Metaphors: What is Said or What is Implicated?

ESTHER ROMERO AND BELN SORIA

Abstract: A variety of theorists have recently argued against the explanation of metaphor as particularized conversational implicature. Although we agree with them in defending that the result of metaphorical interpretation, the metaphorical meaning, is involved in what is said, we do not believe that the arguments they have given against the proposal of metaphor as an implicature were conclusive. Indeed, many theorists still defend a conception of metaphor as implicature. In this context, the main aim of this paper appears: to develop a theory on metaphor as implicature that solves the main criticisms to the identification and interpretation criteria in classical theory of metaphor as implicature in order to defend not only that this theory on metaphor is compatible with the proposal that metaphorical meanings form part of what is said but also that viewing metaphorical meaning as part of a propositional content leads to a view on which it possesses the properties that are usually attributed to what is said.

Financial support for this research, which has been carried out in the project Phrasal Pragmatics (HUM 200608418), has been provided by Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (DGICYT) and European Funds (FEDER). This paper has benefited from comments in the Lisbon ECAP-V Conference (2005), the 15th Annual Meeting of the ESSP (2007) in Geneva, and the Riga Conference on Metaphor (2007). Addresses for correspondence: Esther Romero, Departamento de Filosofa I, Facultad de Psicologa, Campus de Cartuja, Granada, 18071, Espaa. Beln Soria, Departamento de Filologas Inglesa y Alemana, Facultad de Filosofa y Letras, Campus de Cartuja, Granada, 18071, Espaa. Emails: eromero@ugr.es and bsoria@ugr.es 1

1. Introduction: Theories of Metaphorical Meaning We believe that a theory of metaphor must be able to account for its peculiarities. Specifically, what we think is distinctive about metaphor is that it involves a specific human ability: analogical reasoning. Regardless of whether metaphorical utterances are sentential or non-sentential, referential or non-referential, negative or affirmative, etc.: in all cases, metaphor involves a type of analogy. Analogical reasoning, in metaphor, involves using knowledge about something that is not connected to the subject under scrutiny to give us information about the matter we are really interested in. A theory of the interpretive process for metaphorical utterances must specify how this analogy, the very essence of metaphor, takes form. Furthermore, it must specify how, in the metaphorical interpretation, metaphorical meanings appear. Having said this, here we will not go into details of the process used to interpret metaphor, rather we will provide arguments to show that the result of metaphorical interpretation, the metaphorical meaning, is more naturally located in what is said than in what is implicated. Our interest in defending this proposal stems from the fact that, if we take into account the current theories of metaphorical meaning, we do not find agreement about what the status of metaphorical meaning is, even if an identical metaphorical process were defended. Generally, it has been held that metaphorical content depends on the emergence of metaphorical meanings, meanings that make this content itself special. Nevertheless, there are philosophers that, following Davidsons (1978) proposal, maintain that there are no metaphorical meanings, no matter what characteristics might be attributed to them. Proposals that argue for the existence of metaphorical meanings maintain that there is some process of metaphorical interpretation that changes the meaning of some part of the metaphorical bearer,1 resulting in a metaphorical meaning different from the literal meaning of that part. These proposals can be classified in terms of the role that is played by this meaning in the propositional content that is communicated; metaphorical meaning can be considered either as an ingredient of what is implicated or of what is said. According to the first position, the speaker makes as if to say one thing in order to mean another. According to the second, the speaker means what she metaphorically says. When metaphorical meaning is understood as part of the content that is implicated by the metaphor, the pragmatic process of interpretation is always considered to be an inferential one. In the metaphorical utterance, words do not change their meanings to take on different meanings that contribute to what is said. Words do not obtain a semantic value different from the one they usually have; rather, what is meant has a content distinct from the proposition literally expressed by the utterance, a content that results from pragmatic inferences which depend on a pragmatic principle. The principle is normally taken to be either some version of the Cooperative Principle or the Relevance Principle. When some version of the Cooperative Principle is involved, different authors resort to different mechanisms to explain how the inferential process reaches metaphorical implicature or how metaphorical implicature is calculated: resemblance for Grice (1975), some heuristic principle for Searle (1979), or a process of interaction for Kittay (1987). In general, we could say that the authors that have
A metaphorical bearer is understood as an utterance (or an expression in some theories) that is identified as metaphorical in natural language and that conveys a metaphorical content. Nowadays it is usual to distinguish between metaphorical bearer and metaphorical vehicle and the latter is reserved for the word or words used metaphorically in a metaphorical bearer. 2
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defended literalism in what is said have also argued for metaphor as implicature.2 The outstanding exception is Stern (2006) since he calls himself literalist but considers that metaphorical meanings belong to what is said. When Relevance Principle is involved, as illustrated by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) in Early Relevance Theory (ERT), the inferential process is guided by this principle and results in the loosening of a concept where one or more features of this concept are dropped in the process of arriving at the intended interpretation. Opposed to the view of metaphorical meaning as part of an implicated content, it has been maintained that metaphorical meaning is part of what is said. On this view, with a metaphor the speaker means what she metaphorically says. Thus what is said is not always what is literally said. Supposedly, to argue that what is said is not always what is literally said is automatically to become a contextualist, at least in the following sense: According to contextualism, the contrast between what the speaker means and what she literally says is illusory, and the notion of what a sentence says incoherent. What is said (the truth-conditional content of the utterance) is nothing but an aspect of speakers meaning. That is not to deny that there is a legitimate contrast to be drawn between what the speaker says and what he or she merely implies. (Recanati, 2004, p. 4). Admittedly, for the contextualist what is said by the speaker is not always literally said. The most obvious position in favour of what is non-literally said is the defence of the legitimacy of what is metaphorically said, but this is not sufficient to be a contextualist. Indeed, it does not seem plausible for contextualism to defend, as classical rhetoricians did, that some words have, in addition to their literal meaning, a metaphorical linguistic meaning which can coincide with the literal meaning of some other word, where this latter meaning is involved in what is metaphorically said; on this view, the interpretation of a metaphor merely requires a process of disambiguation between these two fixed meanings. Instead, the contextualist maintains that what is said is not always literally said because contextual information intrudes what is said. Because disambiguation is a process where the context only serves to choose among options that are already established, the proposal of classical rhetoric would not be acceptable to contextualists. In addition, the classical rhetoric proposal, which is a type of substitution view, was rejected long ago because, as Black (1954) showed, it reduces the metaphorical contribution to an ornamental value or a case of catachresis, thereby denying the cognitive value of metaphor. The rejection of this substitution view gives rise to proposals intended to account for the production of metaphorical meaning in a way that does justice to metaphors cognitive value. On such a view the content that the metaphorical vehicle contributes to the proposition metaphorically expressed differs from any of its linguistic meanings and from any of the literal contents that the expression might fix. The metaphorical meaning does not coincide with the conventional meaning of some other word either. Contextual factors will always be present in the elaboration of metaphorical meaning and the contextual intrusion is determined
In literalism the sentence linguistic meaning, understood as a compositional meaning that results from the combination of the conventional meaning of sentence terms, is closely related to what is said by an utterance of the sentence. Their differences depend on the contextual information that is involved in the latter, taking into account that, in general, pragmatic contributions demanded by the linguistic meaning itself are kept to a minimum. So, the pragmatic contribution needed to interpret metaphor intervenes in an implicature and not in what is said. Authors such as Stanley (2005) argue for this proposal. 3
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by the mechanism responsible for its production. However, within this approach we can distinguish, not only several different explanations of the mechanism responsible for the production of metaphorical meaning, but also several different views about how the interpretive process is triggered: either as something indispensable for the expression of propositional content or as something dispensable. This distinction is relevant because only when the metaphorical process is considered dispensable (optional) can the proposal be classified as contextualist. Contrary to what one might think, it is not easy to draw the distinction between mandatory and optional demands for contextual information. Indeed, there are at least two distinct senses of mandatory. On the one hand, from a linguistic point of view, a process or its result is mandatory (mandatoryL) when it is, as Recanati (2004, p. 98) says, required in virtue of a linguistic convention governing the use of a particular construction (or class of constructions). On the other hand, from a truth-conditional point of view, an interpretation process or its result is mandatory (mandatoryT) when it is necessary for a propositional content to be generated in the interpretation of an utterance (Recanati, 2004, p. 62). Sometimes, a process is mandatory in both senses, as when pronouns are involved. Sometimes, the interpretation process is mandatoryL but not mandatoryT, as in the process required for recovering the conventional implicature of but.3 In other occasions, the process is mandatoryT but not mandatoryL, as in the process required to interpret incomplete definite descriptions (Romero and Soria, forthcoming). To avoid the presupposition failure associated with the incomplete definite description and thus a failure to express a proposition (Glanzberg, 2005), a mandatoryT pragmatic process is triggered. Finally, there are processes that are not mandatory in any of these senses, as in the cases of free enrichment of the circumstances of evaluation (Recanati, 2004, pp. 115-30). The process of metaphorical interpretation cannot always be mandatoryL since there is no need to consider lexical items in a particular construction as requiring a metaphorical meaning, as it happens in a metaphorical utterance of My cat is on the mat to refer to an infant.4 But, if the process of metaphorical interpretation is required in order to obtain a propositional content, then the metaphorical process is mandatoryT. This position is compatible with a literalist account of what is said and could be attributed to Stern (2006). For him, the metaphorical interpretation depends on a mandatoryT process which recovers a deictic operator that triggers a mandatoryL interpretive process which is itself contextdependant. The operator semantically demands contextual information. Sterns literalist position posits a richer underlying linguistic representation whose meaning will determine the truth-conditions of each metaphorical utterance in context. In Romero and Soria (2007), we also argue for a mandatoryT process, although we claim that it results in a transfer which is achieved by a mapping and not by a deictic operator. Our differences with Stern lie in our views about the particular metaphorical mechanism rather than in the mandatoryT character of this mechanism.5 If Stern and we are right, then the minimal proposition expressed by a metaphorical utterance must be non-literal. This means abandoning the assumption that the input to what is implicated is always what is literally said. Nevertheless, it does not entail
The meaning of but sets up a slot to be contextually filled and when it is saturated (mandatoryL), it determines non-truth-conditional aspects of the utterance meaning (non-mandatoryT). 4 For a metaphorical utterance of this sentence, see example (3) below. The process of metaphorical interpretation would be mandatoryL for a metaphorical utterance of The sky is crying. 5 If, for us, what makes a process obligatory or optional depends on the way in which it is triggered, then the same process, against what Recanati (2004) maintains, can be obligatory or optional. The obligatory or optional character of a pragmatic process is extrinsic to the process itself. 4
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embracing contextualism. Contextualists about metaphor hold that neither the process nor its result are mandatory in any sense. The process either results in an optionalLT ad hoc concept, as Wilson and Carston (2006) in Current Relevance Theory (CRT) would argue, or it is itself an optionalLT process of modulation, in the case of Recanati. A summary of our classification can be seen in Figure 1. Figure 1.Theories of metaphorical meaning
No metaphorical meanings: Davidson What is implicated Metaphorical Meaning What is said Grice: resemblance Searle: heuristic principles Kittay: interaction Relevance Principle: Sperber and Wilson (in ERT) = a metaphorical linguistic meaning (Classical rhetoric) -an operator that triggers a mandatoryL any of the MandatoryT process (saturation): Stern linguistic -transfer: Romero and Soria meanings - an ad hoc concept: Wilson and Carston OptionalLT (in CRT) - modulation: Recanati Cooperative Principle

This brief presentation of the accounts on metaphor that represent the different proposals that may appear in a classification of theories of metaphorical meaning, one articulated on the basis of the central discussion of whether metaphorical meaning is involved in what is implicated or in what is said by an utterance, permits us to show that both positions are currently defended. Still, although the theory of metaphor as implicature has been attacked from its very beginning, the theorists of metaphor as implicature do not abandon their proposal because they understand that these attacks can be resisted.6 As we have seen, many reputed authors nowadays still consider metaphor as implicature while a growing group of equally reputed ones argue for metaphor as part of what is said. We argue for the latter position but we take the other proposal seriously and find that, for the sake of the argument, we need to explain what theory can best account for metaphor as implicature. To do this, we will see first, in the next section, the Gricean proposal of metaphor as implicature and will enumerate the problems that have been attributed to it. Then, we will see, in section 3, how the theorist of implicature might escape from these criticisms. This leads to a new explanation on metaphor within the theory of implicature. Nevertheless, this will not be the end of the story because the measures that implicature theorists have to adopt to solve the problems typically attributed to it lead to a proposal that is compatible also with the one in favour of what is metaphorically said. Thus we will move, in section 4, to the arguments which allow choosing
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Camp (2006) has claimed that the arguments that have been recently elaborated against the explanation of metaphor as particularized conversational implicature are also not conclusive. She considers four criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant that, according to contextualists, support classifying metaphor in what is said and argues that when rightly understood, these criteria do not support this claim. This has left a space, according to her, for defending the conception of metaphor as implicature. Nevertheless, we argue in this paper that this space is not justified. When we get an explanation on metaphor within the theory of implicature that solves the problems traditionally attributed to metaphor as implicature, we obtain a proposal that is also compatible with a theory of what is metaphorically said. As metaphorical contents described in this way have the characteristic features of what is said, they are more naturally located in what is metaphorically said. 5

one of these positions. We will raise the question of what features metaphorical propositional content has, no matter whether it is explained from one or the other standpoint. By comparing the characteristic features of implicated propositional content and the features of metaphorical propositional content, we will reach the conclusion that metaphorical propositional contents possess the properties that are usually attributed to what is nonconventionally said. So the result of metaphorical interpretation is more naturally located in what is said than in what is implicated. Metaphors should be conceived as cases in which what is said is metaphorically said. Finally, in section 5, we will highlight that the subpropositional process required to reach what is metaphorically said is truth-conditionally mandatory and so a contextualist approach on metaphor should not be defended. 2. Grices Theory of Metaphor as Particularized Conversational Implicature and its Problems If we go along with the Gricean approach (Grice, 1975, 1978), we should explain the behaviour of the metaphor (1), (1) [In wondering whether to take an umbrella or not, A asked B what the weather is like today and B utters:] The sky is crying. as a case of particularized conversational implicature. Resorting to the Gricean distinction between what the speaker literally says and what the speaker implicates, it could be said that with (1) the speaker literally says that the sky is crying, a proposition that involves a categorial falsity, something she believes to be false. Thus, the speaker is flouting the first maxim of quality of the Cooperative Principle, Do not say what you believe to be false. The speaker cannot plausibly mean that the sky is crying, a categorial falsity. So, with (1) the speaker has just made as if to say literally that the sky is crying.7 Consequently, what the speaker means is only what the speaker implicates, and what she implicates depends on the attribution to the sky of some features in respect of which the sky resembles more or less an object that can literally cry. Furthermore, what the speaker implicates metaphorically with (1) is that it is raining, thus the situation is re-established and the speakers behaviour becomes cooperative. In this way, the interpretation of metaphorical utterances always proceeds in two propositional stages: first, the speaker makes as if to say literally something that flouts the first conversational maxim of quality, which leads, second, to the search for an implicated content that will re-establish the cooperative situation. Grice said that conversational implicatures, whether particularized or generalized, have several characteristic features. If metaphorical propositions are implicatures, then these propositions should share them. In particular, they should be cancellable and nondetachable, and their truth conditions should be independent of the truth of the utterance.
According to Grice, what is said is part of speakers meaning and it is always intended by the speaker. Indeed, when a proposition is expressed by an utterance and is not intended by the speaker, it is a case of making as if to say. One may distinguish, within the total signification, between what is said (in a favored sense) and what is implicated; and second, one may distinguish between what is part of the conventional force (or meaning) of the utterance and what is not. This yields three possible elementswhat is said, what is conventionally implicated, and what nonconventionally implicatedthough in a given case one or more of these elements may be lacking. For example, nothing may be said, though there is something which a speaker makes as if to say. (Grice, 1978/1989, p. 41). Metaphor is one of those cases in which something is made as if to say and nothing is said and, thus, the total signification of a metaphorical utterance lacks one of its components: what is said. 6
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A conversational implicature is always cancellable either explicitly or contextually. It is explicitly cancellable if it is admissible to add but not p (or I do not mean to imply that p) to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that p (Grice, 1978, p. 44). It is contextually cancellable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature (Grice, 1978, p. 44).8 The metaphorical implicature of (1), that it is raining, is cancellable if (2) (2) [In wondering whether to take an umbrella or not, A asked B what the weather is like today and B utters:] The sky is crying but it is not raining. is inteligible. This property is a necessary condition for all conversational implicatures; but it is not sufficient. There is meaning that is cancellable and does not form a part of an implicature, as in the possibility of using a word or form of words in a loose or relaxed way.9 Strictly speaking, the cancelled linguistic meaning does not form a part of speakers meaning. Indeed, what is said is not cancellable. If we try to cancel explicitly what is said, then we make the utterance unintelligible.10 Another characteristic feature of conversational implicatures is nondetachability and it is conceived as an identity criterion for what is said. Two utterances in the same context do not coincide in what is said if they launch different implicatures. It is a necessary condition, except when the implicature depends on the exploitation of a maxim of manner or when there is no alternative way of saying what is said. Nondetachability does not apply to what is said. So, if the metaphorical content is an implicature that depends on the explotation of the first maxim of quality, it must be nondetachable, that is, there is no way to make as if to say, in the same context, that the sky is crying without suggesting that it is raining. The last feature of conversational implicature we want to highlight is the independence of the truth conditions of the implicature from the truth conditions of the utterance. An implicature (conventional or conversational) does not fix the truth conditions of the utterance of a sentence because implicatures, as Grice taught us, are not asserted but merely suggested. What makes an explicit proposition different from an implicature is that the former has been asserted and so our utterance cannot be true if the explicit proposition is not. The truth conditions of an utterance are fixed by what is said. A proposition fixes the
To understand these two ways of cancellation, consider the following examples. If in a normal context somebody utters Mary is in the kitchen or in the bathroom, the speaker implicates that he does not know where Mary exactly is. This content is explicitly cancellable because this speaker can add to his utterance but I do not mean to imply that I do not know where she is without rendering the utterance unintelligible. If the first sentence is uttered in a context in which the participants of the communicative act are playing hide and seek, the speaker contextually cancels the implicature that the speaker is ignorant because he is just giving a clue. 9 In the utterance of the sentence Macbeth saw Banquo when Macbeth hallucinated, the speaker cancels the requirement of the existence of Banquo that is required by part of the conventional meaning of saw and, nevertheless, this cancellation does not show that this content must be considered as an implicature (Grice, 1978, p. 44). 10 There are different reasons to think that Grice understood that cancellation must produce an intelligible utterance. One of them is provided in Grice (1975, p. 39) where he argued that cancellation depends on the possibility of opting out of the observation of the Cooperative Principle when it affects the production of the implicature, which is compatible with keeping cooperation in part by means of what is said. Another can be found in Grice (1978, p. 44) where he affirmed that an implicature is cancellable if it is admissible to add but not p to the utterance that implicates that p. Finally, it is even clearer when he explains why presuppositions are not cancellable. In Grice (1961, p. 128), he maintains that presuppositions are not cancellable because if we cancelled them we would run the risk of unintelligibility. The result of cancellation must be admissible and intelligible. 7
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truth conditions of an utterance of a sentence if it is absolutely impossible for the utterance to be true without the proposition being true. By contrast, the implicature may be false while the utterance may be true. The truth or falsity of the implicated proposition that it is raining does not affect the evaluation of (1). If metaphorical propositions are implicatures, then metaphorical utterances such as (1) do not express propositions on whose basis their truth is evaluated, since they are merely cases of making as if to say. This Gricean theory of metaphor has been attacked from its very beginning. Among the attacks, we will focus on problems concerning the specific Gricean proposals relating to the identification and the production of implicature, and on the incompatibility of certain empirical results with the explanation of metaphor as involving two propositional stages. Although, as we will see in the next section, the first two problems require some changes in the conception of metaphor as implicature, the other is merely apparent. With respect to metaphorical identification, the implicature theorists maintain that the triggering condition for metaphor is a categorial falsity, which is a special type of flouting of the first maxim of quality of the Cooperative Principle, Do not say what you believe to be false. From this position the identification of metaphorical utterances cannot be explained. As Recanati (1987) argued, this type of flouting a maxim entails that the speaker has just made as if to say the literal propositional content and thus the speaker has not said anything that really violates the Cooperative Principle. In addition, not all metaphors involve a categorial falsity as the metaphorical utterance (3) (3) [A is at home. Her only daughter, who is a two-year-old girl, is playing with a woollen ball on the mat. B, a good friend of A, enters the room, asks A where her daughter is, and, A answers:] My cat is on the mat. Besides, there are non-metaphorical utterances that involve a categorial falsity as the metonymic utterance (4) (4) [In a restaurant, looking at the customer of the ham sandwich, a waitress tells another:] The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. Furthermore, it is argued that not all metaphors can fix a literal propositional content. The speaker of (1) does not make as if to say any proposition literally because (1) cannot be interpreted literally as far as our linguistic competence is concerned. With respect to implicature production, the problem we are considering is posed by Recanati (1987, p. 228). He claims that it is not possible to determine what the speaker implicates from (1) as there is no proposition that can reconcile the utterance with the apparently flouted conversational maxim. In addition, the proposal that the interpretation of metaphorical utterances proceeds in two propositional stages has been criticized by cognitive metaphor theorists since the late seventies.11 According to cognitive metaphor theorists (Gibbs, 1983; Keysar and Glucksberg,
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Theorists of cognitive metaphor such as Ortony et al. (1978), Clark (1979), Gibbs (1984, 1986, 1992), Gildea and Glucksberg (1983), Inhoff et al. (1984), and Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) have performed some experiments in which the results, as they interpret them, are incompatible with the explanation of metaphor as implicature. The idea is that metaphorical utterances should be included in what is said because its comprehension is direct, in the sense of coming first in the order of interpretation. This proposal has also been defended by contextualists, such as Recanati (1995), Bezuidenhout (2001), etc. although they argue for it by invoking sub-personal processing. 8

1992), several psychological experiments have demonstrated that the interpretation of literal and metaphorical utterances exhibit equivalent processing times. On the assumption that processing effort is directly proportional to processing time, and that two processes should take more effort than one, they thus reject implicature theories of metaphor, which appeal to an additional process, as inconsistent with the empirical data. Nevertheless, as we have just said, this problem is merely apparent. The implicature theorists have three lines of defence for this criticism. They can, as suggested by Recanati (1995, p. 208), defend their position by saying that the results involving equivalent processing times depend, in most of the cases, on choosing examples of conventional metaphors where processing times might be expected to be equivalent, but that nothing is proved about novel metaphors, which would require processing the literal proposition first, as the Gricean account suggests. Second, in Romero and Soria (2003, pp. 176-82), we have argued that the assumption that the processing effort is always directly proportional to the processing times is erroneous. Third, implicature theorists no longer need this strategy because, according to some recent empirical evidence (Onishi and Murphy, 1993; Giora, 1999), the processing times for the interpretation of literal and metaphorical utterances of the same sentence are not equal. These strategies, however, do not provide defence for the implicature theory in particular but for the more general thesis that there is an asymmetric dependence of metaphorical meaning on literal meaning: the thesis that the meaning conveyed by an expression is metaphorical only if it is derived from some literal meaning which must be processed in order for the metaphorical meaning to be accessed. This thesis can be articulated in two distinct ways (Recanati, 1995, p. 230): one results in the conception of metaphor as implicature, while the other requires a conceptual mechanism whose results intervene in what is said. Thus, the problem posed by theorists of cognitive metaphor against the implicature theory of metaphor does not seem to touch this conception, although its defence is also compatible with a conception of metaphor as what is said. 3. Grices Proposal Revisited We now turn to consideration of the problems related to the identification criterion for metaphor and the production of metaphorical implicature. This set of problems requires some changes in the Gricean explanation of metaphor as implicature. In order to construct a defensible account of metaphor as implicature, it is necessary to determine the criteria for identifying metaphors; we argue that to identify metaphor we need to recognise (albeit generally not consciously) both a contextual abnormality, and a source domain and a target domain (Romero and Soria, 1997/98, pp. 377-80). We will also defend the thesis that the interpretation process is subpropositional. But these proposals, we will argue, not only permit us to have a theory of metaphor as implicature but a theory of metaphor in which metaphorical meaning forms a part of what is said. The reason why these two possibilities are open is that metaphorical identification and interpretation do not depend on processing the entire literal proposition, they depend on features of subpropositional components instead. When the conception of metaphor as implicature changes in order to avoid the problems related to metaphorical identification and interpretation, the notion becomes compatible with the type of explanation that includes metaphorical meaning in what is said.

3.1 Identification Criteria When metaphor is considered an implicature, the triggering condition for metaphor is a categorial falsity, a special type of flouting of the first maxim of quality of the Cooperative Principle, Do not say what you believe to be false. The first problem with this triggering condition is, as we have said before, shown by Recanati (1987, p. 230). If with (1) the speaker has just made as if to say that the sky is crying, the speaker has not said anything; thus the maxims are not really violated and it is not necessary to suppose that the speaker has implicated anything in order to maintain the Cooperative Principle. This criticism, however, is not conclusive. The implicature theorists might argue that when a categorial falsity is present, the speaker merely makes as if to say that p but does not actually say anything, and thus, although she does not flout the first maxim of quality, she does flout an alleged maxim of quantity related to the amount of information: Make your contribution informative.12 This maxim violation is then repaired by the generation of the implicature. This position would entail a complex identification criterion, as both a categorial falsity and a flouting of the alleged maxim of quantity are required. Nevertheless, metaphors cannot be identified with this complex identification criterion because it is not free of the other problems related to the simpler criterion, the criterion of the categorial falsity, which is included in the former. As we have said, not all metaphors involve a categorial falsity. In example (3), (3) [A is at home. Her only daughter, who is a two-year-old girl, is playing with a woollen ball on the mat. B, a good friend of A, enters the room, asks A where her daughter is, and, A answers:] My cat is on the mat. there is, at best, a simple false proposition, then there is no special type of flouting the first maxim of quality. If we widened the criterion to any type of falsity and not just of a categorial type in order to be able to identify (3) as a metaphor, then all implicatures that depend on flouting the first quality maxim would have to be classified in the same way, even non-metaphorical cases such as (5) (5) [Kent tells his son who is crying because of a minor cut:] You are not going to die. In addition, there are non-metaphorical utterances that present both a categorical falsity and a flouting of the alleged maxim of quantity. In example (4), (4) [In a restaurant, looking at the customer of the ham sandwich, a waitress tells another:] The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. the speaker says that the ham sandwich is waiting for his check, which is a categorial falsity; thus she merely makes as if to say this and flouts the alleged maxim of quantity. Nevertheless, (4) is considered a case of metonymy and not of metaphor.
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We say alleged because, strictly speaking, Grice does not defend this maxim. Grices maxims of quantity make reference to the conversational contribution being as informative as is required for the purposes of the exchange and not more informative than is required. Still, in these two maxims of quantity, it is always supposed that there is some informative contribution. This is just what does not happen when the proposition is false. As Grice (1987, p. 371) says: False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information. Thus the more general assumption that there is some informative contribution is violated. 10

More radically, not all metaphors can fix a literal content. When a categorial falsity is involved, the speaker cannot make as if to say something literally. The speaker of (1) does not make as if to say any literal proposition at all because (1) cannot be interpreted literally as far as our linguistic competence is concerned. To cry is the type of action that requires an animate subject with eyes, and the sky does not fulfil this requirement. (1) cannot fix a literal proposition or some truth conditions determined merely by the linguistic meaning of the sentence. Since (1) cannot fix a literal content because of the categorial falsity, it cannot be a literally false utterance. A categorial falsity stands opposed to well-formedness, not to true propositions. To overcome the last problem, the identification criterion should not depend on processing a literal proposition if (1) is to be counted as a metaphor. In addition, to avoid the problem that not all metaphors present a categorial falsity, we must admit that there are pragmatic categorial falsities, which are involved in (3) but not in (5). (3) does not express a simple false proposition rather it presents a categorial falsity as a result of using My cat in a context in which the speaker does not refer to a cat, this type of categorial falsity is not involved in (5). Kittays theory of metaphor as implicature with its Incongruity Principle (1987) satisfies these two demands, but her principle needs something else to exclude (4), a metonymy, as a case of metaphor. This is achieved by means of our conceptual contrast (Romero and Soria, 1997/98, 2006). For us, hearers are able to identify metaphors because they involve both a contextual abnormality (our technical notion for categorial falsity, pragmatic or not) and a conceptual contrast. The notion of contextual abnormality must be understood as the use of an expression in an unusual linguistic or extra-linguistic context; it differs from other notions of anomaly (Loewenberg, 1975; Kittay, 1987). There are two ways in which abnormality can be manifested: (a) An oddity in the relation between the terms uttered, and (b) An oddity in the relation between the occurrence of an expression in the actual unusual context and the implicit context associated with a normal use of this expression. Mode (a) can be illustrated by examples (1) and (4). In (1) the normal interpretation of is crying as the predicate of The sky is not allowed. In (4) the normal interpretation of the predicate, is waiting for his check, is incompatible with the normal interpretation of the noun phrase the ham sandwich. Mode (b) can be exemplified by (3) as infants are not the kind of thing that we call cats according to our conceptual system. The contextual abnormality is produced by the confrontation between the actual and unusual context and a possible normal context of the expression. It is not normal to use the expression my cat for the speaker to refer to an infant. This is an unusual use of the expression which entails a contextual abnormality, a pragmatic categorial falsity. Contextual abnormality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for metaphor. Some additional identification criterion is needed: a conceptual contrast. The conceptual contrast is the recognition that the speaker is talking about a topic (target domain) using terms which normally describe another (source domain). In (3), we identify that the speaker is talking about an infant (INFANT is the target domain) using a term that normally describes a feline (CAT is the source domain). Similarly, in (1) we detect a conceptual contrast, now between the target domain, WEATHER CONDITIONS, and the source domain, EMOTIONAL
11

Novel metonymies, such as (4), are very different: there is no source domain and no conceptual contrast. Both the customer and the ham sandwich belong to the target domain, we refer both to the customer and to the ham sandwich although the only explicit expression is the ham sandwich, which is used to trigger the recovery of the veiled restricted nominal element customer.13 So, the implicature theorist might solve the problems of the complex identification criterion not only by accepting the requirement of a conceptual contrast, in order to avoid non-metaphorical utterances such as metonymies, but also by replacing the requirement of categorial falsity with that of contextual abnormality that gives form to the requisite that there are also pragmatic categorial falsities. When there is a contextual abnormality and a conceptual contrast, the literal interpretation is blocked because either it is not possible14 or it would be of no use.15 In these cases, the implicature theorist might argue, the speaker flouts the alleged maxim of quantity because there is nothing less informative than having no literal proposition at all. The details of these proposals make it manifest that it is possible to have a theory of metaphor as implicature that includes accurate identification criteria. Nevertheless, they also make it manifest that once the criteria for metaphorical identification do not depend on processing the entire literal proposition and depend on features of subpropositional components instead, it is possible to argue that what is said may be metaphorically said. This is relevant in the main discussion of our paper because, given the accurate identification criteria, both the proposal that metaphorical meaning is involved in an implicature and the proposal that it forms a part of what is said are viable. 3.2 Implicature Production The proposals on metaphorical implicature production is also attacked. On the Gricean approach, metaphorical implicature must be calculated from what the speaker has just made as if to say. What the speaker implicates depends on resemblance between two topics. Thus, once (1) is identified as metaphor, its interpretation is made, according to this proposal, calculating the implicature, that it is raining, from what the speaker has made as if to say, that the sky is crying. The implicature depends on the attribution to the sky of some features in respect of which the sky resembles more or less the object that can literally cry. The first problem is, as we mentioned before, that it is not possible to determine what the speaker implicates from (1) as there is no proposition that can reconcile the utterance with the apparently flouted first conversational maxim of quality (Recanati, 1987, p. 228). There is no proposition that added to the false proposition makes the joint contribution true. This criticism, however, is not conclusive. As we have seen, what forces the speaker, in cases of metaphor, to make as if to say that p is that this proposition is false. Thus, the implicature cannot be calculated as something which together with what is said re-establishes cooperation because, in metaphor, the speaker merely makes as if to say and does not say anything; she only conveys an implicature. The implicature theorist can say that the implicature must not be calculated from p, the literal false proposition, because this could not be the proposition intended by the speaker, as she believes it to be false. The solution would
13

STATES.

Novel metonymy is identified when the hearer appreciates a non-generic use of a NP, a contextual abnormally and a veiled restricted nominal element (Romero and Soria, 2006, forthcoming). 14 This is always the case for metaphors in which the abnormality appears among the terms uttered, mode (a). As far as our linguistic competence is concerned, this type of metaphor cannot fix a literal propositional content. 15 Only in cases of mode (b) can the hearer get a possible literal interpretation, but if he did, the implicature would not be worked out from, among other things, that proposition. 12

be to calculate the implicature by resorting to, among other things, the conventional meaning of the words used, without viewing them as expressing a full proposition. Its production, Grice would say (1975, p. 34), depends on the resemblance between what we are actually speaking about and what we are attributing to it. But, according to Recanati (1995), this understanding of non-literal meaning as being asymmetrically dependent on the literal meanings of subpropositional components of an expression strongly suggests that metaphorical meaning is part of what is said rather than of what is implicated. This proposal, according to Recanati (1995, p. 228), is backed by examples in which we must compute the non-literal interpretation in order to compute what is said. In (3), part of My cat is used non-literally. In order to know what object the speaker is talking about, we must saturate a variable corresponding to the relation between the speaker and a cat. Only if we recognize that cat in this noun phrase is being used metaphorically will we be able to saturate the variable in this context. In order to know what my cat refers to, we have to construct the metaphorical meaning of cat, which then makes it possible to saturate the relation between a metaphorical cat and the speaker. The metaphorical process is previous to the one of saturation, and the latter is a process that is necessary to obtain what is said. This argument, again, would not be conclusive for the implicature theorist. The implicature theorist could explain example (3) by arguing that what the speaker makes as if to say is that the only cat of the speaker (whatever the relation between them) is on the only mat of her house. What causes the requirement of the non-literal interpretation to be prior to saturation on Recanatis view is his explanation of the referential use of the definite description included in (3); but this referential use must itself be understood as a case of implicature. Recanatis argument depends on a defence of the referential use of the definite description in what is said, an argument which theorists of metaphor as implicature do not have to commit themselves to. Crucially, the fact that there are subpropositional processes of interpretation that generate non-conventional meanings is also compatible with their result being a part of an implicature. The implicature may be calculated from the conventional meaning of the sentences constituents together with contextual information as Grice (1975), Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) and Kittay (1987) say. The inferential process required for calculating the implicature is, depending on the particular proposal chosen, characterized differently. In our opinion, the process required for interpreting metaphor should explain how the analogical reasoning necessary to determine what is metaphorically communicated occurs. Kittay uses Blacks (1954) interaction view to improve the resource to resemblance made by Grice. Sperber and Wilson think that the Relevance Principle leads to an interpretation where the denotation of the term used metaphorically is loosened or widened radically since what is talked about falls very far outside the normal denotation. Still, the encoded concept and the communicated one share some properties. But loosening or Kittays second order meanings are not sufficient to explain the analogical reasoning required in metaphorical comprehension and, so, they cannot explain the new properties that characterize metaphors (Romero and Soria, 2007). Conceptual mappings for metaphors (Indurkhya, 2002) are, in our opinion, the mechanisms by means of which we get the best explanation of how the analogy takes form in the interaction view (Black, 1954). In our view, the mechanism of metaphorical interpretation, which is triggered by recognition that a metaphor has been identified, is a coherent mapping of a set of features from a source domain to a target domain in order to obtain a metaphorically restructured target domain; this is a technical way of spelling out
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analogical reasoning.16 With these mappings, some properties of the source domain (specifically, only those which are relevant for obtaining information about the characterization of the subject matter) are employed as a source of information to describe the target, so that new properties in the target domain may be generated. These new properties are not new properties of the source concept or even new properties of the object under description; they are new just with respect to our conceptualization of the target object. This process permits us to explain how metaphors communicate new properties that were not linguistically encodable in the current public language (for the details of the application of this mechanism in particular examples, see Romero and Soria, 2005). Although no implicature theorist has, as far as we know, used this approach, it is possible to appeal to these conceptual mappings in order to elaborate the metaphorical meanings that would form a part of the implicature. In order to maintain the position that metaphor is a form of implicature, then, we should be ready to accept (i) a new way of violating a maxim of the Cooperative principle, characterized by not requiring the processing of the literal proposition, and (ii) a new way of working out the implicature that includes the process that explains the analogical reasoning and that takes the conventional meanings of the words uttered as its starting point, changing them. As we have just shown, the notion of implicature can be modified until we get an explanation of the identification and interpretation of metaphors. Even so, an important question remains: do metaphorical implicatures have the features characteristically considered essential to the original notion of implicature? 4. Features of Metaphorical Contents If metaphorical propositions are indeed implicatures, then these propositions should share the features of implicated propositions. In particular, they should be cancellable and nondetachable, and their truth conditions should be independent of the truth of the utterance. However, metaphorical content is, like what is said, not cancellable. The metaphorical content of (1) is not cancellable because (2) (2) [In wondering whether to take an umbrella or not, A asked B what the weather is like today and B utters:] The sky is crying but it is not raining. is not an admissible and intelligible utterance. Cancellation depends on the possibility of not having to follow the Cooperative Principle on the level of what is implicated, which is compatible with going on cooperating by means of what is said. The problem of cancelling the metaphorical content of (1) is that we cannot cooperate by means of what is said by (1) because the metaphorical utterance is a case of merely making as if to say. Metaphorical contents are not cancellable because to deny what is suggested makes the speaker noncooperative at all levels.17 (2) is unintelligible as a whole because nothing is asserted nor suggested with the first part of the utterance if the second part is really a cancellation of the
16

In the literature, there are other processes or results of processes conceived to explain metaphor such as saturation to a deictic operator (Stern, 2006) or a semantic descent (Guttenplan, 2006), but as loosening they are not sufficient to explain the analogical reasoning required in metaphorical comprehension. 17 The same would happen with the explanation of the utterance (5) from the implicature view. The utterance of You are not going to die but you are going to die from that cut is unintelligible and with its first part we cannot signify anything. 14

implicature of the first part. There is no situation in which the right interpretation of the normal utterance (1) can do without its metaphorical content, but then (2) is inadmissible. The nondetachability feature of implicatures, as we have said, consists in the following identity criterion for what is said: two utterances in the same context do not coincide in what is said if they launch different implicatures. If the Gricean approach in its new light is right, metaphorical contents are identified and elaborated from subpropositional contents and not from a literal proposition. Thus, they do not depend on what is literally said. In this sense, nondetachablility, a necessary condition for an implicature that depends on the exploitation of a maxim of quantity, cannot apply directly to metaphorical propositional contents. Nevertheless, this criterion can be understood also as an identity criterion for the subpropositional contents that may be involved in what is conventionally said18 and not merely as an identity criterion for what is said. The extended criterion would be: two utterances in the same context do not coincide in subproposional contents that may be involved in what is conventionally said if they result in different propositional contents. This new sense for nondetachability may apply to both what is implicated and what is said if what is said is non-conventionally said. What is non-conventionally said will be also nondetachable from the subpropositional contents that may be involved in what is conventionally said. For example, in the explanation of the utterances involving some referential indeterminacy, in which what is said depends on some contextual information, the content non-conventionally said is nondetachable from the content that may be part of what is conventionally said. From this explanation, there is no way, in the same context, to utter both The client is waiting for his check and The customer is waiting for his check without referring to the same person, an ingredient of what is non-conventionally said. This subpropositional content is nondetachable from the conventional contribution that the client or the customer may make to the proposition expressed by the speaker.19 Since metaphor detection does not require elaborating a literal content from which metaphorical content is nondetachable, this nondetachability can be understood as a nondetachability from the conventional part of the utterance that represents the contextual abnormality and conceptual contrast, the type of nondetachability that not only conversational implicatures but also the cases of what is non-conventionally said have. If the metaphorical content is nondetachable there is no way, in the same context, to make the same contextual abnormality and the same conceptual contrast without communicating the metaphorical content. Metaphorical contents are nondetachable of the subpropositional contents that may be involved in what is conventionally said. The nondetachability of metaphorical propositional content is compatible both with the proposal that this content is an implicature and with the proposal that it is a case of what is non-conventionally said. Finally, there is independence from the truth conditions of the utterance. If the truth or falsity of that it is raining does not affect the evaluation of (1), the utterance has no truth conditions by means of which it is evaluated. Thus, the truth value of (1) does not seem to be
18

The requirement that subpropositional contents may be involved in what is conventionally said avoids the contribution of subpropositional contents that take part in conventional implicatures, contents that are detachable from what is said. Thus, but and and contribute the same content to what is said even if they have a different linguistic meaning. 19 The implicature theorist on referential uses of definite descriptions may well consider that the same subpropositional content, the same person, is involved in what is implicated and is nondetachable from the conventional contribution that may be made by the client and the customer to the proposition expressed by the speaker. 15

independent of the truth value of the proposition that the implicature theorist would say it merely suggests. If it is not raining the utterance (1) is false. With metaphor, these propositions are asserted and not merely suggested. Figure 2. Features of propositional content
Conversational Implicature Cancellability Nondeta What is said chability Subpropositional of contents Utterance truth-conditions independence + + + + Metaphorical What is said content non-conventionally conventionally not applicable + not applicable + not applicable not applicable

As can be seen in Figure 2, squeezing metaphorical content into the category of implicature would entail abandoning features that are considered essential to the original notion of implicature. If the metaphorical content is not cancellable and its truth-value is essential to evaluating the truth of the utterance, then these two features of the metaphorical propositional content are identical to these features of what is said and different of those of what is implicated. In addition, the nondetachability of metaphorical content can only be understood as nondetachability from the subpropositional contents, given that nondetachability of metaphorical content from what the speaker makes as if to say is not applicable. In this second sense of nondetachability, the implicated contents have this feature, but it is applicable neither to metaphorical contents nor to what is non-conventionally or conventionally said. In the former, nondetachability is applied to all kinds of propositional contents included in Figure 2 with the only exception of what is conventionally said. It would be a feature that would not allow discrimination between implicated propositional content and what is non-conventionally said. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that metaphorical content coincides with what is non-conventionally said not only in the two senses of nondetachability but also with regard to the other two features, it seems best to consider metaphorical content as cases of what is said, if we want to classify metaphorical contents with regard to either of the two notions involved in this debate. Given this explanation on metaphorical content, the result of metaphorical interpretation is more naturally located in what is said, as it does not meet the defining features of implicatures. As metaphorical contents are elaborated with a process that acts upon the meaning of constituents, we argue that a process of interpretation, when operating on the linguistic meanings of the sentence constituents, characteristically produces contents included in the speakers intended proposition expressed or in what is said. The input of particularized implicatures is content (either propositional or subpropositional), and not linguistic meaning. Particularized implicatures are propositions that are not recovered from linguistic meaning but from content and context. By contrast, the input of what is (conventionally or non-conventionally) said is, as it happens with metaphor, linguistic meaning. In metaphorical interpretation we get an intended proposition which includes subpropositional metaphorical provisional contents, a proposition that fixes the truth conditions of the metaphorical utterance under the mode of presentation imposed by the metaphorical provisional meaning of the sentence constituents. In this sense, when we argue for the notion of what is metaphorically said, we challenge the proposal that what is said is
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always literally said. But this was already suspected by Grice himself when he (1987, p. 361) claimed that there are cases of dictiveness without formality. What is non-conventionally signified can also be said.20 5. Concluding Remarks on Literalism vs. Contextualism Once we accept that what is said can be metaphorically said, the question is whether the best explanation leads to a literalist or a contextualist position on what is metaphorically said. As we said in the introduction, a contextualist argues that what is said by the speaker is not always literally said, that what is said (the truth-conditional content of the utterance) is an aspect of speakers meaning, and that what is said by an utterance should be explained considering optional pragmatic processes, processes that are triggered independently of the syntactic and semantic features of the uttered sentence. A contextualist on metaphor, thus, argues that metaphors are interpreted by an optional pragmatic process. A literalist, against what might seem, may accept the two first claims, what she would never defend is that what is said should be explained considering optional pragmatic processes. Then, our question now is whether what is metaphorically said is better explained by means of a mandatory or an optional pragmatic interpretive process. In our opinion, what is metaphorically said is achieved by a subpropositional pragmatic process which, in spite of not being always linguistically mandated, is never optional from the truth conditional point of view (optionalT). Its mandatory character is due to the fact that most metaphorical bearers cannot fix a literal proposition. The identification of metaphor achieved by the two criteria discussed in 3.1 blocks literal interpretation in order to avoid a route that leads to no propositional content (or at best to an irrelevant propositional content) and triggers the mechanism of metaphorical interpretation. Then approaches that argue for the mandatoryT character, such as Sterns and ours, must be right in this respect. No proposition expressed by a metaphorical utterance can ever be literal. With all due respect to Davidson, our position is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most metaphorical interpretation, mean.21 Esther Romero Department of Philosophy I University of Granada Beln Soria Department of English and German Philologies University of Granada Number of words: 9064

20

The cases of dictiveness without formality are cases such as the sentence He is an evangelist uttered in a context in which he is not an evangelist. The speaker meant what in fact his words said; but some of his words would be dictive and their content would be nonformal (nonconventional) since no part of their conventional meaning is involved in dictiveness. With this utterance, the speaker says that he is a sanctimonious, hypocritical, racist, reactionary, money-grubber and the conventional meaning of evangelist is not involved in what is said. 21 The part of the famous passage from Davidson alluded to here is: metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean . (1978, p. 31). 17

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