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Brazil Ethanol ........................................................................................................................................................1 Inherency................................................................................................................................................................2 Sugar Ethanol Cheap.............................................................................................................................................4 Eliminating Tariffs = Good...................................................................................................................................7 Replaces Oil..........................................................................................................................................................11 Sugar Ethanol Good............................................................................................................................................13 AT: Amazon Destruction.....................................................................................................................................15 Chavez...................................................................................................................................................................18
Hegemony ............................................................................................................................................................25 Global Warming...................................................................................................................................................26 Solve Food Prices.................................................................................................................................................28 AT: Hurt US Producers.......................................................................................................................................29 Brazil Can Supply Enough..................................................................................................................................30 Relations ...............................................................................................................................................................31 AT: Slavery...........................................................................................................................................................32 Ethanol Spillover..................................................................................................................................................33 Topicality...............................................................................................................................................................34 AT: WTO Counterplan.......................................................................................................................................36 Free Trade.............................................................................................................................................................38
Block for Topicality: In the US...........................................................................................................................40 Block for WTO Counterplan..............................................................................................................................42 Block for Obama Politics ....................................................................................................................................45 Block for Quid Pro Quo Topicality.....................................................................................................................47 Block for Proliferation Kritik.............................................................................................................................48 Block for Amazon DA..........................................................................................................................................51 Block for Railroads DA.......................................................................................................................................53
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
U.S. not importing enough ethanol from Brazil now Isabella Kenfield, associate of the Center for the Study of the America (CENSA) who has just returned from living in Brazil, writes on agribusiness, agrarian conflicts and social movements, published by the Americas Policy Program, 3-6-07, http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4049 [Jiajia]
On Jan. 22 the Lula administration announced it will increase federal funding for Brazil's sugar-based ethanol industry by almost US$6 billion over the next four years. One day later, U.S. President George W. Bush declared in the State of the Union address his goal to reduce U.S. use of gasoline 20% by the year 2017. The general response in Brazil to Bush's announcement was overwhelmingly positive. Luis Fernando Furlan, Minister of Industry, Development, and Commerce, was quoted in the Gazeta Mercantil as saying he received Bush's announcement "with applause." "It is a fantastic business opportunity," Luis Carlos Correa Carvalho, an industry consultant, told Reuters. "We have never had such a great opportunity for the substitution of petroleum." The United States is currently the largest importer of Brazilian ethanol. Last year it imported 1.74 billion liters, or 58% of the total three billion liters that Brazil exported. For the United States to reach Bush's target reduction of gasoline use, the country will need an additional 135 billion liters of ethanol annually. Because it will not be able to produce the entire amount, no doubt a large portion will come from Brazil. Brazil is the global leader in ethanol exports. In 2006, the country exported about 19% of the total 16 billion liters it produced, providing 70% of the world's supply.
Even with current talks, tariff won’t be eliminated Monte Reel, writer for the Washington Post, 2-8-07, “U.S. Seeks Partnership with Brazil on Ethanol,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702316.html [Jiajia]
The tariff is unlikely to be lifted during the current talks. It expires in 2009, and many in the industry believe the government is unlikely to address the issue before a presidential election year. "The administration has indicated it would support lifting the tariff, but I think the current inclination is to allow it to expire and have that discussion at a later date," said Brian Dean, head of the private Interamerican Ethanol Commission, which was created in December by then-Florida Gov. Jeb Bush (R) to encourage U.S. ethanol partnerships with Brazil and other Latin American nations. Brazilian industry leaders say the expanding demand for ethanol has resulted in a new understanding that Brazilian sugar growers and American corn growers are not competitors. "Up to yesterday, we considered the U.S. corn growers our enemies, and they considered us their enemies," said Eduardo Pereira de Carvalho, president of Brazil's sugar cane growers union. "But we aren't enemies -- we're allies, independent of the tariff issue that has divided us. My government has said to me, 'Aren't you creating competition for us?' I say no." If an agreement between the two countries is signed, both will likely share some of the technological advances each has been pursuing independently. The U.S. Energy Department last year opened two research centers to study how to better derive ethanol from cellulose material -- a development that could turn a wide variety of plants into fuel sources. Brazil, meanwhile, has been conducting similar research, and some in the industry believe pooling sources could lead to quicker breakthroughs. But U.S. officials said the most valuable result of an alliance would be that it would encourage more countries to get involved in production and use of ethanol. This would create an internationally tradable commodity, much like oil is today, Burns said. That would lessen the power that oil has over the region, he said.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Tariffs discourage Brazilian sugar ethanol Andrew Downie, writer for the Time, 3-3-07, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1596848,00.html [Jiajia]
The U.S. makes its own ethanol from corn and it is reluctant to cede any more advantages to the Brazilians, who have decades of experience producing ethanol and whose sugar cane-based version is three times more efficient than the corn one. Brazil's ethanol is also around a third cheaper to produce. The U.S. levies a $0.54 cent per gallon tariff on Brazilian ethanol and does not give Brazil access to programs such as those Washington provides Caribbean and Central America, which grant nations from the region a special dispensation to export sugar-based ethanol to the U.S. Those exports provide 7% of all ethanol consumed annually in the U.S. American politicians, especially from corn-producing states, are fighting to maintain those barriers, and Bush Administration officials have said the President will not even discuss lowering tariffs in this week's talks with his Brazilian counterpart. That doesn't make sense to Brazilians, and not only because prices of corn and corn-based foodstuffs are rising in the U.S. as producers devote more and more of their crop to fuel rather than food. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva pointed out that for a country eager to promote free trade such tariffs are a hypocritical barrier to the rapid development of alternative fuel sources. "The high tariff that the United States imposes on ethanol makes no sense," Lula said earlier this week, in a clear message to his visitor. "[The Americans] talk a lot about free trade but they like to protect their own products."
Tariffs exist now Carmen Gentile, freelance journalist, regular World Politics Review contributor, writer for The Washington Times, The Boston Globe, and United Press International, 7-11-08, http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2008/06/11/Analysis_Brazils_leader_defends_ethanol/UPI82481213204960/ [JJH]
Brazil has been a world leader in alternative fuels since the 1970s, when Brazil's Pro-Ethanol Program subsidized sugar mills to produce extra product specifically for the production of the biofuel in the wake of the oil price spike experienced worldwide. Today, Brazil is producing enough ethanol to meet its growing domestic needs, and, with the help of some foreign investment, one day could make the leap to becoming a major international vendor of alternative fuels, a bandwagon the Bush administration would like to join, considering the president's repeated pledge to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. However, analysts warn that closer alternative energy ties with the United States won't be easy, considering the much debated import tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and federal protection in the form of subsidies the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry enjoys.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Sugar Ethanol Cheap
Brazil ethanol cost effective David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor, reporters at Wall Street Journal, 1-16-06, The Wall Street Journal, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6817 [Jiajia Huang]
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil -- After nearly three decades of work, Brazil has succeeded where much of the industrialized world has failed: It has developed a cost-effective alternative to gasoline. Along with new offshore oil discoveries, that's a big reason Brazil expects to become energy independent this year. To see how, take a look at Gildo Ferreira, a 39-year-old real-estate executive, who pulled his VW Fox into a filling station one recent afternoon. Instead of reaching for the gasoline, he spent $29 to fill up his car on ethanol made from sugar cane, an option that's available at 29,000 gas stations from Rio to the Amazon. A comparable tank of gasoline would have cost him $36. "It's cheaper and it's made here in Brazil," Mr. Ferreira says of ethanol. If the price of oil stays at current levels, he can expect to save about $350 a year. [Saving at the Pump] At current prices, Brazil can make ethanol for about $1 a gallon, according to the World Bank. That compares with the international price of gasoline of about $1.50 a gallon. Even though ethanol gets less mileage than gasoline, in Brazil it's still cheaper per mile driven. As a result, ethanol now accounts for as much as 20% of Brazil's transport fuel market. The country's use of gasoline has actually declined since the late 1970s. The use of alternative fuels in the rest of the world is a scant 1%.
Brazil ethanol is cheap and decreases carbon emission David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor, reporters at Wall Street Journal, 1-16-06, The Wall Street Journal, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6817 [Jiajia Huang]
Brazil is also fortunate that sugar is the cheapest way to make ethanol and Brazil has the right conditions for growing the crop -plenty of land, rain and cheap labor. Despite these unique circumstances, Brazil's efforts are being closely followed by countries with big fuel bills. India and China have sent a parade of top officials to see Brazil's program. India, the world's second-biggest sugar producer behind Brazil, mandated in 2003 that nine of its states add a 5% ethanol mixture to gas. The Brazilian unit of Germany's Volkswagen AG, the first car maker to introduce a flex-fuel model in Brazil, has received 38 delegations from more than a dozen countries in the past year alone, VW officials say. Brazil says its ethanol exports will likely double to $1.3 billion in 2010 from $600 million in 2005, largely to Japan and Sweden. These countries hope using ethanol -- which releases less carbon dioxide than fossil fuels -- will help them meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to cut emissions.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Brazilian sugar ethanol cheaper than U.S. corn ethanol Associated Press, 3-7-07, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17500316/ [Jiajia]
At every gas station in this city of 18 million, drivers can fill up with gasoline or ethanol. Ethanol came courtesy of a 1970s decision by Brazil's former military dictators to subsidize production and require distribution at the pumps. A 1980s Brazilian fad with cars that ran only on ethanol petered out when oil prices fell in the early 1990s. But the fuel came back into vogue in 2003 when automakers started rolling out "flex-fuel" cars that run on gasoline, ethanol or any combination of the two. With international oil prices reaching record highs, Brazilian drivers turned to the cars; most chose ethanol because it costs about half the price of gas. The ethanol industry is now making profits like never before amid heavy foreign investment. Recently, Brazil's state-run oil firm, Japan's Mitsui & Co. and a Brazilian construction firm signed a memorandum of interest to study the construction of a pipeline in Brazil that would be used to help export ethanol to Japan. Brazil is the world's top exporter, though U.S. ethanol production still surpasses Brazil. But Brazil has an edge over the United States for future production because ethanol can be produced more cheaply with sugar cane than the corn used by U.S. farmers to make ethanol. And increased use of corn for ethanol is prompting international corn price increases, prompting Silva to tell reporters last week he would tell Bush, "Why make ethanol out of corn? Why don't we feed the corn to the chickens." Bush has set a goal of 35 billion gallons a year of ethanol and other alternative fuels, such as soybean-based biodiesel, by 2017 — a fivefold increase over current requirements.
Sugar ethanol eight times better than corn ethanol Tom Philpott and Gordon Feller, Editor for the Grist; and Chief Executive Officer for the Urban Age Institute, 12-14-06, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/12/14/brazil/ [Jiajia]
So to provide a serious challenge to crude oil, the U.S. ethanol industry has a much steeper mountain to climb than Brazil's. Moreover, its ethanol industry must grapple with a much heavier burden than Brazil's as it makes that climb. Corn ethanol is thought to have a net energy balance of just 1.3 -- meaning that every gallon of it produced yields just a third of a gallon of net energy. Rapier points to a study [PDF] that claims that the energy balance of ethanol made from sugarcane -- Brazil's feedstock of choice -- lies somewhere between 8.3 and 10.2. In other words, as an ethanol feedstock, sugarcane is more efficient than corn by a factor of nearly 8. And even if switchgrass-based cellulosic ethanol becomes a reality soon, the U.S. will still lag behind Brazil in this department. Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute reckons that switchgrass-based ethanol has a net energy balance of 4, or about half of its cane-based counterpart. "For net energy yield, ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil is in a class all by itself," Brown concludes.
Brazilian ethanol is cheaper than corn and fossil fuels
LA Times, “Going south”, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/08/opinion/ed-brazil08, March 8th, 2007 [JP]
Brazil’s sugar-based ethanol is more energy efficient and far cheaper to produce than U.S. corn-based ethanol, yet we impose a steep tariff on the Brazilian product to protect domestic corn growers and ethanol producers. The damage wrought by this policy is enormous. It raises consumer prices for all corn products, sabotages long-overdue attempts to move away from dirty fossil fuels and poisons the U.S. relationship with Latin America.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Eliminating Tariffs = Good
Tariff makes importing Brazil’s sugar ethanol to U.S. undesirable David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor, reporters at Wall Street Journal, 1-16-06, The Wall Street Journal, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6817 [Jiajia Huang]
The U.S., which currently imports 60% of its oil, is watching Brazil's progress, too. Three members of the Senate Energy Committee recently visited, and Sen. Hillary Clinton has cited Brazil as a role model in cutting dependence on imported oil. When President Bush made a recent stop-over in Brasilia, Brazilian leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva hosted a barbecue and described to Mr. Bush how the country has reduced its oil import bill, according to Brazilian officials at the meeting. The most recent U.S. energy bill, signed into law in August, calls for more than doubling ethanol use by 2012. But U.S. ethanol, which is made from corn, costs at least 30% more than Brazil's product, in part because the starch in corn must be first turned into sugar before being distilled into alcohol. It may take the U.S. a few more decades to bring the cost of ethanol down to 80 cents a gallon -- equivalent to Brazil's most efficient producers -- according to the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. trade barriers make Brazilian ethanol and its sugar expensive to buy. Using carbohydrates instead of fossil-fuels to run cars is not a new idea. Henry Ford's first car was made to run on ethanol. So was the first spark-ignition car engine, developed by German Nicolas Otto in the second half of the 19th century. During World War II, the U.S., Brazil and other nations relied on ethanol to extend gasoline supplies. In the postwar period, however, gasoline was so plentiful and cheap that ethanol lost its allure.
Lower tariffs solve for integration of Brazilian sugar ethanol PR Newswire, 2008,http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/ethanol-fully-integrated-international-trade-accordingbrailian-sugarcane/ [Jiajia]
SAO PAULO, Brazil, July 25, 2008 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ ----Access to major markets around the globe for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol with lower tariffs, and full integration of ethanol in global trade, as is the case with any other product: these are the key expectations of the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) as the current phase of Doha Round negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland, draws to a close. "What we expect now is full integration for ethanol into global trade. Ethanol should not be treated any differently because currently it is not considered a sensitive product in Europe or the United States," according to UNICA president and CEO, Marcos Sawaya Jank. He adds that World Trade Organization rules are developed for all products, including ethanol, so the idea that a specific product is somehow "outside the list" doesn't exist.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Eliminating trade barriers on Brazilian sugar ethanol is a win-win situation for the U.S. and Brazil Robert McFarlane and George Philippidis, President Reagan’s national security advisor; and energy director at Florida International University in Miami, 7-26-08, “How Free Trade Can Help Solve the Energy Crisis,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121702724001286291.html?mod=googlenews_wsj [Jiajia]
To quickly boost its biofuel supply, the U.S. should partner with Latin America. Sugarcane ethanol from Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Central America should become an integral part of the U.S. energy strategy. An increase in Latin American cane ethanol capacity is the fastest, most cost-effective and lowest-risk strategy to secure abundant ethanol fuel. The U.S. needs Latin America for energy security, and Latin America needs the U.S. for capital and technology infusion. It's a classic win-win partnership -provided U.S. trade barriers to sugarcane ethanol are eliminated. Biofuel production is sustainable. The U.S. corn ethanol industry is investing in technology improvements to reduce land demand through higher productivity and to minimize its carbon footprint. Cellulosic ethanol will come from existing waste materials, not additional land. Still, both corn and cellulosic ethanol can learn sustainable business lessons from Brazil. Its sugar mills have become biorefineries that co-produce sugar, ethanol and electricity in a renewable fashion, thus satisfying food, fuel and energy needs at the same time. The plants are self-powered by renewable energy derived from cane fiber and other biomass. As a result, Brazilian ethanol today is costcompetitive with oil at just $70 a barrel ($45 a barrel before the dollar weakened) without government subsidies -- a significant price advantage over gasoline.
54 cent tariff on ethanol leads to divide between U.S. and Brazil, despite tech-sharing agreement Craig Rubens, Earth2Tech, 5-7-08, http://earth2tech.com/2008/05/07/primer-brazilian-biofuels/ [JJH]
While U.S. ethanol producers are like teenagers in the global biofuels market, Brazil is like a mature adult, approaching middle age. The Brazilian government began investing heavily in ethanol infrastructure and R&D more than 30 years ago. Now the country, which produces 45 percent of its own transportation fuel “on only 1 percent of its arable land,” is aggressively looking beyond both first-generation biofuels and its domestic market. Brazil currently produces 4.7 billion gallons of ethanol every year; the Brazilian government estimates that number will double by 2015. And they are increasingly looking at the U.S. as potential buyers. Although President Bush did sign an ethanol technology-sharing agreement with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a 54 cent-a-gallon tariff prevents cheap Brazilian ethanol from competing with homegrown U.S. corn ethanol. But the readily fermentable sugars found in sugarcane make it a far better ethanol feedstock than grain. Brazilian sugar ethanol gives an eightfold return on the fossil energy used to make it; American corn, on the other hand, only yields 1.3 times the fossil energy used. Brazil is now the No. 2 producer of ethanol, dethroned by the U.S. in 2005, but still leads in ethanol exports, sending some 900 million gallons of ethanol overseas last year, according to Reuters. Brazil’s ethanol success and failures can teach the rest of the world a lot about biofuels. So who are the big Brazilian ethanol players? Who’s investing in the sector? And which biofuel startups are making Brazilian deals? Below, a primer:
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Elimination of tariff will lead to increase in imports from Brazil DTN Ethanol Center, 7-10-08, Brazil Ethanol Exports to US to Rise, http://www.dtnethanolcenter.com/index.cfm?show=10&mid=72&pid=40 [JJH]
SAO PAULO (Dow Jones) -- Brazil will likely export at least three billion liters -- or about 793 million gallons -- of ethanol to the U.S. this year as a result of soaring ethanol prices in the U.S. and cheap ethanol prices by comparison in Brazil, said commodities risk analyst firm FC Stone on Thursday. The volume could be even higher if not for a $0.54 per gallon import duty imposed on Brazilian ethanol by Washington, FC Stone said in a 29-page monthly sugar and ethanol report from Sao Paulo. Brazilian ethanol is made from sugarcane as opposed to corn ethanol in the U.S. Industry estimates are that Brazilian flex-fuel car owners will consume 18 billion liters of ethanol this season, allowing for an extra seven billion for external markets given current ethanol production estimates for crop year 2008-09. U.S. demand for Brazilian ethanol is on the rise on account of higher corn ethanol prices there and difficulties shipping ethanol from the flooded regions of the Midwest to port states like California and Florida where demand for ethanol is high. Brazil exported a daily average of 20.2 million liters of ethanol to world markets in June, up from 19.6 million in May. Most of it was going to the U.S., according to government figures published July 1 by the Foreign Trade Ministry. In addition, U.S. demand is pushing up ethanol export prices at the Port of Santos, rising to $467.20 per 1,000 liters in June compared to $466.40 in May. Sao Paulo ethanol prices at the pump in June fell 2.9 percent to 1.25 Brazilian reals ($0.77) per liter while prices for U.S. corn ethanol rose 23 percent in June, according to FC Stone's estimates. Average U.S. ethanol prices were $2.95 per gallon compared to $2.40 per gallon in May. In major producer states like Iowa, prices averaged $2.87 per gallon and in Minnesota they were $2.75. The highest prices were in Michigan, where corn ethanol at the pump reached as high as $3.07 per gallon, roughly where U.S. gasoline prices were a year ago. However, with corn prices falling to $6.78 per bushel on the Chicago Board of Trade, that gives ethanol producers up north some profit margins with ethanol prices at $2.70 a gallon and up. With U.S. ethanol prices averaging $2.95 per gallon in June, and corn prices at $6.78 per bushel, U.S. ethanol companies in theory could be making profit margins of $0.33 a gallon, according to FC Stone. "Considering the tax credit blenders get, they still have an advantage of $1.17 per gallon, which is still very attractive and should keep ethanol demand high," FC Stone analysts wrote in the report. U.S. corn ethanol prices are around 37 percent less than gasoline prices, which are averaging around $4.05 per gallon. By comparison, Brazil sugarcane ethanol prices are averaging around 52 percent lower than gasoline, making gasoline the "alternative fuel" for millions of Brazilian car owners. Ethanol is used to fill cars more than gasoline in Brazil's center-south region. Brazil is the world's leading ethanol exporter.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Increased sugar ethanol imports from Brazil would benefit everyone. US tariff elimination key. Adam Dean, B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science from University of Pennsylvania and M.Sc. in International Political Economy, with Merit, from the London School of Economics, 4-4-07, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/ethanol [JJH]
Enrique Ochoa, a scholar specializing in Latin America and food issues, has argued that the rising price of corn has been especially difficult for Mexican consumers because of NAFTA. Due to the NAFTA requirement that the Mexican corn market be opened to U.S. imports, many Mexican corn producers were put out of business by cheaper American imports. This reduction in domestic corn production made Mexico more vulnerable to steep price increases. But the effects of rising corn and sugar prices are not all bad. The use of sugar in ethanol production has the potential to benefit thousands of rural farmers in Latin America who depend on the commodity's price. If the United States were to increase imports of Brazilian ethanol, the additional demand could lift the price paid to Brazilian sugar producers from a recent low of only nine cents per pound. In this way, Castro's complaints over the rising prices of food commodities fail to consider the benefits for producers in developing countries. Similarly, Ochoa's analysis of rising tortilla prices in Mexico fails to grasp the complexity of commodity prices and agricultural trade policy. There is no doubt that the implementation of NAFTA led to reductions in Mexican corn production, but that development alone did not lead to rising corn prices. In fact, the cheaper American corn imports made possible by NAFTA had the potential to lower food prices. Despite the above criticisms of biofuel consumption and free trade, the key to higher living standards for the poor of Latin America does not lie in protectionist trade measures or abandoning ethanol production. Rather, an American commitment to free trade would allow all to benefit from the advances in biofuel technology. At the heart of the issue is U.S. ethanol policy. Despite the Bush Administration's explicit support for increased U.S. ethanol consumption, the United States maintains a tariff of 54 cents per gallon for imported ethanol. This tariff limits U.S. ethanol imports and creates a higher domestic price than would otherwise result from a more open market. By limiting market access for Brazilian ethanol producers, who would benefit from increased exports, the U.S. tariff also limits the subsequent benefits that would accrue to Brazilian sugar producers. Furthermore, since ethanol production in the United States is based on corn, the tariff also leads to a higher price of corn in the United States. This artificially inflated price is then passed on to Mexican consumers in the form of higher food prices. In these ways, it is the U.S. tariff on ethanol imports that may have caused higher tortilla prices in Mexico and slowed the growth of Brazilian ethanol production. If the United States were to eliminate its ethanol tariff, we would likely witness market changes that would greatly benefit everyone involved. The ramifications of the U.S. ethanol tariff display the ethical consequences of American trade policy. Although free trade agreements such as NAFTA hold the potential to benefit Mexican consumers through access to cheaper goods, these benefits can be eliminated by later market distortions, such as the ethanol tariff. In order for Mexican consumers to benefit from open markets, the United States must be committed to a free trade policy that does not distort the price of basic commodities such as corn. Likewise, in order for Brazilian ethanol and sugar producers to benefit from global trade, they must be granted tariff-free market access to the United States. If the United States is to share the benefits of globalization with developing countries, it must maintain a commitment to open markets for foreign imports and carefully consider the global impact of its trade policy.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Ethanol solves for economy shock from oil peak. Brazil empirically proves. David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor, reporters at Wall Street Journal, 1-16-06, The Wall Street Journal, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6817 [Jiajia Huang]
The first oil shock in 1973, sparked by an oil embargo amid war in the Middle East, rekindled interest. Months after Syrian and Egyptian tanks rolled into Israeli-held territory, the price of oil quadrupled. Few places were hit harder than Brazil, which imported 80% of its fuel at the time. Within months, Brazil's economy slid into recession. About 40% of its foreign-exchange income was used to import oil. "We faced a clear strategic challenge: How would we develop without oil?" recalls Eduardo Pereira de Carvalho, a finance ministry official at the time who now heads the São Paulo state sugar-growers' federation. In 1975, Brazil's military leader, Gen. Ernesto Geisel, ordered that the country's gasoline supply be mixed with 10% ethanol, a level Brazil steadily raised to 25% over the next five years. That meant the same amount of gasoline would last longer. It also allowed Brazil to pay for fuel with local currency, in the form of payments to farmers. To help the nascent industry, the government gave sugar companies cut-rate loans to build ethanol plants and guaranteed prices for their product. Sugar companies were delighted with the new market, which helped when prices were low. The government also funded Urbano Ernesto Stumpf, an ethanol researcher at a Brazilian Air Force laboratory, who was developing a car that would run on ethanol alone. In November 1976, three ethanol-powered cars created by Mr. Stumpf -- a Beetle, a Dodge and a Brazilian car called a Gurgel -embarked on a 5,000 mile trip from the air force's research lab in the southeastern state of São Paulo to the northern city of Manaus in the heart of the Amazon. The trip, christened "The National Integration Rally," aimed to demonstrate to Brazilians that ethanol really worked. When the government ordered state-owned companies to test ethanol engines in their fleet, the São Paulo state telephone company converted 400 gasoline cars into ethanol ones. They displayed the logo: "Powered by Alcohol." After the 1979 Iranian revolution caused the world's second oil-price shock, Brazil sped up its efforts, initiating what became known as the Proalcool program. In Brazil, ethanol is called "alcool" (pronounced OWL-coal). Brazil's new leader, Gen. Joao Baptista Figueiredo, ordered sugar companies to ramp up production. He also required state-run oil giant Petrobras to make the fuel available at filling stations. Car companies received tax breaks to get ethanol-powered vehicles into showrooms. By the end of the year, Italian car maker Fiat SpA was offering an ethanol-only car for sale. Within a year, every foreign and domestic auto company in Brazil had followed suit.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Eliminating tariffs on Brazilian ethanol will solve our dependence on oil Robert McFarlane and George Philippidis, President Reagan’s national security advisor; and energy director at Florida International University in Miami, 7-26-08, “How Free Trade Can Help Solve the Energy Crisis,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121702724001286291.html?mod=googlenews_wsj [Jiajia]
The unprecedented escalation in oil and food prices is a clear and present danger to our economy and national security. The root cause of this crisis is our dependence on a single commodity, oil, for transportation -- we burn 145 billion gallons of gasoline a year. The only permanent solution is diversity in our fuel supply to ensure competition and choice in the marketplace. While a number of alternatives to oil are being developed, we already have one strategic solution at our disposal: biofuels, both domestic and from Latin America. Biofuels like ethanol and biodiesel are cheaper than fossil fuels, and will become even cheaper if we eliminate the senseless tariff on ethanol imports from Brazil. Ethanol can be used safely as a 10% blend with gasoline in all existing cars, and as an 85% blend in the increasing number of flexible-fuel cars on our roads. That means a 10% to 85% potential drop in gasoline use and, hence, freedom from the oil stranglehold. The public has been bombarded with lies and half-truths about biofuels, especially in the last six months. Americans should realize that biofuels are superior to fossil fuels. Biofuels are renewable, nontoxic and biodegradable. They are also beneficial to the automobile engine, the environment and the economy.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Sugar Ethanol Good
Brazil sugar ethanol constantly improving David Luhnow, Geraldo Samor, reporters at Wall Street Journal, 1-16-06, The Wall Street Journal, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6817 [Jiajia Huang]
The center is located in the heart of Brazil's sugar country, about two hours drive from São Paulo. Giant satellite images of sugar fields help researchers identify which variety will grow best in which part of the country, where to locate new fields and the best time to harvest. Over the past 20 years, the center has developed some 140 varieties of sugar, which has helped lower growing costs by more than 1% a year, according to Jaime Finguerut, the center's director of ethanol research. Other improvements include using remains of processed cane to power sugar and ethanol plants, and using industrial waste from ethanol production to fertilize sugar fields. As a result, the productivity of Brazil's ethanol producers has steadily increased. In 1975, Brazil squeezed 2,000 liters, or about 520 gallons, of ethanol from a hectare, or nearly 2.5 acres, of sugar cane. Today, it's nearly 6,000 liters. As gasoline prices soared in recent years, ethanol rebounded. By 2002, its price was again competitive with gasoline and old ethanolonly cars started recovering their prestige. Last year, thieves stole an ethanol-only, 1994 Ford Royale, owned by Francisco Baccaro Nigro, one of the engineers who helped develop ethanol-only cars. "I'm sure it's because ethanol is cheaper," Mr. Nigro says. "Thieves know this."
Increasing import of Brazilian sugar ethanol is advantageous Raúl Zibechi, member of the Editorial Council of the weekly Brecha de Montevideo, a professor and investigator of social movements at the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina, and an adviser to various social groups, 3-7-07, http://americas.irc-online.osrg/am/4051 [Jiajia]
The choice of Brazil and Latin America as supply sources for ethanol has several advantages. A report of the InterAmerican Development Bank claims that Brazilian ethanol is competitive if the price of oil per barrel is over US$40. The oil price must be over US$60 a barrel for U.S. ethanol to be competitive and US$80 in the case of European ethanol.6 Brazil is five times more efficient converting sugarcane into ethanol than U.S. companies that use corn as the prime material. While biofuels account for just 1% of world fuel consumption for transportation and the substitution of oil-based fuels is only 1.8% in the United States, in Brazil it reaches 20%. The IDB report cited above establishes that Latin America is one of the regions with the most potential to offer biofuels given its climatic advantages combined with low population density. A large part of Brazil's advantages derive from the climate and the availability of land, something that the IDB considers "Brazil's exceptionalism." The developed countries do not have enough land to cover demand for crops to make ethanol. With barely 1.5% of its land sown, Brazil could entirely replace gasoline with ethanol. The United States on the other hand, would have to convert half of its total corn production to ethanol in order to implement a mixture of 10% ethanol to gasoline. That would mean dedicating 15% of its agricultural land. To meet the 20% benchmark Bush set in his State of the Union address, the nation has to look South.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Increasing production of Brazilian sugar ethanol won’t have negative impacts Sam Logan, Senior Political and Security Analyst at Riskline, reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999, 4-24-07, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17530 [JJH]
Brazil's ethanol production could be boosted without detriment to Brazil's "socio-economic and environmental conditions," discounting Chavez's claims. Noting that Brazil uses some 50 million hectares (ha) for the production of grain, Stephanes claimed sugar cane planting represented just 10 percent of that figure. He said Brazil contained some 150 million ha of pasture land, and that some of that land, as much as 50 million ha, could be used for the expansion of sugar cane crops. Stephanes also pointed out that Brazil uses sugar cane, not corn to produce ethanol. Increased ethanol production in the US could put pressure on corn producers, who may choose to use their corn harvest for ethanol feedstock, rather than for food stuffs. This practice, according to Chavez, can lead to a rise in the price of corn and other corn-based food on the international market. Chavez will likely use that to drive a wedge between Brazil and the US. He has also focused on the US ethanol tariff, which some argue prevents more Brazilian ethanol from entering US markets. Jeb Bush has also responded to Chavez’s criticisms. Speaking to the Brazilian congress in mid-April, he said he expected the US tariff on Brazilian ethanol would be "slashed or eliminated" in "several years." Opening the US ethanol market to Brazilian ethanol producers would certainly place some pressure on the use of corn as ethanol feedstock. Using sugar cane to produce ethanol is a cheaper process. More importantly, however, is Brazil's current focus on ramping up its sugar-cane ethanol production in preparation for global export beyond US borders. Brazil's largest sugar and ethanol producer, Cosan, announced on 19 April plans to invest US$1.7 billion over the next four years to boost the production of sugar, ethanol and sugar-based electricity production. At the center of this plan is the construction of a sugar cane processing plant in the Brazilian state of Goias, which will have the capacity to mill some 500,000 tonnes by 2009. This mill will contribute sugar cane feedstock to Brazil's 350 ethanol processing plants. Another 50 are under construction, and some 57 projects are currently seeking investment. As these plants come online, they will boost Brazil's ethanol output from current production levels at 17 billion liters a year to some 24 billion liters by 2010. While the US remains behind Brazil as the world's top producer of ethanol, its ethanol consumer market will help spur the creation of a global market - one that can be in large part supplied by Brazil, fulfilling the South American giant's desire to become a global player.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
AT: Amazon Destruction
Brazil makes clearing rainforests illegal Mongabay, 7-1-08, “Brazil fines 24 ethanol producers for illegal forest clearing, http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0701-brazil.html [Jiajia]
Brazil fined two dozen ethanol producers accused of illegal clearing the country's endangered Mata Atlântica or Atlantic rainforest, reports The Associated Press. The companies face 120 million reals (US$75 million) in fines for operating without licenses and planting sugarcane in illegally deforested areas, Environment Minister Carlos Minc said in a press conference. The firms will be required to restore 143,300 acres (58,000 hectares) of forest. "We will not let companies that destroy the Atlantic rain forest have any peace," Minc told reporters. "If these environmental crimes continue, they will provide ammunition for those who want to slap trade barriers on the export of Brazilian ethanol." The fines come shortly after a group of Brazilian ethanol firms signed the first deal to export sustainably-produced ethanol. The deal, announced last week, will send to Sweden 115 million liters of to meet to certain social and environmental standards. The Brazilian soy and beef industries have recently announced similar certification initiatives. In recent months Brazilian authorities have cracked down on loggers, ranchers, farmers, and charcoal producers believed to be operating in violation of environmental laws. Last week agents seized 3,100 head of cattle found grazing on illegally deforested lands in the Amazon. Minc said the cattle would be auctioned to fund Fome Zero, the government's food program for the poor. Earlier this year the government conducted operation "Arc of Fire" to stop illegal logging on the Amazon frontier.
Amazon deforestation concerns exaggerated Kelly Hearn, independent journalist, former UPI staff worker in Latin America, correspondent to National Geographic News, The Christian Science Monitor, foreign political correspondent for the Washington Times, recipient of 2006 Samuel Chavkin Grant for Investigative Journalism, 2-8-07, National Geographic News, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070208-ethanol_2.html [Jiajia]
Sugarcane industry officials, however, say deforestation concerns are overblown. Carvalho Macedo of Brazil's National Sugarcane Agro-Industry Union says wildlands will not have to be plowed under, because Brazil has 200 million acres (809,000 hectares) of pasturelands available to absorb sugarcane growth. "You don't need more than 5 percent of that land to reach production levels imagined for ten years from now," Macedo said. Macedo said Brazil's current sugarcane production takes place on roughly 14.8 million acres (6 million hectares)—less than one percent of the country's total land dedicated to farming. São Paulo state environment secretary Goldemberg writes in Science that "worldwide, some 49 million acres (20 million hectares) are used for growing sugarcane, mostly for sugar production. "A simple calculation shows that expanding the Brazilian ethanol program by a factor of ten [in Brazil and other countries] … would supply enough ethanol to replace 10 percent of the gasoline used in the world. "This land area is a small fraction of the more than 1 billion hectares [2.5 billion acres] of primary crops already harvested on the planet."
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Brazil can substantially increase land for ethanol without loss of biodiversity Dennis Avery, director of the Center for Global Food Issues at the Hudson Institute, food policy analyst for 30 years, on National Advisory Commission of Food and Fiber, senior agricultural analyst for the U.S. Department of State, 7-1-06, http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=19333 [JJH]
That is where the "spare" cropland in the world is, Brazil, where another 60 million hectares of acid savannah could be plowed without much loss of biodiversity, and 100 million hectares of pasture could be shifted to crops if the U.S. ethanol subsidy were sent down there to finance the roads they don't have yet--a much better investment of our money. Brazil is warm and wet enough to grow rain-fed sugar cane, which currently produces ethanol three times more productively than a cornfield can. The cane yields twice as much, needs only half as much fertilizer, and uses no coal or natural gas for processing.
Their evidence is from biased oil companies. The ethanol industry doesn’t hurt the Amazon, or employ slaves, and food production won’t be affected. Carmen Gentile, freelance journalist, regular World Politics Review contributor, writer for The Washington Times, The Boston Globe, and United Press International, 7-11-08, http://www.upi.com/Energy_Resources/2008/06/11/Analysis_Brazils_leader_defends_ethanol/UPI82481213204960/ [JJH]
MIAMI, June 11 (UPI) -- Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said the world's oil companies are behind the bad press regarding his country's ethanol sector, denying claims by some that the industry uses slave labor and is responsible for deforestation in the Amazon. Da Silva, an ardent supporter of Brazilian ethanol, made defending the world's leading producer of the biofuel one of the focal points of his most recent national address. "I believe the main attacks against biofuels come from oil companies," said the Brazilian president earlier this week. "We are aware of the interests held by countries that don't produce ethanol, or produce ethanol from wheat or corn, which are not as competitive." Hoping to dispel some of the anti-ethanol rhetoric regarding its environmental impact and the treatment of sugarcane cutters, da Silva noted that the cane processed into Brazil's sugar-based ethanol isn't grown anywhere near the Amazon and called "absurd" accusations that the industry was in part responsible for deforestation. The one-time labor leader turned president also denied claims that the ethanol industry relies heavily on poorly paid sugarcane cutters who are sometimes forced to work for no pay as modern-day slaves. However, human-rights groups have accused ethanol producers of treating their workforce like slaves and have called for the Brazilian government to exercise greater oversight of the industry. This isn't the first time Brazil's growing ethanol industry has come under fire. Last year, when Washington and Brasilia inked a deal to expand ethanol production in Latin America, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Cuban leader Fidel Castro complained the deal in essence would reduce the amount of land used for food crops and rob the region's hungry of vital food supplies. Da Silva rejected the comments, saying food production would not be affected by the effort to produce alternatives to petroleum, of which Venezuela is the largest producer in the region and counts the United States as its best customer. "All South American countries and Africa can easily produce oil seeds for biodiesel, sugarcane for ethanol and food at the same time," he said, referring to Brazil's ambition to work with European nations to increase sugar production in Africa to promote ethanol production on that continent as well.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Brazil ethanol industry practices environmentally safe techniques Joel Velasco, Chief U.S. Representative UNICA (Brazilian Sugar Cane Industry Association), 9-19-07, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/vel091907.htm [JJH]
Renewable fuels, including ethanol, represent less than 1% of world energy production. The world consumes more than three times that amount in kerosene alone. Despite such limited impact and an abundance of land for production of ethanol (only 1% of all arable land in Brazil is used for sugar-cane ethanol, seven times less than that used for soybeans), Brazil has taken a leadership position in ensuring sound environmental and labor practices in its sugar cane ethanol production. The ethanol industry has dramatically reduced the use of fertilizers in sugar cane production by spraying vinhaça, stillage, a nutrient-rich liquid byproduct of ethanol production. In Brazil, sugar cane farmers return water to the crop fields, rather than dump them in rivers and streams.
Sugar cane production doesn’t cause Amazon deforestation Joel Velasco, Chief U.S. Representative UNICA (Brazilian Sugar Cane Industry Association), 9-19-07, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/vel091907.htm [JJH]
While some incorrectly try to argue that increased sugar cane production will push cattle ranches north and lead to the deforestation of the Amazon, the industry’s smart growth is proving otherwise. The substantial expansion of sugar cane growing areas has been met by an increase in the productivity of other crops and livestock, not by their move to environmentally sensitive areas. Growth has been driven by productivity, not mobility or expansion into Brazil rainforests. Moreover, Brazil’s experience of creating sustainable rural jobs, confirms that a viable biofuels industry can help sustain rural communities in the United States and bring much needed capital and jobs to America’s rural areas. Finally, Brazil’s experience proves the significant positive impact that sugar cane ethanol can have in the reduction of pollution and emission of greenhouse gases in urban areas. Based on well-to-wheel emission calculations, the Brazilian ethanol program has reduced greenhouse gases by over 80% in Brazil.
Brazil has plenty of land suitable for sugar cane production – no threat to Amazon. Gary Duffy, BBC News, “Brazil defends biofuel's merits”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7528323.stm, July 28th 2008 [JP]
Other fears have been raised by the Brazilian experience; some worry that the rapidly growing demand for ethanol will push crops and cattle further north, threatening the Amazon rainforest. It is a concern that Marcus Jank of the sugar cane producers association is keen to reject. "We are using 3.5 million hectares to produce sugar cane ethanol, and there are 200 million hectares of pastures in Brazil, so it is extremely small," he says."We believe that we are going to double the ethanol area in the next 20 years, but it will still be only 2% of arable land."
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Alliance with Brazil on ethanol will counter Chavez’s influence Raúl Zibechi, member of the Editorial Council of the weekly Brecha de Montevideo, a professor and investigator of social movements at the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina, and an adviser to various social groups, 3-7-07, http://americas.irc-online.osrg/am/4051 [Jiajia]
George W. Bush's trip to Latin America this month is the most ambitious attempt to reposition the United States in the region since the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas died in Mar del Plata in November of 2005. The trip, which includes Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Guatemala, and Colombia has a dual purpose: to counteract the growing influence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in the region and to form a strategic alliance with Brazil for the production of ethanol. Although it may not appear on the surface, the two objectives are profoundly related. "We have 80 million hectares in the Amazon that are going to be converted into the Saudí Arabuia of biodiesel," affirmed the Brazilian engineer Expedito Parente to the newspaper O Globo. Parente knows what he's talking about—he is the owner of the first patent registered in the world for the industrial production of biodiesel. In 1977, when he was a professor at the University of Ceará, he conceived of his project based on the use of oleaginosas such as soybeans and the mamona plant. Today Brazil is the number-one producer of ethanol in the world, alongside the United States, and the two nations are poised to consolidate an alliance that will assure Brazil's position as regional leader and global power. In some ways, Bush's visit— preceded by those of Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, and head of Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon— represents a major recognition of Brazil's clout in the region. The cost of the alliance can be measured in terms of its environmental and social impact. It assumes the destruction of the Amazon and the ruin of millions of small farmers. But it is also a call to re-route North-South relations in the Americas. The second objective of Bush's tour March 8-14 relates to the need to control the spreading influence of Hugo Chávez. Chávez already has strong allies in Bolivian President Evo Morales and the Ecuadorian Rafael Correa. On what is his most important tour of the region in the past six years, Bush will also visit two small countries: Guatemala, where September elections could bring to power the indigenous leader Rigoberta Menchú, and Uruguay, a country that has shown interest in negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the United States. In Colombia, with his friend Alvaro Uribe, Bush will seek to strengthen Plan Colombia given Correa's recent announcement that Ecuador will not renew the agreement to allow the U.S. military base in Manta—a key piece of the Pentagon's strategy in the region. Both objectives converge on one point: to use Brazil to consolidate a strategic alliance that seeks to isolate Venezuela and the countries that follow its policies of Latin American unity as a counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. This appears to be, for the Bush administration, the best way of gaining a new foothold in the region. In Search of Energy Autonomy
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Eliminating sugar tariff will solve Brazil-U.S. relations, which are key to counteracting Chavez. Monte Reel, writer for the Washington Post, 2-8-07, “U.S. Seeks Partnership with Brazil on Ethanol,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702316.html [Jiajia]
"It's clearly in our interests -- Brazil's and the United States's -- that we expand the global market for biofuels, particularly ethanol, and that it become a global commodity of sorts," said R. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. undersecretary of state, who led discussions with Brazilian government officials on Wednesday. For the United States, the initiative is more than purely economic. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has exploited regional frustrations with the market-driven economic prescriptions that the United States has promoted throughout the region for years, and he has used oil revenue to promote several regional economic alliances. Burns declared that biofuel is now the "symbolic centerpiece" of U.S. relations with Brazil, a country that U.S. officials have long hoped could counteract Venezuela's regional anti-American influence. "Energy has tended to distort the power of some of the states we find to be negative in the world -- Venezuela, Iran -- and so the more we can diversify our energy sources and depend less on oil, the better off we will be," Burns said at a news conference in Sao Paulo. Brazil, the world's largest exporter of ethanol, has been a leader in biofuel technology after its government invested heavily in the ethanol industry in the 1970s. Its sugar cane-based ethanol is more efficient to produce than the corn-based fuel made in the United States. To date, ethanol has replaced about 40 percent of Brazil's non-diesel gasoline consumption. More than 70 percent of the vehicles now sold in Brazil are flex-fuel models that run on either ethanol or gas, and the number continues to increase. Although the United States has surpassed Brazil in the total amount of ethanol produced, its producers cannot keep up with surging demand. Last year, the United States produced about 4.9 billion gallons and imported an additional 1.7 billion gallons, mostly from Brazil. U.S. production is expected to sharply increase as new production facilities are finished this year, but demand is expected to surge as well. Bush has called for a 20 percent reduction in gasoline consumption by 2017, which would require an estimated 35 billion gallons of alternative fuels to bridge the gap. The United States currently places a 54-cent-a-gallon tariff on most imported ethanol. Brazilian producers have long labeled the tariff hypocritical, saying that it is exactly the kind of trade barrier that U.S. officials oppose in other countries.
U.S. and Brazil ethanol trade relations would decrease Chavez’s power David Jackson, writer for USA Today, 3-2-07, http://www.usatodsay.com/news/world/2007-03-01-us-brazilethanol_x.htm [Jiajia]
First, expanding world ethanol markets would help the USA and other nations reduce their dependence on foreign oil. Also, reduced demand for oil might reduce the clout of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who has tried to use his nation's oil reserves to undercut U.S. policies in the region. The USA and Brazil produce more than 70% of the world's ethanol; the U.S. supply comes mainly from corn, while Brazil taps its abundant sugarcane crop.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Brazil-US relations on ethanol will remove Chavez’s influence Sam Logan, Senior Political and Security Analyst at Riskline, reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999, 4-24-07, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17530 [JJH]
Almost immediately after Bush's visit to Brasilia, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Cuban leader Fidel Castro decried the evils of a global ethanol market, claiming it would drive up the price of food around the world. The world's poor would inevitably suffer, they said. This argument, however, was absent from the regional energy conference held on 16 April in Venezuela, just two weeks after Lula visited Bush at Camp David. Rather than use the forum where 12 South American heads of state were present to attack Lula, Chavez offered his support for ethanol as a regional energy effort. Chavez is cautious about losing Brasilia's potential support for other regional endeavors, including a Bank of the South alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many agree Chavez will work to undermine the US-Brazil ethanol alliance behind the scenes while publicly supporting the idea of ethanol and criticizing the US approach. But Lula will not be swayed. He has placed Brazil on a path toward the future of a global ethanol market, and the US, not Venezuela, is his choice partner. As Bush and Lula move on to other endeavors, the Inter-American Ethanol Commission drives their relationship forward. Headed by former Florida governor and the US president's younger brother, Jeb Bush, the commission brings to the USBrazilian ethanol alliance a voice with a direct connection to the White House. The additional participation of the president of the Inter-American Development Bank, Luis Alberto Moreno, and Brazil's former agriculture minister, Roberto Rodrigues, cements a well-connected trio that will focus on driving a global ethanol market, while steadily bringing the US and Brazil closer together.
Increasing import of Brazilian ethanol is a blow to Chavez.
LA Times, “Going south”, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/08/opinion/ed-brazil08, March 8th, 2007, [JP]
Bush is deeply unpopular in most of Latin America – a region he has largely ignored – in part because many feel the U.S. focus on free-trade pacts and drug interdiction may have exacerbated poverty instead of relieving it. Into that breach has stepped autocratic President Hugo Chavez of oil-rich Venezuela, who has backed successful leftist leaders in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. During his trip to Latin America, Bush will try to counter Chavez’s influence by appealing directly to the region’s impoverished underclass and signing energy deals – such as a partnership with Brazil and other ethanol producers – that are designed to wean countries from Venezuela’s cheap oil.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Weak democratic foundations in South America cause a Chavez-China alliance that causes war with the US – connections with anti-American governments are key. Stephen Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, and Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Research Fellow in International Energy Security and Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Center for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 8-12-04, “Minimizing Mischief in Venezuela, Stabilizing the U.S. Oil Supply,” http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1787.cfm
Beyond the hemisphere, Chávez is preparing to shift PDVSA's customer base toward Asia and an increasingly oil-thirsty China, making Venezuela less dependent on petroleum sales to immediate neighbors. A deal signed on July 14, 2004, to build oil and gas pipelines between the Maracaibo Basin in Venezuela and the Caribbean and Pacific coasts in Colombia may seem innocuous, but it would enable Venezuela to ship petroleum to China without using the Panama Canal. This would make it more critical than ever for Chávez to secure a pliant government in Colombia to keep this facility operating in Venezuela's interest. Chávez would thus have the luxury of cutting deliveries to those who opposed him, forcing them to seek other sources at greater cost. By destabilizing and replacing democratic governments in hydrocarbon-rich Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador, he also could achieve a regional energy monopoly that could support rogue regimes and frustrate U.S. interests in the hemisphere.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Disengagement in South America causes China to fill in, opening the door to full-scale conflict. Gordon Frisch, Research Editor/Geopolitical Analyst for International Harry Schultz Letter, the world’s premier international investment, financial, geopolitical newsletter with subscribers in 71 countries, 3-5-05, “Commentary on Global Issues,” http://www.jrnyquist.com/frisch_2005_0305.htm
The China Factor: In November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao conducted a two-week tour of Latin America and concluded several major trade agreements and over 400 business deals with several emerging leftist governments. China’s rapidly industrializing economy needs massive natural resources, and Latin America is natural resources rich. China is capital rich, and Hu Jintao promised to spend over $100 billion in the next decade on Latin American infrastructure, natural resources and trade and investment deals, including oil. Politically, it appears business agreements between communist China’s state capitalism and dysfunctional, left-leaning, anti-U.S. governments in Latin America are marriages made in Marxist utopia. China has now been granted observer status at the OAS (Organization of American States), and is likely to conclude a bilateral trade deal with Chile (formerly the staunchest U.S. ally in Latin America) by the end of 2005. The Domino Theory: In The New American magazine (Jan 24), William F. Jasper reminds readers of The Domino Theory that was central to the Vietnam War. It was believed that if the West didn’t oppose the Communist forces backed by Moscow and Beijing, the theory went, the countries of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam would fall to Communism, one by one, in quick succession. Millions of people would be slaughtered, and whole nations would be turned into concentration camps. The Asian nations in the region that didn’t fall to overt Communist takeover would come under Red China’s dominance, nonetheless. The liberal intelligentsia sneered at such simplistic and paranoid notions. They were wrong, of course fatally horribly wrong. The simplistic theory proved to be fact. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam did fall like dominoes. Millions were slaughtered, and the survivors were enslaved in concentration camps. The rest of Asia has come under China’s economic and military dominance. The implications of The Domino Theory for Latin America ought to be glaringly obvious. Judging from events, it appears the dominos have already begun to fall. Strategic Implications: Whoever controls the Panama Canal that’s now China has a chokehold on a huge portion of global commerce (200 million tons of cargo pass through the canal each year). Anti-U.S. Venezuela, the U.S.’s second most important oil provider, wants to conclude oil supply agreements with thirsty China. If so, delivery should not be a problem, as China now controls the Panama Canal through which the oil would transit, but that means critical U.S. oil supplies could be diverted. Brazil, now closely allied with Red China, is a nuclear-capable nation. China and Brazil have a joint space venture with two satellites already in orbit, thus the potential clearly exists to develop nuclear missile delivery systems.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim By strengthening alliances, China is preparing for an attack on the US. Jeffrey Nyquist, Former Contractor in Soviet/Russian Analysis Group for U.S, Defense Intelligence Agency, Former Ph.D. Student at UC-Irvine in Political Sociology, and widely syndicated columnist and published author, 3-24-06, “More Tricks,” http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2006/0324.html
The strategic alliance of Russia and China continues to develop, embracing an ever-widening circle of junior partners in the Western Hemisphere (including Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia and even Mexico). China and Mexico have congratulated themselves on a strategic partnership to the bafflement of those who are clueless about national resentments and historical grudges. For those who are internationally streetwise, a respectful silence regarding the main strategic inference is socially advisable. Last December Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with Mexican President Vicente Fox, who said that Wen had chosen Mexico as his first foreign destination for a reason. The two countries were destined to strengthen their bilateral ties, striving together for a more equitable world. One may ask what is so inequitable as to require the strengthening of this particular partnership? The strategist and the historian will grasp the military-logistical significance, the territorial aspirations and the contribution of Imperial Germany’s late foreign minister, Arthur Zimmermann, and his famous telegram of 16 January 1917. “We intend to begin unrestricted submarine warfare,” Zimmermann explained to the German Ambassador in Washington. “We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to re-conquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you.” Powerful undemocratic countries in Asia and Europe have long dreamt of dominating their respective regions. Since 1917 there has arisen a serious obstacle (i.e., the United States of America). The Japanese ran into this obstacle in 1941. The Russians, Chinese, Iraqis, North Koreans and North Vietnamese also have firsthand experience (along with the Germans and Italians). For over 100 years the United States preferred neutrality, as recommended by George Washington. But modern strategic reality – the reality of U-boats, aircraft carriers, long range bombers and missiles – dictates a policy of American engagement, if only to avoid the isolation of the United States by a combination of totalitarian powers. It was combination, to be sure, that Arthur Zimmermann was reaching for in 1917 when he wrote to his ambassador in Washington: “You will inform the president [of Mexico] of the above most secretly, as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain, and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.” The encirclement of prospective enemies is an old tactic. In the case of Mexico, an Asian alliance is a respectable proposal. But regrettably for Arthur Zimmermann, his idea was 89 years ahead of its time. The usefulness of Mexico to an aspiring Asian power was obvious in 1917. For this usefulness to become effective, however, special conditions were needed. It is not that Mexico would forever refuse an alliance against the United States. If Mexico had sufficient military power (or if America was otherwise on its knees), a Mexican invasion of the Southwest would be inevitable. But Mexico is a relatively weak military power, and America is very strong indeed. But new weapons in a new era, with newfound vulnerabilities to a precarious economic system that requires open borders to continue functioning, and you have several indications of a coming “reversal” of fortune. When a strategically important country like China extends itself to a strategically insignificant country like Mexico, in terms of a symbolic state visit, it should be asked whether or not the insignificant country has a significant future role. In his reply to Vicente Fox’s inference regarding Mexico’s newfound importance, the Chinese premier spoke of enhancing “mutual trust” and a “deeper cooperation” between the two countries. “Our relations present us with a fine strategic opportunity,” said the Chinese premier. The typical American businessman and politician will point to growing ChineseMexican trade. It is a quirk of social psychology that Americans cannot grasp that China regards trade as a strategic tool. And one must distinguish between the economic sphere and the strategic sphere. Mexico is to become a new tourist destination for Chinese nationals. The two countries are joining together, as well, to promote the interests of the developing countries and to promote “world peace.” China’s partnership with Mexico should be understood in terms of China’s partnership with Russia. Consider the following, relevant item: In Russia, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Vasilenko, chief of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry, signaled Moscow’s desire to withdraw from the INF Treaty with the deployment of new medium range nuclear missiles. In a statement intended to prefigure a future Kremlin announcement, Col. Gen. Varfolomey Korobushkin, first vice president of Russia’s Academy of Military Sciences, said: “The construction of a national missile defense in the United States will inevitably provoke a nuclear arms race.” Why would the Russians be interested in medium range nuclear missiles? 23
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
The shortest distance between two points is usually in the same hemisphere. China’s position in the Western Hemisphere, for example, has special importance. According to Gen. Bantz J. Craddock of the U.S. Southern Command, China is offering military support and training to Latin America. As Washington Times correspondent Bill Gertz put it in a March 15 column, “The growing Chinese role [in Latin America] comes amid numerous high-level visits by its leaders and other activities aimed at building military and economic ties to leftist governments and other states in a strategic region long-considered within the U.S. sphere of influence.” Besides its obvious readiness to train Cuban, Venezuelan and Bolivian soldiers, the Chinese are currently supplying military hardware to Latin American “friends.” The intensive training of Cuban artillery officers has led some observers to wonder whether Cuba intends to acquire its own medium-ranged missiles (from Russia, China or Iran). A recent visitor to Cuba was Lt. Gen. Peng Xiaofeng, commissar of China’s missile forces. According to Gen. Craddock, the U.S. knows “almost nothing” about the extent of Chinese military-intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. Add to this the Chinese economic penetration and political subversion of Canada and a clearer picture of strategic encirclement emerges.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Increasing Brazilian sugar ethanol imports will solve U.S. hegemony and trade relations Raúl Zibechi, member of the Editorial Council of the weekly Brecha de Montevideo, a professor and investigator of social movements at the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina, and an adviser to various social groups, 3-7-07, http://americas.irc-online.osrg/am/4051 [Jiajia]
Political objectives also come into play in Washington's move to cement the ethanol alliance. A long-term alliance that projects Brazil as a global player, which is the objective of the Lula government, would allow the United States to recuperate the hegemonic role that it has been losing over the past years. Washington cannot consolidate its hegemony only through military measures like Plan Colombia. It also needs to win over groups of leaders like those in the Lula government and important and dynamic business groups like those that have flourished in Brazil and especially in São Paulo. Jeb Bush was very clear about this, stating that biofuels can strengthen the relationship between the United States and Latin America "serving as a catalyst to remove barriers to free trade within the region." The executive director of the Inter-American Ethanol Commission, Brian Dean, went even further, stating that ethanol can accomplish what the FTAA failed to do.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Importing Brazilian sugar ethanol will reduce global warming Kelly Hearn, independent journalist, former UPI staff worker in Latin America, correspondent to National Geographic News, The Christian Science Monitor, foreign political correspondent for the Washington Times, recipient of 2006 Samuel Chavkin Grant for Investigative Journalism, 2-8-07, National Geographic News, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070208-ethanol_2.html [Jiajia]
In Brazil ethanol has become economically competitive with gasoline, and the country's biofuels program could serve as a world model for producing sustainable energy, officials say. South America's largest country is the world's reigning ethanol king, producing 4.4 billion gallons (16.5 billion liters) of the biofuel from sugarcane each year, on average. Biofuel is widely considered a way to reduce greenhouse gases from fossil fuel use and thereby reduce human-caused global warming. (Related news: "Global Warming "Very Likely" Caused by Humans, World Climate Experts Say" [February 2, 2007].) Brazil's sugarcane-based ethanol program is "appropriate for replication in many countries," writes José Goldemberg, secretary of the environment for the Brazilian state of São Paulo, in a perspective article in this week's issue of the journal Science.
Ethanol is a low-carbon fuel that combats the use of greenhouse gasses
Biodiesel and Ethanol Investing, “Heat is on for Tariff Removal of Brazilian Ethanol”, http://www.biodieselinvesting.com/biodiesel-archives/2007/03/22/heat-on-for-tariff-removal-for-brazilian-ethanol/ , March 22nd, 2007 [JP]
The Financial Times News reports that President of the World Bank and former member of the Bush Administration, Paul Wolfowitz, stated that the U.S. should lower or remove tariffs against ethanol from Brazil. While President Bush recently discussed biofuel cooperation with the country, he has rejected the removal of the tariff. Comments from Mr. Wolfowitz came from a conference on financing low-carbon energy in London. He is a strong supporter of a global regulatory framework to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, similar to the Kyoto protocol, which Bush has also rejected.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Brazilian ethanol has the potential to cause a transition away from fossil fuels and solve global warming.
Kelly Heam, National Geographic News, “Ethanol Production Could Be Eco-Disaster, Brazil's Critics Say”, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/02/070208-ethanol.html , Feb 8th, 2007 [JP]
In Brazil ethanol has become economically competitive with gasoline, and the country's biofuels program could serve as a world model for producing sustainable energy, officials say. South America's largest country is the world's reigning ethanol king, producing 4.4 billion gallons (16.5 billion liters) of the biofuel from sugarcane each year, on average. Biofuel is widely considered a way to reduce greenhouse gases from fossil fuel use and thereby reduce human-caused global warming. Brazil's sugarcane-based ethanol program is "appropriate for replication in many countries," writes José Goldemberg, secretary of the environment for the Brazilian state of São Paulo, in a perspective article in
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Solve Food Prices
Brazil sugar ethanol will solve food prices Jeff Benjamin, Senior Editor at Investment News, 5-12-08, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080512/REG/796826254 [JJH]
"Since it's primarily a tropical plant, there is nothing as efficient as sugar cane to produce ethanol, which is why Brazil is probably the only country in the world that can produce enough ethanol to export," said Pedro Seraphim, a partner at the São Paulo-based law firm Tozzini Freire Advogados. Last year, Brazil produced more than 5 billion gallons of ethanol, second only to the 6.5 billion gallons produced in the United States. Combined, the two countries' output represents 90% of the world's ethanol produced for fuel. A key distinction between corn ethanol produced in the United States and elsewhere, and Brazil's sugar cane ethanol, is the potential to increase volume without adversely affecting other commodities or food prices. "The volumes we're producing right now are achieved with only 1% of Brazil's agricultural land, and we don't have the problem of the [sugar cane] crops' being a food staple," Mr. Seraphim said. "In the United States and Europe, where sugar cane is not a natural crop, they have to resort to other sugars to make ethanol."
The switch to Brazilian ethanol will reduce the demand for corn ethanol, reducing crop prices. Reuters 2-28-08, “Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Welcomes Bernanke’s Remarks on U.S. Ethanol Tariffs,” http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS293569+28-Feb-2008+PRN20080228
SAO PAULO, Brazil, Feb. 28 /PRNewswire/ -- The Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) applauds today's remarks by U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke favoring a reduction in tariffs on Brazilian ethanol to help take pressure off food prices in the United States as a positive approach that goes far beyond economics. In UNICA's opinion, Bernanke's suggestion favors clean renewable energy, boosts the fight against global warming and defies the distorted logic now in place that taxes biofuels while fossil fuels move unobstructed around the globe, without trade barriers or any other restrictions. UNICA President and CEO Marcos Jank called it, "The type of move, if adopted, that would set an example for other countries and regions of the world to commit to using sustainable biofuels, so that the renewable fuel industry can develop worldwide in an orderly and productive manner, with due regard for the necessary balance between producing food and fuel." Brazil is a pioneer in the large scale production and use of ethanol as a motor vehicle fuel, an option it adopted in the mid-seventies following the first oil crisis. The country is now the world's second-largest ethanol producer, and flex-fuel cars are a runaway success, accounting for close to 90% of all new car sales in the country. In mid-February, ethanol surpassed gasoline in terms of volume sold on the Brazilian market. Sugarcane ethanol is also the most cost-effective and energy-efficient biofuel available anywhere in the world -- for every unit of fossil fuel used in its production, 9 units of renewable energy are generated with a reduction of about 90% in greenhouse gas emissions when compared with gasoline. Bernanke told the U.S. Senate Banking Committee that allowing Brazilian sugarcane ethanol to enter the country tariff-free "will reduce costs in the United States." The remarks were made during an exchange with Senator Wayne Allard (Republican-Colorado), who asked about benefits of reducing tariffs in order to contain inflation caused by escalating food prices in the United States. Bernanke admitted it is difficult to say to what extent demand for corn ethanol is boosting food prices in the U.S., but "a significant portion of the corn crop is being diverted to ethanol, which raises corn prices." He added that some soybean acreage has also moved to corn production, which probably has had some effect on soybean prices as well. By way of comparison, Brazil's entire ethanol production occupies about 1% of the country's arable land.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
AT: Hurt US Producers
Eliminating tariff would help competitiveness of US producers Rodrigo De Almeida, Brazilian political journalist, research at the Center of Studies of Entrepreneurial, Institutions and Capitalism, scholar at the New School for Social Research in New York, 3-30-07, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/ethanol_4490.jsp [JJH]
Brazil has the cheapest, most energy-efficient ethanol in the world, as well as the most advanced technology for producing it. The country has been developing ethanol since the mid-1970s, after the first oil shock in 1973. American ethanol is an important resource for the US economy, but it depends on protectionism and subsidies. It would be great for the competitiveness of US producers to face imported ethanol in a free-trade situation. Such competition would benefit both consumers and taxpayers. Bush has clear interests. He is aware that oil is climate-changing and is controlled in part by ideological enemies such as Chávez. The goal is known: the American government wants to cut future US petrol (gasoline) consumption by 20% within ten years. The question is, by what means? Bush knows that Brazil is already there: 40% of the fuel in Brazilian cars is made from sugar cane. Brazilian drivers learned the lesson long ago: 77% of new cars can run on ethanol. Specialists say that the petrol engine is heading for extinction. Companies around the world are trying to make biofuel out of everything from trees to cooking oil. To make ethanol from corn or wheat, as Americans and Europeans tend to do, distillers must first convert the starch in those crops into sugars. But Brazilian distillers dispense with this expensive step by using sugar cane. This enables Brazil to produce ethanol for 22 cents a litre, compared with 30 cents a litre for corn-based ethanol, as produced in the US. "That makes it cheaper than petrol," as the The Economist recently noted, "and therefore lucrative for farmers without subsidies."
Importing sugar ethanol from Brazil is good for the economy Joel Severinghaus, IFBF International Trade Analyst, 7-14-05, http://www.iowafarmbureau.com/programs/commodity/information/pdf/Trade%20Matters%20column%200507 14%20Brazilian%20ethanol.pdf [JJH]
So why are we importing Brazilian ethanol? Simple economics: U.S. ethanol demand now exceeds U.S. ethanol supply, so imports will make up the difference. And Brazil can produce ethanol from sugarcane more cheaply than we can make it from Iowa corn. Last year, the Brazilians could export ethanol for less than $0.90 per gallon, whereas the production cost for Iowa ethanol plants is somewhere around $1.10 per gallon. Half our 2004 ethanol imports came directly from Brazil without duty-free reprocessing the Caribbean, even paying the full 2.5 percent plus 54 cents per gallon import tariff. If the world price of oil is high enough, and the price of ethanol in the U.S. is high enough, it will apparently be profitable for someone to import ethanol from Brazil. Economists will tell you that imports aren’t cause for alarm. On the contrary, imports are a sign of a strong growing economy, where we can afford to buy imports that let us consume more than we could produce domestically. And a situation where demand exceeds supply usually implies higher prices for producers. We may not like import competition for home-grown commodities like ethanol, but if we want increased access to foreign markets for our farm exports, we can’t have it both ways. Our challenge will be to compete with lower-cost producers, such as Brazil, on terms of technological innovation (cellulosic ethanol made from cornstalks rather than grain) and improved efficiency (high-starch corn varieties specifically for ethanol, enzymes that improve ethanol yield) rather than merely on price. In the meantime, some small percentage of ethanol in U.S. gas pumps, particularly on the coasts, may continue to come from the sugarcane fields of Brazil.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Brazil Can Supply Enough
Brazil capable of producing to adapt US needs. Rodrigo De Almeida, Brazilian political journalist, research at the Center of Studies of Entrepreneurial, Institutions and Capitalism, scholar at the New School for Social Research in New York, 3-30-07, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/ethanol_4490.jsp [JJH]
In Brazil, Bush and Lula agreed to promote ethanol production and use it across the region, and to cooperate on research. By fixing purity standards, they hope to make ethanol a globally tradable commodity. The memorandum of understanding signed by US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim on 9 March 2007 promises to advance research and development of new technology and stimulate private sector investment in other countries, starting in central America and the Caribbean. Brazil would like to see ethanol traded as freely and widely as oil. According to a study by the ministry of science and technology, Brazil could potentially boost exports from the current 3 billion litres to as much as 200 billion litres by 2025. There are worries about the prospects of this cooperation on bioenergy. In the short term, the first concern is the American refusal to talk about the high tariff that protects US corn farmers, whose ethanol is more costly and carbon-emitting to produce than Brazil's sugar cane-based fuel. In the long term, the most significant concern ought to be safeguarding the Amazon forest from further harm as a result of expanded sugar-cane plantation. Between one issue and the other, Bush and Lula could pledge to narrow their differences in World Trade Organisation negotiations by boosting the global economy and easing poverty among millions of people. But neither seem optimistic that the talks - which have already lasted more than five years - will conclude any time soon.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Eliminating tariff on ethanol key to US-Brazil relations Sam Logan, Senior Political and Security Analyst at Riskline, reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999, 4-24-07, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17530 [JJH]
The ethanol alliance between Brazil and the US cements an opportunity for each country to expand influence: on the world court for Brasilia and in South America for Washington. Commentary by Sam Logan for ISN Security Watch (24/04/2007) Brazilian President Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva on 30 March paid an unprecedented visit to US President George W Bush. For a second time, the two leaders had met in two weeks, with strengthening bilateral ties at the top of the agenda and ethanol as the bond holding the relationship together. After the first meeting, when Bush visited Lula in Brazil, there was little more than formalities and good will. A US tariff on Brazilian ethanol imports and claims that the US’ use of corn as feedstock for ethanol production could raise world food prices raised many doubts. After the second meeting, however, a tangible - if testy - alliance formed to the chagrin of Washington's enemies in South America. Ethanol, it seems, is main ingredient for a new geopolitical relationship that has arguably increased US influence in South America while presenting real possibilities of a global presence for Brazil.
Eliminating tariff will be a win-win deal for US and Brazil Sam Logan, Senior Political and Security Analyst at Riskline, reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999, 4-24-07, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17530 [JJH]
The irony of an unlikely alliance between Washington and Brasilia is lost on few. Through Brazil's success as a major supplier of the world's ethanol market, the US can recapture much needed support for the hearts and minds of Latin Americans, something it has struggled to do since Bush came to office. For Brazil, ethanol is very likely the country's ticket onto the world court. And for the US, ethanol could be the ticket back into South America.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Increasing production of sugar ethanol provides key jobs to Brazilians in poverty Bryce G. Hoffman, award winning business reporter for the Detroit News, 8-23-07, http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070823/AUTO01/708230405/1148 [JJH]
Most cane harvesting is still done by hand in Brazil by migrant workers who earn about $200 a month. Each is expected to cut seven or eight tons of cane a day. "It's not so hard," said Dilmara Souza Santos. "You have to know how to do it." She is 23, and this is the second year she has left her home in Salvador, in the northeastern state of Bahia, to cut cane for Pilon because there is no work at home. The plant is a massive, open-sided edifice that fills the air with a sweet aroma as it transforms cane by the truckload into sugar and ethanol.
Brazil sugar ethanol is key to solving environment problems and poverty in Brazil Adam Dean, B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science from University of Pennsylvania and M.Sc. in International Political Economy, with Merit, from the London School of Economics, 4-4-07, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/ethanol [JJH]
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and U.S. President Bush met last week at Camp David to discuss the future of ethanol. As the world's largest producer of sugar and a pioneer in the production of ethanol, Brazil is a key ally in Bush's plan to reduce America's foreign oil dependence and environmental footprint. Imports of Brazilian ethanol could be a major step toward achieving Bush's goal of reducing American gasoline consumption by 20 percent over the next ten years. As ethanol can be produced from sugar, increased consumption of the fuel in the United States could also lead to a higher commodity price for sugar producers in Brazil, with the potential to lift thousands out of poverty.
Slave labor is being solved by machines and more stringent federal safety standards. Gary Duffy, BBC News, “Brazil defends biofuel's merits”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7528323.stm, July 28th 2008 [JP]
"There are companies that work properly and others that don't. "The machines replacing the men who cut down sugar cane can already be seen in parts of the state of Sao Paulo and elsewhere. Producers say this will help to address many concerns about working conditions. At ethanol plants such as Sao Manoel, they say they keep within rules set by the government for rural workers, and have introduced changes to improve working practices.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Removing the tariff on Brazilian ethanol would create a global incentive to transition to ethanol. Ben Lieberman, The Heritage Foundation, “Lift Tariffs on Foreign Ethanol”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1074.cfm, May 12th 2006, [JP]
In past years, the 7-percent import cap has not been reached. For one thing, current ethanol production in some nations just meets their domestic consumption, leaving only small quantities for export. Also, the costs of diverting Brazilian or other supplies to CBI nations has discouraged full use of the tariff exemption, especially given the relatively low ethanol prices that prevailed in the U.S. until this year. If the tariff were dropped, foreign producers would now face a strong incentive to export to the U.S. Allowing this ethanol into the country without penalties or special requirements would, over time, act as a catalyst for increased global production.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
E85 is an alternative fuel under federal statutes. Kaylan Lytle, Energy Bar Association, 2007, “Comment: Driving the market: The Effects on the United States Ethanol Industry if the Foreign Ethanol Tariff is Lifted,” Energy Law Journal, L/N
All engines are considered "ethanol-capable" in the United States. However, this does not mean that all engines can run on pure ethanol. Rather, the term "ethanol-capable" refers to a vehicle's ability to accept E10, he standard blend of 10% ethanol and 90% gasoline. n9 While all vehicles can run on E10, flexible fuel engines can accept a blend of up to 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline (E85). Only E85 is considered an alternative fuel under current federal statutes, and therefore only the use of E10 is covered under the typical car warranty unless it is a flexible fuel vehicle (FFV). Nearly every major automaker offers several flexible fuel versions of popular models.
Every decrease in the tariff is an increase in subsidies for sugarcane ethanol Renewable Fuels Association, 2005 (The Importance of Preserving the Secondary Tariff On Ethanol, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/objects/pdf/Ethanol_Tariff_Position_Paper.pdf
Renewable fuels are produced only in countries where programs have been created to assist in their production. Thus, any reduction in the U.S. secondary tariff on ethanol would result in U.S. taxpayers further subsidizing imported ethanol beyond the subsidies that are already be given in the country of production. Since imported ethanol receives the 51cent per gallon tax credit, if the U.S. tariff on ethanol is removed or dips below 51 cents, then U.S. taxpayers would be effectively subsidizing imported ethanol. The subsidy would be equal to the difference between the tax credit and the amount of any reduced tariff. For example, if the ethanol tariff were reduced to ten cents a gallon, then U.S. taxpayers would be paying an additional 41-cent incentive for every gallon of imported ethanol. U.S. taxpayers should not be required to subsidize imported ethanol because it is counter to the purpose and many benefits of the U.S. ethanol program – to foster the domestic production of a renewable fuel.
And the USFG defines subsidies and tax depreciations as alternative energy incentives – our evidence is contextual The Environmental Quality Control Council, 2004
The EQC Energy Policy Subcommittee requested that an explanation of the types of incentive policies that the State of Montana, the Federal Government, and other selected states currently have in place for the alternative energy sources be provided in this report. The rationale for this request was that the Subcommittee wanted to understand Montana's current incentive policy framework and to evaluate the status of other selected state and federal incentive programs. This chapter will provide an explanation of the overall framework for alternative energy incentive policies, including an inventory of incentive policies and a discussion of potential funding mechanisms. Each subsequent chapter that analyzes a specific alternative energy source will explain the specific incentive policies in place for that particular alternative energy resource.
Ethanol is renewable Kaylan Lytle, Energy Bar Association, 2007, “Comment: Driving the market: The Effects on the United States Ethanol Industry if the Foreign Ethanol Tariff is Lifted,” Energy Law Journal, L/N
Ethanol is "clean-burning, high-octane fuel that is produced from renewable sources." n4 Though the most common feedstocks are sugar cane and corn, any crop that contains abundant sugars can produce ethanol. Also, there are several different methods of producing ethanol, though the most common is the "dry mill" process.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Congress considers removing the tariff a subsidy Senator Chuck Grassley, 2006, Letter to the President, http://grassley.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelea se_id=bd9671d5-e37f-471f-bbac-b35bbbade586&Month=5&Year=2006
Moreover, other countries, like Brazil, subsidize ethanol and sugarcane production. Lifting the import tariff would only further subsidize these industries, but at the expense of American tax payers. United States gasoline refiners receive a 51 cent tax incentive for every gallon of ethanol they blend into gasoline, regardless of origin. Even imported ethanol from Brazil, for instance, qualifies for this tax incentive. Brazil has built its ethanol industry through 35 years of tax incentives, production subsidies, mandates, export enhancement, infrastructure development, debt forgiveness and currency devaluation. Foreign countries, like Brazil, do not need U.S. tax dollars to compete effectively. Alternative Energy Incentive Policy Framework The National Wind Coordinating Committee through the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) commissioned a study in 1999 that reviewed and analyzed state policy options that supported wind energy development. This analysis, although focused on wind energy, provides an extremely logical framework that can be applied generally to most alternative energy incentive policies, both at the state and federal level. Figure 2-1 illustrates a noninclusive inventory of alternative energy incentives and policies currently used in the U.S.2 Relying heavily on the NCSL report, Table 2-1 summarizes descriptions and explanations of each incentive policy type. 3 These incentives run the gamut from heavy governmental involvement to market-based approaches. The effectiveness of these incentives is not analyzed in this report. Tax Incentives Production Tax Credits A production tax credit provides an investor or owner of the qualifying alternative energy property with an annual tax credit based upon the amount of energy produced or generated. Investment Tax Credits An investment tax credit allows an investor of an alternative energy project to reduce its tax obligation by some portion of the amount invested in the project. Sales Tax Reductions Exemptions or reductions in state or local sales taxes that apply to the transfer or exchange of energy, material, and land assets reduce the overall tax burden for alternative energy projects. Property Tax Reductions Exemptions or reductions in state or local property taxes decrease the tax burden for alternative energy projects. Accelerated Depreciation Some assets lose value over time. Tax depreciation attempts to approximate the loss of asset value over time by allowing a portion of the investment to be deducted from taxable income in any given year. Direct Cash Incentives Production Incentives Direct production incentives can take the form of direct cash subsidy or price support payment based on energy production, not capital investment. Investment Incentives (Grants) Investment incentives can take the form of direct cash payment to defray capital costs of energy projects. Low-Cost Capital Programs Government-Subsidized Loans Debt costs can affect as well as determine whether an alternative energy project is built. Government can lower the cost of debt by providing direct low-cost loans.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
AT: WTO Counterplan
If the US won’t remove the tariff, then Brazil will push a suit in the WTO and = win Alexandre Marinis is a Staff Writer for the Bloomberg News and The Tampa Tribune, “Ethanol Pales In Comparison To Brazilian Sugar Cane Fuel”, 5/28/08, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/may/28/bzethanol-pales-in-comparison-to-brazilian-sugar-/
Far more problematic than any of these issues is the U.S. Congress' refusal to eliminate a 54-cent tariff on each gallon of imported ethanol. This levy was introduced in 1980 to protect U.S. makers of corn-based ethanol from competitors such as Brazil, which can produce ethacane for 22 cents per liter, while U.S. ethacorn costs 35 cents per liter. Lifting this tariff would ease the demand for corn and take a step toward easing pressure on food prices. Brazil is threatening to challenge the U.S. tariff at the World Trade Organization. Pascal Lamy, the director-general of the WTO, has already said Brazilian ethacane "isn't competing with food" and "is more respectful to the environment than the corn-based ethanol in the U.S. and Europe." Sooner or later, the WTO might have the chance to decide whether the world can finally have a real substitute for oil. Until then, we'll have to live in a world where fake goods are passed off as the real thing.
Disputes, like the one in Brazil, would raise would overload the DSP Stanley Lubman, a Consulting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, “Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years”, 2004, Northwestern School of Law Journal of International Law & Business 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383, Spring/2K, http://www.freechina.net/2004/comment/00012.htm
China's failure to meet the GATT standard, no matter how it is expressed, could well engender a considerable number of disputes. Although some American supporters of Chinese accession have argued that accession would place China within the reach of a "strong dispute settlement mechanism to punish violations in a timely, decisive way," n112 there should be no illusions about the limited extent to which the WTO dispute resolution procedures can be used to enforce adherence to China's obligations as a member of the WTO. Disputes arising out of alleged Chinese failures to comply with obligations of membership could become so numerous as to overload the WTO dispute settlement process, and the processes of obtaining decisions and implementing them could be very time-consuming.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim This collapses the WTO as an effective multilateral trading system Ruth L. Okediji, a Professor at Emory Law School, and William L. Prosser, a Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, “He Nexus Symposium: An Interdisciplinary Forum on the Impact of International Patent& Trade Agreements in the Fight Against HIV & AIDS: Article: Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the Trips Agreement,” Emory International-Law Review, Spring/03, L/N
The WTO dispute settlement process has been presented with several important challenges since its inception in 1995. A sampling of the disputes handled so far demonstrate that the issues raised concern differences in interpretations of TRIPS. More interestingly, some of the disputes reflect the failure of diplomatic negotiations during the pre-TRIPS era, and the dispute settlement process provides a new forum to resolve issues that have been a source of long-standing tension between developed countries. n208 The system does not yet appear to be strained, n209 despite the demonstrated force of the process. [*887] From an international perspective, the WTO Dispute Body’s decisions have not been greeted with any measurable displeasure among scholars. n210 The decisions maintain a fidelity to the multilateral system as the end for which the WTO exists. This has been accomplished through several judicial mechanisms. They include the interpretive rule of “strict constructionism,” n211 the rejection of the “legitimate expectations” test n212 (in other words, careful adherence to the explicit rules of the TRIPS Agreement and nothing more), and the implicit preservation of the moratorium on claims of nullification or impairment. n213 Each of these mechanisms reflect attempts to circumscribe construction of TRIPS provisions as required by Article 19(2) of the DSU. n214 Indeed, in construing the requirement of Article 23, n215 the United States 201-210 Panel n216 found that the most relevant objects and purposes of the DSU, and of the WTO in general, “are those which relate to the creation of market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets and to the provision of a secure and [*888] predictable multilateral system.” n217 It further found that “of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the marketplace and its different operators.”
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
The FTAA doesn't interfere with global free trade Daniel Lederman, World Bank senior economist, "NAFTA Is Not Enough," December 17, 2003, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20146214~menuPK:34457~pag ePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.html
For many years we, in the Latin America and the Caribbean region of the Bank, have been saying that regional trade agreements could accompany unilateral reforms and the pursuit of a multilateral agenda. There is no inconsistency. Since the early 1990s, regional agreements haven’t hampered unilateral or multilateral trade reforms. And Mexico was not an exception. There are gains from trade reforms that demand both trade liberalization by developing countries and market access by developed countries. We estimate that Mexico's global exports would have been between 25-30 percent lower if it hadn’t entered into NATFA, and we found no evidence that NAFTA has caused trade diversion in aggregate trade flows. The lessons of NAFTA are consistent with the Bank’s overall global message that national trade reforms must be accompanied by reforms on the part of rich countries to open up their markets to developing country exports, because these agreements in fact demand reciprocal trade liberalization. Another message is the importance of the behind-the-border development agenda, which has been an important part of the Bank’s global dialogue with our clients. Nevertheless, the evidence from Mexico’s experience could be construed as showing that the benefits are not as large as those promised by their supporters. The report argues that to some extent this was due to certain remaining trade distortions that were not fully removed under NAFTA. For example, NAFTA didn’t succeed in eliminating rich countries’ agricultural subsidies, which is important for some developing countries, and some of its rules of origin are limiting the market access for Mexican firms. This is another reason why it is important to keep pursuing the Doha Round, and another example why the FTAA, or other regional trade agreements, are not incompatible with the Doha Round. What may not succeed in an individual context could succeed in a multilateral one. The key seems to be not to drop the ball once it has been signed with the U.S.
Other nations will inevitably create bilateral and regional trade agreements – lending U.S. support to the process is key to make it effective Cooper ’05 [William H., Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, “Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy”, CRS Report for Congress, June 24th, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/49097.pdf]
The Bush Administration has affirmed the strategy of pursuing U.S. trade policy goals through the multilateral trade system but is giving strong emphasis to building bilateral and regional trade ties through free trade agreements. Lamenting that the United States was involved in only two FTAs while most of its major trading partners were negotiating many more, USTR Robert Zoellick stated early in the Administration: America’s absence from the proliferation of trade accords hurts our exporters... If other countries go ahead with free trade agreements and the United States does not, we must blame ourselves. We have to get back into the game and take the lead. We are certainly in a position to do so. Indeed, the United States will be pursuing a number of regional free trade agreements in the years ahead, though not to the exclusion of global talks and the WTO process. The fact that the United States can move on multiple fronts increases our leverage in the global round, just as the Clinton Administration used the North American Free Trade Agreement and the APEC summit to help squeeze the European Union to complete the Uruguay Round of GATT.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Bhagwati’s argument is wrong – breaking down trade barriers makes it easier to do the same internationall Frankel ’01 [Jeffrey, James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Growth – Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “The Crusade for Free Trade: Evaluating Clinton’s International Economic Policy”, Foreign Affairs, March/April]
Bhagwati also worries that regional initiatives will use up political capital and energies and thus divert momentum from multilateral efforts. To use phrasing that he originally coined and that has since become popular, trade blocks may be "stumbling blocks" to global liberalization rather than "building blocks." But other economists see evidence from recent decades that the political forces behind regional trade arrangements tend to be consistent with those working for free trade generally. Liberalizing trade with a neighbor, they reason, makes it easier to do so with others. In fact, leaving aside an antiglobalization minority in Mexico, Bhagwati is virtually alone in seeing harm in the rapid growth of U.S. exports under NAFTA.
Sugar ethanol is comparatively superior in every way. It also solves poverty and the environment and the FTAA. Marcel De Armas, JD candidate at American University Washington College of Law, Spring 2007, “Exploring How Today’s Development Affects Future Generations Around the Globe: Feature: Misleadingly Green: Time to Repeal the Ethanol Tariff and Subsidy for Corn,” American University/Sustainable Development Law & Policy, L.N
Besides having a higher cellulose content, sugar cane offers several advantages over corn in the production of ethanol. First, unlike corn, farmers plant sugar cane once every four to seven years but harvest it yearly resulting in less soil erosion. Second, sugar cane requires less fertilizers since it can obtain some of its nitrogen from the air. Third, the energy to power the transformation from sugar cane to ethanol comes from burning the sugar cane's waste product and not from oil, gas, or the electrical grid as with corn. Unfortunately with our current technology, even if the United States produced most of its ethanol from sugar cane or other crops with higher cellulose content it still would require excessive amounts of land for cultivation. To protect its environment the United States should eliminate the current ethanol tariff and subsidy, or at least focus the subsidy on crops with high cellulose contents. In particular, eliminating the tariff on ethanol will promote the growth of an ethanol distribution system because more imports would enter the country increasing the market for ethanol. In addition, eliminating the ethanol tariff would increase the demand for sugar cane, and thus, reduce third world countries' excess supply. As a result, the price of sugar cane would increase providing additional revenue to the third world sugar cane producers. The additional sugar cane revenue entering these third world countries could foster the development of a middle class interested in protecting their own environment and promoting sustainable development. Finally, the elimination of the tariff and subsidy could rekindle the trade negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas that stalled over agriculture and service industry differences between Brazil and the United States.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Topicality: In the US
1. W/M – The USFG defines subsidies and tax depreciations as alternative energy incentives – our evidence is contextual The Environmental Quality Control Council, 2004
The EQC Energy Policy Subcommittee requested that an explanation of the types of incentive policies that the State of Montana, the Federal Government, and other selected states currently have in place for the alternative energy sources be provided in this report. The rationale for this request was that the Subcommittee wanted to understand Montana's current incentive policy framework and to evaluate the status of other selected state and federal incentive programs. This chapter will provide an explanation of the overall framework for alternative energy incentive policies, including an inventory of incentive policies and a discussion of potential funding mechanisms. Each subsequent chapter that analyzes a specific alternative energy source will explain the specific incentive policies in place for that particular alternative energy resource. Alternative Energy Incentive Policy Framework The National Wind Coordinating Committee through the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) commissioned a study in 1999 that reviewed and analyzed state policy options that supported wind energy development. This analysis, although focused on wind energy, provides an extremely logical framework that can be applied generally to most alternative energy incentive policies, both at the state and federal level. Figure 2-1 illustrates a noninclusive inventory of alternative energy incentives and policies currently used in the U.S.2 Relying heavily on the NCSL report, Table 2-1 summarizes descriptions and explanations of each incentive policy type. 3 These incentives run the gamut from heavy governmental involvement to market-based approaches. The effectiveness of these incentives is not analyzed in this report. Tax Incentives Production Tax Credits A production tax credit provides an investor or owner of the qualifying alternative energy property with an annual tax credit based upon the amount of energy produced or generated. Investment Tax Credits An investment tax credit allows an investor of an alternative energy project to reduce its tax obligation by some portion of the amount invested in the project. Sales Tax Reductions Exemptions or reductions in state or local sales taxes that apply to the transfer or exchange of energy, material, and land assets reduce the overall tax burden for alternative energy projects. Property Tax Reductions Exemptions or reductions in state or local property taxes decrease the tax burden for alternative energy projects. Accelerated Depreciation Some assets lose value over time. Tax depreciation attempts to approximate the loss of asset value over time by allowing a portion of the investment to be deducted from taxable income in any given year. Direct Cash Incentives Production Incentives Direct production incentives can take the form of direct cash subsidy or price support payment based on energy production, not capital investment. Investment Incentives (Grants) Investment incentives can take the form of direct cash payment to defray capital costs of energy projects. Low-Cost Capital Programs Government-Subsidized Loans Debt costs can affect as well as determine whether an alternative energy project is built. Government can lower the cost of debt by providing direct low-cost loans.
2. W/M – Plan increases incentive to consume sugar-based ethanol in the US – extend Reuters 08
3. Prefer our evidence – their Forbes in 05 card isn’t talking about incentives.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim 4. Standards A. Limits – The neg interp over limits the aff destroying fairness. Neg interp excludes any foreign source of alt energy. B. Education – Increased number of cases is key to topic specific education – our aff proves. C. Context – prefer our evidence for its policy context. D. No impact to bidirectionality 5. Topicality not a voter a. Disclosure checks – potential abuse not a voter b. Reasonability
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for WTO Counterplan
1. Perm – Do both 2. Still links to politics DA – USFG will still have to pass a policy striking down tariffs, and McCain will take credit. 3. Can’t solve for US-Brazil relations, because the US won’t be perceived as being cooperative. Our Cohen in 07 indicates that cooperation is key. No solvency for prolif or Chavez. 4. Their Zhang in 07 card is more solvency for the aff.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim 5. US not compliant—6 examples European Union Factsheet “U.S. Non-Compliance With Wto Rulings” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/sum06_03/wto.pdf, 2008
The FSC legislation provides that, certain income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation would not be subject to U.S. tax. The purpose was to encourage the export of U.S. manufactured goods. Subsidies such as these, which are contingent upon export performance are prohibited under the WTO. In February 2000, the WTO ruled that FSC tax exemptions amount to a prohibited export subsidy. Page 2 - 2 - Subsequently the U.S. replaced the original FSC legislation with the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (ETI). However this Act still provides U.S. firms with prohibited export subsidies and on 14 January 2002 the WTO appellate body ruled that the U.S. had not complied with the original WTO ruling from 2000. Subsequent to this finding, on 7 May 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has authorised the EU to impose countermeasures against the U.S. to the tune of US$4 billion. However, in view of the assertions by the U.S. that it intends to comply with the WTO’s rulings, including a personal pledge to this effect from President Bush, the EC has declined to implement these countermeasures so far. The European Commission has agreed a time horizon within which the U.S. should comply with the latest WTO rulings regarding its FSC legislation. In particular, the Commission will review the situation in the Autumn. In addition to the U.S. FSC legislation, there are a number of other cases where U.S. compliance with WTO rulings has yet to materialise. 2. The U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 prohibiting the importation and sale of goods “at a price substantially less than the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of their production” was judged to be in breach of WTO rules in September 2000. There are currently three bills pending in Congress to repeal the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act, however two of these bills would leave on-going litigation unaffected. The EC has made it clear that repealing this law without also terminating cases pending under it would not be an acceptable solution to the dispute. 3. In October 1998, Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act was adopted. It prohibits, under certain conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity and sets forth that no U.S. Court shall recognise or enforce any assertion of such rights. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled that this legislation breached WTO rules. The EU agreed to extend the initial deadline for compliance (31 December 2002) to 30 June 2003. So far, however, there is little sign that this deadline will be met. 4. The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (or ‘CDSOA’ - also known as the Byrd Amendment - signed into law in October 2000) provides that proceeds from anti-dumping and countervailing duties shall be paid to the U.S. companies responsible for bringing the cases. The payments redistributed to U.S. producers are substantial and have tended to benefit a very limited number of recipients, mainly in the steel sector (cf. facts and figures below), thus increasing their distorting effects on competition. This provision is incompatible with several WTO provisions. On 22 December 2000, the EC, together with eight other WTO partners (Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand), requested formal WTO consultations with the U.S. The position defended by the EC and ten others (Canada and Mexico having joined the consultations in May 2001) was upheld in the WTO reports adopted on 27 January 2003: namely that the CDSOA is an illegal response to dumping or subsidisation and therefore WTO incompatible. A WTO arbitrator set the deadline by which the U.S. has to comply with this ruling for 27 December 2003. 5. On 27 July 2001, the Dispute Settlement Body found that Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was incompatible with WTO rules. So far, there have been no legislative initiatives to bring the Act into compliance with this ruling. The U.S. and the EU are discussing on the implementation of a temporary arrangement, pending full U.S. compliance with the WTO ruling. 6. In the British Steel case the methodology used by the U.S. Department of Commerce on countervailing duties on privatised exporters was considered as WTO incompatible. The U.S. consequently repealed the measure. However, due to a mis-interpretation of the WTO’s original Page 3 - 3 - ruling, the "new" methodology which it was then replaced with was just as WTO incompatible, remaining prejudiced against EC exporters. The EC, in order to defend its legitimate interest, was therefore forced to open another case at the WTO (the so-called Privatisation Case), on the same issue, covering all 14 privatisation cases affected by the U.S. methodology. In this "new" case, the WTO has again ruled in favour of the EC, and stipulated the 8 November 2003 as the date by which the U.S. should comply with this ruling.
6. This tanks the WTO
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Tara Gingerich, Senior Staff, American University Law Review; J.D. Candidate, October, 1998 The American University Law Review, Comment: “Why The Wto Should Require The Application Of The Evidentiary Threshold Requirement In Antidumping Investigations” Lexis,
The WTO has obligations to the international community. While it must be flexible out of political necessity, it also must set standards for international trade. It needs to establish a clear requirement of an evidentiary threshold in antidumping investigations. The standard must be one by which all countries can, and will, abide. The organization must realize its limitations and accept that if it pushes its members too far, they will not comply and the organization will lose all credibility. Conversely, it must not shrink from its responsibility to promote fair and free trade, or the WTO will risk becoming meaningless. Antidumping measures may have met this balance in the past, but they no longer do; the initiation threshold must now be set clearly, and at a sufficiently high level, in order to accomplish the same goals.
7. WTO key to solve Nuclear War Copley News Service, December 1, 1999
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Obama Politics
1. McCain is quickly gaining ground in the election Eric Kleefeld, staff writer, 7-14-2008, Talking Points Memo “Another National Poll Finds Prez Race Nearly Tied” http://tpmelectioncentral.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/07/another_national_poll_finds_pr.php
It's starting to look like the presidential race is narrowing once more. The latest Rasmussen tracking poll now has a nearlytied race at Obama 47%, McCain 46%, the latest national poll showing the race to be practically even. Rasmussen also registered a dead-even tie yesterday of 46%-46%, after Barack Obama had previously held a steady five-point lead for several weeks.This is on top of the Newsweek poll from last week, which showed Obama's lead shrinking from 15 points to a mere three. The Gallup poll also has Obama up by three points.
2. Obama will use military strikes against Iran Gazette 1/10/08 (“Nothing new about Obama”, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T419089336 8&f1ormat=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4190893372&cisb=22_T41908 93371&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8355&docNo=2)
L. Ian MacDonald makes the mistake of following the image-over-issues interpretation of politics that has effectively laid waste to democracy in the United States, and made candidates into products for public-relations experts to market. MacDonald offers only a few tidbits to support his effusive praise of Obama as "new and different" and an abstract promoter of change. A closer analysis shows that even though Obama was indeed against the Iraq war "from the beginning," he has also stated with regards to Iran that "all options are on the table," which presumably includes a pre-emptive nuclear war or "surgical" missile strikes on "soft targets." This position is far to the right of the majority of the U.S. public and world opinion, which is firmly opposed to any military action against Iran.
3. Iran strikes inevitable – Israel SMH, 7-31-08, Sydney morning herald, Peace hopes up in air as lame duck flies out, http://www.smh.com.au/news/general/peace-hopes-up-in-air-as-lame-duck-fliesout/2008/07/31/1217097436375.html
Both Bush, dogged by his invasion of Iraq, and Olmert by his invasion of Lebanon, are finished as leaders. Abbas has been reduced to a weak, ineffectual leader of the Palestinians, propped up on one side with aid from the US and Europe and on the other by the Israeli military. Waiting noisily in the wings in the event of an early Israeli election is the hawkish former Likud PM Benjamin Netanyahu, whose opposition to any territorial concessions to the Palestinians has, according to opinion polls, positioned him to win a national poll - despite the relief with which he was seen off by voters in 1999. But the issue of what to do about Iran and its nuclear program is in a different category to the Palestinian and Syrian questions. It is one thing to be talking about peace 40 years after a conflict - the world has factored in its absence on both the Palestinian and the Syrian fronts. But it is quite another when influential figures in Washington and Jerusalem talk up the prospect of military strikes against Iran. In June, Olmert warned that the international community had a duty to clarify to Iran that the repercussions of its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons would be "devastating". That was followed by what sounded like a threat from Shaul Mofaz, one of Olmert's ministers who also is a candidate for the leadership, who warned that an Israeli strike on Iran was "unavoidable" because, in his view, sanctions and diplomacy had failed. A wild scenario being canvassed by some Israeli analysts calls for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities by Israeli or American aircraft in the window between the US presidential election and the inauguration of the winning candidate in January. With Bush and Olmert on the way out, it might be called the attack of the lame ducks.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim 4. If Obama Wins, Bush will Strike Iran Daniel Pipes, Director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University., June 11, 2008, USA Today, “Prepare to attack [Iran]”, http://www.danielpipes.org/article/5585
Should it not, the U.S. presidential election in November will loom large. "There's only one thing worse than the United States exercising a military option," John McCain has said. "That is a nuclear-armed Iran." In contrast, Barack Obama has called for "tough-minded diplomacy," "stronger [economic] sanctions," and "alternative sources of energy" – basically, a call for more of the same. If George W. Bush's term ends with a McCain victory, Bush will likely punt, allowing McCain to decide on the next steps . But Obama's intention to continue with current failed policies suggests that, if he wins, and despite the tradition of outgoing presidents not undertaking major initiatives in their final weeks, Bush might initiate military action against Iran.
5. Too early to predict election – infinite number of other policies could influence outcome 6. Bush will strike Iran before the elections to give McCain a boost William O. Beeman, professor and chair of the department of anthropology at the University of Minnesota, 721-08, Playing Games with Iran, Foreign Policy In Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5387
Hostile rhetoric against Iran also plays into the U.S. electoral process. For American politicians, Iran is a universal bogeyman, useful in an election year as a device to show elected officials as tough on foreign miscreants. Indeed, since the Iranian Revolution U.S.-Iranian relations have been a centerpiece in election debates. Conspiracy theorists believe fervently that the Republican Party engineered an “October Surprise” in 1980 with Iranian officials – delaying the release of the American Hostages until after the U.S. Presidential election – and thus denied Jimmy Carter a second term. The purported event -- true or not -- has supplied a permanent political term for American elections. In every presidential election since, U.S.-Iranian relations have been featured in presidential debates and campaign ads, with universal negativity toward Iran. This year is no exception with Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain all expressing hostile attitudes toward Iran. And this year’s October Surprise is the rumor that the Bush administration will bomb Iran just before the election to give a boost to John McCain. Unless the Israeli hawks get there first.
7. No internal link – Hirsch impact assumes a nuclear strike.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Quid Pro Quo Topicality
1. W/M - Every decrease in the tariff is an increase in subsidies for sugarcane ethanol Renewable Fuels Association, 2005 (The Importance of Preserving the Secondary Tariff on Ethanol, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/objects/pdf/Ethanol_Tariff_Position_Paper.pdf)
Renewable fuels are produced only in countries where programs have been created to assist in their production. Thus, any reduction in the U.S. secondary tariff in ethanol would result in U.S. taxpayers further subsidizing imported ethanol beyond the subsidies that are already be given in the country of production.
2. W/M - Congress considers removing the tariff a subsidy Senator Chuck Grassley, 2006, Letter to the President, http://grassley.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=bd9671d5e37f-471f-bbac-b35bbbade586&Month=5&Year=2006
Moreover, other countries, like Brazil, subsidize ethanol and sugarcane production. Lifting the import tariff would only further subsidize these industries, but at the expense of American tax payers.
3. C/I – Incentives include both direct and indirect subsidies
Energy Information Administration, 01 (US Department of Energy, “Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends”, February, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf) The term “incentive” is used instead of “subsidy.” Incentives include subsidies in addition to other Government actions where the Government’s financial assistance is indirect. A subsidy is, generally, financial assistance granted by the Government to firms and individuals.
4. Standards A. Education – aff interp increases education by allowing for more cases. B. Limits – Neg interp over limits aff and kills fairness. C. Context – Our evidence comes from real-world policies while theirs comes from an assistant teacher at a college in Colorado. 5. Topicality not a voter a. Disclosure checks – potential abuse not a voter b. Reasonability
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Proliferation Kritik
1. Perm – do the plan and deconstruct the proliferation metaphor. The plan is key to exposing its own flaws. Hélène Cixous, “Deconstruction” , http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/derrida/deconstruction.html, 1995
The term denotes a particular kind of practice in reading and, thereby, a method of criticism and mode of analytical inquiry. In her book The Critical Difference (1981), Barbara Johnson clarifies the term: "Deconstruction is not synonymous with "destruction", however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of the word 'analysis' itself, which etymologically means "to undo" -- a virtual synonym for "to de-construct." ... If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another. A deconstructive reading is a reading which analyses the specificity of a text's critical difference from itself." [First paragraph of a four-page definition of the term deconstruction in J.A. Cuddon, A Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, third ed. (London: Blackwell, 1991)].
2. Their own author concedes that we should try to prevent proliferation Hugh Gusterton, “An interview with Hugh Gusterson”, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/columnists/hugh-gusterson/interview, 2008
Both stronger and weaker than when I began following this issue at the height of the Nuclear Freeze movement in the early 1980s. It's stronger because the terms of debate have largely shifted in its favor. In the early 1980s, the Nuclear Freeze movement's arguments for ending the arms race were dismissed as utopian. But now, nuclear testing and the mass production of nuclear weapons have ended. We have, more or less, a nuclear freeze, and the debate is now about whether nuclear proliferation can be avoided and nuclear weapons can be abolished. Nuclear abolition has even become a mainstream position given that former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have advocated for it in the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal.
3. Case impacts outweigh – K impacts are vague and cite no empirical examples of how Otherization has culminated in violence as a result of proliferation discourse.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim 4. Preventing nuclear war is a deontological imperative because of the huge stakes. Real risk of nuke war comes before K. Robert E. Goodin in 1985 (D.Phil. in Politics at Oxford,Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. (Apr., 1985), pp. 641-658. “Nuclear Disarmament as a Moral Certainty”, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0014-1704%28198504%2995%3A3%3C641%3ANDAAMC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L
That the logic of nuclear deterrence is incorrigibly probabilistic is widely acknowledged. Strategists and social scientists describe as its "fundamental premise" the proposition that "nuclear weapons make probable the rejection [by one's opponents] of armed aggression as a potential policy alternative" (emphasis added). Moral philosophers also fully acknowledge the nature of the gamble. In the words of Bernard Williams, "The morality of deterrence is, I think, legitimately one in which you think principally about those steps which make it less lightly that the weapons get used" (emphasis added). My argument is that all such notions of probability and likelihood are simply inappropriate in these circumstances. Maybe such concepts are not even meaningful at all when applied to situations involving reflective human agents rather than mere random processes. But in any case it is clear that, where probabilities of nuclear war are concerned, we just do not know enough about the shape of the underlying distribution to justify employing any of the standard for estimating probabilities. That we can have no reliable probability estimates is in itself quite enough to render probabilistic reasoning about such affairs wildly inappropriate. Certainly we have no solid objective statistics, based on frequency counts or such like. The balance of terror has kept the peace for the past thirtyfive years, to be sure. But thirty-five years is just too short a run on which to base our probability judgments, given the unacceptability of even very small probabilities of such a very great horror. Besides, nuclear war is just not the sort of thing whose probabilities we dare to estimate by trial-and-error procedures-the first error may well mark the learner's own end.' Nor do we have any well-validated scientific theories (about, e.g., the genesis and escalation of international conflicts) from which we might hope to derive reliable estimates of the probability of a breakdown in deterrence which would lead to a largescale nuclear war. We suffer not from a lack of such theories but rather from a surfeit of them; and none can prove itself decisively superior to all the others.' Nor, finally, do we have any particularly good reason to place any great faith in subjective probability estimates. Of course, we can always bully people into stating their "best guess" as to the chances of anything occurring; we can even bully them into rendering those probability estimates consistent. But when such estimates are as groundless as those concerning the chances of nuclear deterrence collapsing into nuclear war are, we should not set any great store by them. Ellsberg says, "It's no use bullying me into taking action . . . by flattering my 'best judgment.' I know how little that's based Alas, most people do not. Psychological evidence suggests not only that "individuals are poor probability assessors" but also, "and perhaps more important, that they underestimate their poorness by assessing probabilities too tightly."1° Knowing this-and knowing all the severe distortions to which judgments under uncertainty are prone1'-it would be sheer folly for us to predicate any profoundly important policy choices on such fallible subjective probability estimates. The upshot is that it is altogether inappropriate to engage in probabilistic reasoning about the chances of a breakdown in the balance of terror that leads to a large-scale nuclear war. Objective statistics are unavailable; theories are too numerous and too divergent; subjective estimates are known to be too unreliable." The problem is not just that we cannot estimate point probabilities with any great precision-that we cannot say whether the probability of nuclear war this century is 10 percent or 15 percent. Nor is it even just that we cannot make the sorts of order-of-magnitude judgments that would allow us to make ordinal judgments about relative probabilities. We are in a worse situation still. We cannot even say with confidence in what direction any particular strategic innovation pushes the probability of all-out nuclear war. Some theories maintain that that risk is increased by cruise missiles or spacebased defenses or nuclear proliferation. Others hold the opposite.13 Neither logic nor experience enables us to choose confidently between these theories, and only a fool would trust unaided hunches with so much at stake. The most that can be claimed for deterrence is that it will probably work to prevent war. So if probabilistic reasoning is inappropriate in these circumstances, deterrence is too. In short, my complaint against nuclear deterrence is that it amounts to playing the odds without knowing the odds. That constitutes recklessness par excellence. It would be the height of irresponsibility for anyone to wager the family home on rolls of such radically unpredictable dice. Where millions of lives are at stake, that judgment must surely apply even more harshly.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim 5. Alt doesn’t overcome squo – US policy is already structured around the proliferation metaphor.
International threat assessments are unavoidable
John Spanier, University of Florida, GAMES NATIONS PLAY, 1993, p.160.
The second point is that power is what people think it is. A distinction thus must be drawn between subjective (perceived) power and objective (actual) power. If power is in the eyes of the beholder, simple calculation of a nation's power is insufficient. If one country believes it is strong enough to deter an enemy, but the latter perceives it otherwise, it may still go to war. Thus, policy makers must concern themselves not only with what the actual balance of power is, but also with how that balance is seen in other capitals. This is a difficult task because access to another state's assessments is not usually available; therefobvre the best that one can do is guess. Nevertheless, it is a task that must be done.
7. Abandoning counter-proliferation precludes US hegemony which is key to prevent global nuclear war – extend kzad 95.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Amazon DA
Brazilian ethanol production does not necessitate Amazon deforestation Raymond Colitt, “U.S. officials: Brazil ethanol doesn't harm Amazon”, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSHO18246220070711, Jul 11 2007
BRASILIA (Reuters) - Brazil's ethanol production is not devastating the Amazon rain forest or hiking food prices, U.S. energy officials said on Wednesday. "There is a huge misconception internationally that in Brazil, we're cutting down the rain forest to (make) fuels, which is not true," said Dan Arvizu, director of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory. "Done responsibly (ethanol production) does not have to (compete) with food or impact the environment," Arvizu told reporters in the capital Brasilia. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had said on Monday that European competitors were trying to undermine Brazil's biofuels production by raising environmental concerns. Environmentalists fear increased sugar cane production for ethanol could push other crops, such as soybeans, deeper into the Amazon rain forest.
No risk to Amazon – no economic incentive to engage in deforestation because Amazon is too wet Raymond Colitt, “U.S. officials: Brazil ethanol doesn't harm Amazon”, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSHO18246220070711, Jul 11 2007
Cultivating sugar cane in the rain forest's tropical climate makes no business sense, said Gregory Manuel, International Energy Coordinator at the U.S. State Department. "Economics don't drive ethanol production in the rain forest. Yield rates in very wet environments are roughly half that in temperate environments," he said. Both officials spoke on the sidelines of a U.S.-Brazilian business summit in Brasilia. Production growth must be monitored carefully to avoid unwanted consequences, said Arvizu. But he added that the current global market for ethanol was still far from what could be produced sustainably. "We think at least 25-30 percent of current (global) gasoline consumption could be replaced by biofuels using today's technologies without impacting food or fiber," said Arvizu.
No threat of Amazon deforestation – weather unsuitable to sugar cane production Alan Clendenning, Oakland Tribune, “Brazil: Ethanol farming won't impact Amazon rain forest”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20070710/ai_n19354074, Jul 10 2007
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil -- Brazil's president said Monday that his nation's booming ethanol business won't hurt the Amazon rain forest, dismissing criticism that increased production of the alternate fuel could lead to deforestation. Silva, referring to concerns raised during his European visit last week, said it is unjustified to think that increased production of sugar cane for ethanol could prompt more jungle clearing. He said that Amazon weather conditions aren't favorable for the sugar cane used to produce ethanol and suggested critics are trying to prevent Brazil from advancing economically by taking advantage of rising demand for biofuels. "The Portuguese discovered a long time ago that the Amazon isn't a place to plant cane," Silva said, and added, "The cartel of the world's powerful is trying to prevent Brazil from developing, trying to prevent Brazil from being transformed into a great nation."
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim Ethanol production not root cause of deforestation – poor soil conservation, unclear land titles, and timber companies bear responsibility. Jim Lane, Biofuels Digest, “Amazon deforestation not caused by ethanol, a German professor reports”, http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/01/22/amazon-deforestation-not-caused-by-ethanol-a-germanprofessor-reports/, January 22nd 2008
A German academic has analyzed the factors that are causing deforestation of the Amazon, and concluded that sugarcane ethanol production in south-central Brazil is not pushing cattle and soy farming into the Amazon region. Peter Zuurbier, Associate Professor and Director of the Wageningen UR Latin America Office, said that the problem is unclear land titles, unscrupulous timber companies, and poor soil conservation practices by cattle ranchers. He said that after illegal clear cutting by timber companies, the land is occupied by nomadic cattle herds that, over a period of 3 to 4 years, ruin the thin soil of the Amazon areas, which causes fertilizer-based soy farming to be brought into the area to improve productivity.
Brazil Ethanol DDI ‘08 KO: Jiajia and Jim
Block for Railroads DA
1. Non-unique – Midwest flooding has severely disrupted coal shipments on railroads and killed annual profit. Christopher S. Rugaber, Seattle Times, “Midwest flooding disrupts railroads, coal shipments”, June 18, 2008
Extensive flooding in the Midwest has disrupted railroad networks and delayed coal shipments at a time when tight supplies already have contributed to higher prices for coal and electricity. Union Pacific, the largest U.S. freight railroad, said Tuesday the floods' effects will reduce its quarterly earnings, and rail-industry stock prices were battered on Wall Street. Power producers say the disruptions aren't yet causing shortages of coal supplies because they maintain stockpiles in case of such disruptions. American Electric Power, the nation's largest power producer, has "weeks" of coal reserves on hand, spokeswoman Melissa McHenry said. Most electric utilities also purchase coal through long-term contracts at prices set well before the floods hit. That will limit the floods' impact on the prices paid by utilities, analysts said. Meanwhile, several major railroads have either closed lines or are reporting delays of up to three days on shipments of all types of goods. Union Pacific spokesman Donna Kush said three of the six lines knocked out by floodwaters on Friday are still out of service. Union Pacific also said "network outages and disruptions" will reduce its second-quarter earnings by about 5 cents a share. That will put Union Pacific's profit toward the lower end of its prior estimates between 90 cents and 98 cents a share, according to a regulatory filing.
2. Plan shifts coal from domestic consumption to exports – this is key to railroads Association of American Railroads, 10/07, http://www.aar.org/IndustryInformation/~/media/AAR/BackgroundPapers/294.ashx
From 1997 to 2006, U.S. coal exports averaged 56 million tons and, until recently, had been trending downward for several years. In 2006, exports were 50 million tons, far short of the peak of 112 million tons in 1981. Nearly all U.S. coal exports are Appalachian bituminous coal, and more metallurgical coal is exported than steam coal. A significant portion of U.S. coal exports travels by rail, so a slowdown in coal exports has a negative effect on railroads
Rising demand doesn’t mean railroad investments – costs are too high
Congressional Budget Office, “Freight Rail Transportation: Long-Term Issues,” Congressional Budget Office Paper, January 2006, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7021/01-17-Rail.pdf
Why might the railroad industry not respond to rising demand as other industries do? Economic factors specific to the railroad industry may reduce its ability and willingness to invest in new capacity. Building new track is costly, and because track is fixed in a specific location, investing in it subjects railroads to the risk that demand will shift to other locations and that the investment will not yield an adequate return. The other major domestic freight transportation industries, trucking and water carriers, do not face that kind of risk; instead, the governments that build and maintain highways and water-ways – and the taxpayers who provide their funding – bear that risk.
4. No threshold – neg doesn’t articulate what percentage use of alternative energy would lead to their impacts.
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