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Lucid Words A Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Wisdom by Candrakīrti Translated by J.D. Dunne & S.L. McClintock DRAFT TRANSLATION (8/22/01) Not for Citation

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© John D. Dunne and Sara L. McClintock All Rights Reserved

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Critique of Causation ............................................................................................................1 Critique of Motion ...............................................................................................................12 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties ...........................................................................................25 Analysis of the Aggregates ..................................................................................................27 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus).......................................................................................28 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous ...................................................................................29 Analysis of the Conditioned ................................................................................................30 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object.................................................................34 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action]................................................................35 Analysis of Fire and Fuel ................................................................................................36 Analysis of Beginning and End.......................................................................................38 Analysis of Suffering........................................................................................................40 Analysis of Saṃskāras......................................................................................................42 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga)...............................................................................43 Analysis of Svabhāva........................................................................................................45 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation ..............................................................................47 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect ....................................................................50 Analysis of the Self...........................................................................................................56 Analysis of Time...............................................................................................................78 Analysis of Collocation ....................................................................................................80 Analysis of Origination and Extinction .........................................................................82 Analysis of the Tathāgata................................................................................................85 Analysis of Error..............................................................................................................87 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths ...............................................................................89 Analysis of Nirvāṇa..........................................................................................................93 Analysis of the Twelve Links ..........................................................................................95 Analysis of View...............................................................................................................97

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Critique of Causation
Homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī! He has destroyed the indwelling in the dwelling of the twin extremes; he has won birth in the ocean of awakened wisdom.

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Out of compassion he spoke the deep meaning (bhāva) of the true dharma’s ocean in the way he had truly fathomed it. Even today his philosophical flames burn like wood the notions of those who espouse something else, as they burn too the mental darkness of the world.

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The flood of arrows that are the words from his peerless wisdom pierces the entire army of saṃsāra, bestowing on him glorious rule over the three dimensions of the world to be disciplined, along with the gods. To him, Nāgārjuna, I bow, and on his verses I will now write an exegesis, one that is bound with extended, properly composed statements; unshaken by sophistic winds, it is clear.

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In this regard, the treatise to be discussed is that one that begins, “Not from self, nor from other; not from both….” And first of all, one might ask, “What is its subject matter? What is the purpose? What is the relation [between the two]?” [We say] that, as in the explanation given in Guide to the Middle Way, Ārya Nāgārjuna first created the cause for the wisdom of a Tathāgata; that is, he produced the initial awakening mind, which is adorned with nondual wisdom and preceded by great compassion. Having practiced in such a way, Ārya Nāgārjuna, who had understood the correct interpretation of the Perfection of Wisdom, compassionately composed a treatise so that others might understand. And this, [his composition of such a treatise in such a fashion], constitutes the relation [between purpose and subject matter] of the treatise: It controls (śāsti) all your enemies that are your afflictions, and it protects (saṃtrāyate) you from bad rebirth and saṃsāra. Since it controls (śāsanāt) and protects (trāṇāt), it is a treatise (śāstra). Those two [qualities] are absent in others’ thought. Moreover, the Master (ācārya) himself wished to demonstrate the entire subject of the treatise that he would speak, as well as its purpose. Demonstrating this, he wished to proclaim the Tathāgata’s greatness in terms of his correct elucidation of that [subject]. Thus, he wished to compose, as a motivation (nimitta) for engaging with the treatise, a stanza of homage to the Tathāgata, the highest guru, who is not excluded from having such a nature. Desiring to do so, he said: [Verse of homage]: I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers, who taught that interdependent origination involves no cessation, no production, no annihilation, no eternality, no plurality, no unity, no coming and no going; he taught that it is peace, the calming of conceptual structuring. Here, the treatise’s subject is interdependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) qualified by eight qualifications, beginning with noncessation. The treatises purpose is shown to be nirvāṇa,

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characterized as peace, the calming of all conceptual structuring. The homage is, I praise the Buddha, the best of philosophers. Such, first of all, is the overall meaning of the two stanzas. Now, however, I will discuss the detailed meaning. 5 … {LVP55.11} At this point, some thinkers make the following objection. «You have had an indubitable cognition (niścaya) that “things are not arisen.” But does this indubitable cognition come from an instrument of knowledge or not? If it does come from an instrument of knowledge, then you should say which instruments of knowledge you have used. What, moreover, are their characteristics? What are their objects? Are those instruments of knowledge arisen from themselves, or from something else, or from both, or causelessly? If, on the other hand, you maintain that your indubitable cognition does not come from an instrument of knowledge, then that cannot be correct because [as Dignāga has said], knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge. This is so because, without instruments of knowledge, it is not possible to know an object that one has not yet known. Hence, if the object cannot be known because one lacks the instrument of knowledge for doing so, then how can your belief that things are not arisen truly be an indubitable cognition? Thus, it is not correct to say that all things are not produced. Or else the very reason due to which you think that things are not arisen is exactly the reason due to which I think that all things exist. And the way in which you indubitably know that all elemental things are not arisen will be exactly the way in which I indubitably know that they are arisen. On the other hand, if you do not have an indubitable cognition that things are not arisen, then it is pointless to compose your treatise, since you cannot make others understand what you yourself have not indubitably cognized. Therefore, all things have not been refuted.» In response we say the following. If we were to have some indubitable cognition, then it would come from an instrument of knowledge or not. But we don’t have an indubitable cognition. Allow me to explain why. In this regard, if a dubitable cognition were possible, then, in dependence on that, its opposite—an indubitable cognition—could occur. But if for is there not even a dubitable cognition, then how could there be an indubitable cognition that stands in opposition to it? [I ask this] because it would have to be independent of that to which it is related, like the shortness and longness of a donkey’s horns. Thus, there is no indubitable cognition, and if that is so, then we would conceptually fabricate instruments of knowledge in order to justify what? So, how many instruments of knowledge are there? What are their definitions and objects? Are they arisen be arisen from self, from something else, from both, or without causes? We do not need to state any of this. «If you do not have any indubitable cognition at all, then why do have we come across your statement that is in the form of something indubitably known (niścitarūpa), namely, “There are no things at all that have arisen from themselves, from something else, from both, or without cause.”» We respond that it is by the world that this phrase is indubitably known through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by the world, but such is not the case for the Noble Ones. «So the Noble Ones do not employ rational arguments?» Who has said that they do or they don’t? The ultimate is noble silence. Therefore, how in that case could conceptual fabrications such that there would be rational argument or the lack thereof? «If the Noble Ones do not give rational arguments, how then will they awaken the world to the utlimate?»

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The Noble Ones do not give rational arguments by means of worldly conventions. Rather, in order to awaken others, they provisionally accept (abhyupetya) those rational arguments that are commonly accepted from a worldly perspective. Having provisionally accepted those rational arguments, they then use them to awaken the world. For example, the body is impure, but lustful persons, being filled with confusion, do not see that this is the case; instead, they impute the image of beauty [onto the body in question]. Doing so, they become caught up in negative mental states. To remove those persons’ lust, a deity or an entity emanated by the transcendent one might say, “There are hairs on this body!” Saying this, they would reveal to those persons the faults of the body that had been hidden by their belief that it was beautiful. Thus freed from their belief in the body’s beauty, they would become free of lust. Such is also the case in regard to the present issue. That is, the Noble Ones do not perceive any essence in things whatsoever. Nevertheless, because their intellect’s eye is impaired by the cataracts of ignorance, ordinary persons impute a false essence onto things, and in some cases they also impute some particular quality. Through such imputations, they become even more caught up in negative mental states. Now the Noble Ones awaken them through rational arguments that are commonly accepted by them. For example, it is accepted that, in the case of producing a jar from clay and so on, one does not do so with a jar that already exists. Likewise, one should realize that there is no production of something that exists prior to its production precisely because that thing already exists. And to give another example, it is accepted that a sprout does not arise from things that are essentially different from it, such as flames and burning coal. Likewise, one should realize that a sprout does not even arise from those things that are intended [to be its causes], such as a seed. Someone might object: «This is our experience [i.e., that sprouts arise from seeds].» This is also incorrect because experience itself is false because it is experience, just like the case where a person with cataracts experiences two moons and so on. Thus, since [the truth of] experience is equally in need of proof, it is not reasonable to refute us by appealing to it. Therefore, [Nāgārjuna] said, “Things are not produced.” In this way, the first chapter was composed first of all to counteract the imputation of a false essence. Now, the remainder of the treatise is composed so as to refute some [additional] qualifications which are imputed in some cases. That is, the rest of the treatise is composed so as to demonstrate that every single qualification for dependent origination—such as being the agent of motion, the locus of motion, or the action of motion—does not exist. Someone might object: «The convention that governs an instrument of knowledge and its object is worldly (laukika), and this is what is explained by the treatise.» What would be the point in explaining that? «By stating distorted definitions, Sophists have destroyed (nāśita) the worldly convention concerning instruments of knowledge and objects. We have stated the correct definition of them.» This is also incorrect. If a distortion in the definiendum—namely, the world—resulted from the sophists’ statement of a distorted definition, then it would be useful to make an effort for the purpose [of refuting] that. But that is not the case. Moreover, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, [Nāgārjuna] pointed out a flaw in the section that begins, “if knowledge of an instrumental object depends upon an instrument of knowledge, then what is it that determines those instruments of knowledge?” Since the opponent has not rebutted this criticism, it is not the case that they present a correct definition [of instruments of knowledge and their objects]. LVP59.7

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The term “essentially other” can thus mean “production from another. moreover. [Before the effect arises. 1. “production” would be meaningless [since the thing already exists]. conceptual structuring defined as “the signified. Conditions such as a Creator God and so on are not possible. Suppose that some thing. he says “There is no fifth condition. simultaneous. But it is not possible for any thing to exist prior to its production. Hence. sickness and death. Therefore. since all conceptual structuring about it ceases. [then] that latter thing is the controlling condition for the former. all of which are other than that thing which they produce. or individually aggregated collection of the primary cause and other causal conditions. individual. A “thing” is something that has an essence. then that thing would arise from those causal conditions. which are other [than the thing produced]. this immediately preceding cessation of the cause is a condition for the production of the effect. both itself and something other than itself. then it would be apprehended. one can also say:] if the essence [of the effect] does not exist [at the time of the cause]. And if there is no self-essence.1 There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. mind and mental events do not function with regard to it.3 The essence of any thing does not exist in its conditions and such [prior to its production]. and post-production conditions [mentioned by certain Buddhist philosophers] are included in these four. To rule out such conditions. 25 30 35 40 . These are the four causal conditions. “a primary cause brings about something. If that were the case. it is something of which there is production. it is devoid of all problems. such as the pre-production. If it were to so exist. 1. There is no fifth condition. or neither itself nor something other than itself. [In addition to this last sentence. is completely stopped. Other conditions. the self-essences of things do not exist in their conditions.” Thus. the immediately preceding cessation of the seed is the condition for the production of the sprout. something other than itself. it is incorrect to say that things arise from that which is other than those things.” which has been shown to be unreal]. 10 15 20 In accord with the definition. and the controlling condition. then there is nothing that is essentially other (parabhāva) [than the effect such that it could serve as its cause]. If the essence [of those things which are effects] does not exist [in their causes]. “production from something other than itself” means production of things from these conditions. he says that it is the calming of conceptual structuring.” 1.” and so on. Furthermore.” That does not exist. the cause ceases]. [If] one thing comes into existence when another thing exists. such as birth. and as such. That being the case.” one thing is the primary cause of the is that support or basis by means of which a thing that is being produced is produced. and the convention of “knowing” and “thing known” does not occur with regard to it. For example. the supporting condition.Wisdom Page 4 5 … When āryas see that interdependent origination is the way things really exist.2 There are only four kinds of causal conditions: the primary cause. an effect. it is “peace. hence. Therefore. then there is no production from that which is essentially other [than the effect]. existed prior to its production in the aggregated. [then the conditions are not] essentially “other” [because “other” requires “self” or “selfessence. the preceding condition. it is something coming into being.” “the signifier.

(CŚ15. [that is..” If it does not exist as something that has conditions.” It also makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has not yet been produced because. on what does the “otherness” of the conditions depend? Two presently existing things. Otherwise.” We respond: 1.. Instead they are called ‘conditions’ because they establish the process of producing ocular awareness. “production without an agent [that is being produced] is not reasonable. The conditions are not the producers of the awareness. the essential otherness of the seed and so on does not exist. as such. the process that they create cooks the rice].” there is no production from that which is other than the effect. There are no conditions without the process. “The conditions. the son of a barren woman. for “there is no process without the conditions. it would produce awareness. do not directly produce ocular awareness. Now.. such as the people Maitreya and Upagupta.” You cannot say. It makes no sense to claim that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced because the process is what produces the thing [i.” This is also wrong. That process produces the awareness. And so he says. then how can it exist without conditions? How. rather. what do you need the process for? As I have said in Encountering Madhyamaka. something being produced is not produced. “It makes no sense [to speak of] producing something that has already been produced. such as seeds.16) Since the process of production is impossible in all three times [i. This is like the process of cooking rice. Therefore. But such simultaneity is not the case for a seed and the sprout it produces. the process of producing awareness. the awareness]. as I have said. or is being produced. “there is no process that has conditions. it is not possible for something to be neither “already produced” nor “not yet produced.”] As has been said: Since a thing that is being produced is already produced. nor are there conditions with a process. can it be 35 40 . everything would be being produced.” For.” [In other words. Since there is no use for the word “other. He has thus refuted those who claim that the effect is produced by the conditions. as I have demonstrated in Encountering Madhyamaka. But there is no process. Therefore. present and future]. the fire. exist without changing because one would have to conclude that [those effects] are uncaused.. pot and so on do not cook the rice.” Opponent: “If that’s the case. 20 25 30 If there were some process. then there should be a process without the conditions.4 There is no process that has conditions. someone who claims that the effect is produced by a process thinks the following. it does not exist. past. one claims that there is a process when the awareness has already been produced. has cows. are “other” with respect to each other. when claiming that there is a process. If the thing is already produced. Now. in other words.e. has not yet been produced. Why? In this case. such as the eye and the material form. There is no process without conditions. which [is produced by the aforementioned] conditions. if the essence of the effect does not exist.” Nor is it possible for there to be a process when something is being produced because there is no “being produced” without “already produced” and “not yet produced.Wisdom Page 5 5 10 15 Or [one can read as follows]: things such as sprouts that are effects do not have an essence when their causes. is itself the producer of awareness. then it would have as its conditions the eye and so on. . “There is no qualification without something that is qualified. “[this man].e.

for: 1. the eye and so on are causal conditions. it has already been stated that the process does not exist. conditions without a process are conditions devoid of a process. just as sand does not produce oil. “There are no conditions without the process.5 It is alleged that these are conditions because [the effect] is produced in dependence upon them. why then are the eye and so on not non-conditions as long as the effect.Wisdom Page 6 5 10 15 20 causeless? One cannot claim that a cloth is made from vīraṇa roots just because it makes no sense for it to be made from threads.6. there is no production from a process. such as the eye. The same concern thus pertains to that [other condition]. the process does not produce the thing. one might think.” In response. and this idea is therefore incorrect.1 A condition for either an already existent thing or a not yet existent thing does not make sense. Another condition is thought to be the condition for that thing which is not yet a condition. “nor”] means that the possibilities are exhausted. Therefore. “awareness. In response. and so on. At this juncture someone else objects.” The negation [implicit in the word “nor”] is applied [from the previous line] by context.. He expresses this by saying: 1.6. But that other condition is a condition for that [thing which is not yet a condition to become a condition only] if [that thing which is not yet a condition] is [already] a condition. But why are they not non-conditions as long as [the effect] is not produced? 25 30 35 If the eye and so forth are called “conditions” because awareness is produced in dependence on them.” In response. “Your analysis of the [theories concerning the existence of] the conditions with the process.” is not yet produced? [The question is rhetorical]. then the conditions themselves must be the producer of the thing. are discussed in the same way that the process of producing awareness has been discussed. Opponent: “If that’s the case. such as a hyperprocess. how can the conditions be the producer without the process. The signifier “production” is therefore empty of meaning [or “devoid of an objective referent”]. but they become conditions in dependence on some other condition.” This does not make sense. he says. Furthermore. the eyes and so on are thought to be the conditions for awareness. how then can there be a process that pertains to the conditions? One should know that other processes. “Nor are there conditions with the process. Therefore. [The effect] does not come from things that are not the conditions. the author means that they are not conditions.2 A condition for something already existent is a condition for what? And what would be the purpose of a condition for something that already exists? . Why? 40 1. is irrelevant for us. and awareness and so on are produced by those conditions. Opponent: “Then the conditions with the process are the producer. “Before [the effect arises] they are not conditions. Hence. Concerning this line.” If there is no process. It is irrelevant because things such as consciousness are produced in dependence upon causal conditions. he says.e.” This is also incorrect. they are thus causeless conditions [one might translate this as: conditions that cause nothing]. The disjunction [i. but are they considered to be conditions for something that is already existent or for something that is not yet existent? Neither option makes sense.

but lacking the capacity [to causally impinge on things in the present]. and the thing is already existent before the support. But since. an existing thing. Now he shows that the individual conditions are not conditions. This being the case. by means of which mind and mental functions or produced. just as it makes no sense to describe the son of a barren woman. Concerning these possibilities. For something is thought to be a support in order for the thing to be produced. A thing that is both existent and non-existent is not produced because there is no unitary thing that has mutually contradictory [properties] and because all the above stated problems with the first two possibilities would apply. “What are the supported things? Mind and all mental functions. such as the mind and so on. but. For example. has no support. nor a nonexistent thing. nor a thing that is both existent and non-existent is produced. a supporting condition for something that already currently exists is meaningless. due to your own expectations. however. A non-existent thing is not produced because it does not presently exist. [“condition. non-existent. that being the case. being the generator. “Although the conditions are [allegedly] impossible the conditions are established to exist because their definitions are stated. He has thus far pointed out that the conditions as a group are not conditions because they are incapable of producing the effect. the primary cause. meaning a currently existing thing. the above statement. any relationship between a support and the thing.” If some thing to be produced were produced.” is incorrect. or both. you say that it has a support. Now. an existent thing is not produced because it already exists currently. [Form and so on] are thought to be the supporting condition either for mind and mental functions that currently exist or that do not currently exist. then the primary cause. then what is the use of thinking that it is related to some support? Hence. There is not. Since there is no production of the effect. “The primary cause exists because it is possible to give a definition. 30 35 40 .” In response he says that the primary cause would exist if it had a definition. if the thing is unsupported. 1. how can there be a support? In the scriptures it says. if the thing is established to exist by itself. But it is not produced because there is no thing to be produced that is existent. But I have explained the problem with this position in Encountering Madhyamaka: You assert that the appellation. the future existence of the [effect] does not presently exist [and is thereby insufficient reason to call something a ‘condition’].8 [You] teach that an existent thing that has no support [is supported].’ And it makes no sense to state a definition for something that is not presently existing.7 Neither an existent thing. in order to refute the supporting condition.” The supporting condition of mind and mental functions is that suitable support.” is appropriate] because [the effect] will come into existence. In addition.meaning something that is presently existing. Or. he says: 1. the primary cause also does not exist. is defined as follows: ‘a primary cause is a producer. it is pointless to think of something as a condition for something that exists -. such as material form. meaning something that is not now existing? One might object that it should be called [a condition] because the effect will come into being. would produce it. “producer” means “generator. At this point someone objects. Concerning these possibilities. how can it be correct to say that the primary cause is a producer? 20 25 Here.Wisdom Page 7 5 10 15 How can there be a condition for something that does not exist.

have not yet arisen. the preceding condition makes no sense. what would be the condition for the cessation of the seed? Both would have to be causeless. How then can mind and mental functions have supports? There is no problem if one says that the definition [of a support] is given in terms of conventional reality.Wisdom Page 8 5 10 On the other hand. The meaning is as follows. I analyze this in the following manner. one might think of something as a support for a thing that does not currently exist. “If it has ceased.” The words “you” and “supported” should be supplied. the other thing exists. That is to say. “There is nothing whatsoever that has ever arisen anywhere from either itself. The word “and” is out of order and should be read. if the thing. “If things are not [ever] produced. that exists. this latter phrase would be interpreted as above. This also makes no sense because it just has no support. such as the sprout. something that does not currently exist has no connection to a support. The preceding condition is defined as the immediately preceding cessation of the cause. then both would have to be causeless.” And if all things lack an essence because they are all interdependently produced. Now. “You teach that a thing that has no support is supported. what would be the condition?” On this reading.” Moreover. what would be the preceding condition for the sprout? One might claim that the seed has ceased even though the effect has not yet arisen.” By doing this. “If it were ceased. The word “how” indicates the reason. one gets the following reading: “And if it has ceased. then how can there be something defined as a cause with the phrase. he says: 1. Hence. how can there be a support?” The word “if” indicates a question. being non-existent. If the thing is unsupported—that is. Now. what would be the condition? 15 20 25 30 35 In the second half of this verse one should note that the word order is inverted. the verse says. And if it had ceased. such as a seed. then when the seed has ceased—which means that the seed is non-existent—what is the condition for the sprout? Moreover.” 40 In this context. cessation is not reasonable.. and that cessation is a condition for the production of the effect. does not now currently exist—then how much more so should the support [be considered non-existent]? The idea is that the support is non-existent because the supported thing is non-existent. nor any other [condition]. he says: 1.” Or one can give the following interpretation. to have ceased when the things that are effects. “When this exists.” How can there be something defined as the effect with the . therefore. the preceding [condition] is not capable of being what has ceased.” He stated the verse the other way for the sake of composition. it is not correct to say. “If the thing is unsupported. a controlling condition is defined as follows: “One thing is the controlling condition for another in that when the one thing exists. it means the following: “If one claims that there is the cessation of the seed and so on when the sprout has not yet arisen. When the sprout and so on have not yet arisen. therefore.. So.10 Since things without essence have no existence (sattā). Therefore. the cessation of the cause has not yet occurred. It is not reasonable for the cause. something other than itself…. the preceding condition does not make sense. what is the condition? The preceding condition is therefore incorrect. in order to refute the controlling condition. he says. he says. if that were the case. Production has already been refuted with the third verse. “When this exists. “and if.” With this in mind. what would be the condition?” The word “and” refers back to “not yet arisen.” Hence. in order to refute the preceding condition. therefore.9 Cessation does not make sense for things that have never arisen. not ultimate reality.

so why should a cloth not arise from things that are not its causal conditions. since there are many causes. spreader. the effect has the same essence as the conditions. “If the effect were one thing and the causal conditions something else. There would thereby be a cloth if the threads were established by virtue of their own essence.” In response. does not intrinsically [svarūpataḥ] exist. because it does not exist in any of them individually and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that the effect would arise piecemeal.11 The effect of the [conditions] does not exist in the conditions. [therefore]. because it is not perceived there and because one would incur the unacceptable conclusion that there would be many effects. such as the threads. he says: 1. which comes from threads that themselves do not have their own essence. the threads are not established by virtue of their own essence [because. either individually or conglomerated. the conditions have the essence of things that are not the conditions]. “that exists. they too must have the essence of their causes]. such as the threads. Here someone objects.12 “What if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist [in them]?” Why then would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions? 10 15 20 25 The effect also does not exist in things that are not its causal conditions. At this point someone says. But they have or partake of the essence of their atoms. Someone might think. namely the cloth.13 “The effect has the essence of the conditions.Wisdom Page 9 5 phrase. the cloth is essentially the threads]. then one could have the qualm. then [one’s position] is not correct. Therefore. how can that which does not exist in the conditions come from the conditions? The cloth does not exist in the individual conditions. one does not prove by reason of the definition that there is a controlling condition. the cloth does not have its own essence. So how can an effect. how then can one prove that the conditions are conditions? To establish the way in which there is no production of an effect such as a cloth. instead.” Therefore. The cloth also does not exist in the conglomerated conditions. have the essence of the threads? As it says in the Śūnyatāsaptati [Seventy Verses on Emptiness]: “The cloth is established .” But the conditions do not have the essence of being themselves. [in other words. In short. there is no intrinsic production of the effect. shuttle and peg. ‘Does the effect exist in the conditions or not?’ But there is no effect separate from the conditions. It is not correct because the conditions also do not have the essence of being themselves. You say that the cloth has the essence of the threads. instead. “Having perceived that things such as cloths come from things such as threads. they are simply a permutation of their atoms.” 1. the conditions do not essentially exist. we say that the production of an effect. 1. such as vīraṇa grass? Thus. How can an effect that comes from conditions which are not in essence themselves have the essence of the conditions? 30 35 40 If one asserts that the effect has the essence of the conditions. such as a cloth. loom. it partakes of the essence of the threads. as effects. which means that it is a permutation of the conditions. In other words. [In other words. since the effect does not exist. one says that the threads and so on are the causal conditions for things such as cloths. which means that they have the essence of [their own causes] which are not the conditions.

The unknowing world is confused about this. the Buddha. 30 Things can never be shaken. That which does not essentially exist anywhere will never have something else as its cause. they are unaware. They do not cease. Hence. You yourself say. the effect does not exist. would not be conditions if there were no effect. “these are its conditions. he says: 1. As it says in the āryaratnākārasūtra [“The Holy Sūtra of the Jeweled Source”]: For one who knows emptiness. does not arise. namely a cloth or a mat.14. no thing exists anywhere. The Victor taught that reality is this way.14. the leonine human. for if there were an effect. firm and stable. trouble-free and peaceful. but these are not its conditions. like an unshakable stony mountain. ‘if the effect arises from the conditions even though it does not exist in them. the effect also exists. there is no production of things by virtue of their own essence. taught that a thing is that which is not produced. All things are unmoving.14. such as threads or vīraṇa grass.3 Since there is no effect. then one could say. there is no effect. how can something which is not established through itself produce something else?” 1. [there is no effect] that has the essence of the conditions. like the paths of the sky. nor do they arise. Therefore.” In response. “Very well. how can there be conditions and non-conditions? [In the original Sanskrit] the compound conditions/non-conditions means “conditions and nonconditions.” But when analyzed. then why would the effect not come from things that are not its conditions?’ The conditions. the cause is established through some other cause.Wisdom Page 10 through its cause. Suppose then that effect has the essence of something other than the conditions? 1. does not cease and does not age. how can other things be its conditions? What essenceless thing would the other thing produce? The Buddha taught this reasoning.1 Therefore. 25 Something of which the essence is never reached has no essence. they are unchanging. 5 “There is no effect” is supplied from below. If there is no cloth that has the essence of the threads. But there is a definite rule for establishing what is and is not a condition. That which does not have any essence at all is not obtained by anyone through the 10 15 20 35 . how can there be a cloth that has the essence of vīraṇa grass? Now someone says.2 There is no effect that has the essence of something other than the conditions. just like the path of a bird in the sky. It also says: Introducing hundreds of beings to this [reality].” Therefore. we say that there would be an effect if there were things that are conditions and things that are not conditions.

thinking. liberated from states. The Sugata said that this state is peaceful. I will free many beings.Wisdom Page 11 essence of something else. and no state whatsoever is obtained. Nor is it obtained internally.” 5 . there you will live. “Free. the Lord introduces [the world] to this. nor externally.

First. namely.1 not yet walked” expresses a part of the road where a future action of motion has not yet occurred. Nevertheless. the currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known.” is added here because we will be interpreting the verb “to go” (√gam) as “to walk. it does not make sense to say. So too. So he says: 15 2. Hence. we say that if going (gamana). a short walkway dedicated to that purpose. “to go”) and “to know. “One is now walking where one has not yet walked. Second. you have established that interdependent origination has the quality of not being ceased and so on. it is incorrect to say. “One is walking where one just walked.” In this context. Quite possibly he is thinking of the practice of walking meditation along a caṅkrama. which is based upon the peculiarities of Sanskrit grammar (see the introduction. the spot that the walker has traversed is for him a walked upon spot. the forms of √gam have been translated as “walking.” Our motivation for doing so is twofold.1.” It is incoherent to speak of “where one just walked”—meaning the place where the action of motion has just ceased—with the phrase “one is now walking. in order to prove that interdependent origination has neither coming nor going. That which is now affected by the action of walking is expressed by. and so as to reflect Candrakīrti’s interpretation. since the future and the present are completely distinct. one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. Throughout this chapter. Therefore. and without the spots where one already walked and where one has not yet walked. someone says. or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one is currently walking.” 2 .2 Here. or one would conceive of it in relation to the spot where one has not yet walked. The phrase “one is now walking” expresses a present action of motion.1 were to exist.2 Critique of Walking 5 10 LVP92. But none of this makes sense. for the sake of clarity and simplicity.” The phrase “where one has LVP93. «By negating production. the currently walked upon spot is thus not being walked upon. Therefore. it is not the case that one is now walking where one just walked. First of all. there is no action of walking on the currently walked upon spot because “without the spots where one has already walked and where one has not yet walked. it is nearly impossible to arrive at a clear and readable English translation of this chapter if one translates all forms of √gam as “to go” or even as “to move.” etc. then one would necessarily conceive of walking in relation to the spot on the path where one has just walked. exemplified by the action of walking.1 At this point. one is also not walking where one has not yet walked. which is commonly accepted in the world. how can one be now walking on it? And if one is walking on it.” This is in part due to the complicated nature of the argument.» In response.” The phrase “first of all” indicates the order in which the various possibilities are negated.” If one has not yet walked upon it. “which is exemplified by walking. we do not see any third spot that would be “the currently 1 20 25 30 The phrase. Candrakīrti will at various points pun on the dual meaning of the Sanskrit verb √gam. “one is not now walking where one has not yet walked. But in isolation from the walked upon spot and the not yet walked upon spot. how can it be a spot where one has not yet walked? Furthermore. 0000). and the spot that he has not yet traversed is for him a not yet walked upon spot. you must state an additional argument to refute the action (kriyā) that is going to and fro (gamanāgamana). “where one just walked” expresses that part of the path on which the action of walking has just ceased. “to walk” (or literally. “one is now walking.” which expresses a connection with a presently existing action of walking. it is clear that Candrakīrti understands the action of “going” (gamana) here to be best exemplified by the action of walking.

The area behind an atom located on the tip of the toe is included in the spot already walked upon. “one has no knowledge of a currently walked upon spot. «One is indeed walking on the currently walked upon spot. since one has no knowledge of it..” That is.” Therefore. Therefore. Therefore. Moreover. Feet cannot exist without the atomic particles of which feet are composed. relative to that atom. someone objects. na gamyate (i. which he cited in his commentary on MMK1. that is.»4 LVP In this verse. but it could be rendered: “the action of walking is at the currently walked upon spot.4. That is the currently walked upon spot!» This is not the case because the mover’s feet are a conglomeration of atomic particles. nor can it occur where one has not yet walked. See above (5).2.Wisdom Page 13 5 10 15 walked upon spot. Thus. Hence.2. if someone says that the currently walked upon spot is the spot that one has halfway walked upon.” And since that is the case. The translation of the last phrase follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation.” . so should one analyze the atomic particles in terms of the relation between their front and back parts. which is known! This is so because 2. “The currently walked upon spot is not being walked upon or known.1. Hence. there is no currently walked upon spot without being either a spot already walked upon or one not yet walked upon. He gives the reason: 2. the currently walked upon spot is where on observes the action of walking. then one uses the answer that has been given in the analysis of production. How could it make sense for there to be the action of walking at the currently walked upon spot. the currently walked upon spot is still not walked upon or known. The objector94.” Here. and that spot is affected by the action of walking. In this verse. “there is knowledge of the currently walked upon spot. it is not currently walked upon. But someone might say. there is knowledge (gati) of the currently walked upon spot.3 Therefore it is established. «There is a spot that is tread upon by the feet of the walking walker. that spot is not affected by the activity of motion. Therefore. It is not possible for one’s physical movement to be occurring at the spot where one has already walked. There is no physical movement where one already walked or where one has not yet walked.e. There is walking (gati) where there is physical movement. relative to that atom. “physical movement” refers to the raising and lowering of the feet. Therefore. the currently walked upon spot is known.3.1 states that the action of walking occurs only in the spot where there is the physical movement of the moving walker.” At this point.” Even if one thinks that the above is the case.3. but the spot in front of an atom located at the back of the heel is included in the spot not yet walked upon.16. the author says: 20 25 30 35 2. “is not being walked upon”) is taken to mean “is not known. if “the currently walked upon” is unintelligible without the action of walking? 3 4 Candrakīrti is referring to CŚ15. one instance of the word gati means “knowledge”. there is no currently walked upon spot. the other means “motion toward another area. And just as one analyzed the feet. and there is physical movement in the currently walked upon spot. there is also is no action of walking even in the currently walked upon spot. according to the objector.

that spot on the path gains the designation. however. If it were to act as a warrant for that as well.” he means that it “is being walked upon. claim that the action of walking is related only to “is being walked upon. The grammatical issue here is that the action of walking (gamikriyā) is at least part of the warrant (pravṛttinimitta) for the term “the currently walked upon spot”(gamyamāna).” Hence. “the currently walked upon.” This so because the action is linked to “is being walked upon. however. 15 20 25 A theorist might hold. If walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking.” That theorist maintains that the action of walking is the basis for the designation “currently walked upon. This would be so because for him “the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon. Nāgārjuna says: 2. part of the argument here is that there is an exclusive relation between the action and what it warrants. That is.4. claim that the action is connected to both “currently walked upon” and “is being walked upon. One can only say “the currently walked upon.” That is one of the actions of walking. “is walked upon” (gamyate).” even though that which is so designated is devoid of the action of walking.” Hence.Wisdom Page 14 5 10 Here.” and there is no second action of going. This would be so because the currently walked upon spot is being walked upon.1 walked upon.” For that theorist.” and the other is that which is the “walking” there. 30 Through its relation to an action of walking. it is already acting as a warrant for that term. the sentence “the currently walked upon spot is walked upon” does not have a clear meaning. If one accepts that walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. 5 6 That is. one cannot given an adequate account of how the sentence could mean what it appears to mean. then the verbal action would have no relation to the term. however. . then there must be two activities of motion.1 the action of walking. inasmuch as the same entity (namely. One might.” Such are the two actions of walking that ensue when walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. if one presupposes that the various grammatical and referential relations entail absolute connection. “walking pertains to the currently walked upon spot. One is the walking in relation to which that spot is “currently walked upon. by virtue of this second action of walking. “the currently walked upon spot is being 5 walked upon” is incomplete. then the meaning of the statement. The idea here is that. Clearly. that verbal action cannot also act as a warrant for the verbal phrase. when he says. it follows that there is the “currently walked upon” even in the absence of the action of walking. 2.” And “without the action of walking” (vigamana) means that the action of walking is absent. then on the opponent’s realist approach to semantics. “currently LVP96. that spot on the path “is being walked upon. “is being walked upon” is not intelligible without LVP95. the “currently walked upon” would be devoid of the action of walking. the particle hi means “because. In any case. The second is the walking that has that currently walked upon spot as its locus.5. the action of walking) serves as a warrant for both the patient (gamyamāna) and the verb (gamyate). It is absent because one action of walking is connected with “the currently walked upon. then it would follow that there would be a currently walked upon spot even in the absence of the action of walking. if the phrase. For more on this issue.” Even so.”6 One might. For someone who holds such a position. “is being walked upon. one cannot say. see the introduction (0000). and yet it “is being walked upon.” If this were the case. “the currently walked upon.” Since there is no second action of walking. the meaning of the sentence would again be incomplete.” In the verse. then it follows that there are two actions of walking. Since. it follows that the “currently walked upon” spot is devoid of the action of walking.

» Let us suppose that this is the case.2. it is not intelligible to say. This would be the case if there were a walker who served as the locus of walking. let there be two actions of walking? What’s wrong with that?» There is a problem. there are not two actions of walking. And the action of walking. being located in the agent.» We respond as follows. depends upon the agent. the substance is not a contributing factor for the action. two actions of walking do not pertain to one walker. Therefore. the walker is related to walking. If it follows that there are two actions of walking.” Someone might try a different approach saying. is speaking and also seeing something. such as a particular. Therefore. In this case. there is no second agent. «Suppose that John Doe.6. How so? Nāgārjuna says: 2. it is observed that a single agent is involved in multiple actions. it has not been LVP97.1 observed that a single person acts simultaneously as the contributing factor for two similar actions. standing still. someone objects. the capacity is. the capacities that are the means for accomplishing those actions must also be different. and as such. An action necessarily depends upon its own means of accomplishment (sādhana). But there is no such walker. but as is demonstrated by the statement.» This is not so. But when there is only one agent such as John Doe who is walking. walking would have no locus. and as a result of being so 7 10 15 20 25 30 35 The term “possessed of” translates the possessive suffix –vat. it would be nonexistent. often called the “relation of the container to the contained” (ādhārādheyasambandha) is one typical strategy employed by South Asian realists to overcome the .Wisdom Page 15 «Very well. the walker—exists. If walking makes no sense when the walker is negated. for whom there would be no warrant. «That may be so. 2. instead. Here. how can there be the walker. “John Doe is walking. This suffix is often used in connection with a particular theory concerning the relationship between a distributed entity such as a universal and the entity. Hence. walking does not exist.” walking is still observed in relation to John Doe as the walker. Therefore. If that is the case. walking does not exist when the walker is negated—that is. At this point. walking does indeed exist because the locus of walking—namely. two actions might pertain to a single agent. Even so. 5 Why must there be two walkers? Nāgārjuna says. And therefore. and it differs when the action differs. In that case. when the walker’s existence is denied. “The currently walked upon spot is being walked upon. how can there be the walker if there is no walking? We have said that without a walker. if there is no walking. because in the absence of the walker. since 2. This relationship. John Doe is not a “speaker” by virtue of his action of standing still.7. «Walking does exist because the one possessed of walking7 is called such due to the walking.6. Therefore. «But there is just one substance [that is John Doe].1. the substance does not do so. Moreover. whether that be a patient (karma) or an agent. then it also follows that there must be two walkers. the action of walking makes no sense. then. since there are not two agents. In this way. in which that distributed entity is instantiated (see Dunne 2004a). The capacity (śakti) is what serves as a contributing factor (kāraka) for the occurrence of the action. And due to the difference in the actions in question. someone responds.

On the other hand. There would be walking if “is walking” were indeed an [intelligible] expression. and due to the presence of that action one uses the expression.” In the verse. This is like the case where. for warranting the expression. is not walking. the walker. “the walker is walking.” to him. just the walker is walking. Instead. The walker. One who holds that “the walker walks” must conclude that there is a walker without the action of walking. then in the case of some John Doe who is possessed of walking. How is it intelligible to say. Why? Because: 2.” In this phrase. But.” problems of identity and difference that plague such relations. Hence. “The walker is walking. there is no walking. If walking did not exist. and for him the expression “walker” is related to the walking. Therefore. “is walking. 2. it is not reasonable to say. one would not use the expression. 10 15 20 25 30 35 .” there is only one action of walking. “is walking. “is walking. third [agent] which is neither walker nor non-walker is walking? The walker is so-called because he is walking. Therefore.» We answer as follows. LVP99. someone objects. a non-walker is devoid of the action of walking. as one who is a non-walker. But that is not the case. «One who is neither “is walking. A theorist might hold that there is a “walker” because he is connected to the action of walking. he is not walking.1 he is not walking will be shown by the next three stanzas. “is walking. “staff-bearer. one could not apply the expression. 2. “The walker walks.” there is no second action of walking.» This is not so. for him “the walker is walking” without walking. it is not correct to say. it is not possible to speak of the “walker. cannot be the “walker. and the phrase “is walking” is employed for that which has a relation to the action of walking.” So let us grant that one can say.9. Indeed. and what other.” However. and here is why: what third agent—one who is neither a walker nor a non-walker— is there such that you think that he “is walking?” Therefore.” to him. a non-walker also is not walking. without walking. Therefore.8. At this point. «The non-walker is not walking. The non-walker also is not walking. if he “is walking. nor is the one who is neither. first of all. and the way that LVP98. since he claims that the action of walking pertains to the walker. since there is no second action of walking. “the walker is walking. “walker. “there is a walker without the action of walking. how is it that he “is walking?” Or.” Nāgārjuna says.” if the walker is unintelligible in the absence of walking? In the statement.10. Nevertheless.” then he is not a non-walker. the word “walker” is used to mean “is walking.Wisdom Page 16 5 related. first of all. in someone has no staff.”» This is not so.” That being the case. there is the phrase. one cannot apply the expression.” Nevertheless.1 That theorist asserts that walking pertains to the walker.” so it is not reasonable. the walker might be qualified by the action of walking because he is related to that action. who is not walking. This is so because there is no second action of walking. he is walking.

and one would be forced to conclude that there are two agents of walking. one would be forced to conclude that there are two actions of walking. 2.] there is no expression. “So where does one begin to walk?” To demonstrate the way that walking is not possible. In this way.1 made from tortoise hairs. it is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking. And before he begins to walk. If. So much for that objection. the action of walking exists. [on the opponent’s theory. or on a spot where one has not yet walked. Therefore.” Someone might say. namely. it would not be a spot where one just walked. one must conclude that there are two activities of walking: one is the walking through which someone is characterized as the “walker”. Hence. someone is characterized or called the “walker. “is walking.” Even so. nor is there a spot where one just walked such that either of them could be the spot where one begins walking. as a walker.” In this way two activities of walking absurdly follow from the opponent’s position. he says: 2. the walker walks. he is walking? Or as a non-walker? Or as something distinct from both a walker and a non-walker? None of these possibilities make sense. “John Doe is walking. there is no currently walked upon spot. one does not observe anywhere a beginning to the action of walking.” That is one action of walking.e. The other is the action of walking that the walker is doing.” does exist! Therefore. one would have to begin it either on a spot where one has just walked. he is not beginning to walk. the expression..13. then since the past and the present are mutually exclusive. one should state a critique along previously mentioned lines. the other is the walking that the walker does as he “is walking. hence. One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked. If walking were to begin on that spot. so where does one begin to walk? 25 If walking had a beginning. Prior to the beginning of walking.11. «Walking exists because its beginning exists. At this point. one also does not begin to walk on the currently walked upon spot. One does not begin things that do not exist. someone objects.12. nor is there a spot where he has just walked such that either 5 10 15 20 30 35 . And how could there be walking where one has not yet walked? 40 When John Doe is standing still. i. that from this it follows that there should be two walkers. Nāgārjuna says. «Even so. Walking also does not begin on a spot where one has not yet walked because the present and the future are mutually exclusive.” We respond that walking would indeed exist if it had a beginning. nor on a spot where one has not yet walked. on the other hand. or on a spot where one is currently walking. But: 2. Nor does one begin walking on the currently walked upon spot for three reasons: that spot does not exist. there is no spot where he is currently walking.» This is not the case because the following qualm is focused on John Doe: is it that. one does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked because the action of motion has ceased on a spot where one has just walked. Concerning these possibilities. John Doe eliminates the state of standing still and begins to walk. such as a robe LVP100.Wisdom Page 17 One might then claim that the action of walking is related to both “walker” and “is walking.” Due to a connection with the action of walking.

Why would he need another action of standing still? If he did. This is so because one would think that the walked upon spot was the spot where the action of walking ceased. and doubt and certainty. It is incoherent to say that walking begins at that spot.» We respond by asking.» We respond as follows. And the currently walked upon spot would be where that action was currently occurring. Therefore.15. the start of walking is not at either either of those spots. or something else as “standing still. If the action of walking is not discovered at all. as is the case with light and darkness.1 20 25 30 2. given that it had already begun. But how can one conceive of a walker.” Since one would have to conclude that there were thus two actions of standing still. then it exists. 2. «Although.”8 In response we say that walking would indeed exist if its opposite. one would also be forced to accept that there are two agents of that action. the not yet walked upon spot. prior to the beginning of walking. the non-walker does not stand still. First of all. a non-walker.” 8 . How can there be walking where one has not yet walked? The spot where one has not yet walked is a spot where one’s activity of walking has not yet occurred.14. sthāna will at points also mean to “stop. walking begins there. Walking would indeed exist if they existed. LVP101. far and near. And if something has an opposite.” This does not make any sense at all. the not yet walked upon spot would be where the action had not yet occurred. “standing still. However.” However. Now someone objects. in the argument that follows.Wisdom Page 18 5 10 15 spot is where he begins walking. “How could there be walking where one has not yet walked?” «Even though there is no beginning to walking on either the walked upon spot. then why would one falsely think of those three spots? And how could the action of walking be the warrant for those three expressions? It would make no sense. and what third kind of agent—someone who is neither the walker nor the non-walker—is there that is stands still? 35 The next stanza will explain how it is that the walker does not stand still. «Walking does exist because its opposite exists. which literally means “standing” as in “standing still. there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the just walked upon spot. then due to one action of standing still he would be a “non-walker.” and due to the other one would say that he “stands still. then. there is the spot where one has not yet walked. The The term here is sthāna. And if walking were nonexistent.1 Someone might claim. it would not make sense for them to exist. those spots nevertheless do exist. if there is no beginning to the action of walking. the walker does not stand still. Hence. Nāgārjuna asks. which is to say that it is a spot where the activity of walking has yet to begin. does one think that some spot is already walked upon? Does one think that some spot is currently walked upon? Does one think that some spot is not yet walked upon? If no beginning of walking is found at all. The non-walker also does not stand still because he is already standing still. since there is neither the currently walked upon spot nor the spot where he just walked. The opposite of walking exists—it is “standing still.” existed. or the currently walked upon spot. LVP102. So too.

16. as shown by this critique. Instead.» This is also not right.2. Therefore. we prove that there is standing still. beginning. and also because there is no action of walking there. and stopping—each case is the same as in the action of walking. . nor on a spot not yet walked upon. it has the same problems as the action of walking. does not pertain to him. Likewise. in the verse that begins. the one is stopping the action of walking begins the action of standing still. there is no third type of agent who is neither a walker nor a non-walker. “The walker stands still?” When one says. it is the walker himself who stands still. walking is explained to be the same as in the action of walking. He also does not halt and stand still where he has not yet walked. then how could one stop doing it?» We respond that walking would exist if stopping to walk existed. nor on the spot just walked upon.” Therefore. the walker does not halt and stand still on a spot where he has just walked because there is no action of walking there. its opposite— namely. Here someone says. Likewise. “He stands still. there is no walking.” Here. “The walker stands still. One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot.” This is not so. “First of all. And in this regard. standing still does indeed exist because its opposite exists. But if that is the case. there is no stopping the action of walking. As for this verse. it is unintelligible to say.17.1 not exist. Here. the “walking” that is mentioned so as to prove that there is the action of “standing still” is the same as in the action walking—in other words.Wisdom Page 19 5 problem is as stated previously. Hence. someone says. Walking. since: 2. But it does not. standing still also exists because its opposite exists. Therefore. because: 2. For example. which is the contrary of standing still. standing still—also does not exist. If the walker without walking does not make sense. nor does one who is other than both a walker and a non-walker. “The one standing still is not walking…” and so on (MMK2.” Nāgārjuna levels a critique against the action of standing still that is adduced as evidence to prove the action of walking. here as well one should apply the same critique to walking when it is adduced as evidence to prove the action of standing still. then in order to establish that there is walking. «So. It is in this way that. the walker does not stand still…. “Walking does exist because stopping exists.17. 10 15 20 25 30 35 In this regard. since 2. “standing still.1. And in the absence of the action of walking. and that exists. how then would it make sense to say. one does not apply the expression “walker.15-16). So too the walker does not halt and stand still on the currently walked on spot because such a spot is not found. One does so by restating the two stanzas with the appropriate changes. as in. someone says. and since it does not exist. first of all. This is so because the opposite of standing still is walking. walking does not exist because its opposite. And walking is proven when standing still is proven.” then the action of walking. and this is also the case because there is no walking there. And thus. «The non-walker does not stand still. But if walking were nonexistent.” does LVP103.

standing still—exists have no proof for the action of walking because standing still does not exist. in this case as well. one begins standing still. “One does not halt and stand still on the currently walked upon spot. who is standing still. nor on the spot just walked upon.Wisdom Page 20 5 But suppose someone says.» We respond that the action of standing still would exist if the stopping of that action existed. Moreover. a critique of walking was stated by the line that says. That is. nor on the spot just stood upon. One should say that beginning the action of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. in the case of stopping the action of standing still. if walking were to exist. so where does one begin to stand still? 10 15 In this way. one should make it clear that stopping the action of standing still is the same as in stopping the action of walking. nor does it make sense to say. John Doe.” (MMK2. the critique as the same as in the action of walking. then one could not stop that action. Hence. Neither case is at all possible for those who examine the issue. by making the appropriate changes to the three stanzas. nor on a spot where one has not yet stood. one also does not begin to stand still where one is currently standing still. It does not make sense to say. if it is not different from the walker—then agent and activity (kriyā) would be identical.” Why does it not make sense? 35 2. by suppressing walking. or not in exclusion from the walker. “The walker is different from the action of walking. it does not exist. previously the verse that began “One does not begin to walk on a spot where one has just walked…” (MMK2.19. those who hold that the opposite of walking—namely.18.” Likewise. One might object. However. That is. nor on the spot not yet stood upon.12) refuted the beginning of walking.1) Likewise. nor on a spot not yet walked upon. If there were no action of standing still. If the walker were himself the action of walking. stops standing still and begins to walk.17. One does not begin to stand still on a spot where one just stood. then one would be forced to accept that agent and activity (karman) are identical.” That is. then it would have to exist either in exclusion from the walker. «Standing still does exist because its beginning exists. “The walker is himself the action of walking”. the critique is the same as in the action of walking: One does not depart walking on the currently stood upon spot. If the activity of walking does not exist in exclusion from the walker—that is. Thus. since it is “the same as in the action of walking. In the case of stopping the action of walking. «The action of standing still does exist because its cessation exists. 20 25 30 Thus. And how can that which is begun not exist?» We respond as follows. there would be no . Nāgārjuna says: 2.1 the beginning of standing still is the same as in the action of walking. That is. one should make it clear that LVP104.

» This is also not the true. since someone engages in some walking. So too.2. then the walker would exist independently of the action of walking. thus.” is commonly established for the world (lokaprasiddha). he does not achieve that action. 30 “Before walking” means prior to the action of walking.1 . is walking. “The walker is himself the action of walking. the walking would be apprehended independent of the walker. This is so 2. “John Doe. since: 2. a “walker” is engaged in walking. If you think that the walker is something different from the action of walking. This is so 2. “Someone walks to some destination.” Indeed.22. the walker would have to already be engaged in that action. This is most likely the point that Candrakīrti means to make with his example of walking to a destination. as has already been shown. just as a cloth is distinct from a jug. in other words. how then can there indeed be any proof of these two at all? 15 There is no proof for these two—the walker and the action of walking—as being either identical or different. The walker does not engage in the walking by virtue of which he is characterized as “the walker. At this point. the walker “is walking” —i.” Thus. which is not yet existent.22. Nāgārjuna asks.20.e. “How can there indeed be any proof of these two at all?” His intention is that there is no proof for the walker and the action of walking. It would be established as distinct. And except for those options. that is. that by definition an agent is someone engaged in the 9 10 20 25 .22. This being the case. 2. in what other way could they be proven to exist? And so. such that one could say “This is the agent” and “This is the activity. It also makes no sense for the walker to be something other than the walking. he does not do it. But it is not the case that the walking is apprehended distinct from the walker.Wisdom Page 21 distinction between the two.” However. the walker. it is not correct to say. then he would engage in that walking.1 That is. there would have to be the walking without the walker and the walker without the walking. Therefore. In order for the “walker” to exist prior to the action of walking. If the walker and the walker were different. is engaged in—that activity of walking through which he is characterized as the “walker. because he is not the walker before walking.3. someone says. There is no proof whatsoever that these two exist as either identical are different.1 5 2.9 In the commentary on this verse. If the walker were established prior to the action of walking. it is established just in the way that these are established: “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action. Candrakīrti appears to suggest that this line should be read.” To show how there is also no difference between the walker and the walking. the point being made here is simply that an agent is by definition one who is engaged in some action. Nāgārjuna says: LVP105.. That is.” The aforementioned critiques do not hold. the activity of cutting is not identical to the cutter.” John Doe does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the walker. «A statement such as.21. LVP106.

25.” that walker who engages in that action does not exist. An unreal walker does not do the walking in three ways. an unreal walker is not engaged in any of these three kinds of walking.1. ‘coming’ is a state of moving inward. One would be the action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker. Thus. “is walking.Wisdom Page 22 5 It is observed that someone such as John Doe walks to some village or city.1 The walker does not engage in an action of walking that is different from the one due to which he is characterized as the “walker” because two actions of walking would absurdly ensue. Therefore.” 2. an unreal walker is devoid of the action of walking. This also will be explained in that same chapter. which is other than himself. One should know that the walking can also be related to the action of walking in three ways. nor the action of walking. nor yet the action itself. the term gati.” and the other would be the action of walking that he engaged in—these are the two actions of walking that would absurdly follow. which Candrakīrti has interpreted heretofore as “the action of walking. So too. that is. Where there is no state of moving inward of outward. “Venerable Śāriputra. the prior to that action of walking due to which he is called the “walker. Such is not the case here. a real walker does not do the walking. nor is a walker who is both real and unreal.’ venerable Śāriputra. in Nāgārjuna’s usage.1 As the Teachings of Akṣayamati says. the agent of walking does not exist. he engages in another action of walking. In three ways. The walker does not do an action of walking that is different from that walking by virtue of which he is characterized as the “walker” because when there is only one walker. 10 The full flavor of this passage is difficult to render into English because it involves a deliberately ambiguous use of two key terms pada and gati. This will be explained in the “Analysis of Factors of Action and their Object” (MMK8).25. Since that is the case. 10 15 LVP107. That is. it does not make sense to have two actions of walking.” Rather.-2. the term “walking” means “that action of walking which is engaged in” (gamyata iti gamanam). but the current translation captures the main point of the argument. A walker that is both real and unreal does not do the walking in three ways. Such is the gait (gati) of the Āryas: it is without coming or going. 30 LVP108.23.” The complexities— and the pun involved—cannot be fully rendered in English. neither the walker. The main problem of translation here is that both the destination and. and one that is both real and unreal has the nature of both possibilities.” although its numerous other meanings include .” To make matters worse. there is no coming or going. is a state of moving outward. the action can occur in the accusative as that objects of the verbal construction. someone says. nor that which is being walked upon exists. «The walker does not engage in that action of walking due to which he is characterized as the “walker.24. a real walker is not engaged in real walking. At this point. 20 In this verse. 2. The first of these has been rendered as “state. “Going. And in this regard. two actions of walking cannot apply to one walker. a real walker is connected with the action of walking.” can also mean “destination.2. unreal walking or walking that is both real and unreal. This dispels the objection based on statements such as “A speaker says a statement” or “An agent does an action. And as has already been explained. nor does the object of that action.» This is also not true since 2.” 10 25 action in question.

nor does anyone pass on to the next world or go there. confused beings develop desire. Things are like froth or a plantain tree. and no one dies. There is no transference [to the next life].Wisdom Page 23 If the seed itself were to be transferred into the sprout. the sprout were to come from something else. the interpretation of pada as “word” is not wholly implausible as part of a vague play on words. They are like the moon in water. the Tibetan translators take it to mean “word.1 karma is not wasted once it has been done. And production does not pertain to causeless things.” all of which may again be part of a deliberate if vague play on words. having done it. it will give a black or bright result for the one cycling in saṃsāra. the Blessed One said: 5 The sprout of an existent seed is not itself the seed. and not a sprout. Yet. Hence. It is not eternal. nor arrival [from the last life].” Indeed. on the other hand. they feel desire for that face. its nature (dharmatā) is to be neither annihilated nor eternal. the fault of eternalism would also ensue. Likewise. Likewise. akin to a mirage.” Here. conditioning is neither annihilated nor eternal. Nevertheless. in the King of Samādhi Sūtra it says. In this way. and desirous. But if. nor will one experience what another has done. They are like illusions. nor yet does it come from something else. which is the basis for the terms “coming” (āgati) and “going” (gati). but it is not annihilated. In this world no human dies. And: 10 A seal is seen in its impression. one will not fail to encounter it again. it is formed from the verbal root √gam. The faultless Victor with Ten Powers uttered this best of meditative states: “the world of existence (bhava) is like a dream. nor perdurance.” “abode. Yet LVP110. nor is it something other than that. nor is the impression in the seal. In this way. the same as a flash of lightning in the sky. nor is the seed that. then that would be a seed. It is not the “place” and “word. There is no accumulation of karma. we have translated it as “gait” in the sense that it is the way that the Āryas proceed.” but then one would have to argue that there is no coming and going because there is no word for coming and going.1 15 25 . such as a donkey’s horns. but the seal itself is not seen to be transferred there. they urgently seek to get it. In this way. it can also mean “state. the face will never be reached. But if there is no transfer of the face into the image. know that all things are like that.” and “understanding. 20 No being is encountered here. then the fault of being uncaused would ensue. no living thing or human.” “destiny. However. no one is born here. It is the verb that has been translated throughout the chapter as “to walk. As for gati. he said: When children see an ornamented female face on the surface of a mirror or a pot of oil. which is wholly unconvincing. LVP109.

positive qualities and LVP112. a signless place—such is the realm of the Sugatas. wisdom and spells. They quickly fluctuate LVP111. they have the best way to obtain the five superpowers.1 character. nor will something go elsewhere. peaceful.1 and are impermanent like an illusion. The three realms of saṃsāra are like a dream. such are the qualities of the Victors.Wisdom Page 24 case that all exists. It is not that something has come here. There is no place where beings become tranquil through their actions. supreme power of good qualities. Power. spells. [Mind-] streams are always empty and signless. state or place. Unarisen. 5 10 . Here there is no purity of view. and the Ten Powers’ strength—such is the supremacy of the bull-like buddhas: a myriad of excellent. nor does it not exist. they have no core. supreme in magic and miraculous action.

Thus: 3. 3. Likewise. would he depend upon seeing or not? In this regard. we ask: if there were some seer. if seeing is not excluded. 15 3. Hence.1. a seer not excluded from seeing does not exist.6. hearing. touching and the mind. then does dependence on seeing apply to something already established to exist or not yet established to exist? Concerning these possibilities. the already traversed. Their objects are the visible and so on. the four factors in the twelve links starting with awareness also do not exist. What might say that fire burns itself. how can there be . 5 3. 35 3. In this whether or not seeing is excluded. And since there is neither the object of seeing nor seeing.1. If there is no seeing of what is not “being seen.8.6. “seeing sees?” 3. one is not seeing what has not yet been seen. If that is the case. What would dependence upon seeing do for an already established—that is to say. it is said that visual awareness arises in dependence upon the eye and visible matter. It is said a child is born in dependence (pratītya) upon mother and father. When seeing is excluded. nor does non-seeing see.3. In this way. How can there be seeing and the object seen if there is no seer? 3. and the not yet traversed. there is not seer. but we respond: The example of fire is not suitable for proving that sight sees itself. when seeing is not excluded. then. a seer excluded from seeing also does not exist.5. The six sense-faculties are sight.2. 10 Modifying the first verse in chapter 2. one can critique seeing as follows: First of all. as such. Sight does not see itself. smelling. and without what has been seen and the not yet seen. On the other hand. the seer is like the son of a barren woman.4. we have already responded to claims about the reality of fire’s burning along with the act of seeing. one is not seeing what has been seen. there is no seer. if a not yet established seer depends upon seeing. there is no seer. How will that which does not see itself see something else itself? 3. then since it is not yet established.7. existent—seer? This makes no sense because that which is already established is not established again. By means of our analysis of the being traversed. a not yet established seer does not depend upon seeing. one must admit that the seer is also explained to be impossible. suppose that the seer is asserted to be dependent on the seeing—that is. tasting.” how can it make sense to say. a seer who is already established does not depend upon seeing. Seeing does not see. 20 25 30 Here.3 Analysis of the Sense-Faculties 3. the “being seen” is not seen. And has as been stated before. And due just to this analysis in these four verses of seeing. since it does not depend upon seeing.2.

Wisdom Page 26 appropriation and such? 3. just by the critique of seeing. 5 . and one should realize that. touching and thinking. tasting.9. One should realize that. smelling. just by the critique of seeing. we have also explained the objects and agents. we have explained hearing. such as the hearer and the heard.

4. and indeed to all things. if the causes of visible matter existed separate from visible matter. If there were visible matter separate from the causes of visible matter. and separate from visible matter. and there is no cause without effects. conditioning. no. However. the cause of visible matter does not make sense. 4.9. mind. “The effect is not similar to its cause.7 . the causes would have no effects.2.Wisdom Page 27 4 Analysis of the Aggregates 4. visible matter would be causeless.3. the causes of visible matter are also not seen. 20 .4. Therefore. all that he offers as proof has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. 5 4. The same sequence of arguments applies in all ways to sensation. When torn apart by emptiness.1.” It does not make sense to claim. If visible matter already exists.5. When explained away by emptiness. one who utters a defense does not defend anything. 4. 10 4. If visible matter does not yet exist. “The effect is similar to its cause. Visible matter is not perceived separate from the causes of visible matter.6. all that he offers as proof of his criticism has the same unproven status as what he hopes to prove. it does not make sense. the cause of visible matter makes no sense. and there is no causeless thing anywhere. 4. It does not make sense to claim.8. one who responds with criticism has not criticized anything at all. recognition. Causeless visible matter? No. 4. one should not invent any concepts at all that have to do with visible matter.” 15 4.

If there is no thing without a defining characteristic.6. which is the quieting (upaśama) of what is to be seen. 5.8.1. Therefore. then of what would there be nonexistence (abhāva)? And [if] the analyzer that has neither the quality of existing nor not existing. it would have no defining characteristic. If there is no existent (bhāva).7 . If the characterized does not make sense. 5 5.Wisdom Page 28 5 Analysis of the Elements (dhātus) 5. 5. nor does it apply to what already has a defining characteristic. if it were prior to its defining characteristic.3. There is no existent (bhāva) anywhere without a defining characteristic.4. If a defining characteristic is not applying or present. the characterized does not exist. then it does not make sense to speak of the characterized. then to what does a defining characteristic apply? 5. The dim-witted who see existence (astitva) and nonexistence (nāstitva) of things do not see peace. Nor does it apply to something other than what has or does not have a defining characteristic. 10 In the verse above the verb “to apply to” can be translated as “to be present in.2.” 5. then the defining characteristic is not possible. And an existent (bhāva) does not exist without what is characterized and the defining characteristic. and the defining characteristic does not exist. how does he know either the existent or the nonexistent? 20 5. .5. The space-element does not at all exist prior to its defining characteristic. A defining characteristic does not apply to what has no defining characteristic. And the other five elements are the same in this regard as space. 15 5. it is neither the characterized nor the defining characteristic. Therefore. space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent.

none of the elemental things (dharmas) are established either together or separately. their co-occurrence is not established. there would be desire.7. 15 6. in exclusion from desire. while different.8. then do they arise together because they are established separately? 6.6. desire is not established either with the desirous or without the desirous.9 . they would not arise together (sahabhāva) because a thing cannot occur with itself. existed before desire. arise together. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are identical. And as with desire. How could there be desire without the desirous? This same analytical procedure applies to the desirous in the case where there is or is not desire.5. If the desirous. 5 6.3. You expect them to arise together because you think that they are not established separately. If desire and the desirous.4. Thus. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion. Which exists separately such that you assert that they arise together? 25 6.10. And yet.1. And if they were identical. how can they arise together? 6. you again claim that they are separate! 6. If co-occurrence can occur even if they are different. to establish that they occur together. 6. . It is not possible for desire and the desirous to arise simultaneously because desire and the desirous would then not depend upon each other. then why do you imagine that they arise together? 20 6.Wisdom Page 29 6 Analysis of Desire and the Desirous 6. If desire and the desirous are established separately. Since they are not established to exist separately. then desire would exist in dependence on the desirous such that when the desirous existed. grogs). 10 6. then the co-occurrence [of one] would occur without its companion (sahāya.2. And if they are different.

4.3. then how can it be characteristic of the conditioned? 15 7. These oddities are in part what Nāgārjuna critiques. likewise occurrence produces both itself and what is other than itself [i. 7. Since light is [defined as] what eliminates darkness. which is a thing’s continuity over a series of distinct temporal instants. If there is another characteristic of the conditioned for occurrence.6. even though] not yet produced.7 . occurrenceoccurrence].” 7. according to you. According to this theory. namely. perdurance and cessation. “Just as lamplight illuminates [both] itself and what is other than it. the [occurrence-occurrence] causes the first-order [occurrence] to arise [after] having been produced by the first-order [occurrence]. then the three characteristics would be conjoined to it. 7.2. perdurance (sthiti). and “cessation-cessation” (vyayavyaya). and this leads to the invention of things (dharmas) such as “occurrence-occurrence” (jātijāti). On the other hand.5. Moreover. if a thing is conditioned. some things (dharmas) are “conditioned” (saṃskṛta) in that they are produced by causes and conditions. “Occurrence-occurrence is the occurrence of only the first-order occurrence. “perduranceperdurance” (sthitisthiti). The first-order occurrence in turn produces [its] occurrence-occurrence. according to you. and it is not present where there is lamplight. If. occurrence-occurrence is what causes the occurrence of the first-order occurrence.” 7. and cessation (vyaya. etc. what would lamplight 35 .e. Darkness is not present inside of lamplight. and how can [those three characteristics] together apply to one [thing] at the same time? 7. perdurance and cessation are themselves considered to be conditioned things. then they are not conditioned. if production is not conditioned. how does it cause the [occurrence-occurrence] to arise? 20 25 30 7. The three [characteristics] starting with occurrence are not individually capable of acting as characteristics for the conditioned.] 7. how would it cause the [first-order occurrence] to arise if it has not [yet] been produced by the first-order [occurrence]? 7. Of course (kāmam). One of the oddities of this theory is that occurrence. they too must be qualified by occurrence. hence. then an infinite regress [ensues]. were capable of producing the [occurrence-occurrence].8. perdurance and cessation. if the [first-order occurrence. occurrence (jāti or utpāda).Wisdom Page 30 7 Analysis of the Conditioned 5 10 [NOTE: This chapter is based upon a particular theory found within Abhidharma philosophy. If the production [of things] were conditioned.). then it is necessarily qualified by three characteristics. If. then on your view. then [inasmuch as] the first-order [occurrence] has not yet been produced by the [occurrence-occurrence]. while being produced the [first-order occurrence] could produce the [occurrence-occurrence]. If such is not the case.. bhaṅga.9.1.

7.] which is other than itself. as [described] in the scriptural passage: “One who sees interdependence sees the Dharma.10. maintain that any thing that exists has a svabhāva—in other words. the already moved. 7. produce both itself and something else. interdependent origination. Moreover. 5 7. then why would [occurrence]. they are devoid of essence [and] interdependently arisen. then it could arise.]. [the thing] contains its own changeless essence (svabhāva). then darkness also would undoubtedly obscure [both] itself and [lamplight. is an effect. if you admit that things have essences. [need to] be produced again? 15 7. This has been explained in the case of the not yet moved. being already produced. Having shown this. occurrence-occurrence]? And if an occurrence that has already arisen produces [them].” that is.” I. namely. Hence.Wisdom Page 31 illuminate? 7. have shown the following: any thing. then the lamplight located here would eliminate the darkness of the whole world. 35 7. how can you maintain that they are dependently arisen? Thus. one who sees the Dharma.16. it does not depend on anything else. then. How could occurrence. such as seed. it does not reach any darkness.17.] which is other than itself. It does not make sense (na kramate) [to say. and the currently moving. the sprout is the cause. on the other hand. [Candrakīrti’s comments:] You.16. which is not yet arisen. can one speak of “the arising” in dependence on occurrence? 7. such as a sprout. 7. nor does the already arisen. And how could darkness be eliminated by lamplight in the process of arising? [Such cannot be] because while lamplight is in the process of arising. you have thereby contradicted the highest Dharma. how can it arise? 10 20 25 30 . nor is it produced. 7. if darkness that is not reached [by the lamplight] were eliminated by the lamplight. Since that [essence] exists. Therefore. The currently arising does not arise. both that which is arising and occurrence itself are pacified. by admitting that things have essences. this is that which is arising. If some not yet arisen entity (bhāva) existed somewhere.1. nor does the not yet arisen. sir. If lamplight eliminated [both] itself and [darkness. in and of itself. “In relation to occurrence.12.11 . sees the Buddha. namely. Whatever exists dependently is essentially (svabhāvataḥ) pacified (śānta). Both are “pacified.13. I have explained entirely the Blessed Tathāgata’s mother. that arises in dependence on some [other] thing.” How. [namely.15. but if no such entity exists.2. On the other hand.14. the Buddha’s philosophy. you have contradicted interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) in every way.

[This is so] because a state of existence does not cease by virtue of that very state of existence. This has been previously demonstrated. An entity that is currently ceasing to exist does not cease.Wisdom Page 32 7. 5 15 25 . it does not make sense [to theorize] the continued existence of continued existence by virtue of a continued existence other than continued existence or by virtue of that [continued existence] itself. If another occurrence produces this [occurrence]. nor does the occurrence of the nonexistent. 35 7.25.18. There is no occurrence of occurrence by virtue of [an occurrence] that is identical to it or different from it Likewise. 7.24. the occurrence of any entity does not make sense.22. An entity that has already continued to exit [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. in the [aforementioned] manner. And in any case. The continued existent of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense. And in any case. always continue to exist? 7.23. what unarisen [entity] ceases? 30 7. Nor can such be the case of what both is existent and nonexistent.19. An entity that is in the process of continuing to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. The occurrence of an entity (bhāva) that is in the process of going out of existence does not make sense. then everything arises [anywhere at any time]. And if something without occurrence is arisen. 7. 7.26.21. then likewise. The cessation of an entity (bhāva) that is continuing to exist does not make sense. nor does a state of existence cease by virtue of some other state of existence. which ones. If. If an occurrence that was in the process of arising were to cause [some entity] to arise. an entity that has not yet ceased does not cease. but it does not make sense [to speak of] the cessation of an entity that is not continuing to exist.20. 10 7.29.27. 20 7. An entity that has already ceased to exist does not cease. what unarisen [entity] continues to exist? 7. then occurrence is an infinite regress. Among all things that have the qualities of decaying and dying. an entity that has not yet continued to exist [over some period of time] does not continue to exist. The occurrence of the existent does not make sense. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. but it does not make sense [to speak of] an entity that is not in the process of going out of existence. lacking those qualities. the cessation of any entity does not make sense. then which occurrence would cause that occurrence to arise? 7.28. 7.

10 7. if [existence and nonexistence applied to] the same [entity].34. There can be no cessation either by virtue of a thing itself or by what is essentially other [than that thing]. there are no conditioned entities. 5 7. First of all.32. Since occurrence. And if the conditioned is not established.30. just as there can be no occurrence by virtue of a thing itself or by something essentially other [than that thing].31. Like an illusion. like a dream. such is cessation. the cessation of an existent entity does not make sense because. [This is what the Buddha] has said. how can one establish the unconditioned? 7.33. Also.Wisdom Page 33 7. just as one cannot decapitate [a human] for the second time. 7. . like the city of the elves — such is occurrence. the cessation of a nonexistent entity does not make sense. continued existence and cessation are not established. such is continued existence. neither existence nor nonexistence would make sense.

A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on an unreal object. If there is no effect. and [if the factor were real]. then neither action. 8. 8. nor on a real object. Action does not belong to a real [object]. 10 8. For the reasons stated above. All remaining entities are explained by [the analysis of] object and agent. and a path to heaven does not make sense.1. An unreal [object] is not acted upon by a real agent. how can they [occur in or] as the same [entity]? 8.4.3. If an unreal factor acts on an unreal object.13. one would have to conclude that all actions are pointless. Likewise.12 .2. If action and so on are impossible. 8.8. 8. an unreal factor does not act on an object that is real or both real and unreal. Action does not belong to a real [factor]. then there is neither the virtuous (dharma) nor the nonvirtuous (adharma).Wisdom Page 34 8 Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object 8. nor agent. an object would have no [semantic] cause (hetu) [due to which one calls it an “object”].9. The factor occurs in dependence on the object. a real factor does not act on an object that is unreal or both real and unreal. then there is neither effect nor cause (kāraṇa). one should realize that such is also the case for reliance & appropriation (upādāna). I see no other way to establish [them]. 8.6. the effects that arise from those [kinds of actions] do not exist. nor is a real [object] acted upon by an unreal agent because all of the flaws [stated above] would ensue in that case. and the object occurs in dependence on the factor. nor object exists. 5 8. 15 8. since the real and the unreal are mutually contradictory. If there is neither [cause nor effect]. If there is no cause (hetu).11. [You] do not accept an unreal entity as a factor. 8. nor do you accept an unreal entity as an object.7. 30 8. 20 25 8.5. there would be an agent without any object. A real factor (kāraka) acts on a real object (karman). Since object and agent have been refuted. A factor that is both real and unreal does not act on [an object] that is both real and unreal because.10. an agent would have no cause [due to which one calls it an “agent”]. . For the reasons stated above. then a path to liberation does not make sense. One should understand this for the aforementioned reasons. And if there is neither the virtuous nor the nonvirtuous. there would be an object without any agent. and [if the object were real].

by what means does one identify the entity that is established before [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]? 10 9. In that case. then there is no doubt that those [perceptual acts and such] would also be established without that [entity].5. 5 9. the enjoyer] is made evident by one among [the possible perceptual acts]. and there is also the sensation [that accompanies them]. then how can there be one that exists prior to the individual [acts]. If there is [enjoyer] to whom pertain [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]. How can some [enjoyer] be made evident without some [act]? How can some [act] be made evident without some [enjoyer]? 15 9. [Rather. 9. If the agent of seeing were himself the agent of hearing and himself the agent of sensation. Some [enjoyer] is made evident by some [act]. nor later. How can seeing and such pertain to an entity that does not exist? Therefore. then. the entity that exists before them is established. At another time. so too.9. the agent of hearing would exist while the agent of seeing was still present.4. then he might exist before the individual acts. Indeed. it is made evident by another [of the acts].10.” 9.2. such as seeing. and the Self would be multiple.11. 25 30 9. 9. In regard to him. some do say the following: “There are [Perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing. the concepts “he is” [and] “he is not” have ceased. nor now. however. “There is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing. 9.1.Wisdom Page 35 9 Analysis of [the Person] that Precedes [Action] 9.” 9. If that [entity] is established without seeing and such. The [enjoyer] who is before seeing and such does not exist then.3. . If there is no [entity] that exists prior to all [perceptual acts] such as seeing.8. that the agent of seeing is one [entity] and the agent of hearing is another. Well. The [enjoyer] also does not exist even at the time of those element (bhūta) from there are [perceptual actions] such as seeing and hearing and the sensation [that accompanies them]. This. [Suppose]on the other hand.7. such as seeing? 20 9. 9.12. the agent of sensation is yet another. The one who comes before them exists. makes no sense. then they also do not exist. and some [act] is made evident by some [enjoyer].6.

then what burns the fuel? 10. then the agent and the object [of the act of burning] would be identical. We would admit that fire. depending on fire. then [fuel] would establish [the existence] of what has already been established [to exist]. Fire does not come from something else. In this regard. then its dependence makes no sense. If fire is fuel. then what is established in dependence on what? 10. while other than fuel. [fire] would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. It is not the case that. without depending on fuel. Not going it. A thing that is dependently established is not yet established. still touches the fuel. and it would not be caused by the burning [of fuel]. fuel would exist without fire. If it is other than the fuel.4. “Fire.5. 10 10. then fire would exist even without the fuel. If fire exists in dependence on fuel. it depends [on that thing]. If that in dependence on which a thing is established is itself established in dependence on that very thing. In relation to fuel. still touches it. the remaining [critiques] have already been stated through [the analysis of] the [part of the path] being moved over.9.” But if [fire] is nothing more than merely that [burning of fuel]. To start [a fire] would also be pointless. What is not touched [by fire] would not burn. It is not the case that. “fuel is what is burning from the [fire]. starting it would pointless. [Fire] would burn always.10.6.11. 25 10. it would remain with its own mark (liṅga). [Fire. it would have no object [that it burns]. . one might think. 30 10. the [part] already moved over.12. 5 10. being already established. 10. 15 10. 20 10. if fire and fuel were to exist in mutual exclusion. Since it does not depend (nirapekṣa) on anything else. and that being the case. how then can it depend [on some thing]? If. is that on which fire or fuel depends? 10. just as a woman closely touches a man. while other than fuel. And inasmuch as it would always burn. would not touch it. It is not the case that without depending on fire. Not burning.3.” 10. 10. and if fuel [exists] in dependence on fire. It is not the case that.] being other [than fuel].7.1. fire exists. the fire would not go out. then which. and a man closely touches a woman.13.2.8.Wisdom Page 36 10 Analysis of Fire and Fuel 10. fire exists . fuel exists. fuel exists. And if such were the case. depending on fuel. Fire does not exist in fuel or when there is fuel. If fire [exists] in dependence (apekṣya) on fuel. being established first.

Wisdom Page 37 and the [part] not yet moved over.16. there is no fire. 5 10.15. and in relation to something other than fuel. . 10. Fire does not possess the fuel. and so on. cloths. nor does it exist in them. I do not think that they have understand the meaning of the Teaching. fuels do not exist in fire. Fire is not fuel. Such is also the case for jugs.14. Some point to identity and difference in regard to the Self and in regard to things. all procedures [for allegedly establishing] the Self and appropriation have been completely explained. 10. Through [the analysis of] fire and fuel.

Wisdom Page 38 11 Analysis of Beginning and End At this point. it is only for them that saṃsāra is cognized to be beginningless and endless. monks. according to the Buddha’s teaching. If the Self were nonexistent. the Blessed One said: 5 Monks. the cycle of births and deaths has neither beginning nor end. “If the Blessed One has refuted both the beginning and end of saṃsāra. it has neither start nor finish. is that saṃsāra is just a mere label (saṃjñā) [intended for] those whose minds are under the influence of error (viparyāsa). has the Blessed One not clearly taught that saṃsāra itself does not exist? Therefore. If something has neither start nor end. Good sir. “The Self (ātman) exists because saṃsāra exists. such is not the case for those in whom the wind of the wisdom of suchness has uprooted the tree that is ignorance’s obscurations. thinking.’” We respond as follows. part (bhāga) and locus (deśa). how can it have a middle? A start is a beginning. It is called “what comes before” or “the first. as in a tortoise’s pelt. you should train yourselves. “Monks. However. fettered with thirst. then how could he have said this: ‘Therefore.1. ‘Let us practice so as to put an end to saṃsāra. The following are synonyms: point. … Someone now objects. it is just a label because it is devoid of 10 15 20 25 30 35 . And that one is the Self. obscured by ignorance. it is known that [saṃsāra] does indeed have an end. aging and death is beginningless. [the Buddha] applies the following specification [in the aforementioned statement]: “beings …obscured by ignorance. saṃsāra exists because its middle exists. Hence. Therefore. that which does not exist does not have a middle. There would be a Self. he said that saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. what would cycle compulsively through the coming and going that is the continuum of birth and death? Indeed. the Great Sage said. then. bound with thirst’s tether. For such [persons].” Since it has neither beginning nor end.” An end is a termination. However.” He said so because saṃsāra is beginningless and endless. someone objects. as in the case of a torch-wheel. it is endless.” If saṃsāra were to exist. on might think. it nevertheless has a middle because [a middle] has not been refuted. so how could it have a middle? The idea. then there would necessarily be that which is prior to it and also that which is after it. it is called an “ending point” or “extinction. no beginning point is discerned for beings that cycle in saṃsāra.1. In other words. then the one cycling in saṃsāra exists. as is in the case of a vase. the Blessed One said. The whole tree that is the root and imprints of all their afflictive mental states has been incinerated by the fire that is the wisdom of a transmundane path. “Its starting point is not known. How so? Since 11. Starting point means “starting locus.2. if saṃsāra were to exist. At this juncture. If that is the case.” and so on. “Although saṃsāra has neither beginning nor end. nor is its ending point. saṃsāra exists. the cycle of birth.” [In response] we say this. Thus. consider this: 11. Hence. Hence.” You are being ridiculous. the following remains the case: saṃsāra does not exist because neither its starting point nor its ending point are perceived.” The beginning and end of saṃsāra have been refuted.

5. the Self also does not exist. Therefore. death. definitions and what they define. there is no starting point for any [such] things. after or simultaneous with [birth] cannot possibly apply to aging and death. in the case of birth. there is no sequence [whereby one is] before. in this case it does not make sense for them to be in a sequence [such that one is] before.4. The sequence of being before. after. aging. . and both would be causeless. In this fashion. 20 . feelings and the one who has them. or any [other such things that seem to occur in sequence]. and so on. [Nāgārjuna] said: 11. The one being born would die. Birth would be devoid of aging and death. Moreover. 11. or termination. 15 11. as is the case with space and a torch-wheel.7.11. Therefore. saṃsāra has no beginning. then aging and death would be later. since saṃsāra does not exist. If birth were afterward.6. after or simultaneous with [another]. then aging and death would be first. middle or termination. Demonstrating how it is that it does not make sense. saṃsāra does not exist.2. So why would they conceptualize it as aging and death? 11. If birth were first. Rather. or simultaneous [with the other].2. It is not just that saṃsāra has no starting point. and an immortal would be born. and for this very reason.Wisdom Page 39 5 beginning. birth cannot reasonably occur (***) with aging and death. or simultaneous with [aging and death] cannot possibly apply to birth. whether they be causes and effects. How can there be the causeless aging and death of one who is unborn? 11. Thus.3. Also. he said: 10 11. middle. after. So why would they conceptualize it as birth? The sequence of being before. the idea is that.8.

If suffering were existent. What must also be conceptualized is the person by whom.Wisdom Page 40 12 Analysis of Suffering 5 At this point. by both. Moreover.1.” Yet others claim. and it is the Self. if the person who is appropriating . some theorists are of the opinion. Some maintain that suffering is produced (kṛta) by itself. And it is not possible for the [suffering posited in this fashion] to be caused. In this regard. on his own (svayam).” But being posited in any of these ways. which are other [than those to be born]. the five appropriative aggregates are called “suffering. that suffering is made.” We respond as follows. he said: 12.” Others maintain. Instead. that suffering should pertain to something.” and it exists. “Suffering has arisen causelessly. 12. “It is produced by something else. “The Self does exist because the suffering related to it exists. If that is the case. the suffering is made by that person himself (svapudgala). by both. these aggregates [to be born] would be made by those [aggregates that are dying]. it should not lack a locus (āśraya). or if those [that are dying] are different from these [that are to be born]. suffering cannot be what is produced or made. then suffering would be produced by something other [than itself]. it would be produced by itself. … Or someone might object (atha syāt). we say 12. ‘Suffering is made by itself. then (tataḥ) it would not be the case that the [present suffering aggregates] arise in dependence (pratītya) on [the previous suffering aggregates].2. And in whatever way one asserts [its production]. If it were produced by itself. “We are not saying that suffering is ‘self-made’ because suffering itself creates suffering. defined as the five appropriative aggregates. Demonstrating this. [Nāgārjuna] said: 12. And if suffering were to exist.4. then without suffering. there is a locus of suffering. 10 15 20 25 30 35 What is conceptualized here is that this human suffering. and this is the maker of that [suffering]. there is no suffering that could be produced [in any of such fashion].3. [The point. If these [aggregates to be born] were different from those [that are dying]. since (hi) the aggregates [that are coming into existence] arise in dependence on those aggregates [of the previous life].’” In response. is that suffering is made by that person that the suffering indicates (prajñapyate). It is merely theoretical (pratijñāmātraka). “This is its suffering.” Well. then one must state distinctly. Therefore. what ‘own person’ is there such that the suffering has been made by that person itself.” Some hold the opinion. “Suffering is produced by itself. then there would be a Self. or else that it is causeless. or else causelessly. by something else. In this regard.] first of all. by something other than itself. It is in this sense that we say. If suffering is made by its own person. someone objects. Establishing this. it has not been given [to the present person] after having been made by some other person. “It is produced by both [itself and something else]. is made by the person himself.

then without suffering. how is there one to whom that suffering. suffering is not created by its own person.6.7. the persons are not different. having made the suffering. then that [suffering] has not been made by its own person. rather. rather. would hand it over to another? 10 12. 15 . That being the case. this is not the case because it is not possible to demonstrate a person who is distinct from the appropriation [of suffering]. what ‘other person’ is there who.5. suffering is not self-made because that [suffering] is not made by that same [suffering]. how can suffering be made by something else? 12.9.8. then without suffering. while there is a difference in terms of the appropriation [of either human or divine suffering]. And if something else is not self-made. 12.Wisdom Page 41 5 suffering of human has made the suffering of a god. Suffering would be made by both [self and other] if it were made by each. One might assert that. It is not just that the fourfold [establishment of] suffering does not exist. And how could there be causeless suffering that is not made either by itself or by something else? 12. First of all. would be given? 12. However. If suffering arises from another person. having been made by another. it has been made by another person. If suffering is arises from another person. the fourfold [establishment of all] external things does not exist.

then there would be some [entity that is] the empty. but they said that.7. On the other hand.2. they are all deceptive. Things are essenceless because it is observed that they change. 13. what other than milk becomes yogurt? 15 13. There is no non-empty.4.1 . If there were some [entity that is] the non-empty. If change pertains to a thing itself. Hence. The victors have said that emptiness is the death of all views. for those whose view is emptiness. The Blessed One has said. Due to the emptiness of things.8. If that which has a deceptive quality would be deceptive. 13.5. then yogurt would be milk. the Blessed one stated this as [a means to] indicate emptiness. there is no cure. “If there is no essence.6. . there is no entity that is or has a non-essence. All saṃskāras have deceptive quality. then about what is it deceptive? Rather. 13. Change does not pertain to a thing itself. how could there then be the empty? 13. “What has a deceptive quality is deceptive. nor to something other than that change because the youth has not become aged.3 . of what would there be change? 10 13.” 5 13. then of what is there change?” If there were an essence. nor has the aged one become aged.Wisdom Page 42 13 Analysis of Saṃskāras 13.

… Here. If one thing (anyad) were other (anyad) than another (anyasmād). there are three uses of the word “other. the vase is also other. 14. then it would be ‘other’ even without that other [thing] One [instance of the word] “other” (anya) stands for what is being pointed out.4. “If a cloth is different from a vase. and seeing. one should see that this is also the case with desire. 14. nor do they all together enter into conjunction with each other. there is no simultaneous conjunction of the three. Conjunction is of one thing with another that is other than it. 10 There is no conjunction of desire with the desirous. seer. Thus. As in the case of these [three]. in these three forms (traidhena). and there is no conjunction of desire with desiring. likewise. in these three ways—as anger. Also.2. The [object] to be seen. The remaining afflictive mental states are anger. And it is not just in the case of the seen [object] and so on that otherness does not exist. the [action of] seeing. the otherness of any thing from any other thing does not make sense.1. and [the act of] desiring. confusion and so on. the angered and [the act of] being angry—[do not enter into mutual conjunction]. and the one seeing—these three do not enter into binary conjunctions with each other.2. someone objects. that one thing is not ‘other’ without the other. And it does not make sense for one [thing] to be other than to which it is relating. Hence. rather. they do not enter into conjunction. the remaining afflictive mental states and the remaining media (āyatana) 15 do not enter into mutual conjunction.1. And [the media]—as ear. so too. then what is the problem?” We respond: 14.Wisdom Page 43 14 Analysis of Conjunction (saṃsarga) 14.6.5. 5 … Just as there is no binary or group (sarvaśaḥ) conjunction in the case of the seen. hearer and sound—[do not enter into mutual conjunction].” If a real thing 30 35 .3.2. 20 25 14. and that otherness does not exist in the case of the seen [object] and so on. One [thing] is other in relation to (pratītya) another. and if in relation to that separate (pṛthagbhūta) cloth. and another [instance] refers to what is other [than the aforementioned thing]. the desirous. Why is there no conjunction of them? [Nāgārjuna] said: 14. 14. Yet another [instance] expresses the usual sense [as in “other” or “different”].

nor does it exist in what is not other.” We respond as follows.8. or in relation to what is not other. . and the agent of conjunction do not exist. [Nāgārjuna] said: 14.1. “If the cognition of one thing (padārtha) as ‘other’ were dependent on some other thing. 20 25 30 … 14. 14. for the establishment of its reality (svarūpa)..’ … 14. Also. Therefore.” one must clearly accept that the one that is ‘other’ in relation to the other is not other than that other thing. Rather.” then what is the point of conceptually constructing otherness? That is. This would be the case. the cloth. … Here.8. namely. This means the following (tatra). would be ‘different. the thing (padārtha) in which it adheres is called “other” even without any dependence on or relation to another thing.” But this is not what we are saying. the problem that you have discussed is not applicable to our position. the [act of] conjoining. then neither the ‘other’ nor that [thing] itself exists.] otherness. “There is otherness in what is other. But that application of the term ‘other’ is established without otherness since otherness is being conceptually constructed for a thing to which one has already applied the term ‘other. which is without any dependence & relation to a cloth. if there were [that specific universal. And if otherness does not exist. then there would be this flaw. nor is the conjunction of one thing with another. To be specific. That is. independent of the cloth.1 . otherness is a specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa). we do not see any ‘otherness’ of a vase independent of [something else. and it does not make sense either way. you conceptually construct otherness for the purpose of establishing the application of the term ‘other’ (anyavyapadeśa). a cloth—then the thing called a “vase” would be ‘other’ even without that other thing. when conceptually constructing this otherness. the cloth.7. then the vase. The conjunction of a [thing] with that [same thing] is not reasonable (na…yujyate).’ However. someone objects. the vase itself does not depend on that other thing.e. Demonstrating this. the cloth. This is so because that which is ‘other’ than the other is established without that other [thing].2. Otherness does not exist in what is other. it must be conceptually constructed either in relation to what is other.Wisdom Page 44 5 10 15 called a “vase” were other than another—i.2 . [If] one has the notion. And if that were the case.7. “The one is not other than the other. Therefore. if the vase were ‘other’ even without that other thing. [the object] conjoined. such as] a cloth. In this way. in saying. “It is other. then there would be the otherness of a solitary vase.

] “It does not exist. 20 15. “It exists. one is forced into the [belief that things are] eternal.1. [To think.1. In his discussion with Kātyāyana.6. And if its essence does exist. 5 15.1. An intrinsic nature originated through causes and conditions would be manufactured. 15. If its essence does not exist. [To think].” “It does not exist. And an uncreated [i. They who see intrinsic nature.2 . how could there be nonexistence. how could an intrinsic nature be manufactured? 15.10. 15. of what would there be change? 15.2.1.1.Wisdom Page 45 15 Analysis of Svabhāva 15. The origination of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) through causes and conditions is not reasonable. 15 15.2. 15. how can there be [any] existence (bhāva)? [There cannot be] because existence is established when there is intrinsic nature or an extrinsic nature.4. then nonexistence would not [ever] apply to it. but it existed previously. Moreover.. If existence applied to [some thing] essentially.1. 30 . 15.1. Indeed. of what would there be change? 25 15.’ 15. “It is not the case that what exists by its own intrinsic nature does not exist. how can there be extrinsic nature? For the intrinsic nature of what is by nature other is called ‘extrinsic nature. 15.7.2. the Blessed One.” and both. existence and nonexistence do not see the reality in the Buddha’s teaching. without extrinsic nature and intrinsic nature. innate] intrinsic nature would have no relation to or dependence on what is other than it. one is forced into [the belief in] annihilation.10.8. extrinsic nature. who discerns the existent and the nonexistent.9.” is an annihilationist view. And if existence is not established.8. the discerning do not resort to either existence or nonexistence.11.9. [This is so] because it never makes sense for an essence to change. 15. refuted [the positions].e.5. “Now it does not exist.” Thinking this. say that nonexistence [means that] existence becomes something else.” Thinking this.3. If there is no intrinsic nature.2. 10 15. 15.2. “[The essence] exists” is to be eternalist.2. Therefore.

Wisdom Page 46 .

without samsaric existence. If saṃsāra were existent. “It goes on after having abandoned [the previous substratum]. [the Self]. things’ essence does indeed exist. so it would be causeless. And since. like a barren woman’s child. 16. would be without samsaric existence (vibhava). they do not exist. What would undergo saṃsāra? 25 … Moreover. the Skt. “The essence of things does exist because saṃsāra exists..Wisdom Page 47 16 Analysis of Bondage and Liberation 5 10 At this point. would either go on to the divine substratum after having abandoned the human substratum. if saṃsāra were existent. if [you] say. First of all (tāvat).’ If things do not have an essence. and since it does not yet have a new substratum. That which has no samsaric existence—i.” then do they flow together as permanent [things] or impermanent [things]? Among these [possibilities]. … 16. then. flowing from substratum (upādāna) to substratum. or else it would do so without having abandoned the human substratum. That is. What. term] vibhava [without substratum] means to be devoid (vigata) of samsaric existence (bhava). those [things] that are impermanent are destroyed immediately after arising. then it would necessarily be [the flowing together] of [mental] conditions or of a being (sattva). And that which has no substratum lacks .. [their] flowing together (saṃsṛti)—[their] movement from one realm of existence to another—is called ‘saṃsāra. it does not exist. and impermanent [things] are observed to be active (skriya). hence. “The person undergoes saṃsāra.1. then since it has abandoned the previous substratum. If [mental] conditions flow together. [the Self] would be devoid of those [aggregates]. 16. permanent [things] do not flow together because they are inert (niṣkriya). there is also no flowing together (saṃsāra) of impermanent [mental conditions]. media and elements. there is a problem with either [possibility].” When it is sought in five ways in relation to the aggregates. what is this thing that would flow? 30 35 In this regard. Hence. it would be without any substratum in between those times. then it is not the case those conditions that are flowing together are permanent. it would not have the cause that is the substratum of a name (prajñaptyupādānakāraṇarahita). this Self. if impermanent things [are what is flowing together]? Well. nor are they impermanent. then of what would there be saṃsāra? Of who or what would there [this] flowing together? It is not observed that the [mental] conditions (saṃskāra) of a barren woman’s son are flowing together.e. lacking any substratum.e. but it does not exist. Samsaric existence is the five substratal aggregates. going from a human substratum to a divine substratum. hence.” We respond as follows (ucyate). The saṃsaraṇa [of the aggregates] i. if one believes.3. Nāgārjuna said. 15 20 In this regard. how can impermanent [mental conditions] go to any [next realm of existence]? Thus. that which has no substratum—would be devoid of aggregates. [In the verse.2. Therefore. then things would indeed have an essence. “Mental conditions are flowing together. someone objects. The same steps [of this argument] apply to the being. saṃsāra must exist. What comes of this? Well.

extinction]. If the substratum were the binding (bandhana). … 30 16. and so forth. it does not exist. 16. … 5 16.” We respond as follows. In no way is it possible for mental conditions to obtain nirvāṇa. By changing the reading of the verse [in chapter 2]. nor does [it] bind that which is not yet bound. [The verse in chapter 2] should be applied in this manner. bondage should also exist.7. it is unmanifest. the binding would bind [that which is to be bound] if it were to exist before that which is to be bound.5. 16. but it does not bind [anything]. which have the quality of ceasing [when they] arise. That which is bound is not liberated. Indeed. in no way is it possible for a being to obtain nirvāṇa. nor are they liberated. and without that which is bound and that which is not bound. So in what state is [anything] bound? 20 16. The substratum would itself be the binding if it bound something. If that which is bound were being liberated. mental conditions. are not bound.9. and that which is now moving. but it does not [exist before it]. In other words. one should know 16.6. [then] will I have obtained nirvāṇa. 15 35 . As in the previous [argument]. 10 … Here. As for the remaining problems in this context.” Those who grasp [onto nirvāṇa] in this fashion grasp tightly to the substratum. What [kind of] thing is that? It is not anything at all. someone objects. And since that [substratum] exists.1. “Devoid of the substratum.. And that which has no substratum is not bound. Nāgārjuna said: 16.Wisdom Page 48 any indication [of its existence]. do exist. that which has not yet moved. “Although there is no bondage of either mental conditions or a being. Nor is a being bound or liberated. that which is currently being bound is not bound.7.8. and as such. and that which is not bound is not liberated. one should apply it as follows: 25 [The binding] does not bind that which is already bound. desire and such. the remaining [faults] which have been stated through [the analysis of] that which has moved. it is causeless.4. then bondage and liberation would be simultaneous. then that which possesses the substratum would not be bound. which are called ‘the substratum’ (upādāna).e. I will pass into nirvāṇa [i. Demonstrating how it is that [the substratum] does not bind anything.2.

Wisdom Page 49 16.10. Where nirvāṇa is not imputed and saṃsāra not denied. what notion of saṃsāra? . what notion is there of nirvāṇa.

the karma called ‘intention’ is mental [karma]. If.Wisdom Page 50 17 Analysis of Action (karman) and its Effect 5 10 At this point. and intention.” From the moment that one decides to [engage in] sinful (pāpa) karma. namely. [all motion]. then since the mind would cease immediately after arising. virtuous or nonvirtuous—i. it would not be contradictory for karmic actions to have a relation to [their] results. 15 20 17. also. if there were no saṃsāra as described here. “Speech and motion.. whose cause is that decision to 25 30 35 . Motion is movement of the body. “It is recorded (smṛta) that among these. “From today forward I will kill beings and steal [from them].] those recorded to be (smṛta) dispassionate.2. then a karmic action that has been committed would be related to a ripened result even in another rebirth. and a kind & loving (maitra) state of mind are [each] Dharma..3. saṃsāra exists. as in the following (iti kṛtvā): undemonstrative [karma] defined as non-dispassionate. and the one that is said to follow intention is corporeal and vocal [karma]. Therefore. however. saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result. which is [their] occurrence in the relation of cause and effect. In this regard. It is the seed of an effect in a future rebirth and/or here [in this life].e. If the Self or mental conditions were to flow in this fashion. the non-dispassionate [karmic form] named ‘undemonstrative’ and likewise the other undemonstrative [karmic forms.e. and undemonstrative [karma] defined as dispassionate. Hence. [these objectors] say the following: 17. 17. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be manifestations of karma (karmāñjana). “speech. virtuous or unvirtuous—i. that is how I will make my living. establishing & motivating (samuthāpika) an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms called. the undemonstrative is also [thus classified].17. “As in this twofold classification of demonstrative [karmic forms]. [One] thinks. Among these. the state of mind that cares for others.” Likewise.1. “Concerning these [verses].4 . However.2. “Saṃsāra does exist because it is the basis for the relation between karmic action and [its] result.5 . then there would be a relation between karmic action and [its] result. an example of undemonstrative [karma] defined as not dispassionate is as follows. undemonstrative [karmic forms]. there simply would be no relation between karmic activity and [its] result. “The various types of karma are widely known. someone objects. establishing & motivating an undemonstrative form defined as dispassionate or not dispassionate—is in general terms apprehended to be motion.” “What are those karmic actions? And what is the result? With the intention of stating the difference between them..2. “The highest sage said that there is karma that is intention (cetanā) and karma that follows intention (cetayitvā). the mental conditions or Self flows in saṃsāra (saṃsaraṇa) through an uninterrupted continuum that is the sequence of birth and death. all speech. “The state of mind (cetaḥ) that holds oneself back.1. speech is the enunciation of clear & manifest syllables. 17. and since there would be no ripened [karmic result] when [rebirth] is projected by karma. In this regard. 17. the merit that has continuity with use and the non-merit of that type.

then having ceased. undemonstrative [karmic forms] arise in them even when they are not engaged in those [deeds].6. An example is the construction of a temple where beings are killed. likewise [undemonstrative karmic forms]. there is a continuation (anugama) arisen in the continuum (santāna) of the giver. that has continuity with use. even when one is not doing that [unvirtuous act]. [but this problem] does not apply to us. From the use of that temple in such ways that beings are killed there.e. [With that employment this karma has] continuity (anvaya)—in other words.” At this point. first of all. This karma that [you] have stated to be of various types. If it has ceased [before the maturation]. These [karmic forms] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a dispassionate character. arise ceaselessly. they are indicated & made manifest as karma—they are defined as karma (karmalakṣaṇa). [consisting in the ritual of reciting the formula]. non-merit that has continuity with use.” Starting with the completion of those demonstrative acts of body and speech. that continuum does not occur. some [philosophers] object as follows. the nonvirtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative.” Although they are by nature form (rūpa) and action (kriyā). virtuous and nonvirtuous motion. how does it produce an effect?’ We respond to this as follows: 17. And without the seed. “So too. there is also nonmerit of that kind. In this way. does it remain until it matures? Or does it not remain because it ceases immediately upon arising? If. These undemonstrative [karmic forms discussed in these two examples] are called “undemonstrative [karmic forms] with a non-dispassionate character. that is. karma remains until it matures. defined as the mental karmic act of conditioning the mind. ‘Use’ (paribhoga) is the employment (upabhoga) on the part of the Saṅgha and such of an item that has been given away (parityakta). [suppose that one engages in] the demonstrative [acts] of body and speech. even when one is intoxicated and so on. this means the merit—the virtue—that is continuous with use. starting with the time that fishermen and such engage in deeds such as setting their nets.7. These seven entities (dharma) are recorded to be karmic manifestations. Hence. “[For others’ theory of karma. I completely refrain from taking life and so on. they are undemonstrative.” Just as there are these [types of undemonstrative karmic form]. And [there is] the non-merit of that type—i. there are also the other undemonstrative [karmic forms] that. “And there is intention. there arises in the continuum of those who built it the non-merit continuous with use. having a dispassionate character. undemonstrative [karmic forms] that are by nature accumulating merit arise in one. “From today forward. these are the seven types of karma: virtuous and nonvirtuous speech.. Also (ca). merit that has continuity with use. . [and that continuation] is an accumulating of virtue. there is] a problem in that the mental conditions are impermanent because of ceasing immediately upon occurrence. are by nature virtuous. For example. ‘If it has ceased [before the maturation]. how does it produce an effect? 35 40 … At this point. there is [karma that has] continuity with use.Wisdom Page 51 5 10 15 20 25 30 engage in nonvirtue. And you have said. then having ceased. some [Buddhists] from another tradition present another response. then it would be permanent. “In sum. “The result comes from a continuum beginning with the sprout that proceeds from the seed. the virtuous [karma] defined as undemonstrative. unlike demonstrative [forms]. 17. they do not demonstrate & indicate [anything] to others.

it is of four kinds.10. without the seed. “The imperishability (avipraṇāśa) is like a contract. it goes out of existence immediately after occurring. [the result] occurs when there is [the seed]. and by nature it is karmically neutral (avyākṛta). one should know 35 . that continuum starting with the sprout does not occur. having become that cause. In terms of realms. a vast host of effects arise from the cause [i. the one described by the buddhas. inasmuch as it has gone out of existence. it is a continuum that bears the names “sprout. raise problem[s] and offer [their own] answer to the objection. the effect does not occur. 17. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal.12 . The seed. “In this regard. “I will tell you the idea that is applied here. this host of effects arises provided that the supporting conditions are not incomplete. 17.” It is like the contract for a loan. “Therefore.. the mental continuum proceeds from a state of mind [involving an intention]. it is by nature the cause of a continuum that has the distinctive capacity to produce a distinctive future effect of the same type. and the result comes from that continuum. the effect is preceded by karma. [for those two reasons].8. … Such is the way that some answer the objection [that a ceased entity cannot have a karmic effect]. 15 20 17. Therefore. Dharma’s result is the five objects of sensual desire (kāmaguṇa) in this [life] and the future. if one were to have this idea (kalpanā) [about karma].e. regard to those [who have just given the above answer]. and it does not occur when there is no [seed]. Even though the seed is momentary. it is demonstrated that the seed is the cause of a result which is the continuum starting with the sprout. This being the case. although it is small. the effect is preceded by the seed. “leaves” and so on.Wisdom Page 52 5 10 “In this [verse it says the following]. Others. this idea does not make sense in this context. 17. “stalk” (nāla). but it does not follow that.13. Therefore. That is. [This does not follow] because when that karmic act is committed. Therefore.9. 25 30 “And what is that idea? We say. [when] a virtuous karmic act is committed. “From the state of mind comes a continuum.” “shoot” (kāṇḍa). as such.14. 17. And from the continuum starting with a sprout that proceeds [from the seed]. and from that [continuum] comes the [karmic] effect. and karma is like a loan. They say.11. And without that state of mind (citta). then ceases. 17. at that very time there arises in the karmic agent’s continuum an unassociated entity (viprayukto dharmaḥ) which is called that karmic act’s “imperishability. and [it] is neither annihilated nor eternal. “From the seed comes a continuum. and the effect arises from that continuum. pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas. however. Moreover. 17. therefore. “The ten forms of pure karmic action are the means to accomplish Dharma. “There are numerous and severe problems. its result would also be nonexistent. the seed].

And one should know that the karma—of which that entity called “imperishability” has arisen—is like a loan. it cannot cause another payment. “If [the imperishability] were to be abandoned through the abandonment [on the path of seeing] or through the progression (saṃkrama) of [its] karmic act. means that [an imperishability] is to be abandoned only after transcending the realm [in which its karmic act was performed].” which we have stated here. this “imperishability.19. form or formless realms.17. Instead. 17. is stated in other sūtras to be of four kinds in accord with the realm [of the karmic agent]—that is.Wisdom Page 53 5 10 15 that the imperishability is like a contract. in terms of the distinction of being [an agent] acting in the desire. 17. the [imperishability might] remain. “An [imperishability] ceases through the transcending of a result [on the path] or through death. “For all [karmic acts]. Therefore. This being the case. 35 . through establishing [by that karma] another entity called “imperishability. Even though [the effect] has ripened. Likewise. “Furthermore. or [one who is of the] uncontaminated [realm]. it is only to be abandoned [on the path of] cultivation. Through establishing a loan contract. 17. which are of two kinds. regardless of whether or not that [imperishability] still exists. The word “rather” (vā).15. karmic acts’ effect arises through [their] imperishability. that [creditor] is connected to a sum of wealth with compounded interest [to be paid at] another time. 20 25 30 17. there is rather the abandoning of the imperishability through the path of cultivation.15. an [imperishability] arises in the current life for each respective act. whether [those committed karmic acts] be similar or dissimilar. although the karmic act has ceased. … 17.” the karmic agent is connected to the result caused by that [karmic act]. Moreover.16. [Rather]. The karmic actions of an ordinary person are abandoned through the path of seeing. “It is not abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. One should classify an imperishability as either contaminated or uncontaminated. but even āryas have the karma of an ordinary person. [when] a loan contract has made the lender receive his payment and been consummated (nirbhuṅkta). Likewise. “Therefore. a [karmic act’s] imperishability. regardless of whether or not [the contract] still exists.2. cannot connect the karmic agent to another matured effect (vipāka). then the faults of karmic dissipation and such would absurdly ensue.1. 17.18. even though the karmic act of that [kind of imperishability] is abandoned. an imperishability is not destroyed even though the karmic act has been destroyed. “When connecting across lives (pratisaṃdhi). a single [imperishability] arises for all of the [committed] karmic acts of the same cosmological level. the creditor does not lose his investment even if [all of the lent] wealth has been used. “The imperishability is not [on of the afflictions] to be abandoned by the abandonment [on the path of seeing]. used in the sense of an alternative. rather (vā). as in a consummated contract. the imperishability is not abandoned through the path of seeing. having given [its] matured [effect].

23. the Teachers may emanate a [buddha] emanation. If karma were unmade.” 5 … At this point.20. Therefore.28. Why? Because it is essenceless.25. If karma [existed] essentially. since the eternal is not made (kriyate). If karma and afflictive mental states are empty. If there is neither karma nor agent. then there would be the fear of experiencing [karmic results] for something that one has not done.26 . “[In terms of this theory of karmic actions’ imperishability]. 25 35 . Karma does not arise. … 17. 17. 10 17. 17. nor is there karma established without conditions. but eternalism does not.] all conventions are contradicted. and that emanated emanation may again emanate another emanation. it does not cease. Saṃsāra [makes sense].” 30 17. Since these [alleged afflictive mental states] are not truly afflictive mental states. and any distinction between those who do good (puṇya) and those who do evil (pāpa) is impossible. And since it is unarisen. Karma and afflictive mental states are said to be the causal conditions for bodies. Karma would also be unmade (akṛta)]. Through his perfection of miraculous power. Karma is of the nature of afflictive mental states.27. Moreover. what despite will there be about [the emptiness of] bodies? 17.24 . And the fault of not living as a brahmacarin would also absurdly follow for this [position]. There is no karma arisen from conditions. “A being. 17.22. but they are not truly (tattvataḥ) afflictive mental states. 15 17. how could there an agent who experiences it? 17. If karma has an essence because it is established (vyavasthitha). we say the following. nor is he the same as that [karmic agent]. how can karma be truly [karma]? 17.29. is the agent that experiences [karmic effects]. there is also no agent that commits karmic acts. the Buddha taught that imperishability of karma is an elemental thing (dharma). that being is not different than the agent who did [the karmic act]. then how could there be an effect arisen from karma? And if there is no effect. emptiness [makes sense].31 .21. 20 17. then without any doubt it would be eternal.30. but annihilationism does not. There is no doubt that [through your view of karma.Wisdom Page 54 17. obscured with ignorance and fettered with thirst.then the ripened result of a [karmic action] would again be ripened.

karmic agents and effects — these are all like . karmic acts. and as for the karma that it did. it is like another emanation emanated by an emanation.32.33.Wisdom Page 55 17. Afflictive mental states. Likewise. the karmic agent is like the emanation. bodies. 17.

(MAV 6. however. These theories. consider the yogi who wishes to encounter the ultimately real and who wishes to eliminate all afflictive mental states and faults. although MAV has a more extensive analysis. Encountering Madhyamaka says: Insightfully seeing through his intellect that all afflictive mental states and flaws arise from the belief that a transient assemblage is the Self. then it would partake in occurrence and destruction. the yogi refutes the Self. nevertheless. he sees that its root is the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. Therefore. As for encountering ultimate reality. (2) the Self is the foundation for the aggregates. actions. someone objects. he intends to present a refutation of the Self only through these two theories. and he realizes that the Self is the focus of that belief. With this in mind. they appear to childish beings as if they were ultimately real. Candrakīrti will restrict himself to the portions of that analysis that are presented by Nāgārjuna in this chapter. and having realized that the Self is the object of that belief. or (3) the Self is the possessor of the aggregates. then what is ultimately real? Moreover. he does not present them again here. one eliminates that belief in a transient assemblage as the Self. can be subsumed under the theories that the Self LVP341.18 Analysis of the Self LVP340. in both the ‘Analysis of the Tathāgata’ (MMK 22) and the ‘Analysis of Fire and Fuel’ (MMK 10).1 In this regard. five theories are presented. he says: 18. whether internal or external. In this context. «Why is it that elsewhere. «Afflictive mental states. one can raise these possibilities: (1) the Self is based on the aggregates as its foundation. which are thus based on the Self. If it were something other than the aggregates. and effects—all of these are not ultimately real. like the cloud-city of the Sprites and so on. If the Self were the aggregates. And since Nāgārjuna wishes to state a concise argument. He also sees that through the nonperception of a Self. one stops all afflictive mental states. then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. 1 . although they are not ultimately real. which is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’? And when conceiving of this object of the habitual sense of ‘I. he first investigates the Self as follows: “What is this so-called Self. but I will just discuss the position presented here. Rather. through the nonperception of all things whatsoever. he concisely presents the above two theories.20) 15 20 25 30 Encountering reality should be understood in detail from this and other verses in Encountering Madhyamaka. or as distinct from the aggregates?” Here. whereas here there are only two theories?» The answer is that the five theories are already enumerated in those two contexts. both internally and externally.’ does one think of it as essentially the aggregates. Understanding that afflictive mental states are eliminated in this fashion. namely. since they are enumerated elsewhere. the ultimately real is the utter cessation of the habitual sense of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra) and the habitual sense of ‘My’ (mamakāra). that the Self and the aggregates are the same or that they are different. we say the following. In other words. and that by eliminating that belief.1 and aggregates are identical or that they are different. “What is the root of saṃsāra?” Examining it in this way.1 .1 5 10 At this point. how does one encounter the ultimately real?» In response. agents. But if this is the case. that yogi examines the situation by asking. embodiments. 35 One might ask.

Candrakīrti here refers to the theory of momentariness (kṣaṇikavāda). For example. all conditioned entities (saṃskṛtadharma) are conditioned in part because they are subject to the causes and conditions that produce them. the Self. as Nāgārjuna will later explain when he says: It is not the case that the Self. the Self is not the aggregates. 3 Since the karmic agent would thus cease every moment. would not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. perdurance and decay. If it were to arise. so I will not again offer any extensive elaboration now. the Self would be numerous. how could that which relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? (MMK 27.Wisdom Page 57 5 In this regard. The Self would necessarily be annihilated in cessation. Being produced from causes. the aggregates cease in Nirvāṇa. any causally efficient entity—i. one produced by causes and thus capable of producing effects—necessarily endures for only an instant (kṣaṇa).6) LVP342. the aggregates arise from causes and conditions and their defining characteristics are occurrence.1 This position should be understood through studying this section of Encountering Madhyamaka. On this theory. then since according to Candrakīrti’s Buddhist interlocutor. which here refers to Buddhist nirvāṇa. but it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. which is different from a cow. arises. one should understand this position through the analysis presented in Encountering Madhyamaka in the section that begins. if one thinks that the Self is the aggregates. or else the Self would have arisen causelessly. perdurance (sthiti).. For if the Self were something other than the aggregates. 15 If the Self were the aggregates. then it too would endure only a moment. the Self would also cease. and thus they endure only a moment.e. 4 3 2 . And it is not accepted that the Self arises and ceases because various problems would absurdly follow.127-128) LVP343. then the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics. if the 20 25 The term for cessation is nirvṛtti. (MMK 27. then since the aggregates are numerous. such an entity comes into and goes out of existence every moment. The aggregates are known to be causally efficient. if the Self were identical to the aggregates. hence. and the karma accumulated by one Self would be experienced by another. being previously nonexistent. Here. then a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed. then it would follow that the Self would partake in occurrence and destruction—that is. Likewise. it would follow that the Self is a substance. And since the opponent here accepts that the cessation of the Self in this fashion would amount to Annihilationism (ucchedavāda).1 Also.12) And he will also say: 10 The Self is not the substratum. and cessation (nirodha). if one were to maintain that the Self were identical to the aggregates. a horse. and it would not be incorrect for the term “Self” to refer to a substance. does not have a cow as its defining characteristic. when it is conceived as different from the aggregates. The point is that. In any case. it would become something that arises and ceases— since the aggregates partake in occurrence and destruction. See MAVBh (296a). it must be contradictory to maintain that the Self is the aggregates.4 Therefore. they have three defining characteristics: arisal (jāti). According the ontology of Vaibhāṣika Abhidarma. there would be no karmic result for him. (See AK: 0000). In the same manner. (MAV 6.2 and in every moment prior to cessation it would arise and cease. the substratum arises and ceases. in the first place. because they are conditioned (saṃskṛta). And so.

Nāgārjuna LVP345. hence. Hence. It is true that the Tīrthikas state a defining characteristic of the Self separate from the aggregates. (3) the apprehension of an object’s sign.’ but like the image of one’s face. as you maintain. «The Tīrthikas know of a Self separate from the aggregates.Wisdom Page 58 5 10 15 Self does not have the aggregates as its defining characteristics. they do not realize. The Tīrthikas’ system has come to be further divided in terms of this or that distinction in the qualities predicated of the Self. In the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (MMK 8). And the way that the Tīrthikas speak of a separate defining characteristic for the Self is stated in the following verse from Encountering Madhyamaka: The Tīrthikas conceive of a Self that is by nature eternal. Without relying on a mirror. It is observed that. then the Self would be established with a distinct defining characteristic. The Self is not. in dependence upon a mirror. and (5) representation of an object. there is an image of one’s face. And in that case. the aggregates would not be its defining characteristics.» (MAV 6. and they then state its defining characteristic. If. or it would be like nirvāṇa. they depart even from conventional reality. there is no Self distinct from the aggregates. and they thus speak LVP344. just as consciousness is asserted to be different from material form. he refutes the above notion of Self in even conventional terms. however. it would not be called the “Self. As such. and by saying this. the image of one’s face is not seen. “If the Self were different from the aggregates. it is also not reasonable for the Self to be different from the aggregates. I will not labor to demonstrate this point here. ‘I’ am not seen. It is also said. without relying on the aggregates.” nor would it be reasonable for it to be the object of the habitual sense of ‘I. the Self would either be like a sky flower. and due to their false concepts.1 says that the Self and its substratum are established in mutual dependence on each other. . just as consciousness is apprehended as established with a defining characteristic distinct from material form. through not properly understanding dependent designation. because it does not exist. (2) experience. due to their fear. Rather. here is another meaning of the statement. then the Self would not have occurrence. but they do not state its defining characteristic after having perceived the Self in its actuality. Someone objects. they become confused by what is merely spurious inference. it is observed that. it is not really anything at all. it is an experiencer without being an agent. it would be apprehended as being established with a distinct defining characteristic. perdurance and decay as its defining characteristics. it is devoid of qualities and inactive.142) We respond as follows.1 of its defining characteristics. there is the habitual sense of ‘I. As such.’ Therefore. Alternatively. Likewise. 20 25 30 35 40 Since the above has already been stated. that the Self is merely nominal. apprehended in that fashion. because it is unconditioned. Not realizing this. Thus confused. (4) conditioning. in dependence upon the aggregates. but in reality it is not anything at all. so too. the Self were asserted to be different from the aggregates. this way of refuting the Self does not refute them. they conceptually construct a Self due to their confusion.” These are the defining characteristics of the five aggregates: (1) malleability.

As the Master has said. even though a series of statements might be false. The mirage does not. false entities—namely. Likewise. those seeking liberation do not perceive it in this manner in terms of some essential existence. 5 20 25 30 35 . thus.. due to their distorted vision. A form that is viewed from afar is seen clearly by those nearby. for them. As Nāgārjuna said in the Ratnāvalī: 10 15 The aggregates arise from the habitual sense of ‘I’. which are the basis for that designation. then its parts are not perceived because they have been burned. Hence.2. necessarily Note here the slippage between the truth value of a statement or belief (i. they are far from seeing the suchness of the entities that are the Self and the Self-owned in accord with the way those entities are established. one might reasonably say that much can come from a false seed. nor is it real.1 near the vision of those entities’ suchness. A mirage seems to be water.’ And since it has been forsaken. but being signless like a mirage. the imputations that are the Self and the aggregates—appear to be real to ordinary persons due to their ignorance. the habitual sense of ‘I’ is ultimately unreal. and its blazing rays. “unreal”). the five aggregates. one forsakes the habitual sense of ‘I. (RV1. Likewise. and the focus of that obsessive apprehension is that which is being just dependently designated. the aggregates do not arise again. are like the spouting flames of an intense fire.29-30)5 In the summer. the yogi dwells near the vision of the ultimate. beings obsessively apprehend the Self.e. 18. the mirage induces a cognition. In those people who are far from it. one all the more easily does not perceive the Self-owned. wavers slightly. the final month’s midday sun. the aggregates.Wisdom Page 59 5 Imbued with the error of ignorance. if a mirage is actually water. and in that cognition dark blue water appears. living in saṃsāra. but it is not water. nor are they even real. That is. when the yogis realize the essencelessness of the Self. The problem is that.52-54) Due to the non-perception of the Self and the Self-owned. To those. and as such. it is not seen by those nearby. intent on searing the rough and dry earth. people perceive a mirage that looks like water. who dwell LVP347.1.. induce such a cognition in those who are nearby. but they are not the Self. however. Those who seek liberation should examine that focus by asking. wishing to climb to the middle of a cloudless sky. while it may indeed be the case that no thing can arise from an unreal seed. and focusing on a rough and dry place. “The five aggregates appear to be its substratum. if a chariot is burned. they may still motivate action — they might even lead to a war. that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is a false belief) and the unreality of that statement of belief (i. is it then defined by the aggregates or not defined by the aggregates?” Investigating the Self in every way. How can anything whose seed is unreal be ultimately produced? Seeing that the aggregates are thus unreal. that ahaṃkāra is anṛta in that it is asat. how could the Self-owned (ātmīya) exist? LVP346.1 Since the Self is not perceived. they do not appear to be real. (RV1. however. why do those nearby not see it? Those far away who view the world see it to be real just as it is.e. just then do they necessarily realize also the essencelessness of those Self-owned entities. if the Self does not exist. the aggregates seem to be the Self. Indeed. Likewise. Perceiving the rays of the shining sun.

fully extinguished.’ then one does not see.2. And hence. As the Blessed One has said. the yogi becomes one who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’. In no way is the essential reality of the Self and aggregates perceived. 25 All mental sophistry (cittavitarkaṇa) is conceptual structuring (prapañca). because: 5 10 18. appropriation (upādāna) ceases.Wisdom Page 60 18. Through the cessation of appropriation.” is one whose mind has not arisen and does not exist. that being the case. 18. Empty things are proclaimed through words: with words it is said. If one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. Internally and externally. .2. The Self is the object of the habitual sense of ‘I’. In other words.» This is not so. when [the thoughts] “I” and “my” have ceased.’ then one does not see reality (tattva). one should realize that if one sees he who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I. as are his aggregates. the Self-owned. that they are not perceived. are the objects of the habitual sense of ‘my’. birth ceases. the aggregates.e. they are the five aggregates. The Blessed One also said.4 . and inasmuch as he exists. The aggregates are essentially empty and void. his Self is established. thinking. he is without ‘mine’ and without the habitual sense of ‘I. how could some other entity exist such that it would lack ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’? In contrast. the Element (dhātu) is essentially empty and void. See that the internal is empty! See that the external is empty! Even the one who meditates on emptiness does not exist! He likewise said. As a result. He who lacks ‘my’ and the habitual sense of ‘I’ does not exist. “They are beyond words. not the childish..3. so know that things are unthinkable.’ due to quieting the Self and the Self’s possessions. 15 20 One who ponders things. «But this yogi who has no ‘my’ and no ‘I’ does exist. “They are extinguished. i. LVP348. fully extinguished. “Quieting” them means that they do not arise. thinking. “They are extinguished.” One who ponders things.” is a child following a faulty path. the Self-owned. LVP349.1 The ‘Self’s possessions’ (ātmanīna) are that which aid the Self.1 30 Even the one who practices is essentially empty: this is so for the wise.

and thus.1 which has appropriation as its causal condition. how could birth. 10 15 This is so because. LVP350. come from concepts. first of all. lot. the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self is the root of all afflictive mental states. and that comes from conceptual structuring (prapañca).5. Conceptual structuring. I know your root: you are born from conceptuality. one form of mental elaboration consists merely in the association of sounds in one word with the sounds in another.6 material form and sensation. however. All of these worldly conceptual structures cease in emptiness. namely. And if saṃsāric existence has been stopped.1 . cot and tot. then. agent. the appropriation of desire. it is their origin. How so? Because the aforementioned web of conceptual structuring occurs [only] if one perceives a real thing. when one has eliminated appropriation. aversion. 6 30 35 LVP351. there is no more saṃsāric existence. for example. The process of stopping birth is established in this fashion. that is. and confusion come from conceptuality because they arise in dependence on the beautiful. female and male. and so they do not cause conceptual structuring to The actual examples here are ghaṭa (“water-pot”). instrument and action. one eliminates the four kinds of appropriation. The point of this litany is simply that the words contain similar sounds in Sanskrit. pot. This is so because. gain and loss. their cause. (MMK 23. death and so on occur? Thus. mukuṭa (“diadem”) and ratha (“chariot). praise and blame. Through eliminating that belief.Wisdom Page 61 5 According to the sūtras. ascetic vows. desirous men do not perceive a barren women’s daughter to be elegantly beautiful and youthful. you will no longer be in me. and Self-oriented philosophies. through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. No longer will I conceptualize you. object. 25 Desire. Through the nonperception of the Self and the Self-owned. Those various kinds of conceptual structuring include: knowledge and the known object.» We respond: 18. is improperly conceptualizing material form and so on. happiness and suffering. ceases in emptiness. defined as repeated existence in saṃsāra (punarbhava). as a childish. or to put it another way.5. and error. «What. and therefore it is established that 18. it is established that through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. linguistic referent and linguistic expression. 20 This is so because afflictive mental states such as desire arise in one who. the babble of language. decay. is that thing due to the cessation of which karma and afflictive states also cease? You should say what it is. the ugly. And the concepts arise from various kinds of conceptual structuring to which one has become conditioned throughout one’s beginningless saṃsāric existence.2.1. paṭa (“cloth”). And from eliminating appropriation comes the end of birth. views. ordinary person. karma and afflictive mental states.1) And it is also said in a sūtra. Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptuality (vikalpa). As Nāgārjuna will explain: It is said that attachment. In this manner. they cease when one sees that all things are empty of essence. one eliminates the belief that the transient assemblage is the Self. fame and obscurity. thus. and so on.

there are only these two. Instead.” LVP352. And through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states. decay and death. “One who is my-less and lacks I-making does not exist. that single web of the grief. all karma and afflictive mental states cease. distress and confusion that comes from birth. birth ceases. Scrutinizing that collection of entities in that fashion. concepts cease. which is defined as the peace that is the quieting of all conceptual structuring. In the same manner. And without doing karmic actions. And without focusing conceptual structuring on that object. And just by virtue of the absence of that. those men do not produce the host of afflictive mental states. they do not experience the jungle of saṃsāra. Nāgārjuna says. Master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness as explained above. they do not engage in virtuous. non-harm. And due to the elimination of conceptual structuring.” what is born and dies is merely elements (dharma). I have already explained how it is that this master is not following Master Nāgārjuna in regard to this issue.23) 25 In contrast.1 . suffering. Therefore. seeing that all conditioned things are unarisen. they do not engage in karmic actions. And without focusing conceptual structures on that object. from the imagined determination of “I” and “My. And through the cessation of concepts. “And at the LVP353. which is called “birth. In our view. Yogis in the state of seeing emptiness do not perceive an essential reality of the aggregates. wailing.” That is to say. from the imagined determination of “I” and “My. Hence. they do not experience saṃsāra. the web of concepts. emptiness itself is called. he says: The aggregates are a mere collection of conditioned entities that arise in one moment and cease in the next. in short. Not perceiving an essential reality of things. And without focusing a web of concepts on that object. nonvirtuous or immutable karmic actions. How much more so is the case for the great bodhisattvas who.” As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: The Transcendent Ones have said that the Dharma is. Mymaking does not make any sense with regard to any internal or external thing. And without having concepts. which have the nature of satkāyadṛṣṭi. dwell in the practice of nonconceptual wisdom? And hence. [on the part of the saintly śrāvaka] there is no determination of something in its real nature that is an “I” devoid of I-making and Mymaking. and that emptiness itself is nirvāṇa. And not engaging in karmic actions. from resorting to emptiness. “Since there is no entity that is called a “Self.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states beginning with satkāyadṛṣṭi. a saintly śrāvaka has the realization.Wisdom Page 62 5 10 15 20 occur with her as an object. they do not produce the host of afflictive mental states. since it is defined by the cessation of all conceptual structuring. the Self is the object of I-making. there comes the elimination of all conceptual structuring. “Nirvāṇa. (CŚ 12. extensions or elements. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi.” And without producing the host of afflictive mental states. and when the Self is [known to be] nonexistent. whose root is satkāyadṛṣṭi. they do not cause conceptual structuring to occur with them as objects.1 30 35 In Encountering Madhyamaka. I presented my critique in the passage beginning. aging and death. then I-making will not occur. they do not have concepts about it. they are neither the Self nor the Self-owned. they do not focus distorted (ayoniśaḥ) conceptuality on that object. except for a conventional designation.” Hence.

nor does it occur causelessly. 15 LVP354. Subhūti. If that is the case. I will not go to the effort of critiquing him again now. he said: Positive and negative karma does not just disappear. the Blessed One said: 5 Subhūti. And he also said: 10 “I will become a Sugata’s śrāvaka!”. How are the above statements. just as one cannot cross the river if one fails to see the ford. which go on at length. whereas the śrāvakas have a less extensive realization (i.8cd. one who wishes to awaken to a śrāvaka’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom. If he does not resort to this tolerance. Having been done by one’s Self.1 25 MAV 1. then the distinction between bodhisattvas and śrāvakas cannot be that the former has a more extensive realization (i. the great bodhisattva who wishes to awaken to complete and perfect awakening should practice this Perfection of Wisdom. it will be experienced by one’s Self. or “I will be a Dharma King!”: one who wishes to do such things cannot succeed. what other protector could there be? For it is through a well tamed Self that the wise reach heaven. 7 . One does not transfer the karmic result to someone else. but there are elemental things with their causes. they realize the essencelessness of things). or “I will become a pratyekabuddha!”.. The gist of the argument in Candrakīrti’s commentary on this verse is that if it takes until the seventh stage for a bodhisattva to exceed a śrāvaka in intelligence. but not of things). they realize only the essencelessness of persons.e. And did he not likewise say: LVP355.e. what other protector could there be? For the Self is the witness to one’s deeds.1 At this point. And in the King of Samādhi.Wisdom Page 63 stage called ‘Far Advanced.’ he will surpass them in intelligence as well.” and that this nonoccurrence comes about due to the nonperception of external and internal things. Translation by Huntington (1989:150). someone objects. not contradicted by your position?» We respond as follows. good and bad. On the same issue in the Eight Thousand Lines on the Perfection of Wisdom. then how does it not contradict this statement by the Blessed One: The Self is the Self’s savior. 20 The Self is the Self’s savior. one who wishes to awaken to a pratyekabuddha’s awakening should practice this perfection of wisdom And Subhūti. Is it not so that the Blessed One also said this: There is neither a being nor a Self here. and if a bodhisattva at the first stage (where emptiness has been directly realized) is already superior to the śrāvakas in some other regard..”7 Hence. «Suppose it has been established that suchness (tattva) is the nonoccurrence of conceptual webs concerning the internal or external as “I” and “My.

…The Self is not consciousness.1 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . and the Self is not that which possesses material form. above) and also from the Encountering Madhyamaka. Hence. the buddhas have used the label.Wisdom Page 64 The Self is not material form.” “water. which are divided into the definitive and the interpretable. The peerless friends of many worlds (jagad).” LVP356. the buddhas are intent upon fulfilling their promise to uplift every world of beings. “This world does not exist. While established within just conventional reality. 5 And did he not also say that all things are Selfless? But how then could there be no contradiction between these passages and the preceding passages? Hence. we should seek the intention of the Blessed One’s teaching in these contexts. There is also an argument to refute those who reject causality. nor is consciousness in the Self. the distinctive and desired result that is heaven or emancipation.” “fire. grain mush. namely. being bound with that cord LVP358. elements and measures of “earth. There is no such thing as the maturation of the results of virtuous and nonvirtuous deeds. nor does the next. they reject the next world and the Self by saying things such as. Thus. There is no such thing as spontaneously born beings. they deny what has come before and what will come next.” They thus say that minds have just arisen from the mere ripening of the elements in the embryo and so on. In some persons. nor is the Self that which possesses consciousness. Some disciples.1 behavior. a leavening agent. and this can be learned in detail from the “Analysis of Factors in Action and their Object” (i. Doing so.e. like the perceptions that come from an intoxicant with a special intoxicating and stupefying capacity that is caused by its production from the mere ripening of certain substances. they entirely cure the enormous sickness that is the negative mental states. and so on. I will not make any further effort here for the sake of refuting that view.. nor is material form in the Self. Doing so. “It is so—there is a Self”. they reject what leads to a certain kind of result. Hence. “the Selfless. The blessed buddhas are like never-setting suns intent on making the host of lotuses that are the disciples’ minds bloom with the extensive sunbeams that are their great compassion. In order to eliminate those beings’ false view.” Even though they fly far. the buddhas conform to the mindset (āśaya) of each world of beings which are of eighty-four thousand different kinds in terms of beings’ minds and LVP357. These buddhas desire to care for disciples of inferior.1 . methods and awareness. such as roots. “Self. the great kings among healers. they are always and constantly engaged in conditioning themselves with nonvirtuous karmic acts. Hence.” Through these denials. In general in their sayings. are like birds bound with a cord that is tough—due to the difficulty of the belief in a real Self—and very long—due the love of “I” and “My. they do this so as to turn those disciples away from nonvirtue and so on. As such. for the inferior disciples who are engaged in nonvirtuous karmic deeds. method and great compassion. they are intent on describing the names.1 The intention here is as follows.6. however.” and “wind. Chapter 8. even though those things are not beyond the scope of pure worldly vision. they are headed for a fall into the great chasm of hell and so on. and they do so fully equipped with wisdom. 18. they do not see the various things of the world.” and they have also taught. the eye of the intellect is entirely covered by the thick cataracts of inferior theories that are mistaken about the unreality of the Self and the Selfless. and denying that. The Self is not in consciousness. the blessed buddhas in some cases make it known in the world. middling and great capacities. and even though they engage in positive karmic acts and shun negative ones. The Self is not in material form.

neither is real. And to some. To some. It cannot be represented. nor any non-Self whatsoever. he taught one that is based upon duality. It is for this reason that Āryadeva said. due to the various intentions of lesser.” Just as the view that there is a Self is not ultimately true (atattva). and so on. “Self” is one extreme. or to negate non-Self. the Sage did not call them either real or unreal. As for what one sees. The one who knows this is wise. so too its opposite—the view that there is no Self—is also not ultimately true. he taught a profound Dharma that terrifies the timid. Having determined that these disciples have that distinctive aspiration. one refutes the absence of virtue.2. It has neither location nor appearance. hears. Next one refutes the Self.Wisdom Page 65 5 they are still unable to pass beyond the Three Dimensions and obtain peaceful nirvāṇa. Last one refutes all. 35 He taught to some a Dharma not based on duality.1 20 In this way. And in the Ratnāvalī it says. In some disciples. The middle that is between these two extremes is cannot be indicated (arūpya).15) 30 Likewise. Therefore.3-4) 25 In this way. or to negate both. Likewise. neither Self nor non-Self is ultimately perceived just as it is. For these middling disciples—so as to cool their attachment to the belief that the transient collection of mind and body is a real Self. (CŚ8. the Buddha taught the Dharma in accord with his disciples’ abilities. Thus. and it is the LVP360. A grammarian will make some students recite even the alphabet.” There is. they taught that there is neither any Self. where there is neither decay nor death. Kāśyapa. there Mādhyamikas do not contradict the scriptures.6. the Master said. taught. And to some. the teaching of the blessed buddhas’ dharma occurred in such a way as to negate the Self. because from a thesis comes its antithesis. so too. “There is no Self. This is as it says in the Āryaratnakūṭa: 10 15 Kāśyapa. and so as to engender within them a yearning for nirvāṇa—the blessed buddhas. it is called the middle way. At first. that seed has ripened and they have drawn close to nirvāṇa.1 . the Great Sage refuted both the belief in Self and in non-Self. it is aimed at the practice of virtue. the buddhas have taught. In this way. The Dharma he taught to some is for the purpose of stopping negativity. and they have the capacity to plumb the depths of the actual meaning of the king of sage’s highest. These excellent disciples are devoid of Selflove. it cannot be marked. deep words. and “Selflessness” is a second extreme. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. however. LVP359. middling and excellent disciples. (RV2. wishing to take care of those disciples. Therefore. 18. a seed that is an intense aspiration for the profound dharma—an interest obtained through the distinctive qualities that come from previous habituation. the true discernment of things. its essence is wisdom and compassion. it cannot be shown.

another meaning [of MMK18. these thinkers posit a Self [so as to provide some basis for that relation]. there is no relation between karmic acts and their results.” 15 As it says in the Tathāgataguhyasūtra. flies and so on that are perceived by those with cataracts. (RV4. The ‘pacification of error’ is a synonym for the pacification of causes and perceptual conditions. the buddhas have taught. Through pacifying the belief in the transient constituents as the Self.1 5 20 25 30 35 40 . by pacifying the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Not seeing such things.Wisdom Page 66 means to attain awakening. and it is a jackal’s foot. all wishing (praṇidhāna) is pacified. all those negative mental states arise from the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. Śāntamati. Therefore. the bodhisattva Śāntamati said this to the Blessed One. all negative mental states are pacified. They do so with statements such as. The ‘pacification of eternalism and annihilationism’ is a synonym for the pacification of the belief that the transient constituents of mind and body constitute an essential Self.6] is as follows. And through the pacification of all wishing. on the other hand. in the case that karmic imprints (saṃskāra) go out of existence every moment. Hence. and conceptual constructions’ is a synonym for the pacification of recognition and mentation (manasikāra).2] so too. The ‘pacification of recognition and mentation’ is a synonym for the pacification of error. The ‘pacification of the negative mental states’ is a synonym for the pacification of ideas. LVP361. and conceptual constructions. “Oh Blessed One. Through the pacification of all beliefs. concepts. 10 But just as those without cataracts do not at all see the hairs. leaves and fruit wither. The ‘pacification of ideas. So too. The ‘pacification of causes and perceptual conditions’ is a synonym for the pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence.94-96) Alternatively. the term ‘pacification’ is a synonym for the pacification of the negative mental states. all negative mental states are pacified. when a tree’s root is cut. some negative mental states occur in a way that is connected to the belief in perceptual conditions and causes. pacification.” or a “non-self” that is imagined by childish persons. through their reasoning see no Self that would be an agent of continuity [from one life to the next]. “There is neither the Self nor the Selfless at all. so too the buddhas do not at all see any real entity (vastusvarūpa) such as a “self. concepts. For example. they assert that there is no Self. this is what the learned say. it has been said. There is a person just to the extent that there is an object of the senses. The ‘pacification of ignorance and the thirst for existence’ is a synonym for the pacification of I-making and My-making. Perceiving this. The ‘pacification of I-making and My-making’ is a synonym for the pacification of eternalism and annihilationism. Oh Bhadrā. Śāntamati. And so. “Good sir. ‘pacification. all of its branches. Śāntamati. Some thinkers such as the Sāṃkhyas perceive that.’ But what is this ‘pacification’? And from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One answered. all beliefs are pacified. The Lokāyatas. [18.6.

1 . it is not conceptualized. it is not put together. the mind burns. due to perceptual objects. it is not made to occur. And what is unreal and imagined.” through the view of emptiness. “Oh Blessed One. the bodhisattva with skill in means. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. fire burns in dependence on its fuel.’ then what did they teach?» We respond: 18. it stops. it is not determinately known. «If the blessed buddhas taught neither ‘Self’ nor ‘notSelf. that belief is not located internally. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is the non-occurrence (asamutthāna) of the Self. one does not apprehend that belief. it is the non-occurrence of a person. pacified. the one who is purified by the perfection of wisdom. They do not come together. When the mental object has ceased. it is the non-occurrence of beings. In this regard.1 LVP364. through the tolerance conducive to emptiness. Śāntamati. someone says. they do not accumulate. if the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is not recognized. yet he does not pacify the perception of the root of virtue.’ But from the pacification of what does this pacification come?” The Blessed One said. as for “transient constituents. it is the non-occurrence of views. they do not cause harm. that is not imagined. that which is to be named has ceased.” Śāntamati said. Moreover. that is not made. At this point. but without depending on its fuel. Śāntamati.1 LVP363. Śāntamati. one does not apprehend that belief. That belief is not located at all. For example. This too. the mind burns. they do not conglomerate. The one that does not repeatedly take perceptual objects does not burn. Such is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self. what is the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self?” The Blessed One answered. Like nirvāṇa. to recognize the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is to know that this unlocated view has no location. Śāntamati.7. they do not adhere.” Śāntamati asked. but without perceptual objects. of nonoccurrence—through this view. they do not come apart.Wisdom Page 67 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Śāntamati. That is what is called “peace. all appropriation and affliction arises. Śāntamati. it has been said. Śāntamati. the “transient constituents” are not constituents. that bodhisattva knows the pacification of all perceptual objects. it stops. So too. Śāntamati. “But Blessed One. nor is it located externally. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is a synonym for emptiness. of non-conditioning. ‘pacified. What is not imagined and not conceptualized. “Through perceptual objects (ārambana). Śāntamati. then all appropriation and affliction do not arise. LVP362. they are unreal. it is the non-occurrence of a living thing. unceased. of the unknown. of signlessness. the recognition of the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is also the fact that. they are imagined. of wishlessness. Śāntamati. “Śāntamati. From the very beginning. But when the belief that the transient constituents constitute an essential Self is recognized. Not burning it is said to be pacified.

the Tathāgata never uttered even a single syllable. “When the mental object has ceased. the mind does not engage with it. But when that which is to be named has ceased—that is. But what kind of thing is this ultimate? Can it be expressed or known?» Therefore. the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere. nor will the Tathāgata do so. in other words. it was said that. it remains entirely the case that the buddhas did not teach anything at all. “Conceptual structuring. And there is yet another interpretation of the verse (atha vā). what must be supplied is “in the ultimate” (tattve).” Like nirvāṇa. another objection: «It has been said [at 18. then to what would a semantic sign be attributed such that words would refer to it? Demonstrating why it is that there is no mental object.Wisdom Page 68 5 10 15 Here. Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama). And when the mind is not engaged. no longer appropriating [the aggregates]. it is a perceptual object (ārambaṇa). will pass into final nirvāṇa. Such is indeed the case.” The explanation of this line as given before should be added here. however. one night the Tathāgata awoke to complete awakening. Nāgārjuna says. «Previously.1 20 25 30 35 40 . Someone objects. sorcerers (vidyādhara). That being the case. and it embarrassingly outshines the mass of rays that come from the seven suns which cause the fire in the eon LVP366. through the nonperception of any external or internal real thing.” and so on. and so on. Through uttering just an instant of speech. and one night the Tathāgata. “Like nirvāṇa. unceased. if there were some real thing to be named. when there is no object of words—then the buddhas do not teach anything at all. that which is to be named has ceased. For this reason.” In this phrase. unceased. how could words refer? Therefore. did the Blessed One give various kinds of dharma-teachings to all gods. the nature of things (dharmaprakṛti)—is established to be unarisen. adepts. The Tathāgata never spoke a single syllable.4].1 There might be. Nāgārjuna will say [at 25. in this context. For this very reason. then through the attribution of some semantic sign (nimitta) to it. “when the mental object has ceased…. the Tathāgataguhyasūtra says. then that would be taught. Nāgārjuna says. That light banishes the mental darkness of this and that being. the dharmatā—that is. words would apply to it. there arises a great light like the autumn sun. If there were some object of the mind. “When the mental object has ceased. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. namely. Between these two nights. Why has that which is to be named ceased? Nāgārjuna says. How. unceased. both internally and externally. it dries up the ocean of decay and death. “Like nirvāṇa. LVP365. But in this regard. humanoids (kinnara).” Mental object (cittagocara) means an object of the mind (cittasya gocaraḥ). Śāntamati. then. ceases in emptiness. it makes blossom a forest of many different kinds of lotus-minds. however. demigods. how can there be the attribution of a semantic sign? And since there is no semantic sign. that which is to be named has ceased. the essence of things (dharmasvabhāva). the ultimate (tattva) is the complete elimination of I-making and My-making. why is it that what is to be named has ceased in the ultimate? Why is it that the mental object has ceased in the ultimate? Nāgārjuna says. humans. An object (gocara) is an object (viṣaya). But when it makes no sense for there to be an object of the mind. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen.” But how is there the cessation of conceptual structuring in emptiness?» Our response is as in the one given just above.5].

” Then each of the world’s sounds. not eternal! They are unstable. for the sake of the world. 30 At this point. but in doing so. Echoed sounds are not located either internally or externally. “Things do not exist. some raise the following objection. the Āryasamādhirāja also says: 20 When the Buddha has become the Dharma-King. and for the gods it gives a dharma-talk that leads to peace and freedom from lust. Why? Because Mādhyamikas hold the theory of interdependence. then in the grasses and the thickets.1 15 35 . Likewise. the sage who elucidates all dharmas. and yet sounds still come forth. «The Mādhyamikas are nothing but nihilists because they say that all virtuous and non-virtuous karmic actions. To each the Victor has said something different. There is no speaker here. 10 For instructing the gods there is a divine drum. They describe this entire world and all future ones as essenceless because those worlds come into being relying upon—depending upon—causes and conditions.1 LVP367. mechanical chimes are caused to make a sound. 5 Likewise. it is said: From a single of your sounds flows forth. Nihilists also say. they are the moon’s reflection in water! All things have the nature of a dream!” The drum that has resounded proceeds with Śakra and the gods to the dharma-gathering. it is made by the ripening of the gods’ karma. “This does not exist!” Therefore. Likewise. perishable. not one is real. They alike illusions and mirages. is unreal. the Buddha has no conceptuality. Likewise.» This is not so. Mādhyamikas are none other than nihilists. To that same extent flows forth the melodious sound of the Transcendent One. by nature they are but froth. in the peaks and the crags there will be the sound. Moved by the wind. the result and also the entire world—all these are empty of nature. he who disciplines the world. the Buddha’s speech comes forth when moved by the aspirations of all beings. But he has spoken with a smile for the sake of what is relevant. so too. the speech of the Lord of Men is not located internally or externally. every one of them. the agent of those actions. A god having known that he was in a state of heedlesness. the sūtra says.Wisdom Page 69 of destruction. 25 And so on and so forth. due to previous purification. It also says. the sound of the drum descends from the sky: “All desirable things are impermanent. a sound for beings of various inclinations. in the trees and among the herbs. The nihilists do not realize in this way that the next world and so on do not exist in the sense that the next world and such are empty of real essence LVP368.

there is no difference in reality concerning whether or not a robbery was committed. because one who has been harmed cannot at all be an appropriate vessel for the holy dharma. the following verses merit mentioning: LVP370. unceased. In this case. someone says. Seeing things in this way. and they do not see those things as having come from another world or as proceeding to the next world. even though they are similarly restricted to being in a particular place such as a treacherous precipice. Likewise. At this point. people will not be able to know it. How so? Mādhyamikas accept that things exist in conventional terms. there will also be a difference between Mādhyamikas and nihilists.1 (yathāvad) known by Mādhyamikas. The masters of old (pūrvācārya) maintain that. even though the deliberate equanimity and non-deliberate equanimity of the Arhat and the ordinary person are similar in that they are both equanimity. being a direct witness.» Although the position that things are not established really is the same. there is no similarity. there is a difference in terms of the ones who are knowing whether that is the case.Wisdom Page 70 5 10 15 20 25 30 because they are interdependent.” Concerning this verse. therefore. just as there is a great difference between a person born blind and sighted person. “He committed the robbery!” Another person. So. there is no similarity—in terms of knowing and speaking—between them and the nihilists. but the other will not. But enough with this excursus! Now I will discuss just the topic at hand.» This is not so. even though there is no difference in terms of the nature of things. The sequential teaching (anuśāsana) of the Buddha is this: “Everything is real in itself” (tathya). the philosophies are not the same because of the difference in the one who is knowing things as not really established. he falsely says. they incorrectly deny (apavāda) those other things which are similar to the things that they have perceived in this world. and also “Everything is unreal in itself” (atathya). “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself”. For example. if it is not taught. their philosophy is similar to yours because they realize the nonexistence of that which does not exist with the essence of a real thing.1 35 40 One should first engage with whatever is pleasant for the [audience]. consider the case in which one person does not actually know that another person has committed a robbery. they perceive the various things of this world as essentially [real]. say what that teaching is!» We respond: behold and know the blessed buddhas’ sequential teaching for introducing disciples to the deathless nectar of the ultimate: 18. while the other is said to be speaking the truth. «It may be that Like nirvāṇa. [And]: . who do not properly know the nature of things. there is nevertheless a great difference between them. «They are the same in terms of the notion that things are not really established. but spurred on by his enmity toward that person. and that neither words nor thought engages with the essence of things. As such. In this same way. one person will be besmirched by calumny and nonvirtue. «Nevertheless. there must be some sequential teaching of it in dependence on conventional reality. Therefore.8. one is called a liar. the nature of things is properly LVP369. the essence of things (dharmatā) is unarisen. in order to introduce the disciples to the essence of things. but the nihilists do not. in the present context. accuses him. however. Instead. Nevertheless. who speak about it and understand it. Nevertheless. Therefore. When properly investigated.

there are beings to be disciplined who have desires that come from hearing about the analysis of different kinds of things that are well known to them—things such as the “aggregates.” and also “Everything is unreal in itself.” the “extensions” and so on that are imagined to be real by those who have the cataracts of ignorance. one should see that the word vā (“or”) occurs with the meaning of ca (“and”) in the sense of a demonstrative conjunction (deśanāsamuccaya). In the same vein. taught that those things that they have perceived are real in themselves. beginning with the wind-sphere all the way out to the elemental realm of space. since change occurs. To them he taught. Or. that which is real in itself does not undergo change. he is all-seeing. Whatever is considered to be existent in the world is. also considered to be not existent. but I do not argue with the world. He has unerringly taught the arisal. likewise. the world cannot understand without what is worldly. Later. And conditioned things do undergo change because they perish every instant. Thus. abiding. for me. LVP372. As it says in the Four Hundred Verses: They said: “Real”. “And also everything is unreal itself. he taught. who knows the entire history of the world. as when they think. as real in itself]. Like a doctor who treats an illness with the medicine that is appropriate to it. He did so in order to make the world respect him.” the “spheres.” Thus. everything is real in itself. the Transcendent Ones do not utter any statement that is not a method for introducing beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate.” LVP371. “Everything is real in itself and unreal in itself. “Everything is real in itself. everything is false (mṛṣā) because they do not perceive anything in that way [i.1 The Blessed Ones have great compassion. But in relation to the Āryas. they are unreal in themselves. their enjoyments and miseries. in relation to childish beings. For those beings. Whatever is considered to be not existent in the world is.” To some disciples. Indeed. “The world argues with me. for me. a “sequential teaching” is one that proceeds in accord with the disciple’s nature. all of their teachings are designed as means to introduce beings to the deathless nectar of the ultimate (tattva).e. “Unreal”. and in their case only some small amount of the root of the tree that is the obscurations has not yet been uprooted.. both of these possibilities are rejected. Some disciples.1 In this way. and “Neither. A teaching that proceeds step by step is a “sequential teaching” (anuśāsana). It is a “teaching” (śāsana) in that it leads one away from the wrong path and sets one on the right path. they teach a Dharma that is appropriate to the disciples out of a desire to care for the disciples. however. their causes and results. the verse means.” 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . have for a long time studied and practiced the philosophy of the ultimate (tattvadarśana). “Everything is neither unreal in itself nor real in itself. also considered to be existent. just as one would reject the question of whether the son of a barren woman has a light or dark complexion. Such is the sequential teaching of the Buddha. in relation to their philosophy. at the very outset the Blessed One. “The Blessed One. “Real and Unreal”. dissolution and so on of both the vessel-like world and the beings within it—everything up through the peak of existence.” That is. Here.Wisdom Page 71 The barbarian (mleccha) cannot understand when addressed in another language.” In order to eliminate that small degree of obscuration.” In this regard. he teaches those beings. in a scripture the Blessed One said. Therefore. and they know the methods to use. He has taught them along with their widely varied varieties. in beings to be disciplined there arises the belief (buddhi) that the Blessed One is omniscient. is omniscient.

What need.1 And it is also “nonconceptual. the essential reality (svarūpa) of things which is not known through another is their ultimate reality (tattva).9. and so on. even though the Āryas teach the ultimate (tattva) through the use of imputations. But the eyes of those persons’ intellects can be treated with the ointment that is the view of emptiness—an ointment that eliminates the cataracts of ignorance.7ab] If this is the case. it is not to be understood through another’s teaching. the ultimate (tattva) is nonconceptual. And it is of a quieted nature. As it says in the Āryasatyadvayāvatārasūtra: 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . that is. “This is false.” But when their eyes have been treated with the ointment that removes cataracts and they no longer have cataracts.» Nāgārjuna says: 18. its referent is divided into multiple things. Concerning this verse. but what is the definition of this ultimate?» We have already said: 5 When the mental object has ceased. that which is to be named has ceased. Since it is devoid of that. Thus. then they know the ultimate (tattva) on their own through the practice of not knowing it. you should also state a definition of it through the use of imputations (samāropataḥ). its referent is not differentiated. it is to be known (√adhigam) only on one’s own. it is “unstructured through conceptual structuring.” Conceptuality is mental activity (cittapracāra).” LVP374. In other words. is everything medicine? «The Blessed Ones give a teaching of the ultimate in order to introduce beings to it. but just as with the acceptance of worldly reality (laukikatathya) in accord with conventional reality. Likewise. unstructured through conceptual structuring. persons who are not Āryas do not thereby know its essential reality. then. That which has a diverse referent (artha) is plural. Instead.” Here. it is devoid of an essential nature as when a person without cataracts does not see hairs. to mention words?” In this way. flies. Not known through another. They are unable to know—in the way that persons without cataracts are able to know—the properly construed essential reality (svarūpa) of the hairs by using the procedure (nyāya) of not seeing it. “unstructured through conceptual structuring” means “not articulated through words. As it says in a sūtra.Wisdom Page 72 In relation to an illness. In other words. [18. quieted. For example. In other words. non-plural—this is the definition of the ultimate (tattva).1 it through another. from the instructions of the person without cataracts all that they understand is. “conceptual structuring” is speech because it is what conceptually structures and multiplies the objects to which it refers (prapañcayaty arthān iti kṛtvā). “not known through another” means that there is no realization of LVP373. Thus. nonconceptual. persons with cataracts see unreal (vitatha) things that have the form of hairs. They cannot do so even with the instructions of a person without cataracts. That which is not plural is non-plural. “Which is the ultimate reality? It is the one in terms of which there is no activation even of awareness (jñānasyapy apracāra). For this same reason. mosquitoes. it is nonconceptual. When their intellects’ eyes have been thus treated and the awareness of the ultimate (tattva) has arisen. then what more is there to ask? «That may be so. they know the essential reality of the hairs and such through the practice (yogena) of not seeing it.

all things are without pluralization. Also. the qualities of the learners (śaikṣadharma) are the same in that way. affliction is ultimately utter nonproduction. Concerning that effect. purification is ultimately the same in that way. Why is that? Because. it is not possible . Likewise. The qualities of those beyond learning are the same in some way. this (y) is neither annihilated nor eternal.Wisdom Page 73 Then Devaputra said. The qualities of the learners are the same in some way. For the Āryas who have done what needs to be done so as to eliminate the saṃsāric cycle of birth decay and death. purification is ultimately utter non-production. the space inside of an earthen vessel and the space inside of a jewel vessel are just the space element. Therefore. a sprout of rice arises in dependence on a LVP376. Devaputra. mental affliction is ultimately the same in that way. Devaputra. the qualities of those beyond learning are the same in that way. However. [And the pattern continues] on up to nirvāṇa. on the basis of them being utterly unproduced. the theoretical constructs are the same in that way.10.” 5 10 15 LVP375. 40 That effect arises depending on this cause—for example. the space should not be pluralized. the five heinous crimes are ultimately the same in that way. all things are ultimately the same. reality in itself (tathatā). The monk (bhikṣu) who has applied himself in this way to the equality of all things is said to be ‘truly applied. “Devaputra. the Dharmadhātu and utter non-production are ultimately the same in some way.1 rice-seed and the causal complex consisting of soil and so on. That (x) which exists depending on this (y) is not itself this (y). in terms of a worldly definition of the ultimate (tattva). there is ultimately no plurality at all. nirvāṇa is the same in that way. the qualities of ordinary persons are the same in that way. The qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in some way. which one is true application (saṃyakprayoga)?” Mañjuśrī answered. The theoretical constructs are the same in some way. all things are ultimately the same in that way. which is also ultimately utter non-production. Devaputra. For example. Saṃsāra is also ultimately utter non-production.1 25 30 35 One should realize that this non-plurality is a characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the ultimate (tattva) because in terms of emptiness it is of one flavor. all things are ultimately the same in being utterly unproduced. Nirvāṇa is the same in some way. Mental affliction is ultimately the same in some way. thus. “Mañjuśrī. ultimately all things are the same in being nonexistent. Successive later explanations should be understood to apply here. nor is that (x) something other than this (y). The qualities of ordinary persons are the same in some way. saṃsāra is the same in that way. in terms of these equalities. the following is said: 18. Saṃsāra is the same in some way. “It is in terms of which equality that all things are ultimately the same in that way that purification is ultimately the same. Here. The five heinous crimes are the same in some way.’ Devaputra said. Why? Because ultimately all things are utterly unproduced. Purification is ultimately the same in some way. the qualities of a fully awakened buddha are the same in that way.” 20 Mañjuśrī said: “All things are ultimately the same in not being produced. Ultimately. such is the character of the ultimate (tattvalakṣaṇa).

In this way. not eternal—such is the deathless nectar that is the teaching of the buddhas. Therefore. these perfect buddhas are great Nāgas who grant worldly protection to the unprotected and provide shelter to those who are homeless. “That is itself this. (CŚ 10. That is. the world’s saviors.11. but the seed is not itself the sprout. fruits and blossoming vines that are the crop from the disciples’ root of virtue.” That which is the seed is not itself the sprout because one would unacceptably conclude that the productive cause and the produced effect were identical. Or else. it says: For example. Hence. the sprout is not other than the seed because one would have to conclude that the sprout could arise even without the seed. for these reasons. and so on. This is so for the reason expressed in: “If the one were other than the other. Therefore. it is not born eternal. one would also not apprehend the sprout. Nor is it something other than that. decay and death that beats down upon the world from the intensely blazing sun that is involvement in the host of negative mental states such as desire.25) And in the Lalitavistarasūtra. burning suffering of birth. one would apprehend a seed even in the state of being a sprout. the cause in dependence on which an effect arises is not itself the effect.1 20 25 30 35 The perfectly awakened ones are intent upon relieving the intense.” One would be forced to accept that the seed was not annihilated even in the context of the sprout being already produced. And as a result. then the one would exist even without the other. a sprout comes from an existent seed. it is not born annihilated. one would be forced into eternalism. LVP377. With those streams of the teaching’s nectar. Therefore. Nor is the effect something other than the cause. And the seed would likewise be permanent because one would have accepted that it is not destroyed when the sprout comes into being. they wish to nurture in appropriate ways the rapid growth arisen in the grain. not plural. They thus entirely cover every single region throughout all space with the great cloud that is the method of their great compassion. just as one does not apprehend a seed in that context. And since they would not be different. “That which is the seed is itself the sprout. one can establish that the cause is not annihilated. one would incur the faults of pre-existent causality (satkāryavāda). Hence. Not singular. Thus. They thus rain down great rains of the deathless nectar that is the true dharma. not annihilated. These lords of the whole world have a deathless nectar that is the true dharma. just as one apprehends a sprout in that case. in the manner that has been explained: 18. and also that it is not eternal. first of all. it does not make sense to say. it is by nature the extinction of all the suffering of existence . the nature of things (dharmatā) is neither annihilated nor eternal.” Nor is that (x) something other than this (y). They constantly and tirelessly send forth streams of the nectar that is the teaching of the true dharma that appropriately counteracts being’s behavior. As Āryadeva said: Since a thing occurs. and a whole host of great problems would ensue because one would be forced to accept the nonexistence of karmic cause and effect. a father and his son would also be identical. Since a thing ceases.Wisdom Page 74 5 10 15 to say. and as such.

Subhūti. previous life. “How. Hence. they definitely have the realization (adhigama) of that nirvāṇa whose nature is the extinction of decay and death.1 visible in this life (dṛṣta eva dharme) because their root of virtue is not matured. Nevertheless. or it means that one does not seek out a Spiritual Friend.12. like karma.1. Subhūti.2. it is devoid of either singularity or differentiation. the pratyekabuddhas have the realization of the Dharma’s quintessence even when there is no LVP379. Even if the one who knows reality does not attain nirvāṇa in this life. Even if the awakened ones have not arisen in the world and the śrāvakas have disappeared. Hence. good child! There will you here the Perfection of Wisdom! Go in such a way that you do not think of physical exhaustion. One should realize that. Thus. To be “without contact” is to be isolated in body and mind. meditation and wisdom. caused by their study of the Dharma’s quintessence in another. that great being. If even though they have listened to this dharma-nectar. that is. one should realize that it is not pointless to employ this medicine—the nectar which is the true Dharma’s quintessence—that has been taught by the perfectly awakened one. Since that is the case. he entered a forest and he heard sound come from the sky. And somehow. have experienced the taste of the nectar that is the three collections of morality (śīla). Seeking out the Perfection of Wisdom. even at the risk of their lives. the Blessed One answered the elder. without concern for gain. and rely on the causal condition that is just their devotion to isolation. favor or fame. in the manner described. the self arisen 18. He will certainly obtain effortlessly in a future life. the Blessed One recounted the following in the blessed and holy Eight Thousand Lines: Subhūti asked. “Previously. And this is so even though they do not resort to a teacher in this life or world. As it says in the Hundred. the bodhisattva called Ever Weeping (Sadāprarudita). Go to the east. 15 18. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping sought out the Perfection of Wisdom without any interest in his body. they somehow do not obtain liberation in a way LVP378.12. did that great being. then there would be no realization of the nectar that is the Dharma’s quintessence because the conditions would be lacking. it is proper for the wise to seek out the true Dharma’s quintessence. seek out the Perfection of Wisdom?” Thus addressed. without regard for his life. they nevertheless will certainly achieve the definite accomplishment of liberation in another life due to the previous causes that they have established in this life. Along these lines. there would be no Spiritual Friends who teach the saintly path of the truths. contemplating and meditating. it is devoid of either eternalism or nihilism The śrāvakas who have practiced that deathless nectar—the Dharma’s quintessence—and who proceed through the sequence of learning. knowledge of the pratyekabuddhas continues without social contact.Wisdom Page 75 5 10 (bhava) in the three worlds. Blessed One. 20 25 30 35 . the great king of healers.1 Buddha [whose teaching is active in the world]. by reason of not being in social contact.

And one who distances LVP380. The tale continues up to the point where [Ever Weeping wishes to keep sprinkling the ground with water for the sake of lessening the dust where a bodhisattva named Dharmodgata is to teach the Perfection of Wisdom. the evil one. What. decided to obstruct Ever Weeping by making all the water in that area disappear.” … Thereupon. “Well. for example. and go without looking to the right. Distances himself away from what? Distances himself from a buddha’s qualities. 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . One who loses his balance and leaves these behind is one who distances himself. north. The Perfection of Wisdom is not inflexible because all things are not inflexible. And in life after life in saṃsāra. many thousands of my past bodies have disintegrated as a result of desire or due to desire. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. and he sprinkled the ground all around with his own blood. will I do with this body. Māra. the great being. the freedom (viviktatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due the freedom of all things. The Perfection of Wisdom is limitless because all things are limitless. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata. nor sensation. I will just pierce my body and sprinkle this area of the ground with my blood. Go without looking south. go in such a way that you are not thrown off balance by your self. in any case. Look not also in the intermediate directions [such as southeast and so on]. whether internal or external. up or down. east. good child. Go without looking to your left. nor lose your balance and leave this transient assemblage. Why? Because this place is very dusty. The Perfection of Wisdom has a single flavor because all things have a single flavor. Then. upon seeing the great being.Wisdom Page 76 Go such that you do not think of fatigue and drowsiness. Go such that you do not lose your balance and leave physical matter. nor will he obtain it. at this point.1 is experienced by a Mendicant (bhikṣu) who is absorbed in the first meditative absorption. that great being. Good child. Then. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping experienced the kind of pleasure that. nor consciousness. rather than through some type of useless activity. And he who is engaged in saṃsāra does not engage with the Perfection of Wisdom. but not in these kinds of circumstances. west.” The passage continues to the point where it says: 5 Go such that you do not direct your mind to anything at all. LVP381. The Perfection of Wisdom is unproduced because all things are unproduced. And this was the teaching on the Perfection of Wisdom given by the great being.1 himself from a buddha’s qualities is engaged in saṃsāra. one who is absorbed in one-pointed concentration. the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: one should realize that the equality (samatā) of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the equality of all things. and particles of dust from this area should not land on the body of that great being. The Perfection of Wisdom is unshakeable because all things are unshakeable. nor conditioning. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of presumptions because all things are devoid of presumptions. the bodhisattva Ever Weeping grasped a sharp weapon and pierced his body all around. which by nature necessarily disintegrates? It is better that my body be destroyed through engaging in this kind of activity. nor recognition. Go such that you do not think of food. we rejoin the tale] at the point where Māra has made the water disappear: Ever Weeping thought.

. The Perfection of Wisdom is equal in its dissolution because all things are equal in their dissolution. The Perfection of Wisdom is imperceptible because all things are imperceptible. The Perfection of Wisdom is devoid of motion (niśceṣṭa) because all things are devoid of motion. And so on to this point: one should realize that the Perfection of Wisdom is not conflated because all things are not conflated. The Perfection of Wisdom is boundless in that space is boundless.Wisdom Page 77 5 The Perfection of Wisdom is without cessation because all things are without cessation. The inconceivability of the Perfection of Wisdom is due to the inconceivability of all things.

since it has a length. their foundation. then it would have length.1. if time were to depend on an existent thing (bhāva). “Things do have an essential existence (svabhāva) because it is the warrant (hetu) for the identification (vijñapti) of the three times. time—the referent of the words “instant” and such—is identified in reliance on (upādāya) conditioned entities.” If having arisen.4. Nāgārjuna says: 19.]. A thing’s essential existence (bhāvasvabhāva) that has arisen and then ceased is called. someone objects. the present and the future do not exist. Through this procedure (krama). time does exist. there is no problem [with claiming that time truly exists]. “Time does exist because it has length [i. If time were to exist. Nonstatic time is not apprehended. there is no establishment of those two. it has not ceased but still exists.5 . without depending on the past. If this were so.” And that which has not yet come into existence (alabdhātmabhāva) is “future. Therefore. month. that is. complete day (ahorātra). 15 20 19. then the present and the future would exist in the past. then it is called “present. it is taught that the three times are based upon things’ essential existence. then how could there be 25 30 35 . and a static time. which would be apprehended. someone objects. the remaining two permutations should point out [the nature of triads] such as ‘superior. fortnight (pakṣa). “It is true that there is no such thing as permanent time that. does not exist. And without being apprehended. is established by its own essential existence. 19. If the present and the future were dependent (apekṣya) on the past. and year. how is time identified (prajñapyate)? … Here. “past. daytime. we say the following. inferior and middling’ and also the singularity and such [of these ordered triads.” In response. someone objects. then would the present and the future be dependent on the past? 19. nighttime. Therefore.e. the Blessed One has taught three times: past. and demonstrating the way that they do not exist. Moreover. Things’ essential existence would be the warrant for identifying (prajñapti) the three times if the three times that you have theorized (bhavadabhimata) were to exist. Moreover. the present and the future do not exist in the past. Therefore. At this point. hour (muhūrta). however. those three times exist.19 Analysis of Time 5 10 At this point. 19.” We respond as follows. second (lava).2. Instead. etc. That which does not exist has no length.6. also exists. like the horns of a rabbit. But they do not exist. things’ essential existence. present and future.” We respond as follows. duration]. being distinct from material form and such. such as material form and so on.1. And time does have length in terms of measurements such as instant (kṣaṇa). they are based upon what exists (bhāva) for the following reason..” In this way. If. That is. Since: 19. but it does not exist. Therefore.3.

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time without an existent thing? You assert, “Time exists in dependence on an existent thing.” If you do so, then if there were no existent thing, time—which is warranted by existent things—would necessarily not exist. Demonstrating this [Nāgārjuna] says: 5 19.6.2. And there are no existent things at all for reasons that have already been extensively demonstrated and because of refutations that will be stated [later in this text]. So there is not any existent thing. That being the case, for you 19.6.3. How could time exist?

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Analysis of Causal Collocation (sāmagrī)
20.1. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect exists in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation?

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20.2. If an effect arises from the collocation (sāmagrī) of the cause and conditions, and the effect does not exist in that causal collocation, then how does it arise from the causal collocation? 20.3. If the effect exists in the causal collocation of the cause and conditions, then it would be apprehended there, and it is not apprehended in the causal collocation.

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20.4. If the effect does not exist in the collocation of the cause and the conditions, then causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions. 20.5 . If the cause, having contributed its causal [functionality] (hetukaṃ…dattvā), ceases, then the cause has two essences—that which has been contributed, and that which has ceased.

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20.6. If the cause were to cease without having contributed its causal [functionality] for the effect, and if the effect has then arisen when the cause has ceased, then the effect is causeless. 20.7. If the effect were to become manifest along with the causal collocation, then it would absurdly follow that the producer and that which is produced are simultaneous.

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20.8. If the effect were to become manifest prior to the causal collocation, then the effect, being devoid (nirmukta) of causes and conditions, would be causeless. Others, however, say, “Only the cause produces the effect; the collocation does not. And since it is not the case that the cause is one thing and the effect another, it does not follow that there would be an absurd consequence whereby one would inquire, ‘Does the cause cease having contributed its causality to the effect or without having done so?’ Rather, the ceased cause itself is established as in essence the effect (phalātmanā).” We respond as follows. If this were so, that is: 20.9. If, when the cause has ceased, the cause transforms (saṃkramaṇa) into the effect, then one would absurdly conclude that the cause, which has already been produced previously, would be re-produced. 20.10. How can a cause that has ceased and disappeared produce an effect that has arisen? And even if the cause remains, how can it produce [anything] without the effect?

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20.11.1. If the cause were not involved with the effect, then which effect would it produce?

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20.11.2. Neither a cause that is observable produces an effect, nor does one that is unobservable. 20.12. A past effect never meets a past cause, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has arisen. 5 20.13. An effect that has arisen never does not meet a cause that has not arisen, nor does it meet a cause that is past or one that has arisen. 20.14. An effect that has not arisen never meets a cause that has arisen, nor does it meet a cause that has not arisen or one that has ceased. 20.15.1. If they never meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 10 20.15.2. If they do meet, how does the cause produce the effect? 20.16. If the cause is empty of the effect, then how does it produce the effect? If cause is not empty of the effect, how does it produce the effect? 20.17. A non-empty effect would not arise, a non-empty effect would not cease. A nonempty effect would be unarisen and unceasing. 15 20.18. How would an empty [effect] arise, how would an empty [effect] cease? One must absurdly conclude that an empty [effect] is unarisen and unceasing. 20.19. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be identical. It never makes sense for the cause and the effect to be different. 20 20.20. If the effect and the cause were identical, then the producer and the produced would be the same. If the effect and the cause were different, then a cause would be the same as a non-cause. 20.21. How would a cause produce an effect that essentially exists? How would a cause produce an effect that does not essentially exist? 25 20.22.1. [If something] is not producing anything, that it does not make sense for it to be a cause. 20.22.2. And if it does not make sense for [the cause] to be a cause, then [the effect] would be the effect of what? 20.23. And the collocation of the cause and conditions does not produce itself by itself. How then would it produce the effect? 30 20.24. The effect is not made by the causal collocation, nor is the effect not made by the causal collocation. How is there a causal collocation without an effect?

Time would be a factor in origination and destruction if origination and destruction existed. And it is in terms of some specific time that they disintegrate—i. There is neither origination nor disintegration without a real thing (bhāva). How could there be destruction with origination? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. 21. Destruction does not exist either with origination or without it.” We respond as follows. However.6.10.7. there is no real thing without origination and destruction. it is in terms of some specific time that things such as sprouts originate—i. “Time essentially exists because it is a factor (nimitta) in origination and disintegration.e. 21.1. How could there be origination without disintegration? It is never the case that impermanence is not present in things.9.. they do not exist. Nāgārjuna says: 21. and demonstrating how this is the case. Therefore. 21. Origination does not exist either with destruction or without it.1. There is no disintegration of a destructible entity. There is no origination of a destructible entity (kṣaya).3. How could there be origination with disintegration? [We ask] because birth and death are not simultaneous in this way. 20 21. are destroyed. 21. 21.2. How could there be any establishment of two [things] that are not established as either in mutual relation (anyonya) or not in mutual relation? 21. There is no origination of an indestructible entity. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are the same. even while a collocation of causes and conditions is present.8.1. 21.4.2. That is. There is no destruction without origination. are produced. 25 30 21. . The origination and disintegration of that which is empty does not make sense. someone objects. time does exist because it is a factor in origination and destruction.. 21.10.9. 15 21.5. How could destruction exist without origination? There would be death without birth.e. The origination and the disintegration of that which is not empty do not make sense. there is no destruction of an indestructible entity.2.Wisdom Page 82 21 Analysis of Origination and Disintegration 5 10 At this point. [Origination and destruction do not happen] all the time. It does not make sense to say that origination and disintegration are different (nānā).

It is not reasonable (na…yujyate) for essentially existent to nonexistent. 25 21.15.17. But origination is experienced because of confusion (moha).Wisdom Page 83 21.2.16. if such is the case— 21. 21. the annihilation of the cause would absurdly ensue. “For one who accepts the existent. and so is disintegration. “Why? Because 21. If samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation— that is.14. If the last (carama) samsaric existence has ceased. nor does existence come from nonexistence.” 20 21. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible. the beliefs in eternalism and nihilism will absurdly follow. An existent thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself. Since 21. and the arising one would be another. “Samsaric existence (bhava) is the continuum of effect and cause through occurrence and cessation. Since the existent must be either permanent or impermanent. there would be annihilation because the continuum of samsaric existence is extinguished. the initial samsaric existence [in the next life] is not possible (na…yujyate).14.19. it is neither annihilated nor eternal. 10 .1. It might occur to you that origination and disintegration are experienced [as happening]. Moreover.2 .1. [If] it does not come from either itself or something else. how does it arise? 21. Nonexistence does not come from nonexistence. If the initial existence [in the next life] arises while the last is ceasing.18.11.2.16. 21. 30 21. 21.13. Then since that which has ceased does not arise again.17.12. then the cease [samsaric existence] would be one thing.2. nor does nonexistence come from existence. For one who has accepted the existent (bhāva).11. 21.1. nor does it arise from something else. Existence (bhāva) does not arise from existence. 15 21.1. when nirvāṇa [is obtained]. If the last samsaric existence has not ceased.15. 5 21.2.1.

21. then how is it that [a being] is born in [or as] those very aggregates in [or as] which it died. How can there be a continuum of samsaric existence that does not exist in the three times? 10 .1.Wisdom Page 84 21. is not possible in the three times.21.3. If ceasing and arising. Thus.2. 21. the continuum of samsaric existence 5 theorized by you 21.21. and [ceasing and arising] together [all] do not make sense.21.20.

The aggregates are not in the Tathāgata. 30 22. and he is not in the aggregates. what or who would be a Tathāgata? 22.8. “Tathāgata?” 22.4.6. .7.2. If some Tathāgata were to exist [previously] without relying (anupādāya) on the aggregates. The Tathāgata is not the aggregates.. And [if an entity] does not exist without relying [on some substratum].2. And in no way at all is there a Tathāgata without a substratum (upādāna) [on which it relies].7. the aggregates]. then he now would rely on them.3. This substratum also does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvāt). nor is he different from the aggregates. how would it rely on [that substratum]? 20 25 22.1. That which is sought through the fivefold [analysis] does not exist as either the same or different [than the aggregates]—how could it be reliantly designated. 22. And there is no such thing as a substratum (upādāna) without [anything] reliant (upādatta) on it. therefore.6. he would reliant (upādāya) [on the aggregates].5.. there is no Tathāgata at all because one would absurdly conclude that [the Tathāgata] is causeless. then 22.Wisdom Page 85 22 … Analysis of the Tathāgata 5 22. how can [it] have an existence as essentially [something] else (parabhāva)? 15 And if there is neither the existence [of a thing] as essentially itself nor [its] existence as essentially [something] else.e. The Tathāgata is also not possessed of the aggregates.1.2 . How can that which does not exist as essentially itself (svabhāvataḥ) exist as essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 10 22.2. If [a thing] has no existence as essentially itself (svabhāva).4. and how could that which is essenceless be the Tathāgata? 22. It is correct (upapadyate) to think that [something] which depends on [something] essentially other (parabhāva) is essenceless.1.9. So what Tathāgata is there here? 22. then [a buddha] is not essentially [a buddha]. Without existing as essentially itself [i. 22. 22.1. And without relying on the aggregates. a Tathāgata] or as essentially something else [i.e.1. If a buddha is [a buddha] in reliance (upādāya) on the aggregates.

1. “The Buddha does not exist after cessation”—[this thinking (cintā) does not make sense if the [Buddha] is essentially empty. “[It is] empty”. However. the substratum is empty in every way.14 . one thinks. Those who conceptually structure the Buddha. “The Buddha exists after cessation”. 10 22.Wisdom Page 86 22. “[It is] neither. 22. none of them see the Tathāgata. And how can an empty Tathāgata be emptily designated? 5 22. On should not say. nor. the world is essenceless.11. “[It is] both”.10.2. “The Tathāgata exists!” Concerning [the Tathāgata] who has obtained cessation (nivṛtta). as is that which relies on it. Having grasped onto heavy grasping.” 15 22. who is beyond conceptual structuring (prapañca) and imperishable.15 . “The Tathāgata does not exist.9. In this way. for the sake of designation & communication (prajñapti). 22. 22. 20 .2.13 . are overwhelmed with conceptual structuring. And how can that which is not essentially itself be essentially something else (parabhāvataḥ)? 22.” “He is not finite.16. nor should one think.17. [that person] believes. “It is not empty. “[The Tathāgata is] eternal.” 22.10.2. these statements are made. 22. That which is the essence of the Tathāgata is the essence of the world.” “He is not eternal.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one? 22.11.” Nor.1. The Tathāgata is essenceless.” and so on—how could these four apply to the tranquil one (śānta)? “[The Tathāgata is] finite.12.

23. Therefore. and no such something is established. They are like (-ākāra) the city of Gandharvas. As in the belief that one’s own body [is a locus of the Self]. aversion and confusion have six kinds of real things (vastu) [as their objects]: material forms.9. So what beauty. the ugly and error do not exist as essentially themselves (svabhāvāt). sound. how can the existence or nonexistence of the afflictive mental states be established? 10 23.7.2. Therefore.8. 5 23.8. the ugly and error do not exist essentially as themselves. 23. the afflictive mental states do not [exist] ultimately (na tattvataḥ).1. The beautiful.10. 23. ugliness just does not exist. tactile objects.5. Therefore. ugliness and error do the afflictive mental states depend upon? 15 20 23. How could beauty or ugliness exist in those [things]. 23. 23. Without it. Without that something.6. in five ways the afflictive [Self or mind] does not exist in relation to the afflictive mental states.Wisdom Page 87 23 Analysis of Error 23. The Self’s existence or nonexistence is not at all established. like reflections. It is said that attachment (rāga).1.2. then how are they perceived? We say. scents and elemental things (dharmas). and error. they are essenceless.12.11. Those [entities] that arise in dependence on the beautiful. sounds.6. how could there be aversion? . aversion (dveṣa) and confusion (moha) come from conceptual thought (saṃkalpa) because [they] arise in dependence (pratītya) on the beautiful. As in the belief that one’s own body [belongs to the Self]. 30 23. in five ways these afflictive mental states do not exist in relation to the afflictive [Self or mind].3. If they are essenceless.1. scents and elemental things The word mere (kevala) means that they are merely conceptuality constructed. The beauty in dependence on which we identify ugliness does not exist without ugliness. they are like illusions or dreams. the ugly. how could there be attachment? And if ugliness does not exist. 25 23. 23. tactile objects. And if beauty does not exist. Mere material forms. 23. The ugliness in dependence on which we identify beauty does not exist without beauty.2. there are no afflictive mental states belonging to anything. The afflictive mental states belong to something. 23. beauty makes no sense.4 . It is theorized (vikalpyate) that attachment. which are like (kalpa) a person [created through] magical illusion.

If apprehension does not exist. the pure. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error. 23. then why would the apprehension of the empty as “the impermanent” not be an error? 23. and that which is apprehended—all of these are extinguished (upaśānta).18 . the impure. whether correct or false. And when ignorance has ceased. the pure.23.19.Wisdom Page 88 23. Therefore.” How could this be erroneous? 23. the permanent and the pleasant exist. then why would [this] apprehension be an error? 5 23. Errors are not possible for one who has not made errors. then who is making an error? Who is not making an error? 23.15. nor does it arise from something else. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates the unreal? 30 .21. Errors are not possible for one who has made errors. there is no apprehension (grāha). In this way. the apprehension. If the Self.22. the permanent and the pleasurable is not erroneous. If there were some essentially unreal afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something.24. who is in error? 23. Ask yourself this question: for whom are errors possible? 15 23. If the Self. the apprehender. the impermanent and the unpleasant (duḥkha) do not exist.25 . 10 23.14. the permanent and the pleasurable do not exist.17.20. “A real thing (bhāva) does not arise from itself. then [apprehending] the Self. 20 23. then how would they be eliminated? Who or what eliminates an essence? 23.16. nor does it arise from itself and something else. How indeed could errors be unarisen? If errors are unarisen. That by which one apprehends. If the apprehension of the impermanent as “permanent” is error.13. 25 23. Errors are not possible for one who is making an error. then nonSelf. 23. [and if] the impermanent does not exist in the empty. ignorance ceases through the cessation of error. conditioning and the other [phases in the wheel of existence] also cease. If there were some essentially real afflictive mental states belonging to someone or something. the pure.

Like a poisonous snake when held incorrectly or a magic spell when improperly used. and you refute all worldly conventions. when incorrectly understood. Dharma and Saṅgha]. If the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist... 10 24. 20 . you deny that things have a real effect.e.7. Hence. devastates the simple minded. The buddhas teach the Dharma by relying on the two realities. 24. then the Saṅgha [i. eliminating the causes of suffering. And since the four holy truths do not exist. the Community] does not exist. If they do not exist. then the four states that result from practice do not exist. 24. Thus.3. someone objects: 5 24. 24.2. “Do this!” “Cook that!” “Eat!” “Wait!” “Go!” “Come!” . 24.1. you are only refuting yourself. developing oneself in meditation on the path.11. deciding that unintelligent people would find it difficult to 15 . And if the Dharma and the Saṅgha do not exist. the persons who are in those states do not exist.9. the Sage.. nor do the persons who are about to attain those states. If everything is empty. you spurn the Three Jewels. emptiness.. 25 24. 24. then understanding the nature of suffering.4. you reject the good and the bad. all world conventions means [cognitive and linguistic interaction with the world.10 . as when one says things such as].8. you do not know the meaning of emptiness nor emptiness itself. One who does not know how to distinguish between these two realities does not discern the profound tattva within the buddhas’ teaching. In speaking of emptiness. And if those four resulting states do not exist.Wisdom Page 89 24 Analysis of the Saints’ Four Truths At this point. the other is ultimate reality..12. 24. 24. In response we say that you do not know the purpose of emptiness. Without understanding ultimate reality. [Buddha. and attaining cessation are all impossible. nirvāṇa is not obtained. the Dharma does not exist. there is no occurrence and no cessation. You would be forced to conclude that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. how could there be a Buddha? In speaking of emptiness. 24. Ultimate reality is not taught without relying on conventions. 30 24.6. And if those eight kinds of holy people do not exist.5. One is the reality of worldly conventions.

24.19.16. that [kind of coming into being] is not a case of production by virtue of an essence. If everything were not empty. 24.13. you refute production and cessation. has forgotten where her horse is.18. having mounted her own horse. there would be neither production nor cessation. You would be forced to accept that the Saints’ Four Truths do not exist. 25 … 24.21. To a person for whom emptiness makes sense. but those objections actually apply to your own position. hesitated to teach the Dharma. There is no production of it by virtue of its essence.15.20. everything makes sense.”] 24. But for us who maintain that all things are empty of essences. Why? Because: 24. 24. How could there be suffering that has arisen independently? Indeed. [and] that [which is impermanent] does not exist if [things] have an essence. 15 .14.” “is possible. The objection that you raise against emptiness does not force us into a conclusion that contradicts our position. 24. [the Blessed One] said that suffering is impermanent. I call `empty’ anything that depends on conditions. and you refute results. You object to what we say..” or “is coherent. all these things [mentioned in the last two verses] are possible.17. 30 24. Why would [suffering] that exists essentially arise again? Therefore. nothing makes sense. As the Buddha said: That which is produced through by causal conditions is not produced.Wisdom Page 90 penetrate his Dharma. Your objection does not apply to emptiness. Therefore.. If you experience things to be truly existent by virtue of their essences. We call that which is interdependent origination ‘emptiness. 10 24. there is no thing whatsoever which is not empty. then you are experiencing causeless things. instrument and action. There is no thing whatsoever which has arisen independently. you reject agent. The non-production of things by virtue of their essences is emptiness. [”makes sense” can be replaced with “is reasonable. To a person for whom emptiness does not make sense. it is the middle way. You deny cause and effect. for one who 20 . you are like a person who.22.’ That [emptiness] is reliant designation. 5 24. He who knows emptiness is heedful. Interdependent origination means the coming into being of things like sprouts or sensory awareness in dependence on causes and conditions.

24. elimination [of suffering]. then the Saṅgha does not exist. an essence is allegedly established in the world. If you imagine that suffering. And if neither the Dharma nor the Saṃgha exists. There is no cessation of suffering that exists essentially.Wisdom Page 91 denies emptiness. If suffering. 24. That is. as in the case of fire’s [essence]. [its] origin and [its] cessation do not exist.31. Therefore. If [things] had essence.24. so too. how could there be a buddha? 30 24. 5 24. Why? Because its essence is allegedly established. If these either [types of] persons do not exist. For one who clings to essence.32. how will it be known? Indeed. those who abide in the result do not exist. On the other hand. to demonstrate how it is that full knowledge of suffering and such is not possible for the other [who denies emptiness]. 24.30. If it is essentially unknown.25. One who is essentially unawakened would never obtain awakening. If there is no result. how is it possible to obtain a result that is essentially unrealized? 25 24. 24. Since the Saints’ Truths do not exist. for you it would absurdly follow that [there is] an awakened one (buddha) without any relation (apratītya) to awakening. then [it] does not have an essence. 24. then it does not make sense that suffering. 24. you refute cessation. nor do those who are entering the result. for you it would absurdly follow that there is awakening without any relation to the awakened one. the knowledge of suffering is also not possible. its essence is supposedly (kila) established. Likewise.27 . 24. if according to you the path is cultivated.23 . and the cultivation [of the path] are likewise not possible (na…yujyante). the realization [of cessation]. And if an essence does not change. then what path would be obtained through the cessation of suffering? 10 Now.26 . then the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path would be impossible. the four results [along the path] are impossible.33. Nāgārjuna says: 24. there would be no origin [of suffering]. would later be known.28. which is to be hot. Also. then [this belief] is wrong. even though he applies himself to the bodhisattva’s practices for the sake of awakening. For you. Nor would one ever do the proper (dharma) or improper (adharma). Through positing (paryavasthāna) essence. which previously had an unknown nature. [and] it cannot undergo change. whose essence was previously unknown. the true Dharma (saddharma) does not exist. is later known. How can 15 20 .29.

38.36.37. then how is it that. and the path. 24. For you a result. 24. and the agent would not be acting. according to you.39. For one who denies emptiness.34. If it has an essence. then there is no obtainment (prāpti) of the not yet obtained (asamprāpta). it would be static. devoid of its various states and shapes (avasthā).35. 24. the world. 5 24. a result arisen from proper and improper [actions] is non-empty? 24. You contradict all worldly (laukika) interactions (saṃvyavahāra) in that you deny the emptiness [of/which is] interdependent origination. a result caused by proper or improper [actions] does not exist. Of if. that which puts an end to suffering does not exist. 24. an essence is not made or done. there would be no object of action. exists. One who sees this interdependent origination sees suffering. according to you. and there is no elimination of all afflictive mental states.Wisdom Page 92 the non-empty be done? Indeed. even without the proper and improper [actions]. would be unproduced and unceasing. 15 . If [things] are not empty. cessation. And for you. no action would be underway.40. the origin. 10 24. a result caused by proper and improper [actions] exists.

nirvāṇa. 25. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent? Nirvāṇa is unconditioned. then how would nirvāṇa [occur] without relying [on something] (anupādāya).7. the unarisen—this is called “nirvāṇa. 25. whether through elimination or cessation?» To this we respond as follows. then how would it [occur] without reliance.5. 25. it would not be unreliant.12. The teacher said that [one should] abandon samsaric being (bhava) and nonbeing (vibhava).13. Therefore. then nirvāṇa would be conditioned (saṃskṛta). the unobtained.1. then liberation would be both existent and nonexistent.11. nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva) because decay and death would absurdly become its characteristics. . then: 25. since no there is no existent thing that is not reliant [on something]? 20 25. the unceased. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent.2. it is correct to think. then there is neither origination nor destruction. without dependence or reliance. A reliant or dependent entity that comes and goes is. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained]. If nirvāṇa were an existent. Of whom would one assert that nirvāṇa [has been obtained]. since no existent thing (bhāva) exists without decay and death.10. whether through elimination or cessation? 5 10 25. since no unconditioned thing of any kind exists anywhere. If all this is not empty. 25. nor is it nonexistent. since there is no nonexistent thing that occurs without reliance? 25 25. then there is neither origination nor destruction.3 . If nirvāṇa were an existent thing.” 30 25. If nirvāṇa is a nonexistent thing. First of all. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. how could nirvāṇa be nonexistent (abhāva)? How could there be a nonexistent thing where there is no existent thing? 25. and that makes no sense (na yujyate). The uneliminated. If [you] accept in this way that things have essence. someone objects. since both of these are reliant.8. «If all this is empty.Wisdom Page 93 25 Analysis of Nirvāṇa Here. 15 25.6. 25.” 25.4 . If nirvāṇa is not existent (bhāva). the not eternal.9. If nirvāṇa were to be both existent and nonexistent. the not annihilated.

the calming of conceptual structuring: no dharma has been taught by the Buddha for anyone anywhere. The clarification. 5 25. just like light and darkness. This is not apprehended: “While remaining [in this world]. 25.22.17. “While remaining.21 .15. “While remaining.14. Peace (śiva) is the calming of all perception (sarvopalambhupaśama).19. since those two [qualities] are not present in a single [locus]. then what is infinite? What is finite? What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite? 25 25. and a finite beginning (pūrvānta). “He neither exists nor does not exist after cessation. he neither exists nor does not exist. it is not nonexistent. The extreme positions (anta) [concerning the state of the Tathāgata] after cessation and the views of eternalism and such are based upon nirvāṇa. How could nirvāṇa be both existent and nonexistent.23. a finite end (aparānta). 20 25. That which is nirvāṇa’s limit (koṭi) is saṃsāra’s limit. Nirvāṇa is not at all distinct from saṃsāra.” Nor are these: “He does not exist after cessation” “He both exists and does not exist after cessation”.24 . 25.” 25. There is not the slightest difference between them.20. he both exists and does not exist”. 25. “Nirvāṇa is not existent. This is not apprehended: “The Blessed One exists after cessation. the Blessed One exists.Wisdom Page 94 and the existent and nonexistent are conditioned. the Blessed One does not exist”. who would make the clarification.16.” would be established if the existent and nonexistent were established. “It is neither existent nor not existent?” 25. 10 .” 15 25.18. Saṃsāra is not at all distinct from nirvāṇa. What is identical (tad eva)? What is different? What is eternal? What is not eternal? What is both eternal and not eternal? And what then is neither of these? 25.” Nor are these: “While remaining [in this world]. If there were nirvāṇa that is neither existent nor nonexistent. If all things are empty. 25.

When name and material form have been moistened. Consciousness thus occurs in dependence on name and material form. material form. Consciousness. and there would be no samsaric existence.6.1.1 . One obscured with ignorance goes to a realm of rebirth (gati) through the karmas that are the karmic conditionings (saṃskāra) for rebirth which he develops in three ways.5.1. 26. Such is the origin of this mere heap (skandha) of suffering. along with their sensations. From birth comes the grievous experiences of aging.1.8.9. [Contact arises] in dependence on the eye. then [the being] would be liberated. namely. is the five aggregates. and attention (samanvāhāra).6. Contact is the conjunction (saṃnipāta) of three [things]. . from birth also come mental agitation and anxiety. The root of saṃsāra is karmic conditionings (saṃskāra).2.8. 26. Due to samsaric existence.3.9.1.2. and how does it occur? Explaining this. 25 30 26. material form.-26. birth occurs.2. the six sense-media originate.6. The six media having developed. The one who has thirst appropriates & relies on the substratum (upādāna) in four ways.4.5. What is contact.3.7.-26. Therefore. 26. whose causal condition is conditioning (saṃskāra).2. 5 26.2. When there is appropriation & reliance (upādāna). contact occurs. the unwise are karmic agents (kāraka).3. since they see ultimate reality (tattva). And when consciousness has entered [the rebirth]. 15 20 26. 26. Thirst is causally conditioned by sensation 26. 10 26. Sensation (vedanā) occurs from contact. 26. 26.2. consciousness and the eye.1.3. That samsaric existence.2.1.8. 26.Wisdom Page 95 26 Analysis of the Twelve Links 26. death and such.2. name and material form are moistened. the wise are not. the samsaric existence (bhava) of the appropriator occurs. enters into a realm of rebirth. If there were non-appropriation.10. because one thirsts for the purpose of [having or avoiding] sensations. [and] the unwise create karmic conditionings. 26.-26. Thus. moreover. [Nāgārjuna] says: 26.

Through the cessation of this and that.Wisdom Page 96 26. . 5 26. karmic conditionings do not originate. this mere heap of suffering is correctly stopped.11. When ignorance has ceased. The cessation of ignorance comes from the meditation on that very [interdependent origination] with knowledge (jñāna). this and that do not occur. Thus.12.

—are based upon [the notion of] a finite beginning (pūrvānta). 27. then in that case a problem would absurdly follow: the Self would be constructed. And [thus]. or an immortal would be born. It does not make sense for the Self to be different from the substratum. etc.12. 5 27. 20 27. the experience by one person of [the results of] karmic acts committed by another. being previously nonexistent.4. 25 27. and likewise. arises. It is not the case that the Self.11. then it would exist even without that [past Self]. or else the Self would have arisen causelessly.” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) has an [absolute] end.2. “I did not exist in the past”—this does not make sense because this [Self in the present life] is not different from the one in past lives. “In the past I did not exist. what Self would you have without the substratum? 27. 10 27. In this way. Moreover.1. “That one [in the past] is the Self [of the present]. then it would be apprehended without the substratum. If it were. etc. 30 . and it is not apprehended [in that way].2. “[The Self] does not exist. 27. If it were different. “I existed in the past.8.—are based upon [the notion of] a finite end.” This does not make sense because this [Self in the present] is not the one in past lives. 27. 27.8. Indeed.5.1. then the Self is [identical to] the substratum. nor is it [identical with] the substratum.4.7.” But the [appropriated] substratum is distinguished. “In the past I existed”. A Self that is the substratum does not cease and arise. Without the substratum.” 27.2. the Self is not different from the substratum.6. 27.Wisdom Page 97 27 Analysis of View & Belief 27. how could that which appropriates & relies on the substratum be itself the substratum? 27.9. You might think. Various other consequences would absurdly follow: the annihilation [of the past Self].” These beliefs—that one’s worldly existence (loka) is eternal.3.1. If this [present Self] were different [from the past Self]. If it is determined that there is no Self without the substratum. the dissipation of karmic acts. namely. “I will not be in the future” “I will be something else in the future. And that [past Self] might still exist. the Self does not exist. for you. 15 27. Nor is there this certain determination. the Self does not exist.10.

” 5 27.18.21 . 10 20 30 .” This would be the belief in the noneternality [of the Self]. and that [same person] was a human. “It is not noneternal. therefore. then a continuum [across lives] would not make sense.19. “I will exist in the future”. If it partially had an end and partially were endless. were to go some place. If [the being] is partially a god and partially human. If there is no eternal [thing]. this makes no sense. 27. 27.26.” These views are the same as [the views about the past. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. “It is not eternal” and also. then the lifeworld would [both] have an end and not have an end. the following views make no sense: “”I existed in the past”.” 15 27.25. then the lifeworld would have an end. then the lifeworld would be endless.14.” In this way. “I both existed and did not exist”.23.13. 27. “That [person] is a god. That [someone or something] does not exist. if the aggregates in the past were not to disintegrate.16. 27. it is not possible for it to have and end or be endless. the [human] is eternal. “The human is different from the god. In this way. It would be established that [the Self is] both eternal and non-eternal if it were established.22. then beginningless saṃsāra would therefore exist. If [one’s] lifeworld (loka) has an end. how could part of the appropriator be destroyed and part not be destroyed? In this way. and if these aggregates [of the new lifeworld] did not to arise in dependence on those [former] aggregates. “I did not exist in the past”. If the aggregates in the past were to disintegrate.Wisdom Page 98 27. If someone or something. then how could there be the next lifeworld? If [one’s] lifeworld has no end. 27. and the god would be unborn. “I will not exist in the future. “I neither existed nor did not exist.15. how could there be a noneternal one? How then could there be [something both] eternal and noneternal? And how could there be [something] devoid of both these two? 27.20. 27. then it would be both eternal and noneternal. and this is not possible. 27.17. having come from somewhere. since an eternal [person] is not born. First of all (tāvad). 27. then how could there be the next lifeworld? 27. On the other hand (atha).24. The continuum of the aggregates occurs like the flame of a lamp. this is not possible. If the human were different from the god. 25 27.

due to the emptiness of all things. He is Gautama. and to him I pay homage. And how could part of the substratum be destroyed and part not destroyed? In this way.” 5 27. this makes no sense. Relying on compassion. It would be established that [the Self] both had an end and was endless if these were established: “It does not have an end”. and also.27.28. 27.30. .Wisdom Page 99 27.29. what views of eternalism and such would there be for whom for what reason about what? 27. “It is not endless. To put it another way (atha vā). he taught the true Dharma so as to eliminate all views.

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