You are on page 1of 261
DIW 04 A. Garen/MelIntosh NATO NATO GENERIC Part I Consult NATO Inc Shell p. 1-4 Uniqueness, Relations Low P. Relations Low — Iraq P. NATO Dying — Iraq P. P. P. AT Economie Ties Solve 4 Relations Dying 15-18 NATO Good Laundry Lists p. 19-21 German Rearmament p. 22-23, Solves Stability p. 24.27 Solves Spillover War p.28 Solves Euro Conflict p.29 Solves Conflict p. 30-32 Solves Prolif/Conffict p.33 Solves Disease/Prolif p.34 NATO Diplomacy Good _p. 35 Solves Prolif p.36 Solves Russia p. 37-38 Solves E. European Conflict p. 39-41 Solves Afghanistan p. 42-43 Stronger NATO Good p. 44-45 Solves Terrorism p. 46-47 Eastward Expansion Good _p. 48 Trans: Laundry List p. 49-57 Key to Leadership p58 Solve Terrorism p.59 Solve Disease p.60 Solve Balance of Power War p. 61 Solve European Stability _p. 62-63 Solves Russian Integration p. 65-66 Solves Peace Process p.67 Solves Iraq p.68 Solves Middle East p.69-71 Solves Balkan Peace p. 72-73 Solves Trade/Growth p. 74-78 Solves Iran Prolif p. 79 ‘Transatlantic Relations Good Cont Solve Indo Pak and Korea p. 80-81 Solve Demo Promo p.82 Interoperable Forces p.83 Global Stability p. 84-85 Cultural Stability p.86 US-EU Relations Good wundry List p.87 Trade/Growth p. 88-89 Proliferation p.90 US-EU Trade Deal Good. 91-92 Consultation Solves Relations Consult Key to Alliance —_p. 93-106 Consult Key to Plan Solvency p. 107 Consult Key to Leadership —p. 108 inks Out of Europe Operations p. 109-111 Peacekeeping (Generic). 112 Military Policy p.113 Middle East p.1l4 Iraq p. 115-116 Caucasus and Central Asia p. 117 p- 118-119 UN Policy (Generic) p. 120-122 Peacekeeping (Generic) _p. 123-124 Says Yes—Laundry List. 125 Multilateral Policies p. 126 Training/Reform p.127 Landmines p. 128 Iraq p. 129-131 Sudan p. 132 Congo p.133 Afghanistan p. 134 Balkans p. 135 Kosovo. p. 136 DJW 04 NATO. A. Garen/MeIntosh NATO GENERIC Part I Consult NATO Cont. Solveney Cont Kosovo p. 136 Terrorism p. 137-138 Human Trafficking p. 139 Peace Process p. 140 ‘The Permutation Debate Genuine Consultation Key p. 141-149 Leaks Happen p. 150-152 Rumsfeld Not Smooth p. 153 Answers to Affirmative Arguments ‘AT: Delay p. 154-155 AT: Normal Means p. 156 AT: Diplomatic Capital —_p. 157 AT: Russian Backlash p. 158 AT: NATO Expansion Bad p. 159 AT: Cherry Picking Solves _p. 160 AT: Causes Preemptive War p. 161 AT: NATO Expansion Bad p. 162-163 DJW 04 A. Garen/MeIntosh NATO NATO GENERIC Part Il NATO DOES THE PLAN CP Ane Shell p. 164-166 Solvency NATO Solves Peacekeeping p. 167-174 Out of Areas PKOs p. 175-178 NATO Solves Terrorism —_p, 179-181 Solves Iraq p. 182-184 Solves Iraqi Elections p. 185 Solves Israel-Palestine _p, 186 Solves Middle East p. 187 Solves North Africa p. 188 Solves Genocide p. 189 NATO Military Strong _p, 190-194 NATO Allows Cooperation The Net Ben NATO key to Economy —_p. 200 NATO Autonomy Key —_p. 201 NATO Credibility Key p. 202-203 NATO RRF p. 204-208 Russia NATO Membership p. 209-214 Funny Card p.215 Affirmative Answers(Both CPs) Relations Stable/Resilient —p. 216-218 Say No Turn p.219 Can’t Solve Relations p.220 Consultation Doesn’t Solve _p, 221-223 Collapse InevNATO Bad p. 224-295 AT: Relations Solve Terror p. 226 Preemptive War Turn p.227 SOP Turn p.228 NATO Secretary General DA p. 229-230 Diplomatic Capital Link p. 231-232 Afghan Tradeoff Link p.233 Perm Solves p.234 AT: NATO Solves p.235 Security Council Turn p. 236 NATO Bad/Doesn’t Solve p. 237-242 AT Alliance Good p. 243-244 NATO Won't Cooperate _p. 245 Enlargement Bad p.246 Decision-making Sucks _p. 247 AT: Balancing Impacts _p. 248-251 Russia in NATO p. 252-254 Perm Solvency p. 255-256 PLEASE NOTE THAT IF NATO DID NOT EXIST YOU WOULD PROBABLY BE DEAD BY NOW DIW 04 NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Consult NATO INC THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO BINDING CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION OVER, WHETHER THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD bw ICOWEVLT WATO 1 Nato A. Garen/McIntosh OBSERVATIOW IC XS SoLvEcy, Binding consultation with our allies facilitates acceptance and absent consultation the plan will be spun as Bush unilateralism causing allied backlash and counterbalancing Kurt M, Campbell, Senior VP of the CSIS, and Celeste Johnson Ward, Fellow of the CSIS, 2003, Foreign Affairs, New Battle Stations, September-October, P. lexis Given the sensitivity of the issues involved, several steps should be taken before and during the rollout of@nyfew military posture) The first is ensuring that everything about the move is vetted carefully by all major relevant actors. Attention to process will not solve every problem, but it will certainly affect the receptivity of other countries to any changes. How allies such as South Korea and Japan respond, for example, will depend not just on the substance of the modifications themselves, but also on how well the United States consults with their governments, takes their reservations into account, and allays their various anxieties. In fact, rather than being seen as a routine obligation or a nuisance, consultations over the posture changes should be seen as an important opportunity to solidify, strengthen, and redefine those alliances for the future. In Europe, similarly, countries are likely to be more receptive to changes if they take place in the context of a revitalized NATO and a reinvestment in the Atlantic alliance by the United States, rather than being seen as an expression of impatience or unconcern with old Europe." During the consultations, the United States should explain the purpose and rationale behind its actions, making it clear that the changes are global and not driven by any particular regional dynamic. Because of the timing, international observers will be prone to view the changes in the context of recent events, particularly the lead-up to and conduct of the war in Iraq. Without guidance from the United States, they will put their own spin on what is happening, which will not necessarily be accurate and could adversely affect other U.S. interests. 1 Z BM ncnins LCOVEVLT WAT WELT“ OCBSSERM Tov TS THE VETRE GENUINE CONSULTATION REVITALIZES NATO AVOIDING POWER POLITICS AND SOLVING FOR PROLIF, INSTABILITY, AND RECONSTRUCTION Henry Kissenger, former secretary of state, April 25, 2003, San Diego Union-Tribune, p.lexis A revitalization of the Atlantic relationship is imperative if global institutions are to function effectively and if the world is to avoid sliding into a return tO 9th-centuryypowerypolitied And that revitalization must be based on a sense of common destiny rather than seeking to turn the alliance into an ala carte safety net. If common ground cannot be found - if pre-Iraq war diplomacy becomes the pattern -- the United States will be driven to 08) construct ad hoc coalitions together with the core of NATO that remains committed to a transatlantic relationship. That would be a sad end to a half-century of partnership. ‘The time has come to put an end to the debate on unilateralism versus multilateralism and to concentrate on substance. Our European adversaries in the recent controversies should stop encouraging their media's tendency to describe the American adminis Rambo-like figures thirsting for war and the United States as if it were institutionally an obstacle to the fulfillment of Europe's purposes rather than a partner in achieving common aims, ® For its part, America needs more intenseGonsultationto make the partners more predictable to each other. And a vast agenda awaits: curbing theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction addressing the political implications of globalization, speeding reconstruction of the Middle East. DIW 04 NATO 4 ®> NATO SOLVES FOR © VrorEeAy STABILITY ANO NUCLEAR WAk a a Ua. of Damn S, Pukbeld , ass, ro olgov’t andl or aPtaas @ Veegiata Chodeteslle. » IVA , Polihcal Suwice Quarlety ‘ Wrettr, “Nato% Funchan Alen he Cold Wan, “ Initial analyses of NATO's future Prospects overlooked at least three important actors that have helped to ensure the alliance’ enduring relevance First they underestimated the extent to which extemal teats sufficient to help justi the preservation ofthe allian fue fo exist. In fac, NATO stil serves to Seer 1 ae ye eee oe potential dangers emanating om _ ubide their tron. Th nly the residual teat posed By Russ inilitary power, but also the relati ems raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun to develop two ‘important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Easteri— ata dee lve i works prevent a pone wal ‘By actively promoting stability witt loc. [Fabove a, NATO pessimists ovrooked inline funions at ‘the allis erformed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most. importantly, NATO has helped stabilize Western Europe, whose states had o! ‘been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an nto ies, NATO institutional mechanism for the develoy it of cor has contributed to making the use of force-in-elations among the countries ofthe. region virally inconeivable daily Inall these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests ofits European members, But CO ‘even the United States has a signific i ing a peaceful and ‘prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe-as a leadin, Tor US products, as a aiid as the host for considerable direct forel investment by American companies remain substantial. history is any guide, ‘moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into futuré major war in Europe, the consequences of whi Se astafing than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.{11] a Ae past, given the existence of nuclear weapons [ 7 DIw TRRAWSATLAVYTER RELATE eg , NATO Ye 3 A. Garen/MeIntos oe CURRENT TRENDS RISK THE COLLAPSE OF NATO ANDWUS- EUROPEAN RIVALRY Philip H Gordon is senior fellow in foreign policy studies and director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, July 2004, ‘The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” Tam not saying that Europe and America will end up in a military stand-off like that between east and west during the cold war. But if current trends are not reversed, you can be sure we will see growing domestic pressure on both sides for confrontation rather than co-operation. This will lead to the effective end of Nato, and political rivalry ii i st, Africa and Europeans would face an America that no longer felt an interest in—and might actively seek to undermine—the united, prosperous Europe that ‘Washington has supported for 60 years. And Americans would find themselves dealing with monumental global challenges not only without the support of their most capable potential partners, but perhaps in the face of their opposition. Britain would finally be forced to choose between two antagonistic camps. Some argue that such an outcome is inevitable, But I have always thought my friend Robert Kagan’s claim that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” was exaggerated. Obviously there are real and even growing differences between ‘Americans and Europeans on a range of issues. The end of the cold war, the rise of US military, political and economic power during the 1990s, and Europe’s preoccupation with the challenges of integration and enlargement, have combined to accentuate these differences. But we have had different strategic perspectives—and fights about strategy—for years, and that never prevented us from working together towards common goals, And despite the provocations from ideologues on both sides, this surely remains possible today. Leaders still have options, and decisions to make. They shape their environment as much as they are shaped by it. The right choices could help put the world’s main liberal democracies back in the same camp, just as the wrong choices could DIW Ty RA ATO RE 7 NATO On Mcino SACEATLAVTC REVATIOWE Loa CURRENT TRENDS MAKE A COLLAPSE IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS INEVITABLE Henry Kissenger, former secretary of state, April 25, 2003, San Diego Union-Tribune, p. lexis If the existing trend in transatlantic relations continues, the international system will be fundamentally altered. Europe will split into two groups defined by their attitude toward cooperation with America, NATO will change its character and become a vehicle for those continuing to affirm the transatlantic relationship. The United Nations, traditionally a mechanism by which the democracies vindicated their convictions against the danger of aggression, will instead turn into a forum in which allies implement theories of how to bring about a counterweight to the hyperpower United States. Diw TRAWSATLAW TIL RELATIO#S, gnato % A. Garen/Mclntosh TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE ERODING Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, 2003, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis The "Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus" thesis accurately identifies some real differences and problems in transatlantic relations. Structural and cultural ‘gaps that have existed for a long time have been widened by the terrorist attacks on the United States and the crisis in the Middle East; if these differences are mishandled the result could be a transatlantic divide deeper than any seen in more than 50 years. Yet structure is not destiny, and it would be as wrong to exaggerate the gaps between Americans and Europeans as it would be to ignore them. For all the differences over policy in the "war on terr " American and European values and interests in the world remain highly similar. The allies’ differing attitudes toward power have not prevented them from using force together in the past, most recently in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and need not do so in the future, possibly soon in Iraq. Nor should we conclude that the advent of the most socially conservative and internationally unilateralist administration in Washington in more than 20 years — after the most closely contested election in history -- represents some fundamental shift in "American" culture or values, Most important, it would be a mistake to base U.S. foreign policy on the assumption that European support for American policy is neither possible nor necessary. Acting on the false premise that Washington does not need allies - or that it will find more reliable or more important ones elsewhere -- could ultimately cost the United States the support and cooperation of those most likely to be usefial to it in an increasingly dangerous world. Dw ATLAWTIC fF Tren xaro A. Garen/McIntosh TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE HEADING TOWARD COLLAPSE Philip H Gordon is senior fellow in foreign policy studies and director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” Dear rrienps. How did it come to this? I cannot remember a time when the gulf between Europeans and Americans was so wide. For the past couple of years, I have argued that the Iraq crisis was a sort of “perfect storm” unlikely to be repeated, and that many of the recent tensions resulted from the personalities and shortcomings of key actors on both sides. The transatlantic alliance has overcome many crises before, and given our common interests and values and the enormous challenges we face, I have been confident that we could also overcome this latest spat. Now I just don’t know any more. After a series of increasingly depressing trips to Europe, even my optimism is being tested. I do know this: if we don’t find a new way to deal with each other soon, the damage to the most successful alliance in history could become permanent. We could be in the process of creating a new world order in which the very concept of the “west” will no longer exist. ES DIY nino RANSATLAWTI RE) bey LO TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE AT A POINT OF CRISIS Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, hitp://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) The accomplishments of the Atiantic alliance are remarkable. History records few, if any, alliances that have yielded so many benefits for their members or for the broader international community, ‘After centuries of recurrent conflict, war among the European ‘great powers has become inconceivable. The Cold War has been ‘won; the threat of nuclear war has receded. Freedom has prevailed against totalitarian ideologies. Trade. investment, and travel are more ‘open today than ever before. Progress in raising living standards— in rich and poor countries alike—is unprecedented. Despite these accomplishments, the transatlantic relationship is under greater strain today than at any point in at least a generation. Many Europeans assume malign intent on the part of the United States. Many Americans resent European behavior and dismiss European perceptions of today’s threats. The conviction that the United States is a hyperpower to be contained has become fashionable in Europe. Reliance on coalitions of the willing to act when the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will not has become the policy of the United States. ‘The war in Iraq brought these strains to the point of crisis. France and Germany organized resistance to the United States in the UN Security Council—alongside Russia, historically NATO’s chief adversary. ‘The Bush administration, in turn, sought to separate these states from other members of the alliance and the European Union (EU). For a time, rhetoric replaced diplomacy as the primary instrument for taking positions, making criticisms, and shaping coalitions. These events were, to say the least, unusual. The particular outcome was influenced by domestic politics, personality, miscommunication, and unfortunate circumstance. What happened, however, was more than an intersection of unexpected developments, disputes over policy, and bad luck. The roots of the Iraq conflict extend at least as far back as 11/9, the day in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down; they were strengthened, in tum, by the events of 9/11, the day in 2001 when terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center, attacked the Pentagon, and killed 3,000 innocent people. = t A. GarenMintosh] | RAYS A TLAVOL SLA TL OMS LOT Ay THE WAR IN IRAQ HAS SHATTERED TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Henry Kissenger, former secretary of state, April 25, 2003, San Diego Union-Tribune, p. lexis As attention begins to turn to the reconstruction of postwar Iraq, the United States must address an even deeper problem: how to deal with the tectonic shifts within the Atlantic alliance revealed by the diplomacy preceding the conflict. America’s two strongest allies on the European continent, France and Germany. actively agitated around the world against a policy for which the American president was prepared to risk American lives. That schism tempted Russia to confront the United States more explicitly than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And this pattern is repeated in the controversy with these allies over the U.N.'s role in postwar Iraq. A continuation of these trends would involve the progressive erosion of the Atlantic alliance -- the centerpiece of American foreign policy for half a century. The end of the Cold War and of a common threat had gradually undermined many of NATO's underlying premises, Nevertheless, for a decade, the United States remained dominant by habit and momentum, while beneath the surface, many in Europe chafed at the growing gap in military power and economic growth between the two sides of the Atlantic and at the new American administration's muscular assertion of the national interest. \D DIw TR TLAW TE RUTH, Me 0. A. Garen/MclIntosh” E Fy THE INVASION OF IRAQ HAS SPLINTERED TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis In the recent crisis, a particularly radical American policy combined with a unique confluence of European domestic pressures — German Chancellor Gerhard Schrsder's political vulnerability and French President Jacques Chirac's Gaullist skepticism of American power -- to trigger the crisis. Most Europeans - like most Americans -- rejected the neoconservative claim that a preemptive war against Iraq without multilateral support was necessary or advisable. Sober policy analysis underlay the concerns of the doubters, who felt that the war in Iraq, unlike the one in Afghanistan, was not really connected to the "war on terrorism." Skeptics were also wary of the difficulties and costs likely to attend postwar reconstruction. No surprise, then, that most foreign governments sought to exhaust alternatives to war before moving forward and refused to set the dangerous precedent of authorizing an attack simply because the United States requested it. A, Garen/MeIntos Dw |RAMSATLAWICRUTAS DyMe— LR 1 NATO AMERICAN UNILATERAL POLICY ON IRAQ HAS CREATED A SCHISM BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US Henry Kissenger, former secretary of state, April 25, 2003, San Diego Union-Tribune, p. lexis But even granting that in the emergency conditions after Sept. 11, the United States cut some corners on consultation and seemed occasionally too prone to righteousness, the relish with which France and Germany challenged the alliance framework that had seen the West through the Cold War hhas deeper causes. For France and Germany to announce that they would vote against the United States in the Security Council was unprecedented in itself. But this was dwarfed by their intense diplomatic lobbying against American policy in far-flung capitals, ignoring a half-century of alliance tradition - = even going so far as to create the impression among East European leaders that cooperation with the United States in the war might further complicate their entry into the European Union. With an attitude of almost gleeful defiance, the French and German foreign ministers invited their Russian counterpart, the erstwhile NATO adversary, to stand beside them in Paris while they publicly repudiated a top-priority policy of their ally of half a century. Irritations over American tactics could not have produced such a diplomatic revolution had not the traditional underpinnings of alliance been eroded by the disappearance of a common threat, aggravated by the emergence into power of a new generation that grew up during the Cold War and takes its achievements for granted. That generation did not participate in the liberation of Europe during World War II or its reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. It remembers instead the protest against the Vietnam War and the missile deployment in Europe. In Germany, this generation is frustrated by apparently permanent economic crisis. Gaullism, which insisted on a Europe with an identity defined in distinction from the ‘United States, was not supported by a major European country until the Iraq crisis enabled President Jacques Chirac to recruit Germany -- at least temporarily ~- into the Gaullist version of Europe. That diplomatic upheaval has split Europe between states that seek European identity throu; confrontation with America from those, led by Britain and Spain, who see in it an instrument of cooperation. DJW O NATO tal THE INVASION OF IRAQ HAS UNDERMINED NATO ‘Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis ‘The evidence of so much rigidity, bungling, and pique gives the optimists heart, since it suggests that the ultimate outcome was avoidable -- and thus that future crises could be handled more smoothly. By going it alone, the United States lost the tens of billions of dollars in financial support that it managed to attract in the first Gulf War and complicated its military operations by missing a chance to create a second front. Postwar reconstruction is proving an embarrassing burden rather than a prized opportunity, and Iraq's future remains unclear. For France, meanwhile, the crisis. undermined the two institutions in which it holds the greatest influence -- the UN and the EU_-- and perhaps NATO as well. French opposition failed to slow the American move to war and thus undermined France's transatlantic and cross-Channel relations with little to show in return. \s STRONGER ECONOMIC TIES DON’T CHECK A COLLAPSE IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning, May 11, 2004, US Department of State, Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: Bridging the Gap, hitp://svww.state.gov/s/p/rem/32448.htm ‘A second false path is to believe that the strength of the transatlantic economic ‘SoreRReBANPYVTARIFIship can solve our foreign policy disputes. You are familiar with the statistics: in 2001, Europe accounted for half of the total global earnings of U.S. firms. Europe invests more in the single state of Texas than the United States invests in all of Japan. Transatlantic commerce today approaches $2.5 trillion a year. My view is that this economic relationship can act as a shock absorber to help get us past the potholes and speed bumps along the road, but by itself will not be sufficient to ensure a healthy ‘transatlantic relationship. Economic interdependence will not bridge current divisions. A final shortsighted approach would be for the United States and Europe to stop viewing each other as essential strategic partners. Rather, Europeans and Americans would cooperate a la carte, focusing solely on areas of agreement. We could continue to cooperate in the Balkans and Afghanistan, but we would keep contentious issues, like Iraq, off the common agenda. WW oe oe THE US-EUROPE RELATIONSHIP TS ERODING Philip H. Gordon. Sr. fellow for policy @ Brooking Institute. Jan/Feb 2003. Foreign Affairs Vol 82, Issue 1. ‘Academic Search premier. FSince then, however, relations between the transatlantic alles have sharply deteriorated. Europeans now regularly accise the United States ofa simplistic approach to foreign policy that reduces everything to the military aspects of the war on terorism, Americans respond with resentment over Europe's unwillingness to support U.S. efforts to deal with hostile states such as Iraq, In the Middle East, the recent cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians has prompted Europeans to accuse Washington of unconditional support for Isracli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Americans to accuse Europeans of going soft on terrorism, or even of antisemitistn. Deep disagreements about U.S. unwillingness to accept binding constraints on its sovereignty within multilateral institutions ~ as evidenced by USS. rejection ofthe Intemational Criminal Cour, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the global ban on land mines, verification measures forthe Biological Weapons Convention, and other multilateral initiatives -- have also been highly corrosive. U.S.-European differences on matters of policy and global strategy or governance are certainly nothing new. What is striking today, however, is that some serious observers are starting to conclude thatthe fundamental cultural and structural basis for a transatlantic alliance is eroding, Author Francis Fukuyama, who 13 years ago was declaring the triumph of common Euro-American values and institutions to be the "end of history,” now speaks of the “deep differences" within the Euro-Atlantic community and asserts that the current U.S.-European rifts "not just a transitory problem.” Jeffrey Gedmin, director of the Aspen Institute Berlin -- once a bastion of ® Attanicism ~ tks about Europe’ “pathology regarding the use of fore and argues ha U.S. and European views of security are nOW 80 September 11th, 2001, was a dramatic wake-up call. It showed us that terrorism has mutated, like a virus. It has grown beyond the boundaries of states, into a global network. Ithas gone beyond narrow political goals to pose a threat to our people, wherever they may be, our institutions and even our culture. It has surpassed the capacity of any individual state to tackle it alone. Terrorists are not ten feet tall. They can be defeated, But we must face the fact that this cruel genie cannot be put back in the bottle. ‘The second threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. Quite simply, more countries are acquiring them. North Korea's admission that it is developing nuclear weapons, in brazen defiance of its stated and legal commitments, is just the latest evidence of nuclear proliferation. Iraq continues to develop biological and chemical weapons, and is looking for nuclear capacity. Stockpiles of ex-Soviet fissile material are too loosely guarded, and radiological material tums up on the criminal black market in Germany and elsewhere, The examples go on and on, and they are chilling, September 11th 2001 made this much more than an academic problem. Al-Qaida proved to even the most sceptical that there are people fanatical and homicidal enough to use such weapons, Weapons of mass destruction in the wrong hands are a clear, real danger to our safety, and to the stability of the international system. And we cannot be confident that these weapons are not already in the wrong hands, or will become so in the foreseeable future A third threat is more traditional, but has even graver implications today. It is the collapse of failed states, Conflict zones, from the Balkans, to the Caucasus and Central Asia to Africa, have become centres where terrorists find recruits. Where organised crime traffics drugs and weapons. Where loss of state control can mean loss of control over lethal weapons themselves. Where wars can spill over to destabilize entire regions. In essence, failed states can easily become the breeding ground of the new viruses which threaten our safety today. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states: I have painted a dark picture of the threats we face, But I have never been a pessimist. We can shape our security for the better -- and we will face this new, more unpredictable future with a transformed, more effective and more robust NATO, Lam sure you are all aware that in exactly two weeks, NATO's Heads of State and Government will meet in Prague for their first Summit meeting since 1999. At that ‘meeting, they will approve a range of profound adaptations to the way the Alliance does business. Adaptations which will ensure that NATO - a transformed NATO - will remain a solid foundation to defend, and to build our security in this new, more unpredictable world. DIW 04 NATO A.GarenMeintoh = /VATCO GOCes : LAWDRY CEs A STRONG NATO SOLVES FOR PROLIFERATION, WMD TERRORISM, AND CONFLICT Ministry of Defence, 12/9/03, UK Defense Today, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsltem_id=2724 It was said that the old NATO was for Keeping the Americans in; Keeping the Russians ‘out; and Keeping the Germans down. What then of the new NATO? The new NATO. is about capacity and capability; it is about seeking out and meeting threats wherever they manifest themselves: and it is about helping to create stability, through partnership, in what is currently a turbulent security environment. ‘The real challenges for the new NATO lie not in some academic definition of the ESDP- NATO relationship. No - the real and immediate challenges are in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by international terrorism and the consequences of failing or failed states — and how we deal with them. Itis generally accepted that a strategic conventional threat to Europe is unlikely to emerge in the short term. But the events of the last 5 years have demonstrated the uncertain nature of the global security environment and have underlined the range of new menaces facing us in place of the old threat. The recent tragic events in Istanbul and elsewhere illustrate the very real danger to our homelands from international terro: The continuing proliferation of WMD is another pressing cause for concern. Some states will continue to seek WMD, particularly as access to the technology and production become easier. The means of delivering such Weapons are also pr ig. We know too that international terrorists are seeking to increase their access to chemical, biological and radiological means to enhance their capacity for dislocation and destruction. Preventing the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to terrorist organisations is a key part of the counter-proliferation challenge. Weak and failing states also present an increasing problem. Such states are characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religious tensions or economic collapse. They can contain areas of ungoverned territory, which provide havens and sources of support for terrorist groups and ¢ inal networks. The stability of whole regions may be undermined as neighbouring states are drawn into competition for control or influence over these territories and their resources. Internal conflict and famine can create the conditions for mass population movements, adding to pressures on neighbouring countries, We need to be alert to the links between failing states, migration and organised crime, smuggling both arms and drugs. a0 Neaewmetia VATS Good LAVWDRELESR A STRONG NATO SOLVES FOR PROLIFERATION, WMD TERRORISM, AND CONFLICT Ministry of Defence, 12/9/03, UK Defense Today, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsltem_id=2724 It was said that the old NATO was for Keeping the Americans in; Keeping the Russians out; and Keeping the Germans down. What then of the new NATO? The new NATO is about capacity and capability; it is about seeking out and meeting threats wherever they manifest themselves; and it is about helping to create stability, through partnership, in what is currently a turbulent security environment. The real challenges for the new NATO lie not in some academic definition of the ESDP- NATO relationship. No - the real and immediate challenges are in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by international terrorism and the consequences of failing or failed states — and how we deal with them. tis generally accepted that a strategic conventional threat to Europe is unlikely to ‘emerge in the short term, But the events of the last 5 years have demonstrated the uncertain nature of the global security environment and have underlined the range of new ‘menaces facing us in place of the old threat. The recent tragic events in Istanbul and elsewhere illustrate the very real danger to our homelands from international terrori concern. Some states will continue to seek WMD, particularly as access to the technology and production become easier. The means of delivering such weapons are also proliferating. We know too that international terrorists are seeking to increase their access to chemical, biological and radiological means to enhance their capacity for dislocation and destruction. Preventing the potential passage of WMD knowledge or weapons from states to terrorist organisations is a key part of the counter-proliferation challenge. Weak and failing states also present an increasing problem. Such states are characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religious tensions or economic collapse. ‘They can contain areas of ungoverned territory. which provide havens and sources of support for terrorist groups and criminal networks. The stability of whole regions may be undermined as neighbouring states are drawn into competition for control or influence over these territories and their resources. Internal conflict and famine can create the conditions for mass population movements, adding to pressures on neighbouring countries. We need to be alert to the links between failing states, migration and organised crime, smuggling both arms and drugs. dl DIW 04 NATO = A. Garen/McIntosh -LNS TABI LITY OVER NATO @ GERMAN IDOMINKAKCE NATO (5 be only inshhahon that can Mraietuio stubilily, anc PRoreskall Pears OF German domnane. John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. "The most important intra-alliance function is that of reassurance. The continued existence of NATO, including its integrated military structure and the U.S, military Presence, assures its members that they have nothing to fear from one another.[27] Of particular concern in this regard, of course, is newly unified Germany. As many analysts have noted, few if any concrete reasons exist for expecting a renewal of German aggression, Germany has willingly accepted sharp limits on its military capabilities. More fundamentally, the values of democracy, antimilitarism, and {ntemational cooperation are deeply entrenched in the Federal Republic {28] Nevertheless, perceptions do matter, and the profound change that has occurred i Germs tion within the European state system will inevitably raise questions about its future foreign policy orientation. West Germanys already Economie power and is Tong-ierm military potential have been augmented BY ‘unifiaton. In adtion, Germany now fees fewer exiemal consti Se ie ‘Tehavior while enjoying greater opportinities for self-assertion, especially those afforded by the ‘of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus it would not be ital or coumies thet have been cimizat hy Geenanyiaiis pat oe -soncemed that German its new pow. s that are inimical fo their interesis-Just as it took some years for its neighbors to become comfortable with the idea of a rearmed West Germany, they will need time to get used to the Presence of @ unified Germany in their midst [29] In the meantime, the maintenance of stabil YQ sz of Gams ora ey ter West pen county at mater ad NATO remains the leading institutional vehicle for performing this essential Gar sess uncon. As Crstoph Bein, ome disc ronal Reto Taste for Staigic Studies, has argued, "NATO makes Germen power hy controllable and thus acceptable to allies and political adversaries alike. Germany wie © outside NATO would raise international concerns."[30] Indeed, during the critical 1990 negotiations over the terms of German unification, even Soviet leaders concluded that it would be best for Germany to remain firmly integrated within NATO.31] NATO reduces fe possi of cont among West i sire way: increases tanspurnay i alte enaionalonion of he sco ols and by binky te Used Sats oe ‘BaneiaE ola ance ofponsrevegon cL apt a US supack = NATO ee hadi Ger A. Garen/MeIntosh. Lack of US imdeement in WTO would lead Yo German wollte ypurion an a (05s of Statilthy iy fre region, John S. Duffield. assistant professor of government and foreing affairs. at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO"S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. [ein Jiance members did not feel that their concems were bein, adequately addressed by collective arrangements, thoy Would be faclned to take ‘whatever steps (Bey regarded as necessary to provide for their security. Thus US. i ‘tigger a renationalization of security policy, and Germany ‘would be no exception to this trend. Without strong security ties to the United \}f® States it is not unimaginable that Germany would fee compelled inthe face of. emit near an gg? sy sind treenngcremiticescal ead cmb e Oe, , governmental responsiblity, Yet such steps would undoubtedly alam Germany’s- dWancishbors. UBven in the absence ofthe integrated military structure, direct U.S. involvement in. Yar European security affairs exerts a cals efiscton West European pale, Tip ecae US scaly Se ee EE "f.. Habit entwe te maintenance of almenof recente yee United States is perceived as powerful enough to play this internal balancing role. ‘Yet as an extracontinental power, it does not stir fears of military domination. [43] Not suprisingly, U.S. engagement is seen as particularly useful for providing a Sa Sea agement st and onal. Inthe absenoe ofthe United wv bby Germany, making te rest oF Eur _uneasy [44] This function is accepted and even encouraged By German leaders, who recognize that “an American presence in Europe allows its neighbors to feel far ‘more comfortable with the new and larger Germany. "[45] | NATO. lana mill Ukpansion. 43 Ce A. Garen/Melntosh “Ut NATO DIW 04 NO © Stab (lag Enduring transatlantic cooperation advances global security John Lis, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy Advisor, Winter 2003. The Washington Quarterly, ‘Europe's Global Role,” Lexis-Nexis, “B= The greatest change in the 2 Brose of the transatlantic relationship in the oh past few years hes been the broadening of shared U.S and European Bet interests. During the cold war gen 19905, U.S.-European relations security oroneaed on the Euro-Atlantic space sheniu September tt Security environment and the growing role of the EU as an economic Superpower have forced both sides to look beyond their « seattrthe chalien Sommon space to ral an Opportunities in the worta beyarrt Most of these &__gchallenges and opport ; by working together in the "ly has been established, the ide's security and prosperity A. Garen/Mcintosh DIW 04 WAC S&S Stab ty NATO NATO SOLVES STABILITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO secretary general, June 2004, NATO, ISTANBUL. SUMMIT: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIACNE SHAPING STABILITY, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040608a.htm While NATO’ transformation continues, its fundamental purpose endures. It is the vital instrument for Europe and North America to defend peace, democracy and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area — and, increasiny beyond as well. That has been true for over five decades. Istanbul will show that it is as true today as ever, and lay the foundation for that success to continue. & NATO. Roan — MANO) Steboiyide NATO. prepams of rele ane —consulfehn have preowrted (adhbillkg dad expontior oF corAlet John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. TA closely related function is that of stabilizing the countries of tne tormer Soviet ‘bloc in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in the first place. Following the Sd eomonis efome, the Water sakes n hes cee Seabees failure could lead to domestic turmoil, mass migrations, armed conflicts, and even : direct military threats to nearby NATO members. Yet suocess isnot assured, Re swith science with ‘democracy or free markets ig inherently difficult. And these considerable domestic ‘obstacles are often compounded by an uncertain and seemingly threatening external security envionment. In particular, many Cental and Fast European states are) WSO concerned about possible adverse developments within the former Soviet Union that Ys. -fould lead toa renewal oF miliary coereion ot armed conflict on their borders.(19] "Ff If left unprotected, moreover, they may feel pressure t tire additional military forces and to take other preadfenary easiest could be view Ay provocative fairl ‘NATO promotes stability in the former Soviet bloc in two ways. First, it directly fosters the success of political reform in the region. Since 1990, NATO has. established a wide aray of programs and institutions for dialogue and cooperation on security issues, most nobly the North Atlante Cooperation Council NACE) Partnership for Peace (PIP), through which it can assist the fledgling sin reshaping their defense policies, structures, and pl rocesses,[20] In particular, these new arrangements can reinforce democratic control of the armed forces and respect for civilian authority by exposing Central and East European leaders to Western models of civil-military relations.(21] Secon, NATO enhances the security of Cental an East European ats tsrring them at they would not have to ae ental Ica alzely on ei own, thereby helping them to fo tially destabilizing and to pursue their aso toes of Genentech cent inne agendas of domestic reform with greater confidence.{22] Since 1990, the ‘North Atlantic Council has repeatedly offered strong verbal expressions of interest and support, such as the statement issued during the August 1991 Soviet coup tempt "We expect th Soviet Union orespostte nt and scousty ofl sues in Europe" 23] The NACC allows forma Svat Soest woes to concems and to discuss a wide range of security issues on a regular basis while stings ul pater ith thei NATO courerpar[24] And he recently adopted PAP offers each participant Formal consultations with the alliance, suo it perceive direct threat to fs secur, and concrete military tics nth NATO. ‘members via involvement ina variety of miliary actives and operations [25] y UE DIW 04 A.Garen/Meintosh = AV A-TO © Stale’ oes NATO ete seeree oh “Bimmer, Exwope looks bo NATO for seat — ths shengHy W key, John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO"S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. | store fundamentally, NATO continues to enjoy generally strong support from is rember sates. For example, whose commitment Was called into question by unification, have remained eager to maintain and strengthen the alliance, Top government officials have repeatedly expressed the view that 32. (Geog stetve integrated itary structure and the presse onGemmin | ‘oilare sil vital [7] And even French officals, traditionally the most rica o SCL NATO, have often acknowledged is enduring value{8] Neris this favorable ea eat governing ates and coalions. Suppor fora song NATO offen ranges across the domestic political spectrum in member countries, ‘such as Gerussay.[9] Ia short, NATO has remained the institution to ined the institution to which its ‘members- and some nonmembers-primarily look to ensure thei JI) _§ DIW 04 NATO © SPILLOVER OF ao A. Garen/MeIntosh, Lome NATO achvihes wwe matotuinred shabllihy Aad preented te spillover of heshliy (abo aera | war. John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. Ua second pos-cold war NATO function that has assumed grater prominence isthe ‘Plotection of alliance members against an array of newly emerging threats. Tnereasing attention has been paid to possible dangers emanating from North Aftica athe Middle Ea, in pre beeguse shana fhe technology for rodaTag inigelles and weapons of mass destruction to those areas. Highest on thelist of new ‘exiemal concems, however, are ethnic, teciorial and national conflicts within and ‘among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Such conflicts have the potential to generate large numbers of ref ven spl over ois the ron of neighboring countri, Sr sae Nao mentor: ira went one Somer suse ‘might feel ompelled to intervene, risking an expansion of hostilities, as occurred at the, onsale a rt ‘Although so far unable to put an end to such conflicts, NATO helps to address the y47O cconcems they raise in several ways. Firs, it protecs its members against the Dossy epilover of altary hotties, Wile lanes Comite ave yet been fp Seriously threatened in this way, NATO's long experience with organizing the eit sefcoy of is members leaves el naparsds eal win ich oningences, «Qe NATO also helps to prevent other countries from being drawn into conflicts of this Type. The existence of the alliance reassures member states bordering on the region igs {hat they will not be left alone to deal with nearby was should they escalator pill, over, thereby reducing the incentive o intervene unilateral. Instead, NATO's ee _presence helps fo ensure that Western military involvement in such conflicts, where ‘toccurs at all is collective and consensual[16] At the same time, the possibility of a sharp, coordinated NATO response may inhibit other countries from meddling, ee oa pane een meee ee ‘organizational ability to act should its members choose fo do so. In 1992, the allies agreed fo make NATO resdures available to support pesockeeping operations mandated by the Conference on Security and Co< tion in Europe (CSCE) and the “Tated Natone QADIITT And i early 1994 tho approved thetslopment ofa _ mechanism termed Combined Joint Task Forces (CAT) Hat Would enable proups of ‘members - "coalitions of the willing” - to draw upon common alliance assets for specific operations ouside ofthe meaty eaTTE] py, a? A GarevMetnash YATE ® Evivtety Contin. pec et i il NATO SURVIVAL IS KEY TO PREVENTING EUROPEAN POWERS FROM COMPETING WITH ONE ANOTHER Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfi.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdt) The first and most important compatible interest, we believe, is to maintain and support our shared traditions and the community that has formed around them. The age of exploration saw European ideas and values transplanted to North America; the age of revolution saw constitutional democracy spread from the United States to Europe. Twice during the twentieth century, without any pre-existing alliance, Europeans and Americans elected to fight alongside one another to preserve their democratic values against authoritarian challenges. A third such challenge, that posed by the Soviet Union, required no global war, but it did produce the alliance that survives to this day. The fundamental purpose of that alliance, hence, reflects interests that preceded the Cold War, and that remain no less vital now that the Cold War is over. Europe and the United States must ensure that they remain embedded in a zone of democratic peace and that the nations of the Atlantic community are never again divided by balance-of-power competition. 24 ‘A Garen/Metniosh AO @B Crewe ae Hae SS ene eee] | NATO PREVENTS NATIONALISM AND PROTECTIONISM WHICH RISK LARGE SCALE CONFLICT Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfi.org/pdf/Europe_TF pdf) A second compatible interest follows from the first: to remove or at least neutralize whatever might place shared security and prosperity at risk, AtNATO’s founding, the Soviet Union presented the clearest and most present danger to the Atlantic community. Today, the most pressing threats come from beyond Europe; the Atlantic alliance must adapt accordingly.Nonetheless, the task of consolidating peace on the European continent is not yet finished. ‘NATO’s founders were fully aware of two potential dangers that had produced great wars in the past and might yet do so in the future. One of these was aggressive nationalism, an old problem in Europe that had culminated disastrously in the rise of Nazi Germany. The other was economic protectionism: the erection of barriers to international trade, investment, and the stabilization of currencies, which had deepened the Depression of the 1930s, thereby weakening the democracies just as they needed strength. The post-World War II transatlantic relationship, crafted jointly by Europeans and Americans, sought to remove these dangers by promoting the political and economic integration of Europe. That priority too survived the end of the Cold War and today remains—because of the dangers it is meant to avoid—as compelling a common interest as it was half a century ago. 30 ea Mato BH CONMFLECT | A STRONG NATO IS KEY TO DETERRING AND PREVENTING CONFLICTS Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfi.org/pdi/Europe_TF. pdf) First, and most important, a world of safety, free of fear of attack from states or ftom organizations or individuals acting independently of states. It follows that NATO. should retain its historic mission of containing and, if necessary, deterring hostile states, but it should also adapt to new kinds of threats that challenge the international state system itself. This means being prepared to contain, deter, and if necessary intervene against sources of clear and present danger. Such a mission will require the capacity to respond across a spectrum of military options; it will demand the close coordination of intelligence and police work; it will involve readiness to act “out of area” (that is, beyond NATO’s existing borders); it will necessitate the flexibility to deal with dangers the nature of which no one can now foresee. The founders of the alliance knew that without security little else would be possible. That remains true today, and it will remain true well into the future. DIW 04 A. Garen/Melntosh NATO Freyuenk consulluhen - is Kea, Fo Gear communiiuhaan — and Aeoreatd — Suspicion anc mishust John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. ‘An important potential source of intemational conflict is misperception and “Biante ana Se ita abecane of doled we late ain, fecision makers may exaggerate the offensive mili ilities of other countries OF MINMTeRpret foreign Mciions, offen peresiving them as more Hostile they actually are. They also Tend fo overlook the security concems that their Retr own actions may raise abroad. Consequently, international relations are often ‘AcC Sharacterized by suspicion and mistrust 32] leet! event such destructive dynamics from arising among its members : cased SOUaR natal confidence by aclanng sgh dears Tina alliance transparswey- FTEQUENconsuTation at many levels and on many subjects Ear ge ctr ofr waiSey aa iantoas eT ‘Hesessary, to register their concems and misapprehensions, Participation athe alliance's. ring process requires members to exchange detailed information “About their military forces, defense = and future plans. As azesult of such — Cea ar et ania NATO member ar able te kee fw sees from each ter, and they have fewer insentives do $033) DIW 04 A. Garen/Mclntosh ye < a NTO © prolil& and canflict Nato NATO 4 iotequiteck catlthoru Shudwre Bandhonalizer Seanty and Is key bo preventing Preller en Bod conFlrct, John S. Duffield, assistant professor of government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. ‘A further way in which NATO fosters 1ong its members is by. integrating their security policies [34] To varying but usually substantial degrees, NATO counties fonmulate and execute their security policies as part of the alliance rather than on a purely national basis. This denafionalization of security policy tempers the natural rivalry and competition for military primacy that might — “Otherwise oceur among the major European powers, and it helps to preclude any intra-European use of military posturing for political influence. Should renationalization occur, on the other hand, it “could give rise to concems about internal imbalances in We " and generate renewed mistrust, competition, and even conflict 35] ‘NATO promotes the denationalization of security policy in several ways. At the ‘most basic level, its consultative organs, force planning process, and integrated miltary structure help forge a common ideniy among alliance members Regula ltation contributes to a high degree of mutual understandi osture to reflect alliance ‘wide, rather shan national interests, And assignments to the alliance’ civilian ‘bureaucracy and military organization socialize government officials and military officers into a common NATO culture [36] In addition, participation in NATO's integrated military structure fosters reduced iia selsuliteny onthe pat of member eumaee scale bs eee Figen sf eager noes oe oa en oa maberof the nptints crtal oan ndgocniataiingroeenng Pe eaeoys ce apasisoumres cathe arose a) : husband defense resources, moreover, both small and large countries have sacrificed theabliy wo cany ou cata mislore aaa tt Rose Socrping Essig that Oba esd prone A cicatneetl Geman pinta Ries ae Reh eae OS eae indirect fire support, [37] At the same time, multinational integration establishes a degre of mel consol by inveaing ere efeatesie bees “Drganizational and operational planning. Indeed, Germany has never developed a Fubtiedgal atonal pluning Sal corcoand canciliy shave te exes ree ‘counting instead on multinational NATO staffs to conduct those vital tasks. Thus the continued existence of the integrated military structure places constraints on the ability of many members to use their forces for exclusively national objectives, at least in the short- to medium-term, and reassures them as to the common purpose of 3 3 their military powe Init absence, te possiblity hat the forces of one country" _} ‘could raise alarms in another Would be much greater [38] eee WAT S DSease Awd PRODEE A STRONGER NATO IS KEY TO PREVENTING DISEASE SPREAD AND PROLIFERATION Polish News Bulletin July 2, 2004, P. LEXIS Nato has been reacting to crises in a traditional way, writes Onyszkiewicz. It would be much better if the alliance had the capability to coordinate and act at the pre-crisis stage. In regions such as the Middle East and with respect to important countries such as Saudi Arabia, working out a harmonised strategy of forecasting and preventing crises would be much better than handling disasters after they have happened, as in the Balkans, when they become more dangerous and difficult to contain. The current Nato institutions have proved insufficient to successfully address the challenge of preventing crises, and to support security policy co- operation conducive to effective crisis prevention, believe the panel members. Characterising the new security environment, the Warsaw Reflection Group report attaches prime significance to globalisation, because of which "diseases, leologies, information and even weapons of mass destruction can, at last potentially, cross borders and spread through the world without much difficulty, posing countries with new, often serious challenges."" Sy DIW04 warto A. Garen/Meintosh NANOS ERLOMACN RR i) ere A STRONG NATO WOULD DIPLOMATICALLY SOLVE FOR INSTABILITY AND PROLIFERATION Ministry of Defence, 12/9/03, UK Defense Today, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsltem_id=2724 Looking at this from our particular regional perspective where do we judge that future threats to the peace and security of Europe will arise? Those regions immediately adjacent to Europe ~ the near East, North Africa and the Gulf — are likely to continue to have the most significant bearing on both our own and wider Western security interests. Potentially destabilising social. olitical, and economic problems demand that we engage in conflict Prevention, as well as responding rapidly to emerging crises. The Middle East still presents the most significant security challenge. ‘The Israeli/Palestinian problem is a major regional issue. The international community must continue in its efforts to secure a lasting settlement. Although recent operations have largely neutralised one threat, weapons of mass destruction are continuing to proliferate across the Middle East and beyond and will be a continuing concern. Looking beyond the regions adjacent to Europe, we have to recognise that there will be a greater need for commitments further afield. Of course, crises could occur anywhere across the world and the transatlantic alliance may not, as a whole, be engaged in every case. But it will wish to be involved in dialogue and discussions. Expanding effective diplomacy beyond the existing Partnership for Peace countries must therefore be a long term goal. ne) ‘A Gare/Melatosh ATO © Foe NATO IS KEY TO PREVENTING A NEW WAVE OF PROLIFERATION Times Newspapers Limited, october 8, 2003, P. LEXIS If it does succeed, what then? Top of the list of worries for Britain and the US is that Israel would strike Iran to try to wipe out its nuclear capability. In 1981, it did just that to Iraq's Tuwaitha nuclear research complex. Next is the fear that Arab countries, sandwiched between a nuclear Israel and a nuclear Iran, might feel a new desire for their own arsenal. Saudi Arabia is perhaps at the top of the list of concerns. Although Western diplomats do not think that the kingdom has the scientific or industrial capability to enrich uranium itself, they fear that it might try to acquire a bomb "off the shelf". Who from? Pakistan, with close military links to the kingdom, is one possibility. President Musharraf says repeatedly he will not participate in proliferation, but his tenure cannot be assumed to be secure. Egypt is a concern, in theory, but it is more easily influenced by economic incentives than the oil-rich states. Iraq itself is on the list of worries, too. It is an understatement to say that we cannot predict the nature of a future Iraqi government. Tens of billions of dollars cannot guarantee that a new regime would be friendly to the West, or, even if it were, that it would forswear nuclear arms. And beyond? In an apocalyptic vision, a regional arms race might take in Turkey, even Greece. However, senior British and US officials believe that this is too pessimistic. While Nato exists, they argue, it provides a bulwark against proliferation, as its members come under the US "nuclear umbrella" and are covered by that shared deterrent. In Particular, Britain and the US believe that Turkey, as a Nato member, accopts that it has no need of its own nuclear capability. Its hopes of joining the EU are also a powerful reason not to go down that road. If these sketches of the risk of proliferation are right, they affect other calculations. They increase the value of keeping Pakistan on side. They may indirectly boost Turkey's application to the EU. Above all, they give a boost to Nato. The row about whether Nato still has a useful role has taken on a new acidity since the Iraq war made it seem redundant. But the risk of proliferation does give ammunition to those who want to keep the club together. 36 DIW 04 A. Garen/McIntosh Ameruan multhen, power through NATO mucking oO Counterwough F to Hareate a cobrantahara! Ieacsidr. John S. Duffield, assistant professor of i Duffie stant government and foreing affairs at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO”S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. ‘The military threat that the Soviet bloc could pose to Westem Europe declined dramatically between 1989 and 1991. Tn particular, the danger of a massive, short- svaming attack in the central region, perhaps the most demanding contingency “NATO might have faced, was eliminated. The former treat did not disappear AP completely, however, The Soviet successor states continue fo possess substantial military capabilities. Most importantly, Russia remains BWOpe ony ue ce Vy “superpower, and ned a nuclear arsenal larger ven Ukraine has so fart Qa SP ied] aden, depth Soviet pare fom Ca —— Europe, flank co ‘such as Norway and Turkey still face powerful Russian conventional forces stationed near their borders.{13] ‘Nor can anyone be certain that this military power will never again be used for hostile purposes. Under Presidents Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, the Soviet Union and Russia have pursued cooperation with the West and sought to reduce if not eliminate altogether the role of force in their external relations. In view of the twists and tums that have characterized Russian politics in recent years, however, it has not “Yet been possibe to rule out the prospect ofa retum to a more confrontational, even. Expansionst posture. The tumultuous events of late 1993, especially the violent siege ofthe Russian parliament building and the strong showing of the nationalists in the subsequent parliamentary elections, only confirmed the view thatthe situation inRussias remain unsettled for a prolonged period during which Sontinued Westem concems about future Russian intentions will be only natural, “In view ofthese uncertainties, the countries of Westem Europe have found desible sna eure! een milan pone fe oir Soviet Union, especially Russia's nuclear capabilities. Alone, however, they lack the ‘means to do so. Only the United States is seen as fully able to neutralize the potential nuclear threat, however emote it may be, and more generally to preserve, the Europes state blanc [14] An iis pinay tough NATO hat ‘American military power is linked t6 the continent. [15] _y 37 DIWo4 WEZoveEs Russre aro A.Garen/Mclntosh KkTO © INSTABILITY IN FORMER Soet BLOT NATO prenadas seeunty 8 Pom extemal Looypes — Breasons John S. Duffield, assistant professor of i yi , assistant professor of government and forcing affe at the University of Virginia Charlottesville, 1994, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, NATO"S FUNCTION AFTER THE COLD WAR. {[sAto contnsesto enhance th sour of is members with eapecto extra ry dangers in several ways. First, it preserves the strategic balance in Europe ‘neutralizing the residual threat posed by Russian military power. Second, ithelps to b ates emerging new teas nchuding the complex pei poses by cons ¥« within and among the sates of Cental and Eastem Burope, Third it impedes such GP\tareats om arising inthe Fes pTace by contributing fo the process of fostering stability in the former Soviet ble, oe 33 Mantins HAO OQ ERST evict coved NATO SOLVES FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN STABILITY Robert Hunter, senior advisor at the RAND Corporation and vice chairman of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 2000, The Washington Quarterly, Winter, p. lexis Throughout the 1990s, the Western powers have sought to build both structure and practice to write an end to the bloodiest century in European history and to open the possibility in the next century of creating a "Europe whole and free." After a brief period in which other institutions were considered for meeting Europe's future security needs -- the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the ‘Western European Union (WEU), even the Council of Europe -- NATO was again confirmed as the premier agent of Western policy and action. It benefited from familiarity, inertia, and a reputation for competence. Its sixteen members were content to pursue their military security goals through a tried-and-true institution with its integrated ‘command structure; they resisted the "renationalization” of defense. Europeans found that they were comfortable with America's continued military presence on the Continent and in European security (indeed, they came, once again, to insist upon it), in particular as ‘uncertainties in Central Europe and beyond appeared to exceed the capacity of European allies, acting on their own. For its part, the United States came to see the virtues of retaining its military presence in Europe, both for its own sake -- including Europe's value as a secure base for possible U.S. military actions farther afield -- and for the broader influence that such continued engagement confers. That, of course, meant primacy for NATO as the institution that "works" and that the United States leads and continues to dominate. | awo 7/3 AcarnMetnosh ACO E dct EuROpE ce ‘NATO is key to preventing war in the Balkans. PI ‘ellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Fall 2002, The National Interest, hilip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Fall 2 lip Gordon, Reforging the Atlantic Alliance.” {third important role for NATO is preven petee in the Balkans, where the Alliance deploys 51,000 Tobe Bree ence esential to preventing the region fom eng ese conflicts ofthe thee is uae Bamber of tops is gradually being edsend ee 45,000 by mid-2003—aind be nde Europeans under the ESDP eventually ing ec co nission, NATO's role wi coord anabl for at asthe net several years No ater eos effectively plan and presence, | ve military forces fom all the consibuing sonra including the American military | i EAST % A. GacotMcintosh WARC E> EAST EURPE Core HE 7s NATO SOLVES EASTERN EUROPEAN CONFLICT Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO secretary general, June 2004, NATO, ISTANBUL SUMMIT: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIACNE SHAPING STABILITY, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040608a.htm ‘These questions cannot be answered today. But I do want to see them addressed sooner rather than later. Because I see these as crucial elements of preparing the Alliance for the future. NATO must be able to deploy forces where and when they are needed in future, as effectively as it has done until now. Because the Alliance is a vital — indeed, an essential — part of the international community’s efforts to build peace id example of NATO’s potential to shape security for the better. Nine years ago, we helped bring a terrible war to an end. Today, after keeping the peace since then, we can talk about bringing the mission to a successful conclusion. Indeed, I believe that at Istanbul, NATO’s Heads of State and Government will do just that NATO will have a continuing role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, beyond the end of the year. We will have a headquarters in Sarajevo, and the Alliance will support the EU in its follow-on mission. But the overall lesson is clear. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country at peace, and moving ever-closer to Euro- Atlantic institutions. That is the power of transatlantic cooperation. That is the power of NATO to help shape security for the better. That power is still very much required in Kosovo. In mid-March, violence flared up across Kosovo, violence at a level we had not seen since 1999. KFOR reinforced very quickly, and we helped to put the violence down. But the solutions in Kosovo must be political. NATO will continue to play its essential part in maintaining stability, until peace and security become solid and self-sustaining. l Gand NATO ister ay 2 MORE NATO TROOPS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE AFGHAN STABILITY ‘Nicholas Burns, US Ambassador to NATO, 6/10/04, State Department, p. lexis Our highest priority is helping the Afghan people rebuild their shattered country. NATO, which has command of the U.N.-mandated ISAF, must reinforce its long-term peacekeeping role in Afghanistan. The allies have agreed that we will move beyond Kabul to build a nation-wide presence, and help the Afghan government to extend its authority and provide security for nationwide elections. We are moving to create five new Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But NATO's success will depend on having the troops and military resources to do the job. The U.S. calls on European nations to contribute ‘more troops and resources in order to construct a more vigorous NATO presence in Afghanistan. 2 DIW 04 q A 5 IATO “Z_ A. Garen/Mcintosh W © A STRONG NATO IS KEY TO SOLVING FOR AFGHAN STABILITY Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO secretary general, June 2004, NATO, ISTANBUL SUMMIT: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIACNE SHAPING STABILITY, http://www. nato.int’docu/speech/2004/s040608a.htm Those of you who have followed my earlier speeches will not be surprised to hear me start with Afghanistan. It has been my number one priority since the day I took office as Secretary General. And the reason is simple. As an international community, we simply cannot let Afghanistan fail. We cannot, and we will not, turn our backs on that country. Since last summer, NATO has already done a lot to make Afghanistan more safe and secure. Today, thanks in large part to the NATO-led peacekeeping forces, Kabul is safer than it has been for decades. Heavy weapons are being put under lock and key. And the local police and army are being trained at record speed. And we are preparing to do more, NATO already has one Provincial Reconstruction ‘Team under our command, in Kunduz. This innovative civil-military team is helping to build dialogue, build trust and build security, and the PRT concept is welcomed throughout the country. ‘That is why NATO has committed to be in a position, by the time of Istanbul, to take five PRT under its command. This will contribute to building security, and it will help support the national elections later this year. ‘Now, I have seen the headlines suggesting that NATO might not meet this commitment. Let me be clear. At Istanbul, I am confident that the Heads of State and Government, alongside President Karzai, will confirm that NATO will expand its peacekeeping mission beyond Kabul, and that we will play our role in supporting the upcoming elections. ‘We have made a commitment. We must meet it. We will meet it. And in doing so, we will not only help that long-suffering country to take a major step towards a better future. We will also demonstrate NATO’s effectiveness at shaping stability, through its operations, where required. ‘Afghanistan is not only an immediate challenge, however. It is also an example of the new kinds of operations this Alliance must be prepared to face: largely unforeseen; ially far away from our traditional areas of operation; and testing our collective ability to contribute to peace when and where we must. 23 DIW 04 AGaewmenon EV ROVECER WATS Goa], GREATER INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN NATO STATES SOLVES FOR PROLIFERATION Ministry of Defence, 12/9/03, UK Defense Today, hnttp://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp2newsltem_id-2724 The threat posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to State and non-state actors will continue to require a comprehensive response including diplomacy, arms control, conflict prevention, non-proliferation controls, international co- operation and law enforcement, deterrence by conventional and nuclear means and specialist defence. Where this leads to a requirement for active military operations, targets are likely to be fleeting, and the opportunities for effective action will depend on the speed of our response. This will be driven by access to effective intelligence - something many nations believe they have - but something that NATO lacks in an integrated form. Developing a more effective Intelligence Cell will be a vital first step. Ie. 4 2 acim ROVEER WATO GOSS \ A1o THE ABILITY OF NATO TO ACT OUTSIDE OF EUROPE SOL’ TERORISM, PROLIFERATION, AND STABILITY Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 6/27/04, Pagine di Difesa, A New Atlantacism for the 21" Century, http:/Avww.paginedidifesa it/2004/natose_040627.htm! But let there be no mistake. When I admit to a certain sense of relief, itis not because I am somehow hoping that we could safely return to the transatlantic status quo ante, pre~ Iraq. This is impossible. As a matter of fact, it is also unnecessary. We don't need nostalgia. What we need instead is a new transatlantic security consensus post-Iraq. And I believe that this consensus is already coming together - with NATO as its major catalyst. In the remainder of my remarks, I would like to sketch some of those key elements of a new transatlantic security consensus, built on a transformed NATO Alliance. And I will also point out how each of these elements will be dealt with, one way or another, by our Summit meeting here tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. The first element of a new transatlantic security consensus is the need to project stability where it matters. In a strategic environment that is marked by terrorism. failed states and proliferation, projecting stability is a precondition for ensuring our security. If we do not tackle the problems where they emerge, they will end up on our doorstep. For NATO, this means being ready to act outside of Europe. You will recall that, until very recently, this very notion was highly controversial. There was a time when even going to the Balkans was seen as revolutionary. Today, NATO is leading ISAF in Afghanistan - and that is widely seen as the right thing to do. do l DJW 04 /\ JATO © lean CS, — @ A. Garen/McIntosh NATO is key to defending against terorism worldwide because of its versatility, ‘Hon. Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 327/03 Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate One Hundred Eighth Congress First Session, “The Future ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization waToy" Sppertunity to meet with you this morning to discuss the fature ef EXTO. The alliance has heater nature and role over the last dozen years or s0, impelled most forcefully by the end of the Cold War and then by the start of the Blobal war on terrorism. The West's victory in the Cold War, though largely to NATO's credit, faused many people to question whether NATO had a continuing reason for being. The global war on terrorism I believe has rathee clearly answered the question in the affirmative, the details haveeg Just been provided by Ambassador Grossman, ‘The strategic essence of the war on terrorism is the danger to need a set of diverse tools for the job. As for the military tools, wo need rapidly-usable, long-range, and lethal strike capabilities in re, sponse to good intelligence about unexpected events. In the war on terrorism, it is useful for the United States to have allies, and NATO has contributed valuably to the war effost. The September 11. 2001, attack on the United States resulved a debate > within NATO as to whether regions beyond the North Atlante sponding to threats emanating from beyond Europe is part of NATO RS mission: The alliance recently decided to support Germany and The Netherlands, for example, in their leadership in Afghan, Stan of the International Security Assistance Force, a'mission that brings NATO well out ofits traditional geographic domain) % DIW ‘A. Garen/Melntosh M ATO © Tee e-tsn mee Lo NATO MARITIME SURVEILLANCE PREVENTS WMD TERRORISM HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns aitacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis, 10. NATO's maritime surveillance and escort operation, Operation Active Endeavour, demonstrates the Alliance's resolve and ability to respond to terrorism. In March of this year, the operation was extended to the whole of the Mediterranean. Work is underway to farther enhance its contribution to the fight against terrorism, including through the contributory support of partner countries, including the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, We welcome the offers of contributory support by Russia and Ukraine and have invited both countries to discuss the modalities of their participation. All such offers of support, including by other interested countries, will be considered on a case-by-case basis. In reviewing Operation Active Endeavour's mission, NATO may consider addressing, in accordance with international law, the risk of terrorist-related trafficking in, or use of, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials. uF DIW 04 NATO A.GarenMeInioh EASTWARD Ex MNSCOW BRAY NATO eastward expansion is stopping mass death in Tajikstan, Macedonia, and Georgia, Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution, Nov/Dec 2002, Foreign Affairs, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk” Vol. 81 N. 6. is appropriate that the chart resembles a solar system, with NaTo ant the Ev as its twin suns, since those two bodies exert a gravitational pull on Bosnia and Herzegovina at the far right and on Tajikistan at the far left. Tajikistan is the equivalent of Pluto, With much of its population living in poverty and famine, an infant mortality ate higher than that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a feudalistie society, an authoritarian government, an economy dominated by drug, trafficking, and a festering civil war, that country is even further away politically from the capitals of western Europe than it is geographically. Nonethe- less, TajeiStan and other struggling nations, such as Macedonia and Georgia, are mo: likely to close that political distance if they remain patkof the systeth that waro and the ev are helping to put in place through their eastward extension} 48 ‘A GavenvMottos ins Good: WIRY LEE [ATO Ye TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SOLVE FOR FREE TRADE, TERRORISM, GLOBAL STABILITY, AND DISEASE PREVENTION ‘Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New ‘Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis The transatlantic partnership remains the most important diplomatic relationship in the world, and so the allies have much to protect. Together, the United States and Europe account for 70 percent of world trade. The success of the Doha Round of global trade negotiations — which promises much for the developing world -- could contribute greatly to long-term global security. Ongoing cooperation on intelligence and law enforcement is indispensable to successful counterterrorism. An expanded NATO is now widely recognized as a force for democracy and stability. Western governments have unanimously authorized a dozen humanitarian interventions over the last ten years. They work together on many other issues, including human rights, environmental policy, disease control, and financial regulation. Failure to cauterize and contain disputes such as that over Iraq threatens alll of this cooperation, as would any deliberate U.S. strategy of trying to weaken or divide international organizations like the UN, the EU, or NATO. The challenge that remains, of course, is just how to depoliticize controversial high-stakes issues such as preventive intervention. The simplest way to do so would be for the United States to adopt a less aggressively unilateral approach, trying to persuade or compromise with its allies rather than simply issuing peremptory commands. qi Zu DIW FRELATOVS G00: LAWVERY LT&_NATO Va A. Garen/Melntosh TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SOLVE TERRORISM, TRADE, CRIME, PROLIFERATION, DISEASE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfi.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdi) The way to do this, the Task Force believes, is to regard complementarity as an asset, not a liability. If the United States is the indispensable nation in terms of its military power, then surely the Europeans are indispensable allies in most of the other categories of power upon which statecraft depends. Whether the issues are countering terrorism, liberalizing trade, preventing international crime, containing weapons of mass destruction, rebuilding postconflict states, combating poverty, fighting disease, or spreading democracy and human rights, European and American priorities and capabilities complement one another far more often than they compete with one another. 50 2 cantina EL ATION COE: LaMar A. FAILURE TO REVIVE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS PRECLUDES EFFECTIVELY DEALING WITH TERRORISM, GLOBAL STABILITY, AND THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, hitp://snww.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF pdf) When similar situations arose during the Cold War, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic made visible gestures to repair rifts, strengthen institutions, and reaffirm their commitment to a lasting partnership. Such leadership is needed now to lower the rhetorical temperature by reminding Europeans and Americans of how much there is to lose from continued transatlantic tension, and how much there is to gain from effective collaboration. If the United States is to succeed in achieving its primary objectives in the world, whether those objectives be the successful confrontation of terror, ensuring the preservation of peace and prosperity, or the spreading of democracy, Americans must recognize that they cannot succeed alone. Without the leverage provided by protection from the communist threat, the United States must find other means of influence over nations. Legitimacy matters over time and it depends on international support. And without European support, it is not possible to imagine the United States assembling meaningful coalitions of other nations. Likewise the Atlantic alliance serves fundamental European interests. The world remains a dangerous place and the American capacity to project force is not likely to be matched in the next several decades. If the United States and Europe do not find an effective modus vivendi there will inevitably be increasing tensions within Europe as different nations take different views on actions taken by the United States. Nor is the most visionary of European projects —the gradual extension of international Jaw and institutions to the global community on the model of what has happened in Europe over the past half-century—a viable concept without the cooperation of the United States. Jl eee Welims ects. LAV DR Le PAT Vo TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SOLVE FOR MULTIPLE SCENARIOS OF CHAOS AND DEATH Martin Wolf 6/23/04, The Financial Times, p. lexis Both sides of the Atlantic desire the preservation of an open and dynamic global market economy, geopolitical stability, harmonious relations with the rising powers of Asia and stable oil supplies. They have a shared desire for control over proliferation of weapons of ‘mass destruction, defeat of Islamist terrorism, development of the world’s poorest and most unstable regions and management of the threats posed by failing states, trans-border crime and the spread of disease. The two sides of the Atlantic also believe in democracy, the rule of law and human rights. They are hound hy treaties that neither would dream of repudiating. They possess prosperous, market-oriented economies and a shared history and culture. The US has no significant allies with which it shares more than it does with Europe. Europe, in turn, owes its freedom, stability and democracy to the US. If the countries of the west continue to share fundamental interests and values, why is the alliance in such difficulties? The reasons are: divergent perceptions of present threats; different attitudes to multilateral institutions; disagreement over war in general, and preventive war in particular; and, not least, the history of the past few years. Oy ele EOOD: LAWWDRY rec] (NATO Ss US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE Timothy Garton Ash, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” If one steps back and asks what the global challenges to the free really are, any shortlist ‘must include: the tormented politics of the wider middle east; the dramatic economic rise of the far east; the imperative of development for the nearly half of humankind living on Jess than $2 a day; and the climate change which last year gave Europe its hottest summer for 500 years. None of these can be solved by military force. A hammer is no use because these are not nails. And none of these challenges can be addressed effectively if Europe and America work separately—tet alone against each other. 53 LIVS Go y : es OD: LAWDRY Leg hare (4 STRONG EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR TERRORISM, WMD USE, AND GENERAL STABILITY Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New ‘Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis In spite of these doubts about the Bush administration's policies, however, underlying U.S. and European interests remain strikingly convergent. It is a cliche but nonetheless accurate to assert that the Western relationship rests on shared values: democracy, human rights, open markets, and a measure of social justice. No countries are more likely to agree on basic policy, and to have the power to do something about it. Even regarding a sensitive area such as the Middle East, both sides recognize Israel's right to exist, advocate a Palestinian state, oppose tyrants such as Saddam Hussein, seek oil security, worry about radical Islamism, and fear terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. coe RNs Geep eaeay re % INCREASING COOPERATION SOLVES DISEASE, CRIME, AND POVERTY Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02; The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www_useu.be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOAlliance.html, ‘The transnational agenda is growing, and it is not defined by terrorism alone. The international community is threatened by disease, illegal drugs, transnational crime, human trafficking, and environmental degradation. None of these problems is confined to Europe or the United States. None of these can the United States or Europe hope to defeat alone. Combating third world poverty and promoting sustainable development are also high on the list of global issues on which the United States and Europe can work together. Indeed, there is already transatlantic cooperation in all of these areas, but there is an opportunity and a need to do even more. All will take hard work, tough decisions, and close cooperation, TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION SOLVES FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ALLOWING GLOBAL STABILITY Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, 2/12/02, at the American German Business Chub, Frankfurt, Auswartiges Amt, http://www auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_archiv?la nd_id=1888a_type=Speeches&archiv_id=2667 Only together can Europe and North America protect and defend our shared convictions ~— freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law — worldwide. These are ultimately the values which form the foundation for peace and stability throughout the world. If, however, Europe and the United States pull in different directions, the problems I have outlined will persist. As long as Europe and North America are prepared to consider the transatlantic community as a fair partnership, not just between themselves but also in relation to other cultures and religions, many states and peoples far beyond the Euro-Atlantic community will support us. A close transatlantic partnership will therefore continue to be one of the major prerequisites for global stability and security as well as peace and freedom in Europe. 5S N GaewMteinosh VAS GOOD = LAVVPR urge" G TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION SOLVES TERRORISM, NATION BUILDING, PROLIFERATION, AND CONFLICT Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning, May 11, 2004, US Department of State, Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: Bridging the Gap, http://www state.gov/s/p/rem/32448.htm We can agree to remind ourselves — and our publics ~ of how much we do cooperate: ‘The unprecedented transatlantic cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism; Afghanistan, where roughly 6,000 troops comprise the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and where our allies are helping extend Provincial Reconstruction Teams outside of Kabul; Iran and the agreement the EU-3 forged in October, in close coordination with the Bush Administratio Libya, where a joint Anglo-American i agree to give up its WMD. The Balkans, where we will soon announce a successful end to NATO's mission in Bosnia and welcome a new EU operation, or in Kosovo, where transatlantic cooperation remains key to our common goal of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, And yes, even in Iraq, where NATO is supporting the Polish-led division and close to 30 European countries have contributed nearly 15,000 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom. France, Germany and others are committed to helping reduce Iraq’s debt burden; and Finally, we can agree to remember that our bitter dispute over Iraq is but three years old. Our common values, however, are 300 years old — going back to the Enlightenment itself. ‘Next, we can agree to tackle a set of common interests. Indeed, we already have an outline of the common interests we share — and the common threats we face — in this new century. The newly agreed European Security Strategy defines Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, and failed states as the top three threats facing Europe. The ESS has many similarities to my own Administration’s National Security Strategy. These are the top threats facing the United States as well. itiative has led that former terrorist sponsor to = DIW 04 NATO AGarenMetnosh Ras Cerctgl: Lannie LSE Uy ‘Transatlantic cooperation helps stop WMD, terrorism, and failed states. mn Lis, an of the Subcommittee on Europe, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy ‘uo, Winer 2003. The Wasinglon Quarter urpe's Gaba Rae," Lexis Nei Although the Soviet threat that bound together Europe and North America © _ has disappeared, the September 11 attacks obviously demonstrated that security challenges remain. The draft EU security strategy prepared by 48k, Sviania In June 1s a positive step toward bringing U.S. and European ghreat ** perceptions and strategic agendas closer together by explicitly stating that vate, Europe faces three key threats: international terrorism, proliferation of Gad WEAPONS of mass destruction (WMD), and failed states. n9 Because these are mttifaceted threats, we must address them through diplomatic, law betes enforcement, intelligence, and economic means - all areas in which transatlantic cooperation is generally good and improving. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, however, demonstrate that the military dimension in the war on terrorism is also essential, and the challenge now for Eurcpe and North America is to improve military cooperation and capabuities to meet these new threats. | 57, ‘ATO 4 € key to lee A RowewMeinom —_ Releteons ata UG and European security ae closely linked; the transatlantic bond is key to both US, ‘and European leadership. Madeleine Albright, former Sec. State, 4/6/99, Brookings Institution, “A New NATO for a New Century.” Do DIW 04 NATO ‘A. Garen/Mcintosh Relations Qian, NATO IS KEY TO SOLVING WMD TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 6/27/ Atlantacism for the 21" Century, http://www.paginedidifess The third reason for moderation is our overall security environment. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states all confront us with new and unprecedented challenges. Meeting these challenges requires continued transatlantic cooperation, no matter how difficult it may appear at times. And it requires a framework like NATO - a framework that on more predictability and consistency than any "'coalition of the willing" could ever provide. These three factors have, in my view, been instrumental in bringing back some much-needed realism to the transatlantic security debate. agine di Difesa, A New '/2004/natose_040627.htm! ‘US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION IS CRITICAL TO PREVENTING WMD TERRORISM. US Consulate General Frankfurt, May 5, 2004, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: EU Vs. USA?, http://www-usembassy.de/frankfurt/speech05-05-04.htm We enjoy tremendous cooperation from Germany and other European states in. countering terrorist threats. Germany’s help in investigating the lead cell for the 9-11 attacks and in breaking up other terrorist cells was nothing less than outstanding. I see this cooperation every day. The U.S. consulate in Frankfurt -- one of the largest U.S. posts overseas -- includes a number of FBI, U.S. Customs, Homeland Security, and ‘Transportation Security personnel who work closely with law enforcement counterparts in Germany and throughout Europe. This is everyday cooperation at its finest. The threats are very real. Groups that employ terror to realize political goals, using failed states and rogue states as their base, are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction and would not hesitate to deploy these. We in the United States are unlikely to miss this point, given the horror of the September 11 attacks and attacks against Americans overseas. I believe that European leaders also understand the threat, but sometimes the public in Europe does not fully appreciate its significance. Re xo 0. DIW on Tex NATO A. Garen/Melntosh (ee ‘ 2 US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO THE WAR ON TERROR Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, 2003, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis Some, of course, would argue that it does not matter whether the Germanys of this world and their $28 billion defense budgets - support the United States. And it is true that the United States, with a vast military budget and after a decade of spectacular economic growth, seems as well placed as ever to go it alone. Yet such an approach would be extremely shortsighted. The United States still needs its European allies not primarily for their military contributions -- although even that could change in a few years if Washington continues to run up massive fiscal deficits and expands its military ‘commitments around the world. Rather, even an all-powerful America will need Europe's political support, military bases, cooperation in international organizations, peacekeepers and police, money, diplomatic help with others, and general good will. The "war on terrorism" declared by the United States will not be a short-term military battle but a multidecade struggle not unlike the Cold War -- in which "soft power," diplomacy, legitimacy, allies, intelligence cooperation, and an ability to win hearts and minds throughout the world will be as important as military power. Not to do the minimum necessary to ensure that Europeans remain positively disposed to American aims —- or worse, to actually provoke Europe into playing a kind of "balancing" role -- would be to squander the potential advantages of a position of strength. StS Dw FReatios®) Sense | SD Weg NATO A. Garen/Melntosh WaakionsS) Misense |} TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IS KEY TO PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF DISEASE Richard Haas, director of policy planning at the US state department, May 1, 2002, World Link, No. 3, Vol. 15, Pg. 28, p. lexis Moreover, the transnational agenda is growing. It is not defined by terrorism alone. All societies are threatened by disease, illegal drugs, transnational crime and human trafficking, environmental degradation and global warming. US and European contributions have provided the bulk of the start-up money for a global fund to combat HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and malaria. Still, this effort constitutes only a start to what is required in the realms of disease response, prevention and eradication. For instance, we could work together on the worldwide problem of refugee health by supporting the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and international NGOs in providing food, healthcare supplies and expertise to displaced populations in need. We could collaborate on vaccine procurement and on planning for how the international health community should respond to a biological-weapons attack. 60 RQ GarenMetntosn — KARKLONS ED BALANCE 0g PER WAR Reesiers OPAL AMEE 0¢ tw WA ABREAK IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS WOULD RESULT IN BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM THREATENING A US- EUROPEAN WAR Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, hitp://www.clt.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) The debate over multipolarity transcends the tactical issue of U.S.-European relations. It goes to the heart of the emerging international order. A unifying Europe will be a growing force in international relations; it is beyond America’s capacity and against 's interest lo attempt to thwart it. In that sense, Europe’s evolution. contributes to multipolarity. But if Europe defines its identity in terms of countering U.S. power, the world is likely to return to a balance-of-power system reminiscent of the era prior to World War I—with the same disastrous consequences.National interest is a crucial component of foreign policy. Should every actor in the international system seek to maximize only its own interest, however, constant tension is a more likely outcome than world order. The strength of the alliance depends on fostering attitudes that see the common interest as compatible with the national interest. : eyato | [e Cea Reeuvons) Eewefesn Stab’ ks Zz ee US. relations with Europe afremene 9rtuect Eargunn conflict. Si it \d Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy John Lis, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and De Snir Ftey ‘Advisor, Winter 2003. The Washington Quarterly, “Europe's Global Role,” Lexis-Né \ Since the inception of the campaign toward European unity inthe ROS aftermath of World War Il, the United States has actively recognized that a A united Europe isa stronger Europe and that a seeer Foon fundamentally in the interests of the United States, Since the founding of the Furopean Coal and Stecl Community in 1952 as the first step toward PUB the present-day EU, the United States has strongly supported the process 7 Map>= of European integration, based on the rationale that closer cooperation among former foes would bring stablity and economic growth to Europe, ‘greatly reducing the likellhood that the nations of Europe would ever sein engage in armed conflict against one another. As Robert Kagan has observed, the EU democracies have realized Kant's "Perpetaal Pesce” insofar as war among EU members is unthinkable today. As Americans, Who twice sent our sons to die on European soil, we should hail this achievement with equal measures of praise and gratitude. The relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe is perhaps the mest important relationship the United States has. Thanks in ho small part to the greater unity of these once adversarial nations, the United Stotes today :an rely on Europe to remain a bastion of stability and a force for democracy in the world. 62 4 Garen/Metatash Rites © & ie (oom eves bic pe Ce THE ALLIANCE SOLVES FOR EUROPEAN STABILITY Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cft.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) Facilitating the Consolidation of Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity in Eastem and Southeastern Europe. The 1990s made it painfully clear that a stable peace has yet to take root in some parts of Europe, and NATO’s tasks in the Balkans are far from over. Even as the BU gradually assumes peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, a NATO presence will be required there to prevent backsliding and to help resolve residual political and territorial disputes. The alliance must also encourage reform and integration in Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia. Turkey’s membership in NATO has long strengthened that country’s westward orientation; ‘openness to increasing other links between Turkey and Europe would similarly prove constructive. The prospect of joining NATO has promoted reform in Ukraine, as it has elsewhere in eastern Europe. ‘The NATO-Russia Council has given Moscow a voice in the alliance and contributed to a new level of cooperation between Russia, Europe, and the United States. The momentum behind all of these initiatives must be kept up. 63 DJW 04 A. Garen/Mcintosh US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR RUSSIAN INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, ‘http://www.useu. be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOAlliance.html, The U.S.-European relationship also remains vital to the political and gconomic integration of Russia into the West. America and Europe share a ‘common interest in working with Russia to encourage continued progress on human rights, religious and press freedom, rule of law, and political and economic reform. All benefit when a democratic and economically viable Russia is able to. build real partnerships with Europe's core institutions, including NATO and the EU, and to join international institutions like the World Trade Organization. Since September 11, NATO and Russia have given new impetus to their extensive cooperation. The recently created NATO-Russia Council will facilitate joint decisions and actions in areas of common concer. NATO is also intensifving its relationship with Ukraine and other Partners to further the integration and stability of Europe. RUSSIAN INTEGRATION SOLVES TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION, AND A CLIMATE DISASTER Karsten D. Voigt, Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, 2/12/02, at the American German Business Club, Frankfurt, auswartiges Amt, http://www .auswaertiges- amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/Iaendcr/lacnder_ausgabe_archiv?land_id~188&a_type=Spe eches&archiv._ id=2667 On September 12 last year NATO applied Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to a situation entirely different from the one NATO's founding fathers had in mind fifty years ago. NATO has long ceased to be directed against Russia, The first invocation of Article 5 in the Alliance's history did not divide NATO and Russia, it drew them together. Since the terrorist attacks President Putin has demonstrated notable resolve to integrate Russia into the global anti-terror coalition and to open his country more towards the West. NATO and Russia are using this momentum to renew their partnership. This new partnership is incidentally not a hindrance, but rather an invaluable tool for the further opening of the Alliance to new members. We all know that Europe will be more secure if Russia cooperates closely with NATO and the EU. Constructive cooperation with a country as large and important as Russia is crucial for the resolution of global issues like combating terrorism, problems with disarmament, control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global climate protection. DIW A. Garen/Melntosh Wlations SOlve estas US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ENCOURAGE RUSSIAN INTEGRATION SOLVING CONFLICT Richard Haas, director of policy planning at the US state department, May 1, 2002, World Link, No. 3, Vol. 15, Pg. 28, p. lexis The US-European relationship remains vital to the management of traditional ‘geostrategic issues such as Russia's reform. It is in our interest to reach out to Russia and integrate it into the West politically and economically in order to bring greater stability to Europe and Russia itself, We also share a common goal in working with Russia to encourage continued progress on human rights, religious and press freedom, the rule of law and economic reform. We all benefit When a democratic and economically viable Russia is able to build real partnerships with Europe's core institutions, including Nato and the EU, and join international institutions such as the WTO. Since September 1th, Nato and Russia have given new impetus to their extensive cooperation. A new Nato-Russia council is being created that will facilitate joint decisions and actions in areas of common concern. Nato is also intensifying its relationship with Ukraine and other partners to further the integration and stability of Europe. DIW 04 Kons NATO A. Garen/Meintosh Vet Poss US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE THE PEACE PROCESS Senator Chuck Hagel September 2003, The Significance of the Transatlantic Partnership, http:/Awww.kas.de/proj/home/events/1/1/year-2004/month- Siveranstaltung_ id-8401/ ‘America and Europe, along with Israel and our Arab allies, will pay a high price if the Road Map in the Middle East continues to unravel. We must work together to get the parties to take concrete steps toward peace, This is a common cause for the Transatlantic alliance. Europeans have not been spared by terrorists in the past. Europe’s free societies, like America’s, invite the hatred and wrath of those who thrive on violence, despair, and intolerance. An intensification of radical politics in the Middle East will only make these problems worse. Thomas Friedman, reflecting on the “death grip” of suicide bombers in Israel in a New York Times column last week, wrote, “A credible peace deal here is no longer a U.S. luxury — it is essential to our homeland security.” Terrorism knows neither boundaries nor limits. If our efforts to end the violence in the Middle East fail, and, over time, terrorist attacks become part of American life, Europe will surely share the same fate, 6% US recs Good relay Sm Tag, DIW 04 Relahms 4 Tray, NATO A. Garen/Melntosh US NEEDS $ STRONG RELATIONS WITH EUROPE FOR TRIQ Robert E, Hunter. vice president for international i politics and director of Euroy Studies at 2003, Intemational Herald Tribune. “Bush must ease g-8 frictions, eee eles ‘Phe United States needs France and Germany, as well as the rest of the NATO allies just as they need the United States to guarantee Europe's security, to lead in rebuilding Iraq, to work for Israel-Palestine peace, to hat the spread of nuclear weapons and to counter international terorism, ‘America’s future dependence on its European allies was not so evident énly six weeks ago, when the U.S. and Britain stood victorious in Iraq It was popular in Washington for the less-than-foresighted to argue that securing the peace would be as simple, straightforward and swift as winning the war had proved to be. Divide the spoils among the victors, they argued, and let the naysayers go hang. ‘Today, postwar Iraq isin shambles, and looting and violence continue. Iraqi self-rule is still on the drawing board, military occupation is seen as stretching well into the future, the Israel-Palestine "road map" is at a detour if not a dead end and prospects for Iraqi "democracy" are off the agenda for the time being. A go-it-alone "unilateralist” approach no longer seems so desirable and it clearly cannot work. [As predicted by some of the same naysayers including the French and German governments and much of the European public the aftermath, Cf war is not something the U.S. will want to face on its own, Tris dowhefil that the TIS. and British militaries will want to remain exposed on occupation duties without the company of other allied troops and the American people are unlikely to tolerate casualties among U.S. toops engaged in peacekeeping. Nor is it likely that Congress will be prepared to approve the funds required not just to rebuild Iraq far beyond the limits ofits prospective oil revenues but also to meet the other demands of efforts to transform the Middle East. When the U.S. intervened decisively in Iraq, America took on responsibility for the region's future. Washington will be judged severely for the durability of its commitment and degree of its success. ‘Not least, the U.S. must replace the stigma of having invaded a Muslim-Arab country with the reality of commitment to economic development, political reform and Arab-Israeli peacemaking. This means having allies, partners, and a UN Security Council resolution to pronounce legitimacy over the whole effort. ‘The United States and Europe are collectively the world’s great repository of economic strength, political stability, democratic culture and liberal impulses. All of this will be needed in Iraq, the rest of the Middle East and other parts of the world. ‘So Bush should make it a bear hug with Chirac and Schroeder and all the other members of the Group of Eight, including Vladimir Putin of ‘Russia. In this one telegenic gesture, certain to be reciprocated by all, Bush could end an unseemly, unproductive spat among countries that are fated by common interests and values to be allies and partners. This could set trans-Atlantic relations and U.S. policy in Iraq back on the Fight tack.j — RupeehEM EMA “Tat! Meld Tabata « May2e 202, “Bam mushenie. CY Tachons 63 AdacwMelnen ACEKONS E Melle yg” K TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE KEY TO A NEW PLAN FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ‘Timothy Garton Ash, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” ‘Beyond that, we have the Arab world, plagued by dictatorship and backwardness even amid its oil riches. US pressure on states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt is indispensable, but it is Europe that lies just across the Mediterranean—the middle sea which once united rather than divided the countries around it. It is to Europe that tens of thousands of young Arabs come every year, despairing of prospects in their own lands. Itis to Europe that Arab exports would naturally go if we opened our markets to them. And it is the EU that, by agreeing to open negotiations for Turkey’s membership, could signal to the whole wider middle east that a Muslim country with an Islamist government can be accepted as part of the liberal democratic west (or what I call the post-west). In short: you cannot do it without us; we cannot do it without you. R Gaen Meta — KEEKons @) Mickle a an US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE CRITICAL TO PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, hitp://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) Second, the rule of law. Americans and Europeans should seek to extend as widely as possible the institutions of civil society that originated in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century, that spread through most of Europe during the last half of the ‘twentieth century, and that provide the indispensable underpinnings of international order in the twenty-first century. A special effort should be made to include the Arab and wider Islamic world in this undertaking. The objective here is not world government, but rather the coexistence of unity with diversity, of power with principle, of leadership with consultation, that only democratic federalism is capable of providing. 0 DIW Relations © Mise S4I- Nato Fu A. Garen/Melntosh TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE KEY TO THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) A fourth area for transatlantic cooperation in the greater Middle East concerns the area’s long-term economic and political development, Many countries in the region have lagged behind the rest of the world in moving toward democratic societies and market ‘economies. Educational systems are in many instances not providing the skills needed for competing successfully in the modern world; women often are denied basic rights and opportunities. The rigid and brittle societies that result breed widespread frustration and disaffection—social characteristics conducive to radicalism and terrorism, Such societies are also prone to state failure, civil war, or both. 0 A. Garen/Mcintosh DIW 04 Retations G Me EAspato uy hy TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION SOLVES FOR REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning, May 11, 2004, US Department of State, Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: Bridging the Gap, http://www. state. gov/s/p/rem/32448.htm ‘We know that despite the efforts of some courageous individuals, change in the region will not come about by itself; the reform effort needs outside encouragement and support. We know there is no one-size-fits-all reform plan for all the countries in the region; we will have to tailor our policies to local conditions. We know supporting reform in the region is not a substitute for our engagement in the Middle East Peace Process. But the reverse is true as well: reform, dignity, and freedom. in the Middle East cannot wait until there is full peace between Arabs and Israelis. ‘And we know fundamental change won’t happen overnight; this is a generational challenge. Already we are seeing signs in the region that our efforts are having an impact. Indigenous calls for reform include the Arab Business Council conference in Aqaba in December; the Sana’a conference on democracy and human rights in January; the Alexandria Bibliotheca’s conference on Arab reform and the Beirut Civil Forum, both in March. We have strongly encouraged Arab League members to issue a credible call for reform at their Tunis summit, now rescheduled for later this month. A number of Arab leaders have told us of their intention to do just that. My colleagues and I are working on how best to implement the President’s strategic vision for broad transformation in the region. We need the cooperation and help of our European allies. We welcome your ideas. ‘ ‘We should build upon our existing engagement in the region. We can lear from each other. There is much the United States and the EU can do on their own, but when we combine resources, we bring a dynamism, a legitimacy and a strength that cannot be matched. Re nnima REGbvensS) BAL thw Peers Ye US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO BALKAN PEACE Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www useu,be/Categories/Defense/ June] 002HaassNATOAlliance.html, U.S-European cooperation is also essential to managing regional crises. Cooperation has been particularly close and successful in Southeast Europe where, after a shaky start, the United States and the EU have implemented sweeping judicial reforms in Bosnia in cooperation with the government, overseen peaceful elections in Kosovo, and concluded the Framework Agreement in Macedonia that likely prevented another Balkan war. ‘The United States played an important supporting role in the EU's success in brokering aan agreement between Serbia and Montenegro to preserve the Yugoslav Federation, Now, America and Europe need to keep the spotlight on the Balkan States to press ahead with political and economic reform and to deliver all remaining indicted war criminals to the Hague Tribunal. The Balkans were the first test. Together, the United States and Europe are passing it, but there is still work to do, and we will stay until it is done. As Secretary Powell has said: "We need to finish the job in the Balkans -- and we will. We went in together with the Europeans, and we will come out together.” DW agg ELIAS ® BAteAw Reece war SL A. Garen/Meintosh US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO BALKAN PEACE Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www useu.be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOAlliance.html, U.S-European cooperation is also essential to managing regional crises. Cooperation has been particularly close and successful in Southeast Europe where, after a shaky start, the United States and the EU have implemented sweeping judicial reforms in Bosnia in cooperation with the government, overseen peaceful elections in Kosovo, and concluded the Framework Agreement in Macedonia that likely prevented another Balkan war. ‘The United States played an important supporting role in the EU's success in brokering an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro to preserve the Yugoslav Federation. Now, America and Europe need to keep the spotlight on the Balkan states to press ahead with political and economic reform and to deliver all remaining indicted war criminals to the Hague Tribunal. The Balkans were the first test. Together, the United States and Europe are passing it, but there is still work to do, and we will stay until it is done. As Secretary Powell has said: "We need to finish the job in the Balkans ~ and we ‘will. We went in together with the Europeans, and we will come out together.” 2 ej GarenMetntosh — TREK EMSED Tre fexyz oe ly, EXPANDING US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS IS KEY TO A NEW TRADE ROUND AND SOLVING FOR DISEASE Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, hitp://www.cfr.org/pdf?Europe_TF.pdf) ‘Managing the Global Economy. As the task of reconstructing Iraq suggests, NATO's responsibilities extend well beyond the military realm. Its history has always paralleled that of the EU and will surely continue to do so. For this reason, security cooperation requires ‘economic cooperation. It follows, then, that Europeans and Americans must work together, not just to liberalize U.S.-European trade, ‘but also to ensure the successful completion of the current round of world trade negotiations. High-level consultations designed to produce a common approach to the Doha round are essential. Europeans and Americans must also pursue a long-term strategy for fostering economic growth and political liberalization in the developing world. Specific elements of such a strategy should include eliminating trade barriers with developing regions, particularly in the agricultural and textile sectors, and improving coordination among the assistance programs of individual countries, nongovernmental organizations, and major international institutions in order to increase efficiency and minimize waste. Europe should create an analogue to the Millennium Challenge Account so that American and European grants of economic assistance are made conditional on the same governance reforms and directed ina manner that maximizes their impact. Similarly, both Europeans and Americans should increase and coordinate their assis- tance to local and global efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. 4 DIW A. Garen/MeIntosh TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE KEY TO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM Hemy A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http:/www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) That fact suggests that a greater public emphasis on the economic benefits of the relationship might help leaders on both sides of the Atlantic resolve, or at least minimize, their political differ- ences. The U.S. and European economies depend heavily on one another; together they have a major impact on the international economy as a whole. The prospects for sustained expansion will be much greater if the movement toward integrating global trade and investment continues to move forward. This can hardly happen without a common U.S.-European approach.Nor, in the absence of such cooperation, is there likely to be a long-term strategy for fostering economic progress and the political liberalization it can bring within the developing world. Without such a strategy, ‘Americans and Europeans are likely to find themselves struggling with the consequences of illiberal regimes and failed states instead of attacking their root causes. vom a [RELATIons ©) TRADE ERO A. Garen/McIntosh G % US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR GLOBAL TRADE AND GROWTH Richard Haas, director of policy planning at the US state department, May 1, 2002, World Link, No. 3, Vol. 15, Pg. 28, p. lex Europe is both America's chief commercial rival and its most important partner in the international economic-policymaking arena. Shared responsibility should define our relationship in trade, finance and development assistance. Trade disputes are inevitable in an otherwise remarkably smooth § 2 trillion bilateral trade and investment relationship. Bound by internationally agreed rules governing dispute settlement, we must ensure that bilateral trade disputes do not spill over into other aspects of our relationship, permanently damage the enormously successful institutions we worked assiduously to create over a half-century ago or jeopardise our ability to conclude the Doha Round by 2005. ‘No new international financial architecture designed to predict, prevent or resolve financial crises can be achieved without agreement among the leading shareholders of the intemational financial institutions in Europe and the US. Through our millennium challenge account and the EU's commitment to increase development assistance, we have launched a new global partnership for development that increases accountability for rich and poor nations alike, linking greater contributions by developed nations to greater responsibility by developing nations. Although we will continue to have occasional disputes, the successful launch of the Doha Round demonstrated what can be achieved when the US and Europe cooperate to advance common interests in opening markets, restoring global economic growth and alleviating poverty. 4 DIW 04 NATO ‘A. Garen/Meintosh Ritus © Tade % Cram, US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ALLOW FOR THE INTEGRATION OF OTHER NATIONS INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY SOLVING FOR PEACE Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www usen,be/Categories/Defense/June1002Haa html, Defense against transnational threats is not our only task. The United States and Europe also share a positive agenda aimed at integrating other countries and peoples into arrangements that will sustain a world prosperity and justice as widely as possible. By shared interests I mean core principles such as democracy, open trade, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This process of integration has proceeded furthest in Europe. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, America joined Western Europe in a collective effort to create a Europe whole and free. This effort to consolidate the gains for democracy, free markets and stability throughout Europe and the independent states of the former Soviet Union will continue bilaterally and multilaterally through NATO, the EU and the OSCE. 6 77 ei Raantinon (REATEORE SY TRATEERI 2F THE CONTINUING DECLINE IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS. RESULT IN TRADING BLOCKS CRUSHING FREE TRADE The Observer, 6/22/03, Faisal Islam, p. lexis Throw in the fact that many in Europe believe that the US has unleashed the weapon of mass devaluation - a falling dollar - on the world economy and there's a whiff of the 1930s. Of beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations. Of disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariffs, Of the globalisation process tripping up and the dreaded deflationary spiral. "We haven't been here before; the probability of a catastrophe has increased markedly,' says Alan Winters, a leading trade economist from Sussex University. 'When the sympathy disappears from international trade talks then out come these weapons. I'd have no doubt that if the Americans push hard on GM, the EU will push right back over FSC. It's close to that really nasty scenario.’ Both parties can resort to a 'nuclear’ option. The EU's weapon - its Dollars 4bn list of WTO-approved sanctions to compensate for the FSC - is loaded and ready to fire at will. The US arsenal - similar 'counter-measures' to compensate for Europe's GM ban - is, being prepared. Fear of mutually assured destruction will prevent either side firing, itis said. But there are signs that the nuclear analogy is not quite on the money. The truth is that both sides are developing their alternatives to genuine multilateralism, If the impasse continues, both have fallback options based on regionalist free trade areas. Jagdish Bhagwati, the Columbia University economist considered high priest of free trade, has long argued that soundbite-loving politicians attach too much weight to the first ‘two words of the phrase 'free trade area’. He says: 'These blocs do not mean free trade.’ DIW ElLAtIO“S ©) ERAY Pree paro A. Garen/McIntosh STRONGER US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR IRANIAN PROLIFERATION Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) Iran is a second issue. Iran is experiencing considerable internal debate over the direction of its domestic polities and foreign policy. Americans and Europeans should coordinate their policies— if possible, with Russia as well—to ensure that Iranians fully understand how the international community will react to their dccisions regarding proliferation, support for terrorism, and democracy. The importance of encouraging political reform in Iran and neutralizing potential threats should give Europe and the United States a strong incentive to act in unison, 7 US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR IRANIAN AND NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION Senator Chuck Hagel September 2003, The Significance of the Transatlantic Partnership, http:/Avww. kas.de/proj/home/events/1/1/year-2004/month- Siveranstaltung_id-8401/ America and Europe share an interest in limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran could destabilize Northeast and Southwest Asia, regions Vital to the stability and prosperity of the global economy. Non-proliferation is therefore a global responsibility. The Bush Administration has wisely drawn China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea into our strategy of turning back North Korea’s nuclear ‘weapons program. American partnership with Europe and Russia, working through the International Atomic Energy Agency, is the best means of convincing Iran that nuclear weapons proliferation will only increase that regime’s isolation. Here again, America cannot go it alone. a DJW A. Garen/MeInto S SOWWE FVBO-AR at Vie UA STRONGER TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SOLVE FOR INDO- PAKISTANI CONFLICT AND KOREAN WAR Richard Haas, director of policy planning at the US state department, May 1, 2002, World Link, No. 3, Vol. 15, Pg. 28, p. lexis This successful experience in cooperating on European crises can be extended to other regions. We can strengthen our collaboration to help bring about an enduring ceasefire and a parallel political process in the Middle East. We can work to ensure Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide, focusing on key countries of concer. We have a mutual stake in preventing an Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and war on the Korean peninsula. Given the security, stability and prosperity that most of Europe enjoys today, we can afford to devote more of our diplomatic and economic resources to regional crises around the world. ‘Gare Melntosh RA aktors Dene Fon MP STRONG TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS SOLVE FOR THE GLOBAL PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVLEOPMENT Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www.cff.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) A third compatible interest grows out of the first two: to help other parts of the world, including the Arab and Islamic world, share in the benefits of democratic institutions and market economies. Democracy and markets have brought peace and prosperity to the Atlantic community—and hold out promise to do the same elsewhere. Europe and the United States can both set important standards and provide concrete assistance as different peoples follow their own pathways to democratic institutions and free markets. g2 DIW 04 ooo Benes NATO ‘A. Garen/Meintosh eee STRONG US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE KEY TO INTEROPERABLE FORCES WHICH SOLVE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM Ministry of Defence, 12/9/03, UK Defense Today, hntip://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsltem_id=2724 ‘What are the implications of these challenges for our Defence strategies? In meeting the global terrorist threat we must be prepared to conduct operations at relatively small scale but at short notice, at long range, and with high frequency. The relative importance of peace support and humanitarian operations is also likely to increase, as we recognise the contribution that state failure can make to terrorism and try to avoid a repeat of what happened, for example, in Afghanistan. ‘The range of tasks expected of our armed forces will be broad — from peacekeeping, humanitarian and confidence-building operations through to counter-terrorism and high-intensity combat against a diverse set of potential adversaries. Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand for enduring peace support commitments, such as the extended deployments that we have seen in the Balkans. The military to civil transition demands special skills. There is much to learn about how best to harness the full range of levers that nations and multinational institutions can bring to bear. In planning terms the Alliance must be better at recognising the long term nature of nation building. The multilateral response required will set a premium on the capacity of our forces to inter-operate with those of other countries. Itis highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged in high intensity large-scale operations without the United States, a judgement bom of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic trends. This will drive the technologically challenging and financially expensive requirement to inter-operate with the US. This will not just be in the ‘sof world of communications and information networks, but in the harder world of strategic deployment and training atthe most challenging level of military operations. Our European allies particularly in NATO and through ESDP also have a key part to play in our collective defence and security. It will be vital to inter-operate with them as well. For this to happen the Armed Forces of allies will have to link together on the battlefield through technology. To play a part nations must be able to plug into a multinational response at different layers. The key to retaining interoperability with the US, for our European allies as well as for the UK, is likely to rest in the successful operation of NATO’s new Allied Command for Transformation. Ags NATO yw Seater te x GaenMeitosh RE(akéons SOLve Elche [ TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE KEY TO GLOBA. STABILITY Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New ‘Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis A better approach to rebuilding the transatlantic relationship would aim at reconceiving it on the basis of comparative advantage, recognizing that what both parties do is essential and complementary. Europe may possess weaker military forces than does the United States, but on almost every other dimension of global influence it is stronger. Meshing the two sets of capabilities would be the surest path to long-term global peace and security. Each side would profit from being responsible for what it does best. Complementarity is the key to transatlantic reconciliation. BI rlahortng Oh wks od int/lwomm. ke, shill DIW 04 relahons : NATO a A. Garen/Melntosh A US- EUROPE RELATIONSHIP ZS KEY TO UNITY AD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION Werner Weidenfield. Coordinator @ Foreign Ministry of Fed, Rep. Of Germany. Summer 1997. The Washington Quarterly. Vol 20, No 3. P37. internal social and political changes taking place on both sides of the Atlantic will have several consequences on the transatlantic relationship 4 Both partes find themselves in a relatively serious identity crisis and lack a firm sense of direction. Its becoming increasingly difficult for Europé and the United States to calculate one another's actions - especially given the shifting political importance of economy, security, and culture. Under circumstances such as these, conflicts could be triggered very easily. Crises beyond the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), trade conflicts both within and outside the Western community and global challenges such as environmental pollution or nuclear terrorism have moved to the fore as topics demanding high-level political decision-making, yet the transatlantic partners have no commonly accepted guidelines for dealing with them. Differences on individual issues that have always existed are now becoming clearly visible and are being allowed to develop unchecked. Yet, for the foreseeable future, no alternative exists to the transatlantic relations that have developed over the last 50 years. Europe and the United States have created a network of relations unprecedented throughout the world; they have succeeded in building more common understanding concerning democracy, pluralism, human rights, and the market economy than has ever before existed. Moreover, this common understanding is accepted by, and serves as a model for, more and more nations all over the world. This fact is increasingly ignored or forgotten because the West lacks a common orientation and a new agenda to take into account altered external conditions. To establish transatlantic consensus, the West continues to use the old structures left over from the era of East-West conflict. But these structures cannot meet new challenges. New guiding principles for common action are needed to change the old backdrops and to forma consensus on how to tackle the tasks of the future. The ability of the Western partners to develop a new outline for a common direction in transatlantic relations will ultimately decide their fate. : If the West does not step up to this challenge, U.S.-Buropean relations seem headed for a cultural spit, one whose effects would radically question the structure of 50 years of transatlantic links. This split in the culture of political and social contact would not come about in the form of abrupt cuts or spectacular arguments. Rather, it would lead decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic in the medium term to drift apart in terms of their attitudes and subjective political and social designs, Signs of a possible start of this process have already become manifest inthe creeping erosion of bilateral links. Thus, the parliamentary contacts between Europe and the United States have recently been thinning visibly. According to U.S. insiders in the policy planning staff of the U.S. executive, the transatlantic relationship is also moving to the fringe of the operative radar screen. If this trend continues and extends to other fields, in the medium term the ability to conduct transatlantic policy will disappear. ‘As this erosion is below the surface, the whole extent of the current split would become vi repaired by using the reliable pattern of direct contacts and pulling the relevant strings. S ‘when politcal and social contacts are constantly cultivated and a high level of agreement toward the other. As the attitudes of leading opinion makers in Europe and the United 8 crisis management will aso vanish sible only when the damage coud © could no longer be ings ane ale ony nen hye ha ists concerning the expectations each has’ tates dit apart the basis for shore term steceest 3 = DIW 04 i K fF al A. Garen/McIntosh allidn, YE proven a soe, hural split A SPLIT IN THE US- EUROPE ALLIANCE LEAPS To & CULTURAL SPLIT WITH HUGE CoNs€QuUENCES Werner Weidenfield. Coordinator @ Foreign Ministry of Fed. Rep. Of Germany. Summer 1997. The ‘Washington Quarterly. Vol 20, No 3. P37. Tit would be desirabie if this were a process that resulted in positive gains for both sides. But itis entirely possible that the opposite will WES O Collapse Trade disputes are inevitable in the $2 trillion [82,000,000 million} transatlantic economic relationship. But, bound by internationally agreed rules governing dispute settlement, the United States and Europe must set an example for the world and ensure that bilateral trade disputes do not spill over into other aspects of the relationship, permanently damage the enormously successful institutions created over a half-century ago, or jeopardize the prospects for concluding the Doha Development Round by 2005. America and Europe must advance to the high ground and take the tough decisions necessary to expand the circle of benefits to the developing world. US-TIES TIES ARE KEY TO THE ECONOMY US Consulate General Frankfurt, May 5, 2004, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: EU Vs. USA?, http://www.usembassy de/frankfurt/speech05-05-04.htm Economics also drives the transatlantic relationship. We are each other’s largest investors and trading partners, Trade in goods and services between the U.S. and European Union amounted to $548 billion in 2002. Sales of U.S. affiliates in Europe for that same period were $1.4 trillion, and EU affiliates’ sales in the U.S. were comparable. Our combined investment in each other's economies was $1,376 billion. Both trade and investment levels are growing relative to GDP levels. EU affiliates in the U.S. employ 4.4 million people in the States, and U.S. companies employ 4.1 million people in the EU. If we include indirect employment, over 12 million people depend on transatlantic trade and investment for their jobs. We depend on each other for economic growth. Over the seven years from 1995 to 2002, the US accounted for fully 96% of the cumulative increase in world GDP. Nevertheless, the global economy cannot fly with only one engine. This shared interest in economic growth alone should keep us working together. 38 A. Garen/Mcintosh 7 A BOLSTERING US-EU RELATIONS IS KEY TO A NEW GLOBAL TRADE ROUND C. Fred Bergsten, Institute for International Economics AND Caio Koch-Weser Ministry of Finance, Germany, October 6, 2003, Institute for Intemational Economics, http://www iie.com/publications/papers/bergsten1003.htm, (Crichton) ‘The EU and the US are the world's only economic superpowers, as Japan has faded and China is still some time away from global pre-eminence. They inevitably bear responsibility for the effective functioning of the world economy. They cannot provide such leadership if they are battling against each other. They need to construct much more intensive mechanisms for consulting and co-operating on a wide range of global economic topics that will enable them to address both their bilateral problems and ‘common international challenges. No new institutions are needed. There is no need even for a formal announcement of the G2. It would work primarily through existing international institutions, both bilateral, such as the EU-US summits, and multilateral, such as the G7 and the WTO. A crucial objective would be to strengthen those institutions and the multilateral system. An informal G2 has existed for many years in the intemational trade arena, where cooperation between the EU and US has been the essential ingredient for the success of all three post-war rounds of global liberalization. Other countries, especially from the developing world, must of course also participate fully in any multilateral trade advances but the Doha round will succeed or fail largely on whether the two superpowers can agree on agriculture and a few other central topics. a1 A. Garen/McIntosh COOPERATION WITH THE EU PREVENTS PROLIFERATION Andrew Moravesik, Professor of Government and Director of the European Union Program at Harvard University, June 5, 2003, Foreign Affairs, Striking A New Transatlantic Bargain, p. lexis ‘The most reliable evidence of Iraq's weapons programs came from the years of UN- sponsored inspections, and even the Bush administration now concedes that the inspectors forced Saddam to dismantle, destroy, or displace many, and perhaps nearly all, of his WMD. One of the unexpected implications of the Iraq crisis is that although neither UN inspections nor American coercive diplomacy work very well alone, they can be extremely effective as complementary elements of a "good cop, bad cop" routine. This tactic would have been more effective had Europe been willing to sponsor thousands of "coercive" inspectors, a promising avenue for future EU collaboration. Posteonflict monitoring under appropriate multilateral auspices will be equally important, since American credibility has been undermined by prewar errors and exaggerations. Most important of all, the transatlantic commitment to strict controls over the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials might be harnessed to promote a stronger peacetime counterproliferation regime focused particularly on trafficking in WMD materials DIW a os nato YZ US-EV Tac. Beal Gong ¥ A. Garen/Melntosh A US-EUROPEAN TRADE DEAL WOULD SOLVE FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC RIFT C. Fred Bergsten, Institute for International Economics AND Caio Koch-Weser Ministry of Finance, Germany, October 6, 2003, Institute for International Economics, http://www iie.com/publications/papers/bergsten] 003.htm, (Crichton) Numerous other economic issues, though not yet ripe for G2 management, could quickly ‘move in that direction. Examples include: macroeconomic and currency policy, where a sharp and disorderly adjustment of the growing international imbalances would trigger new tensions, and where co-operation with the Asian currency area is vital; energy and environmental policy, where Europe views the US as a profligate polluter and where a new approach is badly needed; the emerging challenges of migration; and development policy towards the poorer countries. All these issues share the attributes of enormous economic impact, high political sensitivity and both transatlantic and global dimensions. The transatlantic relationship desperately needs a fresh conceptual foundation to replace the common enemy of the cold war era. A G2 would also help counter the chief foreign policy shortcomings of each partner: the US tendency to unilateralism and the European tendency towards introversion and fragmentation. Europe and the US must obviously make every effort to resolve their disagreements over Iraq and other security issues. But launching such a new economic strategy could go a long way to restore both the alliance mentality and the mechanisms that are so badly needed to close the continuing rifts across the Atlantic, A. Garen/Mcintosh DIW 04 US—-EU TRADE DEMt Gea NATO = rE Oat A EUROPEAN TRADE DEAL WOULD PREVENT A DECLINE IN RELATIONS AND STABILIZE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY C. Fred Bergsten, Institute for International Economics AND Caio Koch-Weser Ministry of Finance, Germany, October 6, 2003, Institute for International Economics, http://www iie.com/publications/papers/bergsten1 003.htm, (Crichton) ‘The mutual commercial interests of America and Europe, manifest in a billion dollars of daily trade and well over half a trillion dollars of corporate investment in both directions, have proven to be an anchor of stability throughout their sharpest disagreement over security matters in half a century. Indeed, having examined both the security and economic sides of the relationship, the Transatlantic Suategy Group, created in early 2002 by the Bertelsmann Foundation, whose economic component we co-chair, has concluded that Europe and the United States should launch a bold new economic initiative to help overcome lingering security problems and restore the traditional close relationship between the two allies. Such an initiative would also ensure that the alliance was not further jeopardized by problems on the economic side, which have been exacerbated by the breakdown of the recent World ‘Trade Organization meeting in Cancun. Those problems include the real threat of a trade ‘war posed by the several extant cases of threatened retaliation and counter-retaliation over Europe's restrictions on agricultural trade and America’s steel tariffs and tax subsidies for exports. We therefore propose that the European Union and the United States constitute an informal but far-reaching "G2 caucus", which would function as an informal steering committee to manage their own economic relationship and to provide leadership for the world economy. 2 Qnaa mone Cormmlhay kK all DIW 04 A. Garen/MeIntosh | % allance vie US- EUROPE INTEGRITIN TS Key TO COOPERATION AND COORDINATION Wermer Weidenfield. Coordinator @ Foreign Ministry of Fed. Rep. Of Germany. Summer 1997. The Washington Quarterly. Vol 20, No 3. P37. a ‘TPlayers on both sides of the Atlantic have felt the increasingly painful unraveling of the network of transatlantic relations, the lack of a Players mhew diction, and the ensuing dangers of substantial erosion of the U.S.-European partnership. Thus, politicians are, with #4 ff NATO, DIW kk relahons NATO A. Garen/McIntosh Const han, eed CONSULTATION ON MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES BULLDS STRONGER TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Dalia Dassa Kaye, assistant professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly, p. lexis Since the United States presented its national security strategy in the fall of 2002 with its prominent focus on the strategy of preemption, many Europeans have become suspicious of U.S. motives and objectives in maintaining global order. Although the war in Iraq only exacerbated European fears of a growing U.S. tendency to go it alone and engage in preemptive conflict, it also prompted the Europeans to begin drafting their own security strategy document, scheduled to be approved by the end of 2003. In an effort to avoid further marginalization after Iraq, the European document reflects many U.S. concerns, including the threat of terrorism and proliferation, but it also reflects distinct European positions and approaches to security issues. The formulation of documents such as this one allows a perfect opportunity for a transatlantic dialogue on the key questions that emerge from them, particularly the question of if and when preemption is a suitable strategy for addressing contemporary security challenges. Given that the Middle East is a central playground for the implementation of such strategies, an exchange of views on these documents could help foster cooperation on core Middle East policy issues. IO DIW 04 A.GarenMeintosh = Csulhag ~ relahans CONSULTATION ON SECURITY ISSUES IN OTHER REGIONS IS KEY TO EUROPEAN RELATIONS Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, |hutp://www useu.be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOAlliance html, Second, America and Europe must reorient their focus and energies beyond the borders of Europe. We want to know we have European pariners in confronting the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by an Iraq with such weapons, humanitarian tragedies in Africa, and the potential for instability in Latin America posed by narcoterrorism in Colombia. Only by addressing such regional and transatlantic challenges can the transatlantic relationship be relevant; only by being relevant can the transatlantic relationship withstand the inevitable disagreements and divergence. NATO (Ol DIW 04 consulhag » valuhars NATO. A. Garen/Meintosh DIALOGUE ON SECURITY ISSUES REVIVES TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Ralph Fucks, co-president of the Heinrich-Boll-Foundation, 2004, Dossier: Conflict With Iraq, http://www.boell.de/en/04_thema/1960.html understanding about trouble spots and potential threats in the coming decades and about an appropriate civil and military strategy to contain these risks. A second precondition lies in sorting out the future role of the United ‘Nations. Here too there is a need for compromise on both sides. It’s obvious that France’s and Russia’s new-found burning love for the UN Security Council is motivated by power politics: They can thus upgrade their own global political status and rein in the USA. It is a somewhat different case with Germany: Here one believes much more than in Paris and ‘Moscow in the "supremacy of law" and of a supranational regime that, following the example of the EU, increasingly constrains and replaces the sovereignty of nation states ~ an idea that may be rather foreign to Chirac and Putin aside from tactical games. + 02 DJW 04 Conga Inna, K Relahens NATO ‘A. Garen/Mcintosh EXPANDING CONSULTATION IS KEY TO RELATIONS Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www useu.be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOAliance.html, Last, but certainly not least, America and Europe must strengthen consultation - between the United States and the EU, within NATO, and at the bilateral level —- on the full range of regional and transnational issues. Current consultations and coordinated efforts on terrorism, Afghanistan and the Middle East are excellent models, It matters less where and in what forum such consultations take place. What is important is that the consultations are serious and, as was once said about voting in Chicago, they happen early and often. ]O3 com melabons DIW 04 NATO A GarenMeIntosh 7 eonSult ke, +o Ree, lite CONSULTATION TS KEY To evRopcan SUPPORT AND US LEADERSH/P Philip H. Gordon. Sr. fellow for policy @ Brooking Institute, Jan/Feb 2003. Foreign Affairs Vol 82, Issue 1. Academic Search premier. FSome, of course, would argue tha it does not matter whether the Germanys of this world ~ and theie $28 billion defense budgets -- Support the United States. And itis true that the United States, with a vast military budget and after a decade of spectacular econowaic Brow, seems as well placed as ever to go italone. Yet such an approach would be extremely shortsighted. The United States all needs its Bropean allies nor primarily for their military contributions ~ although even tat could change ina ew years if Washington continues to run up massive fiscal deficits and expands its military commitments around the world, Rather, even an all-powerful America will need Europe's politcal suppor, military bases, cooperation in international organizations, peacekeepers and police, money, diplomatic help with others, and general good will. The "war on terrorism” declared by the United States will not be a short-term military battle but a multidecade struggle not unlike the Cold War -- in which "soft power," diplomacy, legitimacy, allies, intelligence cooperation, and an ability to win hearts and minds throughout the world wll be as important as military power. Not to do the minimum necessary to ensure ‘hat Europeans remain positively disposed to American aims ~- or worse, to actually provoke Europe into playing a kind of "balancing" role ~~ would be to squander the potential advantages of a position of strength. ‘The United States maintained a sort of "European empire" so successfully in the past because it was what historian Geir Lundestad has called an "empire by invitation” — the United States was predominant in European affairs because Europeans wanted it to be, Today the United States risks alienating those itis most likely to need as twenty-fist-century allies. European sympathy and support for the United States will not disappear from one day to the next, but overtime, treating allies as if they do not matter could produce thal vety oulcuine; the United States would find itself with an entire European Union that resembles the common U.S. perception of France: resentful of American power, reluctant to lend political support and our to counter American interests at every turn. lo DIW 04 NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh Tensult bo Reta: US CosurTation ZS KEY To wit ‘s STATUS Robert E. Hunter. vice president for international politics and director of European Studies at CSIS. May 26, 2003, Intemational Herald Tribune, “Bush must ease g-8 frictions.” Ti view ofthe crucial importance of public opinion on Security issues, NATO's status as @ voluntary alliance that any of its members can Heave unilaterally assumes a new aspect. Inthe past, this was NATO's moral strength, In the fare ie ‘may become a practical weakness, G NATO members most work harder thn ever before to understand cach other's concerns, ifthe alliance isto be preserved. Much of the work Q win fat tothe United Stas, which more ban ece ane expected to consult allies in advance of major decisions and public statements, J keep them well informed. of developments in Washington during crises, and listen Patiently to their views, taking the time to explain and § defends dcsson before hey ae enced, ne ‘All one does see, to the extent one can judge here, is that the president and his people are saying, "This is the direction we want to go. The alliance is important to us. Let's line it up." In other words, I think he's leamed an awful lot in the last couple of years. [He's learned that] going to the United Nations is a positive thing, not a negative thing, and that working with the alliance pays rich dividends. People want America to succeed; they can't succeed without us, They'll swallow hard. A lot of people didn't like the war in Iraq, but they say, "We now have no choice, and if we have an America that reaches out to us, then"-this will sound patronizing~they will say, "Like the prodigal son, we will welcome America back and put it in the driver's seat." cc NATO 7: am DIW 04 A. Garen/McIntosh CENU INE CMSulTAtion MEANS NATO SAYS YES ea 5 G Mink CR IDEIDY Cons ue ltuhen Supeerk for jorrpatal s Pred Chernoff. ‘Associate Professor of Political Science @ Colgate Univ, 1998, After Bipolarty. P21@_ IF the aim is t look at how communication indicates the use of information in the cybemetic and neoliberal theories, then the breadth of commumicarn ‘ight be inadequate, When one examines alliance members’ resentment on mcction in decisions, it i important to look at how, no just how many, States are involved in the decisions. One must consider whether all the state, wholes ea al 7s, whether some had access to more information, and. _—_ sreiher some were consulted in a more significant way, e-g., by being Conant offered chance to inal decision. Communication be- ‘Seen the sponsor ofa proposal and others helps to provide information from YE fone party to others, But two-w. wunication giv — have their concems heard and addressed and thus gives them pportunity to think that their participation played a role in sha, the case. Coding for the depth measure is based on the nuraber of meetings of officials who were consulted, onthe level of those officia Within their governments, and on whether they were being asked for thei, [ a i erectidely atended would constitute high breadth but low depth, So the FeRREY. the intensity, and the nature of consultations might lead states to feel their interests are taken into account in the Tormulslion oF polices an tha, Ta theoy fo Be more wlig osuppon ies oe ‘e cass in which communieations here ate depth but little breadth That is group of states particularly important for a specifi issue might consult intensely without attempting to bring all or most NATO wena into the consultations. \, "aia lf \ ee MAYO S* = W oe 5 NATO SUPPORTS THE UN HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirmed today the enduring value of the ‘transatlantic link and of NATO as the basis for our collective defence and the essential forum for security consultation between Europe and North America. Our 26 nations are united in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and faithful to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Inspired b the common vision embodied in the Washington Treaty, we remain full committed to the collective defence of our populations, territory and forces. Transatlantic cooperation is essential in defending our values and meeting common threats and challenges, from wherever they may come. oe MATO S4ys yes: Suporte yw ae eH EUROPEAN NATIONS LOVE THE UN — MEANS THEY SAY YES UPI 1/29/04, GARETH HARDING, P. LEXIS But in Brussels -- where Secretary-General Kofi Annan is currently receiving red-carpet treatment -- the international organization is viewed as a champion of peace and justice and a bulwark against the more unilateralist tendencies of the United States. On Thursday, Annan was presented with the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought in front of a packed assembly of parliamentarians, past winners of the award and relatives of the Baghdad bomb attack -- which killed 22 U.N. officials last August. At the end of a speech in which he hailed the EU asa "shining light of tolerance, human rights and international cooperation," the Ghanaian-born diplomat received a standing ovation, and a shower of praise from parliamentarians across the political spectrum, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, whose country holds the rotating presidency of the EU, said he could think of "no more fitting recipient of this prize than Secretary-General Annan and his colleagues," Parliament President Pat Cox described the speech as "outstanding," while Green group leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit said Annan's oratory had “echoes of Martin Luther King." Itis not difficult to see why Annan, and the organization he heads, is held in such high esteem in the self-styled EU capital. Like the United Nations, the BU prides itself on taking a multilateral approach to global affairs. It believes international law is paramount, prefers diplomatic pressure to saber rattling and is an active supporter of the Kyoto treaty on climate change and the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The Bush administration opposes both Kyoto and the ICC, favors a muscular use of military force and has a distinctly unilateralist. approach to international relations. Speaking before the European Parliament Thursday, Cowen said: "A stronger international society, a rules-based international order and strong international institutions are critically important EU objectives and central to this is the EU's support for a strengthened United Nations." The EU is already the biggest financial contributor to the U.N. system, underwriting almost 38 percent of the organization's annual budget, over two-fifths of peacekeeping operations and half of all member states’ donations to U.N. funds and programs, The Brussels-based bloc is also playing an increasingly active role in U:N.-sanetioned peacekeeping operations. Last June, following a request from Annan, the EU sent troops to the Congo and it is gradually taking over policing operations in the Balkans from the UN. and NATO. /21 : 70°, REwearetnn MATO Srzs Yor: Suppor yr Vg EUROPEAN NATIONS SUPPORT THE UN - MEANS NATO SAYS YES Javier Solana, secretary general of the council of the EU, 6/29/04, Business World, p. lexis ‘The EU is committed to the development of a stronger international society, well- functioning international institutions and a rule-based intemational order. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations (UN) Charter, and the EU will support the further strengthening of the UN, including its capability to act when required in conflict and crisis management situations. The EU is also committed to the effective functioning and development of other essential components of this multilateral world order, such as the World Trade Organization and the international Criminal Court, 1QQ mannan URE SAYS JOS Bee ceeceny” V2 NVAXO Suppets Feace Kegping Bremts, HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 39. Since its creation two years ago, the NATO-Russia Council has raised the quality of the relationship between the Alliance and Russia to a new level, to the benefit of the entire Euro-Atlantic area. We reaffirm our determination to broaden our political dialogue and are committed to deepening our consultations on key security issues, including Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery. Our practical cooperation has progressed further, including in military-to-military projects. Through our efforts to improve interoperability, we have also laid the groundwork for future operational support to NATO forces, including for potential joint peacekeeping operations. We welcome the progress made in advancing practical cooperation on theatre missile defence, civil emergency planning, the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, and search and rescue at sea. We look forward to making further progress in implementing the Rome Declaration of May 2002, working together as equal partners in areas of common interest. (23 A OateuMetntosh WAKO SAYS Yoo: Fecotag ey” oy NATO SAYS YES TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS Western Daily Press 6/29/04, p. lexis They are involved in peacekeeping in Afghai the new Iraqi security forces, and have been involved in the former Yugoslavia. Also, Nato amounts to the institutionalisation of the transatlantic link. This makes it the chief forum for discussion for the countries involved. ‘As long as Nato is involved, the US can't do exactly what it wants. The process has to work by concensus. It is an important place for allies to sit down and talk through important issues. oe VATO sex Ves Law Log NATO SAYS YES - LAUNDRY LIST HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 3. Today, we have: ~- decided to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Foree (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including through several more Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and by enhancing our support for the upcoming elections; ~- agreed to conclude the Alliance's successful SFUR [Stabilization Force] operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and welcomed the readiness of the European Union to deploy a new and distinct UN-mandated Chapter VII mission in the country, based on the Berlin Plus arrangements agreed between our two organisations; -- confirmed that a robust KFOR [Kosov Force] presence remains essential to further enhance security and promote the political process in Kosovo; -- decided to enhance the contribution of Operation Active Endeavour, our maritime operation in the Mediterranean, to the fight against terrorism; -- decided to offer assistance to the Government of Iraq with the training of its security forces, in conformity with the separate statement that we have issued on Iraq; ~- agreed on an enhanced set of measures to strengthen our individual and collective contribution to the international community's fight against terrorism; ~- decided to further the transformation of our military capabilities to make them more modem, more usable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions; -- reaffirmed that NATO's door remains open to new members, and encouraged Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue the reforms necessary to progress towards NATO membership; ~- taken a number of steps to further strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, in particular through a special focus on engaging with our Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia; and -- decided to enhance our Mediterranean Dialogue and to offer cooperation to the broader Middle East region through the "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative." (Qs RGaren/Meinosh ~— WATO SAYS Yes: Mutagen polices NATO APPROVES OF MULTILATERAL POLICIES HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 45. Today's complex strategic environment demands a broad approach to security, comprising political, economic and military elements. We are united in our commitment to such an approach. The Alliance is conducting challenging operations in regions of strategic importance; transforming its capabilities to meet the new threats; and working ever more closely together with partner countries and other international organisations in atruly multilateral effort to address common security concerns. While NATO's ‘transformation continues, its fundamental purpose -- based on thc common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law -- endures: to serve as an essential transatlantic forum for consultation and an effective instrument for Europe and North America to defend peace and stability, now and into the future, DIW hat NATO A. Garen/Melntosh MAXOSAYS 7 NATO SUPPORTS ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND MILITARY REFORM HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 18. We welcome the progress made in the transformation of the Alliance's military capabilities. This is a long-term endeavour, which must continue if NATO is to be able to perform the full range of its missions in a challenging security environment and respond to its operational commitments and the threats we face today, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to sustain operations over distance and time. AGwenMeinesn _MATO Ss OMe NATO STATES HATE LANDMINES - MEANS THEY’D SAY YES Richard A. Matthew, Professor in the School of Social Ecology at the University of California at Irvine, AND Ken R. Rutherford, a university fellow and doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, 6/1/99, International Journal on World Peace, p. lexis Finally, it is important for the US to coordinate its military practices with those of its allies and friends. To date, every NATO member has signed the Ottawa treaty except ‘Turkey, and every state in the Western Hemisphere has signed except Cuba, which maintains that it will sign once the US does. As a non-signatory to the treaty the US can be more easily isolated, hath legally and politically, on a range of military and diplomatic issues. With ratification of the Ottawa treaty, NATO countries may soon demand that the US military abide by the Ottawa commitments. This would mean the withdrawal of US antipersonnel landmine stockpiles, including mixed mine systems, from NATO countries. Some anti-ban advocates argue that US force reduction requires continued use of landmines as a force multiplier. However, in the changing post-Cold War world, the US is increasingly reliant on its allies as force multipliers, Conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Rwanda have required multi-national responses. Continued US reli ance on landmines adds to the difficulty of managing such operations. NATO STATES HATE LAND MINES - MEANS THEY SAY YES Defense News May 31, 2004, p. lexis Every NATO nation, except the United States and two new member states, has joined the Mine Ban Treaty. In doing so, U.S. allies have demonstrated that they can accomplish their missions and protect their troops with weapon systems available now. [2g DIW NATO A.GarenMetntosh MATEO SAYS YEs: Th4Q EUROPEAN NATIONS APPROVE OF INCREASING SUPPORT FOR THE MNF - MEANS THEY SAY YES European Report, 6/30/04, P. LEXIS The US and the EU pledged to help reduce Iraq's estimated Euro 100 billion foreign debt and to support the training of Iraqi security forces. The statement said it also supported United Nations’ help in rebuilding Iraq and setting up elections no later than January 31, 2005, The US and EU support the mission of the multinational force for Iraq, which includes protecting the UN presence there. 'We recognize the vital need to combat terrorism and maintain security and stability in Iraq,’ the declaration said, 'We stress the need for full respect of the Geneva Conventions. We also support the training and equipping of professional Iraqi security forces, capable of assuming increasing responsibility for the country's security,’ it said. The statement supported "the continued and expansive engagement of the United Nations in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty" and the leaders pledged to provide support and assistance for the process leading to national elections for the Transitional National Assembly no later than January 31, 2005. AGacwMenon WATO SA7S YescDR4q “ EUROPEAN NATIONS WANT TO SEE GREATER SUPPORT IN IRAQ Chattanooga Times Free Press, 6/27/04, Terence Hunt, p. lexis, The United States and the European Union offered strong support for Iraq's urgent, request for NATO military help Saturday. "NATO has the capability and, I believe, the responsibility to help the Iraqi people defeat the terrorist threat that’s facing their country," President Bush said. "I think the bitter differences of the war are over," Bush said at the close of a U.S.~ European Union summit. "There is a common interest and a common goal to help the Iraqi people." ‘The United States and the European Union agreed in a joint statement to back Iraq's request for NATO military aid to support the training of Iraqi security forces, and to reduce Iraq's international debt, estimated to be $120 billion. Diplomats said later Saturday that NATO nations have reached a tentative agreement on plans to help train Iraq's armed forces. [20 eo NATO SAYS Yes 15 AQ NATO NATO SUPPORTS INCREASING TROOPS IN IRAQ Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, NATO secretary general, 6/22/04, The International Herald Tribune, p. lexis Currently NATO is supporting the Polish-led division in Iraq, and many North Atlantic allies have troops on the ground in a national capacity. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 reflects the international community's resolve to support the interim government. It makes sense for NATO to discuss whether the allies could play a further role if asked to do so. 13) DIWw RO GmewMenon MATOSAYS Yes pay” EUROPEAN NATIONS SUPPORT PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN SUDAN European Report, 6/30/04, P. LEXIS In other declarations and statements issued at the close of the brief summit, the United States and EU agreed to: *Better combat terrorism by sharing data on lost and stolen passports, work more closely on hunting down terrorist financing networks and increasing cooperation between law enforcement agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. *Expand cooperation to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. *Back continued peace talks to end 20 years of civil conflict in southern Sudan, and advance efforts being made by the United Nations to bring ‘peace to all Sudan and address humanitarian and human rights crises in Darfur in western Sudan, A. Garen/Metntosh NKe S* . = EUROPEAN NATIONS SUPPORT PEACEKEEPING IN CONGO. Panafrican News Agency Daily Newswire 6/17/04, p. lexis Brussels, Belgium (PANA) - European Commissioner for foreign policy and common security, Javier Solana has reiterated the European Union's support for the transitional process in troubled DR Congo, and urged political stakeholders to exhibit responsibility in the task of instilling peace and stability to the country. Solana was speaking Wednesday during a meeting with DR Congo Foreign Minister Antoine Ghonda, who is on a working visit to Brussels, according to a statement issued here Thursday. A. Garen/Melntosh Dy NAO YS“ AS eisee” NATO SUPPORTS PEACEKEEPING IN AFGHANISTAN HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 4, Contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority. NATO's leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force demonstrates the readiness of the North Atlantic Council to decide to launch operations to ensure our ‘common security NATO's aim is to assist in the emergence of a secure and stable Afghanistan, with a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, integrated into the international community and cooperating with its neighbours. Establishing and sustaining peace in Afghanistan is essential tu the well- being of the Afghan people and to our shared struggle against terrorism. We remain committed to that cause and pledge to contribute to ISAF the forces necessary for successful completion of our mission in Afghanistan. DIw NATO ‘A.GuenMeintosh VATO SAYS Yes-BALK Ave Ss NATO SUPPORTS PEACEKEEPING IN THE BALKANS HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis, 7. The security environment in the strategically important region of the Balkans is stable but remains fragile. The Alliance remains committed to peace and stability in the Balkans, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the countries in the region. We will remain committed until peace and security are firmly established and the progressive integration of all Balkan countries into Euro-Atlantic structures is achieved. All the countries of the region must assume ownership of, and implement, pressing reforms. Closer cooperation in their own region will help to promote stability and prosperity. While welcoming improvement in cooperation with the Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where it has occurred, we stress that all countries concerned must cooperate fully with the ICTY, in particular bringing to justice all those who are indicted by the Tribunal, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, as well as Ante Gotovina, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1503 and 1534, (2 a NATO A.GarenMelntosh VATO SAYS YEs—kocouo NATO SUPPORTS UN PEACEKEEPING IN KOSOVO HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 9. In Kosovo, a robust KFOR presence remains essential to further enhance security and promote the political process. We reaffirm our commitment to a secure, stable and multi- ethnic Kosovo, on the basis of full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the agreed Standards before Status Policy and the Standards Review Mechanism. We strongly condemn the outbreak of violence resulting in the loss of lives and the destruction of religious and cultural heritage sites in March 2004, and will not tolerate any such actions intended to undermine the political process. We call on all Parties to speed up the reconstruction and to create conditions for the safe return of displaced persons. We urge all communities to work constructively towards meeting the temationally endorsed standards, to engage in dialogue at all levels, and to participate in local civic institutions. We also call on them to conduet, and participate in, the upcoming October elections in a fair and peaceful manner. We welcome the appointment by the U.N. Secretary General of Mr. SA/ren Jessen-Petersen as his Special Representative in Kosovo. To further progress, NATO will continue to work with the UN,, the EU, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and other international organisations, as well as the Contact Group, including, as appropriate, attendance at its meetings. [36 Dw NATO A. Garen/McIntosh (A To rs yes: to-em Frees, NATO SUPPORTS TERRORISM PREVENTION POLICIES HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis, 13. We strongly condemn terrorism, whatever its motivations or manifestations, and will fight it together as long as necessary. The Alliance provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism, which requires the closest possible cooperation of North America and Europe. We are committed to continue our struggle against terrorism in all its forms, in accordance with international law provisions and UN. principles. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, will include the full implementation of United Nations Security Council Kesolution 1373 on the fight against terrorism, and will continue to be multi-faceted and comprehensive, including political, diplomatic, economic and, where necessary, military means. Continuing terrorist acts, including in Istanbul last year and in Madrid in March of this year, have shown the acute threat which tetrorism continues to pose around the world. Defence against terrorism may include activities by NATO's military forces, based on decisions by the North Atlantic Council, to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad, against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any member state, including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them. We have accordingly agreed today an enhanced set of measures to strengthen our individual and collective contribution to the international community's fight against terrorism, including the need to prevent WMD from being acquired by terrorists. These measures include: -- improved intelligence sharing between our nations, including through our Terrorist ‘Threat Intelligence Unit and a review of current intelligence structures at NATO. Headquarters; ~- a greater ability to respond rapidly to national requests for assistance in protecting against and dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and, in this regard, continued robust support for the NATO Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion; = assistance to protect selected major events, including with NATO Airborne Early Warming and Control Aircraft; --an enhanced contribution to the fight against terrorism by Operation Active Endeavour; -- a continued robust effort through our operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan to help create conditions in which terrorism cannot flourish; ~- enhanced capabilites to defend against terrorist attacks, including through our programme of work to develop new, advanced technologies; and -- increased cooperation with our partners, including through the implementation of our Civil Emergency Action Plan and the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, and with other international and regional organisations, including the active pursuit of consultations and exchange of information with the European Union. a7 Dw = NATO A. Garen/Melnwsh vronismn Fre Am S yes EUROPEAN NATIONS FAVOR TERRORISM PREVENTION POLICIES - MEANS NATO SAYS YES Javier Solana, secretary general of the council of the EU, 6/29/04, Business World, p. lexis Terrorism seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and poses a ‘growing threat to all our citizens: Terrorist movements are increasingly well-resourced, interlinked across the globe and willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. The EU is determined to confront the terrorist threat relentlessly and comprehensively. EU countries agreed earlier this year the appointment of a counterterrorism coordinator to improve coordination and visibility of the EU's actions. EU member states are cooperating ever more closely in Europol, sharing criminal and operational intelligence, and have agreed that strengthening the fight against terrorist financing must be a priority for the EU in the coming months. The EU will continue to develop initiatives for closer cooperation with international organizations, particularly the UN, and efforts to counter terrorism will be a key element in our political dialogue with third countries. [3¥ 1 Oaren/Metntosh NAO SAYS Yes: WUMAW/ TRAC teere. NATO IS AGAINST THE TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS HEADS OF NATO COUNCIL 6/28/04, State Department, “NATO Council Reaffirms Collective Defense Role in Europe and Beyond; CommuniquA(C) condemns attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan,” p. lexis 30. NATO has adopted a comprehensive policy to contribute to international efforts to combat the trafficking in human beings, which constitutes a flagrant abuse of human rights and fuels corruption and organised crime. We are also determined to work together with our Partners to support international efforts, where NATO can add value, to combat this and other forms of illegal trafficking. 137 eM (Vi ATO SAys Yes— ace ae ‘= EUROPEAN NATIONS SAY YES TO POLICIES RELATING TO ec THE PEACE PROCESS. Dalia Dassa Kaye, assistant professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly, p. lexis Despite growing frustration that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have implemented the road map -- and European concern that the United States did not invest heavily enough in the effort -- the road map constitutes the first joint U.S.-European effort to produce a peace plan. The Quartet has also served to coordinate European positions, helping to avoid the inclination for unilateral initiatives from major European powers that have tended to erode Washington's confidence in a European partner in the past. Thus, even while regional developments (most notably continued terrorism and settlement activity) undermine the Quartet's road map, the common U.S. and European fear of continued violence and its potential to destabilize the broader region provides a strong incentive for transatlantic cooperation in this ongoing conflict. 140 Dw NATO ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh Genuine Consu Eeq Re, INGENUINE CONSULTATION UNDERMINES RELATIONS EVEN ON ISSUES NATO APPROVES, Stanley R. Sloan, senior specialist in international security policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 7/25/97, Christian Science, p. lexis Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. ‘When the Clinton administration revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not surprised that the United States and several other allies would only support a smaller group. But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power, using its impressive position of strength to have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern European country that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way it was wrapped.” US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to “lobbying” for other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible. However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very best example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is “damned if it does, and damned if it does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply reflects a Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-European relations would have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would have been the same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided. /4/ DIW NATO ‘A. Garen/Melntosh a iP GENUINE CONSULTATION IS KEY Klaus Larres, Kissenger Professor in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress, Spring 2003, The Washington Quarterly, “Mutual Incomprehension,” Vol. 26, No. 2, P. 23, p. lexis In fact, Schroder saw embarking on a war in Iraq not only as a distraction from the pursuit of global terrorism but even as greatly counter-productive as it might further radicalize anti-Western opinion in the Middle East and elsewhere. Rather than forcefully remove Saddam, Berlin felt Washington should expend greater efforts to obtain the long overdue resolution of the Israel-Palestine problem, arguing that this step would most contribute to regional stability and help prevent the further development of anti-Western sentiment and terrorist onslaughts. Furthermore, the Schroder government believed preemptive military action to be a breach of intemational law, which would set a dangerous international precedent; and he viewed the U.S. government's general tendency to inform rather than consult its NATO allies in the fight against terrorism with great skepticism, fearing that Washington would neglect to consult with its allies specifically over whether or not an invasion of Iraq should occur. Schroder even told a journalist that “consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told, 'We are going in.'" n9 142 Diw NATO A. Garen/Melntosh FA Veaone TO GENUINELY CONSULT NATO ALLIES FOSTERS RESENTMENT Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, 2003, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis There is much to be said for assertive American leadership. As developments over the past decade -- from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans to Central Asia -- have shown, Washington's willingness to lead often seems to be the only way to get the rest of the intemational community to act. But itis also clear that when taken too far, assertive Jeadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States. Few have put this argument better than did candidate Bush when, in October 2000, he warned that potential allies around the world would "welcome" a humble United States but "resent" an arrogant one. The Bush team’s policies, however, thus far seem to have been based on the opposite premise. Telling allies that if they do not support Washington's approach to the war on terrorism, they are "with the terrorists," slighting key NATO allies (and NATO itself) in Afghanistan, and refusing genuine consultations before important decisions seem far more likely to foster resentment than to muster support. Whatever the merits of the administration's opposition to the long list of multilateral agreements it has fought since coming to office -~ and many of those agreements were genuinely flawed -- it should hhave been clear that the United States could not abruptly pronounce the Kyoto Protocol “dead,” seek to undermine the International Criminal Court, raise tariffs on steel and increase agricultural subsidies, and oppose a range of arms control agreements without such actions’ having a cumulative impact on the attitudes of European leaders and publics toward the United States. The September 2002 German election, where for the first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed come at a price. DIW enutine Gong % NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh S Ekin GENUINE CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES IS KEY TO RELATIONS AND PREVENTING BACKLASH Stewart Patrick, research associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, 9/22/01, World Policy Journal, No. 3, Vol. 18; Pg. 2, p. lexis ‘The United States has been aptly described as a reluctant sheriff," called upon to assume international leadership but uneasy about the burdens of being the world’s policeman. (25) Any sheriff, and especially a reluctant one, requires reliable deputies. To ensure the support of followers, the Bush administration would be wise to broaden its concept of American leadership and to devote greater attention to cultivating foreign partners. This implies not simply taking the initiative but also forging consensus about the nature of global challenges and desirable responses to them. This leadership will be more enduring if the administration reassures partners that it is sensitive to their concerns, commits to genuine and timely consultations before taking firm positions, avoids the temptation to veto proposals out of hand, and is prepared to compromise on the objectives and forms of collective action. "Ifnegotiations were at the center of Cold War diplomacy," Richard Haass has written, "consultations must form the core of post-Cold War foreign Policy.” (26) Early in its tenure, the Bush administration ran into trouble by abruptly repudiating the Kyoto Protocol, apparently without consulting America's foreign partners. Perhaps in response to the ensuing diplomatic outcry, ‘the White House took a somewhat different tack on national missile defense, dispatching senior foreign policy and defense officials to Europe, Japan, Russia, India, and China, Yet despite an espoused commitment to consultations, an impression has remaii to a willingness to listen to foreign views while holding unswervingly to fixed positions. Some conservatives applaud this minimalist version of consultation trick to unilateralism—doing what you think is tight, regardless of what others think- pretend you are not acting unilaterally at all," writes conservative Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer. "The best unilateralism is velvet glove unilateralism." 27) But it is open to question how long America's foreign partners will accept a "don't ask, do tell” version of consultations, whereby Washington simply informs others of its plans, rather than sitting down with them to engage in good faith give-and-take and hammering out a satisfactory compromise among divergent ints. It has been a long- standing American presumption that multilateral frameworks should confirm existing USS. positions and that global regimes should constrain other countries' policies, rather than its own. To lead the world into a second American. century, the United States will need to tame its instincts for unbridled freedom and rein in its yearning for the open range. 14 DIW 2, NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh Uthe Cevsultetion ESD) INSINCERE CONSULTATION IS SEEN AS CONDESCENDI CRUSHING RELATIONS Klaus Larres, Kissenger Professor in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress, Spring 2003, The Washington Quarterly, “Mutual Incomprehension,” Vol. 26, No. 2, P. 23, p. lexis Despite Washington's belated October -- November 2002 appeal to the Security Council to seek a resolution on how to deal with Saddam's WMD, the general public in continental Europe, particularly in Germany, continued to believe that Bush and his closest advisers had already made up their minds and were merely looking for an excuse to invade Iraq, regardless of what the country’s European allies might say. This Perception led to the firm conviction throughout Germany and most of continental Europe that the Bush administration displayed a "condescending indifference to outside opinion," with Powell representing "the lone voice of multilateral moderation in Bush's administration." n29 The author Salman Rushdie neatly captured how the Europeans feel: "Unilateralist action by the world's only hyperpower looks like bullying because, well, it is bullying,” n30 14S DIW NATO A. Gare/Melntosh ( LAU ACCENSULTA Ty Ke GENUINE CONSULTATION WITH EUROPEAN NATION TO RESTORING RELATIONS Philip H Gordon is senior fellow in foreign policy studies and director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” WHAT WE need is a “new deal,” and that’s what I am writing to propose: Americans will have to show some humility, admit that we do not have all the answers and agree to listen, consult and even compromise. We must accept that even our immense power and new sense of vulnerability does not mean that we can do whatever we want, however we want, We must acknowledge that we need allies to achieve our goals, which means bringing others into the decision- making process, however frustrating that process might be. On a range of issues that have divided the US and Europe in recent years—from climate change and nuclear testing to international law—Americans will have to recommit to seeking practical compromises with others, rather than assuming that our power exempts us from obligations to the global community. S KEY 14, DIW 04 : A.GarewMelnosh — 9ure consultuhon # NATO alliance Nonggoume coasultahos suk disquiet US unilarera lions Richard N. Haass. vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings. 1999. Transatlantic Tensions. P_234 Y still, consultations are critical. Surely ‘he U.S. adminieation of the day needs ¢o.avoid “Consulting” onlyéafier ir has derermined ii own, policy, be it by executive decision or congressional fia. p efforts to build European support for a common approach to India and Pakiscan_in the their May 1998 nuclear rests—and after the Clinton administ ‘Sane mandated by USS legislation salkation docs litle mors x Pour cans IE Ite DIW 04 Znu17 ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh ee consultahen NATO alliance Genune and dee consulfibons oe mosh Important de tee arnetl of bre Alliance. Fred Chernoff. Associate Professor of Political Science @ Colgate Univ. 1995, After Bipolarity. P2647 ‘The DAMC presents the conditions under which alliance cooperation ‘occur; it Tollows the neoliberal institutional theory in distinguishing Elaims about cooperation in the context of alliance maintenance from those “c= nn Shout alliance formation. The DAMC offers an explanation only for the former and shows that security cooperation may continue, but only under certain conditions, namely, that national leaders and bureaucracies uses the to discuss policy proposals and help influence their final form. They can do {his only i they pay greater attention to diplomatic requirements. High levels fof cooperation are likely when there ate high values fr atleast three of the e lets If threat drops to a Tow level, as it has in the 900s, and remains low, coopeTaion 1s Sl tikely as long as the values for the other three factors afe high, From a practical, policy standpoint the. arable ati os import the dah of conmaestin- Oe eabe interests are suDsGInUaly affected by a decision, those states mist be brought jnto the decision-making process and allowed to help shape it, If the United States and its allies recognize the importance of involving other sties ii genuine and ds ions, according, ae aTanes should, -beabefo-continue into the foreseeable fut. os 149 Pypeie consalinron oul DIW 04 A.Garen/Melntosh CO ay in C Wltaiy, & al NATO REFUSING GENUINE CONSULTETW CREATES OPPOSITION TOWARDS THE US Philip H. Gordon, Sr. fellow for policy @ Brooking Institute. Jan/Feb 2003. Foreign Af : ‘Academic Search premier. = ign Affairs Vol 82, Issue 1. "There is much to be said for assertive American leadership, As developments over the past decade ~ from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans to Central Asia have shown, Washington's willingness to lead often seems to be the only way to get the rest of the international community to act. But it is also clear that when taken too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point ‘where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States. Few have put this argument better than did candidate Bush when, in October 2000, he warned that potential allies around the world would "weleome” a humble United States but "resent" an arrogant one. The Bush team’s policies, however, thus far seem to have been based on the opposite premise. Telling alles that if they do not support Washington's approach tothe war on terrorism, they are "with the terrorists,” sighting key NATO allies (and NATO itself) in Afghanistan, and refusing genuine consultations before important decisions seem far more likely to foster resentment than to muster support. Whatever the merits of the administration's opposition to the long list of multilateral agreements it has fought since coming t0 office --and many of those agreements were genuinely flawed ~ it should have been clear that the United States could not abruptly pronounce the Kyoto Protocol "dead," seek to undermine the International Criminal Court, raise tariffs on steel and increase agricultural subsidies, and oppose a range of arms control agreements without such actions’ having a cumulative impact on the attitudes of European leaders and publics toward the United States, The September 2002 German election, where for te first time in the postwar period a leading candidate concluded that major electoral gains could be had by running against the United States, should be taken as a warning that American unilateralism could indeed come at a price. DIw APP NATO A. Garen/Melntosh ***RIVALRIES WITHIN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MAKE LEAKS INEVITABLE*** Knight Ridder Washington Bureau October 16, 2003, P. LEXIS WASHINGTON _ Concerned about the appearance of disarray and feuding within his administration as well as growing resistance to his policies in Iraq, President Bush living up to his recent declaration that he's in charge _ told his top officials to "stop the leaks" to the media, or else. News of Bush's order leaked almost immediately. Bush told his senior aides on Tuesday that he "didn't want to see any stories" quoting unnamed administration officials in the media anymore, and if he did, there would be consequences, a senior administration official who asked that his name not be used told Knight Ridder. An escalating turf war involving Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell has generated an unusually bountiful crop of leaks in recent months, and one result is a criminal investigation of anonymous officials in the White House who are alleged to have leaked the name of a Central Intelligence Agency covert officer to reporters. The infighting, backstabbing and maneuvering on major foreign policy issues such as North Korea, Syria, Iran and Postwar Iraq have escalated to a level that veterans of government haven't seen in years. At one point, the senior official said, Bush himself asked how bad it was. “This isn't as bad as (George) Shultz vs. (Caspar) Weinberger, is asked, referring to a legendary Reagan administration rivalry between the heads, respectively, of the State and Detense departments. One top official nodded in reply and said it was "way worse." "he ISO Dyw a NATO LEAKS ARE VERY COMMON IN WASHINGTON NBC News Transcripts October 19, 2003, P. LEXIS MS. KAY: Wonderful story and congratulations to the Philadelphia Inquirer for picking it up. But, of course, everybody uses leaks, Look, let's admit, it's a two-way process, isn't it? They use us, we use them. The leaking system works generally in Washington, and this one was going to be leaked as well. ‘There was something else that popped up in that article later on, which was apparently Bush turned to one of his aides and said, "But, look, you know, the infighting in my administration is not as bad as between Weinberger and Shul And somebody said, "Yes, it's much worse." MR. RUSSERT: Bill Safire, time for some plumbers to stop those White House leaks? MR. SAFIRE: There's an old saying in politics that the ship of state leaks from the top. And remember I was told by President Nixon when I was a speechwriter, "Hey, we're getting no play at all in the press on welfare reform. For God's sakes, leak it to somebody what we're going to do." And so Henry Brandon of the London Times called about something else and I said, "Hey, you want a leak?" And I gave it to him. And at that point, the FBI was tapping Henry Brandon's wire, and there I was saying, "OK, want a leak?" And they started tapping my wire. And the whole leak investigation involved me, until Haldeman and the president said, you know, "This was an authorized leak. Relax." i emenn LOE ARS HAPPEV Nato LEAKS ENSURE INGENUINE CONSULTATION WOULD BE EXPOSED HAMILTON, the Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, 2001 (MARCI, FIND LAW’S WRIT, LIBERALS' HYPOCRISY OVER MILITARY TRIBUNAL Why The Liberals Who Fought For Discretion During The Clinton Administration Should Continue To Support It Now, DECEMBER 6, date accessed 6-30-03, http://writ:news.findlaw.comv/hamilton/20011206.html) ‘Congress can leak sensitive information. Executive branch fear of leaks can discourage officials from sharing information with Congress. But it should also be said that leaks come from the executive branch as well. Many administration officials are skillful at leaking information to Congress and the public to advance their own agendas. [SQ DJIW NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Um Wet Zrco, RUMSFELD WILL REVEAL THE INGENUINE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATION, A WEEK LATER The Denver Post 6/14/01, Trudy Rubin, p. lexis, Before I explain, let me commiserate with the Europeans’ confusion about W. It's been hard to figure out whether the White House cares about a healthy relationship with our closest democratic allies. It's been harder still to discern who spoke for_the president on the issues that most concern Europe. One week, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld would inform the Europeans he wanted to pull U.S. troops out from NATO's forces in_the Balkans and build a national missile defense system, with or_without European cooperation. The next week, Secretary of State Colin Powell would soothe the Europeans with promises of prior_consultation. Then the 'Rummy'- Powell point-counterpoint would repeat itself. 1s3 1h Garen/MeTntosh Az: be ley — NATO CONSULTATION IS FAST NATO ISSUES 6/22/04, Consensus Decision-making At NATO, inttp://www.nato.inVissues/consensus/index.htm! Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance. Facilitating the process of consultation is one of the NATO Secretary General's main tasks. \s4 DIW — NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh A> DEL oye THE NATO CONSULTATION PROCESS ENSURES NO DELAY NATO ISSUES JUNE 22, 2004, The Consultation Process: Reaching Consensus, http://www nato.int/issues/consultation/ The process is continuous and takes place both on an informal and a formal basis with a minimum of delay or inconvenience, due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The practice of exchanging information and consulting together on a daily basis ensures that governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with prior knowledge of their respective preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies or take action on the basis of consensus. What does this mean in practice? Iss DIW 04 Ni A. Garen/MeIntosh Az: Ho L a Normal consultation doesn’t work ~ it isn’t perceived as genuine Richard D. Kauzlarich, Director, Special Initiatives on the Muslim World United States Institute of Peace, European Affairs, Summer 2002 ‘What is to be done? First, Europeans and Americans alike need to stop kidding themselves that agreement on ends somehow repairs the damage done by visible differences such as those described by Cornwell and Schmitt. This situation is too serious to be allowed to drift. The crises Europe and the United States face, from the Balkans to Afghanistan, demand closer cooperation than is visible today. Second, Europe and America need to make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a test case in closer cooperation. Europe and the United States must be seen as working together to end the violence and begin a new political process aimed at bringing peace. Finally, we need serious efforts in NATO, and between the United States and the European Union, aimed at establishing new mechanisms for the consultation that Europe believes is lacking. In this changed environment since 9/11, new mechanisms for political cooperation must evolve. ISG Dw NATO A Garen’Metntosh (A 2: DERDOM ATION CDSE CONSULTATIVE SUCCESS INCREASES POWELL’S CREDIBILITY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ‘The Denver Post 6/14/01, Trudy Rubin, p. lexis in the early weeks of the administration, Powell seemed to be losing out to Rumsfeld. He came under harsh criticism from conservative Republican publications for his, moderation (which was billed as weakness). But the general has scored an important series of recent policy victories as the president endorsed his views on leaving troops in the Balkans and in Sinai, on consultations with the Europeans on missile defenses, and on restarting talks with North Korea and rejiggering Iraq sanctions. is? DIW 04 NATO A.GarenMeintosh ALS Russtag Baclad, THE NRC SOLVES FOR NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 11/8/02, Pagine di Difesa, The Future of a Larger NATO, http:/www.paginedidifesa it/2002/natosg_021108.html, NATO has engaged Russia in a new Council that provides for substantial cooperation in a whole range of issues that matter to us all - terrorism, proliferation, missile defence, and peacekeeping, for example, Russia's voice is heard, and listened to. So is ours, in Moscow. We are leaming to trust each other, and to work together. ‘That is a huge step forward. We are already engaging Russia's cooperation in dealing with the immediate security threats we face today. Recent history proves the value of this cooperation. And the long-term benefits could be even greater. Because deepening trust and more robust cooperation between NATO and Russia will, over time, become less of an effort and more of a habit - and then simply a reflex. The benefits to Euro-Atlantic security are clear, and we are already firmly on the right path. Is¥ DIW 04 NATO AcweaMeinosh N22: VATO Exst0+ 8 yy NATO EXPANSION IS KEY TO PROMOTING EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www useu,be/Categories/Defense/June1002HaassNATOANliance.html, ‘NATO and the EU are helping to unite Europe as they extend membership to more of Europe's emerging democracies. The next round of NATO enlargement, for example, will further widen the circle of democracies and expand the zone of stability and security through the Baltics and the Balkans. Though it was founded in a different time for a different purpose, NATO now has an essential role to play in helping democracy take root and maintaining stability in regions of Europe that have long suffered from political and social upheavals. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is also making important contributions to conflict prevention, crisis management, post conflict rehabilitation, human rights, and democratization. NATO EXPANSION PROMOTES EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 11/8/02, Pagine di Difesa, The Future of a Larger NATO, http://www. paginedidifesa it/2002/natose_021108.html, For all these reasons, enlargement will shape Euro-Atlantic security for the better. It will ensure that Europe's stability grows and deepens. And it will greatly increase the family of democracies able and willing to defend our common interests and common values. We can see the proof today in Afghanistan, where future NATO members are making important contributions to our common fight against Al-Qaida. These, too, are reasons for confidence as we face a more volatile and uncertain future. Is Reanim — To CHERRY Tree” CHERRY-PICKING BREEDS RESENTMENT Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, 2003, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis The United States maintained a sort of "European empire" so successfully in the past because it was what historian Geir Lundestad has called an "empire by invitation” — the United States was predominant in European affairs because Europeans wanted it to be. Today the United States risks alienating those it is most likely to need as twenty-first- century allies. European sympathy and support for the United States will not disappear from one day to the next, but over time, treating allies as if they do not matter could produce that very outcome; the United States would find itself with an entire European Union that resembles the common U.S. perception of France: resentful of American power, reluctant to lend political support, and out to counter American interests at every turn, 100 NAT R DIw A. Garen/McIntosh Wr2. Le mates Reemtive EUROPEANS WILL NEVER AGREE WITH PREEMPTIVE WARFARE Martin Wolf 6/23/04, The Financial Times, p. lexis Yet optimism is also fragile. Differences of perspective continue to weaken the glue that once bound the two sides of the Atlantic. If the current US administration continues in power, further dissolution must be likely. Certainly, no European support for further wars will be forthcoming. Even the UK is unlikely to join in: that would be the end for Mr Blair. IG! DIJW 04 A.GarenMeIntosh AZ? VATO texParstou Ban NATO Russia is relaxed about NATO enlargement, Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution, Nov/Dec 2002. Foreign Affairs, “From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk” Vol, 81 N. 6. “Pifor the Russians themselves, they look to China not asa natural pater but as an almost certain geopolitical rival and as a potential mnilitary adversary. One reason Putin has been relatively relaxed about the next wave of NATO enlargement and the impending admission of the Baltic states is that he knows, as Western officials have long been saying, that Russia faces no threat from the west. But it does face one from the east, if only for a combination of demographic and economic reasons, Siberia and the Russian Far East are as rich in resources as they are barren in population, while the opposite is true on the Chinese side of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, That discrepancy is a recipe for tension and even conflict. . 162 aa : NATO A. Garen/Melntosh A2iwHro & = tp a ‘NATO enlargement is stabil integra ea izes Europe, allowing for integration, and promoting Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Forei Reforing fe Aner Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Fall 2002, The National Interest, ‘A second enduring role for NATO is to contribute to the continent's integration and stabilization process through enlargement. The incentive of NATO membership has been a powerful force in getting candidates ‘throughout central and eastern Europe to undertake political, economic and military reforms that they ‘would not otherwise have made. Since the enlargement process began in the mid-1990s, NATO aspirants have: resolved border disputes; changed electoral laws to ensure minority rights; discarded old and dangerous weaponry; reduced arms sales to unstable regions; cracked down on anti-Semitism; accelerated iilding e ‘semblance to Cold War detente but ieproone ne ee as great, les DIW 04 NATO A. Garen/McIntosh NATO 1NC Shell COUNTERPLAN TEX’ THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SHOULD OBSERVATION 1: COMPETITION ‘The Counterplan acts via NATO-exclusive action, making any permutation severance of US support of UN action, OBSERVATION 2: SOLVENCY NATO has a superior strategic grasp of peacekeeping operations over the UN or any other actor. Robert J. Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Intemational Studies at University of Cambridge, 6/30/1997, NATO and Peacekeeping, http://www.natoit f seen the emergence of a mult urisditions and imprecisely defined mandates. Among these, NATO has stood out. The UN and OSCE ‘may have greater legitimacy and the wider mandates, but only NATO has military forees a its command with control, communications igence, lit capebility, strategic plans and the ability to actin acti ual level, where the ions became entangled and c acekeepin and peace enforcement, NAT‘ that concepts and ideas should. just be bandied about but need to relate to action on the ground, \e DIW 04 NATO, A. Garen/McIntosh_ NATO 1NC Shell OBERVATION 3: NET BENEFIT Unless NATO expands its role into peacekeeping operations, the US will withdraw, collapsing the alliance. James Kitfield, stafwriter, 10/12/2002, The National Journal, p. lexis Some underlying tensions, however, lurked behind the polite toasts and carefully orchestrated declarations of solidarity in Warsaw. And they sprang from the message that Rumsfeld and his delegation were giving the Europeans. After the terrorist attacks of last September 11, U.S. officials stressed, America is @ reconfis structures of the U.S. government and military to confront the threat posed by the link between global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, Unless NATO dramatically alters its own outlook message strongly implied, the United States will go its own way. "Those September 11 attacks were more than tragedy-they ‘were a wake-up call warning us all of greater dangers lying ahead," Rumsfeld told the assembled NATO defense ministers on the ‘Warsaw summits opening day. "We owe it to those killed to recognize that the world has changed. We've entered a new security environment that is significantly different from the past." Although Rumsfeld stressed that the United States wanted ‘NATO to transform itself to better confront the challenges of that new security environment, he left little doubt about the consequences ifit did not change. "If we fail to do so, it will send a harmful signal to the world about our alliance,” Rumsfeld said. "IFNATO doesn't have a force that is quick and agile, that ccan deploy in days and weeks rather than months and years, then it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century." es DIW 04 NATO A. Garen/Melntosh NATO 1NC Shell NATO prevents ethnic conflict, unchecked Russian Aggression, WMD proliferation, and World War 3 Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 9/22/00, Orbis, No. 4, Vol. 44; Pg. 571, p. lexis 1. A hedge against security uncertainties. For Europe, NATO provides insurance against future security risks in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Paramount among these uncertainties are long-term anxieties about Russia. While peaceful evolution toward a stable, democratic, and economically open Russian society continues to be a widely shared hope, the future remains uncertain. An impoverished and dispirited Russian population does not in the short run provide the basis fora security threat comparable to that of the old USSR, but the Jonger-term course of Russia is an open question, since its desperate population could embrace a nationalist demagogue intent on asserting Russia's place in Europe and the world in ways that would threaten its neighbors. ‘A "Weimar Russia" scenario appears increasingly unlikely, and the December 1999 Duma election and March 2000 presidential election of Vladimir Putin seemed to show that the appeal of extremist parties remains limited. Nonetheless, appeals to restore order and status are evident, and the renewed military campaign in Chechnya has evoked a chauvinistic response among much of the Russian population. Moreover, while the economic and social disarray of Russia is very real, this does not mean that a rapid reassertion of military strength is impossible. One need only recall Germany's sudden resurgence between 1933 and 1939 under Hitler, the Soviet Union's in the 1920s and '30s following the ravages of revolution and civil war, and the USSR's again after 1945 despite the vast death and destruction suffered in World War Il. Nor is Russia itself the only conceivable peril. Instability throughout much of the former Yugoslavia, uncertainties about the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and dangers stemming from the Middle East and Persian Gulf all represent potential risks. Upheaval along the continent's easter or southern periphery, whether from economic collapse, ethnic conflict, or interstate war, could send waves of refugees flooding into Europe. Finally, the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, including missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, poses potential risks-to Europeans. To be sure, these threats are all more diffuse and conjectural than the Soviet threat during the Cold War, but they are not negligible and provide a reason for European countries to retain their alliance with the United States as a form of insurance. To deter or defend against such threats, continuing allied cooperation in the military, economic, and political spheres is likely to remain necessary. log DIJW 04 A. Garen/Melntosh NAT SOLVES PEACEKEEPING Kosovo redefined NATO asthe enforcer of intematonal security: Geoffrey Lee Willlams, Director of Inst of Beonomie & Century: the Twenty-Year Crisis.” Ge the violent flowering of the conflict in Kosovo reinforced the jolute and relative indispensability of American leadership of Europe, even though European leaders were much closer to their goal of a ‘common set of policies in relation to security and defence than at any period since the peace of Potsdam in 1945.1° Second, NATO has been transformed into a genuine hybrid affair In Which its role has fundamentally changed. It is no longer a solely defence alliance but a NATO willing and able to intervene 1 principle anywhere and virtually without the constraining influence of the UN Charter where necessary ~ the necessity being defined by the North Atlantic Council. Third, the new NATO has reinvigorated vital national interests in which individual members of the alliance were less inbibited in asserting their own traditional geopolitical interests. For example, the new Germany has asserted its traditional Balkan interests and a willingness (much disputed by a divided electorate) to use armed force. Likewise, Britain has asserted a leadership role more like that envisaged by Churchill in a military coalition against a power threatening the stability of a European balance of power and requiring a positive military response to ensure a wider and just peace. Fourth, the action in the Balkans by NATO with its relatively success- ful outcome (in spite of several tactical miscalculations and early setbacks) actually reassured the Islamic world that a Muslim people mattered as much a a Christian population when grave acts of attempted genocide were involved. The existence of overwhelming ‘evidence of Serbia intentions was revealed in the autumn of 1998 when the CIA obtained a plan called Operation Horseshoe, which Mr Milose- vic had approved forthe final solution of the alleged problems posed by the existence of the ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo. The evil doctrine of a village a day in order to keep NATO away was best calcu- lated to keep the West from taking decisive action. Mr Milosevic grossly miscalculated NATO's and, more crucially, American resolve. The West recalled past horrors of genocide and was shocked by what was happen {ng in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia. In Prestina, records were used to identify which properties were Albanian-owned as the basis for a programme by Serb police and paramilitaries to ‘cleanse’ villages, neigh- bouthood by neighbourhood. The Kosovo people were marked for destruction solely on the basis of their racial Identity. But this time, ‘NATO had learnt the lesson of the war in Bosnia where the UN forces NATO Political Studies at Cambie, gad Barkely Jared Jones, 2001, “NATO and the ‘Transatlantic Alliance in the had failed to protect isolated and vulnerable communities because of the lamentable lack of fire-power and clear rules of engagement and the {almost total absence of political clarity and purpose. Could NATO do bette? For some, litte time the answer was unclear as NATO war plans were initially misconceived and, inthe event, xather badly executed. ee Daw o4 A. Garen/MeIntosh ete NAD SOLVES PEACEKEEPING ‘The lesson from the Balkans was that NATO is more capable than the UN of adapting to new world security threats and peacekeeping. Geoftrey Lee Williams, Director of Inst. of Economic & Political Studies at Cambridge, and Barkely Jared Jones, 2001. “NATO and the Transatlanti Alliance in the 21" Century the Twenty-Year Crisis." { st, the Balkans had destroyed the ilusion that the en of the Cold Warhad seen the emergence ofa new world order (NWO) as well a the end of history. Second, that Bosnia also brutally exposed European pretensions that the breakup of Yugoslavia was the hour of Europe fnd not the hour of America. This claim was erroneous, s four years Of killing in the Balkans demonstrated beyond doubt, asthe tansatlan- tic aliance began to uncavel. Europe could not cope without America ‘Third the lesson thatthe intemational community must be prepared to intervene sooner rather than later in intemal conflicts when these threaten humanitarian disasters or human abuse on a grand scale. This implied the total rejection of ethnic cleansing or calculated acts of genocide Fourth, the esson that NATO with the USA in the Tead should take action to prevent the abuse of hunman rights even without specific UN authorisation or mandate, This would be the only way around the Russian and Chinese veto in the UNSC. Clearly forthe time being, the EU vias unlikely to provide a lead given is failure to fully articulate or even implement a common foreign and security policy a5 lid down in the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, Filth, Iraq and Kosovo seemed to confitm that precision bombing and Cruise missile attacks alone could, in favourable circumstances, change the course of conflicts This was the dcect result of the perception that the small number of American and allied casualties in the Gulf and none at all in the war with Serbia created the opportunity for the conduct of high-tech wars characterised. by cheap and clinical intervention producing rapid results, The Somali debacle in 1993 was an aberration to be ignored. ‘Western leaders ~ Clinton and Blair in particular ~ came to accept the aed to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 in ode to stop the mas slant and migration, Thus, these considerations became the bass ofthe new || thinking that edo SATO ts yl mr and the rs ptr pun war that NATO had ever launched|The doctrine of power projection was | the conceptual bass of new strategy which was put to the test in the || BalkansyIt was clear by early summer 1999 that NATO's strategic bomb- {ing campaign could not prevent a humanitarian disaster. It was also likely to be ineffectual by itself to compel a determined adversary to submit to compromise unless and until airpower was heavy enough to cause an adversary unacceptable damage t0 is strategic infrastructure and psychological pressure on its urban population beyond continued endurance, Precision-bombing has a rapierike quality and accuracy as much a5 it destroys, Strategic bombing has come of age during the Kosovo crisis, The wae of ground oops in an effensve tole, Moweves, to expel Serb forces from Kosovo could not be achieved without the use of selective airpower but whose outcome at the theatre or tactical level could not be attained by airpower alone. In the event, a land invasion proved unnecessary. \63 DIJW 04 NATO A. Garen/Mclntosh NATO SOLVES PEACE KEEPIN G- Kosovo shifted the role of NATO towards international peacekeeping, Iwo H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, 6/8/2000. Brookings Insion, Live Chat, In acting in Kosovo, NATO demonstrated that one of its primary rationales these days is not the defense of NATO territory but the promotion of security and stability in the Euroatlantic area. This action falls outside the Article V commitment of the treaty (which regards an attack against one as an attack against all) and is justified under Article IV (which allows for consultation and joint action to promote security). As such, NATO actions are not mandatory ~- and the constitutional provisions for using force applies in each ‘eouulty. Many NATO allies (aud, indced, the US Senate) voted to approve the use of force prior to the commencement of hostilities. This suggests that there is no need to ratify NATO's strategic concept ~ given ‘that action is not mandatory and participation is subject to constitutional provisions of each member country. \o4 DIW 04 A. Garen/Melntosh AUTO solUES PEACEKEEPING NATO fulfills the collective security objective that the UN Security Couneil was meant €o¢+ ewe. Geoffrey Lee Williams, Director of Inst. of Economic & Political Studies at Cambridge, and Barkely Jared Jones, 2001. “NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21" Century: the Twenty-Year Crisis.” (Was then the 1991 Gulf War a rear anu yeuuine manifestation of collective security? Well, strictly speaking, the answer {s ‘no’, because the procedures laid down in the UN Charter for the full implementation of collective security were not observed in this case. In the case of the Gulf War, once again, it was largely American military power that under- pinned UN operations and not (as the Charter requires under Article 4 the UNSC itself. The UNSC has never ~ yet ~ been able to assure the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The implementation of UNSC Resolution 678 in 1991 was virtually removed from the UN and placed instead in the capable hands of a coalition of powers under, of course, American leadership and command, The ad hoc coalition, then, observes the niceties of UN endorsement, but the day-to-day operation (with the consent of the government of Kuwait) rested upon the US-led alliance} NATO \Ro Daw 04 A. Garen/McIntosh NATO NAT) SOLVES PEACEKEEPING- Interoperable NATO forces are key to worldwide peacekeeping. Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Poli Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, SS ~Pisaliy bat perhaps most importantly, NATO remains an essenval pesos’ preparation organization, & a per Ue tntroperabe ilitary capabilites tht can be drawn upon by afc Br of allies when "100 ous tht European member-sats donot spend enough and that fy SP .d badly, with many Tedundancies among national European militaries and too ‘high a proportion of immobi forces. eather the European members of NATO will spend only round ‘$150 billion on defense in sas compared with some $380 billion forthe United States. Bu $159 pion not an insignificant 200. er yoney, even by Pentagon standards, However inefficient they might 'e, the European members wT do have considerable military resources at thet disposal, and Wey 0 ‘often willing to undertake asa i which the United States does not want tobe directly involved PAPPSST contributions to sai omnia and Kosovo campaigns were indispensable to the success of ost operations, and today uropean NATO members (and Partners) are providing the overwhelming majority of Balkan peacekeeping forces —using NATO doctrines, tactics, procedures ‘and interoperable equipment. itis also worth noting that NATO can make important military contibutone Sve ‘operations where the 1 i ase soc isnot involved, This was the case, for example, during Se Gulf War and in parts of the Gperatin in and around Afghanistan. NATO was not formally favolved in either case, but in both cases coer a pases and cooperation among NATO militaries were critica. 1p the Afghan campaiga, most AINTO lies were excluded ftom te initial operations for understandebis Test’, ‘but have become more aa pal overtime, This involvement hss included combat and speci foress Mid undertaken by ANGuk Canadian and German soldiers conducting cave-learing missions the Afghan mountains; British aa coh reconnaissance, ar-defense, ai refueling and combs area0 ‘missions; the deployment of a aad ren on naval tack force alongside American ships patrolling the Ingn ect backfilling” by Franc as OF US. military missions in de Delkans and even in the United Sites (where NATO aaesoce Waring and Control Systems were deployed to protect American airspace); and the use of ‘Puropean NATO bases for staging operations during the Afghan ‘campaign, ‘All ofthese tasks were facilitated by the existence of common NATO operational doctrines (for example, aaa erpeee gh reconnaissance officers know what kinds of information U.S. plos need), agreed equipment ‘standards (so that Turkish refueling nozzles fit into U.S. ir Tish refsing plans, rotn intone allied jplaabnidobohyrigratiins together and know what problems to Geren Toeropera ae scr cms ha vais nin free hatin lig a : epi. itemenety inirl e s A o © provide ecu rae an ‘NATO allies provided the vast majority of the forces (first under ee NAT anes Bi ie eam rey By summer 2002 nearly ‘half of the 13,000 foreign troops there came . cuaias ye United States, In the long run, NATO itself may prove to be the best ininenance of longterm, Westend seen fren Afni, \a\ NATO DIW 04 “eemoneenes ARID S0uUes. PenceveerIng- AUS. backed NATO is the best agent for peacekeeping John Lis, Chairman ofthe Subcommittee on Europe, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy ‘Advisor, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly, “Europe's Global Role” Lexie Neo. pal CNY, NATO, backed by U.S. power, had the ritary capabitty and ¥ fe credibility to guarantee the Dayton peace ac nts War sea ane four-year, voetk jgenocidal Bosnian war. The peace Sperations in which NATO is currently eqitdlengaged ~: Bosnia, Kosove, ave aire contribute positively tothe @ te Security ofits members. Recognizing that su-h operations aes NATO is the organization best equipped to p- "form them effectively. « \72 DIW 04 A. Garen/Mclntosh NATO SOLVES PEACEKEEPING es ee een Niche capabilities of NATO countris ‘management. allow for local yet centralized conflict Hon. Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 3/27/03. NATO Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate One Hundred Eighth Congress First Session, “The Future ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Onganization (NATO)” ‘YSccretary Ferm. Mr. Chairman, we see right now in Operation Iraqi Freedom the value that. some of our allies bring by eantribut, ing what you could refer to as niche capabilities—chemical and bio- logical weapons decontamination capabilities, for example. In some cases there are allies that have lift capabilities that they can con. tribute, and in some cases intelligence. In particular, there are countries that have human intelligence capabilities that are a real contribution, a real augmentation of our own. ‘There are’a number of areas where countries that do not have the full range of capabilities in their armed forces can nevertheless be important contributors, including in peacekeeping, including in providing services for the stability operations phase of wars. We see—and we saw it in Afghanistan and we are seeing it now in Irag—this could be an important part, an important role that NATO will play in the future, working together to be able to do op- erations in a way that really does distribute the burdens. Tt does not require the entire set of allies to go to war together, but the ability of the United States to integrate the contributions, these niche, so-called, contributions, into our own operational plans has everything to do with the fact that we are allies, we work together, we train together, we have common doctrine, we have interoperable equipment. So the alliance can play a valuable role and the expanded alli- ance can really increase the capabilities of the different allies to op- erate in coalitions, and I think this is going to be an important part of the future of NATOJ 43 DIW 04 NATO. A. Garen/Melntosh WAT SOWES PEACEKEEPING NATO peacekeeping is fr more effective than the UN: 1c, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy committee on Et 7 Jotm Lis, Chairman ofthe Subcommites on Europe, and Dovg Porta Tr Nexis “Advisor, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly, Few fallacies are more absurd than the erroneous assertions that Dake © NATO is dying and that the United States no longer cares about NATO and ‘\pekty Europe. Last spring, as coalition forces moved to oust the murderous qaaw regime of Saddam Hussein, experienced observers on each side of the RAL Atlantic rushed to pronounce NATO dead. The French analyst Guillaume Parmentier claimed "NATO is finished" n12 while the U.S. scholar Charles Kupchan proclaimed that "the Atlantic [Alliance] nove lies in the rubble of ©] saghded.!'n13 Meir conctusions, however, simply are not validated by an examination of the facts. NATO remains the organization that can most QQ. itfecively defend the nations of Europe ana North Ameria egaint sous threats to their security today. Most of the European members of NATO still regard the Atlantic Alliance as the best guarantee of their security. NATO is also demonstrably far more effective than the UN in peace throrcement, fle in which the EU is only beginning to gain experience, v4 DIW NATO A.Garen/MeIntosh = QUT OF KREA PLO SK THE FAILURE OF NATO TO PROVE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AT PEACEKEEPING DESTROYS NATO Judy Dempsey, FT Brussels Correspondent, 6/25/04, Financial Times, p. lexis "The question is if the Pentagon really takes Nato seriously. This is why Afghanistan is so important," says Daniel Keohane, defence expert at the London-based Centre for European Reform. His view is that if Nato's European allies cannot deliver in Afghanistan, the Pentagon may conclude it is not worth supporting Nato as a collective military organisation. “Afghanistan is supposed to be the savivur mission for Nato," Mr Keohane says. “The alliance keeps saying it is good at peacekeeping. Even that is now open to question. At Istanbul, Nato will have to prove it can do missions such as Afghanistan. Otherwise, it is difficult to be optimistic about Nato. The Pentagon may continue to opt for coalitions of the willing, which it started to do after September 11." Rr DIW NATO A.Garen/MeIntosh OI OF Peed PKOs & NATO SOLVES FOR PEACEKEEPING IN TONS OF PLACES OUTSIDE OF EUROPE Kovi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, 3/9/04, M2 Presswire, p. lexis Looking to the future, NATO's increasing willingness to "go global” presents important opportunities, in particular for Africa. As you know, the Security Council has just authorized a new peace operation for C'te d'Ivoire. It is also likely that the year ahead will see other new peace operations in Aftica, as well as in Haiti and possibly elsewhere, Should such a surge take place, stronger support from NATO would be tremendously helpful. Specifically, NATO might be employed in a "peace enforcement" role, much as the European Union deployed "Operation Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a bridging force before the deployment of a UN operation. NATO could also provide an "over-the-horizon" capacity, should the need arise for localized enforcement tasks. \36 DIW04 ‘A. Garen/McIntosh Ovs oF AREA POs % a Global NATO missions inrease its ability to counter global sec ity threats, rt Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studie, Reforging the Atlantic Alliance,” Fall 2002. The National Interest, — ‘NATO repeated the point in its 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving "acts of terrorism" to the top of the list of "other risks." At Prague, Alliance leaders will need to make vividly clear that NATO is about more than the traditional defense of its borders. This is wot to say that any act of terrorism or threat to ‘energy supplies must be treated as an Article 5 contingency for which all Allis are obliged to contribute ‘troops. It does mean, however, that all allies recognize that their common interests and values can be threatened by global developments, a point made dramatically clear by the attacks on Washington and New York. Evenif invocations of Article $ will no longer necessarily mean a formal NATO operation under NATO command, the concept that "an armed attack" from anywhere abroad must trigger solidarity among the member states is an important principle that should be reinforced.” ( bw ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh OvY oF AREA WO. % NATO MUST DEPLOY FORCES OUTSIDE OF EUROPE TO MAINTAIN ITS CREDIBLITY Henry A. Kissenger, former secretary of state Et Al, 3/18/04 (Laurence H. Summers, Co-chair, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership, http://www-cfi.org/pdf/Europe_TF.pdf) Adjusting to New Geopolitical Realities. NATO must recognize the extent to which the aftermaths of 11/9 and 9/11 transformed the strategic priorities of the United States. As the United States redeploys its forces outside of Europe, the alliance must find the appropriate balance between a new emphasis on out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. Although NATO. will continue to remain active both within and outside the geographical confines of Europe, there needs to be a common understanding that NATO must increasingly concem itself with threats ‘emanating from outside Europe if the alliance is to prove as central to the post-11/9 (and post-9/11) world as it was throughout the Cold War. NATO a DIW 04 A. Garen/MeIntosh, nen Ous of AEA WhOs & Peacekeeping missions outside of Europe are key to defining NATO's role, and therefore its survival. Ronald D Asmus, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 2002. “Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era.” Tithe fll of1997 and early 1998, Grossman and exchanged a series in hich we debated those issues. Should the prime focus of US. policy ply to continue the enlargement process eastward? Or was it more in refocus the Alliance on addressing new threats of instability inthe s cluding potential threats from weapons of mass destruction coming yond Europe? Or should we try to do both in parallel? Grossman eal & “mega-question” in US. policy on NATO.” We concluded that we NATO that both helped to build a Europe whole and free that also s stepping stone fora broader partnership. The question was how both the Alliance and to reorient it to face the missions ofthe future—and from becoming a politically weak and militarily impotent organizafy grew in numbers. ‘The best way to avoid this dilemma, Grossman believed, was to [NATO was focused on real military missions in a new post-Cold Wat ment. NATO, he emphasized, had to remain focused on what it di Bi terring and, ifneed be, fighting wars If those threats came from new beyond Europe, the Alliance had to reorient itself to meat them. The: Should view NATO as “the institution of choice” when the U.S. and 1d have to act together militarily. Ifthe residual Russian threat con- rane, NATO had to focus on the new threats to our territory and in- is meant the Alliance had to rethink what Article 5 meant in a new pare for missions that would take the Alliance beyond its own terti- t had to do it in a step-by-step fashion that did not fracture the sens. | : \43 DIW 04 eae ae NATO. A.Garen/Metntosh — A/ATO TERROR TS NATO's new strategy includes counter-terrorism. Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Fall 2002. The National Interest, Reforging the Atlantic Alliance.” | Ses00d, NATO needs to put real substance behind this political commitment by developing its plitial and organizational capacity to deal with global security threats, including the specific iseue of terrorism, European allies who worry about giving the Alliance too great a “global” role have long resisted sul new missions. European leaders have been very reluctant to put their countries in a position whereby their soldiers could be dragged off by the United States to fight beyond Europe's borders, particulary since there has traditionally been a good deal of transatlantic disagreement over out-of-area issues. Ironically, today the resistance to expanding NATO's potential mission comes more from the United States, where many in the present administration fear being constrained politically by allies whom they believe have litle to contribute militarily. ‘The United States, however, has every interest in having European alles better prepared to join it on potential global missions. While itis hard to see NATO countries agreeing to use the Alliance for such anti- ‘terrorist matters as law enforcement, immigration, financial control, and domestic intelligence anytime soon, the Alliance should begin immediately to adapt its military structures to contribute more effectively to the war on terrorism. NATO should significantly reform and streamline its command structures to remove redundant and wasteful headquarters, replacing them with a leaner and more efficient structure based on military functions rather than geographical orientation, It should develop a new Force Projection ‘Command specifically responsible for planning out-of-area operations, and increase the number and capability ofits rapid reaction forces so that NATO member-states can project forces to distant parts ofthe ‘world on short notice. Allies should share more information about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wma) and ballistic missiles, and develop emergency civil defense and consequence ‘management teams that could assist alles subjected to biological, chemical or nuclear weapons attack. NATO shwuld also coordinate the development of joint theater missile defense systems that eould protect alles in Europe (including, possibly, Russia) that face a growing ballistic missile and wmd threat \44 DIW 04 NATO A. Garen/MclIntosh NATO_(S) TERRORISM NATO is the stringest defense against nuclear and biological terrorism. John Lis, Chairman ofthe Subcommittee on Europe, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy Advisor, Winter 2003. The Washington Quarterly, “Europe's Global Role,” Lexis-Nexis, [ro be certain, security threats have changed dramatically during the past half century. NATO was founded to deter a « >viet-Ied milltary Invasion % 9 Today, its members face threats from international terrorism, WMD, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjuriction of these ‘fein chatienges: the horrifying prospect of thenestates provide Wastes terrorist groups to use against our countries and to kill ouretizens vear®, senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has cited the need for "NATO te play the lead role in addressing the central security challenge of our time,” ni6 Although recognizing that collective defense ‘emains the core mission of NATO, Lugar wrote: "If we fall to defend our societies from a major terrorist attack involving WMD, the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations." nl? y \SO DIW 04 A. Garen/Mcintosh, NATO 6 TE RRORTS a NATO countries can cooperate alliage terrorists Hon. Douglas I. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 3/27/03, NATO it i i Senate One Hundred ies Commite on Arne Serves Ute Sts Se One nd Eihh Congres Fe Son The Fae ore oa ee Oe Hai (NATO)" mber oP pratt. The role that it has played so far has had a nimber of PO's. In the immediate aftermath of doe September 11 attack, NA’ e Sielirst time ever. It dispatched aWixe airplanes to the United States to help in the Siefense of the United States when 4°}08 our flevelop the capability to work togsahen inilitary operations and lave the consult Utis clear that, given ‘the termine threat, which is a threat tv ali they antisties,'including the Ruropeana’ Gia understand that if theta tTe BeINE to be dealing ina veenent fashion with the main Uitkats that face us they are going’ Geant to be working with the United States globally. \81 NATO DIW 04 NAO SOLES A. Garen/Melntosh NATO involvement in Iraq would reverse negative feelings toward the U.S. in Europe. Ruilip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy ‘Studies, 4/10/03. Brookings Daily War Report. \e2 pie NMO COWES ERAQ NATO A, Garen/Melntosh ‘NATO involvement would lend credibility to the Iraqi peacekeeping operation. Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, 4/10/03. Brookings Daily War Report NATO in post-war Iraq would also help to legitimize the reconstruction process in the eyes of ‘any around the world—making a UN mandate more likely and clearing the way for EU reconstruction funds. Having launched the war without explicit UN authority and against the will of much of world ‘opinion, there is already much skepticism about American motives and litle trust that Washington will take amy butts own interests into account, Putting the Pentagon in sole charge of maintaining security, hunting ‘Weapons of mass destruction, and reconstituting an Iraqi army would only heighten that global skepticism, hho matter how much confidence Americans might have in their own judgment or faimess. Putting the UN directly in charge of security in Iraq might be reassuring around the world, bu as it showed in the Balkans, ‘the UN is ill-prepared to play an effective security role in a potentially hostile environment. Giving 2 role 0 NATO~ some of whose members have recently proveri their willingness to stand up to Washington— ‘would prove that Iraq was not a mere American protectorate, while still giving us confidence that security ‘would be ensured. —_— aA \SB NATO DIJW 04 ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh. TO sOowes CRAQ NATO has severat advantages over the UN in peacekeeping operations, ‘especially Iraq rap Gordon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, 4/10/03. Brookings Daily War ort hasnt went hag of ning oe an bpring omni nin i wor thiking sa how te Unie Stats can avid he bes ee 4s unilateral occupation. Wouldn' it be nice, for example, if we had at our disposal a multilateral ‘organization to which we could turn for lrelp, a body more effective and etticient than the UN but that Soll ont elinacy one opera adep aps es ON grouping composed of over two dozen democracies, including our most prosperous European allies, that fad htcropenble lia fresexpeene witpeackea ee ee eer oa ofp, td exing command avengers eee i tc ws, a be po organization had close institutional links with several dozen Partner countries and a proven track record of Promoting defense reform and civil-military relations in former authoritarian states. If such an organization Eidoorett we weal coat wane eee Fortunately, such an organization does exist. NATO has all these attributes and there would be many advantages to giving it key role in post-war lag, First, nowhere else is there a large group of available and experienced peacekeepers who could gradually replace the thousands of exhausted American and British soldiers currently deployed in Trag. The United States should not wish to keep (or pay for) a substantial part of its army in Iraq forthe foreseeable future, especially given other military challenges that could suddenly appear somewhere else around the world. Andi is implausible that we willbe able to quickly draw down our current foree presence, given the political vacuum in Iraq and the potential for ‘ethnic strife, retributions, looting, ot outside meddling in the country. Fresh troops will have to come from ‘somewhere, and no organization is better placed to provide them than NATO. \a4 Cees M At ee LES TRAQ EL ‘ATO [NATO forces and UN authorization are key to secure Irgielecdons. vo, H. Daalder, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, and Anthony Lake, Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown, 5/13/04. Financial Times, “Transfer Power in Iraq to UN and NATO.” “The holding of elections, however, would require security ata level that calls for far mre fore than those Tinply needed to hold on against the insurgency. Is also necessary to make a more best effort to train spe Pootice and military force that wil eventually takeover, Without such a bulld-wp bore ‘the ection the US cannot create the conditions for building down after them. None of these 8 is possible ce a a to at lrg on its own. Washington no longer bas the credibility andthe Americans in Iraq lack the legitimacy to succeed alone. io a rafeation of te political authorities and the security forces is desperately needed now. That Ret in etn axking the United Nations and Nato to hep. It means actually transferring real power and authority to a UN-authorised international mission and a Nato-led security force, a Ke DIW 04 A. Garen/MeIntosh, NkTO SOLES TS RAEL, re NATO could ae Jrael-Palestine conflict. ‘on Furope, and Doug Bereuter, Senior Policy John Lis ter 20 of ta Sogn “Europe's Global Role,” Lexis-Nexis. sn ae inter 2003, The Washington Quarter, JE! One can hope that the time also may come to consider whether NATO ate "might have a role to play in helping to monitor a peace settlement __ between Israel and the Palestinians. Although the United States and Its, 2s¢eal~ NATO allies certainly have some sharp attitudinal and policy differences an del the Middle East, all share a stated commitment to a secure Israel and a democratic Palestinian state. If a NATO peac 2 operation could help alleviate security concerns on both sides in tat conflict, our countries surely should consider underpinning a peace agreement with a peace- enforcement mission. , \eb RoeewMenon NATO SOLVES MEDD NATO is capable of keeping peace in the Middle East, John Warner, Chairman, 3/27/03, : : Hearing Before the Commitee on Armed Services United Sate Senate Oe Hundred Eighth Congress First Session. “The Future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat NATO)” MG. President, in August 2002, 1 wrote to you to propose an idea goncerning the ssblity of offering NATO peacekeepers to help implement a cease we he Me dle East have spaken ofthe iden mummers ney eens ate ie the Mid even more convinced that the United States and its NATO partners shevia ae TRetdaitignal element for the “von map" concepts NATO choi oe at Pee fig word ‘offer,” to provide a peacekeeping force, once a cease-fire hee troy ca fstinian Authority. The NATO. ve tobe vilingly accepeed by both gor. ‘raments, and it'in no way should be viewed as a Chalisece ae eeeae Eee ‘The acceptance ofthis offer would have to be eoupled wish roe seen, by Terael and the Palestinian Authority t cooperate in ever Way neasiie eet 'e peacekeeping mission to sacreed x 1 Lally recognize that this would not be a risk-free operation for the ascigting NATO forces, But I nonetheless believe that the offer of peacelowtrng Rees Rang ould have many benefits. Fist it would demonstra a stvmae eect ee apg de ges Mil Bs” Stn wal fer respect of pete ceping force that is ready today. It is highly capable, rapidly deplete: ait ion jPfovan record of sucest in the Baleanee P MARS al deloebl, ike Ahisd, this would be a worthy post-Cold War mission for NATO in a region where NATO member interests, It could even be an area of through the NATO-Russia Council Po ANATO peacekeeping mission in the Miale East weed he Neto, the Alliances new Strategic Concept, Approved at the NATO Sarat ar Wee, ton In Ail 1899, the new Stratepe Concept envisioned socalled Tau ofa ‘ions for NATO Given the fractious debate in NATO over Iraq and the defense of Turkey, it would be dmportant to show that NATO can work together to make @ poster eres to solting one ofthe most challenging security ates of ade ‘Ge DIW 04 WAIO @ Ve ACRE NATO A. Garen/Mcintosh A STRONG NATO IS KEY TO ITS ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 6/27/04, Pagine di Difesa, A New ‘Atlantacism for the 21% Century, http://www. paginedidifesa.it2004/natosg_040627.html The fourth element of a new transatlantic security consensus is the need to engage North Africa and the broader Middle East. I don't have to explain at length why these regions ‘matter to the transatlantic community. Ron Asmus, who has been instrumental in launching this conference, has argued extensively and convincingly on this matter. All I would say here is that no other region's development will affect transatlantic security more. And that a coherent and comprehensive transatlantic policy for this region is therefore essential. Developing such a comprehensive policy will not be easy. What this region needs is ‘genuine Western support, not Western dogmatism. And I maintain that if Don Rumsfeld and Joschka Fischer both think that it is a good idea, then we'll get there eventually, Tomorrow, at our Summit, we will make a start. We will deepen our Mediterranean Dialogue, by strengthening its military cooperation dimension. And we will launch our new Istanbul Cooperation initiative, offering practical cooperation in areas where NATO can make a real difference. In designing this Initiative, we have put much emphasis on joint ownership. Because we see the countries of the broader Middle East as shareholders of a truly cooperative effort. SB DIW 04 A.GarenMeintosh WATO SOLVES CE voor |= 4. “The transition from security to defense is test of NATO's role as a guardian against genocide. Geoftrey Lee Williams, Director of Inst. of Eeonomie & Political Studies at Cambridge, nd Barkely Jared Jones, 2001, "NATO and the ‘Transatlantic Alliance in the 21 ‘Century: the Twenty-Year Crisis.” “eiven this prospect, it would help if NATO accepted the difference ween security and defence in the European situation and thus, proceeded to explore the institutional dficltes with the Hurope! Prete gbout how best to formulate those policies consistent with combining nations’ efforts into collective security and collective defen . voit raises the question of the future of security and defence in the sa ext of the transatlantic relationship arising from NATO's new and contested role as an ‘enforcer’ of international security and guardian fgainst ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide. Palpably, NATO had weedy established the basis for an appropriate strategy for the 20st aac uny by recognizing that with the collapse of the Cold War conflict fas not come to an end in intemational politics; that the European, as gn was not yet ready to completely displace NATO; and that NATO ae ansfoemned itself into both a defence and security organisation based con the continued relevance of collective defence 08 ‘well as being capable oF Geating with the security challenges of the farare NATO ee \S4 DIW NBTO-crilh stron NATO. A. Garen/McIntosh. NATO NATIONS ARE MODERNIZING THEIR MILITARIES Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 11/8/02, Pagine di Difesa, The Future of a Larger NATO, http://www,paginedidifesa.it/2002/natosg_021108.html, First, NATO is developing the capabilities it needs to take on terrorism and weapons of ‘mass destruction, We must be able to deter, disrupt and if necessary defend against future attacks. Joint plans are being developed. Intelligence sharing is being improved. Our militaries are developing their capacities to defend against terrorism, including by supporting civilian authorities in case of attack. They are also improving their ability to detect and defend against WMD attack. Vaccine stockpiles are being developed. And NATO will be working much more closely with countries across Europe and into Central Asia, to coordinate and improve our collective efforts against these threats. We are also modernizing our forces overall, so that they can go to wherever they are needed, when they are needed, and stay as long as they are needed. At the Summit, NATO's nations will make clear, specific commitments to make improvements to the military capabilities we need today. Long-range air lift. Air tankers. Better surveillance. Precision guided weapons, to prevail with the minimum casualties on all sides. Modern, secure communications. And, as I mentioned, protection against weapons of mass destruction. These are just some of huge range of improvements that will be agreed at Prague. Taken together, they will ensure that we face the security threats of the 21st century with the most modern, most effective military capacities possible. \9@ eal hronk Dw NATO cotony SO NATO A. Garen/Melntosh NATO HAS A SWEET MILITARY Nicholas Burns, US Ambassador to NATO, 6/10/04, State Department, p. lexis ‘To meet those new threats, NATO is beginning to acquire modern military capabilities to produce a more deployable force -- capabilities such as strategic airlift and refueling, precision-guided munitions, air-to-ground surveillance, and combat service support. Last summer, NATO created a new, leaner military command structure and a new Alliance Transformation Command in Norfolk to plug European allies into revolutionary new concepts in training, doctrine, and technology being pioneered by the U.S. Joint Forces ‘Command. Most significantly, the Alliance has also developed a flexible, agile, cutting- edge NATO Response Force (NRF) to which France has been a major contributor. The NRF is prepared for any mission -- whether hostage rescue, humanitarian relief, response to terrorist attack, or high intensity conflict -- deployable within days to wherever in the world it is needed, and sustainable once it gets there. Today, NATO has more troops committed to missions at greater distances than ever before in its history. In addition to ongoing operations in Kosovo and Bosnia, and supporting the Polish-led multinational brigade in Iraq, NATO has embarked on a historic mission in Afghanistan, where it commands the U.N.-mandated Intemational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. DIW 04 ‘A. Garen/McIntosh NATO airpower allows for effective peacekeeping Geoffrey Lee Williams, Director of Inst. of Economic & Political Studies at Cambridge, MATS mltany hog | less ground troop casualties. and Barkely Jared Jones, 2001. “NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21" Century: 1e Twenty-Year Crisis.” } What occurred in Kosovo seems to confirm that once airpower has attained maximum dominance, then ground forces are required to con- solidate a victory not in fact achieve one. High intensity campaigns no longer require ground forces to suffer high casualties once airpower has done its job in providing a permissive environment for ground com- ponents to operate relatively freely and without undue regard for the need to restrict casualties. The war of summer 1999 was won in Serbia, not in the killing fields of Kosovo. Yet, of course, land armies are far from obsolete or irrelevant in warfare, because air forces do not and cannot seize territory either as peacekeepers or as bloody wartiors. Theatre or tactical bombing in Kosovo was a relative failure as opposed to the stunning success of strategic bombing in Serbia. Yet airpower is not a panacea in general or in major war or even in the prevention of civilian massacres on the ground, and it could have done little to prevent or punish the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, in Rasnia. Air power acting. as a single component of military power by itself is almost certainly unlikely to repel or defeat a ground invasion launched by sophisticated hhigh intensity forces. But the use of aixpower can erode the material strength and will of forces on the ground to an extent unimaginable in the Second World War, for example, | NATO 4a DIW 04 A. Garen/McIntosh NATO's strategic: Geoffrey Lee Williams, and Barkely Jared Jones, 2001. Century: the Twenty-Year Crisis’ ‘me discussion of the sole of inthe early spring: its efficacy should not ‘use of airpower caused the success of the Director of Inst. of Eco! ‘ana summer of 1999 and ‘pe allowed to NATO's intervention in ‘eisclear beyond peradventye hat NATO achieved NIPIO milttas rong, Kosovo mission. 7 nomic & Political Studies at Cambridge, Si eae aiypower in relation to the wat Kosovo he consroversy since abou obscure the marked ‘ethical basis of © atlas ants ulimate TNS succes. strategic ViCtory resough te application of aso ma just war. tis parent £0 the evidence now ing of Serbia aid sserbs were that rape, murder igeale. Let us all HOPE ‘two contrasting peing collected ign itself trigger the etn cleansing of ta aton ethnic cleansing well DOT the war commenced and sind terror were deliberate a0 ‘of policy om oved and evaluated that NATO'S ‘bomb- Kosovo. The ‘a huge a rents appalling episode Wil 20 ‘pe repeated ‘views Have emerged which can Be described as esse" Tualy the Europea perspechn® ae se of airpower agninst SecDi8 and the otheras essentially tagreement exist and HEHE each ‘prejudice flourish strategic defeat. ( strategic ¥iCtOOy) th, na obscure the essential tra of what Meat by setting out the Buropee! ‘on the utility and relevance the "ia neither case does COMPLE perspective interservice rivalry and occurred. WE ihe American position bringing about the Serbian agree tat NATO enjoyed & ‘view and then of airpower in ‘schools of thought A443 NATO DIW 04 DITO ain, sera, A. Garen/McIntosh Deployment of NATO forces is centralized and efficient. Hon. Douglas J. Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 3/27/03 NATO Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate One Hundred Bighth Congress First Session, “The Future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat (NATO)” FFENATO is to fulfil its security tasks, it must be able to deploy Groes with global reach that are agile, lethal, and technologente, Superior to any challengers. For this purpuse, NATO loaders arate, Hrague, summit last November launched a programs te asf NATO's command and force structures, j} Key clement of the program is the allies’ commitment to estab- lish the NATO Response Force. If implemented to the stondnrs proposed by the United States, the Response Force will be alle vs i prague, the heads of state and government also approved an Gutline for a streamlined NATO command structure, Operstrnat fommands will be reduced in number from 23 to 16. This will weeks fore efficient use of financial and manpower resources and, mace importantly, NATO commanders will have headquarters that eee Fore mobile, joint, and interoperable. The establishinent of a ree fanctional corumand, the Allied Command Transformation i hee folk, Virginia, will prov formation across the entire alliance. sor new engine to promote military trans- 144 NATO DIW 04 N TS 4 lbw: a A. Garen/Melntosh NATO allows U.S. cooperation in Western European growth, Madeleine Albright, former Sec. Sate, 46/99, Brookings Institution, “A New NATO for a New Century.” Halt'a century ago, American Teadership helped lift Wester EaroPe to pinsperity and democracy In this decade, the entire trans-Atlantie rructures cf lPing Europes nevily fee hein to integrate themselves boon aceconornic and security structures stane ‘This brings me to the second element of a new transatlantic security consensus -the need for new military capabilities. If NATO is to undertake missions potentially in faraway places, we need different forces - forces that are slimmer, tougher, and faster; forces that reach further and stay in the field longer, but that can still punch hard. In short, if we take ‘our new missions seriously, we must embrace military transformation in all its aspects. NATO has been a very effective catalyst to push forward this military transformation. And it is delivering results. Our Allied Command ‘Transformation is up and running. At tomorrow's Summit, we will change the command of the NATO Response Force, which will soon have reached its initial operational capability. We will mark the full operational capability of our Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion. Theatre Missile Defence is coming along as well. And we will initiate a review of our approach to force generation - because we need to ensure that our military means continue to match our political ambitions. DIW A. Garen/Melntosh NATO PEF A NATO RAPID REACTION FORCE CAN RESTORE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS, James Kitfield, staffwriter,10/12/02, The National Journal, p. lexis Wester European allies who want to restore NATO's status as a military alliance capable of meaningful collective action know they will have to embrace U.S. plans for a rapid-response force. The 1999 Kosovo conflict demonstrated that NATO lacked the crisis-management mechanisms, streamlined command structures, and. rapid-reaction capabilities that Washington has been prodding the Europeans to adopt for years. Only Europe's ability to deploy ‘troops rapidly will correct a trans-Atlantic imbalance in shared exposure to risk during times of crisis. If American troops are the only ones who can react quickly, they will take all the risks. That lack of balance is eroding one of NATO's founding principles. NATO DIW 04 A. Garen/Melntosh Busso4 “The NATO-Russia council facilitates Russia's {ideological alignment with the West of the Brookings Institution, Nov/Dee 2009. Tabs, resent so este Tabor gua Bans NATO RHE VSL SINE {Tiss than 20 years ago, Russia seemed to be in another galaxy altogether. Now it has been drawn into multiple Western-centered orbits, including the NATO-Russia Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Council of Europe. Bush, like Bill Clinton before hiin, has left open Russia’ eligibility for nao membership. Although that days still a long way off, Russia today is more genuinely a part~ ner of Nao than it was before. President Viadimir Putin’s decision to accelerate his country’s alignment with the West has profound implications for the future of Naro, including its scope and even its name. ‘North Atlantic” will seem inadequate as the geographic designation of an experiment in collective security expanding, as Winston Churchill might have put it, from Vilnius on the Baltic to Viadivostok on the Pacific. a NATO 209 DIW 04 ‘A. Garen/Melnt nosh DiygsT 4 NATO ee e2vuestk Ie BECOMING PART OF THE WEST ~HRoUeH NATO. John Lis, Chairman ofthe Subeommitee on Europe, nd Dove Bereuter, Senior Policy Join 8 nter 2003, The Washington Quarters, “Europes Global Role,” Lexis-Nexis. yee ee ‘lexander Vershbow, has called for BASS Russia's relationship with NATO to become ‘an alliance with the Alliance ~~ veep a joint venture between He povrer independent entities in areas of me mutual interest.” n10 The NATO-Russia Council provides the mechanlstn rata elationship to evolve. Given that many of the rest important for such 2 European and U:S. security are also threats Host ee, security, ce rtalalyterroriam and WMD proliferation, coopera" 2 these areas ale larly ter erpenefiel. Unfortunately, Russa Nas nok oss7 SS Sno aoe of the opportunities for cooperation that NATO Tt take full adverog< och as counterterrorism, mislle defense, 2° military extended Ir ions. As Vershbow sald, “Russia stl needs © Qosran a tovmtaPyatust and competion in its dea ings with NATO? 9 that a < legacy of mietonship can become "a win-wi lations” Oe NATO zero stag ts hand extended to Russi, ther fore, wither! compromising must ey or its democratic and moral valu In try Hae should take, ts security © dhe partnership belng offered, when would ae adage of secur by working in tan with the words most _Stlccesstul military alliance tt, “The EU's Common Strategy on Russia is alse to be commended, as EU Torts to bring Russia closer to Europe can raduce perceptions among etme Russians that the West Is a potential 2 1versany- By focusing on Specific areas of cooperation such as the ‘environment, organized crime, eee illegal immigration while working to relly erce Russia's democratic and juutions, the EU is trying to help Russia ts become, European ey, Closer economic cooperation wil benefit Rates, ‘and the EU, $eiping to improve the economic situation of ordinary Russians and helping ing the appeal of nationalist politicians who fy Te poison relations irninisn yest by claiming that the United States ang EES ‘seek to keep Win a impoverished. Although EU membership for Russia is long way off ace a stronger association between the FU and the largest country on are continent is a necessary step In creating a EuroPe whole and free, @ tgoal that is likewise in U.S. Interests. 5, DIW NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh _RussdA STRENGTHENING RUSSIAN RELATIONS IS KEY TO ISOLATING TERRORIST SUPPORTING STATES Ariel Cohen, Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies at the Heritage Foundation, 5/22/02, National Review, p. lexis, Given Russia's proximity to Western Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East, establishing closer cooperation with Russia will have significant benefits for U.S. national security and regional and economic interests. Closer cooperation with Moscow is vital, for example, to isolating such terrorism-supporting states as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea and for slowing the transfer of Russian military technology to China. 2 DIW A. Garen/MeIntosh Russr4 a RUSSIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP CAUSES IT TO REVERSE ITS ALLIANCE WITH CHINA SOLVING A GLOBAL WAR David Rivera, visiting asst. professor of government at Hamilton College, 3/22/03, Political Science Quarterly, p. lexis On the other hand, Russian membership in NATO might serve to reinforce and consolidate positive tendencies in Russian foreign policy, such as the absence of a military response to NATO's 1999 expansion and the Yeltsin administration's important cooperation in the implementation of NATO's peace plan in Kosovo. (123) In addition, NATO membership would serve to slow, if not reverse, Moscow's almost decade-long movement in the direction of an alliance with the People's Republic of China, a state likely to equal if not surpass the United States in economic and military power in this century and thus the world's most likely candidate to ignite a global "hegemonic war." (124) NATO / ve, DIW NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh, I RUSSTA, STRONG NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS SOLVE FOR PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM Robert Hunter, senior advisor at the RAND Corporation and vice chairman of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 2000, The Washington Quarterly, Winter, p. lexis, Given this perspective, as well as the lessons of the last few years -- both hopeful and chastening ~ itis clear that the chances for advancing NATO-Russian relations, focused primarily on the European dimension, are most likely to be realized not through some grand bargain, but rather through the slow accretion of individual, concrete actions, both within and outside the auspices of the if Russia and NATO can find the exhaustive, provides an agenda that can even go beyond Europe. This can include the common interest of inhibiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs, and international criminal activity. Even here, of course, perspectives vary. For example, Russia does not see the threat from ‘weapons of mass destruction, potentially emanating from Iraq and Iran, in the same light as do various NATO allies and the United States. Us DIW NATO A. Garen/Melntosh USsSt A RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO NATO SOLVES MULTIPLE SCENARIOS OF WAR David Rivera, visiting asst. professor of government at Hamilton College, 3/22/03, itical Science Quarterly, p. lexis wanna amiga be said regarding Moscow's highly profitable military and nuclear ‘cooperation with Iran. Most basically, Russian membership "would integrate a potentially threatening state into NATO and increase the overall power base of the alliance." (125) It ‘would also promote the continuation of Russian cooperation and assistance in future American actions against terrorist networks and rogue states. Such cooperation and assistance will be even more beneficial should pessimistic predictions of enduring conflict between the West and the Islamic world as a whole come true. (126) In this regard, Russia is, behind Saudi Arabia, the world’s second largest exporter of oil. (127) Finally, whatever the relative merits ofthese arguments, this study has shown that the record of post-Soviet Russia's behavior toward its newly independent neighbors cannot be legitimately construed as providing grounds for Russia's exclusion from NATO. ait DIW NATO A. Garen/Mclntosh ***USELESS BUT HILARIOUS CARD*** BUSH AND HIS STAFF ARE THE WORST DIPLOMATS EVER Klaus Larres, Kissenger Professor in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress, Spring 2003, The Washington Quarterly, “Mutual Incomprehension,” Vol. 26, No. 2, P. 23, p. lexis Although the two leaders’ divergent personalities and incompatible political styles certainly contributed to the bilateral frost, they are not sufficient to explain the recent rift. For electoral, personal, and long-term strategic reasons, Schroder is keen on pursuing a more independent and confident German foreign policy. Bush, in contrast, believes strongly in his personal mission and the "manifest destiny" of the United States, placing a high premium on loyalty and reliability in domestic as well as international affairs. That being said, Bush certainly does not appear to forgive personal slights easily. n19 Schroder, for example, did not receive the customary congratulatory phone call from the U.S. president following his election victory. Instead, both National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld emphasized that U.S.-German relations had been "poisoned." n20 Rumsfeld even went so far as to refuse to talk to his German colleague, Defense Minister Peter Struck, at a two-day NATO ministerial meeting in Warsaw in late September. Rather than call him by name, Rumsfeld repeatedly referred to him as "that man." n21 As late as the end of October, Rice told her staff that she did not wish ing Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in the White House; he was granted a brief meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell but was not allowed any-where near the president. n22 There were many other indications from the U.S. government, not least from the U.S. ambassador to Berlin, David Coats, that the White House regarded ‘Schroder’s campaign-time antiwar utterances as highly objectionable, unacceptable anti- USS. statements. us DIW NATO A. Garen/Mclntosh Freelattons Stable] ans TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE STABLE US Consulate General Frankfurt, May 5, 2004, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: EU Vs. USA?, http://www.usembassy.de/frankfurt/speech05-05-04 htm This week we can truly say that Cold War divisions are gone and Europe is united. Progress in Turkey gives us further hope that the European Union can continue on this path of inclusion beyond Romania and Bulgaria. An American political scientist remarked some time ago that "the end of the Cold War is also over" ~ in other words, we have new and serious global threats. The relationship between the United States and Europe remains the most important political and economic relationship in the world, and ‘we are closer in our values and interests than perhaps any two regions of the world. I have no doubt that transatlantic relations will endure and thrive. Inst as T have no doubt but that AISEC is one of the organizations that will make this relationship work in the future, along with our joint relationships with the rising states of Asia. DJW TO A. Garen/McIntosh Rekteos Fesilsen 4 YS US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS ARE RESILIENT US Consulate General Frankfurt, May 5, 2004, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: EU Vs. USA?, http://www.usembassy.de/frankfurt/speech0S-05-04 htm The U.S.-European security relationship is particularly important. That relationship is healthy, serves the most basic interests on both sides of Atlantic, and will weather the storm of differences of opinion on the question of Iraq. Despite all the controversy over the coalition campaign in Iraq and our efforts to help secure and rebuild that country, 20 European countries currently have forces in Iraq totaling over 20,000 soldiers. Germany has permitted the U.S. the full use of its bases for military operations in Iraq and has contributed extensively to securing our military and diplomatic installations here. We are deeply grateful for that support. If we look elsewhere in the world, we see case after case of close cooperation between the U.S. and its largest European allies. Twenty-nine European countries, including France and Germany, have over 4,000 military personnel in Afghanistan. Germany has shown particular leadership in that effort. In the Balkans, the EU is the single largest donor to the reconstruction process and has over 36,000 troops stationed in Kosovo alone (80% of the total international force). elige Get Relaceons Rest decay “aiss TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE SHOCK PROOF Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 6/27/04, Pagine di Difesa, A New Atlantacism for the 21* Century, http://www.paginedidifesa.it/2004/natose_040627.html ‘The first reason is that those who cultivated the notion of an inescapable transatlantic divorce were wrong all along. Europe and North America can disagree, sometimes quite eaory but they remain the world's closest community - not only in trade or shared security interests, but also in common values. The fact of the matter is that America remains Europe's No.1 tner, and that Washington's need for likeminded Allies will inevitably lead it to Europe. And, frankly, I cannot see this changing. ‘The second reason why we witness a return to realism is that the extreme views that used to dominate so much of the Iraq debate have become increasingly discredited. Those U.S. unilateralists who thought that the United States didn't really need Allies have come to realise that the U.S. not only needs Allies, but also the Alliance. At the same time, notions of turning Europe into a "counterweight" to the United States have also floundered. Because Europe simply does not want to define itself in opposition to the United States. aly Dw 71 NATO A. Garen/McIntosh aA hen Ge AR She TURN: IF EUROPE SAYS NO IT WOULD UNDERMINE TRANSATLATNIC RELATIONS Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, 2003, January/February, Foreign Affairs, p. lexis Europeans have an equally important role to play in avoiding this outcome. The more they reject the notion that some international problems do have to be dealt with by force, the more they reinforce the conclusion among some Americans that consultation is a waste of time and Washington must go it alone. When Europeans appear to play down American concerns about issues such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, they also play directly into the hands of those in the United States who argue that there is no point even trying to get the Europeans on board. The European argument that Bush's approach to terrorism and his "axis of evil” speech are "simplistic" has the merit of being true, but it does not offer much of an alternative plan for confronting the threats that Europeans and Americans face. Europe's repeated "insistence" that Saddam Hussein comply with un Security Council resolutions and allow weapons inspectors to return to Iraq, without the backing of potential military force, was a hollow threat that had no chance of having any effect. 219 DIW \ NATO A. GarenMetntosh ort © Rec ons AAs eee TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE BEYOND THE POINT OF NO RETURN Ralph Fucks, co-president of the Heinrich-Boll-Foundation, 2004, Dossier: Conflict, With Iraq, http://www. boell.de/er/04_thema/1960.him! The transatlantic conflict over the Iraq War marks a turning point in Europe’s relationship to the USA. Whether one greets the rift between "Old Europe" and the global hyperpower as the birth of an emancipated Europe or deplores it as having endangered the basic coordinates of German and European policy, there is no returning to the status quo ante. The current strains in the transatlantic relationship reflect a deep-seated political and cultural estrangement between the societies on this side and that side of the ‘Atlantic. By a decade’s delay, they follow the political eruption of 1989/90 which collapsed the old, bi-polar world system and left the USA as the sole world power. peek nes r- NATO Aowanetans CONSu(tritcon POA SOE prs ONE TIME CONSULTATION WOULDN’T SOLVE FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE Timothy Garton Ash, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter. to Europe” First, to work wherever possible with allies. We hear that loud and clear from John Kerry. Second, to support a more united Europe. These are not the same thing. It is possible to want to work with allies, but to prefer to pick and choose those allies from among the disunited states of Europe. That is what Bush has done. It will take some energetic reassurance to convince us that Washington has really decided to support European unity again. 22 DIW S ‘ATO A.GarenMelntosh — CONSULE efeerAt Sole As —.s-C CONSULTATION DOESN’T SOLVE FRICTION Richard Haas, Director of Department of State Policy Planning Staff, 6/10/02, The United States Mission to the European Union, http://www.useu.be/Categories/Defense/June]002HaassNATOAlliance.html, But these frictions are not due to lack of consultation. The Bush Administration has tried to consult fully and to bridge differences. We have consulted intensively with Europe -- the EU, NATO, and ilaterally — on the global war on terrorism, environmental policies, missile defense and weapons of mass destruction, peace in the Balkans and the situation in the Middle East. Where the United States could not go along with a proposed approach, such as the Kyoto Protocol, we put forward alternative proposals to address the underlying concern. The same will be true with respect to our position on the International Criminal Court. On some social issues, like the death penalty, the United States and Europe will simply have to agree to disagree. 222 DIW ae NATO ey GerevMetatosh Coaele ome owe Ans CONSULTATION ALONE DOESN’T SOLVE EUROPEAN RELATIONS Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning, May 11, 2004, US Department of State, Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: Bridging the Gap, http://www state.gov/s/p/rem/32448, htm. One option would be for us to focus chiefly on consulting more, Some Europeans have told me that they feel shut out of Bush Administration decision-making. They argue that if they were let into that process, rather than just being notified of the end result, they would be more likely to share our perspective. I’m all for consultation. { meet regularly with my European counterparts on trips to Europe and back in Washington, and I value our discussions, But consultation in and of itself is not a sufficient solution. ely ae NATO ‘A.GarenMelntosh = COUMPSE SHAY WTO BA, iD me COLLAPSE OF THE ALLIANCE IS INEVITABLE - ATTEMPTS TO. MAINTAIN IT ONLY PREVENT A TRUE PARTNERSHIP: E. Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, ‘The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m275\Vis_74/ai_112411717 The essence of a true transatlantic partnership is mutual respect of a type now absent. Such an attitude can come about only when Europe respects itself as an independent actor on the world stage and when America sees in Europe a partner worthy of respect. If both sides continue trying to resuscitate NATO, the mutual resentment, hostility and contempt characteristic of the recent transatlantic relationship will only get worse over time. ‘Mutual respect will not guarantee a successful alliance between America and Europe, but it will establish a much more solid foundation for partnership than currently exists. Mutual respect is not itself a policy, nor will it assure either accord or cooperation. In some important policy areas, such as the Middle East, the priorities of Europe and the United States diverge too greatly for any institution (let alone NATO) to bring them together. In areas of primary European interest, such as the Balkans, itis high time for the United States to withdraw. In areas of marginal European interest, which is much of the world, Washington and Brussels need to increase their diplomatic dialogue and their coordination of non-military instruments like foreign aid. Where American and European interests clearly conjoin, as in fighting international terrorism, there must be a true partnership. QU pearenMeinosn Coupe _ Sh felt tors Thee} ee ee ee |e THE OVERWHELMING DOMINANCE OF THE US OVER EUROPE MAKES A BREAK IN RELATIONS INEVITABLE John C. Hulsman, Research Fellow for European Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, 6/11/03, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, p. lexis The reasons for this resurgence are structural, and are likely to endure. With the end of the Cold War, it was to be expected that America and Europe would drift. Without the unifying growl of the Soviet bear to subsume the reality that America and various European states had quite distinct international interests, there were bound to be divergences. The U.S. has emerged as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era, while European states, with the partial exception of France and the UK, are at best regional powers. This structural difference, unlikely to change in even the medium- to long-term, does much to explain the practical policy differences increasingly emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only has America gone from strength to strength in the new era, Europe has conspicuously failed to emerge as a coherent power in its own right. This sense of a resurgent and increasingly unfettered America, coupled with an introverted, increasingly marginalized Europe, does much to explain not only the differences in policy between the ‘two poles, but also the increased virulence many Europeans feel toward American policies. In the end, such differences are less about philosophy and more about power; it is not that European Gaullists feel American international policies are merely wrong - increasingly they feel they have no power to affect them, even at the margins. This change in political psychology does much to explain both the rise of an anti-American Gaullism in Europe, as well as the increasing drift in the transatlantic relationship. 227s DW NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh AZ: Keettons Q)Tevorism fn THE US AND EUROPE WILL COOPERATE ON TERRORISM — REGARDLESS OF RELATIONS Dalia Dassa Kaye, assistant professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly, p. lexis, ‘The common threat of international terrorism, particularly after September 11, 2001, has produced some robust transatlantic cooperation. According to a 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund poll as well as the Transatlantic Trends 2003 poll, Americans and Europeans rank international terrorism as the most serious threat to national security. This opinion helps explain the widespread European support for the U.S. operation to remove the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as strengthened intelligence gathering and sharing in the transatlantic community. Bilateral U.S.-European working groups now meet regularly to coordinate and improve law enforcement measures to contain the movement of terrorists and limit their sources of funding, After September 11, 2001, the member nations of the European Union moved uncharacteristically quickly to harmonize their extradition procedures, and Europe is currently in the process of drafting a treaty on extradition with the United States despite ongoing concems about the USS. death penalty. The common threat, particularly the threat of a catastrophic terrorist. attack, is likely to bind the United States and Europe in common cause for many years to ‘come, even if approaches to the threat are likely to differ. n4 ete Diw ees ee NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Tecampttve_Warkere CONSULTATION WITH THE EU LEADS TO PREEMPTIVE US MILITARY TACTICS Reginald Dale, editor in chief of the policy quarterly European Affairs and a media fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 5/13/04, International Herald Tribune, p. lexis Now proposals are being floated for a "grand bargain," in which Washington would agree to genuine consultations with its allies before acting, and accept that these will increasingly take place with the EU ). In return, the Europeans would acknowledge that pre-emptive military action may sometimes be necessary and that they should be more generally supportive of American policies, including financially. Ans. DIW Seo (feck fe erm ta} NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh eats ae =o pas THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS UNDERMINES SOP Stewart Patrick, research associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, 9/22/01, World Policy Journal, No. 3, Vol. 18; Pg. 2, p. lexis ‘A final impediment to American multilareralism is a constitutional separation of powers granting the executive and legislature joint control over foreign policy. This shared mandate--absent in parliamentary democracies--often complicates domestic approval of multilateral commitments, particularly when the two branches are controlled by different parties. Because the ratification of treaties requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, political minorities frequently block U.S. participation in proposed conventions. ory DIw : NATO A.GarenMeIntosh_ VATO Seer: cal HD NAR ALL CONSULTATION MUST INVOLVE THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL NATO ISSUES JUNE 22, 2004, The Consultation Process: Reaching Consensus, ‘http://www nato.nt/issues/consultation/ The principal forum for political consultation is the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal decision-making committee. The Secretary General, by virtue of his chairmanship, plays an essential part in this process. Consultation also takes place on a regular basis in other forums, all of which derive their authority from the Council. 904 DIWw NATO A.Garen/Meintosh = MAKO Seceé €entrn( PAD PSE NATO ACTION REQUIRES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO BEG OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS Philip H Gordon is senior fellow in foreign policy studies and director of the Centre on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, July 2004, The Prospect, “Letter to Europe” But there are also some worrying signs, especially ‘when it comes to European military and financial contributions. Nato secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer tells visitors that getting troops and equipment for Afghanistan requires him to run around with a “begging bowl.” When the local Nato commanders recently asked member states to send seven transport helicopters, no one was willing to do so, and Scheffer had to continue his begging until Turkey finally pledged to send at least three. Nato has 2,000 helicopters in its inventory, and the member states couldn’t come up with seven of them for a critical operation on which they had all agreed. If European public opinion is really so anti-war (or anti-American) that even modest military contributions to Nato operations are too politically difficult, I may have to concede that Kagan was right. 2s ee Piplomatra Capita Lé nk CONSULTATION REQUIRES THE FOCUS OF KEY NATIONAL OFFICERS Richard Haas, director of policy planning at the US state department, May 1, 2002, World Link, No. 3, Vol. 15, Pg. 28, p. lexis ‘The Bush administration seeks to consult fully and bridge differences wherever possible. ‘The US has already consulted intensively with Europe on the global wat on terrorism, environmental policies, missile defence and weapons of mass destruction, peace in the Balkans and the situation in the Middle East. ‘The president took the decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty only after extensive talks with Russia and allies in Europe and elsewhere. The US expects to codify further nuclear reductions in a legally binding agreement as part of a new strategic framework with Russia. In several instances, the US has put forward alternative proposals, such as Mr Bush's climate-change initiative in lieu of signing the Kyoto Protocol. Regarding the US steel safeguards, the Bush administration recognises the EU's right to bring the issue before the WTO for consultation and dispute settlement, and intends to respect all of its WTO commitments in this regard. Addressing policy challenges such as these is inherently complex, and all the more so when the issues involve the complicated interplay of domestic politics and foreign policy. This is a fact of political life in a democracy, but a fact that can complicate a leader’s freedom of action and make it even more difficult to find common cause with other nations. On difficult social issues, such as the death penalty, we will have to agree to disagree. This is but one example of how we are culturally similar, but not always the same--a description that is equally true of the relationships among the individual countries of Europe. ome DIW A. Garen/Metntosh TL plometi Capttal NATO Line ARE GENUINE CONSULTATION REQUIRES DISPATCHING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME Madeline Albright, former secretary of state, 1/18/04, The Boston Globe, Laura Secor, p.lexis During the Kosovo war ... went to Europe... once a month, or met some Europeans somewhere. It took a lot of work. That's what real consultation is about. And even under those circumstances, they weren't fully satisfied. So you can't order sovereign nations to just salute every time we say so. ae fog Taletf © DIW NATO jaren/McIntos! A, Garen/McIntosh Avy, AGREATER NATO ROLE IN ANOTHER AREA TRADESOFF WITH ITS PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN Judy Dempsey, FT Brussels Correspondent, 6/25/04, Financial Times, p. lexis As an indication of the scale of difficulties encountered by Nato in Afghanistan, several Nato countries are concerned that its mission there would be undermined by involvement in Iraq. "That is one of our big concerns," says a Nato official based in Kabul. "The main Nato players, such as the US, Britain, France, Germany and Poland, are overstretched. Can we really take on Iraq and at the same time deliver on Afghanistan?” ‘Nato already has immense problems even creating small Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the north and west of Afghanistan. It agreed to set them up last December, five months after it took over the 6,500-strong International Security Assistance Force based in Kabul. DIW Sy, =o NATO A. Garen/McIntosh yom ee Afsre, NON-BINDING CONSULTATION SOLVES RELATIONS. The Denver Post 6/14/01, Trudy Rubin, p. lexis Most important, the president's visit to Europe has been cast in a Powellesque mode. ‘This doesn't mean he will change his policies - Monday's speech on global warming offered no new ideas and he's still determined to build an anti-missile network. But it does mean Bush will consult, consult, consult - especially on missile defenses. He seems to recognize that there will be large and inherent contradictions in any missile defense system if he can't persuade the European allies to participate. And that, in turn, means that the Bush team must pay attention to the allies’ concems about alienating Russia. As a result, the administration is trying much harder to win Moscow's cooperation in any grand revision of global nuclear strategy. ‘The Powellesque approach keeps a damper on hubris and ears open to allied concems. This is a formula for success on Bush's important European tour. 234 DIW 04 42: meTO ©) NATO A. Garen/MeIntosh Ar y, NIKI % policy of deterrence futls tnd CorFlick in ervenhon muck be led by me Uniked Stier Shey Weber , rete Plow @ For Ply Shees @ Caro. 1¢ 28 (ed) 12d Galen Carpenter, Barba Conny 1 J NATO Enlargement, p. 224 TAlliances—whether the Triple Alliance or NATO—seek to pre- _serve peace through deterrence, and deterrencé assumes abloodless rationality. But modern wars, which are typically wars of identity rather than plunder, are more the product of unrestrained emotion than of rational calculation. “All my libido is given to Austro- Hungary,” Sigmund Freud enthused at the outbreak of World War I* Deterrence in such a situation is virtually useless. To prevent ‘wars of identity, it is more important to establish political institutions and cultures that reduce the significance of identity. Ifthe problem of post-Cold War Europe is ethnic rivalry, it can only be solved ifg) the legitimacy of the state is based on something other than its synonymy with the nation. As Michael Ignatieff, who has chronicled; post-Cold War nationalism in the BBC series Blood and Belonging, = has pointed out, “A society anchored in a culture of individual rights & and liberties is more easily returned to the practice of toleration than > ‘one where social allegiance is invested in ethnicity.”” The United $ States, by its history and traditions, is uniquely placed to provide the rest of the world with an example of the benefits of such a culture. The United States should deal with any dangers of ethnic instability now confronting Lng serene pase not by assuming that an alliance that arguably prevented a Soviet invasion of Western Europe will prevent all Kinds oF warin- Europe forever. . 24% DIw Secartte Counce Tur, NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Avs. GOING THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS KEY TO INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY Bruce W. Jentleson, director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, 2003, The Washington Quarterly, Winter, p. lexis Multilateralists! concerns about the dangerous precedents set by the unilateralist prerogative claimed by the Bush doctrine are well founded. Multilateralists are also right about the "unique legitimacy," as Annan phrased it in his opening speech to the UN. General Assembly in the fall of 2003, with which the Security Council is endowed in any cases other than those that clearly meet the Article 51 self-defense criteria. Collective action based on collective decisionmaking is at the heart of multilateralism. The "who decides" question especially taps into this. At the same time, it is important that they follow the secretary general's lead in recognizing that "it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns" that the Bush administration and others have raised and "show that these concems can, and will, be effectively addressed through collective action." n19 U.S. multilateralists can hardly be less critical of the UN than its own secretary general is, This concem about the UN's capacity for firm and decisive action runs deeper than just the Iraq debate. In 1999, Annan was critical of the United States and NATO for going to war in Kosovo without the Security Council's authorization but also of the Security Council for not acting when faced with these "crimes against humanity" and thereby “{betraying] the very ideals that inspired the founding of the United Nations." n20 The ICISS report also pushed to confront the problems of Security Council inaction: "It is a real question” when there is a "conscience-shocking situation crying out for action . where lies the most harm: in the damage to international order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council stands by." The ICISS issued its own tough love warning hat, if the Security Council does not act in such situations, "it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these situations." n21 Surely no U.S. leader, whatever his or her general foreign policy orientation, would ever forswear that option. Considering the limits that are being learned the hard way in Iraq, however, future U.S. leaders need to continue to seek ways to make Security Council decisionmaking a more viable alternative. 7220 Dw NATO firs AT pt A. Garen/McIntosh Ew PE4eW OGTR try, ENDING NATO SOLVES FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC GAP E, Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, ‘The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http://www findarticles.com/plarticles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 IT SHOULD go without saying that Europe and America need to be partners in world affairs. The question is, how best to practice partnership? NATO represents the model of a dominant senior partner and various junior partners. The growth of European identity and of European integration makes this approach obsolete, even abstracting from the end of the Cold War and the lack of an external threat. With hesitant steps and many imperfections, Europe is nonetheless becoming a unified and collective partnership of its own, There must be a more balanced transatlantic partnership, with the United States, undoubtedly the stronger and more active party, but with Europe becoming an increasingly cohesive and confident player with interests and ideas of its own. This new model may be unwelcome to many in Washington--it may be unwelcome to some in Europe-but America and Europe will thereby become better partners, and possibly even friends. eae ae NATO AGarewMentash VATO Does Ons DE er NATO DOESN’T SOLVE FOR GLOBAL TRADE E. Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, ‘The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http://www. findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 The transatlantic relationship will not disappear or become marginal for either side, but it will increasingly become dominated by economic issues. Despite the frequent assertion that NATO gives the United States leverage over European economic policy, this rarely proved true during the Cold War. It certainly is not the case today, when the single transatlantic relationship possesses mixed political, economic and security strands. This is the result of our Cold War success. We can afford to haggle over steel tariffs because steel is not needed for battle tanks. Brussels will continuc to be the locus of U.S. concerns in Europe, but at European Union offices rather than at NATO headquarters. The present disproportionate concentration of power in a single political entity was not the plan or expectation of the United States. When the Cold War ended, Washington (with a few dissenting voices) anticipated that a multipolar "new world order" would unfold, with the United States as its leading power and significant power centers in Europe, Russia, China and Japan. The emergence of the United States as "hyperpower” ‘was in part the product of a decade-long economic boom that allowed Washington to fund an increasingly sophisticated military with a declining share of national ineome-- although the U.S. military shrank substantially from its Cold War norm. More important by far in the formation of a unipolar world were the protracted collapse of Russia, the long-term stagnation of the Japanese economy, the slow transformation of China's economic success into diplomatic activity, and~above all--Europe's extended "peace dividend" combined with its refusal to assume a role in the world commensurate with its prosperity. Thus, the United States did not conspire to unipolar status but attained it by default, If the world system is imbalanced today, and if Europeans feel unease at the scope of America’s role, they have none but themselves to blame. 23k DIW NATO tosh MATO VAI mM ‘A. Gaten/MeIntosh ae Ae aues = ans. NATO UNDERMINES US POWER PROJECTION E, Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 For better or worse, the United States has global responsibilities and unique global capabilities. At the same time, Washington's diplomatic and political capacities are already overburdened. While U.S. operational and logistical capabilities are today supreme, America’s overall force structure is little more than half the size it was a ‘generation ago, and its reserves are seriously overcommitted. The best forces can cover only limited tasks, especially for a democratic mation that employs only volunteers. Stated plainly, NATO is a luxury the United States can no longer justify. This vast subsidy for Europe is in direct conflict with the procurement and development budgets required to maintain the American technological lead in an ever-competitive world. Today's precision weapons will be commonplace tomorrow, and even the Pentagon's immense ‘budget cannot always keep up. b) DIw NATO jaren/Melintos TO iv = A. Garen/Melntosh NAR. APSR EEE ce ans NATO INHIBITS MILITARY INTEGRATION WITHIN EUROPE E. Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http:/www.findarticles.comvp/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 The core dynamic of the European Union is integration and the sharing of former national prerogatives. This dynamic has progressed quite far in many areas but remains inert in defense policy because NATO has remained the primary security instrument for most EU members. The Alliance, however, is not a mechanism of European defense integration, nor has it ever been, NATO is a mechanism to integrate American power into Europe. Yet its very success has inhibited significant military integration within Europe. Despite a number of showcase combined units, like the Danish-German-Polish Corps or the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, there is no aspect of public policy in Europe today as rigidly organized within national parameters as defense. ‘The consequence is grotesque: a European defense establishment in which the whole is significantly less than the sum of its parts. Many of the parts are excellent, with Europe fielding high quality units and capabilities that, in some cases (such as paramilitary units), are superior to those of the United States. Yet, except for Britain and France (and increasingly even for them), the lack of scale, the fragmentation and duplication, and the sheer waste of resources within European defense establishments vitiate what could be the world's second-strongest concentration of military power. That Europe fields two million personnel in uniform is not an achievement but the heart of the problem. Half the number--even one-quarter--properly led, equipped and trained in modern operational skills, would produce a whole much greater than the disparate national parts deployed today. 24 Dw NAO Deesi+ ©® Bee Tregeeg AT A. Garen/Melntosh NATO BASES AREN’T USEFUL FOR POWER PROJECTION — GOVERNMENTS DENY USE E, Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, The National Interest, Findarticles.com, hitp://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 No reconfiguration of NATO will solve this problem. Moving bases from Germany or the Low Countries to Poland or Romania may provide some employment in the recipient states, but bases are not much good if in a crisis you cannot rely on overflight rights from other countries. European governments more than once denied overflight or use of facilities to American forces even in the haleyon days of Cold War solidarity when the issue at hand was out of area. More recently, the inability of the United States to use the tormerly-vital tacility at Incirlik in southern Turkey for combat operations in Iraq, despite intense U.S. pressure, shows that bases remain very much subject to the discretion of sovereign states with interests and policies of their own--as, indeed, they should be. In any case, the tendency in Washington to think of Europe and NATO in terms of refueling, points and asa "toolbox" is hardly the stuff of a robust alliance. This is how one speaks about underlings, not allies. Such condescension speaks volumes about how both NATO. and the transatlantic relationship have changed. 241 DIW NATO aren/MeInto: VAIO FREVE AS EUROPE A. Garen/McIntosh MOLL A, antes SURO iF THE EXISTENCE OF NATO PREVENTS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH IS KEY TO STABILITY E, Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, The National Interest, Findarticles.com, hitp://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411717 THE IRAQ conflict ignited transatlantic tensions smoldering since the end of the Cold War. Although politicians in both Europe and America profess to regret the obvious split within the once-sturdy Atlantic Alliance, the United States and its people clearly perceive their security needs very differently than do most of Europe's governments and all of its, populations. NATO is not the solution to this split; it is the heart of the problem. The continuing existence of this Cold War relic stands in the way of the necessary evolution of European integration to include full responsibility for Continental security. In the 21st century, Europe can neither become a responsible power center nor a competent partner for the United States so long as Europeans remain dependent on a non-European power for their security--or even for the appearance of their security. ZY — Az: Alllancg good ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh fay, Wor prerenhon through alliances led bo Umees and Fenda | Stootey Kcloer, resewth fellow @ For. Paves Studies @ Cabo. 19 9G [e0] Ted Galen Carpenter, Barbary 262-203 Cony, NATO anes Enlayemert, (The growing tension between Turkey and Greece challenges one of the feral cease for NATO expansion: that NATO eliminates Seiten ueee e e European nation treated virtually every other as a military threat” Secretary Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its inaugural hearing on NATO expansion. “That pattern was broken only when NATO was born, and only in the half of Europe NATO covered.””" But has the pattem been broken? When asked whether improving ties between Turkey and Israel were inspired by the closer relations between Greece and Syria, a Turkish diplomat did not deny it, but he stressed that Turkey’s concerns did not lie with Damascus. “Why would we have to fight with Syria?” asked Ayden Alagakaptan, a former Turkish ambassador to Syria. “But with Greece, there is always a potential for a conflict to arise any time. Explaining Turkey’s policy, he stressed that “Israel has an advanced arms industry and Turkey needs military hardware, and since the USS. has imposed an embargo on military supplies to Turkey, we were told that Israel was our final resort.” The ambassador's language begs the question, Told by whom? If this is part of Secretary Albright’s sffort to prevent war by forging alliances, it could have disastrous consequences not only for Fee aplan by Turkey and Israel to jointly develop missiles, the Egyptian reaction was immediate, “These policies will lead to an arms race and the return of tension,” warned Egyptian foreign minister Amr ‘Moussa.* Just as in physics every action prompts a counterteaction, $9.in international politics every alliance prompts a counteralliance, A rapprochement of sorts is already under way between Iran and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria,” notes the semiofficial Egyptian > eee aeer Al-Ahram. “Such a rapprochement could serve asa signal ¥ to the Americans of a possible establishment of an Egyptian-Syrian- © Iranian alignment, to counter the leraeli-Turkish US. alliance”™ by EB 242 DIW 04 A. Garen/Melntosh ty In short, the philosophy behind NATO expansion—that alliances preserve peace by deterring aggression—is suitable in some situa- Bone but not in others. In this case, the language that is used to justify NATO expansion—that the prospective members belong oo ‘the West—implies that the rest of the world belongs to a different and inferior civilization. The consequences transcend relations with Russia. “The underlying notion of ‘racial’ and ‘cultural’ harmony is \ ‘also used, and more forcefully, by advocates of Cold War values = who are clearer in providing a conceptual framework for a dividing & line based on a nation’s readiness to conform to Western cultural ‘and economic values,” observes a recent article on NATO expansion in Al-Ahram, “Such statements echo a divisive view of the world that brings back to mind Samuel Huntington's controversial theory of an inevitable ‘Clash of Civilizations.’ Although American officials have never publicly espoused Huntington's ideas, the repeated stress on shared values and the emergence of Euro-centric policies follow the trend." , 262-26 2 NATO Suer es NAC] Wenrt ce@peete pees EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WON’T COOPERATE ON OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS E. Wayne Merry, Sr. Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, Winter 2003, ‘The National Interest, Findarticles.com, http:/Awww.findarticles.comvp/articles/mi_m275V/is_74/ai_112411717 The intense controversy over the Iraq War demonstrated that many Europeans are not willing to accept any transformation of NATO into America’s toolbox. While some European governments will support the United States in most out-of-area undertakings, such as in Iraq, and all European governments will support the United States in some contingencies, as in Afghanistan, no European government will accord Washington automatic cooperation in situations in which European interests are not clearly engaged. ‘As the United States is a global power, a clash between America's needs and Europe's interests is inevitable. Iraq was merely the first instance. 24S _ NATO ‘A. Garen/McIntosh Ene seme Bae As , NATO ENLARGEMENT ERODES ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND ABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION Hans Binnendijk, the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies AND. Richard L. Kugler, Distinguished Research Professor at INSS, October 1998, Strategic Forum, Number 149. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF149/forum149.html, ‘Swift movement to a larger alliance could alter the political and military character of NATO. Populating the North Atlantic Council (NAC) with a large bloc of new members could make consensus-building and decisionmaking significantly harder. NATO might still be able to perform some missions, such as peacekeeping in cases where a widespread political consensus exists. But its effectiveness as a military alliance to perform other critical functions could be eroded. A significantly larger alliance might not produce a more stable Europe or even render new members secure. If enlargement weakens NATO, new members could find themselves deprived of the credible security guarantees that led them to seek NATO membership. This could leave them still searching for security in other ways—a destabilizing trend that enlargement originally was intended to avoid, Moreover, potential rogues would be unimpressed by a larger NATO if its political will and military power to contest aggression are diminished. ‘The same reasoning applies to the daunting task of forging a new NATO southern strategy and preparing for new security missions both inside Europe and beyond its borders. Growing threats from the South mean that NATO may need to prepare WMD. defenses and defend its interests better than now, not only in Europe but outside Europe as well. If NATO enlarges too quickly, it may be unable to carry out this important strategic shift. 2u¢ Dw peciofdnMeler*s Sucks NATO A. Garen/Melntosh y NATO EXPANSION COMPLICATES ITS DECISIONMAKING ABILITIES James Kitfield, staffwriter, 10/12/02, The National Journal, p. lexis Despite generally supporting U.S. calls for a rapid-response force and a "big-bang” expansion of the alliance, the Europeans have deep misgivings about where the Bush administration's new security strategy and reforms are leading the alliance. Ever since the 1999 war in Kosovo, the Pentagon has persistently criticized NATO command structures and European militaries as unwieldy and inadequate, But adding seven new members to the 19 existing ones will inevitably further complicate decision-making in an alliance that requires unanimity. And relatively poor nations with aging Soviet weapons in their small arsenals will add little to NATO's military firepower. Economically struggling European nations are also unlikely to spend significantly more on defense to create rapid- response capabilities. If they don't raise spending, another bitter, 1980s-style trans-Atlantic "burden-sharing" debate over the costs of a new rapid-response force could follow. Only seven current alliance members now meet even the lower goal that NATO has set for members joining the alliance-spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. And only Greece, Turkey, and the United States exceed the long-established goal that current members must spend 3 percent of GDP on defense. 2407 DIW NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Ae: Blane ins hrs, CHERRY-PICKING EUROPEAN ALLIES PREVENTS BALANCING John C. Hulsman, Research Fellow for European Affairs atthe Heritage Foundation, 6/11/03, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, p. lexis Cherry-Picking as the American Answer to a Weak, But Gaullist Europe In separating rhetoric from reality there is a comforting final conclusion that needs to be drawn by American policy-makers - the very lack of European unity that hamstrings European Gaullist efforts to challenge the United States, presents America with a unique opportunity. If Europe is more about diversity than uniformity, if the concept of a unified ‘Europe’ has yet to really exist, then a general American transatlantic foreign policy based on cherry-picking - engaging coalitions of willing European allies on a case-by-case basis - becomes entirely possible. Such a stance is palpably in America’s interests, as it provides a method of managing transatlantic drift while remaining engaged with a nt that will rarely be wholly for, or wholly against, specific, American, foreign policy initiatives. Such a sensible middle course steers between the Scylla of not caring about bringing along allies, and the Charybdis of allowing a perpetually divided Europe to scupper all American diplomatic and military initiatives. For such an approach to work, it is essential to view Europe as less than a monolithic entity. The differences in approach the Bush administration took regarding the Kyoto global warming treaty and the controversy over missile defense are instructive. By condemning out of hand the Kyoto agreement and offering no positive policy alternatives, the Bush administration found itself in a public relations disaster in its early days. By failing to engage the Europeans, the White House unwittingly succeeded in uniting them. Embracing the leaning curve in the wake of Kyoto and refusing to believe reports that ‘Europe’ was implacably opposed to American desires to abrogate the ABM treaty and to begin constructing a missile defense system, the White House sent its representatives to the capitals of Europe where they found the 'European’ stance on missile defense to be predictably far more fragmented than had appeared at first glance. Intensive diplomatic efforts led Spain, Italy, the UK, Poland, Hungary and ultimately, Russia, to embrace the administration's initiative to one degree or another. By searching out potential European allies at the national level, Washington engaged in successful cherry-picking and avoided the kind of diplomatic and public relations disaster that had occurred in the wake of Kyoto. DU DIw : NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Pre. Balancer ; ie A CHERRY PICKING SOLVES FOR FRENCH BALANCING John C, Hulsman, Research Fellow for European Affairs atthe Heritage Foundation, 6/11/03, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, p. lexis In addition, the cherry-picking strategy is the best way to combat French efforts to challenge American predominance. While it is certainly true that the Paris-Berlin- Moscow anti-war coalition resembled Dorothy's friends in the Wizard of Oz (each of the countries lacks something to be a great power on its own- Russia, a first-world economy; Germany, real military power; France, raw materials and an extensive industrial base), it is also true that such a coalition taken together has all the attributes of a balancing pole of power, with France providing the political and ideological leadership, Germany the economic power, and Russia the military wherewithal. While winning over Paris ina fundamental way is hopeless in the near term, both Germany and Russia remain at least as attuned to Washington as to Paris. By working together on a case-by-case basis, and not forcing Germany and Russia to choose between France and the U.S., Washington can effectively dilute the prospects of such a permanent coalition forming. Cherry-picking allows the Germans a way out of their self-inflicted diplomatic isolation, just as it allows Russia a chance to regain momentum in what has been a blossoming relationship with the USS. I think National Security Adviser Rice was incorrect when she recently said, "Punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians." A cherry- picking strategy would lead to a different conclusion. "Ignore the French (and work with them where possible), and engage the Germans and the Russians on a case-by-case basis." This is by far the best way to secure America's diplomatic advantage in the wake of the Iraq war. Nor should America be seen to actively divide the European allies-such an approach would merely throw Germany into the arms of France. During a recent conference in Paris, when challenged by a member of the French foreign ministry that my plan was dividing Europe, I replied that I left that to President Chirac-that perhaps Chirac's threats to keep pro- American Central and Eastern European states out of the EU if they did not tow the French line on Iraq might be more at fault than my policy proposals. I was merely trying to cobble together coalitions of the willing based on the fact that the most interesting diplomatic result of the war was a Europe versus Europe reality, not Europe as a whole standing against the United States. Cherry-picking forces no one to irrevocably choose between Paris and Washington; it engages countries on a case-by- case basis merely by dealing with Europe as we find it-divided, weak, but on a country-by-country basis more than available to participate in coalitions of the willing. More ham-fisted efforts to divide Europe would be entirely counterproductive. re) DIWw a eS NATO ‘A. Garen/Melntosh Pie: Belarcog Ans CHERRY PICKING PREVENTS “GAULLIST” BALANCING John C. Hulsman, Research Fellow for European Asfairs atthe Heritage Foundation, 6/11/03, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, p. lexis A strategy of cherry-picking will preserve the status quo, where the transatlantic relationship, despite fraying a bit at the edges, continues to provide common goods to both sides of the Atlantic. As such, the Europe of today suits America's long-term strategic interests. Cherry-picking will allow the U.S. to make the appearance of a Gaullist, centralized, European rival far less likely, while distributing enough shared benefits that the overall transatlantic relationship will continue to provide Europeans, as well as Americans, with more benefits than problems. Such an accurate assessment, fitting the realities of the world we now live in - where the United States behaves muttilaterally where possible and unilaterally where necessary - is likely to endure. Overview Too often foreign policy practitioners successfully manage problems while wholly missing out on creatively taking advantage of opportunities. The Continental Europe of today presents us with just such an opportunity: it remains divided into Gaullist and Atlanticist camps, with the anti-American grouping splintering and discredited because of American success in Iraq. A Europe of many voices, where the nation-state is again seen as the primary unit of foreign policy decision-making, will best suit American interests well into the future. In addition, helping to retard the perpetuation of a Franco- German-Russian alliance designed to balance against the US must be seen as a primary American national interest. In both cases, the general cherry-picking modus operandi ‘would seem to be the template that American policymakers can best use to take advantage of the present situation in Europe. In the particular case of the anti- American coalition constructed over Iraq, there seems to be ample evidence that Germany (and to a lesser extent Russia) is amenable to such a strategy. Cherry-picking is an idea whose time has come. DIW At Co NATO A. Garen/Mclntosh NA Cant ter Paleurcee Mares EUROPE CAN’T COUNTERBALANCE - EASTERN EUROPE AND BRITAIN WOULD NEVER BREAK RELATIONS Ralph Fucks, co-president of the Heinrich-Boll-Foundation, 2004, Dossier: Conflict With Iraq, http://www.boell.de/en/04_thema/1960.html It is crucial to convince the USA to pursue her interests within the confines of the Security Council and not to pull back into a "selective" multilateralism. But it won’t work for the "Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis" to attempt through the Security Council to tie the giant USA by its hands and feet. The consequence of any such containment strategy vis-4-vis the USA would be to paralyze the UN, not to mention the collateral damage for NATO and the EU itself, One of the central lessons of the Iraq conflict is that any attempt to transform Europe into the US’ geopolitical opposite number leads directly to the division of Europe itself. Great Britain will never be persuaded to pursue such a policy and neither will the eastern- and central-European states, which become suspicious in the face of new French-German-Russian hegemonic aspirations. Aside from that, they remember the dangers of totalitarianism far too well to succumb to the illusion that they can do without the transatlantic alliance, He who wants to keep Europe together politically can not erect European unity as a strategic decoupling from the USA. 2a{ DIW NATO A, Garen/Melntosh. f 2 RUSSIA WON’T BECOME A NATO MEMBER Hans Binnendijk, the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies AND Richard L. Kugler, Distinguished Research Professor at INSS, October 1998, Strategic Forum, Number 149. http://ivww.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF149/forum149. html, ‘Westem states want a good partnership with Russia, but this does not translate into the conclusion that Russia should join NATO in the foreseeable future. Because Russia can defend itself, it does not need NATO military protection, Moreover, NATO will be reluctant to guarantee defense of Russia’s borders, and Russia will be equally reluctant to defend NATO’s borders. If Russia makes the successful transition to democracy, it should be welcomed as a member of the Western community and its other institutions, but NATO membership would create difficult problems. ae DIw Rveseqa Met A Thee NATO A. Garen/Melntosh Ay RUSSIA ISN’T PURSUING IMPERIAL GOALS David Rivera, visiting asst. professor of government at Hamilton College, 3/22/03, Political Science Quarterly, p. lexis However, there are grounds for optimism that a pacific, nonimperialist orientation will continue during Putin's reign. In response to Brzezinski, Sestanovich points out that when Putin speaks of "strengthening the Russian state," the language he uses indicates that he primarily has the domestic, not international, dimensions of state power in mind. (115) More generally, Boris Yeltsin resigned the presidency in December 1999 in the expectation that his prime minister and favored successor would continue his international policies. (116) This expectation has so far been fulfilled as Putin's Kremlin, has retained Foreign Minister Ivanov and, most important, has not undertaken the use of military force against any of the NIS. In fact, Putin's policies have been sufficiently ‘moderate that even Brzezinski has begun to conclude that "the Russian elite is gradually shedding its imperial nostalgia." (117) This moderation and restraint might be merely a function of preoccupation with the war in Chechnya, but it might al so be more fundamentally rooted in lessons Putin has drawn from history. For instance, when asked whether the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into Hungary and Czechoslovakia were mistakes, Putin replied, "In my opinion, those were huge mistakes. And the Russophobia which confronts us in Eastern Europe today stems precisely from those mistakes.” (118) He has also appealed to his compatriots to "abandon imperial ambitions." (119) Hence, Washington should continue to give more weight to engagement over containment until the optimistic assumptions underlying such an approach are convincingly disproved by Russian actions, ee DIW NATO ‘A. Garen/MeIntosh hy We NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR RUSSIA WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF DRAW IN AND UNDERMINE EFFECTIVENESS David Rivera, visiting asst. professor of government at Hamilton College, 3/22/03, Political Science Quarterly, p. lexis ‘The conclusions reached in this article bear upon the future of North Atlantic security arrangements as well. On the one hand, arguments against the inclusion of the Russian Federation in an expanded NATO are numerous and serious. First and foremost among them concems the increased risk of war that would come from the very commitment to defend the Russian Federation's extensive southern and eastern borders from all potential attackers. Equally worrisome is the cost of converting a successful military alliance into something that might more closely resemble an ineffective collective security system. (120) Not least among such arguments, deep-seated anti-Americanism persists among the Russian elite and clearly presents an obstacle to genuine and enduring trust and cooperation between Moscow and Washington. (121) This is especially true of Russia's military establishment whose head of the International Defense Cooperation Department publicly describes NATO's Partnership for Peace program as a mere backdrop to t he rehearsing of military actions against Russia." (122) wy Daw 04 Yon NATO A. Garen/Melntosh As g, UN and NATO can successfully act together Robert J. Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies at University of Cambridge, 6/30/1997, NATO and Peacekeeping, http://www.nato.invacad/fellow/95-97/jackson. pat Nevertheless, NATO. that it can be a) employed outside of area; b) operate successfully under the authority of the UN. With the employment of NATO as its mili ‘the United Nations has finall ‘come fo understand what was needed in Bosnia, namely: 1. a consensus on political purpose and objective; 2. a unity of diplomatic and military action; 3. a clear mission for military engagement linked to the political purpose. But the task ahead is formidable. The United Nations has set itself and NATO up for nothing less than the task of restoring a country, one which must be both democratic and accommodate plural ethnic/political groupings. The possibility of failure is great. The United Nations and NATO have set ‘themselves up as state-builder in a divided country following an internal war and continuing hatreds. The context is one of warring communities and warlords. 288 ees yer aN HS ‘he 7 BURDEN SHARING SOLVES TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, 11/8/02, Pagine di Difesa, The Future of a Larger NATO, http://www paginedidifesa.it/2002/natose_021108.html, They have agreed that those forces should be able to go where they are required, when they are required. And we are putting in place innovative ways to ensure that Europe's 150 billion Euro defence budgets deliver 150 billion Euros worth of capability, and political influence. This will help to balance security burdens more fairly - and fairer burden sharing will be a key test of the long-term health of the transatlantic relationship. Taken together, these changes amount to a dramatic overhaul of the transatlantic relationship. An overhaul, which will go a long way to ensuring that NATO remains relevant to both sides of the Atlantic. It will also ensure that Europe and North America will continue to meet, together, the common threats and challenges we will face in future - and that they will do so with the most effective, the most modern, the most relevant military forces. 286