IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
CASE NO- 4012-
ALLEN H. LIBOW) ESQ-; MELISSA T. LIBOW) and LlBOW & SHAHEEN, LLP, Petitioners/Defendants)
DAVID R- JOHNSON and JANE JOHNSON, Respondents/Plaintiffs.
Petition For Writ ofCertiorari To The Circuit Court Of The Fifteenth Judicial Circuit In And For Palm Beach County, Florida, Hon. Meenu Sasser, Circuit Judge
Arthur W_ Tifford, Esq.
Alexandra L. Tifford, Esq. FBN 0178624 Arthur W_ Tifford, P.AAttorneys for Petitioners 1385 N.W- 15th Street
Miami) FL 33125
Tel: 305.545.7823 Fax: 305.325.1825 email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARIl Petitioners, Allen H. Libow, Esq. ("A. Libow"), Melissa T. Libow
and Libow & Shaheen,
LLP ("the Firm"),
attorneys) respectfully petition this Court for the issuance of quashing in part the "Order Granting Second Combined in Part and
a writ of certiorari Denying
in Part Defendants'
Motion For Summary
J udgment" dated March
1, 2012 ("the March 1, 20 12, order") (App. I),
entered by Circuit Judge Meenu Sasser in a civil action styled, David R.
Johnson and Jane Johnson v. Allen H. Libow, Esq .. Melissa T. Dhow,
and Libow & Shaheen, Fifteenth Circuit Court,
LLP, Case No. 5020 i 1CAOO1121 XXXXMB, Palm Beach County, Florida ("Case No.
2011 CA 1121 '}
THE BASIS FOR INVOKING JURlSDICTION This Court's subject-matter jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Florida and 9.030(b)(3)~ the procedures
Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2)(A)
for which are prescribed by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100.
References to Petitioners'
Appendix shall appear herein as follows: "App.
Petitioners, immunity defendants below, seek recognition filed of their absolute judicial
in a pending
proceeding commenced against them by the Respondents. Since 2003? Respondents/plaintiffs and Jane Johnson (collectively, professionals below: David Raymond Johnson have continuously sued
whom they engaged to perform services on their behalf. They real estate agent, their former attorneys and,
have sued their fanner regrettably,
Their vexatious nature has also extended to at
least one judicial officer presiding over one of the cases in which they were parties-litigant." rise to their collectively, Further, during the litigation which the Johnsons assert gave sole surviving claim in the instant
suit, the Johnsons,
A. Libow and
filed three Florida
The Johnsons' lawsuit against their former real estate agent was styled, David Johnson v. Micheline Many, Case No. 2003CA6564, in the Circuit
Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Florida.
Circuit in and for Palm Beach, County)
In 2009~ the lohnsons commenced a civil lawsuit against their former attorney who represented them in the action discussed more fully in Section A of the Facts, infra, alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract.
David Raymond Johnson threatened to file a complaint with the Judicial Qualifications Committee against the Honorable Donald Hafele, then presiding judge over Case No. 2006SC6215. App. 2) p. 98 .
against A. Libow's Moreover,
attorney, all of which were of the
by the Florida Bar.
during the disposition
Johnsons' first specious Bar complaint against A. Libow, Respondent, David Raymond Johnson accused Florida Bar counsel of being "eunuchs."
THE FACTS ON WHICH THE PETITIONERS
A. The Underlying. Undisl!_uted Facts In Januarv
2004, the Johnsons engaged a former associate of the
Firm and the Firm to substitute in as counsel in their lawsuit against their real estate agent. See n. 2, supra. App. 2, pp. 123-24.
On August 4. 2004~ the Firm commenced
a small claims action in the
County Court in and for Palm Beach County, Florida against the Johnsons to collect a S 1,62l.00 debt the Johnsons owed for legal representation and
costs. The county court action was styled, Libow & Muskat, LLP v, David
Johnson and Jane Johnson. Case No. 2004SC8402. The Firm's action
sought collection of the debt, which the Johnsons refused to pay despite their own attorney (the former associate of the Finn referenced above) urging them to satisfy. App. 2, pp. 8-10.
On August 16, 2004, the Johnsons filed a Florida Bar complaint
against A. Libow who was then the managing partner of the Firm. The Bar
complaint contained defamatory
statements about A_ Libow and Mrs. Libow
who was not an attorney and never had any affiliation with the Firm. The Johnsons' Bar complaint contained a carbon copy notation ecc") to three persons or entities outside the Bar grievance machinery: then
Governor Jeb Bush, the Florida Attorney General's Office, and the Federal
Trade CommissionOn October ~ 2004, in response to being sued by the Finn) in Case
No. 20045C8402, third-party the Johnsons tiled a counterclaim against the Firm and a defendants) A. Libow and Mrsand "malicious
complaint against (third-party
Libow alleging "scheme to defraud," "abuse of process," prosecution" in Case No- 2004SC8402. App. 2, pp. 12-33. 21,2005,
The Johnsons labeled their pleading
a "cross complaint."
On or about Januarv
David Raymond Johnson announced
in open court that he and his wife were withdrawing only the jurisdictional amount of money they alleged in their "cross-complaint."
27~ 2005, the Johnsons served their amended pleading limit of small claims to
alleging damages not in excess of the jurisdictional
court ($5~OOO)~in accordance with their January 21l 2005 representation
the county court judge- App. 2, pp. 36-59. The Johnsons continued to pursue their counter-claims against the Firm and their third-party claims against the
"abuse of process,"
27. 2005) in Case No. 2004SC8402~ the Finn, A. Libow,
and Mrs. Libow moved for leave to amend the Firm ~s complaint to add the Libows' (third-party defendants) personal, compulsory statements contained counterclai ms for in the Johnsons'
based on defamatory
August 16, 2004 Florida Bar complaint, and moved to transfer the entire action to the circuit court. App. 2, pp. 61-69.
On March 7,2005, the county court granted the motion to amend and
to transfer the action to the circuit court
the clerk of court assigned 2005CA3299.
Upon transfer to the circuit court, Case No.
the action a new case number,
On May 1, 2006, the then presiding circuit court judge severed the
claims from the Libows
claims and transferred the
Firm's claims back to the county court.
Upon transfer to the county court,
the clerk of court assigned the Firm's claims a new case number: Case No. 20065C6215. The Clerk's Docket of Case No. 2006SC6215. The Libows'
Also, in May 2006, Mrs. Libow's claims against the Johnsons and A. Libow's claim against Jane Johnson were dismissed. Their appeal was
unsuccessful. On June 26. 2006, in the small claims proceedings, Case No.
2006SC6215, the Johnsons again counter-sued the Firm and re-asserted their third-party claims against (third-party defendants) A. Libow and Mrs. Libow for "[a] scheme to defraud" and "violation of fair debt collection practices act and/or Florida's unfair and deceptive trade practices act." App. 2, pp. 105-111. The Johnsons labeled their pleading, "first amended counterclaim." In 2007, the Johnsons voluntarily dismissed their
In 2008, summary judgment was granted in favor of David Raymond
Johnson and against A. Libow's affirmed on appeal. B. The Circuit Court Civil Action The Johnsons initiated Case No. 201 lCAl121 on January 24\ 2011 by claim tor defamation, which order was
filing a complaint against Petitioners alleging (i) malicious prosecution, (ii)
In 2007 the Firm prevailed in its claims against the Johnsons in Case No. 2006SC6215. The Johnsons did not appeal.
to commit malicious
and (iii) abuse of process.
The Johnsons twice amended their complaint.
Their second amended
complaint omitted the claim for abuse of process, leaving only the claims of malicious App.4. The Petitioners moved fer summary judgment against the Second prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution-
Amended Complaint, arguing, among other things, that they were absolutely
immune from the Johnsons' suit as a result of the Florida litigation privilege
which barred the Johnsons' claims." App. 5-11; App. 12. On March 1, 2012, the lower court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the Petitioners
In denying the Petitioners;
motion, the lower court concluded that the Florida litigation privilege does
not apply to a claim for malicious prosecution
and does not apply to a
The order's pertinent excerpts include:
In the instant case, the Defendants misapply the
litigation privilege. The lohnsons are bringing a malicious prosecution claim against the Defendants for bringing a baseless defamation action against them. The Defendants heavily rely on Levin] to support their position that the litigation privilege bars the malicious prosecution
The trial court granted the Petitioner's motion summary judgment on the conspiracy count based on the statute of limitations defense8
claim against them. However, the Defendants misapply the facts of the instant case to the analysis in Levin. In Levin, a law firm brought a bad faith litigation action against an insurance provider based on the insurance provider) s failure to settle a personal injury suit within the policy limits. lei. at 607_ The law firm had represented the plaintiffs in the underlying personal injury lawsuit. fd. During the course of the bad-faith litigation, counsel for the insurance provider moved to disqualify the law finn because the insurance provider planned to call an attorney from the law firm as a witness based on its representation of the plaintiffs in the underlying action. Id. However) the insurance provider never subpoenaed the attorney from the law firm to be a witness- Id. As a result, the law firm brought suit against the insurance provider for tortious inference with a business relationship; on the theory that the insurance provider intentionally disqualified the law firm with no intention of calling the attorney as a witness. Id. Notably, the basis for the tortious interference lawsuit was the motion for disqualification, which occurred during the litigation- Id.; see also Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P_A. 1'. Zuckerman, 545 So-2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)(holding that the tortuous [sic] claim of extortion, which was based on the alleged fraud and delaying tactics of counsel in the course of litigation, was improper because the conduct at issue was committed during the course of a judicial proceedings [sic] and was immune from civil liability in any subsequent proceeding). Accordingly) the issue under review was whether the motion for disqualification itself was protected by the litigation privilege. Id. The florida Supreme Court held that this motion, which occurred during trial, was qualified by Florida's litigation privilege. Id.
The facts of the instant case, however, are clearly distinguishable from the Levin case, as the conduct at issue in the instant case is solely related to the act of bringing a lawsuit Unlike Levin, where the conduct occurred during the _Qroceedings, the conduct in the instant case occurred based on the filing of the defamation lawsuit itself. The purpose of the litigation privilege is not to preclude the tort of malicious prosecution. If one could raise the litigation privilege simply because a lawsuit was brought, then the action of malicious prosecution would be vitiated .... [TJhus the litigation privilege is not appropriate and does not bar the malicious prosecution claim. For the same reasons, the litigation privilege also does not bar the claim of conspiracy to commit_ malicious
2losecution .... [Emphasis supplied.]
I. The Defendants cite other case law to support their position, but the cases are misapplied for the same or similar reasons as Levin.
NATURE O~FTHE RELIEF SOUGHT
Petitioners seeks the issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing that
portion of the lower court's the March 1) 2012, order entered in Case No. 2011 CA 112l which) rejecting their claim of absolute immunity, denied their motion for summary judgment.
IN SUPPORT OF rHE PETITION AND
APPROPRlATE CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY
L THE PETITIONERS WILL BE IRREPARABLY HARMED IF FORCED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNDERLYING PROCEEDING BECAUSE THEY ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMl\1UNITY
TO THE CLAIl\lS AGAINST THEM
This Court, as well as its sister courts, have consistently certiorari review based on the denial of the applicability
immunity from suit, determining
immunity is not merely a
defense, but a protection from having to defend a suit at all. In doing so, the courts recognize that a party cannot be re-immunized why an appeal after judgment is inadequateafter the fact, which is
So. 2d 517, 52l (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Crowder v. Barbati, 967 So. 2d 166)
167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)(granting petition to review the denial of a motion
to dismiss on the grounds that sheriff was immune from suit); Jenne v_ Maranto, 825 So. 2d 409, 4 is (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(["W]e that an erroneous denial of Eleventh have little Amendment
difficulty in concluding
immunity would cause irreparable injury inescapable appeal); Cit» of Stuart v. Monds,
of being corrected on
10 So. 3d } 134 (Fla. 4th DCA
petition because the doctrine of absolute privilege barred the
claims); Fuller v. Truncale, 50 So. 3d 25 (Fla- 1st DCA 201 O)(finding
would be irreparably
by litigating case to conclusion
because judicial immunity would protect petitioner from suit and review by appeal would not redress the harm to him}. Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer
v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 3801 384 (Fla.
[tjhe litigation privilege applies across the board to actions in Florida, both to common-law causes, those initiated pursuant to a statute, or of some other origin. 'Absolute immunity must be afforded to any act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding ... so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding.?' quoting Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie. Thomas, Mayes Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. i994). [Emphasis supplied.] The Petitioners application are absolutely immune from suit as a. result of the because the undisputed conduct
of the litigation
occurred during and related to an ongoing judicia! proceeding.
final appeal to review an order denying summary judgment, therefore, would render the immunity judgment meaningless
if the lower court denies the summary
in error. Florida State University Board of Trustees
So.3d 316 (Fla. 1st DC/\. 2011). Contrary erroneously to the Petitioners: urgmgs? the March I, 20! 2) order
both excluded Echevarria privilege
from its decision and determined that
Florida" s litigation
docs not extend to the causes of action of
and conspiracy exist
to commit malicious
no such exceptions
Florida iaw is plain: the litigation
privilege applies to all causes of action, statutory as well as common law." (Emphasis supplied).
950 So. 2d at 380. Accordingly,
Petitioners win suffer irreparable harm if this case is allowed to proceed without this Court first applying
Echevarria to the facts at bar and
concluding that the Petitioners are absolutely immune from suit and issuing its writ. II. THE TRIAL COURT THRICE DEPARTED fROM THE ESSENTiAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW
A. The trial court departed from the essential requirements Qf the law by denying summary judgment on the grounds that the litigation privilege does not apply to the claim of malicious prosecution
The Florida Supreme Court has announced, without qualification, that Florida's litigation privilege applies to
privilege applies across the board to actions in Florida, both to common-law
causes of action) those initiated pursuant to a statute, or of some other origin."
Echevarria, 950 So, 2d at 384. In short, there are no substantive
exceptions to the reach of the absolute immunity derived from the litigation
privi lege) so long as the conduct that forms the basis of the tort claim arose
in the course of a judicial proceeding
and related to it. ld. The Florida
Supreme Court articulated
causes of actions
for applying the privilege to all during
proceedings, explaining: perceived necessity for candid and unrestrained communications in those proceedings, free of the threat of legal actions predicated upon those communications, that is the heart of the rule, The nature of the underlying dispute simply does not matter. .. 'Just as participants in litigation must be free to engage in unhindered communication, so too must those participants be free to use their best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action for misconduct.' (quoting
Levin, 639 So, 2d at 608, It is the
u. at 384.
The analysis is simple: if absolute immunity applies to a claim of
malicious requirements prosecution, then the trial
from the essential The antecedent to that the Petitioners'
of the law by denying summary judgment. is not in contest:
the applicability of the privilege
conduct - the filing of the motion to amend to add the Libows' compulsory counterclaims, the Libows' compulsory counterclaims for defamation, and
the motion to transfer the action to circuit court -- occurred during the course of and related to a judicial proceeding, Case No. 2004SC840L The lower court departed from the essential requirements of the law when, in denying summary judgment,
it ruled that the Petitioners'
"solely related to the act of bringing a lawsuit], ...
and ilf one could raise
the litigation privilege simply because a lawsuit was brought, then the action for malicious prosecution would be vitiated." failed to appreciate compulsory App. 1, p. 3. The lower court claims were
the fact that the Libows ~ defamation to the Johnsons' previously
claims of "fraud," "malicious prosecution," No. 2004SC8402.
and "abuse of process" in Case
In Echevarria, the Florida Supreme Court explained its role in Levin? answering in the affirmative the certified question of "whether the act of
certifying to a trial court an intent to call opposing counsel as a. witness at trial in order to obtain
and later failing to
subpoena and call that person as witness, was immune from a claim of tortious inference with a business relationship." Echevarria, 950 So. 2d at
383. The Echevarria court stated that in Levin, the Florida Supreme Court ". . . extended immunity the litigation privilege to all torts) finding that 'absolute
must be afforded to any act occurring during the course of a
judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the acts involves a defamatory statement or other tortious behavior ... so long as the act has some relation to the proceeding. \\\ ld.. quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608. (Emphasis supplied). Similar courts agree that because the litigation privilege applies
to "all torts," absolute immunity must apply to the act of filing a compulsory counterclaim.'
See Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, ILF, 30 So. 3d 644
(Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Trent v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
A permissive counterclaim would not alter the protection afforded by the litigation privilege. Lat Am Investments, LLC v. Hoiland & Knight, LLP, No. 3010-3042,10-32727 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 19,2011), cert. denied. No. SC112245 (Fla. Jan. 20, 2012), In Lat/im, the court rejected the argument that the privilege should be limited to courts having subject matter jurisdiction) explaining: ... [to do 80] would severely undercut the public policy which inspired its creation. The litigation privilege was designed to promote effective advocacy by minimizing the threat of legal backlash from actions taken during judicial proceedings. As was made evident in this case, subject matter jurisdiction can be a complicated and technical issue, __ If protection from exposure to liability hinged on a complicated legal issue, it would render the litigation privilege virtually meaningless, as the privileges protection would always be uncertain and, therefore, attorneys would have reason to hesitate before employing certain strategies. if faith in the litigation privilege is to remain uncompromised, its protections should not be premised on the existence of subject matter jurisdictionLikewise) the determination of whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory can be complicated) and the failure to timely and properly assert a compulsory counterclaim has severe legal consequences, In exactly the same manner as J itigants and their counsel must be free from hesitation on whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction) so too must litigants and their counsel be free from hesitation on whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory.
Kemish v. Madahcom, Inc.. 566 F.SuppJd
Fla. 2008); Robb v, Rahi Real Estate Holdings, LLe) No. lO-81474 (S.D. Fla. May 23 20 II ).
In Fernandez) a law firm and an attorney of the finn were engaged by two condominium associations
obstruct the sale of a condominium
from a buyer who was related to a real estate developer the condominium associations condominium
did not want acquiring
To prevent the sale of the
unit) the lawyer and law firm filed a notice of lis pendens and a civil action against the buyer and unit owner to enjoin the The buyer answered and counterThe circuit court
sale. Fernandez, 30 So. 3d at 645-46.
sued for tortious interference and a declaratory judgment.
granted the law firm and attorney's motion for summary judgment against the buyer's counterclaims based on the litigation privilege. The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed. In affirming the summary judgment based on the litigation privilege
the Fernandez court said, "the filing of the lis pendens together with the action for injunctive relief was privileged
and cannot be the basis of [d. at 647. (Emphasis
In Kentish, compensation Act, 29
against her employer pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards §§201-209 ('"the Ace). 566 f.Supp2d at 1343. In response) filed a counterclaim seeking payment for business charges
incurred by the employee but never paid. The employee moved to amend her complaint to add a claim for retaliation, arguing that the employer's The federal
countersuit was retaliatory and thus unlawful under the Act.
district court denied the motion to amend the complaint futility, determining that Florida's litigation privilege
on grounds of applied to the
counterclaim. [d. at 1349.
Similarly, in Robh, homeowners filed suit in federal district court after a mortgagee and its law firm commenced court, emotional The homeowners asserted foreclosure proceedings in state of
claims for intentional
distress, conspiracy, and other civil torts.
The district court
granted the defendants) motion to dismiss, stating that any claim that relied
on the defendants' conduct which occurred during the course of the
foreclosure proceedings was barred. Id. at
* 16. (Emphasis
Because the litigation privilege applies to all torts, and because it is undisputed that Petitioners' action occurred during and related to an ongoing judicial proceeding) the trial court departed from the essential requirements
of the law by denying summary judgment
on the grounds that absolute
immunity does not apply to the cause of action of malicious prosecution.
B. The lower court departed from the essential requirements of the law by concluding that applying the litigation privilege to a claim of malicious prosecution would abolish it
The trial court also departed from the essential requirements when, in denying summary judgment,
it ruled that applying the litigation
privilege to a claim of malicious prosecution would vitiate it. App.I1 p. 3In LatAm, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed applying the doctrine of absolute immunity to post-final judgment court related
proceedings to enforce collection of the judgment by way of issuing writs of garnishment in an earlier federal proceeding where, subsequent to the final actions, the federal court determined that it and vacated its judgment After the
judgment and the post-judgment
lacked subject matter jurisdiction
federal court vacated its final judgment, LatAm sued the Fonner plaintiffs attorneys for abuse of process. The circuit court granted the law firm 's
motion to dismiss with prejudice. In affirming the dismissal based on the finding of the circuit court that the attorneys' actions were protected by the litigation privilege, the Third District Court of Appeal rejected the argument that applying litigation privilege to the cause of action for abuse of process would abolish that claim. The Third District Court of Appeal explained:
We conclude that the application of the litigation privilege to a cause of action for abuse of process does not eliminate that cause of action. The litigation privilege, by definition: is limited to actions taken during a judicial proceeding and which are related 10 the judicial proceeding. Levin; 639 So. 2d at 608. Therefore, a claimant may still pursue a claim for an abuse of process when the claim is based on actions taken outside of a judicial proceeding or on actions that are taken during a judicial proceeding but which are unrelated to the judicial proceeding. See Olson v. Johnson, 96 i So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during, and were unrelated to, the judicial proceeding); see also Montejo v. Martin Mem'] Med. CtL Inc.) 935 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 20M) (holding that the litigation privilege did not prohibit the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because the confinement did not occur during the course of the judicial proceedings nor in an effort to prosecute or defend the lawsuit). The Florida Supreme Court has also specifically noted that the inability to pursue a tort action due to the litigation privilege docs not leave a party with no remedy. Viable alternative remedies for a participant's misconduct during judicial proceedings include "the discipline of the courts) the bar association, and the state. 'f Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608 (quoting Wright v. Yurko. 446 So. 2d 1162, 1\64 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Specifically, "a trial court would have the ability to use its contempt powers to vindicate its authority and protect its integrity by imposing a compensatory fine as punishment for contempt." Lssin. 639 So.
2d at 609 (citing S- Dade Farms] Inc_ v. Peters? 88 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1956)). Vle therefore reject LatAm's argument that application of the litigation privilege eliminates abuse of process as a cause of action. The teaching of LaiAm is both obvious and important: privilege continues to absolutely immunize the litigation
all actions by the parties and
their attorneys even though a court may later determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the earlier civil action-
Like LatAm, applying the litigation privilege to the facts at bar will not abolish the claim of malicious prosecution.
Latsm, citing to Olson v.
Johnson, 961 So. 2d 356 (Pla. 2d DCA 2007); provided an example of a claim for malicious prosecution outside the broad reach of the litigation
privilege, parenthetically preclude a malicious
stating, "holding that the litigation privi lege did not prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements
that led to the plaintiffs
arrest were made before the charges against him
were filed and were not made during, and were unrelated to, the judicial proceeding." irrefutably Accordingly,
fd. at p. 5. However, unlike Olson, the acts complained
during and were related to the judicial
proceeding, of the
the trial court departed from the essential requirements that application of the litigation privilege
law in determining malicious prosecution
as a cause of action.
C. The trial court departed
from the essential requirements of the law by determining that the litigation privilege does not apply to the claim of conspira£Y to commit malicious prosecution
For the same reasons) legal arguments) and jurisprudential
cited above, the trial court also departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying the Petitioners' absolute immunity bars the Johnsons' motion which likewise urged that claim for conspiracy to commit
malicious prosecution. CONCLUSION That portion of the March 1, 2012, order entered by the trial court in Case No. 2011CA1121
based on their absolute
motion for summary judgment
derived from the litigation privilege
should be quashed by this Court' s writ of certiorari. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by telefax (petition only) and Federal Express (petition and appendix) this 21st day of March 2012 on Steven Rothman, Esq. 505 S. Flagler Dr., P.O, Box- 3475, West Palm Beach, FL 33401-3475; Telefax: 561-805-5510 and Bruce Udolf, Esq., Bruce Udolf P.A., 3351 NW Boca Raton Blvd., Boca Raton, FL 33431; Telefax: 561-910-6974.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing brief complies with the font requirements of Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.210. Respectfully submitted, Arthur W. Tifford, P.A. Arthur W. Tifford? Esq. FBN l06250 Alexandra L. Tifford, Esq. FEN 0178624 1385 N. W. 15 Street Miami FL 33125 Telephone: (305) 545-7822 Fax: (305) 325-1825 Email: email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org Counsel for Petitioners