TO: FROM: unclassified confidential

TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM: Notice: Release only to U. S. Government Agencies is authorized. Other certified requesters shall obtain release approval from Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency, Washington, D. C. 20301.

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APPROVED: F.X. Forest Captain, U.S:N.


Turret Structure. Submarine Salvage Fittings. Study of Fire and Paint. 3. Study of Flooding Sources. 4. pagen . . 2.INTRODUCTION The "Special Reports on Hull Items" contained in this v~ume are as follows: 1.

. .. ... -. ...... .. . . . .. . .. Study of Fire and Paint. ........ .. . .. I n Table of Contents ...Introductton ....TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE NOS.... .... ... . .... Master Flyleaf . .. . .. . - 0" jJ'looding Sources Turret Structure .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ... .... ... . . . . ... ...... ....... m 1-1 to 1-4 2-1 to 2-~2 3-1 to 3-21 4-1 to 4-13 Submarine Salvage Fittings Study ... .. - - . .. . . .... . NOTE: The above is a Ust of thE! effective pages in this . .... .. ... ... .. ...... volume.. ......... .


2.7 main ballast. _ .s a preliminary step. On the PILOTF'ISH. A similar condition was found on the SKATE after test A as a result of severe damage to the main deck and superstructure caused by air blast.. air leaks at the tank top...______ • __ . In salvaging the PILOTFISII. a time consuming job at a depth of 170 feet. .L. Damage to the superstructure of the sunken submarines rendered the salvage fittings useless and hindered rather than aided the operation of raising the vessels . In addition to these leaking fittings. l1.:.L"i\JO SECTION I . every other salvage fitting on the ship. The·same situation existed for about 40% of the salvage connections of the APOGONand SKIPJACK. ~v~'-'. it was necessary to cut away the main deck around each fitting.L. none of the connections could be used as found... No. • ·.. Submarine salvage operations conducted at Bikini after test B disclosed a serious weakness in design of salvage fittings. flOENTIAl .... Six main ballast tanks were found flooded.a. This resulted in preventing access to the r=ach rod or tail pipe.TESTS ABLE ANDBAKER 1. _ . One of these.. 3. The remainder flooded as a result of distorted and leaky tank salvage valves which permitted the tanks to vent: In each case. APOGONand SKIPJACK.:. both compartment and tank.I .&... flooded because the after capstan head was blown over into the main vent valve.... and/or jarnming of the valve operating reach rod. the tail pipe cap had been torn off or the tail pipe and valve had been damaged below the cap...... was distorted to the extent that it is quasttonable whether anyone could have been used for the purpose intended..LJ.the underwater shot had displaced the main deck in certain locations by an arnount varying from 1/2 inch to about 3 inches.

the present salvage valves have: functioned satisfactorily.\. .IIV1IV1I'_d.I.::. when a submarine has been sunk by nonviolent means. in the last ten years there have been only two submarines salvaged. Unde:r conditions of atomic attack and with the present de sign of salvage fittings. (This does not include the SKlPJACK which was participating in a special test in which the possibility of sinking war. for tanks and compartments be eliminated.O. J.t\ J.. However.'. war it was common practice to blank off salvage fittings. as an example. so great that special fittings installed prior to the test might have beer +ustttied).n extension rod and a long vulnerable tan pipe as well as protecting the valve. In times of peace. However. In tne past. the SQUALUS (S8192) and LANCE'I'FlSII (S8296). .ure and recessed into the tank top. For the tanks. In any futur-e war they would introduce a hazard as was shown by the SKATE damage. This is perhaps the extreme case. .}:'.L'II 1.: Page 1-3 CU~f\U[Rl\Al ". but damage of this nat..• /l'h-) 1.J'_. It is therefor recommended that. eliminate their present juxtaposition to the main deck and give them a certain degree of protection. 2.lV.ure to a much lesse:r degree could be serious J especially in enemy controlled water. thus resulting in an up-ended submarine. Consider-tng the cost of manufacturing.L\. continued installation of salvage connections does not appear justified. thus ell rninating the need for a. the relative ease with which a diver can burn holes in the tanks in which to insert a blow fitting. it is not diffieult to imagine a situation in which an end compartment is flooded and all the adjacent t. tnstalling and maintaining each fitting.':r. such a proposition has disadvantages and does not appear at all tenable for compartment.C.. 3. salvage fittings. salvage fittings be eliminated !:. In lieu of redesign it is proposed that salvage (HUng.~~': I'.:. it is possible that the valves might be moved outboard of the superstruct. By suitable redesign it might be possible to make salvage fittings more rugged.ank salvage valves are either blown off or leaking to such an extent that the ballast tanks could not be blown. and the str-uctural weaknesses introduced by the fittings.1..'IIJ. - nc.

SECTION II . It is emphasized that the above discussion 1s concerned only with the salvage of submarines. Paze 1-4 . The rescue of persormel from sunken submarines is an entirely separate issue and one on which vigorous effort should be expended to develop suitable rescue apparatus to function at depths to which modern submarines will operate.RECOMMENDATIONS • 4.

'.. .cONfIUENTIAL . "'.J . Shirley.S.BUREAU OF SHIPS GROUP TECHNICAL INSPECTION REPORT • STUDY OF FLOODING SOURCES BY: J. :. " ~:: SECRE'T .p~e 2-1'.. . B.N. f:')' . " '. U.. Commander.~.

allowable pressure drop. small leaks that when added together permit serious flooding. Progressive flooding not only decreases the residual stability and hence its safeness and utility as a fighting vessel but also increases the damage to equipment and to the habitability or utility of compartments. The importance of maintaining the highest standard of watertight inte'grity has been stressed many times.SECTION I . The transports. Passable compartments were those within the allowable pressure drops. LST's. The destroyers were completely air tested or ~": visually inspected. Where leaks were found remedial action was taken whenever feasible. Excellentcompartments were those having less than the . Due to progressive flooding. what might have bepn a problem of slight repair or adjustment became a major problem of equipment overhaul and of cleaning the ship . 3. Progressive flooding is permitted by many seemingly . Unsatisfactory compartments had pressure drops exceeding the allowable limit. These atomic tests again showed the damage that can result from minor sources of flooding or leakage.or resulted in loss of the ship. On the assumption that air tests of typical sections of the capital ships ' would give an average representation of their watertight condition. 2. these vessels were tested at the bow. Page 2-2 . The spaces were tested in accordance with the ships air test schedule. and the LeI (L)'s were visually inspected and had chalk tests made on pertinent doors and hatches.GENERAL 1. The representative tests on the capital ships revealed the following information with respect to the watertightness. amidships. stern andthe ' quarter points. Many ships had serious damage as a result of progressive flooding.

4 38.0 21.2% Passable or Excellent rating. or Exc.vlng a ships had the follow- Compartmerts Pass. 5.6 38.6 62. several pertinent factors must be remembered. Spaces above those tested are not watertight or . limited flow and that approximately one-fourth would permit from a limited to a light flow. 63 Compartments Unsatisfactory 4 51 3 52 50 4 9 5.6 25.6 3.3% unsatia- Total number compts.Percentage results on compartments Ship Arkansas New York Nevada Pennsylvania Saratoga Independence Pensacola Salt Lake City Prinz Eugen Average 4.3 18.6 34.3 58.5 34..6 .5 19. The majority of the tested spaces are at 01" below the waterline. tested 70 59 89 61 97 65 52 50 23 28. 8.5% of tests 17.8 3.3 25.50.4 8. ing conditions: Ship Ralph Talbot Rhind Mustln Wainwrlght condlttons with respect to the number of compartments Representative were similar in that all had very good h~.0 factory 75. However.0 69.1 41.7 .1 42.0 13.4 55.7 81.2 passabl. As representative figures.3 32. All the destroyers excellent 15.6 13.8 58. the capital ship tests showed that approximately one-half of the compartments would easily permit progressive flooding varying from a free t(" .

(f) 4% caused by leaky rivets. (c) 20% caused by non-tight electric cable stuffing tubes. In addition. its age. to reach the desired condition. (g) 3% caused by leakage into piping systems. (b) 20% caused by poorly fitting or warped doors. the figures represent a higher degree of watertightness than actually exists. Similarly. and the training of personnel in damage control procedure of closing watertight fixtures.airtight and require only visual inspections. the figures on the destroyers represent a higher quality of . The following tabulation of the types of leakage that occurred on the capital ships shows the average frequency of occurence and can be used as a rough guide for other ships. 6. ClOSing-offone compartment to a passable condition might require anything from a few minutes to several hours in comparison with the few minutes allowed under actual operating conditions.waterttghtneas than actually exists. which included checking and tightening of closures. (a) 30% caused by leakage through bulkheads or decks resulting from bolt or screw holes. The percentages for each group will vary with the type of vessel. . CONFIDENTIAL . (e) 4% caused by leakage through stuffing boxes on dogs of hatches and doors. As an indicator. those compartments which were passable or excellent usually req. imcomplete or poor welding along seams. hatches. (d) 10% caused by ventilation systems through pierced ducts and leaky valves or fittings. or opened riveted seams. or ammunition hoist covers. its past service and maintenance.nred a considerable period of time.

Therefore each source haa been sum '" marized in two ways. . the sources of flooding have boc. ..sounding tube caps or deck drains. The upper figure in f:~Rchblock tndicatee the number of ships of that class which had flooding an a rp8ult of .ipn that remained afloat after the atomic t(.p(~.:. A . and 3. iring junction boxes and out or (1) 1% caused by design fail ur« to install closure fitting to isolate a compartment. (k) 2% caused by leaky OW plates •.i divided into primary and secondary sources with sub headings that generally .::h. No attempt has been made to «valuate the aertousnesa or intensity of flooding as a r-esult of any source or the number of spaces flooded A.ihow whether the source is or is not a dlrect r-esult of the test A. occurr-ed as a result of small leaks t. The Ilooding that occurred on th= .ondarysource is defined as a source which pprrnits progr-eastve floodtng of additional spaces after an initial source occur-s. 2. it is felt that roughly (-'~'lch8()UreC could be given an equal value with respect to the flooding rate and still would give.hat accumulated over ::L considerable period of lime. All sources are summarized in the total column without regard as to whether they are primary or secondary sour-ces i'1 order to form a comparative tabulation of all sources. A primary source is 'i(.~finedas a source for tnitlal I.1StS has berm compiled in l1'igurAs 1.a fairly accurate indication of the sertouaness and intensity of the flooding. (1) 2% caused by leaky reach rod stuffing boxes.. '7. Since the:' majority of flooding even ships with a stgnmcant number of spaces flooded. 8.mtry of water Into the hull or for initial escape of otl or water from a compartment or piping system which was Intact prior to the test.S a result of any SOUTee. /' / ( (j) 2% caused by leaky bel ted closure through wir-Ing cables. For this r eport.

3. Page 2-6 CONflUENTIAt .0% of the secondary sources and roughly permitted 8.3% of the total sources were broken pipe lines to internal systems which permitted roughly 4. In .2% of the secondary flooding.0% of the primary sources were broken pipe lines to internal systems and primary flooding through this type of source roughly permitted 1.that undivided source. As a secondary source of flooding broken pipe lines to internal systems were 6. addition the same type of leakage permitted secondary or progressive flooding on one capit'll ship one time and on a total of three ships sixteen times.4% . The lower figure then roughly indicates the seriousness of flooding that occurred. For example in test B.ofthe primary flooding. Q. Item 10: Broken pipe lines to internal systems as a primary source of flooding occurred on one capital ship two times and on a total of two ships three times. 2. As a recapitulation broken pipe lines to internal systems occurred on five of the target vessels. The lower figure indicates the number of times that the source occurred in that class of ship.6% of the total flooding. nineteen times.

TEST ABLE Ao General. Ships in test A had ve-q l1tUe :flood~g as a direct result of the test.6%'of the target ships had no flooding as a direct result of the test. 2. . NEVADA. The only secondary sources were open pipe lines on the NAGATa. All flooding except for the opened shell seams on the SALT LAKE CITY. However. leaky sea valves. 3. page 2-20. The concrete ARD C 13 had a crack in the hull that permitted flooding by two spaces. However. L 71. The PENSACOLA had one magazine partially flooded from an adjacent fuel oU tank through opened seams. 2. .3% of the total sources permitted 2. 13. many of the ships had water enter by ncrmalIeakage through stern tubes. stern tubes.4% of oocme. '!he principal primary sources of flooding were opened shell seams.5% of the total flooding. four voids on the NEVADA. 'Ihe opened shell seams on the SALT LAKE CYIT and the NEVADA would only have r~qu1red isolation of the tanks. The cracks In the concrete hull of the ARnC 13 could have been controlled after a few hours by ships force. rudder trunks. and the main machinery space. and in engineering spaces. Opened· shell seams flooded one fuel oU tank on the SALT LAKE CITY. Normal and excessive leakage occurred in rudder trunks.SECTION II . . and ARDC 13 could have been stopped or handled in routine pumping of bilges. 3. and broken pipe line. B. 1. the flooding was not serious on any ship.3% of the total sources permitted 19.on the beached LCT 812. and leaky piping connections.The flooded tanks would not seriously impair the strength or stability of the ships.Discusslon of Figure 1.

7% of th!3total sources permitted 9. . The stern tubes partially flooded three shaft alleys on the NAGATO. The engine room was flooded through this source. 7. One stern tube of an' LCT had no packing in the stern tube 'prior to the test. • e. The starboard stern tube nor~alleakage on the INDEPENDENCi!:'permitted partial :flooding'of the shaft alley. Failure of scupper valves permitted backflow in plumbing drain lines on the GENEVA.7% of the total sources permitted 4.stern tubes. 3.3% of the total sources permitted 2. 8.2% of the total flooding.7% of the floo~ing.the PRINZ EUGEN partially flooded a passageway. This leakage was greater than normal and on the NAGATO probably was caused by propulsion shaft vibration loosening the packing. and LCM's similarly had engineering spaces with flood:ed bilges. Five of the LCT's. These four lines were the only sources of progressive flooding in test A. Open pipe lines allowed secondary flooding which partially flooded the NAGATO engine rooms and by back :flow in a common gravity drain line partially floodeq one magazine on the ARKANSAS. 8.leaky sea valves permitted flooding of three fuel oil tanks on the NAGATO. 5.0% of the total sources permitted 12. 6. 9. Open or . contributed to the foundering of the LCM 1. • . A broken fresh water line oa.8% of the total flooding.0% of the sources permitted 14. The LeI (L) 327 had normal leakage by seepage through the hull and piping connections in the engineering space. 20.4. LCVP's.7% ofthe total sources permitted 12.9% of the total flooding.4% of the total flooding. and partially flooded the engine room of the LCM 4. 10. 6.2% of the total flooding. Normally in the small craft most of the leakage came through the . 6.

The LCM 1 took water on board through her ramp either from waves or due to pitching as a result of the test.0% of the total sources permitted 7.10.1% of the target ships capatzed. with CONfIDENTIAL . Rudder trunk normal leakage on the SALT LAKE CITY flooded the rudder trunk vOid. 12. This vessel had leaking stern tubes. The submarines in test A had only one. The SKATE was beached to prevent any possibility of her loss. 1.·onthe PENNSYLVANIA partially flooded the Tiller Room. 3. 10. On three of the small craft flooding from unknown sources occurred. This increased leakage was probably caused by vibration of the rudder shaft loosenmg the packing. . . 13. The rudder void on the RALPH TAL BOT .Jas partially flooded by over normal leakage.7% of the total sources permitted 4. the SKATE.3% of the total flooding.9% of the total flooding.. 11. The LCM 1 was found in a semi submerged condition. Rudder trunk excessive leakage as a result of the test partially flooded the ARKANSAS steering engine room and overflowed contributing to further flooding. C. Submarines.3% of the total flooding. The sources were most probably hull leaks from previous beaching operations.0% of the total sources permitted 7. Six main ballast tanks were flooded. Water taken on board through the ramp and the stern tubes contributed to her foundering.3% of the total sources permitted 2. 6. 1. any flooding. 10.' .4% of the total fldoding. . and on the LCI (L) 620 partially flooded the after steering space. 14.

This may be attributable to two factors.sa potential health hazard. stern tubes. except six through opened shell seams or holes.TEST BAKER A. The. bulkhead fittings such as shaft glands or stuffing tubes. and cargo hatches. Flooding on all ships. The opened tank could have been isolated and the hole in the after machinery space temporarily plugged. first. General. Ships in test B had serious amounts of flooding primarily in engineering spaces and compartments in the after . The flooding was seriously aggravated by the fact that no personnel were on board for a considerable period of time after the test. and holes in the decks or bulkheads. normal leakage become. loosened doors and hatches. 1. The flooding on the NEVADAadded very little weight to the ship since the opened tanks had been ballasted to about 90% capacity but was serious in that it opened many fuel oil tanks to the sea. 3. Only on a few ships would flooding have been serious if damage control parties had been able to function immediately or within a few hours. The SALT LAKE CITY had one fuel tank opened to the sea. rudder trunks. Except on the HUGHESand the LST 133 negligible flooding occurred in the forward part of the ships. the vibration of the stern when underway loosening structure. The secondary sources were broken or open pipe lines. The FALLON had tears in the shell plating.SECTIONill . broken piping. These tanks were in poor condition prior to the test with slight leakage between tanks. Leakage of water into the ships after test B is a serious radiological problem.. ntrol by damage control parties within a very short time. This allowed minor leakage to accumulate and thus result in serious flooding. What would be considered. This tank could have been isolated. The ARDe 13 concrete hull had been cracked in test A. could have been brought under c. the few shell openings and second. Normal leakage in engineering spaces and through stern tubes and rudder trunks occurred on approximately one-third of \_ .body. Damage control parties could have kept her afloat. 2. The flooding on the NEW YORKand the PENNSYLVANIAcould have been isolated in a few voids and after trimming tanks. principal primary sources of flooding were opened shell seams. This vessel later capsized due to progressive flooding of the port side pontoons.

. soaces 'Occurred !4USTrn~ and MAYRANT.0% of the total f~ooding. 2.·""'. and on all shafts of the HUGHES. LST 133.1. The NEW YORK had 12 volds.8% of the primary floodin. Nor mal leakage through stern tubes resulting in partial .. and NEVADA.~j V/:. . GASCONADE. 5. 309% of the prima. Stern tube excessive on one shaft.··::b.flood1ng of the shaft alleys occurred on the PENNSYLVANIA . .bJ.ary sources permitted 108% of the primary flooding.2% of the prImary .7% of the total sources permitted 10%0£ the total.B. :. I . r.I~~fl..113 had the steertng ~~ar compartment flooded. ships had no flooding as a direct result of the test. the WAlNWRIGHT and MUGFORD. 8.21 and 2-22. 38 2.··i·'·j. had leakage through all.ble overflow.". The . Opened shell seams and holes occurred on six ships as a result of the test and on one ship after she was beached.9% of the total flooding.g. pages 2. However . BRACKEN.on two shafts and on the INDEPENDENCE on one shaft.. BUTTE.6% of the primary sources per:m.Similarly the LCI (Lrs 615 and 620 had minor leakage into the steering gear compartment. and CATRON.lc '.'.'. the BA. leakage contributing to the flooding the PENNSYLVANIA. and five small craft.. of . Two destroyers... _. of other 3. 5."··':_.'.7% of the total sources permitted 1. The. 9. and four transports.ry sources permitted 1.:i'f}.9% of the pri:rn. BRULE. 6.el Qll~r9. 13. .4.. 7."'mER. Discussion of Figures of the target 2 and 3. FALLON.3% of the total sources permitted 5.itted 10. .8% of the primary sources permitted 7..t.~~1ng tanks flooded.3% of the total sources permitted 3..4% of the total flOoding.£oRtNTi. a negligi. 2.oRK1 PENNSYLVANIA.LCT 1. Rudder trunkexcessive leakage contrIbuting to the flooding of other spaces occurred on the NEW y. flooding.0% of the primary flooding.J1lany of these ships had normal leakage of radioactive water into the hull. ~ . Rudder trunk normal leakageocc:urred on the PRINZ EUGEN and the SALT LAKE CITY where the steering gear voids flooded with. '. stern tubes.flooding.

.2% in of the secondary sources permitted 6.4% of the primary flooding. ~------- ...9% of the primary flooding..0% of the. 6. On the SALT LAKE CITY one inner bottom fuel 011 tank flooded from the after engine room.. I ~...the PENSACOLA5 inner bottom fuel oil tanks had opened seams into the after engine room.5% of the total flooding excluding the flooding on the ARDC 13. ~'r~ "UJ - . On the FALLON the auxiliary machinery space flooded from the forward machinery space through a torn bulkhead. ARDC 13 had cracks in the concrete underwater body that resulted in the ship capsizing.•.. .. total sources permitted 2.. 8. .3% of the total sources permitted 10. . Opened internal boundartes occurred on the HUGHESafter the beaching operation and caused flooding of one space.3% of the secondary flooding. YORK. J. On.. 2. 3...... permitted 19.' •.9% of the primary sources. On the PENSACOLAone fuel 011 tank ..'... The NEVADAhad 21 fuel 011 tanks flooded..9% of the primary sourpes permitted 0. On the FALLON a fuel 011 tank and the after machinery space were flooded through holes in the shell.bulkhead had rivets..._.9% of the total flooding.. ~L\.u:"f_... 4.PENNSYL VANIAhad 7 tanks and voids in way of the torpedo patch flooded.. 6.3% of the total sources permitted 3.:.2% of the secondary sources permitted '6.-.. The GASCONADE had inner bottom tank tops Slightly opened permitting oil to escape from a fuel oil tank into the after machinery space.. Secondary flooding rom opened internal boundaries occurred on the NEW .. 7. and the PENSACOLAas a result of the test. sheared permitting drainage of the tank into the shaft alley. The HUGHEShad shell openings which occurred after the tsst that flooded two spaces and contributed to further flooding while the ship was beached. 3.. Secondary leakage resulting in partial -n I"Il")ning through previously non-watertight boundary connections such as seams or joints occurred on the NEW YORK in 3 of the 5" magazines and on the PENNSYLVANIA one magazine and two other spaces. .. The SALT LAKE CITY had one fuel oil tank flooded. On the NEW YORKa steering foundation pad tore the deck permitting flooding from the after trimming tank..8% of the secondary flooding. ~ONFlU[NTIAL .LT LAKE CITY.. 1. .6% of the total flooding.

The MAYRAN'r had the forward engine room flooded from a brokerf3/8" salt water recirculating line and the after engine room from a broken 3/4" cooling line. t.". The MUSTIN had the forward fireroom and the after engine room flooded from broken 1/2" sea chest blow out lines. The HUGHES had the after engine room flooded through 4 leaks in broken 3/4" or small piping which vlere. The NEW YORK had leakage from the after trimming tank through a ruptured drain 11ne. a sea chest steaming out connection.8% of the primary flooding. Secondary leakage also occurred.STUDY OF FLOODING SOURCES 9. The forward engine room had leakage through a cracked lub oil cooler dtscharge Itne. .6% of the total sources permitted 5. a vent line on the condenser.t escaped from a leaky pipe. 10. 9.4 . and a overboard discharge valve. The FALLON had the forward machinery space flooded from a damaged rubber expansion joint in the main condenser overboard discharge and the shaft alley flooded from a broken stern tube water lubricating line. Broken pipe lines to sea. The BRULE and CATRON had their forward machinery spaces and the GASCONADE had the after machinery space flooded from small broken salt water lines.AKE CITY had the after engine room flooded through a broken salt water line nipple and corroded plug. connections. 6. Broken pipe lines to internal systems permitted primary flooding on the SALT LAKE CITY of the after gyro room from a ruptured fire main riser and of the after fire room from e rupturpo ballasting line. The SALT J . The PENSACOLA had a shaft alley flooded through a broken 2" salt water 11ne.8% of the total flooding. a pump relief valve.'"' . many of which were I" diameter or smaller permitted flooding on 10 ships. Her forward engine room had minor leakage through a four inch crack in number 1 main injection.7% of the primary sources permitted 10. and a lub oU cooler drain line. two broken sea chest blowout connections.er forward engine room had leakage from the main condenser cooling system. On the FALLON one forward space was partially' flooded with 011 tha. The HUGHES had the emergency diesel room flooded from the forward fire room . The NEVADA had the port engine room bUges flooded from a cracked flange in the condenser overboard discharge and one compartment partially flooded from a split overboard discharge line.

0.0% of the secondary flooding.P.9% of the primary sources permitted 1. The after engine room had leakage through a ruptured main condenser and out through a broken fresh water gage glass. On the NEW YORK backflow in the after' gravity drain line flooded 3 of the 14" magazines.7% of the total sources permitted 0. a storage compartment.0% of the total flooding.8% of the primary flooding. 10.3% of the total flooding permitted 5. 1. 11.6% of the total flooding. 1. One magazine flooded through two broken 3/4" pipes in the overhead. On the SALT LAKE CITY in the after fire room and after engine room. On the FALLON the after machinery space had leakage through an open sounding tube from a fuel oil tank that had been opened to the sea. air compressor room. and an accesr +"'lmk. Secondary leakage through open piping systems occurred on five ships. 1. On the HUGHES the emergency di~'.0% of the primary sources permitted 0. The LST 133 had many manifolds and piping cracked throughout the ship and especially in the engine room and ballast control room.through a broken 3/4" day tank drain line. 13.1% of the total flooding.3% of the total sources permitted 4.3% of the total sources permitted 1. 3. open funnel drain lines and sounding tubes permitted flooding of 7 fuel oil tanks.5% of the primary flooding. 6.9% of the primary sources permitted 1.4% of the secondary flooding.el room partially flooded through an open 2" pipe connection from the forward fire room. 1.2% of the total flooding.4% of the secondary sources permitted 11. On the NEVADA a similar system flooded the H. 3. A sea valve that had been left closed but-was found in an open condition permitted flooding of a tank on the PRINZ EUqEN. . 12. Sea valves in the SALT LAKE CITY engine rooms and the MAYRANT' s main condenser flapper valve and overboard gate valve had increased leakage as a result of the test around valve stems and packing.2% of the secondary sources permitted 8.4% "f the primary flooding.

..CI.I.,;VI.,;E\. O:>VUUU,U.1t:) Vi:L.LVI:::i::i on tne .1Vl.l\ I l'\J\1'll' l' Jarrea open and permitted primary flooding from 3 fresh water tanks into the after engine room. Secondary flooding on the LST 133 through open valves in the ballast lines and a check valve permitted water to distribute throughout the ship. 1.8% of the primary sources permitted 1.4% of the primary flooding. 2.1 % of the secondary sources permitted 2.1% of the secondary flooding. 1.3% of the total sources permitted 1.7% of the total flooding.


15. Normal leakage in engineering spaces such as engine rooms, fire rooms, underwater sound rooms or emergency diesel rooms due to leaky valve stems, pipe connections, leaky gaskets, and structural seams occurred on 26 shtps, The 4'r'lllowing ships had such leakage varying from a few inches to 3 feet in depth, the INDEPENDENCE in 8 spaces, PRINZ EUGEN in 3 spaces, PENSACOLA in 1 space, MAYRANT in 1 space, WILSON in 4 spaces, RHIND in 2 spaces, TRIPPE in 5 spaces, $ALPH TALBOT in 4 spaces, BANNER in 3 spaces, BRAKEN in1 space, BRISCOE in 2 spaces, BUTTE in 1 space, GASCONADE in 2 spaces, LST 52 in 2 spaces, LST 661 Iri 1 space, LCI (L) 332 in 1 space, LCI (L) 615 in 1 space, LCI (L) 327 in 1 space and the LCI (L) 329 in 1 space. 25.2% of the primary sources permitted 23.5% of the primary sources permitted 23.5% of the primary flooding. 17.2% of the total sources permitted 12.6% of the total flooding. 16. Secondary leakage occurred through main propulsion • shaft glands whenever the water reached the height of the bulkhead penetration on the PENNSYLVANIA, SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, MUSTIN, MAYRANT, CATRON, FALLON, GASCONADE, and the LST 133. 18.8% of the secondary sources permitted 15.2% of the secondary flooding. 5.9% of the total sources permitted '7.0% of thetotal flooding. 17. Secondary leakage through lea.ky hatches that primarUy had had the dogs jarred loose but also through open hatches occurred in 10 ships. On the NEW YORK water leaked downward through non-tight hatch to partially flood a storeroom. On the PENSACOLA water flooded the ice machinery room wi,tg overflow from a shaft

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alley through a non tight hatch. On the HUGHEShatches permitted water to enter 9 spaces. On the FALLON the after cargo space flooded from the shaft alleys through hatches that had been jarred loose. On the LST 133 one space was partially flooded through an open hatch. The LeT 812 engine room flooded through an open hatch. The LCT 1187 had one void flooded through a loose manhole cover. The LCM 1 had the engine room and one void and the T ,r~M (B) had the engine room and one compartment flooded through open hatches. 18.8% of the secondary sources permitted10.5% of the secondary flooding. 5.9% of the total sources permitted 4.9% of the total flooding. 18. Secondary leakage through leaky doors that primarily had had the dogs loosened occurred on 4 ships. The NEW YORK had 15 compartments and the PENNSYLVANIA had 11 compartments wtth flooding through loosened doors. The :EIUGHESad 11 h compartments flooded through doorways either directly as a result of the test or after beaching. The LST 133 had water enter from the tank deck through an open door. 8.3% of the secondary sources permitted 19.9% of the secondary flooding. 2.7% of the total sources permitted 9.2% of.the total flooding. 19. Electrical stuffing tubes in decks and bulkheads which had not been plugged after removal of wiring or which had non watertight packing contributed to secondary flooding on '5 ships, the NEW YORKin 2 spaces, the PENSACOLAin 1 space, the HUGHES in 4 spaces, the MAYRANTin 1 space, and the FALLON in 1 space. 10.4% of the secondary sources permitted 4.7% of the secondary flooding. 3.3% of the total sources permitted 2.2% of the total flooding. . 20. Secondary leakage through bulkhead and deck fittings such as reach rod stuffing boxes and especially the steering rod glands occurred in 12 spaces on the NEW YORKand 12 spaces on the NEVADA. 4.2% of the secondary sources permitted 12.5% of the secondary flooding. 1.3% of the total sources permitted 6.8% of the total flooding.





J.. U.upluggea DOH and screw holes in decks and bulkheads permitted secondary flooding on the NEW YORK in 1 space arid on the PENNSYLVANIA in 2 spaces. 4.2% of the secondary sources permitted 1.6% of the secondary flooding. 1.3% of the total sources permitted 0.7% of the total flooding •

. 22. Entry of water from the wave, water column, or steam cloud as primary flooding occurred', on the HUGHES where water entered through previously damaged main deck doors to flood 3 compartments, on the DAWSON where water entered through the forward cargo hatch and the smokestack, on the FALLON where it entered topside structure and cargo hatches, and on both the LST 52 and LST 133 where it entered the cargo hatches. The LCM (B) and the LCVP's 7, 8, 1t and 12 which were beached on Binini Island had water in the bilges which came from the wave that reached the island. Q.7% of the primary sources permitted 5.9% of the primary flo '~ing, 6.6% of the total sources permitted 3.2% of the total flooding. ' 23. The MAYRANT had 2 spaces partially flooded with water that came through ventilation systems in the superstructure. Numerous ships had water enter through. ventUation ducts during the decontamination washing of the ships .. This occurred after fittings were jarred loose or previously damaged. In addition the high pressure hose was directed upward from the ship and hitting directly or splashing into cowls. 1.0% of the primary sources permitted 0.9% of the primary flooding. 0.7% of the total sources permitted 0.5% of the total flooding', 24. Leakage came through No. '1 gun mount on the HUGHES to partially flood 1 compartment. 1.0% of the primary sources permitted 0.5% of the primary flooding. 0.7% of the total. sources permitted 0.2% of the total flooding.


Progressive flooding.6% of the primary source permitted 12. or leaky seams penmttted 25. The ARDe 13 hac leakage through shell cracks that eventually caused her to capsize.2% of the primary flooding. the PARCHE and the SKATE. ApprOXimately 31. a hull crack.6% of the secondary flooding. She had no visible evidence of damage to the bottom or the shell plating. On the LST 125 overflow from the engineering space partially flooded the vehicle deck.1. An unknown secondary source of leakage on the HUGHESexisted between the forward fire room and .1% of the flooding. and periscope: stuffing box. loosened doors.7% of the secondary sources directly attributable to the test such as broken piping. Approximately 25.0% of the secondary flooding.2% of the secondary sources permitted 1. Submarines • . 11. The PILOTFISH sank due to undetermined flooding sources which were probably tears in the hull plating. Progressive flooding in test B was permitted by approximately one-third of the sources and accounted for approximately one-half of the flooding. 1. 9. Tne LGT 1114 was capsized.0% of the total flooding. unplugged stuffing tubes.3% of the total of sources permitted 7. open boundaries.damage or stern tube leakage. with no flooding. 26. 4. blow lines from main ballast tanks. C.0% of the secondary sources which were not tight prior to' the test such as bolt holes in decks. Th~ submarines in test B had two. the' forward engine room. openvalves. and unknowns permitted approximately 46.3% of the secondary flooding.3% of the secondary flooding sources that personnel could have prevented such as open pipe lines. and propulsion shaft glands permitted approximately 28. CONfIDENTIAl • . In the other submarines the determinable sources of flooding werE leaky valves. and possibly 2 hatches. D. Approximately 43.

first. • . the supports for small piping to prevent the pipe from breaking when subjected to vibration and whip. the small piping connections to sea chests to prevent breakage outboard of the sea valve. the dogs on doors and hatches to prevent loosening. Vigorous participation of ships personnel in air testing and visual inspection of structure to maintain and to restore the highest quality of water tight subdivision is necessary in order to remove progressive flooding sources through bulkhead and deck fittings stuffing tubes. unplugged wiring tubes.Page 2-19 " ~U'H~lR1\~l . and second. third. second. the main propulsion shaft glands to give a higher degree of watertightness.SECTION IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of the tests it appears that the following four design changes are necessary. and fourth. The followinF' +'110 sources of water entry should be given consideration with the idea of preventing the entry of contaminated water into the hull of the ship. rudder trunks. or holes in decks and bulkheads . first. stern tubes.

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In turrets which were in condition "Y" this ammunition necessarUy was not fully protected.4. 3. There is no recorded rise in temperature within the turrets or mounts that can be attributed to the bomb• • 2. structural damage.~ . In turret. It 0 is believed that the blast struck the underside of the gun barrels which acted as levers in c with the elevation stops . The armor box and barbettes as installed on the target ships appear to provide adquate protection for internal structure and equipment against blast and. In test A. This resulted in scorching and blistering of paint on the outside surfaces •. Some of the turrets b were in condition uY" during the test with hatches or doors in the gun house open. Although the gun can be elevated with ease. 'it cannot be fireQ.TEST ABLE 1. y means of the guns. Heat from the bomb was very intense but of short duration. as in the case of the ARKANSAS. During the test the gun was trained so that it was pointing in the general direction of the bomb detonation. Damage within the turrets was the result of either violent movement of the ship and tur-rets or of forces transmitted to the inside.heat under the test conditions. 4. Powder and projectiles were in normal stowages and also were displayed in the gun chambers of many turrets during the test. Both guns were elevated to the maximum of 11:. the right trunnion of the right gun was fractured. In a few such instances the blast caused damage to interior bulkheads or ventilation pipes in the vicinity of the access opemngc.SECTION I . ARKANSAS: The only structural damage which affected operability occurred on this ship. The nature of the fracture indicates that the failure was caused by an upward force. to the main battery turrets and mounts was caused principally by blast. Ballistic conaiderations will therefore most likely continue to be the governtng factor in armor design. Although this ammunition was disarranged in many places it remained stable. and the breech end was resting on the elevation stops.

The permanent deformation is accompanied by an increase of about 3/8" in side thrust clearance (Photo 1915-6. causing misalignment of the bearing and exceestve side thrust clearance.the' port quarter and apparently caused a violent movement to starboard of the bow of the ship and Mounts 1 and 2. page3-9). modern turret it is likeJ. A continuation of the same duct runs up the outside and is welded to the rear side plate of thp armor box. The trunnion brackets are designed to withstand.e ducts are constructed of 7 1/2* plating and the panel size is 58 1/2" x 72". Damage to the trunnion bracket might have been greater had the slide not transmitted some force to the gun port plating with which it came in contact (Photo 1915-4. SALT LAKE CITY: In Mounts 1 and 2.. If a similar casualty were to occur in 9. forces induced by a normal amount of roll.epair the damage.~ . In view of the vulnerability of light to blast it appears that exposed ventilation ducts cU''''~. A Naval Shipyard avail~ity of several weeks duration would probably be required to _.ythat the cap square holding down bolts would~U first. 6. This force . The blast wave emanated from . NEVADA: The ventilation ducts under the overhang of the turrets are badly dished from the blast. page3-2]). in transverse thrust. Eecause of the inertia of the slide and guns. Th. Welded seams at the edges failed.caused bending of the left trunnion supports between the shelf plate at the bottom and the tie rod at the top. page 3-10. as is the general practice in turrets of later/design. and it would be possible for the ship to make at least temporary repairs. since failure of this part would greatly reduce the fighting efficiency of the ship. This condition does not pre!Ventel~iiation or firing of the guns but trouble would probabll)tev~lop af(e~ repeated use. but 1S fitted into grooves machined in the trunnion bloSWo" he machine T _grooves have sharp corners in which the fracture originated (photo 1991-1.U • I • CONfloEliTIAl . On turret 4 all of these connecting welds failed. the left trunnion support is distorted and forced outward. . force was exerted on the left trunnion supports./ 5. Consideration should be given to the design of all features of gun trunnion brackets. It would be comparatively easy to replace damaged bolts. or 'down.

9. This probably is due to the fact that the blast struck the PENSACOLAalmost dead astern causing relatively less movement to the ship than was expertenced by the SAL~ LAKE CITY. The NEW YORK. 10. to bend the aluminum proiectne scuttle trames ana maze the scuttle doors inoperable. AGATOand PRINZ N EUGEN received no turret structural damage as a result of test A. which is 5/8 inch thic\C. that was sunk in test A. The sinking condition of this ship did not permit a complete inspection of the damage.sufficiently. 8. This patch extended we1l back into the roof plate. It was attached with a full periphery fillet weld but was not stiffened in any manner. having gun turrets or mounts of a caliber of six inch or over. SAKAWA:This is the only target ship. Mount 4. Although the PENSACOLAwas closer to the bomb detonation than the SALT LAKE CITY the trunnion brackets were not similary damaged. CmJFlUfNTML .apparently was not dished by the blast. The gun house plating. This damage was probably caused by blast since the turret was in condition "Y" with all four doors in the gun house open during the test. As a result of the test the patch plate on the after mount was completely crushed in and on the forward mounts it was dished in a fore and aft direction in the form of a "V" for a maximum depression of about two feet (Photos 1859-11 and 1832-6. pages 3-11.12). also in condition "Y" during the test. had the left front door of the gun house blown off. The unsupported panel size of this patch on tbe roof alone is 7' 2" wide and 9' 0" long.PENNSYLVANIA. The SAKAWA had three six inch twin mounts installed but the guns had all been removed prior to the test and the gun ports were closed with a f>:II: patch plate.

In compartments D-36-P and D-36-S under turret 5. Below Mount 1.shows evidence of str and the web is buckled... The left Clip 1s fractured slightly at the front end. port.TEST BAKER 1. and the door in this bulkhead. powder and projectile stowages were shaken up and disarranged. 1677-1. (Pho~o4164-5. the stanchion support under the barbette and stov . particularly Mounts 1 and 2. pages 3-13 to 3~'17). 2.a0). Below Mount 2. In Turret 4 the right holding clip has completely broken. The clips in Turrets 1 and 2 do not show evidence of failure. . The primary failure in each case is the pivot seal casting and its holding down "bolts..10. All of the mounts are completely inoperable as a result of this damage. functions as a holding down clip for the mount and as a retainer for the radial thrust needle bearings (See sketch on page 3-ft. J:age3-18). which provides access between A-412-M and A-411-M are severely buckled. NEW YORK: The holding down clips of Turrets 3. In test B damage to turret structure was caused by underwater shock and violent action of the ships. Extensive damage to the rotating structure below the shelf level in Mounts 1 and 2 resulted from the primary failure. The failure allowed the mounts to lift from the training race. In turret 3 the rear and right holding down clips show evidence of having been drawn up tightly and are bent outward.. PF. 3. (Photos 158-4. (Photo 4222-11. In Turret 5 the rear holding down clip has fractured starting at the right end and extending for about one-half of its length. 4 and 5 are damaged as a result of the turret having lifted. bulkhead 33 on the first platform is severely damaged. In general. All ammunition remained stable. the transverse bulkhead on the second platform at frame 27. page3. Ball and roller bearings were displaced. in addition to housing the weather seal. and the mounts came to rest in a skewed position.SECTION'U .NSACOLA:All four mounts are heavily damaged. 1677-2. The pivot seal casting. and 1685. Damage was confined principally to holding down clips and supporting structure under the Qarbettes and stools. 1678-8.

. The longitudinal bulkhead on the port side of the 14" handling room A-421-B is also slightly buckled at the top. The PENNSYLVANIA. . ed arid that the holding down clips came tnto action. . 4. SALT LAKE CITY and PRINZ EUGEN received no structural damage as a result of test B. CONFIUENTlM . This does not intertere with the train of the turret or prevent its operation. the transverse bulkhead at frame 32 is buckled at the top in three places. page3-1Q. (Photo 4222-7. Operability of these turrets 1s not affected by structural damage but three guns were made inoperable by the failure of their elevating screw-oscUlating bearings. between the barbette and stool. On the first platform under Turret 1.. 5.v-.c. NEVADA: There is evidence that Turrets 1 and 211ft. Under Turret 2 the transverse bulkhead at frame 48 was buckled across the entire top.This was caused by the underwater shock being resisted by the inertia of the turret and barbette. The ARKANSASand NAGATO were sunk in this test before any survey of damage to the turrets could be made. In Turret 2 the connecting bolts for the rear Clip sheared and the Clip fell.

Test A TestB Appr'ox.600 850 750 1200 250 700 700 CA25 SALT LAKE CITY 90~ 1200 1X300 ExJap PR~NZ EUGEN SAKAWA 1250 500 1700 . nortaontai BB38 BB36 PENNSYLVANIA NEVADA 4-Triple 14" 45 Cal. ~-Twin 12" Turrets.) Mounts. 2-Triple and 2Twin 14". 3-Twin 6" (abt. 4-Twin 16" (abt. Turrets. 2-Triple and 2Twill 8" -55 Cal. Turrets.) Turrets. 4-Twln 8" (abt. Cal.45.) Turrets.SHIP NAME MAIN BATTERY distance from bomb blast to ship in yards. Mounts. Turrets. Mounts. 5-Twin 14" -45 Cal. 1600 600 1300 1000 BB34 BB33 ExJap CA24 NEW YORK ARKANSAS NAGATO PENSACOLA 1600 . 2-Triple and 2Twin 8"-55 Cal.

8ACE ._.. u.l:i PIVOT SEAL II 97U .s. PENS~C.OLA JJiR.TYeJCA~__SECT'Ott LF\AJ!.tJNG.®i.I CA24' CLAS~ 8" MOUNTS .s.

left trunnion looking to right and to the rear after Test A. 'I'URRET STRUCTURES 97111 .2-1915 .6. H SALT' LAKE CITY.AA-CR-8. Mount 1.

.j~::.[ -". n ' ~... age!~ "f-'jlr 1.right trunnion of the t nil1r~1!. ARKANSAS. • CJ U~.}I' :I!. right gun after Test A .. • SECRE Turret 4 .~ TURRET STRUCTURES 10 97 1~ .AA-GR-234-1991-1.' . . ~lN[.

m after Test A. SAKAWA. mm~lD£NTIAl Page 3 .AA-CR-62-1859-11.11 TPRRET STRUCTURES 971~ . View from port bea.

12 971~ . TURRET STRUCTURES Page 3 .er after Test A.AA-CR-82-1832-6. View from port quart. SAKAWA.

PENSACOLA. forward and to .971~ .AB-CR-66-158-4.13 TURRET STRUCTURES . Mount 2 -looking starboard at base ring after Test B. \~l Page 3 .

AB-CR-80-1677-2. . TURRET S'TRUCTURES Page 3 ..14 97111 .. PENSACOLA.teeth disengaged and lower portion of bearing missing after Test B...... Training pinnion. View from underside . Mount 2.....' .. . .

.\' ". . ~.: ...15 TURRET STRUCTURES 97U . .Ii. .~ .~. . -~" . . PENSACOLA.' AB~CR-80-1677-1. . .. .. Mount 2. Training race ball bearings and retainer displaced after Test B. .. Page 3 . ~...: I .•.... .. .... .' .. -: ...' " . .

~. oN!:.~ -. Typical unders ide of powder ci. damage to TlJRRET Page 3 . •• '. ~. AB-CR-80-1678-8. Mount 2.16 8TR UCTTJRE8 971" .rcle flat after Test B. PENSACOLA.

' ': .~IRD£NTIAl ".~ B...- powder hoist t.17 . " . PENSAC---<'.. Crushed M and tray after ..> AB-CR-97-1685. ... .JLA..t I..st rc ___ .' "" "1 TURRET STRUCTURES 971~ Page 3 ..j.· . ount 2. "..10. .

Page 3 . Annular space between Fracture in rear holding down clip after Test B.. NEW YORK.. . Turret 5.. .18 TURRET STRUCTURES 'il7U ·CONnOENnAt . " . .. barbette and stool..... .. AB-CR-62-4164-5.

.' .. t· .:..>~. elevating screw oscillating bearing after Test B.... <..: . .:': . NEW YORK... Left gun.~. ....~. Page 3 .19 TURRET STRUCTURES . Turret 5. ~~. ~t. SECRET It~_:~c~~-..AB-CR-82-4222-7.l'\JU nMHOENTIAl ".

J .. . transfer level. NEW YORK. ' ". ~) J .. '. TURRET STRUCTURES 97 U . ~i:.AB-CR-82-4222-11.!. ~j' .::~ ~ •. i:'.·!..':''>:l '.. ( .('a·~..I: t) r a{~Ai·i. .!. Projectile Disarrangement of projectiles after Test B.i ~ ).i ' .: '. :. Page 3 ..1:)' .20 ...q .. . Turret 4..1 ~.. Q .

At'\·-CR-82-1915-4. where gun . Me nt 1. carne into contact SALT LAKE CITY. showing with gun port plating in 'Test A . CON£lQ£NJ/:'~ TUHRET STRUCTURES 9714· .


S.S.S.S."GATO (Ex-Jap BB) U. BUTTE (APA68) U.S. YO 160 U.S. INDEPENDENCE (CVL22) U.SECTION I . NEVADA (BB3e) U.S. Time of outbreak of fires.S. PENNSYLVANIA (BB3S) (explosion) 0927 0950 0950 0950 0950 0950 0950 1010 10~ 10. LCT 816 U.S. In test A numerous small fires occurred on widely dispersed ships.S.S.S.S.30 1105 1130 1135 1135 1156 1156 1307 . WILSON (DD408) N.S.S.S.S.S. BAN!\IER (APA60) U. CORTLAND (APA75) U. These fires became noticeable over a considerable period of time. PENSACOLA (CA24) U. BRISCOE (APA65) U.S. SARATOGA (eV3) U.S. Material must have been set on fire immediately.S. e: Ship Time first smoke observed U.S.S.S.S.S. but the air blast that followed blew out the flames. 1.TEST ABLE A. NEW YORK (BB34) U. NIAGARA (APA87) U.S.S.S.S. Smoldering material then gradually began to break into flames The following table lists the approximate times that smoke became visible to observers in PBM Charlie who had excellent visibility while flying near the array. BLADEN (APA63) SAKAWA(Ex-Jap CL) U.

B. 4. In the workshop.S. On the COR'T'LAND the outer part of the array~ two In boats were burned with secondary. LAMSON. On the RHIND. One form of \~t .damage to paint. There was no gasollne in either of these. 2. painted with fire retardent paint caught on fire and burned. On the NEVADAand PENNSYLVANIA. Significant fires.and CARLISLE immediately after the burst. fires in '~'I(posed U. and w iring on the adjacent wardroom' bulkhead. twelve HBX loaded torpedo warheads burned without detonating and some low order explosions occurred due to external heat on the air flasks. . Army equiprnent consisting of liquid containers caused ex los ions .:::on fire but do not show what is are burning. Fire spread thr )ughthe after superstructure and at about 1400 reached the torpedo workshop.' .on or to the ship. On the LST's 52 and 661 some exposed test ammunition in powder bags burned without dotng damage to adjacent ammuniti. On the NEW YORKa combined fire occurred in U. Fires occurred on the ANDERSO~. S. 1. insulation. On the INDEPENDENCE a gasoline truck which was blown into the after well from the flight deck and an airplane on the flight deck burned. Exposed' U.S. canvas bloomers OnNos. Army test clothing on widely spaced ships either burned completely or had small sections burned out. Incendiary energies. 3.:~~~:.. The indendiary energy responsible for the scorching of material and for the few fires that occurred appears to have existed in several forms with overlapping effects. Army test clothing and in the flag bag above. C. 1 and 4 gun mounts. Photographs of these ships indicate that the _. 1. and the fires are probably secondary effects of the main fires in this area. . The cause of this fire Is undetermined. 5.

energy appeared to be thermal radiation from the extremely hot center of the bomb fission.: ~\'~t:page. but secondary.'. 1. A. The . allowed fires to burn '.4:~-"'~ ". A second form of energy appeared to be a heat wave. source of fires occurred when winds blew smoldering embers into contact with inflammable objects. The cl small amounts of inflammable equipment exposed."i·i.arnage attributable to each form of energy. However. exclusive of test materials and paint en the s'aip's structure.ofenergy existed. Effects of these terms of ene!'Jdecrease withlncreased distance and are distinguishable only in a few isolated cases.. A notice posted on a bulletin board had the writing burned into the backing. Factors aiding combustion. SECRET . E. 1. . extremely short time of exposure of the materials to the indendiary energy allowed only the outer fibers to reach the burning point. In conjuction with the incendiary energy several factors inherently part of the material structure assisted in the absorption of the energy necessary to raise the temperature to the smoldering or burning point. The high wind that followed the burst. i~~::. 'from secondary effects and from isolated cases it is apparent that the forms . D. For example label plates with black letters on a white background had the black letters charred while the white was sometimes untouched. A third possible form appeared to be a result of electrical energy or short wave radiation. Loosely woven or frayed surfaces such as burlap and cotton or manila lines with frayed ends burned while closely woven material such as fire hoses only singed or charred. perhaps an extremely hot blast of Wind. blew out many fires. In opposition to the indendiary energy several factors prevented wide spread fires with possible disastrous effects. ... This occurred on the PENSACOLAwhere a fire hose burned. Dark surfaces absorbed more thermal energy. Factors opposing combustion. although heating material.fourth. The distance of the surviving ships from the burst allowed dispersion or COOling the incendiary energies. no estimate can be made ae to the amount of . Since all fires that occurred and all singeing or charring are similar.

This was noticeable in the shadows of the ships structure. Overhangs had patterns of scorched or blistered paint where eddy currents existed. small amounts of combustible material and the shielding effect of the ship's structure.themselves out W1thoutoverneatmg anjacent structures. F. The outlines were so definite that remarkably consistent estimates of the location of the bomb burst could be made on ships even in the outer half of the array. rnade very sharply outlined shadows on ships near the blast and detectable shadow s on all ships except 1n the extrerne outer part of the array. 1. dynamic laws made airflow patterns around corners on rnany ships. adjacent structure. The outlines were scorched or charred into paint and wood surfaces with a very clear definition. Energy appearing as thermal radiation which traveled in a straight line and was reflected by bright surfaces. G. Energy appearing as a heat wave which followed aero- Page 4-5 CONFIDENTIAl ~--------------------------- . Heat wave. For example. on the H1. This energy was reflected by bright surfaces.JGHES this energy was reflected upward by an unpainted aluminum deck under an overhand and gave a sharp outline of the overhang. Tne natural and artificial restrictions to the spread of fires such as widely dispersed. On the inside curved pattern lines traced the path where a wind swirled over the rim and around the inner surface. since normally ship . Thermal radiation. Smoke stacks had paint blistered almost all the way around. This effect was rnore noticeable in the inner part of the array. 40mm gun tubs 1n exposed spaces had on the outside t. 1. and even of life lines. . board material is stored under . of ladders. greatly reduced the amount of material directly exposed to the burst.overhangs and out of the weather.oward the blast definite straight line shadow patterns of .

two adjacent boat gripes were made up of manila covered with canvas. Electrical .1')/ • ~ . A coil of wire lying on deck had the rubber insulation burned. • 1. liquid containers..SECRE'r .I. exploded from internal vapor pressure built up by the generated heat.~\·. Types of materials affected. swabs. yards that were old and darkened from use. .. From the circumstances. A bucket of paint. ). I. burned while adjacent paint on structure was only scorched and blistered. "Page 4-6 LUNFIDENTMl • .or frayed.than light paints. secured with gal~. it is possible that the third cause of fires was sorne kind of electrical energy or short 'wave radiation.::. Unexplainable fires with repeated peculiar circumstances which could not be directly attributed to thermal radiation or a heat wave occurred on widely spaced ships. Paint was blistered or scorched on all except the extreme outer ships with dark colored paints more affected . Three of the ends were secured with manila seizing while the fourth end was. The end secured with the wire burned while the ren ainder of the gripes was only slightly singed. inadvertently left exposed. Commission pennants had all the blue charred. . . Dirty. and mattress covers were burned or scorched on all except the outer ships. Manila hawsers and lines and cotton signal hal.: j. leaving only a few strands holrUng the undamaged white stars together.T~lij'7. blackened canvas or dark colored cloth burned while new canvas or light colored material nearby was untouched or only singed. .while adjacent containers of dry food were undamaged. Apparently the volatiles in the paint carrier were overheated and caught on fire. f 1.. ~>: l:. ~xposed metal. On one ship. burned while M. Canvas or cotton articles such as firehoses.'. A galvanized rat cage originally suspended from a halyard burned the outline of the cage into the deck where it fell.. Metal helmets packed in cardboard boxes with cardboard spaces had the box and spacers burned or severely scorched while adjacent cardboard boxes were only slightly singed. On many ships the Yoke flag left at the yardarms upon evacuation had the dark sections burned and the light section charred. flags.H. on the LCT 816. energy or short wave raoianon. tarpaulins.ed wire.

Army test materials wrapped in burlap and secured with thin straps burned or smoldered for several hours.. the SKATE had little paint blistering and scorching.. J.001 to 0. K..p explained by elementary laws of physics and can be reproduced in laboratory using any ..003 inches thick) was affected. a steel bulkhead had been partially painted black under a ladder.. "' ..s of ~olor and pigmentation on paint damage. Some of the 1... Wood structure on many ships and broom or swab handles were singed and burned at localized spots where the wood normally would be darkened from usage. Only the top layer of paint (0.. However.S. Life rafts covered with painted canvas had small surface holes burned and srnoldering continued in the interior for several hours. 1..... Effect. L... j by the air blast so that paint fires lasted only a few seconds... On the CRITTENDEN. With the possible exception of the NEVADAand other ships withi..&. Damage to paint was spectacular in that exposed surfaces were darkened.n 800 yards of the burst. Burning paint was extinguls.' . A peculiar case' of paint darkening over a period of several days was reported on the INDEPENDENCE.. . Other damage to the paint surfaces was due to the effects of heat... _ . Dark colored paints were more darnaged than light paints. These ships had two coats of paint damaged... blistered. which was very close to the blast.. new or clean lines were only singed or charred. This may be due to the nearness of the ship to the burst so that a very short time elapsed between the arrival of the heat and the extinguishing air blast. on the TUNA....____ . The black paint was badly blistered while the regular light gray paint was almost untouched. Darkening of the surfaces was partially attributa1. haze gray paint over yellow chromate and over green paint was more affected than adjacent paint.1.. U.' '"' to the scot that was blown out of the smoke stacks. 6-001 .. and scorched. .... Depth of paint damage.. . radiant heat sources. . However.. All heat phenomena observed can }-.. Paint on wooden surfaces was more blistered than on steel surfaces..

of the double base powder increments which burned at about 2200 yards evidently transmitted radiation to the inclosed powder which heated to the ignition point. They were apparently undamaged except for superficial scorching at a distance of approximately 600 yards from the burst. blast pressure. (b) "Some exposed Army items such as wrapped propelling charges and mortar powder increments in plastic casings were destroyed at a disu. Paints containing organic pigments such as toluidine toner were especially susceptible to damage. U. caught fire or changed texture. (c) "Plastics of all kinds were highly susceptible to the heat generated by the atomic bomb.nce within 2100 yards. ' °L. The following quotations are taken from the Final Report (a) "The apparent ability of dense and thick rubber elements such as pneumatic tires and electrical cables to withstand the heat. Many of them fused.STUDYOF FIRE ANDPAINT seemingly unassoclated cases of light and heavy blistering on the same structure may be partially attributable to unevaporated volatiles in the paint. Good baking pigments stood up well and did not carbonize or darken. Baked alkyds stood up remarkably well. Laminated panels of glass and metals separated because of a breakdown of the plastic bonding compound. Army ground group final report. The plastic casmg . The type of coating and the percentage of pigment content are factors in paint damage. as did most of the aircraft paints.S. Enamels stood up much better than highly pigmented coatings. and radioactivity generated by the atomic bomb was noteworthy. Some were fused at as great a distance as 3000 yards from the burst. of the Army Ground Group: 1. At this distance. thin rubber coatings and sponge rubber were charred. SECRET ~'·'·-Pag~·4~8' ~m~nOENTIAL . however.'.

Army ammunition exposed on deck. U. R Life rafts. Insulation. M Mattress cover. fire hoses. rubberized. wind blow embers into other combustibles. P Paint on structural surfaces. that burned. 'The following symbols are used with a sub "s" or Hb" to iIIiicate singeing. flags. 2 Cans exploded. plastics also failed to withstand the radiation. Location of types of damage. Canvas or cotton. Figure 1 shows the widespread and fairly even distribution of damage to the' ships in test A. swabs. Plastics of the thermo setting types were much less affected by flash than the thermoplastic type" • M. Ptb Bucket of paint left exposed that burned. W Wood. None No evidence of heat or fires. broom or swab handles. 3 Heat reflected by bright surfaces. . thrum or cocoa matting.I-ructures. Lines. scorching. T Tar on rigging reduced to carbon. halyards. 1. manila or cotton.S.(d) "As a bonding agent in laminated panels. Fire. .. or burning: A Am C Cl F Fo Fw I L U. Fire. 1 Foreign substance in flagbags. Army test material wrapped in burlap or cardboard. Cloth. Fire in oil soaked boat bilges. lifelines.A.

~= 0( !~ ~ ~ ~ SECIitET PAGE ~ -10 971~ " ...."'~ . '"..iii ~~ II .... .. -.

"l1i ..SECTION II TEST BAKER A. Radioactive contamination of paint..'. In test B. 1. Where there were more than three or four coats of paint.:'~>ijj. . A major part of the radioactivity was in the top coat and progressively lesser amounts were in the next two or three coats. B. Tests on small painted parts showed that the radioactivity was confined to the paint." SECRET . There were no fires. The removal of the radioactivity is a problem of prime importance.' ".~~ Page 4-11 :~~~}'7)\~j:!rJ:~JJW§~~r"(1' " CONf\D[NTIAl ."'. radioactive particles lodged on exposed painted . almost all the radioactivity seemed to be confined to the top three or four coats. .:'~. 1.. General. surfaces. explosions or damage to paint as a direct result of test B.

Some of the suggested ltnes of attack are: (a) Quick and efficient removal of the present types of paint used on shipboard. 3. t absorption of radioactive particles. A paint to offer maximum reststance to damage from an air burst should be:' . (c) Baked rather than air dried. (d) A new type of easily removable coating attached to the external surfaces of the ships. SECRET ·····Page4-12 CONfWENT/At . 1. that after application can be easily removed from the top of an orthodox paint. (d) Without organic pigment other than carbon. (e) The possibility of using bright non rusting unpainted surfaces for topside structure. (b) Development of paint film with resistance to the (c) Development of a film. (a) Light in color. such as the strippable coatings used in ship preservation.SECTIo~m 'CONCLUSIONS . Conclusions. The majority of the serious fires occurred on ships within the sinking range and the probable total deaths of personnel range. 2. Research should center around the radioactivity absorption of the painted surfaces. AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. (b) Low in ptgmentation. This film either to remove radioactivity from a contaminated surface or to prevent contamlnatton of painted surfaces in the future.

No changes are recommended in the present practice of t CONRD~TlAL . even for a few hours after the test went unattended and thus progressively grew over a pertod of several hours. B. 1. However. elimination and reduction of fire hazards.The fire on the INDEPENDENCEand the fires on other ships that floated. Recommendations. the burning of the canvas bloomers on the RHINDrequires further investigation.

XRD-42. XRD-38.366713·AD-366715·' AD-366727AD-366722- • If you have any questions. XRD-34.Defense Special Weapons Agency 6801 Telegraph Road Alexandria. Technical Resource Center . please call me at 703-325-1034. XRD-21. XRD-41. XRD-4 0. Virginia 22310-3398 TRC 4 April 1997 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: TO DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION ATTN: OMI/Mr Bill Bush Declassification of Documents CENTER The following is a list of documents that have been declassified and the distribution statement changed to Statement A. XRD-13. XRD-22. ARDITH JARRETT Chief. Approved for Public Release.'" AD-366714-AD-366709. XRD-27. XRD-39. XRD-36. XRD-29. XRD-28.' AD. XRD-26. XRD-6. XRD-5. AD-366731" AD-366732AD-366730AD-366729'" AD-366728AD-366720-AD-366725AD-366699'" AD-366697AD-366698· AD-3667 08. XRD-8.

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