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U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam A

U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam A

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VI,ETM4M - TiJ/!

EiGN 7'1-01
Union Calendar No. 829
92d 9ongress, 2d Session w
- House Report No.
OCTOBER 17; 1972.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to b. printed
8Il-08'l 0
For sale by the 'of Documents, U.S. Government Oftice
WaablqtoD/O.C., 20402 • Price 7CJ cents
CBET -HOLIFIELD, Callfornia. Oha{rman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, Nortb Carolina FRANK HORTON, New York
ROBERT E. Jo:wms, JOHN N. 'Illinois
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin GILBERT GUDE, Maryland
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut PAUL N. MCOLOSKEY, .Ta., California
TORBERT ir. MACDONALD, Massachusetts JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR., Alabama
New Jersey GAltRY BROWN, M,ichtgan
WM. J. RANDALL, Missouri nARRY M. GOLDWATER, Ja., California
JIM WRIGHT, Texall H. JOHN HEINZ III, Pennsylvan-ia
JOHN C. CULVER, IowQ.' --- -
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
: DON FUQUA, Florida
BELLA S. ABZU(}, New York!. . .
IiBlRBERT R:OBACK; Sta.tr Director
ELMER W. HJQNDER80N, GeneraZ Oounael
MILES Q. ROMNEY, OoutlBeZ-AdmlniBtrator
J. P. CARLSON, Minority OoutlaeZ
WILLIAM S. 'MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania, Ohalrmoo
JOHN E. MOSS, California' '1· JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois,
JIM WRIGHT, ,Texas ' N. MCCLOSKEY, .TR., California
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan '.: -_,Ot'tBERT GUDE, Maryland
CHET HOLIFIELD, Calttornia FLORENCE P. Nf'w Jorsc),
q-, PHILLIPS, st'tiil Direotor
NORMAN CORrNIIiJH, Dep,utll- StafJ Dweotor
HABOLD F. ': Staf/ Oon8uZtant
MA'RTBA'l\!. Don, merk
Ar,MIDDA J. HARLIDY. Seoretartl
-,.'hi", ,,,'," i'1"
Washmgton, D.O., Ootobe1' 17, 1972.
Spealce1' of the B ouae of Rep1'l!8entatitves,
Washmgton, D.O.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government
Operations, I submit herewith the committee's twenty-second report
to the 92d Congress. The committee's report is based on a study made
by its Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcom-
mittee. '
I. Introducuon ___________________________________________ ____
II. Backgro),nd--;-The Uniwd Staws and the Vietnam war ___________ _
III. Economlc assIstance reVlew ........ _____________ _____________ __ -
IV. Commercial (oommodity) import program _____________________ _
Recommendations ............................................................................ ..
V. Agriculture and land reform __________________________________ _
Background ____________________________________________ _
Land reform ________________________________ .:. ___________ _
Land reform progress ____________________________________ _
Increased crop produotion _____________ .. __________________ _
Needs and objectives _______ .. ________________________ _ __
VI. Public safeti}" program _____ , __________________________________ _

AID support o.f GVN public safety' pro.gram ________________ _
Correction. centers ____________________________ . _________ _
AUeged brutallty ________________________________________ _
Political prisoners _______________________________________ _
Thompson stu<:ly ________ _ -..: ____ ___ ____ -__________________ _
VII. Pacificatio.n-CORDS program _______________________________ _
Background ____________________________________________ _
CORDS structure and funding ____________________________ _
Executive refusal o'f access ,to-records ______________________ _
Phoenix (Phung Ho.ang) pro.gram _________________________ _
Phoenix Qperations __ .. __ . _______________ _ _____ _______ - .. _
Legal pro. ... dings _______________________________________ _
Pho.enix funding le"els ___________________________________ _
Conclusions _________________________________________ __ _
Recommendation __ ... _ .;; ____ ' _____________________________ _
VIII. Refugee pro.gram. ___________________________________________ _
IX. Public health pro.gram ___ • ___________________________________ _
X. Public works progra.m ____ M';'. ______ ' ____ _____ ___________ .. ____ _
XI. Recommendations for program overhauL ______ _____ ________ _
Appendix.-Memorandum on the Geneva Conventions ,and· the Phoenix
program _____________ • ____________________________ ' _____________ _
Separate views of Hon. J1m Wright and Hon. John N. Erlenborn ________ ,
Adtlit10nal views of Hon. John Conyers, Jr. (concllrred In by HOIl. Ben-
jamin S. Rosenthal and Ho.n. Bella S. Abzug)c __ " ____ c ________ ______ _
Additional views of Hon" Bella S. Abzug (concurred in by Hon. John Oon-
yers, Jr.) .. ------.. ----'l"------.. ------.,-...... ---------'---.;.--, ... ------.. ____ _
Add1t1ona1 views of Hon. Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (concurred in by Hon.
Benjamin S. Rosenthll-l, Hon. John Conyers, Jr., and Hon. .Bella S.
Abzug) ___________________ " ____________ • __________ ____________ " __ '
pa ..

. , , "
i \ -
OCTOBER 17, 1972,-Oommltted to 'the' Oommlttee' tittM Whole lIouse onth.
State,ofthe,Unton,and ordered to be printed
Mr. HOLIFIELD; from the COl11lllittee on Government Operations,
submitted,ilia following
, together' with'
an 12, the on Gevernment Operations
alld ad, opted a rep, ovt entitled "U;S., Assistance Programs in
Vietnam.,'LThe,l}hailllllan, was muected to, transmit, a copy. to the
Speaker oHhe,House. ' , " " ",' , ' '
" '" ' l. IiNTR(i)DuCTION
'This report reriew 'oftheeci;;'omy alld of certain
U,' ,S,' programs,', oU"t in, rqnrJ,' un,' ction
WIt)i' '1pd military
llll!prts In Southeast ASIa. " """,, " "" "'",,, "" ' "
, ,Siiwe ... W66;,t))'VJonpjlittee,Q!l'
Its Foreign OPeratIons and Government InformatIOn Subcommlttee-
has conducted a continuing remewor"the"economy,and efficiency of
'l'4is latestrepprt, in th,at series.is )lased £01-
.,. " , ',; -.
G,ene,r,,:l Acco,untin
, Office, ,on ,e"x, -,
tanslve hearmgs J)y'tl:i!)fiubcolltmlttee dll;rmg July and .August 1971,
an.d. on a 1,970 field 'tl'lp by' RepresentatIve J OM E. :Moss and .staff
of the sulicomlnittee. '
Among the joint Government of South Vietnam-United States
aided programs covered by these hearings and dealt with in this report
are: Commercial import program; agriculture and land reform; public
safety program; pacification (CORDS) program-(civil operations
and rural development support) ; refugee progr,am; publIc health
field investigations, studies, and hearings will be examined in separate
reports. They include the inequitable monetary rates of exchange
bet'l':!l'ln piasters and dQUarsnow in effect in South Vietnam; 2 black.
market currency manipulation; the'activities of the U.S. Information
Agency's operation'al arm in VIetnam, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
(JUSPAO); the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration COPIC); a review of t\le economy and efficiency of U.S.
stabilization programs in ',and.JWally"a review of the economy
and efficiency of U.S. assistance programs in Cambodia! '
This report isbaseC\ on hearings on the ,economy and efficienc:), of
various U.S. assistance progrllims m 'Southeast Asilli'held in Washmg-
ton on Jnly 1,5" ,16, 19, 21 ,an, q, 0, nAugust 2,1971. TeStI,'m, o,n
was pre-
sented by witnesses from the General Accounting Office, the Depart-
ment of State, the Agency for International Development, CORDS,
and from several outside witnesses invited by the subcommittee. In
addition to ·their public testimony, two of the outside witnesses gave
information in executive session.
United States economic assistance through AID has been in a period
oftransition.·Vast are Vietnam',tha!,affectthe
character of U.S.,' economIC and m'1htary ,aSSIstance. Amerwan'trIJGp
withdrawal continues at an rate. American' casualtieS' have
dropped sharply as more and more of the fighting hassh[fted to',GVN
The pOlit,ical s, P, lit b,etween, Presldllnt' Thieu ,an,',d Vice, pres,iden" t ICy
resulted in Thieu's unopposed victory in the, October B .. 1971, presi-
den:tialelecti611."·' " " ",', ,..' ,J,,,;.,,,
Althimgh the', cnll.Otic ec()nomic' 'i'n,So.utl1V,ietIjain, has
s,?mewhat'stabiHzed, the serious h(pre-

iCondltiJns of'Land -'1!enl1re"for' 'Elids- W ,Vietnam,')· (,Comilift'tee: prhl:tl')
: ,'; dt -PureI\'4sed .cohstetlctloh:
Vietnam." H. 91-1582, Oct. 8,1970., - ,
_ .Y1etnam, J,"f,01l9wuP
'.' 91-
, "M,SI!,. Qct .. 1.2,)97Q., ,,. ", ,.,. " , , •.• " •. '.,,'..... ,
1-' "'.de" :Port' 'Slttiat:lofi . in'
, -the Hldde'n' IfS:"f}L{bsidy': J.tares)."
",:, ",,' ':'
2 "VletAam and the Hitlde4 Rent.'.9.Z-160: "j'M'1:" ,:""
1 :S: p,ec. 8,
, ,4 "u.'S. Assistance' for tli'e "Khmel' 'ltepul>lle;'
":,, '1,:1,'1 ,;',; .. , !", ,-,,',;,,," ;':,
duction, and weakness in the pacification program, still appear to be
major problems in South Vietnam.
Each of the major program areas is considered separately. The
report concludes wIth broad recommendations to improve the econ-
dillY and e f f i c i e n ~ y of theoperatiQns of such programs .considered to be
important and necessary. .
The subjects dealt with in· this report involving the economy and
efficiency of our U.S. assistance programs in South Vietnam cannot
be properly evaluated without some clear understanding of the stag-
germg consequences in human and economic terms of our role in that
struggle.' The following facts and stJatistics. give some of these
dimensions: '
A total of 2.6 million American servicemen have served in South
Vietnam from January 1, 1965 through March 31, 1972. '
Total U.S. casualties during the Vietnam war, as of August 26,1972,
stand at approximately 350,000, including over 50,000 dead; this is
twice the number of U.S. casualties sustained during the Korean war.
The budgetary cost of military personnel, supplies, and equipment,
and other supporting expenditures, for the fiscal years 1965 through
1972, in connection with the Vietnam war was $128 billion, or ·about
$600 for eve!1' American man, woman, and child.
During th,s same 7-year period, the United States has provided
another $9 billion in military assistance to South Vietnam and $4 bil-
lion in economic assistance.
A total of 13.8 million tons of 'air, ground, and sea munitions have
been expended in the Vietnam war from January 1, 1966 through
June 30, 1972.
Chemical herbicides have been applied to nearly one-seventh of
South Vietnam and have destroyed enough food for 600,000 people
for one year and enough to meet the country's requirements
for 31 years at the current level of demand.
Over 5 million (about 30 percent) of the population of South Viet-
nam were in the refugee category during the past 6 years; through
June 1972, over 1 million South Vietnamese civilians have heen war
casualties of which an estimated 325,000 were killed.
These factors do not include such continuing problems related to the
Vietnam war as the number of U.S. servicemen who have become
drug addicted, the Veterans' Administration costs of veterans' hos-
pitalization, treatment, disability benefits, and survivor payments to
dependents of servicemen. Nor does it measure the impact of the heavy
U.S. wartime costs on the U.S. economy and the increased interest costs
on the national debt. '
But statistical data cannot measure the human suffering, depriva-
tion, or the psychological dam. age of such a war to many thousands of
returning U.s, servicemen, nor measure in precise economic terms the
impact of the war on OUf weakening balance-of-payments situation or
on the declining strength of the dollar in foreign markets. Even more
5 Much' of the dllJta used here Is taken from a study by the Aftatrs DlvlslonJ.-
gressional Reaearch Service. Library of Congl'ess, entitled, "Impact of the Vietnam war,"
prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June SO, 1971. Committee prlnt.
difficult to measure are the deep divisions that the Vietnam war have
created between Americans of all walks of life.
All of this occurred at a time when the U.S. economic position abroad
has become increasingly perilous. The U.S. budget defiCIt for fiscal year
1972 totaled billion. "Mean1Vhife" pur balance.of:trade
and balance.irf.payments sltuation 11al3 baencontmuously worsemng to
a poi!lt ",here the :President, in mid.August imposed wage, prIce,
ani! otl1ereconorrtic,cont,rols. on the U.S: and took other steps
wMcl1, m effect, have4evaluedthe dolla;rm the world mRl!ketsandsus·
pended' our Govewmsnt'S of dollars with gold. " •
. . :tn.a meeting 0:1' foreign min,isters o:Uree wprld natiol)El,
In In 1971, .an was by
PresIde. nt that wou)d by "I?P.roXlI
percent by raIsmg the prIce of gold above the $35·an·ounoo level.
Foreign. ·governments "agreed to revalue their currenriies' IIccordingly.
, '
':' !
. '"
,1·\ '
The U.S. economic assistance effort in South Vietnam during this
period of military escalation of U.S. involvement in the war has
been marked by' severe administrative difficulties, the waste of untold
hundreds of mIllions of American tax dollars, black-market currency
maniJ?ulation, corruption, indecisive planning, and poor execution.'
WIthin the context of overall U.S. objectIves in South Vietnam"
AID's currently stated objectives are: '
To help Vietnam to develop its economy in a manner which
will lead to eventual economic self-sufficiency;
To facilitate Vietnamization by helping the Government of
Vietnam to bear the increased costs of the war;
To help prevent runaway inflation and seVere economic
dislocations; and
To assist the Government of Vietnam in caring for ref-
ugees' civilian casualties, and other victims.
. AID's economic supporting assistance to South Vietnam since 1966
has been as follows: .
(In millions of dOliarsl

Fiscal Fiscal
year ,ea'
1971. 1972
actual estlmateil
.... ... ____ ______ ______ ______ ______
Economic Development Fund s. ________________________________ ._. ___ ••• ___________ OM ______ ."._. ___ _
land reform ____ __ •• _______ • _______________________________________ •• _______ _ 15 •• ___ 0 ___ _
ProJect program ________ .___ 184 285 224 159 116 96 72
Program supporL .•• ,....... 2 10 14 12 12 10 10
Food for Peace.............. 143 74 139 99 111 12,0 120
Totals '0............. 727 569 537 404 477 507 515
1 Figures on an obligational basis. Fiscal year 1969 amollnt does not Include $15,000,000 for I1censlng
obl1gated In fiscal year 1968, but not used for licensing that year, thus making the actual total for CIP $205,00 ,000 In fiscal
year 1969.
I For the unrestricted purchase,of Imported goods and services.
S $50,00°1°00 to be used for the unrestricted purchase of ImjIOrted ioodS and services with the local currency generations
being used to finance medium term credit to looal investors. $25,000,00010 be used,for public sector proJects.
t Does not Include reimbursable costs from Department Of Defense which amounteiHo $43 000 000 In fiscal year 1967;
$35,000,/.000 In fisCal year 1968; $35,000,000 in fiscal-year 1969i $55,000,000,ln f1scal.year 1970; $67,000,000 In fiscal year
1971: $09,000,000 In fiscal year 1!J72; and estimated at $12,000,uOOfor,fiscal year 1973. '
Note: This data -was reconstructed from' official AID data 8S presented annually to the ,House Appropriati,ons Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies and from AID's congresslona for fiscal-year 1973.
e See H. Rept. 89-22151. .
7 Congressional presentation. fiscal year 1918, "Se.cu1'1ty AssIstance, Program; ,Security
Supporting Assistance." for International j), -8-1'. It is Interesting to
,note the changes in description by AID Gf the ,overall U.S. 'Qtij,ecUves.in Vietnam from
fiscal 1971. -The ,AID presentatiGn 'of its 'proPos,ed fiscal year 19n ·prog'mJn entitled
"U.S. JroreiJm Aid in 'Vietnam," p. 1, lists tb'ese _objectives as follGws:
(1) .... "tG prevont runaway inflation and severe 6CGnomic dilslcxmtions:

i"Amore' detailed 'breakdown of eXpenditures and, esthnates fOl'tlie
;.vacious AID, project prol11'lIms, in South" Vietnam, ; lll.n:d
I16fOrm finanoia;l: 'suppow, ltimped
ID,theabtlvet,itbleiS shown below
:forthe3aurrentyears',', '" ",', ',', , .. '" ,'",
.. '
.r: .';.' ",co,:;
" 1
, Uri iinU!lons:of I, j""
! :!
,: Fiscal ye'ir;"" . "

PubliC health •• _ •• ________ "'0' __ .. ____ .. ". ________ •••• ___ ._
4.6 " ',,: 3.2, '

. 1.8·· I., • I;t
',0 2,3
3. I
19,6 12.4
Publlb works-(englneering)l. _ .•• _ .••••• ••••••• _._ •••• __ ._
Rural development. ______ ••• __ •••• _ , ___ , ____ •• " __ .•• __ ••••. __
Refurces (war victims) .•• __ •••• _ ••. __ .... ___ .•• ___ •••. _ •• __ .
Miscellaneous. __ • ____ ." ___ •• _ •...• _. ____________________ •
as 6.8
29.9 22.'2
1.2 .7

•• _._ •• _. ________ ._ •• _._ ••• __ ..... _. _____ •• _ •• __ ====7.":;=========;;=;:
9U n3 69.3
Land reform •••• _____ •• _____ • __________ A, _. _________ ._. __ "A"
15.0, __ ,_,"' ___ '" ___
1 AID congressional presentation. fiscal year 1973 p. 8-5.
t, I neludes projects formerly listed under, Urban
The difficulty in carrying out the AID program can be attributed to
the mushroommg demands placed upon AID administrative capability
in South Vietnam during the 1965-68 period of the rapid ,U.S" mil.
itary buildup. The amount of U.S. economic assistanc!l virtually
doubled during the first year of this buildup. These administrative
limitations were coupled with even heavier demands, on the crippled
South Vietnamese economy.
South Vietnam's domestic productivity was seriously hurt by war·
time demands.
Imports relJ.uired to make up the domestic production cutbacks
were clogged m inadequate I?ort facilities in Saigon and elsewhere.
Allied troops made increasmg demands on 'all types ef local goods
and services. '
In1Iation had gone almost unchecked until recent months; the retail·
price index ,in Saigon increased by approxim, aMy 800 percent since
January 1965.
Although the South Vietnamese Government has
takell certain fiscal and monetary steps to curb the rate of inflation, it
h&srepeatedl;y refused to Impose effectl,'ve p, rice and wage controls.
Importers m South Vietnam (financed almost entirely through
U.S. tax dollars) continued to bring in luxury goods for Bale in the
2,}, « « • "to ease the SUfferI,", g of CIV,llIanS displaced Or injUred, by the war, ;
3 .' «, « !'to as,etst the Government ()If South Vietnam. to elllPabd Sts protection an nOuence over more of the p,opula.t1on-especlaIty In the ,rural areas'
(4) • ,. • "to assist In economiC development to the, extent ,posslbie and feasible
under the constralntl!: of wartime con.dltlons . and _
" '
(5) ••• lito helP the Government oi South Vtcnnam to improve its present
of socIal and economic Ber1'lces and to a basil!; for planning Its future
' .. UD, cODa'resslonal presentation, year 1,918, 'table' fifctD&' p. 'B-1:. '
South Vietnamese consumer markets making possible .enormous wind-
fall profits. Less than lOpercentof the $800 millionjn products being
imported by South Vietnam comes from.the United States, South Viet-
nam exporte only about $15 million of its products abroad-making
its balance-of-trade deficit a staggering $800 million annually. The
South Vietnamese Government )8 ,almost totally dependent on the
United States-directly or almost its .entire annual
budget receipts an. d, in addition, receives a "hidden subsidy" of more
than $200 million a :year because of the inequity of the monetary rates
of exchange governmg transactions between piasters and dollars.
o For a comprehensive examinatton ot the Inequ1table rate of exchange 1n Vietnam, see
H. Rept. 92-760; see.p. 7 for data on windfall proflts.
, ," . . ". " '. .
The' commercial (commodity) impol't program (CIP)'haspro'
vided about '.$3 billion worth of various, types af consumer goods and
rll w materials for manufacturing to South Vietnam sincet951l. Slightly
more than $1 billion of this total has' been provided during the past
5 years. It is the largest single component of our. U.S. economic assist-
ance program in South Vietnam." .
Under.the CIP, private South importers, licensed by the
South VIetnamese G"'vernment, cl,ecIde what they deSIre to purchase,
and .if .it is on the AID, "approved list" ,and they comply with the
established procurement. procedures, the United States mak<lS payment
in dollars. to the·supplier,and the South Vietnamese importer pays the
p.iaster '6!luivalent of doHar cost of the product when it arrives in
South VIetnam.··. ., .
The piasters that the·SQuth importer pays for ClP goods
are ·deposited into a apaciaJ counterpart account at the National Bank
of. Vietnam ap.d are by Government .of South
VIetnam subject to the'Jomtcontrol of the' UnIted 'States. ThIS fund is
used to finance programs,general budgetary support, IIJld
supplementary military budgetsupport.· '. ' '. .,' ,
, ,11heCIP programshQufd be· distinguished from the' concurrent
Food,£or· Peace Program, Under the provision of' Public' Law 480
(title I)" piasters. are generated by sales of surplus U.S, agricultural
.products to S<>uth Vietnam. These piasters are U,S. owned and are
held in a U.S. Treasul'j' account. Substantially all of the piasters
generated by the sale of tltle I commodities are made available to G VN
for military budget .support. 'The' remainder of the Public Law 480-
generated piasters are used by the United ,States for general expendi-
tures .in. South Vietnam;, The value 01 funds .generatedby the sale (If
Public Law 480 commodities in South Vietnam is estimated at $120
million in fisca11973. ' '
. The subcommittee's heacings:in July ·1971 describe in considerable
detail the status of the,CIP· and the . efforlts being' made by: AID to
further tighten 'up the eeonomy, and efficiency 'of the program,11
In fisca11972, the cost ,of the ,elF program was 'estlmated'at $313 .
millian. For fiscal year 1973, it is e.timated·at$376:n1iIlion.'It'is used
to finance theinIportof such ,essential products' as fertilizer, industrial
raw matevials,,' capital ·equipment, 'cement, whea\; flour ,chemicals,
petr@leum.products"etci . . ,", ,.. ,. . ..' ,.
In its October 19.66' report,12. the eommittes, faund that cawmmer
goods financed undertheCIP were Mingpumped into' South Vietnam
wdthout any· determination as, t@ the. rea,}, needs of ,the ·eeonomy· or the
ultinIate· use of ,the goods. It fmiher concludedthattthe flooding of
South, Vietnamese '.m8lvIteU!'with :commodities at an unrealistic
16 See p; 6 of this report.
11 See hearings pp. 46-60.
:uJ H. Rept. 89-221S7; p. 10.
, I , j ."
.of exchange and with.out effective' m.onetary and fiscal c.ontr.ols en-
c.ouraged speculati.on and vari.ous. f.orms .of corrupti.on, fed inflati.on,
and deprived the United States.of maximum benefits from its ec.on.omic
assistance pr.ogram.
S.ome impr.ovements in the AID management and contr.ol .of the
CIP, based.on committee's 'rec.ommendati.on, were n.oted in a
f.ollowup rep.ort issued in 1967 (H. Rept. 90-610). C.ontinuing in-
vestigatIve w.ork by .the General. Accounting Office, undertaken at
the request .of the subc.ommittee, al.ong with prodding .of the agency
thTOugh subcommittee field hearings and staff surveillance resulted in
additIOnal implementati.on .of the committee's rec.ommendati.ons by
AID. Theseacli.ons are further described in a sec.ond f.oll.owup report
issued in 1970 (H. Rept. 91-1583). .
Supplementmg the CIP pr.ogram in pr.oviding overall ec.on.omic •
support to the GVN is the piaster-purchase program.of the Depart-
ment .of Defense. DOD purchased piasters from the G.overnment .of
S.outh Vietnam at the 118·to-1 rate t.o pay the I.ocal costs .of .operating
military bases and f.or the f.urchase .of g.o.ods and, services {l.ocal na-
ti.onals payr.oll,. san. d,grave , fresh ·vegetables, etc.} in support of the
U.S. military f.orces in South Vietnam. These d.ollars used to purchase
piasters were, in turn
used by the G.overnment of South Vietnam t.o
finance the imp.ort .or g.oods .necessary t.o supp.ort the ec.onomy and
the war effort m additi.on to the goods imp.orted under the U.S. eco-
n.omic assistance pr.ogram; During fiscal 1971, the DOD purchases.of
piasters amQunted to 52,147 mini.on piasterS.or $442 million (c.onverted
at the .official 118-t.o-1 exchange rate).
D.ollars acquired at the 118-to-1 tate by the.GVN generate,throngh
the import process, ab.out290 piasters perd.ollar in G.overnment
revenues, and further illustratee the inequity .of the presentm.onetary
rate.of exchange f.or .official purchases that is adversely affecting the
United Statee. . . .
AID estimates that with the. continued decline .of U.S. military
f.orces in S.outh Vietnam in 1972 and the corresponding decline of
piaster purchases by DOD it will be necessary toinorease theCIP
fr.om the. fiscal 1971 level .of $266 million to $376 million in fiscal year
1973. '. . .. ..
In its fiscal 1973 budget, AID requested that an' additional $125
million be appropriated for. the establishmen·to:hn economiosupport
fund and 'an economic development fimd deSigned to provi4e a level of
foreign exchange ade<J.uate to meet South Vietnam's resources:require;
This.amount IS esthnated·to be approximately the equivalent
oithe drop: in DOD piaster purohases during .fisoal year 1973.
On June 2, .1970; the GenerallAccounting Office issued. a report
(B.,.15941)1), based .on its continuing. surveillance .of. the CIP' in
South Vietnam. This GAO rep.ort served as the. basis for the commit-.
tee's. report on Ootober 8, 1970, {H. Rapt. 91-1588}.
Much of the !tdditional data on0IP operations was provided through
interrogation of AID's'.Assistant'Administmtor . ('Vietnam) , Robert
1'(. Nooter, and·Willil);m:D. Jr., AID's Associate Assistant
Administrator . .fo;rOollnpodity.and OontractManagement,at the sub_
committee hearings in J . .
1S AID· c'ongreSSional presentatlonj' flscal ,year 19.'78, p. ,B-1 . .
1, See hearings, PP. 77"'60. ' .
. . '.'
Mr. Schmeisser prllvided details about eligible-commodity listings)
the use of automatIc data-processing equipment, steps taken to control
import levels, and the use of market surveys to. determilJe proper
licensing levels for specific commodities. He also furnished data con-
cerning the use of end-use audits of CIP-imported commodities, bank
warehouse audits, the solicitation of price verifications on offshore
procurement of commodit.ies imported under the CIP, and procedures
for U.S. AID review of CIP license. applications. by commodity
analysts in Saigon.
On the basis of the GAO report,continuing subcommittee study
(assisted by. additional GAO followup investigations through
December 1970), and information. presented by AID witnesses a-t the
hearings, it is apparent that AID has taken a number of corrective
actions that have. helped improve the economy and efficiency of the CIP
in South Vietnam."
Several of these improvements are particularly noteworthy. AID
now examines some 80 percent of imported goods arriving in South
Vietnam under the CIP and also examines all arrivd documents of
such shipments. U.S .. customs advisers monitor . such shipments and
are greatly responsible for the overall improvement in the GVN
customs collection system. .
Until a year ago, the GVN customs operations at Tan Son Nhut
Airport, Saigon, was a cesspool of corruption through which an esti-
mated 1 billIOn piasters was lost. each month in uncollected duties.
Recommendations contained i)l. a detailed report on corruption at
Tan Son Nhut by U.S. customs adviser Joseph R. Kvoriak in Febru-
ary 1971, were presented to the South Vietnamese Director General
of Customs and resulted in a wholesale replacement of corrupt G VN
customs inspectors and in the next few months a corresponding sharp
increase of 1 billion piasters a month in customs .collectio)ls was noted.'·
Previously noted "bugs" in the AID automatic data processmg
(ADP) system appear to be eliminated, npw permitting detailed
analyses by commodity, by importers, by supplier, and by source, of
every individual license. issued under the CIP since July 1968. The
system also provides data for current monitoring appli-
catIOns as they move through the of Soutl,1 V and
DB. AID offices for approval." ThIS surveIllance, maddItron to
tighte!,ed procMuresin the selection or commoditi,,!! eligible AID
under the progra,!" and othersa£eguards WIth local
prOdllctIOn of the proposed Import, demand,IllventorIes In bank ware-
houses, reasonableness of price and freight rates are positive. steps
in t4e right direction, even if they have been too long in coming into
being.". .. . . .
However, in seVeI'd other important aspects of the program there
contiriue to be some Of the same deficiencies previously notM in earlier
investigations. A number of the specific previous committee recom-
mendations to remedy these deficiencies iii CIP management have not
yet been fully implemented. For example: .
15 IbId., ,pp. 6-7. For a detailed description of steps taken by AID to improve admhiis-
tratlon of the elP' as recommended in pre'Vlous committee reports. see also, pp. 84':'87.
10 Ibid., pp. 10--11. pl;). 115-116. A copy of the Kvor1ak report. dated Feb. 8, 1971, -is In
the subcommittee flIes. . '.
"Ibid ..... 7. 09. . .
18 See H. Rapt. 89-22(s7 • . p. 24;, R. Rept. 90-610, pp. 15 and 16; and _R. Rept. 91-1588.
, ,,, (l)WihHe AID, no longilr permits dollar oommissions to'be
" " 'pa-id ro sales a-gents(thoOO wha are net both Citizen, sana
,,:rosidents'o'f th,e United Sfutes) ,it is lagging in the oollection of
; claims against the,Governrnentof South, Vietnam for suchoom-
missions'pa-id iii: the past 'and mit ,r!\fundoo.. '
, (2)f\.WstHl'doos not requira'1iha..t CIP commodities being
shi;pped Buppliersbe inspected immediately
" p1'lerto shipment to South Vietnam. "Short-sbil?ments" haa pre-
viously boon noted as one of the most pervasIve of the illicit
activities connected with the Ol'P,
, (3 ) The U.S. Ambassador still 'has not succeeded in the estab-
lishment ofaGoV!\runteIlt of' South Vietnam eacDOW account of at
least $10 million for the payment ofdol'lar claims a;gainst the
Government of South Vietnaln',as speciftca-lly expressed as the
sense of Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act' of 1961, as
amended by Public Law 90-132. ,", "
(4) AID verifications of prices on offshore elP procurements
ha;ve 'not been systenIatized in' such a way as' to assure ful'lest
economy and efficiency in such Although "reasona-
bleness of price"is one of AI D's' stated crit6riabefore approvail
of an import license for It particular commodity, adequate teoords
of aetual price verifications Ilire lacking. " '
, (5) AID end-,use audits m nonunodities imported under the
CI)?, still' al,1ih'ough persOnnel jn
SMgiOn' has"restdte(l m 'ali Increase of'sulfu audits from four In
W66to19 in fiscal year 19'i'1: The most reCeIlt year covered' a
dollar value of CIP' jni.pom Of $130.6 millioli, or '58 percent of
the toM:1 imported. However,therepresimtMive-sample t®hniqueS
ueed 'in the jl;udits traclldonly $29.3miHionof the commodities, or
only about llpercent of tJhe jJotail, on the basis of ultimate end-l1se.
, As qf J Illy)9'71, th\! Govel'!)lUent of South Vietnam had re¢stered
J,Ill.P<lrte1'!3, ,ltUd e;xporWrs" ol;>tjl;l,ll,ed by
AlD from Cqutrol show
W'ere .1,689 a,ctive im,portsrs;, of whl6h ,are
nnpot,Wrs"anQ,'; 459 lUan'1facturers or end -users. " " "
A, C3,ecree, the March 11, Wi1,
,t? ww,l?etItIOn a,nd: s.fIl;btllze ,Iili,e" Im,P,Qrl:,
hbe!'l'hz, ,U;lg, "c, ,J,o,' ,mt-, sto"ck, ' co, IllpanIeS, t/lat, CIl;Il
be ')i<leI)f\'ldi do busmess m
anxpf fIlie 18 maJor ',' , ' " , ",' , , ,
,V.S . .t\:ID ISai/!,on l"i'\wl>.l'" !!Ible. to ,theIr
reVIew of CIP 1100nse apphcatIOns wIthln 12 hours m approlnmately
85 Percent of the, \Il!Be,S"SlIehreviewan,(l decisioll
Ollll-n judgment: of :the ,ments of,1ihe, do,culI\entation accom-
,1the appliCation., :t>ul'lrig !is&lt:!, 197'1, it total of i$,7981lcellse
were rejected." lifajor
See bearlngs .... "Inequital)le Currency! in 'Vletpam,J' -pp. 48-49.
p. 09. ' ' -
., ". ' \
reasons for rejection were failure to post ad vance deposits, missing
documentation, or failure to meet competitive price or other CIP
A listing of ineligible importers, suppliers a,nd a,gents is lllJtintained
monthly by U.S. AID/Saigon. In VieW of the committee's concern
over illicit practices in the CIP and other .investiga,tions currently
underway involving currency IllJtnipula,tion, AID has
agreed to supply the ineligible Iist, which also contains known black-
market currency manipul",tors to the subcommittee."
U.S. AID /Sa,igon ha,s a,lso a,pplied criteria, to make certain that when
an importer is suspended for illicit a,ctivities in connection with the
CIP,affiliated companies or subsidiaries a,re likewise suspended if the
beneficial interest exceeds 49 percent of such affiliate or SUbsidiary or
wlhere there is an interlock of top officers or stockholders of such
1. In the planned increase of the CIP during fiscal 1973, AID
should make certain that commodity imports do not dampen
incentive for the production of similar products by local South
Vietnamese industries. In the transition period, as U.S. military
action diminishes and our presence becomes less a factor in the
South Vietnamese economy, every possible incentive should be
provided to individual South Vietnamese producers to expand
both their domestic and foreign market potentials. Government of
South Vietnam economic planning, both short- and long-run,
should be geared to this effort to maximize the industrial base to
produce goods which now must be imported in significant
2. While there has been a slight increase in the procurement of
Government of South Vietnam-financed imports from the United
States, our country is receiving far less than a fair share of orders
(8.7 percent) as compared with Japan and Singapore (42 percent).
Our Government should direct the U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam to make the strongest possible representations to the
Government of South Vietnam to vastly increase its importation
of U.S. manufactured goods, especially development items. In
view of the complete U.S. support of the Government of South
Vietnam import program, directly and indirectly, and in view of
the present U.S. foreign and domestic economic problems, some
significant reciprocal move on the part of the Government of
South Vietnam should certainly be f(!rthcoming.
3. AID should tighten its preshipment inspection requirements
incorporated under current and future economic assistance agree-
ments to assure proper net weights, quality specifications, packag-
ing, suppliers' certification, et cetera, on a greater range of CIP
commodities from third-country sources.
III Ibid., p. 44. Ineligible 11sb are In the subcommittee :file.
n Ibid •• p. 48.
4. AID should establish a more compl'ehensivepl'ice ·veriflcation
system for offshore procurements· of ·elp commodities because
of the planned increases in the level of the ell' in South Vietnam
and because of unstable world economic conditions that could
result in abnormal price fluctuations. In addition to technical
servic.es that are rendered through AID missions and U.S.
Embassy personnel in various countries, U.S. AID/Saigon com·
modity analysts should fully utilize existing commercial sources
for comparative price,quotations. ' '. , . .
5.' U.S. AID/Saigon should maintain increased surveillance over
existing supplies of individual commodities, including those in.
bank waTeIiouses, before approving licenses for additional. im-
ports,!)f such commodities. Expanded numbers of ultimate end-use
audits are particularly recommended in view 'of the planned
increase in the level of the elP in South Vietnam.
The committee, throug.hthe work of the Subcommittee on For-
eign Operations and Government Information, wiII continue its
close silweiIIanceof the economy and efficiency of· thee!P during
the coming year. .
South Vietnam is predominantly rural and 'agriculturally oriented.
Some 70 percent of the population resides in rural areas. The decen-
tralized social, economic, and political characteristics of the South
Vietnamese society has historically meant relativel;J: weak central gov-
ernments since control and authority has been dIffused into village,
district, and province structures.
, Like other Asian countries, South Vietnam relies heavily on its rice
crop each year. Before the intensification of the war, South Vietnam
exported as much·as 200,000 tons of its rice annually. Peak rice ,Produc-
fion was 5,300:000 tons in 1963. But as the war accelerated, rice output
dropped steadIly to 4,336,000 tons in 1967. Over,700,000 tons of rice had
to 00 imported that year." Until 1971, Vietnam was forced to import
rice to meet its consumer demands.
Shipments of title I, Public Law 480 commodities to South Vietnam
from the United States over the years have.included rice! cotton, flour,
,corn, wheat, tobacco, sweetened condensed and nonfat dry milk, and
other commodi,ties. When sold on the loca1 market b,Y importers, these
commodities have generated piasters to support the GVN war effort.
Title I sales in South Vietnam in fiscal 1970 were $104 million and in
fiscal 1971, $110 million. Estimated sales for fi$lal year 1972 are $115
million.··' .',
AID agricultural technical assistance ' has also been provided to the
Government of South Vietnam in efforts to increase the production of
rice, poultry, and livestock, in research, in irrigation, and in grain
handling !tnd marketing systems. ,. .',.
Land ,Reform
, The ownership of .vast areas of rich land" by a relllti"'e handful of
the wealthy elite, as contr(tSted with the mass of the land-poor peasants '
who had to roIit land to survive, W'aSa characteristie of South Vietnam
as lithe Far E1!St and colonial-doIlliriatedal'ef!,S Of the world. Histori-
cally, it is in suel). widell ,c'outrasting soeial cleavages
that, the seeds Of COnhnUmsmhave, been planb)d and taken root."
, 'attempts at land ref0l'li! in. Squth Vietnap1 began soon
after the VIctory,over'French c'oloniahsmlU 1954. Adetaded account of
the .actions taken by the (}o,;ernmeht of South acquiring
llin'icuitu1'ltlland to be used m land reform was contamed m a March
19'68:report of this committoo(H. Rapt: 90-1142); SUch e'fIorts 'were
118',Ib1d.,'p;-S,'. ,,' -' '_ ' '--:"," { ""
",R,', 7;8 •. s.ee alsO ,AlP ·fiscal Yjmr 1978. -ibid •• p. B-4.
lIII For a'detalled description of- this themE! 'see'a study for 'the 8UbCOtn..nlltttee' by ,Dr. Paul
S. Taylor entltloo Strategy and of mDlPlorl,D' P, '"efactlon
Over Uon(lltJona Of Land Tenure for ,RevolUtloINWY Ends in, Vietnam." Committee ,print.
August - , ' "
· udged to be totally inadequate and largely ineffective. Of the 4.48 mil-
. ion acres of land acquired, less than 15 percent was redistributed to
individuals and less tlmn 10 percent distributed for communal and
public use. .
During the period 1!}/54-,68, U.S. AXD provided some $21 million
to support·these Government of South Vietriam land re-
form programs, includmg approximately $4.8-million-funded techni-
cal equipment and technical services and the remainder in counterpart
funds to defray Government of South Vietnam Rdministrative Cl\sts.
No U.S. financial assistance was provided for lapd reform during
fiscal 1961 through fiscal 1965, as the land redisti'ibuti<:>n program vir-
tually ground to a halt that extended to 1967.
In 1!}68 this' committee strongly urged our Government to press
the Government of South VietnRm for "an aggressive new program of
land. and l'llnt re!ormr,:ipg beyond tile implelllentati9n of present leg-
and On March 26,J970, the. <:tor,ernment.of
VIet)lalll NatIonal Assembly furally epactedthe I Jand-to-the-tdler."
law under which tenant farmers will receive title to theriee lands they
farming,. up toa lilliit of. a hectares in.the southern part of South
Vietnam to 1 hectare in Olntral South Vietnam.
The f()rmer owner .of
the land will be reimbursed by a 20-percept cash payment, phIS bonds
m, ay be redee. in equal annual installments.over an. 8-year
P'}M' 8
• · .. e,,: .IIl;W. .. ·to vIrtually. eliminate on. r!-ce
shoul4 help to proVIde rural South VlE!tnamese resIdents anlnQl'\lIl.I!ed
comnutment to the defenBil·Qf the central goveJ7ll1llent. It should also
help provideth.em with a fairer share of the economic benefitS oftheir
own labor. 'I'M Government of South Vietnam stated its.·intenti.on to
implement the new land reform program .over a a-year period.
J;and Reform Progress .
'Th6' Gtiverr,unent of South
"Iand-to-the-tiller" law, enacted In March 1970, began in September
1970; By the end of 1971, some 1,145,000 acres had been transferred to
nearly 325,000 tenant farmers,'" '1'he' ilurrent estimate thus far after a
m.the, about 2,5 mUlipn. to some
'. . .. ' .... ' ..... ""'" '. "
..... .Iana was }1,litilJ,teli
1?Y . .th. e., ,G9,y.e. !1Wl\S/l.' '.' t'6R.H1.p. ,1),. t.li.: ,V. } .• ,et ... II/lJ)).. ,!n. m. pl.bn,t}ltlfllj 41+<'1, be ... en
to ."'.n,ly 2. .. ¥.<<?,1\. tagn .. a,d .f8JIl . 80m .. e}25,OOO. ,py
t1),e end. pf of. S<111tJi,,:V
dlrectfd the:c<mfil?jll11rg
to. on
.lan. 9. '. ... ;m ... '.nlt.nc
;pf .. t.(),spm. e., [65.,0. 0
. '8,. eres. ' .• ,.. i·i·. .' .
. i .l1 .. AlI;> tycllii}ci\l .to .the ,Go,:e1fl'lle!)t 9M\91lt/l
V,)etn8JJ). ,wograP,ll\>;
and' village officials who adrillU1ster the programs, the use .6f a6nru
photography as a substitute for ground. surveys, the development of
. '- ,. • '!:,-,..,,-// '" :', j "'" ",' ',: "}',L;,i"" ,,, .
. " '., ",. 0',:: . ,
.: AID cODr!':essional presentatlon, fiscal YAA'C' ,,978, p. B-2.
Ibid .. pp. B-2, B-18-19, . .
1& Ibid .. pp. B-lts-19.
Total U.S. AID cost of supporting the Government of South Viet-
nam land program will be $47 million. Approximately $10 million was
obligated from fiscal 1969 funds and an additional $15 million from
fiscal 1971 funds. Another $15 million is proposed in the fiscal 1973
budget. U.S. funds are released only as the Government of South Viet-
nam payments to. former landowners are actually made. These funds
are subsequently used by the Government of South Vietnam to finance
imports as part of the eIP, thus helping to offset the inflationary effects
of piaster payments to the former owners of the land.31
Increased Crop Production
For the first time in many years, the ourrent produotion of rice in
Vietnam should be sufficient to meet its consumer needs. With
U.8.AID assistance and work done by the International Rioe Researoh
Institute {IRRI) in the Philippines, several new "miracle" strains·
have been introduced and, together with increased use of imported
fertilizers and pestioides, have boosted. tho rice crop to some 5,'700,000
tons." At the present rate. of increase, it is possible that the GVN may
reach a level of production that will make it possible to again export
rice to earn badly needed foreign exchange if markets are available.
North Vietnam was also expeoted to harvest a record rice crop in
1971, using the same types of "miracle" strains such as "IR-8" pro-
duced by the IRRIand obtained by the North Vietnamese through
commercial seed ohannels in Hong Kong and elsewhere. However,
in the fall of 1971, floods upset that crop foreoast. Their rice cro!? this
year was estimated to be nearly 6 million tons, about 1 million hIgher
than in 1959, the previous best production year. It is still expected to
be slightly less than the amount of rice needed to feed North Vietnam's
20 million people."
In other U.S. AID-assisted crop production projects, efforts are
being directed toward increasing domestio produotion of animal feed
and research in other cro!?S ad"'ptable to South Vietnam, particularly
. those with export potentIal. Planting of corn and sorghum has been
. targeted at 72,500 acres in 1971 and 150 000 acres in 1972. Efforts are
also being directed to assist the GVN to increase poultry produc-
tion by 15 !?ercent per year and swine production by 10 percent per
year. AdditIOnal emphasis is being placed on the training of personnel
and development of an agricultural credit system and farm cooper-
atiye Organizations. Technical assistance is directed mainly to the
.Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) to increase the availability
of loan funds, efficiency of operations, and broader coverage of the
farmer population." The level of funding for U.S. AID assistance to
the Government of South Vietnam in the field of agriculture for fiscal.
1972 was $4.9 million., as compared with $7.3 million in fiscal 1971, and
a proposed $5.2 million level for fiscal 1973. "
81lbtd., p. 8-18.
8$ Heartngfh.p. 8
au For, an· lntormatlv'e description· of the North Vietnamese rice situation see an article
by George McAl!iihur 0. f t. be' .·t..os _AD&'. Thnes entl.'tIed "North Vietnam Reaping Record
Rice Crop," A;ug. 10,1911, p.
tlsc,alyear 19,78, pp. B-6, :8-18-1.7.
811 Ibid., p. lI-lS.
Needs and Objectives
Among the specific needs and objectives of U;S. assistance in the
fields of agriculture and land reform in South VietnalID, the committee
believes that there is a continuing requirement to diversify the pro·
duotion of new types of crops that are adaptable to the soil and climwte
conditions .of South Vietnam and that represent a potential export
market. . ..
Similarly, the committee concludes· that laudable objectives in the
expansion of a rural banking system and farm loan programs in Viet,
nam, ,together with necessary extenSion services will be of significant
value to those farm families who have recently received a c r e a ~ e under
the South Vietnamese "land-to-the·tiller" law 'and who need-capital,
as well as technical aid, to realize the frill economic benefits from
their newly acquired land.
Finally, the committee concludes that U.S. AID management and
technical assistance being provided to the ·Governlnent of South Viet-
namis a continuing reqUIrement to help accelerate the distribution of
land' under the "land"to-the-tiller" law and other programs such as
the special·Montagnard land distribution so that the backlog of claims
for 'paytnents to former landowners can be further reduced.
. . . '..
Public safety programs in South Vietnam have heen supported by
AID and its predecessor agencies since 1955. Until 1961, the U.S. AID
was largely limited to training. The present program as ad-
mimstered over the past 10 years has consisted of (1) support for the
national police force; (2) establishment ofa police telecommunications
system, 'and, (3) support forGVN correction centers. Since the forma-
tron of the civil operations and rural 'development support program
(CORDS) in 1967, the U.S. support effort has been included as a
directorate under that organization."
, U.S. AID's public safety division has p,,-ovided over 200 police spe-
cialists to help train, organize, and ,equiip the Govermnent of South
Vie!nam,National Police forces at
PolIce FIeld Forces (NPFF), a paranulltary polIce umt engaged prl-
marilyin combating the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) in ruml areas
of South Vietnam. The National Police Force has mcreased from
75,000 in 1967 to 114,000 in January 1972 with a prooposed increase to
122,000 by June 30; 1973. '
A separate national police telecommunication system was established
in 1965 and involves a network of radio, telephone, telegraph, and
teletype equipment that connects villages and hamlets with province
capitals and with Saigon. AID technicians, helped (lesign the system
and AIDilunds paid for much oithe equipment used.
The n, ationa,1 identit, y'registration program, begun in October 1968,
has now registered more than: 6,5 million SOl1th V1etnamese aged 15
and over. ' " ' '
U.S. AID's in the Vietnamese.,correction center, :program is
largely an: adVIsory one desIgned to Improve the condItIOns at the
42 centers esta;blished under the program.
Con Son Prison •
Mnch' public attention had been' focused on inhumane treatment
of i:nmatesat these Centers in 1970, particularly the repression of po-
litical prisoners at"the,jnfa, ,mollS, C,<')n S,on I, sla,nd prison where Mem-
. bers of theU.8.,Honse of Wlpresentativeg disclosed the use of "ti!\,er
cages" to \101<1, certlliin, types of prisoners, in close cOnfinement. The tmy
cells were almost identical to those used on ,Devil's ISland off the coast
of French.Guiana. ",", ' ' . . ' " ,
,Hearings on, U.S. program in South
V,etnam, were held: by onituiy.13,August 12, and
ae Background' on the' Public 'Safety' Progrnl)l:'ln' V:Je-tlriam, testtm()DY by
AID Assfstwt Administrator ,(VIetnam) testimony., ' See hearlliiJS, pp. ,5"":6 and
also the AID congtesstona;l presentation, Jii!u;il!-l year " -
(19) .. . ,.
-,', .
. ,
17, 1970. Testim<;>ny was presented by Representa,tives Wi!-
lia,m R. Anderson, Augustus F. B:awkins, Philip M. Cra.ne, AID} De-
fense Depa,rtment, a,nd outside witnesses concerning their firstnand
observa,tions of conditions a,t Con Son." Pictures and tape recordings
were also used to ,
Gr,aphic descriptions of ,br,utal, itYl ,improper diet, poor medical
facilities, a.nd unsanitary prison conaitions were presented by Mem-
bers a.nd a staff member of the House select committee which toured
South Vietnam, to inapeotthe conduct of U.S, ,operations, in the previ-
ous month. ' ," " "', , ' '
It was also revealed that North Vietnf!,Dj.e8S prisoners <;>f war, were
in, ca,rcera,tedon Con S,on" f, or alleged crillles oO!Uinitted whi!, e pJ,'i,soners,
contrnry to terms of the Gen,eva, Convention. 58 " ,'" " ,
,On Dl)Cemher 28, ,1970, USMACV Headquarters in Sruigon issued
a, ,new policy directive (528--8) designed to upgrnde public safety
correction and ,detentipn policy ,a,nd 0Pl'rations." ;But shortly there-
after, MACV awarded a $400,000 contract to the ltMK/BRJ construc-
tion combine to, ,build new, isolation cells, at the Con, Son prison
AID Support of GYNP\lblic Safety Progra)11
USAtD has expended sOm,e $77.8 million in the
gralll f,ro)11 fiscal 1967 through fiscal 1972,wh,ile the DefenseD,oij;>,at\ti-
has contributed $48 'n;tlil.lion, prima.ril;yto ,tb,o$,illl\,!;il;-
mIlItary elements of theN a(IOnl1-1 PolIce s)lch as the NPFF.41 ",,'
AID project IlSSistallCe for public safety was $9.5 million in,fti<clIl
1971 and $8.8 million in fiscal 1972; $6.8 million
fiscal, 1973.
Addition,al fU,nds for, th
, ubli? p ro"g ,ram,'
by the Departme;nt 0,f.,:pefense-,.$9 m
mIllIon m fiscaU97:i, and an estImated $11.6mIlho)1 In
, T)J.e re/idily probable, need f?r USA.lP
£,or ,polIce t"ritlrim
, jlers,onll:el,' ,e<;J.Ul'pm, ent, an, d chmcal. ass,
tp.,El <1,'£ Y, .,etnallI.1!lstre, and Impr<;>vll!&'iIl
aspects l'olIo\\ operatIOns. "", '," I;"." .,'
But no J.>Togra,m can be effiCie»t a)1g.eco)1omicaJ Hit does'l1Qt ,aJil!reve
the objectIVes for whioh it was' authorized 'a)1d created. Conflicting
yiewpoints 0)1 the operation o!the I\l1bJic s.a,fety progra,m, a.s
m AID documents and by varIOus witnesses at the subcolmmttee s hear-
r\tisaCi serious; to the degree, to
ob, J.ectIVesa, ret aotuaHy., beJngachleved;· Broadly, ,stated! A, ID deS<!mbes
the maj<;>r ,p,ublic safety project ta,rgets 'as. follows:" ,:" ':': ':
'. ,If.,'aiJiiJ.M]i P 8upport.:-;- ',' ,,'
assIsts thEj VIetnaMese Nahomtl P(}lice.to ,mamtam law and
!J' ,- • ". ': ' , ..
tr7 Tmnscr'Lpts of these hearings were "not a.re ln'
cha:i'r'nl'an "tttnoU,nC'dd' in ; ii' '$p'el!¢h oil Bouse' :door
(IP, - ;H30Q9)i. _ tlha-t p_,,1i:Ionersj ,wn.J', : ha,d _l!e.en, , transferred, 'by, 'the. Government; of
Vietnam to the Chi Boa National Corrections hi Saigon and that no more POw.'s
would 'be sent to Con Son.
':E ,;": . J •. ,::';'": ' .. ".-" ,,: ", ,', I'
.11 AID congressionalpresent,atio)\' ,tisct\l year 1!)7S,')).r.a-:S:
48 Teleph(lhe conversat1on with Mr. Jack Oilfce of the Co;mptrGller, Department of
Defense Jan. 11, 1972.
"AID congressional presentation, fiscal year 1978, pp. B-67, B-69,"B-70.
order and local security jn pacified urba.n and rural areas,
combat smaller Vietcong elements, and deny resources to the
enemy. .
Public safety teleaommllUlTI:watWw.-Under this project, AID
provides for the National Police radiophone system
for nationwide police operational communications from the
national to the district level, and the Government of Vietnam
Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD).
. OQ'lW3otiorUJ oente1's.-Under.this project, AID provides
suppovt for improvements in Vietnamese prison conditions.
There is a need to expand the. capacity of existing prisons,
improve seourity, and continue to develop better health and
reha:bilitation facilities. .
AID Assistant Administra:tor (Vietnam) Nooter described U.S.
assistance to the South Vietnamese National Police in his testimony
thusly: ..
* * * AII>'s task has been to assist the National Police in
recruiting, training and organizing a force for the mainte-
nance of law al1d order, including all nOrnial. police fu. nctions.
In carrying out its task. AID's public safety division has had
a team of over 200 police specialists in Vietnam helping train
and organize the National Police forces at all levels. In Sai-
gon, we have been concerned with revising legislation and
planning for the I(1'adual expansion of the National Police
Force from about 75,000 in 1967 to over 100,000 today. Most
of this force has received training either in-country or rubroad,
the entire directorate virtually reorganized along modern
police lines, over 3,000 policewomen added to the service and
a special inspection division established which has led to
prosecution or disciplina.·y action against 2,200 policemen for
violation of conduct including corrupt practices. The N a-
tional'Bureau of Narcotics has been reorganizd and a nar-
cotics section established at both regional and provincial
levels. A nationwide identification program is nearing a goal
of registering 12 million Vietnamese over 15 years old. .
II). respol1se to questions by Representative Reid concerning" allega-
tions of political oppression and brutality by the Thieu regime, Mr.
Nooter.said.:·· '
. It is our objective in the AID program to help the Dolice
forcen.n:dtohelpthecortection centers run both more efficient
To the degree in which we get
su.fficient'cooperation to' make it appear that thdseobjectives
Olin beatta:ined, r think it is toou .. advantage to continue our
presence in those programs. .' .
'l"h:ere"has'been a: r.apia expansion of the Vietnamese National
PoHee Force'over:the PlI:st seyerar years, as was hrougoht out in the
co116tjuy>,between Represen'ta:tlve Moorhead and N'ooter;"
Mr. MOOJ,lHEAD. Mr. Nooter, what .numerical
strength of the National Police Force, let's say, in 1964!
.. (5 Hear1ngs. p. 5.
'II Ibid., p .. 44.
,lit Ibtd., p. 87.
Mr.N()(hJm;probablyabiiut10,OOOin'nJ64.'. "
··'Mr. MOORHEAD. So tbe S6uth Vietnamese police force'bas
increasedfrom 10,000 to 118,000 now, to a projected 122,000;
is that cOrrect! "., .., ,., '
. , NOO1.'J,i:II, Incidental,]:):, on, tbat ppjnt,it is tbe
OPInIOn of our adv.Isers tberethat :[>ohce force for
'Vietnam in would be about 'T5,600:QiYen wartime
conditions al),d theexfrasecnrity burdens that that implies,
sc11n. 6.01' .. oli96"they feeltbatthe 122,000i8 an
,. ' ' ., , ' .. , '". , "
,AlP's described theaccom-
plishments of the National Police ,'. '
50 of all N assigned to
l<htl, distriQt level anc! below .. The!l.umber of, police assigned
to tbe village level has increased from 11,000 to over 31,000 ,
and of statiollsfrom 1,7'76 to 2,102. Efforts
to. ()r food" and drugs
11\g: 197Uesulted In 1,900 conf\scattons Of wea.pons; 226,000
.r<lunda of,ammunition; ,614,000 kIlos Qfc6ntrabal)df<>Od-
stuia; and 9,94'6,000 .eaiiilillei!and tablets of mediCine or drugs.
,'; :," : , ' (.,', ," _', ,. ,-,f I.",:, j • ",
, Centers '
, , ,': , , ,;, - : ,- ;', c "'.: : I :
Add'tionaHIlf0tnlati.on was !'£
AID'suppotted cOrrectIon cente,r 'proJll\lts; ASSIstant' AID' A:dthlms-
traMr (VIetnam) 'N ooter testiified ; '. , '. .' " . '. ".
feedlllg, ;weUItl:ll, al),d h.ave,
pl.a .. i1the reo • t,{)n 9., f 'lV,N.· 2, ItsllW.l,udmg. dISP,. enipll>t;l. eS,. '
\)Itth s:Y,Stems, and inmate
II).g,.rhl' ?t!,Ily bOOn, and
trI!,Ih)i),g bemg (l<>nduct\ld at 32 centers. There 18

vidual inatances, of inhllmane treatlnent no doubt e;x!l$t,the"
overall system'ii!> far leasonel'ou$;.1ohan the,jmpressiol); (joor,""','
veyed in press. stories d., uring the past, year. Specificall;y, 'the'.''''
,Ill",nthly ,de\t#!. wte, jn. Y,"ietllamese {lrXsons.fu>m, ,a;ll,Q8,uBt!' in
19;7Q, 1;hatrthll
,,I'. too, ,CQ\lUtl'Y. ,as.'It.'')'!', ,h.,Ole.lfb., ",.·s. th. ®,
t!\e: QJ dea.th. rate ill. 1967:, whenonr',as-
• byauY absol)lte
or relatIve standarii. , . ",'!I'.",'.,
,. OOte,l' ,1!f!.i1: note {)f,incJ;6llB4lg;11on-
.11O!lflllt;ll J/le ,. qQP, J!,I,ld, q£
nAlll .
Comml . . < _>,' "
. .'" / ";-;" r, ,.'\'1 ",
,,':;" -.- i;', ',": " " :, l."-'-;'!'! .
10 2arlnp, Foreign isslstance Act of 1971, House Foreign Affairs Committee" I,
p.239." , ... -: ,"/-; ".';'.'
" ",'
We have also received numerous comments I\Jld suggestions
that the United States should withdraw the assistance which
we have been providing to the Vietnamese prison system. The
U.S. financial support for this program is small, but I would
like to comment on it since it has received such wide public
It is tempting, indeed, to conteml?late withdrawal from a
program which has received such WIde public criticism. Our
role is advisory and not operational, and, no doubt, the prison
system still leaves much room for improve!\llent. However,
there are several reasons why I believe that we should con-
tinue to support this program for a few moreyears.
First, there is no doubt in my mind that South Vietnamese
prisons are better operated and provide more humane treat-
ment of prisoners than would be the case if oUr program had
not existed. We have hell?ed finance construction which has
relieved crowding conditlOns in the prisons. We have pro-
vided training for Vietnamese personnel, and our adVlsers
have worked with them in a constructive way. The Vietnam-
ese have not always operated their prisons in the 'Way we
'Would, but they have shown a willingness to work 'With us and
have accepted our advice in most cases.
• * * * *
I do not believe that 'We should 'Walk a'Way from this prob-
lemsimply because it is a difficult one, as long as the Viet-
namese continue to demonstrate their 'Willingness to 'Work
with our advisers and to make improvemoots. We 'Will, of
course, phase out these activities as soon as 'We believe that
,the objectives of this program have been attained, but our
assessment nO'W is that this 'Will take several more years.
The sjibcOlllmittes asked, AmbaSsador Colby, Qutgohlg director of
the CORPSprogrwm, to describe the extent to which CORDS has
to ,the operations of OVN prisons, detention centers, and
mtel'!'ogatlOn cent;ers., Colby responded as follo'Ws: " ,
In 1963" a U.S. program of advice and assistance to the
Government of Vietnam prison system 'Was initiated,'Which
'Was taken over by CORDS iil1967., The program initially,
focused, on a vocational skiills training program. In 1967, the
problems of overcrowding because of the war and lossofpris-

program of fortlficatl.:mandexpanslOn :of prISOn faClhtles
was undertaken. '1'0 thIS was added a vanety: of programs to
improve faCilities and procedures in thecoITeetion: and deten-
tion systems, both before and after the Con Son incident of
1970; Advisory attention to these centers hits been increased
over the years, usillgbOth civilian and military personnel,
including six members oIthe U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons
no'W: As! It result of, ('and'the
more strIngent standards of appreh:enslOn esMblished under
the Ph?8l1:IX beell.eliminared
exceptma. few faclhtIes, the: death 'rate 'ill thecol'l'ectlOn
at HearIngs, pp. 220-226.
centers from 1.1;6 per thousalid per'monthin 1967
to 0.36, per per month in 1970, ined.ic,al care has sub-
stantially increased. andfOOdingand sanitary facilities have
been improved. Additional still needed, but
the adVIce and assistanCe to date has certainly improved. the
of Vietnam's of all centerS, as
well as the CIrcumstances of theIr mmates. Fundl1lg (AID and
I?Q1?) for and. (hicluding the coSt of
CIvilran adVIsers) from the mceptIOn of CORDS lsas follows:
,,' , .
(Dollat amount In thousands)
Fista! year
1961 •• __________ ____________________________________ ____ _____ "
•••• _ •• ____ • _____ _____ _______ .'_. ___ .. ____________________ .
, 19i!:: ::::::::: ::,,:: :::::.:: :::::: :::::::,:::::: :::::: :::::::::

4ti: g
. 102. 2
Note: With respkt to Interrogation centers. CORDS since its,establlshment In 1967 has provided about
8f1d improvements.. ' . . , .
Other written questions submitted to Ambassador Colby on the op-
erations of interrogation centers produced the following responses: "
10, HfJWmfWIJI irrderr{)fJ,atiOrt centerfare beinfJ,
()1Ieratea (J'(Iitea,$tatesor'lJJl1!ier U.S. ,adPU()'I'1IBUper-
·vuiOrtf Specilyeach, location. HfJW many U.S.f6r8Ortnel.are
a8,ifJ,neato sU()4opeiatiow amd what are thelJ1"dutie8 .and
resp(Yf)JJi"QiUtii8!' - . . . .
. ' Answer .. A Provincial interrogation center existe in oocp. of
the 44 provinces, a regional cimi(;lr iII of the four l"Ilgions
and a national center at SailP.!n, operated by the
branch bf the National police WIth I1Idviceand aSl\istance'from
·tihe Pacification Sec1\l"ity Coordinatioh Division of CQ1U)S.
In addition, military interrogation centers are operated: by
Army ·of the Republic of ,vietnam;:UnjtedStates,,'Korean,
and· Australian military unite ,at, appropciate levels at which
intllvtogations are eonduoted . .In;Angustl971,.26 U.S. civilian
pllr!l(lnnel worked with"thecivilian centers deseribedllibove,
proyiding8li:vice'on professional interrogation,teehniques,re-
'popting the significant inteHigenCe. acquired, and!observing
the. standaoos'9f, treattnentof 'irunates •. Present plans.aret9
oubmp\!t. provincial centers (and U.S. adl'isory sup-
on the .
. . Que81!iQn,,1,1., T(J ,wh;at,ewtent. are .U.S"persO!IVMljYre8ent,or
;i'(l-; tM iw,te;NI{)fJ,at4MJ". 01 'Vietodnf/ or NortJh; Viet-
'(I(J/me86sU8.peotf/f.:, ;,', ',';',;;,.:,; "l ". ;"", "
., ;Answer,. JJ,S" personnel. are p'Jrlmacily:'. adViisollS 'with 1'6'-
to Govel1lUllent ,Qf ¥ietn(tmlinterrdgation ofYietcong ?r
:Nopth,\lietnatnese"euspects. thus!the,Y'M"elllOmetimes 'present,
soD)etimes ,nO,t; ithey. some.times, make: suggestionswitjJ: 'I"<'-
-Ibid .• p. 226.
',_ I,'
speot to questioning, and sometimes do not. There is no fixed
rule in this regard, other than th",t of helping Government of
Vietnam personnel to meet prMessional( and ethical) inter-
rogation standards. To the extent that suspects are appre-
hended hy UiS. military units, of course, U.S. personnel will
conduct at least initial mterrogations to determine how they
should be handled .. On some few occasions, special arrange-
ments are made for U.S. interrogators to have access to par-
ticularly interesting <lases for direct interrog3Jtion on matters
of interest to the United States.
Alleged Brutality
Obher witnesses, however,criticized the operational basis for AID
and CORDS support of the pwblic safety program in South Vietnam.
In some cases, this testimony was based on personal knowledge; in
others, it appeared to express an opinion. Mr. Don Luce, an outside
witness with 12 years of service in South Vietnam with the Interna-
tional Voluntary Services as an agriculturist, a journalist, and repre-
sentative of the World Council of Churches told the subcommittee: "
I think this morning one of the confusions about the police
system is that there are so many different police systems, so
many different prison systems. For example, there are the na-
tional correction centers,· provincial correctional centers, de-
tention centers, interrogation centers, police station jails, and
military prison", People are imprisoned into all of these dif-
ferent categories of prisons. So .when you try to count the
number of political prisoners, or when. You consider what has
happened to the pl'lsoners, it becomes very confusing as to
which system these people fall under, who is responsible .
. But the United States-has been bnilding the prisons. We fur-
nish the tear gas which is used to repress the students, and I
found in Vietnam that it was very hard to get the information
about what was happening from the U.S. official",
For ""I!-mple,a year aFt0' 11 Vietnamese univers.ity students
werereIMseQ.who'hadshvai-$ under their fingernails, who had
round holes msensitivepai'ts of their body which they said
were froi)ldgarettebul'tlSaild were cover6<.l with black and
blue spots. . . '.' " .... " . ". .' '.
A group of from diffjlrentvoluntary I!-gencies, SUch M
myself from the W ()rld. Ct)undlof Churches, representatives
frofu.the Unitarian Service Committee, the American Friends
ServiceCominlttes,and X'nfurilational Voluntary Services re-
quested to see Ambassador Bl$hl' 'aboUt the fact thl!-t Viet-
nainese studentis were. belngoortit.red,that the U.S,-donated
, equipment had been involved in their jl;r'rest, and that we were
. supporting the whole SY!iteinan;<!.police System. Am-
bassador Bubker's office BIUd" Ambasslldor Bunker could not
see us, we should see :!?eI>uty said he
coUld rrot see us, we sJiQuldileethe'¥'out'li AifI'aH'SOffice. They
said they could not see Us, we 'SlYoiil\!fsee;the' Pul>lic:Sllfety
, .. Resaid we should see theiprisonsadvis!!J;\Tjiepris-
. '''IbId,. PP.9.8-99.
ons adviser said that this was the kind of a decision that
'was too high for him to comment on, there was nothing he
could do about it, lt is very frustrating,
Mr. Lu.ce described interrogation practices in Vietnam in this collo·
quy with Representative McCloskey: "
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Luce, in j'Qur[ong experience in Viet-
nam, would you' state to the subcommittee ilie common belief,
1Jhe COmmon reputation of Vietnamese interrogation ·proce-
dures with the American community, both military and polit-
ical, in South Vietnam, as to the manner of torture of pris-
oners during .the interrogation process j'
Mr. LUCE. The. general opinion of Vietnamese, and I have
talked with people who have been in interrogation centers and
qater released, and talked with just in general hundreds of
people about ·this generail question, is that almost every Viet-
namese who is picked up IS immediately tortured, and then
goes to an interrogation center, or a police station, and i" tor-
tured Digain.
Then the question of Ameri()ll,n involvement in· this, the
people say that in many ooses Americans .are here, so that Viet-
namese ·genera!lly £eel that Americans are often watdhingthe
torture and sometimes involved in the torture. .
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Now, what is the reputation in the Ameri-
can communitylHo:w about ·the Americans that you have
talked with over there I What is their common understll;nding,
beli<Jf or impression lIS to whether 'South, Vietnamese lise tor-
ture in ,the process, if you know I . .'
Mr. LUCE. I think that almost all Americans there would
know of specific cases where 1lhetorture has been used; :tou
know, ids jnst an acoopted fact . '.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Is it It matter of oolillilon discussion I .
Mr. LUOE. Yes;
* * '. • •
Mr. MCCLOSlrEY. What, in y()Ur opinion, can be !\!tid, .or
w hiat is your attitude IJ,bQutaprogJ,"am under which a
perha1?s captured. o.r· certainlY i11-. caRture.by
Arne. ncan troops, IS. tu. r1!ed o. ve. r 11.1 a. p. rovmce mte.rr<>ga;.. ' .. t!()U
center 46 days £l?r mterrogatlonllOleJly by South VIet- .
nll,m¥" WIth no Amel"lCal\SPresent j . '. . . , ... ' .
.. LucE. Wela,my first x:¢action is the United Statesprob-
ably built 1Jhis intgrrogation C\lutor, were involved in
the .arres.. . t ,oUhis eithe .. r,d. ii-ect.l.Y9r indireiltl. y, and .we
cannot eScape the. responsibi!J:ty for wl)at happens to
. We are.it part 9fthattorture as much as if we were
there anil maytbe even mpreso becltnse we a.N doing nothing to
BtlJpit a 1/trgll (>:f thjngs to 6l1OOUoo;ge it, .
Mr,.MoCJ.QS.KEY .•. J;t. a.v. e y.ou.oo. JIlP. any.dwmmoota. I"Y.' eVI-
tortun\, ,81\0h. as' indiyiduals .allegedly
clalme!1 tp, ilol'illlT'ld1,; .'. . , '.. . . .
"Xtild:. po. 10,,"-10'1.';'
Mr. LUOE;r haVM1,t home, tapes.' of pe9P1e.th. tit have be. en
interviewed)pelOple who' have 15een atTested by Amerioans,
beaten.!>y and then go through the whole
pnson. systBm,en4mg :UP at Con. Son 01' othll1'places. I have
mtervIElwedAmencan mterrog.ators who have used what they
CI1Ill the ap).>roadh,ti\at .tJhe pris-
. oner a,rrlves cat the mterrogatlOncenter they give him ooffee
he w:ants, and then
If he dOes not gIve mf6l'1llati6n, they turn, ihlnl back to the
Vietnainesii; . '. ' . " . .. . .
A()OOrding -to thisinten-dgator; 'he said just about every
Vietnamese prisoner ·th8!t he had received ihAd .been tortured
by Yietnll,mese interrogll-tol'S. aJ:ld tJhat the, most effective way
to.send them.bl)-Ck, and
m some cases SeJ:l\l,U)g baek 9 the Vietnamese. As a, mat-
terCif fact, I found'ollelnterrogation centerthro1lP!h a ronner
priS\>lle);,w)\,o 'hild met two N ortJh Vietnamese medical techni-
cians :'iV'Po,he·.saidtJheirfinge.rs twisted up, 'you know,
orQken, Th.eyhad,been bell!ten ,ona, table With boards,
jjJJ,IlY .¥hr, by a,J:l A,D;le,ica,n. ' .
In a colloquy witJh RepresentatiV'il Moss, Ml': .Luce also
testHied as to.theuse.of.the Vietn.ll!mesewliee.ior poilitical pU1,1>0868: "
. Mr. Moss. *.'., I would assume Y0U1' stll!teinent that
in. 'l.. udtin.gJ OM ¥QSSier.l tjle ALP Director, MlYou do.on page
3 mtJhe .... .': . .' '.
"Pul."1ng i9(O pohee contlnued.to unprovethe1r capabil-
ity,in tradit!Onal polic,! .. Their timely.ltpd ,Positive
the spread <'5fyiQlence.'; ...•. ' .. '. .... '. .. . '. .' .' . .
. Po Y,Oll reef pj)liee in in,,!a!,ce h!,v;e
'g!liged: m beyond merely ,,?ntammg,c!vII dlsturb-
.' ..... ..' .... • ....... . .. .
' ... x. ".L.· E., Yes ... :l t:hi1Pr.'. ,that. th. ey. .... h.·9.V:e ..
.sed th. eJ .. 'j> . lice. £o.r.
j;ldlt1J<Wil . W:, Tl;i.ey have
.. ....... .. e .... re .. ligio .. u .. ".:\"S ... .. Q:V\)e.re .. ,1l,\1.,v
tW'iI tie, 'Y,ltr, :'1'#0 Were aslcing for
;yetAlmn,s,': '.
"u:. ... · f'11. V'l,gamw\! some 8\1 pwrtmg, .or., II(t
S'ij:hJ.;# :erorriV'je;>:rVeaid.>."t 1(ii ii\ tMik,i),
ilA., ..• r, I ....' .. .f ... :1,. the'then
.. , ,
SUiEng1Jtiep);. I rtlega'lld wh8!tJWl;.,."". j, ,,, ••••
.' • LTlOE HbirTT'lf'e·:w.· :."'1.0:0' t 201.'3:",';;;',11 (',wliioh
t&d1''' tl'!
, .• ",," 1/:. '\;' .. ,,"" .'. .,.
Another. iWitness; MiE. !iDhoodoVe ,J:acqueneYI 'afonner ,kID eint!loyee
w South
.: ,,'.:, .. ',' .. '
. .r wrote i.n my politicllil repOrt ifue June
IY1! .,'
___ ,",'!''';',V)it ')1(" r,\ ,_"" _,', ,,,, ;,"",-} ','"",,'··.' __ fJ)', ,,I, ,_, .,",.", ii , .1 'v .. "
IIlIlbld., p. 111.
H Ibid., pp. 2151-2152.

Wall a. JU\\jqr .looa.l l)!lQ1ljIe ()f I )lave.
personalijr Wltnll$l\l!d poor iiJIban
fear wh.eU.i): questione. d them. abOJrt.·the of the B8C.ret
police in paIIt election P!'Or .ftsherman in
Danang, arumated and tallmtlVe·lli OOUll'lanung about 800-
nomic conditions, clammed up il). neal' Wrl'Ol' wnen querioo.
about responding that lie "muBII think abi)ut his
family." After many personal interviews in VietnaJ!l on·t.his
subject, lcame to the that no Bingill
ing the feared and hated Vietcong, is more feare!i. OJ: m01'll
hated thl\l1 the South Vietnamese secret police. .
He further stated: "
. In every province in VietnaJ!l there is a province interroga-
tion centel'-a PIC-:-witJh a. l'e.t>litlation f()r using torture to In·
terrogate poople accused of VretcOnlf alliJiati()ns. These PIC's
have a OIA counterpart relationship, and in some en_also
'have a relatiol)ship with the AID police adviser. Not in all
cases; however-last year theseriior All) police adviser of
the DIl.nang City Advisory Group told me he refused, after
ol)e visit, to ever set foot in a PIC aga,jn, because "war crimes
are going on in there." .
Ambassador Colby provided additional information about the U.S.
relationship to the Province interrogation centers:" .
Mn.MoCLOBXEY. Mr. Ambassador, Ihave a document in
front of me indicating that interrogationswtements or con-
fessions are admissible and used extenSively in AnTri heat;-
inga. Is that correct I . .
Ambassador COLBY. Yes. QUite frankly, Mr. Congressman,
they used to be used exclusively, which was one of the major
problems. They are not used exclusively any more.
Mr. MoCws!mY .. That also appears in the document, the
American advisers to the Phoemx program should try to re-
quire!l- quantum of. proof, othe.rthan by coofessiop. ana inter-
rogwtion. ThaJt brings me to the real I>roblem that I saw
I>erson.ally the, I was If
the 'eVldehce IS msufficmnt to convl<rt.. It man, and also ·lOS,U£-
ficient t? show a reasollableptobability thathemay be!t threat
to then he mal' still be toth.e Prl?vul.OO InteVi'O'
g'atIOU center. When llirst met with the Aplenoon p.ersoJl.!lel
In Saigon, I 'understoddthat theBe· seCret priSons :were Mder
the control of the CORDS. perSOnnel. As you well;t out ·00 the .
field, however; we found Province in,terrogation centers
were not operated by CORDS, is tlHlt corre<rt.!· . , ..
. Ambf/-ssadQr .COLBY .. The Provinoo· interrogation centers
are actually operated bJr the spe6il1l bra-neh of the National
.. Police. They .8;re advised, by ·another element of ·our mission .
there. I feelthwt .anl actions. there arel?robably coordinated
with CORDS. I fee a certainrespollsi15IHty ror,thatas well.
'" ' ',. "j "'; :-;' _';:(-J'< ,.','. <_
M lbl(l.; pp .. 196-19'1. ,The "An ,Tri",.·or;' 'det&nUonn ;})fooe(lure 'under -'Soutb
Vietnamese law was described by AmbassadOr Colby on p. 188 of tbe bearlDls.
Mr. McCLosKEY. As a deputy to CORDS, you do have'
sonal responsibility over the operation of these ProVInce
interrogation centers, do you not !
Ambassador CoLBy. l! have a feeling of responsibility. I do
nQtknQwwhll;t the fine lines Qf the organimtional diagrams
be. but I feelresponsibility for everything to do with
thIS program. .
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. ,Who built the pJiovince interrogation
centers! Were they American contractors !
Ambassador COLiBY. I do not believe so. I am not quite sure
of that. ..
(Theinformation follows:) .
Thll$0 centers. were built by rocal Vietnamese cOntractors
funded directly by the United States. .
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Ambassador it iscorI'ect, is it not,
that a dossier is prepared in'the dilltrict lind. theeviderice
is insillllcient· to' swtillfy the ProVince security council, the
prosecutor does have the priVilege of sending the detainee, the
suspect to the Province in:terrogation centel"iAnd furt,her,
under the rules he may be kept.for up to 46 days to see if ad.
ditional information or confllSSions cltn be .extracted which
will be sufficient to establish the reasonable probability that
he is 'a VietcongInfrastructure; llot correct! . .
.Courr.l thin.k ttHttle wrong,
Mr. he IS arrested and InltIallyscreened,
they there isso'1netlling that warrltn:ts his further
detiittioll 4ltve the adequate frgures<1riilfor.
m.a.· .. tion ... t1i,. eln .. Belv. e. B.'. se.nd .. him. there .. T.hE\4.6 daY$was
It time limit estabJish . between arrest an4 final action byihe
sooh*y po,' , , wh'ichquitefr'ankly .used rope
Ii bitlnoretliah thatltwasesta:bliShed alia maxifuum limlt.
ks. I days 'for the preparation of
the d<>Ssie".-.vh\cli .' ',. , ..
allegations ,eoncel'llingtheoperation of the in·
terrogatiollami b:vthe, ,GIlv:ernment of South ,VietI!am
a and
SIgned by tWQ SMgoll cltlzens,N gnyen, '11hrlilInh"alld Huynh ThI' Hoa,
representa,tive8(lf relatives of. prisonel1ll' ill So.uth, .
lID fun text of letter, see hearings, pp. 121-122.
colloquy took place between. Representative Reid and witness Don
'. . , .
Mr. REID. Would you care to·estimate the number of poli-
tical prisoners in Vietnam j And, , by that, J would like you to
give me the relatively low figure, not those that are necessarily
Communists1but,those that. are neutralists and. are 'gen-
uinely politIcal prisoners. .
And .how. many of them would you gUess are at Con Son j
Mr. LUCE. If I can answer that first, the total number of
prisoners 'at ,Con Son is .approximately 10,000. ..
The Government figures state that about 70 percent of these
people at Con Son 'are political prisoners, or as they call ,them
Communist criminals.
When I was"at Con Son with Congressmen, Anderson and
Hawkins, we talked with many of these 'people. J did not see
any indication that they 'were Con'unumsts, and'no evi.dence
was provided. .' . ,. ' ' ,.,. .
,.'J:'hetwo remember specifi"ally who were erim-
, , '." '.
Mr. REID. How mltny pohtico,l;prisone1'l>.'are there, do you
think! .. ,. . ... ',' .' '
Mr. LUGE. futotal,atieat¢ 100,000.' .
Representative ·Reid subsequently questioned another' witness, Mr.
TheodoreJ acqu(!neY,'on this same point: 61 ' . , . .
mejet)}rn; Mr. Jacqueney .to ypur .recom,
mendations at the eM of yoUr testimony. Youealleqfor it
congressionltl investigatIon of JUSP.tO and J?ress. freedoms
in Vietnam, thil 'Whole question of political priSonerS and
eXiles,.'. !lnd ';8i;1'0.no£, w'l\etMtth.ere. isthe,slighest. ch.an.,c,e
of haVIng electIOns that are not a total :fraud aild completely
. give 'me Your
ItppreC!$;,It. IS np oll'l can
ans'!llr,preciselY.,.,-ItS. ,tQ. llO.' .'W .... m. a.11Y.' J?OI .. ltlO. Ill. pfl.,f!<m.e
}1l. e .. r ..e ...
are In'SOut1t VUitnamJi,l'?l howllli!ny"Qf them",lI1-. YOllr .judg.
ment are, In fact,pohtlCal as dlstmotfr6mactural Com'
mutiiste j In. <>ther words, how manyia1'e 'prisoners who'have'
en,dto ()r""ho havesuppol(lied neutr8.lism, •
who have' believed"m('a·.1:)roaderbased 'government, news·'
!bel.5.eved lli a wh?fIhl. '
damentaliystoodup forrcertMn; balM rights'orfoughtcorrup'"
tion or .done some of the they sbould done in a
free sOCletyand for tha;t'pl"lVIlegehave'been]aIled by a cor-
rupt gIlverliment j . .. .
...• ··Mr. 'J'ACQUENEy:'S[t;' J·l).a\ie li\jard ftIN1'eI! .. llnY-
'. ' 'wlle1'(dtloiil'26 Q(,)'01i1:i,·too'O'OO: 'I'·:ftitl\;lfly (\on'tmowbOw Cre'di:.: 'r, •
"' .. bIili pile fite now'eJe!iibleo,llotll.
rfi· teiil;Th¢figurilll'I'.
"ab' .' 'nts"
! : .. '." 1l'l!\ae i1t;Villtiillilil1it,
";1' :Ii:' :. !: '.:Y,·", ,._: i i'll j. :"<1,1'_1' 'L;;;l ' __' ,':' ;f.'j' ",,:, t .' -., 'I ll";- '-}j.::';: '
eo Ibid .• p; lOG.
U Ibid., p. tTtli.
dent Diem in 1!)63 he, like,
prisOners; It said that' whim President Thien was'inaugura;fud
after the election of 1967 that he release,d from jail some 6,000
mirior; pollti<,al prisoners. " " ' ", ,
But ii" before the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
Assistant AID Adlninistrator for Vietnam Eobert.H. Nooter'put the
thl'e!\, based OIL informationfurnished.by theGVN, in this
statemllJ;lt submitte<}.to that committlleonMay 6,1971: ",
.. ,The totJil tlUmber' 6£ illliliLtes of civilianooI'1"OOtional insti-
tutioilS andfacillties in ViCW.a.ll is approxiniately 29;500: The
GoVernment of Vietna.ni'C1assifieS these prisOners as "cotilmon'
criminals," and military personnel convicted of offenSeS.
:rhljre n<lW al.'e'tipptoxim!ttelylIil1500 iJ'l
mwl" category:: 'Phose; P'!"ls.<lners Ill,thiS category are detamed
under laws WhICh )lIake It illegal to belong to or support Com-
munist, organizlitiolls',oI'to ald' for sup)?<>1'tthil enemy forces
in the war. Although persons are not mwrisoned for l(\giti-
mate; oonstitutil'>nal'politlcal'acti vity' or affiliations; there
a small number wh<;>m
nam spokesmen fn publtc' statem,ellts· ha¥e deScrtbed as polt-
tical prisoners. . ",. . '.' I • .
Safety Dire<ilx>rate
describmg populatIon, condItIOns, medIcal C!\re, and 'other
similar infortnation on of poli-
?ies 1. pl'i,fl?,.ile, :a.,$. o .... .api. the. .(lJtteg'!>ries of
mma41., Tb.\lS6 In the sllbCP!iJ.m'itMil's .
H" J ,/T4omI'SlI,,/StJciy', .
thesuqconimittee helttillglSi'tlie
cutl1!ty W<lt)!.,Sll'ltpbevt ,Tb.ompson, a 'i!ilntlsh a.uti-
guerrilla expet1(,Jor $lQO,QQ(l,'study ,of. the" Gov-,.
ernment of SO\lth Vietnam's' police security requirements was ex-
amined in this colloquy with AID witness N ooter: ..
Mr. MOORHEAD. Will you describe for us the tole of Sir
Robert Thompsol) in our Vietnam operations I .
Mr. N OOTFlR. I only speak to a portion of that. He has
· sewed from time to' time' as a consultant or as an adviser.
· More recently, earlier this year, the U.S. poople in the field'
suggested that a visit by him might be useful. to review the
public safety program, and some 6f his police associates from
Great Britain did go out and consult with and advise both
the Vietnamese Government and our own people .on .public
· safety activities..' - . ,
Mr. MOORHEAD. Are you familiar with the 157 reoommen-
dll.tionsthat Sir E<lbert 'l'hompson reo.eritly made through
ourofticials to the Saigop.government, pwrticularly with
· respect to the N atioiml Police I . .
• 'Foretgn Assistance Act 'ot 19,71, Boose Foretgn Affairs pt. 1.
p. 248. '.,
fa Hearings, pp. 8'7-88. See also Ambassador Colby's re1'erenee to the results of the
Thompson ·study at p. 200 of the hearings. - .
sir; I aJ.'l. report with
hlmwhen h.e retumtld, whlCh mcluded thOSe' recommel\da-
tions.' " ,
Mr. MOORHEiAD. Was the increase in the foreeone of
his recommendations, or W8,S the increase a result of his rec-
ommenda,tions'I' ,
, M1',N OOTER.' No, sir, the increase in the force hlid already ,
taken pla:ce when his group went Ollt there. As I reeall, hls
l;'eport suggested that the mcreasa'to the' 122,000' was, Some-"
what more than needtld and suggest<ld that further recruit-
ment slow down or stop. ",'
Thisrecol,llmendation was not well sub$t$Jl,tiated, in terms
ofdetg,ils,but the Vietnamese did that point hold up r,e-
oruitment ,until they had a chanee to review the, ,report
further., " , " , , , ,,': ,",
To the,bjlst of my 'knowledge" that isthe"state,now. They
had reachtld some;Ue,OOO ,at that time which is about the level
now. ,'" , "" ,,,, """ " , , "
Oan Yo)1 s)1ppTy a cOpy ohhose rowommen-
dll-tk>ns ;for our record I ,," " , , , , " ,
11ft;. NqOrnR. ;r' 'Will see if, I cR!lobtll-in,clearance, to do that,
yes,,s}rh,,, '" '. , '''.'" ',' ,'.' :r.o·'
Mr. ¥OORHlllAl)" h9.l! ,the,report" and, to
whom do you have to go for clearance! '", , "
Mr.NOOTER. The, re):l'irtWRl> ,aotuallydone under the aus-
pices of the NatiqnalSecnrlty Counellfor'the'G6vernmenti'
Of Vietnam. "" ,':,' ':'" ," , ,,' , '",'''
"'" ," ,,' ,
, , Mr.NQO'l'InR., W eof coursll1iad access 'to the report and took ,
it into ':ccount;"We' 'our technicM'\\IlOi>le 'arid the' ",
Public Board, these recom-
men?atlOns. In but nevertheless
'wedld " ,', , " ,,'
, <lopyo!f 'thafTho1ilp.sob. stllny' noli made
avaIlable' to the'subcdliitillttee,lIShad bIll\n< requested,)'" . ., ..,'
, -'-1; '. I ",,' r'_' !'" \ i'" "H', ,'i \;!' . -,r,. ,
, r:
'-',; , ' , I ,:"
"( "
, ,\,'
.,'tk'\ .'
. ';.' '-', \) i : " ,j /'
; f,' i '" 'r·, ',' '. - i ' . _' :}
;',-'1', ,I' ','i2"!'!' ';,1,.(,-:.; <.
'i;j', '-, 1 ;'!, J', ".l' :1;:;
, I)'
. Much of the e:f!'ort to achieve the primary objective of local
has involved a variety of military and paramilitary program compo-
nents,' Th, ese.havEl.included the People's Self-, Defense Foroo, an unpaid
militia of overl million men has been organized to help defend
local vil.lages andha!l'lets. sup-
phed to their 'force .. ReglOnal and popular force compames and pla-
toons were incTllasedto the\rpresent level of someMO,OOOmenarmed
with 1\1:-16 rifles and trained by five-man U.S. moi!ile training teams.
'l;'he N a,tionalPolioo F\lroo was and trained and subs<iquently
deployed to loc!il villages to strengthen civil law and order. The· 80-
cQ,lled .. program was developed to combat the Vel and other
terrorIst activIties of the enemy. .
An adjunct of the Government of South Vietnam pacification pro-
gram is tile J1:6Ople's information program (PIP), which publicizes the
overQ,l1 pac,', n effort and see, ,Ita ,to develop commUI1lty solidarity
in the provinces ,as part of a national unification of the, South Viet-
namese' pepple. '" ' . .
The J()4lt, U.S" Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), an arm of the
U.S; Information Agency, works with the Government of South Viet.-
nam Ministry of Informatiqn to implement th,e PIP and also works
with the Miriistry of Cbieu Hoi in propaganda induce Viet-
conI( defect to the Government of South Vietnam. The term "Cbieu
Hoi" means "a to return." '. " .
Fieldworl> In. both th!l,ge fields of communication and propaganda
is coordinated through Government of South Vietnam counterparts
withpereonnel from the CORDS Chieu Hoi Directorate' and the
JUSPAO office aSsigned to CORDS .. " ,',. "
An accurate of CORDS role in the Government of South
Vietnam pacification effort is difficult .to make,-Cas ·difficult as an
I;ISsessment of suocess of theqverall series of pacification
programs urdert!lken 1;>y;the S{lig@ngovernment; .. '
Amb.assador Colby summarized as follows: T.
. I da not this program is in full-blown exist-
'enoo in every "Corner of the cOuntry. Ope()f the characte:ristics,
, of the Vietnamese scene and the "',M' ill
between areas and- pro!(tams, ·tn ,great p:artUependellt
ll.PQn ,thil \11l.lJ;1it;:v' 6£ individual 'on bOtli :sides of the .
contest. Thus,tliere are a few parts .of Vietnam still ill 'effect
,pragram. 0utjined;:a\!)ove,;. ther.e areot'!ier
iaIMg', the.·lIl71. ·crowdmg
the .. ;(n ,S0me ,plM$Hhep@.pull),jllon:,does not

chieftain. In some areas, the bureaucrat has not reIlhq,uished'
to plans.
XStclearly 0neo£ 'lhomentum
,wen .efdoaruL
th!liY."!l<,',}le,(lO,, n,.stantlYi n,
.. : f.,:a¥1!,l1W!
ha:a !lew,·
elforts land. tactics t<!) contest thiS .program, seeing In It a .
major threat to their hope of conquest in Vietnam. Iil:;st)lllW::
oro Ibid., pp. 1'18-179.
areas, or on lIOIIle at:eaBlone, they have had 1lUccesses. But In
the momentum ill stili (Ill the side of th8
Govenunent of • . . .
TheGove. \!j'I\Il1tlIlt of South Vietnam's Central Pacification and DII-
velopment for pbwlinJr,coordinating, and exe-
cuting the anI\nal pacilieation. The.. Oli airman. of tn'l co. uMil
is President Thieu. It is of representatives from all Govern-
ment ofSouth Vietnam miJli8teries and agencies In
the plan and Il$II the authOrity to iesue pacification alia development
to an; other Government agencies, Including the military'.
Joint general etal. Similar counoils o.lao opemte tlie aM·
province levelS. . . ,
CORDS oll9tates through various advisory, IlUpport, and inspec-
tion funotiOnet;·· t all levels of the Govemment of SOuth Vietnam-In
Saigon, In re . one, pJOVlnoes, districts and down to the village.
CORDS plann stal deals with the GW Pacification alid Develop-
ment Council· .nll, .I1rovides advice, liaiBQn, and support to Various
Government ministries involved in the overall pacification I?rogram.
CORDSstafllP/ilrsonnel also operate in each of the four regions and
maintain terul:lw in each of the. 44 provinces
· where a province seni.or
adviser deals with the Vietnamese province c . ief."
About half of these CORDS senior advisers are military oftioers,
while the othel' half are c.ivilian AID or Foreign Service ofticers.
Other. CORDS' teams often operate at the district level and oc-
casionally ihobile UnIts to . asSist. in village security planning.
CORDS Structure and Funding
The fundblg. of the· CORDS program is· unique. Conw-ess· does
not apllropriateifunds' directly in a package or OM bill to finance th
United States role in the Government· of South Vietnam pacification
program. CORDS funds, like its personnel come from the agencies
contributing to the Infl\gratsd program. Individual component parts
of bhe overall pacificatiollpregram are f?I'ded thrOJlgh t. he pepll;rt- .
ment of Defense ,and AIDbudllets. PreCIse costs of the paCification
prograins Ilre.thu.s almOst impossible to determine. .'
GAO witness. Stovall described the CORDS organ.izational struc-
ture asfolJowB :." ' .
The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Coll\1lland, has
overall responsibility. for U.S. pacification and development
assistance andhe;lIdmmisters the program throUjrh his deputy
fOr CORDS,Chiefof Sta1l',and tha Assistant Chief of Stall.
for CORl'ilS. .
At the Saigon level, CORDS hasH directorateS which
advise the Government of Vietnam Is: .and' Perform
the sta1l' arid adnilhisbrative functions. are
under the control of the·Assistant Chief of Staff
and are mllnned by' ·both
CORDSfield'lletsonnelare under the'diteCt control of' 'th(\
deputy. for CORDS. The organization in the 'field ii! similar
, 'i" " "" .' '< ,
that each of the fourmilita17 re.
hassta1i'1tdV'lsers organized along tihe same functIOnal
Imes as the Saigon directorates. '. : .
CORDS had about 18 800 personnel on July 1, 1970. The
staffs were composed of U.S. military and civilian personnel;
·local nationa:l·employeesof Vietnam 1 and third 'country nil.·
tionals from such, countties a:sthe l'hilippines and Korea.
·Over 80 pers?nIlel as<!£ July 1, 1970,
were assIgned, to field actIVItIes outsIde' Of SaIgon.
As to funding of the he ad(ied : "
.' When CORDSwasestabiished,it that it for
the m.ost p,art ,WOUld services, supp.lies
and needed
.materlal ,directly,iromlts ",vgamzatlOns. Accord· ,
ingly, it did not ' establish any Il0ntl'al accOunting or budget
or f\ll1.ds control mechanisms, pf ,its, ,own. It drew direotly as
neede,' d ,-",!pon .its . the
U.S. rp.ihtaryservIceSj andwsd, :thetr, employees, mcludmg
military personnel tQ carry out..itsltctivities. "
, ,In, late 19'1'0 the Saigon headqua,ters the Agency for
atidtneJ qintU.S. :public AJrairs
Office a,tlll operate? pr,?g,rams
l!ot related to paCJ,fipatlOn, put theIr field staffs,.that IS, out·
SIde of Saigon, fall under 'CORDS, for all assIstance, !>fo·
grams. Since the bulk of the resourqes for ,participation
support were and, continue to be provided by ,the militarY,
the Commander, ¥iFtary Assistance Viel·
" nam, was With thelea(iership of the program under
the autliortty of , , ,
. ,1;'he com.blned f\ilft:nCl1lg for.the
3 Yellrs 1965through 1970 totaled about $4 litlllOII, The UnIted
,b,U, b
1," the G,
" of bI.lljon;
" . an4JI)e aPOllt $ll90 mtlllOn:vras tpa1e a
'frorn,1'"iS, (jr controged local
Il9UhtiJ. under other p.S.;
financed Bl!Sistllnce . . . , . '" ,.'.
ApproXImately $8.2 bIllIon or 80 of these funds
weve budge1JedAor::territorial,securIty ,Ql'''.reIated : ,military
progr'llms. :,ptber' ;uses' ifor Iwhichthe· !tim.ds
wers establIshment of 10c8JI or,8
percent· brighter life for war victims or ,refugee'p,rograms '
$141 mihion or 4 percent; general S\lppor,t.:$202.mlllion,in· Ii
'percent', (;general; supp@)1f;, inrvolvessitch. 'asICOR[)S
technical· slipport, . personnel support, and Air' 'A\tuinca).
Funds in lesser ,amounts amounting in
@n less ia,f)the'.,totaliweTe hudtge'Mw foriBeople!s
Force; prosperitv for all or civic action; W"'ater national
1l1lity·or .Ohi\ru::Hoii ;'ptioteotion,frdm"terroliism ,(I)l',Phoehix ;
directorates, to the extent that they .
, ',": "l'", "j.': -< .,;"fn ",1 ;:,!', ,";::;: <l,r " ,:·r( -'"
'to Ibid.
financial information from the agencies (that is, the military
services, AID, and CIA) which support their programs.
This is It time-consuming task for them o,nd in some cases is
Il>voided, During Our survey, we received incorrect and con-
flicting figures from the CORDS directorates. We also found
that some of the responsible officials in th(l directorates were
unaware of the amount obligated under their programs, and
in some cases did not know the amounts in their budgets. In
discussing these matters in Saigon our staff suggested'to offi-
cials there that procedures for central management and con-
trol of budgets and obligation data were needed, as well as
procedures for obtaining obligation datlt input on 'a regular
bltsis from the contributmg agencies. At the conclusion of our
survey, CORDS informed us that steps were in process to
receive Itnd record financial data on a regular basis.
I tion't know, Mr. Chairman, how far this has progressed.
This was based on work last fall. We are going to follow it
through. I don't know what specifically is developing. But
this was a local effort. This was not a department effort.
For 1971, the pacification program cost an estimated $700 mil-
lion in direct U.S. funds"approximately $91.6 million additional in
U.S. generated funds and approximately $612 million
from the Government of Vietnam budget." It should be noted also that
the United States underwrites more than 80 percent of the annual
Gove1'l1ment of Vietnam budget. .
The salaries of the approximately 13,300. CORDS employees were
included in the cost figures of the pacifjcatiop program. For 197.1,
about 4,900 U.S. military personnel and 800 USAID and State De-
partment personnel are included. The remainder of CORDS total
personnel strength is made up of South Vietnamese citizens and t. hird
country nationals."
In testimony presented to the subcommiiJteeby a GAO, witness,
classified GAO stutiyofthe U.S. role in the pacification
program during the July 1967 to 'September 1970 period, it was noted
that ip 1969 CORDS had given fOUI'sepllra,tesets of financilllstate-
ments on its operations. Each set contained significantly different
amounts: "
Mr. Moss. !tsays during your.suI'Vevs, .yoU received incor-
ree.t ItndCQIlflicting .figures from CORDS directorate!\. Is that
about eight direct reports or how many j'
Mr. DUFF. Eleven. '. .
Mr. Moss. Eleven.
Dovou.have that·ljst.in this report, the .11 directorates
of CORDS!'· .
Mr. DUFF.Yes,sir. "." .
Mr.' Moss. Are those conflicting figures identified . in. the
report!, . .' .
Mr. DuFF. I think we have, one schedule,in there showing
the differences. '. " '. '.. " . .
, ,.
74 Ibid" table (&1ll),exII)"p.,lfl2 • . " .,,' ,.
'r\Ilbtd" .,. table (annex"X), p. tAl;' ,>.
'flIlbld., U9-160. $eEl footnote 61S tor reference to study;
Mr. s.:oVALL. There is a table on page 142 CYf the big docu-
ment that shQws relative. differences· of figures. The problem,
of course, arises£·rom: the flto.t that there is no firmresponsibil-
ity, .lnd in some caseB;·the·directorate out 'and tries to '
get information. In ether cases, they aon't exert as much
energy. They do arrive at tetals as we showed in here.
For exs,mple, andTthink 1 would be safe on reading the
totals here, .tha,t for 1969; a set of, figures submitted to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee totaled $1:335, billion;
a set of .figuves,that weasked:ior's,nd got at; that tilM{totaled
$1.354 billion; a set that was prepare« for, NationwYSecurity
Council added up j;o $1.868 billion; and.ourstaff in Saigon as
apart ef our work there tried to tJake Itll· those· and bring'
them into one. set as best theyoould as towha;tthey thought
was· a set of figures for fiscal 1969, 'and they came up WIth
$1.362 billion. .... . . . " . . .
I would Hke to emphasize again, I would not put full flLith
in any ofthese figures. . . '
Mr. Mess. I quite ·lLgree.But even if we concede the very
slOp])y :accounting and the lack of acceunting in. the CORDS
operatiQn,'the should be able to give us' the of
what they made.av!\11able to CORDS, shouldn'ttheyl • . .
Mr •. STOVALL .. They! should., !" ..
M!,: Moss. An,dAID should certainly be able to give us the .
detJaiIs. ., .. , , '.. ," , . . . '..
Mr. STOVALl,. We were able to find a trail il\SOfar as the
'A""'" fi ," . . . '.. .. '''.: .' '. .
.LV gures. ., ... , . '. . .
.' .
Mr. Moss. While we are doingthis,blLCkonmy·uirdedying
theme here,. 'lVhatis there in these figures, as they brelLk dOWII
into their various parts, that' couId adversely affeCt the seCu-
rity of the United States in yourjudgmenti' . .... .
Mr.STOvALL.I.don'teseanythin,g. . .":
Mr.··Moss. It mIght be em!>OirrfiSSlng to the lI;gencIes·or. de-
partJmentS mentioned in the of facts of discrep'
lI;llcies' .betweenfigures,· hut certainly 'It ceuldnot· belLr 'I\pon
the security ofthe Nation, could it i '. . .
Mr.:SroV>liLL. I don1t aee how it·eoold.· . . ..
The Classiffed indicated
that of
the .. pn. au .. zed." ...fo .. r t.\l.e ... o'!-.· .... l!':9 .. ,conl,i;l )lot be
Ii In
tIon, ". • .. '. ". .
thepre$s, sil).<ie J ul:y;O, '109.'71,
conveyed an iJ!lphcation:tJui;t survey,ofthe;,wILCIliqlL1;Ion
that 'l; J;nllion, of t;he·lfnnds. ava,rl8lble
for·t/).ltt,PI'QgI1lJ)l"Wel'l! :iost.;a'ms,;mas,:II.: misinterpreimmonJof '
eur page 187 bj!> ,
n.·; J':' {'" ". " ',,, "i '..........,,'. '
--,,,,",,_,,,(j'-' Ji:d-> ,<-; :,",:(i;\', ,',',lL;,:,

"We were unable to obtain obligations for $1.7 billion of the
$2.1 . billion budget shown above. The largest part of this,
about $1.3 billion, waS budgeted to l?rovide military hardware
and other commodities to the regIonal and popular forces
under the military assistance service funded program. Be-
caUSe this program also provides commodities to other Viet-
namese military organizations and records segregating deliv-
eries to the regional and popular forces are not maintained,
we were unable to obtain obligations.')
The point we were developing in our survey was the fact
that the overalloJl8rational costs for the vanousprograms
administered by CORDS are not available at CORDS nor to
the best of our knowledge anywhere else. In other words, we
are concerned that the absence of adequate fiscal control over
the operating programs of CORDS is a serious weakness
which could permit the misappro,Priation of equipment, ma-
terials,and supplies without alertmg management in a timely
We did not intend for our sta,tement to infer in any war.
that we believed $1.7 billion of funds were lost. It is our belie,
howevel', that in the absence of adequate financial controls
at CORDS it would be ver:\, difficult If not impossible to ac-
curately rec.onstruct the. value of and dispositi<?n of equip-
ment, suyplIes, and servICes that hal'O been furnlShedby the
United States for the operating programs of CORDS,
Ambassador Colby was also questioned about the General Ac.count-
ing Office study of CORDS financing: 78
Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Ambassador, one final line of question-
ing. This has to do with ac.counting.
As you know, the jurisdiction of this subcommittee is to
efficiency and economy of Government operations.
I am sure you are famiIiail' with the General Accounting
Office report. It says, among other things, that CORDS main-
tains incomplete financial records .. It says certain problems
could be avoided "If CORDS had established procedures for
centraL management and control of budgets and obligation
data." .
It says, "We learned during a survey that internal audits
and inspections had generally not been conducted. Of the 12
audit groups to inspect CORDS' operations, ouIy
two had done so since 1967.". . .
. Then itp&ints out it is very dit)icult to check on t4lieffi-
Clency and ec6n'tmyof th\l (itovernment because
frequently commmgles the funds of two or more
And s6 .forthoI say tha,t the 'pages I have read from are
unclassIfied pages m a secret document.· . . . .'
Mr, Ambassador, I understand when· CORDS was first
established, there was situation. I am inclined
t6think it WaS a good.thingtll unite va,riousfundsand person-
nelinto one operating agency. But isn't ill possible n6wto es-
tablish central accounting sot\Iat. the
CongresB'-"atld:theGenera:r AccoUl).ting Ot)iCll,as .an arm Of
.. pp. 208-204.
COnll'l'es&--1lan m,ake audits so that ,we can be" sure, where
the dollars ,and resources haVIl .been expended that they
wereprq:perj:y,applied, and are utilized with a minimum
WttSte,lll,'V01V,ed in./t,program the Slze
,Ambassador CO);Bl'. I agree.witll you, Mr. Chairman.
The team from the General Acwunting Office that was out
there last year, that made that report, ha,d that as one of the
main points they made to me when they left. They had a very
difficult time putting the figures together. '
My point, of course, is that wewerEl'in the middle of a war-
time effort and we, franklY', hlld our main focus.on doing the
job and lesson accounting for Ii considerable period.
Ifnllyagreed that it,was tim\! ttl tIghten uJ? and get the
thing organized so people could \Wderstand It better and
understandthevariousoontributions.We moved along on
We have, I think, some figures that much better:today,
than they were when that team was there. I would not say:
they are entirely perfect yet, but we are in'the bourse of devel- '
oping exactly that kind of figure that should give the Con-
gress a proper, view., , ' ",'
, If)llfy agree that it is lleeded at this stage. , " ,
, "Mr.l\IO\lRHEAD. :(igures now,withquaJi/ications" are
they in such form that they could be pr,esented to Us , ' "
Ambassador COLBl'. I have a copy of them here, Mr. Chair,
mall, alld I will be glad to leave it for the, record. They
somewhat tentative,' hut I can leave them 'for the ,committee,
to 'look at;' " " ' , " ' "
Mr iMoo'iUtEAD. Are they classified ' "
Artib8;S!la:dor are the'
work of bur people in ·thll fieId. ' , "" ',' "
As youkllow;s<'lIltethnesthe field figures don't entirelY
match with the WashingtoI1figures; 'bec,auseo'fotherfMtors
put'intothem. '," '0'". " ',', "", ',"
, Iha'sten tOSIli:t that this figure';isnot aibsolutely
correct. 'These' figures a:re stHl SUbjectt9 I11ildlf)cation, but I
think:tl1ey give Ilirotigh'idea. ,', " " ",' : "," / "
. These ,detailed PFo-

Q't«I8ti&n nJ{r.,A;m'iJaa8MJiJ'I'; 'by p6'1'aMl/tag,earul aolla'l'.
0lI'MWYJ;t., .. hQwlJ1i;JJ;iJh.,o!· tM p,aci1Watirm ,pr:Prfrr/1m .liIi8' oeen· fl·
0'1' ,th.e, 7Jnitea,· State8 f 'in.'
y01JJr 'f1!o:':l,rt, i!rj,oqr,pp:r,atet{l{!t Pil<,Pt.ql
tM V Wt'7\ame8e oy 'l'eVM//1,u;8 .iiAicli 8tem /'I'om
th.e"UWi'p1'e8efll'JIJ'i:n' VMMtamj"lJiDolWf;i;kg;dWftcttfIJItIII/flfiififl,"dj .
course. : ,,")"-:;1': 'l'" :'. DidI'/if,j In::' .
Anllwer.,;In ..
to' show ·the<1I'0p'1y. )to;,thiis' .. ";
port Itt"paigsi:740i ,A1IVlhdWtt'ed, !ii.lii. "'till:;'
marks on pages 740 ebt" •..
'19 Ibld .• pp. 228-224.
;'1 I".,
': l'
Washington level considerations and some degree of interpre-
tation was required in deciding just which expenditures to
include in the "pacification program" on both theVietnamese
and U.S. sides. Taking the totals of annex II al)d usin!\" a
constantrateof exchange of 118 to 1 (despite some 'artificialIty
involved), the informatIOn desired is as follows: .
GVN (pl"slers·blliions)
UnitBd States
revenue Estimate
Direct United' .VN Percent United
United Counter States
from imports

_domestic States (exchange
United- tates revenue and rate at 118-1)
dollars deficit
Total _
Year (millions)
( lilions)
pure ases) financing (millionS) Direct Indirect
1968 ... 523.8.
. 10.2
1t.6 11.4 27.1 $1,034.0 51 78
1969._. 647.4 11.9 11.4 20.4 27.1 1,298.2 50 82
1970 •.. 729.0-'. 1U 1&9 2U 30.2 1,441. 7 51 82
197L. 696,2
21. , 21.9 29.0 1,399.6 50 82
The eAlmmittee makes special reference to the concluding summary
of the GAO study of CORDS' organizational and financial structure
because of its obvious relevance to the economic and efficient opera-
tions of the program in carrying out its stated objectives. Mr; Stovall
told the ,subcommitt,lle: 80
We believe that it is now the time for a fuller reassessment of
the military and AID financing arrangements, not only in
Saigon . but also at the unified command and department
levels. We believe this is needed to clarify fiscal responsibility,
and toovercollle the lack records
in OORDS. What may have. been most expedient under the
the earlier circumstancesshouJd,in.ourview, be fully recon-
sidered now in the light of the changing conditions and the
prospective.shifttQward economic and rehabilitation efforts.
;I'n this. re".avd we would like to express caution about the
degree of reliability of any presently available overall.do¢U-
ments or reports whi<:h purport to contain completely
program·C?sts.asS<,!c,iated with .
tUmS'. We have seen several dlH'ermg sets of figures as lI!<J.l-
. cated on page 142 document. This 'further
supports,.a oonclusion .. that the system' of financial
acconntabilityand financial reports on CORDS' operation
needsto.·be'feallJsessed and tighte1led.
In hisconchldlli,gstatemllnt,Stovall sUmmarizedasf<!11i'ws: 81
to webeliev\l the ma,in re-
latedqneStions pointed up by OUT survey are: ' .
. '1. {;:ORDS, as.the f9r.aihJ!inister-
mg, the· V$. WJ,Qd'lca;!;l\>:n'ln ·VIetnam, has not hee:n·glvenJle- .
sPQl!.sipility forfiliJ!.llciaI a,ccQuntability for
the cpsts oi.thr programs it. administers. . ' • '.' :
$0 Ibid., p. 180.. . . . "
C Ibid .• p', "
We believe that CORDS or any other U.S. organization
responsible for managing a :foreign assistance program,
, should not the integral and very important
r>artof tl:\at responsIbIlIty that relates to finanCIal steward-
ship and accountability. "
2; The military financial budgeting and accounting system
does not provide information as to the portion of the material
supplied from theU,S. military pipelines into the CORDS
program. . ,
We believe the system should be modified to provide such
information. .
3. The r.resent system results in Ii blurred distinction of
accountabIlity between the respective U.S. military services,
the free world military forc{)S, the Vietnamese Armed Forces,
and CORDS, .
We believe that consideration should be given to the more
fundamental question of whether an operation such as
CORDS or any foreign assistance program or, CORDS
should have adequate financial control relatable to that for- ,
eign assistance program,
We expect to look further into the system for financing and
controlling the CORDS operation and plan to make reports
to the Congress on the results of our work.
SubseQuentlv, the General Accounting Office reiterated the fore-
going position in its July 1972 report on the funding and management
of the pacification program in South Vietnam,
Refusal of, Access to Records
, .
The committee finally notes with concern the inwbility of the General
Accounting Office to obtain access to certain information from the
.and Defense, needed ,in its responsi-
bIht!esunder'sectIon ofthe Bu?get and Acco'1ntIllg Act of 1921
(81 UE!;C. 53, 54). TestImony detaIlmg such refusals was presented
to the Sena. til Pri. ations.9o.m .... mjttee. '.b
. GA. 0 du. l'l ... ·n
1970 and was,
subsequently (hscussed by GAO ,WItness Stovl);lI before the subcom-
mitteein oonnection with his testimonyoir tile pacificatiQn program."
Phoenix (i>hung Hoang)" Program '
By far the niost <l0ntroversialoftbe variOllS oori1ponelJ.ts of the paei-
fic.a.tio!1 .. p r,Ogr.· •. am ... is.··.th ..... Pho.enix, or PhungHoan
. "p.rogram:lt was
!ll'testIlU9ny be;liore the sub<)ommlttee by Ambassador, Colby
as . '" '. . . ,'"
, " '\ " '. , " 'I .' ' .' , . ' ," , -" _' "".' , .' _ " ' '.' ',-, ' ' , _ , .'
. 81 Ibtd., 'pop ... 127 tOr collot:l,uy Detween, Rep..relJentattve. Moss -and oM,r:. _ Stovall; also
,eo pp'. .... ••• m.nt .• t •. , A. ".Q'. O"rlatlon.!!. orom.'.tt •• by
. Mr. -Stovilll:'on ,eltl'p:'af ,p •. 16tS ... ·'l'!1e-
notes, the
hearinglJ on'- .. held"bf -the·Foretgn
Operatlc;'lblJ'.8.1:1d· .g,over. mPlent,' . .- Su;bl:!ommt_tte,e ,:thls_ ,ses$ion an.(f, the
mtttee's intention -·,tn-- ,rurtlier- '\\*plm·, rep(!ateC1 -''6:tecutlve 'rettistUlr of requests' for' tnfor-
m'll'on ijy,th.GII,Q, . .' ". .' . . . . '. ' ,
Ibld;;,pp,rS2".i$S: . , , ,
- ;".
", , .
The PhQenixprogram of ,the· Government: of South Viet-
nam, toprotec1;the VietnQJn_,people .from.ter-
rorismand political,:pa.mm.i.litary, economic' and :sub:versive
pressure fro;m, the, :organization in
South V!etriam. The Vietcong VCI, is the:
leadership. :apparatu$of .. the. Qomm'linlst attempt to conquer
the Vietnamese people and g .. ov. ern. ment. The Vietcong Infra-'
structure'supports themihtary operations 00' the VietCong
and North Vietnam_ Army units by providing intel1igel)C6, ,
recruits. or conscript/! and logistiC/! support;. :Et also directs
and implements a systsmatic campaign of terrorism. against .
goveJJ(l,mento/licials" :locally elected leaders and.the general
population. The result of this terrorism is as follows: . .
" Ibid., p.
, " 6.097
Vietcong Infrastructure strength. These goals have been reo
fined in order to focus the action on the hiiZher level and more
significant Vietcong Infrastructure. The Phoenix prograiu is
not a program of assassination. In the course of normiil mili·
tary operations or police actions to apprehend them, however,
Vietcong Infrastructure are killed as members of military
units or while fighting off arrest. The Phoenix program has
been widely publicized in Vietnam as a I;'rogram to protect
the people against terrorism and partIcipation by local
leadershIp and population has been encouraged. "Wanted"
posters have been circulated to enlist public assistance in the
apprehension of Vietcong Infrastructure, although the post·
ers point out to the individual that he may rally under the
Chieu Hoi program and be free of any punishment. The fol·
lowing figures give the results of the program over the past
several years:
Captured Rallied Killed Total
1968 .•• _____ . ____ ._ •. _._ ..•• _______ •.
1969 ...................................
2 229
19: 53
Sentenced Rallied Killed Total
1970 •••••••••••••.•••••.••••••..•..•• 6.405 7,745 8.191 22,341
1971 (May) .. __ ., .. ___ ,_,_ow ___ "", __
2.911 3,650 9.331
In his 1971 testimony, Ambassador Colby described the U.S. role in
the Phoenix program.
' .
The. United States through CORDS has I;'rovided advice
and assistanc.e to the Phoenix program; Tnls currently in·
cludesapproximately 637 U.S. military personnel working .
with thePhoilnix centers at the district, rrovince
region, and
national levels. I.te.lso includes a very few U.S. ciVIlian person·
nel. Of course,.llIdvisors with the military units, the National
Police, the Chieu Hoi program, et cetera, IlIdvise and assist
their respective service in its normal role, which includes
supportaf the Phoenix program. .
In his concluding remarks, Ambassador Colby defended the U.S.
role in the Phaenixprogrnm." .. .. ..
The Phoenix program is an essential element of Vietnam's
defense against V ... ietcong Infrastructure subversion and ter·
rorism. While some unj ustifiable abuses have occurred over
they.have in mltny countries the Vietnamese and
U.S, Go;v:emunsnts have worked to stop them:llInd to produce
instead professional intelligent operatIOns whIch will
meet the Vietcong lnfrastru<Jture attaCk with stern justice, .
with. equ\t1 stress, on both words. Considerable evidence has
&PPeared from enemy doeuments and from former and even
current membeJ1ll of ,the enemy side·thlit, despite some weak,
811 lbtd., p. 184. Poltey and 1'fl8}>ons,lbI,l1tles· for All U$. persOnnflC'IUlrtt,clpatlns_ in or
In 'MACV ,Directive 'dllted -May 18,
1970 .. Fot'- text ot directive, see'.liearl-nl's, p., On "ePtetnJ>er<., E.
Farnham/:' Ofllce"ot the ,A:es1stant Secretaf,' ot'DefenBe tor -Internattona 'SacUrltt Affairs,
advised th. ". t 8.8 of AU,guS. t .. _ on», 195 U.S. mtutary personnel remaIned as: advisors
to the Phoenix program au.d t finDQ Departlnent of Defense's il\teottoo to lJbass OU,t tb._r
advIsOry role to the- J?hoeilb: program by December 81, 1972. '
ness, the progre,m hIlS reduced the power of the Vietcong
Ip.frastruoture and its hopes for conquest over the people of
South Vietnam. Phoenix is an essential part of the G VN's
defenSe as the Vietcong Infrastructure is to the Communist
attack. U.s. support.isfnlly warranted. '. .
Phoenix Operations
Seri9us questions are. raised aoout the methods .by which Phoenix
operates. Specifically, it was devi\lopedduring the hearings that the
use of "quotas" and the "targsting" of is often based
9n fault:)' intelligence, sometimes supplied by Individuals having ulte-
rior m<,ltlves. Once a suspect has been "targeted".he,is subject to being
captured or killed. lfcal?tured, he may be incarcerated for up to 2
years.with9ut benefit 9f trial. In view of.these·dire consequences which
may befall a VCI suspect, the committee finds particularly disturbing
the following testimony of Ambassad9r Colby on the question of relia-
bility of intelligence."
Mr. REID. • • • ( Your) testimony bef9re the Senate is re-
pIet<) with some indications and some explicit repom that Il.t'
times the district coordinating center or the senior advisorS'
have admitted they have made mistakes or are not certain of
theidnformation. . '. ,"
My question is: Are you certain that we know a memoorof
the Vietconl\' Infrastructure from a loyal member of the South
Vietnam citizenry? ' . .' ,
Ambassador COLBY. No; Mr. Congressman, I am not; ':' 01'
Mr. REID. The answer. to that seems'to lbe' no, at qea8t in some
cases. Th. erefore.thereis the possibility' that
be. captured, sentenced" Or· killed, who has' been imJ?roJlelily
placed on. a list without' adequate, verification. If Itls·in-?
adequate .. ,mY goes hack to the first point: Isn't·that,:
a reason for makmg sure that legal .. proceedings are totally,
fair·!, , . . . .' . . " .
. Alll):>l\SSItdor COLBY. I certainly would· like to see themiIb..
proved and we have. been warking to see them improved;
I think they are consi,derllihly improved. As I said" Ido not '
thmk they meet the standards I would like to Be.e appJied1to, 'c",
' ,
, * ' ... .* , ,-,.... '.'
Mr. it is humanly possible; Mir: A.mhas'"
sador, programs to.reliablY, ';
beyond·tIle, perlldventure.{)f rellSonable doubt; td<\l1tl>JIY' 1',200
or,l,40.Q,suspeoliILa.montM:,onee they'are 9D'tbtl'list is
that'll tillketto P:0ssibJe'ol:iHvion faun indi.vidU\l;!ontMt lis,t'? '
: Gk>iidllriI believe there 9ire stepswe:can take to'
in,sure tl;i1lt1lhe!\\videnae ;is:very'. :very relisble. I'w'ohld"D'ot
saybeyond,"I doubt hecause:thatwould get. you
into ,', n . " . '.' ,:
'" ... ,. Jilut. 'to ·I[tlijn)l;: .".'
, , ... .of thIS
"i" '" ;.,i,.:,·'1 ,n',,' , ' ,,' ,""" '>,:: ,', :":.

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