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, 13 ~1arch 1962.






Justification for US r,U1i tary Intervention in Cuba (TS) '0. .

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum' ;tor .bhe Chief 'of Operations, Cuba Project, ~Thich responds to s>o+:_equest of'that office for brief' but precise description of pretexts ,which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

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proposed memorandum be ~orwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agenCies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phas~d plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

2. The .. oint Chiefs of ~Stafr reconunend that the J




3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given bhe 'primary respons,lbll1ty for developing militaryand para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and .covert military operat~ons be assigned the Joint Chiefs of


BY JCS ON ,__ ~_d ,..-- ;

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


Q_1A~SIFICAI!Qli ·U!1!riU~. .... ---- --.-1 Enclosure



Joint' Chiefs pf st ff Memo for Chief of operations, Cuba Project



=:: COpy NO.'.2 Pag.J. J.. F.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP BEeREll' JOS 1969/32:). .I2£. ::. report* on the above SUbject is submitted . . INGELlDO Joint Secretariat . . BLOUIN M..1'or consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. . 1 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 12 March . on file in Joint Secretariat EXCLUDED FROM GDs EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING. 2165 . ".e 2165 NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on NORTHWOODS (S) 1l. . '/ * Not reproduced herewith./ TOP SECRET !ICS 1969/321 .. DOD DIRECTIVE 520Q.


_. has requested "..) } . Cuba Project. II 'fI rV rt._ COpy OF COPIES SPEC~ISTRIBUTION REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP to the JOINT CHIEFS on CUBA PROJECT(TS) OF STAFF ~ The Chief of Operations.'" that he be furnished on this matter the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1962. £'.. ... exCLUDED fROM GOS .---~ 9 March 1962 . by 13 Merch .

Memorandum '1'01' the Cha. DISCUSSION .'Joint Chiefs of staff from Chief of Naval Operations. THE f PROBLEtlT It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. Cuba Project. FACTS BEARING ON 2. and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of 6. 4.srequested* by Chief of Operations. ('is) THE PROBLEM 1. subject: JlOperation MONGOOSE!!. A. J 2 .JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA. subjeot: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)II. the Joint Ohiefs of staff are to indicate brief description but preCise . and the United Nations and irresponsible. For additional facts see Enclosure B. There is * Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations. 3. on file in Geneval Craig's office. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the p~esent time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. on file in General Craigls office.ct.irman.dated 8 March 1962. dated 5 March 1962. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of actiwn proposed** by the US NavY relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area. ** Cuba Proje. The suggested aODreesOr action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. forum World opinion. shOUld be favorably~affected by developing the inter- national image of the Cuban government as~ash the western Hemisphere..5. .

b. US Delegation.as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba. CONCLUSION 7. nor have tmVbfiU\8U '~!!J the Soviets established Soviet bases Therefore. However.ded to US officers assigned " '1 . United Nations Military Staff Committee. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. .. Cuba has not yet become a member of the War~~w Pact. integrated. since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba pr~blem.nth its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations. all projects are suggested within the ti~e frame of the next few months. c. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman. to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwar. in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe.-It is recommended that: a. provide a basis for development of a Single. time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba. RECOMMENDATIONS 8. This paper NOT be_forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands. these suggestions/should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. Cuba Project. and together with similar inputs from other agencies. Enclosure A together .

The Joint Chiefs of starf have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations. similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.... IIOperation MONGOOSEII. operatiOn:! assigned the Joint Chiefs o:C.. dated 5 March 1962.. Cuba Project.' the basic plan.. that this responsibility for both overt and covert. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed It is assumed that there will be memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. on file :. . it is assumed that a Single agency will be responsibility for developing ~~~~ary and It is reconnnended ..inGen Craig t s office 4 Enclosure A .' para-military aspects .. j: .-. '"__ .MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUbje~t: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 1. . _-- -. Further.. subject._ .I * Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations.?:t.. 2.. given the prim~ • i/' D 3.$taff..military -"'. .. be !~ .. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis •. ~. CUba Project.

- build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and oreate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale." . be pursued. for qeneral Craig~ subject: dated 5 ~arch 1962.' . MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. Appendix to Enclosure A "~tl~SS\Ht9 5 --i~&P-ste-Rtt~M1~tPftttHHfttl*~~~n~'UUL--- . ~. i.:~ can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. This plan1 incorporating projeots selected from the attached suggestions..:J • . Such a plan ~o¥ld enable a logioal s. or trom other sources. ii' l Cuba Project. should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultiillate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. The plan would also . 2. directed at other oountries as well as the United States. 3. CUBA PROJECT Justifioation for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) ~ Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations.n-OrlrR'n-~~t ' APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE DRAFT A I 1 . -: . v'" properly ~ntegrate and time phase the oourses of action to The desired resultant from the exeoution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffe~ing defens~ble ~ievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. uaperation MONGOOSE".. It is assumed that there will pe similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. . The indiVidual projects X .. which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. . Subject: 1..

the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months. ~lit~~ #' . . .ra-l]1ilitaryspects of the plan a operations be assigned the for both overt and covert. Therefore. •• -'H..-- ijNtt~~~\ntD \. ~ ~.. and pa.• . ~ '" ~I 6 Appendix..~: _f'or~~.~e~op'ing ilitary _ m Joint Chiefs of Staff... UNGlA~~IHtU 5... Time is an important factor in reso¥utlon of the Cuban problem.. __ • .. it is r-ecommended that primary responsibility __ .. to Enclosure A -m-lreRrI~'EtltHtNIDtlff&~--N*Ditl~~... . Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention... T~ ... .4.

n.U" u~tl~SS\Ht~ . Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan..A AurUMn ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN OUBA.will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo 'td give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. v II. (4) start ~iots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans )....t of cumulative. 1. posture throughout exeoution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response Justifies. 2..O. ' (. .r...D.Ul.') . time-phased plan. n ~Jl. (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fencell to stage attack on base..r. . they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a Single. Use clandestine radio.' Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in ohronolo'gical order): I (1) Start rumors (many).. (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual proJects within tl1e contex.PI~G~~R+U. integrated. UI L" I" L n" nUL II\. ..... A series of well coordinated incidents. 7 Annex to Appendix to Enolosure A --. ~~tt~~~lttt)J (Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes: They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies.p-£·~JJL--&. cpuld be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba). Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the OUr military . to include reQuisite preliminary actions ~uch as has been developed in response to Task 33 c. a.

Conduct runeraas b.. We could blow up a US ahipin blame Cuba." . la. 4. A "Remember the Maine several forms: lt incident could be a:rranged in Guantanamo Bay and . c. b. for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10). from the sea . . Some damage to installations.~ . destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base. follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew.rge fires -.>bor entrance. 8 Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A . 3. of Ouban planes or ships merely invs.'.~.(5) (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage). (9) Capture militia group which storms the base .tigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken 'under-attack. a.napthalene. (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. (11) Sink ship near l'la:r. We could arrange to oause such incident The presence in the Vicinity of Havana Or Santiago as a spectacular ~esult of Cuban attack from t~e air or sea} or both. Commence large scale United states military operations. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in th~ Cuban waters. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation. United states would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies. ':a. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area~ in other Florida cities and even in Washington. (8) Capture assault teams approaching or vicinity of Guantanamo Oity. " (10) Sabotage Ship in harbor. The nesmess to Havana or Santiago The US could would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have Been the tire.

. attaoks on 6.) r t III. Soviet Bloc inoendiaries could be found. Use of MIG type airoraft by US pilots coUld provide additional p~ovocation..II[ '11 R NUti H = be tHtf1J1trr.. with "cuban" messages to the Communist be found..1· Domin.. and Nicaragua at present and possible others. Annex to Appendix to :E:nclosUl~e A "r- 9 ". ..I "I " L 11. CastI'o~suppo!'tedn rilibustev oould be s~lated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein We of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominioan Republic). can be taken of the sensitivity intrusions within their national air space. Exploding a rew plastic bombs in oarerully chosen spotsJ the arrest i' . . Dominican Republic. -.1..11 t I \"" ._ .canRepublic and JlCubanli shipments of'arms which would OJ::' on the beach.. enroute to Florida (real or simulated).. Guatemala. An F-86 properly painted would oonvince air passengers that they The primary drawback to this suggestion oopies of the MIG could saw a Cuban MIG) especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce Such raot. on lives of Cuban refugees in the United states even to the extent or wounding in instanoes to be widely publicized. of CUban agents and the release of prepared doouments Cuban involvement also would be helpful in substantiating projecting the idea of an irresponsible government. Harassment of civil air.I The terror oampaign cOUld pOi!l~lll~ll(~Drefugeea aeeking i We could sink a boatload or CUbans we could foster attempts haven in the United states.night.. surface shipping and destruction of US militar. This o~uld be ooupled \U:ldersround in the . know that Castro is baoking subversive efforts olandestinely against Haiti. A "Cuban-based.1 drone aircraft by'MIG type planes would be useful as oomplementary actions. These efrorts can be magnified and For example] advantage nCubanll B-26 or of the Dominioan Air Force to additional ones contrived for exposure. S." . interoepted) C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at. appears to be the seourity risk inherent in obtaining or modifyHowever. ing an aircraft. reasonable be produced from US resources in about three months.

8. aircraft The actual registered would be converted to a drone.liary £ield at Eglin AFBwhere arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non~scheduled . It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban' aircraft has attaoked and shot a chartered civil Jamaioa. will be interrupted by destruction be triggered by The transmission of the aircraft which will radio signal. flight.7. over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequenoy a IIMAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG airoraft. UNtl~~S\Ht~ r . l should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the Concurrently. and a. be chosen only to cause the flight plan dOh~ airliner enroute from the United states to The destination would route to cross Cuba. b. meanwh1le will continue The drone aircraft When to fl¥ the filed flight plan.to allow a rendezvous south of ~ I~ Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-o~~ing rl t aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an aiUd. GUatemala.'" "t· ·11tt~mtAt-*ttttf1}ttNftM~4AL. ' flulunA and surface craft I ~. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the aotual aircraft will be soheduled. genuine defections of Cuban and military ail' and sunrace Cl:'aft should be encouraged.. Panama or Venezuela. At a designated time the duplicate would be all boarded under substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected pasaengers~ carefully prepared aliases. civil ~~~lA~~~t~ -. This will allow ICAO radio 10 Annex to Appendix to Enclosu:re A ::. Hijacking attempts aga1ns~ civil air government of Cuba. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted aircraft belonging to a ClA proprietary Miami numberadaa an exact duplicate for a civil registered organization in the area.

1. No other . a. Their mission will be to reve~se oourse and simUlate fakir aircraft for an air defense eXercise in southern Florida. 11 . Eglin auxiliary. Approximately 4 or 5 F-IOI alrcraftw111 in be dispat~hed trail from Homestead AF. disappeared. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-IOI parts. at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. 1ih1le near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. an The aircraft would be met by the proper people. would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. the US what has happened to the aircraft' instead of the US trying to 9. quickly stored and ~iven a ~~w tail number. they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs. a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval betwe~n aircraft. The pilot who had performed the mission under "an alias. On one suoh flight.. c..B. etc. b. parachute. calls would be made.. F10ridaJ to the vic1nity of CUba. 1 r"'" '" The pilot would then fly d~ectly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base...stations in the "se1111the inoident. however. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 m1ies off the Cuban coast. Search Ships and aircraft could be dispatched Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A and parts of aircraft found. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent ~ntervals. It 1s possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF airoraft over international waters in an unprovoked attaok. The pilot and aircraft woul~ then have The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew.

~.. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon'which to base overt intervention. II .. 2.. ~ 3.... _ •• \0.. \ . . It is underst90d that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba. ..- - - - -...... ENCLOSURE B FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 1. . The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962...'l4 a .. ""' •• I . - - .'.. as follows: II determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible o! attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United states to develop a Cuban "provocation" as Justification for positive US military action...... ~ . l' * ** JCB 1969/303 JCS 1969/313 12 EncloSUl'e B .