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Witt Reminders

Witt Reminders

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Published by Hilary Cohen

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Published by: Hilary Cohen on Apr 30, 2012
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PLA Basic Argument  A private language, in which a person gives meaning to words by attending to private feelings, etc.

is impossible, because there is no guarantee that such meanings will remain stable.  Claiming that one can check by remembering the past feeling is clearly fallacious. However, we have a public language for talking about our feelings.  We learn this vocabulary by substituting words for natural expressions of feelings.  Such words must have the same „grammar‟ as the displays they replace  grammar of expression What is the grammar of expression, compared with grammar of description?  A description could be T/F, so the proposition must by independent of the state described. (sometimes matches, sometimes not)  The tendency to express a feeling in a certain manner is part of what it means to have that feeling. Ethological  The verbal substitute follows the same grammar; the tendency to use these words is part of what it is to have the feeling.  Deliberately using the wrong words is not falsehood but moral deception – producing the expression of some other feeling Two long-standing problems  Solipsism: Since I only really know the state of my own mind, I must be using a private language to describe it. But that‟s impossible, so solipsism deconstructs.  Skepticism: I cannot know what you are thinking because I do not have access to your feelings. But that is to assume feelings talk in descriptive, while actually it‟s expressive, so that is false. General Point  Human life is grounded in ethology  Local forms of life modify expressive grammars

and acting?  If willing were a mental act. We introduce causes in such contexts when a person behaves „out of character‟ or is unable to carry out what he/she has committed to . Intending Comparing intentional to unintentional  tempts one to look at intention as cause  Are intentions mental states? No  Saying what one intends to do is not a description of a mental cause but an act of commitment like promising. committing oneself to it. then I would have to bring it about  that would mean willing to will  Willing ≠ instrument for getting something done  Not a species of trying o I cannot be said to try to do something that is easy o Trying generally describes failing o Trying makes no sense Upshot Persons are active agents in doing things – so no additional cause is required. Willing Is there always volition between planning an action.Psychology of Action The “cause and effect” explanation is often cited in the psychology of action – how actions are brought about.

Future is not a reference to a particular. it‟s a reference to a type. .

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