..

N A S A

LWN C&Y: RETURN TO
. AFWL (WLiL-2)
KIRTLAND AFB, h4 M E X

PROJECT GEMINI
A Technical Summary

by P. W. MuZik und G, A. Sozcris

1
f Prepared by
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION
, St. Louis, Mo.
if;
WfiFm-anned Sjacecraft Center

NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS
AND
SPACE
ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. JUNE 1968
TECH LIBRARY KAFB, NM
..-. 1 3

- " 7
" --.
00b043i
NASA CR-1106

PROJECT GEMINI

A Technical Summary

By P. W. Malik and G. A. Souris

Distribution of t h i s r e p o r t is provided in the interest of
informationexchange.Responsibility for thecontents
resides in the author or organization that prepared it.

Prepared under Contract No. NAS 9- 170 by
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION
St. Louis, Mo.
for Manned Spacecraft Center

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

For sale by the Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical lnforrnotion
-
Springfield, Virginia 22151 CFSTl price $3.00
. " . " "

TAB= OC
FONTENTS

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1
1

..............
STRUCTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
3
4
SPACECRAETIIESCRIPTION ..............
Re-entry Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 4
6
Rendezvous and Recovery Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Re-entry Control System Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cabin Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Adapter Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
RetrogradeSection
Equipment Section
.. .. . . . .. 13
Mating Section . . .... 13
Heat Protection . . . . .. 13
Heat Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
14
Heat ResistantShingles
Failure
. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
And Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
16
PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary
16
Structural Test Vehicles And Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . .
STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION TEST
16
Structural Dynamics T e a t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
RELIABILm AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 29
Spacecraft Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PROGRAM 0

Evaluation Of 30
Test Program For R e l i a b i l i t y And Quality Assurance . . . . . . 31
Estimates R e l i a b i l i t y Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Equipment Malfunctions . . . . . . .
Of
Monitoring And Analysis Of 33
Development
SPACECRPLFT
FLIGHT
Quality
Of Control ................
. . . . . . . . . . . . .............
PERFORMANCE
33
34
50
......
Power Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50

Power Distribution And Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
60
Sequential Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
CO-CATION AND TRACKMG SYSTJZM ......
Voice Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
73
73
Antennas ..................... ...... 70
Electronic Recovery Aids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 02
Tracking.....................
. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. .. .. 03
85
System Ikscription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RENIEZVOvSRADARSYspEM(RRS)
85
Development Tests For RRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 09
Qualification Tests For RRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flight Mission Results The . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .... . 9391.
Of RRS
90

System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DIGITAL COMMAND SYS'DW s

93

iii

.
..... ." .

TABLE OC
FONTENTS
(Continued)

DCS Subsystem And SpacecraftEvaluation . . . . .. .. . .. ..
. 93

. . .. ........... .. .. .. .. .......... .. ... .. ........ . ..
DCS Design. Development And Qualification Program 94
DCS R e l i a b i l i t y And Quality Assurance Program 94
Flight Results 95
TIME REFERENCE SYSTEM 95
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. ..
Time Reference Subsystem And SpacecraftEvaluation
95
97
......... 98
. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. ... .
Design.Development And Qualification Program
Time Reference R e l i a b i l i t y And Quality Assurance Program 99
Time Reference Flight Results 100
INSTRUMENTATION AND RECORDING SYSTEM
Signal Sources . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Pulse Code Modulation ( E M ) Telemetry
100
100
104
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM 110
Design And Development
GCS State-Of-Art Advances
. .. ....... .. .. .. ......... .. .. .. ...... . .
0

110
122
GCS Qualification Program Summary
R e l i a b i l i t y Program Summary For GCS
. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 123
127
GCS Quality Assurance
GCS Equipment Evaluation
. . ....... .. .. .. ......... .. .. .. ....... . . . 131
135
GCS Flight Performance
PROPUISIONSYSTEhS
. . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
139
. .. ....... .. ... ............. ... ... .......... ... .. .. ..
0 0

Orbit Attitude And Maneuver System 139
Re-entry Control System 145
Retrograde Rocket System 156
ENVIR0N"AL CONTROL SYSTEM
Suit And Cabin
Cooling System
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. 157
157
162
Water Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . .
Envh-onmental Control System Development Test Status
164
166
EnvironmentalControl
Environmental Control
System Qualification Test Status
System Failure Summary . . . . . .. .. .. .. 166
167
EnvironmentalControl System Design Changes
Problem Areas And CorrectiveAction
CKEWSTATIONoo*o
. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
. . ...................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
168
170
173
Controls And Displays 173
Stowage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. .. .. ...... . .
Personal Equipment And Survival Equipment
198
204

Escapesystem . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ................ ... .........................
ESCAPE. LAMDING AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS

Landing And Recovery System
208
208
217
PYROTECHNICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Pyrotechnic Components ..................... 231
Separation Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Fairing Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

iv
...

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)

page
....................
Horizon Scanner Release
FreshAirDoorActuator. . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 240
241.
......................
Docking System Pyrotechnic Devices 241

. .. .. .. .. ..Tests
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Pyrotechnic Valves 243
Fuel Cell HydragenTank Vent Actuator 243
244
. . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. ............ .. .. '... ...
Pyrotechnic Devices For Experiments
Pyrotechnic Development And Quslification 244
fission Anomalies 250

. . . . .
Pyrotechnic FailureSummary.... .. .. .. ........... .. .. .. ...... . .
Pyrotechnic Qualification TestSummary 250
250
MISSIONPLANNM(IF ..........................
Mission Evaluation
~ O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . o . . . . . . . .
250
250
250
SOFTWARE.............................
Description Of Math Flow
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . ......... .. .. .. ......... .. .. .. .. . . .
.
251
251
254
Testing ............................ .
DEVELOPMZNT OF MISSION AND IlESIGN OBJECTIVES
255
255
DEVELOPM3NT OF OpeRATIONAL MISSION PLANS 262
RESULTS OF MISSION PLANNINQ .
PROCEDURESIIEVELO~......................
0

. 0

0 268
268
Developnent Of Hybrid Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Rendezvous Procedures Development
Re-entry Procedures Development . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
. 273
295
EXFERIMENTSUMMARYREPORT. 296
AND AUGMENTED T A R W DOCKING ADAPIER . . . . .
rn

TmGEI' DOCKING AD
-
.- - ..
TfiGE?~-D&KING"~ ".~-. -i -:-.-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
323
323
323
Structural Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Latching And Rigidizing ....................
Unrigidizing And Unlatching Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . .
325
326
327
Developent And Qualification Tests ..............
Failure Sumnary And Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
329
TDA Communication System
TDA Status Display Panel
. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.
329
332
Electrostatic Discharge Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
332
334
Velcro Patches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Special Instrumentation....................
Brperiments.......................... 334
Activity . . . . . . .
334
Configuration ChangesTo TDA 7A For
TDA Mission Performance
AISMWTEDTARGETDOCKINGADAPES.
.
Srmrmary . .EVA

. . .. .. 334
335
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
336
Separation System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
336
340
ATDADisplaySystem.. .................... 340

V
TABIE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)

-
page
..................
.....................
Target Stabilization System 340

. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
communicationSystem 342
Development And Qualification Tests 342
ATDA Mission Performance Summary 343

vi
PROJECT GEMINI
A TECHNICAL SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Project Gemini was begun i n November 1961 by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration as a follow-on program t o Project Mercury, NASA's
first manned space flight program. "he Gemini program was concluded ahead
of schedule and below a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s i n November 1966 a f t e r t h e successful
flights of twounmanned and t e n manned spacecraft. The McDonnell Company was
the prime contractor for both Wrcury and Gemini.

The Mercury program, i n which the last of s i x manned space flights was
made i n May 1963 demonstrated t h a t spacecraft could be launched on precise
schedules, and couldsafelyorbit the earth,re-enter, and land. Gemini
showed t h a t man could survive long p e r i o d s i n space and that spacecraft could
rendezvous and dock with a target vehicle in space and could use t h e t a r g e t
vehicle's propulsion system t o achieve a new orbit.
Thus,Gemini achieved a l l i t s goals (Table 1) t o pave the way f o r the
Apollo flights and f o r o t h e r space programs, such as the A l r Force Manned
Orbiting Laboratory.

MODULAR DESIGN CONCEPT

Gemini's modular system design, which replaced Mercury's stacked system
concept, simplified construction, testing, and operation of the spacecraft.
Modular design permitted v i r t u a l l y independent design, qualification, and
systemcheckout. R e l i a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s was possible without t h e complications
of interacting influences of associated systems.

Spacecraft 7/6 mission, hailed as one of the high points of t h e program,
w a s made possible because launch crews w e r e able, despite a t i g h t time
schedule, t o remove the rendezvous and recovery section (R & R) of Spacecraft 7
and modify it for tracking by Spacecraft 6 . Another example of the effective-
ness of t h e modular design was t h e Gemini X I 1 mission which was t o t a l l y
changed and replanned within two weeks.

Gemini system design was simplified by extensive use of manual sequencing
and systems management, u t i l i z i n g the astronaut ' e a b i l i t y t o disgnoae failures
and t o take corre'ctive action.

1
TABLE 1 GEMINI SPACECRAFT FLIGHT HISTORY

LAUNCHED MAJORACCOMPLISHMENTS MISSION TYPE LAUNCHED MAJORACCOMPLISHMENTS
~

GEMINI I UNMANNED 3 APR. 1964 DEMONSTRATED STRUCTURAL GEMINI VI1 MANNED 16MAR.1966 DEMONSTRATED RENDEZVOUS AND
64ORBITS INTEGRITY. 3 DAYS DOCKINGWITHGATV, CONTROLLED
RENDEZVOUS LANDING,EMERGENCYRECOVERY.,
GEMINI II UNMANNED 19JAN.1965DEMONSTRATED HEAT PROTECTION AND DOCK MULTIPLE RESTART OF GATV
SUBORBITAL ANDS'YSTEMSPERFORMANCE. (TERMINATEC IN ORBIT. SPACECRAFT MISSION
r IN REV. 7) TERMINATED EARLY DUE TO
GEMINI 111 ;MANNED 23 MAR"1965 DEMONSTRATEDMANNED QUALIFICA-
'3 ORBITS TIONSOF THE GEMINISPACECRAFT.
ELECTRICAL SHORT IN CONTROL
SYSTEM.

GEMINI IV MANNED 3 JUNE1965 DEMONSTRATED EVA ANDSYSTEMS GEMINI Ix MANNED 3 JUNE1966 DEMONSTRATEDTHREE RENDEZVOUS
4 DAYS PERFORMANCEFOR 4 DAYS IN 3 DAYS TECHNIQUES. EVALUATED EVA WITH
SPACE. RENDEZVOUS DETAILED WORKTASKS.DEMONSTRATED
ANDDOCK, PRECISIONLANDING CAPABILITY.
GEMINI V 'MANNED 21 AUG.1965 DEMONSTRATEDLONG-DURATION AND EVA
8 DAYS FLIGHT, RENDEZVOUSRADAR
CAPABILITY, ANDRENDEZVOUS GEMINI X MANNED 18 JULY 1966 DEMONSTRATED DUAL RENDEZVOUS
MANEUVERS. 3 DAYS USINGGATVPROPULSIONFOR
RENDEZVOUS DOCKEDMANEUVERS.DEMONSTRATED
GEMINI VI IMANNED 25OCT.1965 DEMONSTRATED DUAL COUNTDOWN ANDDOCK, REMOVAL OF EXPERIMENT PACKAGE
2 DAYS PROCEDURES (GATV AND GLV- AND EVA FROMPASSIVE TARGET VEHICLE DURING
,RENDEZVOU! SPACECRAFT), FLIGHT PERFORM- EVA. EVALUATED FEASIBILITY OF
(CANCELLED ANCEOF TLV AND FLIGHT READI- USINGONBOARD NAVIGATIONAL TECH.
AFTER GATV NESSOFGATVSECONDARYPRO- NIQUESFORRENDEZVOUS.
PULSIONSYSTEM.MISSION CAN-
CELED AFTER GATV FAILED TO GEMINI XI MANNED 12SEP.1966 DEMONSTRATEDFIRST-ORBITREN-
ACHIEVEORBIT. 3 DAYS DEZVOUS AND DOCKING. EVALUATED
RENDEZVOUS EVA. DEMONSTRATED FEASIBILITY
1 DEC.1965 DEMONSTRATED2-WEEK FLIGHT AND ANDDOCK, OF TETHERED STATION KEEPING.
14 DAYS STATION KEEPING WITH GLV STAGE AND EVA DEMONSTRATED AUTOMATIC RE-ENTRY
RENDEZVOU! 11; EVALUATED "SHIRT SLEEVE" CAPABILITY.
ENVIRONMENT; ACTED AS RENDEZ-
VOUS TARGET FORSPACECRAF.T6; GEMINI x11 MANNED 1 1 NOV.1966 DEMONSTRATED OPERATIONAL
ANDDEMONSTRATEDCONTROLLED 4 DAYS CAPABILITY TOPERFORMCOMPLEX
U.E-ENTRY WITHIN 7 MILES OF RENDEZVOUS ANDLONG-DURATION EVA WITH NO
PLANNED LANDINGPOINT. ANDDOCK, NOTICEABLE ASTRONAUT FATIGUE.

7
GEMINI VI-A MANNED 15DEC.1965DEMONSTRATEDON-TIME LAUNCH
PROCEDURES, CLOSED-LOOP
RENDEZVOUS.CAPABILITY,
STATIONKEEPINGTECHNIQUES
AND
r I
AND EVA

EVA - EXTRbVtHICULAR ACTIVITY
GATV - GEMINI-AGENA TARGET VEHICLE
(THREESEPARATE EVA OPERATIONS
TOTALLED ABOUT 5.5HOURS.)

WITH SPACECRAFT 7. GLV - GEMINILAUNCH VEHICLE
I I TLV - TARGETLAUNCH VEHICLE
PzeGemini program stressed safety. As a result 'the t e n manned Gemini
Spacecraft flew a t o t a l of 969 h r and 56 min without an injury t o any of
t h e 16 crewman. All crewmen w e r e recovered in excellent physical condition.

, b j o r Spacecraft Safety Features

I n e r t i a l GuidanceSystem. -
me s p a c e c r a f t i n e r t i a l guidancesystem (IGS)
serves a8 a back-up t o the launch-vehicle guidance system during t h e launch
phase. [-See GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYS'PEM, page UO!.)
Ejection Seats and Retro-rockets. -
Ejection seats and retro-rockets
provide escape modes from the launch vehicle during the prelaunch and the
launchphases. (See ESCAPE, LANDING AND RFXOVEHY SYSTEMS, page 208 and
Retrograde Rocket System, page 156. )

Secondary Oxygen Bottles. -
Two secondary oxygen b o t t l e s are provided,
e i t h e r of which w i l l support the crew f o r one o r b i t and re-entry, i f the
primary oxygen supply i s l o s t . All other flight safety components i n the
environmentalcontrolsystem (ECS) are redundant. (See ENVIRONM3NTAL CONTROL
SYSTEM, page 157. )
Visual Aids.
platform should occur,
-
In.the event t h a t a l o s s of reference of the guidance
t h e crew can control re-entry using out-the-window
v i s u a l aids.

Re-entryControl System. - The re-entry control system (RCS) i s completely
redundant. It is composed of two identical but independent systems, e i t h e r
of which canbeused t o c o n t r o l the vehicle through re-entry. These systems
are sealed w i t h zero-leakage valves u n t i l they are activated shortly before
retrograde. (See Re-entryControl System, page 145 ) .
Drogue Parachute. -A drogue parachute, which i s normallydeployed a t
50,000 f t a l t i t u d e after re-entry, backs up the RCS f o r s t a b i l i t y u n t i l the
main parachute i s deployed.(See ESCAPE, LANDING AND RECOVERY SYSTEM3,
PaQe m.1
Ejection Seats. -
Ejection seats provide an escape mode i f the recovery
parachute fails t o deploy o r is damaged.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

Basic Objectives O f Gemini And How They Were Met

Continuous Program at Minimum Cost. - To provide a continuation program
of manned space f l i g h t o b j e c t i v e s a t minimum cost with major milestones t o be

3

L
complete as soon as practical. Gemini was completed months ahead of t h e
schedule t h a t was estimated i n early-1963. Spacecraft 2 through 12 each was
delivered at least a month ahead of schedule.

Rendezvous,Docking and Maneuvering. - To rendezvous and dock with a
second orbiting vehicle and then perform combined maneuvering. Rendezvous
was first achieved by Spacecraf't 6; Spacecraft 8 was t h e first t o dock.

.
Maneuvering i n o r b i t u s i n g t h e Agena Target Vehicle was first achieved by
Spacecraft 10

Ung Duration Missions. - To expose two astronauts and t h e i r l i f e support
systems t o long-duration missions t o prepare for future e a r t h o r b i t and lunar
flights. Spacecraft 5 remained i n o r b i t f o r 8 days and Spacecraft 7 remained
i n o r b i t f o r 14 d a y s , demonstrating man's c a p a b i l i t y i n a space environment.
The Apollo l unar t r i p i s expected t o take eight days.

Precision Re-entry, Landing,. . e d Recovery_. - To develop and exercise
precision re-ehtry, landing, and recovery of manned spacecraft. From
Gemini V I on, all spacecraft landed within seven miles of the aiming point.
The last five Gemini Spacecraft camedown within three miles of the target.
A l l landings were m a d e i n the ocean. However, early designs had provided f o r
land landings, but the rate of technological development f o r such landings
did not keep pace with t h e remainder of the program so t h a t the land landing
c a p a b i l i t y f o r the s p a c e c r e was subsequently abandoned.

Extravehicular Activity. - To undertake extravehicular activity to
evaluate man's a b i l i t y t o perform t a s k s i n a zero genvironment. Although
EVA was not an original objective of t h e Gemini program, it was made possible
by the design of personnel hatches with mchanical latches which enabled the
a s t r o n a u t s t o open and close the hatches manually. Astronauts on Spacecraft 4,
9, 10, ll, and 12 performed EVA.
Scientific Investigations. -
To u t i l i z e t h e Gemini Spacecraft as an
experimental test platform for scientific investigations, including photog-
raphy, biomedicalexperiments, communications, navigation,meteorology,etc.
Experiments were carried on all mannedGemini Spacecraft.

SPACECRAFTDESCRIPTION

The Gemini Spacecraft, designed t o provide l i f e support f o r two orbiting
astronauts, is a 7000 l b conical structure 18.82 f t long and 10 f t i n diameter
a t i t s base. It i s composed of twomaJor assemblies, a re-entry module and
an adapter module. Both structural bodies are a l l metal, of stressed skin
and semimonocoque construction.Inaddition,there-entry module i s designed
t o withstand t h e extreme heat of re-entry. The general arrangementof the
Gemini Spacecraft i s shown i n Fig. 1.

4
- 4 SPACECRAFT I

4 MODULE
ADAPTER b- MODULE
RE-ENTRY c

z 1d3.44 Z 173.97 Z 236. 2 8

ADAPTER
Z 15.38
11
z 68.44
I
I

I
RE-ENTRY

SYSTEM
SECTION
"II
I

Ic-
I
RETROGRADE
- RENDEZVOUS
8, RECOVERY-,
SECTION
ABLATION SHIELD

NOSE
FAIRING-

SECT ION A-A
TY

SPACECRAFT/LAUNCH VEHICLE
MATINGLINE

BY
FIGURE 1 SPACECRAFT GENERAL ARRANGEMENT

The methodsof construction and the materials used exemplify the care
shown by McDonnell engineers to guarantee high strength-to-weight ratios. The
require&nt of heat resistance led to the choiceof titanium and magnesium as
the principal metals used in spacecraft fabrication. High-strength titanium
bolts (Ti-6A1-4V)were used extensively; titanium was also used for the rings,
stringers, interior skin, and bulkheads of the re-entry module. Aluminumwas
used inside the cabin where temperaturesnotare structurally critical.

of the shell
Stringers and longerons were spaced around the circumference
to carry nearly all axial and bendingloads and to stiffen the framework. To
protect against distortion to large, thin gauge panels, chemical milling
rather than mechanical milling was employed.
5

I .. .. - "_
. .. ... .. -.. ._ ,.. . ... , , ,, , , , ,
For ease i n i d e n t i f y i n g p a r t i c u l a r areas, t h e s p a c e c r a f t is cut by two
reference planes, one running longitudinally from a d a p t e r t o nose, the o t h e r
at r i g h t angles t o t h i s one.
Inoking forward from t h e end of the adapter, one may divide a s e c t i o n of
the spacecraft into four quadrants, thus creating four c a r d i n a l p o i n t s
!E (Top Y) and BY (bottom Y) f o r t h e Y a x i s , and FU ( r i g h t X) and LX ( l e f t X)
-
f o r t h e X axis. A p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n on the c i r c l e i s measured i n d e g r e e s
from any one of thesepoints. (Ref Fig. 3)

The Z s t a t i o n l o c a t i o n s are measured l o n g i t u d i n a l l y from the r e a r of the
spacecraft (adapter) and increase in magnitude as one approaches t h e nose.
For example, t h e s e p a r a t i o n p o i n t between t h e r e - e n t r y module and the adapter
i s s t a t i o n Z 102.00 (in. ); t h e nose of the spacecraft i s s t a t i o n 2 239.53
(2 239.28 plus 0.25 in. of a b l a t i v e material).

Re-entry Module

The re-entry module, shown i n Fig. 2, i s composed of three primarysec-
tions, the cabin, the re-entry control system (RCS), and the rendezvousand
recovery (R & R) sections. In addition, a heat shield is a t t a c h e d t o the a f t
end of t h e cabin section, a nose f a i r i n g i s f i t t e d t o t h e forward end of the
rendezvous and recovery section, and a horizon sensor fairing i s attached on
t h e l e f t side at the mating point of the cabin and the re-entry control
system.

The R & R s e c t i o n i s 47.31 in.
long including the nose f a i r i n g . The
re-entry control system section i s 18.00 in. and the cabin section i s
70.53 in. long, at t h e o u t e r edge of t h e heat shield.
Rendezvous andRecovery Section. - This s e c t i o n houses t h e rendezvous
radar equipmentand the drogue, p i l o t , and main parachutes. The forward
portion of t h e R & R s e c t i o n i s a truncated cone, while the back portion i s
c y l i n d r i c a l . When t h e s p a c e c r a f t was t o dock with t h e Agena TargetVehicle,
the R & R s e c t i o n also comprised t h r e e docking l a t c h r e c e p t a c l e s , a Fiberglas
bumper, and a docking bar. A nose f a i r i n g made of Fiberglas-reinforced
p l a s t i c l a m i n a t e p r o v i d e s t h e r m a l p r o t e c t i o n f o r the s e n s i t i v e radar equipment
during t h e i n i t i a l p o r t i o n s of powered f l i g h t . T h i s f a i r i n g is jettisoned
approximately 45 sec after i g n i t i o n of t h e second stage engine of the launch
vehicle by means of a short-time impulse pyrotechnic actuator. The R & R
s e c t i o n i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e r e - e n t r y c o n t r o l system s e c t i o n by 24 frangible
b o l t s . These b o l t s are tension separated during re-entry byan explosive
s t r i p of mild detonating fuse (MDF) after deployment of the p i l o t chute.

Re-entry Control System Sectiog. - The RCS s e c t i o n i s contained between
t h e R & R s e c t i o n and the cabin section. This cylindrical section houses
re-entry control system fuel and oxidizer tanks, and thrust chamber assemblies.
I n a d d i t i o n t o accommodating t h e r e - e n t r y c o n t r o l system, which c o n t r o l s t h e
s p a c e c r a f t a f t e r the o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O W ) has been
j e t t i s o n e d , t h e RCS s e c t i o n also absorbs the loads induced by the deployment

6
DOOR ASSEMBLY
TORQUE BOX

HEAT SHIELD

CONICAL SECTI0.N

RCS SECTION

DOCKINGBA

I

I
FORWARD BOTTOM
EQUIPMENT
ACCESSDOOR
SIDEEQUIPMENT
ACCESSDOORS
R 8. R SECTION
LANDING SKID DOOR
DOCKING ECS ACCESS DOOR
FITTING
FIGURE 2 RE-ENTRY MODULESTRUCTURE

of the main parachute. The l a t t e r i s a t t a c h e d t o the parachute adapter
assembly, which is i n s t a l l e d on t h e forward face of t h e RCS section.

Cabin Section. - The cabin section lies between t h e RCS section and t h e
adapter assembly. It i s a truncated cone, 38.66 i n . i n diameter at t h e for-
ward endand 90.00 in. i n diameter a t the aft end (with the heat shield
attached). It consists of an i n t e r n a l pressure vessel, which is t h e crew
s t a t i o n f o r the two astronauts and equipment bays located outside the pressure
vessel. The heat shield, a major s t r u c t u r a l component of the cabin, i s
discussed in Heat Protection, page 13.

7

I
A. I n t e r n a l Pressure Vessel. -
The pressure vessel, i n a d d i t i o n t o housing
t h e Geminicrew, contains electrical and l i f e support equipment and various

.
experimental devices. Accessible volume i n . t h e crew compartment (with the
crew aboard) i s approximately 55 cu f't
The pressure vessel consists of a fusion-welded titanium frame t o
which are attached side panels, a hatch sill, and a fore and aft bulkhead.
The side panels and pressure bulkheads are double thickness, thin-sheet tita-
nium (0.01 in.), w i t h the outer sheet beaded f o r s t i f f n e s s .

In a d d i t i o n t o f u s i o n welding, resistance spot and seam welding are
employed extensively throughout the pressure vessel to reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y
of leakage. Individual titanium fusion weldments are made under a controlled
inert gas atmosphere, t h e n s t r a i n r e l i e v e d t o o b t a i n a f u l l y s t r u c t u r a l weld.
Two hatches are hinged to the hatch s i l l f o r p i l o t ingress and egress.
llhe design of the pressure vessel not only provides an adequate crew
station but also gives the pressure v e s s e l a proper water f l o t a t i o n a t t i t u d e .
Structural design criteria for the pressure vessel require it t o withstand an
ultimate burst pressure of 12 p s i and an ultimate collapsing pressure of
three psi.

!Two hatches,contoured t o the shape of the cabin exterior, are symmet-
r i c a l l y spaced on the top side of t h e pressure vessel. Each hatch,hinged on
the outboard side, is manually operated by means of a handle and a mechanical
latching mechanism. I n an emergency, t h e hatches can be opened i n a three-
sequence operation employing pyrotechnicactuators. The actuatorssimulta-
neously unlock and open the latches, open the hatches, and supply hot gases
t o i g n i t e t h e e j e c t i o n seat rocket catapults.

An external hatch linkage fitting allows a recovery hatch handle t o be
i n s e r t e d t o open the hatches from t h e outside. The recoveryhatchhandle is
stowed on the main parachute adapter assembly, located on the forward face of
t h e RCS section. A hatch curtain i s stowed along t h e hinge ofeachhatch.
When the hatches are opened after a water landing, t h e curtains help keep
water out of the cabin.

Each hatch incorporates a window, which contains three panes of glass,
with an a i r space between each pane. Thecommand astronaut's window has two
outer panes of 96% s i l i c a g l a s s and an inner pane of tempered aluminosilicate
glass. For improved clarity while carrying out optical experiments, the inner
pane of t h e c o p i l o t ' s window i s a 964 silica panel with an optical transmis-
sion capability of more than 99$. The thickness of t h i s pane has been
increased from 0.22 t o 0.38 i n . t o make it as strong as the aluminosilicate
glass. Each pane, with the exception of t h e outer pane, i s coated t o reduce
reflection, glare, and ultraviolet radiation.

The personnel access hatches are of skin and beam construction. Sili-
con rubber seals around each hatch s i l l and around t h e two inner panes of
glass prevent t h e leakage of cabin pressure.

a
B. EquipmentBays - IPhree major equipment bays, designed t o contain a
v a r i e t y of e l e c t r i c a l and electronic equipment, are outside t h e cabin pressure
vessel. Two of these bays are outboard of t h e side panels and one bay i s
beneath the pressure vessel floor. Unlike the Mercury Spacecraft, which had
nearly all i t s systems inside the pressure shell, the Gemini Spacecraft has
most of i t s system components i n these unpressurized equipment bays. These
components either require no pressurization or are internally pressurized.
Since equipaent i s normally only one layer deep within the compartments,
launch crews can reiuove an access door, quickly p d 1 out a malfunctioning unit,
i n s e r t a new one, r e i n s t a l l the access door, and proceed w i t h the launch.

Two main landing gear wells are located below the side equipment bays.
Originally these wells were intended t o house equipment f o r ground landings;
however, t h i s requirement was never put into practice. Consequently, t h e
wells are used t o house additional experiment equipment onsome spacecraft; on
other missions t h e wells carry ballast or.remain empty.

Two etructural doors are provided on each side of the cabin to allow
access t o the side equipment bays. The twomain landing gear wells a l s o have
doors. On the bottom of the cabin, between t h e landinggeardoors, two
additional access doors are i n s t a l l e d . The forwarddoorallowsaccess t o the
lower equipment compartment and the aft door provides access t o the environ-
mental control system (ECS) compartment .
C. Hoist b o p -A spring-loaded hoist loop, located near the heat shield
between t h e hatch openings, i s erected after landing t o engage a hoisting
hook f o r spacecraft retrieval.

Adapter Module

The adapter module extends from t h e end of t h e re-entry module heat
s h i e l d t o the spacecraft launch vehicle mating line. A truncated cone, t h e
adapter assembly consists of threesections: the retrogradesection,the
equipment section, and t h e launch-vehicle mating section. The e n t i r e assembly
is g0.00 in. long w ith a forward diameter of 88.30 in. and an aft diameter of
120.00 in. It contains the systemsand equipment needed on long-duration
o r b i t a l flights and provides the interface between the spacecraft and the
launchvehicle. The basic adapter structure i s illustrated i n Fig. 3 and 4.

The adapter structure consists of circumferential aluminum rings,
extruded magnesium a l l o y stringers, and a magnesium skin. The free end of
t h e T-shaped s t r i n g e r s i s a tube. L i q u i d coolant flows through t h i s tube and
t r a n s f e r s h e a t t o the adapter skin f o r r a d i a t i o n i n t o space.

The adapter i s joined to t h e re-entry module by three titanium retaining
straps external t o t h e s t r u c t u r e of both the re-entry module and the adapter
section.Pyrotechnicseparationrings are provided between t h e retrograde and
t h e equipaent Sections, and between t h e equipment and the launch-vehicle
-mating sections.

9
ACE
LUG

RE

RE

T.Y.

RADIATOR COOLANT

7

B.Y.

STRAP LOCATIONS
AT 2103.44
LOOKING FORWARD TYP. STRINGER SECTION

FIGURE 3 ADAPTER STRUCTURE
F.L.S.C. A'T SEPARATION PLANE
FOR RETROGRADE AND EQUIPMENT
SECTIONS OF ADAPTER
FAIRING ON
INTERFACE

ALUM. RING ALUM. 2014-T6
FAIRING OVER RING MATING LINE
213.44 (52-33020)
INTERFACE

ALUM.RING
PARTING LINE MATING RING

4

F I G U R E 3 ADAPTERSTRUCTURE-(Continued)

11

I
RX

Z 13.44

E L E C T R O N I C MODULE- \<

ACCESS DOOR

\ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL SYSTEM

FUEL CELL ENVIRONMENTAL
MODULE C O N T R O L SYSTEM1
PUMP MODULE

FIBERGLASS FACING

ADAPTER

\ALUMINUM
- HONEYCOMB CORE STRUCTURE
ALUMINUM
MOD U L E
:TION B-B SUPPORT
FITTING SECTION A-A
U TYPICAL MODULE
TY PICAL B LAST SH I E LD
SUPPORT BEAM SUPPORTPOINT

FIGURE 4 ADAPTER EQUIPMENT MODULE STRUCTURE
Retrograde Section. -
A t the s
m al endof t h e adapter module i s t h e
retrogradesection, 30 in. i n length. The primary function of the retrograde
section i s t o support t h e four retrograde rockets and s i x of the O M t h r u s t
chamber assemblies. To support the retrograderockets, aluminum I-beams are
assembled as a cruciform, with one retrograde rocket mounted i n each quadrant.

P r i o r t o r e t r o f i r e a flexible linear-shaped charge cuts t h e adapter,
separating the equipment from the retrogradesection. After r e t r o f i r e t h e
three titanium retaining s t r a p s are cut by three flexible linear-shaped
charges,severingthere-entry module from the retrograde section. These
retaining straps are located to coincide with wire bundles and f l u i d l i n e s ,
which are also cut by the shaped charges, thus minimizing the number of
charges required.
Equipment Section. -
The equipment section, which comprises t h e l a r g e r
end of the adapter module, provides the space and t h e a t t a c h p o i n t s f o r f o u r
majorsystem modules, plus individual components. The four principal modules
mounted i n t h e equipnent section are t h e o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuvering sys-
tm ( O W ) propellant tanks, the f u e l c e l l ( o r b a t t e r y ) modue, the environ-
e
mental control system (ECS) primary oxygen supply,and the electronics module.
These four modules are independent of one another, but their support panels
and anaccessdoor combine t o form a blast shield. This s h i e l d . p r o t e c t s t h e
, equipment section and t h e dome of the T i t a n launch vehicle from excessive
(explosion-causing) heat i f it i s necessary t o f i r e t h e retro-rockets in an
abort .
In a d d i t i o n t o the four principal equipment modules, t h i s section a l s o
houses the coolantsupply, the water storage tanks, and t e n O M t h r u s t
chamber assemblies. A gold deposited Fiberglas temperature controlcoverover
the open end of the adapter protects the equipment from solar radiation after
separation from the launch vehicle.

Mating Section. - The spacecraft i s mated t o the Titan I1 launch vehicle
by a forged and machined aluminum a l l o y ring, 120 in. in diameter. This ring,
approximately three in. wide, i s joined t o the launch vehicle mating ring by"
20 bolts. The launch vehicle mating ring has four index mapks, spaced at
90 degree i n t e r v a l s ( a t TY, BY, RX, and IX of the adapter), to insure proper
alignment between the spacecraft and t h e launchvehicle. A flexible l i n e a r -
shaped charge i s fired t o sever the adapter section approximately 1-1/2 in.
above the spacecraft/launch vehicle mating point.

Heat Protection
During re-entry the spacecraft f l i e s with t h e heat shield forward. This
p r o t e c t s the forebody of the re-entry module from excessive heat flux during
t h i s c r i t i c a l mode. The rest of the Spacecraft 'body i s protected by two kinds
of heat resistant shingles, Rene 41 and beryllium.

I .
Heat Shield. - The heat shield i s a dish-shaped s t r u c t u r e t h a t forms t h e
large end of the re-entry module.The heat shield i s an ablative device which
protects the re-entry assembly from the extreme heat of re-entry into the
e a r t h ' s atmosphere. It i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e a f t endof the cabin section by
eighteen0.25-in.-diameter bolts. Ninety inches i n diameter, the shield has
a spherical radius of 144 inches.

The ablative substance of the Gemini heat shield is a paste-like material
which hardens in standard atmosphere after being poured i n t o a honeycomb form.

S t a r t i n g with a load-carrying Fiberglas sandwich structure consisting of
two 5-ply faceplates of resin-impregnated glass cloth separated by an 0.65 in.
thick Fiberglas honeycomb core, an additional Fiberglas honeycomb i s bonded
t o the convex side of the sandwich and f i l l e d w i t h Dow-CorningDC-325 silicone
elastomer. The extremeedge of the heat shield i s a circular Fiberite ring.
It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t t h e basic ablative substance of the heat shield,
developed by the McDonneUCompany, i s now being produced f o r commercial
applications.

Heat Resistant Shingles. -These overlapping Rene 41 and beryllium
shingles, which provide both aerodynamic and heat protection, also hold shaped
pads of flexible insulation in place. The beaded (corrugated) Rene 41 shingles
(0.016 in. thickness) on the sides of the cabin are composed of 535 nickel,
1s chromium, 115 cobalt, 9.754 molybdenum, 3.154 titanium, 1.65 aluminum,
0.095 carbon, 0.0054 boron, and less than 2.755 iron. The shingles are
i d e n t i c a l i n composition and manufacturing technique t o t h o s e used on Mercury.
Extra large holes at the attachment bolts allow the shingles t o expand during
aerodynamic and solar heating.Oversizedwasherscover these h o l e s t o minimize
heat and air penetration.

The R & R and RCS section surfaces are unbeaded shingles of cross-rolled
beryllium. "he p l a t e i s supplied to McDonnell in several sheet sizes ranging
in thickness from 0.300 i n . t o 0.555 in.Shingles are finished by McDonnell
t o thicknesses, depending on spacecraft location, of 0.090 in. t o 0.280 in.
The shingles are a t t a c h e d t o t h e spacecraft by beryllium retainers fabricated
from similar plates.

Beryllium shingles used on Project &rcury were fabricated from hot-
pressedberylliumblocks. The requirementsfor Gemini rendezvous f l i g h t s
were almost twice t h e strength and impact resistance available w i t h hot-
pressed beryllium blocks and t h i s was provided by the cross-rolling technique.

Under the beryllium shingles are Thermoflex RF blankets held in place by
a titanium mesh attached t o t h e s t r i n g e r s . The outer surfaces of the rings
and s t r i n g e r s are insulated with 0.0015 in. Inconel-foil-encased Min-K i n
Fiberglas channels.

Both Rene 41 and beryllium shingles are coated on the outer surface with
a blue-black ceramic paint, t o permit high thermal radiation from t h e space-
craft. The inner surface of the beryllium shingles has a very thin gold coat-
i n g t o a t t e n u a t e thermal r a d i a t i o n i n t o the spacecraft. The outer surface of

14
the adapter module i s coated with white ceramic paint and the inner surface
is covered with aluminum f o i l t o reduce emissivity. The heat protection
devices are pictured i n Fig. 5.

FIBERGLASS
RENE 41 OUTER
IN-K INSULATION
PANE
V Y COR INSULATION

FIBERGLASS
CHANNEL

THERMOFLEX

INNERPANE
TYPICAL DOOR SPLICE
TEMPERED GLASS

I WINDOW FRAME

FIBERGLASS

LBERYLLIUM
TYPICAL FORRCS AND R & R SECTION
FIGURE 5 HEAT PROTECTION
Failure Summary And Analysis

No s t r u c t u r a l failures occurred during development o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n
testing. However, a change was incorporated i n Spacecraft 6 and up as t h e
result ofan anomaly on Gemini IV i n t h e h a t c h manual control mechanism. This
mechanism change i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig. 6. The pinion drive shaft, which
works the hatch latch linkages when the manual handle is operated, is driven
by engagement of drive and gain pawls i n a ratchet configuration. The.auto-
matic return of drive and gain pawls failed to operate positively due t o
frictional effects. This necessitated manual operation of t h e s e l e c t o r i n
Gemini IV. The efficiency of t h i s mechanism has been greatly increased by
reducing f r i c t i o n a l e f f e c t s and by increasing t h e return mechanical advantage
by a f a c t o r of 10.

Furthemore, a sawtooth "gain hold" device i s now i n s t a l l e d on the hatch
s i l l f o r use w i t h t h e hatch closing device, t o assist i n holding the hatch
closed against seal pressure just prior to the latching operation.

The redesigned manual control mechanism w a s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y endurance
tested i n temperature and pressure environments f o r over 1000 cycles.

Also, after re-entry of Spacecraft No. 2 localized heating was apparent
i n one area. Two smal holes were burned i n the shingles due to air flow
around one of t h e umbilical fairings. To reduce localized heating the f a i r i n g
was reconfigured, the affected shingles were increased in hhickness t o .025 in.
and the angle of attack was lowered.

STRUCTURAL QUALIFICATION !EST PROGRAM

Most of t h e major Gemini s t r u c t u r a l and s t r u c t u r a l aynamic tests were
performed between July 1963 and April 1965 on s t a t i c No. 3 and s t a t i c No. 4
t e s t a r t i c l e s . Other representative static t e s t a r t i c l e s were used t o test
the rendezvous and recovery section (R & R) and re-entry control system (RCS)
section.

S t r u c t u r a l Test Vehicles And Testing

Test Vehicles. -In addition t o building twelve flight a r t i c l e s and seven
t a r g e t docking adapters, McDonnell was responsible for t h e manufacture of six
boilerplate spacecraft and f o u r s t a t i c a r t i c l e s , p l u s s t a t i c a d a p t e r s and
miscellaneous t e s t vehicles. A brief description of these major t e s t vehicles
and t h e i r history i s included here.

A. Boilerplate Re-entry Vehicles :

-
1. Boilerplate No. 1 Boilerplate No. 1was a s t e e l mock-up of t h e
re-entry module which was used primarily i n parachute development testing.
Ballast was installed to simulate spacecraft weight and cg. After fabrication

16
52 -35205 HANDLE E L E C T O RL E V E R

52-35204 CAIN PAWL SUPPORT
BRACKET A (ATTACHED TO

(ATTACHED TO HATCH
STRUCTURE)

52-35089
PINION DRIVE SHAFT A
DRIVE PAWL SELECTOR SHAFT 89 PINION DRIVE

GAINPAWL A
PAWL SPRING (REF.)

GAIN PAWL SELECTOR SHAFT
PAWL SPRING

G A I N A N D D R I V E PAWLS
SHOWN I N N E U T R A L P O S I T I O N
52-35203 DRIVE PAWL /3\
SECTION A-A

GAIN PAWL HOUSING
ASSY. (REF.)
GAINPAWL
SELECTOR SHAFT (REF.)
PAWL POSITIONING
SPRING CARTRIDGE

SECTION B-B KEY MATERIAL
A 7075-T5 ALUMINUM

A 7079-T6 ALUMINUM

A AMS 4 9 2 8 T I T A N I U M

FIGURE 6 HATCH MANUAL CONTROL MECHANISM

17

I-

I
a t t h e McDonnell p l a n t , t h e u n i t was shipped t o Northrop-Ventura on 31 July
1962and was t h e r e a f t e r a s s i g n e d t o North American A v i a t i o n f o r testing. The
u n i t was destroyed on 30 July 1963 while undergoing drop t e s t s at El Centro,
California.

-
2. B o i l e r p l a t e No. 2 B o i l e r p l a t e No. 2 was a welded steel mock-up
of t h e pressurized cabin corresponding closely t o t h e flight a r t i c l e i n shape
and volume. It was used f o r f u n c t i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n s of the gaseous oxygen
components of the environmental control system (ECS) under simulated mission
environments; t h e e f f e c t s of solar r a d i a t i o n andequipment heat exchange were
especially significant. A complete ECS and r e l a t e d crew s t a t i o n c o n t r o l s were
i n s t a l l e d . The ECS w a s instrumented t o record and evaluate systemperformance
during normaland secondary modes of operation.Testconditions simulated
regular mission phases as well as f a i l u r e s and o t h e r abnormal operations
including crewman "ejection" during t h e prelaunch and the re-entry modes.

B o i l e r p l a t e No. 2, with i t s complete ECS i n s t a l l e d , was first used
in evaluation testing in the McDonnell laboratory. On 9 April 1963, it was
shipped t o MSC, Houston, f o r f u r t h e r tests a t t h a t site.

-
3. B o i l e r p l a t e No. 3 Boilerplate No. 3 was a welded s t e e l mock-up
of t h e re-entry module, aerodynemically similar t o t h e f l i g h t a r t i c l e . The
b o i l e r p l a t e was u t i l i z e d f o r e j e c t i o n s e a t development s l e d runs. It
contained t h e two s e a t s , t h e s e a t rails, and t h e s e a t a c t u a t i n g mechanisms.
A removable f a i r i n g simulated the adapter retrograde section. Boilerplate
hatches were of the c o r r e c t shape, but were f i x e d i n the open p o s i t i o n because
no hatch sequencing tests were intended.

B o i l e r p l a t e No. 3 was shipped t o Weber A i r c r a f t i n J u l y 1962. The
first sled drag run took place on 9 November 1962, when extensive damage t o
the vehicle occurred due t o t h e f a i l u r e of one of t h e pusher sled rockets.
The u n i t was subsequently repaired and u t i l i z e d i n further sled t e s t i n g .

-
4. B o i l e r p l a t e No. 3 A Boilerplate No. 3 A had e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same
s t r u c t u r e as No. 3, modified by t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of a production large pressure
bulkhead, a seat r a i l torque box, two hatch sills, two side panels, two
"light" hatches, and two f l i p p e r doors.

The u n i t was subjected t o hatch firing f u n c t i o n a l tests a t the
McDonnell l a b o r a t o r y p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y t o Weber Aircraft. A t Weber it under-
went escape system qualification tests, comprising both SOPE (simulated o f f -
the-pad ejection) tests and sled runs. Complete pyrotechnicsystem tests and
sequencing were included in the program. These t;ests were performed at Weber
during t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of 1964 and continued i n t o t h e first months of 1965.

-
5. B o i l e r p l a t e No. 4 Boilerplate No. 4 was b u i l t by Weber A i r c r a f t
and d e l i v e r e d t o McDonnellon 21 October 1963. O f aluminum s k i n and s t r i n g e r
construction, it was designed t o c a r r y ballast a d j u s t e d t o the weight, cg and
moment of i n e r t i a of a production spacecraft. The o r i g i n a l i n t e n t was t o
u t i l i z e t h i s b o i l e r p l a t e i n e v a l u a t i n g the skidlandinggear. These tests
were deleked, however, when t h e ground landing mode was scrubbed f o r the

18
e n t i r e Geminiprogram. Instead, boilerplate No. 4 was used i n a series of
drop tests a t t h e McDonnell f a c i l i t y .

-
6 . Boilerplate No. 5 A welded s t e e l mock-up of the re-entry module,
boilerplate No. 5 was designed f o r use i n t h e Gemini parachute development
program. It contained provisions for ballast t o simulate spacecraft weight
and cg. The unit was shipped t o Northrop-Ventura on 31 August 1962, and
employed i n parachute testing. Subsequent t o these tests, b o i l e r p l a t e No. 5
was refurbished and converted into static a r t i c l e No. 4A (18 September lw),
i n which capacity it was-utilized in high-altitude-drogue qualification tests
along with i t s c o u n t e r p a r t , s t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 7.
B. S t a t i c Re-entry Vehicles:
-
1. S t a t i c No. 1 Static a r t i c l e No. 1was cancelled by agreement
between McDonnell and t h e NASA; however, i t s re-entry module and adapter were
reassigned t o Spacecraft 3A.

2. S t a t i c No. 2 -
Static No. 2 was intended t o be a manned re-entry
module designed specifically for qualifying the NAA Paraglider. The u n i t w a s
cancelled when t h e paraglider was deleted from the program.

-
3. S t a t i c No. 3 Static a r t i c l e No. 3 consisted of a complete re-entry
module of the early paraglider configuration and an adapter module. The
principal difference between it and the standard re-entry vehicle was the
addition of the paraglider torque box structure, located between t h e hatches.
(This torque box could accommodate parachute fittings, enabling the vehicle
t o be employed i n e i t h e r t h e paraglider or t h e parachute configuration.) The
u n i t was delivered to the NASA on 15 May 1963. S t a t i c t e s t s f o r t h i s vehicle
includedlandingconditions,parachutesupportstructure tests, launch,abort,
re-entry and heat shield back-up s t r u c t u r e t e s t s . For the launch and abort
t e s t s t h e k c t i n No. 2 adapter w a s mated to the re-entry module. Following
the completionof i t s t e s t program, s t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 3 was reassigned t o
t h e Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) program f o r t e s t i n g .

-
4. Static No. 4 S t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 4 has the same structural config-
uration as No. 3 except that i n a d d i t i o n it contained dummy equipment t o
simulate t h e mass and cg of t h e flight a r t i c l e . This vehicle was designed t o
undergo dynamic response tests, t e s t s of the seat and hatch back-up structure,
and ultimate pressurization tests. In addition, hoist loop and support tests
and water drop tests were performed. The u n i t was delivered on 18 April 1963.
m e r completion of t h e t e s t program, this vehicle was reassigned t o the
MOL program.

structure (i.e.,
-
5. Static No. 5 S t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 5 had a complete re-entry vehicle
no adapter) and was designed f o r f l o t a t i o n stability tests
and as an egress trainer. All equpment exterior to the pressure vessel and
c r i t i c a l t o f l o t a t i o n was carefully simulated t o assure the .proper water
flotation attitude. In addition, ballast was i n s t a l l e d t o simulate the
correct weight andcg as incorporated into the Spacecraft 3 configuration,
the program's first manned vehicle.
Ihe water f l o t a t i o n tests were successiully completed at the
McDonnell f a c i l i t y and the u n i t was subsequently modified t o t h e egress
trainer configuration. %is modification included the installation of those
systems normally operative at splashdown - i.e., a partial ECS and cop3plltnlca-
t i o n s system. All inoperative equipment e x t e r i o r t o the pressure vessel wa8
simulated i n t h i s configuration; ballast t o sinailate correct weight and cg
was also provided. The pressure vessel contained dummy eJection seats, a
partially operative instrument panel and operating recovery equipment. Provi-
s i o n s f o r the i n s t a l l a t i o n of landing gear were included, although t h e gear
was never installed. A t the completion of t h e modification, the u n i t was
delivered to the NASA f o r egress training.

-
6. S t a t i c No. 6 S t a t i c No. 6 was t o havebeen a back-up v e h i c l e t o
s t a t i c No. 2, but was cancelled with deletion of the paraglider.

7. Static No. 7 - S t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 7 consisted of b o i l e r p l a t e
a
pressure vessel and heat shield and a production RCS section and an R & R
section. Since the function of t h i s u n i t was to qualify the parachute
recovery system, no adapter module w a s incorporated. However, a l l systems
r e q u i r e d t o completely qualify the drogue, p i l o t and main parachute assemblies
were i n s t a l l e d . The u n i t was delivered t o t h e NASA on 2 January 1964.

C. S t a t i c Adapters:

-
1. S t a t i c Adapter No. 1 S t a t i c adapter No. 1was designed f o r
s t r u c t u r a l dynamics and r e l a t e d s t r u c t u r a l t e s t s . The u n i t was completed at
the McDonnell plant and shipped t o the " b i n Company f o r t h e test program
early i n 1963. I n December 1963 it was returned t o McT)onnell f o r a s e r i e s of
dynamic response t e s t s . Ihmrmy equipment of proper weightand cg was then
mounted i n t h e a d a p t e r t o check the response of the adapter shell.

2. Static Adapter No. 2 -
I n October 1962 construction on s t a t i c
adapter No. 2 was stopped due t o budget considerations. With t h e i n i t i a t i o n
of the Popgun program (see 4, belov), however, adapter No. 2 was r e i n s t a t e d t o
replace static adapter No. 4 i n t h e s t r u c t u r a l test program.

After its fabrication, the retrograde rocket portion of t h e adapter
was a t t a c h e d t o s t a t i c a r t i c l e No. 4 f o r dynamic response testing. The equip-
ment portion of the adapter was l a t e r added and f u r t h e r dynamic testing was
accomplished. A t theconclusion of these tests, the adapter was r e t u r n e d t o
manufacturing for modification. Joined to re-entry t e s t u n i t No. 3, the
adapter was used f o r s t a t i c t e s t s of the "cold" launch condition.

-
3. Static Adapter No. 3 This u n i t was used t o s t r u c t u r a l l y q u a l i f y
the equipment mounts, the retro-rocket support structure, the blast shield
access door,and t h e adapter itself' i n t h e "hot" launch condition.

-
4. Static Adapter No. 4 After undergoing one pyrotechnic separation
t e s t at s t a t i o n 2 13, the adapter was assigned to Popgun testing. This test,
which consisted of pyrotechnic separation at s t a t i o n 2 69 and the firing of
the retro-rockets, had inconclusive results since considerable damage was

20
r

sustained in the retrograde section due to rocket assembu' failure. The
undamaged52-33002-3 r i n g from the retrograde section was removed and u t i l i z e d
in the construction of a b o i l e r p l a t e adapter f o r further Popgun testing. This
t e s t i n g showed noPopgun e f f e c t . The equipment section of t h e s t a t i c No. 4
adapter was used in another pyrotechnic separation t e s t a t Z , l 3 .

D. Miscellaneous Test. Vehicles :
1. Thermal'Qualification 'Pest Vehicle -
This vehicle was a complete.
production spacecraft utilizing the No. 3A re-entry module (one of the 13
production units) and a t e s t adapter. All systemsandsubsystems were flight
worthy, qualified production items except for certain easily replaceable
pieces of equipment such as the heat shield and the ejection seats. With
NASA approval, nonflight articles were s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t h e l a t t e r .

Spacecraft No. 3 A w a s delivered to the McDonnell laboratory on
15 October 1964. The thermal q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t program ran u n t i l February
1965
The q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g comprised mission simulation runs during
which a l l systems were operated t o t h e i r dutycycles. However, safety require-
ments f o r the vacuum chamber dictated t h e avoidance of hypergolic8 and cryo-
genic hydrogen; therefore inert fuels and bridgewire-type pyrotechnics were
employed during these tests. I n a d d i t i o n t o these orbit simulation tests,
special vibration a;nd spacecraft system t e s t (SST) t e s t s were performed on
Spacecraf't 3A.

-
2. Electronics Systems Test Unit (ESTU) The ESTU was a simplified
re-entry module mock-up with provisions for mounting all electronic components
i n t h e i r flight locations. Prototype and early production units were i n s t a l l e d
and interconnected t o simulate t h e spacecraftwiringconditions. Components,
subsystems, and systems were at first operated component-by-component and
then system-by-system t o provide an i n i t i a l e v a l u a t i o n of each componet when
integrated with other units.

A configuration representative of t h a t used i n Spacecraft No. 2
was mounted and thoroughly investigated. The ESTU was a l s o used t o examine
e a r l y problems and evaluate the corrective action. The ESTU was first put
into operation on 19 November 1962. ( R e f DevelopmentProgram, page 76. )

-
3. Compatibility Test Unit (CTU) The CTU was a Spacecraft mock-up
employing standard spacecraft w i r e bundles and having a structure very similar
t o the flight a r t i c l e . Prototypespacecraftsystems w e r e installed, creating
a test vehicle with operational systems representative of Spacecraft 1, 2, 3,
and 3A. The objectives of the t e s t program involving the CmT were:
a. Provide compatibility tests (including radio noise) of t h e
spacecraft systems t o assure interference-free combined operation.
b. Establish spacecraft and ground support equipment (GSE)
compatibility.
C . Furnish SST procedure evaluation and personnel training prior
t o production spacecraft tests.
d. Provide a t e s t bed to evaluate spacecraft configuration changes
and investigate problem areas.

The compatibility test unit was delivered from manufacturing i n
February 1963. The i n i t i a l CTU tests were performed i n t h e SST a r e a u t i l i z i n g
SST personnel,procedures and test equipment .
( R e f Development Program,
Page 76.)
4. Specimen Hatch - This t e s t u n i t comprised a production hatch sill,
side panels, hatches and l a t c h mechanismmountedon a boilerplate box assembly.
Latch rigging, functional, and leakage t e s t s were performed on the unit, as
well as s t a t i c s t r u c t u r a l tests of t h e a f t h o i s t l o o p f i t t i n g . Hatch t e s t i n g
was accomplished per TR 052-045.02. To perform the s t r u c t u r a l tests, proper
structural representation required the inclusion of a portion of t h e large
pressure bulkhead. This was subsequentlyinstalled. The u n i t was delivered
from manufacturing i n July 1963.

-
5. R & R and RCS Pyro Test Unit This u n i t w a s composed of a full
production R & R/RCS section equipped for the paraglider configuration. It
was designed for pyrotechnic demonstration of the following operations:

a. Drogue mortar
b. Nose fairing separation
c. MDF ring separation at s t a t i o n Z 191.97
d. Nose landing gear deployment
e. Emergency docking release deployment, and
f . Docking bar assembly deployment.

The pyro t e s t u n i t was originally scheduled f o r d e l i v e r y from
manufacturing i n mid-December 1963, but t h e d e c i s i o n t o abandon the paraglider
concept involved major modifications t o t h e test u n i t , r e s u l t i n g i n a delivery
date i n t h e first quarter of 1964. Tests involvingthelandinggear (d,
above) were deleted.

-
6. R & R and RCS S t r u c t u r a l Test Unit This unit, originally designed
t o contain a paraglider type R & R section and a parachute RCS, was used t o
structurally qualify the radar support structure, the RCS parachute support
structure, and the nose f a i r i n g and supportstructure. Further t e s t i n g
involved qualifying the drogue parachute structure under re-entry temperatures,
and t h e performance of a pyrotechnic separation of the MDF r i n g a t Z 191.97.
A t the conclusion of these tests, the u n i t was i n s t a l l e d on s t a t i c a r t i c l e
No. 3 (Ref B. S t a t i c Re-entryVehicles, page 19 1 for parachute deployment
tests at high temperatures.

Structural Testing.

A. Rendezvous and Recovery (R & R) Section Tests -
The drogue chute
m o r t a r support structure was t e s t e d t o determine i t s s t a t i c strength, axial
spring rate, and s t r a i n gauge calibration. The t e s t a r t i c l e c o n s i s t e d of a

22
tandem drogue rendezvous and recovery section attached t o a rigid support at
s t a t i o n Z 191.97. A uniformly distributed axial load was applied t o the test
a r t i c l e through the base of one of the mortar assemblies. When failure did
not occur after the applied load had subatantially exceeded t h e design ulti-
mate load, testing was considered successFully completed.

B. Combined R & R/RCS llests -
Ihe re-entry heating t e s t of R & R RCS
structure w i t h chute p u l l off loads was conducted t o demonstrate t h e struc-
-
tural i n t e g r i t y of the R & R and of the attachment j o i n t f o r t h e RCS section
at s t a t i o n Z 191.97.
The s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the drogue parachute support structure
during simulated re-entry heating and drogue parachute deployment loads a l s o
was demonstrated. The desired m a x i m u m temperature of 1 6 0 0 ~ was
~ achieved on
the beryllium shingles at a heating rate of 6OF per sec. A limit load of
3550 l b and an ultimate load of 4850 l b were applied t o t h e RX drogue cable
a t a loading rate of 3210 and 1735 l b per sec, respectively. *sting a t sea
l e v e l atmospheric conditions instead of i n a near-vacuum caused fires which
resulted i n l o c a l s t r u c t u r a l damage such as broken thruster nozzles, dislodged
shingle retainers and a b o l t failure. However, t e s t results indicated that
t h e R & R attachment j o i n t at 2 191.97, and t h e drogue parachute support
structure were s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate t o withstand the re-entry temperatures
and loads simulating deployment of the single drogue parachute.

C. Re-entry Module Tests

1. Structural Demonstration of t h e Re-entry Module f o r Parachute
Deployment Loads -
Two load conditions, representing different parachute pull-
off angles, were tested consecutively.Foreachcondition, the RCS section
and a small portion of t h e adjoining conical section were heated by a quartz
infrared lampbank: prior to load application. Loading was i n i t i a t e d when a
~ ~ recorded on t h e web of a stringer located on BY at
temperature of 2 6 0 was
Z 181.5. The structure sustained design ultimate load f o r both test conditions
without failure. Several local fires during the heat t e s t were a t t r i b u t e d t o
laboratory atmospheric conditions.

2. Heating Test of Gemini Re-entry Module f o r C r i t i c a l Re-entry
-
Temperatures Two test conditions were conducted t o demonstrate the struc-
tural i n t e g r i t y of t h e re-entry module f o r t h e c r i t i c a l r e - e n t r y temperatures.
The two conditions consisted of heating (1) the upper c e n t e r l i n e i n the
v i c i n i t y of t h e hatches, and (2) the lower centerline in the vicinity of the
ECS, e q u i p e n t andlandinggeardoors.Temperatures and structural deflections
at several locations were recorded.Test results indicated t h a t t h e conical
section was adequate s t r u c t u r a l l y f o r t h e re-entry heating conditions tested.

3. Spacecraft Structural Evaluation f o r Re-entry Uads This t e s t -
subjected a spacecraft re-entry module t o loads simulating c r i t i c a l r e - e n t r y
conditions. Simulated aerodynamic pressure loads w e r e a p p l i e d t o the heat
shield i n 5s increments t o 136s design limit load. fnads w e r e reacted on the
' a f t section of t h e re-entry module. No damage was sustained during the test.
-
4. S t a t i c T e s t of Ejection Seat an8 Back-up Structure This t e s t
determlned t h e adequacy of t h e e j e c t i o n seat support structure f o r t h e
following conditions:.

a. Condition B = oO, a = -150 Ejection
b. Condition XI f3 L ls0, a ='0 EJection
C. Condition vb Landing.
The specimen sustained ultimate load (135s design limit load) f o r
conditions M and XI without failure.

For condition vb, a torque box f i t t i n g failed at approximately
go$ design limit load. me fitting was redesigned.Sinceconation vb was
a paraglider requirement, no f u r t h e r t e s t i n g was required.

5. S t a t i c Test f o r Re-entry Module Pressurization - The requirements
of this t e s t were as follows:

a. To determine i f the conical section of t h e spacecraft was struc-
turally adequate f o r 200 cycles of internal. burst pressurization from zero t o
six psig.
b. To determine what caused the l e f t hatch on the spacecraft to
unlatch and open at approximately 5.5 psig during cycle 4 of t h e t e s t described
i n a above, and t o repeat t h e malfunction of t h e l e f t hatch opening under
pressure with no changes t o hatch rigging.
C . To detelmine i f t h e conical section of t h e spacecraft was
s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate f o r ultimate i n t e r n a l burst pressurization (12 psig).
d. To determine i f the conical section of the spacecraft was
s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate for ultimate external collapsing pressure (3 psig).
The specimen sustained 200 cycles of i n t e r n a l burst pressurization,
ultimate i n t e r n a l burst pressure, and ultimate external collapsing pressure
without failure o r s i g n i f i c a n t change i n t h e leakage rate.

During the fourth cycle of t h e 200-cycle pressurization testing,
the hatch mechanism r o t a t e d t o the unlatched position, and the hatch opened
from internal pressure. Examinationof the hatch mechanismshowed t h a t a
bolt in the hatch torque box cover was interfering with the hatch mechanism
bellcrank assembly. The malfunction, which prevented the hatch mechanism
from rotating full over center, was duplicated. The condition was eliminated
by design change and the 200-cycle test was resumed without further malfunc-
tion. The specimen was determined t o be s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate f o r all
conditions tested.

6. Spacecraft Water Impact Drop Tests - Simulated parachute landings
on water were conducted t o demonstrate the a b i l i t y of t h e spacecraf't s t r u c t u r e
t o withstand impact loadings and t o maintain a watertight crew compartment.
The specimen was catapulted from a track into a pond t o shulate worst condi-
tions involving local water surface angle due t o wave action andimpact velo-
c i t y r e s u l t i n g from wind and descent speed. !Fwo impact a t t i t u d e s were
tested; RCS section forward,then heat shield forward. The weight and balance

24
of the unballasted test vehicle were determinedexperimentally. The mass
moments of inertia of t h e basicvehicle w e r e d e t e k n e d Impact
accelerations along the 2 (longitudiaal) and Y (vertical) axes were measured.
analy&ally.
The cabin was pressurized t o 5.0 psig before and after each drop t e s t , and
the pressure decay during a 30min period was recorded i n eachcase. The
cabin was not pressurized when dropped.

On the heat shield forwarddrop, no s t r u c t u r a l damage occurred. On
the t e s t with the RCS section forward, shingles were deformed on t h e conical
section adjacent to the main landing gear doors. A subsequent pressurization
check detected a small leak at the forward edge of t h e ECS door. However,
during a 39-hr flotation period following the drop test, only 20 oz of water
was taken aboard. The spacecraft was considerid structurally satisfactory
t o s u s t a i n water impact.

-
7. S t a t i c Test of Crew Hatch These t e s t s helped t o evaluate the
s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of t h e crew hatch and hatch support f o r the following
conditions:

-
a. Condition I Ultimate external airload against the flipper
door f o r astronaut egress during an abort.
b. Condition I1
rotate the hatch past
-
Ultimate air and i n e r t i a l loads tending t o
88 degrees full open, restrained by an extended simulated
hatch actuator. This condition was c r i t i c a l f o r the hatch and hatch actuator
support . C. Condition I11 -
Ultimate air, i n e r t i a l and ejection seat cata-
p u l t loads applied t o hatches and support i n the following sequence:

Airloads were applied t o both hatches when full open 88 degrees
and supported by simulated hatch actuators.
With ultimate airload applied t o hatches, the ultimate ejec-
t i o n seat catapult load was a p p l i e d t o t h e right ejection seat catapult
fitting.
With ultimate load applied to hatches and right e j e c t i o n s e a t
c a t a p u l t f i t t i n g , ultimate e j e c t i o n seat catapult load was a p p l i e d t o the
left ejection seat catapult fitting.
With ultimate load applied to the hatches and both ejection
seat c a t a p u l t f i t t i n g s , t h e a p p l i e d c a t a p u l t l o a d on the right catapult f i t -
t i n g was reduced to zero.

Results of the crew hatch test were:

- The flipper door and adjacent' support sustained
a. Condition I
136s design limit load (6.2 psi) without failure.
b. Condition I1 - The crew hatch and support structure reached
120$ design limit load before the hatch torque box skin failed. "be crew hatch
was strengthened by incorporating a mschined s t i f f e n e r and a doubler on t h e
hatch torque box akin. When the condition was retested, the redesigned crew
hatch failed at 155s design limit load.
-
c. Condition I11 The hatches and support withstood the ultimate
test load (136s design limit l o a d ) f o r all four phases of the t e s t . The

25
flipper doors, strengthened crew hatches, and the hatch support structure
were adequate f o r a l l conditions tested.

D. Adapter Section Tests
1. S t a t i c Test of the Retfograde Rocket Support Structure This test
helped t o determine t h e adequacy of the retrograde rocket support structure
-
forthecriticalabortcondition. !%e structure sustained design ultimate
load without failure. b a d was applied simultaneously along t h e t h r u s t a x i s
of all four rockets, and no permanent deformation was observed.

2. S t a t i c Test of GeminiEquipmentModules and Module Support
Structure -
This t e s t evaluated the adequacy of the following adapter equip-
ment modules and t h e i r s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e f o r c r i t i c a l launch and abort
conditions:

a. Orbital a t t i t u d e maneuvering system module.
b. Fuel cell module, long mission.
c. Environmental control system.oxygen module, long mission.
d. Environmental control system coolant module.

A l l four modules and t h e i r support structures sustained ultimate
load (136$ design l j m i t load) for the c r i t i c a l launch condition without
primary s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e .

When the simulated hydrogen b o t t l e was removed from the fuel c e l l
module after t h e t e s t , t h e press-fit sleeve and plug assembly, which r e s t r a i n s
side motion of the b o t t l e , had separated from the fuel c e l l b l a s t - s h i e l d . The
oxygen bottle sleeve assembly also was loosened. The press-fit sleeve and
plug assemblies were replaced by t h r e a d e d u n i t s p r i o r t o t h e c r i t i c a l a b o r t
tests.

The f u e l c e l l module and o r b i t a l a t t i t u d e maneuvering system module
sustained design ultimate l o a d f o r t h e c r i t i c a l a b o r t t e s t without failure.
A t l3O$ design limit load, the simulated presswant bottle nearest IX deflected
enough t o contact the module supportstructure, To correct this the pressurant
bottle support was stiffened. The adapter equipment modules and adJacent
Support structure were determined t o be s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate f o r t h e launch
and abort conditions tested.

3. S t a t i c Test of the Spacecraft Adapter f o r C r i t i c a l Launch Condition
w i t h Elevated Temperature -
This test helped determine t h e s t r u c t u r a l adequacy
of the adapter for launch condition 2h (Ref: structural design loads,
McDonnell Report 9030), launch t r a j e c t o r y 333, which has a c r i t i c a l combina-
t i o n of load and elevated temperature,

The t e s t adapter was mounted horizontally on the forward oxidizer
s k i r t of a Titan launch vehicle so t h a t the s t r i n g e r No. 40 of t h e equipment
section received maximum compression. The specimen was loaded axially (af't)
in t h e Z direction. Shear was introduced perpendicularly t o the Z axis and
v e r t i c a l l y downward. Adapter radiator leakage was checked, andgaps between

26
t h e oxidizer s k i r t and the adapter w e r e measured before and during the test.
The temperature cycle was run under three conditions of load: limit (lo($ Dm).,
ultimate (136s DLC) and s t r e t c h (1564 DU).

The t e s t structure satisfactorily sustained the stretch load at
1564 Dm. The adapter radiator did not leak, andgap deflections between t h e
oxidizer skirt and adapter were negligible.

The adapter was considered structurally capable of sustaining the
stretch loads.

-
E. Complete Spacecraft Test llhe static test of Gemini Spacecraft for
a critical abort condition verified t h e s t r u c t u r a l and functional integrity
of the spacecraft for the 5.5 degreeangle of attack. Two tests were con-
ducted. During t e s t condition A, the specimen was subjected t o both axial
compression and bending moment about the Y-Y a x i s with t h e right (RX)side of
the spacecraft in compression. The specimen was loaded i n increments t o
lo@ design limit load and t h e hatches were opened by hatch actuators. Inspec-
tion revealed no damage.

For test condition B y t h e specimen was subjected to bending moment
about the X-X a x i s w i t h the bottom (BY) of t h e spacecraft in compression, and
a torque applied through the open hatches, as w e l l as an axial load and bend-
ing moment about the Y-Y axis. The specimen, instrumented t o record strains,
was loaded i n increments t o 1364 DLL without deleterious effect.
The spacecraft was considered functionally and s t r u c t u r a l l y adequate
f o r t h e abort conditions tested.

F. Gemini-Agena Target Docking Adapter (TDA) Test - The ultimate strength
s t a t i c t e s t q u a l i f i e d t h e c r i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the Gemini and Agena target
docking adapter f o r o r b i t a l maneuvering ultimate loads. The t e s t specimen
consisted o f the following:

1. A s t a t i c target docking adapter.
2. A rendezvous and recovery module.
3. A static re-entry control system section.
4. An Agena forward auxiliary rack.
Two sets ofloadingconditions were tested. One consisted of bending
w i t h a x i a l compression which simulated maneuvering i n o r b i t w i t h full t h r u s t ;
the other consisted of bending without a x i a l compression which simulated
maneuvering i n o r b i t w ith zero thrust.

Three t e s t s were conducted w i t h TDA andthe R & R latched together and
r i g i d i z e d t o t h e i r maneuvering configuration. Loading conditions were as
follows :

1. Bending With Axial Compression -
The bending was applied about
t h e X 0.00 axis placing the IX l a t c h i n t e n s i o n .
2. Bending Without A x i
al Compression
Y 0.00 axis placing. the BY l a t c h i n tension.
-
The bending was applied about

-
3. Bending With Axial Compression The bending w a s applied about the
.
Y 0.00 axis placing the BY,latch i n compress'ion. Bending was increased t o
failure

The Gemini and Agena TDA withstood ultimate loads f o r o r b i t a l manew
vering imposed by t h e three tests.

A primary and secondary failure of t h e R & R occurred during test 3
at 147s axial design limit loads and 2274 bendingdesign limit load. The
primary failure consisted of buckling the two stringers adjacent to the BY
docking Sitting. Shingle retainer failure i n t h e same area constituted t h e
secondary failure.

It was concluded t h a t t h e Gemini and Agena TDA were s t r u c t u r a l l y
capable of withstanding ultimate loads f o r o r b i t a l maneuvering, and that the
TDA was structurally stronger than the R & R when subjected t o the loading
conditions defined by t h i s t e s t request.

s t r u c t u r a l Dynamics Tests

Dynamic Response Test of Spacecraft and EquipmentUnder a Vibration
Environment. -
This t e s t helped t o determine t h e following:

A. Spacecraft beam frequency response, beam resonant mode, and resonant
mode damping decay characteristics.
B. Equipment frequency response and equipment resonant acceleration
response mode characteristics.
C. Adapter shell resonant response mode characteristics.

The specimen was tested in the following configurations:

A. Abort Configuration
s t a t i o n s 2 109 and 2 192.
- The abort module was suspended free-free a t

B. Re-entry Configuration - The re-entry module was suspended free-
f r e e at s t a t i o n s Z 109 and 2 192.
C. Landing Configuration - The landing module was suspended free-free
at s t a t i o n s 2 104 and 2 192, w ith the landing gear under t e s t i n the extended
position. The nose landinggear was t e s t e d i n both the compressed and
extended positions.

Dynamic Response of the Spacecraft in the Moored Configuration. - This
t e s t was conducted i n t h e following three phases:

A. Phase 1: Dynamic Response of t h e Spacecraft i n t h e Moored Configura-
tion - The spacecraft was subjected to a sinusoidal vibration environment i n
i t s X, Y and Z axes. The spacecraft was moored t o a t a r g e t docking adapter
(TDA) which was b o l t e d t o an Agena forward auxiliary rack cantilevered from
t h e laboratory floor. The first three e l a s t i c body modes of the system f o r
various static load conditions were determined f o r all axes of excitation.
These static load conditions simulated t h e compression and moment loads
generated by the t h r u s t of the Agena engine. Phase 1 data includefrequency
response plots, modal response data, and damping data.

-
B. Phase 2: Determination of Moment of I n e r t i a The i n e r t i a of t h e space-
c r a f t was determinedabout i t s X and Y 8xes. The spacecraft was supported on
knife edges at 2 s t a t i o n 192 and was suspended with soft springs of a known
spring constant at 2 s t a t i o n 13. The i n e r t i a was calculated by knowing the
weight, center of gravity, spring location, knife edge location, and frequency
of oscillation of the system.

C. Phase 3: Dynamic Response of TDA Equipnent -
The TDA was subjected t o
a sinusoidal vibration environment i n i t s X, Y and 2 axes. The TDA was
attached t o a fixture which vas a t t a c h e d t o an electromagnetic vibration
exciter for excitation in each of t h r e e mutually perpendicular axes. Data
presented for phase 3 included transmissibility plots and modal response data.

Full-scale Structural and Functional Tests of an Agena n>A and a Gemini
"
R -
& R-Sction Subjected t o Mooring Shock. - Tests simulating orbital moorings
between full-scale Gemini and Agena vehicles were conducted t o demonstrate t h e
s t r u c t u r a l and functional capabilities of a production Gemini R & R section
and an Agena TDA when subjected to the mooring shock environment. Both the
R & R section and TDA assembly were moynted on fabricated structural s t e e l
vehicles. Composite vehicle assemblies simulated t h e mass, cg location, and
mass moments of i n e r t i a of t h e i r respective production vehicles for an o r b i t a l
configuration.

Test vehicles were suspended as simple pendulums, 56.57 f t i n length w i t h
a gimbal system a t each cg, giving t h e vehicles freedom i n p i t c h , yaw, r o l l
and translation. The Gemini t e s t v e h i c l e w a s pulled back and thenallowed t o
s w i n g forward through a predetermined distance to attain various vehicle limit
and ultimate closing velocities. Vehicle attitudes and locations ofimpacts
a l s o were controlled. "DA damper loads and strokes and the R & R section
indexing b a r bending moments were recorded.

The Agena TDA and t h e Gemini R & R section sustained a l l shock loads
imposed w i t h no s t r u c t u r a l o r f u n c t i o n a l failures. Al mooring systems that
were operable during the t e s t performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

RELIABILITY AND Q U U T Y ASSURANCE PROCRAM

The objective of t h e Gemini r e l i a b i l i t y and quality assurance progr-
was t o a t t a i n the level of r e l i a b i l i t y required for all aspects of ganned
o r b i t a l flight. The emphasis w a s placed on achieving high mission depend-
a b i l i t y with maximum crew safety. A mission r e l i a b i l i t y g o a l of .95 and a
crew safety goal of -995 were therefore specified, i n which mission relip
a b i l i t y i s defined as the probability of accomplishing t h e objectives of the
mission, and crew safety is defined as the probability of t h e crew

,
surviving the mission. The methodology f o r accomplishingthese two goals
was :

A. Review systems' design t o i n s u r e that the designs were inherently
satisfactory.
B. Suggestchanges t o design engineering t o maximize system r e l i a b i l i t y .
C. Conduct t e s t s throughout the Gemini program t o demonstratesystems'
r e l i a b i l i t y and t o v e r i f y s a t i s f a c t o r y o p e r a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
D. Provide r e l i a b i l i t y estimates for various missions to quantitatively
express spacecraft and mission r e l i a b i l i t y and t o i d e n t i f y equipment o r
systems which required r e l i a b i l i t y improvement.
E. Establish a control system which required the reporting, investigation,
and correction of equipment malfunctions.
F. Develop a r i g i d q u a l i t y c o n t r o l program t o maintain the reliability
inherent in the spacecraft design.

Evaluation O f Spacecraft Design

The design of the spacecraft was evaluated to insure that t h e r e l i a b i l i t y
goals could be met. Wherever a single failure could be catastrophic to the
crew o r t o the spacecraft or could jeopardize mission success, redundant
systems o r back-up procedures were deemed necessary and were i n s t i t u t e d . Some
examples of these redundant features are :

A. Every pyrotechnic function was supplied with redundant i n i t i a t i o n
c i r c u i t r y and redundant cartridges.
B. Two independent re-entry control propulsion systems were supplied
for re-entry safety.
C. Redundant horizon sensors and rate gyros were provided f o r t h e
guidance and control system.
D. S i x f u e l c e l l s t a c k s were i n s t a l l e d t o supply e l e c t r i c a l power; only
three t o five stacks were required for nominal mission performance.

R e l i a b i l i t y Reviews. - Reliability engineers reviewed designs independ-
e n t l y of the i n i t i a t o r s i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e an objective evaluation for
r e l i a b i l i t y and crew safety. These reviews were begun as soon as t h e i n i t i a l
design was established and were continuedthroughout the design phase.Sur-
veillance of the prime contractor's suppliers was also maintained i n design,
p a r t s s e l e c t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n , r e l i a b i l i t y a c t i v i t i e s , and i n proposed
design problem solutions.Inaddition,specification and procurement documents,
schematic and i n s t a l l a t i o n drawings, stress analyses, and design data sheets
were evaluated t o determine t h e i r e f f e c t s on reliability. Detailed studies
were performed to evaluate system configurations for possible design imwove-
ment. Some examples of these studies and t h e i r results are:

A. Reliability analysis of the environmental control system r e s u l t e d i n
t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of a redundant h e a t e r i n the primary oxygen tank. (On
Spacecraft 10, ll, and 12 these redundant heaters allowed both the ECS and the
RSS t o share a single, enlarged oxygen tank.)
B. A study w a s performed t o determine t h e effect of the instrumentation
signal conditioners upon maneuvering and a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l r e l i a b i l i t y . The
study indicated t h a t spacecraft control would not be significantly degraded
by the failure of the instrumentation equipment, s i n c e e l e c t r i c a l i s o l a t i o n
between the systems was p a r t of the design concept.

C. Analysis of t h e flight director controller, located on t h e spacecraft
right-hand instrument panel, resulted i n including ON-OFF switch f o r the
t h r u s t e r s and related units. This conserved and improved r e l i a b i l i t y by not
requiring the units t o . be continuously powered.

Failure Mode and Failure Effect Analysis. -
A detailed failure mode and
failurFe?fFct- analjl;sis &s conducted on a l l f u n c t i o n a l s p a c e c r a f t equipment.
The analysis included the following steps:
A. A description of t h e failure mode.
B. "he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the mission phases i n which the failure was
l i k e l y t o occur.
C. An estimate of how t h e f a i l u r e would a f f e c t the system and the mission.
D. A review of the failure indications available t o the crew and t o the
ground.
E. An estimate of t h e maximuxu time the mission could be continued after
a f a i l u r e . This estimate measured the seriousness of the failure.

The analysis provided a means t o estimate the impact of a failure upon
missionsuccess and crew safety. In addition, it helpeddetermine the need
for design changes to eliminate those f a i l u r e s which significantly jeopardized
missionsuccessor crew safety.Finally, the a n a l y s i s l e d t o a reexamination
of the adequacy of failure indications. Single point failure modes and
f a i l u r e e f f e c t s were analyzed f o r every manned mission.Action was taken
(1)to eliminate the failure mode( s), o r (2) t o j u s t i e t h e design and recom-
mend precautionary procedures or crew a c t i o n s t o minimize the likelihood of
failure.

A n abort time study was made t o h e l p determine whether recovery forces
were adequately distributed. The probability of an abort, and t h e probability
of permitting the flight t o continue f o r a specified time after an abort-
causing failure were estimated. If a failure occurred which required an abort,
the study indicated t h a t there was a 90% probability that at l e a s t 1.5 o r b i t s
could becompleted prior to spacecraft re-entry.

Test Program For R e l i a b i l i t y And Quality Assurance

The Gemini test program consisted of development, q u a l i f i c a t i o n , r e l i -
a b i l i t y , and equipment flight simulation tests ( t h e last u t i l i z i n g b o t h
estimated and real missionenvironmentaldata). Development tests used
engineering models t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of the design concepts. Prior
t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n testing, the functional performance and s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y
ofproduction hardware were demonstrated. Qualification requirements were
established for a l l spacecraft equipment, and s u f f i c i e n t t e s t i n g was then
performed t o prove t h a t a production unit m e t the design requirements, Quali-
f i c a t i o n tests included simulated mission conditions, during which the equip-
ment was operated t o t h e duty cycles and i n t h e modes expected during flight.

The environmental levels to which t h e equipment was subjected were based
on t h e a n t i c i p a t e d p r e f l i g h t , flight, andpost-landingconditions. However,
these environmental levels were revised whenever f l i g h t experience or other
data revealed t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l environmental requirements were too stringent.
Production equipment was also subjected to overstress testing, i n which the
equipment was operated under conditions more severe than the design
requirements .
Tests were conducted on a l l flight a r t i c l e s t o assure t h a t t h e design
r e l i a b i l i t y had not been degraded in the fabrication, handling and i n s t a l l a -
t i o n of the hardware. These tests comprised:

A. Receiving Tests - Parts were inspected by x-ray,spectrograph,and
other techniques where appropriate, and functional tests were performed.
B. Production Tests - Inspection and t e s t s were performed a t various
stages of equipment assembly t o d e t e c t d e f i c i e n c i e s e a r l y i n t h e manufacturing
process.
C. Redelivery Acceptance Tests (PDA)
at the vendor's plant prior to delivery to
- Equipment performance was v e r i f i e d
t h e prime c o n t r a c t o r o r t o the
customer.
D. R e i n s t a l l a t i o n Acceptance Tests (PIA) - Equipment performance was
r e v e r i f i e d p r i o r t o i n s t a l l i n g t h e equipnent i n the Spacecraft.
-
E. Spacecraft Systems Tests (SST) Individual and integrated systems
t e s t s , simulated flight tests, and a l t i t u d e chamber tests were performed after
systems' i n s t a l l a t i o n i n the spacecraft.
F. Spacecraft/Launch Vehicle J o i n t System Tests - Systems tests were
performed at the launch site p r i o r t o mating the s p a c e c r a f t t o t h e launch
vehicle. After spacecraft mate, integrated systems tests, simulated flights,
and abort mode tests were conducted, u t i l i z i n g t h e Mission Control Center, the
Manned Space Flight Network, and the flight crew.
G. Countdown Tests - A f i n a l series of functional tests was performed on
systems t o v e r i f y their flight readiness.

Limited design assurance tests (DAT) and r e l i a b i l i t y assurance tests (RAT)
were conducted; however, t h e q u a l i t y and conclusiveness of the overall test
program were s u f f i c i e n t t o demonstrate equipment performanceand f l i g h t
worthiness.

Estimates Of R e l i a b i l i t y Requirements

The r e l i a b i l i t y requirements were established w ith regard for each system's
mission function and i n keeping w i t h t h e o v e r a l l s p a c e c r a f t r e l i a b i l i t y goal
of .95. These requirements were consistentwith the r e l a t i v e reliabilities of
similar Project Mercury equipment. Each system's inherent reliability was
then estimated, based primarily on component failure rate data. These e s t i -
mates were a p p l i e d t o r e l i a b i l i t y models which c a l l e d f o r a two-day rendezvous
and a two-week o r b i t a l flight; the results indicated that the design would
meet t h e reliability goals for mission success and crew safety.

As p a r t of the continuing evaluation, a r e l i a b i l i t y estimate of mission
success and crew safety was made p r i o r t o the flight of each manned mission.
These estimates were based on the latest t e s t and flight data. The close
agreement of these estimates with the actual mission performance gave addi-
tional assurances that succeeding missions would be accomplished successfully
and safely.

Mnitoring And Analysis Of Equipment h l f u n c t i o n s

A "closed loop'' program of failure reporting, failure analysis, and
subsequent corrective action was established t o i d e n t i f y all equipment mal-
functions and anomalies and t o i n s u r e t h a t c o r r e c t i v e measures were taken.
All malfunctions were recorded, from t h e first t e s t i n g of engineering models
up through the operation of a l l flight items. A material reviewboard deter-.
mined the disposition of t h e equipment f o r failure analysis, corrective action,
and subsequent use.

The failures were analyzed a t the vendor's plant, the McDonnell plant,
o r at Kennedy Space Center, depending upon the nature of t h e failure and t h e
a v a i l a b i l i t y of f a c i l i t i e s . Complex equipment was returned t o t h e vendor
when t h e analysis required special engineering and technical skills or s p e c i a l
t e s t equipment.

Failure analysis laboratories w e r e established a t t h e Kennedy Space Center
and at the McDonnell p l a n t t o provide rapid detailed analysis of t h e cause
of the failure. Laboratories were equipped w i t h precision measuring devices,
environmental chambers, and sensitive detectors. By t h e program's end, the
McDonnell laboratory had performed 882 of these analyses.

A l recommended corrective actions were evaluated and those deemed
appropriate were implemented. The required corrective actions ranged from
changes i n design and manufacturing t o r e v i s e d q u a l i t y control techniques and
testing c r i t e r i a . A "current status" summary of all trouble reports was
maintained, i n which each anomaly o r failure was &scribed, and t h e s t a t u s of
t h e analysis and corrective action w a s indicated. This l i s t was continually
reviewed by the customer and the contractor to insure acceptable and timely
corrective measures; action was accelerated in those areas i n which failure
would have a significant effect on pending flights.

DeveloEooent O f Quality Control

A r i g i d q u a l i t y c o n t r o l system was developed t o maintain the r e l i a b i l i t y
i n h e r e n t i n t h e spacecraft design. This system required that flight equipment
be produced, handled, and i n s t a l l e d i n a manner calculated to maintain a
qualified configuration. A configuration control program was established
which required that a l l changes t o the spacecraft be docmented, approved,

33
implemented, and v e r i f i e d by quality control. This method permitted rapid
changes accompanied by rigorous inspection. No change. w a s made t o t h e t o t a l
configuration until it had been submitted t o a management change board which
evaluated t h e impact of the change upon t h e program cost and t h e schedule.

Each flight a r t i c l e was i d e n t i f i e d by part number, and a l l assemblies
and components (such as pres'sure regulators and electronic boxes) were
serialized, recorded, and accountable.Certain materials, such as pyrotechnic
explosives, were kept track of by l o t t o permit t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i f it
was determined t h a t the materials used were substandard.

A l l manufacturing and inspection personnel who required a specified s k i l l
l e v e l were especially trained and the q u a l i t y of their work was periodically
examined by means of proficiency tests. Parts and fabricated assemblies were
inspected to maintain t h e spacecraft quality. A l discrepancies found by t h i s
inspection and t e s t i n g were recorded and corrected, despite t h e i r apparent
insignificance.

All equipment i n s t a l l a t i o n and removal required inspection approval
p r i o r t o changing the system configuration. Formal acceptancereviews were
conducted by the customer and the contractor at c r i t i c a l s t a g e s of t h e space-
c r a f t assemblyand t e s t i n g t o i s o l a t e d e f i c i e n c i e s t h a t might have reduced
spacecraft performance.

SPACECRAFT FLIGHT PERFORMANCE

Six major objectives were defined for t h e Geminimanned spacecraft
program. Stated simply, theseobjectives were:

A. Exposetwo astronauts and t h e i r l i f e supportsystems t o long-duration
missions in preparation for future e a r t h o r b i t and lunar f l i g h t s .
B. Develop aud exercise precision re-entry, landing, and recovery of
manned spacecraft.
C. Rendezvous and dock with a second orbiting vehicle and then perfom
combined maneuvering.
D. Undertake extravehicular activity to evaluate man's a b i l i t y t o perform
tasks i n a weightless environment.
E. U t i l i z e t h e Gemini Spacecraft as an experimental t e s t platform for
scientific investigations.
F. Provide a continuation of manned spaceflight operation at minimum
cost w i t h major milestones t o be complete as soon as practical.

"he following synopses present t h e flight performance of each spacecraft
and describe how the program achieved all of t h e major objectives, except
land landing. A l l Gemini Spacecreft were launched from Complex 19, Cape

.
Kennedy, Florida. The Gemini launchvehicle was a modified T i t a n I1 ICBM,
"man-rated" f o r Gemini usage

34
a

Gemini I Mission

The first Gemini mission was an unmanned o r b i t a l flight, launched success-
f u l l y from t h e C a p e on 8 April 1964. The objectives for t h i s first mission
were :
Gemini I - Primary Objectives.
A. To demonstrate the Gemini launch vehicle performance and t o flight
qualify the vehicle subsystems f o r future Gemini missions.
B. To determine the exit heating conditions on the spacecraft and
launch vehicle.
C. To determine the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y and compatibility of t h e
combined spacecraft and launch vehicle through orbital insertinn.
D. To demonstrate the a b i l i t y of the Gemini launch vehicle andground
guidance systems t o achieve t h e required orbital insertion conditions.
E. To monitor t h e switchover c i r c u i t s on t h e Gemini launch vehicle and
t o e v a l u a t e t h e i r sufficiency for mission requirements.
F. To demonstrate the switchover function i f anomalies occur within
the primary autopilot or hydraulic systems that would require t h e use of the
secondary autopilot or hydraulic systems.
G. To demonstrate the malfunction detection system.
H. To v e r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the Gemini Spacecraft.

Gemi.ni I - Secondary Objectives.
A. To evaluate the operational procedures used in establishing the
Gemini launch vehicle trajectory and cutoff conditions.
B. To demonstrate the performance of t h e launch and tracking networks.
C. To verify orbital insertion conditions by tracking t h e C-band
transponder system in the spacecraft.
D. To provide training for the f l i g h t dynamics, guidanceswitchover,
and malfunction detection systems flight controllers.
E. To demonstrate the operational capability of the prelaunch and
launch f a c i l i t i e s .

The first production Gemini Spacecraft was u t i l i z e d f o r t h i s f l i g h t but
it did not carry complete Gemini flight systems because the mission was
primarily a t e s t of structural integrity. Spacecraft 1was launched at
11:OO a.m., EST. The mission was declared successfully concluded four hours
and 50 min after l i f t - o f f . Tracking, however, was continued by the Goddard
Space Flight Center until the spacecraft re-entered on t h e 64th o r b i t a l p a s s
over the southern Atlantic Ocean.

Two subsystems employedon the Gemini I mission were the C-band radar
transponder and the three telemetry transmitters. The transponder aided i n
accurate ground tracking of the spacecraft during t h e mission; the transmitters
provided data on spacecraft heating, structural loading, vibration, sound
pressure levels, and the temperatures and pressures encountered d u r i n g t h e
launch phase.

35
Miscellaneous equipment i n s t a l l e d on the spacecraft consisted of a
24-volt M: silver-zinc battery, a cabin pressure relief valve, a prelaunch
cooling system, and threespacecraft-to-groundumbilicals. Dummy equipment,
having a mass and moment of i n e r t i a equal t o t h e missing flight systems, was
i n s t a l l e d i n the spacecraft.

The spacecraft/launch vehicle second stage combination was i n s e r t e d i n t o
an o r b i t having a perigee of 86.6 nautical miles and an apogee of 173 n a u t i c a l
miles. These figures were within the design tolerance; the perigee was
actually only 0.4 nautical miles short of the desired a l t i t u d e . A 20 f’ps
overspeed condition at o r b i t a l i n s e r t i o n producedan increase of ll n a u t i c a l
miles in the apogee.

Although t h e t r a j e c t o r y was designed f o r an o r b i t a l l i f e t i m e of several
days, the Gemini I mission was considered complete after three orbital passes
over CapeKennedy. All primary and secondary mission objectives were
accomplished.

Gemini I1 Wssion

The second Gemini mission was an unmanned suborbital flight launched at
9 : 04 a.m., EST,on 19 January 1965. The spacecraft was recovered by the
primary recovery ship, the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r LakeChamplain, at lO:52 a.m. ,
EST. Splashdown was within three miles of the target. The major objectives
of t h e Gemini I1 mission were:

A. To demonstrate the b a s i cs t r u c t u r a li n t e g r i t y of theunitthroughout ,

the f l i g h t environment.
B. To verify the adequacyof the re-entry heat protection under the
most severeconditions.
C. To achieve s a t i s f a c t o r y performanceof v i t a l flight control systems,
l i f e support systems, retrograderocket system, recovery and landing systems,
and other systems c r i t i c a l t o flight safety and mission success.
D. Verify systems checkout and launchprocedures.
E. Evaluate back-up guidance steering signals throughout launch.

Spacecraft 2 contained production units of all equipment used on the
later manned missions with the exception of the rendezvous radar, the drogue
parachute system,and the auxiliary tape memory. A f u e l c e l l was a l s o
installed but t h e hope for engineering evaluation of flight performance was
not accomplished because a prelaunch f a c i l i t y malfunction made timely activa-
t i o n impossible. An automaticsequencingdevice was i n s t a l l e d i n t h e space-
c r a f t t o c o n t r o l the operation and t h e sequencing of the Gemini systems
throughout t h e f l i g h t . The major spacecraft functions performed during t h i s
mission were spacecraft/launch vehicle separation, controlled 180 degree
turnaround,adapter equipment section jettison, retrofire, retrograde section
jettison, controlled zero l i f t re-entry (10 degrees roll rate f o r 150 sec)
and parachutelanding. The spacecraft was recovered 1848 nautical miles down
range from t h e launch site.
A l l major mission obdectives were accomplished except f o r t h e performance
of tests on the fuel c e l l . Due t o t h e unpredictability experienced with fuel
c e l l performance up t o the time of Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t t h e d e c i s i o n was made
t o use t h e f u e l c e l l as a separately loaded parer source for engineering

.
evaluation purposes rather than a source of spacecraft power on the Gemini I1
flight

Two minor anomaliesoccurred on t h e mission. During t h e re-entry mode,
temperatures near t h e adapter interconnect fairing on the cabin section w e r e
higher than the planned values. This resulted i n damage t o two of the Rene 41
shingles, one washer, and a circumferential strap. No damage was experienced
by the underlyinginsulation, however. The corrective action taken for
Spacecraft 3 and up was to increase the thickness of the s h i n g l e s i n this
area, employ smaller diameter washers as fasteners, and thicken t h e circumfer-
ential strap. Also, temperaturereduction was accomplishedduring the re-entry
mode by reducing the design angle of attack which resulted in the center of
gravity being off-set from e = -196 in. t o e = 1.35 in. on Spacecraft 3, plus
similar reductions on subsequent spacecraft, w i t h an accompanying l o s s of
footprint capability. No further d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced i n t h i s area.

An indicated error in t h e i n e r t i a l measuring u n i t (IMU)accelerometer
o u t p u t ( i n e r t i a l guidancesystem)ofapproximately 66.5 f p s i n the X axis
was received at secondaryenginecutoff. After failure analysis, corrective
action was taken t o redesign t h e rate network t o accept saturated inputs.
This change was made i n t h e X loop only f o r t h e Gemini I11 configuration;
huwever,onGemini IV and all subsequent flights all accelerometer loops
incorporated t h e redesign.

Gemini I11 Mission
The t h i r d Gemini flight and the program's first manned mission was
launched a t 9:24 a.m., EST, on 23 March 1965. The 'planned three-orbit mission
had t h e following principal objectives:

A. Demonstrate manned o r b i t a l flight i n the Gemini Spacecraft and
further qualify both spacecraft and launch vehicle systems f o r future long-
duration missions.
B. Rvaluate the Gemini design and i t s e f f e c t s upon crew performance.
C. Exhibit and evaluate operation of the worldwide tracking network w i t h
the spacecraft.
D. Demonstrate p r e c i s e o r b i t a l maneuvering using the o r b i t attitude and
maneuver system ( O W )
E. Verify O W Capability to perform r e t r o back-up.
F. Evaluate the performame of major spacecraft systems.
G. Demonstrate the a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l the re-entry flight path and t o
a r r i v e at a predetermined landing point.
H. Verify systemscheckout,prelaunch, and launch procedures f o r a
manned spacecraft.
I. Recover the spacecraft and appraise the recovery system.

37
The f l i g h t crew successfully completed t h e mission, during which they
employed s e v e r a l t h r u s t e r f i r i n g s t o a l t e r the spacecraft orbit and t o
perform small out-of-plane maneuvers. Both t h e OAMS and the spacecraft guid-
ance and control system performed satisfactorily during the flight, with no
significant anomalies.

The only primary objective unachieved during t h e Gemini I11 mission was
a landing close to t h e recovery force. The actual landing point was about
58 nautical miles short of the planned retrieval point. A study indicated that
the angle o f attack had been slightly lower than predicted; however, the main
reason f o r t h e short trajectory appeared t o be a considerably lower l i f t
coefficient and a correspondingreduction i n the touchdown footprint. The
flight data appeared t o i n d i c a t e a difference between the a c t u a l and t h e wind-
tunnel-derived aerodynamics of there-entryconfiguration. !J!he experience
acquired from t h i s mission and t h e Gemini I1 flight were correlated with wind
tunnel data t o a r r i v e at a more accurate prediction of t h e l i f t - t o - d r a g r a t i o
and corresponding footprints for later flights.

The mission was successfully concluded with recovery of the spacecraft
by t h e prime recovery ship, the aircraft carrier U. S. S. Intrepid, a t
5:03 p.m.,EST. Two of the principal benefits accruing from the Gemini I11
mission w e r e t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n it gave the worldwide tracking network and the
experience it provided to operations personnel for longer missions.

Gemini N Mssion

The Gemini IV flight, scheduled f o r a four-day mission, was launched
from CapeKennedy at 10:16 a.m., EST, on 3 June 1965. The primary and
secondary objectives of the mission were:

Primary Objectives.

A. Evaluate the e f f e c t s of prolonged exposure t o the spaceenvironment
of the two-man flight crew in preparation f o r longer missions.
B. Demonstrateand evaluate t h e performanceof t h e Gemini Spacecraft
systems f o r four days i n space.
C. Evaluate previously developed procedures f o r crew rest and work
cycles, eating schedules, and real-time f l i g h t planning f o r long flights.

Secondary Objectives.

A. Demonstrate e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y i n space and evaluate attitude
and position control using the hand-held propulsion unit or the t e t h e r l i n e .
B. Conduct s t a t i o n keeping and rendezvous maneuvers with t h e expended
second stage of the Gemini launch vehicle.
C. Conduct further .evaluation of spacecraft systems as o u t l i n e d i n t h e
in-flight sys-cems t e s t objectives.
D. Demonstrate the capability of the spacecraft and f l i g h t crew t o make
significant in-plane and out-of-plane maneuvers..
, E. Demonstrate o r b i t a la t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O W ) c a p a b i l i t yt o
operate as a back-up for the retrograde rocket system.
F. Execute 13 in-flight experiments.
The flight demonstrated effectually t h e a s t r o n a u t s ' a b i l i t y t o a d j u s t
perfectly t o a weightless environment and t o perform a l l mission tasks with
efficiency; both astronauts w e r e in excellent physical condition at the
conclusion of t h e flight. O f 13 scheduled in-flight experiments, t h e Gemini
crew successfully conducted 11.
A l l primary mission objectives w e r e met; however, a problem was encoun-
tered in the 48th revolution wherein t h e computer would not sequence off when
t h e computer on/off switch was operated. Because of this condition a
computer controlled (closed loop) re-entry could not be attempted and a zero
l i f t re-entry was flown instead. Due t o d i s p e r s i o n s i n r e t r o f i r e attitude,
r e t r o f i r e time, and OAMS thrust, the landing point was 50 nautical miles short
of t h e predicted retrieval point. Failure analysis revealed t h a t t h e computer
turnoff anomaly was intermittent and seven postulated failure mechanisms were
identified. The exact cause of failure was never isolated however available
evldence suggested that contamination of the on/off switch was t h e most
probablecause. The corrective action was t o i n s t a l l a manual shutdown
sequence switch whichwould circumvent all the postulated failure modes should
t h e problem reoccur.

An anomaly was a l s o found t o have occurred during re-entry when a brief
period of excessive current drain was observed from the re-entry batteries.
Failure analysis revealed t h a t t h i s anomaly was caused by e l e c t r i c a l a r c i n g
between the computer +25 volt regulator transistor terminal and the computer
case. To remedy t h i s , an epoxy glass insulator strip was attached t o the
inside of the computer cover t o provide an e l e c t r i c a l and mechanical barrier
between t h e t r a n s i s t o r s and computer cover on a l l subsequent f l i g h t units.

Late i n the first revolution, the decision was m a d e not t o attempt the
rendezvous w i t h the Gemini launch vehicle second stage because t h e allocated
propellant f o r the O M had been consumed during the station keeping exercise
with the second stage.

Two t h r u s t e r anomalies were experienced on the Gemini IV mission; how-
ever, neither was considered detrimental to mission success or to crew safety.
No. 5 t h r u s t e r on the re-entry control system (RCS) B-ring f a i l e d t o o p e r a t e
during re-entry. Post-flight inspection revealed a broken wire t o an elec-
t r i c a l connector between the a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l e l e c t r o n i c s (ACE) package and
the thruster solenoid valve. I n addition, a loss of t h r u s t was experienced
e a r l y i n the mission from one a f t - f i r i n g O M thruster. The most probable
cause of t h i s apparent loss of t h r u s t was that t h e crew had inadvertently
thrown the No. 9 c i r c u i t breaker t o O F F during the f i n a l 30 min of the first
o r b i t . During the 61st o r b i t , when the No. 9 t h r u s t e r was again required, i t s
operation appeared satisfactory.

39
The f l i g h t crew r e p o r t e d d i f f i c u l t y i n c l o s i n g and latching the hatch
after EVA. This anomaly, and the corrective action employed, are f'ully
discussed in Failure Summary And Analysis, page 16 of this! report.

The mission was successfully concluded on 7 June 1965. Recovery of t h e
spacecraft was made by t h e prime recovery ship, the aircraft c a r r i e r U. S.S.
Wasp, at 2:28 p.m., EST. With minor changes, t h e Gemini Spacecraft was
considered flight-qualified for longer missions.

Gemini V Mssion

The f i f t h Gemini mission, launched a t 9 : O O a.m., EST, 21 August 1965 w a s
the f i r s t long-duration flight t o use f u e l c e l l s as the principal source of
spacecraft power. The primarymissionobjectives were:

A. To demonstrate an eight-day flight capability.
B. To evaluate the performance of the rendezvousguidanceand navigation
system i n conjunction with t h e rendezvous evaluation pod (HEP)
C. To determine t h e e f f e c t s of prolonged weightlessness
.
upon the f l i g h t
crew, i n preparation for even longer missions.

A secondary objective w a s t o demonstrate a controlled re-entry to a
predetermined landing point.

During the f i r s t two o r b i t s , a l l spacecraft systems were checked, a
nominal perigee adjust maneuver was conducted, and the rendezvous evaluation
pod was ejected on schedule.

Two of the three principal mission objectives were achieved; however, it
was not possible to perform the radar evaluation w i t h the REP because of t h e
n e c e s s i t y t o power down the spacecraft early in t h e mission. Power conserva-
t i o n was deemed necessary because of a loss of pressure i n t h e fuel c e l l
oxygen supply tank. The cause of t h e pressure decrease was believed t o be i n
thereactantsupply system (RSS) oxygen tank heaterwiring.Since t h e cryo-
genic tanks, heaters, and associated wiring could not be recovered f o r
analysis, it was impossible t o determine t h e a c t u a l failure mode.However,
a l l available development and qualification test data show the cryogenic tanks
and h e a t e r s t o be rigidly constructed and.of sound design.Nevertheless,
corrective action was implemented for Spacecraft 7 and all o t h e r f l i g h t s
utilizing fuel cells. Redundant heater w i r i n g was provided t o the RSS hydrogen
tank, and a crossfeed was i n s t a l l e d between the RSS and environmental control
system (ECS) oxygen tanks t o enable oxygen t o be supplied t o t h e f u e l c e l l s
o r t h e ECS loops i n t h e event of heater malfunction. (See RSS F l i g h t
Performance, page 63 ) Despitethe loss of oxygen pressure, the fuel cells
a

received adequate operating pressure t o supply necessary e l e c t r i c a l power f o r
the duration of the mission.

A t the endof revolution 17 the spacecraft was powered up t o a high load
condition, and a successful rendezvous radar t e s t was conducted by tracking
a transponder on t h e ground at CapeKennedy. Further radar tests were

40
conducted throughout the mission t o evaluate the rendezvous system i n l i e u of
the REP exercises. A simulated Agena rendezvous w a s conducted on t h e t h i r d
day which indicated that the spacecraft could have been placed within 0.3
nautical miles of an Agena Target Vehicle (ATV).

During t h e mission, f i v e O M attitude thrusters functioned abnormally,
providing low o r zero thrust. Though the astronauts made two in-flight
attempts to restore operation, they were notsuccessful. A post-flight study
indicated t h a t t h e probable cause of t h e thruster failures was propellant
freezing, due t o the long periods of valve heater and l i n e heater inaction.
To preclude future thruster f a i l u r e s , redundant heaters and c i r c u i t s were
i n s t a l l e d on t h e nextlong-durationconfiguration(Spacecraft 7). I n addition,
thermocouples were provided t o monitor the temperatures of the t h r u s t chambers
t o assure satisfactory heater operation.

Spacecraft systems functioned normally during the re-entry mode, but
ground transmission of incorrect navigational coordinates resulted in a
landing 89 nautical miles short of t h e planned retrieval point. The spacecraft
was recovered on 29 August 1965 by the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r U.S.S. W e Champlain.
The experiment program f o r the mission was very successful; 16 of the 17
planned experiments were conducted, and a high percentage of desired data was
accumulated.

Gemini V I Mission

The flight of Gemini V I constituted the first rendezvous mission of the
program. The mission's primary objective was t o achieve an o r b i t a l rendezvous
with Spacecraft 7, which became the target vehicle due t o t h e Agena's failure
t o achieve orbit on25 October 1965.

Spacecraft 6 was successfully launched at 8:37 a.m., EST, on 15 December
1965, 11 days after the launch of Spacecraft 7. A "closedloop" rendezvous
was achievedapproximately s i x hr after launch. Nine maneuvers were
performed by Spacecraft 6 t o e f f e c t rendezvous. I n i t i a l radar lock-on with
Spacecraft 7 occurred a t a range of 248 nautical miles, with. continuous
lock-on beginning at 235 nautical miles. After rendezvous, s t a t i o n keeping

apart .
vas performed f o r about 3-l/2 orbits, with the spacecraft as close as one f t
The command p i l o t of Spacecraft 6 performed an in-plane fly-around
maneuver, maintaining a distance of 150 t o 250 f t from Spacecraft 7. Separa-
t i o n maneuvers w e r e performed and the v i s i b i l i t y of Spacecraft 7 as a t a r g e t
vehicle was evaluated. The flight progressednormally and was ended by a
nominal re-entry and landing on 16 December within seven nautical miles of
t h e planned retrieval point. The recoveryship was the a i r c r a f t carrier, the
U.S.S. Wasp. All primary mission objectives w e r e accomplished.

Gemini V I 1 Wssion

me Gemini V I 1 mission, a maximum duration flight, was launched at
2:30 p.m. EST2 on 4 December 19-65. The primarymissionobjectives were t o

41
demonstrate a manned o r b i t a l f l i g h t of 14 days, and t o evaluate the effects
of the prolongedmission upon the crew. Secondary objectives included a
rendezvous with Spacecraft 6, s t a t i o n keeping w i t h t h a t spacecraft and with
t h e second stage of t h e launch vehicle, and the carrying out of 20 in-flight
experiments.

Additional equipment on t h i s flight included an L-band transponder which
was used w i t h the Spacecraft 6 radar t o provide target position data f o r
rendezvous.

After insertion, t h e spacecraft performed s t a t i o n keeping w i t h the launch
vehicle, maintaining distances of between 60 and 150 f t f o r 15 min. A closer
approach was not attempted because of the high tumbling rate of the launch
vehicle. On the f i f t h day of the mission, t h e spacecraft was maneuvered i n t o
a favorable orbit for the rendezvous w i t h Spacecraft 6. No further adjust-
ments t o t h i s o r b i t were required.

An additional accomplishment of t h i s flight WRS t h e crew's demonstrated
a b i l i t y t o perform many of the mission requirements while not wearing their
pressure suits. Comfort and mobility were greatly increased with t h e suits
removed;no detriment t o e i t h e r crew health o r missionsuccessresulted. The
ECS provided a nominalatmosphere throughout the flight.

Fuel cells provided t h e principal power source f o r Gemini V I I . These
performednominally throughout t h e greater part of the mission; however, at
286:57 h r ground elapsed time, two of t h e stacks (2A and 2C) were shutdown
becausethey were producing less t h a n the specified current. The remaining
stacks provided sufficient electrical power until re-entry. No corrective
action was taken because the remaining Gemini flights were scheduled f o r a
m a x i m u m of four days o r less than 100 hr, about one-third the time t o failure
on the Gemini V I 1 mission.

Post-flight investigation attributed the fuel cell problem t o a blockage
i n the water management system l a t e i n t h e mission.Since the rest of t h e
fuel c e l l system continued to operate w i t h nominalperformance, the anomaly
was not deemed a system f a i l u r e . A n analog presswe transducer was neverthe-
less i n s t a l l e d on Spacecraft 8 t o provide a better monitoring capability in
the event of a recurrence of this failure.

Another anomaly occurred when the operation of the No. 3 and No. 4 yaw
r i g h t O M t h r u s t e r s was degradedduring the last 47 h r of the flight. How-
ever, performance was not seriously affected because the crew was able t o
r e t a i n yaw right control.through t h e use of a maneuver thruster. Post-flight
investigation indicated t h a t t h e degraded t h r u s t e r performance was probably
due t o an obstruction in t h e propellant flaw or to propellant contamination.
Since t h e anomaly was believed to have occurred as a result of long-duration
operation, no change was made t o t h e system configuration.

The 14-day mission was successfully completed and controlled re-entry was
demonstrated by landing the spacecraft within 6.4 nautical miles of t h e
planned retrieval point on 18 December 1965. Recovery was made by t h e

42
carrier U.S.S. Wasp. AU. primary and secondary mission objectives were
accomplished.

Gemini V I 1 1 Mission

The eighth Gemini mission was the first rendezvous and docking mission
with an Agena TargetVehicle.Spacecraft 8 was launched successfully at
9:OO a.m., EST on 16 m r c h 1966, following the launch of the Atlas-Agena
Target Vehicle one h r and 40 min earlier.

The primary objectives for the Gemini V I 1 1 mission were:

A. Brform rendezvous and docking wieh t h e Gemini Agena Target
Vehicle (GATV).
B. Conduct extravehicular activities.
The secondary objectives for the mission were:

A. Rendezvousanddock with the GATV during t h e fourth revolution.
B. Perform docked-vehicle maneuvers using the GATV secondary propulsion
system.
C. Perform systems'evaluation.
D. Conduct ten experiments.
E. Carry out docking practice.
F. 'Perform a rerendezvous maneuver.
G. Evaluate the auxiliary tape memory unit.
H. Evince a controlled re-entry.
I. Park the GeminiAgena Target Vehicle i n a 220-nautical-mile
circular orbit.
The primary objectives of rendezvous and docking were accomplished during
t h e fourth spacecraft revolution. The secondary objectives of evaluating the
auxiliary tape memory u n i t and demonstrating a controlled re-entry were also
accomplished. Because themission was terminatedearly,extravehicular
a c t i v i t y was not performed and only two of ten scheduled in-flight experiments
could be conducted.

The Agena Target Vehicle w a s inserted into a 161.3 nautical mile c i r c u l a r
o r b i t by i t s primarypropulsion system. Spacecraft 8 performed nine maneuvers
t o rendezvous with t h e t a r g e t five h r and 58 min a f t e r spacecraft lift-off.
The spacecraft docked with the target vehicle after approximately 36 min of
s t a t i o n keeping. Once docked, a 90 degree yaw maneuver was performed using
t h e Agena a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l system.

A t 7:00:30h r ground elapsed time, unexpected yaw and r o l l rates developed
while t h e two vehicles w e r e docked, but the command p i l o t was able t o reduce
these rates t o e s s e n t i a l l y zero. However, after he had released t h e hand con-
t r o l l e r , the rates began to increase again and the crew found it d i f f i c u l t
t o c o n t r o l t h e spacecraft without using excessive amounts of propellant. The
spacecraft was undocked and t h e yaw and r o l l rates then increased to

43

__
... -. . .._. ._ .. .. - -.- . . ... - . .
,approximately 300 degrees per sec, causing the crew t o & a c t i v a t e t h e o r b i t
a t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O W ) and t o use both rings of the re-entry
control system t o reduce t h e rates. The problem was i s o l a t e d t o No. 8 0-
t h r u s t e r which fired continuously because its c i r c u i t r y f a i l e d i n an ON
condition.Post-flightinvestigationsubsequently concluded t h a t t h e anomaly
was caused by a s h o r t c i r c u i t i n t h e wiring t o the thruster. To provide for
immediate shutdown o f all t h r u s t e r s in case of malfunction on subsequent
spacecraft, a single switch was i n s t a l l e d which interrupted power t o all
t h r u s t e r e l e c t r i c a l systems. In t h i s way, a systematic check of eachsystem
could be made per established procedure after individual.systems were shutdown
and the single switchclosed.Inspectionprocedures were modified t o reflect
the engineering change.

Because the re-entry control system had been activated, the mission
was terminated during the seventh revolution in the secondary
recovery area i n the western Pacific Ocean. Retrofire was on time at
10:04:47 h r CET, and t h e re-entry was nominal, r e s u l t i n g i n a landing within
seven nautical miles of the planned r e t r i e v a l p o i n t . The crew and spacecraft
were recovered by t h e U.S.S. Leonard Mason approximately t h r e e h r and 11min
after landing.

Gemini M - A Mission

The ninth Gemini flight was a rendezvous and docking mission w i t h the
augmented t a r g e t docking adapter (ATDA), used as the target vehicle after t h e
Atlas f a i l e d t o i n s e r t the Agena i n t o o r b i t on 17 May 1966. The ATDA consisted
of a target docking adapter (TDA), a c y l i n d r i c a l e q u i p n t s e c t i o n , a re-entry
control system f o r a t t i t u d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n , a b a t t e r y module, andan ascent
shroud.

The ATDA was successfully launched on 1 June 1966, i n t o a nearly circular
o r b i t of 161 nautical miles. The Gemini Spacecraft was launchedsuccessfully
at 8 :39 a.m., EST, on 3 June 1966.

The primary objectives of the Gemini M-A mission w e r e :

A. Performrendezvousanddocking maneuvers w i t h t h e target vehicle.
B. Conduct extravehicular activities.
me secondary objectives of the mission w e r e :

A. Rendezvous and dock during the t h i r d revolution.
B. Accomplish systems evaluation.
C. Perform an equiperiod rerendezvous.
D. Achieve rerendezvous from above.
E. Demonstrate a controlled re-entry.
F. Perform docking practice.
G. Conduct seven i n - f l i g h t experiments.
Rendezvous with the ATDA was accomplished by performing seven maneuvers
during t h e spacecraft's t h i r d revolution. The first three maneuvers w e r e
conducted using ground-computed data. The terminal phase i n i t i a t e maneuver
was conducted using information from the onboard computer, ground computer,
and onboard charts. The f i n a l three maneuvers w e r e conducted v i s u a l l y w i t h
t h e assistance of t h e onboard computer and displays.

It was impossible t o dock with the ATDA because the ascent shroud on the
ATDA had not separated 8 8 planned.Subsequent inspection revealed that the
quick-disconnect lanyards had not been properly attached. Two additional
rendezvous were therefore performed i n accordance with t h e alternate plan. The
first was an equiperiod rendezvous ( i n which the spacecraft has t h e same
o r b i t a l p e r i o d as t h e target) and the second w a s a rendezvous from above,
which was t o simulate conditions which could r e s u l t i f t h e Apollo command
module were required to rendezvous with a disabled lunar module. A two-hr
EXA w a s accomplished, but evaluation of the astronaut maneuvering u n i t was
not performed due t o fogging of the pilot's visor.

On t h e t h i r d day several of the uncompleted in-flight experiments were
performed. A nominal re-entry in t h e primaryrecovery area r e s u l t e d i n a
landing one-third mile from the planned retrieval point on 6 June 1966.
Recovery was made by t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r U.S.S. Wasp.

Gemini X Mission

The primary objective of the Gemini X mission was t o rendezvous and dock
w i t h the targetvehicle. Secondary objectives comprised:

A. Perform t h e rendezvous and docking operation during the fourth
revolution.
B. Utilize large propulsion systems i n space (by using GATV primary
and secondary propulsion systems i n an attempt a t dual rendezvous).
C. Accomplish extravehicular operations.
D. Performdocking practice.
E. Conduct 14 in-flight experiments.
F. Perform systems evaluations.
The tenth Gemini flight marked the second successful rendezvous and
dockingmission w i t h an Agena TargetVehicle. The Agena was successfully
launched on 18 July 1966 at 3 :39 p.m., EST; Spacecraft 10 was successfully
launched approximately one h r and 40 min later a t t h e beginning of a 35 sec
launch window. The Agena was placed i n a n e a r l y c i r c u l a r o r b i t w i t h an apogee
of162.0 nautical miles and a perigee of 156.6 nautical miles. After space-
c r a f t i n s e r t i o n , t h e insertion velocity adjust routine (WAR) of the onboard
computer was used t o c a l c u l a t e the necessary velocity increment t o achieve
the planned orbit. Only a single velocity increment of 26 a s at insertion
was required; t h i s w a s applied by t h e crew and resulted i n a spacecraft orbit
of 145.1 nautical miles apogee and 86.3 miles perigee. These a l t i t u d e s were
only 0.1 mile o lw at apogee and 0.4 mile low at perigee, compared with
planned a l t i t u d e s .

45
The crew completed the rendezvous during the fourth revolution as
planned, at 5:23 h r ground elapsed time. Approximately 30 min later the space-
c r a f t docked w i t h the Agena TargetVehicle.Since more propellant was used
during the terminal phase of the rendezvous than had been predicted, docking
practice was not performed i n o r d e r t o conserve the remaining propellant.

The spacecraft remained docked with t h e target vehicle for approximately
39 hr, during which a bending mode test was conducted t o determine t h e
dynamics of the docked configuration. In addition, a 49 min standup EVA was
accomplished, which includedseveralphotographicexperiments. The Agena
primary and secondary propulsion systems were used to successfully accomplish
six maneuvers i n the docked configuration in preparation , f o r a passive
rendezvous w i t h the Gemini V I 1 1 Agena Target Vehicle.

Approximately three hr after separating from t h e Agena ( a t 48 h r ground
elapsed time), the Gemini Spacecraftachieved i t s secondrendezvous. The
Agena for Spacecraft 8 was found t o be i n a s t a b l e a t t i t u d e ; t h i s allowed
the flight crew t o bring the spacecraft very close to the passive ATV. A
38 min EVA was performed during this s t a t i o n keeping period. A s p a r t of this
EVA, t h e p i l o t r e t r i e v e d t h e micrometerorite packaged which had been stowed
on the ATV.

The planned three-day mission was accomplished successfully and was
followed by a nominal re-entry on 21 July 1966. Touchdown was within three
nautical miles of t h e planned r e t r i e v a l p o i n t i n t h e primary l
a ndi
n g area.

Gemini X I Mission

Gemini X I was launched from CapeKennedyon 12 September 1966 at
9:42 a.m., EST.TheAgena TargetVehicle,with which it was t o rendezvous
and dock, had beenlaunched one h r and 37 min earlier. The primary objective
of t h i s mission was t o rendezvous and dock with the Agena Target Vehicle
duringthe first revolution. The secondarymissionobjectives were:

A. Conduct docking practice.
B. Perform extravehicular operations.
C. Accomplish 12 in-flight experiments.
D. Conduct maneuvers with the Agena Target Vehicle while i n t h e docking
configuration.
E. Perform a tethered vehicle test.
F. Demonstrate anautomaticre-entry.
G. Place the Agena Target Vehicle i n a parking orbit.

A l l primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved; however,
because of astronaut fatigue after i n s t a l l i n g t h e tether l i n e , the mi6
minimum r e a c t i o n p o w r t o o l experiment was not attempted.

Following spacecraft insertion, five maneuvers were performed by the crew

the Agena occurred at approximately 1:34 GET.
t o achieve the f i r s t - o r b i t rendezvous w ith the target vehicle. Docking with
A t 40 :30 GET, using the

46
Agena's primary propulsion eystem, t h e f l i g h t c r e w increased the apogee of
t h e docked v e h i c l e s t o 741.5 nautical miles. while at t h i s altitude, sequences
of photographic and s c i e n t i f i c experiments w e r e performed.
The spacecraft was undocked at 49:55 GET t o begin the tether evaluation.
The 100 f t t e t h e r line, which the p i l o t had a t t a c h e d t o t h e docking b a r on
t h e previous day's EVA, was unreeled. A light tension was maintained on the
tether and a slight spinning motion was imparted t o create a s m a l l gravity
field. . Initial a t t i t u d e o s c i l l a t i o n s began t o damp slowly, and'after 20 min
t h e r o t a t i n g combination had become stable. Performance demonstrated t h a t
t h e r o t a t i o n of two tethered vehicles was an economical and feasible method
of achieving long tenn, unattended station keeping.Approximately three h r
after i n i t i a t i o n of the maneuver, the crew f i r e d t h e aft t h r u s t e r s t o remove
the tension on the tether line. The docking bar was then pyrotechnically
jettisoned, releasing t h e tether.

A t 6 5 : q CET, maneuvers were begun t o perform the coincident-orbit
rendezvous with the target vehicle. Station keeping was accomplished at
66:40.

The re-entry operation was conducted very precisely using the automatic
mode. Splashdown was 2.5 miles from t h e prime recoveryship, t h e U.S.S. Guam.
There were two significant anomalies that occurred during the Gemini XI
f l i g h t . These were a failure i n the radar transponder and a failure of
stack 2 C of t h e f u e l c e l l .

-
R a d a r !Cramponder Infomation taken from the technical debriefing, t h e
air t o ground voice transmissions, and spacecraft and target vehicle telemetry
showed t h a t i n i t i a l l y the transponder was operating properly. This data did
show that t h e transponder transmitter was gradually deteriorating. The first
rendezvous was completed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ; however, i n i t i a l s i g n s of failure
were evident.Eventually complete transmitter failure occurredcoincident
with a failure i n t h e antenna switching circuit. An analysis of the c i r c u i t
indicated that a failure of diodes ~ ~ 6 and 1 0 CR6U in c i r c u i t r y common t o the
high voltage enable and s p i r a l disable functions w a s the cause of t h e antenna
switching failure. The nature of t h i s failure coupled with transponder flight
performance history indicated that arcing occurred within the sealed trans-
mitter assembly. The most probablecause of failure was concluded t o be a
leak i n t h e sealed transmitter assembly allowing t h e assembly t o reach
c r i t i c a l p r e s s u r e and, thereby, sustain arcing.

-
Fuel Cell Fuel c e l l s t a c k 2C failed 54.5 h r i n t o the mission. The
f i v e remaining stacks o p e r a t e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n sharing t h e t o t a l load; how-
ever, during two periods it was necessary t o a c t i v a t e one of t h e spacecraft
main batteries t o i n s u r e t h a t proper voltage levels were maintained.Post-
flight analysis led t o the conclusion t h a t a fire had developed i n the stack,
due t o spontaneouscombustion between t h e oxygen and hydrogen. However, a
check valve upstream of t h e f u e l c e l l prevented additional hydrogen from
entering the stack, t h u s i s o l a t i n g the failure. A reevaluation of the stack's
fabrication and i n s t a l l a t i o n did not reveal any anomalous conditions; neither
had continual monitoring of' stack pressure given any indication of impending
failure. This malf'unction was therefore deemed a random failure.

Gemini XI1 Mission

Gemini X I 1 was launched at 3 :46 p.m., EST, on U November 1966. The
mission's primary objectives were:

A. Rendezvous and dock with the Agena Target Vehicle.
B. Perform extensive extravehicular activity.
The secondary objectives w e r e :

A. Achieve rendezvous with the ATV during t h e t h i r d revolution.
B. Conduct docking practice.
C. Accomplish 13 i n - f l i g h t experiments.
D. Conduct a tethered gravity
vehicle
- gradient test w i t h the Agena t a r g e t

E. Perform a successful automatic re-entry.
F. Performsystems'evaluation.
G. Utilize large propulsion systems f o r space maneuvers (by employing
GATV primary and secondary propulsion systems).
..
The spacecraft was i n s e r t e d i n t o an o r b i t with a 151.9 nautical mile
apogee and a perigee of 86.9 nautical miles. Rendezvous and docking were
accomplished during the t h i r d revolution as planned,over the tracking ship
U.S.S. Coastal Sentry, south of Japan.

By applying a retrograde burn of 43 fps using the Agena's secondary
propulsion system, the configuration was placed i n a 154 nautical mile o r b i t ,
so t h a t it could phase w i t h the 12 November t o t a l solar eclipse over South
America. A second eclipse - phasing maneuver was subsequently performed,

.
enabling the crew to obtain t h e first solar eclipse photographs taken from
space

During the course of the mission, t h e p i l o t performed a t o t a l of f i v e hr,
37 min of extravehicular activity, including t h e longest duration single EVA
(two hr, nine min) t o date.Included i n t h i s record was the performance by
the p i l o t of measured work tasks a t the ATV and at a work s t a t i o n s e t u p i n
t h e Gemini adapter section.

The gravity gradient mode of t h e tethered vehicle exercise (RefGemini
XI Missiop, page 46 and Stable Orbit Rendezvous, page 293) was successfully
completed; the entire tethered exercise lasted four hr and 17 min.

The spacecraft splashed down at 2:21 p.m., EST, on 15 November 1966,
within 2.7 miles of the planned retrieval point, providing a f u r t h e r demon-
s t r a t i o n of the accuracy of the automatic re-entry mode.
A l l primary mission objectives w e r e successfully accomplished, and
almost all secondary objectives w e r e achieved as well. The requirement f o r
evaluation of t h e astronaut maneuvering wit (AMU) was deleted before the
commencement of the mission; In addition, the plan t o u t i l i z e the Agena
propulsion system t o reach a 460 mile a l t i t u d e while over the U.S. was deleted
due t o a suspected problem with the ATV.

A t approximately 60:oo GET, during the rendezvous maneuver, the space-
c r a f t rendezvous radar/transponder ceased t o function. Since the R & R was
not recovered subsequent t o flight, a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e failure
mode couldnot be made. A t the time of the preparation of t h i s report, a
review of Spacecraft 8, 11, and 12 launch and qualification t e s t vibration
data are being conducted. The vendor is a l s o performingtransponder tests t o
further investigate failure modes.

Eerformance of t h e f i e 1 cells was normal during the launchcount. At
5:45 GET, a water management system problem was revealed by the illumination
of both section oxygen-water delta pressure lights. A l l available data
indicate that t h e storage volume f o r water had been depleted by an oxygen leak
i n t o t h e water system. This d e p l e t i o n r e s u l t e d i n p e r i o d o f f u e l c e l l
flooding .
The f u e l c e l l e l e c t r i c a l performance was a f f e c t e d t o t h e extent t h a t two
stacks had t o be shutdown (stacks 2B and 1C) and two others experienced a
s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s of power. Both failed stacks exhibited a rapid drop of open
circuit voltage potential, an indication of a burnout mode. Nevertheless,
the remaining stacks and batteries provided s u f f i c i e n t e l e c t r i c a l power t o
achieve a l l mission objectives. Development and ground t e s t data on f u e l
c e l l anomalies are given i n McDonnell Report F-205, Gemini Fuel Cell Fkrfor-
mance Analysis.

A t approximately 40 h r through t h e mission, t h e crew reported degraded
performance of OAMS t h r u s t chambers Nos. 2 and 4. Tests performed l a t e r i n
the mission w i t h t h e t h r u s t chambers, and post-flight analysis of data
revealed degradedperformance from a l l OAMS a t t i t u d e thrusters. The best
appraisal of the available facts points to propellant flow r e s t r i c t i o n as the
causeof t h e performance l o s s . "his restriction could have resulted fram
propellant contamination or t h e precipitation of i r o n n i t r a t e from t h e oxi-
dizer. McDonnell'Report,F-206,Gemini .%A Anomaly Investigation i s being
prepared for submittal to NASA.

Immediately after arming of the RCS A - r i n g , regulated pressure rose
to- a high of 415 p s i a (nominal is 295 psia). Following t h r u s t e r I n i t i a t i o n ,
however, t h e regulated pressure decreased t o normal l e v e l s and standard
regulator performance was indicated. Post-flight inspection and P I A tests of
the regulator revealed no anomalies.Subsequent disasbembling of the regula-
t o r at the failure analysis laboratory provided no positive explanation of
t h e malfunction; however, scratches were found on t h e bellows, a metal flake
was found on the valve seat, and contaminant material was discovered on t h e
regulator spring.

49
The contaminant was s e n t t o KSC for analysis. Since nomal purging of
the ring seemed t o remove the contaminant from the regulator seat and nomal
system operation was restored, no further investigation of t h i s anomaly was
deemed necessary.

A t 78:30 GET the pressure in the hydrogen vessel of the RSS rose t o a
high of 35'0 psi. After t h e f l i g h t crew had been d i r e c t e d t o p o s i t i o n the
heater switch t o O F F and t h e h e a t e r c i r c u i t breaker was opened, the pressure
declined and the mission w a s able t o proceed with no further hydrogen malf'unc-
tion.Post-flightinvestigation of the switchrevealed noanomaly. (Ref
RSS Flight Performance, page 63. ) The cause of the H2 pressure rise was
assumed t o be intermittent short pulses of power, less than 2.4 sec in
duration. This power application may have been due t o an unstable hydrogen
tank pressure switch. Reliability data on t h e pressureswitchindicate that
the unstable mode of t h i s switch i s the most l i k e l y failure mode. ( R e f
E l e c t r i c a l Memo No. PC-5236, dated 9 January 1967. ) Since the H2 heater has
a redundant manual back-up, t h i s anomaly i s not considered c r i t i c a l .

MAJOR SYSTEMS

EIECTRICAL SYSTEM

Power Sources

The b a s i c e l e c t r i c a l power i n the Gemini Spacecraft i s provided by
b a t t e r i e s , supplemented by f u e l c e l l s onmost missions. Power i s supplied
through a multiple bus DC system i n t h e range of 22 t o 30 VDC. Subsystems
which require closely regulated DC o r AC voltage contain t h e i r own power
conversion components, thus permitting optimum compatibility during flight
operations as well as more intensive development and qualification programs.

The spacecraft parer systems consist of a,main bus, two squibbuses, and
one control bus. The f l i g h t crew can control interconnection of thesesources,
thus providing additional redundancy and maximum power u t i l i z a t i o n from a l l
onboard supplies.

P r i o r t o launch, the spacecraft gets external electrical power through
the umbilical to prevent undue depletion of t h e spacecraft power supply. For
Spacecraft 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, batteries provided all the parer required for
electrically operated equipment. Fuel cells and battery parer were used on
a l l other flights.

I n addition, ample b a t t e r y power was available for operations two h r
before launching, and f o r 36 h r after landing t o operate recovery equipment.
The b a t t e r i e s can also provide emergencypower t o operate the s u i t compressor
f o r 12 h r after landing.
F u e l C e l l System.- !the General Electric f u e l c e l l provided the main
supply of e l e c t r i c a l power f o r seven Gemini Spacecraft (Spacecraft 5 and 7
through 12). The fuel c e l l subsystem i s made up of two GE fuel c e l l sections
.
and an AiResearch reactant supply system (RSS) (SeeFig. 7. ) Both f u e l
c e l l s e c t i o n s and t h e RSS are located in the adapter equipnent section of

report.
t h e spacecraft. The RSS i s discussed in Reactant
this
Supply System, page 59 of

The fuel cell, supplied with necessary reactants and coolant, provides
the main bus parer (renging from 22 t o 30 VDC) f o r all mission requirements
from i n s e r t i o n u n t i l switchover. During t h e prelaunch and t h e launchphases,
the fuel c e l l operates in parallel with the main silver-zinc batteries,
insuring parer continuity in t h e event of the l a t t e r malfunction.

A. Fuel Cell Technology - A f u e l c e l l i s an electrochemical device that
converts the energy of a fuel and an oxidant into electricity by sustaining
a continuouschemicalreaction.Reversingtheprocess of e l e c t r o l y s i s , the
f u e l c e l l c r e a t e s water as a by-product in a hydrogen-oxygen ion exchange that
liberates e l e c t r i c a l energy.

The e l e c t r o l y t e of t h e GE fuel c e l l i s a thin, treated sheet of
polymer p l a s t i c . A catalytic electrode structure is bonded t o each side of
t h i s sheet t o stimulateion-electronflow at r e l a t i v e l y low temperatures. The
f u e l c e l l c o n t a i n s an anode and a cathode. When hydrogen f u e l i s brought i n t o
contact with the anode and a catalyst, t h e hydrogen atom releases an electron
t o the load drawn by t h e anode, and also releases ions. A s o l i d polymer
e l e c t r o l y t e keeps t h e hydrogen and oxygen gases separate, but allows the
hydrogen ions to migrate through to the cathode, where they combine with oxygen
and w i t h electrons that have passed through t h e e x t e r n a l c i r c u i t , t h u s pro-
ducing water.

Balance i s maintained by t h e migration of electrons through the
e l e c t r i c a l l o a d s and t h e migration of ionsthrough t h e electrolyte. Inter-
ruption of the electron flow i n t h e e x t e r n a l e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t s t o p s the
reaction.

The cell converts chemical energy t o e l e c t r i c a l energy with about 50%
efficiency. The remainder of the energy i s largely rejected as heat. For
dissipation of t h i s waste heat, t h e f u e l c e l l s a r e d i r e c t l y connected t o the
environmentalcontrol system coolantloops. The temperature of t h e coolant
entering the fuel c e l l s e c t i o n s i s controlled by an ECS vernatherm valve,
which mixes coolant returning from the spacecraft radiator w i t h coolant coming
d i r e c t l y from the pump packages, thus maintaining a temperature balance.

The water created by t h e fuel c e l l must be removed as t h e reaction
continues. The pressure i n t h e oxygen c a v i t y i n the Fuel c e l l (approximately
22.2 p s i ) i s used t o d r i v e t h e water through the porous sintered glass
separator plates into t h e water collection basins beneath the cell. The
pressure in these basins i s maintained at about 20 p s i and regulated by an
ECS pressure regulator.
52
The Gemini f u e l c e l l system comprises six e l e c t r i c a l l y independent
power-producing units (stacks). (See Fig. 8. ) Each stack consists of 32 cells,
connected e l e c t r i c a l l y i n series. The stacks are housed, i n groupsof three,
i n two cylindrical containers 0.610 meter long and 0.305 meter i n diamter.
Operating together, the two sections produce up t o 2 kw at peak power. The
crew can %hut dom individual stacks at w i l l , o r s e l e c t any combination of
stacks within the system. Each fuel c e l l s e c t i o n weighs 68 l b and produces
up t o 1 kw of DC power at 26.5 V, minimum load, o r at 23.3 V, peak load. The
l a t t e r values are exhibited at the end of rated life. I n i t i a l v o l t a g e i s
approximately 2 V higher i n each case.

The f u e l c e l l s e c t i o n is the smallest field-replaceable power-
producing u n i t of the Gemini f u e l c e l l system. An interface plate, which
contains the hydrogen, oxygen, and water valves, t h e coolant ports, and t h e
e l e c t r i c a l connectors i s mountedon each cylindrical container.

To prevent a malfunction from impairing t h e e n t i r e system operation,
stack is i s o l a t e d and independently supplied w i t h regulated gaseous hydrogen
and oxygen. In addition, each stack within a section had i t s own hydrogen
i n l e t and purge valves. One oxygen purgevalve is also provided f o r each
section. Although purging is normallyperformed by section, individual stacks
can be hydrogen-isolated o r purged on the command of cabin control equipnent.

The water collection basins, one beneatheach stack, are connected in
series; t h e i r output can be isolated from t h e spacecraft water system by means
of a f u e l c e l l latch solenoid valve.

-
B. Developent and Qualification Tests f o r t h e Fuel C e l l A significant
advance i n the state-of-the-art involved in the fuel c e l l was accomplished
w i t h the aid of an extensive development and qualification t e s t program.

E a r l y development tests concentrated principally upon v a r i o u s c e l l
designs, arranged in configurations of fewer than 32 c e l l s each. These tests
served t h e dual purpose of developing e f f i c i e n t assembly techniques and
verifying, on a small s c a l e , c e l l performance for various current densities,
coolant temperatures, and other operational parameters.

Performance investigations were conducted on t h i s configuration, a t
t h e section level, to evaluate operational procedures, c e l l and stack temp

factors .
profiles, purgeflow rates, total heat rejection, vibration and l i f e limiting

These tests culminated i n t h e first production-type sections of the
P2B design.
Qualification testing of the P2B c e l l design included vibration,
acceleration and shock tests. The P2B t e s t sections were successfully tested
under the conditions producing en e l e c t r i c a l load consistent w i t h Gemini
mission requirements.

53
F U E L C E L L STACK CONTAINING INDIVIDUAL
FUEL CELL ASSEMBLIES

HYDROGEN SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL CELL WITH OXYGEN SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL CELL ASSEMBLY
MEMBRANE AND ANODE INSTALLED PRIOR TO MATING WITH THE MEMBRANE

FIGURE 8 FUEL CELL STACK AND CELLS
Based on t h e service l i f e expectance of the p2B design, a number of
design improvements w e r e developed and were incorporated into a new configura-
tion, known as t h e p3 design. Verification tests of t h e new design were
conducted t o determine such items as coolant and pressure level requirements,
and operating life. The qualification t e s t program imposed conventional limits
of acceleration, low temperature, temperature-pressure, and vibration. Three
simulated mission performance evaluation tests were conducted which demon-
s t r a t e d t h a t t h e p3 design would meet operational requirements.

Separate qualification t e s t programs were conducted on c r i t i c a l com-
ponents such as valves, membrane and electrode assemblies, andmanifolds.
Deficiencies encountered were resolved on an individual basis and components
were retested as necessary t o prove t h e designs. The f u e l c e l l s were
integrated with an RSS and a simulated spacecraft distribution system and
were operated i n s e v e r a l ambient tests and under temperature-pressure and
vibrationconditions. The f u e l c e l l s e c t i o n s performed adequately i n these
tests, although a design problem involving water valve corrosion was encoun-
tered.

A stack storage program was conducted t o determine any performance
degradationorleakage. The results indicated that the storage time after
i n i t i a l a c t i v a t i o n of t h e f u e l c e l l stacks must be limited, since performance
decreases in direct proportion to storage time. It was also determined, how-
ever, that t h e voltage at second activation (at launch) i s greater than the
voltage level at first activation.

Therefore, the followingprocedure was employed. A t the time of
premate, the system w a s i n i t i a l l y a c t i v a t e d , and then drained of product water
and flushed w i t h d i s t i l l e d water t o reduce corrosion hazards. The old water
shutoff valve was replaced w i t h a new valve p r i o r t o flight. This i n i t i a l
activation conditioned the stack electrodes, thus providing higher VoJtage
levels during second activation. Experience gained from l a b o r a t o r y t e s t s
(and Spacecraft 5 f l i g h t ) demonstrated no l o s s t o systemperformance f o r at
least 30 days a f t e r the first exposure t o productwater. The techniques
evolved held f u e l c e l l d e g r a d a t i o n t o limits of the original acceptance
criteria.

C. R e l i a b i l i t y and Quality Assurance Program Results -
The r e l i a b i l i t y
and quality assurance program on t h e fuel cells comprised essentially four
series of tests: (1) a nine-stack forced-failure t e s t program, (2) a 5 s
sampling of the manufactured stacks, (3 ) a valve endurance t e s t program, and
(4) a number of stress-margin tests.
The nine-stack forced-failure t e s t program was run at loading and
environmentalconditionsthat were w e l l beyond specification limits. These
tests showed that t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s t r a i n t on fuel cell operation was
temperature. Ibnger l i f e resulted as t h e c o o l a h inlet temperature was
lowered. The tests a l s o showed that performance was lowered when t h e operati=
pressure of t h e hydrogen was reduced even though stack l i f e w a s not signifi-
cantly affected.

55
The manufacturing consistency and quality of production cells was
monitored by sampling e l e c t p i c a l performance capability of 596 of the stacks
during l i f e endurance tests. These stacks had an average l i f e of 1086 hr,
which well exceeded the requirements for a 14-day Gemini mission.

Endurance (cycling) tests were performed on t h e oxygen, hydrogen, and
water valves and the pressure bellows to determine t h e i r endurance and t o
ascertain w e a r out pattern and failure rate. A l three bellows were tested
t o 129 x 103 cycles and t h e three 02 purge valves were tested t o 194 x 103
before failure occurred, Each i n l e t and purge valve was t e s t e d t o 21 x lo3
cycles. Fifty percent of these failed, b u t r e s u l t s compared f a v o r a b u with
the 15 x 103 cycles quoted by t h e switchmanufacturer. The H N valve was
subjected t o 8 x 103 cycles and no discrepancies were encountered.

Stress margin tests were conducted'on the water separator assembly
t o .determine t h e e x t e n t t o which pressure, temperature, flow, and vibration
would a f f e c t i t s operation. These tests demonstrated that t h e assembly could
withstand stresses i n excess of the SCD 52-79700 specification for normal
operation. O f t h e e i g h t u n i t s tested, f i v e were tested for leakage under
normal condition and exceeded specification limits of 50 cc/hr. !The remaining
u n i t s were subjected t o t h r e e tests: high temperature r&dom vibration, pres-
sure cycling, from both the water and the oxygen sides, and imposition of a
water pressure 20.5 p s i greater than the oxygen pressure (reverse pressure).

These tests indicated that the assemblies could withstand conditions
i n excess of the required limits before leakage above the established specifi-
cation was evident.

D. Significant Anomalies and Corrective Action f o r Fuel Cells The major -
anomalies encountered during several Gemini missions and the corrective action
taken are presented in the following paragraphs.

-
Spacecraft 2 E l e c t r i c a l power for Spacecraft 2 was supplied by four
silver-zinc main batteries, three silver-zinc squib batteries, and four silver-
zinc special pallet batteries. A l fuel c e l l s t a c k hydrogen inlet valves were
c l o s e d p r i o r t o launch because a prelaunch f a c i l i t y malfunction made timely
activation impossible, t h e hoped for engineering evaluation of f l i g h t perfor-
mance was not accomplished. However, in-flight information was obtained on
launch e f f e c t s on t h e pressurized static reactant supply system. The f u e l
c e l l s e c t i o n s of t h e first (P2B)design, as used i n t h i s mission, are mentioned
i n Development and Qualification Tests f o r t h e Fuel Cell, page 53.

Spacecraft 5 -
In preparation for Spacecraft 5 delivery and launch,
t e s t s indicated an activation and storagelimitation.Corrosion of t h e f u e l
cell shutoff valve and t h e spacecraft plumbing was eliminated by changing the
material of the valve and water connections and by flushing and drying t h e
system afer the first activation. (RefDevelopment and Qualification Tests
f o r the F uel Cell, page 53.) In addition, a valve f o r product water was
installed. This valve was improved f o r later missions.
Contamination of t h e by-product water, primarily by organic acids,

.
resulted i n t h e withdrawal of the plan t o use by-product water for drinking.
(Ref Product-Water Potability, page 59 ) Therefore, a storage tank was
i n s t a l l e d between t h e by-product water o u t l e t and t h e ECS.pressure regulator.
A three-ply Teflon bladder i n t h i s tank i s o l a t e d t h e by-product water from
the cabin water supply.

During the .Spacecraft 5 f l i g h t , t h e fuel c e l l performance was nominal,
although systemproblems led. t o unusual modes of f u e l c e l l operation. The
following changes w e r e therefore m,on later spacecraft : (1) coolant pump
inverters w e r e redesigned t o give a high o r o w flow c a p a b i l i t y f o r each loop,
l
thus conserving power, and (2) coolant loops w e r e reconnected t o e s t a b l i s h an
independent coolant flow t o each section.

Attention during t h e mission was focused on the water management
system when calculated water production rates created concern over adequate
storage volume. Actions resulting from t h i s on l a t e r flights were t o improve
measurement of astronaut water consumption thus improving water production
rate determination and the storage capacity required for maintaining t h e water
pressure at acceptable levels was greatly increased.
Spacecraft 7 - The fuel cell configuration on Spacecraft 7 w a s essen-
tially the same a s that for Spacecraft 5. During the mission,anapparent
blockage o r r e s t r i c t i o n developed i n the water management system, which
periodically affected t h e performance of t h e three stacks of one f u e l c e l l
section. The evidence did not indicate a systemdesign problem, however, and
all phases of the mission were accomplished s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

Pictures taken of Spacecraft 7 in orbit disclosed an ice formation
at the hydrogen vent port. Modifications w e r e made t o the vent on l a t e r space-
c r a f t t o prevent t h i s icing.

-
Spacecraft 8 The Spacecraft 8 f u e l c e l l system w a s the same as t h e
Spacecraft 7 system, except f o r t h e hydrogen ventmodification. F l i g h t perfor-
mance of t h e f u e l c e l l during t h i s mission was nominal.

Spacecraft 9 -
The fuel cell configuration installed on Spacecraft 9
was the same as that used on Spacecraft 8. The stacks were activated about
15 h r before the scheduledlaunch on 17 My 1966. However, failure of the
Agena Target Vehicle t o achieve orbit resulted i n a two-week postponement of
the mission.

Because of apprehension that t h e twice-activated stacks would produce
a reduced voltage (Development and Qualification Tests f o r the Fuel Cell,
page 53), a new fuel c e l l system was i n s t a l l e d and was launched on 3 June
1966, as p a r t of the Spacecraft 9 mission. This system was nominally activated
and performed without malfunction throughout t h e mission

-
Spacecraft 10 To make room in the adapter section of Spacecraft 10
f o r two a d d i t i o n a l o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O m ) bottles, modifi-
cations w e r e made t o the f u e l c e l l system. The l i f e support oxygen supply,

57
which had provided oxygen only t o the cabin, was redesigned t o supply t h e
f u e l cell, also. The i n s t a l l a t i o n and activation of t h e f l i g h t system was
accomplished without problems, and system performance was nominal throughout
t h e mission.

-
SpacecraFt 11 The Spacecraft 11 f u e l c e l l system was the same as
those on Spacecraft 7 through 10. In preparation for the first stack activa-
t i o n at premate, t h e system originally installed in Spacecraft ll received an
inadvertent overpressurization of oxygen. This imbalance was found t o be
caused by a malfunctioningaerospace ground equipment (ACE) regulator. The
f l i g h t f u e l c e l l s e c t i o n s were therefore replaced and the AGE regulator
repaired; t h e old fuel c e l l s e c t i o n s were s e t - a s i d e f o r bench t e s t i n g i n o r d e r
t o determine their condition.

During the first activation load check of the replacement sections,
an AGE valve failure caused helium t o be introduced on the hydrogen side of
the cells of both stack sections. The problem area was i s o l a t e d from the
system and hydrogen was reintroduced, whereupon a normal deactivation was
begun.

It was subsequently discovered t h a t , due t o a procedural error,
approximately 20 h r of deactivation were accomplished without coolant flow
being circulated through the sections. An investigation was undertaken w ith
the following results: (1)the sections were adjudgedacceptable f o r flight;
(2) t h e AGE components were given a special inspection and preventive mainte-
nance measures were taken; (3) p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n was given t o f u e l c e l l
protective procedures.

The launch of Spacecraft 11was twice delayed due t o launch vehicle
problems. During t h e delay, t h e f u e l c e l l s remained activated and were
operated at three amp per stack. Once i n t o the mission, t h e C stack of Sect. 2
failed at 54 h r and 31 min elapsed time. Review of the flight data revealed
t h a t t h i s was a rapid failure, most probably a t t r i b u t a b l e t o burnout; no
indication of impending failure had been received. It was impossible from
the mission data t o determine a single cause for t h i s failure. Even with t h e
failed stack, t h e e l e c t r i c a l power generating capability of the f u e l c e l l
system was nominal, and all mission requirements f o r power were met.

-
Spacecraft 12 Fuel c e l l i n s t a l l a t i o n and activation (RefDevelopment
and Qualification Tests for the Fuel Cell, page 53) proceedednormally. All
data indicated normal performance during the launch count. A t 5 :45 i n t o the
mission, both section oxygen-water delta pressure lights displayed t h e
presence of an anomaly in the water management system. While no f i n a l deter-
mination of the f a i l u r e mode can be m a d e , indications are t h a t a depletion of
t h e water storage volume, used t o maintain pressure control, had occurred.
The cause of the depletion was most probably the leakage of oxygen i n t o t h e
water system. A s a result of the loss, fuel c e l l floodinRoccurred.
The e l e c t r i c a l performance of the f u e l c e l l was affected t o the extent
that during the mission two stacks had t o be shut d m (stacks 2B and 1C) and
two othersexperienced a s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s of power. Both f a i l e d s t a c k s
exhibited a rapid drop of open circuit voltage potential
burnout mode.However,
-
an indication of a
the remaining stacks and batteries provided sufficient
e l e c t r i c a l power t o achieve a l l mission objectives. A t the time of t h i s
writing, McDonnell Report F-205, Gemini Fuel C e l l Performance Analysis, i s
being prepared f o r s u b m i t t a l t o NASA. It provides a detailed study of fuel
c e l l performance and corrective action.

-
E. Product-Water Potability Because of t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n t t o u t i l i z e
f u e l c e l l product water for astronaut consumption, a tank for storage of t h e
product water was mountedon the ECS oxygenmoduleon Spacecraft 2. However,
p r i o r t o the Gemini V flight (the next mission t o u t i l i z e the f u e l c e l l s ) ,
t e s t s i n d i c a t e d contamination of t h e by-product water by organic acids.

Neutralization of t h e corrosive and a c i d i c q u a l i t i e s of the product
water was attempted by using ion exchange columns. These columns were t o be
mounted on t h e f u e l c e l l module, onecolumn f o r each section. However,
significant diversity appeared among the product water samples obtained i n
testing; experimentation with d i f f e r e n t r e s i n s failed t o produce an ion column
which would be s u i t a b l e f o r a l l applications. Therefore the decision was made
t o store the fuel c e l l product water and provide additional containers for
potable water.

!lbe following storage provisions were therefore made:

1. On Spacecraft 5, two20411. diameter tanks were installed. The
A tank contained drinking water inside a bladder, pressurized by gas. The
B tank contained drinking water inside a bladder, and both product
gas outside t h e bladder.
- water and
2. The same tanks were u t i l i z e d on Spacecraft 7, except that the A
tank, containing the drinking water, was pressurized by product water and t h e
B tank contained gas i n the bladder and fuel c e l l water outside. Because of
the Long duration of t h i s mission, a t h i r d tank was i n s t a l l e d , i n which
drinking water was pressurized by oxygen.
3. On Spacecraft 8 and up,two tanks were provided. I n one, f u e l c e l l
product water was pressurized by nitrogen, i n the other drinking water sur-
rounded a bladder containing product water.

A more detailed analysis of t h i s problem i s presented i n McDonnell's
design note History of the Gemini Drinking Water System, dated 6 July 1966.

Reactant Supply System.

A. Design Concept -
Reactant supplies for the f u e l c e l l are l o c a t e d i n
the adapter section of the spacecraft in two double walled, vacuum insulated,
sphericalcontainers. The reactants, oxygen and hydrogen, are s t o r e d i n
these containers at supercritical pressures and at cryogenic temperatures.
They provide a "single phase" f l u i d (i.e., neither a gas nor a liquid.) t o t h e
heat exchangers and t o t h e d u a l @-Hz pressure regulators. Upon reaching t h e
heat exchangers, each flu3.d i s converted t o a gas, and supplied t o the f u e l
cells a t operating temperatures.

59
Several advantages accrue t o system design through t h e use of t h i s
cryogenicstorage. Because t h i s s t o r a g e can be accomplished at lower pres-
sures than would be feasible with a similar quantity of g a s s t o r e d i n t h e
88me amount of space, t h e danger of s t r u c t u r a l failure is g r e a t l y reduced.For
t h e same reason, associated components can be fabricated from l i g h t e r materiala
Furthermore, waste heat from t h e ECS coolant circuits i s u t i l i z e d i n t h e h e a t
exchangers, instead of being vented overboard.

If, on the other hand, the reactants were stored as low-pressured
liquids, an additional system t o c r e a t e t h e necessary delivery pressure a t
high flow rates would be required; another disadvantage of t h i s methodwould
be that weightlessness and certain acceleration forces mighbat times provide
a two phase (gas and liquid) or unstable, supply of reactants t o the heat
exchangers.

RSS oxygen i s s t o r e d i n the spacecraft at approximately -297OF at
14.7 psia; RSS hydrogen i s stored at approximately -423OF at the same pressure.
The tanks are i n i t i a l l y f i l l e d with t h e hydrogen and oxygen gas which is
replaced w i t h cryogenic reactant l2 t o 24 h r before launch. Because the tanks
are f i l l e d from the bottom, it i s impossible t o drive out a l l the gas. This
o r d e r t o r e s t o r e t h e s i n g l e phase condition, the
.,
results i n what i s known as a two phase condition (i.e gas and l i q u i d )
heaters within the tanks
In
are energized,causing the cryogenic liquid t o expand. Since this expansion
takes place in a closed tank, the internal pressure rises. The gasmolecules
are pressure driven into a homogeneous association w i t h t h e l i q u i d molecules.
This campressed f l u i d state i s the single phase condition which i s necessary
f o r optimum system operation.

The heaters remain ON until normal operating pressures are reached
(approximately 910 p s i f o r oxygen,240 p s i f o r hydrogen). Maximum b o t t l e
pressure i s carefully maintained by the relief valves on t h e heat exchangers.
A t both high and low reactant density (i.e., during t h e i n i t i a l , and f i n a l
phases of the mission), minimum heater activation i s required. When the
reactants are a t approximately a middle density, at the midpoint of the flight,
natural heat leak from the storage containers supplies minimum cryogenflow.

The flow of r e a c t a n t s t o the fuel c e l l system is reduced t o d e l i v e r y
pressures by the dual 02-H~ pressure regulators and dual relief valves. The
pressure regulators use the regulated gas pressure in the by-product water
storage tank as a reference t o regulate the hydrogen pressure, which i n t u r n
i s used as the reference to regulate the oxygen pressure. (A schematicof
t h e RSS system i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig. 9. )

The system senses the generation of product water, and permits suffi-
cient reactant flow to the f u e l c e l l c a v i t y t o maintain a constant pressure on
the porous glass separator plates above t h e water basins. (Ref Fuel Cell
Technology, page 51. ) Product water pressure is maintained at approximately
20 psi. Hydrogen pressure i s reduced t o approximately 21.7 p s i f o r delivery
to the fuel cell; oxygen pressure i s reduced t o approximately 22.2 psi. Thus
the regulators are set t o maintain a hydrogen pressure of approximately 1.70
psi greater than the product water pressure, and an oxygen pressure

60
FIGURE 9 FUEL CELL RSS SCHEMATIC

approximately 0.5 p s i greater than the hydrogen pressure. These pressures
a r e read cnd; on the differential pressure meter i n t h e cabin and on ground
telemetry.

The temperature of t h e reactants provided t o t h e fuel c e l l i s con-
t r o l l e d by the reactant supply heat exchangers, located immediately downstream
of t h e storage tanks. mese heat exchangersautomaticallycontrol t h e reactant
temperature by absorbing and transmitting heat from the recirculating coolant
fluid. When leaving the storage tanks, the temperatureof t h e oxygen i s i n
t h e range of -297OF t o -1600~; the temperature of t h e hydrogen ranges
between 423OF and -3600~. Before t h e reactants are supplied t o t h e f u e l
cells, the heat exchangers r a i s e t h e i r temperatures t o a minimum of 50°F and
a maximum of IJ+O°F.

Normal operation of t h e f u e l c e l l r e q u i r e s t h a t the system be purged
several times during a mission.Purging removes i n e r t gases that accumulate
61
within t h e cells and r e s t o r e s f u e l c e l l o p e r a t i o n t o near its original level.
The frequency of the purgesis in proportion to the section current being
drawn. For section currents of 18 t o 30.amp, a purge is required every four
hr; for currents of 30 t o 45 amp, a purge i s necessaryevery two hr. The
normal section purge takes approximately ll s e c f o r hydrogen and twomin f o r
oxygen.

I n a d d i t i o n t o the components mentioned, provisions for servicing the
system requireshutoffvalves which i s o l a t e the and H2 storage tanks from
t h e rest of t h e RSS, and check valves which permit gaseous reactants t o be
introduced from AGE sources.

B. Development Test f o r t h e Reactant Supply System - The components of
t h e RSS were developed t o meet the specific applications of a cryogenic,
s u p e r c r i t i c a l environment. Subjected t o extensive development t e s t i n g were
the cryogenic storage tanks, the water and gas pressure regulators, the heat
exchangers, the control, check, and relief valves, and the gaugingsystems.

This development t e s t i n g evolved the a b i l i t y t o use t h e same type of
heat exchanger i n both hydrogen and oxygen systems. In addition,since the
oxygen portion of t h e RSS was similar t o t h a t of the environmental control
system (ECS), an interchange of information and hardware was possible in
c e r t a i n areas.

Development t e s t i n g of both the hydrogen and oxygen high pressure
relief valves revealed internal leakage and an out-of-tolerance condition
caused by w e a r on internal operating parts. New valves which held tolerances
t o required specifications were therefore tested; in addition, revised inspec-
t i o n and cleaning procedures were adopted.

Tests conducted on the hydrogen cryogenic containers revealed the need
f o r a redesign because the internal retaining nuts were backing off under
vibration. Additional testing verified that new locking techniques would
withstand vibration.

C. Qualification Tests f o r t h e RSS -
Wherever possible, q u a l i f i c a t i o n
of the reactant supply system was demonstrated at the sys.tem as w e l l as at
the component level, due t o the close interrelationship of all components i n
supplying satisfactory performance.

The RSS q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s t a t u s i s swmarized i n Table 2. All
subassemblies and components were successfully subjected to the complete test
program, which includes environmental, dynamic and temperature-altitude
testing.

I n addition t o t h i s program, both the oxygen and hydrogen subsystems
were successfully subjected t o six 14-day simulated missions. Test conditions
covered t h e full range of f l u i d q u a n t i t i e s , system pressures and internal-
'heaterduty-cyclesexpected i n Gemini f l i g h t s . I n addition, fuel-cell purge
cycles were simulated t o include the effect of sudden, brief flow rate
excursions.

62
TABLE 2 QUALIFICATION STATUS - REACTANT SUPPLYSYSTEM
SPACE RAFT 5 & U P DESIGN APPROVAL
-.
~~ ~ ~
MAJOR ENVIRONMENTS
- -
I
Z
0
I- h
n
COMPONENTS
d 2I-
n Z
0 dw > ca
Z 5I- I-
U -I Y
-P
I- v)

?
5
4
I
2 *
O
K
m
W
V
u
V
0 -
L
I
3 fis
n ~
I ~
-I
-> 4
-
5 -
K . I -K 2
5UBSYS ( T A N K ) SM O2 -203 A A C C 'A A A A C
SM H, -2 05 C C C C A A A A C

SAGE CONT SM O2 -83 A A C C A C A A C
SM H2 - 85 A A C C A C A A C

:HECK VALVE - H2 B O2 -95 C C C C A A C C

- 0 PRESS V A L V E a ~ ~ - -1810 ~C C C C A A C C

? E G U L A T O R H2-02 -1 85 C C C C A A C C

i I PRESS V A L V E H 2 - 0 2 -1 95 C C C C A C C C

3 0 N T A I N E R SM O2 -167 C C C C A A C A C
SM H2 -165 C A C C C A C A C

'RESS SW - O2 -183 C C C C A A C

H2 -1 79 C C C C A A C C

r E M P SENSOR -37 C C C C A A C C
'RESS TRANSD H 2 -1 97 C C C C A A C C

"2 -199 C C C C A A C C

NVERTER-GAGE -45 C C C C A C C C
= I L L a VENT V A L V E H~ -57 C C C C A A C C

O2
-59 C C C C A A C C
- -

C = TESTING COMPLETE A = TESTING NOT REQUIRED

D. RSS Flight Performance -
The RSS performed with only minor anomalies
on Spacecraft 2, 7 and 8. Shortly after thelaunch of Spacecraft 5, t h e
oxygen pressure control heater failed. As a r e s u l t , oxygen pressuredecreased
below the normal control range; however, the system continued t o perform
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y at the lower pressure level. It was not possible t o determine
whether t h i s failure occurred within the heater or i n the spacecraft w i r i n g .
The following corrective action was therefore taken:

1. Redundant wiring was provided t o t h e oxygen heater.
, 2 , - A high-pressure crossfeed was i n s t a l l e d linking t h e ECS oxygen
supply tank and the fuel c e l l oxygen reactant tank. lhis crossfeed comec-
tion, made downstream of the heat exchangers, allowed yarm oxygen f r o m the
ECS tank t o be supplied t o the RSS tank i n the event of an RSS heater malfunc-
tion. Pressurization from one tank would be sufficient to pressurize both
systems with the crossfekd on. The possibility of another failure was
minimized, since the ECS oxygen tank has redundant heaters.

The long-mission hydrogen tank in spacecraft 7 was modified t o improve
i t s thermal performance .by adding a regenerative cooling line, insulated
container mounts, and an external wrapping of several layers of Mylar. A
pyrotechnic pinch-off tube cutter was added t o blow open a valve i n t h e outer
hydrogen vessel iil t h e event of heat leak during the mission. Blowing t h i s
valve allowed t h e pressure of the space vacuum t o r e s t o r e the vacuum between
the inner and o u t e r b o t t l e s of the hydrogen vessel, thus holding t h e heat
leakage t o a minimum.

Subsequent t o Gemini VII, all spacecraft utilized t h e short-mission
hydrogen vessel and either a short-mission RSS oxygen vessel cross-connected
t o a long-mission ECS oxygen vessel (Gemini VI11 and IX)o r a shared long-
mission ECS oxygen vessel alone (Gemini X through X I ) . m o t e c h n i c pinch-off
tube cutters were added t o each of the hydrogen vessels for a l l remaining
spacecraft.

A t 26:58 i n t o the Gemini IX mission, t h e hydrogen vessel indicated
zero fluid quantity, both on the cabin readouts and through telemetry. Post-
flight investigation revealed t h a t the panel gauge, i t s i n t e r n a l telemetry
potentiometer, and the gauge-control output circuitry w e r e operating properly.
It was therefore concluded that t h e failure had occurred i n the quantity
s e n s o r o r i n the sensor-to-controller w i r i n g . Sinceboth of these p o t e n t i a l
failure p o i n t s a r e i n the equipment adapter, further failure analysis was
impossible. However, since all other data indicated that the RSS conkinued t o
function properly, loss of hydrogen quantity indication was f e l t t o be an
insignificant anomaly, and t h e mission continued with no need t o u t i l i z e
either back-up systems o r alternate procedures.

Special operating procedures were written for experimental in-flight
use of t h e hydrogen pinch-off-tube cutters on Spacecraft 9 through 12. b s s
of the hydrogen quantity readout on Spacecraft 9 prevented precise assessment
of the thermal performance improvement. The c u t t e r was again successfully
blownon Spacecraft 10 but the lack of long-duration constant-extraction-rate
periodspreventedaccurate performance determinations. On Spacecraft 11 the
hydrogen vessel exhibited a 9.5 improvement (heat-leak decrease) 24 h r after
blowing tha valve; on Spacecraft 12 flight data confirmed a 22s improvement.
It i s apparent t h a t valve blowing i s e f f e c t i v e i n improving vessel performance
t o the original as-built level, thereby nullifying the degradation which
occurs i n the months p r i o r t o flight. There is no indication, however, t h a t
t h i s action improves t h e vessel beyond the o r i g i n a l performance limits.

A t 78:30 h r i n t o t h e Gemini XI1 mission, the pressure i n the hydrogen
vessel of the RSS rose t o 350 p s i (240 psi i s the normal operating pressure).

64
r

. This s i t u a t i o n was corrected by directing the crew to reposition the heater
switch f'rtnn AU!K) t o OFIF. Subsequently t h e Hz02 heater circuit breaker 'was
opened. Analysis demonstrated t h a t t h e heater had been intermittently
activated over a lCQ-min period during the H2 pressure increnient. However,
flight data revealed that after switch operation the tank pressure gave
i n d i c a t i o n s o f d e c l i n i n g - p r i o r t o t h e opening of the circuit breaker.Post-
flight investigation included an inspection of t h e connector potting, .of the
w i r e bundles,and of t h e switch mounting. No shorting conditions were
revealed. The heater switch was then removed f o r failure analysis, during
which it was subjected t o x-ray inspection, contact IR drop measurements,
cycling, dielectric testing, and dissection. No discrepancies w e r e found as
a result of t h i s investigation. Because of adapter loss, it was not possible
t o determine i f failure i n the pressure-switch o r i n t h e adapter loss, it
was not possible t o determine i f failure i n the pressure-switch o r i n t h e
adapter wiring had caused the anomaly. Once t h e heater had been deactivated,
the mission was able t o proceed with no f " t h e r RSS incident.

Batteries.
A. System Concept - Three types of silver-oxide zinc Eagle Picher
batteries were employed on Gemini Spacecraft. The standard complement was
four 45 amp/hr main batteries, located i n the re-entry module, three 15 amp/hr
squib batteries, stowed i n the spacecraft right hand equipment bay, and, f o r
spacecraft which did not employ f u e l c e l l s , three 400 amp/hr batteries
i n s t a l l e d i n the adapter section. (See Fig. 10. ) A l l t h e batteries are
activated and sealed at sea level pressure; all are capable of operating in
any a t t i t u d e i n a weightless state.

Each battery case has a pressure relief valve t o permit the escape
of gases. Battery temperatures are controlled by mounting the battery cases
in direct contact w i t h spacecraft coldplates.

In every case, prime consideration was given t o the maximum power-to-
weight and power-to-volume r a t i o s , and t o high reliability, storage, and
activated life. Simplified activation and t e s t procedures,plus minimized
handling requirements, were important factors in the design and development
of these batteries.

A significant advancement i n the state-of-the-art was the use of
titanium instead of s t a i n l e s s steel as t h e case material i n both the main
battery and t h e squib battery. This substitution resulted i n a weight
decrease of 16%o r more w ith no loss of b a t t e r y strength.

-
B. Main Batteries The four batteries i n s t a l l e d i n t h e re-entry module
supplied a portion of the main bus parer during launch and all of the main
bus power during the re-entry, landing, and post-landing phases of t h e mission.
Each of these batteries has a rated capacity of 45 amp/hr at a discharge rate
of 20 amp andan activated stand l i f e of 30 days. An analysis of individual
b a t t e r y performance based on telemetered data and post-mission t e s t i n g
indicated t h a t each battery possessed an average capacity of 49.32 amp/hr
at p o t e n t i a l s up t o 20 volts.

65
BATTERY MODULE
STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY (REF)
9

WATER STORAGE

SILVER ZINC
BATTERIES

FIGURE 10 ADAPTERBATTERYMODULE

The change to titanium cases increased the performance at 24 v o l t s
from 45 h r per pound of b a t t e r y weight t o 54 h r per pound. Estimated mission
loads on t h e four batteries varied from 32.0 amp/hronGemini V t o 118.01*
amp/hronGemini XII, with an average mission load of 55.12 amp/hr per space-
craft through the Gemini XI1 f l i g h t . (-is figure includes fuel c e l l back-up
usage p r i o r t o r e t r o f i r e . )

C. Squib Batteries -
The three squib batteries supply power f o r squib-
activated pyrotechnic devices throughout the mission; in addition, they
provide power t o t h e common control bus for t h e relays and solenoids t o the
environmental, communication, instrumentation, and propulsionsystems. These
batteries are mechanically and e l e c t r i c a l l y i s o l a t e d from all other batteries
i n t h e system.

To provide a redundant power supply in the event of t h e malfunction
of the squib battery section, the astronauts canconnectsquib circuitry to
the main b a t t e r i e s .

Each squib battery has a rated capacity of 15 amp/hr, an activated
stand l i f e of 14 days, and a power-to-weight r a t i o of 42 watt-hr per pound
of b a t t e r y weight. Post-flight discharge testing on each battery indicated
an average capacity of 14.73 amp/hr. An additional property of t h i s b a t t e r y
i s i t s a b i l i t y t o respond rapidly t o high loading conditions, making it
especially effective in firing high-load, short-duration squibs.

66
I Power deliveredtothe.spacecraft by the
three
squib batteries was
estimated t o range from a o w of 6.0 amp/hron the Gemini V I mission t o a
l
high O f 27.4 amp/hron t h e Gemini V mission.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n on t h e Gemini Spacecraft, two 15 amp/
h r squib batteries were mounted i n the augmented t a r g e t docking adapter (ATDA)
;.' f o r t h e Gemini M A mission. Their purpose was t o supply power t o the squib
:' bus for ATDA/launch vehicle separation, for shroud separation, and for RCS
pyrotechnic devices.

-
D. Adapter Batteries Adapter batteries were used i n Spacecraft 3, 4
and 6 . Spacecraft 3 and 6 each had three 400 amp/hr batteries i n s t a l l e d i n
the adapter section; these batteries provided the primarysourceof electrical
power f o r the two relatively short missions.Spacecraft 4, t h e onlyspacecraft
t o f l y an extended mission (four days) without fuel cells, required six 400
amp/hr batteries.

On the three missions in which these batteries were utilized, they
provided power t o t h e main bus f o r the communications, environmental, guidance,
and instrumentation systems, as well as cabin and EVA lighting and power f o r
customer experiments.

The discharge rate of each 400amp/hr battery i s between 20 and 25
amp; each has an activated stand l i f e of 30 days. By using magnesium f o r t h e
battery case, a power-to-weight r a t i o of 83 watt-hr per pound of battery
weight was achieved. Power delivered to t h e spacecraft by t h e adapter
b a t t e r i e s was estimated t o range between 265 amp/hr f o r the Gemini I11 mission
and 2032 amp/hr f o r t h e Gemini IV mission. Neither t h e ATDA nor t h e adapter
sections were recovered; therefore no post-flight measurement of the capacity
of the flight batteries was possible.

Three 400 amp/hr b a t t e r i e s were i n s t a l l e d on the ATDA f o r t h e
Gemini IX A mission. These b a t t e r i e s providedprimary power t o the main bus
for the following systemsand functions: the d i g i t a l command system (DCS),
the a t t i t u d e t h r u s t e r s , two C-band radar transponders, the TM subsystem, t h e
rendezvous radar transponder, and the docking, latching and unrigidizing
operations.
E. Qualification and R e l i a b i l i t y Test Program f o r B a t t e r i e s
amp/hr batteries, eleven 15 amp/hr batteries, and nine 400amp/hr
-bEleven 45
atteries
were used i n t h e qualification and r e l i a b i l i t y t e s t program.

The philosophy of the qualification test program was t o d u p l i c a t e ,
as closely as possible, maximum-duration mission conditions, from battery
activation throughspacecraftrecovery.For t h i s purpose, batteries w e r e
subjected to a sequence of environmental tests, including vibration, high
temperature, landingloads,and shock tests. In addition, t h e stand l i f e and
mission duration capabilities of t h e batteries w e r e rated.

The r e l i a b i l i t y tests demonstrated that the three types of batteries
could withstand extremes of environment and activated stand l i f e and s t i l l
produce the rated capacity. Additional tests on the 400 amp/hr battery indi-
cated t h a t t h e battery's a b i l i t y t o deliver the rated capacity i s impaired
after a stand l i f e i n excebs of 30 dsys.
Extra t e s t e demonstrated t h e load sharing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the
45 amp/hr and the 400 emp/hr batteries when connected in parallel. Results
indicated a combined capacity of t h e two batteries which ranged from 500 emp/
h r t o 509amp/hr. Until it was p r a c t i c a l l y expended, t h e 45 amp/hr battery
contributed almost the same portion of the t o t a l load current. as the larger
battery. This t e s t effectively demonstrated the compatibility of the two
batteries.

Power Distribution and Management
m e r is fed from t h e primary power sources t o the main, squAb, and
control bus systems for Spacecraft 3 through 12.
The systemsused on
Spacecraft 1 and 2 were unique, and therefore are discussed i n separate
paragraphs.

Main Bus System. - Power f r o m t h e main bus i s fed through c i r c u i t breakers
o r f u s e s t o the using equipmnt. Astronauts control onboard equipnent powered
from the main bus based on an evaluation of instrument panel display o r at t h e
direction of mission control.

Squib/Control Bus System. * The squib/control bus system consists of three
diode-isolated 15 amplhr s i l v e r z i n c batteries, which provide power t o two
i s o l a t e d and redundant squib buses and t o the control bus through the series
diodes. As an emergency measure, "bus tie" switches on the instrumentpanel
permit application of power t o the squib and control buaes from t h e main bus.
Circuit protection for squib/control bus loads i s provided by f u s i s t o r s f o r
pyrotechnic firing c i r c u i t s and by c i r c u i t breakers for control circuits.
Powermanagement f o r t h i s system i s similar t o that f o r the main bus system.

Spacecraft 1 Paver Distribution and .Wagement. - All power f o r Space-
c r a f t 1 systems was supplied by one &5"/hr s i l v e r z i n c b a t t e r y through
circuit breakers. Since a l l equipment was powered continuously f r o m l i f t - o f f ,
no in-flight switching was required. Hawever,power control was provided
v i a u m b i l i c a l t o t h e blockhouse for prelaunch activities, and by an ON-OFF
switch for earlier ground operations.

Spacecraft 2 Power Distribution and Wagement.
main and squib/control bus system~pnoted above,two sequencer buses
-
In a d d i t i o n t o the
with
c i r c u i t breaker overload protection were provided on Spacecraft 2 t o power
the flight sequencers. During flight, equipment was powered either by the
preset sequencers or by ground command v i a t h e d i g i t a l command system.

Problems Encountered and Resolution.

A. Ammeter and Voltmeter Fluctuations -
A review of films from cameras
on Spacecraft 2 showed fluctuations of the ammeter and voltmeter needles after
landing. The films also showed fluctuations of the a t t i t u d e b a l l corresponding
i n frequency t o those of t h e emmeter and voltmter- It wa8 concluded that t h e
o s c i l l a t i o n s were induced by wave motion af'ter sphshdown. The m8gnitude of
t h e motion overrode t h e mechanical d am pig capability of the measuring instru-
n
ments.. To verify the conclusion, a stock ammeter was tested and it was
determined t h a t movement p a r a l l e l t o t h e m e t e r - s e n s i t i v e axis resulted i n
fluctuations similar t o t h o s e shown i n t h e films. Since any recurrence would
be recognized and would have no deleterious effect on mission accomplishment,
no f u r t h e r ' a c t i o n was taken.

B. Fuse Block Moisture Penetration -
Several fuse blocks showed evidence
of moisture penetration when opened for-post-recovery inspection. An improved
water proofing technique was used on all fuse blocks, starting with Space-
c r a f t 4. In addition, t h e inertial guidancesystem fuses and primary 02
heater fuses w e r e moved downstream of the control switches for Spacecraft 7
andsubsequent spacecraft. With t h i s c i r c u i t r y , employment of a power-down
procedure s h o r t l y after impact wouldremovepower from all fuse blocks and
eliminate any adverse e f f e c t s due t o salt water penetration.
C. Circuit Breaker Opening - Post-flight inspection of Spacecraft 2
indicated that a number of c i r c u i t breakers were i n t h e tripped position even
though they had functioned properly during the flight. It w a s found that t h e
c i r c u i t breakers i n t h e re-entry control system had been tripped by salt water
shorting at the thruster solenoid disconnects due t o an undersize O-ring
seal. All other tripped circuit breakers w e r e inadvertently actuated by the
recovery team during power-down. To eliminate salt water shorting after
landing, astronauts were i n s t r u c t e d t o t u r n o f f all switches and c i r c u i t
breakers associated with hot circuits. O-ringsof t h e proper size were
i n s t a l l e d on the re-entry control system thruster solenoid valves, starting
with Spacecraft 3.

D. Post-landing Indications of MainBus Power Fluctuation -
For Space-
c r a f t 9 and 10, telemetered data indicated excessive variations in main bus
power. Considerablepost-mission t e s t and e f f o r t were expended but the cause
couldnot bedetermined. On Spacecraft 11, a determined e f f o r t was made t o
monitor main bus voltages and currents after landing, and t o review t h e
telemetered data. Here, there wasno indication of abnormal operation.
A rereview of available information included static fire sea tests
and instrumentation system immersion qualification tests. It was concluded
that the improper indications were t h e result of salt water inrmersion of t h e
instrumentation system. Control of the environment of each spacecraft prior
t o flight assured t h a t missions would not be affected. Further e f f o r t became
t h e concern of the instrumentation system rather t h a n t h e power and the power
d i s t r i b u t i o n system.

-
E. Inadvertent Circuit Breaker Openings On Spacecraft 9A, 10, ll and
12, various circuit breakers were found open at times of greatest astronaut
a c t i v i t y , such as EVA. In a l l cases, these circuit breakers were reset and
remained closed during t h e rest of the mission.
Sequential Systems

There were no sequential systemrequirements for Spacecraft 1. For Space-
craft 2 through E!, t h e sequential systems were u t i l i z e d t o separate spacecraft
modules, j e t t i s o n aerodynamic fairings, i g n i t e t h e retro-rockets,&ploy
parachutes,andperform numerous otherfunctions. The sequential systems are
discussed i n t h e following paragraphs.
-
Boost, Insertion, and Abort S e q u e n t i a l S y s t ~ - . Thissystem enables t h e
a s t r o n a u t s t o separate the spacecraft from the launch vehicle and to jettison
t h e noseand horizonscanner fairings. In case of an abort during launch the
system provides f o r shutdown of the booster engines and separation from t h e
launch vehicle.

Retrograde Sequential System. -
Thissystem i g n i t e s the retro-rockets,
separates the equipment adapter and retroadapter modules, and j e t t i s o n s t h e
horizonscanner heads. The a s t r o n a u t s i n i t i a t e all retrogradesequential
events except for the i g n i t i o n of retro-rockets, which are ignited automati-
c a l l y by t h e TR signal from t h e time reference system w ith manual back-up by
the astronauts at "R + 1 sec.

Landing and Post-landing Sequential System. -
Astronauts initiate
landing and post-landing sequential events based on their evaluation of i n s t r u -
ment panel displays. The system deploys the drogue, p i l o t , and main parachutes,
actuat.es the cabin a i r inlet door, separates the rendezvousandrecovery
section, jettisons t h e main parachute, and extends the recovery hoist loop and
flashing light. On Spacecraft 2, t h e drogue stabilization chute was not
installed.

Flight Sequencers. - Spacecraft 2, was adapted for unmanned f l i g h t by
i n s t a l l i n g two redundant f l i g h t sequencers t o i n i t i a t e f u n c t i o n s which would
normally be performed by the astronauts. The sequential systems described
above were not altered t o accommodate t h e f l i g h t sequencers.

Docking Sequential System. - A docking sequential system was i n s t a l l e d
on Spacecraft 6 and 8 through l2 t o incorporate rendezvousanddocking func-
tions. The docking system controls enable the astronautstoextendtheindex
bar, t o separate from t h e Agena vehicle in an emergency, t o i n i t i a t e t h e
rigidizlng and unrigidizing sequences, and t o a m the Agena vehicle engine.
The index bar i s jettisoned and the doors are closed over the latch receptacle
when t h e p i l o t j e t t i s o n s t h e retroadapter. If the docking latches have not
been j e t t i s o n e d o r t h e index bar has not been extended, these functions also
are performed with retroadapter jettison. To accommodate t h e Gemini-Agena
t e t h e r experiment, the dockingsystem on Spacecraft 11 and 1 2 a l s o j e t t i s o n s
the index bar and latches, and closes the doors over t h e latch receptacle
independently of j e t t i s o n of the retroadapter.

Problems and Resolutions in Sequential Systems. -
Listed below are
majorproblems encountered i n s e q u e n t i a l systems operation during flight or
post-flightinspection.Actiontaken t o precludereoccurrence i s also
presented.
A. Retropackage Separation Sensor Failure -
Instrumentation parameter
ADd,t retropackageseparation, was notreceived on Spacecraft 2. Post-flight
inspection revealed that retroseparation limit switches 2 and 3 had not been
actuated. A failure analysis revealed excessive corrosion onone of t h e
f a i l e d switch assemblies. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s corrosion excessive external
force was needed t o operatetheswitch. On Spacecraft 3 the switches were
deactivated and on Spacecraft 4 and up the switches were removed.

B. Uss of P i l o t Chute Deploy Instrumentation Parameter
indicationparameter AE02, p i l o t chutedeploy, was notreceived.
Telemetry -
An inspection
of the toggle switch which senses the p i l o t chute deploy revealed that the
lanyard had become untied. The length of lanyard recovered was s u f f i c i e n t t o
allow it t o be t i e d t o t h e switch bat handle with adequate slack remaining.
Closer attention was paid t o t h e t i e procedure f o r subsequent spacecraft.

C. Thruster Activity After Impact - Spacecraft 2 recovery forces
reported RCS t h r u s t e r a c t i v i t y i n the water. Post-flight inspection of the
a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l e l e c t r o n i c s package indicated that an aerospace ground equip-
ment disconnect w a s not adequately waterproofed, thereby causing thruster
f i r i n g due t o salt water shorts. The following action was taken effective
Spacecraft 3 and up t o prevent reoccurrence of the problem:

1. The AGE disconnect was waterproofed.
2. Astronauts were i n s t r u c t e d t o open all RCS t h r u s t e r c i r c u i t
breakers after impact.
3. Motor operated shutoff valves were incorporated i n t h e f u e l and
o x i d i z e r l i n e s t o be c l o s e d p r i o r t o impact.

D. Loss of Manual F i r e R e t r o i n s t r u e n t a t i o n Parameter- Telemetry indica-
t i o n of parameter 6 , manual f i r e r e t r o , was not received on Spacecraft 4.
Investigation revealed that r e l a y K4-37, manual retro latch relay, was not
latched in. The manual r e t r o f i r e c i r c u i t and associated items were thoroughly
checked andfound satisfactory. The anomaly could be duplicated only by not
pushing the switchthrough t h e operate point. No further action was taken.

E. Loss of Equipment Adapter Separate Instrumentation Parameter Telem- -
e t r y i n d i c a t i o n of parameter ADo2, equipment adapter separate, was not received
on Spacecraft 4. Investigation revealed that relays ~4-66,and K4-67, abort
d i s c r e t e latch relays, which are energized by the equipment adapter separation
sensorswitches, were not latched in. These relays, plus all w i r i n g associated
wi th t h e equipment adapter separate sensing circuitry that was recovered,
were thoroughly che’cked and no discrepancies w e r e found. Since a l l recovered
c i r c u i t r y checked out, the most l i k e l y cause of failure was t h e separation
sensor switches. On Spacecraft 5 and up, the only function of the equipnent
adapter separate sensing switches is to illuminate the SEP ADAFT telelight
green and t o provide telemetry indication.of separation. The telelight
switch d s usedin place of t h e separation sensor switches t o provide t h e abort
d i s c r e t e t o t h e computer.

F. Optical Sight Malfunction
o p t i c a l sight did not illuminate.
-
On Spacecraft 5, the r e t i c l e l i g h t on t h e
The failure was t r a c e d t o an open w i r e i n
t h e u t i l i t y cord that provided power t o the o p t i c a l s i g h t r e t i c l e light. The
cord failed because of excessive strain that was applied when the cord was
extended. A design change added a s t r a i n relief clamp at the connector back
shell, i n s u r i n g s u f f i c i e n t wire slack.
G. Docking Pyro Igniter Failure - Post-flight analysis of Spacecraft 6
revealed that the latch release, latch door release, and index bar j e t t i s o n
i g n i t e r s powered from squib bus No. 1 had not fired. A l l pyro devices m c -
tioned nolPLallydue t o i g n i t i o n of the redundant squib bus No. 2 i g n i t e r s . A l l
unfired i g n i t e r s are normally fired at retropackage jettison i f the nose
fairing has been previously jettisoned. The firing s i g n a l i s interlocked by
a l a t c h r e l a y which is l a t c h e d i n when t h e astronaut depresses the jettison
f a i r i n g switch. It was determined t h a t relay a-86, nose fairing j e t t i s o n
latch relay, had not been latched in, thereby locking out the squib bus No. 1
firing signal. !!%e f a i l u r e was i s o l a t e d t o the nose fairing j e t t i s o n switch,
p a r t No. 52-79719-7, during component tests on t h e switch. An operational
test at reduced pressures revealed t h a t one pole of the switch was inoperative
due to canting of the switch actuator plate. For Spacecraft 8, a l l switches
w e r e replaced with u n i t s which had been subjected to a 48 h r soak at 10-5 psi
and a 48 h r soak at f i v e p s i with a f u n c t i o n a l t e s t conductedeach hr. On
Spacecraft 9 and up, all switches were replaced w i t h u n i t s which had been
modified t o permit an additional 0.015 in. of p l e rt r a v e l .I na d d i t i o n ,
a l l switches are subjected t o a 48 h r soak at 10ypsi, with a f'unctional
t e s t conducted each hour during exposure.

-
H. Amber IND RETRO ATT Telelight Anomaly On Spacecraft 8, the astro-
nauts reported t h a t the IND RE390 ATT t e l e l i g h t failed to illuminate amber
at TR-256 sec. When the telelight switch was depressed,thegreen light was
i l l d n a t e d as expected. The c i r c u i t r y i s such t h a t i f t h e TR-256 sec signal
from the time reference system i s not received, neither the green nor the
amber light will illuminate. Therefore, the failure was r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e
light assembly o r t o t h e wire connected t o the amber t e l e l i g h t . All c i r c u i t r y
and the telelight switch were examined a f t e r flight and no discrepancies
were found. No further a c t i o n was taken.
I. O W Yaw Thruster No. 8 Anomaly -
This thruster i n t e r m i t t e n t l y f i r e d
without comand f o r 17.5 min while Spacecraft 8 and the Agena were docked
and undocked. The exact cause of failure was neverdetermined and is con-
sidered t o be complex. To prevent a recurrence, a switch was i n s t a l l e d on
the astronaut's control panel in Spacecraft 9 through 12 t o cut off e l e c t r i c a l
power t o all 16 attitude and maneuver thrusters.

J. Inss of Automatic Control of Hydrogen Tank Heater
75 h r of Spacecraft 12's mission, the H2 tank pressure could not
-
A t approximately
be controlled
with the H2 heater switch i n AUTO position. The H2 heater switch was placed
t o O F F and C r y 0 02 and H2 HTR circuit breaker OPEN. Post-flight analysis
revealed no discrepancies in the recovered portion of t h e c i r c u i t and indicated
that the most l i k e l y cause of t h e malfunction was a f a i l e d H2 tank pressure
switch.

K. Summary -
There were no major problems associated with t h e o v e r a l l
program i n t h e power d i s t r i b u t i o n and management or sequential systems. Hard-
ware, design, manufacturing and operational failurewere minimal and random
in nature. Cause of several of the failures' couldnot be determined, either
because the circuits functioned properlyon post-fllght inspectionor because
the failed component was not recovered.

COWUNICA!l!ION AND TRACKING SYSTPM

The communication and tracking system provides two-way cornmica-
voice
tion, ground-to-spacecraft c0-d link, spacecraft-to-ground telemetrytrans-
mission, radar tracking signals andrecoery aids. Subsystems consist of
telemetry, tracking, voice communications, digital comnand, antennas, and
recovisy 'aid&. (See Fig. 11 and 12:) m e s e subsystems are discussed in
Voice Communications, page73 through m j o r ,ProblemsEncountered.with Delivered
MIS Tape Recorders, page-109 of this report.

Voice Communications

"he voice communications subsystems include the voice control
center,
two UHF voice transmitters-receivers (transceivers)
and one HF voice trans-
ceiver. The UHF transceivers have a transmitter output of three watts each.
The €IF transmitter outputis five watts.

The voice communication system provides communication between the
astronauts, between the blockhouse and the spacecraft during launch, between
ground stations and the spacecraft from launch through re-entry, and between
the astronauts and the frogmen during the recovery.
water The voice subsystem
also supplies communication between the spacecraft and recovery forces during
landing and post-landing.

The voice control center (VCC), located on the spacecraft center
instrument panel, is the central control and distribution pointf o r the voice
communication system. The VCC provides for intercommunication between the
astronauts, for control and distribution of audio to and from the trans-
ceivers, intercommunication with the ground complex prior to launch, a and
tone for direction finding.

The voice communication system is designedto furnish independent or
"time-shared" capability in eitherUHF or HF voice linksto the astronauts.
Each astronaut has redundant microphone and headset amplifiers, mode switches
and volume controls. Controls common to both astronauts are the HI? and UHF
select switches, voice tape recorder control switch, squelch controls, keying
mode switch, anda silence switch for use during sleep periods.

are supplied to NASA for use
Electro-Voice noise cancelling microphones
in the helments. Lightweight Electro-Voice headset assemblies are also pro-
vided for use when the helmetsoff. are

"he redundant UHF voice radios provide increased reliability. Only one
HF radio is employed, however, becauseof its limited use. The UHF and €IF
73
DIGITAL
COMMAND
SYSTEM(DCS) fidg DELAYED TIME (MID FREQ) TELEMETRY TRANSMITTER

(DCS) DISCRETE COMMAND RELAYPANELS

ACQUISITION AID BEACON
COAXIAL SWITCH NO. 2
ULTRA HIGH-FREQUENCY DIPLEXER
T~
BAND R A D A R BEACON
ROTATED 180° FOR CLARITY

FLASHING RECOVERY LIGHT

RECOVERY ANTENNA

RECOVERY LIGHT POWER SUPPLY
,/ H F WHIP
ANTENNA H F WHIP ANTENNA

/
UHF WHIP ANTENNA

"C"
I
BAND ANNULAR
7

ULTRA HIGH
FRQNENCY
ANTENNA COAXIAL SWITCH NO. 1, NO. 4

REAL-TIME (LOW FREQ)
TELEMETRY TRANSMITTER
POWER DIVIDER
STBYHIGH FREQ

ANTENNA (REF) 1
,UHF VOICE
TRANSCEIVERS

COAXIAL SWITCH NO. 4

"C" BAND RADAR BEACON
HF TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER
UHF RECOVERY BEACON

FIGURE 11 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

74
tT
ANTENNA A NATNETN N A . .. .

7 Y
-
UHF RECOVERY
BEACON
COAXIAL
SWITCH
PHASE
SHIFTER
I COAXIAL
SWITCH
NO. 4

I
COAXIAL , I I
-
POWER HF VOICE
REAL-TIME SWITCH I DIPLEXER
DIVIDER TRANSIRCVR.
TELEMETRY NO. 3
TRANSMITTER
(LOW FREQ.)
A

~

COMMAND 'I
I SUBSYSTEM I

b SWITCH
NO. 2
+

ACQUISITION
AID BEACON
DELAY ED TIME
(MIDFREQJ
TELEMETRY
TRANSMITTER

4"""""""""""""JI""""","" -b
RE-ENTRY MODULE ADAPTER

3 FiGLJRE 12 GEMINI COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
systems are complementary i n t h a t l i n e - o f - s i g h t communications w i l l u t i l i z e
UHF and HF w i l l be used f o r over-the-horizon spacecraft-to-ground communica-
tion. These u n i t s are i s o l a t e d e l e c t r i c a l l y t o minimize failure modes.

Subsystems and Spacecraft- Evaluation.

A. Subsystem Evaluation -
A l l t h e components used i n t h e v o i c e system
were subjected t o e x t e n s i v e t e s t i n g p r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n the spacecraft.
The vendor performed a predelivery acceptance test on each unit. This con-
sisted of a low-temperature/high-temperature test, a v i b r a t i o n t e s t and a
complete e l e c t r i c a l performance test. After delivery to Mcbnnell, the unit
was again subjected to a complete e l e c t r i c a l performance t e s t before it was
i n s t a l l e d i n t h e Gemini Spacecraft.

B. Spacecraft Evaluation -
After installation in the spacecraft, voice
comunicationsoperation was evaluated at t h e system level. Time c r i t i c a l
parameters such as RF power, center frequency, audio distortion and receiver
s e n s i t i v i t y were monitored throughout the spacecraft testing at both St. Louis
and at C a p e Kennedy for possible equipment replacement.

Design, Development and Qualification Program.

A. Design Program -
The voice subsystem components (HF and UHF trans-
ceivers and t h e VCC) were designed and b u i l t by Collins Radio Company t o
McDonnell's specifications. System design was based on the design utilized
for Project Mercury. Problem areas encountered during the lYercury program
were reviewed and corrective action was taken to avoid a recurrence onGemini.
An extensive development test program was initiated during t h e early design-
phase t o uncover possible problem areas requiring redesign.

B. DevelopmentProgram D-ur
i
n g the designphase, the individual voice
system components were subjected to development tests in those environments
which were considered c r i t i c a l . A summary of t h e environmentsused t o q u a l i f y
the u n i t s i s attached as Table 3. I n a d d i t i o n t o the component t e s t s ,
extensive development tests have beenconducted at the system level. These
programs are summarized i n Table 4. A brief description of the tests
performed follows:

1. Electronics Systems Test Unit (ESTU)
fabricated spacecraft mock-up.The
-
The ESTU was a laboratory-
objective of this t e s t was t o assemble all
electronics systems and determine i f any i n t e r f a c e problems existed. Various
systems were operated simultaneously t o determine t h e amount of interference
among them.

This t e s t i n g revealed several problems. Among these were inverter
noise coupling into the audio lines, feedback between the cabln speaker and
theastronaut's helmet, and incorrectaudiolevelsinthe VCC. Corrective
action consisted of installing double-shielded wiripg for the audio; ultimate
elimination of t h e cabin speaker, and vendor testing and modification of the
vcc
-
2. Compatibility Test Unit (Cru) The Cmr was a more sophisticated
spacecraft mock-up used to gain f'urther.information on systems performance.
This mock-up employed standard spacecraft w i r e bundles and had a s t r u c t u r e
similar t o a prdduction spacecraft.

The problem areas discovered during ESTU testing mre further
investigated during the CTU tests. %st methods and procedures t o be used
during production spacecraft system t e s t i n g (SST) w e r e finalized.

-
3. RF Compatibility Test The RF compatibility t e s t was performed
on a screen w i r e mock-up equipped with all the spacecraft antennas and t h e
spacecraft and Agena RF components. The RF sources were operated t o determine
i f any RF' interference existed between the systems.

The t e s t results indicated that RF interference existed on t h e
UHF receiver when the spacecraft and t h e Agena telemetry transmitters were all
operating. This condition would never e x i s t during a normal mission, since
only two of the three telemetry transmitters are operable a t the same time
during flight. For t h i s reason, the Rl? interference was notconsidered a sys-
tem incompatibility.

-
4. Tracking Station Fly-Over Tests The fly-over program, i n which
the voice communication system was i n s t a l l e d i n an a i r c r a f t , was conducted t o
verify station operation and check t h e compatibility of the spacecraft equip-
ment with the ground s t a t i o n s ' equipment. No problems were encountered with
voice system operation during these tests.

C. Qualification Program A -
l of the voice system components success-
fully completed the qualification program. A detailed summary of the quslifi-
cation program i s contained i n Table 3.

-
R e l i a b i l i t y and Quality Assurance Program. In order t o maximize the
r e l i a b i l i t y of the voice. system components, the vendor incorporated a l l of
t h e standard r e l i a b i l i t y procedures into the program. These consisted of
vendor surveillance, qualification testing, parts screening, reliability
estimates, design review,and failure analysis and reporting.

The reliability assurance test consisted of two p a r t s : (1) voltage and
temperatureoverstress, and (2) vibrationoverstress. Performance degradation
caused by the overstress conditions was noted on several parameters, but it
was determined t h a t the degradation was not significant enough t o jeopardize
successful voice communications.

Flight Results. - The only flight failure of a voice system component
was an HF voice transceiver anomalyon Spacecraft 2. The HI? u n i t failed t o
operate properly a f t e r splashdown. It was removed from the spacecraft and
returned t o the vendor f o r failure analysis; subsequent investigation revealed
that the failure was caused by a shorted diode. Tests indicated that a t t u r n
on, the peak-inverse voltage (PN) of the diode was exceeded, causing the
failure. This problem was corrected on all remaining HF radios by substitu-
t i n g a diode w i t h a higher PIV. No further anomalies were encountered.
TABLE 3 QUALIFICATIONS TESTS
COMMUNICATION AND TRACKING

A - SUCCESSFULLYCOMPLETEDWITHOUTRERUN
B - FAILED INITIAL TEST BUT PASSED RERUN.WITHOUT EQUIP. MODIFICATION
C - EQUIP. HAD TO BE MODIFIED TO PASS T E S T
D - TEST REP. HAD TO BE WAIVED OR L O W E R E D
F -TEST REQ.BUTHASNOTBEENPERFORMED
G - RETEST REP. DUE TO UNRELATED EQUIP. MODIFICATIONS

m j o r Problem Associated w i t h Program. -
During the development program
on the UHF radios, a problem was encountered with the 8185 power amplifier
tubes. The tubes exhibited "cathode slump" and fatigue of the mica spacers.
The result was a drop i n RF power. The corrective action employed was t o
incorporate an improved type tube with a modified spacer and different
(Class C ) "burn-in"procedures.

During i n s t a l l a t i o n of the evacuation tube on the HF and UHF radios,
solder balls were inadvertently introduced into the case. This problem w a s
corrected by employing a new case design and sealing process.

Antennas

Spacecraft and Subsystems Evaluation.
transmission/receptioncapabilityforthe
-
The antenna subsystem provides
communication system. Radiation
TABLE 3 QUALIFlCATlONS.TESTS(Continued)
COMMUNICATION AND TRACKING

3a
0
0
a
n.
a
W
I.
I-
0
z
4
a
0
Y
n
E
Y
J
4
0
=.

DOC- DOCUMENTED
DOC-1 - SIMILARITY TO S-BAND ANTI. (REQUAL)
DOC-2 - SIMILARITY TO C-BAND ANT.
DOC-3 - SIMILARITY TO MERCURY
DOC-4 - SIMILARITY TO DIPLEXER
DOC-5 - SIMILARITY TO QUAORIPLEXER
DOC-6 - SIMILARITY TO DESCENT ANTENNA

coverage requirements vary w i t h the mission phasedepending upon spacecraft
s t a b i l i z a t i o n mode and ground coveragerequirements. The antennasystem
p r o v i d e s r o l l symmetrical radiation coverage f o r C-band tracking and UEIF voice,
telemetry and command during t h e launchphase. During s t a b i l i z e d o r b i t
a t t i t u d e , t h e antenna system provides yaw symmetric& horizon-oriented radia-
t i o n coverage. HF voice and DF capability is provided by an IIF whip antenna
on the adapter for orbit use and on the re-entry module for post-landing use.
For d r i f t i n g f l i g h t w i t h uncontrolled spacecraft attitude, t h e antenna system
provides complementary yaw symmetrical and r o l l symmetricalcoverage. The
astronauts select the antenna system usage t o o b t a i n the optimum coverage f o r
voice,telemetry and tracking. During the re-entryphase, C-band and UHF
coverage is u t i l i z e d and is similar t o t h e launch phase coverage. The recovery
phase requires antenna capability for HF' and UHF frequencies. The antenna
systems a r e comprised of high efficiency, high r e l i a b i l i t y antennas and RF
components which are of minimum w e i g h t and volume. The C-band tracking
antenna system consists of three cavity h e l i x antennas, a power divider, a

79
TABLE 4 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
COMMUNICATllONS - RADAR - TIME REFERENCE. SYSTEM
COMMUNICATIONS

1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS -
ELECTRONIC SYSTEM TEST UNIT (ESTU),
COMPATIBILITY TEST UNIT (CTU).

2. R F I C O M P A T I B I L I T Y T E S T - LOCKHEED TEST, TOWER TEST.
3. RECOVERY TEST - BOILER PLATE NO. 3.

4. FLY-OVER RANGE TESTS -
5. RELIABILITY ASSURANCE TESTS (OVER-STRESS).

6. GEMINI/AGENA PLAN X TEST

1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS - ELECTRONIC SYSTEM TEST UNIT.
2. R F I C O M P A T I B I L I T Y T E S T S - LOCKHE ED TEST (IN PROGRESS), TOWER TEST.
3. WHITE SANDS FLIGHT TEST -
4. NEW M E X I C O S T A T E A C C U R A C Y A N D A N T E N N A V E R I F I C A T I O N .
5. G E M I N I / A G E N A P L A N X TEST.

TIME REFERENCE SYSTEM

1. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS - ESTU, CTU.
2. FLY-OVER RANGE TESTS -
3. I N T E R F A C E T E S T S - COMPUTER, DCS AND DTS.
4. G E M I N I / A G E N A P L A N X TEST.

phase shifter and associated power supply,and an annular slot type antenna.
The UHF antennasystem consists of t h e nose stub, forward adapter whip, aft
adapter whip, descent and the recovery antennas and four RF coaxial switches,
a quadriplexer and a diplexer. The HF antenna system consists of two HF whip
antennas and an R F coaxial switch.

State-of-the-Art Advances. -
The UHF nose stub antenna i s located on the
radar ground plane on t h e nose of t h e spacecraft and may be exposed t o impact
during spacecraft rendezvous and t o impact by a parachute cable during single
pointrelease. The antenna is, therefore,designedto be self-erecting after
having been impacted and flexed i n any direction and in addition to survive
re-entry heating and a i r loads. The upper section of the antenna mast pivots
about a matingsocket when impacted. A compression spring i s preloaded so
t h a t when the antenna i s flexed t h e action of the spring and a cable assembly
w i l l exert a f o r c e t o r e s t o r e t h e mast t o i t s normal in-line position.

"he UHF adapter whip antenna i s a quarter-wave stub, which i s unique i n
t h a t it i s self-extendible. It consists of a t h i n s t r i p of specially heat
treated beryllium copper which i s *led i n t o a cylindrical housing under
80
tension. There i s sufficient stored energy t o eject a retaining cap and
latching post assembly and t o automatically extend i t s e l f t o form a tubular
quarter-wave stub antenna matched t o a 50 dhm feed system. The cap and
latching post assembly is e l e c t r i c a l l y released when a solenoid actuated
latching mechanism is energized. The element requires manual r e t r a c t i o n by
proper nu
’filg
r i n t o the housing.

Design, Development-Ground and Qualification Program Results.
criteria for the design and development of the ..antemas and R F components was
- The

based on operational requirements in predicted critical environments. Modifi-
cations were made as t h e t e s t program revealed design deficiencies. and resulted
i n p e r t i n e n t components q u a l i f i e d t o the environments. Table 3 shows t h e
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t program f o r each antenna and RF componenli The comprehen-.
sive t e s t program and quality assurance surveillance resulted i n high r e l i -
a b i l i t y components.

Results of Flight Mission. - There have been no problems r e l a t i v e t o
t h e UHF and C-band antennasystems during t h e launch, orbit, re-entry and
recoveryphasesof the f l i g h t missions. The useof HF antennas for emeriments
during the orbital phaseof t h e missions has been successful. The re-entry
HF whip antenna encountered problems d u r i n g the post-landing phase of the
e a r l y missions; however, modifications sealed the unit and corrected the
problem f o r later missions.

Discussion of MajorProblems. Associated with Overall ProgramProblem. -
Potential damage t o t h e UHF nose stub antenna i f impacted during either
rendezvous o r by parachute cable a t single point release during re-entry due t o
i t s location on t h e radar ground plane.

Corrective Action -
Redesign t o an antenna w i t h a five in. long section
on the end that canbe f l e x e d i n any direction i f impacted. A socket assembly
with a cable and spring under tension inside t h e antenna body returns t h e
antenna section to i t s normal inline position afterrhaving been flexed.

Problem - The HI? whip antenna (located on the re-entry module ) failed t o
radiate t h e RF signal during the post-landing phase because sea water leaked
in shorting out the radiating element and antenna RF feed system.

Corrective Action -The antenna assembly case was sealed and a special
pressure equalizing breather cartridge was attached. The t i p plug which
contains t h e ablative section for closing t h e antenna element egress hole i n
the spacecraft skin was modified so that it could seal against t h e muzzle end
of the antenna assembly i n i t s fully retracted position. In addition, a lexan
polycarbonate (plastic) guide block replaced the metal one at the muzzle end
t o prevent grounding and cellulose sponge sections were i n s t a l l e d i n the
muzzle and the silicone rubber splash boot t o absorb sea water resulting from
spray
Problem - The UHF adapter whip antenna element f a i l e d t o extend due t o
improper furlingwhen manually retracted after ground tests.

81
Corrective Action -
The metal cap which r e t a i n s t h e furled antenna
element was replaced with a clear lexan polycarbonate (high temperature
p l a s t i c ) cap so that proper furling of the antenna element i n t o the housing
can be observedthrough the cap p r i o r t o l a t c h i n g . Proper furling allows the
antenna element t o automatically extend at spacecraft separation when t h e cap
latching mechanism i s e l e c t r i c a l l y released.

Electronic Recovery Aids

The electronic recovery aids consisted of one UHF recovery beacon,
52-85719 and one flashing recovery light, 52-85720. The UHF' recovery beacon
provided a homing s i g n a l f o r the recovery forces to locate the spacecraft
after re-entry and the flashing recovery light provided a visual aid t o pin-
point the location of the spacecraft in t h e event of recovery after dark. Both
t h e R F beaconand t h e light (if required) are turned on at approximately
10,000 ft.

Subsystem and Spacecraft Evaluation. -P r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e space-
c r a f t eachsubsystem was subjected to temperature, vibration and a complete
e l e c t r i c a l test at the vendor's f a c i l i t i e s and t o a complete e l e c t r i c a l t e s t
a t McDonnell.
After i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e spacecraft, the c r i t i c a l parameters were
monitored throughout spacecraft testing to assure acceptable operation.

Design, Development and Qualification Program.

A. Design Program -
ACR Electronics Corporation was t h e vendor f o r both
t h e UIIF recovery beacon and the flashing recovery light.

The recovery light was almost i d e n t i c a l t o the one used on Project
Mercury and the design changes were minimal.

The UHF recovery beacon was a hybrid utilizing transistor regulator,
X-DC converter, and pulser with a vacuum tube transmitter.

B. DevelopmentProgram -
During t h e design phase each subsystem was
evaluated and t e s t e d in all c r i t i c a l environment which included temperature,
altitude-immersion, and vibration. These tests uncoveredproblem areas which
are described i n Problems Associatedwith Program, page 83. In the integrated
system tests summarized i n Table 4, both the recovery beacon and the flashing
l i g h t caused excessive interference t o both radio and audio frequencies. As
a result, an RF bandpass f i l t e r was added t o t h e output of the recovery beacon
and shielded wires were used i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t t o c a r r y t h e f l a s h i n g l i g h t
signals.
A fly-over t e s t was run using the UHF recovery beacon t o v e r i f y its
.range capability using both beacon type receiver and the standard ARA-25
direction finders.

02
C. Qualification Program -
Each subsystem was s u b j e c t e d t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n
t e s t s as noted i n Table 3. A l l t e s t s were successArlly completed with the
exception of RFI on the recovery beacon. This requirement was waivedand 8s
noted in B. Development Program, page 82, an external bandptlss filter was
added t o t h e beacon output.

F l i & Results.
recovery aid subsystem.
-
There .have been no f l i g h t failures of any e l e c t r o n i c

Problems Associated with Program.
A. Recovery Beacon -
I n development testing, t h e 6939 output tube failed
under vibration. The corrective action was to strengthen the internal struc-
t u r e of the tube and t h e mounting structure supporting the tube.

During q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g , t h e beacon f a i l e d t o pass b e r s i o n
tests after being subjected to vibration. The corrective action was a
complete redesign of t h e case incorporating an O-ring s e a l i n s t e a d of epoxy.

After qualification testing, a c a t a s t r o p h i c f a i l u r e mode of the
regulator was discovered. The f a i l u r e caused the regulator to go out of
regulation when the input power was turned off andback on very quickly. The
f a i l u r e was t r a c e d t o an RC time constant in the regulator which became mar-
g i n a l under complex variations in temperature, warm-up time and the elapsed
time between turnoff and tiarnon.

For Spacecraft 2, a temporary f i x was made by adding a c a p a c i t o r t o
t h e RC c i r c u i t t o i n c r e a s e t h e timeconstant. This f i x provided reliable
operation in all exceptextremecombinations of t h e c r i t i c a l c r i t e r i a . For
Spacecraft 3 and up, the regulator was redesigned t o be completely fail-safe.

B. Flashing Recovery Light - During t h e a l t i t u d e immersion p a r t of
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g , the lamp f a i l e d t o o p e r a t e during the immersion environ-
ment. Failure analysis revealed an air bubbleseepage path through the epoxy
inside the lampwhich allowed the water t o form an e l e c t r i c a l p a t h between
the case and a high voltage terminal. The corrective action was t o modify
the potting procedure which included performing the potting i n steps and sub-
j e c t i n g t h e epoxy t o a vacuum p r i o r t o curing.

Tracking
The tracking system consisted of one C-band beacon, 52-85707, one S-band
beacon and one acquisition aid beacon, 52-85706.

Effective S acecraft 4 and up the S-band beacon was replaced by a second
C-band beacon. ("A
Motorola DPN/&. ) The acquisition aid beacon provided an
RF link from t h e s p a c e c r a f t t o t h e ground tracking station t o f a c i l i t a t e
spacecraft acquisition.
The C and S-band radar beacons provided very accurate tracking data.

Subsystemand Spacecraft Evaluation.
craft, each subsystem
-
P r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e space-
was subjected to temperature, vibration and complete
e l e c t r i c a l test at t h e vendor and a complete e l e c t r i c a l t e s t at Mclknnell.
Additionally, the C and S radar beacons were l e a k t e s t e d at t h e vendor.

After i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t , the c r i t i c a l parameters were
monitored throughout spacecraft test.ing t o assure acceptable operation.

Design, Development and Qualification Program.

A. Design Program - I n the development of the acquisition aid beacon it
was decided t o u t i l i z e a standard TM transmitter to provide the low l e v e l CW
output required. In this application the modulation capability was notused.
The re-entry C-band beacon i s b a s i c a l l y an improved and repackaged
version of the radar beacon used on the Mercury flights.

TheS-band beacon i s very nearly identical t o the C-band beacon with
theexception of necessaryfrequencydependentdifferences. The operation
capabilities, construction, development and test of the S-band beacon a r e
i d e n t i c a l t o t h e C-band beacon. I n f a c t , all the frequencyindependentsub-
assemblies were interchangeable between the two units.Therefore,thesubse-
quent discussion of the C and S-band beacons w i l l be handled as a single item
except where specified differences are noted.

The adapter C-band beacon (which replaced t h e S-band beacon Spacecraft
4 and up) was procured as an "off the shelf" item. It was a s l i g h t l y modified
version of the AN/DPN-66 manufactured by Motorola.

B. DevelopmentProgram -
The a c q u i s i t i o n a i d beacon, the re-entry C-band
beacon, and the S-band beacon were a part of the system t e s t s shown i n
Table 4. There were no changes required as a r e s u l t of the system integration
tests.

The adapter C-band beacon (AN/DPN-66)was not being utilized at the
time the system t e s t s of Table 4 were being made. Of course, it was given
a system i n t e g r a t i o n t e s t as a p a r t of an actual spacecraft. There were no
system compatibility of interference problems with the AN/DPN-66.

C. Q u a l i f i c a t i o n Program- Each u n i t was subjected t o t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n
t e s t s as noted i n Table 3. A l t e s t s were successfully completedalthough
some equipment modifications were required. A discussion of problems
encouniered i n q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g - i s i n c l u d e d i n Problems Associated with
Program, on thefollowing page.

Flight Results.
or acquisition aid beacon.
-
There have been no f l i g h t failures of any radar beacon
Problem Associated w i t h Program.
"

A. Acquisition Aid Beacon -
The acquisition aid beacon f a i l e d t o meet
t h e R F I requirements during qualification testing. There were two problem
areas; t h e more serious was excessive spurious output at VSWR and the other
was the radiation and conduction of interference from t h e power lines. The
spurious output was corrected by a redesign of the RF filter, and a l i n e f i l t e r
was added t o t h e power leads t o eliminate the radiated and conducted
interference.

B. Re-entry C and S R a d a r Beacons -
The MECA module packaging technique
proved t o be q u i t e fragile under. random vibration. A s a result it was
necessary to:

1. Rigidize the mother board by applying epoxy t o the bottom and
each of t h e side rails.
2. I n s t a l l neoprene foam pads above and below the MECA modules.
3. Rigidize the beacon cover over t h e MECA modules by adding ribs
across the cover.

The l o c a l o s c i l l a t o r t u b e i n the re-entry C-band beacon developed leaks
after unpredictablelengthsof time. The result was catastrophic failure of
the beacons. Corrective action was t o change from the 6299 vacuum tube t o a
7486 vacuum tube. E f f e c t i v i t y w a s Spacecraft 6 and up.
C. Adapter C-Band Beacon -
Insofar as use of t h e AN/DPN-66 beacon on the
Geminiprogram, there have been no serious problems. The DPN-66 was qualified
and used on many other vehicles and has been proven t o be a reliable beacon.

RENDEZVOUS RADAE3 SYSTEM (RRS)

System Description

The rendezvous radar system consists of the rendezvous radar range and
range rate indicator, and command link encoder a l l i n s t a l l e d on t h e Gemini
Spacecraft. The units of the system i n s t a l l e d i n t h e target docking adapter
of the Agena Vehicle are the transponder, boost regulator, dipole antenna and
s p i r a l antennas. Fig. 13 depicts t h e systemblock diagram. Fig. 14 shows
t h e equipment i n s t a l l a t i o n on the Agena Vehicle.

The rendezvous radar system i s a pulsed system that u t i l i z e s a trans-
ponder f o r r e t u r n responses. The radar operates on a frequencyof 1528 mc/sec
wi th a pulse width of 1.0 Nsec and a pulse repetition frequency (PRF)of
250 PPS. Upon interrogation by the radm-, t h e transponderdelays the return
p u l s e f o r 2.0 psec and transmits a 6.0 *set reply pulse on a frequency of
1428 mc/sec. The i n t e r n a l d e l a y i n the transponder allows for operation to
essentially zero range.

The radar u t i l i z e s the interferometer principle to determine target angle.
This i s accomplished by measuring the difference of phase of t h e return beacon
RANGE RATE SPIRAL SPIRAL Dl POL E
ANTENNA ANTENNA ANTENNA

A A A

I DIGITAL
i r--

/J I
RENDEZVOUS TRANSPONDER AGENA
RADAR PROGRAMMER
I
""I
rK l G w 1
I DIRECTOR
INDICATOR

CONTROL AND
BOOST
REGULATOR
r-" COMMAND
I LINK
ENCODER
I CONTROLLER
ENCODER

"-1
GEMINI
TDA

r-
UMBILICAL I
I TIME
REFERENCE
SYSTEM
L"
"I L"
FIGURE 13 RENDEZVOUS RADAR SYSTEM

signal a t two separate radar antennas. Three broad beam, circularly polarized
spiral antennas are used for two interferometer pairs. (One antenna i s common
f o r both interferometers. ) The radar and antennas are o r i e n t e d i n t h e space-
c r a f t so that t h e antenna boresight axis i s p a r a l l e l t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t r o l l
axis. One interferometer lies i n the pitch plane anddetermines t a r g e t
elevation; t h e other interferometer is i n t h e yaw plane and determines t a r g e t
azimuth. A fourth spiral antenna i s u t i l i z e d f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g .

The transponder receives and transmits as a result of the radar i n t e r -
rogation either through the two spiral antennas or t h e dipole antenna. The
radar, upon receipt of t h e 6.0 psec reply pulse from the transponder, extracts
range and angle information from each pulse.
86
The rangeandrange rate indicator displays range from zero t o 50 nautical
miles, and range rates from -100 t o +500 f p s . D i g i t a l range and angle infoma-
t i o n i s supplied t o t h e d i g i t a l computer i n serial binary form. The radar
provides target azimuth and elevation information on the flight d i r e c t o r
indicator (FDI) .
The rendezvous radar system includes the following command link capa-
bility. Prior to docking, t h e radar system provides for pilot command control
of the Agena Vehicle and Agena systems by pulse position modulation of t h e
radar transmitter. The receipt of a v a l i d message i s acknowledged by pulse
widthmodulation of the transponder transmitter. TheGemini-TDA umbilical
provides a means f o r command control over t h e Agena systems after docking,

In the radio frequency (FW)commandmode of operation, the rendezvous
radar i s modulated at a FBI? of 256 cps by t h e command l i n k encoder through
timing signals generated by t h e time reference system. To transmit a comand,
t h e crew s e l e c t s one of 128 possible commands by positioning three switches
on the encoder c o n t r o l l e r t o correspond t o the three d i g i t s of the command.
The switch positions are read out t o t h e encoder and t h e encoder codes t h e
message i n t o a d i g i t a l format.

The digital message, with a 0 representing one time s l o t and a 1another
time s l o t , i s transmitted t o the transponder by a p u l s e t r a i n of 60 pulses.

The message i s received by the transponder where an automatic phase lock
loop is used t o demodulate t h e command. The command message i s then trans-
mitted t o the Agena programmer f o r decoding. When the Agena programmer
recognizes a command, a signal i s s e n t t o the transponder t h a t results i n t h e
pulse width modulation of the transponder reply and a receipt of message
indication i s provided t h e crew.

In the hardline mode of operation, after docking, the astronaut's comands
are t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e Agenaprogrammer v i a t h e Gemini-TDA umbilical. The
receipt of message indication i s a l s o provided through the umbilical.

This Agenacommand capability was not used on Spacecraft 5 , 6 and 9.

Systems Which Differed From Standard RRS. -
The following systems differed
from the standard rendezvous radar system described above.

A. Spacecraft 5 R a d a r System -
The standard system was u t i l i z e d b u t the
Agenscomponents were packaged i n a rendezvous evaluation pod (REP). The IiEP
was stowed in the adapter section of Spacecraft 5 and was e j e c t e d f o r p r a c t i c e
rendezvous exercises.

-
B. Project 7/6 R a d a r System The standard system w a s i n s t a l l e d on
Spacecraft 6 except t h a t the transponder, boost regulator and one s p i r a l
antenna were i n s t a l l e d i n the rendezvousand recovery section of Spacecraft 7.

C. Spacecraft 9 Radar System -
The standard system was utilized, but t h e
Agena components were packaged i n t h e augmented target docking adapter (ATDA).
A transponder antenna switch control was added t o t h e ATDA t o f a c i l i t a t e radar
tracking of t h e tumbling ATDA. The switch control anticipates loss oflock
and switches the transponder antenna for maximum received signal. In addition,
a simplified command link was added which provided t h e crew with one real time
COImnand.

a0
Development Tests For RRS

Development tests for the RRS w e r e performed by the vendor, by McDonnell,
Snd by NASA.

RRS Vendor Tests.

indicator, boost regulator,
-
A. Prequalification Test The radar, transponder,range and range rate
command l i n k encoder and antennas were subjected
t o launch vibration and high and low temperature environments p r i o r t o formal
qualification testing. Integration tests w e r e made between t h e radar and
range and range rate indicator, the radar and t h e command l i n k encoder, t h e
radar and transponder, and the transponder and boost regulator.

-
B. Modification of Antennas A series of omnipatterns, mutual coupling,
cross coupling, and phase l i n e a r i t y tests on the radar antenna resulted i n
t h e addition of Eccosorb (an RF absorbing material) t o the radar ground plane
t o reduce t h e cross coupling between t h e azimuth and elevation angle channels.
An extensive t e s t program was required on the dipole antenna array t o develop
a design that could be manufactured with repeatability.

RRS McDonnell Tests.
A. Electronic System Test Unit (ESTU) - A n engineering prototype radar
was t e s t e d as part of the ESTU. During t h i s t e s t the engineering prototypes
of t h e guidance and control system were interfaced in a simulated spacecraft.
Interconnecting cables of the proper length and type were used t o i n s u r e t h a t
t h e radar interfaces with t h e guidance and control system were compatible.

The radar command link interface was demonstrated by interconnecting
t h e time reference system (TRS), command link encoder,encoder controller,
and rendezvous radar i n the ESTU mock-up w i t h a transponder for both RF and
hardlineoperation. The t e s t included t h e transmission of RF commands,
receipt of RF message acceptance pulses (MAP), transmission of time c r i t i c a l
commands, docked mode operation (hardline), and evaluation of t h e TRS i n t e r -
face pulse shapes.

B. R a d a r Boresight and Angle Linearity - The boresight of t h e radar was
measured on an outdoor antenna range at New Mexico State University t o g e t a
basis of comparisonof radar boresight and angle l i n e a r i t y . This data w a s
compared t o data from the same radar i n t h e Westinghouse anechoic chamber and
t h e NASA radar antennarange on Merritt Island (KSC). The test also evaluated
t h e e f f e c t of spacecraft configuration on the radar boresight, t h e reference
radar radiation pattern, and the Agena vehicle antenna pattern and e l l i p t i c i t y .
._
NASA Tests.

A. Command Link Test at mckheed Missile and Space Center ( W C ) - A
TDA-Agena interface t e s t a t LMFiC demonstrated the compatibility of the rendez-
vous radar transponder and the Agenaprogrammer. The capability of t h e trans-
ponder t o o p e r a t e i n the Agena RFI environment was insured. Also, t h e
operation of the transponder was tested during the f i r i n g of t h e Agena main
engine .
B. Gemini/Agena RF and Functional Compatibility and Mission Simulation
(Plan-X) - Functional compatibility of t h e Gemini and Agena vehicles in t h e
docked andnear-docked positions was demonstrated during "Plan-X." This was
t h e first t e s t i n which t h e complete radar command l i n k (i.e., TRS, encoder
controller, encoder, radar transponder, and Agena programmer) was used t o
command the Agena. All commands were transmittedsuccessfully.

C. Rendezvous Radar F l i g h t Test Program - The dynamic performance of the
radar was demonstrated i n a flight t e s t at White Sands Mssile Range,
New Mexico.The transponder and s p i r a l antenna were mountedon a T-33 a i r c r a f t
andflown over t h e radar which was mounted i n a ground t e s t stand. By varia-
t i o n of a i r c r a f t altitude andspeed, t h e range rate and angular tracking rate
of the rendezvous radar was exercised.

Qualification Tests f o r RRS

Table 5 l i s t s the various environments t o which the u n i t s of the radar
system were subjected.

Radar. -
The radar boresight shifted during the humidity portion of t h e
qualification tests. "he s h i f t was attributed to moisture being absorbed in
the Eccosorband entering t h e reference antenna assembly. Measures were taken
t o keep the Eccosorb dry p r i o r t o flight, and t h e reference radome was sealed.

R a n g e and Range Rate Indicator.
without retest o r redesign.
- Al tests w e r e passed successfully

Command Link Encoder. - Al t e s t s were passed successfully without
r e t e s t o r redesign.

Transponder. -Problems encountered during humidity testing were
resolved by sealing t h e transponder t o prevent moisture from g e t t i n g i n t o t h e
casing. Extensive difficulty then was experienced i n t h e low pressure environ-
ment. The transmitter cavity was p r e s s u r i z e d t o p r e v e n t e l e c t r i c a l breakdown.
In addition, a l l microwavecomponents and connectors i n t h e RF transmitting
path were vented t o prevent corona discharge. Also added was a plug which
was removed p r i o r t o launch, allowing the transponder t o outgas at an
accelerated rate after launch.

S p i r a l Antenna. -Ekposure of t h e s p i r a l antenna t o t h e low pressure
environment required venting of the balun and connector t o prevent corona
discharge. A l other t e s t s were successfully completed without retest o r
redesign.

Dipole Antenna.
redesign.
- A l l tests were passed successfully without retest o r
TABLE 5 RENDEZVOUS RADAR QUALIFICATIONTEST
ENVIRONMENTS 1
W
K
W
SYSTEM UNIT I
n
VI
0
I
I-
U
Z
Y W
u
U
0 zU r
x
r
VI D! 0
. "

RADAR NIP X N/A N /A
. "_ ___" -

R 8 R INDICATOR X N /A N /A X
~

COMMANDLINKENCODER X N/A N/A X
~- .~ . ..

TRANSPONDER N/ P N /A D N /A
~~

SPIRAL ANTENNA N/ b X

DIPOLE ANTENNA D D
~~

BOOST REGULATOR N/b N/A
-
X - TESTPERFORMED
D - TESTDOCUMENTED
N/A - TEST NOT APPLICABLE

-

-
Boost Regulator. Exposure t o humidity required t h e addition of a con-
formal coating t o t h e internal chassis and components. A l other tests were
completed successfully without retest or redesign.

Flight Mission Results Of The RRS

The rendezvous radar system has been implemented i n t h e following config-
urations .
S acecraft 5
System, page
-
"he system flown is described i n Spacecraft 5 R a d a r
Ejection of the rendezvous evaluation pod from t h e space-
craft was nominal and radar system operation andperformance w a s nominal. The
practice rendezvous exercise was terminated a short time after REP ejection
due t o a spacecraft fuel cell difficulty. On the second day of the mission,
the radar system was exercised in a CapeKennedy fly-over t e s t with a ground-
based transponder. Radar performance was nominal f o r t h i s test. On t h e fourth
and subsequent days of t h e mission, fly-over tests were conducted and a d i g i t a l
rangeproblemdeveloped. The maximum digital range was 24,W The ft.
91

i
problem was a t t r i b u t e d t o low temperature operation. Additional temperature
tests were added t o t h e t e s t cycle for Spacecraft 6 and up.
- The system flown i s described i n ProSect 7/6 Radar System,
Page system
performed the closed-loop
rendezvous maneuver.
Radar performance was nominal f o r a l l phases of the mission.

Spacecraft 8. - The system flown i s described in System Description,
page 85.. R a d a r systemperformance was nominal f o r t h e majority of the first
rendezvous maneuver. A problemdeveloped from 46 nautical miles t o 22
nautical miles i n t h e approach t o t h e Agena.The crew reported fluctuations
of t h e target angles on t h e flight director indicator (FDI). The fluctuating
display did not prevent the crew from maintaining boresight on the Agena
vehicle and did not hamper the rendezvous exercise. A subsequent analysis of
a l l pertinent data revealed that a high frequency e l e c t r i c a l breakdown caused
the d i f f i c u l t y . As a r e s u l t , all of the !FDA coaxialconnectorsassociated
w i t h the transponder were packed with a low vapor pressure grease.

b-
System, page
acecraft 9. The system flown i s described in Spacecraft 9 Radar
The radar used f o rt h e f i r s t and t h i r d rendezvousand
system performance w a s nominal f o r a l l phases of the mission for
radar
t h e tumbling
ATDA target vehicle. The high lobe structure of t h e tumbling ATDA antenna
patterns caused variation in received signal strength and variation i n t a r g e t
e l l i p t i c i t y with a corresponding fluctuation i n radar AGC voltage and approxi-
mately one degree peak t o peak excursions of the FDI needles. This was as
anticipated.

+-
S acecraft 10 The system flown i s described in System Description,
page 5 The radar systemperformed the rendezvous maneuver. Radar perfor-
mance was nominal f o r a l l phases of the mission.

Spacecraft 1 -
1. The system flown i s described in System Description,
page 85. Radar systemperformance was nominal f o r t h e first o r b i t rendezvous
except f o r t h e transponder transmitter output which began t o degrade i n t h e
l a t t e r stages of t h e rendezvous. The t r a n s m i t t e r f a i l e d later i n the f l i g h t .
The most probable cause of f a i l u r e was a t t r i b u t e d t o a leak i n t h e t r a n s m i t t e r
o s c i l l a t o r assembly which allowed the pressure t o decrease t o a point where
RF arcingoccurred.Additionalprocedures were added t o Spacecraft 12 check-
out t o insure t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e o s c i l l a t o r assembly pressure seal.

S acecraft 12
8
- The system flown i s described in System Description,
page I n l t i a l 3lock-on was obtained at a range t o Agena ofapproximately
236 nautical miles. Spacecraftangle andrangeinformation was q o r a d i c
throughout the f l i g h t and consequently the radar was not used as the primary
sourceof rendezvousrangeand angle data. The sporadicrange and angle
information was due t o an erratic transponder transmitter. The most probable
cause of t h e t r a n s m i t t e r f a i l u r e was concluded t o be arcing within the sealed
transmitter oscYllator assembly. The evidenceindicates t h e pressure seal
d i d not survive t h e s t r e s s e s o f Agena launch.
The arc-over could occur within the transmitter cavity pressure vessel
i n the following areas:

A. From the high voltage feed-through t o t h e p r e s s u r e v e s s e l case.
B. From the high voltage terminal on t h e t r a n s m i t t e r c a v i t y t o case.
C. From the transmitter tube plate ring of the o s c i l l a t o r c a v i t y to case.
D. From the cavity plate (high voltage) to t h e tube g r i d ring of the
cavity.
E. A DC arc-over within the tube.
The most probable areas of occurrence are A, By and C.

DIGITAL COMMAND SYSTEM

System Description

The d i g i t a l command system (DCS) 52-85714 consists of one receiver/
decoderpackageand three relay packages. The DCS receives, decodes,and
t r a n s f e r s t o u s i n g systems d i g i t a l commands transmitted from ground stations.
Comands are categorized as either real-time comands ( R E ) for spacecraft
equipment selection or stored program commands (SPC) t h a t consist of d a t a f o r
t h e time reference system o r t h e d i g i t a l computer. The system contains two
FM receivers, either of which i s capable of supplying sufficient output for
properdecoderoperations. The decoder v e r i f i c a t i o n c i r c u i t r y p r o v i d e s f o r
subsystem r e s e t when invalid messages are detected or when data t r a n s f e r i s
notaccomplishedwithin a fixed time duration. The probability of the decoder
r e j e c t i n g a v a l i d message i s l e s s t h a n 1 x 10-3 w i l e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of
accepting a n invalid message i s l e s s t h a n 1x 10' 8.
DCS Subsystem And Spacecraft Evaluation
The receiver/decoder and relay units were subjected t o extensive tests
prior to installation in the spacecraft. A predelivery acceptance test was
performed by t h e vendor on each unit. These t e s t s included:

A. V i s u a l and mechanical inspection.
B. Operation during and after random vibration.
C. Low temperatureoperation.
D. H i g h temperatureoperation.
E. Room temperature operation.

Typical tests while at temperature extremes include message r e j e c t i o n
r a t e s and s i g n a l t o n o i s e r a t i o measurements.

After receipt at McDonnell t h e u n i t was f u r t h e r t e s t e d f o r :

A. Bandwidth and center frequency of receivers.
B. Quieting.
C. Improper vehicle address rejection.
93
D. Stored program command processing.
E. Real-time command processing.
F. Telemetry voltages.
After installation on the spacecraft, the operation of the DCS was again
verified. The DCS was used t o update t h e time reference systemand computer
with stored program information. In addition,thereal-timecomand capa-
b i l i t y was used to control various spacecraft functions.

DCS Design, Development And Qualification Program

Design Program. -
The d i g i t a l command system was designed and b u i l t by
Motorola's Western Military Division, Scottsdale, Arizona.

The need f o r a command system was r e a l i z e d e a r l y i n t h e Mercuryprogram.
A tone command was used f o r real-time commands throughout Project Mercury.

The stored program c a p a b i l i t y t o update the computer and time reference
systems was unique t o the Gemini mission. The real-time capability was a
carry-over from the Mercury system. The cormnand system was designed especially
f o r t h e Gemini requirements.

DevelopmentProgram. -
All component parts used i n t h e DCS were subjected
t o extensive qualification and reliability assurance testing. Standard logic
design practices of logic diagrams, t i m i n g diagrams and c i r c u i t a n a l y s i s were
employed t o l o c a t e marginal design areas.

The DCS was interfaced with the electronic timer and computer e a r l y i n
t h e program t o v e r i f y t h e system integrity. The DCS was f u r t h e r subjected to
ESTU, CTU and fly-over range tests w ith no problems.
Qualification Program. -
The 52-85714-15 receiver/decoder and t h e
52-85714-21 and -23 relay packages were q u a l i f i e d as a system.
The command systems' only problems were encountered during random
vibration testing of t h e 'decoder package. The problems were numerous w i t h
approximately 350 min of vibration time accumulated before successful comple-
t i o n of testing. Problems such as contaminatedsolder j o i n t s and wire breakage
were uncovered. A s a result of t h i s t e s t the w i r i n g harness, deck p l a t e
mounting technique was redesigned.

DCS R e l i a b i l i t y AndQuality Assurance Program

hbtorola utilized the standard reliability techniques of reliability
estimates, failure mode and e f f e c t a n a l y s i s and a n i n t e r n a l failure reporting
and corrective action system in order to achieve a reliable product. In
addition, hbtorola centered much of their program around t h e i r p i e c e p a r t s
program. A l l p a r t s were procured by Wtorola part numbers t o Motorola"high-
'reliability" specifications. These specifications required in addition to
extensive screening that a l l p a r t s be ttburned-in."

94
I

Overstress Tests. -
A n overstress t e s t was performed on t h e d i g i t a l
command system t o further add confidence t o t h e system integrity. Environments
investigated were acceleration, vibration, low temperature and low voltage,
and high temperature and high voltage while overstress testing disclosed a
relay contamination problem and led t o change i n manufacturing process by
relay vendor.

Flight Results

Analysis o f ' f l i g h t data v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e d i g i t a l command system performed
i t s function with no malfunctions.

System Description

The time reference system (TRS) i s t h e c e n t r a l timing systemof t h e
Gemini Spacecraft. The system consists of an electronic timer, an event timer,
a GMT clock, an Accutron clock, a mission elapsed time d i g i t a l clock, and a
timecorrelation buffer. (SeeFig. 15. ) The system i s defined by McDonnell
Report 8664 and A641.

Electronic Timer. - "he electronic timer i s a crystal controlled d i g i t a l
counter w i t h a specification accuracy of 25 parts per million per day
(roughly 53 sec/day) . Through a s e r i e s of countdown chains and storage regis-
ters, it keeps track of elapsed time (time s i n c e l i f t - o f f ) , time t o go t o
r e t r o f i r e (TR) and time t o go t o equipment r e s e t (TX). The basic timing u n i t
of t h e timer i s 1/8 sec intervals and all counting functions are kept t o
within t h i s 1/8 sec interval.

The electronic timer i s approximately5-l/2in. high, 5-l/2 in. wide
and 8 in. long. It weighs about 9.3 l b and consumes seven watts ofpower.

The electronic time TR and l X values can be updated by the ground complex
(by use of t h e d i g i t a l command system) o r by the crew (by use of t h e manual
data insertion unit). The valueofelapsed time cannot be altered. To prevent
inadvertent or premature countdown t o r e t r o f i r e as a result of equipment
failure or personnel error during updating, t h e timer will not accept any new
time value less than a preprogrammed number. (512 sec or 128 sec dependent
upon timer configuration.)

The timer provides timing information for t h e computer, mission elapsed
time d i g i t a l clockand PC telemetry system. It also provides timing pulses
f o r the radar.

Event Timer. -
The event timer provides a digital stopwatch f o r t h e crew.
The display capacity of t h e timer i s 59 min and 59 sec with a resolution of
0.2 sec. The timer w i l l count up o r down. It may be p r e s e t t o a value and

95
EVENT TIMER

I
GET
0DIGITAL DISPLAY
0 DECIMAL DISPLAY
(MINUTES 8 SECONDS)
C L0OCCOKU N T U P ORDOWN

OF GEMINI
ELAPSED TIME

(SHORT-TERM)

1\
.ACCUTRON CLOCK
0 GMT DISPLAY

CLOCK
GMT DISPLAY
-
0
0 STOP
WATCH ~-

?":)
. ~~

(MINUTES AND
SECONDS)

f
0 CALENDAR DAY

W
LIGHTS: (Tr - 256 SEC, T r -30 SEC)

: * =1 e32y
13
ELECTRON TIMER
0 COUNT DOWN T O T r

+
RANGE I , - I
* C O U N T DOWN T OT - * ELAPSEDTIME
STATION TIME-TO-GO TO Tr
0 COUNT UP ELAPSED
7(VIA DCS)
TIME
FROM
LAUNCH
- DIGITAL
TIME-TO-GO TO Tr COMPUTER
4

T x ( V I A DCS)
v
DATA TIME CORRELATION
SYSTEMS BUFFER
0 RECORDED +
v
- 0 REAL TIME ce
ELAPSED TIME,

TIME-TO-GO TO Tr
BIO-MED VOICE
RECORDER RECORDER

FIGURE 15 TIMEREFERENCE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM
started o r stopped by useof f r o n t mounted switches. It normaUy starts
counting automatically up from zero at l i f t - o f f by receiving the lift-off
signal from the electronic timer.

The timer i s approximately two in. high, four in. long and f o u r a n d one-
half in. deep. It consumestwo watts of power.

Greenwich & an Time (GMP) Clock. -
The clock displays Greenwich mean
time i n h r and min. It i s a modified a i r c r a f t clock with a standard 24-hr
face. As additional features a stopwatch and calendar day are provided. The
clock also contains two markers by which the crew can mark significant events.
-
Clock accuracy i s c15 sec/dsy.

Accutron Clock. -
This clock displays GMT t o the command p i l o t . The
display i s a 24-hr type w ith a sweep second hand. The accuracy i s +3, - sec/day
at 5.1 psia. It was used in Spacecraft 4 through E.
Time Correlation Buffer.
biomedical and voice tape recorders.
-
The buffer provides time correlation to the
It accepts elapsed time and TR from the
electronic timer and a f t e r format changes sends them t o the applicable
recorder. It was used in Spacecraft 4 through 12.

W s s i o n E-@psed Time Digital Clock. -
This clock provides a continuous
display of missionelapsedtime from l i f t - o f f . The display capability of t h e
clock i s 999 hr, 59 m i n and 59 sec. The clock accepts timing pulses from t h e
electronic timer, making i t s accuracythe same as t h e electronic timer. The
clock i s started automatically at l i f t - o f f . It has t h e capability of being
stopped, s e t t o a time value, and restarted by the use of f r o n t mounted
switches .
The d i g i t a l clock was requested by NASA (per RFECP 231) because of the
difficulty experienced by t h e crew i n converting GMT t o mission elapsed time.
Since a l l spacecraft maneuvers and work tasks are defined i n mission elapsed
time, it was f e l t t h a t an immediately available readout of t h i s time was
essential. Therefore, effectiveSpacecraft 6, the d i g i t a l clock was i n s t a l l e d
i n a l l spacecraft,althoughthe GMC clock was not deleted. Identical elec-
t r o n i c modules, mechanical design and construction techniques were used i n t h e
d i g i t a l clock and theeventtimer. Because of the sameness of the components,
only the event timer was subjected t o a c t u a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g . The
d i g i t a l clock experienced no problems i n SST o r i n flight.

Time Reference Subsystem And Spacecraft Evaluation

A l t h e individual equipments used i n t h e time reference system were
subjected t o extensive tests p r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e spacecraft,. The
vendorperformed a predelivery acceptance t e s t on each unit. This consisted
of a low-temperature test, a high temperature test, a v i b r a t i o n t e s t and a
complete e l e c t r i c a l performance t e s t including 24-hr accuracy. After i n s t a l -
l a t i o n on t h e spacecraft, the operation of t h e time reference system was
again verified. The operation of the electronic timer was v e r i f i e d through i t s

97
interface circuitry while an operational and accuracy test was performed on
the other components.

Iksign, Development And Qualification Program

Design Program. -
The time reference system excluding t h e GMT and
Accutron clocks was designed and b u i l t by McDonnell's electronic equipment
division. The Accutron was supplied by Bulova Watch and the GMT was furnished
by Aerosonic Corporation.

The need f o r a c e n t r a l timing system was .dictated by the use of
controlled re-entry.

DevelopmentProgram. -
During the design phase the components of the TRS
were subjected t o e x t e n s i v e q u a l i f i c a t i o n and r e l i a b i l i t y a s s u r a n c e t e s t i n g .
A breadboard electronic timer was fabricated and interfaces were simulated i n
order to achieve confidence in t h e design integrity of the system. Numerous
refinements and eliminations of possible problem areas were made during t h i s
phase of t h e program.

The ESTU was a laboratory fabricated spacecraft mock-up.The objective
of t h i s t e s t was t o assemble all electronic systems and determine i f any
interface problem existed. The electronic timer was subjected t o t h i s t e s t
and s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s were obtained. No problems were encountered w i t h
CTU t e s t s o r f l y - o v e r range tests.

Qualification Program.

A. Electronic Timer -
The AO5AOOl7 e l e c t r o n i c timer configuration was
qualified. S m r y of significant events of t h i s t e s t i n g i s as follows:

1. Oxygen Atmosphere - O s c i l l a t o r f a i l u r e which was due t o tempera-
ture s e n s i t i v i t y of o s c i l l a t o r c i r c u i t . The i n t e r n a l packaging of t h e o s c i l -
l a t o r was redesigned from printed circuit boards to terminal board construc-
tion. The r e s i s t o r s used i n t h e o s c i l l a t o r were changed from Daven 1/10 watt
metal film type t o I.R.c.' 1/10 watt metal film type.

2. Vibration -
During the vibration t e s t two separate problems were
uncovered. The crystal o s c i l l a t o r brokeloose from i t s mounting and sheet
metal heat fins were fractured. The c r y s t a l o s c i l l a t o r broke loose from i t s
cement bond which held it t o module No. 1 causing a broken wire. It was found
that the tinned surface of t h e o s c i l l a t o r ( a r e a cemented t o module No. 1)
should be e t c h e d p r i o r t o the bonding operation. Sheet metal h e a t f i n s which
form a p a r t of the base p l a t e assembly were fractured during the vibration
environment. It was found t h a t the h e a t f i n s had become b r i t t l e as a r e s u l t
of a brazing operation used during t h e i r f a b r i c a t i o n . The base plate was
redesigned t o u t i l i z e r i v e t e d r a t h e r t h a n b r a z e d h e a t f i n s .

unit.
-
B. Event Timer The A05A0018 event timer was t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n test
A summary of significant events of t h i s t e s t i n g i s as follows:
1. Vibration -F a i l u r e i n v i b r a t i o n w a s due t o a broken wire l e a d from
the electronics to the stepper motor. Correctiveactionconsistedofadding
a d d i t i o n a l wire t i e s t o t h e wire bundle. After incorporating the additional
t i e s t h e timer successfully completed t h e v i b r a t i o n t e s t .

2. Humidity -
Unit passed the humidity t e s t after revising the method
of applying the humiseal c o a t i n g t o t h e e l e c t r o n i c modules.

C. GMT Clock -
The JO5AOOO2 clock was t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t u n i t . A
summary of significant events of t h i s testing is as follows:

1. Salt-Fog -
This t e s t uncovered a problem w i t h t h e g l a s s t o b e z e l
seal. The bezel gasket had t o be modifiedand t h e f a c e g l a s s had t o be
sealed with epoxy t o t h e b e z e l .

2. Vibration -
Throughout t h e v i b r a t i o n t e s t s numerous failures were
encountered due to slippage of the elapsed time minute hand during the vibra-
t i o n environment. After much t e s t i n g and corrective action, it was decided
that t h e elapsed time minute had would always be s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e v i b r a t i o n a l
environment. The s p c e c i f i c a t i o n was changed allowingslippage of t h e hand
during vibration as long as the clock function operated properly after removal
of the environment.

3. Humidity - Corrective action resulting from t h i s test was p l a t i n g
the knob shafts t o preclude t h e i r rusting.

D. Accutron Clock - No q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g was required on t h i s item.

E. Mission Elapsed Time D i g i t a l Clock - The clock w a s q u a l i f i e d by
s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e ~ 0 5 ~ 0 0 1 Event
8 Timer.

F. Timer Correlation Buffer -
The TCB was subjected t o a q u a l i f i c a t i o n
t e s t program l i m i t e d t o t h e environmentsof vibration, temperature altitude
and RET. No problem areas were uncovered.

Time Reference R e l i a b i l i t y And Q u a l i t y Assurance Program

I n o r d e r t o maximize t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of the u n i t t h e vendor incorporated
a l l of t h e s t a n d a r d r e l i a b i l i t y t e c h n i q u e s i n t o h i s program. Such items as
r e l i a b i l i t y estimates, failure mode and effect analysis, worst case analysis
and an i n t e r n a l f a i l u r e r e p o r t i n g and corrective action system were imple-
mented. In addition, the piece parts used within the timer were c a r e f u l l y
screened. A l l p i e c e p a r t s were environmentally qualified at t h e p a r t l e v e l
and l o t acceptance as well as 1- screening inspection was performed.

Overstress Tests.- Overstress t e s t i n g w a s performed on the e l e c t r o n i c
timer and event timer.

A. Electronic Timer -
Acceleration, vibration and temperature overstress
environments were investigated. Test results v e r i f i e d t h e e x i s t e n c e of a

99
failure mode at temperatures above 250°F due t o solderable NYIEZ, (Fhelps
Dodge Copper Products) 44 gauge core windings and the material used for
encapsulation of t h e magnetic s h i f t r e g i s t e r s . A t suchtemperatures,these
materials became pliable, r e s u l t i n g i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of shorts between the
core windings i n t h e magnetic shift registers. No other failure modes were

.
revealed as a result of environmental stress l e v e l s above the design
requirements

B. Event Timer - Acceleration, vibration and temperature overstress
environments were investigated. The actual vibration t e s t was not run as the
u n i t was q u a l i f i e d at a vibration level of 12.6 g RK3 i n l i e u of the 8.8 g
Rh5 level, which demonstrated an adequate safety factor. The timer operated
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n t h e o v e r s t r e s s environments of acceleration and temperature.
Both environments w e r e approximately l25$ of t h e qualification level.

Time Reference Flight Results

The flight of Spacecraft 4 disclosed t h a t t h e Accutron clock l o s t approxi-
mately five sec per day. The specification limit f o r t h i s clock was +3 sec
per day. Investigationdisclosedthat t h e clock was notcalibrated f& t h e '

zero genvironment. After a change i n t h e c a l i b r a t i o n procedure flight results
were w e l l within the required accuracy. No other problems i n t h e TRS were
uncovered by flight data.

INSTRTJMEXTATION AND RECORDING SYSTEM

The Gemini instrumentation system may be divided into two categories,
(1) signal sources and ( 2 ) the data transmission system, bothof which have
been f u l l y q u a l i f i e d f o r manned f l i g h t .

Signal Sources

-
DC-DC Converter ~ 0 5 ~ 0 0 4 8 . The DC-DC converter regulator supplies prime
regulated power t o t h e instrumentation pulse code modulation (PCM) system
tape recorder and associated signal sources such as pressure, temperature and
synchro repeaters.

The design offered no major problems nor was there any significant
advancement of t h e state-of-the-art.

During q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g with salt spray and humidity, bubbling and
flaking of the protective coating on the magnesium case were detected. This
problem was t r a c e d t o improper application of the protective coating. Addi-
tional inspection steps were added to the painting process to correct this.
Several such u n i t s were considered for reflight, but the case of each was found
t o be severely damaged by salt water. The successful solution was t o replace
the surface paint by an epoxy base paint.

100
The converters were manufactured by Conductron-Missouri i n accordance
with a r i g i d r e l i a b i l i t y and quality assurance program i n i t i a t e d by M C D O M e l l /
NASA. A l l performed satisfactorily during missions with one exception.During
t h e flight of Spacecraft 3, S/N ll9 DC-Dc converter malf'unctioned due t o a
loose nut causing an i n t e r n a l e l e c t r i c a l s h o r t c i r c u i t . The loose nut was
a t t r i b u t e d t o the failure of a star l o c h a s h e r t o l o c k t h e n u t . This anomaly
revealed that component locking devices were a majorproblem area. "he con-
t r a c t o r reviewed all. Gemini spacecraft equipment f o r star lockwasher use, and
took the following corrective action on the DC-DC converter:

A. All future applications involving screws, studs or equivalent
employed only s p l i t t y p e lockwashers, unless t h e application was for other than
vibration resistance.
B. All DC-DC converters were reworked using epoxy t o bond the locking
devices.

A similar Conductron-Missouri converter was used t o supply power t o the
Gemini biomedical instrumentation system.
Temperature Sensors. - Platinum-resistive element sensors andthermo-
couples- a r e t h e two typesoftemperaturesensors. Thermocouples, manufactured
by McDonnell, were used w i t h the McDonnell reference junction box t o monitor
s t r u c t u r a l and skin temperatures on Spacecraft 1 through 4. Platinumelement
sensors, supplied by Rosemount Engineering Company, were used on a l l spacecraft
and were defined in McDonnell specification control drawing (SCD) 52-88721.

The u n i t s were i n s t a l l e d by McDonnell on spacecraft structure skin, in
f l u i d l i n e s , on f l u i d l i n e s , and othersubcontractor-supplied equipment. The
platinum element sensors represent the recognized state-of-the-art methods of
manufacturing r e l i a b l e , s t r a i n f r e e , and accuratesensors.

Several problems were encountered i n the qualification program. Per
specifications, t h e desired repeatability i s 0.2%. Two unitsexperienced
values of 0.285. These readings were considered tolerable since the overall
accuracy remained within t h e required LO$, and the later i s t h e c r i t i c a l
criterion.

The inline sensor failed under vibration during r e l i a b i l i t y o v e r s t r e s s
testing. Failure analysis disclosed t h e platinum sensor had ruptured due t o
cantilever mounting. The problem was resolved by eliminating the cantilever
mount .
Credit i s given to excellent vendor workmanship f o r temperature sensors
which performed so w e l l i n f l i g h t . Over 500 devices were used t o sense the
various physical phenomenaon t h e Gemini program, with only one s i g n i f i c a n t
flight f a i l u r e . I n t h i s instance, suit temperature data for Spacecraft 7 were
erroneous after ll days i n o r b i t . This failure was caused by water which
accumulated i n the s u i t c i r c u i t and penetrated the ceramic coating of the
element. Per NASA direction, no corrective action was t a k e n because no sub-
sequent long-duration Gemini missions were planned.

101
Some problems were encountered with small platinum sensors which
delicate lead wires between bridge and element. These sensors occasionally
of additional work in the area. These sensors wer
were damaged in the course
kept small for the following reasons:
A. To preclude error from their effecta heat
as sink.
B. To guarantee rapid response to temperature changes.
C. To minimize weight.
-
Pressure Transducers. Two types of transducers, potentiometric and
variable reluctance, are used to monitor the various parameters. of the
Many
potentiometer types are supplied with the spacecraft subsystem, such as t
environmental control system (ECS) and the orbit attitude and maneuver
( O M ) . In addition, potentiometer units for suit and cabin pressure and
static pressure, were supplied by Fairchild Controls Corp. in accordance
McDonnell SCD 52-88705 .
The vendor adapted existing designs to the requirements
a minimum
with
of development, and there were essentially no advances in the state-of-
the art.
Qualification testing showed no significant problems. One unit did
experience slight out-of-tolerance readings during acoustic noise testing.
Analysis revealed the wiper-to-potentiometer pressure was insufficient.
Manufacturing and quality assurance standards were revised to insure pro
workmanship. The transducers performed well in flight with no significant
loss
of data.

52-88705
Subsequently, two problems were encountered with the transducers.
Solder contamination within the pressure bellows resulted in out-of-toler
calibrations. This was overcome by revising the assembly of the bellows,
changing the brazing material, and providing
a final x-ray examination.

The second problem consisted of calibration shift after extensive s
a small amount of set
life. Potentiometer-type transducers tend to acquire
in the bellows flexure through lack of exercise. Therefore, these units
retested everys i x months.

Variable reluctance-type transducers, supplied by Consolidated Controls
Corp., are defined in McDonnell 52-88722
SCD and monitor fuel cell pressures.
The transducers performed without failure in qualification tests and dur
flights. Their special use on Spacecraft2 to monitor local static pressures
during re-entry constituted an advancement of the state-of-the-art. One r
was zero to tenmm of mercury, and accurate performance was required during
elevated temperaturesand re-entry vibrations. These units performed remark-
ably well with no ofloss data.
One significant problem developed late in the program.
All units
exhibited susceptibility to external magnetic fields. This susceptibility wa
traced to the transformer in the oscillator circuit. Redelivery acceptan
and preinspection acceptance testing insured that the susceptibility woul
within allowable limits for accuracy.
102
Accelerometers. -The accelerometers used on t h e Gemini vehicle were t h e
force balance or servo type supplied by Gulton Industries, Inc. i n accordance
with McDonnell specification control drawing 52-88712. This SCD alsocovers
linear accelerometers for spacecraft static accelerations andsystems f o r
low frequencyvibration measurements. "his accelerometerdidnotrepresent
an advancement in the state-of-the-art but the use of completely electrical
damping'was a significant development. The basic design has been i n use f o r
several years and proved t o be highly accurate.

One failure occurred during qualification tests. After vibration, the
u n i t was notaccurateduring a s t a t i c a c c e l e r a t i o n test. Analysis showed a
lead wire to the seismic systemsensing vane had parted. The wire was repaired
and the unit operated satisfactorily.

During vibration testing of Spacecraft 3, the static accelerometers
revealed vibration noise. The seismic system which i s t h e sensor portion of
t h e accelerometer i s supported by a jewel pivot. Investigation traced the
vibration noise to excessive pivot to Jewelclearance i n t h e sensor. To
correct t h i s , a l l u n i t s were vibration-tested f o r proper clearance during the
vendor and McDonnell t e s t s . No accelerometer failures were notedduring
spacecraft flight. Data were used by aerodynamicsand s t r u c t u r a l dynamics
personnel to evaluate the spacecraft performance.

Sy-nchro Repeater (52-88723).
spacecraftmonitorthesynchros
- Three synchro repeater assemblies in each
on the IGS platformgimbals. Each synchro
repeater output i s a DC signal proportional t o the spacecraft r o l l , yaw, and
p i t c h a t t i t u d e i n terns of platform coordinates.

Design and development of the synchro repeater offered no majorproblems
nor any significant advancement in the state-of-the-art.

During q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s a mechanical sealing problem occurred on the
(-5) repeater. The external configuration was modified,usingelectron beam
welding to seal the repeater hermetically.

Another qualification unit, serial No. 26, f a i l e d v i b r a t i o n due t o a
broken motor s h a f t . The failure was t r a c e d t o f a u l t y machining i n t h e motor
shaft. Manufacturingand inspection procedures were revised to insure proper
workmanship. S e r i a l No. 22 replaced serial No. 26 and the vibration t e s t w a s
passed successfully, along w i t h other phases of the qualification test.

A major problem l a t e i n t h e program was damage of t h e synchro gears by
electron beam welding. Although visual inspection of the sealed-in gears is
not possible, mostof those delivered suffered some gear damage during welding.
Corrective action included requalifying the electron beam process and burning-
i n t h e synchro gears for several hours. Synchro repeaters provided satisfac-
t o r y data on all Gemini missions.

Signal Conditioners. -
The signal conditioners on the Gemini program
consist of DC voltage monitors, AC voltage monitor, AC frequency sensor, phase
sensitive demodulator, attenuators, DC m i l l i v o l t monitor, and other specialized
cards. These cards were designed and manufactured by McDonnell with the
exception of the one type of phase sensitive demodulator and DC m i l l i v o l t
monitor which was designed and manufactured by Eclipse-Pioneer Division of
Bendix C o r p . Problems encounteredduring the qualification.program concerned
t h e drift of several percent of a number of modules during vibration testing.
T o - c o r r e c t t h i s , t h e i n t e r n a l package connectors were modified t o assure more
positive contact.

No signal conditioner problems were encountered i n flight. Most of t h e
instrumentation packages recovered for post-flight analysis had remained
sealed and none contained salt water. A l l the packagesand signal conditioners
passed a thorough post-flight checkout,and several conditioners were allocated
f o r reflight i n subsequent spacecraft.

E C Seht-p
CO2 Partial Pressure System (52-88715) -
The detector, mountedon the
sFacecrafC crew seats, monitors the condition of the
carbondioxideabsorber i n t h e ECS. An eight cc/min sample of t h e heat
exchanger effluent is supplied t o t h e C 0 2 sensor. After measurement t h e gas
passes into the compressor i n l e t . The concentration of C 0 2 i s displayed on
an indicator in t h e cabin and i s transmitted to t h e ground via the Gemini PCM
telemetry system. Within the detector the stream i s divided into two sub-
streams. One, thereference stream, passesthrough a f i l t e r which removes
C02. The other, t h e measurement stream, feeds through a passive f i l t e r which
doesnot remove C02. Both streams then pass through identical ion chambers
that contain a s m all amount of radioactivity which ionizes t h e gas.Since
C 0 2 ionizes more readily than 02, the ion current from t h e measurement stream
w i l l be higher than that from the reference stream. The ion currents are
subtracted by the bridge c i r c u i t formed by the ion chambers, polarization
voltagesources and a high megohm r e s i s t o r . The differencecurrentflowing
through the high megohm r e s i s t o r i s proportional to t h e amount of C 0 2 i n t h e
measurement stream.

This measurement technique and i t s associated equipment advanced t h e
state-of-the-art, and proved successful in the Geminiprogram. During t h e
mission simulator phase of the qualification program, the sensor did not
respond properly to C 0 2 i n t h e presence of a high percent of water vapor.
The problem was eliminated by reducing t h e gas flow, thus reducing the water
vapor t o a l e v e l t h a t could be absorbed by t h e f i l t e r .

This device passed a l l other phases of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t , and
provided satisfactory data on all Gemini missions.

PDA and PIA tests on t h e P C 0 2 detectors revealed out-of-tolerance zero
s h i f t and pressure sensitivity. This problem was eliminated by changing t h e
radioactivesources t o an americium isotope. Subsequent t e s t i n g showed in-
tolerance zero d r i f t and pressure sensitivity.

Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Telemetry

This technique of data transmission utilizes digital (binary) coded pulses
t o t r a n s m i t t h e sampled data. After measurements are encoded, they are
transmitted overa radio link to ground receiving stations.E The
M data
system is supplied by Electro-Mechanical Research.
Red- W-JataTransmission System.
system consistsof:
- The Gemini data transmissiol.1

A. A pulse code modulation subsystem.
B. A FM transmitter.
C. A spare FM transmitter.

so that the spare unit may be used to
The transmitters are arranged
real time transmitter failure), on
transmit real time data (in theof event
command from the astronaut or on command from the ground station digital
command system(ES).
a maximum of 368 parameters. The system will receive
This system sampled
and transmit:
A. 106 High level analog parameters 0 to +5v
B. 117 Low level analog parameters 0 to +0.020 v
C. 1 8 bit digital time word
D. 24 24 bit digital words
- -
E. 88 Bilevel one bit indications
(on off)
+24 v or 0 V

F. 32 Bilevelpulse
-
(on off)
- onebit +24 V or 0V

The PCM system consists of
a programmer, two high levelmultiplexers, and
three low level multiplexers. If the maximum system capacity is not required
for a specific mission, any or all of the remote multiplexers may be removed
without affecting the rest of the system. The parameter monitoring capacity
of individual system components is shown on11.page
1 of specification control
drawing 52-85713.
State-of-the-art construction and packaging techniques were used in the
construction of the first production models. The state-of-the-art of the
multilayer printed circuit board may have been advanced by solutions to th
problems encountered in the construction of programmer mother The
cards.
state-of-the-art for low signal level, solidDC state
amplifiers was advanced
by the development of the amplifier-clamp and sample-and-hold circuitry.
The transmitter design advanced the state-of-the-art by development of
fully transistorized 2.5-watt transmitters, with adequate heat sinking of
components and without temperature-controlled components.
A typical production unit of each data transmission ("S)
system
item
was subjected to the qualification environment specified for Gemini.

I
A. Problem Areas Detected During W l i f i c a t i o n T e s t i n g

TEST WHERE
PROBLEM CORRECTNE
UNIT UNDER TEST APPEARED FAULT ACTION

1. PCM programmer Inw Data e r r o r as Specification was
L.L. multiplexer Temperature a function of widened t o accept
H. L. multiplexer
temperature. t h i s error.

2. Low l e v e l InW Cold solder Wires were crimped
multiplexer Temperature j o i n t s i n in pins.
and H i g h solder pins
Temperature of wiring
harne ss .
3. Lox l e v e l Vibration Lockwashers Lock nuts were used
multiplexers did not hold. and epoxy was applied
High l e v e l t o b o l t and nut
multiplexers assemblies.

4. LOW level Humidity Water collected
Siliconerubber
multiplexers inside case compression gasket
High level was added t o O-ring
multiplexers seal.

5. PCM programmer Salt water Water seeped Internal printed
immersion i n t o t h e case. c i r c u i t boards were
impregnated with a
resilient varnish,
connectors f i l l e d
with silicone
grease .
6. Transmitter High Transistor Redesign of output
Temperature failure.
.
t r a n s i s t o r heat
sink

B. Major Problems Encountered w ith Delivered Data Transmission Systems
PART NUMBER FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. 52-85713-475 H i g h o f f s e t on several Zar levelamplifierfre-
channels when multi- quency response
adjusted
p l e x ienr s t a l l eti o
n
d a control bandwidth
adapter
location.
noise
elimination.
for

106
PART NUMBER FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION

H i g h Level Multiplexer

Erroneous resets encoun- Diode quad i n s e r t e d i n
tered from noise on r e s e t base c i r c u i t .
control lines.

Inadequatecounterdrive Decrease series resis-
and leakage encountered tance in counterdrive
i n landing phase of circuitry.
flight and d i f f i c u l t y
encountered i n handling Redesign case t o accom-
multiplexers in space- modate cover holddown
c r a f t assembly area. screws.

Water leakage encountered Gasket formed in place
in post-flight phase of w i t h RTV 891 s i l a s t i c .
mission.

Data Transmission System

5. 52-85713-63, A i r leakage occurring Al s e a l screws and
-65, -67 and during exposure t o connectors were coated
-69 o r b i t a l environment with epoxy sealing
caused corona t o
disable transmitter.
materials .

Noise on ground l i n e s Changes grounding philo-
caused high data error. sophy of shielded w i r i n g
carrying control signals
t o remote units.
-&age encountered i n Conformal coating seal
programmers used i n a p p l i e d t o t h e mother
Spacecraft 3 f l i g h t . boards and DC-4 grease
a p p l i e d t o connectors.
Leakage t e s t of a l l pro-
grammers i n i t i a t e d .

Multiplexers were Increased the power
erroneously reset by supply drive capability
noise on t h e control and inserted new N gate
lines. i n reset drive circuitry.

Um Level Multiplexer

9. 52-85713-85 Leakage occured
during Seal around l i d was
salt water immersion. improved.
PART NUMBER FAULT COREiECTIVE ACTION

Vibration caused discon- E l e c t r o n i c c i r c u i t r y was
t i n u i t y i n i n t e r n a l con- encapsulated i n
nectors. resilient potting.

10. 52-85713-385, Erroneous resets encoun- Diode-quad inserted i n
-485 t e r e d from noise on con- r e s e t emitter c i r c u i t
trol lines.
circuit .
and in reset base

11. 52-85713-75 Difficulty
encountered Redesigned case t o
i n handling multi-
plexers in spacecraft
assembly area.
accomodatecover
holddown screws .
12. 52-85713-375 Inadequatecounterdrive Decreased s e r i e s resis-
and leakage encountered tance in counterdrive
i n flight. c i r c u i t r y and improved
s i l a s t i c gasket.

Delayed Time Data Trqsmission._Sy-stem. -
The Gemini delayed time data
system consists of a tape recorder, a FM transmitter, and the spare FM trans-
mitter. The recorder accepts a l l low sample rate data from the PCM i n the
RZ data form, converts it t o a diphase signal, and stores it on magnetictape.
When the spacecraft comes within R F range of a data handling ground station,
the recorder may be commanded t o p l a y back the recorded data, which i s trans-
mitted t o t h e ground s t a t i o n i n t h e NRZ's data form. The transmitters are
arranged so that the spare unit may be used to transmit delayed time data on
command from the astronaut or oncommand from t h e ground s t a t i o n d i g i t a l
command system (OCS)

The state-of-the-art was advanced in obtaining a bit-packing density of
2600 t o 3000 bits/in. The art was advanced a l s o by t h e mechanical handling
of the tape using negator springs to maintain tension between t h e r e e l s and
using mlar b e l t s t o prevent backlash of the tape drive mechanism.

A. Major Problems Encountered i n t h e Tape Recorder -
The tape recorder
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t revealed a severe problem with high frequency b i t r a t e
s t a b i l i t y when data was recorded while t h e u n i t was being vibrated.

Any vibration which i s transmitted to the tape transport causes
f l u t t e r of the tape as it passes over the record head. Flutter causes the
data b i t s t o be deposited unevenly along the tape. Since t h i s recorder d i d
not use a n output storage register, but played back d i r e c t l y from t h e t a p e t o
t h e NRZ's converter, t h e output data string presented a b i t j i t t e r s i t u a t i o n
which was not acceptable t o t h e ground s t a t i o n decommutation system.

Spacecraft 6 and 7 experienced a stopped condition of the tape
recorders while operating in the normal o r b i t a l phaseofthemission.Post-
f l i g h t i n v e s t i g a t i o n of both recorders revealed a frozen bearing in identical
locations in each of t h e recorders, The frozen bearing was failure analyzed
108
and was determined t o be an application and design fault, rather than a
bearing fault. The problem was solved by redesigning the s h a f t collar located
next t o a l l bearings i n t h e c l u t c h mechanism.

In Spacecraft 5 systems t e s t i n g , d r i v e b e l t s i n the tape recorders
broke, causing recorders t o s t o p running after approximately 100 h r i n opera-
tion. The problem was a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e manufacturing process involved with
forming t h e b e l t s from flat Mylar stock. This problem was corrected by
t i g h t e r q u a l i t y c o n t r o l on t h e manufacturing process and by careful handling.

B. Tape Recorder Problems Detected During Qualification Testing
1. "ape recorder
Vibration Redesignof tape drive
system t o employ dual
capstan drive, plus
addition of i n t e r n a l
i s o l a t i o n mounts.

Thermal shock Reflective tape was
applied t o cover.

C. mjor Problems Encountered w i t h Delivered DTS Tape Recorders

RECOFUIF,RS FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. 52-85713-31 Excessive j i t t e r of data Interim f i x w a s t o operate
recorded during vibration recorder in high speed
environment (2 g random). record mode.

2. 52-85713-35 I n t e r n a l connection of Isolated grounds within
signal ground t o power the
recorder and incor-
ground fed noise back porate a f l o a t i n g power
into spacecraft grounding
supply.
system.

Vibration environment Vibration isolation mounts
(6 g) produced excessive were installed within the
j i t t e r on playback of recorder case t o s e p a r a t e
data. the tape handling trans-
port from the vibrating
case .
3. 52-85713-37 Data format prevalence of Recorder playback c i r -
zeros caused l o s s of sync c u i t r y was modified t o
of ground s t a t i o n causedprovide NRZ' s data format.
by absence of t r a n s i t i o n s
used f o r sync lock.

4. 52-85713-41 Spacecraft 6 and 7 experi- Redesigned theclutch
-39 enced a failure o f bearingsshaft and bearing
i n the .tapedriveclutchretainer.
mechanism.
RECORERS FAULT CORRECTIVE ACTION

mlar drive b e l t broke Improved t h e b e l t manufac-
after r e l a t i v e l y f e w t u r i n g procedure and
operating hours. strengthened the q u a l i t y
control of the belt hand-
ling practices.

Negator-spring not hbdified the t e s t proce-
adequately wound during dures t o include a pre-
manufacture o r during f l i g h t checkout per RCA
one of the service Doc. No. 564-125, i n
periods. which the winding of t h e
negator-springs i s
checked.

Clutch bearing froze AU. recorders were
during normal operating returned to RCA f o r new
conditions in Space- bearings, and lubricated
craft 11 SST. with J-type o i l p r i o r t o
prelaunch tests.

GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The Gemini guidanceand control (G & C ) system consists ofsubsystems
which perfom onboard navigation and a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l of t h e spacecraft.
Fig. 16 presents a block diagram of the G & C subsystems.

Design And Development

The program objectives of long duration, rendezvous, and controlled
re-entry missions have placed special requirements on the spacecraft guidance
and control systems. mese objectives required m a x i m u m r e l i a b i l i t y and
f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e equipment. This was accomplished by u t i l i z a t i o n of simple
design concepts, and by careful selection and multiple application of the sub-
systems t o bedeveloped. The guidanceand control subsystemsand t h e i r
development problems are briefly described hereunder.

I n e r t i a l Measurement Unit (IN).

A. IMU System Description -
During i n i t i a l e v a l u a t i o n of t h e Gemini
mission the inertial measurement u n i t evolved i n t o equipment consisting of an
i n e r t i a l platform, platform mount (including coldplate), system electronics,
and i n e r t i a l guidancesystem power supply. Major requirements f o r i n d i v i d u a l
elements were :

1. Inertial Platform
a. A l l a t t i t u d e freedom.
INERTIAL MEASUREMENT
UNIT

INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM
POWER SUPPLY

GIMBAL STATIC
CONTROL POWER
ELECTRONICS SUPPLY

SYSTEMS ELECTRONICS ATTITUDE CONTROL AND
PACKAGE MANEUVERELECTRONICS
-. .

r 1 ACE PACKAGE
INERTIAL PLATFORM

I 1 OAME PACKAGE
PRECISION POWER
SUPPLY

R A T E GYRO
PACK AGE
~~

ATTITUDE
DISPLAY GROUP
POWER INVERTER

HORIZON SENSOR I I HANDCONTROLLER
SYSTEM POTENTIOMETERS

COMMAND E X C I T A T I O N
ACE - ATTITUDECONTROLELECTRONICS TRANSFORMER
ACPU - AUXILIARY COMPUTER POWER U N I T
ATM - A U X I L I A R YT A P E MEMORY
IVI - I NCREMENTALVELOCITYINDICATOR
MDlU - MANUAL DATA INSERTION UNIT
OAME - ORBIT ATTITUDE AND MANEUVER ELECTRONICS

FIGURE 16 GUIDANCE AND CONT-ROL BLOCK DIAGRAM
b. Dual analoggimbal angle readout for pitch, yaw, and r o l l ; one
s i g n a l t o be a synchro output and one s i g n a l t o be c o n v e r t i b l e t o d i g i t a l
representation.
c. Accelerometers t o be compatible with digital rebalancing.
d. Capable of operation in space vacuum, w i t h in-orbit turn on/off
and o r b i t a l alignment capability.

platform.
2. Platform Mount - Provide temperature control for the i n e r t i a l

-
3. System Electronics Provideaccelerometerrebalanceloops to
receive accelerometer analog signals, compensate as required, and convert
rebalance current t o d i g i t a l representation for the computer.

-
4. S t a t i c Power Supply Convert spacecraft bus power, as required,
t o supply a l l i n e r t i a l guidance system components.

5. G i m b a l Control Electronics - Contain all circuitry associated wi t h
t h e gimbalservo loops.

B. IMU Development Tests -
Aside from breadboard testing, developmental
t e s t i n g was conducted on four engineering model IMU's, which were fabricated
and allocated as ESTU, CTU, CCTU, and HI t e s t bed units.

1. Electronic System Test Unit (ESTU) -
This IMU was used a t McDonnell
i n a spacecraft mock-up t o evaluate systemand e l e c t r i c a l i n t e r f a c e c a p a b i l i t y
and to verify spacecraft wiring and test procedures. This system was a l s o
used f o r dynamic analysis and astronaut familiarization.

2. Compatibility Test Unit (CTU) This M -
IU was used a t McDonnell i n
a production prototype spacecraft to assess complete spacecraft compatibility.
The CTU t e s t s included evaluation of coldplate performance,system/telemetry
compatibility, and system/aerospace ground equipment compatibility.

-
3. Configuration Control Test U n i t (CCTU) I B M used t h i s M
IU f o r
IGS integration and f o r developing equipment and procedures employed i n produc-
t i o n testing of IMU-computer integration.

-
4. H I Test Bed This engineering model, allocated for use at
Honeywell, was used i n i t i a l l y i n f u n c t i o n a l and output signal verification
t e s t s and for preliminary interface testing. It was used also in exploratory
environmental t e s t s t o evaluate thermal and vibration design capabilities.

IU Problems Located D
C. M ur
i
n g Developmental Tests

1. S t a t i c Power Supply (SPS) Problems - The problems which were
encountered with the static power supply a r e :

a. Computer DC Voltages -
Computer loading introduced noise and
t r a n s i e n t s on t h e output voltages which causedmalfunctions. This was cor-
rected by r a i s i n g computer Dc voltages 3%which compensated f o r t h e poor s t a t i c
set point on t h i s section.Additionally,theEngineered Magnetics 1262 SPS
1
12
r

was modified for Spacecraft 2 t o accommodate t h e auxiliary computer power
u n i t (ACPU).

b. Computer Section Leakage Voltages -
Computer malfunctions were
caused by leakage voltages through semiconductor switches on t h e computer M=
lines during IMU turnon. The SPS leakage voltage problem was corrected by
the incorporation of a r e l a y i n t o t h e computer 20.7 VDC line.

C. 26 Volt -
400 cps Section
the 400-cycle section performed out of specification
-
Because of a power f a c t o r mismatch,
when maximum 400-cycle
IGS loads were applied. The 400-cycle section of the EM 1262 supply was
improved by incorporating a parallel inductor to tune the SPS t o t h e load.

d. Cross-Coupling Between SF5 Sections
on the parersupplycausedcross-couplingeffects.Pulsating
-
Computerdynamic loading
computer loads
caused a low frequency noise which was reflected back through t h e SPS, onto
the spacecraft bus, and back i n t o t h e M
IU and AC sections.

e. Power Supply Damage -
Several parer supplies were damaged by
low resistance loads on the output lines. The EngineeredMagnetics 1262 SPS
design afforded overload protection for the application of hard shorts, but
f o r low resistance loads t h e SPS would overheat and damage parer t r a n s i s t o r s
o r cause them t o fail.

For problems N and V, EM 1262SPS was modified t o t h e EM 1 2 6 2 ~
configuration which incorporated t h e following changes:

The PWR frequency response was converted from 2400 cps t o
15 KC and magnetic amplifiers were replaced with transistorized switching
circuits. These changesreduced dynamic loading and cross-coupling problems.
The 400-cycle section components were s e l e c t e d t o match the
load.
Overload protection w a s added only f o r ground operations t o
minimize the e f f e c t s of inadvertent overloads and short circuits during ground
handling. The individual SPS sections were fused so t h a t an in-flight short
would disable only t h e affected section. The 400-cycle section w a s modified
t o incorporate an overload protection circuit w i t h an automatic r e s e t capa-
b i l i t y which remained i n e f f e c t during flight.

2. I n e r t i a l Platform Problems - The problems which were encountered
w i t h t h e i n e r t i a l p l a t f o r m were:

a. Vibration Problems

D ur
i
n g low l e v e l (+2 g peak) sinusoidal vibration and random
( t o 6.2 g RMS) vibration, excessiv: e l e c t r i c a l lead breakage was experienced.
This was corrected by improving w i r e routing and by securely attaching circuit
elements.
During subsequent low level sinusoidal vibration and random
vibration up t o 12.6 g R MS, additional mechanical problems were encountered.
Also, excessive gyro drift rates and losses of gimbal reference were experi-
enced. Tests revealed t h a t rotary components introduced w e a k spring constants
i n t o t h e gimbal support system, causing unequal spring rates across a gimbal.
These conditions resulted i n inner gimbal motion with crosstalk and rocking.
Consequently, t h e r o t a r y components were s t i f f e n e d and t h e bearing6 were
changed t o u t i l i z e higher contact angles and preloads.
Under additional low-level sinusoidal vibration and random
vibration up t o 12.6 g RhE the platform still indicated gimbal No. 3 l o s s of
reference, high gyro drift rates, and nonrepeatabilityof results. However,
s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y and performance through 6.2 g RMS were considered
acceptable.

b. Synchro Phase S h i f t Problem -
Phase shift on the platform synchro
outputs introduced excessive deadband i n t h e ACME control. The platform was
modified to include an inductance-capacitance phase s h i f t network, which cor-
rected the phase s h i f t from 15 degrees t o 9 degrees.

C. S l i p Ring Problem -
Problems were caused by s l i p r i n g s which
intermittently opened. The p l a t f o r m s l i p r i n g s had been noted e a r l i e r as a
possible problem a r e a and funds were allocated at c o n t r a c t i n i t i a t i o n f o r a
s l i p r i n g improvement program. This program was expedited and the Improved
(Gemini-NASA) s l i p r i n g was incorporated i n a l l platforms.

-
3. Gimbal Control Electronics Problems GCE Problem with -30 VDC
Regulator - The GCE was exposed t o a temperature of 50°F. A t fast heat drop-
out all gimbals would break i n t o +1 degree o s c i l l a t i o n s because of low current
gain in the -30 VDC regulator, whFch would not turn on at low temperatures.
Since t h i s output served as a supply voltage for the GCE rate and summing
amplifiers, the loop stabilization compensation was degraded and o s c i l l a t i o n
resulted. The corrective action consisted ofmodifying the -30 volt regulator
circuit.

-
4. System Electronics Horizon Sensor Ignore Delay Problem The -
platform was driven out of alignment whenever the horizon sensor reacquired
the horizon a f t e r a loss-of-track condition. The System Electonics was
modified t o generate a time delay upon a s i g n a l that the horizon sensor had
regainedtrack. The ignore relay was delayed i n dropout f o r seven t o t e n sec.

IU Design Problem
D. M

1. Gimbal Control Electronics -
During predelivery acceptance tests on
t h e first production IMU, a gimbal o s c i l l a t i o n problem occurred. The problem
originated from 400-cycle pickup from the spin motor appearing on the gyro
signal generator. Coupling resulted because of perpendicularity between
separate gyro input and outputaxes.Correctiveactionconsisted of adding
a notch f i l t e r c i r c u i t i n p a r a l l e l w i t h the summing amplifiers.

Attitude Control and Maneuver Electronics.

A. ACME System Description - The basic attitude control and maneuver
electronics (ACME) system consists of an attitude control electronics (ACE)
package, an o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuver electronics ( O M ) package, a power
inverter, and two r a t e gyro packages. In t h i s discussion the command excita-
tion transformer and three hand controller potentiometers are included i n t h e
114
ACME system. The redundant rate gyropackages,alongwiththeinternal
redundancyof t h e ACE and O M packages, provide a high system r e l i a b i l i t y
f o r prolonged missions.

1. Attitude Control Electronics (ACE) - The ACE package contains the
c i r c u i t r y which translates i n p u t s i g n a l s i n t o t h r u s t e r command signals. The
command signals, a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e a s t r o n a u t s , may be used t o a c t i v a t e
solenoid valve drivers (SVD) i n e i t h e r t h e r e - e n t r y c o n t r o l system (RCS) o r
t h e o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O M ) .

The various modes of operation provide the astronauts with
s p e c i a l i z e d c o n t r o l f o r a l l phases of the mission. Modes of operation are:

a. Direct -
A manual mode wherein switches i n t h e a t t i t u d e hand
controller activate the appropriate SVD's.
b. Pulse - Same as d i r e c t , e x c e p t t h a t
20 m s f o r each a c t i v a t i o n .
ACE limits t h e t h r u s t t o

c. Rate Command - Combines astronaut commands from t h e hand
controller potentiometers with the rate gyro signals to provide position and/
o r rate control.
d. Hor Scan -
U t i l i z e s p o s i t i o n s i g n a l s from the horizon sensor
t o maintain the spacecraft pitch and r o l l 8xes r e l a t i v e t o t h e horizon. Yaw
c o n t r o l i s t h e same as i n the pulse mode.
e.Platform -
(Not used in Spacecraft 3 and 4.) An automatic,
closed-loop control mode that e s t a b l i s h e s t h r u s t e r f i r i n g f o r a l l axes as a
function of both attitude signals from the platform and rate s i g n s i g n a l s
from t h e rate gyros.
f . Re-entryRate Command - Same as rate commandmode, but control
i s coarser and includes a roll-to-yaw rate cross coupling feature.
g. Re-entry -
A closed-loop mode t r a n s l a t e s rate s i g n a l s and t h e
computer r o l l s i g n a l i n t o t h r u s t e r commands t o achieve the desired downrange
and crossrange impact point.

-
2. Orbit A t t i t u d e and Maneuver Electronics ' ( O M ) The OAME package
provides solenoid valve drivers for the O M a t t i t u d e t h r u s t e r s and f o r t h e
OAMS maneuver t h r u s t e r s f o r S p a c e c r a f t 2, 3, and 4. ACE a t t i t u d e t h r u s t e r
commands and bias power a c t i v a t e t h e a t t i t u d e SVD's; t h e maneuver SVD's are
c o n t r o l l e d by t h e maneuver hand c o n t r o l l e r . For Spacecraft 5 and up, t h e
maneuver t h r u s t e r s are d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e maneuver hand c o n t r o l l e r .

-
3. Power I n v e r t e r ( P I ) The P I package i s used t o provide 26 VAC
when t h e IGS i n v e r t e r i s not energized.

4. Rate Gyro Package (RGP) -
The RGP (two per spacecraft ) contains
t h r e e orthogonally-mounted rate gyros and a s s o c i a t e d c i r c u i t r y . Each gyro
w i t h i n t h e package requires independent 26 VAC, 400 c p s e x c i t a t i o n and has
both a self-test torquer and a spin motor r o t a t i o n d e t e c t o r (SMRD) f o r ground
checkout

5. Hand Controller Potentiometer
consistsofthree
-
The hand controller potentiometer
ganged sections. One sectionprovides rate command s i g n a l s
t o ACME, another section provides an o u t p u t s i g n a l t o telemetry, and t h e t h i r d
i s not used. The a t t i t u d e hand controller contains three potentiometers, one
f o r each axis.

-
6. Command Excitation Transformer The command excitation transformer
steps down t h e 26 V, 400 cps t o 15 V f o r e x c i t a t i o n of the r a t e command sec-
t i o n s of the hand controller potentiometers.

B. ACME Development Tests - McDonnell performed the f o l l o w i n g tests on
ACME hardware :

1. Interface Breadboard (IBB) - The ACPB IBB consisted of the circuitry
necessary t o provide:

a. Proper loading f o r t h e a t t i t u d e hand controller, horizon
sensor,platform, computer, and radar.
b. Generationofsimulated r a t e gyro signals.
C. Complete selection of a l l ACME modes o f operation. The ACME
IBB was interconnected w i t h similar IBB's of the other guidance and control
equipment. No problems affecting the ACME were uncovered.

2. Electronic Systems Test Unit (ESTU) -
The ESTU tests, while not
revealing any new ACME problems, did provide an excellent t e s t bed t o i n v e s t i -
gate anomalies discovered i n e a r l i e r phases of the Geminiprogram.

3. Compatibility T e s t Unit (CTU) - No ACME problems were uncovered
during the CTU testing.

-
4. Thermal Qualification The CTU was subsequently redefined as
Spacecraft 3A and subjected to a thermal qualification test. The ACME
performance was satisfactory.

-
5. Dynamic Testing ACME hardware from the ESTU and CTU programs
was used in three dynamic t e s t programs:

a. Fixedbasesimulator.
b. Three-axis motion.
C. A i r bearingtable. ACME performance was satisfactory.

c. ACME Design Problems

1. ACE Package

a. Early testing revealed that t h e s e n s i t i v i t y of the half-wave
demodulator t o harmonicsand quadrature was such that the switching deadbands
converged when high a t t i t u d e and r a t e e r r o r s i g n a l s were summed.The problem
was resolved by incorporating a full-wave demodulator.
b. Due t o t h e "break before make"mode switch i n the spacecraft, the
selection of any mode except hor scan caused momentary spurious j e t f i r i n g
pulses. A capacitor was added t o t h e mode ACE l o g i c c i r c u i t t o p r e v e n t t h e
spurious pulses.
C. Low temperature t e s t s revealed that the minimurn pulse generator
would not always turn off. A coupling capacitor was found t o causeexcessive
116
attenuation of the turn-off signal. The problem was eliminated by increasing
the value of the coupling capacitor.
d. A n analysis of the pitch axis hor scan mode operation revealed
t h a t false t h r u s t e r firings could be generated. This defect was eliminated
by using the horizon sensor "loss of track'' signal t o a c t i v a t e a mode l o g i c
relay.
e. S o l d e r p a r t i c l e s were found inside several Babcockpower relays.
The problem i n i t i a l l y was resolved by u t i l i z i n g reworked relays. Later
package configuration used welded can relays.
f. It was determined that excessive bounce i n t h e hand c o n t r o l l e r
switch could temporarily disable the single pulse generator input circuit.
The deficiency was eliminated by modifying the generator input circuit.

2. o m
a. TheBabcock l a t c h i n g r e l a y s f a i l e d t o w i t h s t a n d prolonged dry
c i r c u i to p e r a t i o n . The replacementrelay,manufactured by C. P. Clare, was
expressly designed for low c u r r e n t c i r c u i t s .
b. Vibration tests revealed t h a t additional support was needed f o r
t h e major trunks of wireharness. This was accomplished by the application
of RTV 7228.
C. S o l d e r p a r t i c l e s were found inside several Babcockpower relays.
The problem i n i t i a l l y was resolved by u t i l i z i n g reworked relays. Later
package configuration used welded can relays.

-
3. Power Inverter The s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of other systems t o t r a n s i e n t s
d i c t a t e d t h e need for suppression of the output turnon transient. The suppres-
sion was accomplished by i n s t a l l i n g back-to-back zener diodes.

-
4. Rate Gyro L i f e t e s t s uncovered a bearing problem t h a t caused an
unpredictablereduction i n t h e gyro l i f e span. The problem was solved by
switching to bearings w i t h impregnated phenolic r e t a i n e r rings.

5. Hand Controller Potentiometer
a. The potentiometer failed completely during the salt-fog exposure
of the qualification testing. This problem was eliminated by sealing the
potentiometer.
b. S l i g h t shifts i n the deadband tap locations occurred during
qualificationvibrationtesting. The t a p deadband was widened t o circumvent
p o t e n t i a l problems due t o s h i f t i n g . This relaxation has no measurable e f f e c t
on spacecraft operation.

Computer System.
-

A. Computer System Description -The computer system i s comprised of t h e
s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l computer andsupplementary equipment which c o n s i s t s of t h e
manual data insertion unit, the incremental velocity indicator, the auxiliary
computer power u n i t , and t h e a u x i l i a r y t a p e memory.
1. Computer -
The spacecraft d i g i t a l computer i s a binary, fixed point,
s t o r e d program, general purpose computer t h a t operates at a 500 KC arithmetic
117
b i t rate. It interfaces with the inertial platform, platform electronics,
IGS power supply, awciliary computer power unit, manual d a t a i n s e r t i o n u n i t ,
incremental velocity indicator, rendezvous radar, time reference system,
d i g i t a l command system, data a c q u i s i t i o n system, a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l and maneuver
electronics, GLV autopilot, console controls and displays, auxiliary tape
memory, and aerospace ground equipment.

The computer provides the guidanceand control outputs required for
the spacecraft during various mission phases.

The computer memory i s a random access, coincident current, non-
destructive readout ferrite array, which has a 250 KC cycle rate. Thememory
array provides for 4096 words of storage or 159,744 b i t s . All memory words
of 39 b i t s a r e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e s y l l a b l e s of 13 bits. I n s t r u c t i o n words
(13 bits) are intermixed i n all three syllables. Data words (25 b i t s p l u s
s i g n ) a r e l o c a t e d i n syllables zero and one.

The operational computer program contains interleaved diagnostic
subroutines that permit malfunctions t o be detected during operation. When
a fault i s detected, a computer malfunction lamp i s lit on t h e a s t r o n a u t ' s
control panel.

2. Incremental Velocity Indicator -
( N I ) The IVI was designed t o
provide a v i s u a l i n d i c a t i o n of t h e incremental longitudinal, lateral, and
v e r t i c a l v e l o c i t y components and the associated sign for each to be imparted
t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t by the maneuver t h r u s t e r s .

The N I h a s t h r e e d i g i t a l d i s p l a y s w i t h a rangeof 0-999.Each
display consists of three counters, which canbe set automatically by knobs on
t h e f r o n t of t h e computer.

The IVI accepts two types of inputs from the computer:

a. Information Pulses - Each pulse corresponds t o a one fps incre-
ment of spacecraft velocity.
b. Zero Set Pulses - A "zero set" pulse triggers 50 PPS fixed
o s c i l l a t o r i n t h e IVI which d r i v e s t h e i n d i c a t o r s t o z e r o a t t h e rate of
50 fps.
-
3. Manual Data I n s e r t i o n Unit The manual d a t a i n s e r t i o n unit (MDIU)
c o n s i s t s of a manual d a t a keyboard (MDK) and a manual data readout (MDR) u n i t .
The MDK inserts decimal numbers i n t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l computer. The
manual data readout displays address and data as a readout from t h e computer.
The MDIU can i n s e r t up t o 99 words i n t o t h e computer and display the same
number from it. All i n t e r f a c e of the manual data keyboard i s made w i t h the
manual data readout, which i n t u r n i n t e r f a c e s w i t h t h e manual data readout,
which i n t u r n i n t e r f a c e s w i t h t h e d i g i t a l computer.
-
4. Auxiliary ComputerPower U n i t (ACPU) The ACPU operates i n conjunc-
t i o n withthe IGS power supply. It maintainsstableinputvoltages a t the
d i g i t a l computer during spacecraft bus transients and depressions to prevent
a l t e r a t i o n of t h e computer memory.The ACPU contains a b a t t e r y which provides
118
regulated voltage to the computer converter within the IGS power supply during
spacecraft bus transients of 100 m s o r less. The ACPU a l s o sends a signal
t o shutdown t h e I B M computer when t h e t r a n s i e n t exceeds 100 ms.

-
5. Auxiliary Tape Memory (ATM) The ATM operates i n conjunctionwith
t h e s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l computer. It provides additional program storage for
' . t h e computer and can load the computer memory with any operational program
which i s storedwithin it. The programs are stored on magnetictape. Data
are transferred from t h e ATM t o t h e computer under computer control with sum
checks and p a r i t y checks eliminating any erroneous data.

The ATM was first i n s t a l l e d on Spacecraft 8.

B. Computer System Development Tests - During the development stage,
e l e c t r o n i c systems t e s t u n i t (ESTU) and compatibility test unit (CTU) tests
were performed on the computer system (excluding the ATM). The ESTU t e s t s
included a mission simulation t e s t t o determine the operational compatibility
of the guidanceand control, communications, telemetry, and sequenctial systems
by approximating the system combinations and sequences of events during a
rendezvousmission. No changes in the design of t h e s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l
computer were required as a d i r e c t result of the mission simulation test.
The CTU t e s t program operationally verified each of the computer's
interfaces. During t h e computer/ACPU t e s t s , a computer turnon -
turnoff
o s c i l l a t i o n was caused by normal ACPU operation i n the presence of a c r i t i c a l
bus voltage which was affected by computer loading.

The corrective action for Spacecraft 2 w a s a wiring change i n t h e
52-89723-7 ACPU, which disconnected the low voltage sensor from the spacecraft
bus and connected it t o t h e "low voltage sense" output going to the IBM
computer.

C. Computer System Design F!roblems

1. Computer - No majorproblems were encountered during the qualifica-
tion testing.

2. IVI -
Hardware changes r e s u l t i n g from design problems included
changing the switch stepping rates from 1through 10 and 50 fps t o 1, 2, 5 , 10,
and 50 fps; increasing the rigidity of t h e c a s e t o improve sealing; and
incorporating new transistors to eliminate short circuiting.

-
4. ACPU Design problems included failure of t h e . t r i c k l e c h a r g e r
c i r c u i t and the high frequency oscillation underload. Both problems were
corrected by c i r c u i t changes. A modification was made t o i n c r e a s e t h e
battery capacity.

current.
5. ATM - An excessive error rate was caused by i n s u f f i c i e n t write
The e r r o r rate was decreased t o one-tenth of i t s former r a t e by
d e c r e a s i n g t h e p o l e t i p width and by modifying t h e write a m p l i f i e r s t o i n c r e a s e
the write current by 50%.

During p r e q u a l i f i c a t i o n v i b r a t i o n t e s t i n g , the flutter tolerance
s p e c i f i c a t i o n was not m e t . Subsequently, t h e t o l e r a n c e s p e c i f i c a t i o n was
increased. The v i b r a t i o n l e v e l s were reduced t o meet t h e new requirements by
using brass flywheels and weights on the tape reels.

The first attempt t o operate the ATM w i t h t h e u n i t s e a l e d and
pressurized w i t h n i t r o g e n f a i l e d due t o e l e c t r o s t a t i c d i s c h a r g e s which a l t e r e d
the data read from the tape. The problem was eliminated by using a gas
mixture of 70% nitrogen, 20$ freon and 10% helium.

Horizon Sensor System.

A. System Description -
Each horizon sensor system consists of a sensor
head and an e l e c t r o n i c s package. The system establishes a s p a c e c r a f t a t t i t u d e
reference to earth local vertical, and generates error signals proportional
t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e between s p a c e c r a f t a t t i t u d e and t h e l o c a l e a r t h v e r t i c a l .

Attitude error signals are used t o a l i g n e i t h e r t h e s p a c e c r a f t o r t h e
i n e r t i a l p l a t f o r m t o earth l o c a l v e r t i c a l . Two sensorsystems a r e i n s t a l l e d
on each spacecraft. The secondsystem i s redundant.

The horizon sensor system operates by receiving, detecting, and
tracking are infrared radiation gradient between space and earth. The system
employs infrared optics, infrared detection, and three closely related servo
loops. The sensorheadcontains equipment that scans,detects, and t r a c k s
theinfraredgradient. The e l e c t r o n i c s package c o n t a i n s t h e c i r c u i t r y that
provides azimuth,andsearch or track logic signals to the sensor head,and
c i r c u i t r y t h a t p r o v i d e s a t t i t u d e e r r o r s i g n a l s t o ACME and platform systems.

B. Horizon Sensor Development Tests -
TheMcDonnell conductedsystem
i n t e r f a c e t e s t i n g (ESTU and CTU) provided the opportunity to modify the space-
c r a f t w i r i n g and t h e vendor supplied subsystems before a major spacecraft
problemdeveloped. Problems which were uncovered i n development t e s t i n g
included radio frequency interference (RF’I) s u s c e p t i b i l i t y , s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o
power t r a n s i e n t s , and interfaceincompatibility. RFI: s u s c e p t i b i l i t yr e q u i r e d
modifications t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t w i r i n g ( s h i e l d i n g ) and to the horizon sensor.
A suppressor network was incorporated into the horizon sensor to eliminate
t h e e f f e c t of starting t r a n s i e n t s on the 26 VAC. The horizonsensor’soutput
impedance was reduced t o make it compatible with the loads.

C. Horizon Sensor Design Problems -
Problems which were encountered i n
t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n program and t h e development progrem were:

1. The horizon sensor output impedance i n t h e ESTU was too high.for
t o t a l guidanceand c o n t r o l systemrequirements. To correct t h i s , the output
c i r c u i t s were redesigned t o provide an output impedance of less than 100 ohms.
2. Because of t h e distributed line capacitance, t h e low output
impedance units shorted out when connected t o spacecraft cabling. Circuit
I20
changes were incorporated into the horizon sensor t o enable it t o operate
into actual spacecraft loads.

3. S t a r t i n g t r a n s i e n t s caused by the spacecraft 26 VAC i n v e r t e r s
overstressed the regulated power supply of the horizonsensor. A transient
suppressor circuit was designed and incorporated into production hardware.

4. The pivots of the flexure-pivoted positor fractured during vibration
i n t h e predelivery acceptance test. Studies traced the failure t o high
magnification ratios in the head-to-positorinterface.After the casting
material and the pivot configuration had been modified, the vibration require-
ment was, met.

5. Redesigned preamplifier and signal amplifier modules were incorpo-
r a t e d i n t o t h e infrared detection circuits.

6. A design analysis indicated that the extreme operating temperatures
of the sensor head would cause interference between the bearings and shafts
or seat. Sensor head bearings were changed to increase radial play,increase
seat clearance, and s e r i a l i z e t h e bearings.

Attitude Display Group.

A. System Description - The attitude display group provides an
a t t i t u d e unambiguous display of spacecraft attitude using attitude information
all-

from t h e Gemini i n e r t i a l p l a t f o r m and command information from t h e i n e r t i a l
platfonn, t h e d i g i t a l computer, t h e rendezvous radar and the rate gyros. The
attitude display group consists of t h e a t t i t u d e d i r e c t o r i n d i c a t o r and flight
director controller.

The three-axis sphere of t h e attitude director indicator contains
360 degrees of freedom about three axes. It i s driven by signals from synchro
c o n t r o l t r a n s m i t t e r s i n t h e i n e r t i a l measurement unit.

The flight director needles of t h e attitude director indicator display
a t t i t u d e e r r o r s and r a t e commands. The informationdisplayed by the needles
i s selected by t h e flight director controller and consists of t h e following:
1. Computer Data

a. Ascent Mode -
Roll, pitch, and yaw a t t i t u d e e r r o r s i g n a l s
indicative of Gemini launch vehicle attitude errors.
b. Catchup and Rendezvous Mode -
Pitch and yaw a t t i t u d e e r r o r
signals. Roll signal indicates Spacecraft deviation from platformzero r o l l
reference.
C. Re-Entry Wde -
Downrange and crossrange errors for pitch and
yaw, and bank command o r bank rate command f o r r o l l .
2. Radar Data -
Radar-generated p i t c h and yaw error signals of the
spacecraft with respect to t h e target.

121
3. Platform Data
attitude error signals.
- Platform-generated r o l l , p i t c h , and yaw synchro

-
4. Rate Gyro Data Roll, pitch, and yaw spacecraft body rates. The
Gemini a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r was adapted with a minimum of modification from the
k a r Siegler,Inc.Mdel 4 0 6 0 ~Attitude Indicator. Over 1000 similar instru-
ments were produced f o r the USAF’, USN, and RCAF f o r u s e i n X-15, CFl&, and
F-4 aircraft, thus demonstrating the indicator capability.
B. Attitude Display GroupDevelopment Tests -
The a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y was
t e s t e d i n ESTU and CTU; i t s interface compatibility w i t h other systems was
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y demonstrated. No changes were required as a result of
development t e s t s .

C. Attitude Display Group Design Problems -
Because of random vibration
t e s t problems,stemsand needles were changed t o beryllium and supporting
struts were added on meters. A new meter movement (giving five degree full-
scale deflection) was added.

A s c a l e f a c t o r o r range switch which was added t o t h e b e z e l of the
indicator increased pitch and yaw range by a factor of two and r o l l range by
a f a c t o r of three to give a wider display range capability.

During acceptance vibration tests, the needle structure of the
a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r was not sufficient to maintain needle displacement at the
specifiedvalues. A modification reducedneedle movement.

During q u a l i f i c a t i o n tests, o i l leaked from the flight d i r e c t o r
controller modules. The problem was corrected by f i l l i n g t h e modules w i t h a
silicone resinous material and by a new module sealing methcd.

Precision Power Supply.

A. Description - A special, precision frequency, lowpower inverter was
designed and fabricated for Spacecraft 2 only. The special unit was required
because i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e 400 cps voltage source caused unstable phase shift
resolver gimbal angle readouts. The problem was l a t e r c o r r e c t e d by a modifi-
c a t i o n t o t h e EM 1262 s t a t i c power supply, but the interim type correction
was immediatelyrequired. The interim unit was i n s t a l l e d i n the pressurized
area of the spacecraft and tee-type cabling was employed t o accommodate the
i n s t a l l a t i o n . The unitconsistedofaudiofiltering, countdown, regulation-
inversion, and o u t p u t f i l t e r i n g elements.

B. Precision Power Supply Development Tests andDesign Problems The -
precision power supply was n o t u t i l i z e d i n any developmental t e s t s and no
design problems were encountered.

GCS State-Of-Art Advances

In general, t h e guidance and control system required no breakthroughs i n

122
thestate-of-artdesignconceptsormanufacturingprocesses. However, the
auxiliary tape memory concept can be considered an advancement i n t h e f i e l d of
highly reliable onboard bulk storage media for spacecIcft computer operational
programs. The ATM achievesdataaccuracies of 3 x 10 b i t s p e r e r r o r by
u s i n g t r i p l e redundant recorded data and a slow data t r a n s f e r rate of 200 b i t s
per sec.

GCS Qualification Program Summary
Qualification Status. - The guidance and control system was considered
functionally qualified at t h e time of the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t . I n the brief
summary o f t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t a t u s f o r eachsystem that follows, the term
"resolved" indicates that tests were no longer outstanding, as a r e s u l t of
completion, deletion, or waiver.

-
A. IMU A l l environmental tests except vibration were resolved prior
to the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t . Based on v i b r a t i o n t e s t r e s u l t s on design
approval test units, t h e M I U was considered acceptable for flight. The formal
vibration requirement was completed i n February 1965.

- A l l environmental t e s t s were resolved prior to the Spacecraft
flight .B. ACME
Final approval of t h e t e s t r e s u l t s (documentation) was notgiven
until after the flight but this was due t o omission of data and d i d not
2

r e f l e c t upon the qualification status.

C. Computer System - All t e s t s f o r t h e manual data insertion unit and
the computer were resolved prior to the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t . The incremental
velocity indicator lacked t e s t s f o r decompression, temperature-altitude,
fungus and high t e s t p r e s s u r e a t the time of the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t ; a l l
t e s t s were resolved prior to the spacecraft 3 f l i g h t . A t t h e timeof the
Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t , t h e a u x i l i a r y computer power unit lacked salt fog testing,
which was resolved prior t o the Spacecraft 4 f l i g h t . All t e s t s f o r the
auxiliary tape memory were resolved prior t o t h e Spacecraft 8 f l i g h t , t h e f i r s t
mission i n which the ATM was used.

D. Horizon Sensor -.Allenvironmental t e s t s except high temperature, low
temperature,humidity and salt fog were resolved. It w a s decided t h a t t h e s e
t e s t s were not necessary for the Spacecraft 2 becauseof i t s s h o r t f l i g h t .
A l t e s t s were completed by July 1965.

E. Attitude Display Group - All environmental t e s t s were resolved prior
to the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t .

F. Precision Power Supply - All environmental t e s t s were resolved prior
to the Spacecraft 2 f l i g h t .

-.. -Qualification
GCS . . . .. .
Test Problems.

A. I n e r t i a l Measurement Unit

1. Humidity - After exposure t o humidity, the IMU showed considerable
123
corrosion at a l l magnesium-to-aluminum interfaces. It was apparent t h a t t h e
IU units would not pass salt sea atmosphere tests, e i t h e r . The modifications
M
recommended by t h e vendor t o provide humidity and salt sea atmosphere i n t e g r i t y
would have delayed the Gemini IMU schedule and would have increased costs.
Therefore, McDonnell advised the NASA (TWX306-16-8317 dated 7 December 1964)
t h a t no a d d i t i o n a l humidity o r salt s p r a y e f f o r t s would be expended on t h e
I
M U . Thisagreed w i t h t h e NASA's request of 10 August 1964 v i a GP-54886.

2. Vibration - During design tests a t a 6 g l e v e l , gimbal No. 3
changed reference(approximately 700 a r c s e c ) two times. The M IU was then
exposed t o a l a t e r a l axis, ascent orientation, random v i b r a t i o n of 6.2 g RMS
andgimbal No. 3 changed reference approximately 3.3 degrees during onemin.
The platform was then exposed t o a special, unit level, acceptance type 6.2 g
RMS v i b r a t i o n t e s t ; gimbal No. 3 changed reference approximately 600 arc sec
during one min, confirming t h a t the platform had degraded since formal
acceptance testing. Use oftheplatform was discontinued when p a r t i a l d i s -
assembly showed extensive damage t o t h e r o t a r y component s t i f f e n e r and s l i p
r i n g damage. A second platform was s u b s t i t u t e d and t h e IMU was subjected to
DAT v i b r a t i o n i n t h e lateral a x i s w i t h the gimbals positioned to the ascent
orientation.Inertialreference was l o s t d u r i n g f i v e min of 6.0 g ' s random
v i b r a t i o n , r e s u l t i n g i n an X-gyro d r i f t r a t e which was equivalent to 180
degrees/hr.Inorder t oe v a l u a t et h e IMTJ, s p e c i a l t e s t s were performed. Con-
clusions reached from t h e s e t e s t s were:

a. Themaximum random v i b r a t i o n l e v e l t h a t t h e S/N l O 5 / H - l l
platform could take without l o s s of i n e r t i a l r e f e r e n c e was 5.0 g ' s .
b. Loss of reference was r e l a t i v e l y independent of the platform
gimbal orientation.
C. IMU performance was s a t i s f a c t o r y (no loss of reference) when
vibrated a t l e v e l s up t o 8.8 g's with the power s p e c t r a l d e n s i t y minimized
in the platform resonant frequency region.

McDonnell i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of lowering the spacecraft
s t r u c t u r a l resonance i n t h e p l a t f o r m mounting area to permit use of a notched
spectrum as a r e a l i s t i c v i b r a t i o n environment. Dead weight was added t o t h e
platform t o reduce the spacecraft structural resonant frequency i n the plat-
form mounting area.

Tantalum platform end covers were mounted on t h e t e s t u n i t . Subse-
quent testing showedno mechanical problems o r gimbal l o s s of reference, but
t h e gyros showed excessive drift rates.

The platform was vibrated along each of t h r e e axes with and with-
out the tantalum end p l a t e s at both ascent and acceptance t e s t procedure
gimbalangles. The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e d mechanical i n t e g r i t y , no loss of r e f e r -
ence,and no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n performance between t h e weighted and
unweighted platform. Subsequent t e s t s r e v e a l e d t h a t s t r u c t u r a l resonance
could be reduced by a three-point mount. A three-point configuration, without
weights, was used on Spacecraft 5 and up.

I24
€3. A C m Qualification Test Problems

1. Vibration -
The i n i t i a l v i b r a t i o n of t h e ACE and OAME resulted in
multiple failures which required structural redesign. Redesigned u n i t s
were successfully subjected t o vibration.

2. Hand Controller Potentiometer

a. Deadband S h i f t s -
During the qualification vibration test,
s l i g h t shifts occurred i n the deadband tap locations. The deadband was
increased from 6.0 degrees t o 6.6 degrees.
b. S a l t Fog Test Failure -
I n s u l a t i o n r e s i s t a n c e f e l l below t h e
specified valve after salt fog exposure. The salt fog t e s t was then conducted
ontwo additional potentiometers with the terminal areas sealed. Both u n i t s
corroded badly.

Changes were incorporated which enabled the potentiometer to
pass the salt fog requirements.

C. Computer System Qualification Test Problems

1. Incremental Velocity Indicator

a. Random Vibration -
After two vibration runs i n eachof the
unit axes, the unit had an excessive leak rate. The u n i t was modified and was
then successfully subjected to random vibration.
b. Temperature-Altitude -
The u n i t f a i l e d t o meet the leak rate
requirements. The u n i t was twice repaired, retested and f a i l e d t o meet leak
rate requirements after decompressionand temperature-altitudetesting. The
modified unit w i t h a redesigned case-to-bezel seal was then successfilly
subjected to t h e t e s t .

2. Manual Data Insertion Unit

a. Humidity Test -
The manual data keyboard malfunctioned when
using the keyboard t o i n s e r t d i g i t s i n t o t h e u n i t t e s t e r . The u n i t was
returned t o manufacturing and reworked. The u n i t was t h e n r e t e s t e d i n t h e
humidity environment and passed a l l functional requirements.

3. Auxiliary ComputerPower Unit

a. Operational Life Test -
During the temperature-altitude opera-
t i o n l i f e portion of t h e design approval t e s t (DAT) t h e mainpower t r a n s i s t o r
in the regulator circuit avalanched,causing the battery to discharge. The
c i r c u i t w a s redesigned for better operation a t elevated temperatures and
potting was added t o aid heat conduction. After t h e modification, the ACPU
successfully completed the test.
-
4. Auxiliary Tape Memory During prequalification vibration testing
of the engineering model No. 1tape transport, the o r i g i n a l f l u t t e r t o l e r a n c e
specification of 35 peak-to-peak at t h e o r b i t v i b r a t i o n l e v e l was not met. A
study resulted i n an i n c r e a s e d f l u t t e r t o l e r a n c e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of 5s
peak-to-pealc at a reduced o r b i t v i b r a t i o n l e v e l of 0.003 g2/cps f r o m 20 t o
200 cps and 0.0015 g2/cps from 200 t o 500 cps w i t h an overall acceleration
l e v e l of one g M. Several tape transport configurations were used i n t h e
e f f o r t t o reduce f l u t t e r t o t h i s a c c e p t a b l e limit. Brass flywheelsand weights
on t h e tape reels provided the best configuration and were i n s t a l l e d ‘ i n a l l
flight units.

D. Horizon Sensor Qualification Test Problems

1. Vibration -
Horizonsensorsystem(-307)consisting of a -17 sensor
headand a -15 electronics package failed the vibration requirement. The
electronic packageand the sensor head were modified. The reworked system
passed random vibration.

E. Attitude Display Group Qualification Test Problems

1. Attitude Display Indicator - The a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y i n d i c a t o r was
not subjected t o a formal q u a l i f i c a t i o n test program because it was similar t o
the Lear Siegler, Inc. 4 0 6 0 ~a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r , which hadbeen subjected t o a
comprehensive q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t program f o r t h e USAF.

However, a random vibration t e s t (8.6 g RMS), performed t o v e r i f y
that the indicator could meetGemini standards, revealed a structural design
deficiency in the roll gimbal support. Structural modifications were made t o
the unit. Additional vibration tests (6.5 g RE,
each a x i s f o r 15 min) then
were performed successfully.

2. Flight Director Controller

a. S a l t Fog Test -
Salt fog caused out-of-specification outputs
from t h e FDC. Investigation revealed salt residue on t h e terminal board and
around module header holes. A silicone rubber gasket was added on t o p of t h e
module mounting plate, thus sealing leaks under t h e module headers. The u n i t
then passed the salt f o g t e s t .
b. Humidity -
After t h e FM: f a i l e d humidity testing, the gasket
material and fabrication procedures were changed. The r e t e s t was successful.
C. H i g h Temperature Test -
Investigation after testing revealed a
leak i n t h e power supply module caused by a break i n t h e s o l d e r seal. A change
i n t h e module f i l l i n g and sealing procedure enabled the unit t o p a s s the t e s t .

F. Precision Power Supply Qualification Testing -
No problems were
encountered w ith q u a l i f i c a t i o n tests. As an interim unit used only on
Spacecraft 2, the PPS was not processed t o a l l tests normally specified for
cabin-mounted equipment. Upon s a t i s f a c t o r y completionofhightemperature
t e s t i n g , t h e PPS was accepted as q u a l i f i e d f o r a suborbital, nonmanned, f l i g h t .

126
R e l i a b i l i t y Program Summary f o r GCS

The guidance and c o n t r o l r e l i a b i l i t y programs had as t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s :

A. To achieve system designs capable of meeting o r exceeding the system
r e l i a b i l i t y requirement.

B. To producesystemhardware capable of meeting these requirements under
field operation.

the
I n e r t i a l Measurement Unit R e l i a b i l i t y Program. -
Overstress testing for
was plannedonly f o r t h e i n e r t i a l guidancesystem power supplyand t h e
system electronics. The i n e r t i a l p l a t f o r m was omitted because the platform
i s temperature-controlled and not amenable t o temperature overstress testing.
I n addition, no data was available to correlate vibration overstress with
extended i n e r t i a l component l i f e data.

A. System Electronics Vibration -
A system electronics package was
submitted i n i t i a l l y t o an exploratory/quality verification test and then was
subjected to overstress vibration. After completion of 15.1 g RMS exposure,
two switching relays were inoperative.

A new relay module was i n s t a l l e d and the system electronics package
was vibrated a t a 12.6 g RMS random l e v e l f o r 15 min. i n each of i t s three
mutuallyperpendicularaxes;the same relays failed again. The relaysrequired
a modi'fication t o t h e c o i l attachment. With modified relays, the systems
electronics performed satisfactorily during overstress vibration.

B. System Electronics Temperature/Altitude -
A system electronics package
was submitted to overstress temperature/altitude testing. This test had no
measurable e f f e c t on the operation of the system electronics.

C. IGS Power Supply Vibration -
An EM 1262 s t a t i c power supply was mated
with a gimbal control electronic and subjected to overstress vibration. After
1.5 min of vibration at 9.7 g R MS, a noise with a 60-80 cycle frequency
appeared on t h e s t a t i c i n v e r t e r DC and AC output voltages; it continued
throughoutthe 10.2 g vibration period. Before starting the 10.6 g vibration,
the input voltage was r a i s e d t o 30 V
DC
. The 60-80 cycle noise was not present
when the input voltage was maintained at the 30 VDC level. No other discrep-
anciesoccurred W i n g t h i s t e s t . Inherent regulation instability, which w a s
corrected in the EM 1 2 6 2 ~SPS, caused the noise.

D. IGS Power Supply Temperature/Altitude - ingthe first turnon,with
t h e a l t i t u d e chamber at a pressure of 1.47 x l O - e s i a , the 400 and 1200 cycle
outputs were out of regulation on bothamplitudeandfrequency. Problem
isolation revealed that a capacitor (large can) had faulted with an internal
open lead. This capacitor presented a high impedance t o t h e sync o s c i l l a t o r
which distorted the switching output. This distortion resulted in overstress
and damage t o a l l pulse width regulator circuits. The capacitor failure was
a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e e x t e n s i v e v i b r a t i o n t h a t t h e power supply had previously
undergone.
A. ACME Operating L i f e Tests -
A combined mission simulation and operating
l i f e t e s t was conducted on t h e ACME sys em f o r 1200 hr, of which more than
1000 h r were at a pressure of 1.0 x lo-' psia. The performance of t h e system
was satisfactory throughout the test.

The ACME hand controller potentiometer was subjected t o a 500-hr
operating l i f e t e s t a t 8 0 O and ~ 6 p s i a i n a loo$ 02 environment. A cycling
rate of f i v e cycles/min was maintainedthroughoutthetest. The r e s u l t s were
satisfactory. Two ACME comand excitation transformers were subje t t o a
500-hr o p e r a t i n gl i f et e s t a t 160°F w al temperature and 1.0 x
l psia. The
r e s u l t s were s a t i s f a c t o r y .

B. ACME Overstress Tests - The ACME system passed the following overstress
tests:

1. Combined Temperature - Altitude/Hi-Low Voltage

a. Chamber pressure:
b. Chamber shroudtemperature:
1.47 x
165 + 5OF.
psia, maxm
i um.
c. Coldplate i n l e t temperature: 165-+- 5OF t o 205 +
- 5OF (ACE, OAME,
PI), and 125 + 5OF to 165 + 5OF(RGP).
d.-Coolant flow-rate: 50 lb/hr maximum.
e.Supply voltage: 18.0 VDC t o 30.5 VDC.

2. Voltage and Frequency S t a b i l i t y

a. AC voltage:21 VAC t o 31 VAC
b. AC frequency: 388 cps t o 412 cps
-
3. Vibration Although no formal overstress vibration tests were
conducted, t e s t s conducted e a r l y i n t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n program demonstrated
t h a t t h e system could withstand overstress vibration.

Two command excitation transformers were s u b j e c t e d t o o v e r s t r e s s t e s t s
which consisted of 12-1/2 cycles, each cycle lasting 20 h r , a l t e r n a t e l y at
-55OC and 125OC w i t h u n i t s o p e r a t i n g a t 125% of rated load. During the 20-hr
periods, the samples were cycled with power"on" f o r 40 min and power "off"
f o r 80 min. A t theconclusion of each20-hr cycle,thetransformers were
removed from t h e t e s t chamber and l e f t deenergized at room ambient f o r n o t l e s s
than four hr prior to starting the nextcycle. The r e s u l t s were s a t i s f a c t o r y .

Computer System R e l i a b i l i t y Program.
I _ _

A. Computer R e l i a b i l i t y Program -
The s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l computer was
subjected t o a low temperature threshold test, a high temperature threshold
t e s t and a 200°F re-entry profile evaluation.

1. Low Temperature Threshold Test - This t e s t was performed a t the
following t e s t c o n d i t i o n s :

128
a. I n t e r n a l chamber pressure: 1.47 x 10-5 psia.
b. Thermal shroud m e a n temperature: OOF.
C. Computer coldplate inlet temperature: Varied from 6 0 O t~ o 35OF
i n 5OF increments.

No computer malfunction o r performance degradation was experienced
during t h i s t e s t .

2. High Temperature Threshold Test
following t e s t conditions:
- This t e s t was conducted at t h e
a. I n t e r n a l chamber pressure: 1.47 x 10-5 psia.
b. Thermal shroud mean temperature: 160~~.
C. Computer coldplateinlettemperature:Varied from 95OF t o
120°F i n 5OF increments.

A malfunction occurred during testing a t a temperatureof llO°F. The
failure was a t t r i b u t e d t o power l i n e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n test equipment, which
resulted in the imposition of t r a n s i e n t s on the computer chassis. No computer
malfunction w a s noted during subsequent testing above llO°F.

3. 200°F Re-Entry Prof'le Evaluation -
This t e s t was conducted a t a
chamber pressure of 1.47 x lo-? p s i a and the shroudand c o l d p l a t e i n l e t
temperatures initially stabilized at 1 6 0 and
~ ~ 88OF, respectively. The coolant
flow through the coldplate w a s then halted and t h e mean temperature of the
shroud was increased to 200°F. Simultaneouslywith t h e shroudtemperature
increase, the internal chamber pressure was increased t o the micronrange and
maintained for the duration of t h e t e s t .

A malfunction which occurred prior to the attainment of a mean shroud
temperature of 200°F was a t t r i b u t e d t o a t e s t equipment power line fluctuation.
The t e s t was repeated without computer malfunction.

B. Incremental Velocity Indicator Reliability Program

1. High Temperature Test - The powered-up u n i t was subjected to 120$
of t h e designapproval high temperature t e s t l e v e l (192OF) f o r four h r . A t the
endof t h i s p e r i o d t h e u n i t was tested functionally. The t e s t caused no
damage t o t h e u n i t .
2. Vibration Test - The IVI (power-on) was subjected successfully to
120% of the design approval vibration test level for 15 min i n each axis. This
was repeated i n each axis.
-
3. Power Test The u n i t was subjected successfilly to 120% over-
voltage (nominal operating) and120% undervoltage for ten min. Thereafter a
performance t e s t was conducted w i t h voltages maintained.
4. Pressure Test - The IVI was placed in a pressure chamber a t a 2.0
atmosphere level. Then the chamber was depressurizedsuddenly t o a one-
atmosphere level, thus leaving a pressure differential of one atmosphere
a p p l i e d t o t h e IVI case. The IVI was monitored for leakage and p a s s e d t h e t e s t
with nodamage or deterioration of performance.
C. Manual Data I n s e r t i o n Unit R e l i a b i l i t y Program -
Overstress testing
on t h e manual data i n s e r t i o n u n i t was deleted on a u n i t b a s i s . R e l i a b i l i t y
a n a l y s i s stress-data was submitted on t h e M D N on a component p a r t basis. This
d a t a summarized and recommended stress l e v e l s and application information for
t h e e l e c t r o n i c components used i n t h e MDIU and the I B M component p a n d e r a t i n g
p r a c t i c e employed on the unit.

Horizon Sensor R e l i a b i l i t y Program. -
For contractual reasons, overstress
t e s t i w G d on a complete horizon sensor system nor was it
performed on e i t h e r of the two u n i t s of t h e system. However, a l l major p a r t s
andassemblies were individually subjected to various overstress tests. The
t e s t s were of two general categories: Module o v e r s t r e s s t e s t s and e l e c t r i c a l -
mechanical o v e r s t r e s s t e s t s .

Module tests consisted of the following, although all modules were not
necessarily subjected to a l l t e s t s :

A. H i g h temperaturestorage.
B. H i g h o r low temperature and voltage overstress t e s t and/or thermal
shock.
C.
D.
Vibration (sinusoidal) .
Transient noise or transient voltage.

The e r r o r a m p l i f i e r s and t h e d r i v e a m p l i f i e r f a i l e d test B above and had
t o beredesigned.Retest r e s u l t s were s a t i s f a c t o r y . Otherdiscrepancies were
minor and were e i t h e r t h e result of p a r t s which had not been burned i n o r were
readily corrected by the addition of t r i m r e s i s t o r s , diode suppressors, etc.

Electrical-mechanical tests consisted of t h e following and a l l modules
were not necessarily subject to the same t e s t :

A. 1000-hr l i f e t e s t .
B. Temperature cycling.
C. Vibration(sinusoidal).

The only f a i l u r e c o n s i s t e d of a torsion rod which f a i l e d t h e 1000-hr
life test. A modified torsion rod passed the test.

Attitude Display Group R e l i a b i l i t y Program. -
Overstress testing on the
a t t i t u d e display group was confined t o t h e f l i g h t d i r e c t o r c o n t r o l l e r . T e s t i n g
of t h i s type-had been previously accomplished on t h e a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y i n d i c a t o r
on other programs.

The following tests were performed t o determine the effect ofextreme
environmental conditions on t h e performance of t h e c o n t r o l l e r :

A. H i g h Temperature -
The unit passed a t e s t i n which it was energized
and subjected t o a temperature of 210°F f o r a soak period of four h r .
B. Overpower -
The c o n t r o l l e r was energized w i t h nominal input voltage
(26 VAC, 400 cps) and outputs were monitored.Inputvoltage was thenincreased
t o 30 VAC, 400 cps and maintained f o r 15 min, a f t e r which t h e c o n t r o l l e r
outputs were againmonitored and t h e u n i t was inspected for damage. No damage
was incurred by the unit.

The unit was subjected t o a vibration test, which consisted of 110% design
approval t e s t l e v e l f o r 15 min i n each of the three mutually perpendicular
axes. The controller passed the vibration test.

GCS Quality Assurance

I n e r t i a l Measurement Unit. -
The type of quality assurance t e s t performed
on elementsof the IM.U varied with items. The t e s t i n g was as follows:

A. System Electronics and Gimbal Control Electronics -
A n engineering
specification (ES) t e s t was performed t o s e t a l l adjustments and gains and t o
verify that overall unit-level performance was within specification. TheES
t e s t tolerances were generally less than those permitted i n higher l e v e l tests.

A unit level acceptance t e s t including vibration testing was performed
w i t h Government and McDonnell witnessing. Upon satisfactory completion of
t h i s t e s t and accumulation of 100 h r of operation, a u n i t was considered f l i g h t
worthy. If t h e u n i t s were integrated in a system and submitted t o an IMU
acceptance t e s t , t h e 100-hr operate time applied upon completion of system
level acceptance testing.

B. S t a t i c Power Supply Quality Assurance - The SPS was fabricated and
t e s t e d by EngineeredMagneticsDivisionofGultonIndustries. P r i o r t o ship-
ment from EM t o Honeywell, each s t a t i c power supply was tested, and t h e t e s t
was witnessedby Government and Honeywell representatives. A t Honeywell, the
SPS was processed t o a receiving inspection test. This test was a duplicate
of the predelivery t e s t performed at EM. Each SPS was submitted t o an individ-
u a l vendor acceptance t e s t which included vibration; Government and McDonnell
witnessing was required. Upon satisfactory completion of t h i s t e s t the SPS
w a s processed through a system l e v e l acceptance t e s t as p a r t of an I M U , or
shipped f o r f i e l d use. I n e i t h e r case, 100 h r ofoperatetime was required a t
shipment .
C. I n e r t i a l Platform Quality Assurance - Each platform was processed t o
a Honeywell ES test, including adjustment of gains, optical and mechanical
.'alignment,andgimbal f r i c t i o n and balance checks. The platform level
acceptance t e s t depended upon whether the unit was t o be integrated and t e s t e d
IU level or accepted and shipped as a platform. I n either case,
a t the M
Government and McDonnell witnessing was required.

fie-IMU acceptance testing consisted of unit level vibration, acceler-
ometer loop gain checks,synchro e r r o r and s t a t i c accuracychecks, cube t o case
alignment checks,synchro transmitter output checks,and gas leak and pres-
surization checks.
If a platform was t o be accepted for shipment on the basis of M IU l e v e l
t e s t s , it received a l l t e s t i n g performed i n a pre-IMU test, and additionally
was processed t o testing designed t o assure satisfactory system l e v e l
131
performance. This testingincludedloopphasing checks,gyro open loopgain
checks,and pre and post cool down i n e r t i a l parameter checks. Essentially, the
platform was evaluated for system performance, u t i l i z i n g test s t a t i o n power
sources and control loops. The gyro control loops do not duplicate system per-
formance,and analog ( i n l i e u of digital) accelerometer rebalance loops are
employed.

The platform level acceptance test was intended primarily as a proce-
dure f o r evaluating and accepting individual platforms returned from t h e f i e l d
f o r rework where system performance has been verified previously.

D. IMU System Level Quality Assurance -
Each platform accepted for
Gemini was processed through a n M IU acceptance t e s t , i n which a l l equipment of
an IMU system was integrated and t e s t e d t o v e r i f y f l i g h t worthiness. Except
i n r a r e i n s t a n c e s (i.e., when a spare SF'S, s t a t i c power supply; SE, system
electronics; or G CX, gimbal i s required on short notice), items of an M IU were
accepted as p a r t of some IMU acceptance t e s t procedures.

The system l e v e l test includes verification of a c c e p t a b l e i n e r t i a l
component parameters, gyro and accelerometer loop performance, caging and
gyrocompassing loop performance, mode relay verification, and acceptability
of a l l system interfaces.

Upon s a t i s f a c t o r y completion of t h i s t e s t t h e IMU was ready for ship-
ment t o McDonnell f o r s p a c e c r a f t i n s t a l l a t i o n o r t o IBM f o r IGS integration.

-
ACME System Quality Assurance.- The l i s t i n g below a p p l i e s t o t h e a t t i t u d e
control electronics, orbit attitude and maneuvering e l e c t r o n i c s , r a t e gyro
and power inverter packages and does not include any t e s t i n g p r i o r t o t h e
i n i t i a l assemblyof the individual package. The tests l i s t e d i n A through L
below were the vendor's engineering specification (ES) t e s t p r o f i l e and were
performed in the order listed except the high temperature and low temperature
tests were sometimes interchanged.Unlessotherwisestated,thefollowing
t e s t s were a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e f o u r l i s t e d ACME packages.

A. I n i t i a l Room Temperature -
Complete functional checkof unit.
B. High Temperature (ACE, O M , PI) -
Four-hr soak at 160'~,nonoperating,
followed by specific operational test while s t i l l at 1 6 0 ~ ~ .
C. High Temperature (RGP) -
Same as B above except the gyros were
energized during the soak and the temperature was 120°F.
D. Operational Check -Perform specific operational test a t room
temperature.
E. Low Temperature (ACE, O M , PI)
followed by specific operational tests while
-
Four-hr soak at OOF, nonoperating,
s t i l l at OOF.
-
F. Low Temperature (RGP) Same as E above except the g y r o s were energized
during the soak and the temperature i s -lO°F.
G. Operational Check - Same as D above.
H. Vibration - Three-axis random vibration test, one min/axis duration.
The vibration spectrum was i n keeping with Gemini requirements w i t h an o v e r a l l
l e v e l of 6.2 g R N . Limited functional tests were performed during the
vibration.
I. Vibration - The RGP. for Spacecraft 2 and the PI'S for Spacecraft 2 and
3 were subjected to three-axis sinusoidal vibration instead of random vibration.
The vibration consisted of a logarithmic scan of 15-2000-15 cps f o r 15 min/
axis.
J. Operation Check
K. Remaining Burn-In
-- Same as D(Operational Check) on preceding page .
If t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i n g h o u r s t o t h i s p o i n t , plus
the anticipated operational time f o r final room and predelivery acceptance
tests did not equal o r exceed 100 hr, the additional operation time was
accrued at t h i s p o i n t .
L. Final Room Temperature -
A preselloff f'unctional check of t h e unit.
M. Predelivery Acceptance (PDA) - This was the formal selloff tests,
run to the appropriate McDonnell approved acceptance t e s t procedure (ATP) a t
the vendor's facilities.
N. P r e i n s t a l l a t i o n Acceptance (PIA) - S i m i l a r t o M above but run at
McDonnell t o a McDonnell/NASA-approved service engineering department report
(SEDR). Following the PIA t e s t the equipment was installed in the spacecraft.

The following t e s t s were performed on the two remaining items i n t h e
ACME, the hand controller potentiometer and the command excitation transformer:

A. Predelivery acceptance testing a t the respective vendor's facilities.
B. Preinstallation acceptance testing per McDonnell SEDR 360 at
McDonnell, St. Louis.

Computer
. . System Quality Assurance.

A. Computer -
The following t e s t programs were conducted a t D M , Owego,
New York,on the spacecraft digital computer p r i o r t o i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t o t h e
spacecraft. These t e s t programs a r e performed a t IBM, Owego,
New York.

1. PreacceptanceTest - The preacceptance t e s t c o n s i s t e d of a
c o n t i n u i t y t e s t , an i n t e r f a c e t e s t , a diagnostic test, a memory evaluation
t e s t , a pretemperature test and a previbration test.
2. Acceptance Test - The acceptance t e s t c o n s i s t e d of a vibration
t e s t , a temperature t e s t , t h e i n t e r f a c e measurements t e s t and a diagnostic
test.
-
3. IGS Integrated Acceptance Test The integrated acceptance test
consisted of a n IGS i n t e r f a c e t e s t , IGS computer mode t e s t i n g , system power,
voltage, and frequency testing, an IMU/computer interface voltage transient
t e s t , and an auxiliary computer power u n i t t e s t .

B. Incremental Velocity Indicator Quality Assurance The following t e s t s -
were performed on the incremental velocity indicator prior to its installation
i n the spacecraft:

1. Preacceptance t e s t a t Lear Siegler,Inc.
2. Predelivery acceptance t e s t a t Lear Siegler, Inc.
3. Acceptance t e s t a t IBM (for D M acceptance).
4. Predelivery acceptance t e s t a t I B M ( f o r McDonnell acceptance).
5. IGS integration t e s t a t IBM.
C. Manual Data Insertion Unit Quality Assurance The following t e s t s -
were performed on t h e manual data readout and manual data keyboard p r i o r t o
their installation in the spacecraft:

1. Preacceptance t e s t at IBM.
2. Acceptance t e s t at IBM.
3. IGS integration t e s t at IBM.
D. Auxiliary ComputerPower Unit Quality Assurance -
The ACPU was t e s t e d
by the vendor per the McDonnell approvedacceptance t e s t procedure. If t h i s
t e s t i n g was witnessed by McDonnell Engineering, no PIA t e s t i n g was performed
on the unit before i t s installation into the spacecraft. When the ATP was
not witnessed byMcDonnell Engineering, a PIA t e s t was performed at McDonnell.

E. Auxiliary Tape k m o r y Quality Assurance -
Raymond Engineering Labora-
t o r i e s conducted an I B M acceptance t e s t on each unit. IBM then conducted a
McDonnell acceptance t e s t on each unit. The McDonnell acceptance t e s t was
the same as the IBM acceptance test but includes temperature/altitude and
vibration tests.

Compatibility of the ATM with the spacecraft digital computer was
v e r i f i e d by t e s t i n g an engineering model and the first production model i n an
IGS system at IBM.

Horizon Sensor System Quality Assurance, -
The vendor predelivery accep-
tance (PDA) t e s t was performed t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e materials, workmanship, and
performance of u n i t s programmed f o r d e l i v e r y t o McDonnellwere not faulty and
t h a t t h e units had been manufactured t o approved drawings and specifications.

The horizon sensor systems were t e s t e d f o r compliance with the detailed
functionalrequirements of the McDonnell approved PDA t e s t procedure. These
t e s t s included:physicalinspection,weight,squibcontinuity check, power
consumption, p i t c h and r o l l output null and scale factor, pitch and r o l l output
crosscoupling,loss-of-track,output time lag,temperatureenvironment, and
random vibration environment.

Attitude Display Group QualityAssurance. -
The following tests were
performed on t h e a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y i n s c a t o r and f l i g h t d i r e c t o r c o n t r o l l e r
prior t o their installation in the spacecraft:

A. Preacceptance t e s t at Lear Siegler, Inc.
B. Predeliveryacceptance t e s t a t Lear Siegler,Inc.
C. Preinstallation acceptance test at McDonne11.

Precision Power Supply Quality Assurance.
A. UnitLevel Tests -
The precision power supply was processed t o
acceptance t e s t s a t both Engineered Magneticsand at Honeywell, Florida.
B. System Level Tests -
The S/N 100 PPS was processed through the IBM
acceptance t e s t . During t h i s phase the PPS was tested exp?..icitly for voltage
amplitude and frequency. I n addition, it was v e r i f i e d as a r e s u l t of gimbal
angle accuracy t e s t s .

134
r

ThePPS went through t h e IGS integration tests at I B M p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y
t o McDonnell for spacecraft installation.

GCS J3quipment Evaluation

I n e r t i a l Measurement Unit Evaluation. - The i n e r t i a l components constitute
t h e time c r i t i c a l items t h a t a f f e c t IMU performance. The gyros have an
allowable l i f e of 3000 h r and the accelerometers have an allowable l i f e of
5000 hr.

For the gyros, the gravity sensitive and gravity insensitive d r i f t
parameters were measured and evaluated throughout t h e l i f e of t h e platform.
For the accelerometers t h e scale factor, bias, and input axis alignment were
measured and evaluated.

ACME System Evaluation. -The following parameters were evaluated, by
means of time h i s t o r y p l o t s , as an indication of overall ACME performance:

A. ACE -
Rate commandmode switching levels (RCS and OAMS) : re-entry and
re-entry rate commandmode switching levels; orbit mode pulse widths and
frequencies; bias power supplyvoltages; RCS spikesuppression.
B. OAMS -
OAMS spikesuppression.
C. PI -
Output voltage andfrequency.
D. RGP -
Run up times; run down times; i n phase n u l l s .
Computer System Evaluation.

A. Computer -The s p a c e c r a f t d i g i t a l computer contains no time c r i t i c a l
parameters. The computer memory, however, was v e r i f i e d a minimum of four
t i m e s p r i o r t o launch.

Analog voltage output deviation curves were p l o t t e d f o r each unit. A
l i s t of these curves i s presented below.

1. Deviationof GLV signal versus theoretical value-computer p i t c h
channel.
2. Deviationof GLV signal versus theoretical value-computer r o l l
channel.
3. Deviationof GLV signal versus theoretical value-computer yaw
channel.
4. Deviationof f i n e AC signal versus theoretical value-computer
p i t c h channel.
5. Deviation of f i n e AC signal versus theoretical value-computer r o l l
channel.
6. Deviationof f i n e AC signal versus theoretical value-computer yaw
channel
7. Deviationof coarse AC signal versus theoretical value-computer
p i t c h channel.
8, Deviationof coarse AC signal versus theoretical value-computer r o l l
channel.

135
9. Deviation of coarse AC signal versus theoretical value-computer
yaw channel.

B. Auxiliary ComputerPower Unit Evaluation -
The b a t t e r y i n t h e ACPU
should be charged a f t e r 14 days of nonoperation. The ATM, t h e N I and the MDIU
have no time c r i t i c a l parameters which are monitored p r i o r t o launch.

Horizon Sensor System Evaluation. -Selected horizon sensor system param-
e t e r s were monitored after i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t , t o i n s u r e
unchanged operational performance. These parametersincludedpitchoutput,
r o l l output, loss-of-track output, position detector output (primary system
only), andazimuthovershootoutput(primarysystemonly). The a t t i t u d e
display group and precision power supply had no time c r i t i c a l parameters.

GCS Flight Perfonnance

Gemini 11. -
During the ascent phase, t h e i n e r t i a l guidancesystem
indicated errors when compared to tracking data. The anomaly was evidenced as
an out-of-tolerance downrange e r r o r and it appeared as erroneous X-accelerometer
velocity signals near BECO and SECO. Tests confirmed that t h e e r r o r s were
caused by saturation effects within the rebalance loop.

Gemini I11 Performance. - During the ascent phase of Gemini I11 the
i n e r t i a l guidance system indicated errors when compared with tracking data.
The anomaly was evidenced as out-of-tolerance errors in the downrange and
v e r t i c a l v e l o c i t i e s as i n d i c a t e d i n TRW-STL report 4160-6047-TCOOO(NAS9-2938) -
"Gemini GT-3 I n e r t i a l Guidance System Evaluation Trajectory Reconstruction."

Post-flight failure analysis revealed t h a t the ascent velocity error was
due t o s c a l e f a c t o r and bias i n s t a b i l i t y i n the X-accelerometerloop. Further
examination r e l a t e d t h i s i n s t a b i l i t y t o an interim modification which was
employed on the X-accelerometerloop. For corrective action to the Gemini I11
and IV configurations, (See Gemini I1 Mission, page 3 6 ) .

Post-flight analysis also revealed a gyro problem which caused p i t c h a x i s
d r i f t . This problem was caused by a defective header seal which allowed
fluorolube t o escape and subsequently allowed a i r t o be drawn i n t o t h e gyro.
When the acceleration vector changed d i r e c t i o n r e l a t i v e t o the gyro, such as
a t 180 s e c i n t h e Gemini I11 mission, the a i r bubbles caused torques which
r e s u l t e d i n t r a n s i e n t d r i f t . The defective seal was considered t o be an
isolated case and no designchanges were implemented. However, a tilt t e s t
was incorporated at t h e v e n d o r ' s f a c i l i t i e s and at CapeKennedy t o i n s u r e
detection of t h i s problem should it occur on subsequent units.

For additional information, refer t o McDonnell report €3984, "GT-2 and
GT-3 IGS Ascent Anomaly Investigation (U) , ' I and McDonnell guidance and.contro1
mechanics Gemini design note 298.

The horizon sensor system experienced many losses of track during the
Gemini I11 mission. However, it was able to align the platform and t o provide
horscan mode control without difficulty. Post-flight analysis of telemetry
' records revealed that t h e Gemini horizon sensors lost track 382 times during
t h e mission. The t o t a l accumulated loss of t r a c k time was 366.1 sec out of
the 4 hr, 28 min and 3 sec between i n i t i a l lock-on and deenergization of t h e
horizon sensors. O f t h a t t o t a l , 291 losses of t r a c k (293.7 sec ) were explained
through the"corre1ation of excessive spacecraft attitude, switching between
sensors, sunset, and sunrise. Correlationstudies were undertaken i n an
attempt t o relate clouds and special thruster firings t o losses-of-track, but
t h e results were inconclusive. Testing which w a s later conducted on a
horizon sensor system proved t h a t the sun w i l l cause losses of t r a c k when it
i s located between the earth's horizon and approximately ten degrees above
thehorizon, i f t h e sun is within the azimuthcoverageof t h e sensor. To
isolate additional causes of horizon sensor losses-of-track, plans were made
t o add special TM parameters t o t h e horizon sensor system on Spacecraft 4.

Gemini N Performance. -During the flight the astronauts experienced
d i f f i c u l t y i n t u r n i n g t h e computer off using the computer ON/OFT switch.
Removal of t h e IGS power supply 28 V i n p u t f a i l e d t o shutdown t h e computer.
Special tests confirmed t h a t the computer was not operating properly and t h e
flight continued without t h e use of the computer.

Post-flight analyses to determine the cause of t h e anomaly included
analyses of the telemetry data and of the voice transmissions. Post-flight
t e s t i n g was of considerable magnitudeand at considerable expense, and
comprised u n i t t e s t s on the computer, a system t e s t whichemployed an ACPU
and a power supply, and a disassembly and analysis of each of t h e components
which might have been r e l a t e d t o t h e f a i l u r e . All t e s t s and analyses failed
t o r e v e a l t h e cause of t h e f a i l u r e .

Post-flight t e s t s of the computer indicated that an e l e c t r i c a l a r c
between t h e computer 25 volt regulator transistor terminal and the computer
case caused an overload condition i n t h e I G S power supply and failed a t r a n s i s -
t o r component i n the I G S supply. This problem was u n r e l a t e d t o t h e TURN-OFF
failure .
Detailed information regarding t h i s f a i l u r e may be found i n the following
reports :

A. McDonnell report E193, "Final Report -
Gemini Spacecraft 4 Post-Flight
Failure Investigation IGS S t a t i c Power Supply Re-Entry Failure."
B. D M No. 65-928-93, "Final Report on t h e Post-Flight GT-4 Failure
Analysis."
C. McDonnell report El&, "Final Report -
Gemini Spacecraft 4 Post-Flight
Failure Investigation ComputePower Sequencing Anomaly."

The special horizon sensor TM post-flight data analysis of Gemini IV
confirmed t h a t certain cloud conditions can cause horizon sensor output varia-
tions. These data confirmed the Gemini I11 post-flight analysis.
Gemini V Performance. -
The performance accuracy of the ACME platform
mode was questioned by the crew. A comprehensive post-flight t e s t program
indicated t h a t t h e platform mode operated satisfactorily during the mission.

137
The crew a l s o r e p o r t e d an anomaly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e flight d i r e c t o r
indicators of the attitude display group. With t h e range switch i n t h e LO
p o s i t i o n t h e downrange (pitch) needle was d i s p l a c e d f u l l - s c a l e , but wikh t h e
rangeswitch i n H I the needle was displaced less than half-scale. Post-flight
t e s t i n g r e v e a l e d t h a t a d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d between t h e electrical f u l l - s c a l e
limits and t h e meter mechanical limits which accounted f o r the apparent
discrepancy.

The primary horizon sensor became inoperative during the Gemini V f l i g h t .
The anomaly w a s i s o l a t e d t o t h e s e n s o r head,which i s j e t t i s o n e d p r i o r t o
re-entry. Post-flight analysis of the telemetry data r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e yoke
azimuth motion became uncontrolled.

Gemini V I Performance. -The a s t r o n a u t s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e downrange
(pitch) needles on b o t h f l i g h t d i r e c t o r i n d i c a t o r s d e f l e c t 2-1/2 needle widths
below t h e miniature airplane dot after r e t r o f i r e ( t h e needles should have been
centered on t h e d o t ) . P o s t - f l i g h t t e s t i n g was performed on b o t h a t t i t u d e
display groups, t h e d i g i t a l computer, and t h e No. 2 instrumentation package.
The reported anomaly was never duplicated.

Gemini V I 1 Performance. -
It was noted t h a t t h e removalof t h e AC power
from the ACME caused a l l e i g h t OAMS t h r u s t e r s t o f i r e f o r a s h o r t (less
than 300 m s ) period. Post-flight analysis proved t h a t t h i s was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of t h e systemand t h a t it does not affect system performance.

Gemini V I 1 1 Performance. -
Shortly a f t e r docking with the Agena Target
Vehicle the spacecraft experienced an uncommanded firing of OAMS thruster No. 8.
This mighthavebeencaused by a f a i l u r e i n t h e O M package. However, post-
f l i g h t a n a l y s i s of t h e telemetry data indicated t h a t a failure of any of the
c r i t i c a l OAME components didnot f i t a l l o f t h e f a i l u r e modes. Therefore,
it was concluded t h a t t h e OAME package did not fail.

The a s t r o n a u t s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e i r first attempt t o use the ATM on
Gemini V I 1 1 was unsuccessf'ul because t h e ATM run light and t h e IVI's did not
respond as had beenexpected. The a s t r o n a u t s had observed t h i s same anomaly
inthemissiontrainer.Post-flightanalysis has n o t p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d
the cause of the anomaly but the most probable cause i s t h a t t h e MDIU cancel
button was i n a d v e r t e n t l y d e p r e s s e d w h i l e t h e i n s e r t b u t t o n was depressed.

Gemini IX Performance. -
E a r l y i n the mission the crew experienced an
anomaly which caused the same e f f e c t s as a continuous START COMP d i s c r e t e .
Subsequently t h e problem cleared i t s e l f .

P o s t - f l i g h t t e s t s were conducted on t h e computer, t h e COW-START switch
and t h e Manual FETRO switch (connected i n parallel with the COMP-START switch).
No i n d i c a t i o n s were found as to the possible cause of the anomaly.

Gemini X, X I , and X I I . - There were no s i g n i f i c a n t equipment changes o r
anomalie s.

. ._ . .
PROPULSION SYSTES

There are three propulsion systems on Gemini. Two of them, t h e o r b i t
a t t i t u d e and maneuver system ( O W ) and the re-entry control system (RCS), are
liquid propellant systems. The retrograderocket system i s a s o l i d p r o p e l l a n t
system.

Orbit Attitude and ManeuverSystem

DesignConcepts. - During t h e o r b i t phase of t h e mission the OAMS provides
(1)attitude control torques about the spacecraft pitch, yaw, and r o l l axes,
and (2) t r a n s l a t i o n a l t h r u s t a l o n g t h e s e same axes. The system i s l o c a t e d i n
the adapter section of the spacecraft, as shown i n Fig. 17.

A. Thrust Engine Design - Attitude control i s obtained by f i r i n g s e l e c t e d
p a i r s of the eight thrust engines arranged around the spacecraft periphery.
Eachchamber f i r e s i n a fixed direction with a constant thrust level, nominally
23.5 lb. The spacecraft i s maneuvered by f i r i n g t h r u s t chambers of higher
output (two of 79 l b output and s i x of 94.5 l b ) which a r e o r i e n t e d so t h a t t h e
t h r u s t a c t s through the vehicle center of gravity. Two of the 94.5 l b chambers
f i r e together to provide forward thrust, while the other four fire radially to
y i e l d up and down or side-to-side translation. A f t t h r u s t i s obtained by
f i r i n g t h e p a i r of 79 l b t h r u s t chambers, which are pointed forward but are
canted obliquely t o prevent the exhaust plume from damaging the spacecraft
skin.

The a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l chambers are f i r e d i n s h o r t , v a r i a b l e l e n g t h
pulses. In order to achieve precision in attitude control, very short pulse
length capability i s required. High responsepropellantvalves and small
i n j e c t o r volumes meet t h i s requirement. The maneuver chambers are operated
f o r comparatively longer periods and therefore the.hlgh response i s not
required.

B. Thrust Chamber Temperature Control -
The t h r u s t chambers a r e i n s t a l l e d
below the spacecraft skin, with the exhaust nozzles terminating flush with the
vehicleexterior. The submerged i n s t a l l a t i o n , adoptedbecause of aerodynamic
considerations required that the temperature of t h e e x t e r i o r walls of t h e
t h r u s t chambers be limited t o avoid damage t o neighboring systems and struc-
t u r e s . This was achieved by using ablative material i n the construction of
chamber walls. Heat i s d i s s i p a t e d by being absorbed into the chamber w a l l
where t h e ablative material chars and r e l e a s e s gaseous products back i n t o t h e
chamber and out the exhaust nozzle.

C. Propellant DesignConcepts
minimum by t h e use of a high energy bipropellant,
-
Tank propellant weight i s kept at a
monomethyl hydrazine, as
f u e l and nitrogen tetroxide as oxidizer. These propellants are hypergolic
with each other; therefore no ignition provision i s required. The propellants
have additionaladvantages:they do notrequirespecialconditioning, such as
refrigeration,forstorage, andthey do notdegradewith time. Disadvantages

139
FIGURE 17 PROPULSION SYSTEMS-OAMS,RCS, RETRO
LOCATION IN SPACECRAFT
also exist: the prdpellants are highly toxic and, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e c a s e
of the oxidizer, corrosive.

I n o r d e r t o combat corrosion, a l l p a r t s exposed t o p r o p e l l a n t s are
made from corrosion resistant steel, except for the elastomeric materials, in
which Teflon emerged as the only suitable material. Toxicity i s dealt with
by s t r i c t c o n t r o l of leakage so that the propellants are securely contained
within the system. Thiscontainment i s insured by welding a l l c l o s u r e s i n t h e
various components (with a very few exceptions) and by using brazed joints
(as opposed t o threadedconnections) between components. Access ports needed
for servicing and ground t e s t i n g cannotbe welded, but are double o r t r i p l e
sealed against leakage. In addition to control of external leakage, the
propellants are isolated in their storage tanks until the system i s activated.
I n t h i s way, potential leakage locations are h e l d t o a minimum p r i o r t o system
use. Such techniques have resulted i n a systemwith extraordinarily low
leakage characteristics.

The propellants are stored i n spherical tanks of all-welded titanium.
In the absenceof gravity the propellant i s expelled by pressurant gas acting
upon the outside surface of bladders which contain the propellant. This pres-
surant gas (helium stored at high pressure) flows through a regulator and a
s e r i e s of check valvesbefore it i s introducedintothepropellanttanks. As
i n the case of the propellant, the pressurant i s stored behind isolation valves
t o reduce potentialleakagelocations. The pressureregulation i s redundant;
i f the primary regulator fails, the crew can regulate the system feed pressure
manually by switches and valves.

O M Function. -
The o r b i t a t t i t u d e and maneuver system i s arranged
schematically as shown i n Fig. 18.
A. Pressurant Storage -
Pressurant helium i s stored a t a nominal 3000 p s i
i n spherical titanium tanks, isolated before use by a cartridge-actuated valve
i n the component package A, immediately downstream of the pressurant tanks.
A manual access valve i n t h i s same package provides a means of pressurant
loading. The gaspressure,called"sourcepressure," i s monitored by a pres-
sure transducer which provides inputs t o a cabin display and t o ground
telemetry.Thistransducer i s upstreamof thecartridgevalve.

B. Pressure Regulator -
Upon activation of the system by f i r i n g c a r t r i d g e
valves, gas flows unimpeded through component package E to the pressure
regulator, which reduces the pressure t o 295 psig, the system feed pressure.
Malfunctionof the regulator, so t h a t it i s unable t o limit t h e downstream
pressure, i s detected by a pressure switch in package E. When t h i s occurs, a
normally-open cartridge valve, also i n package E, i s f i r e d t o i n t e r r u p t t h e
supply of highpressuregas to the regulator inlet. The crew may repressurize
the regulator inlet by opening a solenoid valve which bypasses t h e now closed
cartridge valve. If the regulator failure blocks the pressurant gas flow, a
regulator bypass valve (cartridge-actuated) can be f i r e d by the crew and
pressure canbe regulated by crew operation of the same solenoid valve. The
regulator override equipment has a l l been collected into package E.
PRESSURIZING GROUP

PRESSURANT COMPONENT COMPONENT
STORAGE TANK (He) PACKAGE E

REGULATOR/
NOTE: 1 A L L COMPONENTS EFFECTIVE ON S/C 2-12
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
A N O T ON S/C 3

TCAASSEMBLY
CHAMBER
THRUST LEGEND
+ CONNECTED
+ NOT
CONNECTED
SOLENOID VALVE (NORMALLY CLOSED)

TI,T2 TEMPERATURE(TRANSMITTEDTOPROPELLANT PRESSURE SWITCH
8 T~ TEMPERATUREAND PRESSURE INDICATOR OR
INSTRUMENT PANEL) (T ALSOTRANSMITTEDTO OAMS
PROPELLANT PUANTIT: INDICATOROR INSTRUMENT
CHECK VALVE
PANEL)
p1a p2 PRESSURE(TRANSMITTED T O PROP. TEMP. AND FILTER
PRESSURE INDICATOR ON INSTRUMENT PANEL) -1 GROUND TEST CONNECTION
P, PRESSUREVRANSMITTED T O OAMS PROPELLANT
QUANTITY INDICATOR ON INSTRUMENT PANEL) PROPELLANT SHUTOFF VALVE (MOTOR OPERATED)

0 23 LE. THRUST TCA (YAW, PITCH a ROLL)
CARTRIDGE-ACTUATED
VALVE
(NORMALLY
CLOSED) 0 95 LB. THRUST TCA
(TRANSLATE FORWARD)

CARTRIDGE
-ACTUATED
VALVE
(NORMALLY
OPEN) @
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER a 95 LB.THRUSTTCA(TRANSLATERIGHT,LEFT,
OR DOWN)
UP,

V A LRVEEL I E F aTHRUST7 9 LE. (TRANSLATE
AFT) TCA
- . ". ~_

FIGURE 18 ORBIT ATTITUDE ANDMANEUVERSYSTEMSCHEMATIC
I

COMPONENT
PACKAGE C
8
10

d
i rOXlOlZER

I I
\PACKAGE
I
-
F.
s/c lo& 1 1
PESERVE
IXIDIZER
TANK

FIGURE 18 ORBIT ATTITUDE AND MANEUVER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC(Continued)

143
the pressure regulator flows through
-
C. Pressure Transducer and Relief Valves Pressurant emerging from
component package B t o t h e p r o p e l l a n t
tanks. In package B t h e flow streams divide and pass through check valves
which i s o l a t e t h e fuel and oxidizer gas systems from eachother. A pressure
t r a n s d u c e r i n t h i s package senses regulated pressure for cabin display and
telemetry. Relief valves on both the oxidizer and fuel s i d e s of t h e package
preventpropellantoverpressurization. These r e l i e f v a l v e s a r e i s o l a t e d from
t h e helium system by b u r s t diaphragms which rupture a t a pressure approximately
e q u a l t o t h e relief valvecrackingpressure. Thus t h e system i s hermetically
sealed until a diaphragm ruptures and no relief valve leakage i s possible
u n t i l an overpressure condition actually exists.

D. Propulsion Tank Operation -
The pressure from t h e gas system i s applied
t o t h e l i q u i d s by means of a n intervening expulsion bladder, made of two
p l i e s ofTeflon f o r t h e oxidizer tanks and t h r e e p l i e s of T e f l o n f o r t h e f u e l
tms. The l i q u i d s are isolated within these tanks by a cartridge valve
l o c a t e d i n component package C on the oxidizer side and i n component package D
on t h e fuel side. These packages a l s o c o n t a i n t h e manual valves needed f o r
servicing and t e s t i n g of the tanks and t h e downstream system components.Motor
operatedvalvesarelocated i n t h e main feedline and a r e used, i f needed,
t o shut off flow t o the t h r u s t chamber assemblies (TCA's) The E A ' S have
fast-acting solenoid valves in the feedline for each propellant. These valves
can be opened t o permit the p r o p e l l a n t s t o f l o w t o t h e t h r u s t chamber injector;
a t t h i s point they are f e d i n t o a combustion chamber where they ignite hyper-
golically. The combustion productsarethen expanded through a converging-
divergingnozzle t o provide reaction thrust. Flow rates a r e c o n t r o l l e d by
fixed orifices in the propellant valve inlets.

F i l t e r s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the gas and l i q u i d systems t o
protectsensitiveelements from p a r t i c u l a t e contamination. The oxidizer,
nitrogen tetroxide, has a comparatively high freezing point, 12OF, and h e a t e r s
a r e i n s t a l l e d on t h e TCA oxidizer valves and t h e o x i d i z e r f e e d l i n e s t o p r e v e n t
freezing.

E. Measuring Remaining Propellant -
Theamount of propellant remaining i n
t h e OAMS i s estimated by measuring the pressures and temperatures of the
pressurant gas in the h i g h pressure and regulated pressure regions of the gas
system. By knowing t h e i n i t i a l q u a n t i t y of pressurant and by measuring
subsequent temperatures and pressures, t h e p r i n c i p l e of conservation of mass
i n the gas systemcanbe a p p l i e d t o compute the gas volume increase i n t h e
propellanttanks. From t h i s r e s u l t t h e p r o p e l l a n t volume and mass change can
be derived.Sourcetemperature and pressuresignals are combined t o provide
a propellantquantitycabinreadout. This indication can be corrected,using
regulated pressure and temperaturevalues, torefinethequantityestimate.
Throughout the Gemini program the trend has been to increase the
available propellant in the OAMS. Thenumber oftanks has ranged from two t o
six. The tankagecombinations and t h e i r e f f e c t i v i t i e s a r e i n d i c a t e d i n Fig. 18
and summarized i n Table 6.

F. Reserve Tank -
On l a t e r s p a c e c r a f t (7 through g ) , a small, c y l i n d r i c a l
reserve tank andan F package were added t o t h e system. The tank provides a
144
TABLE 6 GEMINI OAMS PROPELLANT TANKAGE

Re-entry Control System

Design Concept. - The re-entry control system (RCS) provides for attitude
control torques about t h e spacecraft pitch, yaw and r o l l axes a f t e r separation
of the equipment section of t h e adapter, during the firing of the retrograde
rockets, and duringre-entry. E i g h t t h r u s t chambers each rated at 23.5 l b
t h r u s t supply the output of each of two independent and completely redundant
rocketengine systems. The two systems a r e i n the re-entry section of t h e
145
vehicle, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig. 17. The eight %A's of eachsystem are
arranged, as i n t h e O M , about the periphery of the vehicle.

The RCS i s similar i n design concept t o t h e OAMS i n t h a t t h e TCA's are
f i r e d i n p a i r s and are submerged beneath the spacecraft skin. They are
a b l a t i v e l y cooled, pulse-operated, and are fixed in thrust level and i n t h r u s t
vector location. Thesame propellants used in the O W , monomethyl hydrazine
and nitrogen tetroxide, are used i n t h e RCS, but nitrogen i s s u b s t i t u t e d f o r
helium as t h e p r e s s u r a n t t o minimize leakage. No regulator redundancy i s
employed beyond that afforded by the duplication ofsystems. System r e l i a b i l -
i t y i s maintained by t h e i s o l a t i o n of propellants and pressurant behind
cartridge-actuated valves until shortly before re-entry, thereby minimizing
t h e e f f e c t s of leakageandpropellantexposure. The re-entryphase of the
mission i s r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t and the quantity of propellant i s l e s s than i n t h e
O W .
requirements .
However, e i t h e r o f t h e twoRCS's i s f'ullycapableofmeetingre-entry

RCS System Function. -
The system i s arranged schematically as shown i n
Fig. 19. The function of the RCS i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f u n c t i o n of the O M ,
( O M Function, page 141) with the following exceptions.

A. Since redundancy in pressure regulation i s notprovided, nocomponent
package E i s found i n t h e RCS.
B. Reserve propellant provisions are not provided, hence there i s no
component package F.
C. There are no maneuver TCA's i n t h e RCS.
D. Each propellant tank i s c y l i n d r i c a l and has approximately one-tenth
the capacity of the spherical OAMS propellant tank. Both t h e f u e l andthe
oxidizer bladder in the RCS a r e made of two p l i e s ofTeflon. Onlyone fuel,
oxidizer, and pressurant tank i s provided i n each RCS.
E. Electrical heaters are provided on the TCA oxidizer valves and on the
component packages C and D, but not on the propellant feedlines.

RCS and OAMS DevelopmentProgram. -The development programs on both the
OAMS : were r u n t o permit evolution of the
various designs to the point a t which they could survive the DAT (design
approval tests) planned. Numerous problems were encountered and solved in the
course of thisevolution.Ingeneral, development problems were concerned
withleakage, l i f e c a p a b i l i t y and vibration resistance. These problems usually
yielded to straightforward solutions. In addition to these, however, there
were other more sophisticated solutions, some of which are c i t e d below.

A. TCA Development -
Early TCA development was aimed a t achieving high
performance ( Isp) and long life. Problems were encounteredwithdelamination
of the ablative chamber, throat erosion, and ablative material glass migration.
These problems were not fully solved on the early spacecraft TCA, although
the %A's were fully adequate t o meet the requirements of t h e e a r l y missions.
A reconfiguration was introduced i n which the mixture ratio and performance
were reducedand the l i f e span was greatly increased. A t t h i s time other
improvements were introduced, such as ablative material with differently
oriented wrappingand an attachment of t h e E A valves t o t h e i n j e c t o r , which

146
OXIDIZER/
PRESSURANT GROUP FUEL GROUP TCA GROUP

COMPONENT
PRESSURANT STORAGE TANK (N2) PACKAGE "D"

P F COMPONENT PACKAGE "Bee
THRUST CHAMBER AND
INTEGRAL SOLENOID
7
7 V A L V E S (25 L B SIZE)

I""
1 ct l @ - b

I
im z
LTANKS
FTUP
AER
NL O
K PELLAN1
L - - - - - J
."".I
COMPONENT_/
PACKAGE "A"

-- -
LEGEND:
PRESSURANT GAS
OXIDIZER
TANK
-FUEL (MMH)

-----OXIDIZER (NTO)

CHECK VALVE
RELIEF VALVE

-& M A N U A LV A L V E COMPONENT
PACKAGE "C"
NORMALLY CLOSED CARTRIDGE VALVE MOTOROPERATED
SHUT-OFF VALVE
FILTER ( 2 PLACES) SIC 3 & U P

, U
DIAPHRAGM
BURST
ON(NOT S/C 3)

@ PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER NOTE: ONE OF TWO I D E N T I C A L SYSTEMS SHOWN

P
e FIGURE 19 REENTRY CONTROL(RCS)
SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
-J
TABLE 7 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM - PROPULSIONSYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS
ITEM I~
T E S T SP E R F O R M E D
- ." "_ .~
SYSTEM
"~
A
A PACKAGE 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 10, 11 OAMS-RCS
B PACKAGE 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,11 OAMS-RCS
C PACKAGE 1,2,5,6,7,8,9,10,ll OAMS-RCS
D PACKAGE 1,2,S,6,7,8,9,10,11 OAMS-RCS
E PACKAGE 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,1O,11,12
REGULATOR 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~ 8 ~ 9 ~ 1 1 ~ 1 3OAMS-RCS
~ 2 2 ~ 3 1 ~ 3 2
MOTOR SHUT-OFF VALVE 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,11,12,13 OAMS-RCS
PRESSURANT TANKS 1, 5, 7, 9, 11 OAMS-RCS
PROPELLANTTANKS 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~ 9 ~ 1 1 ~ 1 5 ~ 1 6 ~OAMS-RCS
1 7
CARTRIDGES 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 22, 25 OAMS-RCS
CARTRIDGE VALVES 1,3,4,5,8,9,11,12 OAMS-RCS
PRESS-TEMPINDICATOR 1, 3, 4. 12 OAMS-RCS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 25 L B 1, 4, 11, 19, 20. 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38 RCS
T H R U S T C H A M B E R ASSY - 25 L B 3, 4, 11, 20, 26. 28, 29. 35, 36. 38, 39 OAMS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 85 L B 1, 3, 4, 11,20, 28, 33, 36, 37 OAMS
- 100 L B 1, 4. 26. 27. 28. 29. 37
I
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY OAMS
" - ~ -~~- " "_ - " ~"

I OAMS SYSTEM
RCS SYSTEM
"~""
11, 14, 21, 23, 24, 30
11, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24
.. _____
OAMS
RCS

~ ~~~

LEGEND:
1. V I B R A T I O N 11. AMB FUNCTIONAL 21. O V E R T E S T E L E C 31. S A N D , D U S T
2. S E R V I C E L I F E 12. ELECTRICAL 22. A L T I T U D E 32. C O N T A M I N A T I O N
3. H I G H T E M P 13. HUMIDITY 23.F IHROET 33.SHOCK
TEMP
4. L O W T E M P 14. FILL,DRAIN,CLEAN 24. SHKEIANT I N G 34. BHAESAET I N G
5. M E C H S H O C K 15. SLOSH 25. AI GUTNOITION 35. M O C - A L T I T U D E
6. C O M P A T I B I L I T Y 16. BLADDER LIFE 26. I N V E R S I O N 36. T H R U S T V E C T O R
7. A C C E L E R A T I O N 17. EXPULSIONEFFICIENCY 27. O F F - M I X T U R R
EATIO 37. L O W
S U P P LPYR E S S
8. S A L T S P R A Y 18. MDC-LOW TEMP 28. P U L S I N G 38. P U L S E F A T I G U E
9. B U R S T 19. MDC-LOW TEMP/ALT 29. S T U C K V A L V E 39. W A L L T E M P
10. C A R T R I D G E F I R I N G 20. M D C - H I G H T E M P I A L T 30. M A N R E G U L A T I O N

TABLE 8 DEVELOPMENTTEST SUMMARY
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS, RETRO
I ENVIRONMENTS I MAJOR I T - TEST PERFORMED
b - TEST NOT REQUIRED

COMPONENTS

148
was reconfigured t o improve producibility. Also the valve mounts were
strengthened and the valve poppet clearance was increased t o improve contamina-
tion resistance. The l i f e of t h e maneuver TCA's, ( t h e 79 and 94.5 l b E A ' S )
was increased by boundary layer cooling, in which f u e l , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h a t
i n j e c t e d f o r primary combustion, was sprayed along the chamber walls f o r
cooling andsubsequentsecondary combustion. The . e f f e c t i v i t i e s of t h e TCA
performancechanges a r e shown i n Table 9 .
TABLE 9 CHANGE HISTORY'OF TCAPERFORMANCE

rRBD
EFFECTIVITY
IRC!

I 25.0
i 23.5 79 9 4.: i
!CSl

1.3
I 25

2.0
OAMS

85

!.O

I .6
I 00

-
AD

2.0:

1.6
~

270,'
25
[
18/160 147/27

I
85

270/
OAMS

~
T
100 1
I A D I AALF T

'40,' 540/

!20/300 220/30
100
RCS

2s

300,'

!75/26(
ISp (NOM/MIN) - SEC
I

SPACECRAFT 2, 3

SPACECRAFT 4
I 4251578
I
SPACECRAFT 5

SPACECRAFT 6 8 L
I I- 1
1
1.2
I
1.2
i _" 557175
~
I

Other early R & D experience resulted in a change from a hard, metal-
to-metal valve seat t o a s o f t seat design for improved contamination resistance.
In addition, the injector feedlines and flow passages were strengthened t o
improve their explosion resistance, and a variable flow c o n t r o l o r i f i c e was
replaced w i t h a f i x e d o r i f i c e t o i n s u r e r e p e a t a b l e flow c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

Vibration failures in the valve mount a r e a of t h e 79 and 94.5 l b TCA's
necessitated the installation of a n external valve support bracket for early
spacecraft and a strengthened version for later spacecraft.

B. Propellant Tanks Development
enduranceof t h e propellant tank bladders
-
During t h e development program, t h e
was found t o be limited. The problem
was g r e a t e r f o r the s p h e r i c a l OAMS tanks t h a n f o r t h e c y l i n d r i c a l RCS tanks,
and more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e f u e l t a n k s t h a n of the oxidizer tanks. A l l
bladders were i n i t i a l l y of two-ply construction; however, the OAMS f u e l tank
bladder proved marginal and was replaced by a three-ply bladder, which was
more s a t i s f a c t o r y .

Duringdevelopment, t h e tanks were t e s t e d e x t e n s i v e l y t o e s t a b l i s h
d u r a b i l i t y limits. Vibration tests, expulsioncycling tests, s l o s h t e s t s , and
acceleration t e s t s were run and t h e o v e r a l l r e s u l t s proved that t h e f i n a l l y
selected bladders had a greater l i f e capability than had beenexpected. The
RCS tanks were s i g n i f i c a n t l y more durable than the OAMS tanlcs. I n f a c t , t h r e e
RCS tanks from Spacecraft 6 were reused, without refurbishin i n the a t t i t u d e ,
control systemof t h e augmented t a r g e t docking adapter (ATDAY.
C. B Package Development -
The B package burst diaphragm o r i g i n a l l y
selected was a metallic gold shear disc, which proved t o be e r r a t i c r e l a t i v e
t o rupturepressure.Spacecraft 2 was flown with the gold disc; Spacecraft 3
did not have burst diaphragms. By Spacecraft 4 a s u b s t i t u t e burst diaphragm
had been evolved which had a tighter and more predictable rupture pressure
range. This new diaphragm was composed of a hemisphere, pressurized on i t s
convex side, which collapsed onto a set of knives at t h e rupture pressure.

D. Regulator Development -
Due t o a slight leakage from the fuel/oxidizer
group, propellant compatibility was considered necessary i n the pressure
regulator. This goal was easily achieved except a t the metal-to-metalvalve
seat, where very hard materials were needed for durability, becauseof the
high unit loads required for sealing.

The first attempt was t o make the poppet ball of tungsten carbide w i t h
a cobaltbinder. This solution proved unfeasible because the tungsten was
attacked by the oxidizer. The Spacecraft 2 OAMS regulator, with a b a l l made
of t h i s material, required replacement a t CapeKennedy because of corrosion.
This problem was finally resolved by using Kennamental ~ 6 0 1 as the poppet b a l l
material.

E. State-of-Art Advances i n Development of RCS and OAMS During the -
development of t h e RCS and O M , certain state-of-the-art advances were made.
In summary form they are :

1. Application of ablative cooling philosophies t o actual practice in
the case of small pulsing rocket engines.
2. Closed welding ofcomplexcomponent packages t o prevent leakage.
3. Manufacture of f i l t e r s from 304L CRES, a weldable, propellant
compatible material.
4. Creation of a composite TCA valve seat, combining t h e desirable
features of s o r t s e a t s t o overcome contamination s e n s i t i v i t y and hard seats
f o r endurance.
5. Development of high temperature bonding adhesives for
assemblies .
6; Cleanliness control a t component and system l e v e l s t o
E A

a degree not
previously achieved.

Design Approval Test Program f o r RCS and O M . - Components t e s t e d i n
the design approval t e s t (DAT) program were subjected to varying sequencesof
environments t o demonstrate e i t h e r of two conditions: (1)component survival
after t e s t i n g , o r ( 2 ) properoperation of t h e component during the test. (See
Tables 10 and 11.) I n some instances, parallel t e s t specimens were run, but
t o d i f f e r e n t sequencesof t e s t s . This was done, when circumstancespermitted,
t o conservetime o r t o permit running of several types of destructive tests.
When the component was considered sufficiently durable, only one u n i t was
t e s t e d (e.g., t h e C and D packages) . If t h e component was life-limited, more
t e s t specimens were employed. I n thecase of the propellant tanks, it was
discovered that a l l dynamic and functional tests contributed to t h e ultimate
f a i l u r e of the bladders; hence a l l t e s t series designed t o show bladder
integrity included each of t h e predicted spacecraft dynarnic environments.
Several t h r u s t chambers, whose l i f e was limited by t h e amount of ablative
TABLE 10 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST PROGRAM
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - O M S , RCS
~ ~~

I ~-~

A PACKAGE
ITEM ~
~~ ~
TESTS PERFORMED SYSTEM
1.2,3,4,6.7.8.9.31 OAMS-RCS
0 PACKAGE 1, 2, 6, 7, 8. IO, 18 OAMS-RCS
C PACKAGE 1.2.3.4.6.7.8.9.10 OAMS-RCS
D PACKAGE I . 2, 6, 7,8 , 10, 31 OAMS-RCS
E PACKAGE l,2,3,6,7,8,1O,11,31 OAMS
REGULATOR I , 2. 7, 8, 10, 17. 18, 20, 31 OAMS-RCS
MOTOR S H U ~ O F F V A L V E 1, 2, 7. 8. IO, 11, 17, 30 OAMS-RCS
PRESSURANT TANK 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.31 OAMS-RCS
PROPELLANTTANK 1.2.3,6.7.8,10,31,32 OAMS-RCS
CARTRIDGES 1, 5, 7, 8. 12, 13, 14, 31, 34 OAMS-RCS
CARTRIDGE VALVES 1, 2, 5, 7, 8 , 15, 16, 17,18. 19, 31, 34 OAMS-RCS
PRESSURE TEMP INDICATOR 1.2.3.6.7.8.20.31 OAMS-RCS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 25 LB' 1. 2, 3, 4,5, 6, IS, 17, 18, 21. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.28, 31 OAMS-RCS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY 25 LB' - I , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. IO, 14, 21, 24.25, 26. 27. 29. 31 RCS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY 85 LB' - I , 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 15, 21, 24. 25, 26. 28, 30, 31 OAMS
THRUST CHAMBER ASSY - 100 L B * 1, 2, 3, 4. 5, 6. IO, IS, 21. 23, 24.25, 26, 27. 31 OAMS
~~

1 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, IO, 22, 25, 31, 35
1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 15, 22,.31, 35
~
OAMS
RCS

. .-
LEGEND:
1. AMB FUNCTIONAL 11. CONTAMINATION 22. SEA LEVEL
FIRING 31. PROOF
PRESSURE
2. VIBRATION 12. NO-FIRE CURRENT 23. PROP V A L V E - 32. SLOSH
3. ACCELERATION 13. AUTO IGNITION CONTINUOUS DUTY 33. DROP
4. BURST 14. MULTIPLE FIRING 24. MDCFAILURE
TO 34. BRUCETON
5. MECH SHOCK 15. HI-LO-TEMP A L T 25. MDC TO GUARANTEED 35. PROPELLANT
6. SERVICE L I F E 16. SAND-DUST LIFE UTILIZATION
7. HIGH TEMP 17. SALT SPRAY 26. MDC TO "IN S PEC"
8 . LOW TEMP 18. HUMIDITY 27. EXPLOSIVE ATM
9. CARTRIDGE VALVE 19. ACOUSTIC. 28. V A L V E SERVICE L I F E
ACTUATION 20. RESPONSE 29. PULSING
IO. COMPATIBILITY 21. THERMAL SHOCK 30. THRUST VECTOR

TABLE 11 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST SUMMARY
PROPULSION SYSTEMS - OAMS, RCS

LEGEND:
I I MAJOR ENVIRONMENTS T = TEST PERFORMED
A = TEST NOT
REQUIRED

A. C, D, EPACKAGES:PRESSURANTTANK
. . . -~.-
B PACKAGE
~~
.. . ~

REGULATOR
~~~ . " . ~~

MOTOROPERATEOVALVE
- ~~ . ~ ~~ ~

PROPELLANTTANKS
" ~ . .. -.. -
THRUST CHAMBERS
" ~. - "

CARTRIDGE: RETRO ROCKET ASSEMBLY
.~ -
PRESSURANT-TEMPERATURE INDICATOR
-~
OAMS
. " ~ ~~

RCS
material present, were used i n t h e t e s t i n g so t h a t each u n i t mightkeep within
i t s rated l i f e f o r a l l t e s t environments. "One-shot" itemsof equipment,such
as t h e cartridges and cartridge valves, were t e s t e d i n l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s t o
a c q u i r e s t a t i s t i c a l performance data.

Complete systems were a l s o t e s t e d t o demonstrate interaction between
components andsystem function at thetemperatureextremes. Each system w a s
also vibration tested, the OAMS module being separated from i t s TCA manifolds
f o r t h i s test. System flushing and dryingprocedures were demonstratedduring
system DAT. In the case of the OAMS both two-tankand four-tank modules were
tested.

DAT problems generally led to corrective action involving improved q u a l i t y
control, both in test performance and in fabrication. They a l s o broughtabout
a reduction of t e s t severity so t h a t updated, more reasonable test conditions
came t o be employed.

I n the propellant tanks, for example, a redesign resulted because i n i t i a l
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g showed t h a t some tanks suffered degradation of the
flange assembly during test. The specified flange leakage rate was exceeded
when a lower pressure situation was encountered a f t e r t h e assembly has been
exposed t o t h e s t r i n g e n t environment. The originalspecificationrequired
t h a t the tanks m a i n t a i n an acceptable leak rate a t both proof pressure and
nominalsystem pressure. However, it was apparent that such a requirement
couldnot be repeatedlymaintained.withtheexistingflangedesign. The prin-
c i p a l cause of flange leakage was a propellant compatibility test environment
of 160°F'for twoweeks; t h i s i s nowknown t o be an overly severe condition and
unrepresentative of mission environment.

The flange seal was modified by increasing Teflon thickness ir, the flange
area. Modified tanks were then tested, employing a t e s t time-temperature
p r o f i l e more representative of mission environment. The t e s t requirements were
successfullypassed by tanks incorporatingtherevisedflangedesign. All
tanks used on Spacecraft 6 and later spacecraft incorporate the revised flange
design. This type of leakage h a s been l i m i t e d t o t e s t programs. Service
experience w i t h tanks has been f r e e of flange leakage.

R e l i a b i l i t y Assurance Test Program f o r OAMS and RCS. -
I n t h i s program
"

components were subjected t o environments which were more severe t h a n those
requiredforqualification. (SeeTable 12. ) The components were subjected t o
overstress environmentsof vibration,temperatureextremes,endurance, and
contamination t o demonstratesafemargins existed i n performance, d u r a b i l i t y
and strength. The components testedsurvivedtheseoverstressessatisfactorily,
although certain characteristics were revealed:
A. The A package pressure transducer shifted out of specification toler-
ance under extreme temperature conditions.
B. The f i l t e r s i n the TCA's became plugged when large amounts ofcontamina-
t i o n were introduced. One f i l t e r ruptured under the pressure differential.
C. The E A s k i n temperature went over 7OO0F a t So$ of i t s rated l i f e when
inlet pressures equal to proof pressure wereimposed.
tABLE 12 .RELIABILITY ASSURANCE TEST PROGRAM ,ENVIRONMENTS
~ ~-

LOW HIGH
VIBRATION
*EMPERATURE

-I
4:
Z
2
I-
U
Z
3
U

PACKAGE A

PACKAGE E

REGULATOR

MOTOR VALVE T

TCA PROPELLANT
VALVES
25 L B
~
.~~
~~

100 L B

TCA - RCS 2 5 L B T T
~-

TCA - OAMS 2 5 LB T
"- .

T - TEST PERFORMED

D. The E package and pressure regulator leakages wentup t o f i v e times
specification values when large amounts of contamination were introduced into
the packages .
E. The E package pressure switch failed to actuate at temperatures
below -24'F.

O M and RCS Flight Performance. -
The RCS performed without malfunction
on all-flights except the Gemini X I 1 mission, on which the A-ring regulated
pressure was excessive for a brief period following system arming.

The OAMS experienced thrust reduction in attitude control thrust chambers
on the long duration missions Gemini V and Gemini V I I , during the extensive
duty of Gemini V I I I , which was terminated early, and during the Gemini I X ,
Gemini X I and Gemini X I 1 missions. The cause of the thrust reduction i s being
investigated and the results of the study w i l l be submitted i n McDonnell
report F-206, Gemini TCA Anomaly Investigation. Table 13 of this report pre-
sents a resume of flight experience relative to propellant used and system
perf omance .
153
TABLE 13 PROPULSIONSYSTEM FLIGHT RESULTS
OAMS I RCS 7
TOTAL PROPEL TOTAL PROPELLAN SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PROPULSION EVENTS
'ROPELLAN EXPEN PROPELLAN' EXPENDED DURING MISSION
TANKED # TANKED U
U U .~ .~ "

49 12 70.4 66.4 OAMS, RCS N O M I N A L SEPARATION.RETRD.RE-ENTRY
!BALLISTIC)
~~ .___~._- "
" " .. ~

366 186 73.3 54.2 OAMS, RCS NOMINAL SEPARATION. OUT-OF-PLANE
MANEUVERING, RETRO, RE-ENTRY
:3 ORBITS)
. -~
411 327 72.3 68.1 OAMS,RCS NOMINAL SEPARATION, 4 D A Y S A T T I T U D E
CONTROL,RETRO,RE-ENTRY
:62ORBITS)
~~

385 280 72.2 58.7 RCS NOMINAL ; OAMS NORMAL jEPARATION, 8 D A Y S A T T I T U D E
EXCEPT REDUCED THRUST CONTROL, RETRO, RE-ENTRY
FROM ATTITUDE TCA's AFTER 120 ORBITS)
THIRD DAY -ATTRIBUTED TO
OXIDIZER FREEZING
_
~. _ _ _ ~
713 424 72.0 68.1 OAMS, RCS N O M I N A L SEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
ZIRBIT, RENDEZVOUS WITH SPACE-
:RAFT 7, RETRO, RE-ENTRY (17
IRBITS)
_~____
428 320 71.9 68.0 RCS NOMINAL; OAMS NOMINAL iEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
EXCEPTREDUCED THRUST )RBIT, RENDEZVOUS TARGET
FROM ATTITUDE T C A ' ~u3 a 4 'OR S P A C E C R A F T 6, 14 DAYS
A F T E R T H E l2TH DAY -
ATTRI- 4TTITUDE CONTROL, RETRO,
BUTEDTO PLUGGINGOF FEED ?E-ENTRY (206 ORBITS)
LINE AT TCA
- . .
767 564 72.0 68.1 RCS NOMINAL; OAMS N O M I N A L iEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
U N T I L R A T E D L I F E OF A T T I - IRBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND
TUDE TCA's WAS EXCEEDED. )OCK WITH AGENA. RETRO, RE-
REDUCED THRUST FROM ATTI- i N T R Y (7 ORBITS) EARLY
TUDE TCA'. 3, 7,a 8 EXPERI- r E R M l N A T l O N O F MISSION
ENCED IN OVERLIFE PERIOD
~-- ~ " ~

762 707 72.1 46.0 RCS NOMINAL; OAMS NOMINAL IEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
EXCEPT REDUCED THRUST IREIT, RENDEZVOUS WITH AUG-
F R O M A T T I T U D E T C A ' r U1 AND AENTED TARGET DOCKING
3. RESTRICTION OF PRO- iDAPTER (ATDA), RETRO, RE-
P E L L A N T FLOW APPEARED TO i N T R Y (46 ORBITS)
B E T H E MOST P R O B A B L E C A U S t
" ~ . . ~ "

967 91 7 72.0 5813 OAMS.RCS NOMINAL ;EPARATION,CIRCULARIZE
IRBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK
l l T H AGENA, DUAL RENDEZVOUS,
__- __ IETRO, RE-ENTRY, (44 ORBITS)
"" . - " -
967 855 72.0 56.7 RCS NOMINAL, OAMS NOMINAL SEPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
EXCEPT FORTHRUSTDEGRA- )RBIT, RENDEZVOUS AN0 DOCK
DATION EXPERIENCED FROM l l T H AGENA, MULTIPLE DOCK-
SEVERAL ATTITUDE TCA's
RESTRICTION OF PROPEL-
. NG, RERENDEZVOUS, RETRO,
I E - E N T R Y (44 ORBITS)
LANT FLOW APPEARED TO BE
T H E MOST PROBABLE CAUSE.
- . - "~ . . ~ .~
931 712 71.9 65.1 REGULATED PRESSURE IN RING EPARATION, CIRCULARIZE
O F T H E RCS INCREASED TO 415 )RBIT, RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK
PSlA FOLLOWING SYSTEM ARM- f l T H ACENA, MULTIPLE DOCK-
ING. PRESSURE DECREASED TO NG, RETRO,RE-ENTRY (62
NOMINAL WITH TCA USAGE AND )RBITS)
REGULATOREVENTUALLY
LOCKED-UP. THE ANOMALY WAS
ATTRIBUTED TO PARTICLE
CONTAMINATION AT THE SEAT
OF THE REGULATOR.RCS PER-
FORMANCE EXCEPTFORTHE
ABOVE.
OAMS NOMINAL EXCEPT FOR
THRUST DEGRADATION EXPER.
IENCED FROM SEVERAL TCA's.
CAUSEOFDEGRADEDPERFORM.
ANCEAPPEAREDTOBEPRO.
P E L L A N T FLOW RESTRICTION
-_ ~ .. .. ~.
" ~
~
There were no t h r u s t e r anomalies on Spacecraft 3, 4, 6 and 10. Therefore
these missions are not discussed in t h e following paragraphs.

A. Gemini V Experience - Gemini V data indicated that during the t h i r d
dayof the mission, OAMS a t t i t u d e TCA No. 7 ceased t o provide normal thrust.
On the fourth day, t h r u s t from TCA No. 6 became e r r a t i c . The a s t r o n a u t s a l s o
reported that a l l a t t i t u d e TCA's seemed sluggish. The malfunctionfollowed
a two day period during which the heaters, used to control the temperature of
t h e OAMS TCA oxidizer valves, were switched o f f t o conserve e l e c t r i c a l power.
Thermal a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s that without heating, and under adverse f l i g h t
conditions, the O M oxidizer systemcan drop below the freezing point of
nitrogen tetroxide. Performance of a l l but one of t h e malfunctioning TCA's
w a s restored by r e a c t i v a t i n g the valve heaters. It has beenconcluded t h a t
t h e o x i d i z e r l i n e s f r o z e and that the heaters were not adequate t o thaw t h e
last TCA, which was located in the coldest position i n the spacecraft.

B. Gemini V I 1 Experience -
On t h e twelfth day of t h e Gemini V I 1 mission,
OAMS a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l TCA's No. 3 and No. 4 yielded reduced t h r u s t (estimated
a t 25% of rated thrust) during pulse mode operation. These same T C A ' s l o s t
virtually all thrust during the direct mode of operation.Examination of a l l
available data has resulted in the following conclusions:

1. Freezing was not a f a c t o r i n t h e e r r a t i c performanceof t h e TCA's.
The propellant supply did not freeze nor did power ever f a i l t o the redundant
valve heaters (oneof which w a s under thermostatic control and t h e o t h e r
continuously active).

2. Thetwo TCA's which f a i l e d had had more than 80 l b of propellant
expended through them. This was considerably more t h a n t h e i r r a t e d l i f e .

3. After thorough investigation, it w a s i n f e r r e d that the TCA f a i l u r e s
were probably caused by:

a. blockage of the propellant valve orifices or inlet filter by
contaminants, o r
b. deformation of t h e valve seat due t o h e a t soakback r e s u l t i n g
from the heavy duty cycle.

C. Gemini V I 1 1 Experience -
After seven h r of t h e Gemini V I 1 1 mission,
O M TCA No. 8 commenced f i r i n g without p i l o t a c t u a t i o n , w a s b r i e i l y i n t e r -
rupted, and then recommenced f i r i n g f o r twomin and t h e n f o r 11min u n t i l the
c i r c u i t breaker was opened. Examination revealed that t h i s TCA's t h r u s t
performance was nominal u n t i l i t s r a t e d l i f e was exceeded, after which t h e
thrust degraded. It i s therefore concluded that the TCA was f i r e d as a result
of a short somewhere i n t h e TCA v a l v e e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t .
D. Gemini M Experience - A t various intervals during the Gemini M
mission, OAMS a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l T C A ' s 1 and 3 yielded reduced t h r u s t ; causing
pitch/rollcoupling and yaw/rollcoupling,respectively. These anomalies
occurred while the spacecraft attitude control was i n pulse, direct, horizon
scan, and r a t e commandmodes of operation. Restriction of propellant flow
appeared t o be t h e most probable cause of failure.
155
E. Gemini X I Experience, - During the Gemini X I mission, the crew reported
degradedperformance from TCA's No. 6 and No. 8. In addition, t h e performance
from TCA No. 15 was believed t o be intermittent during t h e first and last
rendezvous. The post-flight data review indicated several TCA's i n a d d i t i o n
t o E A ' S No. 6 and No. 8 produced degraded t h r u s t a t various times during the
mission. The data review didnotconfirmthereported TCA No. 15 anomaly. The
data indicates a problem similar t o the Gemini M experience. The degraded
TCA performance was a t t r i b u t e d t o flow restriction, possibly resulting from
p a r t i c u l a t e matter and/or p r e c i p i t a t i o n of i r o n n i t r a t e from t h e oxidizer..

F. Gemini X I 1 Experience -
A t approximately 40 h r through the mission,
the crew reported degradedperformanceof OAMS t h r u s t chambers Nos. 2 and 4.
Tests performed l a t e r i n the mission with the thrust chambers, and post-flight
analysis of data revealed degradedperformance from a l l O M attitude thrusters.
The best appraisal of the available facts points to propellant flow r e s t r i c t i o n
as the causeof t h e performance loss. This r e s t r i c t i o n could have resulted
from propellant contamination or the precipitation of i r o n n i t r a t e from the
oxidizer. A l data are currently being reevaluated t o e s t a b l i s h a t e s t program
t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e problem. McDonnell report F-206,Gemini TCA Anomaly
Investigation i s being prepared for submittal to NASA.

Immediately a f t e r arming of t h e E A A-ring, regulated pressure rose
t o a high of 415 p s i a (nominal i s 295 psia). Following t h r u s t e r i n i t i a t i o n ,
however, the regulated pressure decreased t o normal l e v e l s and standard regu-
l a t o r performance was indicated. During post-flighttesting,theregulator
Functionedproperly. The anomaly was a t t r i b u t e d t o p a r t i c u l a t e contamination
at the regulator seat which was subsequently purged from the regulator as
pressurant was used.

Retrograde Rocket System

Location. - The four retrograde rockets are located i n the retrograde
section of t h e adapter, as shown i n Fig. 17. Mounted on crossed aluminum
I-beams, t h e retrograde rockets are positioned symmetrically about t h e longi-
tudinal axis of t h e spacecraft. They are exposed when the adapter equipment
section i s jettisonedshortlybeforetheretrograde maneuver. The retrograde

.
s e c t i o n i t s e l f i s jettisoned approximately 45 s e c a f t e r firing of the rocket
motors

Purpose. -
The retrograde rockets are used to decelerate the spacecraft
a t the start of the re-entry maneuver. As an alternate task, these motors
increase spacecraft velocity to aid in separation from the launch vehicle
during a high altitude,butyetsuborbital,abort. During retrograde,the
motors a r e fired sequentially at f i v e and one-halfsecintervals.Intheabort
situation the rockets are f i r e d i n salvo.
Retrograde Rocket Description. -
The four retrograde rocket motors are
solid propellant devices, each generating
~ ~~
a nominal t h r u s t of 2500 lb. Each
motor assembly consists of a solid propellant grain (polysUide/auunonium
perchlorate), a motor case, an exhaust nozzle and two pyrogen-type i g n i t e r
assemblies, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig. 20. A l four motors are identical, with
the single exception that the i g n i t e r e l e c t r i c a l connectors are broached
d i f f e r e n t l y t o p r e v e n t i n c o r r e c t e l e c t r i c a l hookup and therefore insure proper
firing sequence. The ignitionof these motorsfollows t h i s order. An elec-
t r i c a l s i g n a l , communicated through bridgewire, ignites a prime mix and booster
charge which provide the heat and pressure required t o i g n i t e boron-potassium
nitrate pellets. These, in turn, burn t o i g n i t e t h e pyrogen sustainer grain.
The pyrogen exhausts into the motor cavity, igniting the main propellant
charge, which provides thrust and impulse through the exhaust nozzle.

Retrograde Rocket Development Program. - Thirty-three motorsand 50
pyrogen- i g n i t e r s were tested during the development program. The u n i t s were
subjected tostructural,temperature,functional, and agingtests. (See
Table 14. ) Eight motors, o r two sets, were used i n two altitude rocket abort
(popgun) t e s t s , performed t o v e r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the spacecraft
b l a s t shield and structure under altitude abort conditions. During the first
t e s t , t h r e e of the four rockets ejected t h e i r exhaustnozzles.Since l o s s of
the exhaust nozzle endangers the nozzle t h r o a t , without which the rocket motor
cannot f i r e , a redesign which would retain the nozzle more securely was con-
siderednecessary.Following t h i s redesign, 18 motors were successfully
tested, four of these i n a repeat of the popgun t e s t . An i g n i t e r r e l i a b i l i t y
t e s t s e r i e s was performed, i n which the fourth unit to be t e s t e d misfired.
The remaining i g n i t e r s were redesigned t o provide a higher initiator output
and then successfully tested.

Retrograde Rocket Design Approval Test Program. -
The design approval
t e s t program consisted of environmental, structural, and functional tests.
(See Table 15.) The program was carried out w i t h no failures.
Flight Experience. -
The retrograde rockets have functioned without
anomaly on all Gemini flights. The motors have n o t been called upon t o perform
t h e i r secondary o r abort task.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

mjor functions of t h e environmental control system (ECS) a r e t o :

A. Control the suit and cabin atmosphere.

equipment .
B. Control the temperatures of the astronaut suits

C. Provide drinking water for
and t h e spacecraft

t h e crew and a means f o r s t o r i n g o r
disposing of waste water.

S u i t And Cabin

Atmosphere Control. - A simpleschematicof t h e s u i t and cabinatmospheric
system i s shown i n Fig. 21. The primary oxygen system provides oxygen during
launch and o r b i t a l f l i g h t , and t h e secondary oxygen system provides-oxygen
during retrograde and re-entry.
157

I
r GRAPHITE THROAT

-INSULATION

,PROPELLANT
GRAIN

INITIATOR AND PYROGEN IGNITOR (TYPICAL 2)

E X I T CONE-

IGNITION MIX
I N I T I A T O R MIX
CONNECTOR
BORON PELLETS

SECTION A-A
VIEW B-B CAVITY PROPELLANT

FIGURE 20 RETROGRADE ROCKET
TABLE.14 DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM-RETROGRADEROCKETS
ROCKET MOTOR TESTS
~~ ~
~

NO. O F U N I T S T E S T E D
TEST
ORIGINAL FINAL
:ONFIGURATION CONFIGURATION
~

TEMPERATURE CYCLING 4 4
VlBRATfON - HIGH TEMPERATURE - 2
- NORMAL TEMPERATURE 2 -
-LOWTEMPERATURE - 2
DROP 2 4
ACCELERATION 1 2
HUMIDITY 2 4
TEMPERATURE GRADIENT - 3
STATIC FIRE - SEA LEVEL - HIGH TEMP 1 6
- NORMAL TEMP 4 1
- LOW TEMP 1 -
STATIC FIRE - VACUUM - HIGH TEMP 1 2
- LOW T E M P 2 2
STATIC FIRE - SEA L E V E L ( A L T I T U D E I G N I T I O N ) 3 -
SPACE AGING - 2
ACCELERATED AGING - 1
POP-GUN 4 4
"
.. ~
." -~~ ~ ~~
L

PYROGEN TESTS

TEST NO. O F U N I T S T E S T E D

VIBRATION - LOW TEMP 17
- NORMAL TEMP 16
- HIGH TEMP 17
ACOUSTIC NOISE 6
STATIC FIRING - SEA L E V E L - LOW T E M P a
-NORMALTEMP 6
- HIGH TEMP a
STATIC FIRING - VACUUM - LOW T E M P 9
-NORMAL TEMP 10
- HIGH TEMP 9
T A B L E 15 DESIGN APPROVAL TEST PROGRAM
RETROGRADEROCKET

NO. OF UNITS
TEST
TESTED

TEMPERATURE CYCLING 18

VIBRATION - HIGH TEMPERATURE 6

-NORMAL TEMPERATURE 6

-LOWTEMPERATURE 6

DROP 10

ACCELERATION 9

HUMIDITY 9

TEMPERATURE GRADIENT 6

VACUUM SOAK - HIGH TEMPERATURE 8

-LOWTEMPERATURE 8

STATIC FIRE - SEA L E V E L - HIGH TEMP 5

-NORMALTEMP 5

- LOW TEMP 8

STATIC FIRE - SEA L E V E L ( V A C U U M I G N I T I O N )
- HIGH TEMP 8

- LOW TEMP 8

STATIC FIRE - ALTITUDE 6

T O T A L O F 4 0 UNITS TESTED

Operational functions of the suit and cabin atmospheric control system
a r e as follows :

A. The oxygen supplysystem consists ofprimary 02 (stored cryogenically
a t supercriticalpressure), secondary oxygen, and egress oxygen.(The egress
oxygen supply has been deleted for Spacecraft 8 through 12. Ref Environmental
Control System Design Changes, D. page 168).
B. Makeup oxygen i s provided t o t h e s u i t loop,and t o t h e c a b i n by the
primary 02 system a t a regulated pressure.
C. Cabin pressure i s regulated via the suit loop.
D. The cabin i s repressurized by opening the repressurization valve.
E. Suit pressure is maintained by the s u i t demand regulators.

160
"""""""I""""I

PRESSURE
VALVE
I REGULATOR

q-J
I1 SUIT

PRESSURE
REGULATOR
I
I
I
I
FILTER I PRIMARY HEAT
CRYO.
I EXCHANGER
OXYGEN
I

FLOW CONTROL VALVES
I
L""""
I
I
-
L

1
SUIT PRESSURE
REGULATOR
r,
-
'
co2
SENSOR FAN

I SUIT
n EAT "
EXCHANGER ABSORBER

FAN

VALVE

I1 I
I
-
A

4 I 4 CABIN
REPRESSURIZATION t CABIN
4 SUIT PRESSURE
w
REG RELIEF

m
TRAP
1 .
r

"""""-"""I
W B S PRESSURESWITCH
L"3""""""""""""""""""I~
r FIGURE 21 SUIT AND CABIN ATMOSPHERE CONTROL
F. S u i t c i r c u l a t i o n and atmospheric control are provided by fans, suit
heat exchanger and condensate removal, C02 and odor removal, and solid traps.
G. Cabin moisture i s p a r t i a l l y removed by flow of water vapor through
the cabin recirculation valve into the suit loop, where t h e water vapor is
condensed and separated by t h e s u i t h e a t exchanger.
H. Condensate collected by t h e s u i t h e a t exchanger flows t o t h e launch
heat exchanger, where it i s dumped overboard as l i q u i d o r vapor.
1. For parachute descent, the cabin pressure relief valve i s opened, the
i n l e t s n o r k e l and outflow vent valves are closed, and t h e 02 high-rate i s
selected.
J. After landing, t h e inletsnorkel,outflowvent, and recirculation
valves are opened so that t h e s u i t compressorcan provide atmospheric
circulation.

Suit and Cabin Safety and Redundancy. -
Safety andredundancy features of
t h e s u i t andcabinatmospherecontrol system are as follows:

A. Suit plus cabin pressurization.
B. Sufficient secondary oxygen (in case of f a i l u r e of primary 02 supply)
i n each of two b o t t l e s f o r one o r b i t -at normal consumption rate plus re-entry
at high 02 consumption rate.
C. Automatic high r a t e 02 flow in case of decompressed cabin and excessive
s u i t c i r c u i t leakage.
D. Cabin pressure regulator preserves 02 supply i n case of excessive
cabin leakage .
E. Combined dual cabin pressure relief valve and water seal valve.
F. Redundant s u i t f a n s and power supplies.
G. Dual cabin pressure regulator.
H. C02 sensor t o check C02 concentration in suit loop.
I. Redundant primary 02 check valves t o prevent loss ofsecondary 02 a t
adapter separation.
J. Redundantmeansof i n i t i a t i n g high 02 rate automatically.
K. Redundant suit pressure regulators.

Cooling System

Heat Rejection Devices. -
A schematic of the cooling system i s shown i n
Fig. 22. By active and passivecooling,the system providestemperature
control for the crew andspacecraft equipment. Heat sinks, u t i l i z e d f o r
temperature control during the different phases of the mission, are as follows:

A. Prelaunch -Heat i s r e j e c t e d t o t h e ground cooling system via the
coolant loop and the ground cooling heat exchanger.
B. Iaunchand Insertion - Heat i s r e j e c t e d t o space via the coolant loop
by boiling water in the launch heat exchanger.
C. Orbit - Heat i s transferred by the coolant loop t o t h e r a d i a t o r where
it i s r a d i a t e d t o space.
D. Re-entry - Heat i s r a d i a t e d t o space by t h e re-entry module surfaces
and i s absorbed by the heat sink capacity of the re-entry module.

162
RE-ENTRY MODULE I ADAPTER

I
I
COLD
I PLATES COLD PLATES
COOLANT

I I
PLATES

I
I
COLD
PLATES II I
I 75' VERNATHERM A
CRYOGENIC
I HEAT
EXCHANGER
""""

I
TAPERECORDER
COLD PLATE
1I I r i
I REGENERATORS
I
J

RADIATOR

GROUND
COOLING
HEAT EXCHANGER

I TEMPERATURE
\\ I I

CONTROL 40' VERNATH ERM
VALVE

FIGURE 22 TEMPERATURE CONTROL

Cooling System Operational Functions.
cooling system are as follows:
- Operational functions of the

A. Coolant i s forced through the system bypumps.
B. Heat i s transferred from the coolant t o the primary oxygen v i a a
cryogenic heat exchanger.
C. Heat i s rejected from the coolant loop by e i t h e r t h e ground cooling
heat exchanger, t h e launchheatexchanger, o r the radiator.Outlettemperature
of the ground cooling heat exchanger and the radiator i s controlled to approxi-

.
mately 40°F by means of a regenerative loop and a vernatherm temperature
control valve
. .-

D. Heat i s transferred from t h e s u i t andcabinatmosphere t o t h e c o o l a n t
v i a t h e s u i t heat exchanger.
E. Heat i s transferred from t h e equipment to the coolant via coldplates.
Coolant i n l e t t e m p e r a t u r e s t o t h e b a t t e r i e s and f u e l c e l l s a r e c o n t r o l l e d t o

valve .
a range of 50°F t o 9OoF by means of a bypass coolant loop and a vernatherm

F. Water l i n e s i n t h e a d a p t e r , RCS propellant valves, and portions of
the O M oxidizer system are electrically heated to prevent freezing.
G. Passive temperature control i s maintained by special surface coatings
and thermal insulation.

- - Safety and redundancy
Cooling System Safety and Redundancy Features.
features of the cooling system a r e as follows:

A. Two independentcoolingloops.
B. Two parallel coolant pumps, withindependent power s u p p l i e s i n each
coolantloop(except inSpacecraft 6). Because it i s a battery-powered
version, Spacecraft 6 required only one coolant pump i n eachloop f o r both
high and low e l e c t r i c a l l o a d s .
C. Launch heat exchanger,capableofperforming the radiator heat
rejection function for a limited time.
D. Coolant bypass loop to cool re-entry module equipment when cabin
coolant flow i s manuallyreduced.
E. Warning lights to indicate lack of c o o l a n t f l u i d i n eachloop and
l o s s of pump flow.

Water Management System

Function. -
The water management system provides drinking water for the
crew during flight and after landing, and provides a means for disposing of
or storing wastewater. The Spacecraft 10 watersystem i s shown schematically
i n Fig. 23 and i t s operational functions are described below:

A. Tank A has a 42 l b capacity, i s located in the adapter module, and
i s i n i t i a l l y s e r v i c e d w i t h nitrogen a t 19.0 psia. Fuel cell product water is
transferred into tank A bymeans of a bladder, the expansion of which replaces
the nitrogen and forces it overboardthrough two regulators (the second gives
redundancy). These pressure regulators are set at 20 +- 0.5 psia, in order
t o prevent feedback into the tank and f u e l c e l l s .
B. Tank B, also 42 lb capacity tank, located in the adapter module, i s
initially serviced with potable water and i s pressurized with fuel cell water
a t 19.0 psia. As f u e l c e l l product water flows into tank B, potable water
i s transferred into the re-entry tank.
C. The re-entry tank has a 16 l b capacity and i s located in the re-entry
module. Sincethere-entrytank i s referenced t o cabinpressure(nominally
5.0 psia), the adapter tanks w i l l keep the re-entry tank filled.
D. Water i s supplied to the drink nozzle from the cabin tank via the
drinking water tube. Water transfer pressure i s providedby: (1)theadapter
water tanks, (2) s u i t compressor outlet pressure, or (3) t h e biomed bulb.
Water can be drunk with o r without cabin pressurization.

164
I
-
.
I
I A/N F I T T I N G
I
U
I
I
I
I
AGE?L TANK "B"
D &
CELL
PRODUCT
FUEL
H20

PRODUCT

REGULATORS

VENT

OVERBOARD
1 DUMP

H20 TANK VALVE

~

CONDENSATE VALVE

FIGURE 23 WATERMANAGEMENTSYSTEM
E. The launch heat exchanger i s preloaded with seven l b of water p r i o r
t o launch and i s utilized during the launch phase, i n l i e u of the space
radiator, for coolant system heatdissipation. During o r b i t , condensate water
from t h e s u i t h e a t exchanger water separator i s directed overboard through the
launch heat exchanger.

Water Management Safety and Red~qdancy_Features. Safety andredundancy -
features of the water management system are as follows:

A. Three water tanks.
B. F'ressurization of cabin water tank by e i t h e r s u i t oxygen (suit
compressors) or adapter water tanks.
C. Gas relief valve prevents overpressurization of water tanks.
D. Warning l i g h t s i n d i c a t e f a i l e d c l o s e d poppet valve on the launch
cooling heat exchanger.
E. Redundant means of urine dump: d i r e c t l y overboard o r through t h e
launch heat exchanger.

Environmental Control System Development Test Status

During the developmentof the environmental control system components,
designs were v e r i f i e d by production prototype t e s t s rather than by engineering
model t e s t s . For example, i f a pressure regulator w a s t o be produced as a
casting, the engineering test model was a l s o produced as a casting rather than
by a more convenient machining process. Thus, a d d i t i o n a l t e s t i n g f o r produc-
i b i l i t y was avoided, and confidence in flight worthiness was accumulated from
developmental t e s t s as well as from later q u a l i f i c a t i o n and system r e l i a b i l i t y
demonstration tests.

As shown i n Table 16, majorsystemdevelopmental t e s t s of the environ-
mental control system that have beencompleted include I (1)full-scale radiator
t e s t s under simulated o r b i t a l c o n d i t i o n s t o determine pressure drop and
radiator heat transfer characteristics, and ( 2 ) 129 h r of manned runs using
the boilerplate No. 2 t e s t a r t i c l e t o determinetheperformance of t h e s u i t and
cabin atmosphere control system i n all modesof operation.

Environmental Control System Qualification Test Status

Wherever possible, qualification of the environmental control system has
been demonstrated a t the system l e v e l rather than at the component l e v e l
becauseof the close interrelationship of i t s components, especially with
respect to thermal performance. System qualification tests are followed by
mission r e l i a b i l i t y demonstration t e s t s , and, i n the case of Spacecraft 3A, a
flight-type spacecraft w i t h operating systems has been subjected t o simulated
o r b i t a l environments to qualify the temperature control system f o r t h e extremes
of flight conditions.

166
TABLE 16 ECS DEVELOPMENT STATUS
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT TESTS COMPLETED
~ "

SU.MMARY OF TEST RESULTS

B / P 2 SUIT AND CABIN COMPLETED 20 HOURS OF PRE-LAUNCH TESTING, 96
ATMOSPHERE SYSTEM TESTS HOURS OF ORBITAL TESTING, AND 13 HOURS OF POST
LANDING TESTING. VERIFIED PERFORMANCE OF
CABIN AND SUIT ATMOSPHERE SYSTEM. INSULATED

~

SIMULATED ORBITAL OPERATION VERIFIED RADIATOR
PRESSURE DROP AND HEAT TRANSFER PERFORMANCE.
. -
~~ ~

URINEDUMP DEVELOP DIRECT OVERBOARD DUMP AS PRIMARY
MEANS OF URINE DISPOSAL DUMP THROUGH LAUNCH
HEAT EXCHANGER ALSO PROVIDED FOR REDUNDANCY.
I

The environmental control system qualification test status is summarized
in Table17. All subassemblies and components were successfully subjected to
the complete qualification test program, which includes environmental, dynami
and temperature-altitude testing.
In addition to the qualification test program summarized 17,in sTable
ix
two-day mission reliability demonstration tests of the suit and cabin atmo-
sphere system were completed with no failures. In these tests, all cabin and
adapter mounted suit and cabin atmosphere components were exposed to simulat
an altitude
altitude, temperature cycling, and temperature extremes in chamber.
Moisture andC02 atmospheric conditions were provided by crewman simulators.
After each of these tests, oxygen containers were sefviced and LiOH caniste
were replaced, but otherwise the same environmental control system components
were used for all six tests.

six lbday mission reliability demonstration tests
Three seven-day and
have also been completed. The first test also servesa temperature/altitude
as
of the suit and cabin atmosphere and oxygen
long-mission qualification test
supply systems .
Environmental Control System Failure
Summary

A sumnary of the major problems that were encountered and solved in
development of the environmental control system is
as follows:

A. Coolant Pump Performance
.- Some pump units were unable to meet specifi
of more stringent
cation performance. The problem was solved by application
quality control procedures in manufacturing.
.

TABLE 17 ECS QUALIFICATION STATUS

I I ENVIRONMENTAL MAJOR

REMARKS

COMPLETE
-
COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE

COMPLETE
~

*RFI, STRUCTURAL, EXPLOSION, HEAT TRANSFER,
8 OTHER QUALIFICATION TESTS.

P T Y O . OF TESTS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.
C O M P L E T E L Y Q U A L I F I E D . NO. O F
-NO. O F TESTS REQUIRED.
'REQUIRED TESTS INDICATED.

TOTAL TESTS REQUIRED = 461
TOTAL TESTS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED = 461

B. Coldplate Manufacturing -
Difficulty was encountered in assuring t h a t
the coldplates were completelyflushed after salt brazing. The problem was
solved by changing the process to a nonflux, inert gas braze.
C. Cryogenic Vessel Forming -
Wrinkles and cracks occurred i n e a r l y
attempts t o form titanium half-shells for cryogenic vessels. The problem was
solved by v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e deep d r a w forming process.

Environmental Control System Design Changes

As a r e s u l t of redefined mission requirements, several changes t o t h e
environmental control system have been required.

A. To provide for mission durations in excess of two days, the two-day
LiOH cartridge has been replaced by a seven-day LiOH c a r t r i d g e , f o r ~ p a c e c r a f t . 6
and Spacecraft 8 through 32. This caused a nine l b weightincrease.
168
B. Due t o an increase i n OAMS requirements f o r Spacecraft 10 through 12,
t h e RSS oxygen tank has been deleted. The ECS oxygen tank now has the dual
requirement of supplying t h e environmental oxygen as w e l l as the reactants
( f u e l c e l l ) oxygen supply.
C. For Spacecraft 10 and 11, two additional secondary oxygen tanks, plus
various valves, regulators, and associated connections, havebeenadded in the
adapter module t o supply gaseous nitrogen f o r EVA astronaut maneuvering.
D. The egress oxygen supply has been deleted, for Spacecr&t 8 through E.
The composite disconnect and tank block remains t o permit separation from t h e
suit loop in the event of abort via the ejection seat.
E. Due t o the significant quantity of water recovered from t h e Space-
craft 3A cabin at the conclusion of the thermal qualification t e s t , some method
of preventing or controlling condensation within the pressurized area was
deemed necessary.Severalapproaches t o t h i s problem were available. One
potential solution was t o i n s u l a t e a l l cold areas of the cabin t o prevent t h e
exposed surfaces from f a l l i n g below the dew point temperature of the gas in
t h e cabin. Another solution was t o cover the cabin walls w i t h a b l o t t i n g
material which would absorb t h e moisture which condenses on t h e walls.

Experimentation w i t h wallpaper (an absorbent material fabricated from
urethane foam or regenerated cellulose) disclosed that it could feasibly
provide moisture absorption but would not effectually control temperatures.
For t h e long duration mission of Gemini VII, it was therefore decided t o modify
t h e ECS by installing egress-kit bypass hoses t o t h e s u i t o u t l e t d u c t s t o
eliminate heat t r a n s f e r between t h e s u i t o u t l e t and i n l e t gas. This modifica-
t i o n reduced water condensation i n t h e l i t h i u m hydroxide charge by delivering
higher temperatures, thus extending t h e l i f e of t h e LiOH charge and providing
additional cooling for t h e crew. Inaddition, t h e carbondioxideandodor
absorber canister in the re-entry assembly ECS package also contained an
insulated LiOH cartridge having greater C02 absorption capacity than the
Spacecraft 5 cartridge, thereby avoiding t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of l i t h i u m hydroxide
hydration.

These changes were instituted in addition to the wallpaper, for the
Spacecraft 7 missiononly. The wallpaper was installed in Spacecraft 4 and
up. Sheets of Amsco sponge cloth were stitched to cotton broadcloth and
treated t o enhance t h e i r f i r e retardantcapability. Approximately 7,000 square
in. were i n s t a l l e d wherever p r a c t i c a l on cabin interior surfaces. Areas of
installation included t h e bulkheads, t h e sidewalls, t h e floor, the hatch sills,
the hatches, the consoles, debris guards and the stowage boxes.

Before f l i g h t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , some concern was f e l t over t h e possible
boiling of t h e absorbed water during the re-entry mode.The astronauts
reported t h a t i f any steam generation did occur (especially at t h e ECS doors),
t h e l e v e l s were not significant enough t o cause t h e removal or redesign of t h e
wallpaper. On Spacecraft 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 attempts were made t o analyze
wallpapersamples t o determine their absorption rate. The results of these
studies were inconclusive, because a reliable quantitative indication of
absorption was not established. However, since t h e additional weight of the
installed wallpaper i s negligible, and since i t s absorbent qualities are good,
a sound basis exists f o r i t s use.
Problem Areas and Corrective Action

-
Urine F i l t e r s . Effective for t h e 14-day mission of .Gemini VII, two new
u r i n e f i l t e r s were i n s t a l l e d i n an e f f o r t t o reduce the amount of contamina-
t i o n at the systemsolenoid. The urine system functioned properly during
flight; a vigorous inspection of the filters and the overboard dump solenoid
valve was undertaken at the conclusion of the mission. Examinationof t h e
f i l t e r s (one used f o r t e n and t h e other for four days) revealed a certain
amount of coating of the outer surfaces, naturally more pronounced on the ten
day f i l t e r . Microscopic analysis of the foreign material disclosed normal
urine sediment, some amorphous material(probablycalciumphosphate), some
crystals, some c e l l s and c e l l u l a r debris. Also present were a number of
fibers. The l a t t e r agreed i n w i d t h and appearance w i t h samples of g l a s s wool.
In addition, a f e w flakes ofgreen p l a s t i c material were found. No metal
fragments were discovered.

In conclusion, it was determined t h a t t h e f i l t e r s had held back the
precipitated material which normally forms i n a urine sample as it becomes
alkaline; certain foreign substances had a l s o accumulated, b u t t h e i r amounts
were negligible and t h e i r composition was not such as t o cause alarm.

Disassembly of the urine solenoid valve revealed small amounts of
contaminant i n t h e a r e a of the i n l e t port. No contaminant was v i s i b l e a t the
outlet port. The foreignsubstances f e l l i n t o f o u r d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s :

A. White c r y s t a l l i n e powder coating the entire inner surfaces of t h e
valve
B. Yellow c r y s t a l l i n e powder coating the entrance port
C. Black p a r t i c l e s l o o s e l y bound to the inner surface of the valve, and
D. One large yellow particle found inside the valve.

Samples of t h i s foreign matter wereremoved and subjected t o chemical
analysis. The analysis demonstrated t h a t the white and yellow c r y s t a l l i n e
powders (A and B above) were products of dried urine. The b l a c k p a r t i c l e s
were not positively identified, but they are a t y p i c a l a l i p h a t i c hydrocarbon,
such as wax. The large yellow p a r t i c l e was i d e n t i f i e d as an epoxy.

The deposition of t h e c r y s t a l l i n e powders was considered t o be normal
f o r a mission. The o r i g i n of sample C was notdetermined. Sample D was f e l t
t o be a piece of epoxy tube coating which had become dislodged. The amounts
of contaminant material discovered by t h i s investigation prove t h a t the new
u r i n e f i l t e r was e f f e c t i v e i n reducing contamination and preventing a stoppage
in the solenoid valve. A reviewofmanufacturingtechniquesdemonstrated
that normal handling or flexing of the epoxy-coated aluminum l i n e s between the
u r i n e f i l t e r and the solenoid valve would not be detrimental to the internal
coating.

Solids Traps.

A. A routine investigation was conducted after the completion of t h e
l b d a y mission of Gemini V I 1 t o determine i f the s o l i d s t r a p s were s t i l l
functioning and to record t h e amountof filter saturation t h a t had occurred. .
Both t r a p s were removed from t h e spacecraft and s e n t t o the laboratory for
analysis .
Inspection revealed t h a t the residue from the left-hand duct and t r a p
weighed 0.787 grams; that from the right-handduct weighed 0.914 grams. The
composition of the collected material was dust, lint, skin flakes and hair.
The contents of the traps differed slightly, i n t h a t there was more l i n t and
hair i n t h e left-hand duct and t r a p t h a n i n t h e right-hand unit. The right-
hand u n i t appeared t o contain more dust or sand particles than the l e f t . Both
s o l i d s t r a p s were found t o be operative and not saturated. No abnormal condi-
t i o n s were observable i n e i t h e r t r a p s o r f i l t e r s .

B. The flight crew reported considerable eye i r r i t a t i o n during the standup
EVA on the Gemini X mission. A thorough post-flight investigation of the
problem was made; t h i s included a careful examination and chemical analysis
of the contents of t h e solids traps. "he constitution of the m a t e r i a l i n the
t r a p s was as follows:

LH SOLTDS TRAP RH SOLIDS TRAP
Gold Flakes Gold Flakes

Plastic
Unidentified Hair

Li: 0.13 ppm (parts
permillion) L i : None

Ca: 0.148 ppm C a : 0.23 ppm

Na: 7 ppm Na: 4.3 ppm
K: 2.4 ppm K: 1.0 ppm
As a r e s u l t of t h i s investigation, it was demonstrable that the
q u a n t i t i e s of material found i n t h e solids traps were not significant enough
t o be harmful t o mission success; there was a l s o no evidence t h a t the sub-
stances found i n t h e t r a p s had produced the reported eye i r r i t a t i o n . *

T r a c e s of trichloroethane were found in the charcoal charge of the
LiOH canister on Spacecraft 10. During theSpacecraft 12 a l t i t u d e runs, gas
samples also revealed t h e presence of trichloroethane. McDonnell was there-
fore directed by t h e NASA to discontinue t h e use of a l l chlorinated solvents
for cleaning spacecraft and ACE components, and t o s u b s t i t u t e an alkaline
compound with detergent characteristics slightly stronger than hand soap. In
addition, t h e decision was made t o employ only one suit fan during both the
standup and the umbilical EVA, i n order to decrease t h e air flow across the
astronauts' faces during these periods.
C. The relative cleanliness of t h e s u i t c i r c u i t f o r t h e e n t i r e Gemini
program was demonstrated by the negligible amounts of foreign material found
collected in the solids traps during post-flight investigations.

Drinking Water Contamination. - A post-flight investigation was made of
the Spacecraft 9 drinking water system t o determine t h e water's conformity
with specifications " 3 6 0 6 and pS20531. Analysisrevealed that both the
p a r t i c l e count and t h e impurities present were higher than specification.
Further examination disclosed that t h o s e l i n e s u t i l i z i n g aluminum Voi-shan
flare savers (seals) exhibited corrosion damage, resulting in the deposition
of p a r t i c l e s of beta-aluminatrihydrate.Lineswithoutthe Voi-shans, o r
having nickel flare savers, gave no evidenceofcorrosion.

As a r e s u l t of t h i s investigation, aluminum Voi-shans were deemed
unacceptable f o r use i n t h e water system; replacement w ith nickel Voi-shans
was recommended.

It i s noteworthy t h a t t h e chemical analysis of drinking water remaining
in the cabin water tank detected no platinum o r sulfonates; therefore the
p o s s i b i l i t y of f u e l c e l l w a t e r seepage was excluded.

Cabin Pressurization. - A t approximately 66:30 GET i n t h e Gemini IXA
mission, the cabin pressure declined from a normal 5.1 p s i a t o 4.68 p s i a at
67:37 GET. The pressurethenrecovered and rose t o 5.19 psia. An intensive
post-flight investigation was made of the pressure regulator, pressure trans-
ducer, and t h e cabin pressure relief valve. No anomalies were discovered in
either the transducer or t h e regulator. The pressure relief valve was
subjected to cycling above the crack pressure of 5.5 t o 6.0 p s i a and allowed
t o r e s e a t t e n times. No abnormal leakage was encountered i n t h i s testing.

The valve was disassembled i n the McDonnell failure analysis laboratory
and examined for possible valve seat damage and contamination. This investi-
gation revealed nodamage t o the seats; however, a white andbrownish-pink
residue was discovered in the following areas:

A. On the inner face of both main poppets.
B. On the springs anddiaphragmsof both pilot valves.
C. On the housing of both p i l o t valves.

Chemical analysis of the residue revealed t h a t it was composed of sodium
chloride with traces ofcalciumsulphate. A study o f t h e f l i g h t p l a n
indicated that the valve had been open during the landing mode; t h e deposits
were therefore most probably due t o exposure t o sea water. After t h i s analysis
was completed, the valves were reassembledand retested. No anomalies were
discovered.

Despite the most thorough investigation of a l l hardware involved.in the
cabin pressurization loss, no final determination of the anomaly could be
made
CREW STATION

The f o c a l p o i n t i n the operation of a spacecraft i s the crew station.
The primary goal of the design phase was t o produce a simple, reliable and
effective display and control system which wouldcomplement an intelligent,
well-trained astronaut i n the performance of t h e mission.

To achieve t h i s objective, simple ,and available components such as meters
w e r e used for display purposes in lieu of cathode ray tubes, etc. Reliance on
crew judgment was r e f l e c t e d i n a design which provided the astronauts with
s u i t a b l e c o n t r o l s and displays, and eliminated ground-based o r automatic
onboardsystems f r o m importantcontrolfunctions.Independentoperationof
subsystems was provided t o the crew through mode switching of both controls
and d i s p l a y s . C r i t i c a l sequences,such as retrofire, were implemented with
dual mechanical and electrical interlocks to preclude malfunctions or inad-
vertent actuations.

Gemini o r i g i n a l l y was designed t o accommodate a 75 percentile man i n the
sitting position. It was thenlearned t h a t some second generation astronauts,
although six f t o r under, w e r e greater than 75 p e r c e n t i l e i n s i t t i n g height.
In addition, some of these individuals grewup t o two in-when torso length was
measured lying on t h e i r backs, simulating a weightless condition.For this
reason it was determined that more height i n the crew area w a s required.
However, since external geometry as well as seat configuration was fixed, the
obvious solution was outruled. The egress k i t containing oxygen was cut 1.75
i n . by making the part a machining rather than containing bottles. In addi-
t i o n t h e hatch was i n t e r n a l l y "bumped" i n the region of the helmet area t o
give the astronauts additional room above t h e i r heads. An additional .75 in.
was gained i n t h i s manner and proved t o be a g r e a t aid f o r ingress f r o m EVA.

Controls And Displays

Spacecraft 12 control and display panel i s shown i n Fig. 24. The basic
arrangement places piloting functions a t the l e f t hand station, engineer and
navigation duties at the r i g h t and common functions a t the center.

Differences in panel arrangement resulted f r o m system changes and f l i g h t
crew experienceduring t h e program. The change from batteries t o fuel c e l l s
and the v a r i a t i o n i n experiment controls account for right hand panel differ-
ences, whereas only minor switches w e r e added on the l e f t . On the center
panel a ground elapsed time clock replaced the flight plan r o l l e r , andminor
changes were made t o t h e a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l andcomputer mode switches.

Several lighting trade-off studies w e r e made f o r the Geminicrew station.
Because of weight and parer considerations, flood lighting was selected for
Gemini. Sinceredand white lights having a dimming capacity w e r e desired,
incandescent bulbs w i t h rheostats w e r e selected. Additional warningand t e l e -
panel lights w e r e used t o denote c r i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s and conditions. I n several
cases these warning l i g h t s remained illuminated f o r prolonged periods, and w e r e

173
\
PEDESTAL

FIGURE 24 SPACECRAFT 12 CREW STATION DISPLAYS, CONTROLS AND FURNISHINGS
L A
CENTER CONSOLE

"

I CODE CODE
I UTILITY BRACKET C 5s ATTITUDE COYTROLLER H
60 SUlT/CASlH TEMPERATURE COHTROL D
2 UTILITY LIGHT C
%1 MAHUAL O2 HIGH RATE,CDYTROL D
I UTILITY CORD C
61 PARACHUTE lETTlSDH SNITCH K
4 ABORT HAHDLE IHSTALLATIOH
C
61 LANDIHG ATTITUDE SWITCH K
s SECOHDARYOXYGEHSHUTDFF D bl SUIT FLOWCOHTROL INSTALLATIOII D
IHSTALLITIOH
65 REPRESSURILATIOH COHTRDL D
6 ALTIMETER
~~ K
66 EVA UIIBILICAL DISCOYHECT D
7* YAHEUVER COHTROLLER IHSTALLATIOH H
67 PARACHUTE SWITCH K
70 YAHEVVERCONTROLLER H
68 HIGH4LTITUDE DROGUE SWITCH K
IHSTALLATIOH IAUXILIARYI
69 ATTITUDE COYTRDL SWITCH H
1
P
70
71
C O M P ~ T E Rswrcn
PLATFORM SWITCH
H
n
0 =CIRCUIT UREAKER
10 (52-79721)
71 MESSAGE ACCEPTAHCE LIGHT H
I1
71 CAIIIH VEHT VALVE PULL RIHG D 0 = TOGGLE SWITCH
1) 74 1011 5E"SOR MODE SELECTOR SWITCH c (92-79705)
11
@ =LEVER.LOCK SWITCH
(52-79705)
I. 0 = INDICATOR LIGHT
(52-79710
=. PUSHBUTTONSWITCH

i

FIGURE 24 SPACECRAFT 12 CREW STATION DISPLAYS, CONTROLS AND FURNISHINGS (Continued)
excessively bright and annoying, i.e., f u e l c e l l A P l i g h t s andcomputer s t a r t
l i g h t . These l i g h t s were equippedwithcovers t o reducethe light emitted.
The s t a r t comp l i g h t was f i t t e d with an adjustable Polaroid cover.

Because of long-duration Gemini missions and increased intravehicular
a c t i v i t y as well as anticipated extravehicular activity, switch and c i r c u i t
breaker panel protectors were provided. A l l bus switchesand c r i t i c a l
function switches such as pyrotechnics employed lever lock switches, recessed
andcoveredpushbuttons, o r slide lock push buttons. O f t h e remaining
switches and c i r c u i t breakers, a first-design attempt of s o l i d p l a s t i c c o v e r s
which sprang out of the way of the panel when a push button was actuated was
abandoned due to excessive inadvertent actuation and breakage. The configura-
t i o n t h a t did f l y on a l l Gemini Spacecraft was a guard arrangement v i t h a bar
pass overeach row of switches and c i r c u i t breakers. Despite a l l t h e a c t i v i t y
on Gemini f l i g h t s , very few switches or circuit breakers were inadvertently
operated.

Malfunction Detection Sxstem (MDD)), - The MDS design (See Fig. 25) was

GUIDANCE

FIGURE 25 MALFUNCTION DETECTI ON SYSTEM

based on a detailed study of booster systems, Titan 11 f l i g h t h i s t o r i e s and
a c t u a l and probablemalfunctions. It was decided that the crewwould deter-
mine shutdown, e j e c t i o n o r a b o r t i n Modes I, 11, or 111, thus sufficient
displays were provided t o keep the crew aware of abort o r impending abort.

176
Placement of the displays on the command pilot panel was such that
-
lift-off the command pilot could monitor all critical parameters the two
ENGINE I under pressure lights,
A'JTITCJDE overrate indicator,ABORT light
(ground command), fuel and oxidizer pressure needles, accelerometer and the
Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI). A minimum of two cues are required
before an abort is initiated.
The first and second stage fuel and oxidizer pressure indicators contain
redundant pointers powered from separate booster electrical sources. Power
failure causes needles to fail Aup.cross-hatched area on the center of the
scales indicates minimum allowable tank pressures. The first stage indicator
20, 40,
contains a time scale to show the minimum required pressure atand 60
sec after lift-off. The astronaut then is able to use both needle displace-
ment and movement rates to predict
an impending failure which may result an in
abort or which may require crew action to save the mission.S index The
on
the right hand gauge indicates minimum allowable second stage fuel pressure
staging.
Engines 1 and 2 lights illuminate when booster thrust chamber pressure
drops below 68$, and 57$, respectively. The lights thus indicate engine
start, shutdown, and malfunction conditions.Normally the Engine2 light
will be on during first stage burning and go out after second stage ignitio
and the Engine 1 light will be out during first stage burning and on briefly
at staging.
Attitude rate and guidance lights indicate whenever these errors exceed
allowable values. Rates in excess of the following will illuminate
ATT the
RATE light:
Stage I Stage I1
Pitch +2.0 to -3.0°/sec -
+1o0/sec
Roll -+200/sec
Yaw -
+1o0/sec
A display of digital time from launch provided the astronaut
a time with
reference for correlation of events during boost.
An accelerometer was used
with the timer for
a gross indication of booster performance.
Both FDAI's effectively furnish the crew with "how-goes-it" information
during launch and insertion. The coxnand pilot monitors attitude rates for
any deviation from normal.rates while the pilot selects computer reference
ascertain differences between the launch vehicle and onboard guidance signals
-
Ianding Systems. The landing system controls and associated instruments
(See Fig.26) have not changed throughout the manned portion of the Gemini
is entirely manual.
program. Initiation of all sequences
FIGURE 26 LANDING INSTRUMENT SYSTEM

Redundant a l t i t u d e i n d i c a t i o n s are provided i n t h e form of an a i r c r a f t
type barometric altimeter and lights operated by pressure sensing switches.
The a l t i m e t e r i s a three-pointer type w i t h a zero t o 100,000-ft rawe.
Although some astronauts would have preferred a counter-pointer type, t h i s was
rejected due t o l a r g e r c a s e s i z e requirements and decreased high altitude
s e n s i t i v i t y . Amber warning l i g h t s provided indicator back-up a t 40,000 and
10,000 f t .

After re-entry, drogueand main chute deployments are i n i t i a t e d a t
50,000 and 10,000 f t , respectively. In addition to using altimeter and l i g h t s ,
the asuonauts could estimate a l t i t u d e by aerodynamic s t a b i l i t y c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c s , the computer program, and elapsed time from r e t r o f i r e .

A rate of descent indicator, utilizing standard aircraft mechanical
barometric indicator principles was included also. Although the condition of
the main and drogue chutes was ascertained visually, t h i s instrument allowed
greater confidence i n chute performance and provided better anticipation of
events such as water impact.

A lever lock switch, used to arm the landing sequence functions, was
i n i t i a t e d by push-button switches protected w i t h covers t o prevent inadvertent
operation. The first button deployed the droguechute. This pulledoutand
the pilot chute which, in turn, pulled the R & R can from the spacecraft. The
second buttondeployed the main chute. Once the p i l o t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the
main chute had deployed, he pressed t h e t h i r d button t o i n v e r t the spacecraft
i n t o the landing attitude. After touchdown the main chute was c u t free by the
last button on the landing sequencepanel. If the droguechute failed t o
deploy, an emergency switch t o deploy it was provided on the command p i l o t ' s
panel, The emergency switch cut the drogue chute free; the pilot chute was
f i r e d by i t s own mortar.

Guidance System. - Rendezvous and docking missions along with experiment
pointing requirements demanded a more sophisticated guidance system on the
Gemini than on the Mercury program. Controls and displays were arranged so
t h a t the command p i l o t p r i m a r i l y would control the spacecrsft, while the
p i l o t would fhnction as systemsmonitor. The computer was designed f o r
operation by the p i l o t with an incremental velocity indicator (IVI) on the
command p i l o t ' s p a n e l t o show computer commanded t r a n s l a t i o n s i n three axes.

The guidancesystem controls (platform, computer, a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l mode
s e l e c t o r ) were located on t h e center panel accessible to either p i l o t though
they ordinarily were used by the command p i l o t . Wfth t h e c e n t r a l a t t i t u d e
c o n t r o l s t i c k and dual maneuver controllers, guidance could be controlled by
either p i l o t . Each p i l o t had selectable modes of display and reference inputs
f o r h i s f l i g h t d i r e c t o r i n d i c a t o r (F'DI)as shown i n Fig. 27.

A. Launch -
Redundancy was the primed consideration in the design
philosophy of launch displays. A t l i f t - o f f the command p i l o t ' s F
DI needles
indicated booster guidance information while as a back-up the p i l o t monitored
the Gemini computer guidancesignals.Intheevent of excessive errors in.the
booster guidance system the command pilot selected the spacecraft platform/
computerguidancesystem t o control booster guidance. The mode s e l e c t o r on the
computer panel was placed i n ASCENT and the platform in FREE mode. A l l launch
oriented controls and displays were evaluated f o r p o s i t i o n and operability by
the crew under the maximum g loads and vibration which might be encountered
on launch.

€3. -
Rendezvous Development of guidance controls and displays was based
on a requirement t o rendezvous,independentof ground i n p u t s u t i l i z i n g radar,
computer,and - f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n and back-up - manual computation. Computer
controls w e r e located i n f r o n t of the pilot enabling him t o make inputs into
t h e computer and extract readouts f r o m it while the commanded A V f o r o r b i t a l
or planar corrections were displayed on the N I f o r the command p i l o t . The
displays allowed the pilot the option of monitoring FDI outputs that differed
f r o m those viewed by the command p i l o t ; e.g., while the command p i l o t moni-
tored computed rendezvous steering information, the pilot could monitor actual
t a r g e t aximuthand elevation angles from the radar.

The radar system, acting in conjunction w i t h a cooperative transponder
i n the target, furnished range, range rate, azimuthand e l e v a t i o n t o t h e
computer i n d i g i t a l form and t o panel displays in analog form. Target azimuth
and elevation signals were displayed on the flight director indicator needles
provided t h a t t h e p i l o t s e l e c t e d RDR (Radar) on h i s f l i g h t d i r e c t o r reference
switch. Range and range rate were displayed on a d i a l on the command p i l o t ' s
panel (See Fig. 28). Sincerange and range rate were c r i t i c a l as c l o s e r
ranges, a special range sweep c i r c u i t was used i n the radar t o expand the
sweep at c l o s e r ranges. The near range ( z e r o t o 3000 f t ) was nine times more

ip
FLIGHT DIRECTOR INDICATOR

FLIGHT DIRECTOR CONTROLLER

,""""- COMPUTER
1 REFERENCE MODE
I 1. ASCENT I
I
I
2. RENDEZVOUS
3. RE-ENTRY 9 I
2. RDR
3. P L A T F
I
3. A T T D
I
I I I I
4
'
I I

I
ROLLERROR
ROLL RATE
OR ROLL
ATTITUDE -@ I
I
I
I COMMAND & 1 PITCH

I P I T C H ERROR
5
I DOWN RANGE ,-@ I + I

'I
I ! I
I 1- "1
I YAW ERROR I.
I- @
I CROSS RANGE -A
LERROR
J SPHERE
ATTITUDE

I RADAR 1 PLAT FOR^ , oz
5
IR A T E GYRO .I
'* SLAVED
TO
POSITIONS
OF
GIMBAL
THE
PLATFORM -
FIGURE 27 ATTITUDE DISPLAY GROUP

180
FIGURE 28 RADARAND RATE INDICATOR

sensitive than the middle range (3000 ft t o 30,000 f t ) and 90 times more
sensitive than the far range (30,000 f t t o 300,000 f t ) . The needle jumped as
it passed from one range t o t h e o t h e r . With the exception of the vernier
zero +5 f p s scale in the center which was b e n e f i c i a l i n docking, the meter
face was inadequate for the following reasons:

1. The range rate meter index point appeared t o p o i n t t o t h e range
scale.
2. The point of the range index pointed t o t h e range r a t e s c a l e -
3. The broad portion of the pointers covered the numerals t o be read,
making extrapolation necessary on a nonlinear scale.
4. 250,000 f t was an impractical figure for pilots accustomed t o miles
a t far ranges. Ranges i n excess of 6000 f t should be calibrated in miles.

Threeand four above introduced a time-consuming f a c t o r f o r e x t r a -
polation and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n while a simpler dial could be "scan read" by the
command pilot during rendezvous when time i s critical. Operational controls
of the radar have been simplified t o one OFF-STBY-ON toggle switch and a
l i g h t t o i n d i c a t e lock-on.
Optical rendezvous could be accomplished,even w i t h a radar f a i l u r e ,
as on Gemini XII, by using the optical sight and back-up charts. The sight
r e t i c l e mounting lugs w e r e placed i n the l e f t hand window and aligned and
inspected t o w i t h i n +0.1 degree of the spacecraft longitudinal axis. The
sight i t s e l f was guaranteed t o w i t h i n +0.1 degree of i t s mounting points. A l l
experiments,including radar, were ali&ed t o w i t h i n +0.1 degree. In other
words boresighting the spacecraft guaranteed +0.3 degree accuracy w i t h any
experiment. Flight experience shared that thzse accuracies w e r e well within
the guaranteed - +O.3 degree and i n most cases within - +0.1 degree.

C. Re-entry -
Control provisions were provided f o r a man-in-the-loop
re-entry control system as well as an automatic mode. Spacecraft 3 through
10 re-entries were controlled manually by the command p i l o t c e n t e r i n g the FDI
needles t o maintain the proper attitude while t h e p i l o t e x t r a c t e d the

181
predicted touchdown earth coordinates from t h e computer. Spacecraft 11, and
1 2 u t i l i z e d t h e RE-ENT mode of computer.

PowerManagement Section. -
The e l e c t r i c a l system powermanagement con-
. t r o l s and displays w e r e subjected to more changesand modifications than any
other system on the spacecraft. Continuity was notachieved u n t i l Space-
c r a f t 10, 11, and12, f o r which powermanagement controls and displays, w e r e
the same. Changes were d i c t a t e d by introduction of f u e l c e l l s on Spacecraft 5
and by development work involving t h e f u e l c e l l and i t s associated reactant
supplysystem (RSS).

Table 18lists every switch associated with t h e e l e c t r i c a l power system
monitoring and control. This figure shows the increasing need for monitoring
more parameters and controlling more functions by the crew t o preclude loss
of a mission due t o e l e c t r i c a l power failure. Thenumber of controls and
displays of necessity w e r e i n c r e a s e d a s . t h e f u e l c e l l s were introduced, since
some batteries were retained for redundancy.

The crew of Spacecraft 5 demonstrated what could be accomplished when
provided with adequate controls t o c o r r e c t f u e l cell/RSSmalfunctions. The
s i x v e r t i c a l s c a l e ammeter readouts for the six fuel c e l l s t a c k s provided the
best method for constantly monitoring the overall conditions of t h e c e l l s and
electrical loads. This enables the crew t o observedeviations more rapidly
rather than wait f o r a preset time t o r o t a t e a knob and check for deviations.

'Communications Section. -
The voice control center (VCC), located on
the upper center console, contained the s e l e c t and volume switches for voice
communication on U HF, ED
,'
and intercom. Beacon, telemetering and antenna
control switches were located immediately t o t h e right of the VCC. Switch
type circuit breakers for the communication system were located in the top
row of t h e l e f t hand circuit breaker panel and i n t h e l e f t a f t corner of the
overhead circuit breaker panel.

Additional console space could bemade available by reducing VCC s i z e
and by incorporating the functions of the audio mode switch into the UHF and
HF select switches, and dual volume control switches into a single set. (See
Fig. 29.)

The audio mode switches on the VCC w e r e positioned by the crew t o s e l e c t
U
HF
, INT (intercom), HF,' and HF-DF. The switches w e r e independent so t h a t
while onecrew member was transmitting and receiving on U HF, the other crew
member could transmit and receive on HF and also receive on UHF
.'
Selection
of the HF-DF position on e i t h e r switch i n i t i a t e d a lo00 cps tone which was
a u d i b l e t o both crew members regardless of the position of the other switch.
The INT position was s e l e c t e d t o reduce the noise level in the respective
headset. The RCD (record) position on t h i s switch was used for the voice tape
recorder on Spacecraft 3 and 4. Beginning with Spacecraft; 5 it was removed
and the function was incorporated into a toggle switch located in the lower
r i g h t hand corner of the VCC.

182
I UORY

PRESENT CONFIGURATION

I on I con1 I CONT
-
-
UHF "
r
UHF

-
1
OFF
no. I@ HO. 2
I I
I TI4 CMtTROL
HF TU COWTt
unFI[~~ L
CALI8 STBY

NO. I

cil&l &
w r
PTT OFF

RESET ADPT PTT
SILEHCE RECORD
KEYIHG RECORD
PROP@SED CONFIGURATION
ALTERNATE PROPOSED
CONFIGURATION

FIGURE 29 VOICE CONTROL CENTER AND BEACON, TM AND
ANTENNA CONTROL SWITCHES

The volume control switches were l o c a t e d d i r e c t l y below the audio mode
switches. Eachcrew m e m b e r had individual wheel controls for U HF, INT, and
HF. These switches operated quite satisfactorily and they,required less
panel space than rotary switches, whichwould have had t o be large enough t o
be manipulatedwith a pressurized glove. However, due t o limited panel space,
one of the two sets of controls could be eliminated. On Spacecraft 7,
removable plastic covers w e r e provided t o prevent moisture from g e t t , i w i n t o
the controls. It i s suggested that f+u&re applications of this type- control
be sealed against moisture.

The UHF and HF ,iquelch and select switches located in the center of the
VCC f'unctioned s a t i s f a c t o r i l y throughoutthe program. Prior to Spacecraft 3,
TABLE 18.ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM MONITORING AND CONTROL SWITCHES!

IPACECRAFT BATTERY .!!E: 1
I
AMP
SELECTOR
SWITCH
VOLT
SELECTOR
SWITCH

~
MAIH
BATTER1
SWITCH
ADAPTER
BATTERY
ISOLATIOH
SWITCHES
COHTROL
SWITCH
POWER
SWITCH
ADAPTER
BATTERY
AMMETER
PRIMARY
AYYETER

GEMlHl 111 13) SQUIB 11) POSlTlOH 4) OH 6 PUSH BUTTOH TWO TWO A L L READIHGS (2) SCALES
(3) ADAPTER ROTARY OTARY OFF TELELIGHTS M U L T I P L I E D BY MONITORS HAL1
3 ORBITS (4) MAIH TEST 2 LITES COH- 1.2s T H E FLOW IH
10 T O T A L ADAPTER BAT.
A L L E L TO (1) TERIES L MAIH
BATTERY 1L2
~

GEMINI IV no no no (6) 1 LITE PER no no 20 AMP SHUNT A L L (2) SCALES
CHAHGE CHAHGE CHAHGE BATTERY XHAHGE CHAHGE REAOIHGS 1 TO I MONITORS F L O l
4 DAYS ADAPTER BAT-
T E R E S I A , IB.
AHD MAIN BAT-
TERIES 1 L 2

GEMlHl V (3) SQUIB no no (61 I L I T E PER no no SIX AMMETERS TO (2) SCALES YOU
(41 MAIH CHAHGE CHAHGE STACK CHANGE CHWGE MONITOR SIX F U E L TORS FLOW IH
8 DAYS 7 TOTAL C E L L STACKS. FUEL SECTIOH
12 CELLS PER M U L T I P L Y BY 1.2s PLUS FLOW IH

-I
STACK MAIH BATTER11
1L2

(3) SPUlB no no (61 SAME no no SAME
GEMlHl VI (3) ADAPTER CHAHGE CHAHGE AS CHbJlGE CHAHGE AS
1 DAY (4) MAIH 3 3
IO T O T A L
~
~
"

GEMlYl VI1 SAME no no SAME no H/A
AS CHANGE CHANGE AS CHAHGE
1 4 DAYS S 5
~ ~~

GEMlHl VI11
NOHE
SAME SAME 2-POSITIOH no HONE STACK SECTION SAME AS 5 E X C E P T
AS mC VOLTAGE CHAHGE CONTROL POWER READIHGS AHD
6 ORBITS
5 101 IHCLUDEO SWITCHES4IX IWITCHES-TN PROCEDURES DIF-
CME I N V E R T E STACK COH-
. ~~ kP T E L E L I G P FERENT
no IGS TROL RELAY

GEMlHl IX SAME SAME HOHE SAME no HOHE SAME SAME AS 8 EXCEPT
AS AS CHAHGE AS READIHGS ARE DIF-
3 DAY S S 8 a FEREHT
.~

I
GEMlHl X SAME SAME no HOHE SAME SAME
AS AS CHANGE AS AS
3 DAYS 5 8 8 9

- ~~~

$)::::
GEMlHl XI SAME SUE no HOWE SAME SAME
AS AS CHAHGE AS AS
3 DAYS S 8 a 9
~
~ ~. ~

GEMIHI XI1 SAME SAME no NONE SAME SAME
AS AS AS AS
4 DAYS
5 a I 9
TABLE 18 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM MONITORING AND CONTROL SWITCHES (Continued)

FUEL
BATTERY
CELL
?OWEM
1111
TELELIGHT
X.0VCR

LITE ILLUMINATE3
AMBER AT S YIH.
PRIOR TO RETRO
BATTERY OH L I T E
GREEN

I
HAME C H A N C E T O
A. BOOST INSERT BATTERYPOWER
B. RETRO POWER SEQUENCE LITE.
C. RETRO ROCKET COMES ON A T
TR-1%
0. RETRO J E T T
E. LANOIHG (IN.
CLUOIHG RE.
COVERY
I
(91 TWO VOCT SCALES (3) F C A P ON AH- (1) HI 42 OR 01 TO SAME
*. BOOST INSERT - AC L OC. AC
HUHCIATOR OFF EITHER OR BOTH AS
B. ACEHA BUS PORTIOH IHOPERA. rcAr SECTIOH I 01 'UEL CELL SIC. 4
C. RETRO POWER TIVE. OC VOLTSFCAP
SECTIOH 2
0. R E T R O ROCKET USE A SELECTOR
141 SWITCH SCALE
E. R E T R O J E T T READS FROM 18-31
F. LANDING (IN-
CLUDES RECOV.

r
ERYI

SAME
AS
4

'9' SAME
AS
S
SAME
AS
4

SAME SAME
AS AS
LOCKS FOR HOLD S 4

SAME
AS I I SAME
AS
SAME
AS
s
SAME
AS
4

SAME SAME
AS AS
S 4

SAME SUE
AS AS
5 4

SAME SAME
AS AS
S 4
an €IF' transmitter-receiver (T/R) was p-ed for installation in the adapter
section in addition to the one in the&-entry section. However, due to the
poor HF transmission qualities, the T/h was replacedby another HF whip
antenna in the adapter. The HF select.switch remained aasthree-position
switch with two unused positions.
The audio mode switch relocated
functions becould to UHF and HF
the
select switches as follows:
AUDIO MODE
FUNCTION UBF SEIECT SWITCH HF SELECT SWITCH

A. UHF to No. 1 or No. 2

B. INT (for CP) to position now used
for OFF

C . INT (for P) now
to center position
used forOFF

D. HF to RNTY
E. HF-DF to position formerly
designated forADFT

Incorporation of the above changes would make additional panel space
available for other controls and/or displays.
on the lower left hand corner
The silence switch was incorporated of
5. In NORMAL position there was
the VCC beginning with Spacecraft no change
to the communications capabilities. In either No.the1 or No. 2 position
all UH , €IFand
F , INT receiving capability was removed from the respective
headset. This addition enabled one crew member to sleep r e s t without
or
6 the flight
any radio interference. However, beginning with Spacecraft
plan called for simultaneous crew rest periods which limited the use
switch, making its usefulness questionable.
The keying switch, located in the lowerpart of the VCC, had
center
three positions: VOX, FlT, and CONT RTT-PTT.
In the VOX position either
crew member communicated with ground stations as well as each other
pressing the switcheson the attitude hand controller. In the PTT position,
the switcheson the attitude hand controller or pressure suit electrical
umbilical were actuated (1) for communication with ground stations when the
respective audio mode switch was UHF in
or HF position, and(2) for conver-
sation between crew members when the respective audio mode switch was
position. In the CONT INT-PTT position the crew members conversed without
actuating any switches. However the switches on the attitude hand contro
or suit electrical umbilical switch were pressed for communication wit
ground stations. This last position was the only one connected to the
tape recorder. The VOX position, though rarely used on flights, could be
utilized duringan emergency that would preclude theof use the switcheson

186
The PTT position had l i t t l e u t i l i z a t i o n and 3 t a
t h e a t t i t u d e hand controller.
importake i n an emergency s i t u a t i o n i s nebulous. The CONT IIW-F"J! position
was used most because it afforded the convenience desired most by the crew
m e m b e r s . Depending on the degree of importance plac'ed on t h e f e a t u r e s of t h e
VOX position, the keying switch could be eliminated from the VCC and features
of the CONT INT-FTT posStion could be incorporated into the VCC without the
Switch

The record swstch l o c a t e d i n t h e lower right hand corner of the VCC i s
f o r the voice tape recorder. As mentioned previously, this switch was added
p r i o r t o S p a c e c r a f t 5 , giving the c r e w g r e a t e r c o n t r o l c a p a b i l i t y with i t s
MOMENTARY and CONTINUOUS positions. To operate the recorder, the record
switch was placed i n either the C Om o r MOM position, the keying switch i n
CONT INT-FTI position, and the audio mode switch i n t h e UHF, HF, o r HF"DF
position.

right of t h e VCC . -
Beacon Control Switches These switches w e r e located immediately t o the
The RJ3SC (rescue) switch was labeled ON-OFF W/O LT. I n
the ON position the UHF rescue beacon and the flashing recovery light were
operative, but in the W/O LT position only the UHF rescue beacon was operative
provided the Vm bus was operative. To avoid possible transmitter damage, the
switch was not actuated from the O F F p o s i t i o n u n t i l the rescue antenna had
been extended at main chute single point release.

Spacecraft 3 had one S-band beacon located in the equipment adapter
section and one C-band beacon located in the re-entry section. Beginning
w i t h Spacecraft 4 the S-band beacon was replaced with a C-band beacon. The
C-ADPT and C-RNTY switches w e r e two-position switches labeled CONT and CMD.
In CON" position the beacon was powered continuously, but t h i s position did
not disable DCS command "on" capability. The CMD position placed the beacon
i n a standby mode u n t i l a ground DCS command was s e n t t o a c t i v a t e the beacon.
TheC-band helix antenna (re-entry) phase shifter was powered by C-RNTY switch
provided that t h e ANT SEL switch was i n the RNTY position. Only one beacon
was on a t any given time, since both beacon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were the same.

The configuration and operation of these switches w e r e s a t i s f a c t o r y
throughout t h e program.

Telemetry Control Switches -
These switches were located directly below
the beacon control switches. The location and arrangementof these switches
did not change throughout the program.

The CALIB switch has three positions: No. 1, OFF, and Bo. 2. Position
No. 1 i n i t i a t e d c a l i b r a t i o n o f low calibrate point ( 2 6 f u l l s c a l e signal)
of ECS 02, M: 02, and M= H2 quantity and pressure gauges,and a one-point
calibration of 20 other parameters. Position No. 2 i n i t i a t e d c a l i b r a t i o n of
high calibrate point ( 8 6 f u l l s c a l e signal) f o r the same items as No. 1.
The STBY switch. had three positions: R/T, OFF, and D/T. I n R/T ( r e a l
time) position the standby T/M transmitter was powered f o r R/T transmission
and R/T TIM data was transferred from the FCM Programmer t o the standby
T/M transmitter. I n the OFF position there was nopower t o the standby
transmitter. In the D/T (delayed time) position the standby T/M transmitter
was powered f o r D/T transmission. This position also enabled tape playback
control through "E PLYBK switch i n CONT and DCS when TAPE PLYBK switch was
i n CMD.

The T/M switch had three positions:

A. When i n R/T and ACQ position, the switch powered R/T T/M transmitter
continuously (the R/T T/M transmitter was always connected t o the quadri-
plexer), activated the acquisition aid beacon and connected the beacon t o
the diplexer.
B. I n t h e CMD position, the T/M switch enabled DCS t o command R/T and
DIT T/M transmitters on, disconnect the acquisition aid beacon from the
diplexer and connect D/T T/M transmitter to the diplexer. It a l s o a c t i v a t e d
t h e acquisition aid beacon when the D/T T/M transmitter was o f f and connected
the acquisition aid beacon t o the diplexer.
C. I n the R/T D/T position, the switch powered the R/T T/M and D/T T/M
transmitters continuously and connected the latter t o the diplexer. The T/M
switch also enabled tape playback control through the TAPE PLYBK switch i n
CONT and DCS when TAPE PLYBK switch was i n CMD.

On Spacecraft 6 and up the TAPE PLYBK switch was located directly under
the T/M CALIB switch. On Spacecraft 3 through 5 it was located in t h e same
group with the ANT SEL and HF ANT, but t h e order of position varied w i t h each
spacecraft. In the CONT position t h e FCM T/M recorder played back continu-
ously through the T/M control T/hl switch. In the CMD position the recorder
played back (dumped) whencommanded onby DCS. On Spacecraft 6 and up the
REXZT position was used t o r e s e t DCS relays 1 through 8. Calibration
(Channel 9) and abort (Channel 10) were notreset.Spacecraft 3, 4, and 5
d i d not have t h i s reset capability.

The ANT SEL (antenna s e l e c t ) switch w a s a two-position switch located
d i r e c t l y below the T/M control switches. In the RNTY position the re-entry
C-band beacon phase shifter was powered (whenC-band beacon i s on), and the
UHF stub antenna (re-entry R & R section) was connected t o the quadriplexer
through the descent antenna coax switch. In the ADFT position the UHF whip
antenna (retroadapter) was connected t o the quadriplexer.

The three-position HF ANT select switch was located on the upper center
console with the TAPE PLYBK and ANT SEL switches. I n the EXT position t h e
re-entry HF whip antenna was extended through the LANDIXG switch i n ARM
position. The adapter HF whip antennaextendedthrough the LANDING switch
(SAFE), and the HI? T/R connected t o t h e extended antenna. In the OFF position
power was removed from the antennamotors. I n the FtET position either
extended HF whip antenna was retracted. During docking or during Agena burns
while docked, t h e HI? whip antenna should be retracted to prevent possible
antenna breakage.

Attitude Display. -
A simulation program was established to determine
the best approach t o an attitude reference display duplicated on each side of

188
t h e cockpit. The display most acceptable to pilot/astronauts was e s s e n t i a l l y
the same type attitude ball found on contemporary f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t with some
modification. Each display incorporated a three-axis attitude reference ball
having 360 degrees of rotation about each axis. The attitude reference balls
were slaved t o t h e p o s i t i o n of the i n e r t i a l p l a t f o r m gimbals t o provide a
continuous a l l - a t t i t u d e r e f e r e n c e o f r o l l , p i t c h and y a w . A needle at the
top of the indicator provides roll rate i n d i c a t i o n i n one degree/sec incre-
ments t o f u l l . s c a l e n e e d l e d e f l e c t i o n of f i v e degrees. The pitch reference
scale marking was changed from five degree increments t o one degree increments
e f f e c t i v e on Spacecraft 6 . Pitch readouts became c r i t i c a l as inputs w e r e
needed f o r p i l o t manual computation i n c e r t a i n rendezvous malf'unction modes
with one-half degree o r better pitch reference.

The a t t i t u d e ball was s e l e c t e d f o r Gemini because it provided a simpli-
fied method of using gimbal position information f r o m the stable platform as
an all-attitude display. The sphere through mutual interaction of t h e axes
provides an unambiguous, a l l - a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y which i s a tremendous improve-
ment over the separate a x i s Mercury-type display.

An example of the lack of mutual interaction in a Mercury-type display
was shownby the following maneuver: Yaw t o 180 degrees, then pitch to
180 degrees. This r e s u l t e d i n a r o l l of 180 degrees with a y a w and a pitch.
Since the Mercury display elements were single plane the interaction did not
occur. However, i n r o t a t i n g a sphere 180 degrees i n y a w , and180 degrees i n
p i t c h as i n the Gemini display, it provided i t s own i n t e r a c t i o n and displayed
t h e e f f e c t as 180 degrees roll.

I n event of a partial o r complete platform failure, considerable simula-
t i o n was accomplished using a star background and r e t i c l e f o r a t t i t u d e
reference. Based on the simulations, it was considered feasible t o rendezvous
despite a platform failure, though it was more d i f f i c u l t and the probability
of e r r o r was increased.

"he i n e r t i a l guidancesystem (IGS) selected for the Gemini was a four-
gimbalsystem u t i l i z i n g an i n n e r r o l l gimbal w i t h +l5 degrees freedom, i n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e 360 d e g r e e s o u t e r r o l l gimbal t o prevent gimbal lock a t the
zerodegree y a w , zerodegreepitch, 90 degree r o l l attitude. The stable
element contained t h e gyros, accelerometer, servo loops and alignment prism.
The system was designed so that the spacecraft could be a l i g n e d i n f l i g h t by
aligning the b l u n t end forward o r small end forward w i t h t h e horizon scanner
and caging the platform. Guidance System, page 179 describes operational
controls of the IGS system. No'major problems w e r e encountered with the IGS/
a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y combination which proved accurate and reliable i n o r b i t a l
flight.

Flight Control Console. -
The flight control console included $he manual
attitude c o n t r o l l e r and the control m o d e select switch. Studies on the manual
controller included location of t h e controllers, loads'versus displacement of
the controller, and determination of optimummovement about the axes.
I n i t i a l l y , rudder pedals w e r e envisaged; however, weight and space
limitations forced abandonment of pedals i n favor of placing a t h i r d axis on
the manual controller. Either crew member could operate the controller while
in the restrained position through wrist a r t i c u l a t i o n and palm pivot motion
only, t o preclude bodymovementsfrom being transmitted to the controller.
The handle was spring loaded t o provide an increasing resistance as the
handle was movedaway from neutral. Controller force/displacement originally
had a step function designed i n a l l three axes, but was later r e v i s e d t o a
smooth curve as shown i n Fig. 30 f o r a l l three axes. Redundant switches w e r e
incorporated for selectively energizing solenoid valves in the a t t i t u d e con-
t r o l system. T o t a l t r a v e l o f the hand c o n t r o l l e r was 10 + 1 degrees from
n e u t r a l i n p i t c h and y a w axes and 9 + 1 degrees i n the r o i l axis. Rotary
movement of t h e handle about a transverse axis located a t t h e palm pivot
point effected a correspondingspacec-raftmotionabout the pitch axis. Rotary
displacement i n a clockwise or counterclockwise direction in a transverse
plan'e w i t h respect t o an adjustable canted axis below t h e p i l o t ' s wrist
effected a similar movement about the s p a c e c r a f t r o l l axis. Clockwise o r
counterclockwise rotation of t h e controller about the longitudinal axis of the
handle effected a corresponding movement about the yaw axis.

Due t o extended operation in t h i s mode, the r e s i s t a n t s t i c k f o r c e s
tended t o cause wrist fatigue. Consequently, the c o n t r o l s t i c k was modified
t o assimilate a T a t t h e top. This enabled the p i l o t t o g r a s p the top of the
s t i c k palm down i f desired f o r more ease of y a w control. A guard was b u i l t
upon the top to prevent depressing the communications transmit buttons while
grasping the stick in t h i s manner.

Evaluation of the many attitude controller designs included operation of
the s t i c k w i t h a b a r e hand, a soft glove or a pressurized glove, as well as
consideration of the man pressurized or unpressurized, in zero g o r under
heavy re-entry g loads.

The a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l l e r (See Fig. 31) worked i n conjunction with a rotary
mode s e l e c t o r s l i g h t l y forward and l e f t of t h e s t i c k . This was needed t o
allow the pilot minimal three-axis response for fine maneuveringsuch as
docking (pulse) o r l a r g e r o r d e r s of magnitude i n response f o r gross correce
t i o n s (rate command o r d i r e c t ) .

The modesmade available t o the p i l o t w e r e :

A. HOR SCAN - The horizon sensors provided a reference in pitch and r o l l
to automatically control a limit cycle mode +5 degrees in these axes. The
y a w a x i s was maintained by the pilot using tge pulse mode which was maintained
on a l l axes i n t h i s mode.
B. RATE CMD - Pitch, roll and y a w rate gyro outputs were compared w i t h
c o n t r o l l e r p o s i t i o n s t o produce a t t i t u d e rates p r o p o r t i o n a l t o c o n t r o l l e r
deflection.(Operationally, t h i s mode was e f f e c t i v e i n c o r r e c t i n g t h e f a i r l y
high cross-coupling rates developed when the maneuver c o n t r o l l e r was used
to translate.)
C. DIRFCT - Provided d i r e c t c o n t r o l t o open t h r u s t chamber solenoids when
t h e a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l l e r was deflectedapproximately 25$ of full t r a v e l . ( m e
ROLL FORCE TEST YAW FORCE TEST
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
+ 2
z-
2: 1
5: 0

%
-
e21
n
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1 0 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 1 0 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
FORCE (LE) FORCE ( L E )
PITCH F:ORCETEST

FIGURE 30 ATTITUDE HAND CONTROLLER FORCES
(ORIGINAL AND REVISED LIMITS)
FIGURE 31 ATTITUDE HAND CONTROLLER
r-

utmost discretion was used i n t h i s mode, as it tended t o waste fuel. )
.
D FULSE -
For each deflection of the controller away from the center
position, a single short duration (20 msec) pulse was a p p l i e d t o the appropri-
ate ais.
E. RATE CMD, RE-ENT -S i m i l a r t o rate command with a wider neutral band
and gain crossfeed from roll t o yaw. (Designed f o r use i n manual re-entry.)
F. RE-ENT -
Pitch and y a w axes i n rate damping control mode, with roll
axis slaved t o bank-angle command from the computer.
G. PUT -ACME accepted attitude information from the platform and
provided outputs t o the thrusters to maintain spacecraft attitude automati-
cally within pitch, y a w and roll deadbands.
-
H. PARA A mode designed f o r use with a paraglider which was eliminated
before the f i r s t manned f l i g h t . (On Spacecraft 5 and up, t h i s s e l e c t o r
position was used f o r the PLATFYIRM mode. )
Environmental Control Section (ECS).
environmentalcontrolsystem
-The control and d i s p l a y s f o r the
are shown i n Fig. 32. Several significant
changes i n t h e ECS (See ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM, page 157 ) are r e f l e c t e d
on t h e panel. The overheadmanually-operated ECS handles w e r e the same on
a l l spacecraft, A redundant valve was added t o back up the vent valve on
Spacecraft 7 and up. On Spacecraft 7 it was merely a cap t h a t was pulled off
the valve opening with a lanyard, but on Spacecraft 8 and up it was a spring-
loaded permanent i n s t a l l a t i o n that could be recycled for EVA. The e l e c t r i c a l
switch t o a c t i v a t e 02 high rate was located on the sequence panel on Space-
c r a f t 3 and 4, but was detennined by t e s t not t o be a sequential requirement.
When the function was removed from the sequential panel and placed on the
lower position of t h e cabin fan switch on Spacecraft 5 and up, the associated
light i n the sequence panel was placed on the annunciator panel. The manual
02 high rate p u l l ring located on the center pedestal between t h e s e a t s did
not change throughout the Gemini series. The suit fan switch positions
changed f r o m No. 1 and No. 2 t o No. 1 and No. 1 and No. 2 ( t o runboth fans
simultaneously) on Spacecraft 4 and up i n o r d e r t o g e t g r e a t e r c i r c u l a t i o n i n
the latter position. The cabin fan was removed in Spacecraft 8 and up and
other functions placed on i t s switch position. The remainderofthe ECS
switches and warning l i g h t s on the upper center panel remained the same i n a l l
spacecraftalthough the functions varied slightly. Spacecraft 6 had one
coolant pump i n each loop i n o r d e r t o save weight since it was a one-day
mission and of the battery configuration.

Pump B i n each loop a l s o was configured t o a lower flow rate t o conserve
power on Spacecraft 5 and up for periods of low a c t i v i t y and parer down. A l l
the gauges associated with the ECS remained the same on a l l spacecraft except
that a r o t a r y s e l e c t o r was added t o read the cry0 gauge when f u e l c e l l s w e r e
added t o Spacecraft 5 and up so that fuel c e l l 02 and H2 could be read i n
a d d i t i o n t o ECS 02. A crossfeed switch was added t o Spacecraft 7, 8 and 9 i n
order to supply ECS 02 t o the fuel c e l l s and vice versa. This a c t i o n w a s
taken as a r e s u l t of the M: 02 cry0 heater f a i l u r e on Spacecraft 5. Space-
c r a f t 10 and up had only one 02 supply f o r both ECS and fuel c e l l s . A tube
c u t t e r was added t o the H2 cry0 vacuum b o t t l e on Spacecraft 7 and up t o
improve the thermal c h a r e c t e r i s t i c s . This c u t t e r was activated by the cross-
feed switch with the experiments bus armed but was labeled separately on

193
IECOCU

- TEMP COHTROL

M4NU4L
O2 HIGH R 4 T E

DEC DFC
OPEN CLOSED

OFF OFF

FIGURE 32 ECS CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
Spacecraft 10 and up. The manual heater in 02 the
bottle was originally
a
momentary switch but was changed a fixed
to position and resulted in adding
a light ECSRTR to the annunciator panel. The temperature selector on the
center console served the same function throughout the program but, beginni
with Spacecraft8 it was marked "minimum" and "maximum" because the flow was
controlled over sucha short valve travel. The center pedestal items did not
change except for the addition a positive
of lock to the repressurization
valve. The repressurization oxygen was ducted through the console a quick
to
disconnect so it couldbe used withan EVA umbilical.
-
Propellant Quantity Indication.As originally conceived, the measure-
ment ofOAMS propellsnt quantitywas based on display of temperature and
pressure of the heliumOAMS fuel pressurant from which the crew would inter-
polate quantity by utilizinga graph curve. To avoid this inconvenience and
provide a constant quantity readout, an instrument and associated circuitry
were designed which would integrate the temperature and pressure parameters
and presenta zero tolo@ OAMS quantity indication.
an input to one side a of
A pressure transducer furnished bridge whilea
a temperature variable input to the other
sensitive platinum element provided
side, resulting in an integrated signal to an indicator 33) (Seewith
Fig.

+ 24 VDC G
H

6

24 VDC
(GN D)
E E I
F
I-
-

FIGURE 33 OAMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY INDICATOR

internal variable resistance to compensate for fuel loadings v a r y which
between spacecraft. Uneven fuel/oxidizer burning ratios principally accounted
for the -+lo$ accuracy of the present gauge.
Agena Status Display Panel. -
When docking was establisheda mission
requirement, McDonnell assumed the design responsibility
a status
for
as
display
panel for the Agena target docking adapter (TDA).
Due t o space limiations i n the Gemini cockpit, the panel was designed f o r
i n s t a l l a t i o n on t h e Agena so as t o be v i s i b l e and f’unctional t o a s t r o n a u t s i n
the Gemini cockpit.

No new design problems w e r e involved because the instruments were t o be
subjected t o almost the same environment when the hatches w e r e opened and t h e
cockpit depressurized for EVA.

This type of installation shown i n Fig. 34 probably was the first

FIGURE 34 AGENASTATUS DISPLAY PANEL

u t i l i z e d i n t h i s manner and proved highly beneficial because of savings in
Gemini cockpit instrument panel space, spacecraft weight and related electri-
c a l wiring.

Qualification t e s t s proved uneventful with a l l display indications and
lights passing t h e predicted testing requirements.

The ASC panel was mounted atop the forward end of the TDA so that it was
visible to the astronauts during the docking sequence and during subsequent
maneuvers i n the docked configuration. The display consisted of nine lights
and three analog dials that provided the following data:

A. TDA docking system ready f o r docking.
.
B TDA rigidized.
C. Agena Target Vehicle (ATV) e l e c t r i c a l power system operating properly.
D. Amount of PPS burn timeremaining.
E. PPS s a f e t y s t a t u s (main r e d ) .
F. PPS pressure status.
G. Status of PPS and SPS t h r u s t allow -
thrust stop circuit.
H. SPS g a s pressure status.
I. Amount of SPS burn time remaining.
J. Vehicle under control of Agena a t t i t u d e system.
K. Amount of attitude control gas remaining.

With the exception of the main red, the a t t i t u d e c o n t r o l system (ACS)
gas pressure display (ATT g a s d i a l ) and t h e propulsion system clocks, the ASD
panel was deenergized until activated by ground or spacecraft connaand. The
ACS gas pressure display and t h e A P portion of the main red light were always
energized and the propulsion system clocks were energized whenever the appli-
cable engine fired.

Two levels of illumination, bright and dim, were a v a i l a b l e t o a l l
displays except the main red which was either o f f o r on bright.

Dock (green l i g h t ) -
When illuminated, the docking cone was unrigidized,
the latches were reset and the TDA was i n the proper condition t o r e c e i v e t h e
nose section of the spacecraft.

Rigid (amber l i g h t ) -
When illuminated, the docking cone was rigidized
and ready t o allow post-docking maneuvers.

-
Pwr (green light) When illuminated, t h e 28 v o l t s DC unregulated
28 v o l t s DC regulated, -28 v o l t s DC regulated, 115 volts, 400 cps, single-
phase and 115 volts, 400 cps three-phase parameters were operating within
tolerances.

Main (red light) - When illuminated, indicated the following:

A. When the ASD was activated:

1. When the main engine was firing, the turbine exceeded 27,000 R PM ,
the hydraulic pressure was below 1500 + 20 psia o r the d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e s s u r e
between the f u e l and oxidizer tanks was below 3 - + 2 psid, fuel above oxidizer.
2. When the main engine was not firing, the differential pressure
+ 2 psid, fuel above oxidizer.
between t h e f u e l and oxidizer tanks was below 3 -

B. When the ASD was deactivated: the differential pressure between the
+ 2 psid, f u e l above oxidizer.
fuel and oxidizer tanks was below 3 -

Main (green l i g h t ) -
When illuminated, the main f u e l t a n k was above
15 + 2 psia, the main oxidizer tank above 15 + 2 psia, the hydraulic system
pressure above 50 -+ 5 psia, and the PPS safely commanded t o f i r e .
Amed (amber l i g h t ) -
When illuminated, the engine control circuits
were closed and either the main o r secondary engines were commanded t o f i r e .

-
Sec H i (green l i g h t ) When illuminated, more than 1110 + 20 psia expul-
sion gas pressure existed in both nitrogen spheres for a 50 s& u n i t I1 (200
l b SPS t h r u s t chamber) f i r i n g and more than 170 5 5 psia regulated pressure
existed i n both propellant tank gas manifolds.

Sec Lo (green light) -
When illuminated, more than 360 + 20 psia expul-
sion g a s pressure existed in both nitrogen spheres f o r a 150-sec u n i t I (16 l b
SPS t h r u s t chamber) f i r i n g and more than 170 2 5 psia regulated pressure
e x i s t e d i n both propellant tank gas manifolds.

197
-
ATT (green light) When illuminated, the Agena attitude control syste
was active.
Main time (clock display) indicated by minute and second hands t
28 VDC was applied to the main
remaining for main engine burn. The regulated
time display unit when the start signal was applied to the main This engine
a rate
caused the display unit to decrease the time remaining indication at
of one sec/sec burn time.
Sec Time (clock display) indicated by minute and second hands the
remaining for200 lb SPS burn. The regulated 28 VDC was applied on separate
wires for high and low thrusters of SPS.theThis caused the display unit
to decrease the time remaining indication a rate
at of one sec/sec burn time
for the high consumption aandrate of one-twelfth (1/12) sec/sec burn time
for thelow consumption rates.

A n t Gas (synchro display) indicated the percentage of total pressur
remaining in the Agena attitude control system gas spheres.
Spacecraft 8 produced two minor problems, the first being the diffic
in distinguishing the docking light illumination from the rigid light b
of their close proximity and similar color (green). The second became evide
during the daylight pass. At 50 to 75 ft (the station keeping range) it
became impossible to read either lights or gauges due to the sunlight
ing off the lenses. The acquisitiona film,
of probably Agena propellant
mist, on the entire Agena status display panel is believed to have c
to this condition. The problem was overcome by sighting the lights throu
the telescopic portion of the sextant.

Stowage
Allotting space and providing the means to secure stowage items on
on most missions.
spacecraft presented problems
known quantities of food, and rendered known
Manned missions called for
quantities of waste. Cameras, film, camera accessories, and various hard a
software were required for experiments. Logbooks and data cards were used
for recording events during the missions. "Zero g" conditions necessitated
stowing each item. Other factors affecting stowage included the duration of
each mission, the size and nature of the item to be stowed, and its i
and frequency of use.
3 mission and
Due to the relatively short duration of the Spacecraft
the small amount of equipment necessary, stowage wasa problem.
not Space-
craft 3 did not have all the fixed stowage containers of later spacecraft
Consequently, the right hand aft box and the modified whirlpool center
6,
box contained excess space. But on subsequent spacecraft, except Spacecraft
all available stowage space was utilized.
A l l items had t o be secured t o prevent themfrom floating. The method
of securing "loose items," i.e., not bolted to the spacecraft or removed from
a fixed container, was t o apply Velcro hook about the spacecraft walls,
instrument panels, hatches and seats, and Velcro p i l e t o the item t o be
secured. A f t e r each flight, the next crew usually requested that additional
Velcro hook be a p p l i e d t o the i n t e r i o r of each spacecraft through Spacecraft 8
when nearly a l l the usable space was occupied.

Beginning with Spacecraft 4, the a f t and center stowage area was
redesigned t o the following configuration:

A. A center stowage rack f i t t e d with one t o t h r e e Fiberglas containers.
B. Left and r i g h t a f t food boxes.

On Spacecraft 4 and 5 , the center stowage rack was configured w i t h three
Fiberglas containers which housedcamerasand camera accessories. A mounting
adapter f o r the 200 mm lens was stowed on the center stowage rack door.
However, the center stowage containers on Spacecraft 4 d i d not have adequate
space f o r stowing a l l of the camera accessories. Based on the probable low
use rate, three lenses were stowed i n t h e r i g h t hand a f t box i n pouches.
Since t h e film magazines could withstand more shock and vibration than the
accessories, they were stowed i n t h e side food boxes due t o t h e lack of space
i n the center containers and the need f o r a c c e s s i b i l i t y .

CommencingonGemini VI a special centerline rack was i n s t a l l e d t o c a r r y
the extravehicular l i f e support system (ELSS) and a Fiberglas camera case.
Although the ELSS was not carried on Spacecraft 6 and 7, t h i s rack was carried
t o maintain a standardized stowage configurationthroughout t h e program. The
ELSS was placed into the rack on a guide rail and structurally supported by
two pins on the rear of t h e rack and two p i n s i n t h e door of t h e rack t h a t
mated with correspondingholes i n the EMS. On several flights considerable
d i f f i c u l t y was encountered in closing the door on the stowage rack. This
problem was resolved by removing part of the structure in the rack (making it
more f l e x i b l e ) so it could more e a s i l y be placed i n a mating position with i t s
door. A theory t h a t the structure s h i f t e d as the spacecraft was pressurized
prompted t h i s action.

The Fiberglas container arrangement on Spacecraft 6 and 7 was changed
t o two containers, upper andlower, which allowed more stowage space.Except
f o r pen l i g h t s on Spacecraft 6 , camerasand camera accessories were stowed i n
these containers. The primary stowage objective was t o l o c a t e a l l equipment
needed f o r a given photographic experiment o r documentation i n one container.

On Spacecraft 7, cameras and camera accessories were placed i n the lower
container and the e x t r a f i l m magazines w e r e stowed i n the right hand pedestal
a u x i l i a r y food container. The upper container was used p a r t i a l l y f o r items
t h a t w e r e usually stowed i n t h e sidewall containers on other spacecraft.
These included tape c a r t r i d g e s , s u i t repair k i t , urine collection system
components, p l a s t i c z i p p e r bags, tissue dispenser, vision testing anddewpoint
hygrometer components, interference filters, and medical accessory kit.

199
The upper part of the center stowage area on Spacecraft 8 through 12 was
used for the extravehicular l i f e supportsystem (ELSS)' package. The lower
portion contained a Fiberglas box with foam molded t o accept cameras, film
magazines, and camera accessories. On eachof these spacecraft there was not
s u f f i c i e n t room i n t h i s box t o c o n t a i n a l l the equipment,and overflow items
such as lenses and film magazines sometimes w e r e stowed i n pouches i n t h e
a f t and side food boxes.

I n a d d i t i o n t o c e n t e r stowage overflow of camerasand accessories; the
l e f t and r i g h t a f t boxes were u t i l i z e d f o r stowing food, extravehicular
a c t i v i t y (EVA) equipment, urine bags, defecation devices, and other items not
requiring frequent use. Each item, with the exception of the foodpacks, was
i n a n i n d i v i d u a l pouch. Some items such as cameras with lenses were i n
padded pouches. Typical stowage i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Fig. 35.

On Spacecraft 4 and 5 , the l e f t a f t box was used f o r food, but the r i g h t
a f t box was used t o stow "infrequent use"itemssuch as camera lenses,
umbilical hose, defecation bags, s u i t repair k i t , and Zodiacal l i g h t camera.
On Spacecraft 4, the s i z e and shape of the in-flight exerciser, blood pressure
adapter, urine receiver andhose,and umbilical guide was responsible for
these items being stowed i n the r i g h t a f t box.

The l e f t a f t boxon Spacecraft 6 was used f o r food, personal effects
items such as tissue dispenser, bio-med f i t t i n g wrench, waste containers,
roll-on cuff receiver, and defecation devices, and f o r items of a general
nature such as lightweight headsets, humidity sensor, voice tape recorder
cartridges, 16 mm film magazines,and a c o l l e c t i o n bag assembly. The r i g h t
a f t box contained auxiliary water bags f o r use in obtaining a drink during
prelaunch count down.

Both of t h e a f t boxes on Spacecraft 7 were used mainly f o r food.
Personal hygiene towels also were stowed i n eachof the a f t boxes.

Beginning with Spacecraft 8, mission requirements became more uniform
w i t h respect to duration, EVA, andphotography. On Spacecraft 9, 11 and12,
t h e l e f t aft box was u t i l i z e d p r i m a r i l y f o r EVA equipment. On Spacecraft 10,
the EVA equipment was divided between the two a f t boxes. The r i g h t a f t box
contained items which could not be stowed elsewhere o r which had a low l e v e l
of use. The right aft box on Spacecraft 11 and 12 was used p r i n c i p a l l y f o r
food,blood pressure bulb, waste container, defecation devices, and camera
equipment that could not be stowed i n t h e center stowage container due t o
lack of space.

The l e f t and right sidewall boxes were u t i l i z e d p r i m a r i l y f o r items
intended t o be easily accessible, or of a small volume. Typicalofsuch items
were personal hygiene towels, waste containers, pen lights, defecation
devices, voice tape recorder cartridges, the spot meter exposure dial, and
lightweight headsets. On most spacecraft twoman-meals w e r e stowed i n each
sidewall box t o eliminate the need f o r unstowing of the aft boxes o r the
hatch foodpouches until a f t e r t h e first sleep period. The "small volume"
hard items such as hose nozzle interconnectors and 16 mm and 70 mm film

200
I _

T Y P I C A L C A M E R A STOWAGE T Y P I C A L H A T C H STOWAGE

F O O T W E L L SHOWING T Y P I C A L
T Y P I C A L A F T BOX STOWAGE POUCHES
STOWAGEPOUCHES

FIGURE 35 CABIN STOWAGE
201
magazines w e r e placed i n t h e sidewall boxes rather than the pedestal, footwell,
o r c i r c u i t b r e a k e r panel f a i r i n g pouches, due t o launch conditions. On some
s p a c e c r a f t t h e c i r c u i t breaker and light module assemblies, plastic.'iippe!r
bags, u t i l i t y e l e c t r i c a l c o r d s , and velcro hook s t r i p s and velcro piie strips
w e r e stared only i n t h i s location because of crew preference that they be
equally accessible in t h e pedestal pouches o r t h e u t i l i t y pouch under the
r i g h t hand instrument panel.

The sidewall extension boxes were incorporated beginning with Space-
c r a f t 4. They were located directly aft of the sidewall boxes. Accessibility
t o these boxes was limited due t o proximity of the ejection seat. On Space-
c r a f t 4, they were used f o r stowing a lightweight headset and defecation
devices. On Spacecraft 6, the boxes contained one hosenozzleinterconnector
eachand on Spacecraft 7, seven defecation devices each. On Spacecraft 5
through 12, the crew preference kits were stowed i n these boxes.

Underneatheach sidewall box a long, n a r r o w , a u x i l i a r y stowage pouch
was a f f i x e d t o the sidewallbeginningwithSpacecraft 5. These pouches were
used g e n e r a l l y t o star the blood pressure bulb and one of the urine hose
and f i l t e r assemblies. On some spacecrafttheycontained small items such as
hosenozzleinterconnectors.Beginning with Spacecraft 8, a pair of debris
c u t t e r s were stowed i n the r i g h t hand sidewall pouch.

There were s i x "hard-mounted" itemsabout the spacecraft. The i n - f l i g h t
medical kit was mounted between the l e f t hand seat and sidewall on Space-
craft 3 through 7 and between the right hand seat and t h e sidewall on Space-
c r a f t 8 and up. The voice tape recorder was mounted permanently between t h e
r i g h t hand seat and the sidewall on Spacecraft 3 through 7. Beginning with
Spacecraft 8, the recorder was interchanged w i t h t h e i n - f l i g h t medical k i t
and at the same time the mounting was changed t o allow the recorder t o be
removedfrom i t s bracket and be stowed on the l e f t hand c i r c u i t breaker
panel fairing pouch cover during orbit. It was made portable primarily for
EVA purposes. The 16 mm camera bracket that mountson t h e outboardcornerof
t h e window frame was stowed i n a h o l s t e r mountedon t h e l e f t sidewall a f t and
s l i g h t l y lower than the sidewall box. A similar h o l s t e r f o r t h e right window
bracket was mounted on the right sidewall directly opposite the mounting on
t h e l e f t side.

The s w i z z l e s t i c k was located on the right side of the overhead c i r c u i t
breaker panelswitchguard. E i t h e r crew member coulduse t h i s device t o
actuate switches i n the other cockpit. An o p t i c a l s i g h t was stowed under
the l e f t instrument panel on each spacecraft.

A pouch approximately 4 x 6 x 1.5 i n . deep was located directly below
the l e f t and r i g h t c i r c u i t breaker panels. It was constructed so as t o fair
in with the panels. These pouches were used primarily for small, lightweight
items such as the urine collection device (UCD) clamps Velcro s t r i p s , small
rolls of tape, and a urine system component.

Each spacecraft had dry stowage bags mountedon the footwell sidewalls
with Velcro.These bags w e r e used f o r stowing charts,sunshades,reflective
shades, and f l i g h t data books. On Spacecraft 3 through 9, a plotboard pouch
was i n s t a l l e d on the inboard sidewall of the l e f t footwell. This pouch con-
tained charts and f l i g h t data books i n a d d i t i o n t o the plotboard. On Space-
c r a f t 4, the v e n t i l a t i o n c o n t r o l module (VCM) was stowed i n the right footwell.
The VCM was the forerunner of the ELSS.

On Spacecraft 73 a n a u x i l i a r y food pouch was stowed i n the right foot-
well. On Spacecraft 8 and 11, a TV monitor was mounted on the inboard
sidewall of the right footwell for launch and re-entry. For the rest of the
flight the TV monitor was stowed i n a specially cut mounting on top of t h e
inboard side of the l e f t e j e c t i o n seat. On Spacecraft 10 and 11, a 50 f t
umbilical was stowed i n the forward portion of the l e f t footwell. The debris
guard under the l e f t instrument panel was modified t o make more room f o r the
umbilical. This was done t o provide more clearance f r o m the e j e c t i o n
envelope.
An o r b i t a l u t i l i t y pouch was i n s t a l l e d under the right instrument panel
on Spacecraft 4 through 12. On Spacecraft 4 through 6 , this pouch was small
and held only a f e w items. On Spacecraft 4, it was primarily for the hatch
closing device. On Spacecraft 7, it was enlarged t o provide additional
stowage space. Spacecraft 8 through 12 retained the Spacecraft 7 configura-
tion.

Due t o the requirement f o r a d d i t i o n a l stowage space f o r experimentand
photographic equipment on Spacecraft 9 through 12, food pouches were i n s t a l l e d
on eachhatch. Similar pouches were i n s t a l l e d on Spacecraft 7 due t o t h e
increased need f o r food on t h e 14-day mission. I n i t i a l l y the pouches were not
r i g i d enoughon Spacecraft 9 t o hold the food in place before the hatch was
closed.BeforethelaunchofSpacecraft 9, e l a s t i c straps were sewed onto
the pouches t o provide the required rigidity. As a precaution the crew
planned t o e a t a t least two mealseach from the right hatch pouch t o avoid
any d i f f i c u l t y i n c l o s i n g t h e h a t c h a f t e r the first EVA exercise.

Incorporated in t h e water management panel was a water drink gun on t h e
early spacecraft. On Spacecraft 8 and up, a water metering device was used
which would measure i n half-ounce increments and provisions were made f o r
stowing an additional urine hose and f i l t e r assembly.

The l e f t and right hatch torque boxes were u t i l i z e d t o i n s t a l l v a r i o u s
experiments in hard-shell containers. The designrequirements f o r these
containers included adequate clearance with the e j e c t i o n seat, noninterference
with the crew's helmets, and a b i l i t y t o withstand hatch opening shock loads
of up t o 40 g ' s . The l i s t ofexperiments stowed on the hatch torque boxes
i s shownbelow:

s/c LEFT HATCH 'JXRQUE BOX RIGPI' HATCH lDRQUE BOX

3 Sea Urchin Egg Unit Blood Chromosome Unit
4 Dose Rate Indicator
(Removable )
- Type 5 Dose Rate Indicator
(Fixed)
- Type 1

I
slc LEFT HATCH TORQUE BOX RIGET HATCH rORQUE BOX

5 Vision Tester Photometer

6 Dose Rate IndicatorType 1 - Dose Rate Indicator
Dosimeter, Passive

7 Vision Tester Photometer

8 Frog Egg Container Frog Egg Container

9 50 mm Lens and Filter(S-11) Sextant
10 Star Occultation Photometer Sextant
11 Blood Irradiation Device Sextant

12 Spectrometer Sensor Frog Eggs Experiment

Personal Equipment And Survival Equipment

All of the personal and survival equipment was government furnished.
Personal equipment largely consisted of the space suit and associated
ment. Fig. 36 illustrates the Gemini pressure suit. The following suits
were flown:
SPACECRAFT -
SUIT

3 G3C
4 G4C
5 G3C
6 G3C
7 G!X
G4C up 8 and
Personal equipment consisted
of:

QTY. PAFtT NUMBER NOMENCLATURE
2 sets ACS-1505 Wrist Dam
2 CF55019-16 Flight Booklet
2 CF55033 Chronograph Wrist Watch
2 CF55044-1 Leg strap
2 sets
CF55047-5 Flight Data Cards
4 CF55050-1 Marking Pen
4 CF55051-2 Mechanical Pencil
2 CF55052-5 Watch Band
2 Pr CF55081-1 Sunglasses
2 CSD20537-iL Life Vest Assembly
2 CSD20537-1R Life Vest Assembly

204
FIGURE 36 GEMINI PRESSURE SUIT

QTY. PART " B E R NOMENCLArn

2 CSD20542 Surgical Scissors
1 a35998-1 Radiation Pocket Dosimeter
0 m35999-1 Passive Radiation Packet
2 EC 30045 Space Suit Knife
1 EC30047-1 Visor Cover
2 G4C Space Suit Assembly
4 M S C -ECG-SIG-GF-S1 ECG Signal Conditioner
2 MSC-HAR-SYS-GF"G2-1 Bio-Med and Communication Harness
2 MSC -!LE"PRB-GF-Sl Oral Temperature Probe
2 MSC"TEM-SIG-GF-S~ O r a l Temperature Signal Conditioner
2 MSC-ZPN-SIG-GF-S1 Impedance Pneumograph Signal
2 9557-3-112-3 Launch Day Urine Bqg
2 IRI-GBE-A Auxiliary, EIG Electrode Harness
2 IRI-GBE-s Sternal, ECG Electrode Harness

205
The following equipment i s i n t h e s u r v i v a l k i t :

QTy. PART NUMBER NOMENCIA=

2 CSD20539 Survival Pack (Less Container)
2 CSD205034 Life Raft
2 ~~~20548 Sea Anchor
2 CSD20543 Sunbonnet
2 cm20505 C02 Cyliner and Valve
2 ~~~20536-1 H$ Container
2 cs~20538 Combination Lite Assembly
2 cs~20511 Desalter K i t
2 CSD20534 Medical Kit
2 ~~~20526 Machete and Sheath
2 CSD20513 Sunglasses
4 CSD20504 Sea Dye Marker
2 2588218 Radio-Beacon

"he survival kit i s pictured on Fig. 37 and 38.

.PARACHUTE

SUR

206
FIGURE 38 CREWSEATING AND RESTRAINTDETAtLS
ESCAPE, LANDING AND ReCOvERY SYSTEMS

Escape System
The ejection seat system, designed as the primary escape system f
safety, consists of ejection seats, seat rocket/catapult, hatch actuating
system, personnel parachute system, and survival equipment. Maximum design
operating parameters are at altitudes 70,000
up to ft, speeds up to Mach
2.86
and dynamic pressures
up-to820 psf. The ejection system also has the
-
zero velocity thus, the system
capability of being utilized at zero altitude
will allow the astronauts to escape from the spacecraft while on the
pad, during launch or after re-entry. However, the operational use of t
seat was restricted to altitudes 15,000
below ft by decree, although the
design and qualification tests were as stated. The reasons for this res
tion are as follows:
A. Titan I1 booster flightsN-7 and N-20, where breakup occurred disclosed
no hazards that would have been significant to the spacecraft a "ride
during
it out" abort. This, coupled with additional analysis indicated a high degree
of confidence in crew safety couldbe obtained by remaining in the spacecraft
during a booster malfunction and then usinga Mode I1 (retro-rocket salvo)
abort to escape from the booster.
B. Although high speed ejection seat sled tests were satisfactory,
random nature of possible ejection conditions such as attitudes, oxygen
flapping, astronaut sizes and pressure suit modifications did not instil
confidence in high altitude or high dynamic pressure ejections.
C. Water recovery after an ejection posed as additional safety h
which wouldbe compounded if an injury were sustained during the ejecti
D. Use of the ejection seat made an abort decision more time cri
since a late ejection could result in recontact with the booster or fi
Thus; ejection had to occur before significant booster attitude excursio
occurred. This was nominally about 5 degrees while booster breakup angles
were much greater and therefore the decision to eject was time critica
on ejection seat rather than booster restrictions.
Optimum trajectory and stability of the seat during its powered f
is maintained through position control of the seat-man combination cente
gravity. After the powered phase of the flight the man is separated fr
a stabilizing device called
seat and descends under a ballute, untila
desirable parachute opening altitude is reached. After parachute opening,
the backboard assembly and egress kit are jettisoned, leavingman to the
a lanyardtobelow
descend under his parachute with his survival gear secured
him.
a .995 has
The ejection seat system as it is currently designed reliabil-
ity factor of successful operation.
The basic' location arrangement/configuration
and of the ejection system
39. The crew members are seated side by side, faced towar
are shown in Fig.
the small end of the re-entry module. Each seat is12 canted
degrees outboard

208
0AC

HATCH ACTUATOR
INITIATION SYSTEM

FIGURE 39 EJECTION SEATSYSTEMAND DEVICES

and 8 degrees 20 min forward t o a s s u r e s e p a r a t i o n and provide required
e l e v a t i o n i n the event ejection off the pad i s necessitated.

Ejection Seat. - The e j e c t i o n s e a t as shown i n Fig. 40 i s basically a
sheet metal s t r u c t u r e b u i l t on a torque box frame principle. The seat i s
mounted i n the spacecraft on T-type rails a t t a c h e d t o the large pressure
bulkhead and held i n position by a single bolt a t t h e top of the seat back
where it a t t a c h e s t o the rocket catapult. The seat structure includes a
seat back, seat pan, side panel, am rests, padded headrest, stirrups,
stowable am r e s t r a i n t s and seat slider blocks.Attached t o the seat strucd
t u r e i s the equipnentrequired t o separate the man from h i s seat. T h i s
includes t h e e j e c t i o n c o n t r o l mechanism, seat-man separator thruster, seat-man
PARACHUTE RISERAND
B A L L U T E RISER STORAGE
CPARACHUTE RISER

SURVIVAL KIT

SLING ASSEMBLY
CONTOUR BOARD
BACKBOARD

ARM RESTRAINT

PELVIC BLOCK

REEL
CONTRO L

HARNESS RELEASE

BALLISTIC HOSE T O
SEAT MAN SEPARATOR
SEAT-MAN SEPARATOR

FIGURE 40 EJECTION SEATASSEMBLY

separator strap with personalized contoured pelvic block attached, harness
release actuator, lap b e l t releases, and upper andlowerbackboard releases
and t h e i r associated linkage. Attached to the l e f t seat side panel i s the
i n e r t i a reel control handle, which allows the man t o s e l e c t either a manual
lock or automatic lock position. The manual position prevents the astronaut's
shoulders from moving forward by mechanically preventing extension of the
shoulder straps. The automatic lock position allows the a s t r o n a u t , t o move
forward slowly but w i l l lock with a fast movement of 2 g ' s . If locking occurs

210
in the automatic position, the astronaut releases himself by cycling the
control handle to manual and back to automaticOn lock.
the right hand seat
side panel,a ditching handle releases the man with his backboard assembly
and the egress kit from the seat structure. This provision anpermits
over-
the-side bailout.
- on the eJection seat
Backboard Assembly. The backboard assembly mounts
structure through theupperand lower backboard'releases. Mounted to the
backboard assembly are survival items such as the survival kits, personnel
(a high altitude, high velocity
parachute system, and the ballute system .
stabilization device).
Mounted to the backboardan is
inertia reel with restraint straps that
pass over the top of the backboard and are attached to the parachute ris
A personalized cushion contoured
at the parachute quick disconnect fittings.
for safety and comfort, is mounted to the front of the backboard. Also
mounted on the backboard are the pyrotechnic devices that initiate system
operation. These devices include the drogue mortar and its associated equip-
ment jettison system and the ballute deploy and release system.
-
Egress Kit. The egress kit assembly rests on the seat structure and
is restrained to the seat structure and backboard assembly by the lap bel
system. The egress kit contains the emergency bailout oxygen system. For
Spacecraft 8 and up, the egress kit height is lowered by removing the bailou
oxygen system to allow more room in the seats. Removalof the bailout oxygen
system lowersthe rated ejection altitude to
15,000 ft. For pilot comfort,
a contoured cushion is mountedon top of the egress kit. Located at the front
of the egress kita single
is point release handle which, when activated,
releases the egress kit from the seat structure and backboard assembly. This
manner is convenient for lw altitude over-the-side bailout. The ejection
a o
control handle(D ring) is normally stowed undera sliding door at the front
of the egress kit to prevent inadvertent ejection. However, during launch
and re-entry, it is in operational position. At the rear of the egress kit
is a pytotechnic-activated quick disconnect system. The supply and return
oxygen hoses from the suit as well as the communications wire bundle ar
attached to this disconnect. Because the egress kit was lowered for Space-
craft 8 and up (see below), the single point release handle was removed and
the D ring was stored on the seat-man separator thruster.
After the flight of Spacecraft3, the astronauts reported that the egress
kit knee supports provided were uncomfortable and actually hampered their
leg movements when they tried to shift their position.In addition, it was
felt that the excessive height of these supports might render egress durin
EVA more difficult.As a result, the thickness of the egress kit cushion was
trimed (deleting the knee supports) for Spacecraft4 through 7; this served
to lower the astronauts in their seats and a provided
more comfortable
attitude. However, the old (52-82911) structure was still employkid and the
single-point release system was still incorporated.
For Spacecraft8 and up, the trimming was carried further, resulting
in a thinner egress cushion in the forward position.
A new egress kit
structure was employed, aand
new ejection control mechanism was incorporat
I n addition, the ejection
The single-point release system was eliminated.
control handle storage container which went between the legs was del
-
Lap Belt Assembly. The lap belt assemblya webbing
is arrangement
designed to hold the egress kit into and thethe astronaut into the
seat
ejection seat system. After ejection and subsequent seat-man separation i
secures the bottom of the backboard and the egress kit to the astrona
a manual disconnect and
lap belt assembly includes a pyrotechnic disconnect.
11 and 12 by adding belt
The lap belt disconnect was modified for Spacecraft
guides to the disconnect. The guides prevent belt jamming in the discon
during adjustment by the astronaut.
-
Hatch Actuating System. The hatch actuating system, when initiated by
either pilot, activates the firing mechanisms of both hatch actuators. T
system consists of two manual firing mechanisms cross-connected by two
mild detonating fuse (MDF) crossovers and two pyrotechnically actuated h
actuators redundantly interconnected by four rigid and four flexible
MDF
lines .
An MDF interconnect is
a single strand of high explosive
(2 gr/ft of
RDX) encased ina lead sheathing and installed in flexible or rigid stee
tubing. A small booster charge is incorporated at each end of the explos
on each end of the tubing.
strand. Attachment fittings are incorporated

The pyrotechnic hatch actuator unlocks, opens, and mechanically reta
the egress hatch in the open position. This assembly also furnishes gas
pressure to initiate the firing mechanisms of the seat ejector-rocket
A lanyard, attached to the locking
catapult after opening the hatch.
mechanism of the actuator, permits the hatch to be unlocked manually.

Escape System Operation (Fig. -
41). The ejection sequence is initiated
when either crew member pulls D thering. The D ring then activatesa
detonator in the manual firing mechanism which induces propagation in
MDF interconnects. These MDF lines redundantly provide the initiation pulse
to the dual cartridges in each hatch actuator breech. The large of volume
high pressure gas developed in the breech is ported into the actuator. T
gas pressure extends the latch piston, which unlocks the egress hatch
a bellcrank/push rod mechanism. The gas pressure then acts on the piston/
stretcher assembly, moving it through the length of the cylinder. At ap
mately 0.6 in. priorto the stretcher assembly reaching
full extension, gas
pressure is exhausted intoa ballistic hose. The ballistic hose then delivers
the gas pressure to the firing mechanism of the seat ejector-rocket ca
As the stretcher assembly reaches the fully extended position, the lo
of the locking mechanism engages the piston of the stretcher assembly,
holds the hatch open. The catapult firing mechanism ignites
a relay and main
charge in the catapult. The resulting gas pressure propels the rocket moto
31 in. of
through the length of the catapult housing. After approximately
stroke of the catapult, the gas initiates dual igniter charges in the
sustainer motor which provides additional thrust through the cg of th
tion seat. The ejection seat moves up the rails actuating four lanyards

212
-
SYSTEM ACTIVATION 0.0 SECONDS
SEQUENCE-1-
-
HATCHES OPEN 0.250 SECONDS
SEQUENCE -2-

BALLUTEACTUATOR
ARMINGPINS

BACKBOARD

RELEASE7 7

(FROM SEAT)
SEAT/MAN
SEPARATOR

--
HARNESS RELEASE FIRES 1.474 SEC.

--
SEAT/MAN THRUSTER FIRES 1.524 SEC.
SEAT/MAN SEPARATED
LANYARDS PULLED
EALLUTE I S DEPLOYED 5.00 SEC.
AFTER SEPARATION
BALLUTE I S RELEASED A T 7500 FT.

FIGURE 41 EJECTION SEATSEQUENCE OF OPERATI-ON
SEAT
EJECTOR
ROCKET/
CATAPULT-

\ r EGRESS K I T

-
SEAT MAN SEPARATED
FROM SPACECRAFT
I
I

- -
ROCKET CATAPULT FIRES 0.333 SEC.
LANYARDS PULLED 0.394 SEC.
SEQUENCE -3-

FDROGUE MORTARSLUG

PILOT CHUTE

SUSPENSION LINES

LANYARD

DROGUE MORTAR IS ACTUATED
AT ALTITUDE OF 5700 FT. ORLESS.
2.30 SEC. TIME DELAY AFTER
ACTIVATION FORFIRING.

FIGURE 41 EJECTION SEAT SEQUENCE OF OPERATION (Continued)
a t t a c h e d t o the spacecraft structure. Threeof the lanyards a l s o are attached
t o the egress k i t , and accomplish the following functions:

A. Remove lock pin from composite disconnect allowing separation of
spacecraft oxygen hoses and w i r e bundle f r o m the seat.
B. Trip pressure regulator valve, initiating oxygen flow from egress
k i t t o astronaut.
. C. I n i t i a t e control check valve t o provide pressure in suit.
Effective Spacecraft 8 and UP, the lanyards t o t h e oxygen regulator and the
control check valve are removed as the bailout oxygen i s removed.

The fourth lanyard i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e f i r i n g mechanism of the harness
release actuator, which fires a percussion cartridge to release the backboard
and egress k i t from the seat structure after a 1.08 secpyro time delay. The
gas pressure of the harness release actuator cartridge i s then vented through
a f l e x i b l e hose t o i n i t i a t e t h e seat-man separator thruster cartridge. The
seat-man separator thruster pushes against a Y strap, fixed a t a l l three
points, and forcibly separates the astronaut with h i s backboardand egress
k i t from the edection seat. Duringseat-man separation, lanyards f o r the
b a l l u t e deploy and release mechanism i n i t i a t e a time delay deploy cartridge
and ann a barostat-controlled firing mechanism f o r t h e release function.
Below 7500 f t the barostat fires the ballute release cartridge. For off-the-
pad ejection, the release function occurs prior to the ballute deploy,thereby
freeing the ballute i f the deployment function should inadvertently occur.
Also, a t seat-man separation, a lanyard a t t a c h e d t o the seat structure fires
t h e parachute drogue mortar, o r i f separation occurs above 5700 f t , unlocks
t h e f i r i n g p i n t o be released by a barostat when the 5700 f t a l t i t u d e i s
reached. The drogue mortar deploys the personnel parachute and also supplies
p r e s s u r e t o i n i t i a t e a time delay cartridge propagating MDF which accomplishes
t h e following:

A . Disconnects the suit hoses and wiring (Jetelox) from the egress k i t .
B. Releases the l a p b e l t which allows the egress kit t o f a i l away.
C. Cuts the i n e r t i a reel straps which releases the backboard t o f a l l
away.

A s t h e backboardand egress k i t f a l l away, a mooring lanyard attached t o t h e
astronaut becomes t a u t and e x t r a c t s t h e l i f e raft and rucksacks (containing
survival items) from t h e i r packs on the backboard. The astronaut descends
w i t h t h e survival kit items a t t a c h e d t o him.

Escape System Development and Qualifications Tests. - Ejection seat
system development t e ' s t s and q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s ' a r e shownon T a b l e s 19, 20
and. 21, respectively. Firings of ejection seat ofpyrotechnic components and
devices a r e tabulated in Table 22. Beforeeach f l i g h t , v e r i f i c a t i o n firings
were made of u n i t s from the same l o t s as t h o s e i n s t a l l e d i n the spacecraft.

Failure Summary. - The f a i l u r e summary i s shown i n Table 23.
TABLE 19 EJECTION SEAT DEVELOPMENT TEST

TEST
IOMPLETED TYPE OF TEST

10% SEAT-MAN COMBINATION POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL TESTS TO OBTAIN THE
20% SEAT-MAN COMBINATION AERODYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS USING SCALE MODELS
4 SIMULATED EJECTION (SLED SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM BOILERPLATE UNDER
TEST) LAUNCH AND RE-ENTRY AIR LOAD CONDITIONS
11 SIMULATED OFF-THE-PAD SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM TOWER FOR EJECTION
EJECTION (SOPE) FROM LAUNCHING PAD
14 LOW A L T . DUMMY DROP PERSONNEL PARACHUTE
3 ROCKET/CATAPULT (RPI) SEAT-MAN TRAJECTORY
2 THROUGH CANOPY (NAA) SEAT EJECTION THRU THE CANOPY OF NAA PARAGLIDER
CAPSULE
3 ROCKET/CATAPULT (AEDC) ALTITUDE FIRING CHARACTERISTICS AT 70k
1 ROCKET/CATAPULT - SEAT VERIFY POCKET BUMPER FITTING OF EJECTION SEAT
1 SEAT DROP TEST TO PROVE OUT 3-POINT RELEASE SYSTEM

2 ROCKET/CATAPULT VERIFY EJECTION SEAT FLAME BUCKET

5 SEAT - EGRESS KIT SEPARATION DYNAMIC SEPARATIONS OK EGRESS O2 DISCONNECTS AND
VALVE INITIATION

5 ROCKET CATAPULT THRUST ANGLE VERIFICATION
2 L O W A L T D U M M Y DROP VERIFY PERSONNEL PARACHUTE
14 SEAT - MAN SEPARATION VERIFY HARDWARE BEFORE SLED AND SOPE TESTS

PYROTECHNIC COMPONENTS AND DEVICES - NUMEROUS DEVELOPMENT TESTS WERE CONDUCTED. THESE
TESTS WERE A T T H E C O M P O N E N T L E V E L , SYSTEM LEVEL AND BREADBOARD TYPE TESTS TO OBTAIN THE
CORRECT OPERATING TIME, PRESSURE AND MECHANICAL FUNCTION OF EACH DEVICE.

Mission -
Anomalies, No mission anomalies occurred with the escape
system.

-
Mission Evaluation. F'yrotechnic components of Spacecraft 2 were removed
and post-flight fired. Pyrotechnic components of Spacecraft 10 (except hatch
actuator and rocket catapult) were post-flight fired in the No anomalies
seat.
were encountered.

In-flight safety pins for the drogue mortar were repositioned for
easier insertion.

216
BALLUTE
~~
TABLE 20 WIND TUNNEL TESTS
.
FULL SCALE SERIES I MCDONNELL LOW SPEED WIND T U N N E L 16 RUNS
FULL SCALE SERIES I

-1
AEDC 16' x 16' T U N N E L 11RUNS
FULL SCALE SERIES II AEDC 16' x 16' T U N N E L 8 RUNS
FULL SCALE SERIES Ill AEDC 16' x 16' T U N N E L 8 RUNS

DROGUE
5'0 E
:'L- ~~ LANGLEY SPIN TUNNEL 48 RUNS

BAROSWITCH
FULL SCALE MCDONNELL LOW SPEED WIND T U N N E L 7 RUNS
- ~ ~~~~
~~ ~

EJECTION SEAT
20% MODEL SERIES I MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND T U N N E L 115 RUNS
20% MODEL SERIES II MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 51 RUNS
20% MODEL SERIES Ill MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 65 RUNS
10% MODEL SERIES I MCDONNELL POLYSONIC WIND TUNNEL 149RUNS

Landing And Recovery System

A three-parachute system i s series s t a b i l i z e s and retards the re-entry
vehicle velocity. During t h e final stageofdescent, t h e main parachute
suspension i s s h i f t e d from a single-point to a two-pointsystem i n o r d e r t o
achieve a more f a v o r a b l e a t t i t u d e f o r a waterlanding. The landing system
consists of three parachutes (drogue, pilot, and main parachute), two motars,
reefing cutters, pyrotechnic cutters and separation assembly, disconnects,
r i s e r s , and attaching hardware. The system i s located primarily in the
rendezvousandrecovery (R & R ) module as shownon Fig. 42. Only Spacecraft 2
u t i l i z e d a two-parachutesystem ( p i l o t andmain). The recovery systemcon-
sists of a h o i s t loop, flashing recovery light, pyrotechnic cutter, dyemarker,
and f l o t a t i o n material.

Parachutes. - A high a l t i t u d e drogue parachute stabilizes the re-entry
vehicle. The drogueparachuteassembly consists of an 8.3 f t Do, 20 degrees
conical ribbon chute with twelve 750-lb tensile strength suspension lines.
A pyrotechnic-actuatedmortardeploys the chute. Two 16-secpyrotechnic time
d e l a y r e e f i n g l i n e c u t t e r s disreef the chute after deployment. A three-legged
riser assembly attaches the parachute assembly t o the R & R module. Three
electrically initiated pyrotechnic cable cutter guillotines, each u t i l i z i n g
dual c a r t r i d g e s f o r redundancy, sever the chute risers from the R & R module.
Attached t o one of the drogue r i s e r l e g s i s an apex l i n e which e x t r a c t s t h e
pilot parachute from its own mortar. A p i l o t parachute,used i n tandem with
t h e drogue chute, decelerates the re-entry vehicle, removes the R & R module,
and deploys the main parachute. The pilot parachute assembly consists of an
18.3 ft DO ringsail chute with sixteen 5W-lb tensile strength suspension
TABLE 21 EJECTION SEAT QUALIFICATION TEST
- ~~
-.

-tI 3 COMPLETED
TYPE OF TEST

SIMULATED EJECTION
(SLED TEST)
~
REMARKS

SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM BOILERPLATE TO
QUALIFY IT UNDER LAUNCH AND RE-ENTRY
CONDITIONS

I 3 1
1
SIMULATED OFF-THE-PAD
EJECTION (SOPE)

STATIC EJECTION
15k E J E C T I O N
SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM FROM TOWER TO QUALIFY
FOR EJECTION FROM THE LAUNCHING PAD

SEAT EJECTION FROM F-106 AIRCRAFT TO DEMON-
STRATE EJECTION CAPABILITY AT ZERO VELOCITY AND
IT

1 40k E J E C T I O N Z E R O A L T I T U D E A N D M A C H 1.72 AND 40k A L T I T U D E

4 LOW A L T DUMMYDROP TO QUALIFY ALL ESCAPE SYSTEM COMPONENTS AT-
2o 16 H I G HA L T TACHED TO THE ASTRONAUT AFTER SEAT SEPARATION

12 LOW A L T LIVE DROP
6 HIGH ALT

I l2
STATIC TEST TO QUALIFY EJECTION SEAT FOR STRUCTURAL IN-
TEGRITY

ENVIRONMENTAL TO QUALIFY SEAT ASSEMBLY FOR HIGH AND LOW TEMP,
T E M P I A L T , H U M I D I T Y , O2 ATMOSPHERE AND PRESSURE

ENVIRONMENTAL TO QUALIFY PERSONNEL PARACHUTE AFTER EXPOSURE
TO VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL TO QUALIFY BALLUTE AFTER EXPOSURE TO VARIOUS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL TO QUALIFY SURVIVAL KITS AFTER EXPOSURE TO
VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

SEAT PYRO FIRING TO DEMONSTRATE FUNCTIONING OF PYRO SECOND
SOURCEVENDOR

DUMMYDROPFROM TO QUALIFY PERSONNEL HARNESS INTEGRITY
TOWER

l i n e s . A two-legged riser assembly attaches the parachute t o the R & R module.
Two pyrotechnic reefing cutters disreef the p i l o t c h u t e s i x s e c a f t e r deploy-
ment. The pilot chute can be pyrotechnically deployed by i t s mortar i n the
event the drogue parachutedoesnotdeploy o r deploysimproperly. An e l e c t r i -
cally initiated pyrotechnic apex l i n e g u i l l o t i n e , with dual c a r t r i d g e s f o r
redundancy, i s provided t o s e v e r the apex l i n e t o free the pilot chute from
the drogue chute i n the eventof a drogue chutemalfunction. The design of
the guillotine allows the apex l i n e t o p u l l free when the p i l o t c h u t e i s
deployed by the drogue chute.

Themain parachute assembly consists of an 84.2 f t Do ringsail chute with
seventy-two550-lb t e n s i l e strength suspensionlines. Threepyrotechnic
reefing cutters disreef the main chute 10 sec a f t e r deployment. The main

218
"

TABLE 22 ESCAPESYSTEM PYROTECHNIC COMPON-ENT FIRINGS
" "
I
RELIABILITY
COMPONENT ASSURANCE
~~

HARNESS RELEASE ACTUATOR
(HRA)
FIRING MECH (HRA)
~ ~~
~ ~

p- CTI
TEST

IO
8
IO
8
CARTRIDGE (HRA) 8
(1.08 SEC TIME DELAY)
SEAT-MAN SEPARATOR 19
THRUSTER (SMS) 8
FIRING MECH (SMS) OA/WAC 37 25
CTI 21 8
CARTRIDGE (SMS) CTI 21 8
ROCKETCATAPULT RPI 89
HATCH ACTUATOR NATIONAL 26
WATERLIFT
BREECH-HATCH ACT MCDONNELL 31
BALLUTE ANEROID MCDONNELL/ IS
OA
BALLUTE REL CARTRIDGE CTI 24
BALLUTE DEPLOY CARTRIDGE CTI 24
DEPLOYCUTTER OA/WAC 17
CTI 24
BALLUTE GUILLOTINE OA/WAC 17
CTI 24

DROGUEMORTAR BACKBOARD
JETTISON SYSTEM
MAIN CARTRIDGE CTI 21
INITIATOR CARTRIDGE CTI 21
TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE CTI 21
FLEX MDF INTER CTI IO
RIGID MDF INTER OA 24
RESTRAINT STRAP CUTTER OA 12
L A P B E L T DISC OA 7
JETELOX PIN DISC OA 7
MDF MANIFOLD OA 6

MANUAL FIRING MECH OA I5
MDF FIRING MECH OA 19 34
DROGUE MORTAR MCDONNELL/
OA
HATCH MDF INITIATION
SYSTEM
CROSSOVER CTI
RIGID MDF INTER CTl
FLEX MOF INTER ' OA 50
MANUAL INITIATOR OA 88 IO
CARTRIDGE ( H R A ) 'OA 40 IO
CARTRIDGE (SMS) *0A 34 19
MAIN CARTRIDGE *OA I8
{BACKBOARD JETT)
INITIATOR CARTRIDGE 'OA 18 45
(BACKBOARD JETT)
TIME DELAY CARTRIDGE *0A 18 23
(BACKBOARD JETT)
FLEX MDF INTER 'OA 30 24
(BACKBOARD JETT)
CROSSOVER 'OA so
(HATCH MOF)
RIGID INTER *0A 100 20
(WATCH Y D f )
RELEASE CART *0A 27 3
((BALLUTE)
OEPLOYCART *OA 27 2
(BALLUTE)

*SIMILAR UHlTS THAT WERE UTILIZE0 IN TEST AHD ON EARLY SPACECRAFT, BUT WERE NOT AVAILABLE
FORSPACECRAFTSANDUP.
NOTE,OA'WAC
CTI
-- TESTS AT WEBER AIRCRAFT CORP.
TESTS ATCENTRAL TECHNOLOGY INC.
TABLE 23 ESCAPESYSTEM FAILURE SUMMARY
TEST FAILURE CORREC.TIVE ACTION

SLED #a L H SIDE PANEL OF EJECTION SEAT HAD S T R U C T U R A L A T T A C H M E N T O F SIDE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE DUE TO PANELS TO SEAT PANEL MODIFIED.
LATERAL LOADING CONDITION. FOOT STIRRUPS MODIFIED TO RE-
STRAIN LATERAL FOOT MOVEMENT.
SOPE #12 HATCH ACTUATOR SUPPLIED PRESSURE HATCH ACTUATOR BREECH ENDCAP
TO ROCKETCATAPULTPREMATURELY MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE PREMATURE
CAUSING EJECTION OF SEAT PRIOR TO PRESSURE DUMP TO ROCKET CATA-
COMPLETE OPENING OF HATCH. SEAT PULT BY INCORPORATING REDUNDANT
A N D DUMMY I M P A C T E D A G A I N S T H A T C H SEALS AND INCLUDING A VENT AREA
DURING ATTEMPTED EJECTION. TO INSURE NO PREMATURE PRESSURE
BUILD-UP.
DUMMY DROP SUIT OXYGEN HOSES A N D E L E C T R I C A L HOSE FITTINGS IN DISCONNECT MODI-
TEST #1 & 2 WIRE BUNDLE (JETELOX) FAILED TO FIED TO PREVENT BINDING. SEPARA-
DISCONNECT, WHICH PREVENTED TION COMPRESSION SPRINGS STRENGTH
J E T T I S O N O F EGRESS KIT. ENED.
L I V E DROP B A C K B O A R D A N D EGRESS K I T F A I L E D QUALITY CONTROL PROBLEM. DOWEL
TEST #2 TO JETTISON AFTER PERSONNEL PAR- PINS MISSING FROM FLSC ASSEMBLY.
A C H U T E D E P L O Y ED, AS R E S T R A I N T INSPECTION CHECK POINT WAS A D D E D
STRAP FLEXIBLE LINEAR-SHAPED DURING INSTALLATION OF RESTRAINT
CHARGED (FLSC) CUTTER DID NOT CUT STRAP IN CUTTER.
STRAP.
~ _ _ _ , ~ ~

DUMMY DROP ANEROID MECHANISM JAMMED OR "HANG MCDONNELL REDESIGNED AND RE-
FIRED" AND FAILED TO FIRE OR FUNC- WORKED THE ANEROID MECHANISM TO
TION AT THE PROPER PRECALIBRATED ELIMINATE THE HANG UP.
ALTITUDE.
Q U A L TEST ANEROID MECHANISM FAILED AFTER EXAMINATION, ANALYSIS, AND RE-
EXPOSURE TO A HUMIDITY ENVIRON- P E A T E D T E S T O F THESE ASSEMBLIES.
MENT PER MIL-E-5272 PARA 4.4.1. THE ORIGINAL TESTS WERE NOT REA-
L I S T I C . S P A C E C R A F T 3 & 4 UNITS WERE
P O S T F L I G H T F I R E D A N D WERE WITH-
I N T O L E R A N C E . A 14-DAY H U M I D I T Y
T E S T WAS C O N D U C T E D O N T H E U N I T S
FROM SPACECRAFT 4 AND THE UNITS
WERE I N T O L E R A N C E .
.~ ~
-
QUAL TEST JETELOX LINES FAILED TO FIRE DUR- HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE CHECK OF
ING QUAL TESTING. L I N E S WAS D E L E T E D SO T H A T N O
WATER WOULD BE L E F T IN T H E L I N E S .
L I N E S A R E NOW CHECKED WITH DRY
NITROGEN.
~ ___ ~ - . .
QUAL & FIELD PERCUSSION CARTRIDGES FAILED DUE BOTH DESIGN AND PRODUCTION DE-
TEST T O T H E L A C K O F SOLID SUPPORT FOR FICIENCIES EXISTED. THE PERCUSSION
THE PRIMER. CARTRIDGES WERE REDESIGNED TO
H A V E S O L I D S U P P O R T FOR T H E P R I -
MERS A T SECOND SOURCE VENDOR AND
T H E NEW CARTRIDGES WERE QUAL
TESTED AND UTILIZED SPACECRAFT
5 AND UP.
~ ~~ ~~

220
HOIST LOOP 6 FLASHING
FLASHING LIGHT
RECOVERY LIGHT

P A R A C H U T ER I S E RM A I N

PYROTECHNICSWITCH"A"

OTPARACHUTE

R&R SECTION WIRE
NE BUNDLE
BRIDLE RELEASE
GUILLOTINE
RENDEZVOUS AND
RECOVERY SECTION
(RBR)

C A B L E THROUGH, /-A!?
DROGUE BRIDLE PEX LINE
DROGUE BR X GUILLOTINE
GUILLO PILOT CHUTE

DROGUE MOR
PILOT MORTAR

D R O G U E B R I O )LE
GUILLOTINE
DROGUE
BRIDLE

SECTION A-A SECTION B-B

FIGURE 42 LANDING 8, RECOVERYSYSTEM

221

p
IN. (Dl)
Dl IS THE DIAMETER OF THE PARACHUTE
I N f L A T E D W H I C H IS A P P R O X I M A T E L Y 70%
OF D o

c (Dl) 58 F T .

' 312 I N .

DROGUE PARACHUTE
(DISREEFED)

DROGUE

L 26.4 IN.
CHUTE
IEFED)
MAINCHUTE
c
CREW INITIATED
I

i 1 1n1 IN. 1 8
IN.

I TWO P O I N T S U S P E N S I O N
A"
TANDEM -
DROGUE/
PILOT PARACHUTES

Y

F I G U R E 42 L A N D I N G & RECOVERY SYSTEM (Continued)

222
chute canopy can withstand a dynamic pressure of 120 psf. However,by
reefing the main chute, a maximum of 16,000 l b i s experienced at deployment.
The disreefed main parachute allows a m a x i m u m average rate of descent of
31.6 m s f o r a module weight of 4.400 l b .

R & R Re-entry Separation Assembly. -
A mild detonating fuse (MDF) ring
assembly separates the rendezvous and recovery module f r o m the re-entry
vehicle. This separation assembly primarily consists of MDF, MDF housing/
mating ring, two detonators, two detonator housings, two booster charges, and
frangible bolts. Two strands of high explosive ( 5 g r / f t o f RDX) encased i n
lead sheathing are i n s t a l l e d i n parallel grooves i n the housing ring, which
faces the re-entry vehicle. The groovesconverge a t the booster charges which
are installed approximately 180 degrees. The MDF housing i s f a s t e n e d t o the
R & R module which i s a t t a c h e d t o the RCS of the re-entry vehicle by 24
frangible bolts. The detonator housings are i n s t a l l e d i n the RCS so that the
detonators are indexed d i r e c t l y under t h e booster charges when the sections
are mated. The detonators haveredundant e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t r y t o i n s u r e
a c t i v a t i o n of t h e boostercharges. Each boosterchargestrengthensthe
detonation wave and transmits it t o the dual strands of MDW F. hen initiated,
the MDF e x e r t s a force against the RCS and the R & R section mating surface.
T h i s force breaks a l l the frangible bolts and allows t h e p i l o t chute t o p u l l
the R & R module f r e e of the re-entry vehicle, thereby deploying the main
parachute from i t s container in the R & R module.

Main Parachute Disconnects. - The main parachute disconnects include
the single point disconnect assembly,and the forward and a f t bridle d i s -
connectassemblies. The disconnect assemblies are identical in design and
function. The assembly consists of a breech assembly, arm, and two e l e c t r i -
c a l l y f i r e d gas pressure cartridges. The arm with the parachute strap
attached i s held i n p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t t h e breech by a piston. The cartridges
produce gas pressure in the breech which e x e r t s a force on the piston,
propelling it a l l the way i n t o the am and i n t o a lead slug.This action
prevents the piston from hindering arm operation. 'The p u l l of the parachute
causes the arm t o cam open after release, thus releasing the attached riser
or bridle.

Landing System Pyrotechnics.
with the landing system consist of:
- Additional pyrotechnic devices associated
A. W i r e bundle g u i l l o t i n e s u t i l i z e d t o s e v e r the two e l e c t r i c a l w i r e
bundles routed f r o m the -re-entry vehicle to R & R module. For redundancy, two
c u t t e r s are provided f o r each w i r e bundle, one on each side of t h e separation
plane.
B. A pyroswitch t o deadface the electrical circuitry before severance
by guillotine action.

S t a t i c System. -
The s t a t i c p r e s s u r e system operates the rate of descent
indicator, altimeter, and the two barometric pressure switches which provide
for illumination of the 10.6 K and 40 K warning indicators.

. 223
Recovery Aids. - Flotation of the re-entry vehicle i s achieved by
displacing water with the cabin vessel and the equipment i n the floodable bays.
The f l o t a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are a function of the cg location. To improve
the f l o t a t i o n a t t i t u d e , a d d i t i o n a l f l o t a t i o n material (Styrofoam) was
i n s t a l l e d under t h e equipment i n t h e side bays and inside the RCS.

A sea dye marker i s u t i l i z e d as a visual rescue aid. The dye i s packaged
i n a Fiberglas-reinforced plastic laminate container which releases the dye
throughopeningscovered with water soluble film. The container i s mounted
below the f l o t a t i o n l i n e on the forward end of the RCS and i s exposed when
the R & R module i s jettisoned. A c a b l e c u t t e r u t i l i z i n g two e l e c t r i c a l l y
f i r e d gas pressure cartridges, each with a separate circuit, severs a holding
c a b l e a f t e r main parachute jettison. This allows the spring-loaded hoist
loopand f l a s h i n g r e c o v e r y l i g h t t o j e t t i s o n t h e i r protective doors. The
h o i s t loop, which i s located near the heat shield and between the hatches,
provides a hoisting attachment point for lifting devices used for recovering
the re-entry vehicle. The flashing recovery light i s located forward of the ’
hoist loop and provides a visual rescue aid. The flashing light, which
u t i l i z e s i t s own battery power independent of the spacecraft power supply,
i s energized by the positioning of the RESC beacon control switch.

Landing System Operation(Fig. 43). - Operationof the landing system
i s as follows:

When t h e altimeter indicates 50,OOO f t J the HI-ALT drogue switch is
activated manually by the astronaut. The drogueswitchenergized two single-
circuit pyrotechnic cartridges in the drogue mortar. The drogue mortar
deploys the drogue chute reefed t o 4% of t h e parachute diameter i n o r d e r t o
reduce the openingshockload.Sixteensec after deployment, two lanyard-
initiated pyrotechnic reefing cutters disreef thechute. A barostatically
operated instrument panel light is illuminated a t 40,000 f t t o signal that
t h e drogue chuteshould have been deployed. A t 10,600 f t another barostati-
cally operated light signals t h e a s t r o n a u t t o a c t u a t e t h e PAR4 switch, which
i n i t i a t e s the main parachute deployment sequence.

The PARA switch energizes six 80 msec pyrotechnic time delay cartridges,
which are i n s t a l l e d i n the three high a l t i t u d e drogue cable guillotines.
After the drogue r i s e r s have been cut, the dorgue parachute pulls away from
the re-entry vehicle extracting the pilot parachute f r o m the pilot mortar tube
with the apex line. When deployed, the pilot chute i s r e e f e d t o 11.5% i n
o r d e r t o limit the openingshock load t o 3000 l b . The PARA switch a l s o
energizes a 2.5 sec time d e l a y r e l a y t o the separation sequence t o allow
s u f f i c i e n t time f o r the pSlotchute t o be deployed. The 2.5 sectimedelay
relay then energizes the c a r t r i d g e i n a pyroswitch t o deadface the e l e c t r i c a l
w i r e bundles t o the R & R module.The f o u r c a r t r i d g e s i n s t a l l e d i n the wire
bundle g u i l l o t i n e s a l s o are energized. These g u i l l o t i n e c a r t r i d g e s have a
12 0 msec pyrotechnic time delay to assure deadfacing of the w i r e s before
severing. The two MDF ring detonators are energized a t the same time t o f i r e
the MDF ring which separates the R & R module from the re-entry vehicle. The
MDF detonators have a 160 msec pyrotechnic time d e l a y t o assure that the w i r e
bundles have been cut before the MDF r i n g fires. The w i r e s t o t h e r e - e n t r y
I 40,000 F O O T
BAROMETRIC I
4 0 K ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 N G

-
PRESSURE SWITCH
ILLUMINATES
ACTIVATES
1 t 1

-@- 0-
REEFED DROGUE
CHUTE D" R
DO GG
RO UE
UE" DROGUE
MORTAR SWITCH

c - DEPLOYED (16
TPD
Yk)REO
C

BAROMETRIC
LIGHT
SWITCH
ILLUMINATES
ACTIVATES
I I I J

DROGUECHUTE
0- @-

-I
REEFED PILOT CHUTE
DISCONNECT
- GUILLOTINES
D I S R E EC
FHED
UTE PILOT
(6 S E C P Y R O T D )
-
DEPLOYED
(80 MS P Y R O T D )
"PARA'* L
SWITCH
2.5 SEC
ELEC
TIME DELAY

R 8 R SECTION
MAIN CHUTE
SEPARATES
DEPLOYED (160 MS T D )

4
CONNECTION ELECTRICAL - I'

-- -
1
2 POINT
ATT" "LDG MANPARACHUTE
A N T E N NSAUSWITCH
SPENSION POINT SINGLE
DISCONNECT EXTENDED
ACTIVATED
'I I

r-qq-iq
1
r
HOIST LOOP
AND FLASHING UHF DESCENT
-b
RECOVERYLIGHT
RELEASE
"PARA JETT"
SWITCH

L
MAIN 0
PA RACH UT E
JETTISONED

I
w
VI FIGURE 43 LANDING SYSTEM SEQUENTIAL BLOCK DlA,GRAM
umbilical also are deadfaced a t t h i s time by energizing another pyroswitch
cartridge.
As the landing vehicle falls away f r o m the R & R mduik, the -in para-
chute i s deployed in a reefed condition (10.546). six sec after deployment
of the pilot parachute, two lanyard-initiated pyrotechnic reefing cutters
disreef the p i l a t chute. The main parachute i s disreefed by three lanyard-
initiated pyrotechnic reefing cutters ten sec after deployment. The two
decelerations provided by the main parachute divide the retarding shock load.
The astronaut visually monitors a l l parachute deployments and after the main
chute disreefs and i s f'ully inflated, he actuates the IDG ATT switch. The
LDG ATT switch energizes two pyrotechnic cartridges in the single point
release (main disconnect) t o change the single point suspension system t o a
two-pointsuspensionsystem. Upon landing, the main parachute i s jettisoned
by a c t i v a t i n g the PARA JETT switch. The PARA JETT switch energizes the
forwardand aft bridle disconnects releasing the main parachute. The PARA
JETT switch also energizes the two single pyrotechnic cartridges in the cable
cutter allowing the hoist loop and flashing l i g h t t o be erected.

Emergency Operation of Landing System (Fig. 44). - In the event the
drogue parachute does not deploy o r deploys improperly, t h e drogue emerg.
10.6 K switch i s actuated. This switch fires the three drogue cable guillo-
t i n e s , the apex l i n e g u i l l o t i n e , and the pilot parachute mortar, and i n i t i a t e s
the 2.5 sec time d e l a y t o the separation sequence. After the pilot mortar
deploys the pilot parachute in a reefed condition, the remaining emergency
sequence i s t h e same as t h a t f o r a normal landing.

Landing System Development and Qualification Tests. - The landing system
developmentand q u a l i f i c a t i o n tests are shownon Table 24. Thenumber of
a c t u a l firings of the pyrotechnic components, and d e v i c e s u t i l i z e d i n t h e
landing system i s shownon T a b l e 25. I n a d d i t i o n , v e r i f i c a t i o n f i r i n g s o f
u n i t s from the same l o t s as those installed in the spacecraft were made before
each f l i g h t .

Failure Summary. - The f a i l u r e summary i s shown on Table 26.

Mission Anomalies. - The landing system had the following anomalies on
Spacecraft 2:

A. Problem - One wire bundle g u i l l o t i n e on the RCS failed t o completely
cut a wire bundle a t t h e R & R separation plane. "he redundant g u i l l o t i n e
i n s t a l l e d on the R & R section did sever the wire bundle which allowed the
separation of the R & R re-entry sections.

-
Investigation/Conclusion The wire bundle in question was i n s t a l l e d
i n an abnormal position. It was pulled up t i g h t l y a g a i n s t t h e c u t t e r blade
which requires additional energyof the cartridge. The cartridge was
developed t o c u t t h e w i r e bundle when it was held against the a n v i l and did
not have s u f f i c i e n t margin of energy t o handle the abnormal, i n s t a l l a t i o n .
The f a i l u r e was duplicated in the f a i l u r e l a b .

226
PILOT
"DROGUE
PARACHUTE
EMERG. 10.6K"
APEX LINE
SWITCH

tY
0 +
ILOT REEFED PILOT
PA RACHUT E
PARACHUTE PILOT
1
MORTAR DISREEFED PARACHUTE 0
(.5 SEC PYRODEPLOYED
TD) (6 SEC PYRO TD)

I , 4

SECTION FIRED
(160
DELAY
2.5 SEC
ELECT
TIME
RING MDF

MS T D j SEPARATES
Q
REEFED
LEGEND
PILOT ACTUATED

MECHANICAL CONNECTION
MAIN CHUTE

A
4 ELECTRICALCONNECTION
DISREEFED
l3
I (IOSEC
TD)

@
2 POINT
MAINPARACHUTE UHF DESCENT
"LDG ATT" BRIDLE
SWITCH 4 SINGLE POINT
SUSPENSION .
..I
DISCONNECT EXTENDED
- ACTIVATED

W
HOISTLOOP
UHFRESCUE
AND FLASHING
RECOVERY LIGHT
EXTENDED
RELEASE
"PARA JETT"
SWITCH

MAIN
PARACHUTE
JETTISONED ?
FIGURE 44 EMERGENCY LANDING SEQUANTIAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
TABLE 24 DEVELOPMENT AND QUALIFICATION TESTS
LANDING SYSTEM DROP TEST

TEST DROGUE LANDING PILOT MA1 N
PARACHUTE PARACHUTE P A R A C H U TSYSTEM
E

DEVELOPMENT 14 18 30 14

TYPE OF TEST PTV (BOMB) PTV (BOMB) PTV (BOMB) BOILERPLATE SPACE-
DROP TEST FROM DROP TEST FROM CRAFT DROP TEST DROP TEST FROM
A I R C R A F T 42k A I R C R A F T 10k A I R C R A F T 10k F R O M A I R C R A F T 20k

QUALIFICATION 8 13 13 13
TEST 3 - WITHOUT DROGUE
SPACECRAFT2
CONFIGURATION
2 - EMERGENCY MODE

TYPE OF TEST BOILERPLATE SPACECRAFT WITH PRODUCTION
RCS 8, RBR SECTION. DROP TEST FROM AIRCRAFT
3 A T 20k - S PACECRAFT 2 CONFIGURATION
2 A T 17k - EMERGENCY MODE
8 A T 33k - NORMAL LANDING MODE

I TEST
COMPL.ETED
TYPE OF TEST REMARKS

ENVIRONMENTAL TO QUALIFY BAROSWITCHES FOR ADDLTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
NOT QUALIFIED BY PROJECT MERCURY. BAROSWITCHES IN
GENERAL WERE QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY TO PROJECT
MERCURYHARDWARE.

STATIC TEST TO QUALIFY THE INVERSION BRIDLE FOR STRUCTURAL
I N T E G R I T Y A F T E R 24 DAYS OF EXPOSURE TO 160°F.

-
Action Taken Effective Spacecraft 3 and up, the length of the w i r e
bundle was adjusted to allow the b l u e p r i n t i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e wire bundle
solid against the anvil. A CTI cartridge with higher energy output was used
i n l i e u of t h e OA cartridge.

B. Problem - The flashing recovery light d i d not deploy.

Investigation/Conclusion - A review of engineering drawings and
spacecraft revealed t h a t a tolerance buildup could exist and r e s u l t i n binding
t h e door on structure thus preventing t h e door from opening.

Action - Effective Spacecraft 3 and up, t h e door f i t t i n g was shortened
t o preclude any tolerance buildup interference and inspection requirements
were added t o a s s u r e s a t i s f a c t o r y o p e r a t i o n o f the door a f t e r i n s t a l l a t i o n
and p r i o r t o f i n a l r i g g i n g o f door restraining cable.

228
I

TABLE 25 LANDING SYSTEMCOMPONENT FIRINGS
- ~ ~

SPECIAL
DROP KDONNELL QUAL
COMPONENT VENDOR TEST @ RAT
TEST TEST TEST
VENDOR.
- ~~

CARTRIDGE CTI 4 20 18 61 32
APEXCUTTER
HIGH ALTITUDE MCDONNELL/ 30 7 22 23 36
DROGUE CABLE OA
GUILLOTINE (HAD)
CARTRIDGE (HAD) CTI 60 45 38 61 36
CARTRIDGE* ORDCO 18 - - 368 28
DROGUEMORTAR
CARTRIDGE* CTI - 5 - - -
PILOT MORTAR
CARTRIDGE* SDI - - - 353 19
MAIN DISCONNECT
CARTRIDGE* SDI - - - 7a 19
BRIDLE DISCONNECT
BRIDLE DISCONNECT N -V 54 - 2 21 19
ASSEMBLY @ CTI - 5 - 21 19
CARTRIDGE CTI - 21 - 42 19
B R I D L ED I S C O N N E C T
DROGUEMORTAR N -V 33 - 1 - 28
ASSEMBLY @ CTI - 21 21 21 25
CARTRIDGE CTI - 21 32 24 25
DROGUE MORTAR
PILOT MORTAR N-V 27 - 2 72 -
ASSEMBLY @ CTI - 4 - - -
CARTRIDGE ORDCO 8 - 368 -
PILOT MORTAR
RBR SEPARATION OA 27 - 19 40 18
MDF RING ASSY
APEX GUILLOTINE MCDONNELL 2 5 10 23 32
OA
REEFING CUTTER OA 32 - - 63 12
PILOT CHUTE
(6 SECTD)
REEFING CUTTER OA 106 - - 53 12
MAIN CHUTE
(10 SEC TD)
REEFING CUTTER NOP - - 62 32 10
DROGUE CHUTE
(16 SEC TD)
REEFING CUTTER* 50s 16 - - 103 19
DROGUE CHUTE
(16 SEC TD) (BACKUP)
MAIN DISCONNECT N -V 27 - 1 71 19
ASSEMBLY @ CTI - 5 - 21 19
CARTRIDGE CTI - 5 - 42 19
MAIN DISCONNECT

* S I M I L A R T O U N I T S U T I L I Z E D O N S P A C E C R A F T 3 AND UP.
T A B L E 26 F A I L U R E SUMMARY

~

PROBLEM CORRECTIVE ACTION

PRIME VENDOR HAD DIFFICULTIES SPACECRAFT 2 UTILIZED THE PRIME VENDORS CARTRIDGES
WITH MANUFACTURING AND QUAL AND DETONATORS WITH DUAL BRIDGE WIRE CIRCUITS. AB-
TESTING OF DETONATORS, GAS BREVIATED QUAL TESTS WERE CONDUCTED ON THESE UNITS
GENERATING CARTRIDGES, SOME WHICH CONSISTED OF HI-TEMP/ALT, HUMIDITY, VIBRATION,
GUILLOTINES AND PYROSWITCHES. AUTOIGNITION, PROOF AND BURST PRESSURE, 40-FT DROP,
1 A M P N O - F I R E A N D 1 WATT NO-FIRE. THE UNITS WERE AC-
C E P T A N C E T E S T E D AS FOLLOWS: BRIDGE WIRE RESISTANCE,
L E A K A G E , V I B R A T I O N , 2OO0F TEMP, SOAK 1/2 HR, RESISTANCE
8, D I E L E C T R I C .

S P A C E C R A F T 3 - M C D O N N E L L ASSUMED THE DESIGN AND
MANUFACTURING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GUILLOTINES AND
PYROSWITCHES WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE. MCDONNELL
PROCURED SECOND SOURCE VENDORS FOR DETONATORS AND
CARTRIDGES. THE DETONATOR AND CARTRIDGES WITH THEIR
ASSOCIATED DEVICES WERE QUALIFIED BY THE SECOND
SOURCE VENDORS AS REQUIRED. DISCONNECT CARTRIDGES -
S P E C I A L D E V I C E S INC. MORTAR CARTRIDGES ORDCO -
DETONATOR AND CARTRIDGES UTILIZED FOR GUILLOTINES,
PYROSWITCHES AND TUBE CUTTER -
CTI.

SPACECRAFT 4 AND UP - CTI CARTRIDGES AND DETONATORS
WERE U T I L I Z E D E N T I R E L Y W I T H T H E L A N D I N G S Y S T E M E X -
CEPT FOR THE PILOT MORTAR (ORDCO).

MORTAR BREECH BLOCK FAILED P I L O T M O R T A R B R E E C H M A T E R I A L WAS CHANGED FROM
DURING ENVlRONhE NTAL QUAL ALUMINUM TO STEEL. UNITS WERE RETESTED WITHOUT ANY
TESTING, WITH ORDCO CARTRIDGES. FAILURES. DROGUE MORTAR BREECH WAS T E S T E D A T C T I
WITH THEIR CARTRIDGES REPEATEDLY WITHOUT ANY
ANOMALIES.

S P A C E C R A F T 4 AND UP CONFIGURATION - C T I C A R T R I D G E S
IN THE DROGUEMORTARWITH AN ALUMINUMBREECHAND
P I L O T M O R T A R WITH S T E E L B R E E C H A N D O R D C O C A R T R I D G E S .

Mission Evaluation. - The landing and recovery systems functioned
successfully onall missions.

PYROTECHNICS

Pyrotechnic devicesas shown onFig. 45 perform manyof the spacecraft
sequential operations. They provide the modes to function or diable systems
and separate or jettison various sections or assemblies. The pyrotechnic
system consistsof a wide range of explosive devices, their actuation system,
and related equipment. The systems utilize bothlow explosives which burn and
generate gas pressure, and high explosives which detonate and generate a
shock front. Hot gas pressure f r o m the slowly decomposing low explosives i s
used t o a c t u a t e a device or propel a projectile. Pyrotechnic devices are
described in subsequent paragraphs except for the pyrotechnics utilized for
the escape system, recovery system,and the retro-rockets, which are discussed
i n t h e i r appropriate sections.
The pyrotechnic devices i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t are i n s t a l l e d so t h a t the
explosions are confined within the device or are shielded t o preclude damage
to the spacecraft.
A r e l i a b i l i t y program was conducted throughout the design, development,
fabrication, and q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the pyrotechnic system. Testing by
McDonnell and i t s vendorsinsured a system r e l i a b i l i t y of .995. Beforeeach
f l i g h t a u n i t from the same manufacturing l o t as the pyrotechnic device
i n s t a l l e d on the spacecraft was t e s t f i r e d f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n .

Pyrotechnic Components

Pyrotechnicitems, such as cartridges,detonators,flexiblelinear-shaped
charges (FLSC), g u i l l o t i n e s , and pyroswitches were used extensively throughout
thespacecraft.Theirdescription and operationareoutlined below. Later
sections describe t h e i r use in various systems.

Cartridges and Detonators. -
The e l e c t r i c a l l y i n i t i a t e d c a r t r i d g e s and
,detonators have the same basicdesign. They consist of a body, bridgewire,
c i r c u i t , i g n i t i o n mix, and anoutputcharge.In some instances, a pyro-
technic time delay column was used t o provide a delay between ignition mix
andoutputchargeignition. The c a r t r i d g e s u t i l i z e low explosives t o produce
a specific gas pressure output to operate t h e device i n which they are
i n s t a l l e d . The detonators utilize high explosives which transmit a shock
wave t o t h e assembly i n which they are attached. Cartridges and detonators
are provided w i t h one o r two e l e c t r i c a l bridgewire circuits. The second
c i r c u i t i s redundant. Each bridgewire c i r c u i t i s independentofthecartridge
or detonator body.

The body of the cartridge or detonator provides for the i n s t a l l a t i o n of
the explosive train. The bodies are threaded on one end f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t o
the device. An e l e c t r i c a l r e c e p t a c l e i s machined on the other end f o r
connection t o the spacecraft w i r e bundle.

Each f i r i n g c i r c u i t , c o n s i s t i n g of two electrical pins with a bridgewire
attached between them, i s i n s t a l l e d i n t h e body. The e l e c t r i c a l p i n s are
insulated from the bodyby a ceramic material.

The heat-sensitive mix, which encases the bridgewire, i g n i t e s when
e l e c t r i c i t y passes 'through the bridgewire. This i n t u r n i n i t i a t e s t h e next
explosive element i n t h e t r a i n of explosives. The number and type of
explosive elements i n t h e t r a i n from the ignition mix t o the f i n a l output
charge vary with requirements. Cartridges are designed with anenergyoutput
11, -..

OAMS C O N T R O L V A L V E
"l r OAMS ISOLATION VALVE

269 DETONATOR

U&-VHF POLARIZATION
__-
MEASUREMENT
". EXPERIMENT GUILLOTINE
0-14 (S/C 8 6 9)
Z13 (FLSC) ASSY.

TUBE CUTTER ASSY.

D-12 FOOTREST GUILLOTINE (S/C 8 6 9)
213 DETONATOR

ILY)

D-4, D-7 DOOR
U l L L D T l N E (S/C 1 0 6 12)

D-10
POWER TOOL RADJONATAR
(S/C 5 6 7)

D - 4 6 D-7 EQUIP

GUILLOTINE2

ADAPTER EQUIP
GUILLOTINES

S/C-LN GUILLOTINES

SION
UCLEAR
PLACES) 3 P (TY
DETONATOR
GUILLOTINE
HOLD
HAND
D-10 (S/C 8 ONLY)
GUILLOTINE (S/C 8 6 9 )
FAIRING JETTISON
269 DETONATOR GUILLOTINE (S/C 5 ONLY)
ELECTROSTATIC CHARGE EXP.
P-4, D-7 DOOR RELEASE
INTERCONNECT.
MDF (REF) GUILLOTINE

D-4 6 D-7 EQUIP RELEASE GUILLOTINE ( R E F ) l
L I G H T L E V E L T.V.
ASSEMBLY
CHARGE
SHAPED D1,5 L
E
GUILLOTINE (S/C 8 AND. 11)
(TYP 3 PLACES)
DOOR RELEASE GUILLOTINE

j FIGURE:45 SPACECRAFT
. PYROTECHNTC DEVICES
"
PYROTECHNICSWITCH(A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H=_HyK) -"
A -
(55 PINS) R6R WIRING
F --(41 PINS) ADAPTER
EQUIP
B
C --- (41
PINS) POWER WIRING
(41 PINS) POWER WIRING
G
H -(41 PINS) LV/SPACECRAFT
(55 PINS) RETRO SECTION
1 - (55
D
E - (55
PINS) ADAPTEREQUIPWIRING
(41
PINS) ADAPTEREQUIPWIRING K -
PINS) ADAPTER E W l P
(41 PINS) UMBILICAL

a PY R O T E C H N K V A L ~
(RCS SYS "A''-AA-CA-DA 16 SYS "B"-AB-CB-DB)

FRESH AIR DOOR*CTUATOR

HORIZON SCANNER FAIRING ELECTOR

HORIZONSCANNER

DOCKING BAR ASSEMBLY
(S/C 6-8 6 UP)

RENDEZVOUS AND RECOVERY
SECTION SEPARATION ASSEMBLY 7
1 PILOT MORTAR
/-CARTRIDGE

WIRE BUNDLE PILOT PARACHUTE REEFING CUTTERS
GUILLOTINE
7
PILOT PARACHUTE APEX
LINE GUILLOTINE
MAIN PARACHUTE
PILOT CUTTERS REEFING MORTAR

MAIN PABACHUTE
ST DWAGE CONTAINER

DROGUEMORTAR
EMERGENCY DOCKING
SYSTEM RELEASE WIRE BUNDLE
GUILLOTINE (S/C 6-8 6 UP)

DROGUEPA
DROGUEPARACHUTE
BRIDLE RELEASE
JETTISON ASSE (3 T Y P I C A L )

FIGURE 45 SPACECRAFT PYROTECHNIC DEVICES (Continued):

233
of 1.5 times the energy required t o operate t h e device.Detonators have an
energy output of 1 . 3 times that necessary t o i n i t i a t e the next inline
explosive element and w i l l produce sufficient energy to propagate across a
gap 1.5 times the nominal design gap between the detonator and the next
inline explosive element.

The design of the,cartridges and detonators also includes the following:
A. The cartridges and detonators without pyrotechnic time delays begin
to function within 0.004 sec after 15 VDC is applied to the bridgewire
circuit.

B. Bridgewire c i r c u i t r e s i s t a n c e i s 1.0 -+ 0.2 ohm.

C. The cartridges and detonators have a d i e l e c t r i c strength capable of
withstanding:

1. Five hundred v o l t s (RMS) f o r one min a t sea level between a l l
pins t i e d together and the case.
2. Two hundred f i f t y v o l t s f o r 20 min a t altitude conditions.

D . No-Fire Requirements.
1. The u n i t s w i l l n o t f i r e i n a d v e r t e n t l y due t o t r a n s i e n t c u r r e n t s
o r s t a t i c charges.
2. The u n i t s w i l l not f i r e when one ampere o r one watt i s applied
simultaneously t o e i t h e r o r both c i r c u i t s f o r f i v e min.

E. All-Fire Requirements -
The units w i l l f i r e w i t h 40 msecwhen four
amperes i s applied t o t h e c i r c u i t .

Flexible Linear-ShapedCharge. - The flexible linear-shaped charge
(FLSC] i s a V-shaped, flexible lead sheathing containing a high explosive
RDX core. FLSC i s used i n t h e separationassemblies t o severvarious
materials. The FLSC i s i n s t a l l e d i n a molded back blast shield w i t h t h e open
portion of the V-shaped sheathing placed toward the material t o be severed.
The FLSC explosive core, set off by the detonator, collapses the sheathing
i n t h e V-groove. This produces a c u t t i n g j e t composed of explosive products
andminute metal p a r t i c l e s which cut the t a r g e t material. The FLSC i s
designed with a minimum c u t t i n g a b i l i t y of 20$ greater than required.

Guillotines. - Guillotines are designed i n two basic configurations, one
t o c u t e l e c t r i c a l w i r e bUrIdleS, the other to cut stainless steel cables.

-
A. Wire Bundle Guillotines W i r e bundle g u i l l o t i n e s a r e provided i n
two sizes t o c u t bundles up t o 1-1/4 and2-1/2 i n . i n diameter. The guillo-
tines consist of a body, end cap or anvil, piston/cutter blade, shear pin,
and an electrical-fired gas-pressure cartridge. Thebody houses the piston/
c u t t e r blade held i n a r e t r a c t e d p o s i t i o n by a shear pin and provides f o r
i n s t a l l a t i o n o f the cartridge and attachment of the anvil. The a n v i l i s
removable t o f a c i l i t a t e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f ' e i t h e r the g u i l l o t i n e o r the w i r e

234
bundle or cable. Lugs, f o r a t t a c h i n g the g u i l l o t i n e t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t s t r u c -
t u r e , are a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e g u i l l o t i n e body.The pressure produced by
f i r i n g t h e c a r t r i d g e e x e r t s a force on the piston/cutter blade. When s u f f i c i -
ent force i s applied, the piston/cutter blade first severs t h e shear pin,and
then the wirebundle w i t h a high velocity stroke. The stroke of the piston/
c u t t e r blade i s stopped by t h e a n v i l . The wire bundle i s then free of the
g u i l l o t i n e body. Two g u i l l o t i n e s are used p e r w i r e bundle, oneon e i t h e r s i d e
of the separation plane.

B. Cable-Cutting Guillotines - Cable-cutting guillotines are provided
i n t h r e e sizes t o s e v e r cables up t o 1/8, 1/4, and 9/32 i n . diameters. The-
g u i l l o t i n e c o n s i s t s o f a body, p i s t o n / c u t t e r blade, shear pin, anvil end cap,
and two e l e c t r i c a l l y fired gas-pressure cartridges. The body provides for
t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e two c a r t r i d g e s and incorporates a p o r t between the
c a r t r i d g e areas t o t h e p i s t o n / c u t t e r area. The body h a s a n i n t e g r a l barrel
section which houses the piston/cutter blade r e t a i n e d i n t h e r e t r a c t e d
p o s i t i o n by a shear p i n andprovides f o r t h e attachment of the end cap. The
b a r r e l s e c t i o n i s s l o t t e d f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n and positioning of the cable normal
t o t h e p o s i t i o n / c u t t e r blade. The a n v i l i s r e t a i n e d i n t h e barrel under the
cable by the endcap. The a n v i l and end cap are removable t o permit guillo-
tinecableinstallation. Lugs, f o r a t t a c h i n g t h e g u i l l o t i n e t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t
s t r u c t u r e , are a n i n t e g r a l part of the body.

Pyroswitches. -Pyrotechnic switches are used t o open e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t s
i n v a r i o u s wire bundlesbefore the bundles aresevered. They are provided i n
two s i z e s , one with 41 e l e c t r i c a l c o n t a c t s , and t h e o t h e r with 55 pyroswitches
c o n s i s t of a body, piston, shear pin, spring lock, and e l e c t r i c a l l y - f i r e d
gas-pressurecartridge. A dual-bridgewirecartridge w i t h s e p a r a t e e l e c t r i c a l
circuits provides redundancy. The body houses the cartridge and the piston.
Incorporated i n o p p o s i t e ends of the switch body a r e two e l e c t r i c a l recep-
t a c l e s which contain hollow spring leaf contacts. These contacts are con-
n e c t e d a x i a l l y i n the switch-closed position by pins mounted i n t h e p i s t o n .
The p i s t o n i s held i n p l a c e by a shear pin. The pressure produced by f i r i n g
t h e c a r t r i d g e i s ported through the switch body t o a flange onone side of
thepiston. When sufficient gas pressure i s generated, the pistonseversthe
shear pin and moves a x i a l l y i n t h e body. A s t h e p i s t o n moves, the connector
pins mounted i n the p i s t o n a r e disengaged from t h e hollow contacts a t one end
and driven farther into the hollow contacts a t t h e o t h e r end. The spring
lock moves i n t o p l a c e behind the p i s t o n t o l o c k it, and residual gas pressure
provides a redundant means for preventing piston rebound. The piston thus i s
maintained i n the SWITCH OPEN position.

Separation Assemblies

2 1 3 Separation Assembly. -
The launch vehicle i s separated from the
spacecraf't/adapter equipment section by c u t t i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s k i n with
redundantdualstrandsof FL
' SC.
The separation assembly c o n s i s t s of two
strands of FLSC, three detonator blocks each containing a crossover and two
boosters, and three detonators (two single-bridgewireand one dual-bridgewire),
eachwith a pyrotechnic time delay of 240 msec. The FLSC i s i n i t i a t e d when
t h e redundant detonators receive the p r o p e r e l e c t r i c a l signal from the SEP
SpclT switch. The detonators transmit a shock wave to the crossover charge
i n t h e d e t o n a t o r block, which i n turn i n i t i a t e s the boosters. The boosters
propagate the wave t o t h e FISC i n both directionssimultaneously. The FISC
detonates and functions redundantly t o sever the adapter skin at the parting
l i n e ( l o c a t e d at s t a t i o n 2 13). The FLSC i s i n s t a l l e d around t h e inner
per5phery of the adapter skin with the detonator blocks as an i n t e g r a l part
of the assembly. The i n t e g r a l b l a s t shield protects the structure and
equipment f r o m shrapnel. Proper detonation of one strand of FLSC w i l l achieve
separation.

The e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t r y t o t h e launch vehicle i s deadfaced by t h e
activation of pyroswitch G (located in the re-entry vehicle). The e l e c t r i c a l
wire bundle t o the launch vehicle i s severed by w i r e bundle g u i l l o t i n e s
located on either side of t h e separation plane. The pyroswitch, two guillo-
t i n e s , and FLSC assembly are energized by t h e a c t i v a t i o n of the SEP SPCFT
switch.

The sequence i s as follows:
A. Initiated simultaneously are three detonators with 240msec pyro-
technic time delay, two wire bundle g u i l l o t i n e c a r t r i d g e s with 120 msec
pyrotechnic time delay and a r e l a y with 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l time delay.
B. The 50-70 msec r e l a y i n i t i a t e s the pyroswitch cartridge t o deadface
t h e c i r c u i t s , removing the power f r o m the cartridges and detonators.
C. The cartridges f i r e a f t e r the 120 msec delay, activating the guillo-
t i n e s t o c u t the deadfaced wire bundle.
D. The d e t o n a t o r s f i r e after the 240 msec d e l a y , i n i t i a t i n g the F
LSC, t o
cut the s t r u c t u r e f o r complete separation.

Z 69 Separation Assembly. - The equipment adapter section i s separated
from the spacecraft retro section by an FLSC assembly. The FLSC assembly
consists of twomain units: A separation assemblyof FLSC which i s similar
i n design and operation t o t h e Z 1 3 assembly and a FLSC tubing cutter
assembly.

A. FLSC Separation Assembly -
The FLSC of the separation assembly i s
i n s t a l l e d around t h e outer periphery of the adapter skin and i n s u l a t e d t o
protect it from launchheating. The adapter skin i s s l o t t e d i n three places
under t h e FLSC t o provide f o r t h e installation of three detonator blocks on
t h e inside of the skin. One of t h e detonator blocks provides for installation
of both a detonator and an explosive interconnect (MDF). The other two
containdetonatorsonly. The t h r e e d e t o n a t o r s u t i l i z e d f o r t h i s separation
have no pyrotechnic time delay. A sheetmetal b l a s t deflector, which i s
part of the adapter structure, protects the structure andequipment from
shrapnel. The i n i t i a t i o n andfunctionoftheseparation assembly i s the
same as Z 13.

B. FLSC Tube Cutter Assembly -
The FLSC tube cutter i s mounted t o the
inside of t h e retrograde section of the adapter forward of the parting line
( Z 69). T h i s tube cutter severs 12 aluminum tubes and one nylontube f r o m
the equipment section. The c u t t e r assembly consists of a housing, molded
back-up retainers, two strands of FLSC with boosters attached, explosive
interconnect,and a dual bridgewire detonator. The FLSC i s installed on
opposite sides of t h e tubes i n . t h e back-up r e t a i n e r s of t h e housing and
staggered t o provideredundantcuts. The detonator i s i n s t a l l e d i n the
housing with i t s outputzend adjacent t o the booster charge of one strand of
FLSC. The explosive interconnect i s i n s t a l l e d with one end i n t h e gube c u t t e r
housing and the other end i n a detonator block of the separation-assembly.
The explosive interconnect i s a single strand of high explosive (€DX). encased
i n a lead sheathing andcovered by a flexible vinyl tube. Attachment f i t t i n g s
are incorporated on eachend of the interconnect for installation. A small
booster chqrge i s incorporated a t each end of t h e explosive strand, which i s
i n s t a l l e d a d j a c e n t t o t h e booster charge of t h e strand of FLSC and t h e booster
chargeof one F’LSC s e c t i o n i n t h e tube cutter. The explosiveinterconnect
transmits detonation from the separation assembly t o one strand of FLSC i n
the tube cutter. The detonator in the tube cutter and the detonators in the
separation assembly are i n i t i a t e d simultaneously.Properdetonation of one
strand of FISC i n both the separation assembly and tube c u t t e r assembly, w i l l
achieveseparation.

C. E l e c t r i c a l W i r e Bundle Guillotine -The e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t r y t o the
equipment section i s deadfaced by the activation of pyroswitches B, C,C, E,
F, and J. The three s e p a r a t e e l e c t r i c a l w i r e bundles t o the equipment section
are severed by wire bundle g u i l l o t i n e s C, D, and E located on both sides of
the separation plane.

D. OAMS Line Cutter
the hypergolic propellants used in
- Two stainless steel, Teflon-lined tubes containing
the OAMS a r e sealed and severed by the
tubing cutter/sealer located on both sides of t h e Z 69 separation plane. The
tubing cutter/sealer assembly consists of a body, a n v i l , e l e c t r i c a l l y fired
gas pressurecartridge,four shear pins, and c u t t e r assembly. The c u t t e r
assembly consists of a piston,crimper, and blade. The crimperandblade are
a t t a c h e d t o t h e p i s t o n bytwo shear pins(sequencingpins). Thebody houses
the c u t t e r assembly r e t a i n e d i n a retracted position bytwo shear pins (lock
pins), and provided f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n of the cartridge and attachment of the
anvil. The gas pressure produced by firing the cartridge exerts a force on
the piston of the c u t t e r assembly. When sufficient force i s applied, the
two lock pins are severed and the c u t t e r assembly actuates with a high
velocity. The blade andcrimper, which extend past the end of the piston,
contact t h e two tubes first. The crimper f l a t t e n s t h e tubing against a
raised portion of the a n v i l and comes t o a halt, shearing the two sequencing
pins that hold the crimperand blade. The piston andbladecontinue t o travel,
allowing the blade t o s e v e r the tubing. Proper f’unctioningof one tubing
c u t t e r / s e a l e r w i l l achieve separation.

E. Sequencing -
Three switches achieve separation of the adapter equip-
ment section from t h e spacecraft retro section.

Sequencing i s as follows:

1. SEP OAMS LineSwitch
a. Initiates simultaneously two tubing cutter/sealer cartridges
(instantaneous type), three w i r e bundle g u i l l o t i n e (C -Dl -E ' ) cartridges
(with 120 msec pyrotechnic time delay) installed below the separation plane,
and energizes a 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l time delay relay.
b. The 50-70 msec r e l a y i n i t i a t e s the pyroswitch (B-C-D-E-F-J)
cartridges to deadface the c i r c u i t s and remove e l e c t r i c a l power from the
cartridges and detonators.
c. The g u i l l o t i n e c a r t r i d g e s f i r e a f t e r the 120 msec delay,
actuating the g u i l l o t i n e s t o c u t t h e deadface wire bundles.

2. SEP ELECT Switch -
Energizes a 50-70 msec e l e c t r i c a l time delay
r e l a y which initiates simultaneously t h r e e w i r e bundle g u i l l o t i n e (C-D-E)
cartridges (instantaneous type) installed above the separation plane t o
actuate the guillotines and cut the w i r e bundles.

-
3. SEP ADAET Switch Energizes a 70-90 msec e l e c t r i c a l time delay
r e l a y which initiates simultaneously three detonators of t h e FLSC separation
assemblyand the detonator of the FLSC tube cutter.

Z 100 Separation Assembly. - The retrograde section separates
re-entry vehicle when t h r e e titanium straps and various tubes and wire bundles
from the

are c u t by redundant dual strands of FLSC. The separation assembly consists
of three cutter assemblies, three detonator housing, three dual bridgewire
detonators (160 msec pyrotechnic time delay) six explosive interconnects, and
t h r e e i n e r t unions. Each c u t t e r assembly severs one titanium strap, electrical
wires varying i n s i z e from No. 20 to coaxial cable, .35 diameter, and up t o
s i x 1/4 in. diameter tubes. The c u t t e r assembly consists of two parallel
machined bars. Two RDX FLSC cords, with their apexes 1/2 i n . apart, are
embedded i n each bar. One endofeach FLSC s t r i p i s bent 45 degrees away
from the bar. When joined together with an 0.4 in. gap between bars, the
FLSC s t r i p s f a c e each other and the bend endsconverge a t t h e booster.Proper
gap i s maintained by spacers and bolts. The detonator housing i s i n s t a l l e d
onone end of the cutter assembly and contains a parallel booster assembly
and an interconnect booster. The detonator housing also provides for the
i n s t a l l a t i o n O f a detonator and t w o explosive interconnects with their output
endsadjacent t o the interconnectbooster. The interconnect booster i s a
column of RDX explosive in a holder with two output ports which mate with the
converged strands of FLg. The parallel booster assembly consists of a main
column, crossover column, and two dual output columns installed i n a charge
holder. The main booster column i s installed with one end a d j a c e n t t o the
interconnect booster and the other end sitting on t h e crossover column.The
output boosters have chevron-shaped output cans on both ends of each booster.
The two output columns a r e parallel planes, adjacent t o each end of the cross-
over column. Each end of the output column i s mated w i t h the openV-groove
of the FLSC.
The c u t t e r s are located i n three places around the p a r t i n g l i n e (Z 100)
and are linked by explosiveinterconnects. Two explosiveinterconnectsjoined
by a union are i n s t a l l e d between each c u t t e r . Two explosive interconnects
are i n s t a l l e d i n each detonator housing with t h e i r booster charges adjacent
t o t h e booster column of t h e housing. A detonator i s i n s t a l l e d i n each
housing with i t s output end a d j a c e n t t o the booster column of the housing
and t o t h e boosters of the interconnects. The t i t a n i u m s t r a p , e l e c t r i c a l
wires, and tubes t o be severed are i n s t a l l e d between the two bars of the
c u t t e r . The FLSC i s i n i t i a t e d when the redundant detonators receive the
proper electrical signal f r o m the JETT RETFtO switch. The detonator transmits
a shock wave t o the interconnect booster, which relays propagation t o t h e
FTSC i n t h e c u t t e r a t the point where they converge and simultaneously
propagates the main booster of the parallel booster assembly. The main
column charge relays propagation redundantly t o the four strands of FLSC
throughthecrossover and two outputcharges. The detonator also simulta-
neously propagates the two explosive interconnects.

The interconnects transmit the detonation wave t o a l l three c u t t e r
assemblies. This i s to assure detonation of three c u t t e r s , i n theevent one
o r two detonatorsshouldnotfunction.Properdetonationof one s e t of two
opposing s t r i p s of FISC i n each c u t t e r i s sufficient to achieve separation.
The e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t r y t o t h e retrograde section i s deadfaced by pyroswitch
H. T h i s pyroswitch u t i l i z e s a n 80 msec pyrotechnic time delaycartridge. The
pyroswitch and separation assembly are energized by the JEW R E n O switch.

The sequence i s as follows:

A. Initiated simultaneously are three detonators with 160 msec pyro-
technic time delay and the pyroswitch cartridge with 80 msec pyrotechnic time
de lay.
B. The pyroswitch c a r t r i d g e f i r e s a f t e r t h e 80 msec delay t o deadface the
c i r c u i t and a l s o removes t h e e l e c t r i c a l power from t h e cartridges and
detonators.
C. The detonators f i r e a f t e r the 160 msec d e l a y , i n i t i a t i n g t h e FLSC, t o
cut t h e straps, tubes and deadfaced wires.

Fairing Release

The horizon scanner i s uncovered by a pyrotechnic ejector which j e t t i s o n s
the horizonscannerfairing. The radar, parachutecanisters, andnose
antennas are uncovered by a pyrotechnic ejector which j e t t i s o n s the hose
fairing. Spacecraft 2, 3, and 4 u t i l i z e d a c a b l e c u t t e r t o s e v e r a holding
cable that releases the nose fairing for spring-driven jettison. The nose
f a i r i n g and horizon scanner fairing are jettisoned by the JEW FAIRING switch.

HorizonScanner Fairing Release.
assembly secures the fairing to the spacecraft
-
The horizon scanner fairing release
and, when i n i t i a t e d , j e t t i s o n s
it. The assembly consists of an actuator housing, actuator rod, main piston,
release piston, eight locking pins, and two e l e c t r i c a l l y f i r e d gas pressure
cartridges. The actuator rod forms a p o s i t i v e t i e between the actuator and
t h e scanner fairing. The a c t u a t o r rod i s locked t o t h e main piston by four
locking pins. The main piston i s locked i n the base of the housing by four
locking pins that are held i n p l a c e by the release piston. The release piston
i s spring-loaded i n the locked position. The housingprovides f o r i n s t a l l a -
t i o n of the pistons, actuator rod, and two cartridges and f o r mounting of the

239
assembly. The gas pressure produced by firing the cartridges is ported
through the housing to the ofbase the piston. The gas pressure moves the
release piston forward, enabling fourthe locking pinsto c m inboard and thus
release the main piston. The
g a s pressure causes the main piston, with
attached actuator rod, to move through the length of theA shoulder housing.
stops the piston at the ofend
the housing. The four locking pins, securing
the actuatorrod to the piston, cam outboard a intorecess and release the
actuator rod. The actuator rod is jettisoned with the scanner fairing
attached. Proper function of one cartridge is sufficient to Jettison the
fairing.
-
Nose Fairing Release. The nose fairing ejector, which secures the
rendezvous and recovery section nose fairing to the spacecraft, is init
to jettison the fairing. The assembly consists a breech,
of ballistic hose,
actuator assembly, bellcrank mechanism, a and
dual-bridgewire electrically
fired gas pressure cartridge. The nose fairing is attached to the bellc
mechanism. The actuatorrod forms a positive tie between the actuator body
and the crank mechanism. It is locked a piston
to in the actuator by two
locking pins and held in place in the actuatora shear body by pin. The
actuator assembly is connected to the breech by the ballistic hose. T
breech provides for installation of the cartridge and is positioned ap
mately nine in. from the actuator. The actuator is installed on the ante
support/actuator fitting of the rendezvous and recovery & R) (Rsection and
is located on the Y zero. The gas pressure produced
X axis, five in. up from
by firing the cartridge in the breech is transferred through the ballis
hose to exert a force on the piston in the actuator. The piston with rod
attached severs the restraining shear pin. The gas pressure causes the
piston, with attached rod, to move through the length of the actuator
As the piston reaches the end of the housing, the two locking pins sec
the rod to the piston cam outboarda recess
into and release the actuator rod
The actuator rod then is jettisoned with the nose fairing.A hinge on the
nose fairing, located on the outer moldline, releases and directs the pa
of the fairing away from the spacecraft. The bellcrank mechanism provides
for angular jettison of the fairing using the axial movement of the ejec
shaft.

Horizon Scanner Release

The horizon scanners are jettisoned from the spacecraft JETT
byRETRO
the
switch. The horizon scanner release assembly secures the scanners to the
spacecraft and jettisons them when actuated. The assembly consists of an
actuator housing, actuator rod, locking mechanism, cartridge housing, and
electrically fired gas pressure cartridges with 80 msec
an pyrotechnic time
delay. The actuator rod is secured in the actuator housing by the lock
mechanism. This mechanism consists ofa tang lock,tang lock retainer, and
a shear pin. The tang lock is secured to the base-of the actuator ho
The actuatorhousing is attached to the spacecraft structure. The cartridge
housing withboth cartridges installed is attached to the actuator rod. The
g a s pressure produced by firing the cartridges is ported through the holl
actuator rod to the base of the actuator housing. Slots in the tang lock

240
allow the gas pressure to aexert
force against the baseof the tang lock
retainer. The tang lock retainer then severs its shear pin and moves axial
of the tang lock. The tines cam open,
in the housing, exposing the tines
releasing the actuator rod and allowing the gas pressure to jettison the
of one
actuator rod with horizon scanners attached. Proper functioning
cartridge is sufficient to jettison the horizon scanners.

Fresh Air Door Actuator
A fresh air door actuator ejects the door when initiated HI ALT by the
DRO(UE switch. The fresh air door actuator is located in the unpressurized
area forward of the egress hatches, to the left of the spacecraft cente
and below the outer moldline. The actuator consists of breech, plunger,
screw '(shear pin), and two electrically fired gas pressure cartridges. The
plunger formsa positive tie between the fresh air door and the breech, and
is retained in the breech by the screw which acts
a shear
as pin. The breech
to the space-
provides for installation of the two cartridges and attachment
craft structure. The gas pressure produced by firing the cartridges exerts
a force on the plunger, which severs the screw. The plunger and fresh air
door then are jettisoned free of the spacecraft.

Docking System Pyrotechnic Devices
The pyrotechnic devices utilized for the docking mission of the space-
craft are located in Rthe 45 Fig.
& R section of the spacecraft as shown on
and consist of the following:
A . A pyrotechnically-actuated docking bar assembly extends and locks the
indexing bar prior to the docking maneuver and jettisons the indexing bar
after rendezvous operations are completed. The indexing bar aids both
visually and mechanically in the docking maneuver.
B. Three pyrotechnically released latch receptacles mate with the moorin
latch hooks on the docking cone of the target docking adapter (TDA). The
latch receptacles normally are jettisoned during the retrograde sequence or
they can be released from the spacecraft to an emergency demate
provide
capability in the eventa malfunction
of TDA release system.
of the normal
C. Three pyrotechnically actuated cable cutters release the three latch
covers for re-entry heat protection.
-
-+=-
Docki Bar.
cycles extension
The docking bar has been designed and developed with two
and Jettison). The indexing bar is retained
bar
retracted position until cycled. The extension cycle moves the indexing
i
13.82 in. from the retracted position to the fully extended position and lo
bar, when in the
the indexing bar until jettison is required. The indexing
a 1500 lb ultimate load applied normally to
extended position, can withstand
the outer end of.the bar. The jettison cycle jettisons the bar indexing
without recontact with the spacecraft.
The docking b a r assembly consists of cylinder/housing, pistons, indexing
bar, manifoldassembly, one extension cartridge, and two jettison cartridges.
The cylinder/housing i s mounted to the spacecraft structure along t h e X axis.
The manifold assembly, which i s attached t o the top of the cylinder housing
and a t t a c h e s t o the spacecraft structure, contains a spring-loaded locking
pin mechanism and two breeches. The extension cartridge i s installed i n t h e
breech on the l e f t side of the manifold and the two j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e s are
i n s t a l l e d i n t h e breech on the right. The indexing bar, with a hollow base,
i s secured i n t h e o u t e r p i s t o n by a, shear pin. A d r i l l e d o r i f i c e i n t h e upper
portion of the outer piston mates with an o r i f i c e i n t h e hollow base of the
indexing bar. An inner piston i s i n s t a l l e d under theindexing bar, inside the
outer piston. A hollow extension on the inner piston protrudes through the
outer piston base. The indexing bar assembly i s r e t a i n e d i n t h e r e t r a c t e d
position inside t h e housing by a retaining pin (shear p i n ) through one side
of the manifold.

The indexing b a r i s extended by the gas pressure generated when t h e dual-
bridgewireextensioncartridge i s i n i t i a t e d by the INDEX EXTENT switch. The
gas pressure i s ported into the cylinder/housing and enters the orifice in the
base of the indexing b a r . The gas pressure then i s portedthroughthehollow
inner piston extension and exerts a force on t h e bottom of the outer piston.
When sufficient force i s a p p l i e d t o t h e base of the outer piston, causing it
t o move, the retaining pin in the manifold/indexing b a r i s severed. The gas
pressure causes t h e piston, w i t h attached indexing bar, t o move through t h e
length of the cylinder housing. The engagement of the locking pin in the
manifold with a recess in the outer piston stops the t r a v e l and secures the
outer piston w i t h the attached indexing b a r i n the f’ully extended position.

The docking bar i s jettisoned by the gas pressure generated when the two
j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e s a r e i n i t i a t e d by the JETT RETRO switch. The gaspressure
generated by firing the j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e s i s ported into the cylinder/
housing and e n t e r s a n o r i f i c e i n the lower portion of t h e outer piston into a
cavity between the inner and outer pistons. The thrusting action of the inner
piston causes the indexing b a r t o s e v e r t h e shear pin (indexing bar/outer
piston) and j e t t i s o n both the inner piston and t h e indexing bar. I n i t i a t i o n
of one j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o complete the jettison cycle. The
j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e s have a 2.0 sec pyro delay to assure t h a t during an abort
mode the extension cartridge w i l l f i r e f i r s t t o extend the bar before t h e
jettison cycle is initiated.

Emergency Docking Release System. -
The emergency docking release system
consists of three pyrotechnically released docking latch receptacles, which
release the spacecraft from t h e docking vehicle i f the normal release system
fails. Each release assembly consists of a body, latch receptacle, piston/stud
assembly, shearpin,closure end cap,and two gaspressurecartridges. The
body houses the piston/stud assembly and provides f o r the i n s t a l l a t i o n of the
two cartridges andattachmentof the endcap.Flanges f o r a t t a c h i n g t h e body
to the spacecraft structure are an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e body. The piston/stud
assembly i s i n s t a l l e d with the stud protruding through the body.The end cap
seals the area above the piston andprovides a mechanicalstop. The l a t c h
receptacle i s secured t o t h e structure by a holding shear pin through the
protruding piston stud. The l a t c h i s preloaded on assembly by torquing the
stud in the piston. The design of the latch, stud, and shear pin arrangement
allows the unit to withstand a 5770 l b ultimate docking load on t h e l a t c h
without failure. The gas pressure produced by f i r i n g t h e two cartridges i s
ported to.the underside of the piston. The pressure displaces the piston,
separating the shear pin from the latch receptacle and moving the piston stud
i n t o the body t o c l e a r the latch receptacle. The latch receptacle being
held by the docking vehicle latch i s then parted f r o m the release body,
allowing the spacecraft freedom t o move out of the docked condition.

The EMERG REL switch simultaneously i n i t i a t e s t h e d u a l c a r t r i d g e s i n
eachdevice. The JETT RETRO switch also w i l l i n i t i a t e the release system i f
not fired previously. Function of one c a r t r i d g e i n a device provides latch
release. Functionof two of the three releases w i l l achieve separation.

Latch Cover Cable Cutter System. -
One latch cover i s located a t each
emergency docking release t o cover the opening created when t h e emergency
docking release l a t c h i s released and t o prevent excess t h e m 1 energy from
entering the spacecraft. Each system consists of a spring-loadedlatchcover,
a restraining cable and a dual cartridge guillotine. Firing either or both
cartridges actuates the guillotine that severs the restraining cable. The
spring-loaded cover then slides forward t o cover the docking latch cavity.
A l l cartridges are i n i t i a t e d simultaneously by the JETT RETRO switch. The
cartridges contain a 1.0 sec pyrotechnic time delay t o i n s u r e emergency
release p r i o r t o l a t c h cover release.

Fyrotechnic Valves

.Pyrotechnic valves i n t h e o r b i t a t t i t u d e andmaneuveringsystem (OM)
and re-entry control system (RCS) a r e one-time actuating devices which control
f l u i d flow. Types of valves utilized are e i t h e r normally open o r normally
closed. A package valves are nonnally open, C and D package valves are
normally closed, and E package valves include one of each type.

The pyrotechnic valve consists of a valve body, nipple, ram, and a dual-
bridgewire e l e c t r i c a l l y f i r e d high explosivecartridge/detonator. When the
proper electrical signal initiates the cartridge/detonator, the resulting gas
pressure and shock wave actuates the ram and e i t h e r opens o r c l o s e s t h e f l u i d
l i n e depending on the type of valve.

Fuel Cell Hydrogen Tank Vent Actuator

The f u e l c e l l hydrogen tank vent actuator opens the hydrogen tank pinch-
off tube, allowing g a s molecules in the void between the inner and outer tank
walls t o escape when t h e spacecraft i s i n o r b i t . This increases system
efficiency by reducing heat transfer. The actuator assembly consists of a
body, piston/cutter blade, shear pin,breech b a l l i s t i c hose,and a dual-
bridgewire e l e c t r i c a l l y f i r e d g a s p r e s s u r e c a r t r i d g e . The body houses the
piston/cutter blade retained by a shear pin and provides f o r attachment of a

243
blade guard. The actuator body assembly is bonded and strapped on in place
the fuel cell hydrogen tank and connected to the a ballistic
breech by hose.
The breech provides for installation
of the carbridge and is positioned
approximately nine in. from the actuator to protect the cartridge from
extreme coldof the He tank. The gas pressure producedby firing the cart-
ridge is transferred through the ballistic hose, causing the piston/cu
blade to sever the shear pin and to move foruard a high velocity
with to
split open the vent tube. As the piston/cutter blade reaches the of endthe
body, a shoulder stops the piston travel. The blade
guard attached to the
actuator body providesa trap for fragments.

Pyrotechnic Devices For Experiments
The experiments utilizing pyrotechnic devices (cable-cutting guillotin
to sever restraining cables and allow the release of spring-loaded do
equipment includeD-4, -7, -10, -12, -15, -16, MSC-1, -2, -3, -6, and S - 9 . A
large wire bundle guillotine witha dual-bridgewire cartridge was used to
sever a holding bolt on the extravehicular support package a holding
and bolt
and two tubes on the astronaut maneuvering unit.
The rendezvous evaluation pod was jettisoned from the adapter of
craft 5 by a pyrotechnic ejector employing two electrically fired gas pre
cartridges. This ejector was similar to the horizon scanner release ass
in design and operation, except for output charge of the cartridge.

Pyrotechnic Development And Qualification Tests

Numerous breadboard development tests were conducted on each pyrote
device at component and system levels to obtain the correct operating
pressure, and mechanical function.

Qualification tests of devices shown on 27Table
were made while under
the environmental condition, or after exposure to the condition.

-
Z 13 Separation Assembly Tests. The Z 13 separation assembly was
environmentally tested utilizing test sections or strips. The test units
consisted ofa section of simulated spacecraft structure approximately24 in.
long with a section ofF’LX assembly attached as in the production assembl
One single and one dual-bridgewire detonator were installed on each se
The units were fired by applying four 30 amps to one or both detonators
VDC or
according to the test schedule. The nine vendor system or performance tes
were full scale separation assemblies mounted
on boiler plate structure.
These units were fired with60 linear in. of the shaped charge2880~.
at All
tests were successful. The six McDonnell system tests were conducted on
boiler plate structure utilizing production pyroswitches, guillotines and
A l l tests
bundles. The system was sequenced the same as production systems.
were successful.

244
TABLE 27 PYROTECHNIC QUALIFICATION TEST SUMMARY
- - - -

6 RELIABILITY
U
L ASSURANCE
n
-i z L TEST
I
DEVICE VENDOR < c'
J
E
J
< <
\
n
<
I
\
n
I
- >-
c

X
I- Y
J
W P Y
c- 0c
W U
0 3I U
U ' + 0
X J 5 4 : s z
_" "" "

ET
-
~~

IS
20
-
-
10
~

IO
-~
5
-
10
~

15
-
5 - 6 25
2 1 3 SEP. ASSY.
269 SEP. ASSY. ET 5 5 3 3 10 2 - - 25 SE 4C s

2100 SEP. ASSY. 3A/CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 " - 20 3 3 3
DETONATOR CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 " - - - -
HORIZON SCANNER DEA/ 20 10 10 5 20 ZO 5 2 6 25 10 3 3 3
F A I R I N G R E L . ASSY. HOLEX
HORIZON SCANNER TALLEY 20 10 10 5 20 20 - 2 6 25 10 3 3 3
REL. ASSY.
RENDEZVOUS EVAL. TALLEY 6 6 - - - 2 5 - - 6 10 - -
P O D R E L . ASSY
FRESH AIR DOOR DEA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 6 6 10 3 3 3
HOLEX
NOSE FAIRING REL. ASSY. CTI - - 3 - 3 3 3 2 " 10 3 -
PYROSWITCH (41 PINS) OA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2" - - -
WCDONNELI

PYROSWITCH ( 5 5 PINS) OA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 " - - -
MCDONNELI
PYROSWITCH CARTRIDGE CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 - 12 3 3 3
INSTANTANEOUS
PYROSWITCH CARTRIDGE OA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 - 12 3 3 3
80 MS T I M E D E L A Y MCDONNEL
L A R G E WIRE B U N D L E ( L W B ) OA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2" - - -
GUILLOTINE MCDONNEL
(LWB) CARTRIDGE (INST.) CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 25 19 3 3 3
(LWB) CARTRIDGE CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 25 19 3 3 3
(120 MS T I M E D E L A Y )
S M A L L WIRE B U N D L E (SWB) OA/ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 - - - - -
GUILLOTINE MCDONNEL
(SWB) CARTRIDGE (INST.) CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 - 19 3 3 3
(SWB) C A R T R I D G E CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 - 19 3 3 3
(120 MS T I M E D E L A Y )
1/8 D I A . C A B L E C U T T E R OA/CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 6 - 23 3 3 3
GUILL. (EXPERIMENTS)
(WITH INST. CART.)
1/16 D I A . C A B L E C U T T E R ICDONNELL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 6 - 23 3 3 3
GUILL. (LATCH COVERS) :TI
(2.0 SEC. T I M E D E L A Y C A R T . )
EMER. DOCK. REL. (1/8 OIA. MCDONNEL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2" 10 3 3 3
CABLE CUTTER GUILL. CART.'
DOCKING BAR MCDONNEL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 " IO 3 3 3
EXTEND CART. CTI 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 6 - 10 3 3 3
JETTISON CART. CTI 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 - 6 - 10 3 3 3

B- I
D.
E E

TUBING CUTTERAEALER MCDONNEL 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 22 3 3 3
/CTI
- - - -
*UNITS WERE FIRST HUMIDITY - TESTED, THEN VIBRATION - TESTED.
The following reliability assurance tests w e r e conducted t o demonstrate
(1)a detonator output of 1.3 times that required, and (2) that detonators
w i l l i n i t i a t e the boosters which i n t u r n i n i t i a t e the FLEE w i t h a gap of
1.5 times maximum blueprint gap.
A. Fifty detonators were divided into five groupsofteneach. Each
group was loaded w i t h a reduced output charge and fired into production FLEE
a t a maximum blueprint gap of 0.015 i n .

GROUP PERCENT NORMAL OUTRTT FLSC INITIATED

10 out of 10
10 out of 10
7 out of 10
6 out of 10
None

B. Thirty production detonators were divided into six groups of f i v e
each. Each group was f i r e d i n t o a detonator block and FLSC assembly w i t h
i d e n t i c a l gap adjustments between t h e detonator to crossover and crossover
booster t o FLEX as shown.

TEST GAP M
AX
. BWEPRINT GAP FLSC
GROUP (INCHES) FACTOR INITIATED

1 0.023 0.015 1.5 5 of
out 5
2 0.030 0.015 2.0 5 out of 5
3 0.038 0.015 2.5 5 of
out 5
4 0.045 0.015 3.0 5 out of 5
5 0.053 0.015 3-5 5 out
of 5
6 0.060 0.015 4.0 5 out of 5
T h i r t y - f i v e f i r i n g s were made with shaped boostercaps and FLSC. A l l
the f i r i n g s w e r e successful. The tests were divided into two groups as
follows: Fifteen were made with booster against FLEE w i t h a lead sheath of
0.025 in. thick andambient conditions. Twenty were made with an 0.050 i n .
s t r a i g h t - l i n e gap between the booster and FLSC w i t h a production lead sheath
of 0.010 in. thick and fired while a t -54OF.

Z 69 Separation Assembly Tests. - The Z 69 separation assembly was
environmentally tested using test sections as was t h e Z 13 separation
assembly. The Z 69 t e s t unit also included the tube cutter, detonator, and
interconnect.Simulatedtubes f i l l e d w i t h l i q u i d a t productionpressures
were i n s t a l l e d i n t h e tube cutter.

Nine vendorperformance tests were similar t o t h e Z 13 except w i t h 60
linear inches a t 270°F and60 l i n e a r i n . on the opposite side a t -9OOF. A l l
tests were successful.

Six successfulMcDonnel1 system t e s t s were conducted similar t o t h e Z 13
separation assembly tests. In addition, one assembly was placed i n an

246
altitude chamber 14 days
for ata pressure level of
800,000 ft before firing
(static 3).
-
2 100 Separation Assembly Tests.The 2 100 separation assembly was
environmentally tested at McDonnell, to accelerate the test program. Each
test assembly consisted of three cutters, six mild detonating (MDF) fuse
interconnects, three unions and three detonators. The detonators were
manufactured by Central Technology Inc. and the remainder
of the assembly was
manufactured by Ordnance Associates, Inc. The assemblies were mounted on
simulated back-up structure for firing and contained the tubes, straps, and
wire bundles to be used as production assemblies. The tubes were filled with
representative liquid and capped. All tubes, titanium strap, and wire bundles
in each cutter were cut in two planes. The detonators, which are the same
type as those used for R separation assembly, also were environ-
R & the
mentally tested at CTI. All tests were successful. The following reliability
assurance tests were conducted to demonstratea detonator outputof 1.3 times
that required by reducing the output load. Tests also were conducted to
demonstrate propagation with gaps1.5oftimes maximum blueprint gaps for the
components of the cutter. The gaps are as follows:
GAp LOCATION 2 2%
A Detonator/Interconnect 0.040 0.060
Booster
B Interconnect
Booster/ 0.032 0.051
Interconnect
C Interconnect
Booster/ 0.014 0.021
Parallel Booster
D Interconnect
Booster/ 0.020 0.030
nsc
E Parallel
Main
Column/ 0.078 0.113
Crossover
F Crossover/Output
Can 0.027 0.041

G Can/FLSC
Output 0.088 0.132
A. Detonator Output Tests (Five Groups)
1. Ten detonators 10% output
with charge and
l5O#, gaps A-B-C(all
fired).
2. Ten detonators with
10% output charge and lo@$ gaps A-B-C (all
fired).
80$ output charge and
3. Three detonators with 10% gaps A-B-C (all
fired).
4. Three detonators with
60$ output charge and
10% gaps A-B-C(all
fired).
5. Three detonators with
4 6 output charge and
106 gaps A-B-C (all
fired).
B. Gap Tests (Three Groups)
1. Five detonators with 106 output and1 5 6 gaps E-F-G(all fired).
2. Five interconnect/interconnect booster (B) l5C$ gap (all fired).
3. Five interconnect booster/FLSC(D) 1 5 6 gap (all fired).
C. S i x McDonnell system tests were conducted on boiler plate stru
as 2 69 assemblies and sequentially fired
as a system. A l l tests were
successful.
Emergency Docking Release Tests. -
The emergency docking release (EDR)
unit was manufacturedby McDonnell and environmentally qualification-tested
with its cartridges at CTI. The cartridges were manufactured by CTI
the' same as those utilized with 1/8 in.
the diameter. cable cutter guillotine
EDR assembly to various environments, the devices w
After subjecting the
installed ona load test fixture and fired to verify proper operation.
assemblies were fired aftera limit load of 4250 lb was applied to the latch
and then released, and five were fired as this limit load was be
Two units without cartridges were static-tested by applying a load in excess
of the5770 lb ultimate load until the shear pins failed. The latch re
cles from five assemblies without cartridges were torqued 100 in. to
lb and
held for200 hr. The torque was verified once daily to insure that the
receptacles had not loosened. Tiro of these assemblies then were mounted o
the load test fixture and subjected to more cycles of loads from
1500than
zero to4250 lb to zero on the latch. A l l tests were successful.

The normal reliability assurance tests were conducted utilizing
a single
cartridge with reduced output charge to actuate the device. All the c
ridges with67$ or more output charge actuated the device.40$The
output
charge cartridges did not, as expected, actuate the device.

Nine reaction load tests were conducted on assemblies utilizing t
cartridges with the output charge uploaded as follows:

A . Threefirings with
lo@ output charge.
B. Three firings with
ll5$ output charge.
1 3 6 output charge.
C. Three firings with

The assembly was proof-tested by utilizing two cartridges with an outp
of 12oqd. The assembly was also burst-tested by utilizing two1 5 6 normal
output cartridges to insure that no yielding or deformation of the
chamber occurred. A l l tests were successful.

In addition to the qualification firings, McDonnell conducted six
& R section as
scale firings on R an a system test with three
EDR's and three
All tests were successful.
latch cover systems on each firing.

248
I-

Docking Bar Assembly Tests. - The docking bar manufactured by McDonnell
was environmentally tested by CTI with i t s CTI-designed and manufactured
cartridges. Four &its w e r e - f i r e d simultaneously so that the extension and
j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e s were pulsed simultaneously to insure proper sequence
operat ion.

Twenty u n i t s were sequentially f i r e d so that the extension cartridge
was f i r e d first t o extend the indexing bar, then the jettison cartridges were
fired. Twelve of the sequentially-fired units had a 1100 l b limit load
applied a t the extreme end of the extended indexing bar, normal t o t h e
c e n t e r l i n e ; t h i s was then released and t h e j e t t i s o n c a r t r i d g e f i r e d .
Two units without cartridges w e r e s t a t i c - t e s t e d by extending the bar,
one unit was tested by applying a load TOO l b i n excess of t h e 1500 l b
ultimate load normal t o the b a r u n t i l f a i l u r e occurred. The other unit was
t e s t e d by applying a load 1070 l b i n excess of the 1500 l b ultimate load a t
15 degrees above normal u n t i l f a i l u r e occurred. Two units without cartridges
were s t a t i c - t e s t e d t o i n s u r e that the indexing bar wouldbe retained during
t h e ascent forces. A calculated force of 31.2 l b was applied without any
f a i l u r e . The load force then was increased until failure occurred verifying
the 1.5 margin of safety.

Three system t e s t s f o r t h e assembly included a dynamic f o r c e t e s t
conducted by t h e vendor. The docking b a r assembly was mountedon a produc-
tion support structure of the R & R section and test-fired as follows:

A . One assembly s t a b i l i z e d a t 200°F and h e l d f o r a period of four h r
before firing.
B. One assembly a t room ambient conditions.
C. One assembly s t a b i l i z e d a t - 6 5 0 ~and held for a period of nine h r
before firing.

Nineteen r e l i a b i l i t y a s s u r a n c e tests were conducted on t h e assembly w i t h
both the extension and jettison cartridge containing reduced output charges
and sequentially fired.

A. Five assemblies w i t h 1 0 6 output and lo@ shear pin - a l l fired.
B. Three assemblies with 80$ output and lo# shear pin - a l l fired.
C. Three assemblies w i t h 6O$ output and 100$ shear pin - a l l fired.
D. Three assemblies with 4 6 output and loo$ shear pin - did not func-
tion.
E. Five assemblies with 10% output and
fired (shear p i n held u n t i l j e t t i s o n c y c l e ) .
8 6 jettison shear pins - all
One assembly w i t h the indexing b a r in the retracted position was
hydrostatically proof (126) and burst ( 1 5 6 ) tested.

McDonnell conducted f u l l - s c a l e shock tests per TR 052-044.09 i n which
the docking bar and emergency release assemblies (all without cartridges) were
i n s t a l l e d on a production R & R section. The indexing b a r was manually

249
R & R section assembly then was impacted approximately
extended, and the 20
times with the docking cone simulating various docking conditions.

McDonnell conducteda docking bar, Spacecraft 11 configuration demon-
stration test perTR 052-069.56 in which the indexing bar was manually
extended anda docking bar mirror, tether clamp and tether weighted to
lb were attached.Two jettison cartridges were installed and initiated
electrically. The indexingbar was jettisoned and the weighted tether
separated from the indexingbar.
McDonnell conducted development and demonstration tests
TR's per
052-069.57, 052-069.57.01, 052-069.57.02 and.052-069.57.03 to determine under
bar could be jettisoned with single
what applied side load the indexing
cartridge firing. A side load of
100 lb was determined to be acceptable fo
mission plans which was successmlly demonstrated with single and d
cartridge firings.

Mission Anomalies

The anomalies associated with the pyrotechnic system were electri
circuitry problems, whereby electrical energy was not delivered to the
redundant cartridge.
- -
A. Spacecraft3 Fresh Air DoorThe device functioned but one cart-
ridge did not fire.
- -
B. Spacecraft 6 Docking System The system functioned but one jetti
cartridge (dockingbar) and one cartridge in each of the emergency dock
release assemblies and cover release guillotines did not fire.

-
(See Table27)
Pyrotechnic Qualification Test Summary

Pytotechnic FailureSummary - (See Table28)

Mission Evaluation

The pyrotechnic systems have f'unctioned successfully on all mission

MISSION PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

of the Gemini mission planning was to maximize,
The major objective
reasonable limits, the probability of mission success.
To accomplish this
of planning were undertaken.
objective, two basic phases
Early in the program, mission and design objectives wereso developed
that the systems configuration requirements could be determined for both t
Gemini Spacecraft and the modifications to the target and launch vehicles.
Following this, design reference missions were established which permitted
detailed specification of the hardware requirements.
The second phase was the development of mission plans for each fligh
including both onboard operations and the ground tracking and computation
a logical progression of missions and
operations. This phase established
maximized the probability of success of each mission.
In addition to preflight planning, some mission planning was conducted
during flights in response to nonnominal situations.

During the Gemini program, nine different configurations of the onboard
computer program were defined and, with only three exceptions, were carrie
a was
through acceptance test selloff. The large number of configurations
result of additional mission requirements that were defined as the Gemini
program progressed. Subsequent paragraphs will describe the evolution of the
different versions of the operational programs, the major differences betwee
them, the analysis effort involved in defining the various computer modes,
the various levels of testing which were used to verify the computer pr

Description Of Math Flow
(SDC) program originally was
The Gemini Spacecraft digital computer
designed to accomplish the mission objectives defined early in the program
On later flights, theSDC program was revised to accommodate new mission
objectives within the limited computer memory capacity12,288 13-bit
of
instructions. The computer program also was changed to improve guidance
SDC program evolved from the
technique.and accuracy. Consequently, the
relatively simple first program, titled "Gemini Math Flow" which consisted
four operational modes, to the complex Math Flow Seven, which utilized the
auxiliary tape memory(ATM) and consisted of six program modules containing
nine operational modes.

The first math flow contained the ascent, catchup, rendezvous,
and
re-entry modes and was used in acceptance testing of engineering model
computers. The second math flow evolved from the desire to provide orbital
navigation and re-entry mode initialization capabilities. The computer
memory capacity was insufficient for this math flow and, consequently, Math
Flow Two was short-lived.
Math Flow Three, which was used in Spacecraft
2, was similar to the
second math flow except for the deletion of orbital navigation and re-ent
Four contained the touchdown
mode initialization capabilities. Math Flow
TABLE 28 PYROTECHNIC FAILURE SUMMARY
. ~" -

TEST PROBLEM CORRECTIVE ACTION
_.
(1) GENERAL PRIME VENDOR HAD DIFFICULTIES SPACECRAFT 2 UTILIZED THE PRIME VENDOR'!
WITH THE MANUFACTURING AND (OA) CARTRIDGES AND DETONATORS WITH
Q U A L T E S T I N G OF DETONATORS, DUAL BRIDGEWIRES CIRCUITS IN ALL UNITS.
CARTRIDGES, GUILLOTINES, ABBREVIATED QUAL TESTS WERE CONDUCTED
PYROSWITCHES, AND TUBING ON THESE UNITS WHICH CONSISTED OF HI-
CUTTER/SEALER. TEMP/ALT, HUMIDITY, VIBRATION, AUTO-
IGNITION, PROOF AND BURST PRESSURE 40-FT
DROP, ONE AMP NO-FIRE, ONE WATT NO-FIRE.
T H E U N I T S WERE A C C E P T A N C E T E S T E D AS
FOLLOWS: BRIDGEWIRE RESISTANCE, LEAKAGE
V I B R A T I O N , 2OO0F T E M P SOAK ?4 HOUR, RE-
SISTANCE AND DIELECTRIC.
S P A C E C R A F T 3 A N D U P - M C D O N N E L L ASSUME1
THE DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING OF T H E
GUILLOTINES, TUBING CUTTERAEALER AND
PYROSWITCHES WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE.
MCDONNELL ENGAGED SECOND VENDOR (DTI)
FOR DETONATORS AND CARTRIDGES WITH
T H E I R A S S O C I A T E D D E V I C E D WERE Q U A L I F I E D .
( 2 ) QUAL (213) DETONATORINSTALLATION MADE DETONATOR BLOCK A PART OF THE
PUSHED FLSC AWAY FROM S H A P E D C H A R G E ASSY AND SHAPED BOOSTER
INITIATING BOOSTER. VARIATION T O F I T F L S C SO THAT BOOSTERS WERE IN
OF STAND-OFF BETWEEN BOOST- CONTACT WITH FLSC.
ER/FLSC TOO GREAT.
"i

DlPAM SHAPED CHARGE BLIS- CHANGED FLSC FROM DIPAM TO RDX. SPACE-
TERED. CRAFT 2 UTILIZED DlPAM FLSC.
I ___
TUBE CUTTER FAILED TO INITI- REDESIGNED TUBE CUTTER, ADDED A DETO-
ATE. NATOR AND REMOVED ONE EXPLOSIVE INTER-
C O N N E C T . S P A C E C R A F T 2 U T I L I Z E D ASSY
WITH TWO INTERCONNECTS.
TUBECUTTERINTERCONNECT INCREASED ACCEPTER CHARGE IN EXPLOSIVE
FAILED TO PROPAGATE. I N T E R C O N N E C T (40 T O 5 5 mg).
ONE DETONATOR BLOCKBLEW ADDED SOLID BLAST SHIELD BETWEEN DETO-
FLSC FROMUNDEROTHERDET N A T O R B L O C K S A N D A D D E D TWO S T I F F E N E R S
BLOCK AT DOUBLE DET BLOCK AT END OF SHAPED CHARGE.
AREA.
THESINGLE BRIDGEWIRE D E T O - ANEW L O T O F DETONATORS WERE FABRI-
VERIFICATION NATOR FAILED TO INITIATE FLSC CATED INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED
BOOSTER OF TEST STRIP. CHARGE BUILD-UP.
~ ~ ." ~-
(8) M C D O N N E L L THE ASSEMBLY FAILED TO WITH- THE TANG LOCK RETAINER WAS REPOSITIONED
TEST (VIB) S T A N D A N A X I A L L O A D OF 1500 TO COVER MORE OF THE TANGS, PREVENTING
RENDEZVOUS LB FORFIVE MINUTES DURING THEM FROM CAMMING OUT FROM UNDER THE
E V A L POD REL RANDOM SPECTRUM. R E T A I N E RP R E M A T U R E L Y .
ASSY
T A B L E 28 PYROTECHNIC FAILURE SUMMARY (Continued)

TEST PROBLEM CORRECTIVE ACTION
" . ~~

(9) C A R T - Q U A L ' H ~ THE ORIGINAL CARTRIDGE FAILEt V E N D O R F A B R I C A T E D NEW CARTRIDGES (RE-
SCANNER REL TO MEET THE ONE AMP/WATT NO- MOVED EPOXY SEAL) AND REDESIGNED TIME
ASSY FIRE REQUIREMENT. DELAY COLUMN TO PREVENT OUTAGE.
. - - -
(io) QUAL - (VIB)
~ ~~
~~~

ASSY W I T H A L U M I N U M P I S T O N REDESIGN.ED ASSEMBLY WHICH INCORPORATED
HORIZON FAILED SINUSOIDAL VIBRATION. A STAINLESS STEEL PISTON. THIS ASSEMBLY
SCANNER PASSED RANDOM VIBRATION TEST. STEEL
R E L E A S E ASSY PISTON ASSY I N C O R P O R A T E D S P A C E C R A F T 4

r
AND UP.
-~ ""

(11) M C D O N N E L L THE CHAMBER P L U G B L E W O U T CHAMBER PLUG AND ADJOINING AREA WAS R E -
TEST HORIZON DURING AMBIENT TEST. DESIGNED TO INCREASE THREAD STRENGTH.
SCANNER
- " ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _
(12) S P A C E C R A F T 4 AHSFR FAILED TO FUNCTION. T O INSURE ZERO INTERFERENCE IN THIS AREA
VERIFICATION ANALYSIS INDICATED THAT THE A 100% P I N T O P I N P R E - A S S E M B L Y A C C E P T -
(HSFR) L O C K I N G PINS H A D I N T E R F E R E D ANCE INSPECTION WAS ADDED.
WITH THE ID OF CYLINDER
ENERGY.
.. "" .-
T H E C A R T WAS SUSPECTED OF A NEW L O T O F C A R T R I D G E S WAS F A B R I C A T E D
Y I E L D I N G LOW ENERGY. INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED OUTPUT
CHARGE.
____-.__ ~-"_
PISTON FRACTURED ALLOWING IT T H E P I S T O N WAS R E D E S I G N E D T O I N C O R P O -
GENCY DOCKIN( TO DEFORM THE CLOSURE CAP. R A T E A LARGER FILLET RADIUS. THE NEW
RELEASE HOWEVER, AT A L L T I M E S T H E D E - PISTON WAS T E S T E D 18 T I M E S W I T H O U T F A I L -
VICEFUNCTIONED. URE.
"" _ _ _ _ _ . .". ~~~

ONE CARTRIDGE HAD TO EXTEND A SINGLE CARTRIDGE WITH DUAL BRIDGE-
THE BAR WHILE IN A TEMP RANGE WIRES AND A SLOW B U R N I N GP R O P E L L A N T ,
OF -65OF TO +250°F. WHEN TWO WAS D E V E L O P E D A N D Q U A L T E S T E D W I T H T H E
CARTRIDGES WERE USED IN THE DEVICE FOR THE EXTENSION CYCLE.
DEVICEFORREDUNDANCY,THE
PRESSURE GENERATED WOULD
SHEAR THE PIN AND JETTISON
T H EB A R .
~" ~~ ~ ~______

THE ELECTRICAL P O R T ~ ~ N - O F ANEW L O T O F C A R T R I D G E S WAS F A B R I C A T E D
T H E J E T T I S O N C A R T R I D G E WAS WITH HEAVIER/STRONGER BODIES. (INTERNAL
EXPELLED FROM THE CARTRIDGE D I A A T T H R E A D R E L I E F WAS R E D U C E D F O R
CARTRIDGE WALL RUPTURED AT FOR THICKER WALL).
THREAD RELIEF.
- ~~ -
(17) Q U A L ( V l B ) B R E E C H C R A C K E D ON SINUSOIDAL BREECH REDESIGNED WITH LARGER RADIUS
DOCKING VIBRATION AND MATERIAL CHANGED TO STAINLESS
S T E E L . T H I S ASSY PASSED RANDOM VIBRATION
TEST PER THE SCD.
. -~
~ ~~~
~~

(18) S P A C E C R A F T 11 ONE DETONATOR FAILED TO IN- A NEW L O T O F D E T O N A T O R S WAS F A B R I C A T E D ,
VERIFICATION ITIATE THE FLSC BOOSTER OR INCORPORATING "TARE" WEIGHED OUTPUT
213 DETONATOF T H E 2 1 3 TEST STRIP. CHARGE.
~- . ~

253
predict mode which provided re-entry mode initialization nearly indepen
of the ground. This program utilized12,150 of the12,288 available instruc-
tions and was at that time planned to on be Spacecraft
flown 3 and up. A
February 1964 NASA directive changed the guidance logic of the re-entry
to a constant bank angle logic rather than the proportional bank angl
constant roll rate logic commonalltoprevious math flows. This, and other
changes, became Math Flow Five, and”ath Flow Four was terminated. Math
Five saturated the computer memory and was cancelled a McDonnell/NASA
at
management meeting approximately three days after being defined.
At thesame meeting, it was decided to fly slightly modified version
Math Flow Three on Spacecraft 3 and 4 and to definea new program, Math Flow
Six, effective Spacecraft 5 and up. The modified versions of Math Flow Thre
which were flown on Spacecraft 3 and 4, were titled Math Flow Three I Mod
and
Mod 11, respectively.

The addition of ATM 8 and up,
the to the IGS, effective Spacecraft
provided the means for increasing SDC
the program’s capabilities. The
resulting modularized program was called Math Flow Seven.

Table 29 provides a brief general description of the SDC
Gemini
math
flows. The descriptionsare given in the form of major changes and/or add
tions to the previous edition.

Analysis
Simulations were utilized extensively in defining and evaluating th
different computer modes of the Gemini operational programs. These simula
tions generally fall into the following categories:
A. Early Simulations- used to evaluate equations and served
as a basis
for configuringa given computer mode.
-
B. Man-in-the-loop Simulation to define input/output requirements,
procedures, and display format.
-
C. Refined Digital Simulationsto determine performance characteristics
and to perform error analysis.

Fig. 46 portrays the recommended procedure for establishing
a specifi-
cation control document (ED), which was the basis for the development of
operational computer mode.Of the ten computer modes ultimately developed,
only four (ascent, catchup, rendezvous, and re-entry) went through this t
of development. The analysis of the remainder of the computer modes was
accomplished concurrently with their programming I B M by
for the onboard
computer. A sUnrmary of McDonnell simulation programs used in the developmen
definition, and evaluation of the various computer modes is presented
Table 30.
Testing
Verification of the equations and determination that accuracy require-
meats couldbe met was initiated IBMat Space Guidance Center, Owego, New York
SCb. The results of
immediately upon receipt of the McDonnell FORTFUN
simulation of the operational mode were compared a simulation
to of the exact
of the equations. The basic
equations to verify the validity and accuracy
testing of the coded program was conducted I B M in atthe configuration control
test system (CCTS) laboratory. Flight hardware used in CCTS checkout con-
sisted of the computer, manual data insertion (MDN),unit and incremental
velocity indicators (IVI). Inputs from other systems, e.g., radar and
accelerometer, were provided by simulators.
The formal acceptance testing was performed when the operational prog
was considered to be ready for flight. This testing was conducted using hard-
ware and simulators similar to those in the CCTS lab. Post-acceptance testing
of the operational program was conducted
I B M ,atMcDonnell, St. Louis and
Cape Kennedy.
The purposeof the mission verification simulation
(MVS) was to verify
that theIGS, loaded with the operational program and operating with dynamic
inputs, performed in an acceptable and predictable manner. Actual flight-type
hardware used inMVS testing consisted of the computer, M DN, time
IVI,
reference system, and attitude display group. Other inputs were supplied by
a 7090 computer through hardware simulators.

testsat
The post-acceptance testing included spacecraft systems (SST)
St. Louis and launch pad tests at Cape Kennedy, and were essentially the s
except that testing for booster guidance compatibility with that of the sp
pad. The tests established the proper
craft was only conducted at the launch
operation of the computer and the operational program in the total syste
I B M during
configuration. These tests were similar to the acceptance tests at
computer and operational program selloff.
The operational program errors which were detected during post-acceptanc
31.
testing are summarized in Table

DEVEWPMENT OF MISSIONAND DESIGN OBJECTIVES

The rendezvous and re-entry requirementsa major
had effect on mission
radar,
and design objectives. Early analyses established the need for the
inertial guidance system, orbital attitude and maneuvering system and digital
command system. The inertial guidance system was required primarily for
navigating through re-entry, and the radar and maneuvering system were need
for rendezvous. Additional studies evaluated the orbital requirements,
particularly the desired target orbit altitude and inclination to provide
satisfactory launch windows.A description of the launch window problem is
given in the following paragraphs.
.TABLE 29 DESCRIPTION OF MATHFLOW

- COMPUTER 0 IRATIONAL MODES
MATH SIC TART LOMPLETE
FLOW USE )ATE DATE CATCHLIP T RENDEZVOUS RE-ENTRY

I 4ONE 3-62 4-63 BACK-UP GUIDANCE ANI ACCEPTEOGROUNO ACCEPTEDRAOAR DATA GUIDANCE AND NAVIGA-
NAVIGATION DURING GENERATED AV'S VIA TO SOLVE C-W EQUA- TION INITIATE AT 4OOk
FIRST AND SECOND OCS/MDIU:TRANS- TIONS TO DETERMINE A! USINGGROUND PRE-
STAGE BOOSTER OPERA FORMEDTO SPACE- TO RENDEZVOUS IN 270° DICTEO INITIAL CONOI-
TION; ORBIT INSERTION CRAFT A X I S AN0 OIS- OF ORBIT TRAVEL; IN- TlONS AT 400LWITH
ADJUST ROUTINE (IVAR1 PLAYS ONIVI'S;MONI- TERMEOIATE CORREC- COMPENSATION FOROF1
TORED THRUSTING TlONS AT 60' INTERVAL! NOMINAL RETRO ROCKE
WITH THE LAST AT 30" OPERATION; PROPOR-
TIONAL BANK ANGLE
WITH CONSTANT ROLL
RATE LOGIC
-
4ONE 2-63 6-63 AOOEO MINOR CHANGES MINORCHANGES NAVIGATION INITIATED
ASCENT-ABORT RE- AT RETROFIRE USING
ENTRY GROUND O R ON-BOARD
GENERATED INITIAL
CONDITIONS;PROGRAM-
ME0 ATMOSPHERE AP-
PROXIMATION TO 400k

"

I 2 6-63 5-64 MINORCHANGES MINOR CHANGES MINORCHANGES MINOR CHANGES
"

4ONE 8-63 6-64 MINORCHANGES IVI ZEROING LOOP BY- IVI ZEROING LOOP BY- MANUAL INITIATE VIA
PASSED AFTER 50 SEC PASSED AFTER 50 SEC START COMP BUTTON;
OCS LOCKOUT A T 128
SEC BEFORE RETROFlRl

4ONE
-
6-64 6-64 IMPROVED IVAR
"

SAME AS MF4 SAMEAS MF4 CONSTANTBANK ANGLE
LOGIC WITH HALF-LIFT
RANGE PREDICTOR
"

6-64 11-64 SAME A S MF3 WITH IM- SAME A S MF3 SAMEAS MF3 SAME AS MF3
PROVED SWITCHOVER

- FADE-INEQUATION
"

-8-64 12-64
6-65
"
IMPROVED IVAR
"

FOUR-STEP PITCH PRO-
SAMEAS MF3 MOD I
SAMEAS MF4 WITH AV'S
SAMEAS MF3 MOO I
SAMEAS MF4 WITH AV'S
SAMEAS MF4
SAMEASMFS; RE-ENTRY
6-64
GRAM; NON-ZERO FLlGHT ALSOON MDIU: START ALSO ON MOIU: 11-POINT SELF-TEST (INITIAL CON
PATH ANGLE AT INSER- COMP LIGHT ON CUE TO POSITION TABLE; wt OlTlONS INSERTED); OCS
TION; IVAR CHANGES START THRUSTING; VARIABLE VIA MDIU;OC! LOCKOUT 120 SEC BE-
RADAR DATA VALIDITY LOCKOUT OF A i A?, Ai FORE RETROFIRE
VERIFIED; RADAR ANGLE R A D A R DATA VALIDITY
OATALOCKOUT VERIFIED RADAR ANGLE
-7-65 5-66 GYRO DRIFT COMPEN-
"

RADAR DATA ONMOIU:
OATALOCKOUT
A L L THE MF7 CATCH-UP PROPORTIONAL BANK
SATION; STATE VECTOR RANGE RATE ANDRANGE CHANGES PLUS VARI- ANGLE, CONSTANT ROLL
TRANSFER; ABORT RATE ERRORONMOIU; ABLE RADAR SAMPLING RATE LOGIC: ZERO L I F l
RETROFIRE ATTITUDE A F T O R FWOTHRUSTER INTERVAL; RENOEZVOU! RANGE PREDICTOR; RE-
COMMAND; ABORT -
RE- IVI OPTION; FOI INER- SELF-TEST ENTRY SELF-TEST (INI-
ENTRYSELF-TEST; TIAL, LOCAL VERTICAL, TIAL CONDITIONS PRE-
REAOOUTOFCENTRAL OR IVI REFERENCE; PROGRAMMEOAND
ANGLETRAVEL AND R A D A R MISALIGNMENT INSERTABLE)
OUT-OF-PLANE POSIT10N COMPENSATION; ORBIT
RATE TORQUING COM-
PENSATION: 1011 I V I
FWD/AFT CHANNEL
ATTENUATION

"

ES - 41,108.200,245. 325, 30,200,325,350, 377 2, 7. 25.200,325, 3.50, 32,170,193,200,325.
GUIDANCE 8 CONTROL 333. 350 377 350
MECHANICS,GEMINI
DESIGNNOTES:
-
TABLE 29 DESCRlPTlON OF MATH FLOW (Continued)

1I
"
C O M P U T E R O P E F ? ALTIONAL M O D E S
~~ -
ORBIT PREDICTION RETRO TIME PREDICT RELATIVE MOTION ORBIT DETERMINATION TOUCHDOWN PREDICT

N /A N/A N/A N/A N /A

~ ~". -~~

AVIGATION THROUGH PREDICTED SPACECRA NITIALIZED THE RE- N/A N/A N/A
,ANEUVERS UPDATING EPHEMERIS USING INTRY-MODE BY
#ROUNDOR ON-BOARD GROUND OR ON-BOAR0 IETERMINING TIME TO
ENERATEO INITIAL GENERATED INITIAL ZETROFIRE TO LAND AT
ONDlTlONS CONDITIONS AUTOMATIC Ib SELECTED SITE; SITE
DISPLAY OF PREDICT11I N s;ELECTION VIA MDIU;
TIME, LATITUDE, EAR1 'H LJSED ON-BOARD OR
LONGITUDE AT FIXED IN- (;ROUND-GENERATED
TERVALS OF PREDIC- NITIAL CONDITIONS
TION TIME ___ -.
DELETE0
N /A
IELETED
-~ __-N/A
N/A

N/A
N /A
N/A
UI.

INITIALIZED THE RE-
ENTRY MODEBY DETER-
MINING TOUCHDOWN
SITESFOR MDlU IN-
SERTED TRIAL RETRO-
FIRE TIMES;GROUND
GENERATED INITIAL
CONDITIONS

i
N /A N /A N /A N/A N/A SAME A 5 MF4

N /A N/A N/A N /A DELETED

N/A N/A N/A N /A N /A N/A

N /A N/A N /A N /A N /A N/A

1
~~

SAMEAS MF2 WITH OP- DETERMINEDFUTURE N /A DETERMINED THE TWO IMPROVED THE ON- SAMEAS MF4 WITH
;IONS TOUSE IVI WITH AN0 PAST SPACECRAF IMPULSIVE AV'S RE- BOARD GENERATED RETROGRADE AV'S AN0
:WD/AFTTHRUSTERS; EPHEMERIS BASE0 UP1 QUIRE0 TO TRANSFER STATE VECTOR BY PRO- L/O INSERTABLE VIA
011 I V I FWO/AFT AT- MDlU INSERTED SOLU- BASED UPON MDlU IN- CESSING STAR-HORIZON OCS; GROUND O R ON-
IENUATION TlON TIME; OPTION TO SERTABLE INITIAL AND VERTICAL MEASURE- BOARD GENERATED
DETERMINE TARGET FINAL RELATIVE STATE MENTS INITIAL CONDITIONS
VEHICLE OR SPACE- VECTORS
CRAFT RELATIVE TO
TARGET VEHICLE;
INITIAL CONDITIONS
FROMGROUNDORON-
BOAR0 SOURCES;OPT1
TO SIMULATE SPACE-
CRAFT MANEUVERS
IMPULSIVELY
"
~- __"
130. 350 5, 40, 130. 350 56, 130.350 350 4.14, 2 9 2 . 350. 363. 307 130.148, 325, 350

" " .. -
MISSION OBJECTIVES
1
1
DEFINE MATH FLOW
REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY
MISSION OBJECTIVES

r- FORMULATE
EQUATIONS

SIMULATION OF
REVISE EQUATIONS
EQUATIONS (IBM 7094)
A

NOT ADEQUATE
+ PERFORMANCE
ANALYSES

ADEQUATE
YES
DEFINE
DISPLAY REQUIREMENTS
ADDITIONAL
NO
EQUATIONS
REQUIRED

A
MAN-IN-THE-LOOP
SIMULATION
I i
REVISE
DISPLAYS

NOT ADEQUATE
CREW AND/OR ENGINEERING
EVALUATION

1- ADEQUATE

FIGURE 46 SOFTWARE SPECIFICATION CONTROL DRAWING
(SCD) DEFINITION PROCESS
TABLE 30 MCDONNELL SIMULATIONS UTILIZED
DURINGCOMPUTERMODEDEVELOPMENT

-

I
1
OPERATIONAL MAN-IN-
SIMULATIONS I THE-LOOP
MODE I
"

ASCENT 1. RADIO GUIDANCE-SYSTEM D
2. COMBINED RADIO AND INERTIAL GUIDANCE H X
SYSTEM
3. COMBINED RADIO AND INERTIAL GUIDANCE D X
SYSTEM
4. INERTIAL GUIDANCE SYSTEM D X
5. ORBITAL INSERTION VELOCITY ADJUST D X
6. ORBIT INSERTION VELOCITY ADJUST A X
7. ASCENT POST FLIGHT D
CATCH-UP 1. FORTRAN SIMULATION OF RENDEZVOUS D
AND MATH FLOW
RENDEZVOUS 2. CATCH-UP SIMULATION D
3. CLOSED LOOP TERMINAL GUIDANCE D X
4. CLOSED LOOP RENDEZVOUS H X
5. RENDEZVOUS GUIDANCE SIMULATION D X
6. CATCH-UP MODE H X
ORBIT 1. RETROGRADE TIME COMPUTATION D
NAVIGATION, 2. REAL TIME THRUSTING IN ORBIT 0
ORBIT 3. ORBIT EPHEMERIS COMPUTATION D X
PREDICT, 4. NUMERICAL INTEGRATION ACCURACY D X
RETRO TIME 5. TOUCHDOWN PREDICT MODE A X
AND 6. TOUCHDOWN PREDICT MODE H X
TOUCHDOWN 7. TOUCHDOWN PREDICT MATH FLOW D X
PREDICT SIMULATION
8. ORBIT PREDICT MODE H X
9. ORBIT NAVIGATION MODE H X
RE-ENTRY 1. RE-ENTRY GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION D X
2. SIX DEG. FREEDOM REAL TIME HYBRID H X
3. PSUEDO S I X DOF MAN-IN-THE-LOOP H X
4. RE-ENTRY HEATING STUDIES D
5. ALTERNATE RE-ENTRY GUIDANCE D
6. SIX DOF RE-ENTRY SIMULATION D X
7. RE-ENT.RY MATH FLOW SIMULATION D
8. RE-ENTRY WITH NAVIGATION FROM RETROFIRIE D X
ORBIT 1. ORBIT DETERMINATION SIMULATION D
DETERMINATION 2. AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION D
3. ORBIT DETERMINATION MATH FLOW D X
4. ORBIT DETERMINATION MODE H X

259
TABLE 31 PROGRAMERRORS DETECTED DURINGPOST ACCEPTANCE TESTING
, . . -
M A T HF L O W ERROR DETECTED LEVEL OF TESTING

3 PLATFORM RELEASE TIMING ERROR MISSION V E R I F I C A T I O N
AVx 0VER.FLOW DURING SECO COUNTDOWN SIMULATION(MVS)(IBM)
TELEMETRY TIME SCALING ERROR
Vx OVERFLOW
LIFTOFF TIME SYNCHRONIZATION ERROR t
A D D E D At T O R E - E N T R Y D A T A A C Q U I S I T I O N S Y S T E M lvlvs
(DAS) AS A R E S U L T O F MVS TIMING DISCREPANCY IN SST (MCDONNELL-ST. LOUIS)
GIMBAL ANGLE SUBROUTINE
3 MODE II ELAPSED TIME LAGS ACTUAL TIME DUE TO ERROR MVS
IN CONSTANT

"i'
6 PLATFORM MISALIGNMENT CAUSING INITIAL
POSITIONERROR
LIFTOFF TIME SYNCRONIZATION ERROR
PROBABILITY OF MISSING DAS FRAME AT SECO
ERROR IN SECO TIME DUE T O S E P A R A T I O N OF MVS
ACCELEROMETER AND CLOCK SUBROUTINES

7 MISSING DAS FRAME AT SECO MVS
RADAR COMPUTEROPERATIONAL PROGRAM SST
INCOMPATIBILITY

If the target orbit inclination is chosen to be slightly greater
of the launch site from the orbit
launch site latitude, the displacement
plane will besmall for a fairly long period of time as shown in47.Fig. By
using a variable launch azimuth, the spacecraft can be inserted parallel
the target orbit plane thus minimizing the out-of-plane displacement. In
addition, yaw steering can be used during the second stage of powered
to eliminate the out-of-plane displacement entirely if the displacement
not exceeda certain limit. This limit is dependent upon the payload pena
the planner is willing to pay and was chosen 0.53 degrees
to be for Gemini.
0.53 degrees greater than the launch
By selectinga target orbit inclination
site latitude,a continuous launch capability is available 135 min as
for
shown in Fig.48. This time isknown as the launch plane window. Higher
r t s and lower inclinations decrease
inclinations break this window intop atwo
the lengthof the window.

The target orbit altitude also affects the launch window. Since the
altitude specifies the period of the orbit, it determines the points i
plane window where the in-plane phasing is equal to the desired The value.
range of acceptable phasing values determines the phasing windows or "p
within the launch window as shown in 48 . A desirable situation would
Fig.
be to achieve a zero phasing error at the same time that the out-of-plan
displacement is zero on several consecutive days. While this can be achi
so o
the required altitudes are either lw that lifetime constraints are vio-
lated orso high that the launch vehicle capabilities are exceeded.
An
altitude of 161 nautical miles was finally chosen since it aprovides
phasing
I N T E R V A L OF SMALL
OUT-OF-PLANE DISPLACEMENT
.
I NORTH POLE

LAUNCH SITE
LATITUDE

ORBIT PATH

EQUATOR

FIGURE 47 ORBIT PATH RELATIVE TO LAUNCH SITE LATITUDE

window within the plane window for several consecutive
and furnishes
days a
near optimum launch condition on the second day after target insertion.
of importance is the spacecraft insertion
Another orbital selection
altitude. An evaluation was madeof the launch vehicle radio guidance system
, the
a function of the elevation angle at insertion)
accuracies (which are
exit heating requirements, and the launch vehicle performance capability.
As
of 87 nautical miles was chosen for the
a result, an insertion altitude
design requirement.
After having developed the basic systems' configuration and orbital
missions were established to permit
obJectives, three basic design reference
detailed hardware specifications to be written. The of these wasan
first
unmanned ballistic mission for systems and heat protection qualification. The
second wasa manned orbital14-day mission witha closed-loop guidance
re-entry, and the third a wasmanned orbital rendezvous and docking with
closed-loop guidance re-entry. These missions were flexible enough to allow
performance of many other exercises such as extravehicular activity.:,
DAyF
AGENA INSERTION
G E T = 00:09
SAME (1?:09 AM EST)
I- 4 M=l 4
I .

8 12
16

‘ %!~”+4
G E T L O R = 24:lO 1
FIRST DAY ,GENA CATCH-UP NECESSARY
(1O:lo AM E S T ) A - ~
M = l 41I 8 12 16 1
I
I
I
1I
1
I
1
I
1
I
1
I

Z
3
4:
-I
-
D A Y (8:52 AM EST)

9 1216

I-
L
4:
K
D
TH
CATCH-UP
A IYR D (8:48 AM EST) ,i’ AGENA
NECESSARY
U M - 1 A ‘168 12 M = l 4 168 12
w
I I I I
U
4:
FOURTH DAY
’ .w///////I-
GETLOR.= 94~53
CATCH-UP AGENA -
(8:53NECESSARY
AM EST)
!
M=l 4 8 1216
0 10
20
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
110
120
130
140
150
T I M E S C A L E I N P L A N E WINDOW - MIN

FIGURE 48 LAUNCH WINDOWS FOR TYPICAL GEMINI MISSION

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL MISSION PLANS

A logical progressionof missions was developed in ofeach
several areas
of the missions. As examples, the rendezvous and closed-loop re-entry
guidance progressions will be described.
3 mission in which the
The rendezvous planning began with the Spacecraft
propulsion and guidance and control systems were evaluated. It continued

262
the Spacecraft4 mission wherea plan was developed for rendezvous maneuvers
and station keeping with the spent second stage of the launch vehicle. The
plan for Spacecraft 5 was a rendezvous witha rendezvous evaluation pod (REP)
which carried aloft with the spacecraft and eJected in orbit. This pod
included a radar transponder and flashing lights to a allow complete checkout
of the onboard. rendezvous system. While all these exercises were not com-
pleted, they were valuable in that they provided flight experience and po
out problem areas.I n the case of Spacecraft 5 , the rendezvous evaluation pod
exercise was cancelled because of an electricsl power problem, but another
exercise, referred to as the phantom rendezvous, was planned and executed i
real time. This exercise duplicated the maneuvers planned for the midcourse
phase of the first Agena rendezvous mission and thus verified the accuracy
which could be expected during this phase.
The Spacecraft6 crew completed the first rendezvous 15 December
on 19-65,
with Spacecraft7. While this exercise did not include a docking, it was
successful and proceeded almost precisely as planned. On the following
mission, the Spacecraft 8 crew was able to successfully rendezvous and dock
with an Agena Target Vehicle. Rendezvous also was performed successfully on
Spacecraft 9 through 12 missions. I n addition, several of these missions
included more than one rendezvous so that ten rendezvous exercises in all
were completed.
The closed-loop re-entry guidance planning began with guidance system
2 mission. On the Spacecraft3
qualification on the unmanned Spacecraft
flight, the closed-loop re-entry procedures were evaluated a planandwas
4. When a computer failure
devised for utilizing the procedures on Spacecraft
on Spacecraft4 prevented this, the plan was rescheduled for the Spacecraft5
mission. However, the ground complex transmittedan incorrect initialization
5, once again delaying the demonstration.
of the re-entry mode on Spacecraft
Finally, the Spacecraft6 crew achieveda closed-loop re-entry. Following
7 through 12 for a
this, closed-loop re-entries were performed on Spacecraft
total of seven successful exercises.
a logical progression of missions, planning for
In addition to developing
each mission involves consideration of such constraining factors as launch
windows, systems requirements, crew procedural requirements, necessary con-
ditions for in-flight experiments and extravehicular activity, and re-entry
location. Because of their great importance, the crew procedural requirements
will be discussed in detail.
The four main procedural requirements are as follows:
A. Sufficient time for the crew to complete the necessary crew procedures
B. Approach trajectories which are reasonably insensitive to insertion
dispersions and errors in catchup maneuvers.
C. Lighting conditions which are compatible with back-up procedures.
D. Low terminal approach velocities and line-of-sight angular rates.
Allowing time for crew procedures affected several Gemini missions. For
11 first orbit rendezvous was planned
example, the Spacecraft so that terminal
phase initiation occurred near first spacecraft apogee.of One
the primary
factors in delaying terminal phase initiation until this point was t
required for crew procedures.
an important part in the early
The second procedural requirement played
a plan which could effect
rendezvous planning. It was desired to develop a
near nominal terminal approach trajectory in spite of insertion dispe
spacecraft equipment degradation or ground tracking and computation erro
This desire stemmed naturally from the need to develop terminal phas
cedures which could be employeda guidance
if component failed. After three
approaches were studied, the coelliptical approach trajectory was selec
This approach has been utilized on all of the Gemini primary rende
11.
exercises except that of Spacecraft
The need for lighting conditions which are compatible with back-up
cedures has affected all of the rendezvous missions. The desired lightin
situation for primary rendezvous, shown in 49, is that the crew be able
Fig.
to see the following:

A. The target by reflected sunlight prior to terminal phase initiati
B. The target acquisition lights against
a star background during the
terminal transfer.
C. The target by reflected sunlight for docking in daylight.

This lighting situation allows the crew to see the target througho
rendezvous operations and makes possible inertial line-of-sight angle me
ments in the eventof a platform failure. Lighting conditions are
a factor
in selecting the terminal phase initiation point, the central angle
transfer, and the terminal approach angle. The desirable lighting conditio
for rendezvous witha passive target is very different from that for ren
vous withan active target. Since the passive target is not visible in
darkness, the rendezvous is conducted in daylight.
In addition, terminal
phase initiation does not occur until near the midpoint of daylight. Ea
initiations place the sunline too near the line-of-sight to the target
shown in Fig.50) obscuring the target, while later initiations do not all
adequate daylight to complete the rendezvous.
The final requirement imposed by the need for workable onboard pr
is that the trajectory selected ahave
low terminal approach vel’ocity and
line-of-sight angular rate. This requirement was important in the selectio
of the trajectory parameters in both the coelliptical and first orbit
vous plans. The 130 degree transfer utilized
on several missions was chosen
primarily because of the low line-of-sight angular rate near intercept. F
Spacecraft 11, a major reason for the selection of the biased apogee p
a more direct approach was that the direct approach resulted
a high closing
in
velocity.
The manner in which these constraints were involved in the traject
planning was illustrated by the evolution of the first Gemini rendezvous
a few concepts
The first step in this evolution was the selection of for
achieving the desired objectives. As shown in 5Fig.
1, three different

264
PRIOR TO TERMINAL PHASE INITIATION
INITIATION
VISIBLE
(TARGET
TERMINAL
PHASE IN REFLECTED
SUNLIGHT.)
(TARGET LIGHTS VISIBLE.)
\

FIRST VERNIER C

1

STARS SUN

SECON D VERNIER

T-AGENATARGETVEHICLE
S -GEMINISPACECRAFT

STARS

FIGURE 49 DESIREDLIGHTINGSITUATIONFOR PRIMARY RENDEZVOUS
DESIRED SUN SUN D I R E C T I O N
DIRECTION AT FOR LATE
SUN DIRECTION E D U 1 U 4 LP H A S E
TLm.,.lnn., TERMINALPHASE
FOREARLY INITI,A r I n u
I
INITIATION
TERMINAL PHASE f
INITIATION
t /

1.

GEMINI SPACECRAFT ORBIT

T -AGENA TARGETVEHICLE
S - GEMINI SPACECRAFT
FIGURE 50 DESIRED LIGHTING SITUATION FORPASSIVE RENDEZVOUS

concepts were selected. The first of these was the tangential plan which
employed tangential approach of the spacecraft to the target vehicle
four orbits of ground commanded catchup maneuvers. The closed-loop guidan
system was used in this plan only to remove trajectory dispersions si
midcourse maneuvers nominally placed the spacecraft on an intercept tra-
jectory. The second plan has a similar catchup sequence except that the
final midcourse maneuver establisheda coellip%ical approach trajectory. The
closed-loop guidance system is then used to establisha collision course. A
third plan featured rendezvous at first spacecraft apogee. With this plan,
the Spacecraft would nominally be insertedon a collision course with the
target and the closed-loop system would be used to correct insertion
dispersion.

Careful analysis ofa number of suitable concepts led to the selection
of
the plan best suited to fulfill the mission objectives. This involved
trajectory error analysis, propellant and parer consumption studies, an
evaluation of the suitability of the plan for back-up guidance procedur
a general evaluation of the flexibilityof the plan. For the first Gemini
of the coelliptical rendezvous
rendezvous, these studies led to the selection
Plan*
Primary reasons for this selection were as follows:
A. The first apogee rendezvous was eliminated froh consideration beca
of the relatively high expected propellant consumption.
266
BRAKING
AND LINE-OF-SIGHT r S L O W RATE CATCH-UP MANEUVER
PHASE ADJUST MANEUVER
X (HORIZONTALDISPLACEMENT)

BRAKING
AND LINE-OF-SIGHT
TERMINAL PHASE INITIATION
X (HORIZONTAL DISPLACEMENT)
"_ - ~~~~~ . _ ~ ~ _ _ _ _.. ~~

COELLIPTICAL MANEUVER
PHASEADJUST
MANEUVER
U
4
-I
n
2 OUT-OF-PLANE
n MANEUVER
-I
4
-
U
I- ADJUST HEIGHT INSERTION
!x
W MANEUVER
L
>.

BRAKING
AND
/-CONTROL
LINE-OF-SIGHT

I/ ~
X (HORIZONTAL DISPLACEMENT)
- ...~.~ ________
~~~ ~

TERMINAL PHASE
INITIATION

u
I-
a
W
L

FIGURE 51 CONCEPTS PROPOSED FOR THE FIRST GEMINI RENDEZVOUS
B. The coellipticd plan was chosen over the plan
tangential
because the
terminal phase of the coelliptical plan was much less sensitive to
trajectory conditions or equipment performance.

Development ofa single operational plan involved optimization of t
trajectory parameters, developmentand testing of the ground support progr
and the development, evaluation and crew training associated with the
procedures. The onboard proceduresare discussed i n a follawing section. The
primary trajectory parameters to be optimized for the first rendezvous
were the central angle of the terminal phase transfer and the coel
differential altitude. The central angle to transfer was chosen to sati
several of the mission planning requirements described earlier, especi
the area of onboard procedures. First, it was desired that the transfe
initiation maneuver be along the line-of-sight to the target in order
provide a back-up reference direction for the maneuver. The second requir
ment wasa'lowterminal line-of-sight angular rate and low closing rate.
Finally, it was desired to have the terminal phase initiation point be
behind the target vehicle and the final approach from below and ahead
target vehicle to optimize the lighting conditions. an evaluation of
After
all these factors,a 130 degree transfer was selected. The selection of the
coelliptical differential altitudewas based ona trade-off between(1) the
desire to have the range to the target "PI at
pointthe
small enough that
visual acquisition couldbe assured, and(2) the need for a large differential
altitude in order to minimize the effect of insertion dispersions and
maneuver errorson the locationof terminal phase initiation.This trade-off
resulted in the choicea 15 of nautical mile differential altitude.

This basic plan with only minor modifications was employed on e
11. The
primary rendezvous of the Gemini program except that of Spacecraft
first orbit rendezvous plan of Spacecraft
11 underwent the same evolutionary
phases as the coelliptical plan, but with results compatible with its
different objectives.

RESULTS OF MISSION PLANNING

A s mentioned previously, the mission planning effort was oriented t
maximizing the probability of success formission.
each A discussion of major
mission objectives and accomplishments
may be found in
SPACECRAFT FLIGHT
PERFORMANCE, page 34.

Development Of Hybrid Simulation
natural evolution of early Gemini
The Gemini hybrid simulations a were
simulations, which were e.ither analog or digital and asupported
wide range
& C design note141. Since the requirement for
of studies as describedG in

268
the eqanded real-time simulation capability of hybrid systems was already
recognized at that time, this design note also describes the planning to
achieve a hybrid capability.
After less thana year of development effort, the re-entry hybrid
simulation was being used for evaluation of guidance concepts. Major problem
areas encountered during this time were digital program checkout and utili
tion of advanced digital-analog interface equipment. Other hybrid simulations
which became operational during1964 are summarized in Table
32. While the
simulations originally were intended for guidance evaluation studies, they
became a useful tool for familiarizing flight crews with the required pro-
cedures.
A decision that McDonnell contribute directly to procedures development
and crew training initiated additional simulation development. Simulation
hardware and programs were developeda parallel
in effort. Major hardware
improvements included: a new digital computer with expanded capability, an
additional analog computer,an improved star-horizon display,
an improved
reaction jet simulator, new Agena target models, and flight-qualified crew
stations displays. The crew station is shown in Fig.52. Simulation
developments are outlined in Table32.

-
Re-entry Simulation. Although this simulation was developed for
engineering evaluations prior to the procedures d.evelopment period, only mi
changes were required to simulate specific spacecraft responses. The simula-
tion madea significant contribution to the re-entry procedure development and
8, at which time re-entry training
crew indoctrination until after Spacecraft
was transferred to the Gemini mission simulator.
- 6
Rendezvous Simulation. The hybrid simulation for evaluating Spacecraft
rendezvous procedures was initiated by developing an all-digital program on
the UNIVAC 1218 computer usinga simulated guidance computer programmed with
Math FlowSix. To achieve hybrid operation,E A1an231 analog computer was
programmed with the spacecraft dynamics and control systems an adage
and
conversion unit allowed the necessary transfer of To provide for
data.
man-in-the-loop, a fixed base crew station was built a closed
and circuit
television window display was incorporated.
The simulation was completely reprogrammed for Spacecraft8 utilizing the
CDC32OO digital computer. The greater speed and capacity of3200 the
allowed
digital simulationof the platform and computation of display drive equations.
This reduced the analog program by one-half but required additional digital to
analog trunking capability. The trunking capability was accomplished by
adding eight new conversion units and developing a multiplexing capability.
Also, the math flow program was updated to Math Flow Seven V to bemodule
accurate f o r Spacecraft 8 simulation. An addition to the analog program wasa
simulated sextant display which was used in the back-up procedures. This
display was continuously improved during the rest of the program.
For Spacecraft10, the mathflaw was again updated to Math Flow Seven
module I11 and a new star display was incorporated a using
spherical star
TABLE 32 GEMINI HYBRID SIMULATIONS

I NAME
SEENOTE(1)
T A R T E DC O M P L E T E 1 PURPOSE SIMULATED ELEMENTS

I
1. R E - E N T R Y a) 3-25-64 7-12-64 TO STUDY RE-ENTRY FLIGHT ENVIRONMENT (6 D O F ) ,
CONDITIONS WITH MANUAL MATH FLOW 3: RE-ENTRY
CONTROL. GUIDANCE, PARTIAL ACME.

5- 3-65 5-21-65 TO STUDY RE-ENTRY TO SAME AND MATH FLOW 6:
DESIRED SITE WITH MANNED RE-ENTRY GUIDANCE.
CONTROL.
~~

2. BRAKING AND 9- 9-64 12-18-64 TO EVALUATE PROPELLANT ENVIRONMENT (RELATIVE
DOCKING AND PROCEDURES FOR MOTION, 6 DOF). PARTIAL
BRAKING AND DOCKING. ACME.
2-22-65 8- 7-65 DEVELOP RENDEZVOUS SAME
BACK-UP CHARTS AND VERIFY
PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS.

I
3. INSERTION
VELO- a) EVALUATE IVAR CAPABILITY ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF).
CITY ADJUST AND FAMILIARIZE MATH FLOW 3 AND 6:
ROUTINE(IVAR) ASTRONAUTS. ASCENT AND CATCH-UP,
P A R T I A L ACME.

I b) 6-21-65
6-22-65 ASTRONAUT TRAINING SAME
4. ASCENT 12-30--64 2- 6-65 TO EVALUATE GEMINI ENVIRONMENT (6 D O F ) M A T H
ASCENT BACK-UP CAPABILITY FLOW 3r ASCENT, RADIO
GUIDANCE, PRIME A N D
SECONDARY AUTOPILOT,
BOOSTER ENGINES, AND
MALFUNCTION DETECTOR.

5. RE-ENTRY ASTRONAUT TRAINING AND SEE I b
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT.
6 . RENDEZVOUS 0 ) 7- 6-65 ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF), MATH
FLOW 6: CATCHUP AND
RENDEZVOUS, PARTIAL ACME.

(STATION-KEEPING) b ) 10-11-65 10-21-65 SAME

.) 12- 6-65 ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF a PLAT:
MATH FLOW 7: MOD 5: CATCH-
U P AND RENDEZVOUS, ACME.

(IVAR) d) SAME AND IVAR

(MODULE 3 ) e) 5- 9-66 ASTRONAUT TRAINING AND SAMEAS Sa EXCEPT MODULE
PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT. 3 AN0 SIMULATED SEXTANT.
(MODULE 3-2) 1) 7-15-66 9-17-66 SAME AS 5s WITH ATM AND
IVARPORTIONS OF MODULE 2.

7. MANEUVER WHILE ENVIRONMENT (6 D O F , P L A T )

I
DOCKED CATCHUP GUIDANCE. COM-
BINED GEMINI-AGENA
DYNAMICS, ACME. AGENA
PRIMARYPROPULSION,EN-
CODERCOMMANDSYSTEM.
AGENA ASC ADDED FOR
S P A C E C R A F T 11.
8. NAVIGATION 12-27-65 TOUCHDOWNPREDICT
(TOUCHDOWN 0 ) GUIDANCE.
' PREDICT)

(ORBIT
NAV.
AND b) 5-16-66 ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF, PLAT),
PREDICT. MATH FLOW 7 1 ORBIT PREDICT
AND NAVIGATION.

(MODULE 6 ) C ) 5-26-66 ENVIRONMENT (6 DOF, PLAT),
MATH FLOW 7: MODULE 6,
ACME:
(MODULE 6-3) d) 7-15-66 8-19-66 SAME AS 8c WITH ATM
L N D TOUCHDOWN PREDICT.

NOTES: ( I ) DATES DO NOT ALWAYS REPRESENT CONTINUOUS OPERATION; (2) EXPANDED FROM I6 TO 24 D/A CHANNELS
TABLE 32 GEMINI 'HYBRIDSIMULATIONS (Continued)

EPUIPMENT DISPLAY COMMENTS AND REFERENCE!

DIGITAL: UNIVAC 1218 CREW STATION II SEE GDN 249
CONVERT; ADAGE 770 HORIZON
ANALOG; EA1 231

SAME SAME SEE GDN 299
PROVIDED ASTRONAUT
FAMILIARIZATION.
ANALOG: EA1 231 CREW STATION I SEEGDN 264
MOVING TARGET
MODEL.

I
I
SAME
SAME AND STAR
DISPLAY.
PROVIDED ASTRONAUT
FAMILIARIZATION.

I DIGITAL: UNIVAC 1218
CONVERT:ADAGE 770
CREW STATION II SEE GDN 241
USED ASCENT SIMULATION

II ANALOG:
SAME
EA1
EA1 DOS
231
SAME
FOR INITIALIZATION.

FOR SPACECRAFT 6.
DIGITALI UNIVAC 1218 CREW STATION II SEE GDN 289
EA1DDS
CONVERT; ADAGE 770
ANALOG: EA1 231

SEE 1 SEE SECTION 4.6.1.1

DIGITAL! UNIVAC 1218 CREW STATION II SEE SECTION 4.6.1.2
CONVERT; ADAGE 770 MOVING AGENA USED FOR SPACECRAFT
EA1DDS MODEL, STAR S AND 6.
ANALOGtEA1 231 (2) DISPLAY.

SAME SAME E X C E P T SEE GDN 388 USEDFOR
BOOSTER MODEL. SPACECRAFT 7.

DIGITAL; CDC 3200 SAME E X C E P T USED FOR SPACECRAFT
CONVERT: ADAGE 770 (2) AGENA MODE 1. BAND 9 .
EA1 DDS
ANALOG; EA1 231
SAME SAME REQUIREMENT DELETED.
SAME AND EA1 131 SAME AND STAR USED FOR SPACECRAFT IO.
PLANETARIUM.
SAME A S Sa. SAME AS 5 0 E X C E P T USED FOR SPACECRAFT
STARPLANE- 1 1 AND 12.
TARIUM.

DIGITAL: CDC 3200 CREW STATION II SEE SECTION 4.6.1.3
EA1 DOS AGENA STATUS USED ON SPACECRAFT
CONVERT: ADAGE (2) PANEL. 9. IO AND 11.
ANALOG: EA1 231
EA1 131

DIGITAL: CDC 3200 CREW STATION II SEE SECTION 4.6.1.4
CONVERT: EA1 DOS USED FOR SPACECRAFT 8.

DIGITAL; CDC 3200 CREW STATION II USED FOR PRELIMINARY
CONVERT: ADAGE 770 (2) SPACECRAFT 10 WORK.
EA1 DDS
ANALOG: EA1 231
SAME A S 8b. CREW STATION II USED FOR SPACECRAFT IO.
STAR PLANETARIUM

SAME AS 8 c . SAME A S 8 c DEVELOPED FOR SPACE.
C R A F T II AND USED FOR
SPACECRAFT 12.
FIGURE 52 HYBRID SIMULATOR CREW STATION

272
field model. The new star display greatly increased the operating range
and accuracy of the star display.
Spacecraft 11, the IVAR portion of module
I1 and an auxiliary tape
memory (A") program were added to the simulated math flow. This, along with
a simulation beginning
applicable changes in the environment program, provided
at SECO and continuing through rendezvous in the first orbit.
-
Wneuver-While-Docked Simulation,This simulation evolved from portions
of the- rendezvous simulation and included extensive revisions to incorporat
desired Agena systems, such as primary propulsion and remote command logic
While minor changes were made a flight-to-flight
on basis to maintain the
desired configuration, only one major change was made. This was the extensio
of the Agena control system to include high order and nonlinear control
effects for Spacecraft11.
-
Navigation Simulation. The navigation simulation was composed of
several related onboard guidance modes. The first to be developed was
touchdown predict, which at that time a portion
was of Math Flow Seven. This
first simulation was developed to drive crew station displays only.
Other environment and navigation program sinulations, orbit navigation
and orbit predict, were developed concurrent with Math Flow Seven. When
module 6 of Math Flow Seven was defined, orbit determination and the necessa
realistic star display were added to a make
complete simulation. Finally,
4) was integrated with module
touchdown predict (module 6 to support the
onboard re-entry initialization procedures studies,

Rendezvous Procedures Development
The primary means to accomplish rendezvous with
a cooperative target was
closed-loop, i.e., utilizing a radar, computer, and platform.To increase the
probability of mission success, an alternate or back-up to the closed-loop
system which provided a monitoring capability and back-up guidance information
in caseof a closed-loop equipment failure. The back-up guidance commands
were based on visual observations of the target a retic.1e
with or sextant in
conjunction with flight charts. The flight charts, consisting of tables,
graphs, and nomograms, were derived from orbital mechanics relationships and
provide the velocity change maneuvers required to rendezvous in components
convenient to the crew. Flight charts of this form also were required to
accomplish rendezvous with an uncooperative or passive target such a as
"dead" Agena target which was used a previous
on mission.
Preparation of flight charts and the crew procedures that accompany thei
use was followed by engineering evaluationon the hybrid simulator. During
this evaluation, the flight charts were subjected a wide to
varietyof tra-
jectory dispersions and their performaace was compared of the that
with
closed-loop system. The procedural time line was refined to simplify the
chart usage as much as possible and thereby reduce the probability a of
procedural error. The charts and: hybrid simulator then were prepared for
crew training. The weeks of crew indoctrination provided both the prima
and back-up flight crews awith and
good working knowledge of the procedures
flight charts,and procedures were further tailored to suit crew preferen
I n addition, estimates of the orbit attitude and maneuver( O system
M ) pro-
pellant consumption for various rendezvous situations were obtained.
The following paragraphs describe briefly the rendezvous
missions,
outline the development
of the procedures and flight charts
for both primary
and rerendezvous and present significant results
of the engineering evaluation
and crew training. However, it should be noted that the procedures are
described as they were developed and that in some cases, these were
precisely followed in the actual flight.
Initial Rendezvous.
-
A. Midcourse Maneuvers The Gemini primary rendezvous missions include
a number of midcourse maneuvers which corrected insertion errors and orbi
perturbations prior to the terminal rendezvous phase. The maneuvers were
(PI) point at the correct
designed to position the terminal phase initiation
trailing displacement and differential altitude from the.target with pl
a discussion of the various maneuvers
lighting conditions. The following is
as applied to each primary rendezvous mission including the source o
midcourse velocity corrections.

Spacecraft 6 was launched into an orbit essentially coplanar with
target vehicle and performed ground-supplied midcourse maneuvers to rend
during the fourth spacecraft revolution. An apogee height adjustment was
performed at the first perigee following insertion at perigee to correc
in-plane insertion dispersions and orbit decay due to atmosphericdrag. A
phase adjustment was made at second apogee to raise perigee and reduc
catchup rate to provide the correct phase angle at thirdAnapogee. out-of-
plane correction occurred at the nodal crossing just following second
to place the spacecraft in the same orbital plane as theA vernier target.
height adjustment was performed at second perigee to compensate f o r small
errors in the initial height adjustment anda more permitnominal terminal
phase. At third spacecraft apogee a forward A V was applied to raise perigee
and producean orbit coelliptical with 15 andnautical miles below the target
orbit in preparation for the "PI maneuver.
Spacecraft 8 primary rendezvous midcourse maneuvers were identical
to 6 primary rendezvous.
those performed during the Spacecraft

Spacecraft 9 primary rendezvous included ground-supplied midcourse
maneuvers which resulted in rendezvous with the target during the thir
spacecraft revolution. These maneuvers included
a phase adjustment at first
apogee to provide the correct phase angle at second A apogee.
combination
phasing, height adjust, and out-of-plane correction was performed approx-
imately one quarter orbit prior to the coelliptical maneuver at second
The coelliptical maneuver aand vernier out-of-plane correction were perform
at second apogee.

274
Spacecraft 10 primary rendezvous includeda procedure for computer and
sextant usage to demonstrate an onboard navigation capability. The flight
crew was required to calculate the midcourse maneuvers necessary to prod
the desired orbit conditionsW Iatby using the orbit prediction and deter-
mination modesof module VIof the.Gemini onboard computer. These maneuvers
were the same as thoseon used the Spacecraft6 mission with the exception of
the apogee height adjust at first perigee which was replaced by an ins
velocity adjust routine (IVAR)correction at insertion.
The procedures began making
by the insertion velocity adjust routine
(IVAR) correction to downrange and vertical velocity after which VI wasmodule
loaded and the orbit detennination mode was selected and started with th
ascent navigated insertion state vector. In the first darkness period, the
altitude of the observed horizon was calibrated by taking sextant measur
to the selected star, and plotting the resulting computed measurement resi-
duals on a flight chart. After the calibration, the remaining darkness was
used to gather data for the computer by sextant sightings and by
two taking
inputting a dummy measurement. Following the first darkness period activity,
the orbit predict modeof module VI was started with the ascent vector and
used with flight charts to obtain solutions to the midcourse maneuvers. The
second darkness period was used to complete the data table of the orbit
determination mode. Two additional sextant measurements were made,a and
second duxny measurement was input, thus filling the data table with the
required six measurements. After processing the data contained in the six
measurements, the computer produced an updated vector which attempted to
eliminate any IGS errors contained in the ascent vector. Using the orbit
predict mode once again, this updated vector was used with the flight ch
to obtaina second set of onboard solutions to the midcourse maneuvers. With
the ground solutions to these maneuvers as the basis of cmparison, the
onboard maneuvers were evaluated to determine whether they were within pr
flight established bounds. The selected maneuvers then were performed in the
normal manner. An addition onboard capability similar to that planned for
Spacecraft 12 was provided for calculating the circularization maneuver in
which radar range data was used a flight
with chart to obtaina solution.
Spacecraft 11 rendezvous in the first orbit contained two maneuvers
prior to the tenninal phase, a radial insertion correction and an out-of-
plane maneuver. Both maneuvers were calculated on board. Because of the
interrelationship between these midcourse maneuvers and "PI maneuver
the a
discussion of the fomer will be reserved for a subsequent section on the
terminal phase.
Spacecraft 12 primary rendezvous was similar to that of Spacecraft9
except for the onboard computation of the coelliptic maneuver at second apogee
and out-of-plane corrections during the terminal phase. The coelliptic
maneuver was calculated from radar range measurements and onboard flight
charts. The charts converted the radar measurements ainto trajectory fix,
and supplied theA V to be applied at the ground determined oftime second
apogee to provide a coelliptic orbit witha nominal differential altitude
of ten nautical miles. Out-of-plane corrections were calculated from platform
yaw gimbal angles measured with the target in the center of the reticl

275
range measurements and onboard flight charts. The actual change in the
gimbal angle overa specified interval was compared with the required cha
for the appropriate angular travel to rendezvous. The results of this
A V to be applied.
parison were used in the charts to obtain the out-of-plane
-
B. Terminal Phase ManeuverThe terminal phase of Spacecraft 6 primary
rendezvous containeda 130 degree transfer maneuver occurring nominally one
-minute after entering darkness. The closed-loop guidance system was con-
sidered the primary method to accomplish rendezvous; however, back-up g
procedures and flight charts wemidevelopedin the event ofeq~pment guidance
failure. The terminal phase initiation (TPI)lpaneuver began with the initia-
tion cue which was chosen to be the elevation angle of the line-of-s
the target. This cue provides a convenient pointing reference during thrust
application and permits radar lock-on during the closed-loop maneuver. Th
closed-loop "PI solution was monitored with a back-up solution computed using
the line-of-sight elevation angle radar and range and the chart in 53. Fig.
This chart provided a line-of-sight maneuver based on the nominal forwardAV
plus a correction which was proportional to the deviation in the range
measurements from the nominal.A maneuver normal to the line-of-sight which
was directly proportional to both the angular variation fram the nominal and
the radar range was provided.
Following theTPI maneuver the command pilot remained boresighted o
the target while the computer collected radar data necessary for the
vernier closed-loop solution. After a period of optional platform alignment,
the pilotread radar range and elevation angle measurements f'rom the computer
and calculated the back-up solution for the closed-loop vernier correct
using a chart similar to T PI maneuver chart. This chart was similar to
the
the TPI maneuver chart and provided velocity corrections along n o m 1 and
to
the line-of-sight. The IVI's displayed the closed-loop vernier correction at
a point in the trajectory where 8i.8 degrees central angle travel of the
target remained until intercept. Upon completion of. the thrusting, the first
vernier was complete and an identical cycle was repeated for the secon
closed-loop vernier correction which occurred 33.6 at
degrees central angle
to go to rendezvous. Four back-up solutions were computed following TPI the
maneuver to detect a trajectory error as soon as possible. The second and
fourth back-up vernier corrections provided a check on the two closed-loop
vernier corrections. Following the last vernier correction the command pilo
observed any motion of the target with respect to the celestial backgr
and nulled the line-of-sight motion. The pilot monitored range and range
information from the computer to determine .trajectory characteristics
give position reports. Braking thrust was applied a as function of range with
initiation at15,000 ft, braking to four f p s at 3000 ft, andto one-half f p s
at 100 ft. Since a radar failure precluded the use of range information, a
braking schedule as a function of time was followed until visual growth of
the target was detected.

In the event ofa radar failure, range and range rate information
TPIThe
were not available for terminal phase back-up solutions. initiation
cue was elevation angle as in the closed-loop case. However, the spacecr
was controlled to
a specified attitude and when the target drifted through
GEMINI VI RENDEZVOUS FLIGHT CHARTS
INITIAL THRUST CALCULATION

ANGULAR RATE CORRECTION
I GET:
:
e,
+3:20=
GET:
:
e,
+,
TO
4:30 =
GET STOP-RESET-START

OMP FAILURE:-BALL 15.5 A V O R AT A P P L I E D
=CN aca Aac AOc

\TGTA7
-
5.1 - -=-x
.
2 =-
INITIATE BALL: 27.5
FWD:
AFT:

LAT FAILURE:
/ M
:E
T
I:
'sa
"
+

:-
1:40
RCO
..

x27 -
ARa
INITIATE RANGE: 32.96 NM
u P:
PWN:
LT:
RT:
P R = 41.00 t

+ 2.50

RANGE
RATE
CORRECTION

FIGURE 53 INITIAL THRUST CALCULATION SHEET
center of the reticle, thrust was initiated. The nominal maneuver along
line-of-sight was applied and the maneuver normal to the line-of-sigh
computed from the deviation of observed elevation angle from the nomin
Only vernier corrections normal to the line-of-sight were applied in t
absence of range data.
A computer failure precluded the use of accurate radar and ele
TPI initiation cue could have been obtained
angle information; however, the
from the attitude ball while holding boresight.TPIThe maneuver consisted
of the nominal velocity correction along the line-of-sight a calculated
and
correction normalto the line-of-sight based on the deviation of inertial
elevation angle from the nominal. The firsttwo vernier corrections consisted
of only the velocity correction
n o m 1 to the line-of-sight based on inertia
elevation angle variations. The second two vernier corrections also includ
the component along the line-of-sight which was computed using range ra
from the analog meter.
TPI initiation cue was radar
of a platform failure, the
In the event
range obtained from the computer. The TPI maneuver and the four vernier
corrections were computed from the variations in range, range rate, and
inertial elevation angle.

Although the procedures development and flight chart derivation
the terminal phase of most Gemini rendezvous missions were very simil
differences in format and data measurement techniques did occur through
flight experience. The evolution of the procedures and flight charts is
outlined inTable 33 for Spacecraft6, 8, 9, 10 and 12 primary rendezvous
missions. This tabulation includes a comparison by spacecraft of the TPI
initiation cues and data measurement techniques used to determine the
"PI maneuver and back-up vernier corrections for both closed-loop guidanc
and radar, computer, and platform failure cases. The major revision in form
was the change from tabular chart form for Spacecraft 6 rendezvous to the
graph and nomograph format for Spacecraft 8 and up missions as shown for the
TPI maneuver in Fig.54. This change allowed direct interpolation without
calculations and an expansion of the data toa wider range of vari-
include
ables. The engineering evaluation and crew training sessions for-the
Spacecraft 6, 8, 9 and 10 primary rendezvousare summarized inG eC C design
notes 317, 351, 352, 370, 389 and 409.
11
The developmentof procedures and flight charts for Spacecraft
direct rendezvous necessitateda reaction to requirements not imposed in
previous rendezvous missions. These requirements included:
1. Compression of the time allotted for procedures and back-up
guidance computations due to the limitedfrom insertion through inter-
time
cept.
2. The necessity for
a radial insertion correction to eliminate t