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TT ‘The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994 Page 1 of 2 Phe National Security Archive mea aca aa a ee The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994 Evidence of Inaction A National Security Archive Briefing Book Edited by William Ferroggiaro August 20, 2001 Contact: William Ferroggiaro (202) 994-7045, wferro@gwu.edu Today the National Security Archive publishes on the World Wide Web sixteen declassified US government documents detailing how US policymakers chose to be “bystanders” during the genocide that decimated Rwanda in 1994, ‘The documents include those cited in the new investigative account, “Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United ‘States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen”, by Samantha Power, in the September 2001 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Power’s account is the result of a three-year investigation involving more than 60 interviews of US policymakers and scores of interviews with Rwandan, European and United Nations officials. It also draws on hundreds of pages of recently declassified US government documentation obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by the National Security Archive’s William Ferroggiaro. The documents demonstrate what US officials knew about the genocide, what options Cc ‘were considered, and how and why they chose to avoid intervening in the slaughter. ‘The documents published today show that: Contrary to later public statements, the US lobbied the UN for a total withdrawal of UN forces in Rwanda in April 1994; # Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not authorize officials to use the term “genocide” until May 21, and even then, US officials waited another three weeks before using the term in public; + Bureaucratic infighting slowed the US response to the genocide; * The US refused to “jam” extremist radio broadcasts inciting http://www. gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBS3/press.htm! 22/08/2001 The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994 Page 2 of 2 oe the killing because of costs and concem with international law; + US officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with those leaders to urge an end to the violence. Ferroggiaro, who is the Director of the Archive’s Freedom of Information Project, said “Until now, we could only speculate as to what US officials knew about the genocide or what they were arguing in closed diplomatic forums. Samantha Power’s account lays bare the motivations and perspectives of US officials; the documents provide essential evidence of official inaction in the face of the slaughter in Rwanda in 1994.” Ferroggiaro heads the Archive’s effort to obtain the declassification of all relevant US policy documentation on the Rwandan genocide. Go to the Documents Cn http://www. gwu.edw/~nsarchiv/NS AEBB/NSAEBBS3/press.html 22/08/2001 The Atlantic | September 2001 | Bystanders to Genocide | Power Page 1 of 49 1 DE ee ae Came . than any other monthly? cone ne Ss Sree Oke emi CO REE er a ‘Tre hte Monthy | September 20 susene Bystanders to Genocide Sr escptan ‘The authors exclusive interviews with cores of the prdsipants inthe Siocon decisin-making, together wth er analyse of ely declassified documents, come >> ld hing narrative of sel serving caution and flee will—and bes countess missed opportunities to mitigate @ colossal crime Foren Aare BY SAMANTHA POWER, Feat ee Src 8 fectnbooy 1 PEOPLE SITTING IN OFFICES Set anaan, our - the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu a government of Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in exterminating the country’s Tutsi minority. Using firearms, machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu sorssaeeetssse” militiamen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered oraon toxin atirsron SOme 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. Contant | Satember 2001 1m This anv (Cortes) aso It-was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the ll een twentieth century. Se a A few years later, in a series in The New Yorker, Sresefanosmi”"" Philip Gourevitch recounted in horrific detail the Sins forte ‘onaane story of the genocide and the world's failure to stop Shee maninntenYoxety.” it. President Bill Clinton, a famously avid reader, Intigence expan ny? y _ eXressed shock. He sent copies of Gourevitch's oe articles to his second-term national-security adviser, Sandy Berger. The articles bore confused, angry, > REURREwereee searching queries in the margins. "Is what he's He ma onernon, saying true?” Clinton wrote with a thick black felt- ste: Sma, ster irda, tip pen beside heavily underlined paragraphs. "How sterGrecnyes dont” did this happen?” he asked, adding, "I want to get to Receumrertact®.” the bottom of this.” The President's urgency and Dewlen'snd Beye outrage Were oddly timed. As the terror in Rwanda. ‘Scan enon had unfolded, Clinton had shown virtually no Ral interest in stopping the genocide, and his acct: “The Administration had stood by as the death toll rose Inerveign Queeton’ into the hundreds of thousands. ‘Sano ates tram 1967 to 986~0y George Necovern, frou See raton Gare, Why did the United States not do more for the {toto Rasorievo we Rwandans at the time of the killings? Did the ‘even President really not know about the genocide, as his fashoncla:"vlane and rarginalia suggested? Who were the people in his {Sovembe: 38996) Administration who made the life-and-death ‘a ecard eet decisions that dictated U.S. policy? Why did they Satuermecspeeae — decide (or decide not to decide) as they did? Were aattzingassstnce nd any voices inside or outside the U.S. government http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/09/power.htm, 22/08/2001