to argue that there is no coming and going because there is no word for coming and going. In this world no human dies. But if there is no transfer of the face into the image. And production does not pertain to causeless things.” Indeed. LVP109. it is formed from the verbal root √gam. the interpretation of pada as “word” is not wholly implausible as part of a vague play on words. which is wholly unconvincing. which is the basis for the terms “coming” (āgati) and “going” (gati). we have translated it as “gait” in the sense that it is the way that the Āryas proceed. As for gati. They are like the moon in water. the Tibetan translators take it to mean “word. Likewise. he said: When children see an ornamented female face on the surface of a mirror or a pot of oil. Nevertheless. no living thing or human. the fault of eternalism would also ensue.” Here. Hence. nor perdurance.” all of which may again be part of a deliberate if vague play on words. It is not eternal.” “abode. on the other hand. the face will never be reached. It is the verb that has been translated throughout the chapter as “to walk. the same as a flash of lightning in the sky. Things are like froth or a plantain tree.Wisdom Page 23 If the seed itself were to be transferred into the sprout. Yet LVP110. However. then the fault of being uncaused would ensue. they feel desire for that face. the sprout were to come from something else. But if. they urgently seek to get it. 20 No being is encountered here. conditioning is neither annihilated nor eternal. and desirous. Yet. They are like illusions. nor yet does it come from something else. the Blessed One said: 5 The sprout of an existent seed is not itself the seed. then that would be a seed. There is no accumulation of karma. There is no transference [to the next life].

a signless place—such is the realm of the Sugatas. such are the qualities of the Victors. spells. The three realms of saṃsāra are like a dream. They quickly fluctuate LVP111. Unarisen. positive qualities and LVP112. Here there is no purity of view. nor does it not exist. they have the best way to obtain the five superpowers. Power. 5 10 . wisdom and spells. It is not that something has come here. state or place. [Mind-] streams are always empty and signless. and the Ten Powers’ strength—such is the supremacy of the bull-like buddhas: a myriad of excellent.Wisdom Page 24 case that all exists.1 and are impermanent like an illusion. There is no place where beings become tranquil through their actions. supreme power of good qualities. nor will something go elsewhere.1 character. peaceful. they have no core. supreme in magic and miraculous action.

then since it is not yet established.1. one is not seeing what has not yet been seen. since it does not depend upon seeing. “seeing sees?” 3. On the other hand. How can there be seeing and the object seen if there is no seer? 3. 10 Modifying the first verse in chapter 2.7. and without what has been seen and the not yet seen. then does dependence on seeing apply to something already established to exist or not yet established to exist? Concerning these possibilities. the seer is like the son of a barren woman. The six sense-faculties are sight.3. And due just to this analysis in these four verses of seeing.6. how can there be . 3. If that is the case. And since there is neither the object of seeing nor seeing. when seeing is not excluded.2. suppose that the seer is asserted to be dependent on the seeing—that is. there is no seer. if a not yet established seer depends upon seeing. 5 3. And has as been stated before. it is said that visual awareness arises in dependence upon the eye and visible matter. It is said a child is born in dependence (pratītya) upon mother and father. hearing. a seer who is already established does not depend upon seeing. the already traversed. a seer excluded from seeing also does not exist. a seer not excluded from seeing does not exist.5. 35 3. one can critique seeing as follows: First of all. we have already responded to claims about the reality of fire’s burning along with the act of seeing. Likewise. one is not seeing what has been seen.2. Hence. In this whether or not seeing is excluded. but we respond: The example of fire is not suitable for proving that sight sees itself. nor does non-seeing see. the “being seen” is not seen.3 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties 3. we ask: if there were some seer. In this way.6. the four factors in the twelve links starting with awareness also do not exist. as such. When seeing is excluded. one must admit that the seer is also explained to be impossible.1. What might say that fire burns itself. What would dependence upon seeing do for an already established—that is to say. Their objects are the visible and so on. touching and the mind. By means of our analysis of the being traversed. existent—seer? This makes no sense because that which is already established is not established again. Seeing does not see. smelling. How will that which does not see itself see something else itself? 3.” how can it make sense to say. there is no seer.8. Sight does not see itself. a not yet established seer does not depend upon seeing.4. and the not yet traversed. there is not seer. if seeing is not excluded. Thus: 3. 20 25 30 Here. then. tasting. If there is no seeing of what is not “being seen. would he depend upon seeing or not? In this regard. 15 3.

just by the critique of seeing.9. we have also explained the objects and agents. just by the critique of seeing. such as the hearer and the heard. smelling. touching and thinking. and one should realize that. tasting.Wisdom Page 26 appropriation and such? 3. 5 . we have explained hearing. One should realize that.

all that he offers as proof of his criticism has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. When torn apart by emptiness. one who responds with criticism has not criticized anything at all. the causes of visible matter are also not seen. the causes would have no effects. “The effect is similar to its cause. 4. the cause of visible matter makes no sense. If visible matter already exists. If there were visible matter separate from the causes of visible matter.9. 4. and indeed to all things. It does not make sense to claim. and there is no causeless thing anywhere. When explained away by emptiness.1.” It does not make sense to claim. recognition. all that he offers as proof has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove.” 15 4. However.3.6. 10 4. Therefore. one who utters a defense does not defend anything. conditioning.7 . Visible matter is not perceived separate from the causes of visible matter. 4. and separate from visible matter. 4. 4. 20 . visible matter would be causeless. “The effect is not similar to its cause. and there is no cause without effects. if the causes of visible matter existed separate from visible matter.4. mind. no.8. Causeless visible matter? No.2. it does not make sense.Wisdom Page 27 4 Analysis of the Aggregates 4. the cause of visible matter does not make sense. 5 4. The same sequence of arguments applies in all ways to sensation. one should not invent any concepts at all that have to do with visible matter.5. If visible matter does not yet exist.

7 . then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized. the characterized does not exist. and the defining characteristic does not exist. then the defining characteristic is not possible. 5. 5 5. If the characterized does not make sense.5.Wisdom Page 28 5 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus) 5. then to what does a defining characteristic apply? 5.2. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic. Therefore.8. If there is no thing without a defining characteristic.6. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic. If there is no existent (bhāva). There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic. And the other five elements are the same in this regard as space. .1. space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent. 5.4. then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)? And [if] the analyzer that has neither the quality of existing nor not existing. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present. 15 5. And an existent (bhāva) does not exist without what is characterized and the defining characteristic. how does he know either the existent or the nonexistent? 20 5.” 5. which is the quieting (upaśama) of what is to be seen. 10 In the verse above the verb “to apply to” can be translated as “to be present in. Therefore. nor does it apply to what already has a defining characteristic.3. it would have no defining characteristic. if it were prior to its defining characteristic. Nor does it apply to something other than what has or does not have a defining characteristic. it is neither the characterized nor the defining characteristic. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do not see peace.

Thus. grogs). If desire and the desirous are established separately. How could there be desire without the desirous? This same analytical procedure applies to the desirous in the case where there is or is not desire.Wisdom Page 29 6 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous 6. existed before desire. 6.4. while different. 15 6.10. If the desirous.1. then why do you imagine that they arise together? 20 6. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are identical. you again claim that they are separate! 6. And yet. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are different. in exclusion from desire. You expect them to arise together because you think that they are not established separately. how can they arise together? 6. . If desire and the desirous. none of the elemental things (dharmas) are established either together or separately. 5 6. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion (sahāya. there would be desire.3. And if they are different. Since they are not established to exist separately. they would not arise together (sahabhāva) because a thing cannot occur with itself. It is not possible for desire and the desirous to arise simultaneously because desire and the desirous would then not depend upon each other. to establish that they occur together.6. their co-occurrence is not established.9 . then do they arise together because they are established separately? 6. desire is not established either with the desirous or without the desirous.8. then desire would exist in dependence on the desirous such that when the desirous existed.7. And as with desire. Which exists separately such that you assert that they arise together? 25 6. 10 6.5.2. And if they were identical. arise together.

bhaṅga. and this leads to the invention of things (dharmas) such as “occurrence-occurrence” (jātijāti). “Occurrence-occurrence is the occurrence of only the first-order occurrence. perdurance and cessation.). perdurance (sthiti). were capable of producing the [occurrence-occurrence].e. occurrence (jāti or utpāda). and “cessation-cessation” (vyayavyaya). then the three characteristics would be conjoined to it. The first-order occurrence in turn produces [its] occurrence-occurrence. If. perdurance and cessation are themselves considered to be conditioned things. then how can it be characteristic of the conditioned? 15 7. If.3.] 7.8. These oddities are in part what Nāgārjuna critiques. and it is not present where there is lamplight. 7. likewise occurrence produces both itself and what is other than itself [i. then an infinite regress [ensues].4. occurrenceoccurrence]. If there is another characteristic of the conditioned for occurrence. according to you. if a thing is conditioned. then [inasmuch as] the first-order [occurrence] has not yet been produced by the [occurrence-occurrence]. If the production [of things] were conditioned. and how can [those three characteristics] together apply to one [thing] at the same time? 7.5.” 7. 7. On the other hand. The three [characteristics] starting with occurrence are not individually capable of acting as characteristics for the conditioned. “Just as lamplight illuminates [both] itself and what is other than it. One of the oddities of this theory is that occurrence. according to you. then it is necessarily qualified by three characteristics. how would it cause the [first-order occurrence] to arise if it has not [yet] been produced by the first-order [occurrence]? 7. even though] not yet produced.Wisdom Page 30 7 Analysis of the Conditioned 5 10 [NOTE: This chapter is based upon a particular theory found within Abhidharma philosophy.9. Moreover. “perduranceperdurance” (sthitisthiti). which is a thing’s continuity over a series of distinct temporal instants. how does it cause the [occurrence-occurrence] to arise? 20 25 30 7.1. what would lamplight 35 . According to this theory. namely. hence. the [occurrence-occurrence] causes the first-order [occurrence] to arise [after] having been produced by the first-order [occurrence]. then they are not conditioned. then on your view.” 7. if production is not conditioned. some things (dharmas) are “conditioned” (saṃskṛta) in that they are produced by causes and conditions. Darkness is not present inside of lamplight. Of course (kāmam). Since light is [defined as] what eliminates darkness. if the [first-order occurrence.6.2. occurrence-occurrence is what causes the occurrence of the first-order occurrence. perdurance and cessation. If such is not the case. they too must be qualified by occurrence. etc. while being produced the [first-order occurrence] could produce the [occurrence-occurrence]. and cessation (vyaya..7 .

16. it does not depend on anything else. such as seed. [the thing] contains its own changeless essence (svabhāva). sir. Both are “pacified. then the lamplight located here would eliminate the darkness of the whole world. then darkness also would undoubtedly obscure [both] itself and [lamplight. you have contradicted interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) in every way.]. is an effect. nor does the not yet arisen. such as a sprout. “In relation to occurrence. then. have shown the following: any thing. Since that [essence] exists. 35 7. It does not make sense (na kramate) [to say. you have thereby contradicted the highest Dharma. namely. but if no such entity exists.16. 7.15. Having shown this. this is that which is arising. sees the Buddha. as [described] in the scriptural passage: “One who sees interdependence sees the Dharma. namely.” How. occurrence-occurrence]? And if an occurrence that has already arisen produces [them]. they are devoid of essence [and] interdependently arisen. how can you maintain that they are dependently arisen? Thus.14. interdependent origination. 7. Moreover. the already moved. Therefore. [namely. being already produced.17. I have explained entirely the Blessed Tathāgata’s mother. On the other hand. and the currently moving. one who sees the Dharma. then why would [occurrence]. then it could arise.] which is other than itself.11 . both that which is arising and occurrence itself are pacified. nor is it produced.13. [Candrakīrti’s comments:] You.” that is.” I.10. And how could darkness be eliminated by lamplight in the process of arising? [Such cannot be] because while lamplight is in the process of arising. the Buddha’s philosophy. How could occurrence. maintain that any thing that exists has a svabhāva—in other words. This has been explained in the case of the not yet moved. If some not yet arisen entity (bhāva) existed somewhere.] which is other than itself. [need to] be produced again? 15 7. that arises in dependence on some [other] thing. produce both itself and something else. 7. the sprout is the cause. in and of itself. if you admit that things have essences. on the other hand. 7.Wisdom Page 31 illuminate? 7.12. how can it arise? 10 20 25 30 . which is not yet arisen.2. if darkness that is not reached [by the lamplight] were eliminated by the lamplight. Whatever exists dependently is essentially (svabhāvataḥ) pacified (śānta). If lamplight eliminated [both] itself and [darkness. nor does the already arisen. The currently arising does not arise. 5 7. it does not reach any darkness. by admitting that things have essences. can one speak of “the arising” in dependence on occurrence? 7.1. Hence.

An entity that is currently ceasing to exist does not cease.25.23. The cessation of an entity (bhāva) that is continuing to exist does not make sense. but it does not make sense [to speak of] the cessation of an entity that is not continuing to exist. an entity that has not yet continued to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist.26. always continue to exist? 7. 10 7. in the [aforementioned] manner. then everything arises [anywhere at any time]. This has been previously demonstrated. 5 15 25 . the occurrence of any entity does not make sense. which ones. If another occurrence produces this [occurrence]. 7.28. 35 7. 20 7.18. An entity that has already ceased to exist does not cease. 7. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. The continued existent of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense. lacking those qualities. the cessation of any entity does not make sense. nor does the occurrence of the nonexistent.27.Wisdom Page 32 7. an entity that has not yet ceased does not cease. If an occurrence that was in the process of arising were to cause [some entity] to arise.21. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. 7. There is no occurrence of occurrence by virtue of [an occurrence] that is identical to it or different from it Likewise. 7. nor does a state of existence cease by virtue of some other state of existence. Nor can such be the case of what both is existent and nonexistent. The occurrence of the existent does not make sense. And if something without occurrence is arisen.29. then which occurrence would cause that occurrence to arise? 7. Among all things that have the qualities of decaying and dying. then likewise. The occurrence of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense. An entity that has already continued to exit [over some period of time] does not continue to exist.20. it does not make sense [to theorize] the continued existence of continued existence by virtue of a continued existence other than continued existence or by virtue of that [continued existence] itself.22. what unarisen [entity] ceases? 30 7. And in any case. [This is so] because a state of existence does not cease by virtue of that very state of existence.24. then occurrence is an infinite regress. If. And in any case. An entity that is in the process of continuing to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. what unarisen [entity] continues to exist? 7.19.

neither existence nor nonexistence would make sense. Since occurrence. Also. such is continued existence. there are no conditioned entities. how can one establish the unconditioned? 7. First of all. just as one cannot decapitate [a human] for the second time. such is cessation.31.Wisdom Page 33 7. the cessation of an existent entity does not make sense because.30. just as there can be no occurrence by virtue of a thing itself or by something essentially other [than that thing]. [This is what the Buddha] has said. And if the conditioned is not established. like the city of the elves — such is occurrence. . if [existence and nonexistence applied to] the same [entity]. 5 7. 7.34. There can be no cessation either by virtue of a thing itself or by what is essentially other [than that thing]. 10 7. continued existence and cessation are not established. like a dream.33. Like an illusion.32. the cessation of a nonexistent entity does not make sense.

15 8. one would have to conclude that all actions are pointless. If action and so on are impossible. and the object occurs in dependence on the factor. If there is no cause (hetu). then a path to liberation does not make sense. An unreal [object] is not acted upon by a real agent. 8. one should realize that such is also the case for reliance & appropriation (upādāna). 10 8. nor is a real [object] acted upon by an unreal agent because all of the flaws [stated above] would ensue in that case. The factor occurs in dependence on the object. I see no other way to establish [them]. a real factor does not act on an object that is unreal or both real and unreal. 8. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on [an object] that is both real and unreal because. 30 8. nor on a real object. Since object and agent have been refuted.6. nor do you accept an unreal entity as an object.2. there would be an object without any agent. Action does not belong to a real [object]. nor agent. Likewise. and a path to heaven does not make sense. and [if the factor were real]. then neither action. If an unreal factor acts on an unreal object.9.1.Wisdom Page 34 8 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object 8. A real factor (kāraka) acts on a real object (karman). For the reasons stated above. an unreal factor does not act on an object that is real or both real and unreal. nor object exists. there would be an agent without any object.7. One should understand this for the aforementioned reasons. 8. an agent would have no cause [due to which one calls it an “agent”]. If there is neither [cause nor effect]. then there is neither effect nor cause (kāraṇa).3.4. All remaining entities are explained by [the analysis of] object and agent. then there is neither the virtuous (dharma) nor the nonvirtuous (adharma). [You] do not accept an unreal entity as a factor.8. how can they [occur in or] as the same [entity]? 8.11. the effects that arise from those [kinds of actions] do not exist. and [if the object were real].12 . . And if there is neither the virtuous nor the nonvirtuous. For the reasons stated above. 8. Action does not belong to a real [factor]. 8. 8.5. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on an unreal object.10.13. an object would have no [semantic] cause (hetu) [due to which one calls it an “object”]. If there is no effect. since the real and the unreal are mutually contradictory. 5 8. 20 25 8.

If that [entity] is established without seeing and such. The one who comes before them exists. the entity that exists before them is established.12. the concepts “he is” [and] “he is not” have ceased. In regard to him. makes no sense. 9. If there is [enjoyer] to whom pertain [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]. nor later. “There is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing. the agent of hearing would exist while the agent of seeing was still present. 9. [Rather.1. however. so too. If the agent of seeing were himself the agent of hearing and himself the agent of sensation. The [enjoyer] also does not exist even at the time of those element (bhūta) from there are [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them].” 9.” 9. The [enjoyer] who is before seeing and such does not exist then. the enjoyer] is made evident by one among [the possible perceptual acts]. . the agent of sensation is yet another. 9. then they also do not exist. 9.Wisdom Page 35 9 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action] 9. If there is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing.4. by what means does one identify the entity that is established before [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]? 10 9. and some [act] is made evident by some [enjoyer].11.6.10.8. 25 30 9. and there is also the sensation [that accompanies them]. then he might exist before the individual acts. then how can there be one that exists prior to the individual [acts].5. then there is no doubt that those [perceptual acts and such] would also be established without that [entity]. and the Self would be multiple. some do say the following: “There are [Perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing.7. In that case. [Suppose]on the other hand.2.3. This. Well. Some [enjoyer] is made evident by some [act]. such as seeing? 20 9. then. nor now. it is made evident by another [of the acts]. At another time. How can some [enjoyer] be made evident without some [act]? How can some [act] be made evident without some [enjoyer]? 15 9. such as seeing. that the agent of seeing is one [entity] and the agent of hearing is another. 5 9. How can seeing and such pertain to an entity that does not exist? Therefore. Indeed.9.

then which. It is not the case that. one might think. . it depends [on that thing].11. And if such were the case. If fire [exists] in dependence (apekṣya) on fuel.3. It is not the case that. is that on which fire or fuel depends? 10.2. To start [a fire] would also be pointless.] being other [than fuel].7. If fire is fuel.13. it would have no object [that it burns]. 25 10. then its dependence makes no sense. fuel exists. being already established. and it would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. the [part] already moved over. Not going it.6. fire exists .Wisdom Page 36 10 Analysis of Fire and Fuel 10. Since it does not depend (nirapekṣa) on anything else. In this regard. starting it would pointless. the remaining [critiques] have already been stated through [the analysis of] the [part of the path] being moved over. 20 10. If fire exists in dependence on fuel. just as a woman closely touches a man. 15 10. [Fire. how then can it depend [on some thing]? If. still touches it. and if fuel [exists] in dependence on fire. then the agent and the object [of the act of burning] would be identical. “Fire. if fire and fuel were to exist in mutual exclusion. Not burning.5. then what burns the fuel? 10. [fire] would not be caused by the burning [of fuel].1. and a man closely touches a woman. A thing that is dependently established is not yet established. fire exists. Fire does not exist in fuel or when there is fuel. depending on fire.12. 10 10. still touches the fuel. 10. while other than fuel. and that being the case. Fire does not come from something else. [Fire] would burn always. depending on fuel.” 10. If that in dependence on which a thing is established is itself established in dependence on that very thing.9. without depending on fuel. It is not the case that without depending on fire. It is not the case that. then fire would exist even without the fuel. fuel would exist without fire. 30 10. fuel exists.” But if [fire] is nothing more than merely that [burning of fuel]. If it is other than the fuel. 10. And inasmuch as it would always burn. while other than fuel.10. “fuel is what is burning from the [fire]. We would admit that fire. What is not touched [by fire] would not burn. 5 10. being established first. In relation to fuel.4.8. it would remain with its own mark (liṅga). the fire would not go out. then [fuel] would establish [the existence] of what has already been established [to exist]. would not touch it. then what is established in dependence on what? 10.

10. 10. Fire is not fuel. Such is also the case for jugs. I do not think that they have understand the meaning of the Teaching. and in relation to something other than fuel. 5 10. there is no fire. cloths.Wisdom Page 37 and the [part] not yet moved over. Fire does not possess the fuel.14. Through [the analysis of] fire and fuel. .15. fuels do not exist in fire. and so on. nor does it exist in them. Some point to identity and difference in regard to the Self and in regard to things. all procedures [for allegedly establishing] the Self and appropriation have been completely explained.16.

Hence. fettered with thirst. “Although saṃsāra has neither beginning nor end. it is known that [saṃsāra] does indeed have an end.” He said so because saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. what would cycle compulsively through the coming and going that is the continuum of birth and death? Indeed. If that is the case. as is in the case of a vase. the Great Sage said. then there would necessarily be that which is prior to it and also that which is after it. However. it is endless. The following are synonyms: point. “If the Blessed One has refuted both the beginning and end of saṃsāra. ‘Let us practice so as to put an end to saṃsāra. is that saṃsāra is just a mere label (saṃjñā) [intended for] those whose minds are under the influence of error (viparyāsa). monks. as in a tortoise’s pelt. he said that saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. it nevertheless has a middle because [a middle] has not been refuted. saṃsāra exists. If the Self were nonexistent. “Its starting point is not known. Good sir.” You are being ridiculous. For such [persons]. it is just a label because it is devoid of 10 15 20 25 30 35 . the following remains the case: saṃsāra does not exist because neither its starting point nor its ending point are perceived.Wisdom Page 38 11 Analysis of Beginning and End At this point.” [In response] we say this. part (bhāga) and locus (deśa). The whole tree that is the root and imprints of all their afflictive mental states has been incinerated by the fire that is the wisdom of a transmundane path. Hence. the Blessed One said: 5 Monks. that which does not exist does not have a middle.” Since it has neither beginning nor end.” The beginning and end of saṃsāra have been refuted. Hence. the Blessed One said. thinking. bound with thirst’s tether.2. aging and death is beginningless. such is not the case for those in whom the wind of the wisdom of suchness has uprooted the tree that is ignorance’s obscurations. However. according to the Buddha’s teaching. it has neither start nor finish. “Monks. it is only for them that saṃsāra is cognized to be beginningless and endless.” and so on. “The Self (ātman) exists because saṃsāra exists. Therefore. There would be a Self. so how could it have a middle? The idea. obscured by ignorance. If something has neither start nor end. It is called “what comes before” or “the first. then. Starting point means “starting locus. nor is its ending point. how can it have a middle? A start is a beginning. the cycle of births and deaths has neither beginning nor end. the cycle of birth. then the one cycling in saṃsāra exists.1. has the Blessed One not clearly taught that saṃsāra itself does not exist? Therefore. no beginning point is discerned for beings that cycle in saṃsāra. then how could he have said this: ‘Therefore. … Someone now objects. you should train yourselves. Thus. someone objects. as in the case of a torch-wheel. saṃsāra exists because its middle exists. [the Buddha] applies the following specification [in the aforementioned statement]: “beings …obscured by ignorance.1. it is called an “ending point” or “extinction. consider this: 11. on might think. if saṃsāra were to exist.’” We respond as follows. In other words.” If saṃsāra were to exist. How so? Since 11. And that one is the Self. At this juncture.” An end is a termination.

How can there be the causeless aging and death of one who is unborn? 11. since saṃsāra does not exist. If birth were first. there is no starting point for any [such] things. If birth were afterward. The sequence of being before.5. he said: 10 11.2. then aging and death would be first. after. and so on. the Self also does not exist. after. after or simultaneous with [birth] cannot possibly apply to aging and death. then aging and death would be later. and both would be causeless. death. and for this very reason. and an immortal would be born. 20 . 15 11. saṃsāra does not exist. the idea is that. in this case it does not make sense for them to be in a sequence [such that one is] before. or simultaneous with [aging and death] cannot possibly apply to birth. So why would they conceptualize it as aging and death? 11.2. middle or termination. The one being born would die. feelings and the one who has them. definitions and what they define.3. or termination.7. saṃsāra has no beginning. Moreover.6. Demonstrating how it is that it does not make sense. birth cannot reasonably occur (***) with aging and death. Also. Therefore. whether they be causes and effects. or simultaneous [with the other]. aging. . middle.4. in the case of birth.11. as is the case with space and a torch-wheel. or any [other such things that seem to occur in sequence]. Rather. It is not just that saṃsāra has no starting point. after or simultaneous with [another].Wisdom Page 39 5 beginning. Thus. In this fashion. Birth would be devoid of aging and death. [Nāgārjuna] said: 11. there is no sequence [whereby one is] before. So why would they conceptualize it as birth? The sequence of being before. 11. Therefore.8.

And in whatever way one asserts [its production]. It is in this sense that we say. And if suffering were to exist. “The Self does exist because the suffering related to it exists. then there would be a Self. Some maintain that suffering is produced (kṛta) by itself. he said: 12. then (tataḥ) it would not be the case that the [present suffering aggregates] arise in dependence (pratītya) on [the previous suffering aggregates]. or else causelessly.” We respond as follows. that suffering should pertain to something. 10 15 20 25 30 35 What is conceptualized here is that this human suffering. by both. 12. it has not been given [to the present person] after having been made by some other person. by something else. [The point.” Well. it would be produced by itself. Instead. What must also be conceptualized is the person by whom. defined as the five appropriative aggregates.” Some hold the opinion. Establishing this. Demonstrating this. If that is the case. ‘Suffering is made by itself.” and it exists. “We are not saying that suffering is ‘self-made’ because suffering itself creates suffering. what ‘own person’ is there such that the suffering has been made by that person itself.” Others maintain. If suffering is made by its own person. If these [aggregates to be born] were different from those [that are dying]. or if those [that are dying] are different from these [that are to be born]. there is no suffering that could be produced [in any of such fashion]. suffering cannot be what is produced or made. that suffering is made. It is merely theoretical (pratijñāmātraka).’” In response. we say 12. which are other [than those to be born]. then suffering would be produced by something other [than itself].1.] first of all. the five appropriative aggregates are called “suffering. then without suffering. If it were produced by itself. and it is the Self. And it is not possible for the [suffering posited in this fashion] to be caused. by something other than itself. If suffering were existent. “Suffering is produced by itself. since (hi) the aggregates [that are coming into existence] arise in dependence on those aggregates [of the previous life]. or else that it is causeless.3.” Yet others claim. there is a locus of suffering. and this is the maker of that [suffering]. “This is its suffering. on his own (svayam). Therefore. “It is produced by something else. someone objects.4. [Nāgārjuna] said: 12. … Or someone might object (atha syāt). by both. then one must state distinctly. some theorists are of the opinion.2. “It is produced by both [itself and something else]. is made by the person himself. Moreover. the suffering is made by that person himself (svapudgala). In this regard. it should not lack a locus (āśraya).Wisdom Page 40 12 Analysis of Suffering 5 At this point. is that suffering is made by that person that the suffering indicates (prajñapyate).” But being posited in any of these ways. “Suffering has arisen causelessly. if the person who is appropriating . In this regard. these aggregates [to be born] would be made by those [aggregates that are dying].

12. it has been made by another person. how can suffering be made by something else? 12.7. And if something else is not self-made. then that [suffering] has not been made by its own person. And how could there be causeless suffering that is not made either by itself or by something else? 12. However. Suffering would be made by both [self and other] if it were made by each. while there is a difference in terms of the appropriation [of either human or divine suffering]. how is there one to whom that suffering. If suffering is arises from another person. One might assert that. would hand it over to another? 10 12. rather.Wisdom Page 41 5 suffering of human has made the suffering of a god. It is not just that the fourfold [establishment of] suffering does not exist. having been made by another. having made the suffering.6.9. If suffering arises from another person. then without suffering. suffering is not created by its own person. That being the case. then without suffering. would be given? 12. First of all. 15 .5. the persons are not different. the fourfold [establishment of all] external things does not exist. suffering is not self-made because that [suffering] is not made by that same [suffering].8. what ‘other person’ is there who. rather. this is not the case because it is not possible to demonstrate a person who is distinct from the appropriation [of suffering].

13. “If there is no essence.7.5.1 . 13. . If that which has a deceptive quality would be deceptive. Hence.8. but they said that. nor has the aged one become aged.6. 13. nor to something other than that change because the youth has not become aged. then about what is it deceptive? Rather. what other than milk becomes yogurt? 15 13. of what would there be change? 10 13.3 . If change pertains to a thing itself. then yogurt would be milk. There is no non-empty. how could there then be the empty? 13. Change does not pertain to a thing itself. All saṃskāras have deceptive quality.Wisdom Page 42 13 Analysis of Saṃskāras 13. Things are essenceless because it is observed that they change. the Blessed one stated this as [a means to] indicate emptiness. then of what is there change?” If there were an essence.” 5 13. The victors have said that emptiness is the death of all views. then there would be some [entity that is] the empty. for those whose view is emptiness.2. Due to the emptiness of things. The Blessed One has said. “What has a deceptive quality is deceptive. there is no entity that is or has a non-essence. there is no cure. they are all deceptive.4. If there were some [entity that is] the non-empty. On the other hand.

5 … Just as there is no binary or group (sarvaśaḥ) conjunction in the case of the seen. 14. the remaining afflictive mental states and the remaining media (āyatana) 15 do not enter into mutual conjunction. the desirous.Wisdom Page 43 14 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga) 14. Conjunction is of one thing with another that is other than it. 10 There is no conjunction of desire with the desirous. then what is the problem?” We respond: 14. And it is not just in the case of the seen [object] and so on that otherness does not exist. Why is there no conjunction of them? [Nāgārjuna] said: 14. And [the media]—as ear. in these three forms (traidhena). and seeing. Yet another [instance] expresses the usual sense [as in “other” or “different”]. As in the case of these [three]. the vase is also other. The remaining afflictive mental states are anger. so too. one should see that this is also the case with desire. someone objects.4. 14. And it does not make sense for one [thing] to be other than to which it is relating. and there is no conjunction of desire with desiring. and that otherness does not exist in the case of the seen [object] and so on. If one thing (anyad) were other (anyad) than another (anyasmād). the angered and [the act of] being angry—[do not enter into mutual conjunction]. Also. 14. confusion and so on. and if in relation to that separate (pṛthagbhūta) cloth. the otherness of any thing from any other thing does not make sense. The [object] to be seen. and [the act of] desiring. there is no simultaneous conjunction of the three. “If a cloth is different from a vase. nor do they all together enter into conjunction with each other. seer. there are three uses of the word “other. … Here. Thus. then it would be ‘other’ even without that other [thing] One [instance of the word] “other” (anya) stands for what is being pointed out. hearer and sound—[do not enter into mutual conjunction]. and another [instance] refers to what is other [than the aforementioned thing].” If a real thing 30 35 . Hence. likewise. the [action of] seeing.2.3.6. that one thing is not ‘other’ without the other. One [thing] is other in relation to (pratītya) another. in these three ways—as anger.2.2.1.1. and the one seeing—these three do not enter into binary conjunctions with each other. they do not enter into conjunction.5. rather. 20 25 14.

Therefore. such as] a cloth.” then what is the point of conceptually constructing otherness? That is. and it does not make sense either way. [If] one has the notion. nor is the conjunction of one thing with another. [Nāgārjuna] said: 14. … Here. a cloth—then the thing called a “vase” would be ‘other’ even without that other thing.2 . “If the cognition of one thing (padārtha) as ‘other’ were dependent on some other thing. would be ‘different. someone objects.1 . namely. This would be the case. To be specific.Wisdom Page 44 5 10 15 called a “vase” were other than another—i. the thing (padārtha) in which it adheres is called “other” even without any dependence on or relation to another thing. In this way. the problem that you have discussed is not applicable to our position. which is without any dependence & relation to a cloth. the vase itself does not depend on that other thing. if the vase were ‘other’ even without that other thing. otherness is a specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa). The conjunction of a [thing] with that [same thing] is not reasonable (na…yujyate).” We respond as follows.’ … 14.e. This is so because that which is ‘other’ than the other is established without that other [thing].” But this is not what we are saying. “It is other.7. [the object] conjoined. “There is otherness in what is other. then there would be this flaw. or in relation to what is not other. .” one must clearly accept that the one that is ‘other’ in relation to the other is not other than that other thing. the cloth. But that application of the term ‘other’ is established without otherness since otherness is being conceptually constructed for a thing to which one has already applied the term ‘other. if there were [that specific universal..] otherness. Demonstrating this. then the vase.8. That is. we do not see any ‘otherness’ of a vase independent of [something else. in saying.2. And if that were the case. 20 25 30 … 14. independent of the cloth. for the establishment of its reality (svarūpa). This means the following (tatra). Otherness does not exist in what is other. the [act of] conjoining. and the agent of conjunction do not exist. then neither the ‘other’ nor that [thing] itself exists.1. when conceptually constructing this otherness. then there would be the otherness of a solitary vase.’ However.7. Therefore. Also. 14. the cloth. Rather. And if otherness does not exist. nor does it exist in what is not other.8. it must be conceptually constructed either in relation to what is other. “The one is not other than the other. you conceptually construct otherness for the purpose of establishing the application of the term ‘other’ (anyavyapadeśa). the cloth.

8. 5 15.2.Wisdom Page 45 15 Analysis of Svabhāva 15.1. without extrinsic nature and intrinsic nature.10.9. 15. who discerns the existent and the nonexistent.” Thinking this. 10 15.” and both. Therefore. And an uncreated [i. “It exists. 15. “Now it does not exist. An intrinsic nature originated through causes and conditions would be manufactured.2.7. refuted [the positions].’ 15. how could there be nonexistence. how can there be extrinsic nature? For the intrinsic nature of what is by nature other is called ‘extrinsic nature. 15. In his discussion with Kātyāyana. [This is so] because it never makes sense for an essence to change. 15.2.10. extrinsic nature. And if its essence does exist. 30 .6.8.2.1. how could an intrinsic nature be manufactured? 15. existence and nonexistence do not see the reality in the Buddha’s teaching.” “It does not exist. innate] intrinsic nature would have no relation to or dependence on what is other than it. 15. of what would there be change? 25 15. how can there be [any] existence (bhāva)? [There cannot be] because existence is established when there is intrinsic nature or an extrinsic nature. say that nonexistence [means that] existence becomes something else.11.1.9. 15.e. Indeed.2 . They who see intrinsic nature.” Thinking this. And if existence is not established. [To think].3. one is forced into [the belief in] annihilation.] “It does not exist.1.1.2. If there is no intrinsic nature. “It is not the case that what exists by its own intrinsic nature does not exist.2. “[The essence] exists” is to be eternalist. Moreover. the discerning do not resort to either existence or nonexistence. 15.1.4. 20 15. then nonexistence would not [ever] apply to it.5.1. but it existed previously.” is an annihilationist view. one is forced into the [belief that things are] eternal. the Blessed One. If existence applied to [some thing] essentially.. The origination of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) through causes and conditions is not reasonable. If its essence does not exist. of what would there be change? 15. [To think. 15 15.

Wisdom Page 46 .

If [mental] conditions flow together. the Skt. without samsaric existence.” When it is sought in five ways in relation to the aggregates. it would be without any substratum in between those times. What. Samsaric existence is the five substratal aggregates. if impermanent things [are what is flowing together]? Well. 16. and impermanent [things] are observed to be active (skriya). [their] flowing together (saṃsṛti)—[their] movement from one realm of existence to another—is called ‘saṃsāra. and since it does not yet have a new substratum. term] vibhava [without substratum] means to be devoid (vigata) of samsaric existence (bhava). media and elements. First of all (tāvat). then of what would there be saṃsāra? Of who or what would there [this] flowing together? It is not observed that the [mental] conditions (saṃskāra) of a barren woman’s son are flowing together. but it does not exist. lacking any substratum. That is. hence.” We respond as follows (ucyate). it would not have the cause that is the substratum of a name (prajñaptyupādānakāraṇarahita). Therefore. Hence.e. how can impermanent [mental conditions] go to any [next realm of existence]? Thus. if [you] say.Wisdom Page 47 16 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation 5 10 At this point. then it is not the case those conditions that are flowing together are permanent. permanent [things] do not flow together because they are inert (niṣkriya). would either go on to the divine substratum after having abandoned the human substratum. 15 20 In this regard. saṃsāra must exist. If saṃsāra were existent. What comes of this? Well. those [things] that are impermanent are destroyed immediately after arising. what is this thing that would flow? 30 35 In this regard. it does not exist.” then do they flow together as permanent [things] or impermanent [things]? Among these [possibilities].. someone objects. hence. nor are they impermanent. … 16. And since.e. The saṃsaraṇa [of the aggregates] i. going from a human substratum to a divine substratum. then since it has abandoned the previous substratum.. [In the verse. like a barren woman’s child.2. this Self. if saṃsāra were existent. there is also no flowing together (saṃsāra) of impermanent [mental conditions]. 16. or else it would do so without having abandoned the human substratum. Nāgārjuna said. [the Self].1. so it would be causeless. “The person undergoes saṃsāra. What would undergo saṃsāra? 25 … Moreover.’ If things do not have an essence. that which has no substratum—would be devoid of aggregates. [the Self] would be devoid of those [aggregates]. “Mental conditions are flowing together.3. they do not exist. if one believes. And that which has no substratum lacks . That which has no samsaric existence—i. “The essence of things does exist because saṃsāra exists. things’ essence does indeed exist. flowing from substratum (upādāna) to substratum. then. then it would necessarily be [the flowing together] of [mental] conditions or of a being (sattva). there is a problem with either [possibility]. The same steps [of this argument] apply to the being. then things would indeed have an essence. would be without samsaric existence (vibhava). “It goes on after having abandoned [the previous substratum].

“Although there is no bondage of either mental conditions or a being. in no way is it possible for a being to obtain nirvāṇa. which have the quality of ceasing [when they] arise. Nāgārjuna said: 16. then bondage and liberation would be simultaneous. 15 35 . and without that which is bound and that which is not bound. but it does not bind [anything]. bondage should also exist.” Those who grasp [onto nirvāṇa] in this fashion grasp tightly to the substratum. it does not exist. Nor is a being bound or liberated. extinction]. If the substratum were the binding (bandhana). one should apply it as follows: 25 [The binding] does not bind that which is already bound.9. 16. it is unmanifest. and so forth. which are called ‘the substratum’ (upādāna). that which has not yet moved. 10 … Here. “Devoid of the substratum.8. desire and such. I will pass into nirvāṇa [i. Demonstrating how it is that [the substratum] does not bind anything. do exist. mental conditions. someone objects.7. nor are they liberated.e. 16.. The substratum would itself be the binding if it bound something. … 5 16. So in what state is [anything] bound? 20 16.1. it is causeless. And that which has no substratum is not bound. As in the previous [argument]. That which is bound is not liberated. By changing the reading of the verse [in chapter 2]. In other words.4. … 30 16. and that which is not bound is not liberated. then that which possesses the substratum would not be bound.” We respond as follows.6.7. but it does not [exist before it]. and as such. the binding would bind [that which is to be bound] if it were to exist before that which is to be bound. [The verse in chapter 2] should be applied in this manner. In no way is it possible for mental conditions to obtain nirvāṇa. Indeed. And since that [substratum] exists.5. What [kind of] thing is that? It is not anything at all. that which is currently being bound is not bound. one should know 16. [then] will I have obtained nirvāṇa. and that which is now moving.Wisdom Page 48 any indication [of its existence]. If that which is bound were being liberated. the remaining [faults] which have been stated through [the analysis of] that which has moved. As for the remaining problems in this context.2. nor does [it] bind that which is not yet bound. are not bound.

Wisdom Page 49 16. what notion is there of nirvāṇa. Where nirvāṇa is not imputed and saṃsāra not denied. what notion of saṃsāra? .10.

“Saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result. “From today forward I will kill beings and steal [from them]. “speech. [all motion]. Motion is movement of the body.Wisdom Page 50 17 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect 5 10 At this point. the mental conditions or Self flows in saṃsāra (saṃsaraṇa) through an uninterrupted continuum that is the sequence of birth and death.e. It is the seed of an effect in a future rebirth and/or here [in this life]. there simply would be no relation between karmic activity and [its] result. “The highest sage said that there is karma that is intention (cetanā) and karma that follows intention (cetayitvā). “As in this twofold classification of demonstrative [karmic forms]. namely. “The state of mind (cetaḥ) that holds oneself back.3. and undemonstrative [karma] defined as dispassionate. In this regard. then since the mind would cease immediately after arising. undemonstrative [karmic forms]. it would not be contradictory for karmic actions to have a relation to [their] results. which is [their] occurrence in the relation of cause and effect. someone objects.2. Hence. and since there would be no ripened [karmic result] when [rebirth] is projected by karma. virtuous or unvirtuous—i. then there would be a relation between karmic action and [its] result. 17.2.1. the merit that has continuity with use and the non-merit of that type. 17. 17. In this regard. establishing & motivating (samuthāpika) an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms called. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be manifestations of karma (karmāñjana). the karma called ‘intention’ is mental [karma]. an example of undemonstrative [karma] defined as not dispassionate is as follows. 15 20 17.] those recorded to be (smṛta) dispassionate.5 .. speech is the enunciation of clear & manifest syllables. then a karmic action that has been committed would be related to a ripened result even in another rebirth. establishing & motivating an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms apprehended to be motion. saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result. and a kind & loving (maitra) state of mind are [each] Dharma..2. all speech.” From the moment that one decides to [engage in] sinful (pāpa) karma.4 . and intention.” Likewise.” “What are those karmic actions? And what is the result? With the intention of stating the difference between them. also. However. as in the following (iti kṛtvā): undemonstrative [karma] defined as non-dispassionate. [One] thinks. “The various types of karma are widely known. Therefore. [these objectors] say the following: 17. if there were no saṃsāra as described here. the undemonstrative is also [thus classified]. If.17.1. Among these. whose cause is that decision to 25 30 35 . virtuous or nonvirtuous—i. If the Self or mental conditions were to flow in this fashion.. and the one that is said to follow intention is corporeal and vocal [karma]. “Speech and motion. saṃsāra exists.e. the non-dispassionate [karmic form] named ‘undemonstrative’ and likewise the other undemonstrative [karmic forms. however. that is how I will make my living. “Concerning these [verses]. “It is recorded (smṛta) that among these. the state of mind that cares for others.

These [karmic forms] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a dispassionate character. [consisting in the ritual of reciting the formula]. [but this problem] does not apply to us.7. karma remains until it matures. likewise [undemonstrative karmic forms]. does it remain until it matures? Or does it not remain because it ceases immediately upon arising? If. This karma that [you] have stated to be of various types. And without the seed. defined as the mental karmic act of conditioning the mind. [With that employment this karma has] continuity (anvaya)—in other words. then having ceased. first of all. undemonstrative [karmic forms] arise in them even when they are not engaged in those [deeds]. “In sum. undemonstrative [karmic forms] that are by nature accumulating merit arise in one. If it has ceased [before the maturation]. having a dispassionate character.e. And [there is] the non-merit of that type—i. there is [karma that has] continuity with use.” Just as there are these [types of undemonstrative karmic form]. even when one is not doing that [unvirtuous act]. “[For others’ theory of karma.” Starting with the completion of those demonstrative acts of body and speech. ‘Use’ (paribhoga) is the employment (upabhoga) on the part of the Saṅgha and such of an item that has been given away (parityakta).” At this point. I completely refrain from taking life and so on. there arises in the continuum of those who built it the non-merit continuous with use. merit that has continuity with use. non-merit that has continuity with use. Also (ca). .” Although they are by nature form (rūpa) and action (kriyā). that is. this means the merit—the virtue—that is continuous with use. these are the seven types of karma: virtuous and nonvirtuous speech. they do not demonstrate & indicate [anything] to others. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be karmic manifestations. In this way. Hence. “And there is intention. there is a continuation (anugama) arisen in the continuum (santāna) of the giver. [and that continuation] is an accumulating of virtue. virtuous and nonvirtuous motion. [suppose that one engages in] the demonstrative [acts] of body and speech.Wisdom Page 51 5 10 15 20 25 30 engage in nonvirtue.6. how does it produce an effect?’ We respond to this as follows: 17. there is also nonmerit of that kind. they are indicated & made manifest as karma—they are defined as karma (karmalakṣaṇa). there is] a problem in that the mental conditions are impermanent because of ceasing immediately upon occurrence. they are undemonstrative. then it would be permanent. “So too. These undemonstrative [karmic forms discussed in these two examples] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a non-dispassionate character. arise ceaselessly. then having ceased. some [Buddhists] from another tradition present another response. the nonvirtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative. some [philosophers] object as follows. are by nature virtuous. that continuum does not occur. the virtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative. “The result comes from a continuum beginning with the sprout that proceeds from the seed. starting with the time that fishermen and such engage in deeds such as setting their nets. unlike demonstrative [forms]. From the use of that temple in such ways that beings are killed there. even when one is intoxicated and so on. And you have said. An example is the construction of a temple where beings are killed. For example. ‘If it has ceased [before the maturation]. that has continuity with use. “From today forward.. 17. how does it produce an effect? 35 40 … At this point. there are also the other undemonstrative [karmic forms] that.

12 . This being the case. without the seed. “From the state of mind comes a continuum. The seed. having become that cause. this host of effects arises provided that the supporting conditions are not incomplete. if one were to have this idea (kalpanā) [about karma]. “I will tell you the idea that is applied here. “stalk” (nāla).9. the effect is preceded by the seed. “leaves” and so on.10. and from that [continuum] comes the [karmic] effect. [This does not follow] because when that karmic act is committed. a vast host of effects arise from the cause [i. then ceases. and it does not occur when there is no [seed]. And from the continuum starting with a sprout that proceeds [from the seed]. the effect is preceded by karma. Therefore. “The imperishability (avipraṇāśa) is like a contract. its result would also be nonexistent. that continuum starting with the sprout does not occur. [for those two reasons]. however. Therefore. 25 30 “And what is that idea? We say.14. 15 20 17. but it does not follow that. it is demonstrated that the seed is the cause of a result which is the continuum starting with the sprout. 17. it goes out of existence immediately after occurring. “Therefore.” “shoot” (kāṇḍa). Even though the seed is momentary. it is of four kinds. at that very time there arises in the karmic agent’s continuum an unassociated entity (viprayukto dharmaḥ) which is called that karmic act’s “imperishability. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal. 17. and by nature it is karmically neutral (avyākṛta). one should know 35 . Moreover. Others. and karma is like a loan. the mental continuum proceeds from a state of mind [involving an intention]. it is by nature the cause of a continuum that has the distinctive capacity to produce a distinctive future effect of the same type. therefore. [when] a virtuous karmic act is committed. it is a continuum that bears the names “sprout.11. 17. … Such is the way that some answer the objection [that a ceased entity cannot have a karmic effect]. inasmuch as it has gone out of existence.13. 17. Therefore. and the result comes from that continuum. the effect does not occur. “In this regard. They say.8. 17. In terms of realms. pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal. regard to those [who have just given the above answer]. Dharma’s result is the five objects of sensual desire (kāmaguṇa) in this [life] and the future.” It is like the contract for a loan. and the effect arises from that continuum. 17.. this idea does not make sense in this context. as such. That is. raise problem[s] and offer [their own] answer to the objection. And without that state of mind (citta). although it is small. “There are numerous and severe problems.e. the seed]. “The ten forms of pure karmic action are the means to accomplish Dharma. [the result] occurs when there is [the seed].Wisdom Page 52 5 10 “In this [verse it says the following]. the one described by the buddhas. “From the seed comes a continuum.

“Furthermore. “Therefore. “When connecting across lives (pratisaṃdhi). there is rather the abandoning of the imperishability through the path of cultivation. even though the karmic act of that [kind of imperishability] is abandoned. an [imperishability] arises in the current life for each respective act. 17. The word “rather” (vā). in terms of the distinction of being [an agent] acting in the desire. which are of two kinds. cannot connect the karmic agent to another matured effect (vipāka). The karmic actions of an ordinary person are abandoned through the path of seeing.15. … 17. whether [those committed karmic acts] be similar or dissimilar. [when] a loan contract has made the lender receive his payment and been consummated (nirbhuṅkta).16. the [imperishability might] remain. 17.” which we have stated here.19. Instead.” the karmic agent is connected to the result caused by that [karmic act]. but even āryas have the karma of an ordinary person. although the karmic act has ceased. regardless of whether or not that [imperishability] still exists. regardless of whether or not [the contract] still exists. the creditor does not lose his investment even if [all of the lent] wealth has been used. Through establishing a loan contract. used in the sense of an alternative. through establishing [by that karma] another entity called “imperishability. it cannot cause another payment. or [one who is of the] uncontaminated [realm]. this “imperishability. as in a consummated contract. [Rather]. 17. then the faults of karmic dissipation and such would absurdly ensue. that [creditor] is connected to a sum of wealth with compounded interest [to be paid at] another time. is stated in other sūtras to be of four kinds in accord with the realm [of the karmic agent]—that is.2. Moreover. karmic acts’ effect arises through [their] imperishability. Therefore. rather (vā). “An [imperishability] ceases through the transcending of a result [on the path] or through death. means that [an imperishability] is to be abandoned only after transcending the realm [in which its karmic act was performed]. Likewise. 17. having given [its] matured [effect].18. form or formless realms. “If [the imperishability] were to be abandoned through the abandonment [on the path of seeing] or through the progression (saṃkrama) of [its] karmic act.17. the imperishability is not abandoned through the path of seeing.15. “It is not abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. Likewise. This being the case. an imperishability is not destroyed even though the karmic act has been destroyed. Even though [the effect] has ripened. 35 . 20 25 30 17. One should classify an imperishability as either contaminated or uncontaminated.1. And one should know that the karma—of which that entity called “imperishability” has arisen—is like a loan. “The imperishability is not [on of the afflictions] to be abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. it is only to be abandoned [on the path of] cultivation. a [karmic act’s] imperishability. a single [imperishability] arises for all of the [committed] karmic acts of the same cosmological level. “For all [karmic acts].Wisdom Page 53 5 10 15 that the imperishability is like a contract.

If there is neither karma nor agent. but annihilationism does not. it does not cease. There is no karma arisen from conditions. And the fault of not living as a brahmacarin would also absurdly follow for this [position]. what despite will there be about [the emptiness of] bodies? 17. but they are not truly (tattvataḥ) afflictive mental states. “[In terms of this theory of karmic actions’ imperishability].” 5 … At this point. If karma [existed] essentially.24 .29. “A being. Moreover. Saṃsāra [makes sense].30.26 . how can karma be truly [karma]? 17. and that emanated emanation may again emanate another emanation.31 . Karma and afflictive mental states are said to be the causal conditions for bodies. 20 17. then without any doubt it would be eternal. Karma is of the nature of afflictive mental states. Karma does not arise. obscured with ignorance and fettered with thirst. … 17. there is also no agent that commits karmic acts.” 30 17. If karma and afflictive mental states are empty. 25 35 . nor is there karma established without conditions. There is no doubt that [through your view of karma. is the agent that experiences [karmic effects].] all conventions are contradicted.then the ripened result of a [karmic action] would again be ripened. If karma has an essence because it is established (vyavasthitha). but eternalism does not. Why? Because it is essenceless.25. emptiness [makes sense].Wisdom Page 54 17. how could there an agent who experiences it? 17.22. 15 17.23.20.27. the Buddha taught that imperishability of karma is an elemental thing (dharma). Since these [alleged afflictive mental states] are not truly afflictive mental states. Karma would also be unmade (akṛta)]. 10 17. Through his perfection of miraculous power. that being is not different than the agent who did [the karmic act].28. then there would be the fear of experiencing [karmic results] for something that one has not done. And since it is unarisen. then how could there be an effect arisen from karma? And if there is no effect. nor is he the same as that [karmic agent]. the Teachers may emanate a [buddha] emanation. since the eternal is not made (kriyate). we say the following. 17.21. 17. 17. and any distinction between those who do good (puṇya) and those who do evil (pāpa) is impossible. If karma were unmade. Therefore.

32. the karmic agent is like the emanation. and as for the karma that it did. karmic agents and effects — these are all like .Wisdom Page 55 17. Afflictive mental states. Likewise.33. karmic acts. bodies. it is like another emanation emanated by an emanation. 17.

one stops all afflictive mental states. (MAV 6.’ does one think of it as essentially the aggregates. he first investigates the Self as follows: “What is this so-called Self. then it would partake in occurrence and destruction. and he realizes that the Self is the focus of that belief. Encountering Madhyamaka says: Insightfully seeing through his intellect that all afflictive mental states and flaws arise from the belief that a transient assemblage is the Self. consider the yogi who wishes to encounter the ultimately real and who wishes to eliminate all afflictive mental states and faults. five theories are presented. both internally and externally. which are thus based on the Self. and effects—all of these are not ultimately real. If it were something other than the aggregates. and having realized that the Self is the object of that belief. «Afflictive mental states. he sees that its root is the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. through the nonperception of all things whatsoever. that yogi examines the situation by asking. 35 One might ask. (2) the Self is the foundation for the aggregates. Understanding that afflictive mental states are eliminated in this fashion.1 . nevertheless. He also sees that through the nonperception of a Self. we say the following.18 Analysis of the Self LVP340. in both the ‘Analysis of the Tathāgata’ (MMK 22) and the ‘Analysis of Fire and Fuel’ (MMK 10). they appear to childish beings as if they were ultimately real. “What is the root of saṃsāra?” Examining it in this way. Candrakīrti will restrict himself to the portions of that analysis that are presented by Nāgārjuna in this chapter.1 5 10 At this point. If the Self were the aggregates.1 and aggregates are identical or that they are different. he says: 18. then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. he intends to present a refutation of the Self only through these two theories. then what is ultimately real? Moreover. and that by eliminating that belief. he does not present them again here. like the cloud-city of the Sprites and so on. But if this is the case. «Why is it that elsewhere. actions. And since Nāgārjuna wishes to state a concise argument. how does one encounter the ultimately real?» In response. one can raise these possibilities: (1) the Self is based on the aggregates as its foundation. can be subsumed under the theories that the Self LVP341. but I will just discuss the position presented here. agents. As for encountering ultimate reality. 1 . however. These theories. Rather. since they are enumerated elsewhere. Therefore.1 In this regard. which is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’? And when conceiving of this object of the habitual sense of ‘I.20) 15 20 25 30 Encountering reality should be understood in detail from this and other verses in Encountering Madhyamaka. namely. that the Self and the aggregates are the same or that they are different. one eliminates that belief in a transient assemblage as the Self. whether internal or external. embodiments. In this context. the ultimately real is the utter cessation of the habitual sense of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra) and the habitual sense of ‘My’ (mamakāra). or (3) the Self is the possessor of the aggregates. the yogi refutes the Self. although MAV has a more extensive analysis. he concisely presents the above two theories. someone objects. or as distinct from the aggregates?” Here. whereas here there are only two theories?» The answer is that the five theories are already enumerated in those two contexts. In other words. With this in mind. although they are not ultimately real.

if the Self were identical to the aggregates. then it too would endure only a moment. so I will not again offer any extensive elaboration now. (See AK: 0000). any causally efficient entity—i. does not have a cow as its defining characteristic.1 Also. and it would not be incorrect for the term “Self” to refer to a substance. which here refers to Buddhist nirvāṇa. the Self would be numerous.12) And he will also say: 10 The Self is not the substratum. For if the Self were something other than the aggregates. If it were to arise. the aggregates cease in Nirvāṇa. how could that which relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? (MMK 27. The aggregates are known to be causally efficient. it would follow that the Self is a substance.6) LVP342. if one thinks that the Self is the aggregates. Candrakīrti here refers to the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). On this theory. then a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed.Wisdom Page 57 5 In this regard. one produced by causes and thus capable of producing effects—necessarily endures for only an instant (kṣaṇa). the substratum arises and ceases. the aggregates arise from causes and conditions and their defining characteristics are occurrence. See MAVBh (296a). the Self would also cease. then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. when it is conceived as different from the aggregates. one should understand this position through the analysis presented in Encountering Madhyamaka in the section that begins. and the karma accumulated by one Self would be experienced by another. perdurance and decay. According the ontology of Vaibhāṣika Abhidarma. and thus they endure only a moment. And since the opponent here accepts that the cessation of the Self in this fashion would amount to Annihilationism (ucchedavāda). they have three defining characteristics: arisal (jāti). And it is not accepted that the Self arises and ceases because various problems would absurdly follow. The point is that. arises. (MMK 27. there would be no karmic result for him. (MAV 6. being previously nonexistent. 15 If the Self were the aggregates. In the same manner. then it would follow that the Self would partake in occurrence and destruction—that is. then since the aggregates are numerous. For example. 3 Since the karmic agent would thus cease every moment. perdurance (sthiti). or else the Self would have arisen causelessly. and cessation (nirodha). but it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. it must be contradictory to maintain that the Self is the aggregates. all conditioned entities (saṃskṛtadharma) are conditioned in part because they are subject to the causes and conditions that produce them. would not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. In any case. the Self. if one were to maintain that the Self were identical to the aggregates. a horse. which is different from a cow. hence.4 Therefore.1 This position should be understood through studying this section of Encountering Madhyamaka. as Nāgārjuna will later explain when he says: It is not the case that the Self. the Self is not the aggregates. because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta). And so.e. Here. Likewise. The Self would necessarily be annihilated in cessation. such an entity comes into and goes out of existence every moment.127-128) LVP343. it would become something that arises and ceases— since the aggregates partake in occurrence and destruction. if the 20 25 The term for cessation is nirvṛtti.2 and in every moment prior to cessation it would arise and cease. in the first place.. then since according to Candrakīrti’s Buddhist interlocutor. Being produced from causes. 4 3 2 .

(2) experience.’ Therefore. Alternatively. As such. here is another meaning of the statement. just as consciousness is asserted to be different from material form. then the Self would not have occurrence. and they thus speak LVP344. It is true that the Tīrthikas state a defining characteristic of the Self separate from the aggregates. it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. Hence. «The Tīrthikas know of a Self separate from the aggregates. it is devoid of qualities and inactive. it would be apprehended as being established with a distinct defining characteristic. there is an image of one’s face. It is also said. in dependence upon a mirror. Without relying on a mirror. there is the habitual sense of ‘I. (3) the apprehension of an object’s sign. it is an experiencer without being an agent. The Self is not. Nāgārjuna LVP345. as you maintain. .” These are the defining characteristics of the five aggregates: (1) malleability. And in that case.1 of its defining characteristics. they do not realize. Likewise. but they do not state its defining characteristic after having perceived the Self in its actuality. because it is unconditioned. in dependence upon the aggregates. the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. he refutes the above notion of Self in even conventional terms.’ but like the image of one’s face. without relying on the aggregates. apprehended in that fashion. they conceptually construct a Self due to their confusion. then the Self would be established with a distinct defining characteristic. The Tīrthikas’ system has come to be further divided in terms of this or that distinction in the qualities predicated of the Self.142) We respond as follows. just as consciousness is apprehended as established with a defining characteristic distinct from material form. that the Self is merely nominal.Wisdom Page 58 5 10 15 Self does not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. or it would be like nirvāṇa. but in reality it is not anything at all. And the way that the Tīrthikas speak of a separate defining characteristic for the Self is stated in the following verse from Encountering Madhyamaka: The Tīrthikas conceive of a Self that is by nature eternal. this way of refuting the Self does not refute them. hence. they become confused by what is merely spurious inference. the image of one’s face is not seen. Someone objects. If. due to their fear. ‘I’ am not seen. It is observed that. through not properly understanding dependent designation. it is not really anything at all. however. (4) conditioning. I will not labor to demonstrate this point here. because it does not exist. In the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (MMK 8). 20 25 30 35 40 Since the above has already been stated. As such.» (MAV 6. they depart even from conventional reality. it would not be called the “Self. and by saying this.” nor would it be reasonable for it to be the object of the habitual sense of ‘I. Thus confused. the Self would either be like a sky flower. there is no Self distinct from the aggregates. Rather. perdurance and decay as its defining characteristics. “If the Self were different from the aggregates. and (5) representation of an object. so too.1 says that the Self and its substratum are established in mutual dependence on each other. it is observed that. Not realizing this. and due to their false concepts. and they then state its defining characteristic. the Self were asserted to be different from the aggregates.

the yogi dwells near the vision of the ultimate. due to their distorted vision. The problem is that. why do those nearby not see it? Those far away who view the world see it to be real just as it is. if a chariot is burned. “unreal”). To those. people perceive a mirage that looks like water. and in that cognition dark blue water appears. the five aggregates. and its blazing rays. the habitual sense of ‘I’ is ultimately unreal. the imputations that are the Self and the aggregates—appear to be real to ordinary persons due to their ignorance. they do not appear to be real. the aggregates. Indeed. induce such a cognition in those who are nearby. As the Master has said. but being signless like a mirage. intent on searing the rough and dry earth.1 near the vision of those entities’ suchness. Likewise. That is. Likewise. those seeking liberation do not perceive it in this manner in terms of some essential existence. just then do they necessarily realize also the essencelessness of those Self-owned entities. living in saṃsāra. when the yogis realize the essencelessness of the Self.. 5 20 25 30 35 . that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is asat. while it may indeed be the case that no thing can arise from an unreal seed. A form that is viewed from afar is seen clearly by those nearby. that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is a false belief) and the unreality of that statement of belief (i.e. beings obsessively apprehend the Self. false entities—namely. the final month’s midday sun. 18. How can anything whose seed is unreal be ultimately produced? Seeing that the aggregates are thus unreal. In those people who are far from it.Wisdom Page 59 5 Imbued with the error of ignorance. then its parts are not perceived because they have been burned. necessarily Note here the slippage between the truth value of a statement or belief (i. if a mirage is actually water. which are the basis for that designation. but they are not the Self. they are far from seeing the suchness of the entities that are the Self and the Self-owned in accord with the way those entities are established. one might reasonably say that much can come from a false seed. how could the Self-owned (ātmīya) exist? LVP346.1. Perceiving the rays of the shining sun. even though a series of statements might be false. one forsakes the habitual sense of ‘I.2. are like the spouting flames of an intense fire. nor is it real. wavers slightly. however. who dwell LVP347. and the focus of that obsessive apprehension is that which is being just dependently designated. the aggregates seem to be the Self. A mirage seems to be water.. The mirage does not.e. “The five aggregates appear to be its substratum. nor are they even real. but it is not water. the aggregates do not arise again. wishing to climb to the middle of a cloudless sky. and focusing on a rough and dry place.29-30)5 In the summer. (RV1. Those who seek liberation should examine that focus by asking.52-54) Due to the non-perception of the Self and the Self-owned. and as such. for them. the mirage induces a cognition. it is not seen by those nearby.1 Since the Self is not perceived. Likewise. one all the more easily does not perceive the Self-owned.’ And since it has been forsaken. however. they may still motivate action — they might even lead to a war. if the Self does not exist. Hence. thus. (RV1. is it then defined by the aggregates or not defined by the aggregates?” Investigating the Self in every way. As Nāgārjuna said in the Ratnāvalī: 10 15 The aggregates arise from the habitual sense of ‘I’.

’ then one does not see. his Self is established. He who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’ does not exist.” is a child following a faulty path. In no way is the essential reality of the Self and aggregates perceived. one should realize that if one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. Internally and externally. 18. “Quieting” them means that they do not arise. birth ceases. As a result. As the Blessed One has said. because: 5 10 18.3.” One who ponders things. the Self-owned. 25 All mental sophistry (cittavitarkaṇa) is conceptual structuring (prapañca). The Blessed One also said.” is one whose mind has not arisen and does not exist. that they are not perceived. Through the cessation of appropriation. and inasmuch as he exists.2. so know that things are unthinkable.1 30 Even the one who practices is essentially empty: this is so for the wise. are the objects of the habitual sense of ‘my’. In other words. LVP348. Empty things are proclaimed through words: with words it is said. how could some other entity exist such that it would lack ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’? In contrast. the Element (dhātu) is essentially empty and void. the aggregates. i.’ due to quieting the Self and the Self’s possessions. «But this yogi who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’ does exist. thinking. the yogi becomes one who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’.4 .1 The ‘Self’s possessions’ (ātmanīna) are that which aid the Self.’ then one does not see reality (tattva). that being the case. thinking. appropriation (upādāna) ceases. The Self is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’. they are the five aggregates. “They are beyond words. the Self-owned. not the childish. LVP349.Wisdom Page 60 18. as are his aggregates.2. . 15 20 One who ponders things. when [the thoughts] “I” and “my” have ceased. “They are extinguished.» This is not so. The aggregates are essentially empty and void. If one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. he is without ‘mine’ and without the habitual sense of ‘I. See that the internal is empty! See that the external is empty! Even the one who meditates on emptiness does not exist! He likewise said. “They are extinguished. And hence. fully extinguished..e. fully extinguished.

and therefore it is established that 18. however. object. there is no more saṃsāric existence. (MMK 23.1. In this manner. gain and loss. the ugly. first of all. linguistic referent and linguistic expression.5. defined as repeated existence in saṃsāra (punarbhava). cot and tot. And from eliminating appropriation comes the end of birth. it is established that through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. aversion. death and so on occur? Thus. And if saṃsāric existence has been stopped. agent. «What. 6 30 35 LVP351. when one has eliminated appropriation. the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self is the root of all afflictive mental states. through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. and thus. fame and obscurity. Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptuality (vikalpa). 20 This is so because afflictive mental states such as desire arise in one who. and error. the babble of language. decay. and that comes from conceptual structuring (prapañca).6 material form and sensation.1) And it is also said in a sūtra. I know your root: you are born from conceptuality. mukuṭa (“diadem”) and ratha (“chariot). their cause. ceases in emptiness. and confusion come from conceptuality because they arise in dependence on the beautiful. Conceptual structuring.Wisdom Page 61 5 According to the sūtras. then. desirous men do not perceive a barren women’s daughter to be elegantly beautiful and youthful.2. This is so because. How so? Because the aforementioned web of conceptual structuring occurs [only] if one perceives a real thing. All of these worldly conceptual structures cease in emptiness. one eliminates the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. praise and blame. happiness and suffering. one form of mental elaboration consists merely in the association of sounds in one word with the sounds in another. or to put it another way.5. 25 Desire. As Nāgārjuna will explain: It is said that attachment. And the concepts arise from various kinds of conceptual structuring to which one has become conditioned throughout one’s beginningless saṃsāric existence. they cease when one sees that all things are empty of essence. for example.1 which has appropriation as its causal condition. you will no longer be in me. female and male. and so on. one eliminates the four kinds of appropriation.1 . namely. 10 15 This is so because. Through the nonperception of the Self and the Self-owned. as a childish. ascetic vows. and Self-oriented philosophies. LVP350. thus. and so they do not cause conceptual structuring to The actual examples here are ghaṭa (“water-pot”). ordinary person. instrument and action. pot. No longer will I conceptualize you. the appropriation of desire. is improperly conceptualizing material form and so on. lot. views. Those various kinds of conceptual structuring include: knowledge and the known object.» We respond: 18. The point of this litany is simply that the words contain similar sounds in Sanskrit. it is their origin. karma and afflictive mental states. Through eliminating that belief. that is. paṭa (“cloth”). The process of stopping birth is established in this fashion. is that thing due to the cessation of which karma and afflictive states also cease? You should say what it is. come from concepts. how could birth.

Scrutinizing that collection of entities in that fashion. the web of concepts. dwell in the practice of nonconceptual wisdom? And hence. since it is defined by the cessation of all conceptual structuring.” Hence. [on the part of the saintly śrāvaka] there is no determination of something in its real nature that is an “I” devoid of I-making and Mymaking. And without doing karmic actions. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi. they are neither the Self nor the Self-owned. non-harm.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states beginning with satkāyadṛṣṭi. Yogis in the state of seeing emptiness do not perceive an essential reality of the aggregates.1 30 35 In Encountering Madhyamaka. seeing that all conditioned things are unarisen.23) 25 In contrast. “Nirvāṇa.” That is to say. In our view. How much more so is the case for the great bodhisattvas who. from resorting to emptiness. And due to the elimination of conceptual structuring. except for a conventional designation. In the same manner. Nāgārjuna says.Wisdom Page 62 5 10 15 20 occur with her as an object. And not engaging in karmic actions. aging and death. they do not experience the jungle of saṃsāra. Mymaking does not make any sense with regard to any internal or external thing. And just by virtue of the absence of that. those men do not produce the host of afflictive mental states. there comes the elimination of all conceptual structuring. Master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness as explained above. that single web of the grief. Instead. they do not focus distorted (ayoniśaḥ) conceptuality on that object. Not perceiving an essential reality of things. suffering. they do not produce the host of afflictive mental states. in short. they do not engage in karmic actions. “Since there is no entity that is called a “Self. And without focusing conceptual structures on that object. wailing. birth ceases. (CŚ 12. which is called “birth. from the imagined determination of “I” and “My. and when the Self is [known to be] nonexistent. distress and confusion that comes from birth. there are only these two. emptiness itself is called. And without having concepts. “One who is my-less and lacks I-making does not exist. they do not engage in virtuous. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi. which is defined as the peace that is the quieting of all conceptual structuring. all karma and afflictive mental states cease.” As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: The Transcendent Ones have said that the Dharma is. Hence.” what is born and dies is merely elements (dharma). I have already explained how it is that this master is not following Master Nāgārjuna in regard to this issue. concepts cease. and that emptiness itself is nirvāṇa.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states. then I-making will not occur. decay and death. the Self is the object of I-making.” LVP352. extensions or elements. I presented my critique in the passage beginning. they do not cause conceptual structuring to occur with them as objects. they do not experience saṃsāra. he says: The aggregates are a mere collection of conditioned entities that arise in one moment and cease in the next.1 . from the imagined determination of “I” and “My. And without focusing conceptual structuring on that object. And through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states. Therefore. And through the cessation of concepts. nonvirtuous or immutable karmic actions. “And at the LVP353. a saintly śrāvaka has the realization. they do not have concepts about it. And without focusing a web of concepts on that object. which have the nature of satkāyadṛṣṭi.

And he also said: 10 “I will become a Sugata’s śrāvaka!”. but there are elemental things with their causes.e. not contradicted by your position?» We respond as follows. it will be experienced by one’s Self. One does not transfer the karmic result to someone else. And did he not likewise say: LVP355.1 At this point.. or “I will be a Dharma King!”: one who wishes to do such things cannot succeed. just as one cannot cross the river if one fails to see the ford. and if a bodhisattva at the first stage (where emptiness has been directly realized) is already superior to the śrāvakas in some other regard. If he does not resort to this tolerance.’ he will surpass them in intelligence as well. 20 The Self is the Self’s savior. they realize only the essencelessness of persons.” and that this nonoccurrence comes about due to the nonperception of external and internal things. one who wishes to awaken to a śrāvaka’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom. or “I will become a pratyekabuddha!”. then how does it not contradict this statement by the Blessed One: The Self is the Self’s savior. then the distinction between bodhisattvas and śrāvakas cannot be that the former has a more extensive realization (i. If that is the case. good and bad. Having been done by one’s Self. which go on at length. one who wishes to awaken to a pratyekabuddha’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom And Subhūti. but not of things).1 25 MAV 1. someone objects. what other protector could there be? For it is through a well tamed Self that the wise reach heaven. On the same issue in the Eight Thousand Lines on the Perfection of Wisdom.e. Translation by Huntington (1989:150). what other protector could there be? For the Self is the witness to one’s deeds.”7 Hence. 7 . I will not go to the effort of critiquing him again now. Is it not so that the Blessed One also said this: There is neither a being nor a Self here. the great bodhisattva who wishes to awaken to complete and perfect awakening should practice this Perfection of Wisdom. they realize the essencelessness of things). And in the King of Samādhi.Wisdom Page 63 stage called ‘Far Advanced.8cd. 15 LVP354. «Suppose it has been established that suchness (tattva) is the nonoccurrence of conceptual webs concerning the internal or external as “I” and “My. nor does it occur causelessly. he said: Positive and negative karma does not just disappear. How are the above statements. Subhūti.. whereas the śrāvakas have a less extensive realization (i. The gist of the argument in Candrakīrti’s commentary on this verse is that if it takes until the seventh stage for a bodhisattva to exceed a śrāvaka in intelligence. the Blessed One said: 5 Subhūti.

the buddhas conform to the mindset (āśaya) of each world of beings which are of eighty-four thousand different kinds in terms of beings’ minds and LVP357. they are headed for a fall into the great chasm of hell and so on. …The Self is not consciousness. are like birds bound with a cord that is tough—due to the difficulty of the belief in a real Self—and very long—due the love of “I” and “My. they do not see the various things of the world. the buddhas are intent upon fulfilling their promise to uplift every world of beings.” LVP356. Hence. In some persons. nor is the Self that which possesses consciousness. they reject the next world and the Self by saying things such as. the blessed buddhas in some cases make it known in the world. Doing so.” “water. we should seek the intention of the Blessed One’s teaching in these contexts.1 The intention here is as follows.Wisdom Page 64 The Self is not material form.” Even though they fly far. and even though they engage in positive karmic acts and shun negative ones. above) and also from the Encountering Madhyamaka. nor does the next. elements and measures of “earth. they are intent on describing the names.1 behavior.e. These buddhas desire to care for disciples of inferior. Thus.” Through these denials.. method and great compassion. There is no such thing as spontaneously born beings. “It is so—there is a Self”.” They thus say that minds have just arisen from the mere ripening of the elements in the embryo and so on. however. There is no such thing as the maturation of the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds. The blessed buddhas are like never-setting suns intent on making the host of lotuses that are the disciples’ minds bloom with the extensive sunbeams that are their great compassion. they deny what has come before and what will come next. even though those things are not beyond the scope of pure worldly vision. “the Selfless.” “fire. for the inferior disciples who are engaged in nonvirtuous karmic deeds. Some disciples. 18. the great kings among healers. the distinctive and desired result that is heaven or emancipation. such as roots. and this can be learned in detail from the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (i. and they do so fully equipped with wisdom. nor is material form in the Self. namely.6. Doing so. Hence.” and “wind.1 . methods and awareness. they are always and constantly engaged in conditioning themselves with nonvirtuous karmic acts. grain mush. 5 And did he not also say that all things are Selfless? But how then could there be no contradiction between these passages and the preceding passages? Hence. In order to eliminate those beings’ false view. Hence. and so on. and denying that. nor is consciousness in the Self. they reject what leads to a certain kind of result. “This world does not exist. like the perceptions that come from an intoxicant with a special intoxicating and stupefying capacity that is caused by its production from the mere ripening of certain substances. Chapter 8. “Self.” and they have also taught. The peerless friends of many worlds (jagad). middling and great capacities.1 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . they do this so as to turn those disciples away from nonvirtue and so on. I will not make any further effort here for the sake of refuting that view. being bound with that cord LVP358. There is also an argument to refute those who reject causality. a leavening agent. the buddhas have used the label. As such. the eye of the intellect is entirely covered by the thick cataracts of inferior theories that are mistaken about the unreality of the Self and the Selfless. In general in their sayings. While established within just conventional reality. The Self is not in consciousness. The Self is not in material form. and the Self is not that which possesses material form. they entirely cure the enormous sickness that is the negative mental states. which are divided into the definitive and the interpretable.

Likewise. the buddhas have taught. In some disciples. These excellent disciples are devoid of Selflove. This is as it says in the Āryaratnakūṭa: 10 15 Kāśyapa. And to some. “Self” is one extreme.Wisdom Page 65 5 they are still unable to pass beyond the Three Dimensions and obtain peaceful nirvāṇa. the Buddha taught the Dharma in accord with his disciples’ abilities. Last one refutes all. it is aimed at the practice of virtue. and it is the LVP360. And to some. he taught one that is based upon duality. middling and excellent disciples. In this way.6.2. Therefore.” Just as the view that there is a Self is not ultimately true (atattva). the true discernment of things.3-4) 25 In this way.1 20 In this way. (RV2.” There is. It has neither location nor appearance. due to the various intentions of lesser. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. The Dharma he taught to some is for the purpose of stopping negativity. deep words. wishing to take care of those disciples. that seed has ripened and they have drawn close to nirvāṇa. The one who knows this is wise.1 . the Sage did not call them either real or unreal. taught. LVP359. Next one refutes the Self. its essence is wisdom and compassion. The middle that is between these two extremes is cannot be indicated (arūpya). and “Selflessness” is a second extreme. because from a thesis comes its antithesis. there Mādhyamikas do not contradict the scriptures. and so on. so too its opposite—the view that there is no Self—is also not ultimately true. 18. the Great Sage refuted both the belief in Self and in non-Self. (CŚ8. and they have the capacity to plumb the depths of the actual meaning of the king of sage’s highest. neither is real. As for what one sees. For these middling disciples—so as to cool their attachment to the belief that the transient collection of mind and body is a real Self. nor any non-Self whatsoever. To some. hears. so too. It is for this reason that Āryadeva said.15) 30 Likewise. it is called the middle way. At first. the teaching of the blessed buddhas’ dharma occurred in such a way as to negate the Self. Having determined that these disciples have that distinctive aspiration. “There is no Self. Therefore. Kāśyapa. Thus. it cannot be shown. It cannot be represented. it cannot be marked. 35 He taught to some a Dharma not based on duality. neither Self nor non-Self is ultimately perceived just as it is. they taught that there is neither any Self. however. and so as to engender within them a yearning for nirvāṇa—the blessed buddhas. he taught a profound Dharma that terrifies the timid. a seed that is an intense aspiration for the profound dharma—an interest obtained through the distinctive qualities that come from previous habituation. where there is neither decay nor death. A grammarian will make some students recite even the alphabet. And in the Ratnāvalī it says. the Master said. or to negate both. or to negate non-Self. one refutes the absence of virtue.

They do so with statements such as. concepts. “Oh Blessed One. The Lokāyatas. there is no relation between karmic acts and their results. pacification. another meaning [of MMK18. all of its branches. it has been said. There is a person just to the extent that there is an object of the senses. Hence. The ‘pacification of eternalism and annihilationism’ is a synonym for the pacification of the belief that the transient constituents of mind and body constitute an essential Self. 10 But just as those without cataracts do not at all see the hairs. flies and so on that are perceived by those with cataracts. And so. Śāntamati.6. the term ‘pacification’ is a synonym for the pacification of the negative mental states. The ‘pacification of the negative mental states’ is a synonym for the pacification of ideas. The ‘pacification of I-making and My-making’ is a synonym for the pacification of eternalism and annihilationism. the bodhisattva Śāntamati said this to the Blessed One.6] is as follows. Perceiving this. these thinkers posit a Self [so as to provide some basis for that relation]. Śāntamati. all negative mental states are pacified.” or a “non-self” that is imagined by childish persons. Oh Bhadrā. Through the pacification of all beliefs. Śāntamati. all negative mental states are pacified. Through pacifying the belief in the transient constituents as the Self. The ‘pacification of ideas. So too. [18. The ‘pacification of recognition and mentation’ is a synonym for the pacification of error. all those negative mental states arise from the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. all beliefs are pacified.1 5 20 25 30 35 40 . they assert that there is no Self. on the other hand. (RV4. ‘pacification. the buddhas have taught. so too the buddhas do not at all see any real entity (vastusvarūpa) such as a “self. leaves and fruit wither. through their reasoning see no Self that would be an agent of continuity [from one life to the next]. and conceptual constructions. by pacifying the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. all wishing (praṇidhāna) is pacified. Not seeing such things.” 15 As it says in the Tathāgataguhyasūtra. And through the pacification of all wishing. Some thinkers such as the Sāṃkhyas perceive that.’ But what is this ‘pacification’? And from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One answered.Wisdom Page 66 means to attain awakening. The ‘pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence’ is a synonym for the pacification of I-making and My-making. The ‘pacification of causes and perceptual conditions’ is a synonym for the pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence. concepts. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. For example. when a tree’s root is cut.2] so too. some negative mental states occur in a way that is connected to the belief in perceptual conditions and causes.94-96) Alternatively. and conceptual constructions’ is a synonym for the pacification of recognition and mentation (manasikāra). LVP361. The ‘pacification of error’ is a synonym for the pacification of causes and perceptual conditions. in the case that karmic imprints (saṃskāra) go out of existence every moment. “Good sir. and it is a jackal’s foot. Therefore. this is what the learned say.

the bodhisattva with skill in means. that which is to be named has ceased. “Śāntamati. of non-conditioning. it is the non-occurrence of beings. They do not come together. it is not determinately known.’ then what did they teach?» We respond: 18. it is not made to occur. the “transient constituents” are not constituents. pacified. the mind burns. the one who is purified by the perfection of wisdom. In this regard. through the tolerance conducive to emptiness. Moreover. Śāntamati. it is the non-occurrence of a living thing. to recognize the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is to know that this unlocated view has no location.Wisdom Page 67 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Śāntamati. unceased. one does not apprehend that belief. someone says. that is not imagined. but without perceptual objects. Such is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. it is the non-occurrence of a person. Śāntamati. yet he does not pacify the perception of the root of virtue.1 LVP364.1 LVP363. The one that does not repeatedly take perceptual objects does not burn. “But Blessed One. it is not conceptualized. Śāntamati.” Śāntamati asked. That is what is called “peace. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. due to perceptual objects. one does not apprehend that belief. the mind burns. But when the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is recognized. that is not made. is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Not burning it is said to be pacified.” Śāntamati said. it stops. they are imagined. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is a synonym for emptiness. they do not cause harm. that bodhisattva knows the pacification of all perceptual objects. LVP362. that belief is not located internally. Śāntamati. When the mental object has ceased. At this point. what is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self?” The Blessed One answered. «If the blessed buddhas taught neither ‘Self’ nor ‘notSelf. they do not conglomerate. This too. of nonoccurrence—through this view. “Through perceptual objects (ārambana). of wishlessness.’ But from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One said. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is the non-occurrence (asamutthāna) of the Self.” through the view of emptiness. it is the non-occurrence of views. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is also the fact that. it has been said. they do not come apart. Like nirvāṇa. ‘pacified. they are unreal. it stops. For example. Śāntamati. nor is it located externally. fire burns in dependence on its fuel. it is not put together. of the unknown. but without depending on its fuel.1 . So too. then all appropriation and affliction do not arise. if the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is not recognized. as for “transient constituents. That belief is not located at all. What is not imagined and not conceptualized. Śāntamati. And what is unreal and imagined. of signlessness. Śāntamati. From the very beginning. all appropriation and affliction arises. Śāntamati. “Oh Blessed One. they do not accumulate.7. Śāntamati. they do not adhere.

demigods. Someone objects. Between these two nights. But when that which is to be named has ceased—that is. “When the mental object has ceased. how could words refer? Therefore. there arises a great light like the autumn sun. the mind does not engage with it. then that would be taught. will pass into final nirvāṇa.” and so on. Nāgārjuna will say [at 25.” Like nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna says. That light banishes the mental darkness of this and that being. another objection: «It has been said [at 18. Why has that which is to be named ceased? Nāgārjuna says. and one night the Tathāgata. one night the Tathāgata awoke to complete awakening. what must be supplied is “in the ultimate” (tattve). however. humans. nor will the Tathāgata do so. Nāgārjuna says.” The explanation of this line as given before should be added here. how can there be the attribution of a semantic sign? And since there is no semantic sign. For this reason. The Tathāgata never spoke a single syllable. the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere. And when the mind is not engaged. But when it makes no sense for there to be an object of the mind. If there were some object of the mind. it remains entirely the case that the buddhas did not teach anything at all.” In this phrase. For this very reason. «Previously. and it embarrassingly outshines the mass of rays that come from the seven suns which cause the fire in the eon LVP366. it is a perceptual object (ārambaṇa). ceases in emptiness. words would apply to it. through the nonperception of any external or internal real thing. “Conceptual structuring. no longer appropriating [the aggregates]. But in this regard. in other words. that which is to be named has ceased. that which is to be named has ceased. Through uttering just an instant of speech. the Tathāgataguhyasūtra says. the essence of things (dharmasvabhāva).” Mental object (cittagocara) means an object of the mind (cittasya gocaraḥ). it makes blossom a forest of many different kinds of lotus-minds. the nature of things (dharmaprakṛti)—is established to be unarisen.” But how is there the cessation of conceptual structuring in emptiness?» Our response is as in the one given just above. humanoids (kinnara). both internally and externally.1 20 25 30 35 40 .Wisdom Page 68 5 10 15 Here. adepts. when there is no object of words—then the buddhas do not teach anything at all. Such is indeed the case. “When the mental object has ceased.4]. if there were some real thing to be named. unceased. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. “Like nirvāṇa. it was said that. did the Blessed One give various kinds of dharma-teachings to all gods. How. But what kind of thing is this ultimate? Can it be expressed or known?» Therefore. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. LVP365. and so on. the Tathāgata never uttered even a single syllable. however. “when the mental object has ceased….5]. then through the attribution of some semantic sign (nimitta) to it. unceased. unceased.1 There might be. then to what would a semantic sign be attributed such that words would refer to it? Demonstrating why it is that there is no mental object. why is it that what is to be named has ceased in the ultimate? Why is it that the mental object has ceased in the ultimate? Nāgārjuna says. “Like nirvāṇa. An object (gocara) is an object (viṣaya). Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama). namely. sorcerers (vidyādhara). then. in this context. That being the case. And there is yet another interpretation of the verse (atha vā). Śāntamati. the ultimate (tattva) is the complete elimination of I-making and My-making. it dries up the ocean of decay and death. the dharmatā—that is.

10 For instructing the gods there is a divine drum. Echoed sounds are not located either internally or externally. it is said: From a single of your sounds flows forth. mechanical chimes are caused to make a sound. is unreal. by nature they are but froth. the result and also the entire world—all these are empty of nature. A god having known that he was in a state of heedlesness. not eternal! They are unstable. the speech of the Lord of Men is not located internally or externally. There is no speaker here. They describe this entire world and all future ones as essenceless because those worlds come into being relying upon—depending upon—causes and conditions. they are the moon’s reflection in water! All things have the nature of a dream!” The drum that has resounded proceeds with Śakra and the gods to the dharma-gathering. the sūtra says. the Buddha has no conceptuality. perishable. It also says. 30 At this point. Likewise.” Then each of the world’s sounds. not one is real. due to previous purification. The nihilists do not realize in this way that the next world and so on do not exist in the sense that the next world and such are empty of real essence LVP368. so too. 5 Likewise. in the peaks and the crags there will be the sound. the sage who elucidates all dharmas.1 15 35 . Nihilists also say. «The Mādhyamikas are nothing but nihilists because they say that all virtuous and non-virtuous karmic actions. the Buddha’s speech comes forth when moved by the aspirations of all beings. the sound of the drum descends from the sky: “All desirable things are impermanent. in the trees and among the herbs. They alike illusions and mirages. the agent of those actions. and for the gods it gives a dharma-talk that leads to peace and freedom from lust. To each the Victor has said something different. the Āryasamādhirāja also says: 20 When the Buddha has become the Dharma-King. Why? Because Mādhyamikas hold the theory of interdependence. But he has spoken with a smile for the sake of what is relevant. “Things do not exist. he who disciplines the world. every one of them. but in doing so. Mādhyamikas are none other than nihilists. To that same extent flows forth the melodious sound of the Transcendent One. for the sake of the world. 25 And so on and so forth. then in the grasses and the thickets.Wisdom Page 69 of destruction. it is made by the ripening of the gods’ karma. Likewise. some raise the following objection. Moved by the wind. Likewise.1 LVP367.» This is not so. and yet sounds still come forth. “This does not exist!” Therefore. a sound for beings of various inclinations.

Therefore. and also “Everything is unreal in itself” (atathya). Instead. just as there is a great difference between a person born blind and sighted person. the nature of things is properly LVP369. they incorrectly deny (apavāda) those other things which are similar to the things that they have perceived in this world. At this point. even though the deliberate equanimity and non-deliberate equanimity of the Arhat and the ordinary person are similar in that they are both equanimity. Nevertheless. while the other is said to be speaking the truth.1 35 40 One should first engage with whatever is pleasant for the [audience].” Concerning this verse. even though there is no difference in terms of the nature of things. In this case. there will also be a difference between Mādhyamikas and nihilists. one is called a liar. someone says. The sequential teaching (anuśāsana) of the Buddha is this: “Everything is real in itself” (tathya). As such. Nevertheless. however. consider the case in which one person does not actually know that another person has committed a robbery. one person will be besmirched by calumny and nonvirtue. When properly investigated. Seeing things in this way. Likewise. who do not properly know the nature of things. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. say what that teaching is!» We respond: behold and know the blessed buddhas’ sequential teaching for introducing disciples to the deathless nectar of the ultimate: 18.Wisdom Page 70 5 10 15 20 25 30 because they are interdependent. “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. Therefore. who speak about it and understand it. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself”.» This is not so. there is no difference in reality concerning whether or not a robbery was committed.8. the following verses merit mentioning: LVP370. In this same way. «It may be that Like nirvāṇa. The masters of old (pūrvācārya) maintain that. even though they are similarly restricted to being in a particular place such as a treacherous precipice. they perceive the various things of this world as essentially [real]. accuses him. «Nevertheless. “He committed the robbery!” Another person. there is no similarity. in the present context. people will not be able to know it. being a direct witness. there is no similarity—in terms of knowing and speaking—between them and the nihilists. and they do not see those things as having come from another world or as proceeding to the next world. their philosophy is similar to yours because they realize the nonexistence of that which does not exist with the essence of a real thing. because one who has been harmed cannot at all be an appropriate vessel for the holy dharma. there is a difference in terms of the ones who are knowing whether that is the case. but the other will not.1 (yathāvad) known by Mādhyamikas. the philosophies are not the same because of the difference in the one who is knowing things as not really established. [And]: . in order to introduce the disciples to the essence of things.» Although the position that things are not established really is the same. therefore. and that neither words nor thought engages with the essence of things. For example. if it is not taught. «They are the same in terms of the notion that things are not really established. he falsely says. but spurred on by his enmity toward that person. How so? Mādhyamikas accept that things exist in conventional terms. So. But enough with this excursus! Now I will discuss just the topic at hand. but the nihilists do not. unceased. there is nevertheless a great difference between them. there must be some sequential teaching of it in dependence on conventional reality.

and they know the methods to use. dissolution and so on of both the vessel-like world and the beings within it—everything up through the peak of existence. He has unerringly taught the arisal. their enjoyments and miseries. they teach a Dharma that is appropriate to the disciples out of a desire to care for the disciples. have for a long time studied and practiced the philosophy of the ultimate (tattvadarśana). “And also everything is unreal itself. “The Blessed One. “Everything is real in itself. likewise. for me. in relation to their philosophy. both of these possibilities are rejected. beginning with the wind-sphere all the way out to the elemental realm of space. he teaches those beings. To them he taught.” In order to eliminate that small degree of obscuration. “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. abiding. Such is the sequential teaching of the Buddha. LVP372. and “Neither. and in their case only some small amount of the root of the tree that is the obscurations has not yet been uprooted. Or. in relation to childish beings. In the same vein. “Real and Unreal”. the Transcendent Ones do not utter any statement that is not a method for introducing beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate. And conditioned things do undergo change because they perish every instant. taught that those things that they have perceived are real in themselves. in a scripture the Blessed One said.e. It is a “teaching” (śāsana) in that it leads one away from the wrong path and sets one on the right path. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself. A teaching that proceeds step by step is a “sequential teaching” (anuśāsana). also considered to be existent. he is all-seeing.” LVP371. he taught.1 The Blessed Ones have great compassion. they are unreal in themselves.” 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . also considered to be not existent. the world cannot understand without what is worldly.Wisdom Page 71 The barbarian (mleccha) cannot understand when addressed in another language. He has taught them along with their widely varied varieties. there are beings to be disciplined who have desires that come from hearing about the analysis of different kinds of things that are well known to them—things such as the “aggregates. Later. since change occurs. just as one would reject the question of whether the son of a barren woman has a light or dark complexion. Some disciples. one should see that the word vā (“or”) occurs with the meaning of ca (“and”) in the sense of a demonstrative conjunction (deśanāsamuccaya). “The world argues with me. all of their teachings are designed as means to introduce beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate (tattva).” In this regard. “Unreal”. but I do not argue with the world. But in relation to the Āryas. Indeed.. Whatever is considered to be existent in the world is. at the very outset the Blessed One.” Thus.” the “extensions” and so on that are imagined to be real by those who have the cataracts of ignorance. the verse means. As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: They said: “Real”. Thus. however. their causes and results. that which is real in itself does not undergo change. as when they think. a “sequential teaching” is one that proceeds in accord with the disciple’s nature. Here. Like a doctor who treats an illness with the medicine that is appropriate to it. Therefore. who knows the entire history of the world.” To some disciples. for me.” That is. everything is false (mṛṣā) because they do not perceive anything in that way [i.” the “spheres. everything is real in itself. Whatever is considered to be not existent in the world is. is omniscient. as real in itself].1 In this way. He did so in order to make the world respect him. in beings to be disciplined there arises the belief (buddhi) that the Blessed One is omniscient. For those beings.” and also “Everything is unreal in itself.

They are unable to know—in the way that persons without cataracts are able to know—the properly construed essential reality (svarūpa) of the hairs by using the procedure (nyāya) of not seeing it.” Conceptuality is mental activity (cittapracāra). but just as with the acceptance of worldly reality (laukikatathya) in accord with conventional reality. That which has a diverse referent (artha) is plural. but what is the definition of this ultimate?» We have already said: 5 When the mental object has ceased. persons who are not Āryas do not thereby know its essential reality. its referent is divided into multiple things. “Which is the ultimate reality? It is the one in terms of which there is no activation even of awareness (jñānasyapy apracāra). In other words. even though the Āryas teach the ultimate (tattva) through the use of imputations.1 And it is also “nonconceptual. the essential reality (svarūpa) of things which is not known through another is their ultimate reality (tattva). For example. mosquitoes. Not known through another. it is nonconceptual. “conceptual structuring” is speech because it is what conceptually structures and multiplies the objects to which it refers (prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā). from the instructions of the person without cataracts all that they understand is. What need. flies.” Here. Thus.Wisdom Page 72 In relation to an illness. Thus. that which is to be named has ceased. then.» Nāgārjuna says: 18. to mention words?” In this way. is everything medicine? «The Blessed Ones give a teaching of the ultimate in order to introduce beings to it. they know the essential reality of the hairs and such through the practice (yogena) of not seeing it. “unstructured through conceptual structuring” means “not articulated through words. then they know the ultimate (tattva) on their own through the practice of not knowing it. That which is not plural is non-plural. In other words.7ab] If this is the case. and so on. it is “unstructured through conceptual structuring. non-plural—this is the definition of the ultimate (tattva). As it says in the Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra: 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . quieted.9.” But when their eyes have been treated with the ointment that removes cataracts and they no longer have cataracts.” LVP374. its referent is not differentiated. unstructured through conceptual structuring. nonconceptual. you should also state a definition of it through the use of imputations (samāropataḥ). it is devoid of an essential nature as when a person without cataracts does not see hairs. In other words.1 it through another. “This is false. then what more is there to ask? «That may be so. the ultimate (tattva) is nonconceptual. As it says in a sūtra. They cannot do so even with the instructions of a person without cataracts. Concerning this verse. “not known through another” means that there is no realization of LVP373. it is to be known (√adhigam) only on one’s own. persons with cataracts see unreal (vitatha) things that have the form of hairs. Likewise. When their intellects’ eyes have been thus treated and the awareness of the ultimate (tattva) has arisen. For this same reason. But the eyes of those persons’ intellects can be treated with the ointment that is the view of emptiness—an ointment that eliminates the cataracts of ignorance. that is. Instead. Since it is devoid of that. And it is of a quieted nature. it is not to be understood through another’s teaching. [18.

there is ultimately no plurality at all. it is not possible . the qualities of ordinary persons are the same in that way. For the Āryas who have done what needs to be done so as to eliminate the saṃsāric cycle of birth decay and death. Here. Purification is ultimately the same in some way. the space should not be pluralized. The theoretical constructs are the same in some way. Nirvāṇa is the same in some way. Likewise. purification is ultimately the same in that way. For example. The qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in some way. Devaputra. “Mañjuśrī. all things are ultimately the same in that way. which one is true application (saṃyakprayoga)?” Mañjuśrī answered. on the basis of them being utterly unproduced. “It is in terms of which equality that all things are ultimately the same in that way that purification is ultimately the same. the Dharmadhātu and utter non-production are ultimately the same in some way. purification is ultimately utter non-production. However. thus. the qualities of the learners (śaikṣadharma) are the same in that way. Devaputra. Therefore. reality in itself (tathatā). the following is said: 18. Mental affliction is ultimately the same in some way. saṃsāra is the same in that way. Concerning that effect. Also. the qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in that way. a sprout of rice arises in dependence on a LVP376. Saṃsāra is the same in some way. this (y) is neither annihilated nor eternal. Why? Because ultimately all things are utterly unproduced. in terms of these equalities. “Devaputra. which is also ultimately utter non-production. The five heinous crimes are the same in some way. the theoretical constructs are the same in that way.” 20 Mañjuśrī said: “All things are ultimately the same in not being produced.Wisdom Page 73 Then Devaputra said. the qualities of those beyond learning are the same in that way. nirvāṇa is the same in that way. mental affliction is ultimately the same in that way. Devaputra. all things are without pluralization. the five heinous crimes are ultimately the same in that way. Ultimately. The monk (bhikṣu) who has applied himself in this way to the equality of all things is said to be ‘truly applied. the space inside of an earthen vessel and the space inside of a jewel vessel are just the space element. [And the pattern continues] on up to nirvāṇa. nor is that (x) something other than this (y).” 5 10 15 LVP375. That (x) which exists depending on this (y) is not itself this (y). Saṃsāra is also ultimately utter non-production.’ Devaputra said. all things are ultimately the same in being utterly unproduced. all things are ultimately the same. 40 That effect arises depending on this cause—for example. The qualities of ordinary persons are the same in some way. The qualities of those beyond learning are the same in some way. The qualities of the learners are the same in some way. such is the character of the ultimate (tattvalakṣaṇa).1 rice-seed and the causal complex consisting of soil and so on. Why is that? Because.1 25 30 35 One should realize that this non-plurality is a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the ultimate (tattva) because in terms of emptiness it is of one flavor.10. ultimately all things are the same in being nonexistent. affliction is ultimately utter nonproduction. Successive later explanations should be understood to apply here. in terms of a worldly definition of the ultimate (tattva).

They thus rain down great rains of the deathless nectar that is the true dharma. just as one apprehends a sprout in that case. and as such. the cause in dependence on which an effect arises is not itself the effect. just as one does not apprehend a seed in that context. decay and death that beats down upon the world from the intensely blazing sun that is involvement in the host of negative mental states such as desire. That is.” That which is the seed is not itself the sprout because one would unacceptably conclude that the productive cause and the produced effect were identical. “That is itself this. As Āryadeva said: Since a thing occurs. Or else. first of all. Hence. not plural.1 20 25 30 35 The perfectly awakened ones are intent upon relieving the intense. one would apprehend a seed even in the state of being a sprout. Not singular. a father and his son would also be identical. and a whole host of great problems would ensue because one would be forced to accept the nonexistence of karmic cause and effect. it is not born annihilated. it is not born eternal. And the seed would likewise be permanent because one would have accepted that it is not destroyed when the sprout comes into being. Therefore. one can establish that the cause is not annihilated. This is so for the reason expressed in: “If the one were other than the other. Nor is the effect something other than the cause. They thus entirely cover every single region throughout all space with the great cloud that is the method of their great compassion. They constantly and tirelessly send forth streams of the nectar that is the teaching of the true dharma that appropriately counteracts being’s behavior. With those streams of the teaching’s nectar. one would be forced into eternalism.” Nor is that (x) something other than this (y). burning suffering of birth. Nor is it something other than that. Therefore. a sprout comes from an existent seed. Thus. in the manner that has been explained: 18. Therefore.” One would be forced to accept that the seed was not annihilated even in the context of the sprout being already produced. the sprout is not other than the seed because one would have to conclude that the sprout could arise even without the seed. and so on. the nature of things (dharmatā) is neither annihilated nor eternal. one would also not apprehend the sprout. it says: For example. “That which is the seed is itself the sprout. one would incur the faults of pre-existent causality (satkāryavāda). Since a thing ceases. for these reasons.25) And in the Lalitavistarasūtra.11. LVP377.Wisdom Page 74 5 10 15 to say. not annihilated. And since they would not be different. they wish to nurture in appropriate ways the rapid growth arisen in the grain. these perfect buddhas are great Nāgas who grant worldly protection to the unprotected and provide shelter to those who are homeless. it does not make sense to say. it is by nature the extinction of all the suffering of existence . And as a result. (CŚ 10. the world’s saviors. Hence. These lords of the whole world have a deathless nectar that is the true dharma. but the seed is not itself the sprout. and also that it is not eternal. not eternal—such is the deathless nectar that is the teaching of the buddhas. fruits and blossoming vines that are the crop from the disciples’ root of virtue. In this way. then the one would exist even without the other.

“How. that great being. the great king of healers.1 visible in this life (dṛṣta eva dharme) because their root of virtue is not matured. Subhūti. contemplating and meditating. that is. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping sought out the Perfection of Wisdom without any interest in his body. Since that is the case. it is devoid of either singularity or differentiation. the pratyekabuddhas have the realization of the Dharma’s quintessence even when there is no LVP379. Even if the awakened ones have not arisen in the world and the śrāvakas have disappeared. without concern for gain. by reason of not being in social contact. good child! There will you here the Perfection of Wisdom! Go in such a way that you do not think of physical exhaustion. And this is so even though they do not resort to a teacher in this life or world. 15 18.2. Hence. “Previously. like karma. previous life. the Blessed One recounted the following in the blessed and holy Eight Thousand Lines: Subhūti asked. Go to the east. and rely on the causal condition that is just their devotion to isolation. they nevertheless will certainly achieve the definite accomplishment of liberation in another life due to the previous causes that they have established in this life. As it says in the Hundred. Even if the one who knows reality does not attain nirvāṇa in this life. Subhūti. without regard for his life.Wisdom Page 75 5 10 (bhava) in the three worlds. then there would be no realization of the nectar that is the Dharma’s quintessence because the conditions would be lacking. 20 25 30 35 . the bodhisattva called Ever Weeping (Sadāprarudita). the self arisen 18. knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas continues without social contact. it is devoid of either eternalism or nihilism The śrāvakas who have practiced that deathless nectar—the Dharma’s quintessence—and who proceed through the sequence of learning. or it means that one does not seek out a Spiritual Friend. have experienced the taste of the nectar that is the three collections of morality (śīla). If even though they have listened to this dharma-nectar. Blessed One. they definitely have the realization (adhigama) of that nirvāṇa whose nature is the extinction of decay and death. did that great being. To be “without contact” is to be isolated in body and mind. seek out the Perfection of Wisdom?” Thus addressed. He will certainly obtain effortlessly in a future life. Seeking out the Perfection of Wisdom. they somehow do not obtain liberation in a way LVP378. One should realize that. one should realize that it is not pointless to employ this medicine—the nectar which is the true Dharma’s quintessence—that has been taught by the perfectly awakened one. in the manner described. Nevertheless. favor or fame. meditation and wisdom. caused by their study of the Dharma’s quintessence in another. it is proper for the wise to seek out the true Dharma’s quintessence. Thus. the Blessed One answered the elder. Along these lines.12.1 Buddha [whose teaching is active in the world].1. he entered a forest and he heard sound come from the sky.12. even at the risk of their lives. there would be no Spiritual Friends who teach the saintly path of the truths. And somehow. Hence.

the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. the evil one. Māra. nor consciousness. at this point. we rejoin the tale] at the point where Māra has made the water disappear: Ever Weeping thought. Then. Go without looking to your left. What. Why? Because this place is very dusty. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: one should realize that the equality (samatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the equality of all things. and he sprinkled the ground all around with his own blood. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping experienced the kind of pleasure that. The Perfection of Wisdom is unproduced because all things are unproduced.1 is experienced by a Mendicant (bhikṣu) who is absorbed in the first meditative absorption. that great being. Then. The Perfection of Wisdom has a single flavor because all things have a single flavor. go in such a way that you are not thrown off balance by your self. upon seeing the great being. nor sensation. rather than through some type of useless activity. “Well. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. decided to obstruct Ever Weeping by making all the water in that area disappear.Wisdom Page 76 Go such that you do not think of fatigue and drowsiness. nor will he obtain it. The Perfection of Wisdom is unshakeable because all things are unshakeable. nor recognition. And one who distances LVP380. which by nature necessarily disintegrates? It is better that my body be destroyed through engaging in this kind of activity. And he who is engaged in saṃsāra does not engage with the Perfection of Wisdom. the freedom (viviktatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due the freedom of all things. one who is absorbed in one-pointed concentration. and go without looking to the right. And in life after life in saṃsāra. for example. good child. Go such that you do not lose your balance and leave physical matter. Good child. nor conditioning. Distances himself away from what? Distances himself from a buddha’s qualities. Go such that you do not think of food. will I do with this body. I will just pierce my body and sprinkle this area of the ground with my blood. the great being. Go without looking south. The Perfection of Wisdom is not inflexible because all things are not inflexible. nor lose your balance and leave this transient assemblage. The tale continues up to the point where [Ever Weeping wishes to keep sprinkling the ground with water for the sake of lessening the dust where a bodhisattva named Dharmodgata is to teach the Perfection of Wisdom. LVP381. whether internal or external. Look not also in the intermediate directions [such as southeast and so on]. up or down.” … Thereupon. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of presumptions because all things are devoid of presumptions. 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . west.1 himself from a buddha’s qualities is engaged in saṃsāra. And this was the teaching on the Perfection of Wisdom given by the great being. and particles of dust from this area should not land on the body of that great being. in any case. north. east.” The passage continues to the point where it says: 5 Go such that you do not direct your mind to anything at all. but not in these kinds of circumstances. many thousands of my past bodies have disintegrated as a result of desire or due to desire. The Perfection of Wisdom is limitless because all things are limitless. One who loses his balance and leaves these behind is one who distances himself. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping grasped a sharp weapon and pierced his body all around.

Wisdom Page 77 5 The Perfection of Wisdom is without cessation because all things are without cessation. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of motion (niśceṣṭa) because all things are devoid of motion. The Perfection of Wisdom is imperceptible because all things are imperceptible. The Perfection of Wisdom is boundless in that space is boundless. . The Perfection of Wisdom is equal in its dissolution because all things are equal in their dissolution. The inconceivability of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the inconceivability of all things. And so on to this point: one should realize that the Perfection of Wisdom is not conflated because all things are not conflated.

such as material form and so on. then the present and the future would exist in the past. complete day (ahorātra). And without being apprehended. Instead.1. and year. and a static time. however. the remaining two permutations should point out [the nature of triads] such as ‘superior. since it has a length.4. And time does have length in terms of measurements such as instant (kṣaṇa). Through this procedure (krama). then how could there be 25 30 35 . etc. Things’ essential existence would be the warrant for identifying (prajñapti) the three times if the three times that you have theorized (bhavadabhimata) were to exist.” If having arisen. how is time identified (prajñapyate)? … Here. “Things do have an essential existence (svabhāva) because it is the warrant (hetu) for the identification (vijñapti) of the three times. someone objects. then it would have length. “past.5 . they are based upon what exists (bhāva) for the following reason. 19. and demonstrating the way that they do not exist. duration]. which would be apprehended.” And that which has not yet come into existence (alabdhātmabhāva) is “future.6. 19. Therefore.3.]. without depending on the past. the present and the future do not exist. “It is true that there is no such thing as permanent time that. then it is called “present. being distinct from material form and such. the Blessed One has taught three times: past. present and future. If time were to exist. someone objects. A thing’s essential existence (bhāvasvabhāva) that has arisen and then ceased is called.e. Since: 19. does not exist. time does exist.. the present and the future do not exist in the past. time—the referent of the words “instant” and such—is identified in reliance on (upādāya) conditioned entities. If this were so. that is.” In response.” In this way. we say the following. but it does not exist. nighttime. things’ essential existence. That which does not exist has no length. like the horns of a rabbit. “Time does exist because it has length [i. it is taught that the three times are based upon things’ essential existence. also exists. Moreover. But they do not exist. second (lava). then would the present and the future be dependent on the past? 19. it has not ceased but still exists. someone objects. Therefore. hour (muhūrta). their foundation. daytime. fortnight (pakṣa). month. At this point. Therefore. Therefore. Nonstatic time is not apprehended. there is no problem [with claiming that time truly exists].19 Analysis of Time 5 10 At this point.1.” We respond as follows. inferior and middling’ and also the singularity and such [of these ordered triads. is established by its own essential existence. there is no establishment of those two. That is. If the present and the future were dependent (apekṣya) on the past. those three times exist. Nāgārjuna says: 19. If. Moreover.” We respond as follows. if time were to depend on an existent thing (bhāva).2. 15 20 19.

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time without an existent thing? You assert, “Time exists in dependence on an existent thing.” If you do so, then if there were no existent thing, time—which is warranted by existent things—would necessarily not exist. Demonstrating this [Nāgārjuna] says: 5 19.6.2. And there are no existent things at all for reasons that have already been extensively demonstrated and because of refutations that will be stated [later in this text]. So there is not any existent thing. That being the case, for you 19.6.3. How could time exist?

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Analysis of Causal Collocation (sāmagrī)
20.1. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect exists in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation?

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20.2. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect does not exist in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation? 20.3. If the effect exists in the causal collocation of the cause and conditions, then it would be apprehended there, and it is not apprehended in the causal collocation.

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20.4. If the effect does not exist in the collocation of the cause and the conditions, then causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions. 20.5 . If the cause, having contributed its causal [functionality] (hetukaṃ…dattvā), ceases, then the cause has two essences—that which has been contributed, and that which has ceased.

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20.6. If the cause were to cease without having contributed its causal [functionality] for the effect, and if the effect has then arisen when the cause has ceased, then the effect is causeless. 20.7. If the effect were to become manifest along with the causal collocation, then it would absurdly follow that the producer and that which is produced are simultaneous.

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20.8. If the effect were to become manifest prior to the causal collocation, then the effect, being devoid (nirmukta) of causes and conditions, would be causeless. Others, however, say, “Only the cause produces the effect; the collocation does not. And since it is not the case that the cause is one thing and the effect another, it does not follow that there would be an absurd consequence whereby one would inquire, ‘Does the cause cease having contributed its causality to the effect or without having done so?’ Rather, the ceased cause itself is established as in essence the effect (phalātmanā).” We respond as follows. If this were so, that is: 20.9. If, when the cause has ceased, the cause transforms (saṃkramaṇa) into the effect, then one would absurdly conclude that the cause, which has already been produced previously, would be re-produced. 20.10. How can a cause that has ceased and disappeared produce an effect that has arisen? And even if the cause remains, how can it produce [anything] without the effect?

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20.11.1. If the cause were not involved with the effect, then which effect would it produce?

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20.11.2. Neither a cause that is observable produces an effect, nor does one that is unobservable. 20.12. A past effect never meets a past cause, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has arisen. 5 20.13. An effect that has arisen never does not meet a cause that has not arisen, nor does it meet a cause that is past or one that has arisen. 20.14. An effect that has not arisen never meets a cause that has arisen, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has ceased. 20.15.1. If they never meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 10 20.15.2. If they do meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 20.16. If the cause is empty of the effect, then how does it produce the effect? If cause is not empty of the effect, how does it produce the effect? 20.17. A non-empty effect would not arise, a non-empty effect would not cease. A nonempty effect would be unarisen and unceasing. 15 20.18. How would an empty [effect] arise, how would an empty [effect] cease? One must absurdly conclude that an empty [effect] is unarisen and unceasing. 20.19. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be identical. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be different. 20 20.20. If the effect and the cause were identical, then the producer and the produced would be the same. If the effect and the cause were different, then a cause would be the same as a non-cause. 20.21. How would a cause produce an effect that essentially exists? How would a cause produce an effect that does not essentially exist? 25 20.22.1. [If something] is not producing anything, that it does not make sense for it to be a cause. 20.22.2. And if it does not make sense for [the cause] to be a cause, then [the effect] would be the effect of what? 20.23. And the collocation of the cause and conditions does not produce itself by itself. How then would it produce the effect? 30 20.24. The effect is not made by the causal collocation, nor is the effect not made by the causal collocation. How is there a causal collocation without an effect?

e. However.6.3. How could there be origination without disintegration? It is never the case that impermanence is not present in things. are produced.Wisdom Page 82 21 Analysis of Origination and Disintegration 5 10 At this point. 21. someone objects. even while a collocation of causes and conditions is present.9.. That is.. There is neither origination nor disintegration without a real thing (bhāva). [Origination and destruction do not happen] all the time. How could there be any establishment of two [things] that are not established as either in mutual relation (anyonya) or not in mutual relation? 21.10. are destroyed. And it is in terms of some specific time that they disintegrate—i. There is no origination of an indestructible entity.7. it is in terms of some specific time that things such as sprouts originate—i.” We respond as follows. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are the same. 15 21. Origination does not exist either with destruction or without it. . 21.9. There is no disintegration of a destructible entity.4. they do not exist. 21.1.10.5. 21. “Time essentially exists because it is a factor (nimitta) in origination and disintegration. and demonstrating how this is the case. There is no origination of a destructible entity (kṣaya). there is no destruction of an indestructible entity. Destruction does not exist either with origination or without it. there is no real thing without origination and destruction. The origination and the disintegration of that which is not empty do not make sense. How could there be destruction with origination? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are different (nānā).2. 21.1.2. How could destruction exist without origination? There would be death without birth. How could there be origination with disintegration? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. Time would be a factor in origination and destruction if origination and destruction existed. time does exist because it is a factor in origination and destruction.8. 25 30 21. The origination and disintegration of that which is empty does not make sense. 21. 20 21. Nāgārjuna says: 21.1.2. 21.e. There is no destruction without origination. Therefore.

14. Since the existent must be either permanent or impermanent. It might occur to you that origination and disintegration are experienced [as happening].17. 15 21.16. [If] it does not come from either itself or something else. 21. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible.11. Existence (bhāva) does not arise from existence.1.1. Then since that which has ceased does not arise again.19. Nonexistence does not come from nonexistence. 21. 21. “Why? Because 21. It is not reasonable (na…yujyate) for essentially existent to nonexistent. 5 21. how does it arise? 21. For one who has accepted the existent (bhāva).16. nor does existence come from nonexistence.” 20 21. An existent thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself. then the cease [samsaric existence] would be one thing.18. the beliefs in eternalism and nihilism will absurdly follow.1.Wisdom Page 83 21.15.2. “For one who accepts the existent.1. when nirvāṇa [is obtained].2 . and so is disintegration.2. 25 21. if such is the case— 21. “Samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation.17.2. If samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation— that is. Since 21. 21. 10 . But origination is experienced because of confusion (moha).14. nor does nonexistence come from existence. it is neither annihilated nor eternal.13. If the initial existence [in the next life] arises while the last is ceasing. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible (na…yujyate).1.11.2. there would be annihilation because the continuum of samsaric existence is extinguished. and the arising one would be another. the annihilation of the cause would absurdly ensue. Moreover.12.15. 30 21. If the last samsaric existence has not ceased. If the last (carama) samsaric existence has ceased. nor does it arise from something else.

21. 21.Wisdom Page 84 21. is not possible in the three times. Thus.21. 21. then how is it that [a being] is born in [or as] those very aggregates in [or as] which it died.2. If ceasing and arising. How can there be a continuum of samsaric existence that does not exist in the three times? 10 .1.21. and [ceasing and arising] together [all] do not make sense. the continuum of samsaric existence 5 theorized by you 21.3.20.

22.4. This substratum also does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvāt).1.1. 22. So what Tathāgata is there here? 22.5. then [a buddha] is not essentially [a buddha].3. And without relying on the aggregates. “Tathāgata?” 22. The Tathāgata is also not possessed of the aggregates. what or who would be a Tathāgata? 22. 30 22. How can that which does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvataḥ) exist as essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 10 22. If a buddha is [a buddha] in reliance (upādāya) on the aggregates. how would it rely on [that substratum]? 20 25 22.1.6. the aggregates]. then 22. there is no Tathāgata at all because one would absurdly conclude that [the Tathāgata] is causeless.. nor is he different from the aggregates. And there is no such thing as a substratum (upādāna) without [anything] reliant (upādatta) on it.e. therefore. . It is correct (upapadyate) to think that [something] which depends on [something] essentially other (parabhāva) is essenceless.. That which is sought through the fivefold [analysis] does not exist as either the same or different [than the aggregates]—how could it be reliantly designated.1. and he is not in the aggregates. 22.6.9. If [a thing] has no existence as essentially itself (svabhāva).2 .7.2. then he now would rely on them. a Tathāgata] or as essentially something else [i.Wisdom Page 85 22 … Analysis of the Tathāgata 5 22. how can [it] have an existence as essentially [something] else (parabhāva)? 15 And if there is neither the existence [of a thing] as essentially itself nor [its] existence as essentially [something] else. The Tathāgata is not the aggregates. The aggregates are not in the Tathāgata. and how could that which is essenceless be the Tathāgata? 22.1.2. Without existing as essentially itself [i.2. he would reliant (upādāya) [on the aggregates].8.7. And in no way at all is there a Tathāgata without a substratum (upādāna) [on which it relies]. And [if an entity] does not exist without relying [on some substratum].e.4. If some Tathāgata were to exist [previously] without relying (anupādāya) on the aggregates.

Having grasped onto heavy grasping. “The Buddha does not exist after cessation”—[this thinking (cintā) does not make sense if the [Buddha] is essentially empty. 10 22. 20 .15 .Wisdom Page 86 22. 22. And how can that which is not essentially itself be essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 22. [that person] believes.2. The Tathāgata is essenceless. “The Tathāgata does not exist.10.17.2. nor. In this way. these statements are made.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one (śānta)? “[The Tathāgata is] finite.” “He is not finite. “The Tathāgata exists!” Concerning [the Tathāgata] who has obtained cessation (nivṛtta). “[It is] both”. nor should one think.12. However. 22. none of them see the Tathāgata. as is that which relies on it. On should not say. That which is the essence of the Tathāgata is the essence of the world. Those who conceptually structure the Buddha.13 .1. who is beyond conceptual structuring (prapañca) and imperishable. “It is not empty.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one? 22.” “He is not eternal.16.1. And how can an empty Tathāgata be emptily designated? 5 22. “[It is] neither.2. 22. one thinks. 22.” Nor. for the sake of designation & communication (prajñapti).” 15 22. the substratum is empty in every way. the world is essenceless. “[The Tathāgata is] eternal.11.9.10.11.14 . “[It is] empty”. are overwhelmed with conceptual structuring. “The Buddha exists after cessation”.” 22.

the afflictive mental states do not [exist] ultimately (na tattvataḥ). 23. they are essenceless. 23. Therefore. Those [entities] that arise in dependence on the beautiful. scents and elemental things (dharmas).9. If they are essenceless. the ugly.3. 30 23. 23.10. The beautiful. 23. How could beauty or ugliness exist in those [things]. tactile objects. 23.2. like reflections.4 . how could there be aversion? . Mere material forms. which are like (kalpa) a person [created through] magical illusion.5. 25 23. scents and elemental things The word mere (kevala) means that they are merely conceptuality constructed.1.1. there are no afflictive mental states belonging to anything. ugliness just does not exist. It is theorized (vikalpyate) that attachment. and no such something is established. Without that something. The ugliness in dependence on which we identify beauty does not exist without beauty. 23.11. in five ways the afflictive [Self or mind] does not exist in relation to the afflictive mental states. how could there be attachment? And if ugliness does not exist.6. Without it.8. 23. 5 23. Therefore.Wisdom Page 87 23 Analysis of Error 23. ugliness and error do the afflictive mental states depend upon? 15 20 23. The Self’s existence or nonexistence is not at all established. Therefore. sounds. in five ways these afflictive mental states do not exist in relation to the afflictive [Self or mind].6. It is said that attachment (rāga). As in the belief that one’s own body [belongs to the Self]. the ugly and error do not exist essentially as themselves. They are like (-ākāra) the city of Gandharvas. and error. So what beauty. The afflictive mental states belong to something. beauty makes no sense.2.12. 23. aversion and confusion have six kinds of real things (vastu) [as their objects]: material forms.1. tactile objects. then how are they perceived? We say. sound. aversion (dveṣa) and confusion (moha) come from conceptual thought (saṃkalpa) because [they] arise in dependence (pratītya) on the beautiful.7. they are like illusions or dreams.2. And if beauty does not exist. how can the existence or nonexistence of the afflictive mental states be established? 10 23. the ugly and error do not exist as essentially themselves (svabhāvāt). The beauty in dependence on which we identify ugliness does not exist without ugliness. As in the belief that one’s own body [is a locus of the Self].8.

the pure.25 . Errors are not possible for one who has made errors. 25 23.13.23.14. and that which is apprehended—all of these are extinguished (upaśānta).17. 10 23. [and if] the impermanent does not exist in the empty.Wisdom Page 88 23.15. Ask yourself this question: for whom are errors possible? 15 23. And when ignorance has ceased. ignorance ceases through the cessation of error. then why would the apprehension of the empty as “the impermanent” not be an error? 23. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates the unreal? 30 .16.20.19. 20 23. then why would [this] apprehension be an error? 5 23. How indeed could errors be unarisen? If errors are unarisen. then nonSelf. 23.21. nor does it arise from something else. the apprehender. Errors are not possible for one who has not made errors. the permanent and the pleasant exist.22. In this way. 23. Therefore.18 . If there were some essentially real afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error. then who is making an error? Who is not making an error? 23. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates an essence? 23. the pure. “A real thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself. then [apprehending] the Self. If the Self. whether correct or false. the apprehension. conditioning and the other [phases in the wheel of existence] also cease. there is no apprehension (grāha). nor does it arise from itself and something else. That by which one apprehends. If the Self. the impure. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error. the permanent and the pleasurable is not erroneous.24. Errors are not possible for one who is making an error. the impermanent and the unpleasant (duḥkha) do not exist. If apprehension does not exist. the pure. If there were some essentially unreal afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something. who is in error? 23. the permanent and the pleasurable do not exist.” How could this be erroneous? 23.

you are only refuting yourself. Dharma and Saṅgha]. the other is ultimate reality. [Buddha. 24.e. the Sage. 24. there is no occurrence and no cessation. emptiness. 24.9.11. 25 24. 24. as when one says things such as]. If they do not exist. eliminating the causes of suffering. when incorrectly understood.3. If everything is empty.7. Like a poisonous snake when held incorrectly or a magic spell when improperly used. 24.8. One who does not know how to distinguish between these two realities does not discern the profound tattva within the buddhas’ teaching. In response we say that you do not know the purpose of emptiness. how could there be a Buddha? In speaking of emptiness.6. and attaining cessation are all impossible. nor do the persons who are about to attain those states. the Dharma does not exist. In speaking of emptiness. And if those eight kinds of holy people do not exist. someone objects: 5 24. 24. the Community] does not exist. 24. The buddhas teach the Dharma by relying on the two realities.Wisdom Page 89 24 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths At this point. and you refute all worldly conventions.. then the four states that result from practice do not exist. “Do this!” “Cook that!” “Eat!” “Wait!” “Go!” “Come!” .4.5. you do not know the meaning of emptiness nor emptiness itself. nirvāṇa is not obtained. developing oneself in meditation on the path. the persons who are in those states do not exist.. 20 . devastates the simple minded. And since the four holy truths do not exist.1. you spurn the Three Jewels.10 . 30 24.12. you reject the good and the bad. And if those four resulting states do not exist. You would be forced to conclude that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist.. 10 24. Hence. One is the reality of worldly conventions. And if the Dharma and the Saṅgha do not exist. deciding that unintelligent people would find it difficult to 15 . Without understanding ultimate reality. then understanding the nature of suffering..2. If the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. all world conventions means [cognitive and linguistic interaction with the world. then the Saṅgha [i. Ultimate reality is not taught without relying on conventions. Thus. 24. you deny that things have a real effect..

If everything were not empty. there would be neither production nor cessation. all these things [mentioned in the last two verses] are possible..14. 15 . How could there be suffering that has arisen independently? Indeed. I call `empty’ anything that depends on conditions.Wisdom Page 90 penetrate his Dharma. There is no thing whatsoever which has arisen independently.13. 25 … 24. You deny cause and effect. and you refute results. has forgotten where her horse is. there is no thing whatsoever which is not empty. but those objections actually apply to your own position. instrument and action.20. You object to what we say. [”makes sense” can be replaced with “is reasonable. 5 24. [and] that [which is impermanent] does not exist if [things] have an essence. 24. 10 24.15. To a person for whom emptiness does not make sense. Therefore. [the Blessed One] said that suffering is impermanent. 24. it is the middle way. having mounted her own horse.”] 24. nothing makes sense. that [kind of coming into being] is not a case of production by virtue of an essence. He who knows emptiness is heedful. Why would [suffering] that exists essentially arise again? Therefore. The non-production of things by virtue of their essences is emptiness. 24.16. We call that which is interdependent origination ‘emptiness. for one who 20 . then you are experiencing causeless things.21.’ That [emptiness] is reliant designation. To a person for whom emptiness makes sense. Why? Because: 24. The objection that you raise against emptiness does not force us into a conclusion that contradicts our position. everything makes sense. There is no production of it by virtue of its essence. hesitated to teach the Dharma. you refute production and cessation. If you experience things to be truly existent by virtue of their essences.22.19. But for us who maintain that all things are empty of essences. As the Buddha said: That which is produced through by causal conditions is not produced. you are like a person who.17. Interdependent origination means the coming into being of things like sprouts or sensory awareness in dependence on causes and conditions.” “is possible.. 30 24. 24. you reject agent. Your objection does not apply to emptiness.18. You would be forced to accept that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist.” or “is coherent.

26 . Since the Saints’ Truths do not exist.27 . how will it be known? Indeed. those who abide in the result do not exist.30. an essence is allegedly established in the world. then the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path would be impossible. which is to be hot. then [this belief] is wrong. Likewise. even though he applies himself to the bodhisattva’s practices for the sake of awakening. the four results [along the path] are impossible. its essence is supposedly (kila) established. If [things] had essence. There is no cessation of suffering that exists essentially. the knowledge of suffering is also not possible. so too.31. 24.24. How can 15 20 .28. 24. Therefore. 24. And if neither the Dharma nor the Saṃgha exists. 24. That is. If these either [types of] persons do not exist. And if an essence does not change. [its] origin and [its] cessation do not exist. For you. If suffering.29. Why? Because its essence is allegedly established. for you it would absurdly follow that [there is] an awakened one (buddha) without any relation (apratītya) to awakening. to demonstrate how it is that full knowledge of suffering and such is not possible for the other [who denies emptiness]. [and] it cannot undergo change. If there is no result. is later known. there would be no origin [of suffering]. 24. then the Saṅgha does not exist.23 . elimination [of suffering]. if according to you the path is cultivated. If you imagine that suffering. 5 24. how is it possible to obtain a result that is essentially unrealized? 25 24. then what path would be obtained through the cessation of suffering? 10 Now.33. which previously had an unknown nature. Through positing (paryavasthāna) essence. and the cultivation [of the path] are likewise not possible (na…yujyante). 24.25.32. would later be known. then [it] does not have an essence. One who is essentially unawakened would never obtain awakening. as in the case of fire’s [essence]. the true Dharma (saddharma) does not exist. Nāgārjuna says: 24. nor do those who are entering the result. 24. On the other hand. the realization [of cessation]. Nor would one ever do the proper (dharma) or improper (adharma). Also. for you it would absurdly follow that there is awakening without any relation to the awakened one.Wisdom Page 91 denies emptiness. whose essence was previously unknown. If it is essentially unknown. then it does not make sense that suffering. how could there be a buddha? 30 24. you refute cessation. For one who clings to essence.

exists. 24.35. For you a result. cessation. 15 . and there is no elimination of all afflictive mental states. a result caused by proper or improper [actions] does not exist. If it has an essence.38. If [things] are not empty. then how is it that. it would be static. according to you.37. according to you.39. And for you.40. Of if. 10 24. and the path. One who sees this interdependent origination sees suffering. For one who denies emptiness. 5 24.36. then there is no obtainment (prāpti) of the not yet obtained (asamprāpta). the origin. would be unproduced and unceasing. no action would be underway.34. and the agent would not be acting. 24. 24. 24. a result arisen from proper and improper [actions] is non-empty? 24. devoid of its various states and shapes (avasthā).Wisdom Page 92 the non-empty be done? Indeed. there would be no object of action. an essence is not made or done. You contradict all worldly (laukika) interactions (saṃvyavahāra) in that you deny the emptiness [of/which is] interdependent origination. a result caused by proper and improper [actions] exists. the world. that which puts an end to suffering does not exist. even without the proper and improper [actions].

1. it is correct to think.Wisdom Page 93 25 Analysis of Nirvāṇa Here. since no existent thing (bhāva) exists without decay and death. then there is neither origination nor destruction.12. since there is no nonexistent thing that occurs without reliance? 25 25.3 . someone objects. whether through elimination or cessation? 5 10 25. If nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva). . Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained].10. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent. since no there is no existent thing that is not reliant [on something]? 20 25. then: 25.6. 25. since both of these are reliant.5. Therefore. without dependence or reliance. nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva) because decay and death would absurdly become its characteristics. the unarisen—this is called “nirvāṇa. then there is neither origination nor destruction. and that makes no sense (na yujyate). it would not be unreliant. how could nirvāṇa be nonexistent (abhāva)? How could there be a nonexistent thing where there is no existent thing? 25. 25. 15 25. nor is it nonexistent. A reliant or dependent entity that comes and goes is. 25.7. then how would it [occur] without reliance. «If all this is empty. the not annihilated.” 25. First of all.11. then how would nirvāṇa [occur] without relying [on something] (anupādāya).4 .13. nirvāṇa. then liberation would be both existent and nonexistent.8. If all this is not empty. 25. 25. The uneliminated.9. The teacher said that [one should] abandon samsaric being (bhava) and nonbeing (vibhava). How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent? Nirvāṇa is unconditioned. If nirvāṇa were an existent. the unobtained. since no unconditioned thing of any kind exists anywhere.2.” 30 25. the not eternal. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. If nirvāṇa is a nonexistent thing. the unceased. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent. If nirvāṇa were an existent thing. If [you] accept in this way that things have essence. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained]. then nirvāṇa would be conditioned (saṃskṛta). whether through elimination or cessation?» To this we respond as follows.

19. This is not apprehended: “While remaining [in this world]. “He neither exists nor does not exist after cessation.17. and a finite beginning (pūrvānta). 25. then what is infinite? What is finite? What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite? 25 25. That which is nirvāṇa’s limit (koṭi) is saṃsāra’s limit.” Nor are these: “While remaining [in this world].” 25.18. a finite end (aparānta). just like light and darkness.Wisdom Page 94 and the existent and nonexistent are conditioned. There is not the slightest difference between them. 25. Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama). 20 25. 25.16. he neither exists nor does not exist. he both exists and does not exist”.” 15 25. Nirvāṇa is not at all distinct from saṃsāra. This is not apprehended: “The Blessed One exists after cessation. If there were nirvāṇa that is neither existent nor nonexistent. The clarification. since those two [qualities] are not present in a single [locus]. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent.” Nor are these: “He does not exist after cessation” “He both exists and does not exist after cessation”. 10 .22.20.14. Saṃsāra is not at all distinct from nirvāṇa. If all things are empty. 5 25. “While remaining. the Blessed One exists. “Nirvāṇa is not existent.23. the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere. 25. it is not nonexistent.15. the Blessed One does not exist”. “It is neither existent nor not existent?” 25.” would be established if the existent and nonexistent were established. What is identical (tad eva)? What is different? What is eternal? What is not eternal? What is both eternal and not eternal? And what then is neither of these? 25. “While remaining. who would make the clarification.21 .24 . The extreme positions (anta) [concerning the state of the Tathāgata] after cessation and the views of eternalism and such are based upon nirvāṇa.

That samsaric existence. [and] the unwise create karmic conditionings.1.-26. If there were non-appropriation.4. 5 26. then [the being] would be liberated. since they see ultimate reality (tattva).2. 15 20 26. namely. because one thirsts for the purpose of [having or avoiding] sensations. 26.5.-26. the six sense-media originate. death and such. Sensation (vedanā) occurs from contact. the unwise are karmic agents (kāraka). When name and material form have been moistened.2.3. moreover. the wise are not. is the five aggregates.7. the samsaric existence (bhava) of the appropriator occurs.2.1. Thus. 26.1.5.Wisdom Page 95 26 Analysis of the Twelve Links 26. and how does it occur? Explaining this.3.2.8. [Nāgārjuna] says: 26. The root of saṃsāra is karmic conditionings (saṃskāra).9.9.1. contact occurs. Contact is the conjunction (saṃnipāta) of three [things]. When there is appropriation & reliance (upādāna). Due to samsaric existence.8. along with their sensations.6. Consciousness thus occurs in dependence on name and material form. and there would be no samsaric existence. 26. material form. Thirst is causally conditioned by sensation 26. From birth comes the grievous experiences of aging.1. Consciousness. And when consciousness has entered [the rebirth]. enters into a realm of rebirth.3. One obscured with ignorance goes to a realm of rebirth (gati) through the karmas that are the karmic conditionings (saṃskāra) for rebirth which he develops in three ways.2.6.1 . Such is the origin of this mere heap (skandha) of suffering.3.2. from birth also come mental agitation and anxiety. consciousness and the eye. and attention (samanvāhāra). .8.2. 26.-26.1. material form. What is contact. 26. Therefore. 26. 26.2.10. whose causal condition is conditioning (saṃskāra). [Contact arises] in dependence on the eye. The six media having developed. birth occurs. The one who has thirst appropriates & relies on the substratum (upādāna) in four ways. 26. 10 26. name and material form are moistened. 25 30 26.6.

The cessation of ignorance comes from the meditation on that very [interdependent origination] with knowledge (jñāna).12.11. this mere heap of suffering is correctly stopped. . 5 26. karmic conditionings do not originate. When ignorance has ceased.Wisdom Page 96 26. Through the cessation of this and that. Thus. this and that do not occur.

what Self would you have without the substratum? 27. 27. arises. 20 27.” This does not make sense because this [Self in the present] is not the one in past lives. the experience by one person of [the results of] karmic acts committed by another. Nor is there this certain determination. then in that case a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed.11.7.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) has an [absolute] end. And that [past Self] might still exist. or an immortal would be born.2. “In the past I did not exist. Without the substratum. 10 27.8.Wisdom Page 97 27 Analysis of View & Belief 27. 25 27. or else the Self would have arisen causelessly. “I will not be in the future” “I will be something else in the future. etc. And [thus]. “In the past I existed”. 15 27. then it would be apprehended without the substratum. the Self does not exist.” 27. Moreover. If it were.1. for you.5.4.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite beginning (pūrvānta).2. Indeed. “I did not exist in the past”—this does not make sense because this [Self in the present life] is not different from the one in past lives.9.” But the [appropriated] substratum is distinguished. Various other consequences would absurdly follow: the annihilation [of the past Self]. 30 . the dissipation of karmic acts. and likewise. It is not the case that the Self. A Self that is the substratum does not cease and arise.6.1. You might think. 5 27. 27. If it is determined that there is no Self without the substratum.1. and it is not apprehended [in that way].10. etc. how could that which appropriates & relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? 27. nor is it [identical with] the substratum.4. 27. the Self does not exist.8.2. then the Self is [identical to] the substratum.12. “[The Self] does not exist. namely. 27. 27. “I existed in the past.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) is eternal.3. In this way. then it would exist even without that [past Self]. It does not make sense for the Self to be different from the substratum.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite end. If this [present Self] were different [from the past Self]. the Self is not different from the substratum. being previously nonexistent. If it were different. “That one [in the past] is the Self [of the present].

this makes no sense.14.21 .” These views are the same as [the views about the past. If [the being] is partially a god and partially human. “That [person] is a god. That [someone or something] does not exist. then it would be both eternal and noneternal. then the lifeworld would [both] have an end and not have an end.” 15 27. then how could there be the next lifeworld? 27.23. then the lifeworld would be endless. “I neither existed nor did not exist. 27.15.24.” This would be the belief in the noneternality [of the Self]. and that [same person] was a human. If [one’s] lifeworld (loka) has an end. “I did not exist in the past”. If it partially had an end and partially were endless. 27.17. 27. First of all (tāvad).18.20.19. then beginningless saṃsāra would therefore exist. 27. it is not possible for it to have and end or be endless. If the human were different from the god.25. “I will not exist in the future. and this is not possible. since an eternal [person] is not born. “I both existed and did not exist”. were to go some place. 25 27. If someone or something. “It is not noneternal. then the lifeworld would have an end. therefore. 10 20 30 .” 5 27.16. If there is no eternal [thing]. the following views make no sense: “”I existed in the past”. the [human] is eternal. On the other hand (atha). In this way. “I will exist in the future”. If the aggregates in the past were to disintegrate. how could part of the appropriator be destroyed and part not be destroyed? In this way. “It is not eternal” and also. “The human is different from the god. 27.Wisdom Page 98 27. The continuum of the aggregates occurs like the flame of a lamp. then a continuum [across lives] would not make sense. and the god would be unborn. 27. if the aggregates in the past were not to disintegrate. how could there be a noneternal one? How then could there be [something both] eternal and noneternal? And how could there be [something] devoid of both these two? 27. 27.22. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not to arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. this is not possible. 27. It would be established that [the Self is] both eternal and non-eternal if it were established. having come from somewhere.13.26.” In this way. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. then how could there be the next lifeworld? If [one’s] lifeworld has no end.

due to the emptiness of all things. And how could part of the substratum be destroyed and part not destroyed? In this way. . and to him I pay homage. and also. what views of eternalism and such would there be for whom for what reason about what? 27.28. “It is not endless. Relying on compassion. this makes no sense. 27.29. He is Gautama.” 5 27.27.30.Wisdom Page 99 27. It would be established that [the Self] both had an end and was endless if these were established: “It does not have an end”. he taught the true Dharma so as to eliminate all views. To put it another way (atha vā).

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