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1AC…………………………………… 2-16
TOPICALITY
a2 Alternative Energy T…………………. 17-18
a2 Direct Incentive Extra T
- we meet……………………………...... 19
- indirect is topical………………………. 20
a2 Incentives T…………………………... 21
CASE
Auto Competitiveness Advantage
- auto key to econ……………………….. 22-23
- feebates solve……………………….…. 24
Warming Advantage Solvency..……….. 25-26
Aerospace Advantage
- alternative fuels key…………………… 27
Spillover Internal Link (generic)………. 28
Solvency
- generic…………………………………. 29-30
- consumer shift…………………………. 31
- manufacturing conversion………………32
- phase-in………………………………... 33
a2 Turns (generic overview)…………… 34
- fuelling stations takeout……………….. 35
- current tech fails………………………..36
- low income families…………………… 37
- incentivize older polluting cars………... 38
- rebound effect…………………………. 39
ADD-ONS
Acid Rain 2AC.………………………….. 40-41
- extensions………………………………42
Air Pollution 2AC..……………………….43
- extensions………………………………44-45
Oil Dependence 2AC..……………………46
- extensions………………………………47
Oil Spills 2AC…………………………… 48
Military 2AC………….…………………. 49
A2 OFF-CASE
Bush Bad Politics 2AC...……………….. 50-51
- auto lobby extension...………………… 52
Bush Good Politics 2AC...………………53-54
- public extension...……………………... 55
- auto lobby ext...……………………….. 56
a2 Elections
- McCain doesn’t solve the aff...………... 57
- auto key to election...………………….. 58
Spending Disad 2AC...…………………. 59-60
State Sales Disad 2AC...………………... 61
A2 COUNTERPLANS
CAFÉ 2AC...……………………………. 62-63
Gas Tax 2AC...………………………….. 64-65
- consumer credits ext...………………….66
- a2 highways NB...…………………….. 67
Reg Neg 2AC...…………………………. 68-71
Regulations-Only 2AC...………………. 72-73
- emissions turn ext...…………………….74
States CP 2AC...…………………………75-76
ext #1 – rollback...………………………. 77
ext #2 – perm solvency...…………………78
ext #7 – int’l action...……………………. 79
a2 Not Uniform (state-based) feebate…….80-82
- ext #1 – patchwork...………………….. 83
- ext #2 – biz con...…………………….. 84-85
- ext #3 – manufacturing turn...………… 86-87
a2 Uniform (nationally-set) feebate...…… 88
State PTX links...……………………….. 89
California PTX links...………………….. 90
a2 49 states cP (exclude Cali) ...………… 91
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Contention I is Inherency –

1. Congress is wed to boosting ineffective CAFÉ standards – they fail to consider options like
feebates
North Star Writers Group 07. (“Kill the Fatted CAFE: Let Feebates Encourage the Purchase of Fuel-
Efficient Cars”, July 30, http://www.northstarwriters.com/eb004.htm)
Today’s call for fuel efficiency isn’t a new thing. There has been a 20-year lull between the last time people were
hot for fuel-efficient cars, and coincidentally it’s been 20 years since the price of gas was high enough to cause
personal discomfort to consumers. That should tell us something as Congress moves to increase Corporate Average Fuel
Économy (CAFÉ) standards. The federal government could require Detroit’s automakers to increase their fleetwide fuel
efficiency averages, only to watch consumers lose interest if the price of fuel were to again drop. This would leave
the Big Three with an unfunded federal mandate to manufacture something no one wants to buy. Although this isn’t
likely (the price of gasoline will probably continue to increase a little faster than the rate of inflation), policy makers should keep it in
mind. It’s one thing, in reaction to our growing awareness of our twin problems of energy dependency and global warming, to
demand action. It’s another thing entirely to demand action that in the long run might not be sustainable in the
marketplace. Rather than tinkering, Congress should simply scrap CAFE and address efficiency through something
that stimulates demand, not dictates supply. An idea worth considering is something called a feebate.

2. Federal CAFÉ explicitly preempts state feebates initiatives, though momentum is building
EPA 08. (“State Action Policies: California”, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/MSTY5PFKFB?OpenDocument)
Feebates, a system of fees and rebates applied to vehicles to induce certain behavior, have been proposed in various states, including
California (Reference available in the California State Action Plan). Legislation in Maryland that would apply feebates, based on
fuel efficiency, to new vehicles to reduce gasoline use is the only proposal to make it through the legislative process,
but thus far has not been implemented due to court challenges derived from the preeminence of the national
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) legislation. The popularity of feebates in recent years is due, at least to some degree, to the
potential for revenue neutrality—the system can be structured so that the total rebates paid out equal the total fees paid in. Thus, a feebate may be
more politically viable than a tax.

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Contention II is Auto Competitiveness:

1. Foreign competition will inevitably destroy US auto industry – feebates create strategic potential
for employment growth and innovation
Lovins 06. (Amory B., co-founder and chief executive officer of Rocky Mountain Institute, a nonprofit organization that fosters the
efficient and restorative use of resources, and chairman of the composites-technology firm Fiberforge, eJournal USA, electronic journal
of the US Department of State, Jul 2006 “Clean Energy Solutions” http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0706/ijee/lovins.htm)
The modern car needs to be functional, aesthetic, safe, fuel-frugal, and affordable. Makers of cars and public policy often assume that efficient cars must be small, sluggish, unsafe, ugly, or
costly. But integrative design and new technologies can achieve all desired car attributes, today and tomorrow, simultaneously and without compromise. Wetherefore will not
need high fuel taxes or efficiency standards to induce people to buy unattractive cars; rather, they'll want to buy the super-
efficient cars because they're better, just as most people prefer digital media to vinyl records. For conventionally improved cars that do cost
more up front, car buyers' short view—looking at just the first two to three years' worth of fuel savings—is a big obstacle. High
fuel prices discourage driving but have little effect on car choices because they're diluted by nonfuel costs, then heavily
discounted. The most powerful way to influence car choice is "feebates." Within each size class, new-car owners pay a fee or get a
rebate—which and how big depend on a car's efficiency—and the fees pay for the rebates. The increased price spread encourages a buyer to buy
an efficient model of the size he or she prefers. The buyer saves money; automakers make more profit; national security
improves. Such feebates, now starting to emerge around the world (in Canada, France, and some states in the United States), are more effective and politically attractive than fuel taxes
or standards. The car-efficiency revolution faces many challenges, but each can be overcome. Hybrids, invented by Dr. Ferdinand Porsche in 1900, were reengineered nearly a century later
U.S.
by Japanese automakers with strong leadership and balance sheets. These popular hybrids now offer up to doubled efficiency, many with boosted performance as a free bonus.
automakers are playing catch-up and need help with retooling and retraining (which needn't cost the Treasury). Their choice is
stark: whether America will continue to import efficient cars to displace oil, or make efficient cars and import neither
oil nor cars. A million jobs hang in the balance. But the process Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter called "creative destruction" is sweeping the overbuilt
auto business: The market will change either the managers' minds or the managers, whichever comes first. China's and India's ambitious automakers will
quicken the pace, leapfrogging over Western technology. And countries without an auto industry may choose to start one of a wholly new kind—not based on
steel, but more like making computers with wheels than cars with chips.

2. Strong employment in auto industry props up all other sectors of the economy
Center For Automotive Research 01. (In Conjunction With The University Of Michigan, March,
http://careerrpm.trishield.com/automotive-industry.shtml/)
While the automobile industry continues to be America's largest manufacturing industry, the majority of those jobs are in supplier and related
industries, with total auto industry and related employment numbering 13.3 million, a new Center for Automotive Research study shows. About 6.6 million jobs are connected to
automotive manufacturing and new vehicle sales, generating more than $240 billion in annual private sector compensation.
"When you look under the hood of today's automobile, you'll see goods from America's greatest industries across the country,"
said Alliance President & CEO Josephine S. Cooper. "These include textiles from the Southeast, computer chips from California, aluminum
manufactured in Iowa, and air bags produced in Arizona." "No other single industry is more linked to U.S. manufacturing or
generates more retail business and employment. New vehicle production, sales and other jobs related to the use of automobiles are
responsible for 1 out of every 10 jobs in the U.S. economy," Cooper added. Key findings of the study include: The auto industry is responsible for more than
100,000 jobs in each of several industries, including dealerships, fabricated metals, auto parts, auto repair and maintenance, road construction, tire dealerships, fueling stations, and car washes.
The auto industry is responsible for more than 50,000 jobs in each of several other related industries, including plastics and
rubber, trucking, computers and electronics, petroleum and machinery and equipment. The auto industry is responsible for more than 25,000 jobs in
each of several more related industries, including advertising, textiles, aluminum and recycling. The auto industry also provides thousands more jobs each in the
rail industry, the steel industry, the painting and coating industry, the glass industry, the copper and brass industry and the iron
industry. The automobile industry provides among the highest levels of wages and benefits in the private sector, averaging $69,500 in 2001. The auto industry boasts a value added of
$292,000 per worker, 143 percent higher than the overall value-added ratio for U.S. manufacturing ($120,000). The automobile industry invests more in research and development than any other
The automobile industry directly employs 1.3 million Americans in all 50 states. 2.2 million U.S. workers
industry -- $18.4 billion in 2000.
are employed indirectly by auto industry suppliers and other industry-related companies. Expenditures of auto industry employees
create an additional 3.5 million jobs nationwide. The study, "Contribution Of The Automotive Industry To The U.S. Economy," was prepared by the Center for
Automotive Research. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers sponsored the study. Economic Facts America's automobile industry doesn't just manufacture the passenger cars and light
Auto manufacturers, along with their suppliers and dealers
trucks that millions of Americans depend on for work, shopping, vacation and other mobility needs.
across the country, drive the U.S. economy, and that economic engine has more horsepower than many people realize. No other
single industry is linked to so much of U.S. manufacturing or generates so much retail business and employment, as these facts show:
Employment: America's automobile industry is one of the largest industries in the country. When jobs dependent on the industry are included,
the auto industry is responsible for 6.6 million jobs nationwide, or about 5% of private sector jobs. Compensation: The contribution of automotive
manufacturing to compensation in the private sector is estimated at $243 billion, or 5.6% of U.S. private sector compensation. Job Creation:
For every worker directly employed by an automaker, nearly seven spin-off jobs are created. America's automakers are among the largest
purchasers of aluminum, copper, iron, lead, plastics, rubber, textiles, vinyl, steel and computer chips. GDP: More than 3.7% of America's total gross
domestic product is generated by the sale and production of new light vehicles. Output: The U.S. automotive industry produces a higher level of output
than any other single industry. When measured in constant 1996 dollars, automotive economic output increased by 47 percent during 1987-1999. R&D: The auto industry invested $18.4 billion
in research and development in 1997, higher than any other manufacturing industry. Exports: Automotive exports rose from $33.4 billion in 1988 to a record $74 billion in 1997, an increase of
122%.

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3. Auto innovation is key to economy-wide growth

UCS 04. (Union Of Concerned Scientists, July 28,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/cars_and_suvs/page.cfm?pageID=1473)
The economic growth of our nation is tied to technology. From the steam engine and the automobile to the microchip and the Internet, a “can do”
attitude of aggressive technology development and implementation has created millions of jobs and enormous wealth.
Investments in technology to make cars and trucks more fuel-efficient provide the country with yet another opportunity to
continue this trend. Many technologies already exist, such as efficient engines and transmissions, high-strength steel and aluminum, better tires, and hybrid-
electric powertrains. The investments required to deliver these more efficient products to consumers will pay off in the form of new
jobs for the US automotive sector and other industries throughout the country. In addition, consumers will save billions of dollars on
gasoline, US dependency on oil will be reduced, and emissions of global warming pollution will be cut significantly. In order to quantify these benefits, the Union of
Concerned Scientists estimated the effect of moving existing technologies into cars and trucks over the next 10 years to reach an average of 40 miles per gallon by
2015. We found that: In 2015, the benefits resulting from investments in fuel economy would lead to 161,000 more jobs throughout the country, with California,
Michigan, New York, Florida, Ohio and Illinois topping the list. In the automotive sector alone, projected jobs would grow by 40,800 in 2015.
For consumers, the cost of the new technology would more than pay for itself, saving them a net of $23 billion dollars in 2015
alone. In 2015, we would cut our national oil use by 2.3 million barrels per day—nearly as much as we currently import from the Persian Gulf —and we would
reduce emissions of global warming pollution from cars and trucks by 106 million metric tons of carbon.

4. Economic contraction would cause collapse, mass starvation, totalitarianism, and nuclear war
Nyquist 05.
(J.R, expert in geopolitics and international relations, WorldNetDaily contributing editor, “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash,” 2-4-
05, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0204.html)
Should the United States experience a severe economic
contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely
support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady
pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the
coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of
the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti-capitalist majorities and a turning away
from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad.
The withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that
presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading
system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic
totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with
mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party
gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this
context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive
wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As
one observer recently lamented, “We drank the poison and now we must die.”

5. Technological innovation and economic competitiveness are key to Heg

Khalilzad 95. (Zalmay, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program @ RAND & current US Ambassador to Afghanistan]
"Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring, p. proquest)
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic
economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-
looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the vacuum. To sustain and improve its economic
strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past,
developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to
take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift
the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative
position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further
improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and
technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues
and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and
taxation accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic well-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their
government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate. Another key factor affecting the global
standing of the United States is its current social crisis: the high rate of violence in cities, the unsatisfactory state of race relations, and the breakdown of families.
Although it faces no global ideological rival, and although movements such as Islamic fundamentalism and East Asian neo-Confucian authoritarianism are limited in
their appeal, the social problems of the United States are limiting its attractiveness as a model. If the social crisis worsens, it is likely that, over the long term, a new
organizing principle with greater universal appeal will emerge and be adopted by states with the power and the desire to challenge the erstwhile leader.

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6. Heg prevents multiple nuclear conflicts

Lieber 05. (Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, The
American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 53-54)
Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would
almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the
return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that
some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly.
Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia
involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with
regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major
regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees,
economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly
be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power
from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit-tingly observed, "If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all
clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."2z Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance
ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson's
warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, "apolarity," could bring "an anarchic new
Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation
and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves."2

7. Err Aff on risk assessment—turns are overblown and don’t measure hidden benefits of heg
Wohlforth 07. (William, Prof and Chair of Dept. of Government @ Dartmouth, “Unipolar stability: the
rules of power analysis”, Harvard International Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring)
Defining power as the ability to solve whatever global problem is currently in the headlines virtually guarantees
highly volatile prognostications about polarity. This sort of headline chasing led to talk of "empire" in 2002 and 2003, just as it
feeds today's multipolar mania. Assessing active attempts by the United States to employ its power capabilities may well
be the most misleading way to think about power. This approach inevitably leads to a selection bias against
evidence of the indirect, "structural" effects of US power that are not dependent upon active management. Many effects that
can be attributed to the unipolar distribution of power are developments that never occur: counter-balancing
coalitions, Cold War-scale arms races, hegemonic rivalry for dominance, security dilemmas among Asian powers, and
decisions by Japan and others to nuclearize. Clearly, assessing unipolarity's potential effects involves weighing-such
non-events against the more salient examples in which active attempts to use power resources are stymied. But the selection bias goes
much further. Not only are non-events downplayed in comparison to salient events that appear to demonstrate the powerlessness of the United
States, but patterns of events that do go its way are often missed. Consider, for example, how often Washington's failure to have
its way in the United Nations is cited as compared to its experience in the IMF. And, even in the United Nations, a focus on highly
contested issues, such as the attempt at a second resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq, fails to note how the institution's entire
agenda has shifted to address concerns, such as terrorism, that are particularly important to the United States.

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Contention III is Warming:

1. Warming is real and human induced
Monbiot 7
George, Professor @ Oxford Brookes University, Heat: How to Stop the Planet from
Burning, pg. 5

2. Moreover, climate change will be rapid

Lynas 7
Mark, Environmental Activist, Educational focus on Politics and History, Six Degrees,
pg. 46-47

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3. Rapid warming prevents any effective adaptation

Brown 2
Donald, Phillip R. Allen Professor of Economics, American Heat, pg. 239

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4. While some warming is inevitable, every temperature decrease helps avoid catastrophic impacts
Chemical and Engineering News 5
Stark Effects From Global Warming,
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/83/i12/8312globalwarming.html

It may not be feasible to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C, Keller warned. “But if you want to limit the
temperature increase to 2.5 °C, you have to decarbonize the economy during this century,” he said. In other words,
society must start deriving energy from sources other than fossil fuel or find some way to sequester the CO2 from
fossil fuel. Keller pointed out that “these predictions of threshold responses are deeply uncertain because of
uncertainties in the structural models and in observational constraints.” Resolving the uncertainties could have
considerable economic benefits, he said. All of the scientists who spoke during this AAAS session agreed that,
despite uncertainties about when climate thresholds will be reached, near-term action should be taken to reduce
emissions. If society waits for the research that will nail down the thresholds with greater clarity, it may well be too
late to avoid exceeding them, they said. “If we don’t reduce CO2 emissions now, then future generations may
bear the cost,” Keller said.

5. We can’t solve c02 without some focus on transportation

Gallagher et al 07. (KELL SIMS GALLAGHER, GUSTAVO COLLANTES, JOHN P. HOLDREN, HENRY LEE, ROBERT
FROSCH - Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of GOvernmentSchool of Government. “Policy Options for Reducing Oil Consumption
and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U. S. Transportation Sector: A joint project of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program and
the Environment and Natural Resources Program Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs” July 27, 2007. accessed july 11 at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/policy_options_oil_climate_transport_final.pdf)
Overall, the U.S. transportation sector accounts for 33 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions and highway fuel
consumption for 20 percent.13 Other greenhouse gases from the transportation sector such as methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons contribute an estimated 23 million metric tons of carbon equivalent,14 which is equal
to about 5 percent of transportation carbon dioxide emissions.15 The remaining two thirds of U.S. emissions are
attributable mainly to the industry and to industrial and commercial buildings and the energy using devices they
contain; this includes emissions from the generation of electricity, nearly all of which goes to the industrial and
buildings sectors. The numbers show that U.S. greenhousegas emissions cannot be sufficiently reduced 9
without a significant effort in the transport sector.

6. Feebates reduce emissions 16% within two years, and 20% by 2020

The Center for Clean Air Policy Guidebook 05. (written and developed by Greg Dierkers, Mark
Houdashelt, Erin Silsbe, Shayna Stott, Steve Winkelman & Mac Wubben; Part Two:Vehicle Technology and Fuels;
With Support from the: US Department of Transportation’s Center for Climate Change and Forecasting;
http://www.ccap.org/images/guidebook/CCAP_Transportation_Guidebook_Part2.pdf )

In 2002, the California Energy Commission (CEC) conducted an analysis of both national and statewide feebates as
a mechanism to reduce petroleum demand in California. The study concluded that a national feebate of $1,825 per
0.01 gallon per mile could reduce fuel consumption in new vehicles by up to 16 percent by 2010 and 40 percent by
2020 leading to total reductions of 6 percent in 2010 and 20 percent in 2020. A California only feebate would result
in a response estimated at 30 percent of a national program.19,20

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7. Feebates incorporate cost of global warming pollution into vehicle price – allows for an
immediate shift

McManus 07. [Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University
of California, Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow)
May 2007 “Economic analysis of feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”
Abstract, http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/3461.html]

A growing majority of climate scientists are convinced that unless emissions are reduced, global warming would
cause a number of adverse effects throughout the United States. In California, rising temperatures would reduce the snow pack in
the Sierra-the state's primary source of water-and lead to less water for irrigating farms in the Central Valley. Global warming would increase the
number of extreme heat days and greatly increase the risk of poor air quality across the state. California's 1,100 miles of coastline and coastal
communities are vulnerable to rising sea levels. Concerted action could curb global warming, but all sectors would need to take
immediate steps to reduce heattrapping pollution. In California, the transportation sector consumes well over half the oil used statewide, and
passenger cars and trucks emit 20 to 30 percent of the state's global warming pollution. Vehicles therefore are a central focus of the
immediate action required to reduce global warming. The state of California's regulatory approach involves phasing in limits to
average global warming emissions from passenger cars and trucks beginning in 2009 and culminating in 2016. This regulation is often called
"Pavley," after its author, Assemblywoman Fran Pavley. The federal government's approach provides tax incentives to buyers of hybrid
vehicles, which emit significantly lower amounts of global warming pollution than most conventional vehicles.
However, the hybrid incentive affects only a small portion of the vehicle market. A[n] third approach that could be
used to enhance or replace existing regulations would be a feebates program. A feebates program creates a schedule of
both fees and rebates that reflects the amount of global warming pollution that different vehicles emit.
Purchasers of new vehicles that emit larger amounts of heat-trapping emissions pay a one-time surcharge at the point of purchase. These
surcharges are then used to provide rebates to buyers of new vehicles that emit less pollution.

8. Fast warming leads to extinction – quick time frame

Pearce 7. Fred, With Speed and Violence, environment and development
consultant, pg. 240-241

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9. Independently of warming, co2 leads to ocean acidity

Monbiot 7. George, Professor @ Oxford Brookes University, Heat: How to Stop
the Planet from Burning, pg. 9

10. The impact is extinction

Hendricks and Inslee 7. Bracken, Senior Fellow with American Progress, Jay,
Representative from Washington, Apollo’s Fire, pg. 8

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11. Their turns are hype – any positive impact of warming is massively outwieghed
Brown 2
Donald, Phillip R. Allen Professor of Economics, American Heat, pg. 204

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Contention III is Aerospace:

1. The Aerospace industry’s very existence is threatened now

Walker 02. (Robert, Chair, Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace Industry,
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)
The contributions of aerospace to our global leadership have been so successful that it is assumed U.S. preeminence in aerospace remains assured. Yet the evidence
would indicate this to be far from the case. The U.S. aerospace industry has consolidated to a handful of players—from what was once over 70
suppliers in 1980 down to 5 prime contractors today. Only one U.S. commercial prime aircraft manufacturer remains. Not all of these surviving companies
are in strong business health. The U.S. airlines that rely upon aerospace products find their very existence is threatened. They
absorbed historical losses of over $7 billion in 2001 and potentially more this year.

2. The implementation of alternative fuels in the auto industry will function as a pilot program to
apply the technology to the aerospace industry
Jolley 99. (Ainsely, Director of the Emerging Technologies and Asian Growth Program at the Centre for
Strategic Economic Studies, Transport Engineering Technologies, CSES Working Paper No. 13, October,
http://www.cfses.com/documents/wp13.pdf)
Technological Synergies The
nature of the technologies employed, and the intensive R&D that lies behind them, makes aerospace close to the
most technology-intensive of all manufacturing industries. Of crucial importance are the spillover effects associated with the
utilisation of these technologies. The synergies between civil and military aerospace are well-known, and are currently
expected to increase (Scott 1999). The technological linkages between aerospace and shipbuilding, less well-known hitherto in Australia (although well-
appreciated in countries like Japan and Russia), are becoming increasingly important with the developing similarities between airframe, hull design and construction,
and the extensive use of electronics. In the longer run, given the increasing importance of new materials technology, aerodynamic styling and on-
board electronics, these linkages could extend across the whole transport equipment sector, including motor vehicles. These
technological interdependencies rest on the delivery of key technologies which are capable of transforming production in a range of industries – advanced materials
(which have significance for aerospace, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, other transport equipment, and building and construction), embedded information and
communications technologies (aerospace, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, other transport equipment and transport system infrastructure), and aerodynamic design.
Innovation in its broader sense also implies spillovers across the whole transport equipment and transport systems with respect to life-cycle
design and manufacturing systems, maintenance and repair systems, and the development of a comprehensive approach to safety. Defence contracts can provide a spur
to technology in civil aerospace as well as other transport and engineering industries with respect to materials, electronics and on-board diagnostics. Civil aerospace,
in turn, provides a lead to the defence sector with respect to computer-aided design and virtual prototyping, life-cycle planning, maintenance and repair, and
developments in air safety. The motor vehicle industry is a leader in lean manufacturing, but the new technological challenges it faces
could eventually put it in the position of influencing industries like aerospace in particular technologies. Finally, primary defence
contractors, civil aerospace suppliers and motor vehicle producers depend on sub-contractors and suppliers of cast and forged metal products, repetition engineers,
heavy engineers, and electronic sub-components. There is a two-way relationship here. The depth of the supply chain underpins the flexibility and capabilities of the
major manufacturers. On the other hand, the major manufacturers often provide an important conduit for technology and productive
efficiency to their sub-contractors. Technologies can also move in the other direction. In civil aerospace manufacturing, the integrators of the finished
aircraft are shifting many aspects of design and R&D towards primary risk-sharing contractors. In the manufacture of aero-engines, new developments are taking
place through the agency of complex international consortia. There are economies of scope across a range of technologically advanced heavy engineering industries.
The key aspect is systems integration, which requires stateof- the-art project management skills. In Japan, heavy engineering conglomerates have exploited these
economies across aerospace, shipbuilding and civil engineering projects. In the United States the economies are exploited across civil and military aerospace and other
defence projects. The motor vehicle industry has traditionally been more self-contained. US automobile producers have tended to shed peripheral
interests over the past decade, although European companies such as DaimlerChrysler, BMW and Fiat still cover a wide range of interests. However, the new
technologies being developed in the industry are leading to new associations between vehicle producers and innovative
engineering companies.

3. Inter-industry testing of alternative fuels key to keep up momentum in aerospace transition away
from fossil fuels
IHT 08. (“Alternative fuel gets close study as airlines seek more efficiency”, International Herald
Tribune, July 14, pg. 12, lexis)
Emissions reports on these tests, which involved feeding biofuel, or a biofuel-kerosene mix, to just one engine of the aircraft, are
eagerly awaited. At this stage, elements of the industry are sharing research. ''The airline industry is very competitive like any
other industry,'' said Lott, the industry spokesman. ''But when it comes to something like this, it's important that there's
transparency and sharing of information because that's the only way we can keep momentum.''

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Feebates 1AC (12/_)

4. US commercial aviation is a critical enabler of US dominance and air power.

Andrews 00. (Col. William F, USAF “Industry Studies: Aircraft”
http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/2000/aircraft/aircraft.htm
The U.S. aircraft industry has long been a critical enabler of U.S. political and military power and remains one of the most
pervasive industries within the U.S. economy. However, continued U.S. dominance in the global aircraft market is uncertain.
After a decade of mergers and downsizing, the industry’s four main sectors—commercial fixed-wing aircraft, military fixed-wing aircraft,
rotary-wing aircraft, and jet engines—are entering a head-to-head competition with Europe from a strategically weakened position.
To ensure profitability and maintain market dominance, aerospace manufacturing companies are striving to improve profit
margins by streamlining production processes, reducing overhead costs, and entering into strategic partnerships to
stimulate revenue-generating opportunities. Many of these innovations are indeed yielding new profit centers. Nevertheless, U.S. dominance of
the global aircraft market has eroded to the point that vigorous action is required by industry and government to preserve this vital
element of national power.

5. Collapse of air power causes global WMD conflict

Tellis 98. (Ashley, Senior Political Scientist – RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf)
This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the
potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that
American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This
argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war.
This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the
South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has
preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other
areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a)
of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability
unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of
surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and
high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—
fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS,
and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations
against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea,
China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional
deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are
already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and
biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity.
China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class
theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-
range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report.

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Feebates 1AC (13/_)

6. Deficits make economic collapse inevitable—only aerospace can export our way out of the crisis
Faux 02. (June, President of the Economic Policy Institute
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_viewpoints_airspace_natlasset)
It is clear that the U.S. current account deficit -- driving by the chronic excess of imports over exports -- is unsustainable. In 2000 the U.S.
current account deficit was $450 billion, 4.5% of GDP. The recession reduced the deficit somewhat last year, but it was still above $400 and 4%
of GDP. As the economy recovers, the deficit will continue its relentless expansion. As last year's report of the US Trade Deficit
Commission showed, for an equal increase in national income in the US and foreign countries, the United States increases its imports
proportionally more than its exports. The Wall Street firm of Morgan Stanley recently warned of a current account deficit reaching 6 percent of
GDP by the end of 2003. As the Economist magazine observed, studies -- including one done at the U S Federal Reserve -- indicate that when the
current account deficit reaches 5 percent, international financiers begin to pull back. In order to finance this deficit the United States has had to
borrow from other countries and sell them more of its assets. Thus, each year its economy must devote more of its income to interest on the debt
and the transfer of profits to investors in other countries. After 1988, these payments began to exceed foreigners' remittances to the United States.
This net foreign "debt" is now 22 percent of GDP. Assuming a recovery, the U.S. economy is on trajectory of a debt of roughly 40
percent of GDP within five years. Nobel prize-winning economists Franco Modigliani and Robert Solow last year characterized the large and
growing deficit in the U.S. international trade balance as "the greatest potential danger facing the economy in the years to come." The dollar is the
world's most important reserve currency and America has better credit and more assets to sell. But it is a matter of simple arithmetic that it cannot
forever borrow in order to buy more from the rest of the world than it sells. The interest burden will eventually be so heavy that foreign
investors will be unwilling or unable to keep financing the rising debt. When that happens, the dollar will drop and
interest rates will spike upward. The United States will then be forced to run a trade surplus with a drastic devaluation of the dollar and/or a
draconian deflation in real incomes in order to reduce demand for imports and make U.S. goods cheap enough to run a surplus in world markets.
An overvalued dollar makes it hard for even the most productive U.S. companies to compete in global markets. As an aerospace industry
executive recently remarked: "We still probably do less off-shore sourcing than most industries, but with the dollar where it
has been the last couple years, there's even more pressure to look offshore." Economists at Goldman-Sachs estimate that cutting the
current account deficit in half by devaluation alone would require a more than 40 percent drop in the dollar's value. Clearly the preferred way
to address this danger is by increasing our exports rather than decreasing our incomes to force Americans to import less. But as the
U.S. industrial base has shrunk, so has our capacity to expand exports in the tradable goods sectors. Moreover, we clearly would prefer to expand
the export of high value goods. This makes the aerospace sector crucial if the U.S. is to weather the inevitable adjustment
in its current account deficit. Today, rather than watch the aerospace export surplus shrink, we ought to be devising ways to expand it, not
for some mercantilist notions of trade, but because we will soon find ourselves rather desperate for industries that can help us
export our way out of the problem rather than adjusting through a lowering of living standards.

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Feebates 1AC (14/_)

The United States federal government should

ensure the use of alternative fuel vehicles by
providing revenue-neutral feebates

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Feebates 1AC (15/_)

Contention IV is Solvency:

1. The status quo regulations-only approach makes AFVs too expensive to

buy or produce. Feebates compensate for tech costs, allowing a market
shift
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461,
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, May, pg. 8-9, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
This is one advantage of a feebates program. Under a regulation scenario (Pavley Only) in
our model, vehicle manufacturers install technologies on all vehicles, clean and dirty, to
reduce global warming pollution to the required level. The prices consumers pay to
purchase the vehicles rise, because of the cost of the additional technologies (Figure 2).
However, under a feebates scenario in our model, manufacturers install technologies on
all vehicles, clean and dirty, to reduce emissions and to reduce surcharges and increase
rebates. Rebates compensate consumers for some of the costs of the
technologies, making clean vehicles less expensive (Figure 3). Surcharges on high-
polluting vehicles increase the cost of those vehicles even further. This accounts for the
small market shift.

2. Revenue-neutral feebates are self-financing

McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461,
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, May, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
A feebates program gives incentives to consumers to buy, and to manufacturers to produce
and sell cleaner products by combining a fee on dirtier products with a rebate on cleaner
products. See Greene et al. 2005 and Johnson 2006 for examples of feebates programs
applied to vehicles. Two features of feebates programs have made them attractive to policy
makers. By addressing choices across the full range of alternatives, feebates programs have
the potential to stimulate more significant changes than one-sided approaches. Probably
more important is that a feebates program can be structured so that the fees
collected equal the rebates paid, making the program self-financing. The figure
below can be used to explain the parameters of a feebates program for vehicle emissions.

3. Only feebates can solve for all ends of the market spectrum – consumer
preferences, manufacturing conversion and fleet transformation
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461,
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, May, pg. 2, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
A third approach that could be used to enhance or replace existing regulations would be a
feebates program. A feebates program creates a schedule of both fees and rebates that
reflects the amount of global warming pollution that different vehicles emit. Purchasers of
new vehicles that emit larger amounts of heat-trapping emissions pay a one-time surcharge
at the point of purchase. These surcharges are then used to provide rebates to buyers of

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new vehicles that emit less pollution. A feebates program has several advantages over
other approaches:
Market-oriented: A feebates program recognizes the power of price signals to change
consumer behavior. That is, incentives spur consumers to purchase and
manufactures to produce cleaner vehicles.
Self-financing: A feebates program can be designed so that the surcharges
collected equal the rebates paid.
Affects entire market: A feebates program applies to all new vehicles—clean and dirty—
spurring a transformation of the entire market.
Consumer choice: A feebates program can be designed so that consumers have the option
to buy vehicles that carry no surcharge in each vehicle class, such as cars, trucks, sport
utility vehicles (SUVs), and minivans.
a2 “Alternative Energy” Topicality (1/2)

1. We meet. Feebates are an alternative energy incentive – they deal with fuel diversity
Newell, 2006, [Richard G. Newell, writer for Resources for the Future, “What’s the Big Deal About Oil? How We can Get
Oil Policy Right”, Fall 2006, http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Features/The-Deal-About-Oil.cfm]
Increased access for domestic oil development is potentially justified based purely on traditional economic grounds--if the value of the oil is greater than
the production and environmental costs. However, increased domestic supply does little to decrease our vulnerability to oil price shocks or associated
national security threats. Since oil prices are determined in a global market, U.S. prices will rise by the same amount in the event of a disruption
regardless of whether they are for domestic or foreign barrels. And money will flow to unfriendly regimes even if it is not U.S. dollars. Iran is a useful
reminder: the United States has banned oil imports from Iran since 1979, but that does not reduce Iran's oil wealth or the sway it holds over oil prices.
Policies oriented toward increasing the supply of alternative fuels through subsidies or mandates, such as ethanol and other liquid fuels, do little to reduce
our vulnerability to price shocks. They are direct substitutes for oil and have relatively high production costs. In the event of an oil price shock, the price
for fuel will therefore be determined largely by the international price of crude oil, not domestic fuel production costs. Only a dramatic
shift to an
alternative energy source that is not in direct competition with oil (for example, electricity or hydrogen) could remove this
strong linkage. One way in which supply-side options can help, however, is by increasing the diversity of fuel supply types and locations. As
described earlier, the environmental impacts of expanding domestic alternatives to conventional oil could be either positive or negative, depending on the
fuel type. In contrast, policies that encourage demand-side reductions in fuel consumption are better targeted at addressing all the major concerns related
to oil production and use. With lower fuel use, households and businesses are affected less by oil price shocks, and other negative macroeconomic
consequences are reduced, as are local environmental effects and GHG emissions. Two categories of relatively cost-effective policies are most often
discussed: policies that directly or indirectly raise fuel prices, and policies that raise vehicle fuel economy. The first category includes taxes on gasoline
or petroleum, as well as policies that put a price on GHG emissions, such as a cap-and- trade system or carbon tax. Each of these provides a direct
monetary incentive to reduce petroleum consumption, although the breadth of a petroleum tax or a price on GHG emissions is much greater than a tax
solely on gasoline. Fuel economy policies, the second category, can take the form of either performance standards--as with Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards--or purchasing incentives, such as "feebates" that combine fees on inefficient vehicles with
rebates for efficient ones. Each can be designed in a flexible, cost-effective manner or can be riddled with constraints and loopholes that
render it ineffective and inefficient. Relative to policies that raise fuel prices, however, fuel economy policies have the disadvantage of not
encouraging demand reduction through reduced driving.

B. We meet –clean cars

a) Feebates provide incentives for cleaner cars
Dayen, 6-27-08, [David Dayen, writer for Calitics, “The Low-CARB Diet”, June 27, 2008, lexis-nexis]
Building on Bob's report about the San Francisco Clean Energy Act, the California Air Resources Board has released its draft
blueprint designed to fall in line with the mandate of AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions (OOTC:GWSO) Act, by cutting emissions
30% by 2020. The 75+ page plan includes a range of policy recommendations. Chief among them is increasing the state's renewable
electricity standard. The plan also contains provisions for a regional cap-and-trade program that could work in harmony with other
more specific policies to reduce pollution economy-wide. The plan also says CARB will consider a vehicle "feebate" program
that would provide incentives to consumers to buy cleaner cars. In addition, the proposal includes plans to reduce emissions
from heavy-duty trucks with hybrid engine technology and better fuel economy. Like many of CARB's proposals, the heavy-duty
truck provisions would improve public health by also reducing smog-forming pollution. The plan also advocates for a high-speed train
system in California. Jim Downing at the SacBee has more here. Analysis on the flip: There's no question that California needs to do
what is within its control to act immediately. Climate change is already imperiling two-thirds of the state's unique plants, and Los
Angeles is trying dubious ideas like seeding the clouds with silver iodide particles to force it to rain.

b) Cleaner cars are alternative energy

Nakata, 2002, [Toshihiko Nakata, professor at Tohuku University, “Energy modeling on cleaner vehicles for reducing
CO2 emissions in Japan”, May 13, 2002, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VFX-

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462BGN5-
5&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_useri
d=10&md5=56e393336e018130ab90e9ac1121ed8f]
This study is to evaluate the impact of cleaner vehicles on energy systems and CO2 emissions in the transportation sector in Japan.
The transportation sector has the characteristic of spending petroleum. Even when the cost of petroleum rises, conventional
vehicles cannot switch fuels to alternative energy right away. Cleaner vehicles, such as fuel cell vehicles, would be
one of the alternative technologies in the transportation sector. It is supposed to have excellent performance in fuel efficiency
and has strong possibility to reduce CO2 drastically. This paper uses a multi-period market equilibrium model to explore the impacts
of cleaner vehicles on the passenger transportation sector in Japanese energy system out to the year 2040. A Btu tax is tentatively
imposed to evaluate the effect of fuel cost on energy consumption in the transportation sector. Financial parameters such as capital
cost and operating cost are considered to summarize the profit in taxation case. The result of this study shows that fuel cell vehicles
have a great effect on reducing CO2 emissions especially when Btu taxes are imposed, which in turn has the advantage of encouraging
a more diverse set of technologies and fuels. The analysis that petroleum consumption can be reduced using fuel cell vehicles will
have effects on perspectives on energy systems in Japan.
a2 “Alternative Energy” Topicality (2/2)

3. We meet. Feebates are incentives for green tech

Langer 2005, [Therese Langer, writer for American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, “Vehicle
Efficiency Incentives: An Update on Feebates for States”, September 2005,
http://www.aceee.org/pubs/t051.htm]
The lack of federal initiative on global warming and oil dependence has led states to consider their own options to
address these problems. An approach that has been considered many times in the United States over the past fifteen
years, but never implemented, is a feebate program, i.e. a sliding scale of fees and rebates for the purchase of new
vehicles based on fuel consumption or emissions of greenhouse gases. The simplest structure sets the fee or rebate in
proportion to the amount of fuel consumed by the vehicle per mile driven. Feebates shift the market towards
green vehicles by providing an incentive for manufacturers to adopt cost-effective efficiency
technologies; by mitigating the market failure arising from consumer undervaluation of the fuel savings associated
with efficient vehicles; and by raising consumer awareness of the relationship between fuel efficiency and greenhouse
gas emissions. Market-based mechanisms and regulatory approaches each have advantages for reducing vehicles'
environmental impacts, and a combination of the two is probably the best approach to reducing vehicle emissions and
fuel consumption.

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a2 “Direct Incentive” Topicality – We Meet

1. Feebates are non-regulatory incentives

Morton and Durning, 2005, [Donna Morton and Alan Thein Durning, director of the Centre for integral
Economics and director of Northwest Environment Watch, respectively, “Stop Rewarding the Guzzlers”,
July 15, 2005, http://thetyee.ca/Views/2005/07/15/RewardingGuzzlers/
The public has much to gain from feebates, but few people know about all their pluses. Feebates are a plus for the economy, because
they correct a documented market failure called the "payback gap." Typically, consumers will only pay extra for vehicle fuel economy
if the investment pays itself off within three years, which is just one-fifth the expected operating life of most vehicles. The result is
productivity-sapping economywide overconsumption of fuel. Feebates close the payback gap by posting a foretaste of lifecycle energy
costs on the one label that no car buyer ignores: the price tag. Feebates are dynamic, nonregulatory incentives. As the
average fuel economy of the fleet rises, the fees and rebates recalibrate and keep the entire market shifting
toward fuel savings. Regulatory standards cannot imitate this market-wide benefit. Feebates are a big plus for
clean air and a secure climate, because they put prices in line with Canada's Kyoto commitment. They put the power of the
marketplace behind the agreement automakers have signed with government to markedly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from new
vehicles. And feebates are a huge plus for communities, because inefficient vehicles hemorrhage dollars from local economies. British
Columbia currently sends $5 million a day to Alberta to pay for its oil habit. By speeding the advent of superefficient cars, feebates
keep more of that money at home. Feebates are a plus for car buyers and makers, too. Buyers get paid to choose vehicles
that save them money anyway. And automakers get consistent rewards for investing in fuel efficiency; at present, the roller coaster of
oil prices makes consumers fickle about fuel.

2. Feebates are incentives, not command-and-control

RMI 08. (“RMI Holds the Nation’s First Feebate Forum”, Rocky Mountain Institute,
http://www.move.rmi.org/move-news/good-car--bad-car.html)
A feebate is a policy that provides a one-time rebate on fuel-efficient vehicles and places a surcharge on vehicles that are inefficient. New
light vehicles that exceed a defined fuel economy benchmark, called the “pivot point,” qualify for a rebate. The logic is that people who
choose to drive more efficient vehicles deserve a rebate because they are helping reduce social problems, such as pollution, oil dependence,
congestion, health problems, and climate change. The amount of the rebate would depend on where the vehicle’s fuel economy falls in
relation to the pivot point for all vehicles in that class. A Honda Civic, for instance, would qualify for a rebate because it’s more efficient and
consumes less fuel than comparably sized vehicles. Conversely, new vehicles that are less fuel-efficient than others in the same class would be
subject to a fee. “Feebates are truly a market-oriented solution to improving automobile fuel economy,” said Natalie Mims, a
Consultant with RMI’s Energy & Resources Team. “State governments should consider feebates as an opportunity to create
incentives to improve vehicle fuel economy and help get the United States off oil without federal leadership. Ideally, the federal
government could use the feebate as an alternative to CAFE, and shift to a national incentive-based system
instead of the current command-and-control system.”

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a2 “Direct Incentive” Topicality – Indirect is Topical

1. Incentives are defined to include regulations

CSIRO 96. (“Reimbursing the Future”, Division of Wildlife and Ecology, the Australian Centre for
Environmental Law, and Community Solutions, Biodiversity Series Paper No. 9, January,
www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/series/paper9/glossary.html)

Incentive mechanism or instrument - something, introduced by any level of government, that has a positive or
negative influence on the way people behave. In this report, incentives are defined to include regulations. They
are not restricted to those incentives that increase the money received by resource users.

2. Incentives include both punishment and reward

Free Dictionary 00. (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/incentive)

in·cen·tive ( n-s n t v)
n.
Something, such as the fear of punishment or the expectation of reward, that induces action or motivates effort.
adj.
Serving to induce or motivate: an incentive bonus for high productivity.

3. Incentives include fear of punishment

TBA 07. (“Team Building Activities”, www.teambuildingactivities.net/team-building-incentives.htm)
An incentive is defined, according to the dictionary, as something that induces action or then motivates effort. This
includes aspects such as fear of punishment or then the expectation of reward. It is also something that serves as
an inducer of motivation and inspiration to climb higher sales. Basically an incentive is a factor, which motivates
one towards achieving their goals. And according to experts people do require positive incentives in order to
encourage them and propel them to work towards their goals, either on a personal front or at the workplace.

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a2 “Incentives” Topicality – Feebates = Incentives

1. FEEBATES ARE INCENTIVES –

a) that is the government-defined mechanism
National Research Council, 2002, [Committee on the Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards and National Research Council, “Effectiveness and Impact of CAFÉ
Standards”, 2002, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10172]
These alternative policies more fundamentally restructure CAFE with alternative regulatory or incentive policies directed at fuel economy of new
vehicles. Tradable fuel economy credits: There would be an increase in economic efficiency and in flexibility of the CAFE system if a market-
based system of tradable fuel economy credits were created, under which automobile manufacturers could sell fuel economy credits to other
manufacturers and could buy credits from other manufacturers or from the government. This system would be similar in many respects to the
successful system now used for trading sulfur emission credits among electricity power plants. Feebates: Feebates is an incentive
mechanism that uses explicit governmentally defined fees and rebates. Vehicles with fuel economy lower than
some fuel economy target pay a tax, while vehicles with fuel economy higher than the target receive a rebate. Such
systems could be designed to be revenue neutral: the tax revenues and the subsidies would just balance one another if the forecasted sales
weighted average fuel economy (or average per-mile fuel consumption) turned out as predicted

b) Feebates are financial incentives

Center for Environmental Studies, 2002, [CES, “Vehicle Inefficiency Incentives”, December 2002,
http://envstudies.brown.edu/oldsite/Web/special%20reports/Classes/ES201/2002/HSVEIA/index.htm
A vehicle fuel efficiency incentive seeks to internalize the costs or benefits of a vehicle's fuel economy in order
to influence consumer purchasing preference. Phase I of the Rhode Island Greenhouse Gas Action Plan identified incentives in the
form of fees and rebates related to vehicle fuel efficiency as a top priority to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Popularly termed "feebates" such policy instruments provide incentives for the purchase of more fuel efficient vehicles.
Under such a program consumers are required to pay a fee for the purchase of any vehicle that is below a target fuel efficiency and are rewarded
for the purchase of a vehicle with a fuel efficiency rating above the target. The target can be changed over time to embody the goals and to reflect
the impacts of the incentive program and can be designed to be revenue neutral or revenue generating. This website details an analysis conducted
on Rhode Island's vehicle fleet which focuses on the fuel efficiency of the 2001 model year. This project is one of the results of Brown
University's Fall 2002 Center for Environmental Studies Graduate Seminar.

c) they’re tax incentives

Bernow, No date, [Steve Bernow, works for the Tellus Institute, “Program Design for Local Fuel
Economy Improvements (Feebates) Initiative”, no date, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus
%20Feebate%2010-9.doc.]
Tellus intends to develop draft legislation for a vehicle feebate system for the purchase of new passenger vehicles in Rhode Island. Feebates
are tax incentives for consumers to buy more fuel-efficient motor vehicles. A feebate system is typically designed to combine
elements of both a fee and a rebate for different categories of passenger vehicles. Feebate legislation in Rhode Island can be designed in a variety
of ways, and the choice should be based on the need to maximize effectiveness and equity at the lowest possible transaction costs for consumers,
vehicle retailers and the state agencies charged with implementation. Careful consideration should be given to simplicity and fairness in program
design, compatibility and coordination with other local vehicle and tax-related programs, the likelihood of “leakage” and, most importantly, the
potential for realizing significant emissions benefits.

d) incentives to encourage more efficient vehicles

Mims and Hauenstein, 2008, [Natalie Mims and Heidi Hauenstein, Rocky Mountain Institute
researchers, “Feebates: a legislative option to encourage continuous improvements to automobile
efficiency”, February 2008, http://www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid175.php]
A feebate is an incentive policy that encourages the continuous improvement to automobile fuel economy and
greenhouse gas emissions by providing incentives for manufacturers to build more efficient vehicles and rewarding
consumers who purchase more efficient vehicles. The feebate concept is simple in concept: inefficient vehicles receive a surcharge
(FEE-), and efficient vehicles are granted a rebate (-BATE). The fees on the inefficient vehicles pay for the rebates on the efficient vehicles.
Thus, the feebate has the potential to accelerate the production and adoption of more efficient vehicles, ultimately reducing the United States’
transportation fossil fuel consumption.

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Auto Competitiveness Advantage – Auto K Economy (1/2)

1. Auto industry downturn spills over – collapsing the whole economy

Hall 04. (Don, President Virginia Automotive Dealers Association, Richmond Times Dispatch, 3-10)
AS IMPORTANT as the impact of such a drastic tax increase would be on Virginia car buyers, it would have an even greater impact on our overall
economy. Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the automotive industry has been one of the only sources of strength in our
economy. The direct impact will be to the dealerships themselves. New car and truck dealerships in Virginia account for nearly $20 billion in retail sales annually -
more than 20 percent of Virginia's total retail sales. They employ more than 37,000 Virginians. However, the indirect impact could be even more severe. New
car and truck dealerships purchase more than $915 million in goods and services from other Virginia businesses. This includes everything from advertising to
utilities to insurance. Lost sales will result in lost buying power, which will ripple throughout our economy. Most people don't realize how
critical the automotive industry is to our economy. According to a 2001 report on the "Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the U.S. Economy" prepared by the
University of Michigan and the Center for Automotive Research (CAR), for every worker directly employed by the auto industry, nearly seven spin-off jobs are
created. This includes the Virginians directly employed by manufacturers, workers employed indirectly by industry suppliers and other industry-related companies,
and jobs created by expenditures of auto-industry employees. It is important to note that the vehicle sales and use tax already provides significant increases in tax
revenue each year under the current structure. Over the past decade the sales and use tax revenue on vehicles has more than doubled, increasing an average of nearly
7.5 percent annually due entirely to strong sales and increasing vehicle prices.

2. And our claim is reverse causal – extend our UCS ev – a transition away from fuel-consumptive
cards would promote over 40,000 new jobs for the auto sector, spur growth in supplying sectors,
and save consumers $23 billion within 7 years

3. SPILLOVER/
Strong auto industry props up all other sectors
Center For Automotive Research 01. (In Conjunction With The University Of Michigan, March,
http://careerrpm.trishield.com/automotive-industry.shtml/)
While the automobile industry continues to be America's largest manufacturing industry, the majority of those jobs are in supplier and related industries, with total
auto industry and related employment numbering 13.3 million, a new Center for Automotive Research study shows. About 6.6 million jobs are connected to
automotive manufacturing and new vehicle sales, generating more than $240 billion in annual private sector compensation. "When you look under the hood of today's
automobile, you'll see goods from America's greatest industries across the country," said Alliance President & CEO Josephine S. Cooper. "These include textiles
from the Southeast, computer chips from California, aluminum manufactured in Iowa, and air bags produced in Arizona." "No other single industry is more linked to
U.S. manufacturing or generates more retail business and employment. New vehicle production, sales and other jobs related to the use of automobiles are
responsible for 1 out of every 10 jobs in the U.S. economy," Cooper added. Key findings of the study include: The auto industry is responsible for
more than 100,000 jobs in each of several industries, including dealerships, fabricated metals, auto parts, auto repair and maintenance, road construction, tire
dealerships, fueling stations, and car washes. The auto industry is responsible for more than 50,000 jobs in each of several other related
industries, including plastics and rubber, trucking, computers and electronics, petroleum and machinery and equipment. The auto
industry is responsible for more than 25,000 jobs in each of several more related industries, including advertising, textiles, aluminum and recycling. The auto
industry also provides thousands more jobs each in the rail industry, the steel industry, the painting and coating industry, the glass industry, the
copper and brass industry and the iron industry. The automobile industry provides among the highest levels of wages and benefits in the private sector,
averaging $69,500 in 2001. The auto industry boasts a value added of $292,000 per worker, 143 percent higher than the overall value-added ratio for U.S.
manufacturing ($120,000). The automobile industry invests more in research and development than any other industry -- $18.4 billion in 2000. The automobile
industry directly employs 1.3 million Americans in all 50 states. 2.2 million U.S. workers are employed indirectly by auto industry suppliers and other industry-related
companies. Expenditures of auto industry employees create an additional 3.5 million jobs nationwide. The study, "Contribution Of The Automotive Industry To The
U.S. Economy," was prepared by the Center for Automotive Research. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers sponsored the study. Economic Facts America's
automobile industry doesn't just manufacture the passenger cars and light trucks that millions of Americans depend on for work, shopping, vacation and other mobility
needs. Auto manufacturers, along with their suppliers and dealers across the country, drive the U.S. economy, and that economic engine has more
horsepower than many people realize. No other single industry is linked to so much of U.S. manufacturing or generates so much retail
business and employment, as these facts show: Employment: America's automobile industry is one of the largest industries in the country. When jobs
dependent on the industry are included, the auto industry is responsible for 6.6 million jobs nationwide, or about 5% of private sector jobs. Compensation: The
contribution of automotive manufacturing to compensation in the private sector is estimated at $243 billion, or 5.6% of U.S. private
sector compensation. Job Creation: For every worker directly employed by an automaker, nearly seven spin-off jobs are created.
America's automakers are among the largest purchasers of aluminum, copper, iron, lead, plastics, rubber, textiles, vinyl, steel and computer chips. GDP: More than
3.7% of America's total gross domestic product is generated by the sale and production of new light vehicles. Output: The U.S. automotive industry produces a higher
level of output than any other single industry. When measured in constant 1996 dollars, automotive economic output increased by 47 percent during 1987-1999. R&D:
The auto industry invested $18.4 billion in research and development in 1997, higher than any other manufacturing industry. Exports: Automotive exports rose from
$33.4 billion in 1988 to a record $74 billion in 1997, an increase of 122%.

4. CONSUMER SPENDING/ Auto key

CNN Money 04. (July 16, lexis)
Why they matter: The U.S.
auto industry is still both a key building block of the economy, as well as an excellent indicator of
consumer spending. Spending on motor vehicles and parts represented almost a quarter of retail sales last year.

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Auto Competitiveness Advantage – Auto K Economy (2/2)

5. JOB CREATION/
a) Auto sector key driver behind to economic growth – every additional auto sector job creates 7
spin-off jobs
Cross 04. (Lisa, Business Editor, Graphic Arts Monthly, March 1)
Automotive: economic engine America's automobile industry doesn't just manufacture passenger cars and light trucks; it is also a key driver of
the U.S. economy. According to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, more than 3.7% of America's total Gross Domestic Product is generated by
the production and sale of new light vehicles. No other single industry, reports the alliance, is more linked to U.S. manufacturing or generates more retail
business and employment. America's automakers are among the largest purchasers of aluminum, copper, iron, lead, plastics, rubber,
textiles, vinyl, steel, and computer chips. America's automobile industry is also one of the largest industries in the country, accounting for 6.6 million
jobs, or about 5% of private sector jobs, and producing $243 billion in payroll compensation. These figures appear in a 2001 report, Contribution of the
Automotive Industry to the U.S. Economy, prepared by the University of Michigan and the Center for Automotive Research. For every worker directly
employed by an automaker, notes the report, nearly seven spin-off jobs are created.

b) That’s more than 320,000 jobs by 2015

6. MANUFACTURING/
Strong auto industry key to manufacturing – at a turning point now
Business Wire 04. (August 18, lexis)
The Roundtable begins with an eve-of-conference dinner and cocktail reception, hosted by Graeme Maxton, The Economist Group's automotive industry expert. This
is an ideal opportunity for informal networking and a chance to start some low-key discussion of the agenda topics. The Roundtable is scheduled for November 10 and
11 at the Ritz Carlton in Dearborn, Michigan. "In many ways the auto sector is at a turning point," says Maxton. "Medium term growth prospects
are increasingly uncertain, margins are under ever greater pressure and oil prices are bringing new challenges. With informed debate,
new ideas and some bold decisions we think that these seemingly bleak prospects can become opportunities for a more sustainable future. Our aim is to provide the
platform for that debate." "The Economist brings a unique perspective to the global automotive industry," states Ronald Hesse, president of GlobalAutoIndustry.com.
"As the world's largest manufacturing industry, the auto industry affects the global economy like no other industry. The
Economist brings together the thought leaders to discuss and debate key issues of where this global industry is going and what it will take to succeed in getting there."

b) Manufacturing key to the economy

Vargo 03. (Franklin, National Association of Manufacturers, Federal News Service, October 1, lexis)

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Auto Competitiveness Advantage – Feebates Solve

1. Revenue Neutral Feebates spur economic development

Center for American Progress ’05 (A progressive Response to High Oil and Gasoline Prices; May 6,
2005; http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/05/b669657.html )
Reducing our dependence on oil must be a national budget priority. Investment in reducing oil consumption now
will save the government and consumers money in the long run. There are existing tax incentives that actually
increase oil consumption. These should be eliminated and funds redirected, starting with the $25,000 tax credit for
the heaviest SUVs. This would save the Treasury almost $250 million annually and help cover the costs of other
programs to help reduce oil consumption. Most of the near-term policies proposed here, however, could be
designed to be nearly revenue neutral. In addition to saving the federal Treasury money by increasing the fuel
efficiency of the government fleet, they could increase access to affordable, reliable transportation, which in turn
would expand job opportunities for many workers and spur economic development.

2. Plan causes job creation in the auto industry – regulations jack domestic workers – only
incentives allow for new investment
Podesta et. al 05. (John, Chief of Staff under President Clinton and Visiting Prof of Law at Georgetown
U, “Taking Action on Oil Savings”, Center for American Progress, September 13,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/09/b1033079.html)
3. Ensure U.S. workers and industry lead the way in next generation cars and fuels:
Concerns over job impacts for domestic workers have slowed consensus on regulatory
action to reduce oil consumption. If properly structured, new incentives could actually
drive new investment into U.S. plants and workers. Manufacturing conversion
must be part of a package of national oil savings measures.

3. Alternative-energy vehicles key to auto industry competitiveness

CAP 06. (“Energy Incentives”, Center for American Progress, June 20,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/06/b1801925.html)
Equally important to America's future is its automotive workforce. There are several ways in which policymakers in
Washington can help our nation's troubled auto industry compete in the 21st century, but one key ingredient is to
ensure our automakers are developing and then producing cutting-edge, highly efficient, alternative-energy
vehicles that American consumers can easily purchase and drive. A manufacturing conversion incentive like the one
in S. 2747 will go a long way towards making this a reality.

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Warming Advantage – Feebates Solve (1/2)

1. Extend our Clean Air Policy Guidebook – feebates cut fuel consumption by 40%, reducing
20% of C02 emissions within 12 years

2. Our McManus ev says that there would be an immediate shift in consumer demand, as global
warming pollution costs are incorporated into vehicle price.

3. Feebates solve for 25% more global warming pollution that current regulations
McManus 07. [Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University of
California, Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow) May 2007
“Economic analysis of feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California” Abstract, Accessed
July 11 at http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/3461.html]
A feebates program has several advantages over other approaches: Market-oriented: A feebates program recognizes the power of
price signals to change consumer behavior. That is, incentives spur consumers to purchase and manufactures to produce cleaner
vehicles. Self-financing: A feebates program can be designed so that the surcharges collected equal the rebates paid. Affects
entire market: A feebates program applies to all new vehicles-clean and dirty-spurring a transformation of the entire market.
Consumer choice: A feebates program can be designed so that consumers have the option to buy vehicles that carry no surcharge
in each vehicle class, such as cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), and minivans. This study explores the economic impacts on consumers and
manufacturers of the existing Pavley regulation and a feebates program by analyzing four alternative scenarios, using information from 2002 as the base year. Our
findings show that a feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global warming pollution by up to 25% more than
Pavley alone. Also, under a feebates program consumers will save thousands of dollars and retailers will see their revenue rise by
as much as 6%.

4. Feebates pressure the auto industry into solving global warming

LA Times 08. (January 27, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/27/local/me-feebate27
This week, the California Assembly is expected to vote on the California
Clean Car Discount Act, which, if passed, would be the nation’s first
“feebate” law, imposing charges and granting rebates based on a vehicle’s emission of carbon dioxide and other gases. One-time
registration fees of up to $2,500 would be levied on new gas guzzlers, such as Hummers, Dodge Vipers and Chevy Tahoes. Some cleaner sport utility vehicles,
pickups and minivans would be exempt from any charge, while the Toyota Prius, Honda Civic, Nissan Sentra and other fuel-efficient cars would get hefty rebates.
The bill, AB 493, is among a raft of measures under consideration in the Legislature and, behind the scenes, by officials at California’s powerful Air Resources
Board, to press the auto industry to do its part to fight global warming “We put 1.8 million vehicles a year on the road in California,” said
Assemblyman Ira Ruskin (D-Redwood City), the bill’s author. “We have to find ways to get more clean cars on the road and more dirty cars
off. There’s no time to waste if we’re to avoid the catastrophes ahead from global warming.”

5. Feebates work to reduce auto emissions - especially as fuel prices rise

McManus 7 (Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California,
Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow) “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California: executive summary” May 2007, accessed July 11
at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55179/1/UMTRI-2007-19-1.pdf)
Under a feebates program, we assume that automakers install emission reducing technologies until the cost of those technologies, plus the
feebates, equals the value to consumers (marginal cost equals marginal revenue). That is, the prospect of lower fees encourages manufacturers of
dirtier vehicles to make them cleaner, while the prospect of higher rebates encourages manufacturers of cleaner vehicles to make
them even cleaner. We then simulated the impacts of these scenarios on the light vehicle market in California. We assumed that the cost of the additional
technologies designed to reduce emissions, lower fees, and raise rebates changes the cost of the vehicles. This, in turn, changes consumer demand for the vehicles and
retailers’ revenue, according to UMTRI’s market model. We then evaluated the impact of the four scenarios on emission reductions, retailers, and consumers—
including lifetime savings to consumers from more fuel-efficient and thus cleaner vehicles. The model used a fuel price of $1.74 per gallon—the average
in 2002—and a 5 percent discount rate, to estimate the present value of future savings to consumers. However, the U.S. Department of Energy reported an average
retail gasoline price of $3.30 in California in April 2007. If our study had used today’s higher fuel prices, it would have found significantly higher
demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. Such a market shift would reduce emissions even further, and improve lifetime savings
to consumers.

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Warming Advantage – Feebates Solve (2/2)

5. Feebates provide a continual incentive to achieve GHG reductions – long term shift
Gallagher et al ‘7 (KELL SIMS GALLAGHER, GUSTAVO COLLANTES, JOHN P. HOLDREN,
HENRY LEE, ROBERT FROSCH - Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of GOvernmentSchool of Government.
“Policy Options for Reducing Oil Consumption and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U. S. Transportation Sector: A joint
project of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program and the Environment and Natural Resources Program
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs” July 27, 2007.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/policy_options_oil_climate_transport_final.pdf)
Traditionally, feebates have been thought of in terms of vehicle fuel efficiency. However, the same notion could be used as a
climate policy instrument. Instead of fuel efficiency, fees and rebates could be applied to vehicle per-mile emissions of CO2 In principle,
feebates could also be applied to fuels, incentivizing the purchase of lower-carbon fuels and discouraging that of higher-carbon
fuels. Feebates are not a new policy notion. However, there have been virtually no implementation experiences in the United
States. The DRIVE+ program passed the California legislature in 1990, but was eventually vetoed by the Governor. The state of Maryland passed a feebate law in
1991, but it was never actually implemented. The main advantage of feebates is that they may induce changes in consumer choices when they
purchase a vehicle. As the cost of new vehicles increases proportionally to their fuel or GHG efficiency, consumers are likely to
respond by purchasing vehicles that are more fuel efficient. This is a short-term, demand-side effect of feebates. This effect, however, has been found
to be responsible only for a small fraction of any increases in overall fuel economy achieved by a feebate system when modeled.64 Feebates also provide
assistance to lower-income purchasers of fuel-efficient vehicles. Studies show that the principal mechanism triggered by fuel-
efficiency feebates is the adoption by manufacturers of fuel-efficiency technology (e.g., Davis et al., 1995). This is the long-term, supply-side
effect of feebates. Whenever adopting a technology is cheaper than the corresponding feebate, manufacturers will tend to proceed this way rather than changing their
product mix. Feebates also provide continuous incentives for technology adoption. Contrary to static fuel economy standards, feebates
provide incentives for continuous reductions in vehicle fuel (or GHG) intensity.

6. CO2 EMISSIONS –

a) saves 4.4 million tons within two years

EPA 08 (US environmental protection agency, “State Action Policies : Washington,” last updated July 12th, 2008. accessed
July 12 at http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/MSTY5Q4LPY?OpenDocument)

A recent Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory report estimated that a Feebate of $100 per mpg differential could improve new car fuel
mileage by 15 percent in 2010. Such an improvement in new vehicle fuel efficiency would lower annual carbon dioxide
emissions by 4.4 million tons in 2010.

b) only a federal feebate solves drastic cuts in C02 -- states fail to incentivize manufacturers
Langer 05. (Therese with the American Council for Energy Efficient Economy, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives:
An Update on Feebates for States” September 2005, accessed July 11 at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/t051.htm)
Feebates shift the market towards green vehicles by providing an incentive for manufacturers to adopt cost-effective efficiency technologies; by
mitigating the market failure arising from consumer undervaluation of the fuel savings associated with efficient vehicles; and by raising consumer awareness of the
relationship between fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions. Market-based mechanisms and regulatory approaches each have advantages
for reducing vehicles' environmental impacts, and a combination of the two is probably the best approach to reducing vehicle emissions and fuel
consumption. There is little experience on which to base a prediction of the outcome of a feebate policy, although various analyses have been done based
on modeling of consumer choice and manufacturer behavior. The findings of these analyses support the conclusions that: (1) the
effect of a national feebate could be quite large (over 20% reduction in vehicles' CO2 emissions and fuel consumption, using
technologies available today); (2) the dominant response to a national feebate would be on the part of the manufacturers, who would put
more vehicle efficiency technologies into their new offerings; and (3) consumer response through changes in buying preferences would be limited.
The models used may not capture all of the important elements of manufacturer and consumer behavior, however. Much less analysis has been done of the
effects of a state-level feebate. Consumer response may dominate in this case, especially if the state is small, as manufacturers
will be less responsive to an incentive program that affects only a limited part of the vehicle market.

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Aerospace Advantage Extensions – Alternative Fuels Key

Alternative Fuels are vital to the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force 08. (“Alternative Fuels”, June 28,
http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080514-067.pdf
The United States Air Force’s mission is to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America
and its global interests—to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. This mission requires global reach and
flawless performance by the most sophisticated and advanced aircraft and trained Airmen in the world. To conduct
this mission, the Air Force used over 2.5 billion gallons of aviation fuel in 2007 and is the largest fuel consumer in
the federal government. An assured supply of fuel is critical to sustaining the mission of air superiority, support, and
global reach. The role of largest fuel user carries a tremendous responsibility. The research, testing, and certification
of new technologies have been increased to include renewable, unconventional, and traditional energy sources. This
work is vital and it will allow the Air Force to expand the availability of new domestic sources of energy. Research
and testing has led to an investigation of new synthetic fuel-blends that will leverage the natural energy resources
found in the United States. The Air Force will certify the entire fleet to use a 50/50 synthetic fuel blend by early
2011. Ultimately, the Air Force goal is to obtain 50% of CONUS (contiguous United States) transportation.

Key to air power

Manske 01. (Chad T., Major, USAF, Air Force Journal of Logistics, LOOKING AHEAD AT THE
FUTURE OF AIRLIFT: April, https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2001/acsc/01-080.pdf)
Second, the evolution of technology suggests that —advanced high bypass engines“ or even advanced, non-air
breathing engines that operate near space could be manufactured for aircraft of the future.2 The driving factors
behind this evolutionary technology could be one of several reasons. Among them include the advantage gained by
projecting power faster to a theater of operations before potential adversaries have time to react; or the need to
respond to a humanitarian crisis quickly. A good reason for needing faster responding airlift forces is the USA‘s
goal of transporting a division ready brigade-medium force anywhere on the globe within 96 hours after takeoff.3
Third, —natural laminar flow aerodynamics,“ will become improved, such as those incorporated into the design of
both the USAF F-22 and competing versions of the Joint Strike Fighter.4 Better aerodynamic designs in addition to
the first two improvements listed above will naturally lend themselves to a fourth assumption--that of increased fuel
efficiency. Better fuel efficiency translates to savings for a defense department normally lacking the funding to
fulfill many of its requirements. Increased fuel efficiency also equates to longer range, requiring less dependency
on air refueling aircraft, and —deliver[ing] more goods faster than present [aircraft].“ (emphasis added)5

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Spillover Internal Link (Generic)

Automotive tech innovation spills over to dramatically transform other industries

Struben 06. (Jeroen, “A product lifecycle model with heterogeneous technologies”, MIT Sloan School
of Management, August,
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2006/proceed/papers/STRUB390.pdf)
Adding to the complication is the plurality and diversity of other alternatives being considered. Besides leapfrogging
to HFCVs or electric vehicles (EVs), some automakers are focused on increasing the efficiency of the current ICE
technology. Others emphasize shifting to alternative fuels, such as compressed natural gas or blends of bio- and
fossil fuels or are exploring various combinations of these alternative technologies, such as ICE-electric hybrids
(ICE-HEVs), diesel-electric hybrids, or hydrogen-ICE (MacLean and Lave 2003). Beyond the fact that each
technology trajectory involves large upfront investments, an alternative fuel transport system will drastically
transform the social, economic, and organizational landscapes, with implications well beyond the automotive
industry. With so much at stake, a thorough understanding of the transition dynamics is crucial.

Auto industry key to spillover – far ahead on R&D

McCurdy 07. (Dave, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, “Statement
before the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation”, State News Service,
May 3, lexis)
The auto industry leads the way when it comes to investing in research and development. Automakers are
committed to being first to market with breakthrough technologies that can produce new generations of autos
with advanced powertrains and fuels. Automakers are competing to bring these vehicles to market, as soon as the
technology is feasible, affordable and meets consumer expectations.

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Generic Solvency (1/2)

1. Feebates encourage all ends of the production spectrum to move

towards cleaner cars
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461,
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, May, pg. 23, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
The reduction in fees (or the increase in rebates) is what makes consumers demand (and
automakers supply) cleaner vehicles. The incentive to move to cleaner technologies
applies at all levels of current emissions. Just as the prospect of lower fees encourages
makers of dirtier vehicles to make them cleaner in the above example, the prospect of
higher rebates encourages makers of cleaner vehicles to make them even cleaner.
Simulations were completed for this study under two alternative assumptions about
whether automakers would respond to the feebates by changing the technologies in their
vehicles. In every case we examined, the automakers would gain if they were to
respond
by adding technology. Therefore, in this report, we show only scenarios in which
automakers respond by applying technology.

2. Feebates are sweet (and zero-sum)

Kateri Callahan, 6/22/06, [President Alliance to Save Energy, Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, S. 2747, the Enhanced Energy Security Act of 2006,
http://www.ase.org/content/article/detail/3181, liz]

There are several benefits to the feebate approach:

• Revenue neutral: The program can be designed to cost the government NO money, and it would not be a
tax increase.
• Market-driven policy: The financial incentives will help push the market to more efficient vehicles, to
align consumer demand, manufacturer requirements, and national policy.
• Continual improvement: As fuel economies increase, the midpoint mpg is ratcheted up, encouraging
continual improvement, but never out of line with the existing market.
• Not tied to CAFE standards: If the feebate is large enough, market forces will drive up fuel economies
beyond the current fuel economy standard.
• Reduces oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.

3. Feebates provide a continuous incentive for fuel-economic tech adoption

Greene ‘7 David Greene, (PhD, Johns Hopkins in Geography and Environmental Engineering, corporate
fellow Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Department of Energy, February 2007, “Car of the Future:
Beyond Technology,” accessed July 10 at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/car/greene.html)

Greene: An advantage of feebates over fuel economy is that when you set out a fuel-economy standard (as we set
27.5 miles per gallon by 1985), once the manufacturers meet that standard, they're done. There's no reason to keep
going. If new fuel-economy technology comes along, they can use it to increase horsepower, they can not use it at

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all. On the other hand, with a feebate system, there's always a dollar to be gained, or a dollar of cost to be avoided,
if a new fuel-economy technology comes along. So there's a continuous incentive for the manufacturers to adopt
fuel-economy technology.

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Generic Solvency (2/2)

4. Feebates have unique advantages over plan ol’ regulations.

McManus 7 (Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California,
Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow) “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California: executive summary” May 2007, accessed July 11
at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55179/1/UMTRI-2007-19-1.pdf)
This is one advantage of a feebates program. Under a regulation scenario (Pavley Only)
in our model, vehicle manufacturers install technologies on all vehicles, clean and dirty,
to reduce global warming pollution to the required level. The prices consumers pay to
purchase the vehicles rise, because of the cost of the additional technologies (Figure 2).
However, under a feebates scenario in our model, manufacturers install technologies on
all vehicles, clean and dirty, to reduce emissions and to reduce surcharges and increase
rebates. Rebates compensate consumers for some of the costs of the technologies,
making clean vehicles less expensive (Figure 3). Surcharges on high-polluting vehicles
increase the cost of those vehicles even further. This accounts for the small market shift.

5. Feebates gives huge incentives for shifts on production and consumption

McManus 7 (Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California,
Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow) “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California: executive summary” May 2007, accessed July 11
at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55179/1/UMTRI-2007-19-1.pdf)
The price of vehicles, including feebates, is just one aspect of how a feebates policy
would affect consumers’ pocketbooks. Some technologies that reduce global warming
pollution also improve the efficiency of vehicles, thereby reducing fuel costs over their
lifetime. Table 2 combines retail prices and lifetime fuel savings to show the impact on consumers over the lifetime of their vehicles. Under all scenarios
and all vehicle types, consumers save up to $2,544 over the lifetime
of their vehicles. The most cost savings in the Market category is realized under Feebates alone with $36 g Per g/mi.
1.1.2 Impact on Retailers We also examined the impact of the different scenarios on retailers. Although sales
decline no more than 4 percent because of higher costs stemming from additional technology: Retailers’revenue rises under all scenarios, and
the feebates program boosts the sale of cleaner vehicles. Overall, while policy designers can adjust a feebates program to achieve different
reductions in global warming pollution: We found that a feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global warming
pollution while benefiting both consumers and retailers. The combination of the existing Pavley regulation with a modest feebates program
would achieve a 25 percent greater drop in emissions than a regulatory system alone. Feebates create incentives to both manufacturers and
consumers to produce and purchase cleaner vehicles. Furthermore, consumers can save thousands of dollars over the
lifetime of their vehicles because of lower operating costs.

6. Feebates solve best for innovation

Smith 4 (Mike Smith,Content Coordinator and co-founder of the Natural Edge Project and co-author of
The Natural Advantage of Nations, “Encouraging more sustainable practice – the easy way” Sept 2004.
Accessed July 10 at http://www.publish.csiro.au/?act=view_file&file_id=EC121p24.pdf)
The key benefit of feebates is that they ensure industry knows there will be clear market signals to the consumer to
purchase more efficient products, thereby stimulating innovation in the right direction for sustainability. But
government would still need to work with industry to phase in feebates, giving industry time to respond. To reduce
administrative costs, feebates can first be targeted at those products that have the largest ongoing environmental
impacts, such as cars, and household products such as refrigerators and washing machines. Such market signals can
encourage car makers for instance, to move to producing hybrid cars rather than continuing with current models.

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Solvency – Consumer Shift

1. Extend McManus – feebates incentivize a consumer demand shift in the market

2. Feebates are key to increasing consumer interest in alternative fuel vehicles because they solve
the cost issue
The Toronto Star, 3/24/07, [Gerry Malloy, “Carrot and Stick”,
http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/195045, liz]
That time difference in money changing hands is not the only discrepancy between the carrot and the stick. While only 21 vehicle models
are eligible for the rebate, more than 100 are subject to the levy, and more than half that number will be assigned a fee of $2,000
or more, according to data provided by Dennis DesRosiers of DesRosiers Automotive Consultants in Richmond Hill. It is not just big, high-
buck SUVs like the Mercedes G500 and the Range Rover that will be affected, either. The $1,000 levy will apply to many
mainstream family vehicles, such as the Chevrolet TrailBlazer and Nissan Pathfinder. There will be a partial offset for the biggest of those
vehicles, however, as the existing "heavy vehicle" excise tax will be eliminated. It can amount to as much as $780 for a vehicle such as a
Hummer H2. DesRosiers says he "has very mixed feelings about this particular (levy) initiative," and his response is typical. Reaction to the
incentive side of the equation has been generally positive; that to the levy, less so. "The entry-level market in Canada is very price sensitive,"
DesRosiers adds, "so the rebate (carrot) side of this equation will help many existing consumers in this segment and may encourage even more
consumers to purchase one of these very fuel-efficient vehicles." He cautions, however, that the effect may be to rearrange buyer preferences
within the small-vehicle market rather than expand the market. "Last year, over 50 per cent bought a small entry-level vehicle, and most of the
ones that did not were forced into a larger vehicle because of the particular use for their vehicle. Tell a soccer mom to trade in her Toyota Sienna
and buy a Toyota Yaris! No feebate system can address that situation." DesRosiers thinks rebates should be restricted to advanced-
technology vehicles like hybrids, clean diesel and certain E85 vehicles. "The resistance to these technologies is
price," he says. "Many believe they are worth the extra cost because they offer much better overall performance, plus fuel efficiency, but most
consumers can't get by the price issue. So nudge them over the price barrier."

3. The immediate incentive ensures consumers will buy.

Greene ‘7 (David Greene, (PhD, Johns Hopkins in Geography and Environmental Engineering, corporate fellow Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Department of Energy, February 2007, “Car of the Future: Beyond Technology,” accessed July 10 at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/car/greene.html)
Feebates are an alternative to fuel-economy standards that have some very positive attributes. Feebates get around
this problem of the consumer not fully considering the value of fuel economy, because the feebate comes at the time
of purchase. It essentially affects the price of the car, and we know that people focus on the price of cars, and we know that manufacturers focus
on keeping those prices down. If a manufacturer can add a fuel-economy technology and avoid a fee or gain a rebate, it's very likely that they will do that. So even
though we have not tried feebates, there's every reason to think they would work well.

4. Feebates solve more than twice as well as just taxes or rebates – consumer shift key
Greene et al ‘3. [David L. Greene (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, National Transportation Research Center), Philip D.
Patterson (US Department of Energy), Margaret Singh (Argonne National Laboratory), Jia Li (National Transportation Research
Center, The University of Tennessee, “Feebates, rebates and gas-guzzler taxes: a study ofincentives for increased fuel economy”
2003, accessed July 14 at http://www.uns.ethz.ch/edu/teach/bachelor/energmob/K_Greene_et_al_2005.pdf]
Because feebates apply to all light-duty vehicles, they are far more effective at increasing MPG than rebates or
gas-guzzler taxes. Comparable feebate systems achieve more than twice the fuel economy increase accomplished
by rebates or gas-guzzler taxes. Rebates increase consumers’ surplus, but at a greater cost in expenditure of governm
ent revenues. Gas-guzzler taxes cause losses of consumers’ surplus, and only very small increases in government
revenue. We need a government policy; many consumers won’t convert otherwise. How consumers value fuel savings is critically important.
If consumer s count only the first 3 years of fuel savings when evaluating the benefits of fuel economy, then without
policy intervention there would be very little increase in fuel economy from the use of currently available,
proven technologies. If consumers value the discounted present value of fuel savings over the full life of new vehicles, an increase in MPG
of almost 30 percent could be expected from the use of these same technologies even without a feebate policy.11 The levels of fuel economy
achieved by feebate systems are sensitive to the cost of technology but the cost of feebate systems is not. Exchanging the NRC study’s low-
cost/high-MPG cost curve for its average curve raises the average fuel economy achieved by a $500, two pivot point feebate system from 28.9 to

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31.0. Using the high-cost/low-MPG cost curve decreases the average fuel economy achieved to 26.3. The loss of consumers’ surplus, however, is
smaller in either case than for the average cost curve.
Solvency – Manufacturing Conversion

1. Feebates solve manufacturing conversion – that’s 95% of their effectiveness

Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency
Incentives: An Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy, September,
http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

2. Feebates gives huge incentives for manufacturers – boosts sales of clean vehicles
McManus 7 (Walter (head of UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division, Ph.D. in economics from the University of California,
Los Angeles, Sidney Stern Fellow, and Foundation for Research in Economics and Education Fellow) “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California: executive summary” May 2007, accessed July 11
at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/55179/1/UMTRI-2007-19-1.pdf)
1.1.2 Impact on Retailers We also examined the impact of the different scenarios on retailers. Although sales
decline no more than 4 percent because of higher costs stemming from additional technology: Retailers’ revenue
rises under all scenarios, and the feebates program boosts the sale of cleaner vehicles. Overall, while policy
designers can adjust a feebates program to achieve different reductions in global warming pollution: We found that a
feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global warming pollution while benefiting both consumers and
retailers. The combination of the existing Pavley regulation with a modest feebates program would achieve a 25
percent greater drop in emissions than a regulatory system alone. Feebates create incentives to both manufacturers
and consumers to produce and purchase cleaner vehicles. Furthermore, consumers can save thousands of dollars
over the lifetime of their vehicles because of lower operating costs.

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Solvency – Phase-In

1. MANUFACTURING CONVERSION/
a) Pre-announcing solves long lead times
Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
The current program is a first step in introducing market instruments to help address concerns about fuel use. Going
forward, the government
should take steps to ensure that the program is improved in such a way that it is more environmentally effective by
providing a greater incentive to switch to lower-emission vehicles, but balancing any changes with an attempt to
minimize adverse consequences on the auto manufacturing sector. Since many of the likely gains will come from
technological innovations and redesigns of current models, the adverse effect of the feebate on domestic auto
manufacturers should be lessened by pre-announcing the path of the feebate over time so that the auto
manufacturers have sufficient time to adjust their plans. A time frame of several years to introduce major changes is reasonable,
given the long lead times required in auto manufacturing. Any increase in regulated emissions reductions would overlap with the
feebate and may provide a basis for a reduction in the feebate rate, although the feebate will continue to have positive effects.

b) The vast majority of feebates solvency comes from manufacturing conversion

Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
Another key insight is that, in the models, the majority of the effects of a feebate policy seem to come from
manufacturers attempts to preserve their market shares through technological innovation and improvements to
their vehicles. Implementing innovative technologies often makes more economic sense once the added financial
incentives of the feebate are in place. The adoption of such new technologies has a much greater positive impact
than that of consumers switching to smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles in order to take advantage of the rebates and
avoid the tax. But there is also a rebound effect which works against the policy, as consumers-now able to travel further at lower cost—offset
some of the efficiency—related reduction through higher use. However, even with the increase in fuel consumption due to this rebound effect, the
studies still anticipate an overall positive result.

c) Any timeframe deficit to a phase-in is outweighed by manufacturing response

Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
A phase-in period for the policy reduces the net reductions in fuel use by delaying the short-run benefits, but
provides manufacturers with more time to implement some of the technological improvements and redesigns
that will help them maintain market share. This is especially critical for the North American manufacturers
who are predicted to lose market share due to their reliance on sales of larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles.

3. CP’s phase-in key to solve for Big Three

Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
Indeed, the simulation models generally suggest that feebates
will produce a decrease in market share for the “Big Three” North
American auto manufacturers, without a large reduction in overall demand for automobiles. The implication is that the
“Big Three” may be better able to compete if given a period of adjustment to re-tool their fleets, since on average,
they sell less fuel-efficient vehicles.

4. Experience proves

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Globe and Mail 07. (“Delay in publishing rebate list angers auto makers”, November 29, pg. g7, lexis)

The study recommended that the government announce its feebate fuel economy parameters within a multi-year
time frame, to allow auto makers time to possibly adjust their products accordingly, as well as an increase in fuel taxes, or
mileage-based charges, as a disincentive to drive all vehicles whenever possible.
Solvency – a2 Case Turns (Generic Overview)

1. Positive benefits of feebates far outweigh your turns

Kahn ’94 (Jeffery; Computer model forecasts impact of automobile fuel efficiency incentives; January
13, 1994; http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/Archive/auto-fuel-efficiency-model.html )
"Feebates are found to have very few shortcomings and promise to yield large benefits to society," says E&E's
William Davis, primary author of an upcoming DOE Office of Policy report on the subject. "By affecting prices that
consumers and manufacturers see in the market for new vehicles, feebates are likely to be effective in achieving
energy, environmental, and economic goals simultaneously."

2. Flaws with feebates are not a reason to reject the plan – still comparative solvency

Beatty and Ogilvie ’07 (Stephen and Ken, Financial Post; ecoAuto works; Toyota and Chrysler differ on
new federal program; October 23, 2007; Lexis)
However, for all its flaws, there's evidence that the program is actually working. Sales of the targeted categories
of fuel-efficient vehicles have increased. Some manufacturers have started engineering improvements to certain
models to make them eligible for the rebates or to avoid the levies. This is exactly how we should expect a feebate to
work: inducing automakers to use technology to improve fuel efficiency, and expanding the range of fuel-efficient
choices for consumers. Granted, there are problems with the design and administration of the current program, but
that's no reason to throw out the policy. The response so far is an indication of the significant benefits a good
program could generate for Canada, so why not fix the policy and build a better program?

3. Feebates have a success snowball effect

Durning ’05 (Alan Thein; How to Vurb B.C.’s High Risk Hunger for Energy; April 18, 2005;
http://thetyee.ca/Views/2005/04/18/curbBCenergy/ )

Conversely, cars and trucks that are less efficient than average, come with a fee -- a fee that grows with the vehicle’s
inefficiency. The fees pay for the rebates each year, so it’s revenue neutral. Even better, feebates would have a
“snowball” effect on efficiency because they are designed to continuously tug the entire car and truck market
toward better fuel efficiency.

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Solvency – a2 Fuelling Stations Takeout

We do not need massive infrastructure to convert to alternate fuels vehicles

Wood 08. (Charles Cresson, president of Post-Petroleum Transportation, is a well-known writer in the technology
field. Since 1979, he has served as a technology management consultant, researcher, and journalist, working with
over 125 different organizations in more than 20 countries around the world; Five Myths Hindering the
Development of Alternative Fuels; 5/13.08; http://www.greenestchoices.com/energy-articles/five-myths-hindering-
development-alternative-fuels.php#author)

While massive infrastructure changes may be needed to support certain types of hydrogen vehicles (those that burn
hydrogen in internal combustion engines), these investments are unnecessary with many other technologies. Rather
than creating a brand new infrastructure, the energy distribution infrastructure for electricity already exists, and only
needs inexpensive metering facilities to sell electricity to consumers driving electric vehicles. Meanwhile, bio-
methane, and other energy alternatives not based on fossil fuel, can now be manufactured on a relatively small-scale
basis from trash, animal waste, agricultural waste, and other biomass sources. Several new technologies can be
adopted on a household or organizational basis, and do not need to have additional supporting infrastructure.

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Solvency – a2 Current Tech Fails

1. Even if current tech is insufficient, investing will spur new developments for AFVs
Struben 06. (Jeroen, “A product lifecycle model with heterogeneous technologies”, MIT Sloan School
of Management, August,
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2006/proceed/papers/STRUB390.pdf)
Technological innovations spill over between technologies. The effect increases with the gap between laggards
and leaders (Jovanovic and Macdonald 1994; Aghion et al. 2001), and with the capability to extract knowledge from
the outside (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). At the industry level, competence building is a social, distributed process of
bricolage (Garud and Karnoe 2003). This view emphasizes the value of technological diversity as was discussed for
the emergence of wind energy by (Karnoe 1999; Kemp 2001; Garud and Karnoe 2003). Whether innovations of a
potential entrant will generally trigger increased R&D activity and performance increases of incumbents, the
so-called sailing-ship effect (Rosenberg 1976), has also been observed in the automobile industry (Snow 2004). It is
these combinations of interactions that suggest that hybrid technologies can serve as temporal intermediate
bridges between an incumbent and a radical innovation (Utterback 1996).

2. Big Three is already capable of increasing production of AFVs

Daniel Whitten November 20, 2006 (Inside Energy with Federal Lands
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?
docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4146068515&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4146068523&cisb=
22_T4146068522&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=7989&docNo=18

The chief executives of the "Big Three" U.S. automakers came out of a meeting with President Bush last week saying
they are ready to significantly expand the manufacture of vehicles that can run on alternative fuels if the
government makes certain commitments. DaimlerChrysler's Thomas LaSorda, Ford's Alan Mulally and General Motors' Richard Wagoner
met with Bush, Vice President Cheney and senior administration officials at the White House Tuesday. The CEOs said they could commit that
flexible-fuel vehicles will account for 50% of their companies' production by 2012 "if we could be assured of
adequate availability of ethanol and adequate distribution capability,"

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Solvency – a2 Low-Income Families

1. No link and turn – feebates have no negative effect on low-income families and only make
vehicles more affordable
EPA’08 (State Action Policies: Vermont; sector: Transportation;
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/BMOE5PVQUG?OpenDocument )
One way to encourage energy efficiency is to provide incentives to consumers who purchase energy efficient
vehicles (rebates), disincentives to consumers who purchase inefficient vehicles (a gas guzzler tax), or both
(feebates) at the time of sale. Feebates, as the most comprehensive option, would provide a long term, market-based
incentive to develop and purchase increasingly efficient automobiles, and would help ensure that energy use and
emissions are an important factor when transportation vehicle choices are made. This type of program would not
put additional burdens on low income drivers. The most efficient cars to drive (and often the least expensive
to purchase) would have no additional fee and would probably receive a rebate.

2. This argument is counter-intuitive. Feebates only drive up prices of high consumption vehicles
that out of the price-range of the low income bracket anyway
Terra Pass, 2/20/08, [Adam Stein, “Adventures in carbon pricing”,
http://www.terrapass.com/blog/posts/adventures-in-carbon-pricing, liz]
Although not quite a carbon tax, the system does establish clear price signals for energy efficiency, and such feebate
systems are thought to be an improvement over CAFE. Unfortunately, some members of the Assembly are still
sitting on the fence: “What if some poor guy in Watts retires and says, ‘I want an SUV,’” Dymally said. “Do you
punish him for that?” Feel free to email Assemblyman Dymally to explain respectfully that no one wants to punish,
um, poor, inner city…retiree SUV drivers. We just want them to shoulder the full cost of their choices, so that the
rest of don’t have to. (You might also point out that some of the cleaner SUVs won’t be subject to any charges under
the bill.)

3. Normal means for the feebate bill has provisions protecting small businesses and low income
families
Edmunds.com, where smart car buyers start, 1/28/08, [“California "Feebate" Bill Would Be First To
Reward Buyers of Fuel-Efficient Passsenger Vehicles”,
http://blogs.edmunds.com/greencaradvisor/2008/01/california-feebate-bill-would-be-first-to-reward-
buyers-of-fuel-efficient-passsenger-vehicles.html, liz]
State analysts have estimated the 25 percent of vehicles would not be affected at all, while 35 percent would be
assessed an emissions fee and 40 percent would qualify for rebates.
The fees would be collected by new car dealers at the time of a vehicle's initial sale and would be used to pay
rebates to purchasers of the cleanest, highest-mileage vehicles.
Car dealer groups have opposed the measure, claiming it would suppress sales of the largest and most powerful
vehicles -- typically most expensive – and thus would cut into state sales tax revenue (not to mention dealer profits).
Opponents also argue that the measure could discriminate against large families that need bigger vehicles and
against businesses that need trucks and other less-efficient vehicles to move goods and equipment.
The measure, however, has provisions exempting small business with fewer than 25 employees, as well as low-
income buyers, from paying the greenhouse gas fees.

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Solvency – a2 Feebates Incentivize Older Polluting Vehicles

1. The older car theory is wrong – feebates will cause fleet transitions and have a net positive effect

Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives 2k (“Vehicle feebates should be considered,” December 1,
2000, Accessed july 14 at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/index.cfm?
act=news&call=733&do=article&pA=BB736455)

One final argument is that the feebate system leads to worse air pollution because people will put off buying a vehicle
and instead continue to use their older, more polluting car. In fact, just the opposite is true. Only people wanting to
buy gas-guzzlers will delay that purchase. For anybody wanting a vehicle with average or better fuel efficiency, it
will be either the same price or cheaper. Over time, these incentives will lead to a fleet that is newer, more fuel
efficient, and less polluting. (Again, other problems that have to do with the personal automobile--especially our over-reliance on cars--must be dealt
with through other approaches.) So what does the auto industry propose for dealing with urban air pollution and climate change? Industry spokespersons do
acknowledge that these problems exist. When pressed, though, the only solution they offer is "voluntary measures", which is industry-speak for "do nothing". They
argue that people will decide, supposedly through moral persuasion (and despite a deluge of advertisement to the contrary), that they should purchase more
In spite of worsening urban air pollution and a better
environmentally friendly vehicles. However, the evidence refutes this.
understanding of climate change, the public has opted, throughout the 1990s, for less and less fuel-efficient vehicles.
On the other hand, regulations do work, and people do react to financial incentives. It is no coincidence that, compared to 10 years
ago, the vehicle fleet has both a worse fuel efficiency (which has not been regulated) and much better tailpipe emissions of regional air
pollutants like hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur oxides (which have been regulated). When the price of gasoline went
up in the early and late 1970s, people adjusted by buying more fuel efficient cars.

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Solvency – a2 Rebound Effect

1. Feebates solve for the rebound effect

ERSA 05. (“Backcasting energy saving and CO2 emission reductions by using feebates system in
Japan”, European Regional Science Association,
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wiw/wiwrsa/ersa04p328.html#author)
After the Kyoto Conference (COP3), the Japanese transport sector was required to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions by 16% by 2010. The Japanese government has decided to improve the fuel economy standard in 2010 by
improving it by an average of 22.8%. However, Japanese consumers tend to prefer heavier passenger cars such as
four-wheel drive or recreational vehicles. Because of the difficult target of COP3, environmental policy should
involve not only automotive technologies but also non-technical measures. Since Japanese vehicle taxes are
expensive compared to other OECD countries, we would like to introduce the “feebate”, a word composed from
“fee” and “rebate”, as a “Green Tax” at the acquisition stage. The feebate system charges a fee for less fuel-efficient
vehicles and refunds for vehicles more fuel efficient than the fuel efficiency standard. This system is a market based
alternative by fuel efficiency standards so that it can be tax neutral. Acquisition tax does not affect to environmental
sustainability. Since social marginal cost has increased more and more, it is not always realistic to impose all the
costs at the motoring tax level. The feebate system could partially share the social marginal cost and might mitigate
the rebound effect at the motoring stage. We use the data set from 1995-2001 on fuel efficiency by vehicle type and
the fuel efficiency standards of 1995. The contribution of this paper will be to propose a combination of feebate rate
and CO2 emission reduction by vehicle gross weight group.

2. Rebound effect is small enough that feebate benefits still outweigh

NRTEE 07. ( “DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS FOR A VEHICLE FEEBATE IN CANADA”,
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, July 27, http://www.trnee-
nrtee.gc.ca/eng/publications/feebates/summary-feebates-eng.html
Environmental Effectiveness. Feebates are less well-targeted than alternatives such as fuel taxes but the main
concern, the rebound effect, is expected to be no more than 23 percent, and probably less. Consumers are expected
to respond by switching from trucks to cars, from larger vehicles to smaller vehicles, and to more fuel-efficient
vehicles within a given class. The car share of the vehicle market is expected to increase by 1–6 percent, depending
on the rate. Manufacturers will respond primarily by investing in cost-effective technologies; however, some less
fuel-efficient models may be dropped.

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Acid Rain 2AC Add-On (1/2)

ACID RAIN/
1. Plan key to curb acid rain – transportation sector is main cause of NOx
ASE 05. [Alliance to Save Energy, “Increasing Vehicle Fuel Efficiency” May 200,5 accessed july 14 at
http://www.ase.org/uploaded_files/policy/Fuel%20Economy%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf]
Today, more than two-thirds of the oil consumed in the U.S. is used for transportation, mostly for cars and light trucks, and most of that oil is imported, often from
politically volatile regions of the world. Increasing fuel efficiency would lower pressure on oil prices and enhance our national security. Increasing fuel
efficiency also would help curb pollution from refining oil and from vehicle tail pipes, a major factor in smog, acid rain, exposure
to toxic chemicals and carcinogens, and global warming. The transportation sector accounts for the majority of CO and NOx air
pollution in the US, and it is responsible for approximately one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards passed by Congress in 1975 led to a 70 percent increase in America’s gas mileage over the subsequent decade. However, CAFÉ
standards have remained static for almost two decades due to political gridlock. The current standard of 27.5 miles per gallon for automobiles first
applied in 1985, and the 21 mpg standard for light trucks is only 0.5 mpg above the 1987 standard (but is now set to rise to 22.2 mpg by 2007). Furthermore, real on-
road fuel economies are much lower than those numbers would suggest—the average fuel economy of cars and light trucks is only around 20 mpg. And as the
sales of SUVs have exploded, average vehicle fuel economy has actually declined since 1988. Meanwhile, the number of vehicle miles
traveled each year in the US is growing at more than twice the rate of the population.CAFE Reforms Even without the political will to raise CAFE standard numbers, several
reforms are needed to close major loopholes and bring actual fuel economies closer to current standards. “Truth-in-testing” Loophole: By law, CAFE is based on the fuel economy tests that
were used for model year 1975. EPA recognized that those tests are inaccurate, and in 1984 started reducing reported fuel economies by about 15%. Because driving patterns have changed, real
gas mileage is likely 20-25% below CAFE numbers. Testing procedures for CAFE need to be updated to reflect increased congestion, higher speed limits, use of air conditioning, more powerful
vehicles, and other changes. “SUV” Loophole: When light trucks were given a lower standard, pickup trucks and vans were used primarily for businesses and farming, and represented only
about 20% of vehicles sold. Today, about half of all light-duty vehicles sold in America qualify as “light trucks” for CAFE. Most of those are SUVs and minivans, most are used as passenger or
family vehicles, and they average roughly 40% more fuel for each mile driven than the average passenger car. SUVs and minivans should be reclassified as what they are: passenger vehicles.
“Hummer” Loophole: CAFE standards only apply to vehicles under 8,500 pounds (gross vehicle weight). In fact, EPA does not even test or report the fuel economy of larger vehicles, yet their
mileage is generally much lower. Manufacturers are selling more and more of these super-large SUVs and pickup trucks, such as GM Hummers and Ford Excursions. CAFE standards should
cover these heavier vehicles. “Dual Fuel” Loophole: Automakers that produce vehicles that can run either on gasoline or on an alternative fuel, usually ethanol, can claim CAFE credit as if the
vehicles ran on the alternative fuel onehalf of the time. Unfortunately, dual fueled vehicles today run on gasoline 99% of the time. With only 188 ethanol fueling stations in 27 states, the
infrastructure does not exist to supply these vehicles with ethanol. This credit has allowed manufacturers to put more gas guzzlers on the road, and thus increases gasoline use. It should be
A new, innovative approach to improve the efficiency of cars and light trucks
modified to require actual use of the alternative fuel. Vehicle Fuel Use “Feebate”
is a national “feebate” system. Such a system would impose a national security surcharge, or “fee” on inefficient vehicles, and then use the funds collected to
provide a “rebate” to fuel efficient vehicles. How would a national feebate work? In one approach, a fee or rebate would apply to manufacturers of all new light-duty
passenger vehicles—including SUVs and minivans. The amount would be based on 25 cents per gallon of gasoline estimated to be used over the lifetime of the
vehicle. The fee or rebate would then be determined relative to a mid-point fuel economy. This dividing line between fees and rebates would be set each year such that
the total fees would just pay for all the rebates, so there would be no net revenue or cost to the government.

2. Acid rain kills coral reefs and ocean biodiversity

LiveScience 07. ( “Increasing Acid Could Kill Most Coral by 2050”, December 13,
http://www.livescience.com/environment/071213-coral-acid.html)
The world’s coral reefs face almost certain death as increasing amounts of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are absorbed by the
oceans, acidifying the water in which corals live, a new study warns. In the past few decades, corals have come under increasing pressure from warming
ocean waters, overfishing and disease. A recent study found corals in Pacific ocean were disappearing faster than previously thought. The new study, to be presented
tomorrow at a meeting here of the American Geophysical Union, points to yet another factor plaguing these underwater bastions of biodiversity:
carbon dioxide. As carbon dioxide is emitted through the burning of fossil fuels, some of it is absorbed by the world’s oceans. “About a third of the
carbon dioxide put into the atmosphere is absorbed by the oceans,” said study team member Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution of
Washington, “which helps slow greenhouse warming, but is a major pollutant of the oceans.” When the carbon dioxide is absorbed in the water, it
produces carbonic acid, the same acid that gives soft drinks their fizz. This acid also makes certain minerals dissolve more readily in seawater,
particularly aragonite, the mineral used by corals and many other marine organisms to grow their skeletons. Caldeira and his colleagues ran
computer simulations of ocean chemistry based on a range of atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, from 280 parts per million (ppm) (pre-industr3ial levels) to 5,000
parts per million. (Present levels are 380 ppm and rising.) Their findings, detailed in the Dec. 14 issue of the journal Science, show that if current emission
trends continue, 98 percent of present-day reef habitats will be too acidic by mid-century for reef growth. “Before the
industrial revolution, over 98 percent of warm water coral reefs were bathed with open ocean waters 3.5 times supersaturated with aragonite, meaning that corals
could easily extract it to build reefs,” said study co-author Long Cao, also of the Carnegie Institution. “But if atmospheric CO2 stabilizes at 550 ppm—
and even that would take concerted international efforts to achieve—no existing coral reef will remain in such an environment.” At greatest risk of
these changes are Australia’s iconic Great Barrier Reef, the world's largest living structure, and the reefs of the Caribbean Sea. To slow ocean acidification,
Caldeira and Cao warn, will likely take more stringent and immediate reductions in carbon dioxide than would be needed to reduce the other
effects of global warming. “The science speaks for itself. We have created conditions on Earth unlike anything most species alive today have experienced in their
evolutionary history,” said co-author Bob Steneck of the University of Maine. “Corals are feeling the effects of our actions, and it is now or never if we want
to safeguard these marine creatures and the livelihoods that depend on them.”

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Acid Rain 2AC Add-On (2/2)

3. And, Oceans key to survival

Craig ’03
(Robin Kundis Craig -- Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law – McGeorge Law Rev – Winter – elipses in original)
The world's oceans contain many resources and provide many services that humans consider valuable. "Occupy[ing]
more than [seventy percent] of the earth's surface and [ninety-five percent] of the biosphere," 17 oceans provide
food; marketable goods such as shells, aquarium fish, and pharmaceuticals; life support processes, including carbon
sequestration, nutrient cycling, and weather mechanics; and quality of life, both aesthetic and economic, for millions
of people worldwide. 18 Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the ocean to humanity's well-being:
"The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary
biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and
climate." 19 Ocean and coastal ecosystem services have been calculated to be worth over twenty billion dollars per
year, worldwide. 20 In addition, many people assign heritage and existence value to the ocean and its creatures,
viewing the world's seas as a common legacy to be passed on relatively intact to future generations. 21

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Acid Rain 1AR Extensions

Combustion automobiles create acid rain

Clean Air Trust 99. (Acid Rain, http://www.cleanairtrust.org/acidrain.html)

Acid rain (or acid deposition, as it's called in technical circles) is produced by the burning of fossil fuels. It is formed
when emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides react in the atmosphere with water, oxygen and oxidants to
form various acidic compounds. These compounds then fall to the ground in either wet or dry form.
Acid rain acidifies lakes and streams and contributes to damage of trees at high elevations. (Check out Mount
Mitchell in North Carolina if you want a graphic example of tree damage.) Hundreds of lakes in the Adirondacks
have become too acidic to support sensitive fish species. In addition, acid rain accelerates the decay of paints and
buildings.
Electric power plants account for about 70 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions about 30 percent of nitrogen oxides
emissions. Cars, trucks and buses also are major sources of nitrogen oxides.

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Air Pollution 2AC Add-On

AIR POLLUTION/
1. Feebates solve air pollution by incentivizing fleet transitions
CCAP 06. [center for clean air policy…Greg Dierkers, Mark Houdashelt, Erin Silsbe, Shayna Stott,
Steve Winkelman & Mac Wubben, “Vehicle Technology and Fuels” July 13, 2006, Accessed July 14
at http://www.ccap.org/images/guidebook/CCAP_Transportation_Guidebook_Part2.pdf]
Feebate programs can result in a reduction in the emission of criteria and hazardous air pollutants and greenhouse
gases by facilitating fleet wide transition to lower emitting vehicles. Additional benefits may include: �improved
passenger vehicle fuel economy; � ongoing incentives for manufacturers to invest in the further development of
markets for low GHG vehicles; � minimal program costs to government; � politically saleable to consumers; �
increased visibility relative to other incentive programs; and � relatively quick implementation

2. Air pollution causes extinction

Zayed Prize Org 03. ( “Press Release on The Dubai Intl. Conference on Attmospheric pollution and The
International Exhibition on Environmental Technology”,
ENVIROTEX2004, http://www.zayedprize.org.ae/en/display.aspx?type=news&id=1518)
Air pollution is a serious threat to human survival affecting all aspects of life on earth including its socio-
economic development. Climatic changes have been on their upswing choking, many urban areas worldwide and
theory effecting sustainable development. With Asian brown clouds becoming an important issue in this part of the
world. It has been catching media headlines recently.

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Air Pollution Add-On – 1AR Solvency (1/2)

1. Plan curbs pollution, solving for smog, acid rain, carcinogens and global warming
ASE 05. [Alliance to Save Energy, “Increasing Vehicle Fuel Efficiency” May 200,5 accessed july 14 at
http://www.ase.org/uploaded_files/policy/Fuel%20Economy%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf]
Today, more than two-thirds of the oil consumed in the U.S. is used for transportation, mostly for cars and light trucks, and most of that oil is imported, often from
politically volatile regions of the world. Increasing fuel efficiency would lower pressure on oil prices and enhance our national security. Increasing fuel
efficiency also would help curb pollution from refining oil and from vehicle tail pipes, a major factor in smog, acid rain, exposure
to toxic chemicals and carcinogens, and global warming. The transportation sector accounts for the majority of CO and NOx air
pollution in the US, and it is responsible for approximately one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards passed by Congress in 1975 led to a 70 percent increase in America’s gas mileage over the subsequent decade. However, CAFÉ
standards have remained static for almost two decades due to political gridlock. The current standard of 27.5 miles per gallon for automobiles first
applied in 1985, and the 21 mpg standard for light trucks is only 0.5 mpg above the 1987 standard (but is now set to rise to 22.2 mpg by 2007). Furthermore, real on-
road fuel economies are much lower than those numbers would suggest—the average fuel economy of cars and light trucks is only around 20 mpg. And as the
sales of SUVs have exploded, average vehicle fuel economy has actually declined since 1988. Meanwhile, the number of vehicle miles
traveled each year in the US is growing at more than twice the rate of the population.CAFE Reforms Even without the political will to raise CAFE standard numbers, several
reforms are needed to close major loopholes and bring actual fuel economies closer to current standards. “Truth-in-testing” Loophole: By law, CAFE is based on the fuel economy tests that
were used for model year 1975. EPA recognized that those tests are inaccurate, and in 1984 started reducing reported fuel economies by about 15%. Because driving patterns have changed, real
gas mileage is likely 20-25% below CAFE numbers. Testing procedures for CAFE need to be updated to reflect increased congestion, higher speed limits, use of air conditioning, more powerful
vehicles, and other changes. “SUV” Loophole: When light trucks were given a lower standard, pickup trucks and vans were used primarily for businesses and farming, and represented only
about 20% of vehicles sold. Today, about half of all light-duty vehicles sold in America qualify as “light trucks” for CAFE. Most of those are SUVs and minivans, most are used as passenger or
family vehicles, and they average roughly 40% more fuel for each mile driven than the average passenger car. SUVs and minivans should be reclassified as what they are: passenger vehicles.
“Hummer” Loophole: CAFE standards only apply to vehicles under 8,500 pounds (gross vehicle weight). In fact, EPA does not even test or report the fuel economy of larger vehicles, yet their
mileage is generally much lower. Manufacturers are selling more and more of these super-large SUVs and pickup trucks, such as GM Hummers and Ford Excursions. CAFE standards should
cover these heavier vehicles. “Dual Fuel” Loophole: Automakers that produce vehicles that can run either on gasoline or on an alternative fuel, usually ethanol, can claim CAFE credit as if the
vehicles ran on the alternative fuel onehalf of the time. Unfortunately, dual fueled vehicles today run on gasoline 99% of the time. With only 188 ethanol fueling stations in 27 states, the
infrastructure does not exist to supply these vehicles with ethanol. This credit has allowed manufacturers to put more gas guzzlers on the road, and thus increases gasoline use. It should be
A new, innovative approach to improve the efficiency of cars and light trucks
modified to require actual use of the alternative fuel. Vehicle Fuel Use “Feebate”
is a national “feebate” system. Such a system would impose a national security surcharge, or “fee” on inefficient vehicles, and then use the funds collected to
provide a “rebate” to fuel efficient vehicles. How would a national feebate work? In one approach, a fee or rebate would apply to manufacturers of all new light-duty
passenger vehicles—including SUVs and minivans. The amount would be based on 25 cents per gallon of gasoline estimated to be used over the lifetime of the
vehicle. The fee or rebate would then be determined relative to a mid-point fuel economy. This dividing line between fees and rebates would be set each year such that
the total fees would just pay for all the rebates, so there would be no net revenue or cost to the government.

2. Feebates reduce air pollution and GHG emissions.

CCAP 06. [center for clean air policy…Greg Dierkers, Mark Houdashelt, Erin Silsbe, Shayna Stott,
Steve Winkelman & Mac Wubben, “Vehicle Technology and Fuels” July 13, 2006, Accessed July 14 at
http://www.ccap.org/images/guidebook/CCAP_Transportation_Guidebook_Part2.pdf]
A feebate15 is a tax on vehicle purchases or a rebate given to buyers of new vehicles based on fuel economy. The feebate acts as both an incentive for efficient vehicle
purchases and a disincentive for inefficient vehicle purchases. Under a feebate system, consumers would be charged a fee on purchases of relatively high-emitting
vehicles and would receive a rebate on the purchase of relatively low-emitting vehicles. The program can be designed to be revenue neutral or revenue
generating. Feebates can make the lifecycle energy, air pollution, and greenhouse gas costs highly visible to the consumer
by altering the purchase price of the vehicle based on its emissions. As opposed to Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that set fixed fleet
targets, feebates put continual pressure on the market to move towards lower emissions. As the average emissions of the fleet decrease, fees and
rebates can be recalibrated around a new average to maintain revenue neutrality.16 Feebate systems, similar to those being proposed in the state of Connecticut,17 typically establish a revenue-
neutral “pivot point” based on the amount of CO2 emitted per mile driven. Vehicles that emit less than the pivot point would receive a rebate, while those that exceed it would be required to pay
a fee. The size of the fee or rebate would be assessed based gallons of fuel used per mile (GPM). If the dollar value is set at $500 per 0.01 GPM, consumers would pay $500 for 0.01 gallons that
their vehicle is above the pivot point. A rebate rate of $500 would have the same impact as a tax of $0.43 per gallon of gasoline of consumers value fuel savings over the full life of the vehicle.18

3. Feebates create cleaner cars

The Atlantic 95. [The atlantic monthly, Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins are the cofounders and directors of Rocky
Mountain Institute, a nonprofit resource-policy center in Snowmass, Colorado, “Reinventing the Wheels: The Cost of Inaction”
accessed July 14 at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199501/reinventing-wheels/6]
Under the feebate system, when you buy a new car, you pay a fee or get a rebate. Which and how big depends on how efficient your new car is. Year by year the fees pay for the
rebates. (This is not a new tax. In 1990 the California legislature agreed, approving a "Drive+" feebate bill by a seven-to-one margin, although outgoing Governor George Deukmejian vetoed it.)
Better still, the rebate for an efficient new car could be based on how much more efficient it is than an old car that's scrapped (not traded in). A rebate of several thousand dollars for each 0.01-
would rapidly get efficient, clean cars on the road and
gallon-per-mile difference would pay about $5,000 to $15,000 of the cost of an efficient new car. That
inefficient, dirty cars off the road (a fifth of the car fleet produces perhaps three fifths of its air pollution). The many variants of such
"accelerated-scrappage" incentives would encourage competition, reward Detroit for bringing efficient cars to market, and open a market niche in which to sell them. Feebates might even break
the political logjam that has long trapped the United States in a sterile debate over higher gasoline taxes versus stricter fuel-efficiency standards—as though those were the only policy options
and small, slow, incremental improvements were the only possible technical ones

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Air Pollution Add-On – 1AR Solvency (2/2)

4. Feebate market-based solutions are best: they cut pollution drastically by encouraging both
producers and consumers.

University of Michigan Record 07. (Faculty/Staff Newspaper, “California's clean car program would cut
pollution, save drivers money “ July 5, 2007, accessed on July 11 at
http://www.ur.umich.edu/0607/Jun25_07/17.shtml)

A market-based incentive program to reduce global warming emissions from new cars and trucks would cut
pollution as much as 33 percent and provide up to $2,500 in lifetime fuel savings for drivers, according to a new
study by the University of Michigan's Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI). The Clean Car Discount program
creates a schedule of fees and rebates, collectively known as "feebates," based on the amount of global warming
pollution different new vehicles produce. "Our analysis shows that by harnessing the power of price signals, feebates
spur consumers to purchase and manufacturers to produce cleaner vehicles," said Walter McManus, director of
UMTRI's Automotive Analysis Division.

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Oil Dependence 2AC Add-On

1. Feebates key to completely cut out oil use by 2050

The Oil Daily, 9/22/04, “US Could End Need For Oil Imports By 2040, Research Group Says.”,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-13427499_ITM, liz
The US could end its need for oil imports by 2040 and phase out oil use altogether by 2050, according to a study
published by the Rocky Mountain Institute.
The Colorado-based research and consulting group said in report called "Winning the Oil Endgame" that its
recommendations could deliver net annual savings to the US economy of $70 billion by 2025, create a million new
jobs and eliminate oil as a source of geopolitical conflict.
They would also cut US carbon dioxide emissions -- widely viewed as a key source of global warming -- by 25%.
Nathan Glasgow, one of the five authors, acknowledged that implementation of the proposals would require a
massive collaborative effort between government, industry and consumers. "It's great if this works as a symphony,
with all three working together, but if we can take action at any one of those three levels, we can still see good
effects on reducing oil dependency," Glasgow told Oil Daily. The 329-page study, co-funded by the Pentagon,
focuses in particular on reducing the consumption of petroleum-based fuels by cars and light trucks, which are
projected to account for almost half of total US oil demand in 2025.
A key recommendation calls for the use of "feebates," a system of rebates for buyers of fuel-efficient cars paid for
by fees levied on gas-guzzlers. These would encourage consumers to buy high-mileage vehicles and automakers to
develop and sell them.

2. Oil dependence causes terrorism

Ben-Meir 04. (Alon, Middle East Project Director @ World Policy Institute, United Press International,
June 21, lexis)
First, dependence on oil-producing countries compels us to protect their governments in order to maintain political
stability, no matter how corrupt, rigid, and undemocratic they may be. As long as we continue to be perceived as the
protector of undemocratic regimes and as long as the prospects for real reform remain elusive, we will continue to
suffer the disdain and hatred of the region’s masses. If these perceptions remain unchanged, we will be the target of
choice for Al-Qaida, whose public support in Saudi Arabia, for example, is currently higher than 50 percent and
whose main agenda there is to destabilize the country. As long as we remain beholden to the oil-producing states, we
compromise our strategic interests and limit our policy choices in the region, thereby severely impeding our chances
of ever winning the war on terrorism.

3. Terrorism causes global nuclear war

Speice 06. (Patrick, JD Candidate, William & Mary Law Review, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, Feb,
lexis)
The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek
to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be
devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense political
pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing
the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. n50 In addition to the threat posed
by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear
ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. n51 This proliferation will increase the
risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, n52 as well as increase the
likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

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Oil Dependence 1AR Extensions

Revenue neutral feebates will help fuel economy by 18% and reduce fuel

Kahn ’95 (Jeffery; Computer model forecasts impact of fuel efficiency incentives;
http://www.lbl.gov/Publications/Currents/Archive/Jan-13-1995.html )
In the analysis of feebates, six alternative fee/rebate programs were analyzed. All tilt the price that consumers pay
for new vehicles in favor of the more fuel-efficient ones. All are revenue neutral--that is, the fees and rebates even
out.
LBL's analysis concluded that over time, feebates would improve the average fuel economy of new vehicles to a
maximum of 11-18 percent. This would reduce U.S. fuel consumption in 2010 by 6-8 billion gallons per year. The
report predicts a 7-8 percent reduction in gasoline consumption by cars and light trucks. Reducing fuel consumption
also cuts carbon dioxide emissions. Between 1995 and 2010, cumulative emissions are reduced by 750-890 million
tons.

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Oil Spills 2AC Add-On

1. Incentivizing alternative fuel vehicles prevents oil exploration which causes oil spills and species
loss
Nader 00. (Ralph, author of numerous articles and books including Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-
In Dangers of the American Automobile, former Presidential candidate for the Reform Party,
http://www.satyamag.com/oct00/nader.html)
Passenger cars and light trucks account for 40 percent of the oil used in the U.S. Adequate mile-per-gallon standards
for motor vehicles could reduce smog and alleviate some of the pollution exacerbating global warming, reduce
consumption of foreign oil, and cut the trade deficit. Better standards could also save consumers money at the pump,
and lessen the toll air pollution takes on our health (according to several national studies, air pollution is responsible
for 64,000 deaths each year). Moreover, improved vehicle fuel efficiency standards, coupled with a strong
commitment to renewable energy, could eliminate our need to explore for oil in environmentally sensitive areas
around the globe. (Less oil exploration and development also means fewer off-shore oil spills and fewer leaky
underground storage tanks to pollute our nation’s ground water).

2. The impact is extinction

Santos 99. (Miguel, Environmental Crisis, p. 35-6)
In addition, natural forests provide recreation and unique scientific beauty while at the same time serving as the
basis for natural communities that provide life support to organisms (including people). As mentioned, one vital by-
product of plant photosynthetic activity is oxygen, which is essential to human existence. In addition, forests remove
pollutants and odors from the atmosphere. The wilderness is highly effective in metabolizing many toxic substances.
The atmospheric concentration of pollutants over the forest, such as particulates and sulfUr dioxide, are measurably
below that of adjacent areas (see Figure 2.3). In view of their ecological role in ecosystems, the impact of species
extinction may be devastating. The rich diversity of species and the ecosystems that support them are intimately
connected to the long-term survival of humankind. As the historic conservationist Aldo Leopold stated in 1949,
“The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth century is not television or radio, but the complexity of the
land organisms... To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.” An endangered
species may have a significant role in its coimnunity. Such an organism may control the structure and functioning of
the community through its activities. The sea otter, for example, in relation to its size, is perhaps the most voracious
of all marine mammals. The otter feeds on sea mollusks, sea urchins, crabs, and fish. It needs to eat more than 20
percent of its weight every day to provide the necessary energy to maintain its body temperature in a cold marine
habitat. The extinction of such keystone or controller species from the ecosystem would cause great damage. Its
extinction could have cascading effects on many species, even causing secondary extinction. Traditionally, species
have always evolved along with their changing environment. As disease organisms evolve, other organisms may
evolve chemical defense mechanisms that confer disease resistance. As the weather becomes drier, for example,
plants may develop smaller, thicker leaves, which lose water slowly. The environment, however, is now developing
and changing rapidly, but evolution is slow, requiring hundreds of thousands of years. If species are allowed to
become extinction, the total biological diversity on Earth will be greatly reduced: therefore, the potential for
natural adaptation and change also will be reduced, thus endangering the diversity of future human life-support
systems.

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Military 2AC Add-On

1. Commercial fuel economy developments spill over to military applications

Pike 04. (John, 21st Century Truck Initiative, Global Security, 6-5,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/21c-truck.htm)
The U.S. Army’s Army After Next (AAN) concept calls for a 75% reduction in battlefield petroleum usage, as part of overall goals to make the
Army’s future logistic operations and infrastructure lighter, less costly, more flexible, and less susceptible to interruption or attack. Reduced
petroleum usage is potentially the most significant goal because fuel constitutes 70% of the bulk tonnage supplied to military forces. Improved
fuel economy will reduce the Army’s peacetime operating costs. Highly efficient propulsion systems will make
large improvements in military truck fuel economy. More improvements are possible through truck structural weight reductions and
streamlining. Automated navigation, mission planning, and cargo inventory tools will improve fuel economy by allowing supplies to be delivered
with fewer miles driven. Emerging commercial advancements in propulsion technologies are expected greatly improve vehicle
fuel efficiency. The likely technologies are advanced, low heat rejection diesel engines and improved, electronically controlled
mechanical transmissions; hybrid electric drive systems, equipped with optimized electrical systems, including "smart" battery
management systems, advanced drive motor designs and motor controllers; and diesel fueled, fuel cell power systems. Army ground
vehicles may continue to use commercial diesel and JP8 fuels as their primary fuels for many years. However,
commercial shifts toward clean diesel fuels, and fuel cells may eventually lead to adopting "designer" diesel fuels
that can also be used in reformer-equipped fuel cell engines.

2. This is key to power projection

Peterson 03. (John L., Et Al., President of the Arlington Institute, Arlington Institute Report, A Strategy,
Moving America Away From Oil, http://www.arlingtoninstitute.org/library/A%20Strategy%20-
%20Moving%20America%20Away%20from%20Oil.pdf)
Strategic Benefits to the Military Increased Efficiency, Increased Surprise and Reconnaissance Capabilities, Decreased Cost The
strategy of
technology, fuels, and efficiency that makes oil obsolete could have profound positive impact on the U.S. military
forces. Major benefits include increased range, increased capabilities for surprise and reconnaissance purposes,
increased agility of forces, and decreased costs. A move toward an increase in the utilization of gasoline-electric
hybrid engines, Hypercar technologies, bio-fuels, and fuel cells among military vehicles could have significant
benefits. Increased Range and Mobility As an initial phase, the integration of gasoline-electric hybrid engines would
significantly improve the efficiency of U.S. forces. Just as in civilian vehicles, gasoline-electric hybrid engines are able to go up to
twice the distance on the same tank of fuel, without sacrificing performance. In the longer term, both HyperCar™ technologies and fuel cells will
have the same effect – make the vehicles more efficient in fuel consumption. This makes the vehicles more agile, capable of
covering more ground in less time. The positive effects in range and mobility can also be seen on the larger scale. An armored division
currently uses about 600,000 gallons of fuel a day57, which means large refueling vehicles and infrastructure must be on hand at all times. The
less fuel needed, the less refueling vehicles and infrastructure needed, and the more range and mobility of the
entire division. Decreased Costs In addition, this increased efficiency saves costs. When taking into consideration the
transporting of fuel and the vehicles that must refuel, large amounts of money can be saved through a decrease in fuel needs to
perform the same tasks and missions. Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute estimates that a comprehensive fuel
efficiency plan for the military could save upwards of ten billion dollars a year58. These funds can then be
reallocated toward other endeavors. Increased Surprise and Reconnaissance Capabilities Gasoline-electric hybrid engines
also have the potential to dramatically improve the surprise and reconnaissance capabilities. This is because the
electric motor is significantly quieter than internal combustion engines -- virtually noiseless – allowing U.S. forces to
sneak up on enemy targets or pass by unnoticed, at certain speeds. This capability would only increase when fuel cells become
available, as fuel cells are even quieter than gasoline-electric hybrid engines. Investment in these technologies would add many
advantages to war-fighting situations. The benefits in range and mobility, decreased costs, and surprise and reconnaissance capabilities
would only improved as the strategy accelerates and new technologies are brought on board. Increased efficiency would save time,
money, and energy and increase capabilities for most aspects of the military.

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Bush Bad Politics 2AC (1/2)

1. Feebates cost political capital

Automotive News, 4/16/07, [Harry Stoffer, “‘Feebate’ Programs May Help States Fight Warming”,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-30350864_ITM, liz]
Honda’s John German said that getting feebates right would take a “large expenditure of political capital.” For
that reason alone, it appears unlikely that a feebate system will be put into place. A bill to start a feebate system in
California was introduced earlier this year, but went nowhere. A Canadian feebate proposal is likely to suffer the
same fate.

2. Feebates unpopular in Congress – even supporters agree

Automotive News, 4/16/07, [Harry Stoffer, “‘Feebate’ Programs May Help States Fight Warming”,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-30350864_ITM, liz]
But even feebate backers concede that the political hurdles for a bill that might be called a tax hike on some
constituents are greater than they would be for other climate-related measures.
"There will be the perception issue of a tax increase,'' says Therese Langer, transportation program director of the
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, a nonprofit research group in Washington. Still, Langer says,
feebates may be an idea whose time has come.

4. PUBLIC –
a) Public hates feebates – gets spun as an SUV tax
Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment,
PhD and former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing
Feebate Programs”, November 25,
http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Policy Review: This bill has been introduced in the legislature by Rep. Marzilli, and he will do so again this year. In
the last round of debate, the bill failed to win approval in great part because it was branded as an “SUV tax”
(in spite of the within-class design of the feebate.) This highlights the importance of sending a clear message to the
public regarding the goals of a feebate. There has also been the suggestion that certain groups such as farmers and
businesses be exempt from the tax.

b) Popularity key to the agenda

LA Times 1-18
Yet as the president begins making that case to the American people -- starting with his second inaugural address
Thursday, followed by the annual State of the Union speech 13 days later -- he will in many ways be dealing from a
position of weakness. Bush is saddled with job approval ratings barely above 50% -- ahead of only President Nixon
among newly reelected second-term presidents since World War II. Some of his top priorities, including Social
Security restructuring and immigration issues, face skepticism from key Republican lawmakers. And recent polls
suggest that the public does not subscribe to key aspects of his agenda. Historians and analysts such as Bruce
Buchanan, a University of Texas political scientist, warn that Bush is in danger of overreaching in his second term.
"What he needs to do is to galvanize support, in and outside of Washington, to try to inspire a new beginning at a
time when his bare-majority approval scores are low by recent standards for just-reelected presidents and many in
his own party, not to mention Democrats, are already in open revolt against his agenda," Buchanan said.

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Bush Bad Politics 2AC (2/2)

4. AUTO/
a) Auto lobby hates the plan
LA Times 08. (“Bill would set car fees, rebates”, Los Angeles Times, January 27, pg. B1, lexis)
Auto companies, whose profit margins are higher on big cars, vigorously oppose feebates.
"Feebates harm businesses and consumers who need a range of vehicles," said Gloria Bergquist of the Washington,
D.C.-based Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, noting that carbon emissions will drop due to a new average fuel
economy standard of 35 miles per gallon by 2020.

b) They’re key to agenda

The Guardian (London) - Final Edition November 27, 2004
Consumers who want to exercise some political clout when they buy a car can also do so. Daimler Chrysler, Ford
and General Motors, for example, have been listed as being major contributors to the Republican party by
Opensecrets.org. You should also bear in mind that car makers pay lobbyists to try to bend legislation to their
interests. In 2002, the car industry was said to have collectively donated more than $ 1.1m to members of the US
Congress in an attempt to drum up support for the Bush administration's energy bill, which gave massive financial
and environmental concessions to the energy industry, often running counter to environmental interests. The car
industry also opposed Congressional proposals to raise federal fuel efficiency standards.

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Bush Bad Politics – 1AR Ext #4 – Auto Lobby

1. Extend our Auto Lobbies link – the DC Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers lobby against it –
that’s our LA Times ev.

2. More ev that the auto industry strongly opposes feebates

a)They view it as a regulation
NRTEE 05. (“Study on Vehicle Feebates”, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy,
October, http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/publications/feebates/briefing-note-feebates-eng.html)
Industry Groups (including vehicle manufacturers) - Industry associations are critical of feebates in general.
Their basic view is that a feebate is a regulation, so implementing a feebate would be counter to the spirit of the
voluntary agreement on GHG reductions between the vehicle manufacturers and the federal government. There was
also opposition from industry groups because of their view that a feebate will negatively impact vehicle sales.
However, industry groups did feel the government needed to provide incentives to consumers to purchase more fuel-
efficient vehicles.

b) The industry incites partisanship

Associated Press Financial Wire, 1/30/08, [Samantha Young, “Calif. lawmaker pulls bill that would
impose vehicle emission fee”, l/n, liz]
Unable to overcome auto industry opposition, a state lawmaker shelved an ambitious proposal Tuesday that would
have charged car buyers a fee for purchasing high-polluting vehicles. Redwood City Democrat Ira Ruskin said he
withdrew his bill because he did not have the votes to pass it. It would have imposed a $2,500 surcharge on vehicles
that spew the highest levels of greenhouse gases. Ruskin and environmental groups had tried for more than a year to
create a program giving incentives to Californians who buy cleaner cars, sport utility vehicles and pickup trucks. The plan would have provided a rebate of up to
$2,500 for fuel-efficient vehicles like the Toyota Prius and Honda Civic, while imposing a similar fee for buying vehicles with higher emissions like Hummers and
The lobbying by the auto industry and behind-the-scenes negotiations showcased the long-standing
Chevrolet Tahoes.
philosophical differences between Democrats and Republicans about how California should respond to climate
change. It was the second time Ruskin failed to get his plan out of the Assembly to make California the first in the
country to enact a "feebate law." He spent the day lobbying fellow Democrats, offering unsuccessfully to amend the
bill. He said he planned to reintroduce the bill later this year. The latest collapse followed the Bush administration rejection in December of
California's 2002 plan to curb tailpipe emissions. The state had sought permission to force auto makers to manufacture less polluting cars, and it is appealing the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's decision in federal court. The bill, the California Clean Car Discount Act, sought to encourage but not mandate more fuel efficient
cars by raising the price of gas-guzzling vehicles beginning with model year 2011. "This bill is the only ready-to-go option that we have that will lower greenhouse
gases from new vehicles," Ruskin said in an interview before he pulled the bill. The one-time auto fees would have targeted about a third of greenhouse gas emissions
equal to taking 20 million cars off the road by 2030 from California's transportation sector, which accounts for about 40 percent of the state's greenhouse gases,
according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a sponsor of the bill. The California Motors Car Dealers Association had argued that a surcharge on new vehicles
The Alliance of Automobile
would encourage Californians to buy or continue driving used vehicles that emit higher greenhouse gases than new cars.
Manufactures described the bill as "profoundly unfair" and said it would penalize small businesses, large families
and others that need larger vehicles.

c) Past legislation proves

McClatchy-Tribune Business News, 2/13/08, [“EDITORIAL: Feebate concept sound”, l/n, liz]
Assemblyman Ira Ruskin, D-Redwood City, withdrew his so-called "feebate" bill on Jan. 30 because it didn't have
the required votes -- thanks, in no small part, to automobile-industry opposition. But Ruskin should try again with a few changes to
the bill. He has promised to do so. The "feebate" plan would have imposed surcharges of up to $2,500 on vehicles that spew the highest levels of greenhouse gases,
and give rebates of up to $2,500 for those that emit the smallest levels. The fees would pay for the rebates. Many vehicles would have smaller rebates or fees, and 24
percent would come with no associated fee or rebate. With California's groundbreaking effort to reduce global warming emissions stalled by a long-running battle
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the innovative feebate plan looks like our best chance to slow climate change caused by vehicles. Ruskin's plan
would encourage consumers to buy clean, fuel-efficient cars and make socially responsible purchasing decisions. It would compel car makers to build more fuel-
efficient, cleaner cars, and it would accomplish it without costing the government money. The rebates and surcharges would range from $100 to $2,500, depending on
Ruskin
the amount of emissions. A Toyota Prius hybrid would come with a $2,500 rebate; a Hummer would come with a $2,500 surcharge. Makes sense. But
must address valid concerns that the feebate plan penalizes small businesses and large families. If he can address
those problems, his plan deserves support.

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Bush Good Politics 2AC (1/2)

1. Plan is net popular – Congress supports combining tax credits with mandates – huge momentum
and bipartisanship
E&E Daily 07. (“Bipartisan Senate group takes shot at alt. fuels legislation”, January 19, Vol. 10, No. 9,
lexis)
But supporters of the bill said they believe there is significantly more momentum this year behind a
comprehensive approach to energy policy and argued their bill could be a major component of that effort. "I hope
it becomes a central piece of the energy agenda of this Congress," said Sen. Ken Salazar (D-Colo.). Other lead
sponsors of the bill include Sens. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.). All
told, 17 Democrats and five Republicans have signed on as supporters of the bill, according to the legislation's
supporters. The DRIVE bill is a combination of tax credits and mandates for the use of alternative fuel and
vehicle technologies. The bill requires that 50 percent of all new vehicles sold in the United States by 2012 be either
alternative fueled, hybrids, plug-in hybrids or fuel-cell vehicles.

2. PUBLIC –
a) Feebates are overwhelmingly popular with the public – 66% support
Public Support for Feebates. USC 8 (Union of Concerned Scientists, “Putting the Brakes on Global Warming:
FEEBATES: Cutting Global Warming Pollution from Vehicles”, 5/20/08, accessed July 12, 2008 at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_vehicles/CCCD-3-6-06.pdf)
According to a 2006 poll, 60 percent of registered voters supported a feebates program, with an overwhelming
majority from every region, income level, and political affiliation indicating support.1 A 2008 poll saw support for
feebates rise to 66 percent.

b) Popularity key to the agenda

LA Times 1-18
Yet as the president begins making that case to the American people -- starting with his second inaugural address
Thursday, followed by the annual State of the Union speech 13 days later -- he will in many ways be dealing from a
position of weakness. Bush is saddled with job approval ratings barely above 50% -- ahead of only President Nixon
among newly reelected second-term presidents since World War II. Some of his top priorities, including Social
Security restructuring and immigration issues, face skepticism from key Republican lawmakers. And recent polls
suggest that the public does not subscribe to key aspects of his agenda. Historians and analysts such as Bruce
Buchanan, a University of Texas political scientist, warn that Bush is in danger of overreaching in his second term.
"What he needs to do is to galvanize support, in and outside of Washington, to try to inspire a new beginning at a
time when his bare-majority approval scores are low by recent standards for just-reelected presidents and many in
his own party, not to mention Democrats, are already in open revolt against his agenda," Buchanan said.

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Bush Good Politics 2AC (2/2)

3. AUTO LOBBY/
a) Auto lobby loves consumer incentives – prefers to regulatory action
Stoffer 07. (Harry, recipient of the Golden Quill award from the Washington Automotive Press
Association for excellence in automotive journalism, “AAM chief expects laws on energy, climate;
McCurdy's goal: Make sure autos don't bear full brunt”, Automotive News, February 26, pg. 8, lexis)
Dave McCurdy, president of the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, said in an interview last week that forces are
converging for federal action on energy consumption and climate change. McCurdy began the alliance job this month. The
alliance will work to ensure that any new law does not merely impose further limits on vehicle emissions, McCurdy said. Many other
industries responsible for greenhouse gases are not regulated, he noted.
Automakers oppose significantly tougher fuel economy standards. Instead, McCurdy said, the alliance will lobby for
broader availability of alternative fuels and more incentives for consumers to buy fuel-efficient vehicles.
Limited tax credits for fuel-saving vehicles took effect last year. ``We also know that we will be at the table'' when
congressional leaders make decisions, McCurdy said. But he conceded that ``positions that have always worked in the past may
not work'' in the future. Democrats control Congress for the first time in 12 years. Political analysts have predicted that lawmakers will
introduce climate and energy bills and hold hearings but will not enact major laws until after the 2008 presidential election. But anxiety about
instability in oil-producing regions is growing, McCurdy said. In his State of the Union address last month, President Bush McCurdy, 56, was
a Democratic U.S. representative from Oklahoma from 1981 to 1995. Before he joined the alliance he was president of a 1,300-member
association of electronics manufacturers. McCurdy calls himself a free-market Democrat. He has a three-year contract with the alliance. Its
members are the Detroit 3, Toyota, Volkswagen, BMW, Mitsubishi, Mazda and Porsche.

b) They’re key to agenda

The Guardian (London) - Final Edition November 27, 2004
Consumers who want to exercise some political clout when they buy a car can also do so. Daimler Chrysler, Ford
and General Motors, for example, have been listed as being major contributors to the Republican party by
Opensecrets.org. You should also bear in mind that car makers pay lobbyists to try to bend legislation to their
interests. In 2002, the car industry was said to have collectively donated more than $ 1.1m to members of the US
Congress in an attempt to drum up support for the Bush administration's energy bill, which gave massive financial
and environmental concessions to the energy industry, often running counter to environmental interests. The car
industry also opposed Congressional proposals to raise federal fuel efficiency standards.

4. BIPART/
a) Plan has bipartisan support – unites the usual factions
USA Today, 7/9/06, [John Machacek, Gannett News Service “Demand for fuel-efficient cars puts pressure on
Congress”, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-07-09-alt-fuel_x.htm, liz]
With voters clamoring for relief from sky-high gas prices and facing long waits to buy hybrid cars, bipartisan
legislation to increase production of fuel-efficient vehicles and alternative fuels is gaining momentum. More than a
quarter of the Senate, including five potential presidential candidates, and 84 House members are pushing for a vote
on "vehicle and fuel choice" measures that are supported by an unusual alliance of conservative and liberal groups.

b) Bipart key to agenda

National Journal 1-22
Despite the wide-eyed goals some Republicans have espoused since the election, Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa,
warns that no majority party in the Senate can simply ride roughshod over the minority.
"Even if we had 60 Republicans, nothing is going to get done in the Senate unless you have a bipartisan
approach," Grassley said in an interview. As Senate Finance Committee chairman, he will be at the center of the
battles over reforming Social Security and rewriting the tax code. "The necessity for bipartisanship," Grassley
added, "is going to give minority elements in both political parties an opportunity to have a voice."

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Bush Good Politics – 1AR Ext #2 – Public

Revenue neutrality solves your public link

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment,
PhD and former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing
Feebate Programs”, November 25,
http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Revenue neutrality can be quite important in determining public opinion about a feebate. Anything other than
neutrality could be perceived negatively as yet another rise in taxes. Yet, in tough economic times state legislatures
are often interested in fresh sources of revenue. (In at least one recent case feebate legislation was deemed not
successful because it was revenue-neutral during a period when the state was actively looking for revenue-enhancing
measures1.) If a part of the revenues can be diverted to worthy programs (such as public outreach efforts to increase
environmental awareness), the effect of a feebate can be further enhanced. In any case, it is hard to keep a feebate
scheme completely revenue-neutral from year to year without adjusting the rate structure constantly to take into
account the composition of the new vehicle fleet, and some amount of the revenue must necessarily be used for
administrative costs.

Popular with the public – view as job creation and relief from oil
Podesta et. al 05. (John, Chief of Staff under President Clinton and Visiting Prof of Law at
Georgetown U, “Taking Action on Oil Savings”, Center for American Progress, September 13,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/09/b1033079.html)
In the face of record-breaking oil company profits, progressives can offer decisive action and visionary leadership –
to provide immediate relief to working Americans, reduce long-term structural demand for oil, create real
transportation choice, and retool the auto industry for jobs in the markets of the future. Public opinion is with us.
Voters are looking for real answers and concrete action to break our dependence on oil.

Revenue neutral feebates are politically popular

Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency
Incentives: An Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy, September,
http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

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Bush Good Politics – 1AR Ext #3 – Auto Lobby

The auto alliance wants incentives for AFAs

McCurdy 07. (Dave, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, “Statement
before the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation”, State News Service,
May 3, lexis)
Alliance members support enhancing energy security, promoting fuel diversity and increasing fuel efficiency
through accelerating the availability of the growing number of advanced technology and alternative fuel
automobiles in the market. Alternative fuel autos, including vehicles that run on hybrid-electric technology, clean
diesel, and alternative fuels like E85 ethanol and hydrogen, will help our country address the growing concerns
about U.S. gasoline consumption and oil imports. Federal and state incentives for consumers who purchase
alternative fuel automobiles can accelerate the introduction of these highly fuel-efficient vehicles. Working
together, we believe that government and industry can put more alternative fuel automobiles on our roadways.

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a2 Elections – McCain Does Not Solve Our Aff

McCain’s alternative energy promises are empty – just election year rhetoric with no follow
through – his record proves
E&E News PM 6-23-08. (“McCain outlines incentives to boost alternative vehicles, fuels”, Vol. 10,
No. 9, lexis)
Meanwhile, the campaign of Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois, McCain's Democratic rival, continued to assault
McCain for his embrace last week of offshore drilling policies, saying the likely Republican nominee's most
recent rhetoric did not match his record in Congress.
"It's notable that over the course of his Senate career he has multiple times voted against those CAFE
standards," Jason Furman, director of economic policy for the Obama campaign, said of McCain. "Even today,
he's not proposing any improvements in those CAFE standards."

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a2 Election PTX – Auto Key to Election

1. <insert Autos Link Turn>

b) Auto unions key to sway crucial swing states

Detroit News 04. (August 8)
Within the battle for Michigan's 17 electoral votes, John Kerry and George W. Bush will fight for the votes of the
United Auto Workers. [Continues]
Dingell received substantial UAW support in a tight 2002 primary race against Rep. Lynn Rivers, helping him turn
back a stiff challenge from an established congresswoman. The UAW is widely credited with tipping the scales for
Sen. Debbie Stabenow in an upset victory over Spencer Abraham in 2000. Not to mention Al Gore's decisive victory
that same year. This year, the union's influence could extend beyond Michigan. There are sizable numbers of auto
workers in swing states like Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio and Missouri. There are sizable numbers of UAW retirees
in Florida.

2. <remember to insert public link turns>

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a2 Spending Disad (1/2)

1. NO LINK --
a) feebates are self-financing
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of feebates to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461, University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute, May, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
A feebates program gives incentives to consumers to buy, and to manufacturers to produce and sell
cleaner products by combining a fee on dirtier products with a rebate on cleaner products. See Greene et
al. 2005 and Johnson 2006 for examples of feebates programs applied to vehicles. Two features of feebates programs
have made them attractive to policy makers. By addressing choices across the full range of alternatives, feebates
programs have the potential to stimulate more significant changes than one-sided approaches.
Probably more important is that a feebates program can be structured so that the fees
collected equal the rebates paid, making the program self-financing. The figure below can be used to
explain the parameters of a feebates program for vehicle emissions.

b) require no government allocations

Callahan 07. (Kateri, President of the Alliance to Save Energy, “Testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee”, June 21, http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=8a6b98d8-17fe-4a17-897a-264c33ab6ad9&Witness_ID=f44fb28b-82b6-4fd8-
88d2-6c5361dc9c6e)
We would recommend setting this dividing line between fees and rebates each year such that the total fees would pay for all the
rebates thereby allowing the program to operate at no cost to the government. Under such an arrangement, about half the
vehicles would receive a rebate, and about half the vehicles would be assessed a fee. This would create an incentive for
manufacturers to use fuel-efficient technologies in the vehicles they produce, and hence should increase the availability of efficient
vehicles, as well as creating an incentive for consumers to purchase more efficient vehicles. As fuel economies increased, the reference
mpg’s would be ratcheted up, creating an incentive for continual improvement, but never out of line with the existing market. This policy has the potential to improve
fuel economies throughout the passenger vehicle fleet, not just give new technologies a foothold in the marketplace.

c) Revenue-neutrality proves it would involve no new tax

Smith 4 (Mike Smith,Content Coordinator and co-founder of the Natural Edge Project and co-author of The Natural
Advantage of Nations, “Encouraging more sustainable practice – the easy way” Sept 2004. Accessed July 10 at
http://www.publish.csiro.au/?act=view_file&file_id=EC121p24.pdf)

It seems so. Two ideas of note are ‘feebates’ and Germany’s Best Available Technology legislation.7 Feebates
very simply combine both a fee on the
most environmentally harmful brands of a certain products, thereby providing income to governments which facilitates a
consumer-encouraging rebate on the most environmentally benign products. Take the example of the concept applied to car use: when
buying a new car you would pay an extra fee if it were an inefficient user of fuel, or alternatively get a rebate if it were energy
efficient. The neutral point would be set so that fees and rebates balanced, and so it becomes neither an inflationary measure
nor a disguised tax. The fees and rebates may impact at the point of sale, or on annual registration fees, and usually offset each other ensuring
fiscal neutrality. In principle, this can be a costneutral program to government, not involving any new taxes.

3. Even if we lose the revenue-neutrality debate, plan doesn’t break the budget. Alternative fuel
vehicles are not too costly – the rebate would be small
Wood 08. (Charles Cresson, president of Post-Petroleum Transportation, former technology management consultant,
researcher, and journalist, worked with over 125 different organizations in more than 20 countries, Five Myths Hindering the
Development of Alternative Fuels, May 13, http://www.greenestchoices.com/energy-articles/five-myths-hindering-development-
alternative-fuels.php#author)
The fact is that many alternative fuels are now ready for widespread use, and the pressing peak oil situation means that we will
soon be forced to use them. All electric cars, available now, can be used for commutes and deliveries; ethanol and natural gas are
already widely used for municipal transportation. Many of these vehicles are less expensive to operate than comparable

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petroleum-fueled vehicles. Supporting this, a three-year study conducted by the Energy Management Institute concluded that alternative fuels are now
cost-competitive with hydrocarbon-based competitors.

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a2 Spending Disad (2/2)

4. We solve the terminal impact –

a) Extend our auto competitiveness advantage – this sector is the key internal link to the US
economy, not government spending – that’s our UCS ev

b) Revenue Neutral Feebates spur economic development

Center for American Progress ’05 (A progressive Response to High Oil and Gasoline Prices; May 6,
2005; http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/05/b669657.html )
Reducing our dependence on oil must be a national budget priority. Investment in reducing oil consumption now
will save the government and consumers money in the long run. There are existing tax incentives that actually
increase oil consumption. These should be eliminated and funds redirected, starting with the $25,000 tax credit for
the heaviest SUVs. This would save the Treasury almost $250 million annually and help cover the costs of other
programs to help reduce oil consumption. Most of the near-term policies proposed here, however, could be
designed to be nearly revenue neutral. In addition to saving the federal Treasury money by increasing the fuel
efficiency of the government fleet, they could increase access to affordable, reliable transportation, which in turn
would expand job opportunities for many workers and spur economic development.

c) Savings from gas use will be re-invested into the economy

UCS 03. (Union Of Concerned Scientists, February 10,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/cars_and_suvs/page.cfm?pageID=228)
Fuel savings would be accompanied by billions of dollars in savings each year through reduced fuel costs, along
with the creation of a significant number of new jobs. By 2010, consumers could be saving $9.8 billion per year. This figure
would rise to over $28 billion by 2020. These savings, along with the investments automobile manufacturers would make to improve
fuel economy, could be returned to the nation's economy, with a resulting increase of over 40,000 jobs in the
automobile industry by 2010, ultimately reaching over 100,000 new automobile industry jobs by 2020.

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a2 State Sales Tax Disad

1. No link -- revenue neutral feebates means sales tax revenues remain constant
Bernow No date Given (Steve, Tellus Institute; Program Design for LOCAL FUEL ECONOMY
IMPROVEMENTS (FEEBATE) INITIATIVE; righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus%20Feebate
%2010-9.doc )
Finally, if the program were successful, the zero-point would have to keep moving upwards each year, as might the
size of the feebate itself. The current sales tax rate in RI is 7% on new vehicles. Our estimate is that the state gets
roughly $40-45 million in revenues from motor vehicle sales and use (based on http://www.budget.state.ri.us/ ). If
the feebate is designed to be revenue neutral, then there should be no net increase or decrease in the sales tax
revenues.

2. Prefer our ev – all their link evidence comes from auto companies who are obviously biased

3. We have a better internal link to their economy impact – extend our competitiveness advantage.
They can never win that a single state is more key to the econ than job creation and manufacturing.

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CAFÉ CP 2AC (1/2)

1. CAFÉ is the status quo – extend our 1AC NSWG ev – it’s an unfunded mandate that links
more to all your offense and can’t solve for market sustainability.

2. Perm – do both – gets double solvency.

3. And, perm solves best

Boston Globe, 5/23/07, [“Market can fuel energy solutions”, John Heywood, Ddirector of the Sloan Automotive Lab at
MIT. He is also leader of a research team on fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, l/n, liz]
But thereare ways to lower the cost and the burden of relying solely on regulation. Measures that could stimulate consumer
desires for fuel economy would ease both the costs and uncertainty borne by the manufacturers. Along with tightened CAFE
standards, here are two proposals that could go a long way toward solving the crisis. First, create a "feebate" system that would impose levies on the
purchase of gas guzzlers while providing rebates to buyers of gas sippers. This program would allow individuals to pay for extra power and size if they so desire
it, while promoting the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles by others. The system could be revenue-neutral, neither requiring nor
producing additional government funding.

4. Perm – do the CP

5. CAFÉ fails – prefer our comparative ev

McCurdy 07. (Dave, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, “Statement before the US Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation”, State News Service, May 3, lexis)
A market-driven, market-responsive approach is needed. Any effective program needs to consider the realities of the
marketplace. CAFE can create distortions in the market, depending on the price of gasoline. By contrast, incentives in place
for the renewable fuels program enable competitive pricing of ethanol, which is resulting in increased consumer demand for this
alternative fuel. Incentives are needed to encourage real reductions in carbon dioxide. Incentives can encourage consumers to
purchase the many advanced technology autos on sale today. Incentives can encourage energy providers to increase availability of
alternative fuels. And incentives can reward automakers for high achievement in developing new technologies and producing more alternative
fuel autos. CAFE, by contrast, has few incentives and fails to bring consumers into the equation. Any effective, broader
program to reduce carbon dioxide needs to allow for companies to grow and thrive, without imposing provisions that would
result in job loss. The ultimate goal is real reductions in tons of carbon dioxide, not wealth transfer among companies or higher cost autos.

6. CAFÉ incentives are static – only feebates allows for a long-term transition
Pandey 06. (Rita, Senior Fellow @ National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, “A Proposal for Stimulating Fuel
Economy of Road Transport in India”, January)
A key advantage of feebates over fuel economy standards is that they provide a continuing incentive to increase fuel
economy as new technologies are developed (Gordon and Levenson, 1989). Once fuel economy standards are met, there is no
incentive for manufacturers to make further increases. 4 The feebate schedule provides an ever-present extra incentive to increase
fuel economy whenever new, more cost-effective technologies become available. Disadvantages of feebates include the possibility that they
will be perceived as a kind of tax and that they will undoubtedly confer different benefits and costs on different manu-facturers. The first disadvantage can be
mitigated by designing feebates to be revenue neutral: to pay out as much in rebates as they collect in fees. The second disadvantage can be
mitigated by establishing different feebate schedules for different vehicle classes, a topic that will be considered below.

7. EMISSIONS TURN/
a) Feebates solve for 34% more emissions than a CAFÉ approach

University of Michigan Record ‘7. (Faculty/Staff Newspaper, “California's clean car program would cut pollution, save
drivers money “ July 5, 2007, http://www.ur.umich.edu/0607/Jun25_07/17.shtml)

Experts on fuel efficiency and vehicle markets gathered on Monday, April 21, in Sacramento, Calif., to explore the idea of feebates as a strategy for
reducing carbon emissions from cars and trucks. California is trying to bridge the gap between current greenhouse gas laws—and the level of emissions the state has
pledged to reach under AB32, the far-reaching Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. The state is targeting the transportation sector because the 25 million cars and trucks in California produce
almost 40 percent of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions. Feebates are a combination of a FEE (or tax) on inefficient vehicles and a reBATE for ones that are more efficient. The idea is that the
money balances out and the program pays for itself—that is, the fees from some of the car buyers become the rebates given to others. In the symposium, examples were offered of similar systems
being adopted in Europe to reward the manufacturers and buyers of cars with low CO2 emissions, while collecting from the less-efficient ones. Walter McManus from the

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University of Michigan’s Transportation Research Institute gave a detailed analysis of feebates, which he believed could achieve
34% more emissions reductions than either CAFE.

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CAFÉ CP 2AC (2/2)

b) The impact is extinction – US C02 directly responsible for ocean acidity

Hendricks and Inslee 07. (Bracken, Senior Fellow w/ American Progress; Jay, Rep from Washington, Apollo’s Fire, p 8)

8. MARKET SHIFT – sends clear price signals

Stein 08. (Adam, VP of marketing/co-founder of Terrapass, an alternative energy company, “Adventures in Carbon Pricing”
February 20, 2008, accessed Junly 11 at http://www.terrapass.com/blog/posts/adventures-in-carbon-pricing)

First: the California Assembly this week votes on the California Clean Car Discount Act, a “feebate” system that imposes a direct charge on sales of gas guzzlers
and uses the funds to reward buyers of fuel sippers. The way it works it pretty simple. If you buy a Chevy Tahoe, you’ll have to pony up a $2,500 fee, which then goes
straight to all the folks buying Honda Civics. Fees and rebates are determined on a sliding scale based on the fuel efficiency of the vehicle in question. Although not quite a carbon tax,
the system does establish clear price signals for energy efficiency, and such feebate systems are thought to be an improvement
over CAFE.

9. CP CAN’T SOLVE COMPETITIVENESS –

a) places the full burden on auto manufacturers --feebates don’t
Natalie Mims, consultant with the Energy and Resources Team, and Noah Buhayar, a fellow at Rocky Mountain Institute,
2/10/08, [ “How gas guzzlers could help pay for more efficient cars”http://green.yahoo.com/blog/amorylovins/28/how-gas-
guzzlers-could-help-pay- for-more-efficient-cars.html, liz]
While the new CAFE standard is a landmark event -- U.S. fleet efficiency has been relatively flat since 1985 -- this
command-and-control style of regulation oppresses market forces and requires automobile manufacturers to install
fuel economy technology, regardless of the cost. Fortunately, there is an alternative to this expensive and ineffective
approach to regulating fuel economy. It's called a feebate. What is a feebate? A feebate is a policy that provides a one-time rebate on fuel-
efficient vehicles and places a surcharge on vehicles that are inefficient. New light vehicles that exceed a defined fuel economy benchmark, called the "pivot point,"
qualify for a rebate. The logic is that people who choose to drive more efficient vehicles deserve a rebate, because they are working to reduce social costs such as
pollution and oil dependence, congestion, health problems, and climate change. The amount of the rebate would depend on where the vehicle's fuel economy falls in
relation to the pivot point for vehicles in the same class. A Honda Civic, for instance, would qualify for a rebate because it's more efficient and consumes less fuel than
comparably sized vehicles. Conversely, new vehicles that are less fuel efficient than others in the same class would be subject to a fee. Why feebates work A feebate
is a better approach to regulating the automotive industry because it allows manufacturers to install as much fuel economy technology as is cost-effective, as opposed
to requiring manufacturers to install technology regardless of the cost. Feebates
also help consumers to consider the long-term impacts of
a vehicle's fuel economy when they purchase the car. Better yet, a well-designed feebate can be self-financing. Fees
could pay not only for the rebates, but also the administrative costs of running the program.

b) unfunded mandate on Detroit – Big Three fudge the numbers to meet requirements
Eric Baerren, 7/30/07, [Freelance Journalist, North Star Writers Group, “Kill the Fatted CAFE: Let Feebates Encourage the
Purchase of Fuel-Efficient Cars”, liz]
A feebate is a fairly simple thing. Those who choose to buy a gas-guzzling truck or car are charged extra. That’s OK, those of us who don’t own these things are already subsidizing those
who do through our taxes that help pay for things like keeping open our oil supply, public health costs created by auto exhaust, environmental damage, wear and tear on roads and a few other
things. This extra fee would reflect those costs currently covered by everyone else. Rather than dropping that money into a government treasury, it would be distributed to people who choose to
buy smaller, more efficient cars. The only money held by government would be what is necessary to administer the program. Although this requires government to offer the kinds of incentives
that would artificially stimulate demand for fuel efficient cars, itwould fulfill two things that that are highly positive. The first is that a feebate program is
sound economics. The government doesn’t mandate that people buy more efficient cars, and it doesn’t require the automakers to
make cars that people could very easily opt not to buy in the near future. It instead relies on incentives meant to encourage good
behavior. The second is that it frees Detroit from what is an unfunded government mandate. You can point fingers at the Big Three for not
anticipating this moment, and you should, but theirs is not at all like the tobacco industry. Punitive policy would have a number of unintended negative
consequences. But, this would provide an ongoing incentive for Detroit to conduct real research, not just play the numbers game of
CAFE.

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8. <Insert a2 Regulations Only CP frontline>

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Gas Tax CP 2AC (1/2)

1. Perm – do both. Gets double solvency and overwhelms the politics link – plan would not be
enough to offset how unpopular gas taxes are.

2. Gax taxes fail to solve for long-term fuel conversion choices – only feebates work
Grist, Environmental news and commentary, 3/29/05, [Alan Durning, founder and executive director of Northwest
Environment Watch, “Feebates, not fuel taxes, are key”, http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2005/3/29/165716/905, liz]
Thomas Friedman's usually pitch-perfect commentary on energy and security hit some high notes Sunday, but it also went off key twice, in
disappointing ways. First, the sweetest passage from his New York Times column: By doing nothing to lower U.S. oil
consumption, we are financing both sides in the war on terrorism and strengthening the worst governments in the
world. That is, we are financing the U.S. military with our tax dollars and we are financing the jihadists--and the
Saudi, Sudanese and Iranian mosques and charities that support them--through our gasoline purchases. The oil boom
is also entrenching the autocrats in Russia and Venezuela....Finally, by doing nothing to reduce U.S. oil
consumption we are only hastening the climate change crisis. Now, the ear splitters: We need a gasoline tax that would keep
pump prices fixed at $4 a gallon, even if crude oil prices go down. At $4 a gallon (premium gasoline averages about $6 a gallon in Europe), we
could change the car-buying habits of a large segment of the U.S. public, which would make it profitable for the car companies to convert more
of their fleets to hybrid or ethanol engines, which over time could sharply reduce our oil consumption. What's wrong with that? I like the sound of
it and the general drift. And I don't take issue with very high fuel taxes, if they are offset with cuts in conventional taxes and if their regressivity is
offset. But Friedman goes sharp here in one important detail: he suggests that fuel taxes are mostly about changing
car-buying habits. In fact, they're a pretty poor instrument for influencing purchases. (They do a better job of
influencing day-to-day driving decisions, but even there, other things might be more effective, such as pay-as-you-
drive insurance.) The reason fuel taxes fall down as an incentive for buying more-efficient vehicles is that
consumers are notoriously short-sighted in their estimates of the value of future energy savings. Typically,
consumers will only pay extra for vehicle fuel economy if the investment pays itself off within three years. (In
economic lingo, their "discount rate" is well about 50 percent for future energy savings.) According to Rocky
Mountain Institute (huge pdf, see page 139), consumers underinvest in fuel economy by roughly 60 percent-- at any
given fuel prices. So simply raising fuel taxes, as Friedman suggests, will certainly factor into consumers' calculus and encourage them to buy slighly more efficient
vehicles. But it won't have the mammoth effects he suggests. The cost of fueling remains fairly modest: perhaps one-eighth of the cost of owning and operating a
vehicle. Hiking fuel taxes might raise that fraction to one-fifth or even one-fourth, but it won't make fuel-economy the overriding factor in purchase decisions. As
RMI writes, "The difference between a 30-mpg and a 40-mpg car, though consequential for society, will seem to the short-sighted buyer to be worth only about the
price of a set of floor mats." So, if Friedman gets gas up to $4 a gallon, the difference may double to about the price of two sets of floor mats. But that's not going to
set off a dramatic change in car buying habits. Fuel taxes won't close the yawning chasm between consumers' payback requirements and the economically justified
level of efficiency investment. But feebates can: they make the lifecycle energy costs of new vehicles powerfully evident in the one price that matters most to car
buyers--the sticker price. These point-of-purchase incentives charge fees to the buyers of inefficient vehicles and refund the resulting revenue as rebates given to the
buyers of efficient vehicles. The fees and rebates are directly proportional to the efficiency of the model, so there's a continuous and market-wide upward tug on fuel
We need a
economy. They're on the docket in Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and -- most recently -- Connecticut. So here's Friedman rewritten:
gasoline tax vehicle feebates to turbocharge gains in fuel economy. that would keep pump prices fixed at $4 a
gallon, even if crude oil prices go down. That we would change the car-buying habits of a large segment of the U.S.
public, which would make it profitable for the car companies to convert more of their fleets to hybrid or ethanol
engines, which over time could sharply reduce our oil consumption. ** their editing, not ours **

3. Studies prove feebates solve better than gas taxes alone

Entropy Production, 8/9/05, [Robert McLeod, “The Feebate”, entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2005/08/feebate.html]
There have been a number of academic papers on the feebate concept. The most recent one, which I will regurgitate here, is DL
Greene et al., Feebates, rebates and gas-guzzler taxes: a study of incentives for increased fuel economy, Energy Policy 33 (2005), pp. 767-775.
The authors examined a number of feebate programs, at a $500 and $1000 per 0.01 bushels per rod rate (or that might
be gallons per mile). The impact of the program on average mileage is heavily determined by how far-sighted the consumer is. Since the
consumer is myopic with a 4.67x diopter, most of the analysis is based off a 3-year amortization period, rather than the assumed 14-year lifespan
of the vehicle. The last key point, is that they aren't using an absolute zero-sum feebate -- there is a very small ding to government finances.
The results? 1. $500 per 0.01 GPM: a 12.5 % gain in car mileage and a 25.1 % gain in light truck mileage. 2. $1000 per 0.01 GPM: a 24.6 %
gain in car mileage and a 40.7 % gain in light truck mileage. They also looked at a pure gas-guzzler tax or a pure rebate.
Neither is nearly effective as the combination. The results appear quite significant, especially in terms of the impact on the evil
soccer mom's SUV. One of the conclusions is that buying patterns aren't significantly altered by a feebate. Instead, it mostly acts to
facilitate the purchase of more technologically advanced models. Overall unit sales are slightly decreased, but the overall

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monetary value of car sales increases with the higher capital costs. Of course, this favours Japanese automakers over the
comparatively mentally retarded domestic manufacturers.

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Gas Tax CP 2AC (2/2)

4. Perm – do the CP

5. CAN’T SOLVE CONSUMER SHIFT –

a) Gas taxes can’t solve for consumer preferences – prefer our ev, it’s comparative to feebates
Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An
Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
September, http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

b) And, production conversion alone cannot solve without consumer credits – Europe proves
Birmingham Post 07. (“The end of sports cars?”, pg. 19, February 8, lexis)
Spokesman Nigel Wanncott said: "This proposed legislation is likely to result in less choice for the motorist and higher prices on the
dealer forecourt. "We support the fundamental tenant which is the need for cleaner cars, but manufacturers who have made the cleanest
cars have often found that consumers do not want to buy them. "We need a more integrated approach looking at the
development of alternative fuels and government incentives for people to buy cleaner vehicles. "Otherwise
manufacturers will simply be forced to make cars that consumers don't want. Cars with large engines - sports car and luxury
vehicles - will not be able to be produced. "We don't want to wipe manufacturing off the face of the UK and Europe because targets
are too stringent, choice is reduced and vehicles too costly."

6. ECON TURN/
a) A gas tax would spur an economic recession
The Bond Buyer 08. (“Study: Raise Fed Gas Tax”, January 16, Vol. 363 No. 32798, pg. 1, lexis)

"Raising the gas tax would put us in the fast lane to a recession," Grassley said in a release. "Businesses and
consumers depend on strong transportation infrastructure. A gas tax increase would ramp up transportation costs
without ensuring road improvements."

b) X-A Nyquist from the 1AC – that would incite totalitarianism, mass famine, and escalating
nuclear lashouts

7. <Insert a2 Regulations-Only CP frontline>

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Gas Tax CP 1AR – Ext #5 – Consumer Credits Turn

Only the perm solves – a gas tax alone can’t solve consumer preferences – consumers will not
account for lifetime savings
Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
Still, a fuel tax can be effective in reducing fuel consumption over the long term, by reducing mileage driven, and
could complement a more effective strategy that targets the purchase of new cars. A reason to target car purchases
directly rather than relying exclusively on a gas tax is that there is evidence that consumers by and large are
unable to accurately measure the dollar value of fuel efficiency differences between vehicles over their useful
lifetimes.11 Box 1 illustrates the potential effects of incorrectly measuring lifetime fuel savings.

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a2 Gas Tax CP – a2 Highways NB

1. Gas tax won’t finance highway reconstruction efforts – inflation alt cause
Indianapolis Star 04. (“INDOT Budget”, October 2, http://www.indystar.com/articles/1/183401-4771-
092.html)
But the age-old funding structure has its drawbacks.
For one, gas taxes in the majority of states are not indexed to inflation. So, even as construction costs climb, gas
tax revenues remain relatively flat -- that is, unless legislators raise rates.

2. Perm solves the net benefit

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Reg Neg CP 2AC (1/4)

1. Perm –do all the plan and the parts of the CP that mandate a reg neg, but not the parts that
make it prior.

2. ROLLBACK TURN/ reg negs are unconstitutional

Ackerman 94. (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University, Duke Law Journal, April)
How should policymakers decide which approach to regulation is best given our commitment both to public participation and to technical competence and efficiency?
regulatory negotiation and incentive systems involve private individuals, they raise
The initial consideration is a constitutional one. Because both
concerns about the extent to which the government can delegate public tasks to the private sector. American democracy traditionally is wary of delegating
policymaking tasks to private groups. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 36 the U.S. Supreme Court objected to Congress's
reliance on industry self-regulation. The Government urges that the codes will "consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by
representative members of that industry -- by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems." . . . But would it be seriously contended that
Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and
beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that
Such a delegation of
purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? . . . The answer is obvious.
legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of
Congress

3. Perm – do the CP then do all of the plan

4. Turn/ Reg negs take longer, increase litigation, don’t help compliance and are likely to be
modified
Grimes 01. (Shepherd R., J.D., "The Federal Regional Fishery Management Councils", Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal, 6 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 187, lexis)
Finally, what appears to be at the heart of his argument and underlying all of his other criticisms is that negotiated rulemaking prevents the agency from searching for
what is truly in the public interest. 42 Underlying the APA and all other statutes delegating to agencies the authority to promulgate regulations is the notion that the
agency will act in the best interest of the public as a whole, that is, the public interest. As he points out, the public interest may not always be clearly defined, if at all
defined by the authorizing legislation. Regardless of whether it is precisely defined by the statute or left largely to agency discretion, Congress presumes that the
agency will exercise its discretion and judgment to further the public interest. However, under
a negotiated paradigm the goal is to achieve
consensus among substantially affected parties who are likely to challenge the regulation, not promote any notion of the public interest.
While it is true that other forms of modern rulemaking, such as notice and comment under the APA 44 and the National Environmental Policy Act's notice and
comment procedure for environmental impact statements, 45 encourage enhanced participation by affected interests, they do not "[substitute the participation
requirements] for the agency's responsibility to engage in reasoned decisionmaking in search of the public interest." [*194] Other commentators have examined
negotiated rulemaking to see how well the process accomplishes its stated objectives of increasing the acceptability of rules, improving their substance, reducing
likelihood that affected parties will resist rules or challenge them in court, and decreasing the amount of time required for promulgation. In particular, Professor Cary
Coglianese performed "an empirical assessment of the impact of negotiated rulemaking on two of its principal goals: reducing overall rulemaking time and decreasing
the number of judicial challenges to agency rules." He assembled and analyzed a dataset of "all negotiated rulemakings across all federal agencies" in order to assess
how well negotiated rulemaking had achieved these goals. He concluded, to the surprise of many, that the
process did not appear to be more capable
of limiting the time required to promulgate regulations nor did the process avoid subsequent litigation of rules more than the regular notice
and comment procedures required by the APA. 48 In fact, his results indicated that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which utilized the
procedure the most, had not realized any decrease in the time required for promulgation compared to its notice and comment rules,
and had actually seen a higher rate of litigation of negotiated rules than other significant rules promulgated via notice and comment alone. In
explanation of his findings, Professor Coglianese proposes that they may be due to the fact that for the negotiation process to be successful agencies must both secure
and maintain consensus among parties involved which oftenproves very difficult. 50 Furthermore, the problem of consensus is
complicated by the multiple avenues of input and oversight in the regulatory process which increase the
additionally
likelihood of changes in policy that alter the previous agreements or negotiations.

5. Perm – do the CP.

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Reg Neg CP 2AC (2/4)

6. Perm – do all the plan and the parts of the CP that mandate a reg neg, but not the parts that
specify the reg neg should be about the plan

7. Turn/ Reg negs delay, increase litigation, make worse policy and cause more conflicts
Coglianese 01. (Cary, Associate Prof of Public Policy @ Harvard and Chair of the Regulatory Policy
Program @ Harvard Law, "Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip
Harter", New York University Environmental Law Journal, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 386, lexis)

Despite nearly twenty years of experimentation, negotiated rulemaking has yet to achieve a demonstrable reduction in the time it
takes to develop regulations nor in the frequency or intensity of subsequent litigation over those regulations. Indeed, the
empirical record shows that negotiated rulemaking actually demands more effort and results in more litigation than other
comparable rulemaking processes. Had it not been for several decades worth of enthusiastic advocacy of negotiated rulemaking, these results
would probably neither be surprising nor contested. After all, it is bound to take an intensive effort to develop a consensus among
multiple interests on a proposed rule, even for those rules that agencies find more predisposed to success and which are for that reason selected
for negotiation in the first place. It is similarly unrealistic to expect that negotiation will stave off subsequent litigation, especially when
negotiated processes themselves raise expectations and generate conflicts over who participates in the negotiation
and over what the terms (and silences) in the negotiated agreements mean. The finding that negotiated rulemaking neither reduces rulemaking time
nor prevents litigation could conceivably be viewed as somewhat less of a failure if it could be shown that negotiated rulemaking systematically led to significantly
better quality rules. Harter makes such an assertion, but it too is unsupported by the available body of empirical research. The results of the Langbein and Kerwin
study cited by Harter are not easy to interpret, but at best they can be said to show only that participants in negotiated rulemakings tend to perceive the conventional
rulemaking process in terms better than those who file comments perceive the conventional rulemaking process. Perceptions on the part of participants in negotiated
rulemaking, formed as they are after involvement in quite intensive processes, are likely explained by factors other than genuine, underlying policy improvements.
Indeed, there are good reasons to doubt that negotiated rulemaking will in fact lead to any systematic improvement at all in regulatory policy. Making
consensus a precondition for policymaking will only likely exacerbate problems such as ambiguity, lowest common
denominator results, and an undue emphasis on tractability. More significantly, whatever benefits negotiated rulemaking might presumably
hold in terms [*447] of generating information and dialogue over regulatory policy, these benefits appear to be just as achievable through alternative processes that
encourage public participation but which do not demand consensus. Negotiated rulemaking's failure to achieve its goals of reducing rulemaking time and preventing
litigation is simply not offset by any demonstrated improvements in the quality of regulatory policy when compared with other ways of developing regulations. Given
that the promises made for negotiated rulemaking over the years remain unfulfilled, agency
officials seeking to involve the public in the rulemaking
process should continue to rely on other processes for developing regulations. Negotiated rulemaking demands a concentrated investment of time and
resources by all involved, but without any clear corresponding return in terms of avoiding litigation or achieving other goals. Nothing in Harter's latest effort to
salvage negotiated rulemaking diminishes this conclusion. Agency officials, legislators, and other observers of the regulatory process would do well to look elsewhere
for a cure to whatever ills the regulatory process.

8. Perm – do all the plan and the parts of the CP that mandate a reg neg, but not the parts that
make it binding.
Ackerman 94. (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University, Duke Law Journal, April)
regulatory negotiation and incentive systems need not be mutually exclusive alternatives; they could be
Of course,
complements. For example, the regulations that are needed under a market scheme could be produced by consensual
methods. However, the commitment to least cost solutions, which is a precondition for incentive-based systems, would rule out some of the
political compromises that might arise under regulatory negotiation. The regulatory issues in the design of incentive schemes are usually technical and
informational -- not the kind of bureaucratic problems that can be solved by negotiation.

9. Reg Neg is a voting issue –

a) Unpredictable – there are an infinite number of industries.
b) Ground – the CP does the Aff and all of our answers to the DA prove say yes
c) Makes the CP conditional because of different answers and modifications.
d) Infinitely regressive – they exclude a section of the Aff that isn’t grounded in the plan text.

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e) Dispo is uniquely abusive – makes the CP doubly conditional and forces us to forgo best answers to
reg neg.

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Reg Neg CP 2AC (3/4)

9. CONFIDENTIALITY TURN/
a) Reg neg requires full disclosure
Harter 82. (Philip J., Visiting Associate Prof and Dir, Program on Consensus, Democracy, and
Governance, Vermont Law School, Georgetown Law Review, October)
One significant issue the participants must face at the outset of negotiations is the extent to which the process will be open to public inspection.
Under current theories agencies are accountable for reaching rational results based on the neutral exercise of their discretion. Thus, the rulemaking process is subject
to public scrutiny at virtually every stage. For example, ex parte rules prohibit discussions and transmittal of data unavailable to others; 448 advisory
committees are open to public attendance; 449 the Sunshine Act requires that meetings of collegial agencies be open to the public, 450 and the Freedom of
Information [*84] Act requires agencies to provide the public with many of their internal documents. 451 In short, the current political climate distrusts meetings and
other communications between agency officials and members of the private sector unless they are open to all. Therefore, confidential exchanges are frowned upon, if
not banned outright. In keeping with this theory, the parties to a regulatory negotiation may agree to conduct their affairs in public.

B) Disclosure kills biz con and solvency

Martin 91. (Herbert J., partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 3-1)
Confidentiality is a critically important consideration in the use of dispute resolution. Parties involved in these procedures desire and
expect that communications among themselves and between the parties and neutrals will be treated as privileged and confidential. The
act imposes strict limits on disclosure of dispute resolution communications by neutrals or parties, whether such disclosure is offered voluntarily or is sought by others
through discovery or compulsory process.

12. SAY NO –
a) Manufacturers are opposed to feebates – view them as regulations
NRTEE 05. (“Study on Vehicle Feebates”, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy,
October, http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/publications/feebates/briefing-note-feebates-eng.html)
Industry Groups (including vehicle manufacturers) - Industry associations are critical of feebates in general.
Their basic view is that a feebate is a regulation, so implementing a feebate would be counter to the spirit of the
voluntary agreement on GHG reductions between the vehicle manufacturers and the federal government. There was
also opposition from industry groups because of their view that a feebate will negatively impact vehicle sales.
However, industry groups did feel the government needed to provide incentives to consumers to purchase more fuel-
efficient vehicles.

b) Say no – auto alliances are vigorously opposed

LA Times 08. (“Bill poses fees, rebates on cars”, Los Angeles, January 27,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/27/local/me-feebate27)
Auto companies, whose profit margins are higher on big cars, vigorously oppose feebates.
“Feebates harm businesses and consumers who need a range of vehicles,” said Gloria Bergquist of the Washington,
D.C.-based Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, noting that carbon emissions will drop due to a new average fuel
economy standard of 35 miles per gallon by 2020.

c) Partisanship
Harter ’83. (Phillip J., American University Law Review, Winter)
Consensual rulemaking is certainly not a panacea. Obtaining consensus on controversial and complicated subjects is difficult in
the best of situations. It is likely to be even more difficult in the face of contentiousness that has developed over a period of time. Some
interests may find it difficult to participate with the expertise and vigor of other interests, yet their participation is essential to the validity of the system. In those situations where it will work,
however, and it is reasonable to believe that it will work in a wide variety of circumstances, the consensual process may have far-reaching benefits. It may be less costly and more expeditious

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than alternative processes; it may even result in "better" regulations that take into account important practical details and respond to varying needs. Aside from these potential benefits, however,
it would also have a political validity beyond that which could be provided by any hybrid process. It would be a mirror of the legislative process.

Reg Neg CP 2AC (4/4)

D. Psychology
Ackerman 94. (Susan Rose, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale
University, Duke Law Journal, April)
A regulatory negotiation is not analogous to a therapy session or a friendly, disinterested discussion of policy options. It is similar
to a contract negotiation in which all parties expect to gain from an agreement but where the gains can be divided up in different [*1210] ways. Because of
its focus on strategic interaction between the parties, game theory is the appropriate analytic tool for studying reg negs. Although psychological studies of small group bargaining also can help

one understand how agreements are reached, the psychological forces at work may have as much to do with power and strength as with trust
the parties are bargaining under conditions in which their interests
and mutual respect. The proponents of reg neg should not forget that

are, in part, opposed. 14

13. Even a small risk means we win –

a) Only takes one vote
Case 01. (David W., LLM Columbia, Sen. Res. Assoc @ Vanderbilt Cent. For Env. Manag. Studies,
“The EPA’ s” Winter, 50 Emory L.J. 1)
For example, in the case of the CSI, stakeholder groups generally sought to achieve one hundred percent agreement among participants during negotiations.
305 The requirement of unanimous consent essentially bestows veto rights upon individual stakeholders, leading to
“paralyzed” negotiations, especially when participants assume polarized positions, and corresponding increases in transaction costs necessary to participate. 306 Indeed, in an
extreme example of the polarization that can occur, in 1996, the EPA was forced to dismiss certain representatives of non-profit organizations from the CSI process for “unduly obstructionist”
behavior during negotiations. 307 Even absent overtly obstructionist behavior, the substantial leverage held by public interest representatives over final decisionmaking significantly diminished

incentives for continued industry participation in the CSI. 308 This factor [*5 1] greatly contributed to the eventual withdrawal of the automotive and petroleum industries from the CSI initiative .

b) Snowball Effect
Coglianese 97. (Cary, Assistant Prof Public Policy – Harvard, Duke Law Journal, April)
Theories predicting the success of negotiated rulemaking are based on the assumption that everyone who could ever conceivably take an interest in a rule will come to a complete and stable
agreement on every particular aspect of that rule. If that could happen throughout government as well as throughout the interest group community, a rule could theoretically sail undisturbed
through the entire rulemaking process. Yet what is theoretically possible is different than what is realistically probable. The intervention by a few well-placed agency managers, or by OMB, the

It only takes one interest group excluded from the negotiation, or one included but
White House, or Congress, can lead to modifications that begin the unravelling of a consensus.

defecting group, to begin unravelling the consensus from outside government. 325 Any heightened sensitivities created by the
process of reaching a consensus may serve to accelerate the breakdown of consensus. In practice, the fact that agencies are embedded within a
dynamic political environment makes maintaining consensus a bit like building a house of cards. 326 [*1329]

c) Future breakdowns
Coglianese 97. (Cary, Assistant Prof Public Policy – Harvard, Duke Law Journal, April)
Even if a search for consensus could avoid creating new kinds of conflicts, negotiated rulemaking still would have a difficult time succeeding in many cases for
another reason altogether. Any procedure that depends for its success on the maintenance of a consensus is, given the realities of the federal
fighting uphill. 318 A consensus forged at the earliest stages of the rulemaking process is inherently fragile because the structure of the
regulatory process,
American administrative state provides numerous opportunities for that consensus to unravel. Even if all the participants in the negotiated
rulemaking reach a consensus, the agency must still prepare a preamble to a proposed rule and provide an opportunity for public comment on that proposal. 319 If the public comment period is to
be meaningful, the agency must consider changing the proposed rule in light of any negative comments it receives on a proposal, even if such a change entails a retreat from a consensus. 320 In
the Office of Management and Budget (and sometimes other executive
addition, during the development of the proposed and final rule, the agency receives input from
may lead the agency to modify features of a rule. 321 Members of Congress [*1328] may step in and attempt to
branch officials) which
pressure the agency or change the underlying statute in such a way as to disrupt the consensus. 322 As we have seen, other interest groups may also challenge the rule in court,

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which can lead an agency to change the rule further. 323 Finally, even if a consensus reached during the early stages of rulemaking could remain intact through all the subsequent stages, the
agency can decide at a later time to revise the rule

Regulation-Only CP 2AC (1/2)

1. Can’t solve the case. Regulations-only make AFVs too expensive for
consumers to purchase and limit manufacturer response – only feebates
can compensate for tech costs, shifting the market
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of feebates to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461, University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute, May, pg. 8-9, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
Under a regulation scenario (Pavley Only) in our model, vehicle
This is one advantage of a feebates program.
manufacturers install technologies on all vehicles, clean and dirty, to reduce global warming pollution to
the required level. The prices consumers pay to purchase the vehicles rise, because of the cost
of the additional technologies (Figure 2). However, under a feebates scenario in our model,
manufacturers install technologies on all vehicles, clean and dirty, to reduce emissions and to reduce
surcharges and increase rebates. Rebates compensate consumers for some of the costs of
the technologies, making clean vehicles less expensive (Figure 3). Surcharges on high-polluting
vehicles increase the cost of those vehicles even further. This accounts for the small market shift.

2. Permanent subsidies key to pass the tipping point required for consumers to buy AFVs
Green Car Congress 07. (“MIT Study: Widespread Acceptance of Alternative Fuel Vehicles Will Require Decades of
Subsidies and Targeted Programs”, June 2, www.greencarcongress.com/2007/06/mit_study_wides.html)
A study by MIT researchers concludes that marketing programs and subsidies will need to be in place for decades in order for the adoption
and long-term market penetration of alternative fuel vehicles to become significant and self-sustaining. Jeroen Struben and John
Sterman of MIT’s Sloan School are developing a behavioral, dynamic model to explore the possible transition from internal combustion engine
(ICE) vehicles to alternative fuel vehicles (AFV) such as hybrids, plug-in hybrids, natural gas vehicles, flex-fuel vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles.
Results show that there is a tipping point in the diffusion of AFVs: successful adoption of alternative vehicles requires policies, such
as subsidies for alternative vehicles and fueling infrastructure, that persist long enough to push the AFV installed base over a critical
threshold. Efforts falling short of the tipping point will not lead to sustained adoption. We show that the time required to achieve self-
sustaining adoption is long—on the order of several decades—primarily due to the long life of vehicles.

3. EMISSIONS TURN/
a) Feebates solve for 25% more emissions than a strict regulatory approach
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of feebates to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461, University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute, May, pg. 9, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
a feebates program is an effective strategy to reduce global warming pollution while
We found that
benefiting both consumers and retailers. The combination of the existing Pavley regulation with a modest
feebates program would achieve a 25 percent greater drop in emissions than a regulatory
system alone. Feebates create incentives to both manufacturers and consumers to produce and
purchase cleaner vehicles. Furthermore, consumers can save thousands of dollars over the lifetime of
their vehicles because of lower operating costs. Also, retailers’ revenues can rise more than 6 percent
when feebates are combined with the existing Pavley regulation.

b) The impact is extinction – US C02 directly responsible for ocean acidity

Hendricks and Inslee 07. Bracken, Senior Fellow with American Progress, Jay, Representative from
Washington, Apollo’s Fire, pg. 8

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Regulation-Only CP 2AC (2/2)

3. SPENDING TURN/
a) Mandating cuts in CO2 emissions would devastate the economy and cause spending
Thorning 08. (Margo, PhD and Senior VP and Chief Economist @ ACCF, American Council for
Capital Formation, http://www.accf.org/pdf/ThorningTestimony.pdf)
In light of the current debate about how to use the projected federal budget surpluses, policymakers
need to consider the potentially
large negative impact on GDP growth and federal budget receipts of proposals that address the possible threat
of global warming by requiring sharp, near-term cutbacks in CO2 emissions. As described above, estimates provided by
various academic, private-sector, and EIA modelers show that requiring the United States to reduce CO2 emissions to 7 percent
below 1990 levels by 2008–2012 (the EIA projects U.S. CO2 emissions will be about 40 percent above this target by 2010) would
reduce GDP growth in the range of 1 to 4 percent per year. Using a simple calculation based on the relationship of increases in GDP to
federal tax receipts, if growth falls by 3 percent per year, the projected on-budget surplus in 2010 would decline from $195
billion to $57 billion (see Figure 3). Therefore, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would make it much more difficult to sustain tax cuts,
“save” Social Security, or promote the retirement security of the baby boom generation, and could require sharp changes in fiscal policy in order
to avoid deficit spending. These budgetary impacts should be considered as policymakers shape the U.S. response to the
potential threat of climate change.

b) And, it only links to the CP. Our 1AC McManus ev says the plan would be self-financing
c) X-A Nyquist from the 1AC – an economic collapse would incite totalitarianism, mass famine,
and escalating nuclear lashouts

4. JOB CREATION TURN/

a) A regulations-only approach would jack auto industry’s employment rate
McCurdy 07. (Dave, President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, “Statement before the
US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation”, State News Service, May 3, lexis)
A market-driven, market-responsive approach is needed. Any effective program needs to consider the realities of
the marketplace. CAFE can create distortions in the market, depending on the price of gasoline. By contrast, incentives in place for the
renewable fuels program enable competitive pricing of ethanol, which is resulting in increased consumer demand for
this alternative fuel. Incentives are needed to encourage real reductions in carbon dioxide. Incentives can encourage
consumers to purchase the many advanced technology autos on sale today. Incentives can encourage energy providers to
increase availability of alternative fuels. And incentives can reward automakers for high achievement in developing new
technologies and producing more alternative fuel autos. CAFE, by contrast, has few incentives and fails to bring consumers into the equation.
Any effective, broader program to reduce carbon dioxide needs to allow for companies to grow and thrive,
without imposing provisions that would result in job loss. The ultimate goal is real reductions in tons of carbon dioxide, not
wealth transfer among companies or higher cost autos.

b) Job creation in the auto industry key driver behind economic growth
Cross 04. (Lisa, Business Editor, Graphic Arts Monthly, March 1)

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Automotive: economic engine America's automobile industry doesn't just manufacture passenger cars and light trucks; it is also
a key driver of the U.S. economy. According to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, more than 3.7% of America's total
Gross Domestic Product is generated by the production and sale of new light vehicles. No other single industry, reports
the alliance, is more linked to U.S. manufacturing or generates more retail business and employment. America's
automakers are among the largest purchasers of aluminum, copper, iron, lead, plastics, rubber, textiles, vinyl, steel,
and computer chips. America's automobile industry is also one of the largest industries in the country, accounting
for 6.6 million jobs, or about 5% of private sector jobs, and producing $243 billion in payroll compensation. These figures appear in a
2001 report, Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the U.S. Economy, prepared by the University of Michigan and the Center for
Automotive Research. For every worker directly employed by an automaker, notes the report, nearly seven spin-off jobs
are created.

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Regulation-Only CP 1AR – Ext #3 – Emissions Turn

1. Extend McManus – a regulations only approach can’t solve for manufacturer and consumer
switches – 25% solvency differential at best.

2. Feebates solve 10x better than a regulatory scheme

Energy Policy 05. ( “Feebates: An effective regulatory instrument for cost-constrained environmental policy”, Vol. 34,
Issue 18, pg. 3965-3976, November 8, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V2W-4HHGNWC-
2&_user=1111158&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000051676&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_user
id=1111158&md5=682ec5e221514090b9589379a39646b4)
The tax-versus-feebate comparison is dramatic: the refund makes it possible to increase the emissions price, and
hence the marginal incentive to reduce emissions, by over a factor of 10 relative to an unrefunded tax (cf. A and
B). Eliminating the weight disparity allows for another factor of 3 increase (e.g., cf. B and C).

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States CP 2AC (1/2)

1. CP GETS 0% SOLVENCY –
a) Best case, the law will be on the books but not implemented because of court challenges.
EPA 08. (“State Action Policies: California”, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/MSTY5PFKFB?OpenDocument)
Feebates, a system of fees and rebates applied to vehicles to induce certain behavior, have been proposed in various states, including
California (Reference available in the California State Action Plan). Legislation in Maryland that would apply feebates, based on
fuel efficiency, to new vehicles to reduce gasoline use is the only proposal to make it through the legislative process,
but thus far has not been implemented due to court challenges derived from the preeminence of the national
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) legislation. The popularity of feebates in recent years is due, at least to some degree, to the
potential for revenue neutrality—the system can be structured so that the total rebates paid out equal the total fees paid in. Thus, a feebate may be
more politically viable than a tax.

b) Worst case, it gets rolled back – federal government will strike down state based feebates
Garcia 08. (Nicolas, with the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Greenhouse Gas Mitiation Options for
Washington State, pg. 39-40, http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/MSTY5Q4LPY?
OpenDocument)
A recent Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory report estimated that a Feebate of $100 per mpg differential could improve new car fuel mileage by 15
percent in 2010. Such an improvement in new vehicle fuel efficiency would lower annual carbon dioxide emissions by 4.4 million tons in 2010.
However, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) blocked an effort by Maryland to enact a Feebate program.
DOT held that fuel economy incentive programs are preempted by federal statute. Maryland’s Attorney General,
while conceding that certain aspects of the Maryland law violated the federal preemption otherwise affirmed the
state’s central right to enact a Feebate. Presently, the legality of a fuel efficiency based Feebate is uncertain.

c) Durable fiat doesn’t solve – the Neg can only fiat that the state government won’t roll it back

2. Perm – do both. Gets double solvency. Federal climate policy needed to guide state efforts
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State roles in U.S. Climate
Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
Federal action on climate change is needed to achieve the significant reductions science demands and
to establish a minimum level of uniformity across the U.S. economy. This federal action can preserve room
for states to continue in their important roles as policy innovators, on-the-ground implementers, and policy
drivers, and to capitalize on the significant experience in the states across the many aspects of climate change action. A federal climate
change program will be most successful if it is designed with the relative strengths of each level of government in mind.

3. State feebates fail for 2 reasons – prefer our comparative ev

German 08. (John, Manager of Environmental and Energy Analysis with American Honda Motor Company, “Feebates –
Critical Points”, April 21, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/meetings/042108/4_21_feebates_1_german.pdf)
2. Feebates offer continuous incentive to improve
• State systems would likely be less effective
– Same customer impact – Technology benefits affected by ties to national sales

4. States can’t solve – leakage

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and former
prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”, November 25,
http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Unless a nationwide feebate is implemented, there would always exist a problem of leakage whereby
consumers can avoid the fee by purchasing a vehicle in a neighboring state without a feebate. This could be
especially important for a small state like Rhode Island if the fee or rebate were paid at the time of purchase.
Fortunately, this problem is easily avoided because the sales tax is paid at the time of first registration of the vehicle.

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States CP 2AC (2/2)

5. State feebates programs face huge political and legal hurdles that prevent effective
implementation
Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and former
prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”, November 25,
http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
While the concept of feebates is attractive, and they make a lot of sense from an environmental perspective, various political
and legal hurdles have bogged down feebate legislation at the state level in the U.S. In our conversations with experts2, some recurring
themes emerged: Maryland’s unfortunate experience, the fact that feebates are politically unpopular because they are perceived
to be new taxes, and that feebates are often perceived by the general public to be an “SUV tax”. Any decision to try to
implement such a program must therefore face these challenges head-on. It is of crucial importance to begin a public outreach and
education program well before the legislation is debated in committees, so as to circumvent popular misconceptions that might arise in the minds of the public. It is
also important to find ways to deal with the powerful automobile lobby.

6. There’s a 70% solvency deficit between state and national feebates

Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An Update on
Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, September,
http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

7. DOESN’T SOLVE GLOBALLY/

a) Fed action key spur international action
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State roles in U.S. Climate
Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
Federal Action as Platform for International Engagement. Even a large number of states enacting comprehensive climate change action
plans cannot alone solve the global climate change problem. Ultimately, the challenge will be to effect change throughout the United
States, as well as cooperative action from the major emitting countries of the world. A comprehensive federal climate action
program would put the United States in a position to engage the rest of the world in negotiations to ensure effective
international climate action. Absent federal action, successful international negotiations resulting in significant and
sustained emissions reductions are unlikely.

b) Having international feebates modeling maximizes manufacturing incentives

Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
The simulation results suggest that there
are strong benefits from coordinating policies across jurisdictions. Since technological
innovations are such a strong driver of benefits from a feebate policy, any marginal increase in the return on investment of
implementing new technologies will improve the effectiveness of the policy. For example, an auto manufacturer will be
more willing to introduce a new technology or model redesign if the fixed cost can be spread among a greater number of
consumers. This implies that a policy that is, for example, coordinated between the US and Canada, will be more effective
than a Canada-only policy. Domestic sales are usually a small percentage of total sales for most models that Canadians can choose from. Indeed,
even most Canadian vehicles are manufactured for export. Thus, there is less incentive to redesign models specifically for Canada.

c) They can’t solve our international modeling/cooperation/relations add-ons

8. <Insert a2 Uniformity/Non-Uniformity, depending on if CP sets feebates at state or nat’l level >

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States CP 1AR – Ext #1 – Rollback

1. Extend rollback. Our Garcia ev says that the DOT strikes down any state feebates initiative.
Even if you win that the law is on the books, our EPA ev proves it wouldn’t be implemented – there
would be continual court challenges.

2. CP GETS REPEALED –
a) 1975 Federal Energy and Conservation Act preempts state law
Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and
former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”,
November 25, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Analysis of Repeal: The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration found that the 1975 Federal Energy and Conservation Act
preempted Maryland’s law. The findings were that states cannot enact laws that conflict with federal regulations on fuel
economy disclosures and Maryland could not tax vehicles based on fuel economy or require vehicles for sale to display a sticker stating the
vehicle’s fuel efficiency and the resulting tax/credit imposed. In 1992 the Maryland Attorney General stated that the Maryland Act only partially conflicted with the
Federal law. The opinion stated that the section requiring the sticker to be displayed did indeed violate federal statute, but Maryland could impose a fee/credit based
on fuel efficiency. The opinion stated that federal law does not preempt Maryland from using the federal fuel mileage ratings to compute taxes owed in Maryland. The
suggestion was made that the state could implement the gas guzzler/sipper tax if the sticker requirement was amended. The proposal has not been revived
due to lack of political will in the state. The repeal of the Maryland legislation was a serious blow to feebate proposals all over
the country. Many states became unwilling to go through what they perceived to be a difficult legal process (apart from the
already difficult political process) required to pass such a law and make it stick. It continues to loom over the debate on
feebates.

b) Federal CAFÉ standards preclude

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and
former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”,
November 25, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Feebates must be carefully designed to avoid legal pitfalls, as the experience of Maryland proves. In that case, the main
challenge came due to the labeling requirements of Maryland’s law that mandated that all sellers display a sticker showing the tax
(or rebate) on a vehicle and the fuel consumption basis of the tax. This was deemed to preempt Federal CAFE regulations (see
further details under the Maryland discussion.)

c) Delays because of court challenges provide huge loophole to state-based feebates

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and
former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”,
November 25, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Description: Maryland
became the first state in the U.S. to enact a feebate proposal through a gas guzzler tax that increases or
decreases the 5% motor vehicle titling tax, based on whether the vehicle has a lower or higher than average fuel economy rating. Loopholes: The
major drawback turned out to be a legal one. The labeling requirement made this legislation subject to challenge based on
preemption of federal CAFE regulations.

d) Legality still up in the air – there’s a risk the CP solves 0%

EPA 08. (“State Action Policies: California”, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/gw/StatePolicyActions.nsf/uniqueKeyLookup/MSTY5PFKFB?OpenDocument)
State-only feebates, although reducing consumer surplus, do not appear to affect equity adversely. In addition, in comparison to carbon taxes for a given level of
carbon reduction, feebates may be more effective in promoting alternative fuel vehicle demand. However, such feebates do not appear to reduce driving and,
therefore, may not offer the high social benefits of pricing measures. In addition, it is not yet clear whether state-only feebates that increase
fuel efficiency will be allowed by the federal government. Nationwide feebates appear to increase consumer surplus for drivers, while reducing
carbon emissions. Such policies reduce the average cost of driving due to manufacturer response and, therefore, may actually increase VMT, exacerbating external
costs related to driving.

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3. Extend durable fiat doesn’t solve – the Neg can only fiat that the state government won’t roll it
back – this doesn’t speak to the USFG role
States CP 1AR – Ext #2 – Perm Solvency

1. Extend Litz – perm gets double solvency. Federal action ensures minimum uniformity and
solves freakout while states can still innovate within those guidelines

2. Perm solves best – mechanisms for federal and state cooperation over climate change already
exist
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
Against the current and historical jurisdictional backdrop, the key question is not whether responsibility
for climate change action should rest exclusively with the federal government or the states, but rather how
the federal government and the states should share responsibility for tackling the problem. It is difficult to
imagine the federal government stepping in to assume exclusive and broad authority over all activities in the
United States that contribute to climate change. Because legal authority is already shared in many of these
areas, the appropriate questions relate to the degree to which state and federal governments will continue
to share responsibility. Will the path forward rely most heavily on the states to tackle the problem, with the
federal government stepping in to make sure all states are acting with comparable vigor? Or will future climate
change policy place the federal government in the dual role of both devising and implementing policy from
Washington, D.C., perhaps with the states acting as local enforcers? Or will Congress devise an approach that
places certain key responsibilities with federal agencies while vesting other key responsibilities with the states?

3. Perm solves best – having a federal baseline with state implementation mechanisms achieve huge
reductions in auto emissions
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
National and State Greenhouse Gas Vehicle Tailpipe Standards. The Clean Air Act struck a compromise
between the two extremes on vehicle tailpipe standards. Vesting exclusive authority in the federal government
to regulate tailpipe emissions could lead to unresponsive policies. On the other hand, allowing all 50 states
to regulate tailpipe emissions would result in tremendous inefficiencies for automobile manufacturers and
consumers. By limiting to two the number of different regulatory standards the automakers must meet,
Congress struck a balance between state and federal authority. The outcome is a policy that preserved the
ability for states to innovate and spur federal action.
By enacting certain key national anchor programs that preserve the states’ ability to enact policies more
stringent than the federal programs, the federal government will be achieving significant reductions through
policies that make sense at a federal level. The remaining policies in other areas are then left for states to
develop as appropriate. Through the state climate change mitigation planning process, states could assemble a
portfolio of policies and measures across all areas, including energy efficiency, low-carbon and renewable fuels,
transportation and land use policies, agriculture, forestry, and waste reduction measures.

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States CP 1AR – Ext #7 – International Action

1. Extend Litz – it specifically says that a large number of states acting in unison on climate change
would still not be able to spur the global cooperation that a federal program would. Can’t solve
absent national action

2. Independent state action on climate collapses U.S. global leadership on the issue – our ev is
reverse causal ***

Maxwell 07. (Katie Maxwell is a 2007 graduate of the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University and a 2004 graduate of Columbia University, Barnard College, Penn State
Environmental Law Review, Winter 2007, p. 368-9)
Not having enacted any legislation about the emissions of CO2, does not mean that the United States has failed to
take a stance on the issue. Oftentimes, inaction is more signaling then actual action, and just like in Virginia v.
Tennessee can be very telling of Congress' intent. By refusing to act on CO2 emissions the federal government has
laid out a federal climate change policy, that shows it is opposed to regulating CO2 emissions
There are many plausible reasons why Congress and Bush administration may not want a national program similar
to RGGI, and it is just as easy to argue that Republicans are being manipulated by energy lobbyists as it is to say that
RGGI-like agreements are bad policy as they encourage other forms of energy that may cause other environmental
harms that are arguably worse than an increase in CO2 emissions. Regardless of whether states agree with the policy
plan, they should be bound by federal policy. Furthermore, by publicly speaking out against federal policy, the
RGGI states are undermining the official policy of the Congress and the President. The United States is losing
international clout on the issue of global warming, by the mere fact that it can not control its own states
(Note: RGGI = Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative)

3. Federal action key to global modeling and cooperation

Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
A great number of states, both alone and in combination, have taken meaningful initiative to fight climate
change. It is clear, however, that state and regional action alone will not be enough to achieve the reductions
science dictates. A federal program is required to ensure the United States achieves its share of the necessary
reductions. Such a federal program is also a necessary foundation for productive participation in ongoing
international negotiations to secure adequate worldwide reductions.

4. Despite states benefits, federal action key to be perceived internationally

Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
There are, of course, reasons some climate change policies might be better effectuated at the federal level,
notwithstanding the states’ important roles as first movers, policy innovators and on-the-ground implementers.
Among the reasons are the broader coverage of a federal program, the ability to level the competitive playing field for citizens
and businesses, and the ultimate need for coherent and comprehensive national and international action. Indeed,
many state leaders have themselves made these arguments to advocate—and sometimes even to sue the federal government to
compel—national action.

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 2AC (1/3)

1. Patchwork – A heavy state role would result in uneven regulations – our ev is comparative
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
The Heavy State Role approach would present additional challenges beyond the differences across states and
regions. Although every state would be required to make reductions, experience to date suggests that many high-
emitting states are very reluctant to impose emissions limitations. Delays would accompany federal attempts to
bring unwilling states along. While different policies from state to state would yield innovative results in some states, other state
attempts may fail to get reductions, while differences would bring inefficiencies as compared to uniform
national programs. There is also the potential for uneven regulation across state lines.

2. BUSINESS CONFIDENCE/
a) Federal key to solve business confidence – state regs cause greater uncertainty
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
Federal Action Levels the Playing Field. A federal program would tend to level the playing field for businesses in
all 50 states. Although the state laboratories of democracy produce useful policy products, they also present a more difficult
environment for companies doing business in multiple states. Those companies must contend with different
rules and regulations, which presents competitiveness issues. In addition, the potential for emissions “leakage”—
the result of shifts in production from areas with stringent policies to areas without policies—is greater in an
environment where some states act and some do not.

b) Regulatory predictability key to investor confidence

Press Association 93. (November 16)
"Predictability is the mother of confidence, and we want government to provide a steady, growing economic
environment in which we can develop our businesses with that confidence," the CBI conference in Harrogate was told
yesterday (Monday) by Clive Thompson, chairman of the SE Region and group chief executive of the Rentokil Group. He added: "We in the CBI
are no longer on the outside looking in - we're right on the inside. But being on the inside demands we express our views responsibly and
completely. It is insufficient to put the business view in isolation without thought or concern for the requirements of the other parts of the
economy. "We cannot ignore the demands of health, education, social services and transport on the public purse. Clearly, tax revenue directed
towards business means less resources for other important requirements in the economy. Recognition brings responsibility." He went on to
advocate government focusing on creating an environment in which business could create success. "We don't want radical changes of
policy and direction much loved by politicians. Peaks and troughs have done more to wipe out the confidence so
necessary for investment in research and development, speculative new projects, and investment in plant and machinery than any
misguided political dogma. "Businessmen invest in their businesses and take risks in new ventures if they believe they will be
working in a business friendly environment. Confidence is the key, and for those who have to invest in the future,
predictability is the mother of that confidence."

c) Investor confidence key to the economy

DeFeo 02. (Phillip D., Chair, Pacific Exchange Inc., National Association of Securities Professionals, 6-
19, http://www.pacificex.com/news/pub_state/pub_state_investor_confidence.html)
As long as investors do not trust the financial system, investment performance will lag economic performance.
Lacking confidence, they will overweight risk, discount values and potential returns, and shy away from committing new
capital to the market. I believe this can and will act as a brake on essential capital formation. I believe will weaken and slow both
the economic recovery and long-term growth.

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 2AC (2/3)

3. MANUFACTURING TURN**
a) The effectiveness of state-based feebates are limited by how much of the market producers
capture regionally – much less than the national average
Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An
Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
September, http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

b) There is a 95% of solvency deficit

Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency
Incentives: An Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an
Energy-Efficient Economy, September,
http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 2AC (3/3)

4. CO2 is a global problem – state-wide regulations can’t solve for emissions levels

Cabaniss 04. (John Cabaniss Director, Environment & Energy at association of international autobile
manufactuers, “California Air Resources Board Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Standards Report” Sep
23, 2004 accessed july 10 @ http://aiam.org/public/aiam/media/agency_comments.aspx?PRID=89)

Climate change gases cannot be effectively regulated state by state, because they are fundamentally
different from criteria air pollutants. Throughout the entire Staff Report, ARB treats climate change gases
the same way it treats criteria air pollutants. This is a fundamental error that distorts all of ARB’s analyses.
1. Air pollution is primarily a local problem. Climate change is truly a worldwide phenomenon, as it makes
no difference where the carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas emissions occur.
2. California’s air quality needs are special in many respects, but California does not have a special or unique situation with respect to
global climate change.
3. At the time of the passage of the Federal motor vehicle provisions of the Clean Air Act, California already had its motor vehicle
emissions standards program in place. Conversely, the federal government has been regulating carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles
through the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act adopted nearly
thirty years.
4. Pollution from motor vehicles has been successfully dealt with using narrowly focused aftertreatment
strategies that deal with a limited number of motor vehicle components. Aftertreatment or other control of
carbon dioxide emissions is not possible. Instead, vehicle climate change emissions are inherently linked to the amount of
fuel consumed. Fuel consumption is impacted by virtually every aspect of vehicle design and construction, ranging from engine and
transmission modifications to possible changes in the shape, size, and materials of passenger cars and light trucks.
5. Vehicles are designed, built, distributed, and marketed for the entire U.S. market, not just for California.
While it has generally been possible for the industry to produce vehicles with separate California-only aftertreatment strategies to meet
California’s air pollution requirements, such an approach would not be feasible given the comprehensive nature of the necessary
changes to comply with the ARB greenhouse gas proposal.

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 1AR – Ext #1 – Patchwork

1. State based feebates would vastly differ across the board – heavy pollutant states would impose
lighter fees, jacking solvency – that’s our Litz ev.

2. Only a federal program will allow for uniform incentives for business in the 50 states
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
There are also numerous arguments in favor of a strong federal role in climate policy. A federal program
would bring every state into the climate change effort and tend to level the playing field for businesses in all
50 states. Federal action offers a platform for engaging with other nations in forging an international emissions
reduction agreement. A national GHG cap-and-trade program would keep costs manageable and drive climate-
friendly technological innovation, and could link with other markets around the world

3. Differing state-based feebate levels can’t solve – leakage

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and
former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”,
November 25, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Unless a nationwide feebate is implemented, there would always exist a problem of leakage whereby
consumers can avoid the fee by purchasing a vehicle in a neighboring state without a feebate. This could be
especially important for a small state like Rhode Island if the fee or rebate were paid at the time of purchase.
Fortunately, this problem is easily avoided because the sales tax is paid at the time of first registration of the vehicle.

4. Patchwork regulations bad for auto – causes resource diversion

CNN 07. (Cnn.com US “EPA denies tighter emissions goals” December 19, 2007, accessed on July
10 at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/19/california.epa.ap/index.html)
Automakers applauded the outcome. General Motors Corp. said in a statement that "by removing the
disproportionate burden of complying with a patchwork of state-specific regulations that would divert our
resources, automakers can concentrate on developing and implementing the advanced technologies in ways
that will meet America's driving needs."

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 1AR – Ext #2 – Business Confidence (1/2)

1. Our Litz ev says that companies would be forced to comply with different regulations in
different states – jacking their willingness to comply and imposing undue costs. The solvency
deficit is our competitiveness advantage – puts too much of a burden on manufacturers

2. STATES JACK THE AUTO INDUSTRY –

a) forces them to comply with multiple sets of regulations
Litz 08. (Frank T., Esquire and Senior Fellow, “Towards a Constructive Dialogue on Federal and State
roles in U.S. Climate Change Policy”, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf)
National Vehicle Efficiency Standards. Another key federal program is the national Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards. 41 Under the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the national fuel economy standard for the combined fleet of cars and trucks was increased to 35
miles per gallon by 2020. The standard for passenger cars had not increased since 1985, when it was raised to 27.5 miles per gallon. 42 Less was
required for light trucks, which had to meet standards of 20.5 miles per gallon in 1987, increasing to 22.2 miles per gallon for model years 2007
and beyond. The new CAFE standards will lead to GHG emissions reductions in the transportation sector across the entire United States. Under
current federal law, only the federal government may regulate vehicle fuel efficiency. 43 This ensures that
automobile manufacturers need only comply with one set of efficiency regulations rather than a patchwork
of state regulations.

b) they are counterproductive – don’t influence design and manufacturing

Canter, 2008, [Sheryl Canter, editor and writer for Environmental Defense, “Emissions Standards not a
‘patchwork’”, January 15, 2008
http://environmentaldefenseblogs.org/climate411/2008/01/15/not_a_patchwork/]
Just before Christmas - after two years of stalling - the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied California's request to set its own,
tougher vehicle-emissions standards. In denying the request, EPA Administrator Johnson said: The Bush Administration is moving
forward with a clear national solution - not a confusing patchwork of state rules - to reduce America's climate
footprint from vehicles." What's wrong with this statement? Well, among other things, the word "patchwork". Under the Clean Air Act,
there are only two possible standards for motor vehicles: 1. Federal standards, 2. California standards, which are tougher than federal standards
and other states may adopt. A choice between two options is hardly a "confusing patchwork". So where did this idea come from? The
"patchwork" argument originates with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM). (Thanks to cleanairwatch.org for the references.) Fred
Webber, AAM, before the California Air Resources Board (CARB), 9/23/04: The U.S. Congress reserved the issue of regulating
vehicle fuel economy to the federal government to balance all sectors of the economy and to avoid a patchwork quilt
of state regulations which hurt businesses and, perhaps more importantly, consumers. It is a simple fact. This regulation is federally
preempted. Steven Douglas, AAM, before EPA, 5/22/07: In this light, a patchwork of state-level fuel economy regulations, as is
now proposed by California, is not simply unnecessary, it's patently counterproductive. Ellen Gleberman, AAM, Submitted to
EPA Docket, 6/15/07: The regulation of greenhouse gas emissions therefore requires a coordinated national approach
rather than a patchwork of state approaches. This is especially true for the automobile industry where
Congress - through the preemption provisions of EPCA and the Clean Air Act - has recognized the need for a uniform, nationwide
approach for standards that impact the design and manufacture of automobiles. A mischaracterizing word can have a lot of
power, and unfortunately this one has been repeated by major news organizations. But California Air Resources Board Chair got it right in her
explanation, as reported by the New York Times: [CARB chair] Ms. Nichols pointed out, in a telephone news conference, that the Clean Air Act
did not permit a patchwork of individual state regulations; it permits California to have independent rules on air pollutants, and permits other
states to choose between the federal standards or more stringent standards set by California.So don't be fooled by the "patchwork" argument, and
tell your friends - California's waiver request is about two choices, not 50.

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c) Automakers strongly opposed – increases consumer costs

Silverstein 2008, [Ken Silverstein, editor-in-chief of EnergyBiz Insider, “Energy Risk – California
Exercises Legal Options”, January 14. 2008, http://www.riskcenter.com/story.php?id=15867]
California is flexing its muscle. It is now suing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for preventing it from strengthening its
standards for tailpipe emissions in cars. It's a classic case of whether federal laws should supersede those of the states when the
two come into conflict. Typically, conservatives prefer to give localities greater say as they are the ones closer to the communities that will be regulated while
liberals tend to like centralized power at the federal level. In this latest test, the opposite is occurring. So, California officials have vowed to challenge the Bush
administration's ruling in the federal courts to forge ahead with its tougher air pollution rules. In 2002, California passed its Clean Car law that requires vehicles sold
there to release 30 percent less greenhouse gases by 2016 -- a move that the state says will require cars to get 36.8 miles to the gallon by that time. That's a stricter
standard than the federal law just passed, which requires fuel economy averages of 35 miles-per-gallon by 2020. It's all part of a strategy to combat greenhouse gas
emissions in cars and light trucks, which are responsible for 16 percent of all those pollutants. Since 1967, the federal code has allowed federal agencies
the power to grant waivers to states seeking to deviate from federal law. This time, however, EPA rejected the request, saying that the energy law
passed in December applies to all 50 states. Specifically, the California Air Resources Board says that its fuel economy standards would cut annual carbon dioxide
emissions by more than 32 million tons by 2020. That's compared to the nearly 19 million tons under the new federal law. Altogether, the 17 combined states -- most
of the Northeast, Northwest, Florida and Colorado -- that seek to enact the tougher rules make up about 139 million people. "The Bush administration is
moving forward with a clear national solution -- not a confusing patchwork of state rules," EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson told
reporters. "I believe this is a better approach than if individual states were to act alone." It's a move backed by the auto industry that
has argued vociferously that an incongruent rules across state lines ultimately accrue to the expense of consumers. "[EPA officials]
are ignoring the will of millions of people who want their government to take action in the fight against global warming," counters Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger.
"That's why, at the very first legal opportunity, we're suing to reverse the U.S. EPA's wrong decision." California is, in fact, appealing EPA's decision and has said it
will proceed with its tailpipe emissions laws that are to begin on all 2009 models. California Attorney General Jerry Brown has filed a suit in San Francisco-based 9th
Circuit, which in the past has sided with the state's positions. But legal analysts expect the Bush administration to request a change of venue and to a more
conservative appeals court in Washington, D.C. In arguing its case, California will assuredly rely on three prior court rulings, the first of which was handed down by a
federal appeals court in Fresno, Calif., in December as well as a recent and similar decision in a Vermont appeals court. In both those trials, auto makers said that
federal fuel economy standards were paramount and that such rules pre-empted state laws. The other major case that California will cite will be the recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision allowing the EPA to regulate heat trapping emissions. "Given the level of impairment of human health and welfare that current climate
science indicates may occur if human-generated greenhouse gas emissions continue unabated, it would be the very definition of folly if EPA were precluded from
action.," wrote Judge Anthony Ishii in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in Fresno . In September 2007, a federal district court judge in
Vermont came to a similar conclusion. The California case may ultimately be headed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has recently handed down some key victories
for the environmental community. Key among them is an April 2007 decision in which the High Court said that gases that cause global warming are pollutants that
can be regulated under the Clean Air Act by the EPA. California's law does not just regulate gasoline. It also oversees other greenhouse gas emissions that emanate
from refrigerants and alternative fuels. The state's goal is to cut such releases by 80 percent by 2050, which is the amount that many experts say is necessary to avoid
the worst possible implications posed by global warming. While the 17 states that would enact tailpipe emissions regulations that are stronger than federal laws are
comprised of lawmakers from both parties, it is unlikely that they could collectively propose legislation to override EPA's ruling that could sustain a presidential veto.
Proponents therefore have two options: Wait and see which party occupies the White House next year or pursue their case in the federal court system. "The Supreme
Court told EPA it has to take action on global warming," says California Air Resources Board Chair Mary Nichols, in a public proclamation and whose agency asked
EPA for the waiver in 2005. "It affects our health and our environment. It's not just about fuel economy." The whole matter falls under the broad category of whether
state laws may trump federal standards and if so, under what circumstances. But in arguing their cases, both sides are missing an even more profound point -- one that
signifies a fundamental shift in American energy and environmental policy. Not too long ago, intransigence persisted. Today, all stakeholders are taking more
definitive actions to curtail global warming.

d) state-to-state regulation puts an undue burden on both the auto industry and consumers
Cabaniss 04. (John Cabaniss Director, Environment & Energy at association of international
autobile manufactuers, “California Air Resources Board Motor Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Standards Report” Sep 23, 2004 accessed july 10 @
http://aiam.org/public/aiam/media/agency_comments.aspx?PRID=89)
The past decisions of Congress on preemption should not be treated simply as a legal issue. These were not arbitrary decisions;
rather they properly reflected the differences between criteria air pollutants and fuel economy (and indirectly climate change).
Congress, when it adopted the Clean Air Act, recognized that California had special air quality concerns differing significantly
from the other states and provided California the unique ability to set its own motor vehicle emission standards to meet their
needs. Congress also correctly recognized that motor vehicle manufacturing and marketing are necessarily conducted
on a national level and that varying state-to-state regulation of fundamental vehicle design elements would be
extremely harmful to the industry and costly to consumers. For these reasons, Federal law establishes the U.S.
Department of Transportation as the sole agency authorized to set light-duty fuel economy standards, expressly
preempting states from setting standards “related to” fuel economy. See 49 U.S.C. 32919(a).

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 1AR – Ext #3 – Manufacturing Turn (1/2)

1. Extend the 2AC Langer ev – 95% of the effectiveness of feebates stems from shifts in car
manufacturing. Automakers don’t respond to state feebates initiatives

2. Only a federal feebate solves for automakers – state based has limited manufacturing responses
Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An
Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
September, http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf)

2. More ev that state-based feebates do not incentivize manufacturers to change production

Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An
Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
September, http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf)

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State-Based (Not Uniform) Feebate 1AR – Ext #3 – Manufacturing Turn (2/2)

The benefits of manufacturing changes far outweigh consumer preferences – huge solvency deficit
Banerjee 07. (Robin, Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, “Deals on Wheels”, Backgrounder, No.
108, November, http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_108.pdf)
Another key insight is that, in the models, the majority of the effects of a feebate policy seem to come from
manufacturers attempts to preserve their market shares through technological innovation and improvements to
their vehicles. Implementing innovative technologies often makes more economic sense once the added financial
incentives of the feebate are in place. The adoption of such new technologies has a much greater positive impact
than that of consumers switching to smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles in order to take advantage of the rebates and
avoid the tax. But there is also a rebound effect which works against the policy, as consumers-now able to travel further at lower cost—offset
some of the efficiency—related reduction through higher use. However, even with the increase in fuel consumption due to this rebound effect, the
studies still anticipate an overall positive result.

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Uniform (Nationally-Set) Feebate 2AC

If all states adopt the same feebate rate, it fails – must be specific to their manufacturing and
consumer revenues
Langer 05. (Therese, PhD UC Berkeley and transportation program director, “Vehicle Efficiency Incentives: An
Update on Feebates for States”, Report Number T051 for the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
September, http://www.oilendgame.com/pdfs/Implementation/WtOEg_FeebatesUpdate.pdf

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a2 States CP – State PTX links

State feebates programs face huge political and legal hurdles that prevent implementation
Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment,
PhD and former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing
Feebate Programs”, November 25,
http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
While the concept of feebates is attractive, and they make a lot of sense from an environmental perspective, various
political and legal hurdles have bogged down feebate legislation at the state level in the U.S. In our
conversations with experts2, some recurring themes emerged: Maryland’s unfortunate experience, the fact that
feebates are politically unpopular because they are perceived to be new taxes, and that feebates are often perceived
by the general public to be an “SUV tax”. Any decision to try to implement such a program must therefore face
these challenges head-on. It is of crucial importance to begin a public outreach and education program well before
the legislation is debated in committees, so as to circumvent popular misconceptions that might arise in the minds of
the public. It is also important to find ways to deal with the powerful automobile lobby.

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a2 States CP – State PTX Links – California

A state-based feebate in California is hugely politically unpopular

Energy Washington Week 08. (“Economy, Rising Gas Prices Stall California GHG Auto ‘Feebate’
Bill”, Vol. 5, No. 18, April 30, lexis)
A California lawmaker has abandoned plans to advance legislation that would require the state to implement a
"feebate" program that would issue rebate checks to motorists who buy cars with lower greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and impose a fee on those who buy higher-emitting vehicles. A legislative source says the bill is being
rejected by many lawmakers at this time because of the slowing economy and rising fuel prices.

A Californian feebates scheme is political suicide

Energy Washington Week 08. (“Economy, Rising Gas Prices Stall California GHG Auto ‘Feebate’
Bill”, Vol. 5, No. 18, April 30, lexis)
California Assemblyman Ira Ruskin (D) recently decided to abandon pushing a GHG auto feebate proposal initially
intended to be included in AB 2316, a bill that would require a study on the GHG-reduction benefits of current
vehicle retirement programs.
"It wasn't happening politically right now," the legislative source says of Ruskin's feebate bill. "The timing was
not right . . . certain [lawmakers] are dealing with the economy and gas prices and the perception [a new fee] would
create."
Ruskin last year failed to advance a feebate bill, AB 493; it stalled on the Assembly floor. That bill proposed to
establish a program for new vehicle purchases beginning July 1, 2010. Motorists who purchase vehicles that emit
low GHGs would qualify for rebates from the state up to $2,500; consumers who purchase vehicles that emit high
GHG levels could be assessed a surcharge up to $2,500. The measure included a scale for amounts of surcharges or
rebates, depending on the GHG emissions of vehicles.

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a2 49 States CP (Excludes California)

1. CP can’t solve – Californian emissions alone will be almost 60 million metric tons by 2030
LA Times 08. (“Bill would set car fees, rebates”, Los Angeles Times, January 27, pg. B1, lexis)
The Union of Concerned Scientists, an advocacy group that worked closely with Ruskin, estimates that California's
emissions could drop by as much as 57 million metric tons a year by 2030 as a result of the feebates. That would
be equivalent to taking about 9 million cars and trucks off the road.

2. Differing state-based feebate levels can’t solve – leakage

Bernow 02. (Steve, founder and VP of the Tellus Institute which researched energy and the environment, PhD and
former prof @ Rutgers U, “Program Design Features for Feebate Initiative: Survey of Existing Feebate Programs”,
November 25, http://righg.raabassociates.org/Articles/Tellus_FeebateMemo_Nov25.doc.)
Unless a nationwide feebate is implemented, there would always exist a problem of leakage whereby
consumers can avoid the fee by purchasing a vehicle in a neighboring state without a feebate. This could be
especially important for a small state like Rhode Island if the fee or rebate were paid at the time of purchase.
Fortunately, this problem is easily avoided because the sales tax is paid at the time of first registration of the vehicle.

3. Excluding California would trigger the impacts of global warming – water shortages, air
pollution, rising sea levels
McManus 07. (Walter, PhD and Director of the Automotive Analysis Division, “Economic analysis of
feebates to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from light vehicles for California”, MRPA Paper No. 3461,
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, May, pg. 8-9, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/3461/1/MPRA_paper_3461.pdf)
A growing majority of climate scientists are convinced that unless emissions are reduced,
global warming would cause a number of adverse effects throughout the United States. In
California, rising temperatures would reduce the snow pack in the Sierra—the state’s
primary source of water—and lead to less water for irrigating farms in the Central Valley.
Global warming would increase the number of extreme heat days and greatly increase the
risk of poor air quality across the state. California’s 1,100 miles of coastline and coastal
communities are vulnerable to rising sea levels. Concerted action could curb global
warming, but all sectors would need to take immediate steps to reduce heat
trapping pollution.
In California, the transportation sector consumes well over half the oil used
statewide, and passenger cars and trucks emit 20 to 30 percent of the state’s global
warming pollution. Vehicles therefore are a central focus of the immediate action
required to reduce global warming.

4. REMEMBER TO READ a2 STATES CP (NOT UNIFORM)

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