DS 918 .

E54 1951

MONOGRAPH

ENEMY
. f;..I,.:; ::; i .>

TACTICS
--~

UNCLASSTap

EIGHTH.UiS. ARMY:<KOREA (EuSAK)
.\

PROPERTY U-S, ARM OF

DJE:rT!' TACTICS

.t - -lllllC’“OPERTV -.

OFus-64 ------

UNCLASSIFIED
i g e4

fiuk.4 _LA... ^._u-u COabt*0*6~8Q
use of smo;..e SC eens to L-L large-scale
daylight movements 63 b Increased propaganda effori ;oOi&;u&*t&*
release of friendly WS 0 o I> o D o +, 0 J 8 e Forward displacement of artillery o B 6 E% statements as to being issued extra*cimiai
rations (up to fifteen-t;Paenty days per man) e Repair and Construction of roads in forward
areas by the enemy pI b 3 tp Q 5 c) 8 8 Sharp increase in re qq3s travel follo&~ ;iy'a: drop in this travel i DJ e s 0 The imposition of radio silence ~y*t~e*e~e~y: Steps taken by friendly forces to counteract: enemy offensive indications I) D L) c 6, 61 (r .

3 6 8 4
o s 4
6 6 4
J B f)
0 6 5
El 6
8 8 6
e B 6
s ir
e e 6

Countermeasures taken by United Xations Forces
%o prevent enemy movement, B d e o y a a 8 o o pB16

UNCLASSIFIED

North Korean PeopleQs Army Engineer Reconnaissance. d Miscellaneous. i o e e I e Observation Posts, D 0 e Patrols, : c 0 * 0 0 (I Probing Attacks' B o e o Countermeasures.employed enemy reconnaissance o SECTION ;:on Enemy Movement to the Attaok SECTICN Fs The Attack 0 d o c Ro o c 0

Reconnaissances c e . b e 0 e e e e e . . Q D d o e ofiaB o 0 0 (I 0 * 0 & 0 e Q B ., e 0 against
. . . d . 0 0

. d a 0 o

e 0 e o 0 6

. e . . b Q

, e 20
. s 23
d . 25
0 . 25
10 @26
0 . 30

o e e e 0 31

Penetration of Mine Fields. e e o e 0 . D . e . . @.!@ Bayonet Companies and Penetration Unit. . . o B B .& Exploitation of Veak Points in United Nations Lines. d $ c d 0 u d 6 B o , 0 * a d . . , s 0 o 146
The Envelopment Support Force* , u 0 o e . e e ti 9 46
Commitment of Reserves B I) d I 6 0 e . a . a . 6 e 118
Isolating Units, a a e d e a o . o c . d . a o .2 m 49
Pursuit and Baorganization * n B o o o s d a * e . 50
Counteralcasur~s 6 Tsken by UN Forces Against
Enemy Attank i t 0 5 * 0 * e e, 0 0 * 0 b t 0 * 0 52
SECTION G; A~o~OO~.er~~.~.e~.e~a~eroes56
North Korean Artillery o e e 0 e d CCF Artillery0 ., B a o e 8 , ., . 0 Nortars, e o u B * e c e u Oe e B Miscellaneous, E d 0 . a 0 0 o e e Countermeasures Taken to Counteract Artillery and Armor, o e d o . e SECTION Hs e a e 0 . . o e . . e O . . 0 . Enemy
o o e * B . B e o . o o 0 B d 0 . 58
. 60
. 63
. 64

-.

. 6 d . 65

UNCLASSIFIED

a.**

UNCLASSIFIED

C.&.PTEK IT (pp '71,-11: >

SECTIOX A:

Defensive lo

Indications

s Determined

by Friendly

Forceso 74~-75

positions Elaborate Bunkers, covered artillery 2nd troop shcltrzrs, o c* a o m e a 6 e o Q o * a a 74 in front 2, kppeararrce of bnm wire entanglamsnts e * 0 e a 0 * e 0 8 , 8 0 8 0 74 of' mlCr!l~ipccitions, (rdm?? s $ ditches, i'iT 0'0; kac;les 30 .b.tcilsive I-z.rricades) oil routes of edvance, d B d . d B e B 74 Lr ck of I% ~tr~.-t;er~:~xt~ :'n impending offense 0B o 0 74 of ll, of SUf'~'li" s f3 6 0 0 * e Q 6 a ID a e 0 Q 75 Stockpflin;, 50 6, A stubborn defense line instead of an elastio defense, 0 6 0 d c a e D B e a % c a o e 6 e . 0 e75 76 The use of an active defense (numerous counterattacks), o 8 B B o I) d 0 a o . a o o d d ~l‘j.7

UNCLASSiFlED

Establishment of Defensive Positions . d B e 8 o O 87 Worth Korean People3s Army n o 0 o o . o e e o o g 0 . 0 0 a 0 . a 6 Chinese Communist Forces Utilization of Terrain Feat&s: t) d g (d o B d (t e 76 Entrenchments and Fortifications b 0 L) b e e 8 e e 31 Camouflage O - c e b O O o B o e e d O . * o e o a93 Employment of Weapons in the Defense 8 ., o 0 a o e 96 North Korean ?eopla*s Army 6 +, e. Q d ,, e . o J . 96 n 0 B . 0 . o 6 o 6 0 100 Chinese Communist Forces i:;ines and Roadblocks, d O O u O o 0 Q O e b e e a ,102 Miscellaneous e 0 b 0 0 o 0 e b o o 0 o e o n g o 3-04 Antitank Defense, e 0 o 0 o 0 e 0 e 0 e B (I a Q 104 iv

UNCLASSIFIED

Antiaircraft Defense, . e B d . (I . 6 * o o ,, 106
Countermeasures employed by UN F&ces
against the stubborn defensea o ., a o D . e 108

WTER III
(pp 112-127)
Infiltration and Guerrilla Activities against enemy e e e q e e e a 0 . , o o 118
. S , a ., ., . . e . . e e lx)‘
UN forces against
o o , , . b. . . . . e . 124

UN Countermeasures taken infiltration, o d 0 o Guerrilla Activity m 0 ,, Countermeasures taken by Guerrilla Activities,

WAPIPER IV
(pp 128 18)
Soapy of the Effioncy of Enemy Tncti:s

UNCLASSlFlED

UNCLASSIFIED

!Ms

monograpR

was mmpfled

by peraomel

of khs Histor%aal

Ssstfm,

EWSAKand the Eighth

Army Xistarfml

SWV~.BQ Drstaohment (Pm)3

UNCLASSIFIED

The CommnMrot armies ployed

opposti~~: l.hkf;ed Nations prinsiplas
s~rprisefd,

foroes namely',

in Korea em= the
prinicples

the oommonly aooepted

of

IV~P,

of

mepssg movement, the offensfve,

seuurfty, In the taotfoal with western

simplioityo exeautfon , tactical

coordinatfon
of these doctrine and

of command8 and economy of forse, principles dfffsred they agreed '1 3.n others*

fn some aspects

BaGfoa1l.y the Communist foroeaB the military doctrine outl5ned

particularly

the CCF, followed

the "ten princfples 10 centrated 2e side; "First strike

by I&o Tm Tung 012 25 December l.947 as 2 of war by which theP CCF fight'% soattsrsd and isolated armierp; later

strjtlre bob-

powerful "first

enemy forces0 and m5ddfe+izad tams, o9ties and oouMry-

take the small

later 30

czapture the big sft9tbs. the ann%hElatfon of the eneqyls fight%ng strsugth, and

'%gard

strength,

and thfs

of'tezn has to bc nepeaked 'befor@~ thsy

can be finally

held or trak=,

40 'In every battle,
quadruple, even ffve
OP

conc+Wxate sfx tties that

superfor

foroes

(doubls,

triple, the

of the enemy) to enoirols

sf ths msmy forces aad mom the sqme troopa
of tha cs~my strength, Avofd battles

to wipe

out other portiana

of attrft%on

in whioh gabs are not k

losses, local

We (Communists) superiority

am

aumel:fw~.b.i,r 3nferSor,

but we must ~eow6

in every seotian no unprapared

arni every oampcaigne Fight no engagem8nts wherea by prsp-

50 thora aration
60

"Fight

engageMenCdo &denvor

is no assum.me and staff '&omot8

of victory,

to secure vietory

work8 the valiant charactcwistios action of no f6ar Of saorifbO@

md fatigue, 70

of continuous

or suc3c+ssive combat a&ions,

"Destroy

the enemy while of attaoking
to assault

he is in mov8mentG At the same the, position& of citi4is, defended, wrest from the enemy all favorso h@Pd cities $&]R@

@mphasizts the tactics 8,
“rn r8Sp8&

and strongpoints similar cities 98 points

which are weakly which ar8 defended

When opportunity Strongly

to a medium degree0 after sonditions

and installationrs "Replenish

oan bo attacked

mature0 and matsrial~ Pronto to rest, ?%groupB

our army by oapturing

enemy personnel
at the

The 8our00 of men and arms of our army fs mainly 100 and train
hoW8V8r0

"Utilize

the period8

between combat operations of rest permit

the troops, Insofar spat%"

This interval doi:not

should not be too long, the (~~~LCIIII~ have a to

a8 poasibllr,

breathing

!I'hs CCF used oertain None was restrioted, had to employ all 3 situation,

armies

offensively

and oth8rie dsfensfvelyO
of warfaro,,

however, committed

to one type

because the @AamY taaticzal

armies to fit

the immediate

The Chinese Communists developed the Japanese and suooassfully

these

prinoiplss

in war against

used them agabst viii

the Chinese EJationalist

_-_-_---

.--.

CHAPTEX GTE
OFFEXSIV$ TACTICS

every ruseg 3.n addft%on to swperf@r eamsuflage

d%sefpline,

to prevent

were prhsvalemt 'SPaforeall ma@n-attaoks

cm United lsatiorm posftfons

dfd no% abmys

%nd%oat&, an i.med?l&e

of&mslve

aotfon,

as the replaoemmts

i.Adfca%ions

o usually

pointed

to a @mdzbg csffens~vs,

unft;s WQla"ig uni%s ~QA$

ah%f$ed 3.n aooordanoe

wtPTg,th evnw praot%se of das%gnatbg the

!Phis act-&m usually

took

placclr 5 6

36 k;owm prim

to the attack6

%CXWM,gmumally
in operatzioms sime

presaged an lewaem~ attack,
the ?UKTQlitff pwbeter pariod,

This proved true

5

2,

Sensitivity
oonoentPatfons

in tIhe dire&fen
0

of lumm or suspeoted

troop

Init%ally attempted to avoid

preoeding all oontact therr

an offensive with United

operation, Nations

Communist foroes patrols, apparently ounpaign, hir

'

a8 an effort

to dfsguise

mafk titention, and delaying for

Late in the foroes to shieU

the enemy used strong rear area aotitityO foroes

screening After withdrew

holding

a oertafn

pradste&.ned
l'he

timb,

the delaying ssnsftfv5ty troop

to new defensive

posftfon8, supply

of the enemy in the direction

of his

bases or

sonaantratfons

was ably illtmtratad

by Us resiLstanoe to a

In April

?3510 The eaemy used a d&y&tg-screening
aga3autlQI fores,
to the front

foroo and then

suddenly lammhed m attaok

6

30 Amqy reserves
aa oontrastbd purposes,

close

rather

than 9n depthe of the front defeas5ve of enemy

Reserves8 within

overnight

rnarohfag

distanse for

orfth a deep displacement

of reserves Aotud

was an offenaiva

indiaaticurr.

obsarvatfon

movement wad d%fffoult

dur3ng period8

of iaolemsnt weather, due to at oamouflagro

hfa utfli8atfcm
An inoreaae oomlua5lve 7
VfOfnl~,

of darkness, sightings

and by his adeptsess in a partfcular In troop

of troop evidenos

area was ganekally strength in that

of an irmrease

&,

StoakpIling

of supplisa

ti. forward amas
large supply time, dmps at the enemy

Wntfl June 1951 the enemy tztilfsed
dfvSarlsn and Army (aorpsj level,

Subsaguemt to that

reduced the widely

size of his

supply

installatfons of WI air

to minfmize Se

the effeot

and dispersed 8 a;ad artflleryo

them

The inorease

in deserters'snd

:mglers

apprehended

from units

not in oontaot. Bight marohas in the rear encouraged straggling and desertion0 of the of of a

Duping the summer of 1951 it North

was possible

to trace

the shift%ng

Korean VI Corps from the west to ths east front md deserters0 The enemy usually to avoid behbd guerrilla lines0 xw.or

by the r,aptum

stragglers future 6,

offensfve, Increased Early

and some deserted guerrflla aotivfty

S.nfomad bfs sold3.ars 9 oonflict, friendly forms ~)cPFD~?~ st.mseasf"ully

in the Korean aonflf&, supply with

hampered the Unitad Blatfons auoh actfvfty cations, of all activity inoreassd

to an enemy affensha, targets being
~onnnpmnl-

sharply

ths primary

bridges, high ground, -was later

and supply

routes,

Due to the suaces&.zl.

screem%ng

plus the use of ROK Nationa kc raduoad to a m9n~mum, of
bzwdmg operehtione,

l?o.?ice, guerrills

7 O 3% statements tiemy their urcits soldiers

were well

informed

about taetiaal

pk&

of polftioaX

and the overall

plan as a result

of ths Comunfst

indoatrlnation in the operation, soldier rather

method of building Readiness

up tha indXvfdualqe; givm

sense of duty tc the smmy

dates were prabahjly 11 than the actual attaok data, enemy ,raaonaafsssnoa attaoks

Inoreased tiemy ffnd out troop

on the front-pqLyII f'mm rear areas and -e)"D-orrrn-m-J methods WBPB sxsed to command ~GS~B~,trom&~fes

probing

and infiltrntlon artillery s positforms,

dispositions,

between fric:?dly agents returned offensive,

units, to their

and the disposition lines approximately

of ROK units. five

Enemy an

days before

and the probing

attaoks

took plaoe two or three

days prior an area

to the attaok, at will during

When the enemy had the opportunity a withdrawal, reconnaisbanoeu he attacked 12 advancing

to reconnoiter W foroes

without

ix~l--adiate prior 90

Use of smoke screens to hide large-scale The enemy~s use of chemioal

daylight

movements6 but

smoke generators

was limited,

the desired dry natural visibility, screen aoross

effectt

of screen5ng and debris

troop

movements was obtained periods of extended

by b-kg clear
a smoke

vegetation During

during

11. to 15 May 3951 the enemy established front

his entire sector 13

to screen the movement of his forces Army% front prior to launching his

to the eastern 16 May offensive,

of the Eighth

10,

Increased UN capture

propaganda

effort

to include

the release

of friendly

p'fiis.

of enemy RVs who made fantastic with the enemy release to undermine of captured

ola3ms of a coming United Bations

offensive personnela troops0

coincided

This was an attempt

the morale

of other%

14
of artillery0 into forward areas his

110 Forward displacement
In the past, tended later chiefly to indfoate attacks with

the movement of artillery defenses

a strong

but the enemy did not support fire, He relied

any notable and automatic

amount of artillery weapons, However,

on mortars

the forward offensive

displacement

of artillery

had to be considered

as a potential

- .I

indication,

cslnt%nued fez fSwe days,

Prior

to the May a951 Qffensive, stated

Fvk

c3iaptured in the US X and IX Corps sectors

they wbr6 3ssued an

was prior the aa&,

to their

departure

from assembly

area

CD,- t*heXr march to X @orpa on 16 May,

Thf~ &'fansiva

WKBB Xalmched again&

ncu resupply

had baan re~eived~ Nations

The COP attack a6 cswnCeratta&,

was bx-okan up afta-

seven day% by a Unit&I

the aven?Ae of approach

of the pendtig

enemy caffensl-ve,

To pPat%st

Short;;by before

launching

his

attaok,

the raad and brMge

damye

wm

148 Sharp increase
traveL

in refu~-frse trawl U"

followed

by drop in this

As the onem~r tightened 150 Ths --MD -11_1impsition Radio silence preceding

his

security,

the flow

of refugees

fell

sharply6

of* radio silence bxthe (~MMW~ se -_I-Um ‘~~-e..cn. .,"c..?re.“un-r;uuuc~r was resorted 19 to by the enemy, 24 to 48 hour8

each off'snsfve.a Forces to Counteract Ener?.lyOffensive ?Cn-. * indications pointed to an attack at an

Steps Taken by Friendly dicationso When such enemy offensive early htider date, United Nations

forces

took certain

counter

measures to

his preparations0 Air attacks were increased An extended on known enemy supply effort attacks and troop

canoentrations, of supply and attaoks suspeoted offensive trails,

aerial Night

was made to cut his linas by radar guided

and reinforcements0 in adverse weather routes of advance,

aircraft
and

were made on enemy positfons Evldenoes

of the suocess of our air roads and of troops0 armor

was indicated his extensive objective

by tho WW-C.~~~ use of secondary '~xseof camouflage, attacks and probing and his attacks * d.i+ersal

Limited

by friendly balance

in November bgy

and Ap~fl

1951 kept the enemy off and attack prematurely, awaited

and foroed this

him to commit his reserves *In January

Uncioubtedly the enemy attaok*

and May 19518 M forses 6

had an adverse

affect

on the

.jrgle action

of the enemy soldier rather into thm his

by forcing one0 of

h-im to engage in a defensive These attacks ammunition

an offensive stockpiles

also made the enemy delve needed for

and sup;plles

a sustained

offensive, potential, Forces. reports activity of to

To dete,rmine increased

the enemyvs movement and offensive effort was mede by United reports, carefully, having air

intelligenoe

Nations

Agent reports, and other

F?!s interrogation

obs0rvers" patrol

means were screened up with many patrols

Increased the primary

was stepped capturing determine

mission

prisonersa

Small probing

attacks

were conducted

the arees in Txhich the enemy was most sensitive. of the a:Iti&imted force? United xere shifted enemy attack was

When the direction determined, This in turn ,,ffensive m counter friendly enabled

to meet the offe..lsive. the enemy
rn.~~.mf.~

Nations

Forces to contain

and, as in the case of the Commllnist f&y offensive, 20 offensive,

-

,’ . ,:.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTI@ B Preparation Prior to launching for the Attaok the enemy carefully was his problem strikes, planned *

a major off,ensive, importanoe Nations sir

his every movement. Hampered by persistent a master

Of utmost United

of supply.

the enemy baoame harassment placed a by *

of movement and oamouflage

due to the constant

bombing and strafing, strain on preparations The CCF supply to the lower \ forward

Supply dumps were destroyed, for offensive or defensive

which aoticmss border of

system began at the China-Korea To expedite the transporting fnto

and led to Brsnoh

eohelonsO

supplies

dumps, North points0

$ol?ea was divided Speaific drivers

seot%onso eash wfth

W-nit control

were assigned This enabled

to eaoh se&ion to and

and drove only routes beoome familiar facilitated with

fn that. area@ f:h~3 routes

the driver

and available during

oonoealment,

the transportiug MUitary

of supplies

the hours of darkness. Department was

The CCFBortheast charged with
into

Area Rear Service of supplies. to ,truoking

the transportation

Supplies points

were moved where vehioles

North

Korea from China by rail

picked

them up and delivered roadse Air sightings

them to dumps looated revealed that these

along main and dumps, on at

seoondary seoondary

roads brsnohing extremities

from principal of the roads,

routes,,

were olustered supply

the southern

This indfoated

was prepared *An excellent study, RCCF--NKPA Supply and Transport" jointly by the 62, 8th Army and the A2, 5th Air Force in September 1951. Refsrenoe should be made to this study,

8

UNCLASSIFIED

routea probably front

for

the forward utilfzed for

unita* the flow

It

alao

indioatad

these

routes

were

of troop8

inlet various

saotors of the

or for

the withdrawal

of unita

fn forward

area&
and

The Transportation vard.es aocordBng vehioles facilitate to supply avaflable vehioular
23 miles

SootSon of a Communfgit army Sa very flexible on hand. into three Generally, unftrs ti all

to the number of vehicles

in a Communfst army were organized supply0 division, wfthin Cart units regimenta, regfments were organized

in aaoh enemy dfvisioln All

and ,aomet%mea Army units, in these unita,

0arb8

were ute'lized Eaoh cart

supplementtig about

transportatfon, a day, Also within

was supposed to travel

each regfnent

were two tranaportnt%on or pack laborer of supplytie; group0 dump86 2%

groups--a

wheelbarrow

group and a ~ooolie" the responqibflity

These were oharged with

forward

Eaoh mit, oompany through divisfoti, sent personnel , higher eohelon to draw neoessary auppliea for their Constant use vehicular bombing and harassing travel extenafvely of tree by air

to the next organfzationeb

rafds forced
or in oversast

the enemy to weather and

at night

to employ camouflage fJnited Nations fts headlighta afroraft,

branokes

and foliage.

To deoeive

the last

vahiole

in a oonvoy sometimes used think it was the

to make the pilot

of the airoraft to overshoot

lead vehfele, During Rail

TQ&s oauaed the pflot

the oonvoyo

the daya vehiolea travel All

hid undar,bridgerr, to night

waa also reatrfoted bypassea

ti woods0 and Ss tumelde -22 movementa bridges and roada were at bridges to

available

aromd

destroyed

utilized,

and squads of enemy seld%ers were stationed

-

to begin repairs

immediately

after

hostile

air

raids0 by the enemy, Logs were

Submerged bridges

were used effectively by rocks

cut and held undsr the water method was effective

and :;-;A~5bags,~ However# this wm relatively shiLlow

only where the water

sl.ightly aircraft

daxta~cd, unit

If

it were destroyed prtis

moved to another and trestles

completely, 23 ioc.:tian,
routes0

the anti-

On bridges reported several

along

railroad

air

sightings Bridgea the to

bypasses and alternate were repaired overnight

routes

construoted,

rvhioh ';:t:re blown enemy laid

It was reported permftting

his rails

on top of the wreckage8 dangerous

travel

cmxtinueD although

due to the unsteadiness was required ten days*;

of the wreckage0 to have seven daysg and an army from one and each oatties

Eaoh enemy company and regiment
aombat

rations

on hand;

each division,

half

month to one month@ Storage

shelters

were dispersed,

shelter

was supposed to aontaz!.n no more than ten thousand thirteen easily . -; thousand po\md+ of food0 readily

(approximately located

Each dump was to vehicles,

in a plaoe that

camouflaged,

aooet:sible

and so located A few prisoners of night truok

C were able to draw supplies that in some oases there

at any time, was a system and, system

of war stated delivery

from division dazzps,

dumps to regimental

in some 5nstanoesg was the exception

battalion rather

This type of supply 22 than %-ICJ rule, 10

7

8EGTIQSI c

lU~-t

tethe&aembly&ea

WUally

Sf OOrp8

8tXW!@iiha:@&lb-W'&!&8 ti

OUtly%&

biV@tia-

-

~~AIWZUW mmutevd out

the

router

of approaoh

and any rurpcrofsd

uwd at the head af a rrsgilanslptalOO~UIEBfallemd
garde
The pdnt preoeeded -k2m ina.3~1 salum

by aa advame

1000 to lm

yardse

IdXl

091U!U&la

Ih opentsrrafn,the flank

. antitaako~arPgm8 ,ff

amploye9d

opt parallel

road8 a8

l mrftg.

a

mmll

I&xitedIllatMrr

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AWYV 3AU3S3Y JO SOH MYV AWMV 3AM3S3M JO SNOISIAIO AWMV aNM3vllv 40 OH AWMV AHlMV 9NM9VllV 90 NOlSlAla 3AM3S3U M3VllV Nl NOlSlAla SloawAS

-3 -0 -3 -8 -V

In rear of files battalions minimfee i -

areas1 most mit8

marbhed in a oolmnn of two8 or a 0Olm~1 In forward arealo the men ia the

on both sides

of the road. file strikes

marohed in single oasualtfer from air control.

on one side of the road to and possible artillery fire,

This alao faoilftated enemy soldiers plstioons # eight yards0

The standard

diatanoe

between

durSpg the maroh wa8 three to ten yards;

to five

paoerg between tan to ffftesll of illumination, started five-to while tenthe troop8 beoause about

and between oompanies, upon the amet& Marohes uamlly with brief

The diatanoes

were dependent

sinoe most moves were made at night. 1630 hours and oontinued mfnute . rest periods until daybreak

gfven-to

the men every hour.

were resting, of the prior

guards were not employed for 28 reoonnafssanoeD movement8# the enew Villagers provided

looa& aeourity

Dar5ng night roads and trails, regarding looatfona

generally

utilized

aeoondary

the enemy with troopso

informatiOn

of UnftedNations

and sametimes native blazed the use .'29

gufdes were employed. tree8,

Routes of approaoh

were marked with PW8 reported

rOOk8# and sign markerso easily

Some oaptured dfaoernible

of a lum.5.nous substanoea During

at night8

to mark traflrb by enemy tro@p8e and the

the maroh atrfot about

diaofpld$e loud noises0 during

V&XI exeroiaed smoking,

The men were cautioned display either of lights. orally

talking,

Communfoations

the maroh were oonduotti by runners were usedo or horreOften

OF by written

messages delivered eohelona, radios

mounted messengers. at night,

At higher soldier

the individual

wore a white

armband to faoilitats

.-

aontrola

30 posted on high ridge lines during the mar&, fired

Bfr observers, warning nex3 hill,

shot8 wh@I&FI hsotils hearing

plane wag sighteda the warntig troepr

A araB.dfer on the by f9rtig for mother she%;

the shot relayed

thus the entire 3 air raid, OnlLy mder

ooluren of marohfng

was alerted

an ant5aipated

the most trying

oiroumetanoew

wer6 wehiLt&~i ussd %@ PimLted te tranoportatien
advanoad

tPanspor% toqoops, and even than St was gener&ly of the wounded.
area@ to the battle

In spite

of thir,

enemy unftr

from rear

tene at the rate aerieu8lg

of 25 m%lea a daye

afr

strikes

dfd.not

impede thel.r

chf%eld ERxtiQne 32 mcrsvementa% nigh%. aenditicefas

&me daylight QP unde~ the and equf+nt firer
OQVQP

moms were made during ef amokee

advera@ weather

The enemy, la&Lng

make p~~daesing .materialr

O oreatsd

#make hazes by resar%Ang %o widercrpread fas~rwst of villages aga'inst du~5a.g periods sf rela%i~ly f.i%%Pa

and the firing

wind velao%%y, infiftratora h$zeo

To insure

a posaih%ry wixtd shAf%, anamy to as~ur(r a a~r&tiuouru daylight sm&ce
moves ‘wer(s,

aet fires during

behind

Ix0 lties

_

-

However,

the Commuafst May offsnsi.vs, The enemy troops Mach&

made in goed weather, 001~ tith

$33 s. s5.ng.Z.a~sbw&i.nucur at-,taoks Wtw@ dartig fhs -

2'j to ,!$I)yards

between groUpsO squatted

StsaibLg in d8tohea a high

ineffeotfve attaok

as the memy soldiers

and then moved on0

!I!his indicated

ats%s af die:o%pline,

TWOa8rsmbl.y area8 were used. 25m%lea from the frent order8 lines

The frirsf; was aa tmm approxtila3y ur&~s a~remKLe& through the

where ba%%a%fm-size r%aff offfoer,

and reoeived

from a dfvisimal

Regimental reported facing

CP, to march to a designated area* * / a large orange light, about five feet of the enemy's rear

Escaped American square,

soldiers

on the top of a hill

in the direction wfth

lines.

Large troop of the 34

concentrations light, indicating Before evacuate entrance Nations place all

paok horses were gathered that the light a large-scale

in the vicinity

might have designated attack,

an assembly area. to the United

launching civilians

the enemy attempted and prohibited

in and around his area, into the sector.

of civilians espionage

This was done to counter of civilians for took security

aotivities.

me' evacuation

one month prior 35 reasons*

to the launching

of the attack

A second assembly area, bivouac area, The distance to 1 I./&l l/2

the regdmental of this milese

area,

was generally lines

the varied sent

area from the front Attack battalions

from 7 miles to a point aocounted units9

were later

from which the attack for the reoorded designated units

was launohed, of United

and they may have Nations lines. Some

closeness areas other

however,

than the bivouac columns0

areas0 and
This

the subordinate indicated divisional these

moved to them in separate on the part

an amount of flexibility commander in seleoting

of the regimental to an attaoke Nations

or

his own area prior

areas were seleoted spottings Nations

out of the range of United

artillery,

where air of United attaok,

were impossible, patrols, However,

and beyond the normal distance prior to the 1 January within artillery $951 range

enemy troops

moved Into all day*

trenches

and remained

undeteoted

36

* Such light

was only

DurTng the early rfqetated site, afr portions

phases of the Korean confliot, or mountain were seleoted

the most heavfly as the bfvouao Nations

of a hill

This was done to minimize attacks,

the effectiveness

of United

Fox holes were dug and oamouflaged, guards POP regiment With the inoreased were posted affe&tiveness

and about ten

to twenty the area0 power, valleys planes

on the high ground aromd of United Nations positions in tE7 air

the enemy resorted

to digging

his bivouac villages,

and around bombed or burned-out usually bombed and strafed bombed villages,,

ITTs stated

molartain

tops rather

than valleys

and prcvfously

The enemy also used the reverse the routss fox holes extended were for hundred of advanoe as assembly

slopes

of hills Closely of foliage,

and draws along bunohed,
ruhallow

points,

were dug commenoing at the line only a short proteotion feet, dfstanoe against air toward

but these

the crest, fire,

These emplasements Beyond a few 37 t0 detaot, ~~~.Movemezr,t II-Yand prevent

and artillery posftfons

observers

found these

difficult

Countermeasures

Taken by United Nations Forges used various

Fo~oes to Prevent methods to deteot

United Nations

enemy movement to the front, artfl,lery mearM By the use of radar B night concentrations acouraoy and supply fire on suspected

The use of night enemy routes

bombers and interdicts~

of advsnoe were the ohief

bombers were guided Captured reported

to enemy troop to the explosions areas so that

potits,
and

R'& testiffad secondary

of these raids, Flare

pilots

in some seotorsa uNc!kXJFfED

ships were used to illuminate E

fighter-bombers Interdiotory on all HoweverI into likely

oould more effeotively artillery routes fire

strafe

snd bomb snw

troopso Foroes areare

wa8 u8ed by tMtedl#atisns

of advanoe and on suspeoted lndioated.that through arti$lery

enemy asrsmbly

enemy prisoner8 positions u8uSlly

they had been able to maroh fire rimply by study-g outside the it8

attack

pattern.

snsmy assembly arfilleryo

area8 wsre releoted

range of friendly plaoed on this

80 toe muoh importanoe

oould not be

oo~termsasurs.
were U8sd to note

Right

patrol8

enemy movsmeint.

Patrols

oansisting the The80

of Amerioan and Republio enemy linea patrolr,

of Korea roldierr

were dirpatohed

behind

te note enemy troep with enradial, troop

movsmsntr and a88ejnbly
were

pQtit8.

equipped

8uooe8rful

in oslling

dann artillery

and airrrtrike8--on &irtiUery

oeno&ntratisno. illuninatfng prokimity u8dd. oloud8 flare& were ured to revsal t%ne8. searohlightr of a m0Onlit 38 observation* '

snd 8lxa3nwtar

enemy ts@op moVOmsEIt8 frr al080 Ssarsfikight reflected night, ssmpanies were alro againrt but it low-hanging

to I&i-ted nati= ch dark nighbr,

gave the sffeot for aerial

did not prove too effeative

UNClaSSlFlED

SECTICN D Reconnaissance The enemy divisfon Nations extensive foroes or Army whioh made inStfa1 oontact with Un%ted

and assumed rasponsibflfty
mfrsfonr

of the front probing

conduoted There

reoonnafssanoe

and light

attaoks,

were many eimilfarftieo

between Chinese and Iorth

Korean reoonnafssanesg has bsen made to into

however B beoause of some basfs.~dfffersnoer,

an attempt

traat

each separately0 basically

A captured

Chinese manual translated

Korean revealed

the same objeotives

to be reoonnoiterad treop80 sf

and the same method8 of reconnaisss.noeO hostile posftfenr, engineering Pn addition, unit werkIg

Movement of hostile and fire power were all

p~fmapy oonoernc point, potit

the unfte oover, routes

releoted

the break-through

of attack,

of marah, and the attack was ured to learn Observation the

commenaement psint. hostile strength

Reoonnafssanoe

in forse

and deployment

of firapewer,

pootm ts

were used to note enemy movement D and all conduot reoonnaissanoa 39 a%tuatfon 0

offfoerr

were required

and to know the terrain

and the host3le

Remmnafssanoe
fmm Army group

units

were organh regiment, level

&I the Chfnese Commtasfst ForPoe units ranged from

through

The sfze of these

a platoon nafrsanoe basis aa&

at regimental elements

to a battalion in struoture ten-man

at army group, and were built squadsa

Reoonup frsm of

were triangular

uufG of two officers,

and three

Ik;re-third

reoonnafssanoe

unit

was issued 18

o%vfl%an oloth@

and performed

UNCLASSIFIED

misrfanr

in a semi-agent

oapaoity

behind

hostile

1iXM60 Foroar reooPPnairr-

The prirary 6noo mit6 terrain po6ftion6. Ikfted other

rerpensibilitisr th6n those isrued

of Chinere oivilian

Conmmirt clothing and pido

were to mak0 taib yadr
in

reoonnai86anoe~
They

obtain

read gPide6, to $thip

to of the
oanbat

rooonnoitered

a fmr thoumnd

Illatfonr
It

poritfena

but rarely taken taotioal fpte

mdo oontaot ,aonrid@ratien,,

or engaged
hmmrer,

patPslling,

laurt

k

*hat

the 6rmmy*6 prel%minary

r6eonnai66moe

prior

to 6n The r6o@nat

engagsonent in the part was effootivo
naireanoo

and persirtezat, Divirion

of perition6 tha main attaok

ef the US 2nd Infantry was made by three in an upright hostile ffrs before

XVNDRI gfoupr file

before of five

to five poritim

detaohed

or six IWII advauoing bunched uutfl

in 8inglO They

or aom6timer approached After front

wa6 emoouutared. being reoog,nieed

as olose aa 20 yrdr

a6 OXMIIIY*

draw9ng ffre, lines

the enemy then withdrew suspeotad Ikited

and moved alcpng the periti@nr. ffrs, At

te the next

latfonr

D(I tfme dfd the enemy reply they appeared to be unarmed.

to Unfted Nations fr9 ofvflfan by.three

and at times

The reomnafssanoo this

group with

oleth&g or four

wa8 al6o givan mu at nights hortfle dfrolore alcmg Choir

~&~sfon whfoh was performed

The emmy squad ffred posftionr poritienr dffferent in an attempt by retumfpg reotfrar

indiroriminataly

at ruspoted feroos

to have Unfted Natfcwr firao !I!hir prowdur6 Aa a rerult

ua6 ropeatod of theea

ef the font. to inffltrato

prebaa, United

the group attompt6d

and reoeanoiter

behind

Bations In
l

lin138~

Sane of there there

agent6 wore ROKA, US or oivflfan marked the leoatfon

olother.

tune inrtanoer, mortar

small patrol8 target8

l f United

Natienr

and atiilhry
4

w%th btX8t8 .ef automatio

fire

in%0
and

the targot obrervation

areaso Peltl.

meso leoationr

vrere pa88Od baok by m&guards

A6 an advanoe patrsl

or while

aoting

as guidee,

three-man of abe& #se wa8

reoennafssauoe

team6 preoeded Bhe 6@n body by a dfstanoe baok eaoh hem-. If the patrol three-man

3000 yard6 and reported report

failed patrol

baok, the main body halted If hastfle unit6

and anefher

dirpatohed,

were righted,

the reoennafsragoe

greups were erdered

to return

to the main body. te rend em reoennaf88anoe en 6eme oooarfonar a unit squad k larger than

It wa8 oemnen praotfoe acoomplfsh a mi8uIen,

although

a squad was di,p$tohed, a terrain reoonuaf66anoe,

As few a6 one or lmo men were ren% ts mke In heatile a oertain terrftery, reotian, enemy petrel6 Upon campletEen rplft of the up ._

and eaoh man reoonnoitered mirefran, te it8 liairon the patrol parent with

reastembled

at 6-e

predearignated element8

spet and returned alre establiohed .

orgaufeatien, other Horth mit6

Beoonnaissanoe 42 in the area0

Korean People98 Army Becmmafrsanoe mite of the North Korean People60 Army were srganized * of every eohelen frem oorpe to oempany level0 Tke Army oerps and dfVf8fen6 had a reoemai66anoe had a reoonnairrame ompany,o the battalfea, unft8 extended

Beoennafeeanoe
tithin

the rtruoture
Korean

North

Peoples8 the regfnteut

battalfono

*In the CCFo the l rgamfra%imn to regfmental level early.

of reoonnafssanoe

a platema;

and the omnpany, a reoamaissanoe to the h6adquarterr oammmder, type6 of mirsionf, Pirrt,

8quado

All

rueh unit8

were attaohed by their

of eaoh eoholon

arrd were employed

rerpeotire

Three ornon

were perfermd

by l&h -8

Korean mado 8ydm’Of Laber

~eOWUN!ii88UUW UZIit8a to detetie villager8 Party the tremd8,

a poiitio@
thoughtr,

rooonnai8r6soe
and the &Mb

politioal

in the aroa of prope86d rympathirerr

attaoka

'1210leoal

Korean

and it8

were oantaoted,

aad the politiaal reoannai886nae c06~1tsi8t

tendersroior
uuit8

of the area were analy6ed0 Korean Lab& PI*

The member8'6f momberr or houn

were astrally
of

eympathiterr srientod dootrfne

proletarian eroh airrfrn

origin, of thir

!Ihe mombsrr wibro thoroughly
type with the cOmm%8t

before 60 that their

they were oapable 6upporte Politioal

ef indootrtiting l ffioer8

;wkk led politioal

oitirsn8

and gaI&ng reoenna'lr6anoe

gr*upro of mi88i.n W&8 lntelligenoe United Xatiens reoeEmai66amoee
olarrif%sd

A rearad type primary

The

oenoerm was te oapture order of battle

daovs6e8tr Wa8

and to oolloot

infirmatfmo

'Ari8 mi88irn

6OoOI6pli6hed by infiltrating tirean looal Labrr oitfrmr,

United ~atiePA8 poritfrmr, a8
8OeUtla

u8fng looa% In oeSUbRto

Party member8 and 6ympathisorr elR68%f%6d a8 low level agwLt8* wore atilired koause

srpionage of their

er taotioal

iafwmatian

km-lodge
esd tilitar$

of

the surreuading offfoerr

terrain

and languagoo

Politfaal

led the iratelligonoe
type

reoCrri88anoe m8:8igflRr

1Pi88iea6. 60 that of Chine80

?he t&d

Of af88fOa

___-

UNCLASSl FIED

Commmirt ks detewine

Foroea reoc3nnaissanoe hortile firing

unitss

It 9aa armed reaonnaissanoe Weapon6 iere fired
and

po6itiou8.

indisoriminately return military fireras offioerr.

in the dire&fen oarefully rrated,

of 8nepe6ted Thi8 type

TH positfens,

6f 16166fOn 'RB6 led by

When a tmit his respeotfve trends

cmrrmander was given an ebjeotive, reoeunai86anoe unit'to determine

he salled the pelitioal positienr, 6n terrain

upon

of oivili6n6

3x1 the area and my hertile a map srientatien

&fez-e

the mission, features himself inspeotfen who might five

the group was given

ixt the objective nfth the oonditions

area@ and every member familiarited ef the approaoh, A rigfd phyrioal anyone three t@

war made of eaoh unit hinder the arrignment,

m6mber to eli&Mte Eaoh man was issued ef the mission0

ration8

depending were taught mi88fen6

upon the length atiple Englirh

Men en

the patrols on inffltratfen leaving talk .

or Koresa phraSe6 to u6e Watfm guarda, Before

to deceive a la6t minute

b&tad

en the mirrion,

Cemmuuiat indaatrination and eaoh group wa8 43 6rderlc oansistiag of three ~86 about MO yards group

was given

by the palftioal its mirsien

offioer,

made to repeat

and general

The moat advanoed eohelen was a patrol to seven per66ns led by a squad leadera

The patrel

300 yard8 ahead sf the squad, whioh in turn ahead of the plateen,
Some advanoe units

was absut

had a supporting patrol,

to o6ver the advance @f-the reo~nuaf8sanoe C~eRrf?g group te remeve any ObStrUOttin8,

and 6n 6bstaole

suoh a6 barbed wire

and miue8s ia the way. iin intelligenoe .raider *
grbup.

patrol

OOnSitied

of a oonfi8oatien

group and a of oapturimg by
of

!Phe oonfisoation

greup had the mirsion order ef battle information

enemy daoum6nt8 or obtaining infiltrating
preteoting

anew

liner,

The raider

greap had the mirsien m li3e6,

the oonfiroation

group rithim

i%68WOrd8 ured

among member8 af the

rooonpccf88aBoo etoa,

umit8 were nermally dopendiag five-man

nambr CO

ef tree8o which
it

riv(IP8,

tmwmr, areas,

OR the unit

was attachedo

OKI three-to

patrolr,

eaoh member

wa6 numbered aoosrding Pararordr temporary ftiily mirsian hertile diroard
were

to the rank held by hfa! In the patrel, used amen& leoal
age&lb

alro

oititent patrol6

ukw aoted

a8

or low level

Of$ea ml1

held the the arrsigned by would

of a tesprapy

%foTt

as heStRg68 t&f1

of the informant foroe6o all

wa8 oompletdd,

UpOn doteotimn tnit

the members of the reoonnairranoo 44 weapons and sot as refugeeLo
Bngineer

Eeoonnai66anoe o-bat .battalien
i?a Supper*

In a nawmal rrituatit#n, of a Rorth regiment8 Korean diVi6im and f\;lootioned
the

the oagbeer was habftrrally under the'oontrol lfmftr
ia regard

allmoated

to rubordiaatlr

ef the rogtiemtal field
-8

oarmnnader8 withfP

goaoral

of the diri816BI
to

erdera

Y!he mi88f6m of the eag%eeP8 6u6mmd up frr an exaerpt

reWZma&88aWM

from a oaphured

aneq

documents

The engineers. O o will discharge all duties (engineer reconnaissance0 fartifioatf~nr, road building, orosrhg riverq, oamauflagkg, reoonnairrluloe for drinkfag building bridger, water0 o o) pertinent to aotivities af the ether armlO Nerth night
Kerean

.

engineer a6 far permfttsd departure,

reaonnaS68anoe a6 sfx miler return

patrol8 inte

normally

aperated
er

at

.

^

and penetrated

hostile

territory peint
within

ta a di6fWIOe *hat
eight

to the 888slnbly

harurr af&er

The mf68%an was generally The leoatien, natureD

te aeouro and of

Wermation
extent

of eng%neer intere8te, ob&aoler

of hortile device6

and mine ffeldrj and feasfble

the exf8tenOe

rignal

and busby traps

BIbthods of breaching
weapona

suoh ebStRele8; potential reuter

the type and nature af attack, sfterg

of herrtile

emplaoe6@nt8?

o@nditfenr
pofnt8

of read210 and the lsoatirna and thefr loo&-k&en; and During rfmple the

ef Piver-orosrfng
rimilar

water

data of engineer
Bm-th repaira

impsrtanoe

were gathered, perfermed

reoonnai88anOe0

Korean eng%lpeerr
future
router

road

aad brfdge

along

of advance but more extanr%ve tsarns af the dftisi@ndl

repair8 eng$neer

were left battalion.

to regular

pioneer

ka additfeu
engineers

t@ the reoennafrsanoe

mfrafon6

stated

abeve,

eneqr

were al8:o oalled having
Ifm3ted

upen ta oonduot and speoifio

speoial

reoennairraaoe Road + for a alI -.

opepatians

ebJeotive8,

PO~~BIMi88~049,

bridge

Pe09Z19L4i88aweD r~OOWAai88WlOe

stream-orortfig fell fnts thfr

peint,

and reoennaiiranrse

of hestile

ebr$a&er

oategcbryo

When remmmltering
determined i _. reoessary available, be dotourod, tti road%

a road prior
load aapaofti,

to an adwe.
the condition

engbeer ef the mad wre

pIRtrO18 and the

repair8o the

whether

6UOh neodod

repair aad miser

material8

leoatioa
Bridge8

of roadblookr
arrd porrfbl~ reedod

and hew they

oould and

fardr
to

wore rooamoltored,
repair
the

the availability

of material8 wa8 notod.

bridge

ar to

oonrtmot

foario8
45

TJpma~oompleti& te the

of the rirrisarp diVi8i6a OAgkOOP

a ree8BUai866X¶eO 8kOhh
sffioorr*

na8 ruluittod

Obrermtia Beth Chinere

-8t8

Comtnrlrt S&veral

Foroe6'and l b6omti.n root6ro

Iwth p8t8

Korou

timer

rrkilised OS
the

obremtfen hfgh gr&nd

p0it8.

Vera proparod
rith

fs. one doffirrite
and strength po6t

Baoh war 8oloetod

m06Ky"8 operation Eacah ob8oPmti6n

in mind of thmo

aad uu8 wll-ara*uflaged~ 6mmberlo Tao re09rrf88an00 ~a8 of the

eenristed

pOr8OAAd slad ae
de+m-mined by high

r%aff
raakirg

l ffleorb offfoerr

3%. method
only,

sf mb8ervation
m51aPen

and tha

obremtion cwmm=Poatf6s amilablo,

post8 wa6 to ebtafr and the rfrria
talooop68, 46 the

frPtollfgenee of United
&id

perba%tig Peroo8.

to b&h Uhm
is

Batian

oayarror,

Very pirtmlr

Were ured

making l bsemtinr.
At night,

onemy used rurer,

to laaato

Umited

Eations

arbfllory

pO8iti.n8, be light8

Friamdly artillery
of enomy rohtoler. Ji

f iri

waa adjwtod
munkg,,

a what
a +hormgh

appeuod

to

The npxt

tl?,fp\ L-‘. l>iii, I’

UNCLASSIFIED

reoenaeissenoo olem
proxiraaity

of the eroe produood of the lightr the rehiolo

nogetivo

ro8ultao

Beaaure of the that

to the frrsPt lightr

liner,

it wa8 believed
lafionr

the enemy &Meted artillery fire

to drew United leoete

utxd thus,

by sotmd and flarrh, Pstrolr

the gun poritim8.

47

.-

f'he Chinsre plaood more weight
rooennef8senoe
Another

CenrmurPfrt For008 end Horth ea fnforrmation gathered

Korean

Peoplo8*

Anay
and
atteekr.

from oirilfonr of their probing

patrol8

than on the rermltr

important Hatfons

soupoe of inform&n

Co the enmy u-a8 oaptured
the the of arrtvel
time to

mrft,

Qaitod

per80nnelc forosa
Ikited

The enoqv relsoted

of tlnited oapture rtragglor8, inrtruoted

Xatimm pri8ener80 end -6

at a new plaoe er the opportune
Hation .prronnel

away from the&r

man were dor%rad pri8enere* lines lLnd watt

Patrol8 tho

were

to out telephomm

to oapture

FrSor to departing patpol determined router
the

ok a mirrfq~ weak pobt

to oapturo

pri80ner80 lefiona

the
line
potit

3,zt the United and withdrawal,

defense

and releoted was alro

selected0

of approach 4% fro&the that

A rerrdezvour

A oaptured

prirener atated

Beoonnafssanos unit8

Compariy, 15th loortrh anployed a

buvmn

Division,

reconnafasa?me of three

capturfag A rupport

team whioh oonsfsted
group

groups with

ene leadorm it

of three

men ohore a looatfon twe groups0
Fcwae~~

from which

oou&d rupport

the otbor

It8

pPhIPJ7 8&88fon wa8 to allaw the

to engage United Iationr

ff

neoemary,

J

group whioh was to take the prisoners A oapture miaslon covered* signal group of three of oapturing

te ge a6 far

a8 pessible. had the groupi

men, led by the team leader* while the other

ene enemy soldier spotted

When the leader by whistling

hostile

roldlers,

he gave a

or using

a pa68 mrda to oapture the possibilly were captured, aapture more than three of failure. and
wa8

The aapture enc~M@ soldiers

group never attempted beoause thir inoreesed

when two or more United kept and the other8 withdraw,, \ ths oapture
the at$aok

Nation8

8oldi6r8

killed,

After'the

group rtartsd

te

group of threti
remained in pr$tfen

men, whioh alwayr te attaoke
prOteO%

worked with

group,

the aapturo

group from a possible Daylight half patralr

United

Nation8

k3 eightion
There

oonsisted

af approIimately
olother,

*

ma, were either dressed attem~e+ 50 needed@

of whc#mwere dra6eed

in oivilian

unarmed QP annsd with in civilian to infiltrate waited olother United

pi6tollo

The members of the patrols KereaWo and there

were u8uallyWorth Nations liner.

The remainder supporting

of the patrol fire if

fCpr their Enemy patrol

return

and furnirbed reemingly

formation6

always aorsumed a oolum~ If a at th6 ,

formation three-oolunn

with

the squad loader formatfen

at the head of the aoltnm, he assumed a poeitfon

was employed,

head of the appeared regardless

aenter

column,

Chinese Connnunlst Foroes patrols route to their sbjeotive the same way*

always

to take

the shortest

of oover and ooncealment,

and returned

* ?&x-e men were used on night

patrolas

The selectfon

of routes

dfffered

with

various

units. or rear

SeourSty guard wa6

guards were not employed aa such,, and a polnt rarely used. AvoGi%ng defiles
enemy patrols

and crests

of ridge6

was a &aracterSstic Usuaily

of two

when mavS.ng through

mcruntafnous terrafna just

parallel

f"lles

were used to move forward Forting the deffle,

below the r~dgeie9ee each membar of the front, and

of the mountains patrol

At night,

kept a three

to five<-paoe

interval paotis,

from th6 man ti Control

in daylight, files

from ten to twenty

of the parallel Eaoh

was spiit

between the squad ieadsr &gals controlled

and his assfstant, the pat.eol--lighting hands,

led a fYLe, of matches,

Prearranged b.Unktig

a flarshlf&t, was forced

ziappfng

or whfsti~&~g~ a three-man If"

If the patrol pofnt it

to move through m6ters

a daffle,

was sent fifteen fire

to twenty

ahead of the mafn body0 the mati body rushed ef

recefved

from the surrounddng This action

hflls,

through

or withdrew,

dapecded on the lmportan~e received* fiat open terra&, led the threaman of three it

the mfssfon

and the amount of fire

When the patrol split center fit0 colt, three

squad moved across

ool\rmnsO

The squad leader

!Rm two flanking

0c13lumns~~hlnsistfrng

men

ea6hsr moved sii,htiy squad leader rear0 dlstanoe elth6r

ahead of the center led one of the flank

CYJ~'EPIU;~~ assistant The oolumusr w foliow6d at the

D?stanoe between the mt#a and columns depended 88 the
from

the center Audfbl6

column and the abiifty signals

to hear the squad

ieader@s sfgnala,

were uasd 5n the op6n rather

UNCLASSlFlEa

243

thR3aruRlmeanr.

Similar

format&en8

were wed

by enemy patrol8 bp

whl10 movi6g through whidilbag and lightad

wooded arear* mat0hsro unit rent

Control

war maintatied

Whm a reeontiiriaaoa hill,r 8quadwarlaermally
nmmber8

reaemoitered I)%% lllhem it

a ridge&m
reaohadth0

or h%gh foowu6, sad

two patrol

$oek up perstir at the bars

ef the mm&&A

aboerved beth

aide8

mf its

Thmremainder file,
and Jwt

of the patrol

gradually a petit

moved up the sfds in a r3ngle near the minter I ninety of the west

Uhca tb
below,

ensar(y rsaohsd
the patrol

turned

degPOe8 and moved in a 8jPgio
ef hwtfie is

file
troo&,

rtraigtdi

up the erO8+0

If the mmita%a%n was dear at the bare wuro Irfgnaled reool~naf~ranae retumed Wit mm nsodad,

the two

l Ubpe8+8
I*

jofm the patrol@ patrol

.Xf a further

the

prooesded,.

Xf not,

by the mm

rmzteB the formatl*n ride
area

ecpntrol appeared to distate If a fairly or four

u8ed bJ war

Z'~O@XlZU!Lib+lULOO pa0r@18.

60 reoonaoitur

gJtw leader, feature, po8ition

a patril,

three

rmmnber8e tith

the astiatmt tsrrafi a &filrded

squad

wore diipatahed

to rsoozanaftsr

the 'praentiek rwminsd

The remaf;rrder of the patrol to the mar0

ti

If the area w-m slaar,
If
BaItad

a Urrage
Ba%imr

or 8ignal fommi were

war 86nt baok to the 8qyad leader. sighted, a member sf the firrt while the rest rithdkr
group

wa8 sent tr, war% the remainder

of the patrol reoennajlrranee uay strength,

omatinaed if w loft

te ob8mveb 8aw hortilo to mntkau~

U8Iltlly
forosr

enin

patrol8 Ibar•ly

WOPOmmber8

ob8ervntfek*

If hostile dispatched

forces

were not sighted, area on the flank, an objective area,

snother

three-man

team wa8 took

. __

to another

and the squad leader in the tiddle,

two men and reconnoitered Given a time limit either visual

Eaoh teamwar aw&.ted a signalto -_ w~%8-uo~i% _

to oheck its

after

whioh it

or audible,

from the equad leader,

pyhen the signal

was reoafved, the point by wing

the two teams prooeeded The entire of approach,, Probing

to where the squrad leader patrol 51 then returned to its

of rendeevorur, the seme r8ute

dttaokr used to locate United Nations off balanos
United

Enemy probing psiats
diversionep

attack8

were

Nations

strong

and weapons;

te detarmbm

stremgth,o prior

to create

to throw the opponent the junction

to the main attack3 attaoks and other were United

and to determine ordered Nation5 defenses reservw

of units0 point

Enemy probing of ROb units habitually other units liaison

to determine foraes, at night

the junction

In the past, without

ROti uuits with

assumed perimeter on line or with it8

oontaot oontaot

o Laok of physical and diffiault

or oloss

had been caused a series of

by wide frontages strong point8 Probing atbok probing judgment with

terrain,
between

Beaause of this, unitr, prior

wide gap8 exirtsd

attaokr

were mado rnyvhers preuediug

from two weekr

to an of the .-

to immediately -it varied

a main eff8nsivo.

The size

fr8m a platOon~te ownderb

a oompany dspsnding Later larger

upon the

of the eneagr division inoreased

in the onmpaign, th8.n thors
aHsaok&l

enemy attaok8

in size o uiing Foro88*

units

employed by United Hation8

An enemy regiment

a II!!

,

Battaliw,
tsok

anda

battilfon

attaoked

a oompmaye

Stroag

probing

attwkl

plaw

abeut l/% hour to 1 heut after
fil-0.

an intense

preplanned
with tha

8t9pOtiing

C1@8@ l%fsm

wa# anintained

by mesren~or

main body, '

leoated

from 30 te 306%yards to the rear0 ~11 groups were ThQ8e grsupr
organ&red

From the enemy unit,
bhngular formatlam

and a to aveid the er re& us;ing the were

employed0 a&

trisd

frsnt

of a

skroag

psiut

airoladto of apprsaoho
noi8ea

the &u&8 HSllr

base of a hill avoided Ikritod b

a8 an avenw

and &ad8

proven%

any psssibls aotiou

Rhum osntast

was made wSth
a

Batism8

troopeo

was srrfft

aud the enemy adopted withdrew,
the

soattered ferao If

fermatiew,

If' Whited BR$i+lrr8 forsos uutfl re6lisved by

the prsbdag

eoaupisd

the ps8itSou

43mmyt8 main fer0.0

it mar0 waucoe88ful, uulsss
the

St attsmpt6d
for

to oaptur8

pri8esAr oosurrsd. 52

and*

retum,

opprttmity

eaofrslasmu~

UxxStsd lBation8

Foraer

empleyed a3.r ebservatieu patrolsa harnsr%ug

urhg

flare8

80

deteot likely

emmy reosnnafs8anae ea%q appreaohsr

artillery
in

ffre

OR

and’rwpeo~6d

emmy OPI aided

oeuuteraatdng

the effeotivermm serseus, suf'ficient~y

af ensmy reomnaissauoes in advanoe of friendly

&muter-reosnnaisroe lines to ~nteroept regarding

enemy patrols, United Nations

prevented posftiens~

the enemy from gainiug

iuformatfsn

Beoause of the snemy~s stereotyped shtwtsst distauos and his laok

way of us%ug the appreaoh seourityo

ef

of all-aroupld

ambush patrols

were easily

employed*

F'riendly units

defen8e

peAmeters fields

in depth,

with

physical

oontaot

between

and prearranged friendly

of f&e, Rigid

prevmted control

enemy patrol3 of fire

from

determining

boundaries,

also denied of

the enemy this

information. action

Only troops fired on him,

izmediately Friendly

to the front flank elements
53

the enemy~s probing held fire

exoept 2n the faoe of a sizeable

enemy attaok.

SECTI= E Zuemy Movement to.the After fbilfty gashed the soreeaing &ttaok Fbbt

army er dfvisicm

whioh had assuued respeasthe tm reor(he

of the front armi&

had osmpleted

ite,~reoeunaissanoe,

or diviSiOu8

iu the.rear

meved to an aWmuk point. on a maxbnm fmntage
ia the bited

of the twe diVfSien8 of abeut three Batienr line, miles,

was ocmnitted usually
thrmgh

tc a thrust

a weak pint

This point

was preferably defended

at the boundary by ROU treopls

loP%ts or a portion The attaok ~atiens fire, Salients suppertfng foroes

of the front
gas usually

of two !54
tbited

psi&

Ipear the juuuture
for one te depth

of tm

where ft was diffioult of sh&aw

support

the ether
Stations

by

er if was near a point were also fbre
seleoted

Sa United

strez@h

as 6 ddparture

paint

as it

aided eneq Ftuutes sf

and hfidered

Ihtited avsfdeda

oammau%tpat Soa were usually Frfe~ were fssued

Batieus ‘55

observatisu,

ta the lnavemmt en f&ot from ffvs to sewn needed0

to a~ attaok

point,

enemy troops

days? oombat rations Basis loads utflise

and were warned were also issuedo

not to eat them uutfl md the troops httaliom asssmbly poiut,

of ammuuition saptured

wore &scrtx&&to

IX? materialQ at ths
attack

csmnandetrr were givem the* amao
In movement frsan the

20~~s of attaok

assembly area to the eaoh Pa battalieu m flank

multiple

crelumus were agaPlP used,

8traagtha

The aelumus shswed ss %norease of oapharis hewever* hsuro the
rata

reottrify3
per

ef advaaae was reduoedte three

almu% 2g;oO yards

ht ZBW hours0

squads wure sent eut rrithh

audible

di8tmoe

UNCLASSIFIED
of the tidvanoe squad and abaut the oolunmo The rmrte 200 ,tt;s 3OU yards from the oenter highwayr a& flat of 56 --

ef advaaoe aveidsd

ten-aim, wefe

About 2000 meters

from he&i14

liae,

the enemy troop8

girerr a shsrt rest peried az%dwere allemed to eat @no oembat ratie& : At th%s point, oanpany oenmandsrs were given their erderr and teak - over iram the battalia time element uera flexfbf$fty this respeoto ommandera. Method ef attaok oemmadero and the 1Ce 3.u dc&relled by the division the battalfon maintained liaisea

was permW+d Platoons

and ooazpany c-der with oempany head-

quarters right

by runner

and deployed of fifty

by 'squad celu~~~ to the left to erk hundred yards

er

w%th intervals

between squads f%mation, squad

acoording

to the terrain*

The first

squad uaed a line and the third

the second squad a triangular echeloned vidual to the left.

formation,

SupportzIng weapons were set up,, and tiij.-3s olose as 800 yards to United 57 for attack, Nations lines

squads crawled

where they awaited

the signal

-

-

UNCLASSIFIEII

SECTION F The Attack Frontages in the attack' * a Communist Army had a front front

In the attack,, twelve although milesa

of not less

than

The maximum division

was usually cenducted

six miles, on a

on occasions, mile front.

an enemy division

a thrust

maximum three attacked battalion

An enemy infantry

battalion

usually a was also in

on a 400 to 600 yard front, attacked on a PO-yard in depth. front.

but in one instance This battalion

approximately width

400 yards

An enemy company area varied on the terrati were deployed and the over a

from 100 to 600 yards of the en-. causing

depending

strength large

At night,, United Nations action.

troops

58

front, During

fqzi‘ces to distribute

their commander

fire,

an offensiw

the enemy battalion of his observation Similar

usually

took a position

to the rear point@

post about the CP
Thq

100 yard6 from the attaok regimental

to our tactics,

commander wa6 found anywhere from the regimental CP or from 200 to 2000 yards from the front. anywhere from the division

to the battalion division

commander was located CP during

rear

area

to the regimental from the front.

th6 attack

or from 1000 to 8000 yard6 post wa6 uraually lcoated observation

The reg3amntal

obremmtion ldnee,

about 200 yard6 from the front post varied

whereas the division

from 800 to 2000 yard6 from the front. port6 99 roughly to a Wrth wa6 conduoted

Movement of of the

commnd and observation next higher *A commanders

only by order6

Chfae6e Amy corresponded

Korean Corps*

The Assladt Multiple

Force penetrations of United Nations These flank.
wara

line

in a given fellomd

seater
by were /

were attempted an envelopment organized of reserve fer

by enemy forces, 6f the hostile

normally

The attack their

formation6

in great unit6

depth and continued through the troops

astaaults

in contact.

by the passage L The depth allow6d at will, line firs was 300

a degree of flexibility CCF unit6 attacked

in exploiting frontally, mens

a penetration a akirmiirh marching

employing Ineffectiw line before

varying used*

from twenty During

to sixty

the day, the skirmish Rations positions

approached epening
fireg

to within but at pcsitienso

yard6 of United nfght, it

approaohed

aa close initial

as 20 yard6 to friendly

In many ca6e6, the individual mortar6, element6

assault carried

wave was not armed with grenadeao Rifle fire,

weapons but just

and machine guns engaged and fixed in 6upport of the assault attack, force0 line

United Nationr

In the frontal For example, ridgelines In another in a eingle

the skirmish

was net

always

u6edo

in several toward action, file, friendly

instance6 line6

CCF columns moved dewn the in calumns of twos and feur6. Batidrna pe6itiOn6

an enemy platoasn charged United

When the enemy skirmish men took cover by laying lifted, fire* places the skirmish line

line

was fired

upen, it

halted

and the firo

prone on the ground, moved forward

When the hostile it raoeiwd

again until other6

When seme enemy sdldiers from defiladed positiona,

were wounded,

teak their

---__ _I- -----

_ .-

In some attacks, shallow-depth strength, regiments, formation, For example, and the first

the assault The first the first lfne

far&

utilized

a wide-front twe-thirds deployed

and a of its IXO

eohelon line

deployed

of a dfvisfcn deployed

of the regiment units. prisoners0

twc battalicna.

This continued echelon United

down to smaller

The mission

of the second disorganized strength of the automatic

was to mop up, capture Nations forces,

and observe of attack,

In the mafn line in depth, assault.

enemy un-fts was dfstr%buted

Only a few men with

weapons were used in the inftfal The battalfcn with seocndary

echelon

stayed

in line

as much as possible and divisional set==

the main direction echelons

of the attaok,

Regimental with

ondary

also Elttempted to keep in line out by battalions

the main directfmz Wfhsn the oentinued successfullye revealed

of assault; penetratfen

carried

and regiments0 through

was acccmplfshed,9

battalions

platoons

tc search for weak points Another that

se the attack

could be continued p~sfticns

method of assault

on Unfted Nations

a twelve-man

enemy squad, each armed with defended by friendly

a submachine ,;uno trocpse A base of

deployed fire while hell

to a base of a hill on United

was placed

Nations

defensive

positions

by the squad

the remainder in nine ooluxm across

of the attacking of three-man the front, failed,

company moved up the face of the assault teams, These columns were

distributed

When an assault If the assault rear troops

enemy troops

withdrew

by leapfrogging0 to the

were forced for

ef the enemy lines

to disperse, 60 reorganization,

they reported

-

-

,

---

UNCLASWED

!

Mass ?Tave Tactics Whsn mass wave taotios sea of bodies correoto In the initial Foroes utilized taotio. The ffrst training Attaoks phases of the Korean conflict, which might Nations easily positions Barth Korean a human wave overwhelming were mentioned, friendly positionsr one piotured a human from

._ -_ This was far

a taotio on United

be thought

were made in waves0 very little had a rifle

wave was composed of young Koreans with in the art it, of warfare. Eaoh enemy soldier

but did not fire maition experienoed thefr plaoe,

These were easily

mowed down, but a costly more took

e:.;- :..CIt-c-:: resulted,, Koreans who fired

A seoond wave of slightly but reldom aimed their stopped and fourth rifles

These, toop were easily was expended* The third

but more friendly wavss were still firepower slackened

ammunition slightly

trained

troops,

9Jhen United Mations seasoned North attaoks

due to, the laok of ammunition,
overran

Korean troops were usually aooompanisd

the positions. attaoka,

These frontal

by flanking

In the latter

phases of the aonflict,

the enemy deployed depending positions, on the

in

depth and employed numerous waves of troope formation of the United Natidefensive

As a rule. of the If the lines, a .

too muoh strength attack, leading The terrain

w-as not oonoentrated determined

in the spetrilead

the number of men usedo United Nations

element failed

te break through

second and third

wave were used mtil

a breakthrough

was established,

The distance Yations

between theee echoions

ws.:s so determined

that

United

artillery

fires ou~;r.ld never oever mere than ens echolone .small groups of enemy grenadiers, type hand grenadesn attaoked armed armed

In one Chdnese assault, with

bags of 20 to 30 ps+R:o-mashsr strong points

Uhfted Bations with

anti main positions. their attaok,

Enemy trosps Heavier autematfo

submachine guns supported the att:-ok

weapons supported the treepa with

from the flanks.,

The grenadiers

and

the submaohfne guns advaaoed at a walk using As s6smewere killed, pesftionssl, until others took their plaoes

marohfng fire, from daffladed heavy oasualtfes

Chinese Communfst F~roes acoepted ran @ut @f ammunitfen appreaohed oloso

the defiond:ing foroes

and were Poraed te -withdraw, to Unfted Natfons In the attacrk

When'anexay trssps

pesit5cans D they infantry

seldem used bayenet n fellswed

oharges.

pattern

assaults

an artfllsry

objeotPve

ef sverooming

United

Na.tfens floes 6

sf dfvfsfon

sfsas

The objecth af the CCF wi 11 bs trs destroy US manpower o Brev%o~siy the CCP used large units suoh as three CCF f;ixs.ns ts 6rm us dfVi8L3?2* In this manner the CCF expeoted te overcome the US with a sea of menO However, when the CCF oonorntrated such large numbers sP man %a a small area, it made them vulnerable to the US QBCQQ fire* of (artilleryjO O D ., the CCF will now oonaentrate on the destruc,ti.cn af *units, attaoking @no US company tith three CCF oempanfas or ano US battalion with three The main emphasaa will be en destrcyfng small CCF battalions, and to avoid aeucentrating large numberrs: of US Infantry units, CCF troops where the 7% $an brfns its superierity ef artillery fnte effecgt,

UNCLASSIFlED
Massed manpower was used after
to

destrsy

individual

May 1951 by the Comvnmist foroes 61 small United Nations units,

Penetratien

ef Mine Fields deotrine held ths engineer hostile field staff responsible and

The Censsunist engineer for breaohing obstacles,

neutralizing

fortifioations, Because of to

preparing

a route

of advanoe for the attaoking personnel,

infantry.

the shortage olear applied

of engineer

eaoh oombat mit own se&or.

was required Enemy engineers If

obstacles their

and mine fields efforts

in its

only in the se&or and obstaoles

of the main advanoe,

time permitted, but usually,

ndnefields only a suffioient

were removed over a broad front, for

number of paths were cleared 62 Koresn units saorifioed

passage of the assault

troops. small details to explode by the by

Both Chinese and North sending them through mines by stepping

suspsotsd

and known minefields

on them,

Mine fields

were determined of war, local

enemy from interrogation of the area,, observation.of and evaluating of the oonfliot, the terrain

of prisoners

inhabitants

United-Nations and material

movement, and by estimating found, In the early part

the enemy also rounded up large minefields
63

numbers of oivilisns flares, anti-

and drove them through personnel. Another use of wire was lafd

to detonate

any trip

and land mines0 method of olearing mine fields Iry enemy troops was the net -.

nets to whioh a powder. oharge wae attaohedo

The wire

over the mines and then the powder bag was exploded, of the net explcded ji@ mines in the minefield.

The The

downward pressure

UNCLASSiFlED

r,- r a’ / .
t i

I
I

.

enemy rlrro

probed

mh;fielda

urfng.r~omnaimenoe United

by fbyer

Ithan a

-

firefight iufaatry
Mostar .E]mgalorr ursd

took plaoe btwea~ uaitr I
ahella

Bitionu

and engrenader,

foro~a;“a@W

fired into

maohine gum,, :toered the minefield
long

and fired

w

5n an effort
fi111ed with wau determinrdr

to datoaate
oxploaiver,

the pima*
wwo ala0

torpedoep,

piper

bqoe a minefield

pattorn it

When ODO wk . rlid with&

intO

thi rinofiold
detonate.

and l xplodedo
Whm hand intern1 probing

orwad was dqne,

all the

a&or

1.5 ylrrd@ to kept When this other rurploei~~ oords a

mcnqy roldierr a mike

,

auff ioiant happened,

in ease one IIU+ detonated
m

the

other

olorsly
64

oheokad the arka for
ured for

0bAPgWS Booker on long poles were:alao #
attiohad to 1010 boobytrapll.
lines

tripping

Enepsy ekirmbh
uhioh WIifed had the

in attaok

were prooaeded obstaolm ,

by -11

Wita*

primery

purpose

of oleariug

and deStrO@X

Waticmr
Barth

firepcmmr. organfsed aesault amr

Korean divisions
infantry0

uuite

oom@eed
$ad foti

Of

engixmarap

end supporting olearing

Thsed unit8

dlemantre
whioh

an obetaole

team,, oonsisting hostile

of an engineer

squad,

oleared

and marked paths through oonsisting

obstaolelrt

a

dwwlition throwerao

toa@

of an qngineer pill-boxeso

squad with

IZWQ flame team,

whioh Ipeutralfsed of r$fle
to

a oapt?ing
-ited

Oouriating
&a an effort md a firirrg

platooni

whioh,,attaoked point
t’he

Blations

infal%tX'y

isolate

a strong supported

and prevent rest

reinforoemen~es for00

team whioh fir.,

of the arsaulbLg

with

a base,of

f

Under the cover of 8uppoPting~aLaohine olearing it team marked a path through its tiuaion, it
tie

gun fire,
fields

the obstaole When .-

and obetaolea.

had aomplatsd all

signaled

the ds8aol'ition

team0 whioh,

utflfzing bounds,
positfans

available

oover and dead spaoe, advancbed by leap6 and the latter
aharges,

Rea6hing the objeative,
with grmadee, demalftion

attaaked

fortified

'- _

and PlaBle throwerse

The oapturfng United Bations 9ts supporting *and prepared operation,

tesm advanoed with

the demolition

team agd destroyed the objeotive
the assault

weapon 6mp&aoem6ntr .and isolated fnfa&ry, for any United It also Hationr supported

from forse

by fire

oounterattaok. the demolitien fortifioatione

During

this

the firing it6

team supported fire at hostile

and oaphring and w6apoar

team by direoting 65 emplao6mant6e 'Ike types The fir& their

of ascsault team

were organized emmy troops

by Barth

Korean

foree8e in

aided the assaulting and seouriug

by removing

obstaales

approaoh

&mug by ordir

points0

This type teamwas omnnrander, artillery to destroy a&'

organized It
positions

in eaoh battalion had the mission
0

of the regimental Unit6d Hatims

alra

of destroying

Ths aasond type

wau amigned

to a unit

hoetile fields,

omrmarnd posts, and to penetrate The aomandiug

signal deeply

oentm-6p military into United

warehouses, territory, regime&

Hations sohelon

offiosr

of the forward assault

of a

division

organized

two or three

team6 in raoh kttalicmo mnd attaohed dfreotly

One car two were also organized

as a reserv6

to the reg%ment to seoure iter adv6noee

UNCLASSIFIED

4?

....I’ .‘.

The assault and a medioal team, uhioh
attaohadt

UNCLASSIFIED

team CP was oomposed of one team leader, The .te&wa6 of one inf'an~ry sub-team, divided into

a me6s6ng6rp rmb-

aid rnuo.

an assault

oonsistsd

squad with

two 6nginOOr6 of four
engineers

a aeourity

whioh oonsistsd

with

wire

outters

and &IO heavy maohine gun squad3 two f%nm mortaret~ squad.
A reriervg

and one anti-tank

Sub-tOaI6 aoted with 6ub-team.

the Ssourity ar6au1t
by

sub-team uutil

assigned

. as an assault ~;rndn

The entire

t66JQ OOnei6ted of approximately
a platoon

and vms otumaudsd The assault

aither

leader Dnited

or a

oompany oammander.

team whioh

pen&rated

Vations

lines

wa$ equipped with

enough fire.

power $0 withstand

a oowatsrattaok,

f+sh man on the assault
and one day*6 .raw food.

team oarried

one day*6

ooobd
worn,

rioa

Light

dr@aa was generally

and

606Mtim66 miform6 "&e pan&rat&z&g
gwrrilla~lsadere

ai+lar assault

to IbhitkFSationa tom psoperated

w6re utili6ed~

o obtaining

from&hem

olosely.l'i$th looal. ' : supplier and 6qufprmanfr
ad+ 9,

Eaoh team had tuo altomats
team leader,

W66uaxIder6g and the pkitioal ur res~~~~..slibl~~;a~.~'

seourfty the firet

sub-team leader alternate. infiltrated spot6

~r6s.appoint$#

The assault and rsorganiced and hostile fire

team usually at 6 designated wa6 reoeived,,

f&dly

line8

one by On0

If larger

groupuwsrs

used group

the assault

team 66nt a 6~11 point while

to engage and destroy body ohanged direotiOnso populated
area5

the frisndly"strong The team:rarely if

tbd =%A a
into

paeesd through it
divided

however,

it were neoessary, tithout
r;3

gmall groups and passed through _,

attraoting

attentiOn*

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSFIED

Often native

g\?fdes wtwe smplsyeda was ts br taksn, ffro the assault sub-tsam attasksd

When an sbj$otive frontally Hatfons

undsr the osverfng feraes dfsoovered

6.f the maohine guns0 the assault assault

If United

the attaek,

sub-team apprsaehsd
sub-toam attempted
roar* In an - _

on the runa

In the meanwhile,

the .reserve

to enwelope the rssistanor attaok on a United Nations

and str%ke the flanl,ar ‘...
CP, f%re was distrfbuted and the varfons ffred at ensso

smsng the tents
weapon emplaoeIn order to firs
jinto
If the
groups,

or build%ngs,
malts 0

oonmuanfoatfon ,osnters8 signal all

At a prearranged

on various ssv*ral bufldfngs ino9iuding

wsapen amplaoements, groups --

thb assault

tsam was divided a specfffa targot, fits

small

eaoh group taking

OF tote

were entered,

the men wera divided

one group of lo&out the buildfngs

men equal to the number ef entranobsa
or tents at the sams timsti rofthdrewe All
If
ts

Ths onsmy sntared ast%ons were swift, heavy resfstanoe prearranged

and tho assault

teams quiokly the assault

was enoounteredg 66
assembly points,

teams afthdrew

Baysnat Csmpanfes and Penetrat5sn

Unft

Ch%nese Cozmaun%stForoas employed Bayonet Companf@s -0 "Chfsn
!fas Lisn" -a- and pen&ration ompanfes The first
unfts

as assault

unitse
and breaoh United ef oloarfig equipped wfth Ratfans

haysnet pssft%snsO for

wers used ts assault platoon had the missfen

the path
four

the remainder

of the oompany,

One squad,

f"Rsh submsh%me guns, spa: 'qead, Two squads,

56 grenades o and ssvsn rifles, equipped with bangalors squads,

aoted as a

torpedos, with

RPf&3

the vfsu of

~~%~%dea,. and rifles.,

acted as demolition

UNCLASSIHED

UNCLASSIFIED

,;*,,

dwo~fshing *rr,.rakrer, kohk?e

triplo

Vnfted Nations

+ef~&re

fortifWation6

-- b6rb6d.:
two ligh+ th6

wd roadblookeO

QM iqUad,, equipped with &mm mrrfrr .' f&o.

gune, In uaord%natiaPr fith:a sqW6 with

SqUad, oov6r.d

sp6urhrrad and dauolition . The sooend platoon rft&r r&Nd the fir@ platoon

aoted as the ~@ault.platoon had oomplstad fts mis91an.

and took The third platoon.

l otisn

plat,ml If 6nd

66 the rupport

platoon

and r&for6ed heavy ho&b*
bavy

the awond

6% l&met

dompany angquntsrad

#.#rr , 82tmn mortars 7-e

heavy maoh3.no guns from the regime&al used for support,, oom~aniss had the mis8fon

oompany' WWQ

'Bay&et

of thb seoond wave of troopp TJnited Nat&one CPs and artfllery 67 01' trpo of these. oompaqies, I* 1.. Penetz?rtion.~fts

of removiqg obstaslas in froQt / and also had the objeotive of 86i~tig., positions. Eaoh rsgi.m@z bd. Oru

were organized

within to that that

individual

saZ@i~y ior~#~p@y.,

oompanies 0 Their miss%on was sfnilar and the.'North #~rsan assault team-being

of the bayonet of olearing

m&268 pnd

ob~&aoles I),i&.6ring The penetration toamp and a su&Wt

the enemy fnfantr~ unit team,,

advanoo, team0 a demolit* ITWO

wal oomposed of an assault

The assaa%' team was equipped with light

&mm mortars@ %WO three to p1US three or four

maahins gupls; one hstvy maohino g\n, this team actually attaaked United

submaohtie
A demolition

guns,

latlon~,~positions. anti-t@ Molotov

team, inoluding at least fifteen

demdlition

squads artd and

. teams equipped with Cooktailsp oleared tanka@

banga$ors, torprdoes <. @nos, and

wiro e~tanglement4,abattis~ A support team of sii

demolished,~hostile 3h

to eight

men carried

UNCLASSIFIED

_-

idFlED UNCLASS

and transported

ammunition

for

commander led the penetration Exploitation of Weak Points

tho.other .68 unit0

ho

teams,,

The comp6ny

in United Nations two'Unitod hostile

Lines units was noted by

When the junoturo

b&worn

Rations foroor

the enemy, OP when he determined he was qufok to exploit, WOPSsent through Nations attacks
rear

were shallow

in depth, MitS

Reoonnafssanoe mainly

companies and other by infiltrating, ,.

the work point,

to -United and hirassfng . '.,: _

areas where road blooks

were established

mado. stages of the Korean oonfliot, supposedly natural inacoessiblo the enemy demonstrsted high ground and a lines' " by "

In the early his ability brfdging North
scaling

o'f attaintig other so-called

obstacles,,

In one tistana'e, United Rations thf'si'tho

Korean unit practically

suocaeded in infiltrati.ng vertioal cliffs, with

To aooomplish

ehati

shot a form of harpoon grouad, attacked

or anohor,

a rope attaohed, climbed rear0

to the high

When it was seouredp United Nations

enemy troops from thr

the rope and In one other as a'natural and were' a ' ' _ -

positions

casep United obstacle ferried quickly foot

Nations

troops

depended upon a river The enemy troops over on logs, of supporting

against fndfvfdual

the enemy, equipment capable '

swam the Aver Temporary bridges

oonstruoted 69 trQOpse

light

vohioles,

oxoatitsS. and .' . -

The Envelopment Great stress

Support

Foroe on envelopment tactios by the C&Mu&&

wa6 placed

UNCLASSIFIED

-

*

': ,

,"

-

-

‘:

UiCLASSlFlED‘,

foroes

itj -Komao

This is evident

from the taotios

em$loydd and frolq.

-

oaptured

ensrmy documents 8

‘Surrotiding

taetios are a gre’at threat to the ensby (II?) The enermy and it is eiksy to suooeed with suoh measuress h6s no great strength, their morale is low,.and fighting ability is not goad, Not &nly is their rear unguarded, a striot watdh not kept, but the Bnemy are oareless of their guard to th& front. Thus we oun easily suooeed in breaking ,throwh their. lines aad going iaround them. The fundamental taotioaldootrine of all Communist Forces 6omblC. or attaokSng the front: a

eohelsns w6a.k point

was that

of “double

envelopment” $6 unit

taotioso attacked

frcsn two direotions, from d$fferent

as two

Other6 hit’ the rear

‘dfreotions,

70

The missioln -clf..the ‘pn (oop$g fOroa was three-folds. first; it , t, ,T / was te arrive undet66$6d r(: a given loaaticq as &.&$y as :?ossibles t : I Seaand B it was to attaok 5” United Nations line UT?Pstrau:z’. Thirdly8 L. it ww ta blookade the line of retreat *’ A point fati it break+hrough . of $36 enveloping foroe ads generaiiy seleoted about t&em 11d.166 from the point where the frontal assault of the United Nations For00

-

_

wae taMng plaoa e This was to avoid any possible United Nations t . 07'086 fir6o The depth of flanking penetrations and the distanae ,I. be%$6eP @M&rations variedD depend5ng upon the situatiafi~ terrain,,
and

misaicm.

All

t&its

moved as quietly

as possible

to aid&d ,

rear

13 -small enemy aits were engaged whiie thrusting towards the . of United Nations lines, a small forae was used to disperse main body oontinued toward its objeotiver Other small

them whilr’the

groups .subh as assault mission of attaokia

teams and bayonet

oompanies,

were given the

United Natfons:oossnand

posts and artillery

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSiFlED '
positions. lines e If United assault, Nations attaok, Nations Foroes oounterattaoked of an eneq'division If United the Communist frontal would attack Nations foroes the mited did not and attaok from any to - . Enoirolements were aooomplished in great depth behind UT -_

two regiments foroes

from the flanks,

the two regiments the position, to avoid hostile

would then advance to the flanks Enemy boldiers artillery referenoe lihes, fire, advanoed slowly They were taught flanks0

to envelope direction oontinua

to advance without United

to their

Cnoe behind road blooks started

Nations

Communist foroes The road blook

established was usually ita This with

to out off

fleeing.foroes.

by ambushing the lead vehiole that then attempted until

of a oonvoy and disabling was also disabled, blooked

Any vehicle

tti by-pass

proaess was oontinued disabled extensively weapons fir*, in February silhouette the fire, mortar ffre, vehfoles,

the r>Ad was oompletely end mortar fire

Maohine gun fire

were used

in road blocks During

along the normal Nations fires

small arms and automatio north of HCESGSCWG to -

the United

withdrawal

1951D the enemy lighted the vehfoles

near the road at night Then friendly automatio troops

as they passodo to intense

passed

they were subjeoted 71

weapons and

Commitment of Reserves JThen a Communist division was well b&talfone to the rear contfnued penetrated line United IIatisns units, lines and two

of the hostile

approximately reserves0

to engkge United Nations executed

The reserve around .

enemy division

g %n the meantime,

a single

envelopment

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACK MANEUVER SKETCH
(A)

UNCLASSIFIED

PRIOR TO ATTACK

(B)
DEVEWPMENT Of ATTACK

I
t
t I------I
'LGBw---

CCF

3

4 1 -----CCF -----

I

\ 11

'r b --a$ -

l-l
E; 2 3 ++-

giI)-EN

SYMBOLS ENEMY FORCES DEFENSIVE CCf DlV FLANKINS CCf ON RESERVE CCF DIV ROUTES TAKEN BY DIVS --‘; 1 ; --i t AREA INDICATES fANHN6 OUT Of DEfENSlVL: DIV PRO6lN6 ATTAcI(

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSlFiED

one flank left

and joined

one of the p&&rating Comrqnist when:the for till'

foroes division,

moving out to the whioh was about

or righta

The remaining

one nightus

maroh to the rear reserve

attack

commenoed, moved up division, depth, and the enamyts pasaago of
After

to act as an active Attack continual retserve ob,jeotive formations attaoks units

bttacking in great

were organized

were maintained units which

by the consecutive
were in contaot.

through

the oneand

was secured9

the enemy re-established was basic

his

"two-up,

back" formation,

This tactic

to the Conar,unist forces

was employed down to company level0 'The reserve miles Vations to the rear artillery (or defense) WTI~ was generally located about 23

of the attaokfng~armies, fire, It was close
72

out of the range of Wnited however8 to be available

enough.

to any area upon demand, Isolating Units

In a Communist a,ttack, on the, situation, designated force 0
Jk;;,

certain

units

of various units."

sizes,

depending

were designated the attack
i‘!

as "isolating

These way enveloping to attaok United Nations

before
'i.9c:! E,

and usually

acoompaniedthe first,

zlit

was assigned to destroy

two missions: fleeing

reinforcements; unitsa

and second,

isolated

When the unit segments, positions coverage

arrived

at its with

destination,

it mission.

divided

into

two

Each one dealt were built

one speoifio

Defensive provided shelters exoellent were

in depth

in rugged areas whioh

of escape routes

and easy camouflage. b9

Strong

.II a -
:I

UNCLASSPIED

’ ..- UNCLASSIFIED ..,... e.
built and all spoil

SW ,

lgl!!me. :
,... _ .,

_
. .,

was removed.

$'wo different

type

positions

were and to

constructed the other

-- one to prevent to deal with remnants

United Nations of;United

reinforcementad troops

Nation8

trying

break 6ut of the encirclement, close enough to provide

The two positions

were construoted to afford - _

easy con&l,

yet wide enough apart unit

maneuverability. reserves

A portion

of the,isolating

was held for and

and'anti-tank

positions appear.

were set up at ambush points All neighboring terrain

spots where tanks might which dominated

features the security

the pcsition.were and prevent Nation8

seized

to guarantee of United

of the position When Unitid troops, position

the withdrawal

Nation8

trosps. surrounded

forces with

counterattacked reinforced troops. fire

to relieve power,

a amall enemy unit,

remained .3x1 _ deployed drew close of the - ,_

and engaged the assaulting and took cover*

The main force Nation8 force

to the flanks

When the United both flanks

enougha the enemy counterattacked approaching Pursuit troopse

and the rear

73

and Reorganization
an

When a major United

enemy attack

suooeeded in surrounding

United

Nations

forces0

effort Nations

was made by the Communist units units. Hcwever, pursuit

to separate

and annihilate

was carried of encircling by other

out only when the the hostile pursued units.

Communist ccmmsnders saw the opportunity Generally, United pursued an enemy company, if forces United until supported

units,

Nations fleeing

contact

was broken.

When enemy troops as a

Nations

soldier,s,

they used shouting oonfusion.

psychological

weapon to add to the resulting

fn the early

UNCLASSIFIED

stages

of the confliot, supply

the enemy buried during a pursuit*

caches of axmunition

and

weapons to insure

T&en the enemy maintained generally conformed

routid logistical table?

support,

his advance

to the following

!rERRAlN

TYPE OF RESISTANCE flat a0 b, co a0 b, co rugged a0 b. co light moderate heavy light moderate heavy light moderate
heavy

BATE OFADIWWE (miles per day}

10

Relatively

2. Rugged

505
3

less
h88 h88

than 2 , than j than 1 Naticns

3.=

Extremely

4

YJhen extensive forces, dffffculty objective defensive

and rapid

withdrawals contact logistical

were made by United

the enemy normally in maintainfng was seized positfons

allowed adequate

to be broken due to his support. When an temporary one

by Communist forces, and issued orders

the &emy organized next movement if force

for the

was contemplated, the objective

The second echelon

of the attacking

mopped up

and consolidated

the pcaftion.

74
plan0 to prevent

The mopping-up Blfckades

method used by the enemy was a well-coordinated on routes of communication units, lightly searches for

were set up at key points traffio

enemy vehicular equipped daylight

frcm withdrawing. disguises, likely oarried places

Special

and wearing hours of all troopa* groups

out systematic offered foroep

during

which

concealment endeavored

United Nations small isolated

Chinese

Co+nunist

to capture

of UN soldiers,,

Special

emphasis was placed

UNCLASSiFlED

UNCLASSIFIED

.

on the aapture All front, units

of the leaders operations

mopping-up with

of &ted Nations units. I rer0 oonduoted with a o#znpany 0r@a%00n using
a squad wedge formation. fbser*

.-

the searoh parties

were stati0ned

at 00nvsanding'k0y

positions

along Pnour&a%n'r&lgss &$I%* ?#%MQ~ a&w4 th0

to support moved quietly 'isolated searches

tha searoh and t0 pr0vib0

fan. any emergency,

snd under 'oover and isxecuted small Uplits.

envelopm0ntp befor

United Nation8 75 began. Countermeasures

Ambushear were established

Taken by G Foroes Against
.,

Enemy Al$aok

Prsbably againat Artillery positiens Artillery Nation8 friendly

the most &feotive

m0asure takezJ by United t*s the 0ffeativs routes

Xati0n8

@'0$?000

Chinese Communist atta! fire wa8 plaoed 0~1 all

use sf artialery. tit0

: .

suspsoted

and w&8 regirtered and mortar pOsitiOn8 troop8,, the April sn0~

in on,areas
were

oonoentratienb

Vz%it;sd 'laa$&?& : adj0ining friendly unitN* '. plaoed on vaoated Unft0d the withdZ%wul Of .

Within

a f0W minute8

after

During tr00ps

offensiw UUt0d

against
Batians

th0 US I Corps, po8iOi0ns

oam0 down valley8 fiw,

torrards

Oermartmi;r4
_:
%xi maaU0d

_ -

OOluRin8 of four,, I Corps Artillery,, fired 186&O

and six hundred the artillery

at a tima,

In f&v0 daya, th0

inoludihg

organi@ to divisfens, types, Snfliatkzg h~vy .

0asualties During fire Eighth artillery fast

of anmtunitiari,of 76 . on the enemy, the May Communist 0ffensive,

rounds

all

th0 artillery Van Fleet,

was unable

to

enough to suit States

General

Jmes

Commanding General, for 8n

United

Army K0rea.

A basio

load of ammuniti0n per lO5mm h0w%&r

gun :$rior

to May wa.s 50 rounds gr:

par day;.

.

.

:

-

1

.

Howeverp during instituted. One battalion fired .

the May offensive, five

'the ordinary

"van Fleet" days'

day of fire

was

Eaoh gm fired

supply

in one day, Division fired

of 105mm howitzers

in the US 2nd Infantry three days; 77

2'70 rounds

per gun per day for the three

the battalion

14,580 rouuds during Friendly by fields

day period.

mine field8

and obstadss enelqy.mine

were booby-trapped reoonnaissanoe

and oovered

of fire

to prevent

and removal. terrain

To prevent for his approach, with

the enemy from uabig Ul Force8 utilized defensive taotioal

supposedly a defense perimeter.

inaooessible of all

key terrain although by

features

an all-around preserved United against night their

Units, until

surrounded,

counterattaoking Air effeotive, sorties During

Nations

integrity * Foroes. troops

relieved

advanoingienemy attaoks

proved to be very and May 19510

by the enemy in April

~26 and 329 bombers were guided to enemy formations
the MFQ-2 radar systema An effeative bomb ratio results for

by the use of four
enemy

VT to troep8o

one HF was used with In isolated instances,

very effeotive patrols

against

reported

finding

800 te 900 enemy bomb8 in

dead in the areas of the drops. six quiok openfug VT fuses Results alusters

Some Ba bombers used lOO-lb general-purpose

and PO-lb during

bomb8 with offen8ive.

on Chinese troops 78 were exoellentc attacks

the enemy's April

To prevent colu~n8,
Whfa

by infiltrating positions

and enveloping adopted

Comi8t security US

rear

CPs and artillery

all-around

2nd Infantry

was-amply pivision,

illustrated by the 23rd Infantry Regiment, at CHIPYCNG-NI in February 195l.
53

UNClASSlFlED

UNCLASSIFIED ’
measureso Strong outposts to detect, reports line

.

and delay the enemy whioh oould be quickly TriP

were set up, and an interior manned fi flares strength

mafn battle

and held at all'oosts shells revealed'

was established,

2nd d.lLuaGnation natural

enemy movement, and all Defensive and during -

obstacles, posftfons

and improvised, Snto tight

were covered by fire, perfrneters at night; within

were organized

the day,'patrols units3 aprons) regardless

in strength

were dispatohed IN units front .An alert laid of

the different wire (two positions tin in

zones of responsibility0 and mines across

tactioal

the entire

the defensive wire, strung with

of the rugged terrain.
noise

cans and other front

devfces, line

was placed of resistance,, wits,

about 200-300 yard8 To strengthen

of the W outpost

boundaries flareso ordinated

between frfendly barb wire, fields

extensive

use 'aas made of trip Adjacent
units

mfnes, their

and booby traps, in the area, with

OQborder-

of fire

and the isutposts amunition line,

ing the boundary strong pofnt

were as amply supplied

as the

was in the middle exertC.sed fire United

of the defensive control

UN Forces positions, that

ao aa not to expose f'r$endly were oriented as the frontb to the fact Alternate .-

and all

Nations' the flanks

troops as well

the enemy attaoked

and dummy positions
reconnafissance

were employed to deoeive took place

the enemiyu as his

usually radios

a few day8 ahead of the attacks one to two thousand troops yards in

Patrols front

with

were dfspatohed to warn frfendly

of outpoata Plans for

of the advancing

enemy@

an organized

withdrawal learned

were provided during

in case the movementa

need arose0

Valuable

lessons,

the retrograde

UNCLASSIFIED ”

.

made by United Nations foroes early in the conflict,

,,&ss,F,ED

were utilized. vehioles

Tanks were employed at the head of columns to push disabled off the roads and allew forces oolumas tewithdraw. features

At the same time, during withdrawals antiairto

infantry si.Lmi.nate craft

soreened key terrain

enemy roadblocks. utilized.

This highfirepower

of mobile

weapons was also

Tank oompanies were used to gieat

advantage of friendly

in fighting
units.

delaying

aotfons

and permitting defensive forces

the withdrawal positions,

Alternate United Natfans

manned by fresh and foroed the

reservea,

aided

in withdrawing

enemy to fight snd annihilating

a "%far of attrition"'rather friendly units.

than one of enoiroling

Counterattaoks

were planned

before

the enemy attaoks United lations all lost attaok

to foroe

a

debouohment and proved very after the enamy May offensive

suocessful. regained

oounterattaoka

ground and foroed point. By a

the enemy to withdraw suocessfully new defensive elcploiting line

beyong his original the oounterattaik,

north

of the 386 Parallel.

IN forces 79

established

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED '

SECTIQJ G Support Armor Only during the early month8 ok the Ksrean oonfliot extent. At the eutbreak did'the of hostilities, in Attaok

enemy employ armor to any great the North

Korean Peeplegs Army had One armored componentB the 105th Thfs division regiments, had approximately
123

Armored Division. tanks in its three

Ts medfum

22 T3,!p and 11 l706 %n a training

regiment,

making a total

of 156 tanks. and tank regiments were

Ordfnarfly organized

Commtrnist tank divisi.ons unfts,

as independent

The 105th Armored Division*8 of the division Taotioal 80

component tank regimenta but were used in support control was exeroised

were not under the control of other infantry divisions,

by the unit

to whioh they were attached, ten to fifteen for thou-h an attaok yards about one

Tank assembly areas were usually from hastfle to four poaftfons, the line

of departure

thousand

yards from the front. hearing

In one instanoeo enemy tanks raoing

a US their

Regimental engines for

Combat Team reported several hours before

they attacked.

Tank speed8 Approximately ten 81 .

depended upon the terrain to twenty miles

and the s'ituatfen, on roads,

per hour was achieved

whereas a speed 5n open country. by infantry from the A small in an

of only ffve

to ten miles

per hour was accomplished

As a rule, attack-. infantry

I?orth Korean tanks were supported commander received them to lower

The tank regimental oommander and relayed

orders

echelons.

advanoe infantry frent troop ,

party0

equipped

w$th mine detectorr,
This

oheoked~in aeught cut hestile and:ob&aolea. to 500 yard6

of the Jead tank fer mines* diapo8itieni and looated

party

alro

a&warning

devioes about 90

The main bedy of infantry to the rear Nation8 attaoked ef the tankr. while flank8

advanoed'abreast The tanks

attempted

to pin down United to the'slder
During

foroea
the

the infantry

hneuvered

and

enemy tank

ef the ho8tile'porition. ~82 orew8 drove buttened up. attaokr# the infantr$ and t&k

the at-ok,

In other

moved out about 1000 yardr, defensive poritionr. From

and

the tank8 then oame on line these positions,,

the tanks' bhelled'United wa8 moderately W artillery
aoburate;

Natiena

Earsan tank fire

poritiap?rr. Narth 7: hewever, attempt8 by
tank

the enemy to silenoe ineffeotive position Early

fire

with

fire

prmed
83

due to the flat defilade taotios

trajeotory

af the tank gun8 and the artillery.

employed .:by United Natiens ttrs en&y

in the oenfliot,

employed his tIlak8 of the terrain the tank8 operated missions rseket

by twer

and oftem singly canalized of three

because of the nature At ether times,

which in group8

movement. to five.

One of the primary
3*j

of enemy tank orewi teams. wa6

was te seek and <destroy hortile By November 1950, destroyed Nation8 of T.&Iair air
as a;,;potential

launcher

the North fighting

K&oan foraa

105th Armered DiviSien by the aoouraoy

of United

peer strength

and infantry foroed North

ground unitr. Korean tankr,to Deoauae of thir,

The ruperiority move at night the tanks by late and beoame rummer. 1930

use aeoondary

rgaga and trails.

*The NK 105th Armored Division'was

reoenrtituted

roadbound

and herded olose together, light6 at nigh&;.

moving one at a time.

Enemy

tanks moved wkthout

The enemy adopted many osmouflage United Nations airmen. When IN airoraft

measures in order appraaohed,

to deceive

the enemy tank .> .

crews lit

smudge pot6 or oily that the tanks Still

rag6 near the tanks

to give the used United

imprerafon States

were burning, others oralhod

Other tank6 into

markings,

houses or used thatohed destroyed trucks br

roof6 a6 concealment, tankr. North

Others

84
Korean ArtilleQ North Xorean artillery nation;

parked beside I

was in+tially it'war

superior rendered rupply

to that

of any by United

ether Nations artillery,

oriental air

however,

impotent *
liner,

power +nd it6 in&t6 battle Soviet artillery

over-extendod doctrine dootrina B relied

North version

Korean of

on a modified for

the battle-tested of all availlable

whioh called

the utiJizatirn of eaoh phare of

te meot the requirement6

a projeoted

operatieno Korean Artillery regiment (12) oonsirtod of two battalion6 In . had L

Eash Barth (24) of ‘&m

guna, and one battalion

122mm howitzar6.M battalion

addition, battalion
one battory

eaoh .regiment of self-propelled

had one urtiarioraft artillery.

and one regiment

Eaoh infantry

(4) 7&m howitzorer ; one antitank

oompany whioh oonsiated 12Omm

of six &3nm AT gunrg and en8 mortar mortarlo In an offensive artillery aotion,

oempany oimposed of rix

the artillery

d oomnnaner determined

the

r6quircr;r~ents.

This was done by perronal

reoennab66anooo

8

.
and by an analyaia study, he determined and mortar8

UNCLASSIFIED

by intelligenoe oapabilities, artillery,

information,
F'rem this

of United

Xations

the amount of of subordinate units,

includ3.q

the artillery the attack,

needed to auppert Eaoh attaok preparatsry phase during fire

operation

wau divided

into

three fire

phases -- the phase,, and firing of command weapOna,

phase, the asaarilt

support

penetration

and osnsolidatien, fire were to break.-up hostile

The objectives the hostile supporting

the enemy*s preparatory and observation system,

to neutralize defenses0

to open gaps through opponent's
from

hctstile foroes. minutes

and to soften

up the varied

defending
to

Preparatory aooordfig

oonoentrations

ten

thirty

to the ameunt of available

ammunition, preparations line

It was SOP for at knm firing

the enemy to open artillery posititins in the United Nations one or more false A final of infantry intense automatio @f main

of resistanoe, ef fire

The enelny also executed to mask his impending

transfers

assaulte

concentration weapons,

of fire,

aclcempanied by the fire the aotual attack.

sometimes preceded fire,

Fer applioatien dark in

the preparatory well fsrward

the artillery positions.

was emplaoed after Flat trajectory lines which

camouflaged

weapons were fer dire&

emplaoed 500 to 1000 yards laying;

from tIMted

Bations

and the enemy's 82tnm and 1Xbmn mortars, were plaoed peraennel by ebserved in defilade.

he olassified was

as artillery, ta attaok defense

The mission Nations

of the mortar8 line of

and weapon8 in the United fire.

UNCLASSIFIED
,-

.

UNCLASSIFIED

*ilch artfllery the flank8

the start transfer{

of the enemy assault, Y its ffre te apprepria$e positien.

general

and direot

support

target8

fn depth and en either ,

of the United l f the

Nations*

This wa8 exeouted

at the signal

dPv5.sion oezzusnder or sutematioally The mi8siOn8
l f thie

aa direobed fire
Were t.

in the operation8 continue reserves

plan,

assault

_ L

the neutralization
fn l rder he prevent

of W firepewer,
a amnhbwcattaok,

to engage the opponent*8 te fselate III? defenders

frem refnferoements
routes o

and supply,

and %o deny the use of any wi$hdrawsl

The artil.Pery

oonisinued to support

an enemy breakthrough

in depth

by prompt df8plaoementb laying from the flanks

The enemy*8 i@nn or 7&m gun8, or through intervals

by dire& fired firet support were by the by two1

between platoons, Nations

on targets

of opportunitya

Oooupation the forward

of the United displaoement and routes

line

of defeU8e signaled

of direot seleoted

artillery, preplanned assault eohelon thirds

The sequenoe of displaoement

before

the attaok, aoamnander,
nannero

and the movement was oontrolled Usually, One-thfrd
85

regimental

the artillery displaoed

displaoed forward while

in a leapfrog remained

in posftion,

CCP Artillery

i Chinese platoon having

arki3lery two 10% as Observer8a a8 observer8

oompany hrrrftzer

oonsieted

of three

platoons, of four

each

guns and one sub-squad

men assigned men assigned artfllery

The oompany had one squad of twelve .
fn addftion to those in the platoons., of three oompaniesS eaoh wfth

An

battalion

oonsisted

six guns0

*In a CCF artillery division, artfllery had 7?..7kn~ zuzs, SE=

Most GCF infantry dfvision organfo UN("&S/;. 1; _, WI ___~ -.__-

.

and the battalion mena

had an additional

forward

observer

squad of twelve

The companyns twelve-man
,.

observer

group maintained

an OP forward

of the artillery

company,

The assistant

company oommander was in in front Telephone of the company varied oormnunication was The

charge of the group, according maintained principal Nations

and the distinoe situation. the artillery

to the taotioal by the OP with function troops

company oommander. deployment fortifications.

of the OP was to observe

of United This notified the fired

and the emplaoement of their

information the regimental preparation

was relayed

to the company commander who in turn This unit plan. was responsible for

headquarters., of the night fire

Missions support

were ususally of infantry

between MOO hours

and OYO hours;in detection liaison unit

as8aultsc

This was done to avoid

by United

Nations

airoraft6 forward was battalion commander. team. Eo the

There was no apparent observer attached, and the infantry The infantry

between the CCF artillery battery

to which the artillery fire through

requested relayed

commander, who, in turn, The battery

the request

the infantry , to the battery

commander then relayed plan was prepared

the message to the observer by the regimental If, during staff. the night,

Only one fire secondary

or auxiliary

plans were made* his position

enemy withdrew

or shifted

from 1.2ft to rnght, day,

no further

plans were made until
In preparation

the following for an attack, 200 yards

the artillery from the United 63

company was Nations line of

deployed

approximately

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED '

defense

0

The first

wavs of enemy infantry Sueaessive fires

dsployed

%xanediately to were

the artillery echeloned initial

oompanyre front. to the rear,,

wave8 of iniantry were laid,

190 preparatory

and the

barrage

oeourred 100 yards

when the assault from the TABl&R. During artillery by relaying

wave reaohed a potit Fire was sontinued the forward until OP

approximately the objeative was raaponsfble attaskunits.

was neutralized. for maintaining
This was done

the attaak, firs

ahead of the

the message to the

oomply ccmvmmdera, who in turns
informed gun a~ews to shff) firs

by the use of'messengers, or lift i%, The observer sub-

squad assSgned ts eaoh platoon A~tfllepgr fhe aasfgned target0
Coni~rol

oomputeil the moemary as a unit to

o;orreotisns~ of of the

csompauy weapons fired
target

on ame seation
other

and shifted was oral

as a unit for

seotiam

fire

those weapons nearest

the ocmqwny

~oxnrnanderB and written a oonsequerme, firipg

to Cha gucrs beyond *he range of voi~~e. As was irregular although oonoentrated. Interdiotory
+ and

Fire

power of the artillery harassing types of firs

oorapany was masseda

wwre not employed by ahe CCF, the divisional artfllery battalion missfon. the fire to divert wau !Rie plag, the was
OP

FOP nfght assigned regiment although artillery permitted

operations,

to the regiment

hav%ng the most diffioult control and prepared the right

assumed opewtfonal the dfvisfon battalion onae a fire

commander reserved to support another

reg3men%Co Xo flexib5lity It was either adhered to

plan was made.

*CCP artillery beoame more fnteuse

improved vastly since the spring of 1951. aad more aacura*e,,

It

62

UNCLASSlFlED

*

-

abandoned until artillery s _' ,_ the fire

the next day, whea:a new one was formulated. forward

?ho shifMng,,

battalion

observation

post was oharged with it. artillery lipes.

ni*hin

*he lmrgs+ area a& oontrolling
&he divieional Ih+ted Xatioas

During _ . was no oloser eighteen target

the nigh* operations, than 600 yards
frum

batlalion The

guns in the battalion area approxiantaly

werg normally

assigned

a general

200 fee+ in diame)er.

If 5) exoeeded *ha*,

the battalion through

awai%ed speoifio
Fire

regipsn&

battalions, requests from the infgtry ; power of Che battalion was oonoetitratsd upon

one seation

of the target. of the CCF that
and

It, was the dootrine mission of destroying

mortars

had the primary of destroying hostile

perronnelJ

artillery,

fortifications.
During flanks
.

daylight

amault,

artillery

pieoes
were

on the right
rpaaed

aad 1eiY

of the regirnembal

artflleryoompany

approximately

@O-500 feet relatively the general

apazlt and had a depth of $30 feet, immobile praatioe
aad were well

The guns remained At night,
it

oamouflaged.

wa8

for

100-200 yards Mor*arr Mortars about

to avoid

eaoh weapon to fire 86 deteotiono

f5ve rounds and ~OVS

were habitually from the ore&.

empladed on the*reverss !?his afforded was within

slops

of a hill

10 yards

the enemy several 8peaMag distanoe axis*
of made

advantages3

the forward observer and by plaolng fsr defleotions

the g\oa orew, oomputatioms

himself

on the gun-target whem obtatiing

tumeoosrary

iaitial-fire

63

UNCLASSIFIED
,Qfw

!lmmb

UNCLASSIFIED
data0

Thfs posit&on flat trajeotory

afforded fire,

the gun orew protection

from Unfted

I?atfons

Mortars

were infrequently Exoept for

used ia batteries his light mor'tarsp

but were mostly the enemy used down by

.

employed singly, previously infenky prepared unfts

concentrations'whiah
This

were oallad

as needed,,
the

indfoated

a poor OorePuriOatfOR8 posts of firing
and forward five to ten

ne-hwork whioh limited sbt3erverse rounds rapfdly in a target The enew

use of o&mvation

adapted

the,polioy Light

and thea deploying,: mortars

mortarr were zeroed in
in as aebdede in shape with
yard deep.
as it was

times, well-
the

and heavier

were brought

The main mortar the forward
Very only little osoupied

firfing

positions

was efrOUlar

edge about
effort durfiag

1 yard deep and the rear this
At all

edge l/2 position
other

was made to oamouflage
the aotual fipfag,

gum was taken oamouf%ged

out of posftion

and oonosaled

%&I Smaller firing

holes

about

5 t;o 10 yaPd8 from the

position.

87

Captured

ensPay dOQuIUOnt8 indicated fn strength
battalforr This
had

that

eaoh Comuuist

uait

BakSPg an assault
team0 equipped tith

a supportfag

firs

power unit

or

(8&n) mortarso
aBit WaS supposedly

reooilless

guns8 and

type 92 fapaatr-y gum, battalion cadre member0

@ onmnnded by a

The supporting mortar@, mountain and howitzers
pieces, were

regimental guns attaahed

fire

unit

was equipped

with

heavy
gUn8

from the dfvi8foBlo In addftfon,

and field artillery

attached

fram a CCP army.

Set up by Wtfllery

UrnitS themselv98,

UNCLASWIED
c md

UNCLASSIFIED ..,
-

The mission ia hostile United

of the field
for iafmtq

gunk and howitters

ua8 to make breaohes
t@ MNI'tralim

po8itimS

.tU!+itS to pesetrato;

lPatiens

a.r$illery

porition8;

md to oarry

out a areeping
US artillery at all
agd to

I _

krrrage,
furnish

TWQbatteries
a areeping

were used $0 neutralize Motmtaim guna fired

barrage.

obrrtaales

in

80
front of the attacking During angle fire adjaoeit for firing, the lather on a ruin strategio enemy infantry
unitr.

parC of the'oonfliot, objeotive*
Beutraliziag

CCF artillery
fire

tared high

was also

plamd

Ed

pointr.

CCF mortar6

were set up on forward well forward in daylight. wre

md artillery Infmtry

was brought divisioars was left
kere

slopes as
fouud

In the 08: ah
whioh length iadioated
l

seator,

position8 for

artillery Bo roads
anmunitiaa

in position

a protraoted

of t&m.

ia evidenoe, a& roof agaiast

and deep emplaoementr wre fomd. the #&oer beoause Of the

with

Oonneoting

pits proteotion

shelter8

Beoauee of the

overhead

UN airoraft, targets

were believed narrowem -

placed

to fire

om pr6sel~oted
whioh
varied

90
of the field instanoes, of fire, artillery from 200 to 500 miles. in de+th and wa8 displaoemat8 were In other Well disperred was eoheloned Frequent

to oombat Ull patrols.

xaade by enemy artillery

to avoid UBI observation

and mmxmterbattery

fire.

91
Tagen to Counteraot Emmy Artillery
oountermeasures and Armw

Coratemeasnres

Perhaps the two most effsotive
emmy artillery fire and air agd armor fPbrik*cr. wers the:uae

employed against
artilky

Of oounterbattezy

direot

*This was'probably fire.

a regimental
US

7Chnmitiantry

gun often amd for

UNCLASSIFIED

To overcome the fort‘ffied artillery using employed intense a preponderance of 15m pos%tions of enemy artillery, of aeaurately urfng friendly adjusted

conoentratfons

of fuz6 delay,, w low tith

Area fire,

fire L approximately

100 rounds effeot5veo

mfxed fused delay

apd VT, wns also

Tarks wera engaged wilt+

VT face and fuee qu%ako forePeg immobilizfig 1Bt artfllery High angle some by damaging a used 'wp shsaf ffra, usfng a

the enemy armor to button
traok,

up aad also

fbP%e the tauks were immobill.eed,
to

area fire aomb%atfon mortara

sat the vehioles
of fnzs

oa fire,

quiok, 810pes~

VT, and fuze delay, 92 strikes destroyed

was empJoyed against

cm rever8et

The affeotivamese potential

of air

the

FBorth Korea38, armor
use of aamonflage afr pOWerc. during

by Kovembar 1950.,

The enemy*8 sxtensfve KatiQnS aga%lst

measXWds dsaaoastrated Wnfted Katfons the early Eattaliga During
days

his PUSpeOt of tiited armor was also effeotivs

enemy tanks

of the Korean sonfliot,

The US 70th Tank (Heavy) one round of 7&txa HVQ eaah, launoher teams

destroyed the period

two euexy T?& tanks with
prior to

2 Bcavember 1950D 3.,5 roaket friendly tanks* off
Korean

were used in oa>n$austfou tith . had Priendly
posf%ions

The

system employed oovered
!l'he US

tanks

drive

the enemy tanks

the road hto
frrfaPtryo

away from aooompanyfng North
than

rocket

team gunners 93 enemy tanks@

advanced under oover and destroyed

the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The Daylight Ii3 rare !Phe feasibflfty

At%aak ins*anoes, the Communist Forses employed daylight; depelnded upoln Several outrsighad faotorsg attaclks, fir6%, 5~
his

of such an attack the batOle

and most imporCant, the opinion
inovemeat frm

Sua&ss

the aasual$ies

of the enemy oommallpder. Seoond, bha wea%her shfelded obeervation and athok by Uni.ted Natiom of the faot not differetiiaSa air powore

In one attaak, mations friend attack foroas OP foe,

the enemy %ook advantags
and could

tha$ Wited be%wesn

were dfsorganited

XL the prepondst;~~noe of memy &taake, 4: was the favored astsaul,ka

ths night

Communist Foroes relied whelming General foroe of United

on night

warfare

beoause of the overpower. Lieutenant stated8

Nation6

artillery

and air

Ida chaxlg, Co;mdhg

General,

14th CCF Army (Corpcr)*

warfare of a laok of air be employed.
Daylfg‘h~

had becme disastrous for power, mnsequently night were the

the CCF because envelopment musS

Ths tactfos

employed at night followed

SBIIL~as employed dur5x.q the day.

An envelopment

the %nJRtfal engagement. the ccver of darkness the effectiveness The attaaks Junior

95
as advantageous of United l'?ations for aira

The enemy selected attack artilleryg objective

because i% minimized and tank support. prior to daylight.

mere designed

to seoure an to

officers

were trained

*The 4th CCF Army (Corps)

was never

in Korea.

UNCLASSIFIED

IED UNCLASSIF .
estimate attaok the situation should be pressed during daylight@ and to determine whether an

at nfght, control at night by the use of white and whist166 banners, were used the to ' -

The enenpr exeroised armbands, to indiaate and placards. directions

Ropes, lime, and tranrnnit

trumpets, messages,

In one insCanoe, about 24" in diameter

enemy used a series guide troops
At

of rfoe position.

straw

doughnuts

into

night

in an assaultg Rations a ten-yard position,

small North

Korean units, defiles,

in single valley8

file,

approached trails,

United

positions interval

through

and along

keeping

between men* foroa

About 100-200 yards Wh6n saoh all rushed the

from the hostile

the attaaking fired

deployed.

msn was in position, United Nations

the leader

a shot whereupon If a withdrawal

defensive

posftions,

was neoessary, machine gmsa

the enemy troops

were supported after

by heavy and light attaokmg enemy troops Regiment,

96

In one instance defensive Division, areae their positions they plaoed !l'his enabled

had penetrated 2nd US Infantry of the

of the 38th Infantry fllumfnatPng enemy troops

grenades slightly pressure

on both flanks to the rear

to ooordlnate areas. major control North :

movements and to inorease Chinese favored

on the penetrated moon to launch

97

the time of the full assuPl%ng that

offensives, offset

evidently

the advantage

of taotioal

the damager of United Nations to attaok

bombing and strafing.

Koreans preferred

on dark nights.

98
to gain entrsnae was the favorit
tridc

The enemy employed various into United Nations positfons.

ruses at night Most typiaal

UNCLASSlFlED

.I

UNCLASSIFIED

enemy soldiers psrfmater by oalligg

of pretending gained entransa

to bs ROE:troops, into

On ens instanoe, Battalion

the Nstherlands

out 0 "O=kay, where ROKs," soldiers North -
- noticed

In a resulting

firsfight,
fnsignia.

Nethsrland
On other oemdong,

the enemy waarfig:ROK for
the

Korean8 usad woodan slappers gprn firs, the eonfliot, Shortly aftor

dao6ptfve

proposes

to

simulate entered

Communist Chinese For668
a preliminary deployed reaonnaissanoe around a base a full skimishsrs lbooop

thsy conduetsd

of m pOSftfOZl8 by a rusee of a hfll and played about fifty tunes,

Four flutists

yards apart FOP five minutes

fs the open aad under they played while

kept shuttling drawing fire

up to them and wfthdraw%ng,
whfah

dfsolosed

ths SutXine

Th6y suooeeded ti 59 of tha perimeter,

communfoat ions_ Lack of oomamicatSons battle, captured 6speoially at night, hampered Commmist Foroos oonsiderably 7!hf8 stat6mnt "A Collsotilcbn WS6 berm out by a i%

enemy dooumsnt snt,,a+led XXX Army Qroups

of Combat Exper26n060"

Hsadquarters,

Diffiaulty of mad.ntain%mg signal aomzumioations at night after the dspioyment of tmops resultsd in d%ffioulti6s of oommsmd eontrole e o b Reeauas of poor ooammications, controlling an6my oftan his unfts the enemy had diffiaulty For this In 6ither maeone th6

or &alt%ag an attaok, his attaok Forms

had to oontinus

even under adv6r68 and the North Koran

oonditfolare PSOp10'6

Both the Chinese Comnletist q flares, utilized

the sanm modes of ooxnunioaticm flaga, and me88eng6rdQ a. ~:‘qv

-- radior,

bug106,

whirtlea,

UNCLASSiFIED 3#

-

W%$’

UNCLASSIFIED '
Radio Radio aommunications On rare radioa. support oocasions, Wire nets companies. units

,:i -

were used on regimental
smaller

level

and higher. SC8 300

than a regiment

had Amerioan

extended

down to and inoluded

battalions

and fire

All

messages transmitted

by radio

were aoded.
artillery

Transmissions to avoid

in the alear 'were made only to diraot in battle,

fire, oombat. -

disaster

and by enemy armored tollits ran from the forward of the oatiro at the forward I?orth

in aotual CP to the signal

!RIO principal oommndrr’6

axis CP.

of communioation The verve center

Nor+& Korran CP.
Koroas

system was the base message center During liahed radio the early relay part

of the oonfliot, forward

fareea.ostabon

stations

of the advanoo mossago eator of United Nations Poroas was to

the flank take plaoo.

from whioh an evelopment' The enemy found radios in keeping and the failure wire

not too reliable

in Korea booruse of W

of the diffioulty artillery fire

in due to the effectiveno in oold weather.

of batteri.

and Chinese Communist Foroas telephones Bug106 -primarily, arranged During Bugles were uaed,at and as a fear for withdrawals, the attaok

American 100 were used by the enemy. leveba for signals

oompany and battalion All signals

weapon. attaoks,

were short

and pro-

or oonsolidation

of positions. preoodad the An

of some enemy rogimonts, this varied

bugle calls

main assault. extenaivo

However,

from rrgimomt

to regimen%.

russbar of -11s

was used during

an attaok.

As a frar

weapon, the bugle ma employed Imr two ways: first, and diaalose the outline of a

it was used as a means to draw fire

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSlFlED

United

lOatiaas

unit@8 defonae per%mater~ a600ndo buglers to onate
Finally,

wore deployed

around thd partioter in great
strength,

the.%mprisaion
when a United

of an l n6my 6nvrl6pm6nt lVation6 ratruating poaiti6n ma taPam,
101

en6apr buglers Whistle6
m&hod -

6ound64 "TapsA to dagoralirr
RhisClrs

II? soldi6rs. a8 a ~ Mh

wore used only
It

duriag

cl060 l ngagemenQ u66d only It

of group

control*

was appmron%ly

phtOm

squad level,

and its

prdmary use was to urge troop6 tha whist16
hfore

forward*

ollhva of fire.

an enamy attaek Vfhistlo Flares
used e

faltered,

signaled

a resumption

measagrs were prearranged -- Flare6 Different

an l ttaok, typos paoarr6ng.d of visual ai@aala !I!hoao to

ware one of the primoipal colors
signiffed The North

short

moaarrgar,, flu.6

were ohanged

frequently.
fire
was

Koroans

used three

request

6upporting
torah

to commonoe and five used to rally troop6

An l leotric

to halt it. 102 on a positi6n. in cxnnbat, priHlar&ly oond~tions. 60mm6nae firing, to

flarms

Flags -- Flag6 were used .for eaarna\miaations ^ . dire& Various batt6lion-size and smaller units

under taotiaal withdraw, order6

movaments meant orders All

to attaok,

or drop to the grounds oontrolled, finished, These orders

praarranged were used until

war8 taotiaally wa6

an engagaant

and than naw orders

ware isauad* regulated leaders the usage of flags, waved them.
to

The ooaanander of a unit
battalion,

and only

o~mpany, and platoon wua handled

Whtan a blub
indioate a

flag

wa6 used0 it

by a squad leader The loaation

partioular flags

prearranged

squad signal.

of other

signal
of a

indioated

the preaenoe

of the 06ma~ der or the looatioa

..:

UNCLASSIFIED '
103

.w.

0-a

post.

Messengers -- Mesaengera, all levels -- each unit

both mounted and diamouated, from platqom carried

were used on

size and up had a group of
both oral
tmd writtm

messengera~

These messengers

meaaagea.
lob units.

Runners were used for

oommnmioati~s

between patrola

aad parent

7iz - UWASSIFIED "".. ',.

:. B@lBqgb

‘: .” _‘,’

UNCLASSIFIED

9i'aakmeas in Knemy Offensive 1, attaoka - The Communist attack in Korea0 was inflexible, doctrtie,

!Paotios in all
lnajor

as observed

enemy

Subordinate

xmits were not permitted defenses, or other or seaondary always patrol faotora missions

to make adjuatment6 might have indicated
fo

whioh terrniR,.friendly as being deaii-able.
asaaul-bing

Alternate Enemy patrols tiemy

were not assiglsed the route6

units.

utilized

of shortest

approach

and r&urn0 for for whioh

formations or slii to

were standard frisrrdly inflexible fr

md made no allowance Preparation6 pattern

differenoea ML attack

in terrain followed

diapoaiticn,
and

umarying

aoos became apparent

ndly foroea,,

And finally,

enemy inaiatenoe, proved oostly

due to inflexibility, Nations

on maaa employment taotica air and artillery
2,

in the face of United

fire, suffioi8nt logistical support to 8u8taiB

The enemy lacked offensive,

a~ extended

3e The enemy lacked communieationa
control of units in the attaok, of enew

faoilitieao

This hampered cause for

and may have been the basic

the inflexfbili~y 4. a taotiaal

tactics. flank support or seourity during

Enemy unfts march.

employed little

73

JNCLASSIFIED

id...

UNCLASSIFIED

DZXEXSIVE TACTICS . SECTICN A Defensive 1. Elaborate During Indioations aa Determined artillery by Friendly positions, either features Forces and troop shel'ters. for the

Dunkers, periods

covered

of defensive

operations,

when preparing to IN foraea,,

a new offensive Colmauniat foroes withstood W air

or denying prepared

oertain'terrain elaborate

fortifioationa

whioh suocessfully were placed

and artillery features

attaoks. and‘hiadered

These positions UV advanoea. front

on oommanding terrain 2. Appearance Barb wire sector

of barb wire entanglementsin entaglamenta front * were first

of enemy positiona, in the North Korean

reported

of the eastern

in June 1951, positiona

although

some use of wire in the oentral

by the enemy in defensive front 3. as early Extensive aa March. AT obstaclea

was enoountered

(nines,,

ditches,

barrioader)

on routes

of

advance,, The appearanoe vehicular operation. only troops 4, of numerous obstacles indicated to hinder United Natiosr

and tank traffic Barricades

a defensive of various in other

phase in the enezqfla were used, not to ohawelize IN

and ditohes but also of fire.

types

on routes into

of adyanoe,

seotors

enemy fields

Laak of IV statements Enemy FWs were well

of an impending informed of their

offense. offensive operations, and

United Nations
* titer

officers

were able to fix "Breaking

the approximate

date of attaok

3rd Historioal

a&ion Intarviaw8, Defaohment,
l

the HGNGCHWDefense Line,"

UNCLASSlFlED

fro= / c.

their

statements.

Lack of information

of suoh attackr

indioated

an enemy defense. 5O Stockpiling of supplies. of either instead defense offensive of an elastic line inrmediately or defensive defense* after an enemy and a need Of displayed a a&ion.

This eras an indication 6. A stubborn defense line

Ihe use of a stubborn offensive time for stubborn indicated regrouping defensive a lack

of counteroffensive

potential

and re-equipping, attitude that,

Ihe enemy also

when hia supply during the latter

bases were threatened. stages of the Korean for their

It was alao probable confliot, North Korea

troops

realized spaoe for

they were fighting time. The armistice

homeland and would not trade no doubt influenced defense
70

talks

the Communist armies

to resort

to a stubborn

line@ defense (numerous oounterattaokr). to restore Units from

The use of an aotive Communist Forms

used numerous counterattacks United Katioas

lost

positions

and to hinder

advancese attacks.

squad to battalion

size were used in these

UNCLASSIFIED

.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECTI$N B The Elastio Defense

It was apparent

that

two types

of defensive oonfliot. position

tactios

were Korean some

employed by the enemy during People's provision

the Qrean &pe

The North defense,

Army employed a modified was made for an elastio defense.

although

type defense, '

and the Chinese Communist

Foroes used a mobile
Chinese Communist

Foroes

The Chinese Communist Foroes did not employ the principle
*

of a

main line

of resistanoe

nor a position for three

defense. or four

Then the enemy exhe employed armies. a deIn

peoted to be in one plaoe fensive army whioh phase, ocoupied

weeks,

the se&or

of two offensive formation

a defensive

the CCF employed a tactioal army of division plaoed

of "one up,

and two baok ." position,

When a defensive

was in a delaying as a screening unit Forces. launched In the three 105 offered to do a oounterunits to .. _

one division foroe.

or regiment,was Small foroes

on line

and delaying limited meantime, hours'

from the defending United Nations

attacks

to confuse

and delay

the other

two divisions

of the army, approximately rested and reorganized. the unit slowly on line when forced units,

walking When United

distanoe Nations

to the rears

Foroes attaoked, but withdrew

moderate

to

stiff

resistanoe as far to restore

SO* when it withdrew attaak was launohed

back as the two reserve the lost ground,

If the reserve withdrew

were unable the offensive

to launoh armies

a oounterattaok, ih reserve0

the enemy slowly oounteroffensive

A major

wa8 then defense.

* Since June 1951,

the CCF def.initely

employed .a position

UNCLASWIED

/
1

b

,

1

SYMBOLS:
A - DIVISION ON DEFENSE 8 - RESERVE DIVISIONS DF DEFENSIVE ARMY C - DEFENSIVE ARMY HO D- WFENSIVE ARMY ASSEMBLY AREA
( REORI~AMZA~~ON 8 REGROUPING

APPROXIMATELY

100

KYS

,

I
3 HOURi MARCHING TIME

izj

A

e

POSITION IN THE DEFENSE

-.

UNCLASS ~IFIED
launched by the CCF. defense, the holding
derire~wr

In aa elastio impor tan00 . the United effort.

of term& to ereate

was.of

minor in

The enemyfs major Nations offensive

weaknorse

which: oould be exploited wat an kpartant

by aouMardefease

The oountereffort

par% of the elrstio

employed by the emmy, and it no6 ma5nly direoted 106 United Nation6 flask, I-rrusal of enemy documents leads this his soldiers about thi6 writer

toward aa exposed

to believe

that

the enemy propagandized elastio after this defemse taotio. withdrawing taotio
from

the importanos

of the morale to

Evidently

wa8 dome t;o bolster The emqy referred

hard-wolp poiitims.

a6 two-folds

%ard workn' -- con6truotion

of emplaoslnsntr

and field motioa n -Thaited

work6 in every plaoe to which they moved, and '90-g. employment6 of troops offensive. "Strong
107

in attaok defense,

or defenrie deplete

to delay

a

Nation6

the srrezny; fir4

the ohazmeS and destroy Communist Force6 high CCF regiment6

the enemynfwaa the 'theme of the Chinese command.

usually

deployed disposed

in three on the front

lizm6. line

Two-third6 rrith one-third

of

eaoh unit

wa6 6upposedly for

kept on both flonka along a narrow front

a poss.ible

oouuterattaok, depth. Co-d

Deployment

wa8

and in great

aad obrervation oosaurications andl seoond

po6ts were set up on favorable were established defensive lines

terrain,

and telephone The first

between the OP and the CP. oonsirted of well-oonstruofed trenohe6.
Nations fire.

forti%ioatiorr pO6itiOlr6 wre

oo111lpbcted by oommunioations

Dummy oamouflaged All hill positiogr

were built

to draw United

UNCLASSIFIED

I

UNCLASSlFlEb

4-6

defended and all

by small units fields of fire

adequatelyequipped

with

automatic

weapon6,

appeared to be well-coordinated. the first line were constructed
of United

Jdost defensive forward

works for facing

on the approaoh. slope of : .-

slope of hills

the direction

Nations reverse

The seoond line the hills, line. United

of defense was ustWly fire

set up on'the

or where its

power could readily positions were built Of fir0

support

the firrt

All-around

defensive

to guard against covering line having
a6 16rg6 6n

Nati0B.s surprise

attacks,

Field6 with

area a6 possible preponderanoe

were selected,

the front

the

of maohins guns and automatio United Nation6 daylight

weapons* gains0 CCF troops loat ground.
198

To counteract

aent SOlRO-

rmrall groups to counterattaok timers North two or three
Korean

at night a night

to regain

amh attaokr Army

were employed.

People*6

The North Sobile drawal

Korean elastic

defea6eo

or in their

terminology rand withto allow foroe. -.

defense,"

wa6 characterized lines

by the aounterattack It was designed tine agatist

to suocessive foroe

of defense, spae for

an inferior The general

to trade

a superior differart

exeoutiola

of this

maz%euver was not greatly Foroer~ All however,

from the tactics was permitted diSsngage6mStS

of the United Nation6 the subordinate

no flexibiliv and
crommander.

commnderr.

withdrawal6

had to be made as the order ocoupied two lines Korean form

of the senior at the

-I

Eaoh regiment but the bulk forward

of defense

same tixI6P im the the _

of the North

was ooncentrated dootriae

poritkm.

Tha erosmy*r defensive

speoified

UNCLASSIFIED

"-UNCLASSIFIED
--

distance ai attacker

between the two position6 to dirplaoe his artillery One third

had to be great and mortars

enough to oause after occupying of trbe urni% of the seooad

one of the sectors.

of &he effective well

rtr6agth

on defense was deployed
.

as a reserve

to the rear

liae

of defens6. The forward unit opened fir6 forces 'at extreme ramr@;erin an attempt to

for06

United

Nations for

to (aploy However,

rusd make t%e-oonruming

preparation6

the asarault,
dowa by UV fire,

before

the forward

line

eould be pinned under ewer drawal to throw forward against

it withdrew

%o rear po6ition6
with the wilhlauachd If the was launched

of rupportirg

weapomsi

Conourreatly
were

to the second line, IX force6 line off

count&attacks and inflioh

Muediately

balaaoe

oqewlties,

was unable

to disengage, flank

a oouxhwattack in the rear

the attacker*6

by the troop8

This was done only on the order

of the senior

position. 109 oommamder.

Withdra=le Inverted-V . During restricted Carmuaist -. a mobile Formation the early their forces force. phases 0,f th6 Korean conflict warfare to the low gramd formation wh6a UB forces and valleys, the

offensive

used an inverted-V & withdrawing troops to enter

in conjunctionwith they permitted

to the high ground, the V, at which

United Nations numerical foroe

time a superior the V.

encircled

the attaoking

column and closed

As one North

Korean Ppp stated8
79

'IFlED UNCLASS ', '.>.

UNCLASSlFlED

Our troops make strategic withdrawals when the enemy (m) attacks3 our troops then attack from the flanks and encircle the en&y with superior numerical strength* In most case6 the enemy (W) had no additional foroes on their own flanks to assist them, D o d Enemy groups occupied ground and plaoed was made to destroy and halt deployed arrival fire the forward slopes of ridges paralleling low

on the United Nations
and

columns.

An attempt to canalize

the first

last

vehiole

of a colu~

movement on the narrow to the rear

roads.

A sizeable of friendly

enmy foroe units and the

to prevent retreat 110 of W reinforcements, traps an areas into

Tactical troops entice into

were employed by the energy to lure Withdrawals a hasty to strike to destroy

United

Nations to

were made by some enemy troops Other enemy troops or flanks

W forces

exploitationd the flank

positioned force8

themselves

of the attaokbg such

in an attempt

small W units. on the first

In selecting line was

an ambush site, decreased, bulk attaok. Dslayimg

the number of riflemen of automatic deployed

but an increase

weaponswas

provided. a quick

The

of the enemy troops 111

under cover to afford

Parties
foroe

The covering withdrawal contact placed attack, with

or delaying
selected

party

whioh, covered unit

an enemy

was usually

from the last

to break parties favorable few. were to Thus,

United Nations points

Forces0

These delaying

at strategic

where the land was least

where the roads were poor and natural automatic

approaches

a small number of men armed with hinder a United Nations attack,

weapons were able to

UNCLASSIFIED

B+

3miiw

UNCLASSIFIED
The oovering L although foraes ranged fn size from a *man employed. The Variation unit usually group to a platoon, 3n size of the

a squad was normally

group depended on the size of the withdrawing exerted -. drawal divert fire by United Wations
Foroes.

and the pressure oovered party their the with-

'.A platoon

of a battalion*
a possible United

The mission Hatfons

of the delaying by inoreasing

was to volm of

attaok

on IR! positions.

Radios rere.not

used to oontrol

the delaying

aotion. A marked ohange took foroes . after their taotioa, nfth plaoe in'the delaying Usually,
dark

aotion

of CCP,oover&ng in their parties.

May 1951 offensive, moved out after United taoti'o

the Chinese, no delaying

withdrawal

leaving

Close oontaot departure

l!iTatAons units

was avoided,

A marked defended tenaoiowlyo until ilsued. 112

from this

was noted when CCF unita foroe was forbidden rarely

even to death. ordered

A covering

to withdraw

to do so by higher Taotios

authority;

was suoh an order

Withdrawal

Ths regiment order units a tithdrawal* withdrew

was the Iowest

eohelon

d of oomman authorized

to and the under all

Assembly areas were not predesignated, as possible during the hours In a battalion file

as far

d darkness withdrawal,,

the proteotion :

of the delay%ng foroe.

oompanies moved as one oolunm in siugle Regiments diotated used the same prosedureo by the terrain

along the same route. of ooltmn movement were One or mere battalions Contaot between battalions

Variations

and enemy situation. single-file oulumna.

-

also moved in parallel, was maintained by radio

oommunioations

and rumer. before the withdrawal

Bnamy artillery

and heavy weapons deployed

-

UNCLASSIFIED

‘.

Under oowring fire of one squad of the 1st Platoon, Company ~mover east in single file elonF the ridgeline toward Company B. lu elements of the 3d Platoon, Company A, reaoh the right flank of the 4th Platoon, Company B, the letter PO-JOE out in single file toward Compare C. when l lementr of the 6th Platoon, Company B, oontaot the 7th Plrtoon, Coapaw C, the latter ~OTOLSnorth landing the Betalion. upon reeahing the foot of Hill I, units me oheoked off b the Battalion Staff and Upon order of the Bettalion Commander, the oowrCcnpany Commanders. Battalion Hradquerters 1~ poriing sqund then joins its parent unit. tioned between Companies B and C.

UJ 8’1

-

UNCLASSIFIED

of the main body of troops0 As far as oould be determined, Countsrattaoks although party, the last This kas dus to their no artillery Gerei rarely units laok of mobility* firs supportsd with with a

or mortar

a withdrawal,, _ withdrawal, delaying

made in oonjunotion

inoreasod their

to disengage, togother 113 vslme of fir.&

Ohs

Use of the Counterattaok Enemy oountsrattaaks system and were used for a United foroeg Nations and (3) assaults to reoapture wsre an integral various purposess part of their defensive the edge of sf the hostils

(1) to blunt a perti~n

(2) to annihilate a lost positions

If the purpose Nations early

of a Comnunist an offensive,

souuterattaok the attaok

was to delay United began at night, If its motive but wa8

Foroes or blunt

enough to end the engagement by daybreak* a oaptured reoapturing sf the night position, the attaok

to regain to permit rsmaiuder

began early

in the evening.

the objeotive

by midnight*

!&is enPcl,led the defensive positions

to be spent in organizing tenable for

to Lntxe the objeotive

the next dayDs fighting* Xations support0 positions He also whioh he oounterattaoked

The enemy oounterattauked thought -. laoked depth w strong

UA%tsd

rear

when United Bations

Nations

Fcccaes appeared

disorganized,

or when the United point for a

Feroes used the oaptured aotion without unit

position

as a starting fer defeAssa

new offensive The regiment the terrain
enemy

organizing:ft varied

attaoking

in size from a oampany ts a A thorough reosnnaissanoe of en

depending

upon the situation.,

in the 'vioimity

of the objeotive

ta gain information

UNCLASSIFIED .-f

UNCLASSIFIED

.

.

,;, .,," ."
and armament was aoocmplished by

,’ .. .’ *

United late

Nations afternoon

strength, or early unit

disposition, evening
uere

of the attasking the signals

of the day of the attaok. All members L , familiar with the routss of approach, and before unit x~~ing out.

to be used, and the pl,an of attaok of the prearran&d

The loaation on the flank rear

oouxxterattaok line

was set up

at the depth of the defense defensive position.

9 to 80 yards to the trenohes
was

of the front position oral.

&nmnunioation An order for

oonneoted

the rear usually extended

from the front. The attaaking

the attaok dPvided into

foroe was usually

widely

small groups of squad and platoon lines quietly, deployed,

size whioh appreaohed swiftly. with

United IIations Generally

and then attaoked

one squad moved out first forward, turning

in a triangular

formation

one angle pointing Envelopments,

movements , and penetrations oou&erattaoks. Enemy troops

were employed infiltrated on both troops +

by the enemy in his night into flanks 1x0 rear

areas and endeavored

ta make the main

assault

of the United Bations or against

position

between the frontline defended. of frontal

and reserves, attaok

a seotor

weakly

me enemy ssuntersupporting fire, to the . -

did not extend beyond the limit was taken,

and when a position flanks to avoid

the enemy main body dfspersed fire, from the se&or
was

TRTartillery

If a planned withdrawal reserve elements

to take place, unit.

enemy If

oovered the withdrawal

of the attaok$ng

the position

was to be held, his posftions.

the enemy oonstruoted

fortiPioation8

and consolidated

114

UNCLASSIFIED

.

‘_

UNCLASSF 'IED

Comtemeasures

Taken & UN Foroes!Against

the Elastio

Defense

The same defensive enemy foroes
counterattaoks. n

measures employed agaiast offsns5ve
peAmeter.

the night wsll
against

a4baak of
MS
ssordination

in a major
A t%ght

mrked

equally

ig depth,

togsthsr

with

of fire
and repel

between units,

permitted

Wited
'

lgations

tmits

to withstand

erremy eeuaberrttaoks. taotic

A favorite
elsstio defense

of United
the

Xations
attaok

Foroes against
until

the

enemy18 .psint

was to press Friendly units

an eaemy strmg amd plaoed artillery

was oontaoted. oonoeatrations

then

wsthdrew

on the ezmiy's

positions0 etlollly,'

To proteot

agairut all

the

%zmwted-V in their

fermatktn forward
~atisns

of the

UI!I tomes flanks
the

soreensd

high growad

mommeat and kept
&roes

well

proteoted. of the Cansnt&st of fire. Vhm
were

United defensive

dstermiared

extremities

positioms

by observatioxi
a withdrawal,

of its

pattern

enem# aotiora
_ -

ind%oated

artiblsry

oonoelatFat%ons

plaoed

011 both ends of the sneay'r This artillery
withdrawal efterr

posit&mm

as wll

as om the

dala-ySng party.
say

fire
mute.,

was eohelemed im depth to oover Rapid follew-up
him fraa of ths smew aa the main

possible

eaeq

withdrawal

by UN For-s

pre+ented

reorganizisg aotions,

preparimg
hostile

new defensive
covering fores

pssitioms, was easily

IB smaall wit
by-passed

aad the nfChdrawimg

bedy engaged. tank mits

The emoq oooasiomally
effestive

employed a rear guard.
the emmy

Ul!!

provsd

in by-passimg
*aa+

sbremg psirts.

Im Ostsber

19511 anar.lCUMWHQ,

fras

the 7m
the

US Tamk M~talioa
ensmy as hs was

by-passed6.sme such stromg poirt

curd surprised

UNCLASSIFIED

JNCLASS

beis relieved by another unit. 1'15 foroe. air power, Heavy oasualtier were inf'lioted

on the hostile Utited lesser

Nations

by the use of radar, at Bight.

inilioted

heavy

oa ermslliy troops

as they withdrew

85

UNCLASSIFIED

. _

.

UNCLASSIF ‘IED . . _..

i

Late an elastio

%n the defense

Xoream oonflSol,

)he

Cumrnirt lirps

&roes

changed

frse (yLB~o no

to me util3ris$
may be advawed

a mati

of res%Stalss ahange, although

Sevsral
eonorate

thearies
'pruef

t(lr

justify the
aay,:ike.
afferd

has beer

famd

te

&port

:
to trade spaos for when

Im the past,
time igl order

Communist

Fsreerfootild

te launoh @

ammteroff~mive Parallel'

measures,,

Hmrever,

the emumy reaohed the face"
people. the North by saarifiokg

territory

ho oould. net afford to %eq I of Ijhe hsmland of the Morth Korom

To do’so,
Korean

he may have felt,
poop10 aid pessibiy armis&, Bations

would oause loss
of the
e&tire

ef

respect

of

oriental reotioms

world.
of Morth

Ia v%aw of a possible
Kerea to fall

to permit
hmds

imtm l’hi*od

would have g%vea U!J delegates
frs%ng the 019 troops world to to,halt retair

a weape
-*

Ya megotiatiom. w Parallel would

Furthermore. have e&led : realm

at the its

the Commmist

"Yrsm curtafir" 'Robably

in Xoreai logiaal

the-smut

for
of

the

ahaage froa

elastia

t0

stubborn artillery
attempted

defemo

taotias

was the offeet

BniWd

Blations
the

air

md

on muses
te

of ememy trsop*,

Fome~ly~

ComxuWtte

destroy

fricmdly

divisim-size

unit&
air

by superior and artillery,
the

weight

of

atmbereD

But beoause ef<frieAdly
attemptr

e]ipcNpr resorted !?hls taotia
A Conmmfst

k

k

anthilate

s&l

fr&smdly

ruitso

was mere effo&ve'whe@
dosummt swpperts *his

the MLR ia defense was employed.
theory

as follrrsr UNCLAS$

IFIED

--i --c-.--“f-c.-e

.

TppIc~ymmsIlm~~A~m~m --. -.-e-.._-.-----

.-.-“---y-e-

SI(BTCH PREPARED EYms-cm FEC

OBTAINED CAPFROM

We are te defmd

amd further fetiify *he present pesitisms of our bat%alior; Bherefere, we must mot yield a s~g~e lw peretratae inoh ef grmmd l r allow even 9~ ememy soldier Ab, the 6-0 time, in order tr'infllot a large mssber ef casualties, we musB be OPL the alert ti the froth lines SO that we say seize uper auWable spperhxti%icw fer aggrsrsbe small unit aetirao 116 :

Barth

Korean Paople~s Army The 19or$h Korean Army employ@ a modified type p@sitiom dbfease.

ThPs aonsisD;ed of a maim lime of resis$aase deff-sufficiea0
mst

oemposed sf a serSes of of all-around Koresla of ilm kypes.of defense;

islands, of mutual stressed

Eaoh island support

was capable
by ffre,

wore capable dootrSne

The North

defense defensive fire with

the fact'that

the sffe&ivensss of all

posi4&ms antitank

depended OR the ae-ordinat5.m defenses
and

obstacles, unfts varieda A regiment sometimes a

Depths of Berth extended -. . division a Ncrth
a depth

Koreaa rifle

to a deptrh ef six miles sometimes'extended Kerean battalien

from the mafia 1%~ of resistaneet Nmmally, aad

to a depth of kwelve miles. occupied a fro& of about

2000 yards

ef 1500 tcs 2000 yards0 often defsndc2 a fro&

In.smuntafnous of
3 l/~miles~

terrain0

an earmy-

battalion

The Nerth te four miles

Korean main line aad was divided

of resistawe into regimental

had a dep$h of three

and battalieja

seoborss

These consisted About 1 to 1 l/2

of a nuaifmr ef strong miles fa frex&

poSnts protsated

by ebstaalsse line, mamed strong %a

of the MLR was a seouri%y

by am enemy bat%alion, peints pro+eaQed.by

whioh eensf+ted

sf mmber ef individual 1-k was designed

a system of obs0aoles,

UNCLASSIFIED

to prevent for

surprise

attack6

and te:aot stroag

as a reomnaias~oe point fr the line In fro&
@OaSiS~Od Of

sorespr 1186 supported

the l&R.

Eaoh individual

by fire

frem the maim line

of resi6tamcee which ~6Ua11y

of the security hasty e6Iplaee6IOntS

li~0 was an 0uhpa60 line
mmmd with line troops

armed wi%h smalr miles

arms and hand grenades.

This

was about

six to eight

ia front

ef the ML&
he one-sixth of the seaior in the of

Enemy reserves the main forebe

varSed 51 Stremgth

from l me-third

Commitmsm~ was made omly on the order was usually dome to restsre located

cosssandero tmd this kLR.3 Battalion URs regfintmts,

penetratioms

OPS were gelaerally 3OO-JjOOyards3

200-300 yards frem the 500-1QOQ yards; -w a battalion,

andldivisions, the rear yardss

eommamdpests were leeated 8oQ-1000 yards; a regiment,

further.to 190-2500

ard a divlsien,

3500~

The smallest &my fm defemsive

self-sufffofent

tactioal

umit im'the Regimental

North seotors

Korean in

eeaabat was the rogfmemtB

the &R were mde up of battalion in a cfrcular This provided The imftial posftfons mammer im depth fire
.

and company strong-pO%ntS

deployed

around the regimental the, f larks arad oritioal

key positionso seoters~

supp-xt

for

shack of a W attack
by the

on North lime*

Korean defensive
The Ugit holding

was absorbed
to forao

seourf-by

this

limo atibmp%ed them fnto
s%reng,

TE troops

to doploy If hostile
the

prosMxarely presrrure

or te lure was toe

tho I&R fields the security
lim

of fire.
witidrew~te

MLE uador

the protective all fire

fir0

of supporting

weapons0

If the IdLR was penetrated,

UNCLASSIFIED

.

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFIWSIVJEONESOF A RIFLE DIVISION Z

i
-.---me- --- . i
:S=TCH PREPARED ATIP&IiQ FEC FROM BY illATERIALOBTAINEDFROMBNE~-DOCtRIE~ SKETCH1 i-2 EN ~~?,OJland - ...----. 2OlJJ4 - -_CI..--I
-..1__-*--,rce
UNC[

! ,
I

i

.ASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

power from the other oonoeutrated , Iforth

strong-peimts\ :

e1p the flauks

and depth was

ts seal ths gap.
BaDisas’

In the evsat a Usitod Korean dofomrsivs line, mission, uuit fer

usit

sa-vdopd

a soot&m soul&mod its

of the

the l noirsled

unit

dofonsive
l nsirelod

aooordiPag to Hsrth
rosgoasfblo

Korean do&rise, its
assigned

the

was still

for

a&ssiom.

Ts proven0

sush a hsstils agaimt

nevsmoat o the l aoq the flanks
l f the the

laumshsd~ vigorous OREthdrawal lnas I
Whoa such a tro infiltrate 117

csumfsrattaaks
mado enly
l

of the ta m&to
oamtudor~
attempted

B the order
was

so&r
enemy

withdrawal IEi posftfons
Chineso

impossfbls,

and eondaat

guorrflla

aotivitfes

to the rsare

Coem~~~is-lr Foroos

Shortly they defended psnding positions

after

the Chinsso For'oes entorod features

the Korean oonfliot, a&ion for
a

key terrain

as a soreeuiug

offensfvse to obsorvs

A small

rooonnaissanso Nations mvsment

group oooupied and troop

forward

Unftod

deplomt.

The remainder foxholes easily ore&, Whsn m troops

of tho onsmy unit over ths arest

rsmained

aonosalad

in wsll-protested it
ootiid

dispersed attask the

of the hill Nations ffro
on

fromwhieh Foroos arossod the
attaoking

forward, lafd faltsrod,

Xhsn United a devastating

the foroeO

enemy

118

tho l nsmy oountorattasked~ dofenss or rmin line sf resistanos Extondsd S&l1 wsapons, WWJ were .-

Ths CCF stubborn organized plaood

in depth along

a narrow

front0

outposts

to ths front
armed wfth

and on tho flanks, light aubmalAe

groups of ensmy Panned the outposts probing attaeks
on

soldAers,

anal had the mission

of dslaying

United Hations

the CCF main line terrain erected features obstacles

of resistance0 for an all-around

Chinese foroes defense if

organized

key and All were

necessary, movement.

to ohannelies

UnPted Rations fire, pofiitsg of‘Korea,

doad spaoe was oovered by mortar established bstwosn the strong terrafn slopss

and oross f9ro

patterns

In the mountainous usually oaoupied

the CCF rifle

oompanies

the lower

of a ridgeline, Battalion

The heavy woapons headquarters was All bstwem

oompany oooupied

the top of the ridge,

somewhsre between the rifle units hills, fsaturo

aompanies and the heavy weapons. We, mainly in saddles of the terrain

from the squad upward mainta3aed Reserve units seleoted for oooupfed

areas to the roar a&ion, part

the defsnsivs

The Chineso dopendod defonss,
139

on oounterassault

as an integral

of their groupso

and o&ha% W

small units positions

were desfgnatod

as assault

These attaoked

under lover

of light

maohine gun ffre, of Terrain Features
hrcas selsoted were Most

Utiffzatlon Roth Xorth tops as princfp&e
in plaoes
Korean

_ hill
looa-bed

and Chinese Communist

defensive

pos%tfms a Posftions armor0

always

inaocossfble positions

to Unfted Rations

of the enemyls orset
three-sided

^

defensive ridge-lines def enae d valley

were dug near or on the topographfoaZ and were usually dug in f$r

of
I -

or h%gh hills,

!I% enemySs strongest aontain3n.g

defense was normally roadwayse

dirooted

aga%nst

corridors

prfnc\fpal

and his positions
masses0 asmunition, Al1

wore usually positions

mutually

supported
fortiffed,

in depth bstwesn hill well-supplied
tith

wars heavily

_,

“‘?’

.' UNCLASSIFIED

_ -

120 and tied

together by interlookIng
EntreneIments

fFee anr Fortifioattons
whon

Early

in the Korean oonfliet utflisod hasty

U!I foreos

were on the defensive, astQOn.

Communist foroos
.

elaplaeomnts type,

%n a defensive

Foxholes / a squad. ffelds

wore of the slit-trenoh Foxholes were scmstties

oaeh large

enough to aemmodate for goal; posts for

_

&g along and soourity

a hillbase
observation

of fire

and observation,

suoh positions were large
often

wore locbated midway'up lrith

the hillside,,

Plateau

tronshes

mmstruotod

machine guu smplaooasnts maehinq gun squad. to fight prolonged

at both ends

enough for

the entire

When the enemy was forood adequate protective fire,

dofsnsive

sstions, air

measures had to be taken Simple omglao&ents A typiaal wsapom positions,
On forward

agaSnst United Nations

and artillery

beoame elaborate oonsistod

dirt

and

log fortifieations,o for riflemen,

enemy strongpo%nD

of foxholes posiM~so
by

automatis

positions, All

mm-tar fir%ng

and 76m psok howitzer aoraaunfaaticms
covered

pqsitions slopes

'Ipore oonneobd were

trenshos,,

these trenohes slope,

wfBh logs and soil; 8oversd0 firing

on the

reverse

they were only dug-in to plase shelters sholtsrs pFism=y on

partially . -.and mortar
defense

On the rovorss posftions,
OA

!slopos wro

located

It was sosmon praetise slope, with prsanol

positions slopea
and

the forward Communicationa

the reverse by tuunol to sfford

'between the fzwo were maintaind All pt positions provide
l onstrueted

by alternate

tronohese

wsre son&rusted
good fields

savor from high angle f&e on the forward

of fire.
o~omy

Entrenshmsnts

slops tore

to enable

UNCLASSIFIED . -

UNCLASSIFIED

troops

to rain Hill

grenades

down on an assaulting were covered with in'depth.

form. alternate layers of of loga

top fortifioatfons

logs and dirt
were used for

from 4 to 15 feet oover.

FYon 3 to 12 layera
shelters

Other underground All

were eonstrueted by oommunioations joined to the

in soil, trenches.

rook and shale. Ammunition

bunkers were connected compartments were also

storage

H&.X-I network

of defensive shelters hostile

position

by trenches. slope.

These were located All were well

near the personnel fortified All against

on the reverse artillery,
mortar,

and small arms fire, from the vicinity incendiaries. below the

brush and inflammable

materials

were oloared hostile located

of the defensive Lips of dirt military

works as protection around

again&

were placed to divert

some bunkers,

orest,

the flow

of W napalm bombs. six or eigha yards a hostile attaok. strong . -

!Fwo-or three-man apart on the forward Nations

foxholes

were dug about

slope and were manned during artillery fire was plaoed

Vhen Unit4 paint, tions slopee fire

on a Cammmist through

the enemy riflemen trenches

moved from foxholes personnel

the oomntolioa-

to underground

ahelters men.

on the reverse When QI artillery positions,

Eaoh shelter

held about six to eight

was liFted,

the enemy moved back, troops, fcaraoe.

oooupied

the former fire

and fired placed

on the attacking

Enemy mortar

was alao in shelters to ~/.

on the assaulting

Reserve onemy troops,

on the reverse prevent positions

slope,

were used to oounterat$ack newly Baken positions.

UT troops Alternat. by hostile

them from oooupying were prepared

in case one was destroyed

fire.

UNCLASSiFiED

The ensmy alro in drawing Mortars fied fire sector
observed.

eonstruoted

many dw

positior~

which wers aueoessful

fire.

and artillery
on or just

pUmes ~sual,ly below thb reverse

xere ss~lased slope.

in well-fortifields of

positions

Often,

were restristed several unusual

by overhead ej,wer.

However, mor$bra

ti

the

Us I

Corp

methods of ksploying in wsll&mstructed of the hill,

and artillery below the

wers

Pieoes,

lotated slops

bunkers

oreat with

on the forward asmunition while

oould be fired

and resupplied
to ahe

under sovera‘ p&&aes ti

Eseaps tunnels be evaoua4edo

leading

reverse instame, forward

slope allawed'the four-gun slops battery

In one suob
on the

of ?&skgams
@O!$ yard6

was found located

of a hill these beneath

withb

of the enemy MLR.

The

emplaoemenB for least 18 feet

guns measured tb
ground

21 feet

level

by 35 fee% and was at 121 of the ridge.

Camouflage One of the most effestive weapons of defense employed by the

enemy in Korea was his use of oamouflage. and deoeption No speoial art inoreased training

Methods of ooneealment

as the war progressed. was given the Communist soldier was responsible dirsipline. in the for This war

of camouflage,

but eaoh squad leader

teaohing probably variety

the members of his unit why United lrlationr

oamouflage

foroers enoountered taoties, so that

such a wide Enemy caps and natural oamouflage smeared dirt

of aoneealment with

and deoep+fve fiber loops

coats were equipped oould be used.

Q!hen no oover existed,

the soldier

I UNCLASS\F

i .- \ --,. \. \\

Units

up to battalion in ditches

size

esaaped aerial

deteotion

durfng
or rolling

the up During

day by sleepfng ..
-

oovered,wf%h rows,

pine bran6heso like piled

in straw mats and lying the enemy retrograde pine branohese

%n orderly‘

of 6Crawe earrid the

movement in May 19510 enemy soldiers afrerafQ were overhead,

,When United Nations
and remained

:

eneety squatted

fmobilee

Had the

enemy ueed Bhe side

of the road ralher

+han the middle,
of an ordelrly

he would
row of

have g5ven lhe bushe by 6ra6hllng Snto

appearancae from the air Self-propelled houses or hayetaoks, that the vehiel66

guns and tank6 Others

esoaped

detection

burned smudge pots to g%vethe QIheeled vehioles
were

i6Ipr666%On

were on fire,

dug in during vegetatfone

the day in forward If the vehioles parked in ditches,
These,

areas and oovered with

surrounding

had to be ready to move %n a rhort gullies,
too, were

tims,

they were and

under partially
camouflaged

deslmoyed with

bridges,

in tUI'*llelSs
vegetation. ground,

branrbhea and other crossed tracks, soft Paok
and

In on6 inrtance
some dragged

when energy vehfolea behind Bo erase their daylighb antih8s

trees

an-16

were kept hfdd6n during by the indSv3.dual

a6 muoh as possible attendant

aamouflaged

when neoesraryi branohes this and

RaSJroad engfner brush,

and oars were also

covered with

but the movement of the train method ineffective, with

and the spoke rendered

oamouflage

However8 open flat oorrugated metal and dirt

oars and gondola whioh suooessfully eoneealment

cars were camouflaged hid the aargo. of trains*

Tunnels were frequently

used for

daylight

94

UNCLASSIFIED

.’

Camouflage of' depots and other division was not mandatory,

installations
from

of units division

lower

than

but installations

upward were ~uppljr
:

welb=oonoealed. depots. neoessarys

I4aximum use was tide

of tunnels

and oaveo for unit whenever

Excavations

were made by the responsible

mhen an individual the soil and eoneealed by plaoing later

soldier

dug hia foxhole natural

he carefully

removed

the hole with it on a oloth, it with

vegetation.
it

He disposed around hir straw, or

of the dirt position, other

then by strewing scrub pine, digging
sod,

camouflaging at hand.

rioe

materials

Enemy soldiers they were skylined,

entrenchments

were their

diff3malt uniforms

to see unless and shovels,

They eamouflaged

and when diqisg;

they used short bridge

strokes. to simulate high trees floor.

The enemy once oamouflaged a oontinuous to the sides On oocasionr sections roadway. To oreate

a long highway this effect,

he attaohed to the bridge

of the bridge

and added gravel bridges

he broke up pontoon

during

the day and hid the bank, bridges

under nearby bridge foroer

wreokage thought

or along the river that there
ponboon

For some time friendly were under eonstruetiong The enemy often draw United Nations some partially drawing tank8 Artillery

aetually

they were being used every night. and simulated madeb represent target8 to

used dummy poiitions fire. with Straw dummies disoarded

riflemen,

elothed

garment@, sucoeeded in fire. Dummy and bombing. . :

oonaiderable and air+'% positions

W small attraeted

arms and maohine ga oonsiderable air material

strafing

trade out of natural

were erplaeel

UNCLASSIFIED

UMCLASS ;/FED

in the standard placed around shields .._ foot and vehiole

horseshoe

manners while

Staoks of empty shell other
empty oases were

oarea were
soattered

near eaoh position, eaeh simulated were steel gun.

Ehnrrelr

oonsisted were boards;

of 6 insh logrr the wheel@ were of manufacturing

plates;

trails

made of straw.

Real%tracks

was carried

to the extent 122 in the position area.

Bnploment North Artillery harassing It alro Korean People18 Army

of 7Fleapons in the Defense

and Ddortarr -- North and inflioting fired to disperse Purely

Xorean artillery
on W reserves

had the miaa%orc of in assembly tank areas* and

oasuaatiea

and neutralize interdictory and harassing ranges.

Unite& Nations mission8

infantry Mortars antiattaok attempted penetration artillery
it.

assaults. fired

were not fired. as well always If a oeourred, as

antipersonnel

xnieaions Fire

missions to separate

at extreme W infantry

missions

from its

armor support. of resistanae force

in the North and mortaro

Korean main line

engaged the penetrating laterally

to oontah of Mortar? of the

Enemy mortars

displaeed

over a dfstanee deployed in kp%h.
yard8

approximately

450 yards

but rarely were within

were used when W forQes

1000 to 19

ULR or when ten or more men were conoentrated In the early dootrine required days of the Korean oonfl2et, a eoarmand reeonnaiaranoe of the outpost line

together. North Korean military the (2) to

(1) to detenaine of reaistanee,

most suitable assign

loo&ion

regimental

secstors of responsibility,

and (3) Co seleet

UNCLASSIFIED

areas to be mined and neutralized was oonduoted jofnely

by obstacles. regiment, artillery

This rssonnaissanse and battalion cmmander and the artille ry

by the division, with the division weapons. plan,

commanders together s:onsanderr officer of other

supporting fire

The dSvision

made the over-all for fire support

inoluding

the use of ~&MI and line, aounterof

1Bmm mortars, battery fire,

of the division protecrtive

security line,

on the final

and support

oounterattaoko. Fire located front support for the seourity line

was furnished

by NX artillery

in the main defense of the I&R.

zone and by mortar6

whioh were moved in weapon8 line. regiment. of

The bulk of the artillery strong points

and supporting in the defensiive to an infantry

was attached Normally Artillery the security

to the various

one artillery

battalion

was attashed

fire

was delivered line, the main line

from alternate

posfBiona icaupgort

To support coverage p speoifio Speoial attention

of resistanoe

and assure
zones

maxhum _ ' to

weapons were assigned was given to provide, strong

of responsibility, fire proteotion

adequate points.

the zone6 between the individual the artillery generalI!y defense assigned
varied

The emplaoement of but it was , of the

with

the situation

and terrain, that

employed in depth to assure zone oould be brought to support the seourity

any penetration The weapons not

under fire. line

were kept well

oomealed unt&l

for

the element the attaoking

of surprise* foroe

These weapons were not fired to within 450 yards

approached

of the main lixke
f

UNCLKSlF1ED

97

UNCLASSIFIED

of re8i8tamm. fire _dark,
fqreer

If a portion on that spot.

of the MLB'wa8 penetrated,

all

available

was foouaed In the elastic firing

defense,

‘EJK artillery

deployed

w emheloru tTnitd

af%er lQatiom

at am&urn

ranges in an endeavor

to foroe

to deploy. by atta&Ang

Par% of the artillery it to unitr

wao emplOyed under deeentralfeed defenre poritiunr. and

rontrol

ip the foxkard was aonaentrated immuhndor.

The remainder
fired

of the artillery Of the retior

in the rear

under ecmt~ol During

the la-Her

pal'0 of the: eonfliet, terrain;

l!TX artillery thir

&merally

took poritionr
hostile
assigned situation

in inaaoetribls

huwever,

depended on the gun8 wa8

and the terrain...

A battery for

of mmntain support.

to different

infantry

regimantr

The rite8 Of the

8elOb3d

were ~81aally on the Sl'Op08 of hill8
GUI positiOn

or at +&hefoot

high gromd.

were dug approxiaately of front thir%$ febt line troop8.

100 yardS aparb A3$armition of the gmr Wa8 on

and 800 yard8 to the rear stored level in rhelterr ground,
abouk

to the mar

and rix

Bo Seven fee% where the terrafn posiBionr

wa8 hilly.

Gun positions Light raohine

were in bunker-like

and well-sauouflagti.

guru were dug in between the gun position8 for 101~0 security. f&r* All firing at night, remained

on
day‘.

both flanks light
hour8,

was done durbg
l aloulations

and if the day. in

war do+

were

made during

If the artillery location, aujciliary

for

an extended wum dug If the enmy

length

of tire

one

poaftionr

approx%mately br$illery
pO8itioP8

1% yards

to the flank disowerad

of the battery.

pie%08 wre
W&e used.

by Ibl air

Ob8WVathC#n, ths'alternete

123

UNCLASWED ---__~

UNCLASS1FIED

,,..

. ..- . ...*

1,-

Heavy and Ligh*

Maohine Guns heavy ataehine gun oompany war urually Each rifle of reaistancpe sompany assigned deployed -

The RR battali'on with the rifle

ooznpanies.

to the

defense

of the main line

had ape heavy maohine gun platmcm, security and antiairorait to the
defense

a8 did the battalion defsn8eo Thir latter

CP for all-around
platoon

-

oould be oommittsd

of the MLR in an emergency. Most of the heavy maohine gun9 were plased a8 Were the light along the front.and the gun8 by Ui a& platoon
tmzmmd~
were

on the flank8 fire of

MOhine adquate

gWI8,

Thicr permitted obliqw

@overage of obotaelss.

Poriticm8

staggered

in depth to avoid All

riaultaneout-destruotion cpemtrally to anothor by the
on hi8

or arbillery. and
wera

gun8 were eontrolled from one target

leader

shifted

NK heavy mehine

gun61 usually

opened fire for

at a rauge opening fire

of 800 to 1000 yards; wa8 300 to 90 yards. for

the light

maehine gun range firat

When IXf troops

asraulted, mtil

bnly a few tha, asoaulttig

guns opened fire,
troops 3~:ll

were vulnerable

the enemy usually waited 124, to c:~~ss‘ fire. Weapon8

Am8 and Autcmatio North

Korean8 depended on heavy rather in halting troop8 with a BI attacak, were within small

than aearurate automatio waited until b,afore

weapons fire United Nations

The enemy uausally of their

'75 yards

posktions

they opened fire

arms and automat!.@ weaponsr at about 200 yards,.and at di.stanoes rifle8

However, at 125

submaohine guns opened fire 100 yards,

Grenades were hurled

from 10 to 30 yards.

UNCLASS\F\ED
".,

.

.*
Chinese Communist Forces. Artillery
.

.

UNCLASSIFIED

CCF artillery artillery foreeat strength regiment infantry fire, however,

was seriously and therefore after

depleted

by TX air

strikes

and to 111([

did nbt constitute

too great i-ttieat increased in

JuSe 1951, eaPearyar$illery v and constit,uWd a real hasard. .Normally supported division; No an Army; an artillery 9 an artillery batfery, battalion a regwt;

a CCF artillery supported an

a platoon, Fur proteotion weapons unit to

a battal%on. against U? air

attemPt; was made $0 ma88 fire. a CCF antiaircraft qrtillery

strikes,

auWmatie

aorrerponding them.

in sise to the field

un%t was asbigned

Chinese did not utiliee withdrawal were fired _ the artillery, well of their infantry

their

hr‘@.llery

to supper)

the

units,'although to the aobual lask

minor preparations disengagmt. 'Izsually,

some time prior

beoause of its

of mobility, units. During

moved to the rear the latter part

in advance of the withdrawing 1951, the enemy appeared

of August of defense, coordinated

to have adopted

the Weetern type

for at that time his artillery L, with hi8 infantry. battery area was.generally coarimander with piaked

began to be wll-

The artill&y designated for

selected speoifis

and

by the battalion pieces

loaaticms Presince

the artillery locations

by $he battery

6oamander.

ferred

were in mountainous pieces

areas away from road8, The

msny of the CCF artillery

were of the. paek-type. lie *

UNCLASSIF1ED ,

UNCLASSIFIED

distance

betieen

pieces was governad All

by the terrain,

but usually

it 126 .,

was between 40 &ndSO yards, Mxtiars CCF'mortars just were normally

guns were dug in and well-camouflaged. I loeated at the foot position defense of high grotlad, where the fir? line.' Mortars were or

below the reverse

slope of a defensive of the first varying.fron

could be employed in support usually troop employed at ranges eoneentrations,

I

:

1000 to 1500 yards on hostile ! -

and from 5OO'to SO0 yards on attaokdng,troops. aa a shosk a&ion on offensive of withforses,

Three to five and concentrated drawing

rounds were fired fire was placed

in the @enter and rear

TN troops

to cause oonfusion. Maohdne Guns in support All patterns. of the main

Heavy and Light

CCF machine guns were usually'employed line of resistance in defensive warfare.

areas of enemy approaeh Short bursts effective of

were oovered by maahine gun aross fire fire oommenaed on dispersed within lB troops

when they reaohed

ranges or eoneentrated Small Arms and Automatia Rifles and dispersed

200 yards.

Weapons weapons were fired fir&g range, great when U? foroes attaaked .

and automatie within

effeotive

or from 10 to 1OQ yards. were'thrown arms fire. when

Grenadeso on whiah the enemy plaoed IN forces approaohed within

reliance,

10 to &I yards. 50 to 75 yards

Most small

oeeurred with ic, dr Ehiseellaneous

U? forces

within

of the anemy positions,

The CCF also various

employed roving

fire

power units

equipped

with their

weapons to oonfuse UN units

and cause them to divert

UNCLASWED
-

:m UNCLASSIFlED

-

fire

power* On one defensive position captured by UN forces, rocks the enemy These down

had prepared were loaated on attacking oasualt5es. about trip

drums filled;.with 1 on rough ramps and evidently troops with the hope that

corrugated

and TNT.

were to be rolled flying

roek would cause UN was oonstruated eontrolling 127

Also on the same posit+, below the crest to bangalore

a trench

50 yards wires

to oarmeal torpedoes

enemy soldiers around the hill.

attaohed

Mines and Roadblocks Both Chinese Communist Foroes and Worth Korean People's employed mines and roadblooks during defensive operatfons. ARRy
Very

little

use of them was made under other Enemy mines were generally in some instances vehiaular
_

tactical laid

circumstances. although

in roads and- by-passes, which afforded

the enemy mined open fields to defensive plaoes positions. not suitable in a staggered

approaah

Roads were mined in for by-pass. manner at three-paoe to shoulder. one lay in the 1 l/2 yards

cuts,

fills, Usually

and other

they were placed across

intervals

and stretched however,

the road from shoulder so that

In most places, tract

the mines %ere laid

or rut most oommonly used.

Most mines w&e normally

from the edge of the road, Occasionally were stretohed If a vehicle them, trip wires

Depths of minefields to pull-type

were not uniform. fuses on some mines objeots.

attaohed

aaross

the road and tied

to trees

or other

missed the mines,

the tension

on the wire

aativated

102

UNCLASSIFIED

North a distanae

Korean engineers of two to five

plaoed m'Snes in five yards betv@n rows*

to six rows with The interval between averaged

-

mines was two to four from 50 to 500 yards. use by UN armora

yards. Bridges

The depth of the mine fields

and stream beds were mined to prevent

Some mines were buried a great amount of traffic to locate

18 inohes to 28 Snohes deep. to pass before exploding.'

This allowed

These mines were by

very difficult mine deteotors, the shoulders the.suxmer

as they were too deep to be disoovered was useless. detection large

and probing

Other mines were dug in from from the top. .quantities rather During

of the road to avoid

of 1951, the enemy plaoed to destroy spots,

of dynamite than to sorap metal

atop mines in a roadbed, cripple or delay it.

UN Equipment

In other

the enemy buried of II? engineer

and beer abs were clearing they

to hinder paths.

the progress

groups which nor were

Enemy mined areas were not marked,

in the most oases epcvered by fire. The frequent use of roadblocks and undefended taatias. road obstruotions were

charaaterized construoted

the enemyts defensive from large

Roadbloeks

rooks or stones oraters

covered with

brush and logs. and favored I _. ..

Abandoned vehioles, artificial landslides

ditohes,

dynamited

in roads,

oaused by demolitions of advanoe.

were other

means of bloaking and in series,

routes

Roadblooks plaoed

were employed singly close together. Many

fn the latter

aase being

mirres and roadbloaks were booby-trapped. i'
coverd by enemy fire,

Some roadblooks.were

UNCLASStFtED

103:

TYPICAL ANTITibMc ML hmE PI2ul

/em

,r# UNCLASSiFlED

_’

.

UNCLASSSF tED

l

Most of the enemy's booby-traps blocks or picric of !BJT and grenades. aoid were used. Earthen

were crude, jars with

made mostly blooks

from

of TNT, amatol, was often of

Abandoned U? and enemy equipent enemy dead.

booby-trapped,

and in some instances,

Most detonations wire. During the

enemy booby traps oold weather inches

depended on some form of a trip the enemy buried of the ground wood was plaoed The shell

of 1950-1951,

a mortar

round a few

below the surface

in an abandoned fireplaoe. ontop of it to tempt W the

A small amount of fresh soldiers fire to build a fire. 128

exploded

two hours after

was kindled. Misoellaneous

Antitank

Defense of UN armor was extremely effective oh the damage

The shock aotion CCF and the NKPA, done by m tanks, pamphlets courage

To combat both the p::~.~?(;:-l -i?d..mental the enemy took various measures, tried

Many enemy to build up

and manuals distributed to oause personnel were organized, Korean army, all or "hunter

to his troops UN armor.

to attack

Speoialized

anti-

armor units

In the North antitank defense organized teams, against

rifle

regiments

had two or three of

groups, "'whioh

had the dual mission

tanks and airoraft. antitank

These teams were orginally battalion and worked with The AT tetis antitank in the

from the NK division teams of platoon of four

combat engineer consisted grena&s,

to company size.

of three mines,

men armed with torpedoes.

submachine guns,

and bangalore positions

Teams were deployed foroes. Their

rear of defensive

as mobile

antitank

UNCLASSIFIED

*

UNCLASSIFIED

main mission which

in defensive

warfare

Fas to neutralize

hostile

tank&

penetrated

the defensive unit

perimeter. planted tanks. mines and other The "'Titer UN armor? which could obstaoles had"the this, ' to

The combat engineer hinder mission the approach of attaoking

of hostile

group"

and annfhilat'ing

To acoomplish

the teams hid near roads or approaohes and attacked front and rear from the flank. tanks,

be used by armor, to Imook out the individual tanks

As AT guns attempted group" attacked

the "hunter attacks

in the CO~IRIU. Multiple the purpose.

were sometimes made to aooomplish

Chinese Communist forces The enemy doctrine and platoons called for

used antitank all infantry

teams of various',sizes. . battalibns, organized companies, two or three. a demolition

to organize

teams,

Eaoh platoon

Company and battalion team of three _ _ hand mines, to four mission to allow to four

sL-,e teams consisted men, armed with torpedoesi

of two parts':

one submachine a support

gun eaoh, three

and two bangalore subchine

team of three machine guns, The

men armed with of the support the demolition

guns and light

team was to separate team to attack,

IN infantry

from armor teams consisted incendiary oharges

The platoon

of two to three bottles, were also mines, carried

men armed with and other

submachine guns,

greandes,

explosives, teams. selected

Pole and satchel

by the antitank crews usually

The antitank found it difficult

terrain

in which tanks in depth. Wellline,

to maneuver to set up positions approximately 150 yards

camouflaged

emplaoements,

from the defense

105

UNCLASSIF ' 'IED

UNCLASSIFIED *

were built approached, infantry support,

adjacent

to the routes

of approach.

When hostile

tanks

the support

group opened fire When theltanks

to separate approached

the assaulting without artillery Small to hit

from the tanks. the antitank

teams attacked was placed

from the rear on the tanks

flanks.

arms and maahine gun fire the driver's teams attacked. periscope

in an attempt

and keep the tank commander down as the enenly one tank at a time. he attazmpted to climb or gun, He

A team assaulted

When the enemy approached on the rear and hang small and bangalore

the 'UN tank,

dynamite

bags on the turret in the bogies. on fire with

threw grenades was disabled, grenades fanatical generally anassault. Antiaircraft

torpedoes

If the.tank incendiary teams were they were from

the enemy attempted cocktails. to initial

to set it Although

or Molotov in reaction oontent 1s

CCF tank hunter

advances of W tanks,

to stay out of sight

when the armor returned

Defense stages of the Korean conflict, defense. However, with and passive air the NKPA placed the increase

.Duri.ng the early little

emphasis on antiaircraft power,

of UN air measures* with

he employed both active Korean Army organized from the divisional

antiairoraft teams, units units. armed

The North

defense antiaircraft

heavy machine guns,

and from the antiaircraft Air observation

machine gun platoons

of subordinate

posts were used to warn troops, used in antiaircraft installations.

and 30 to 50 peroent Antiaircraft .-

of the ground armswere artillery guarded rear

defense.

UNCLASSIF

,

.

*

*

UNCLASSIFIED

Ihe enemy also at key tunnels, at any overhead hit and could

employed

"hunter

groups,"

armed with

machine guns,

bridges, United

and other: installations. Nations airoraft, and if

This team fired the installation If not, was

be repaired,

the teq

remained

in position.

the team moved'to Early anantiaircraft In addition, in oombat. -- four

guard another

key point. pmrer, CCF regiments were asa'igned

in 1951, due to U'? air oompany armed with each Chinese battalion

six to nane 12.7mm DSEg guns. employed an antiaircraft manned tith net

It was composed of a unit

nine maohine guns maohine were

heavy machine guns from the battalion, Emplacements guarding

and two light key positions

guns from each company. usually on high terrain

where the weapons could

cormand the sky

over the target, with oomtnunioation
were

Emplacements were in the shape of a triangle trenches oonnecting t the guns were set up on .The of the ammunition dumps. All

positions

well

camouflaged.

If four four corners

machine guns were employed, of an invisible

square around the installation. and between groups

interval guns, placed

between guns was 50 to 109 yards, 200 yards. triangularly fire,

Three machine guns formed a group and these were with on order an interval of the of 30 to 50 yards between guns, ":': yl.aced

Continuous

cox~a::(!: : : , ,'r' : CL.‘,

on UN airoraft. In a defensive hostile different planes. angles. position, one platoon was designated but staggered at ranges
over

to fire at

on

The fire

was concentrated,

Heavy machine guns fired 107

800 yards;

tJNCLASSlFlED

light

machine guns,

500 yards;

andirifle

fire

at altitudes

less than break up 130 --.~-

300 yards. any formation.

Fire wassfirst All firing

placed

on the lead plane to

yas controlled

by the commanding officer. the Stubborn Defense of other the

Countermeasures In spite weapons, stubborn

Employed by UN Forces Against of excellent artillery, had to finally air,

and the support and dislodge

the infantrymen foe. assault

close

In a typical artillery weighing were first

on an enemy defensive

position,

air Aerial

and bombs fusing,

used in the softening with

up prooess. delay

250 and 5Op pounds,

a lo-second

nose and tail hit ~8

proved effeotive scored. required destroyed Aerial

on enemy fortifications bombardment ms restricted bombing.

provided

a direct

due to the lack one bunker was identified

of the

precision

On an average,

out of eight

bomb drops on positively in adverse weather that for

targets. .
!

This average decreased identification, utilizing Field 250-pound Artillery usually the hill silenced sheal.

or because of poor target three fighter-bombers,

commanders felt

bombs was required fire,

each bunker,

131
was of was _ A

assault

at ranges of 2500 to 3000 yards, up and over the crest

employed in 500 to 6O- brackets or ridge with defended by the enemy. with

Enemy maahine gun fire quiok and converged the

artillery fire

area fire

fuse

Precision

by one pieoe was employed to destroy also reconnoitered using VT fuse to strip a aireot with hit all suspected

emplaoement. enemy positions camouflage, was effective

The artillery by fire

away any possible by a 155mm shell protective roof; a

It was proven that on enemy pillbox

108

a 5-foot

.! . ; ‘* .I . . _ . .

'IED

direct

hit

with roof.

a 105mm shell

was effeotive support

on one with was provided

a j-foot by the

proteotive dire& : _ artillery at night fire

The best artillery

g of a 155mn.1un, althot@h also proved egfective, rebuilding.

high angle fire

from heavy

tT fuses were used on bunkers 1 to lift if an artillery concentration

to prevent

A method employed by XN forces on enemy positions recognized this, was the firing

a WP shell. was fired positions,

The enemy quickly he returned and fired from at the

and when such a shell manned his defensive

hfs bomb shelters, assaulting objective,

UN troops, QJ troops

In one such attack employed a ruse, later p after

on a stubborn

enemy at &he small

A WP round was fired friendly infantry fired

enemy; and five arms to simulate was brought without

minutes

an attaok,

a mixed TOT and VT artillery position. The objective

barrage was taken

down on the hostile difficulty. fire

further

132
was lifted, 4.21ntn and 8&m mortars intervals pounded

When artillery the enemy positions foroe assault . fire moved up, and tried

at three-minute 'lank& moved forward to close within

as the assaulting in the final

of the infantry

4 range of less than 1000 yards to

on the enemy bunkers, was placed

A range of 300 to 400 yards was preferred.' or embrasures using

Tank fire & delay-

on the bunker apertures

If these were not visible, an opening where the logs

two rounds of APC were fired in the fortifioation joined the but

to effect earth

or just

below the slope of the roof, the bunkerAntiaSrcraft 2.

This neutralized,

did notidestroy

weapons also moved out

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

with the tanks and supported Fhen the infantry tanks isolated the ground assaulte the position,

133
the artillery and

assaulted

the bunker

being attacked

from other The infantry

enemy supporting used assault one

installations teams consisting demolition opsrator#

with WP smoke and FE fire. of one rifle

squad, two flame throwers, satchel rifle and pole charges,

team armed with one 75mm recoilless

one SCR 536 radio machine

squad, and one light

gun squad, or a total
The teams deployed fire yards, support throwers, BAR fire 35
yam5

of 26 mena with recoilless the 75nn-1 rifle squad placing

on the apertures The light the attack, closed

df the enemy baker

at a range of about 600 to the flanks with to

machine gun squads deplo;-ed The rffle in as far squad, together

the two flame small arms and until fire .

as possible

and placed

on lrhe bunker.

Y'ne flame throwers

then moved forward

s from the enemy position the demolition team planted

and engaged the bunker with the explosive charges. reorganized 134

while

When and

the position prepared

was neutralized,

the team hastily

to move forward Nations

or to consolidate

the pc#oitfon. attacks

United

armor was used in surprise and hit him from UN engineer the rear

to by-,I~-:;; To

enemy fortifications accomplish this,

and flanks.

continuous

reconnaissance of obstacles. praise enemy fire,

was necessary W infantry for the work they Yarious sucpeeded apparatus, *'

for the removal

of mines and reduction

and armored offioers

and men had the highest in Korea0 Braving

of the oombat engineers in detecting suoh as fails the majority and rollers9

of enemy mines employed. used on tanks to explode

enemy mines,

UNCLASSIFIED :

,.. r ,.., “:.,, : ; :

:

-. I

. -m

:

. . .. "__ 'r--d UNCLASSIFIED __
due to malfunctions employed by the enemy, and the great amount of

proved unsuccessful explosive charges

135

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSlFlED
'

CHAPTERTHREE IXFILTUTION Infiltration B:emy espionage beginning AND GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES and Guerrilla activity and played The North Activities were widespread a large part in since the &e -.

and guerrilla

of the Korean confliot, and tactics, forces

enemy's operations intended guerrilla

Korean People's military, political

Army

to be strictly

but the Chinese indoctrination. .

Communist Forces wanted the groups to be for It appears that a happy medium was 'struck For this reason,

between the two Communist tactics and guerrilla I

Forces in Korea. activities will

infiltration

136
be considered separately, Infiltration Infiltration espio!lA;e activities tactics were employed by the enemy for military mingled operations, with refugees to strafe Early both in the south-

and for enemy'troops

Korean conflict,

fleeing

ward because of the reluctance civilians, walked into In other instances, with

of DN pilots groups North

columns of

of men, women, and children interspersed other

UN positions

Korean soldiers

among the lead elements, enemy soldiers to determine launched

As the groups were screened, an attack,

137

UN officials

were quick tactics

the importance

of the, enemygs infiltration statements

as shown by the following

Infiltration tactics played a bi&, part in the enemy's attack of small in the Vb'est sector, accomplished by the infiltration groups during darkness over a Z-3 day period, after which the infiltrated elements rallied for attacks in coordination with frontal attacks bs tanks and infantry, 138
l&2

UNCLASSiFIED

Not only f major Division Parallel feat, units

small groups Early

succeeded

in infiltrating

UN lines*

but Korean

as well,

in December 1950, the 10th North mountainous country from the 38'

moved south through to withintwenty It had to rely stocks for

mliles of TAEGU. It was a remarkable on the countryside ammunition: on a survival for food and clothing medical facilities, basis.

military and it

on captured was forced

Lacking

to operate

of the fittest (as well

It was

able to keep the DS 1st'iMarine forces) occupied

Division

as ROK security the

in the mountains was committed

northeast to action

of TAEGU, After 3n February. the

1st Marine Division enemy force Despite

beoame the full

time concern i attacks,

of the 2nd ROX Division. it maintained the form

heavy losses unit,

from constant Approximately northward

of a military

one-third own lines

of the enemy division by breaking into

.managed to withdraw 139 smaller units.

to its

Because of the effectiveness Army changed its tactics

of UN air

power-$ the North called and carrying and attaoked

Korean

and adopted dressed

an operation

"Paktisa," confrom

Groups of enemy soldiers, cealed weapons, the fiatis withdrawing infiltrated

as civilians at night

UN lines

and rear0 friendly

Others established units.

roadblocks

to cut off Koreans practiced clothes

Both Chinese and North some soldiers dressed

the same ruses and mingling during raids

of having refugees.

in civilian

with

These men hid in caves and buildings information civilians
or

the day, and gathered at night. Some so-called

conducted

harassing by W

apprehended

2

UNCLASSIFIED

troops

carried

mortar

base plates,

mortar

tubes,

ammunition, North Korean

and hand grenades soldiers

concealed

in packs.

Other captured civilian

had a complete

had a package of 900 kemy espionage

changt> of white 140 ROH won*

clothes,

and each _

was widespread of low calibre,

in Korea and mas very effective, Most enemy agents primarily Korean enemy agents - :

but it was generally gathered People's guerrilla to gather tactical

information

in a combat zones

Both North with trained

Army and Chinese Communist Forces9 together forces, utilized large numbers of poorly value0 High-level

information

of military

intelligence Korean

was conducted Political especially agents

by training

companies established

by the North

Security trained

Bureau and by North for intelligence their nets. llrl varied

Korean field

grade officers, work, These of

and espionage

normally

confined

activities

to the supervision

subordinate . 'asions assigned, the location composition, types

information given

50 agents lines,

with

the sector attempted

to which to determine

On the front

the agents

of the UN main line and disposition the condition

of resistance; units;

the strength, the number and and

of various of roads;

of,weaponsg

the objective of hidden

movement of UN patrols; In forward location 163 artillery, various noting refugee areas., of troops. armor,

and the location

foodstuffs,

the agent also determined In addition, he noticed

the number and the location of , ..

and command posts; In rear

the location areas,

of the to '

checkpoints,

in addition agents

the location

and number of UN troops, lL!l

located

UNCLASSIFiED

National

Police

strong

points

and determined of civflians

their

strength, toward the

They

took the names and addresses North also

friendly with

Korean cause and those who collaborated and feeling ‘ of refugees

UN Forces,

Tl.-Y

noted the attitude U-2 3 $e e I-

and the South Korean

Enemy agents were recruited boys were very active partisan bands. in collecting

from bcth sexes and all information for

ages0

Young

the NKPA and

Some individuals themselves activities. for their and tried

were used who brought to prove their loyalty

political by engaging

disfavor

upon

in espionage incentive

Agents were not well-picked work6 Evidently, there.was

and showed little no authority

which centps.lized Youni; #

selection, middle-aged,

assignment

of missions,

or control

of enemy agents*

and e1de::I.y men and women were used singly, groups to facilitate movement,

in pairs,

and iz "f%mTly-type" used a stretcher adults carried

One such agent Two on the

in an attempt the agent,

to pass through

UN lines, father,

who posed as an ailing

stretcher,,

Several

young children,

who kneT:/ they would be well-fed claimed him as father,

as long as the agent Then apprehended, bed clothes, mingled farmers troops with

needed them, willingly

he was found to have concealed adopted

weapons under the children and as

Other agents bonaffde

one or more small Others disguised

reftigees,

themselves

or local

villagers northward,

withdrew

143

and some were Lit .

behind when enemy

115

UNCLASS IFIED

Some attempted utilized mountain

to pass through trails to avoid

UN lines checkpoints.

as refugees, Falsified

others passes Some wore

were carried US clothing units. other

by the agents to be used when questioned. and pretended to be ROK soldiers separated area,

from their and the assigned their

Once the agent

reached his assigned protected Sometimes,

guerrilla

Communist organizations he obtained, subsequent orally,

him and transmitted these organizations transmitted

information the agent information clothes areas,

missions* or concealed

Usually,

agents

information parts

in the seams of their bodies, In rear Korea

or shoes or in the private gained

of their

information U-i by radio0 Enemy espionage

by enemy'agents

was sent to North

agents

used many methods of identifioation. but was also pieoes a means the of

Money was not only a means of identification, of transmitting messages. Japanese fifty-sen

indioated

agent was a member of the Korean Labor Party. various five denominations indicated etc.). types

Japanese ooins

of arms (one sen-oarbine, indicated the rank

sea-Ml rifles,

Other Japanese coins the denomination, colors and buttons Cloth,

of the agent; Buttons

the higher of various

the higher sewed with

the rank* different

145
thread

denoted an agent's other glassess jackets, North

identity.

broken eyeglasses hair

which matohed

and South Korean flags, beans, various

cut in various of spoons, and An pocket colors, full spoons0

manners, tattoo

pencils,

types

marks on the body, were also

used as identification. carried in all a

agent apprehended of various coins

in the US IK Corps sector of all denomfnatfons,

buttons

.
9

.

'IED UNCLASSIF

and all Inoluded

the known methods of identffioation in the coins were two sen'pieces

carried

by enemy agents* year of

dated in the eighth

Emperor Meiji, pieces. life-long

These were the key ooins and the agent's the other coins and trinkets

identifioation were a

The agent claimed 146 collection.

r

117

."_

UNCLASSIFIED

’ UNCLASS . .,
UN Countermeasures Infiltration Taken Agsinst Enemy Infiltration .

of enemy military units was .aombatted in various ,' ways by UN forces, Coordination of fire power between adjaoent W units in suspected areas, plus interdiotory artillery At regimental fire, abetted a

the influx civil

of infiltrating detachment,

enemy troops.

levels,

assistant

two oounterintelligenoe to deteot

agents, All

and one

ROK police refugees

company were utilized in the area were brought by the CIC agents.
were

enemy agents. oolleoting

to a regimental Ail indigenous prisoner

point

and screened

men of military of war channels. point for

age apprehended All others

evacuated

through

were sent to a division&refugee From the division,

oollection the refugees if

further

screenings

were sent to interro-

corps points gation

and on to an Eighth However,

Army point those cleared

further

was necessary0

at oorps level UN personnel army level duty. for This

were turned released screening

over to ROK civilian

oontrol.

All

by the enemy were returned prior to release and return

to at least to military

was done to detect
ment

any possible en& 147 of an espionage mission. troops were instruoted line area5D

indootrination

and assign. -

Friendly civilians assisted

to be suspicious

of any

in front units

Leotures

by CIC agents also Normally, oivilisns by a

in spotting

enemy agents*

were not in the oombat zone. report issued

This statement Pol$oer.

is evidenoed

by the ROK National

*See countermeasures aotivity,

employed ,by RI? F'oroes against 118

guerrilla

ED

-

When the defense line is very! close fron enemy line, those should be evacuated to the area located at 40 to 643 kilometers (approx. &to 36 miles) from,the defense line; and those ztreas loca.i;ed'lO to 20 kilometers (approx, 6 to 12 miles) south of &he next defense line should be evaouated. . o o Checkpoints for the control of trapel units, by civilians civil affairs in both dire&ions

were set up by military National Police.

polioe

teams, and ROK

Close iiaison units

was maintained

between UV Foroes and Palioe, Informants

ROK counterintelligence employed by UN foroes Some UN divisions personnel

and the ROK National in the detecztion organized

also aided

of enemy agents* from indigenous G2, up

had security

forbes

which operated

under thei control

of the division

These assisted of enemy agentso which refugees
148

in the prevention .CSvil assistanoe could

of sabotage detaohments northward

and in the rounding established in an attempt lines to

not cross going

return

home, heasurss to control All civilians a subdivision refugees were also exercised by the ROK in their

- .

Government0 villag@..or3.n In this

were required of a larger Polioe,

to register city

such as SEOUL, a polioe

manners the Xational

which maintained

-

.

box in every village, Counterintelligence were suspeoted questioned identifioation interrogation, all

knew everyone who belonged teams informed' the National

in the town. Polioe when agents

to be in the areas and the police-immediately strangers, were turned Eaoh civilian All suspicious persons who laoked agencieti for to oarry Certificate, 149 proper

over to investigative

in South Korea was required or City
or

a Refugee Certificate

or a Prefectural

Resident's on request,

These had to be shown at every checkpoint

UNChASSIF1ED

Refugee aativities fifth villages columnists.

were centralized

to ward off

any possible

Groups to be evacuated

were formed in the various leader from

and seotors,

and each group had an appointed He knew everyone within

the same looalitg. proper in rear trails authorities

his group and notffied his oolwm. All refugees 150

when a stranger

joined

areas were required and seoondary

to keep on main roads and avoid and guerrillas.

roads used by infiltrators Guerrilla Activity

At the beginning 5000 comnunist guerrillas trinated People's guerrfllas

of the Korean conflict, were operating

approximately These

in South Korea.

were directed personnel.

by a core of some 1700 Communist indooto thfs foroe, the North unit, the 766th Korean Korean

In addition

Army had an organized an independent

army guerrilla army unit,

the North Infantry

Zennam Unit,,and Regiment. 6 battalions guerrflla sildom

This regiment and trained units

was expanded later for such work.

from 3 battalions Korean divisional

to

North

were sfmilar from their

to NK reconnaissance

oompanies and were

divorced

rti *uler tables

parent unit. 151 of organization, Korean ZennamGuerrilla

HoweverB they had ir-

Both the North Infantry

Unit

and the 766th

Regiment were landed amphibiously groups (about landed

in South Korea in into the hills, ._

company-size

80 men) and dispersed in the wrong se&or was to destroy

The ?X Zennam Unit ineffective. crossings,

and proved traoks at

Its mission bridges,

railroad

tunnelsB

UNCLASSIFIED

ourves, and switches, 120

and to cut

4

UNCLASWED

away telephone mountain succeeded trails

and telegraph through

wires'.

The 766th Regiment moved by areas to its t dressed the in objeative and

uninhabited UN troops*

in harassing

Enemy military uniforms standard oivilian UN foroes similar weaponso

units, to other

used in'gusrrilla.aotivitd.es, North Korean outfits and carried

However, members of the organization towns, villages, returned and rear

wore areas of before

dress to reconnoiter in daylight.

These soldLers

to the hills In the

dark and guided the main body back to the objeot%ve, approach to the objective, three

s&outs were sent out first, by 20 to 22

each

about 8 yards apart. yards; After before platoons, the attaak, daylight* At other infiltrated separated ,-

Companies were separated

15 to 17 yards3 and squads, about 10 yards,
the guerrilla unjt withdrew into the hills

152
times, NK guerrilla of UN lines, units mingled with refugees point, and .

to the rear

At a certain

they

from the civilian

column and assembled their or bundles,

weapons

which had been hidden

in oxoarts

A reconnafssance Units were

was then made by the units given specific missions

and an attack

launched0 tfne limit

and a specific

to accomplish

the assignment.

153
of battle in favor of UN Forces, Some could many out-off Consequently,, with other .

With the turn units attempted

to escape northward. own guerrilla bands,

not. forces

they formed thefr previously

bands or joined

established

Communist sympathizers

and Korean

121

UNCLASWED

Labor Party members also furnish logistioal support

joined

their

ranks.

These were utilized missions. In

to

-

and to perform that there

espionage

November 1950, it was estimated 40,OCOO guerrillas North Korean general

was "a Qnin5xium' of that some

in South Korea." offioera

It was believed

for the over-all
CCF and NK Foroes.

ooordination 154 of withdrawal

and their staffs were responsible . of the activity of these bands with

!lhe routes easily determined,

of the guerrilla blooking
.

troops a&ions

uere by UN Foroes,
A oonsiderable

and by effeotive were inflioted 155

heavy casualties

on!the

enemy troops.

number were taken prisoners. As a result, dispersed, branoh People's guerrilla

foroes,in

South Korea were widely six branohes. Eaoh The' of

and later

were divided

up into

consisted Guerrilla

in strength

from &OOmen to 4,000 men.

Commandwas one of the twelve Headquarters, and it controlled 8,000 men, organized

departments the active In addition

the NKPA General guerrilla

branohes

of approximately

to

the branches, Labor Party, The branch organized

numerous partisan operated throughout

b&da,

by the Korean

the western

part of South Korea, Branoh units were the

units

operated

in the eastern

se&or*

on an army pattern,

but the partisan

loose organitation Guerrilla terrain in their

of the Korean Labor Party. bands established their

bands followed 156

headquarters Seourity

in the mountainous oamps depended c

areas of operation,

of these

upon the guards at the stronghold depl~~yj;~~l;"~~ area,

itself.

Members of the band and farmers, and had

disguised.as

peasants

JNCLASSIF ‘IED

spies i __

in nearby villages.

Liaison

with

these

strongholds

was

maintained Guerrilla reoeive destroyed couriers

by the use of couriers Command in North Korea. Korea,

dispatched Guerrilla

from the Poeple's foroes were able to and by

messages from North most of their were frequently mission

but UN action

captured

sending

stations.

Messages oarried codes.

in changed secret

157
branches was and ,

The general + mainly supply

of the enemy guerrilla

to impede the South Korean war effort. lines were attacked: villages pillaged Many raids oritical All this

Communication and raided; and

Communist propagandadisseminated. of necessity. desperate hatred brutal

were conducted items, increased and the in of contrend,

out

Food and ammunition'were many villagese the guerrilla captured.

bands raided toward

of natives treatment & guerrilla

bands and resulted A general pattern *

of those foroes

centratin-

in one area was the general were obtained

Food, clothing, which the guerrilla from voluntary - i

and supplies

from the area in

bands were operating, and sympathizers,

These were gathered by raids on farms, medioal

oontributors TJN supplies,

or by capturing
supplies

Female guerrillas :

purohased

from the local for

markets* guerrilla

Replacements kidnapped

bands were obtained

by volunteers, who

young men and women, hostages, UN lines. Hostages

and enemy soldiers contri-

had infiltraged butions of food.

aided in scouring

158

123

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Countermeasures

Taken by UN Forces Against

Guerrilla

Activities days of

During the days of t- I i; .X perimeter the breakout large Cactioal by UN F'oroeso it was necessary units, division or larger,

and the ensuing for

UN Foroes to divert areas0

to seoure rear effect

Friendly forcesa positions all

armor was employed to have a quieting The 73rd Heavy Tank Da&lion within the UN perimeter Heavy and light on the enemy. forces, Normally perimeter fired

on guerrilla enemy in

WP on dug-in

and foroed

the enemy to flee used

directions.

machine guns were then By studying the routes

to good effect of the guerrilla of withdrawal. organized for

of movement their routes

UR troops this

were able to blook by employing

was.done

one battalion,

defense,

in the route

of enemy withdrawal, to encircle platoon-

The remainder

of the regiment

of division

used deployed Initially,

the area in whioh the enemy was how-n to be. size patrols However, used to combat guerrilla and larger foroes

company-size

were too small, 159 had good suooesso of Coordinator, Protection Eighth of United of

On 19 July 1950, the Office Lines States of Communication, Army KoreaIts

Rear Areas* mission

was set up by.the

was to coordinate

the efforts

Korean and US police highways, UN signal and bridge:;.

to effect

the maximum protection to provide

of railroads, 1or act.ivity.

It was also against

protection

oommunioation steps

sabotage

and enemy guerrilla

One of the first Battalions, assigned procuring

taken by this one provisional

offioe

was to form Korean Polioe company was the mission of

At first,

ROK police with

to the US 2.&h and 25th Divisions loaal . guides, seouring information

on the enemy and

_

UNCLASWIED

familiarizing terrain police

the respeotive

commanding generals After

with

local the ROK 143 Police, combatted of

conditions

and road nets,

about two months,

comapnies were returned ROK Ulscurity Battalions areas,

to the Korean National and the Korean National

Police

guerrillas

in rear

and were under the operational logistioally by it.

oontrol

the ROK Army and supported for the National Police

Arms and ammunition Both-&ad antito

were furnished fixed installations

by the US Army.

the mission guerrilla

of'guarding aotivitkes.

and oonducting were attached

ROK Seourity,Battalions

the TABAKK-SAN Command, which had the mission of guarding two .. strategic passes on main supply routes, the TANYANG.and bmJYONG passes; and the SCX?A.M Command. This cormand was activated in in

June 19511z; the iusist~notj the area. The ROKNational expand until Polioe

of the ROK Army to combat guerrillas

was organized

in 1945# but did not It now has 63,000 men Police, besides

the outbreak

of hostilities0 The National

as compared to 148,000 in 1945. guarding aotivities, in Korea, American personnel, fixed installations

and conduoting

anti-guerrilla of the railroads to the

also were oharged with Several thousand National civilian

the security Police population,

were attached

corps to control and conduct

counterintelligence attacked a village

soreen indigenous 162 missions, the

When guerrillas National attaoking Police force.

or an installation,

went immediately ROK Security

to the scene to pursue the Battalions did note
When a definite

UNCLASSIFIED

guerrilla strikes National attacks

force was located, called Polioe

the area was surrounded, :&fter the air raid,

and UN air the

in on the target.

moved up to olean out the area* conducted with

Often such Battalionso 100

were jointly

the ROK.Security inflicted

Since 25 June 1950, the National guerrilla oasualties

Polioe

an average

a day.

143

* -8

RESULTS 0~ NATIONAL POLICX OPERATI‘DNSFROM 25 JuNE 50 t0 31 AUGUST 51

Enemy killed Enemy captured Enemy surrendered Enemy h*..avy weapons captured Enemy rifles captured Police Police Police Police Police Killed kidnapped missing heavy weapons captured rifles captured In addition Police maintained guerrillas. to physioally agents contaoting

67,228
23,837
44,154
135,219

~233

.

22,571 1,900 6,%! 8,991 90 2,‘300
the guerrillas, suspeoted the National to be

in towns and provinoes Pamphlets, guaranteeing areasp

harboring distributed

safe conduht,were to induce the enemy .-I

to surrendera

by hand and air 164

in the'same

In addition for North guerrilla

to guards at VHF stations, raids, wire, booby-traps

which were prime targets extensively in

and mineswere by-passed

* These figures probably included Korea during late 1950.

enemy troops

*u.l

. .,

UNCLASSIFtED

employed. during Flat

Each rear

area organizhtion raid. Security

had an SOP which rode railroad

it

followed trains.

a guerrilla or gondola

platoons

cars,

oarrying

mabhinZi guns and crews0 were placed Hospital explode trains had two
I

on the front gondolas traoks,

and rear

of some trains. The first wasito

in fronts

any mines on the In this by the fall of

and the seoond carried

machine guns and crews. eliminated

manner, the guerrilla 165 19510

menaoe was iirtually

CHAPTERTOUR Summary of the Effioaay Enemy taotics popular conception
l

of Enemy !Cactios Contrary horde,"'the to the NK Enemy attaoks for the most

were sound and well-exeouted. of the enemy as.% soreaming fighting

and CC Foroes were well-coordinated showed considerable part, Reoonnaissance many penetrations. especially landing, similar "holding during of W positions The extensive prior planning

maohines.

and good judgment

was thorough use of guerrilla

and resulted activity,

in

the days of the PUSAN perimeter machine.

and the MCHCLil employed were adage of Envelopfire-

aided the ene?qy*s fighting to Western taotios;

Taotios

especially,

the old Patton

them by the nose and kioking used. It is believed

them in the pants." that air superiority,

ments were widely power, and mobility

of the UI? Foroes provided

the differenoe

between the two forcess Defensively, as UT Forces; time and inflict the enemy used the same taotios, that of trad,&g terrain on the whole, to gain May 1951,

namely,

in an effort After

maximum losses

on the oppasition, 'of the main line foe to dislodge. were neoessary

the enemy adhered to the prinofple and proved a stubborn, fire and hand-to-hand p,t.;".:.cjn;;. definite disadvantages Definite tenaoious assaults

of resistanoe, Massed artillery the enemy

to clear

defensive

Certain tactics spicuous

to the enemy were noted indioations

in the

he employed. before

offensive This:enabled

were oon-

every attack,

Iw Foroes to prepare

.
themselves. all cases, Another ,* ,sustain Since the enemy attac'kb

:*.
followed a definite pattern in defensive measures.

UN Forces were able to $ake appropriate weakness noted

an offensive,

in ene&y tactics was his inability to i especially a$ lower unit levels0 This was on his supply system by V-T air and ‘ each en&y soldier carried approximately . was exhausted, the enemy winter This

caused by the damage inflicted artillery. a week's at&& Consequently, supply of food.

When this

lost'momentum x.::. hindered

and finally

&alled, of enemy rear

Undoubtedly installatfons.

weather

the resupply

was due to the scarcity weather available

of natural '

camouflage

and to the good flying

to W aircraft. of the enemy's of UN fire

The advantage disadvantage

superior

manpower became a Eq+my troops to control support was

in the fsce

superiority* were d9fficult and logistical

became demoralized

and confused;

units

because of inadequate dgfficult. The capture that

communications;

of many enemy troops Communist medical

suffering

from old

wounds indicated All.in
-

support

was limited,

all,

the Communist Force employed in Korea was a empLoyed sound basic principles.of wara
.

capable

opponent which

CIIAPtiR I CITATIONS 1, "Chinese Com-nunist Forces Tactical Concepts," Hqo EUSAK 15 Apr 51.

2, "A Comparison of CCF Doctrineland CCF Practice" undated. rept, G2
Section, Hq. EUSAK; 'How the Chinese Wage 7jiar," by Major Robt. Be
Risg; Combat Bulletin #lo, Hqe EUSAK, & Feb 51e

30 PIR -,&3, Hq, EUSAK, & Feb 5:; undated report,
4.

G2 Section, Bulletin

Hqo EUSAK, !bo Hqo

"Characteristics of the CCF," Combat Information EUSAK, 20 Nov 50.

"Summation of Recent and Current Indications," Memo, Hq, EUSAK G2, 23 Jun 51, pages 3-4; Summary G2 Command Report, x)0001-202&O Jan 51; qnemy Tactics,' Techniques, and Doctrine," Hq. IX Corps G2 Section; Combat Information Bulletin #2O, Hq. EUSAK, 31 Ott 51.

6s "Summation of Recent and Current Indications," Memo Hq. EUSAK 29 June 1951 "Enemy Tactics, Tech,,, and Doctrine," C-2 Hq* IX Corps; Interview
with< Lt, Cal, b!3, L, Fallwell,.GP Research and Analysis, Hq. EUSAK,

31 Octe 51. .- 70 Ibid
80

90 Interview

with

Lt,

_Cal. 16, L o - ._I ~;‘*17~.~11.* Interview Police, Fallwell. with
23

100 '%n, Tactics, Cal. William

Tech., and DO&~," 62 Hq. IX Corps; Hamby, Senior Advisor to ROK National Tech, and Do&,," IX Corps; Lt. Cal,

act 51*

110 "Ek. Tactics, 12, Lt, Cal,

Fallwell, IX Corps; Combat Notes #2, IX

13; "En. Tacta, Tech., and Do&.," Corps, 7 Jun 51e

140

%n.

Tactics,

Tech.,

and Do&.,"

IX Corps.

15,

"En. Tact., an analysis G2 Section, "En, Tact.,

Tech., and Docto," IX Corps; "Battle of the Soyang,"
of enemy action in X Corps sector 16 May-l June 19519 X Corps, Tech., and Do&.," IX Corps.

16,

UNCLKsFlED

130

-

170 Ibid
18. Ibid

-_

190 "Enemy Tact., .. _a. ,.
Lt.

Tech,,

and Do&.',"

IX Corps, B. I. Nelson, War," by Page Study Army. 164th &3; Prepared and

Interview with 1st Lt. Hq. EUSAK, 17 Ott 51. t 21. "A Lecture on How to Prepare for a Long Lasting Executive Officer SUNG, enemy ilocument translated MISD; "En. Tact., Tech., and .t)Oct.," IX Corps, "CCF-NKPA Supply and Transport\" p. 22, Joint G-2, 8th Army, A-2, 5th AF.

G3 Special

Cal. M. L. Fallwell; Projects Div,

by ~

22.

"En. Tact., Tech., and Dock.,", transport CCF-NKPA." to prepare for

IX Corps,

p &L; "Supply

23. PIR- Reports,
24.

Hq. EUSAK; Lt. Cpl. Fallwell; "A lecture of How a Long Lasting Tar," en. doct. trans. by l&h,bfISD.

Ibid. "En. Tact., Tech., and,l>oct .," IX Corps, p ,!+l.$ Combat Inf. metin #20, Hq. EUSAK, 15 Sep 51; Research Supplament ;$!+, MI Section, ATIS, GHQ, FEC. Tech., and Doct.,"‘IX Daily Corps, pp. &l-k. S'zsnary, of Chinese GHQ, FEC, 14 Mar 51. Chinese trans-

25. "En. Tact.,

26. PIR &i&3, Hq EUSAK, 12 Mar 51; "Interrogation
Communist Captain," Intelligence

"How to Use AT Guns,n l4il. Training Sec., Hq., Ml. Dist., People's Liberation Forces Army, 30 bkr 51, Ens& -&cument lated by the 164th bZSD, 28. "En. Tact.,' Combat Inf.

and' Doot .," IX Corps; PIR #Z332, Hq. EUSAK, 30 Jan 51;‘ Bulletin -$l, Hq. EUSAK. Tech., and Doct.,".IX b6th R&t, Corps. CCF, en Corps,
l

e. "En. Tact., 30. 'Operational

Orders," MISP and 164th k&SD. Tech.,

dot.

trans.

by 528th

31. "En. Tact.,

and Doct.,"iIX ".PIR

pm 4.

32. "Enemy Movement Capabilities, 33. "Battle

# 323, Hq. EUSAK, 13 by

51,

of Soyang," X Corps; Phi $228, Hq X Corps--Enemy Tactics Bulletin #3, G2 Section, X Corps; Combat ?qotes #2, Hq IX Corps, 7 Jun 51.

1%

UNCLASSIFIED

JNCLASSlFlED

‘I . I

":CF Attack Doctrine*and Tactics," G2, 25th Inf TIR $228, Hq IX Corps, 12 May 51). Enemy Tsctics Bulletin #9, Hq. G2, X Corps; Hq IX Corps, 7 Jun 51.

Div.

(Ext.

from

Combat Notes #2,

"En. Tact., Tech., and Doct.;" Hq IX Corps, p. &.I.; Combat Intell,
Sunrmnry,
Bulletin #l3, Hq EUSAK, 13 Mar 51; Daily Intelligence GRQ, FEC, 13 Feb 51; PIR #376, Inol. &, Hq EUSAK, 23 Jul 51, pm 5.
"Battle of Soyang," Corps, p* 4l. X Corps; "En. Tact., Tech., and Do&.," Hq IX

Enemy- Taotios Bulletin 84, X .Corps--PIR #la, Hq X Corps;
Enemy Taotios Bulletin -#, X Corps--PI3 #l71, Hq X Corps; "New
Report of Liaison Visit to 7th Regt.,
Patrolling Techniques," 1st Cav. Div. by 1st Lt. Jack Engle, Psywar Div., G3 Training,
EUSAK.
Korean Translation ATIS, GHQ, FECb
of Chinese Taotioal Manual, Dooument 146&32-B,

"Notes on Chinese Company Taotics," Combat Inf. Bulletin #, Hq
EliJSAK, 17 Dee 50; Armor Observer Report by Lt. Cal. William He
Hale: "CCF in the Attack, Part II,w by Col. S. L. A. Marshall,
Operations Research Office, Z/ Jan 51.
"En. Taot., Ibid, p* 9. and Do&.," Hq. IX Corps, PO @*

>TKPA Reconnaissance and Intelligence, PIR @l, Hq X Corps, lb Jul 51 -(Extracted from CIC Report X-KOR (lo)-324, 11 Jul 51, oompiled by 210th CIC Det.). Ibid. Research Supplement, Interrogation Divs.) MIS, ATIS, GHQ, FEC. "Reconnaissance Methods," captured Reports (NK YOth and 73rd Inf. by 164th @SD, -'

document translated Bulletin $3.

PIR .#306, Hq X Corps-- Enemy Tactics

"En. Taot., Tech., and Dbct., 'n IX Corps, Corps--Enemy Tactics Bulletin*&,

p 40; PIR #I.&

Hq X

"En. Tact., Tech., and Do&.,? IX Corps; Combat Inf. Bull. #6, Hq EUSAK, 17 Deo 50; OR0 Report "CCF in Attack" Part II, Col. S. L. A. Marshall, 27 Jan 51; Enemy Taotios Bulletin #&-PIR #ls, Hq. X

Y.

"En, Tact., Ibid#

Teoh.,

and Doot.L"

IX Corps,

p .!.&.

51. 52.

pp. 8-12. 1

Combat Inf. Bulletin,#@O, Hq@JSAK, 15 Sep 51; Disposition Form, "Taotioal Principles, W from Ghief K?&AG,Brig. Gen. F, W. Farrell, 2 Mar 51; Korean trhnslatio&f CCF Taotioal Manual, Doo. #@326-B, MI Se&ion, ATIS, GHQ, FEC; &mbat InfL Bull&in #ll, Rq EUSAK; Captured doouments'by 12th,@F Army Group d&d. Aug 51, Batoh. $6768, translated by 164th MISDj D+ly Intslligenes Summary, GHQ,.FEC, 13 Feb 51; Daily Intelligenoe Summary, GHQ, FEC, 14 Mar 51, Lt. Col. Fallwell; Armor Obsbrver Report by Lt, Col. William 8. Hale, Armored Sczhool; "Taotieal Prinoiples,"' Chief KMAG, Brig. Gen. F. W. Farrell, 2 Mar 51j “En. Tad., Teoh., and Do&., "IX i Corpf3, pa 12. "En Tact., Teoh,, and Doot.,j" IX Corps, p, 9. Doe. #@26-B, MI,

53.

54.

5k 56,

Korean Tranelat1on of CCF Ta&ioal Se&ion, ATIS, GHQ, FE%.

Manual,

Daily Intell* Summary, GHQ, #'EC, '14 Mar 51; "CCF Combat Dootrine," Combat Inf. Bull, &, Hq a 17 Deo p; Combat Inf. Bull. &O, Hq EUSAK, 15 Sep 51; PfR EUSAK, 13 May 513 "supply and Transport, CCF-EKPA";pp. 6743. Tech., and:.Doot " IX Corps, p 9; Enemy Taotics Bull. $9, X Corps; FIR # 230, Hq ZCorps; "CCF Attaok Dootrine and Taotios,"' Hq 25th Tnf. Div. (Extra&e@ from IX Corps PIR j/228, 12 May 51).

570 "En. Tact.,

58,

Daily Intell. Sum., 4 Feb 9; "Primary Conolusion of 9th w's Battle Experience at USAN" published by 66th CCF Army Hq. Following the 1st Cav9 Div. Action in 'Fate Oat* 50; PIR #202, Hq EUSAK, 30 Jan 511 PIR #228, Bq IX Corps; PIR #&3, Hq EUSAK, 12 Mar 51. Hq X Corps. i En. Taotios Bull. #2, Bq X &pss PIR #228, Hq IX Corps, 12'May 512 Korean Trans. of CCF Manual; Do@. #@2&B, MI Se&ion, ATIS, GHQ, l!EC;'Combaf Inflo Bull. #l, I@ EUSAK, undated; Unnumbered Enemy Taot. Bull., Hq X-:Cp,rpsi Combat Bull. -#4, Hq EUSAK, 20 No? p; Order of Battle Annex #l, War D Hq EUSAK, 19 Aug 50; Armor Gbsesver Report by Lt. Cal. Wm. H. Y%unmezatsof offloere of 3rd
@5,

E@. Taotiss

Bull.

#&-PIR

Tacef~8, "' 39th Regt., 11th @ trans$ated by 164th MISD; PI& fl$J

38th CCF Army, 10 Sep 9, , Eq X Corps5 "CCF in Attatik

(Part II)" by Col. S, L. A. I&shall, Staff I&morandum, Operations Research Office, 27 Jan 51;: Captured Enemy Doournent, Batch #770, translated by i&h MISD; PIR $202, Hq EUSAK, 30 Jan 51; Combat Inf. Bull. ,811, Hq EUSAK. exp. at UNSAN,"'pub.. 61. "Primary Concl. of 39th CCF Army's battle by 66th CCF Army following 1st Cav 'Div action in late Ott; PIR /ml, Hq EUSAK, 29 Apr 51; Combat Inf. Bull. .#5, Hq EUSAK, 17 Dee 50; Combat Inf. Bull. ,#2$ Hq EUSAK, 15 Sep 51; Combat I&'. to X Corps by Capt Benj. Bull #ll, Hq EUSAK; "Liaison Visit Hunter ," G3 Training Section EUSAK, 26 Jan 51; Interrogation Report, G2 Hq EUSAK, 23 Jul 50; Combat Inf. Bull. 84, Hq EUSAK, 20 Nov 50; PIR iy482, Hb EUSAK, 6 Nov 51.

62. Res,earch Supplement,
Inf. Divs,)

Interrogation Reports MI Section, ATIS, GHQ, FEC.

(NK 70th and 73rd

'

43* Batch &'3'7, "Mine Sweeping Work," Hq. 9th CCF Army Group, 1G'Mar 51, translated by 164th MISD; War Diary, Order of Battle, Annex #l, Hq EUSAK, 19 Aug 50; Armor Obs. Rpt. by Lt. Cal. Wm. H. Hale;
Interviews with men of Cal, F, 23rd Inf. Regt; Visit to 3rd Bn, 19th Inf, Regt. by Capt Benj. A. File) Hq EUSAK. Rpt, of Liaison Hunter, G3 (R and

64. Batch &'37,

"Mine Sweeping Bllork,"Hq 9th CCF Army Group, 10 Mar 51, translated by 164th MISD;;NK translation of CCF Manual, DOG. #6@26B, MI-section, ATIS, GHQ, FEC. (?TK 70th and 73rd Inf. Divs.)

65.
.; 66.

Res,earch Supp., Interr. Rpts, ,MI Section, ATIS, GHQ, FEC.

"Assault Team Tactics," NK Defense Dept., 1951, translated by /$, Hq X Corps, l&!&h MISD on 11 Apr 51; Enemy Tactics Bulletin unnumbered; Issue if48, Interrogation Reports MI Section, ATIS, GHQ, FEC. Report, G2 R and A File, Hq of CCF Manual, Doe. #@26-B, ATIS, GHQ, FEC, 20 Mar 51. Batch .#1770, translated by 164th MISD. Staff, G2 Section, Hq Eusak,

67. "Chien Tao Lien," Interrogation SUSAK 13 Ott 51; Korean trans.
1,ilI Section, 68. Captured Enemy document,

@, Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA) Special Planning GHQ, FEC; Enemy Tactics Bulletin #2, Hq X Corps.

70. Combat Inf.,
29Apr51.

Bull.

#l3, Hq EUSAK, 13 Mar 51; PIR -ml,

71. Combat Inf.

Bull. &, Hq EUSAK, 20 Nov 50; PIR #378, Hq EUSAK; "A Collection of Battle Experiences," Hq XIX Army Group, 29 Mar 51, transld. by ATIS 25 JUT 51; Combat Inf. Bull. #13, Hq EUSAK, 13

134

IED

71 conta
Mar

15 Sop 51; Intell,

Bq'EUSAK;@ Apr 51; Combat Inf, Bull. #20,
S~@V,~.&@$ G2 GHQ, 17 Feb 51; Interview
Set 'Changbong~~i-~oen~~~n~~~~'l1-12 Feb 51, 8th Hist Det.
514 PIR ml,

-

72. PIR #la, Hq X Corpsg:~&rr&ation Report of CCF Army Captain by 164th MISD; PIR &Z&3, kq l!&@AK, 12 Mar 51; Armor Observer Report by Lt, Cal. W?4i'H0 Ha&; %n. Tdot., Teoh,, and D~ct.~' Hq IX Corps p0 16,

73. NK'Trans,

of CCF Manual, Coo, #&8926=-B, MI Section, ATIS-, GHQ, FEC, 20 Mar 51; PIR #378, Hq EUSAK 25 Jul 5:; ,%.Colleotion of Combat tiperiencesgn Hq XIX Army Group? 29 Mar 51, translated by ATIS, 25 Jun 51. "Enemy Movement Capabilities, "'G2 PIR #323, Hq EUSAK, 13 fiy 51; En. Tactics Bull, #, Hq X Corps;.PIR $202, Hq EUSAK, 30 Jan 510 Combat Inf, Bull. #ll, Hq EUS&K; Daily Intelligence Summary0 GHQ; 13 Feb 51; Armor Observer Rpt;by Lt, Cal, Wm, Ho Hale, transld, Combat Experienoespw Hq XIX Army Group, 29 Mar51 by ATIS, GBQ, FEC,, 25 Jun 51s: PIR #375, Hq EUSAK, 22 Jul 51~1

74.

750 "A Collectionof 760 "Report

of- Conference with,Cql. Jennings, I Corps Arty/ET. Off.;". Report of Col, Wm, S, .Bodner,.Commaad and General Staff Corps ReArrw Field Force Observer Team #j. presentative, of Cal, Olin, S, Bodnerp C hnd GSC Repr,, AFF' Ohs. Team #5*

770 Report
..

780 Ibid,
_. 796 PIR-.@28, Hq EUSAK,_25 Fob 51, "Taot, Princo,.b from Chief K&M+--(Brig. Gen, F0 Vi, Farrell) disposition form9 2 &far 5’6; ?!F3 ,Convaents and raoommendations on Operations, O' Researoh Offioe Msmoraadum::S-25 (CCF Tactics in the Envel.opment of a Column), G3 Training Dips Hq EUSAK, 7 Jan 51; "'Liaison Visit to X Corps;" "Combat Lessons Learned 16 May-5 Jlxn 510n 23rd Inf Be&., b 14. Jun..51:--Combat Notes ~#b, Hq IX Corps, 8 dug 51% Combat Notes go Hq IX Corps9 7 Jun Artillery Perjmeter iq Korea," 51; "Paragraphs on Perimeters-An Lt, Cal. Leon F, Lavoie, 92%d Armd FA Bn; Unnumbered En, Taotio W1.s HqX Corps, 80, "Tactics of a Tank Unit," Tra%ning Department Northeastern kanohuria liliilitary District9 Maroh 1951 translated by &a SectO, ATIS, GHQ, FEC, 2'7 Jun 51: PIR #335g Hq EUSAK, 2 Jul 51e Intelligence Summary, GHQ @,e.Hq EUSAK, 14 Sep 50,
Inf, Eulld ,@, Hq E&K,

81, Daily Bull,
82,
Comigt

Japan,I!+ Feb
l$ Sep 50a

51: Combat lnf,

Order of Battle

Handbook (;TKPA)' Special

Planning

Staff,

G2 aQ,

FEC, sec. 6, pp 1, Irr 5.
Ibid; Annex #l to Inol. #j, PIR #&ll, Hq EUSAK, 27 Aug 51; "Report Order of Battle Se&ion, G2, Sect., Hq EUSAK, ofrmor Potential," 18 Feb 51; Annex #l, Order of:Battla, War Diary, Hq EUSAK, 19 Alg 50; Combat Inf. Bull. $2, Hq EUSAR, 14 Sep '9.

-85. Research Supplement,
Section,

Interrogation ATIS, GHQ, FEC.

Reports,

IvZlitary

Intelligenoe

86.

"Extract of a Special Report Prisoner, " Artillery Section, M-21 Jan 51, GHQ, FEC.

of Interrogation ‘Hq EUSAK; Daily

of a Selected CCF. Intall. Summ. for

PIR $474, Hq 2nd U.S. Inf. Div., 30 Jul 51; PIR #388, Hq EUSAK, Hq EUSAK, 5 2 Au.g 51: PIR #4lO, Hq XJSAK, 26 Aug 51; PIR fill,

Dee 51. 88.
En. Dot; Batch #lnO, transld. -#6, Hq EUSAK, 17 Dee 50, by 164th NISD; Combat Inf. 19th Inf. Regt., Div., 9 b&y 51. Bull.

"Rpt* of Liaison Visit to 3rd Bn.," Div. by Capt Benj. Hunter, G3 Trng.

24th U.S. Inf.

90. 91. 92. 93.

"Rpt.

by 214th L?f ..Div,

on 2/.4.b,ar 51," PIR #In,

Hq EUSAK.

PIR $4.58, Hq EUSAK, 13 Ott 51. "Forward 3rd Inf, Observer Tactics, Div., Undated. Techniques, and Doctrines," Hq. U.S.

Hq 70th Bn., Annex #2, "Summary of Salvaged Enemy Tanks,' to ltr, on Armor, (Hvy) 25 Ott 50; file 470.8, Technical Information Armor Section, EUSAK; Combat Notes #&, Hq. IX Corps, 8 Aug 51. . "Korean trans. GHQ, FEC. "En. Tact., of CCF finual," and Doct.," Dot. #&926-B, Mt Sect., p. lg. ATIS,

94. 959 96.

Tech.,

Hq IX Corps,

1st Ibid, p. 20; "Reference for Night Combat for Small Units," m, 50th Forces undated li;I sect., ATIS, GHQ, FEC, 18 Feb 51; Combat Inf. Bull. #CO, Hq EUSAK, 15 Sep 51. En. Tact; "En Tact.,
Bull. #2,

37. 98, 99.

Hq Corps. and Doct.," &, Hq Corps, p 20. Tech., and Do&.,'*

Tech.,

Enemy Tactics Bull. Hq IX Corps, p 20.

Hq X Corps;

"En. Tact.,

100.

#ll, Hq EUSAK,; Issue #&, "CCF Combat Doctrine II, n CAbat Bulletin MI Se&ion, ATIS, QIQ, Research Supplement, Interro&ation'Reports, FIX; Combat Inf. Bull, $20, j.'q EUSAK, 15 Sep 51; ?A Colldotifm Of Group, 2$3 Mar 51, Itransld, by Combat ExperienoesO" Hq XIX. L MI Sect., ATIS, GHQ, FEC, 2TJUn 51. Combat Inf. Bull. #ll, Hq EUSAK. $6, Hq E$ o 37 DOG 50; Combat Inf.. Bull.

101,

t" "': Y Speoial:&lan. S&f, @Z Sect, 102. Order of Battle Handbook (&$A), Hq E'ljSJKt bmb*t GHQ, FEC, See,, 6, p 1; Combat Inf, ,Bull:.;~#ll, Inf. Bull. 7#60'Hq EUSAK, 17 i,, c .F. p" an&$@&+," G2 .Seotion, Hq, EUSAK, 103e "Use of Signal Flags by the&F 5 Mar 51; Combat Inf, Bull.,pl, Hq EUSAK, i. 104. Combat Inf. Bull, #ll, Hq EqAK. 1
I

CHAP&R II

105. PIR :&57, Hq EUSAK, 12 Oot 5r;. "Summation of Reoent and Current +Section, Hq EUSAK, 29 Jun 51,. pp 3-4; Indioations, m Memoraiiibm, G2::
Interview with Hq EUSAK. Lt, Col. M, Lb Fallwell, .,G2Research a$@,AnalysiS,~

106.

, 107.

"Special Study - A comparison of CCF Rootrine with,CCF Praotios," Conoepts" GG? Se&ion G2 Se&,, Hq EUSAK, 20 Mar 53.3 "CCF Tactical .; Hq EUSAK, 15 Apr 51 PIR #2&, Hq EUSAK, 12 I%r 51; kemy ,l$ctics, Teohniques, and Doctrine, Hq IX Corps, p 22e, "The Proper Conception of Fl8xible Defensi+e pamphlet translated by 16L&h~NISD; $?@I #07, Warfares" CCF Hq X Corps.

to Experiences in 108, ;FIR #96, Hq EUSAK, 14 May 'jl; "Introduction bgr Defensive Operetions, "Hq 12th Army CCF, 8 Apr 51, translated Military Intelligence Seotio&, ATIS,' G2, GHQ, FEC, 14 May 51, pp

19-20.
1090 110, Ibid, Fizz ATIS; pp 20-21; Armor &bserVer Report by Lt.,Col. WmHi

Y Combat Information Bulletin .fi9 Hq EUSAR, 20 Nov 50J Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA), Spe$:'al Planni‘q Staff, G2 Section, GHQ, Fee; Enemy Tactics'Bulletin E Hq X Corps, jb 137 :

UNCLASSIFIED

'"+?$

111. PIR jk282, Hq ETJSAK, 20 Apr 51; Combat Inf. 13 kr 51; En. Tact. Bull, #, Hq X Corps.

Bull.

#l3,

Hq EUSAK,

112. G2 Report, Command Report, I Corps, l-30 Apr 5l; Armor Observer Report by Lt. Col. Wm. H. Hale; Report of Liaison Visit to 3rd Bn., 19th Inf. Regt., Capt Ben. J. Hunter, G3 Training Section, EUSAK, (R and A File) 9 Xray 51;: Liaison Visit with 1st Marine Div Capt Ben J. Hunter, 30 Mar thru 4 Apr 51, G3 Training Section, EUSAK; "l-l &n. Tact., Tech., and Doct.," Hq IX Corps, p 28; 63 Section, Command Report, EUSAK, l-31 %ar 51. 113. "En. Tact., Tech., and Doct.,"' Hq IX Corps, p 28; Ammor,Observer Report by Lt. Col. Wm. H, Hale; En. Tact. Bull, .#$, Hq X Corps,, Bulletin -#l3, Hq EUSAK, 13 Mar 511 Chinese Document "Primary Conclusion of 39th Army's Battle Experience at UNSAN," published by 66th CC%Army Hq. following the 1st U.S. Cav. Div. action in late Ott; Enemy Tactics Bull. @, Hq X Corps; PIR Ml, Hq EUSAK, 2'3 Apr 51; Batch #7'37 "A Study on the Tactics the U.S. Army," enemy document translated by 164th MISD; Enemy Tactics Bull, #lo, Hq X Corps; “En. Tact., Tech., and Doct.," Hq IX Corps, p 24. "En. Tact., Tech., and

114. Combat Information

of

115. Interview with Lt. Col. E. L, Fallwell; Do&.," Hq IX Corps, pp 28-a.

116. Enemy Operations Order of 422nd Regt ., 47th CCF Army, 164th MISD-T03&L; PIR /&82, Hq EUSAK, 6 Nov 51; "Report of Liaison Visit to U.S. 25th Inf. Div. on 23 Mar 51," Lt. Col. Conner, G3 Psy. War., G3 Training Div., Hq EUSAK. 117. Issue ;p6, ATIS Research Supplement, "North Korean Defensive Tactics," MI Section, G2, mQ, F'FJC,pp b-9; PIR $4'05, Hq X Corps; Armor Observer Report by Lt. Cal. Wm. H, Hale. 118. Combat Inf. Bull, fi, Hq EUSAK, 20 Nov 50.

#l1, Hq EUSAK; Annex #2, PIR #377, Hq IX Corps; 119. Combat Inf.Bull. "Directions of Tactics for Defensive Operations," Hq 26th CCFArmy, 18 Feb 51, Batch #737, translated by 164th IvZSD; "Liaison Visit with 1st Iviirine Division.: 30 Nar-4 Apr 51," Capt Ben J..Hunter, G3 Training Section, Hq EUSAK. $2, Hq 3rd Inf. Div., 4 Feb 51; Annex #2, PIR #fl7, 120. Combat Bulletin Hq U.S. IX Corps; En. Tact Bull. &, Hq X Corps; "An Introduction to previous Combat kperiences," enemy document dated 12 Sep 513, Batch #l770, 164th MISD. 138

* UNCLASSIFIED

121 0

Chinese DOG., "Primary Concljsion of 39th Army's Battle
Experiences at UNSAN,": published by 66th CCF Army foil. the 1st
Cav. Div, action in late O&p Combat,Inf. Bull. .#2?, Hq 3rd Inf,
Dip,, 4 Feb 51; Combat Inf. ll', /h, Hq EUSAK, 20 Nov 9; En.
Tact, Bull. &, Hq X Corps;,,, P orth Korean Defensive Tactics,"
Issue 496, ATIS Research Sup$lement, MI Sect,, GHQ, FEZ;.
Letter, Hq 24th IJ,S. Inf, Diva, Office of AC of S, G3 Sect.,
undated; PIR #62,-&t&-US Inf~i.~Di,~&+p 9; "Directions of Tactics
for Defensive Operations, ",H$O 26th GCF Army, 18 Fob 51, Batch
&'37, translated by 164th MISD; PIR #l43, Hq IX Corps: Combat
Notes #6# Hq IX Corps, 27 Soi 51; PIR #ZW, Hq EUSAK, 30 Jan 51;
PIR #$$?I, Hq EUSAK, 2Y Apr 5'; 164th M,ISD-T-0157, Batch ij!Tl.7,
P 26 Apr 51; Report $86, ,556th CCF Manual on Field Fortific@zl.on, ,Engr. Technical Intell, Tea& CCF Field Works, IL5 Ott 51; "CCF Fortifications," 0ffice;of Technical Intelligence Coordinator, G2 Sect:‘, Hq EUSAK; Combat Bulletin #lo, Hq I' 5 Corps, 11 Ang 51. %

_.'

GHQ, Sece 122. Order of Battle Handbook (.Nl&A), Special Plan Staff, 6 p p 5; Combat Inf, Bull, #l$$, Hq EUSAK, 8 Jul 510 "Condensation of ADVATIS Special Report O&" En0 Tact, Bull; #3, Hq-X Corps; Briefing Report, Offibe of G3 Air, Hq EUSAK, 14 Feb 51; %nemy Camouflage Practices in Korea," Engineer Iiitel'liigence Notes No. S-=1951, Engr. In-tall, Div. Dept, of Army, Sep 51.

123. PIR #27Y, Hq I Corps,

-

-

6 Ott ;l; PIR .#62, 25th U,S, Inf. Div., Sep 9; Enemy Tactics Bull, #2, Hq X Corps; Combat In-f. Bull. #$, Hq EUSAK, 20 Nov 50; Combat Inf, Bull. #l.l; Hq EUSAK; Annex ,&?, PIR #377, Hq IX Corps; "North Korean Defensive Tactics, "ATIS Research Supplement 496, MI Sect,, GHQ FEC, Hq G3 Sect., 24th UOS. Inf Div., undated; Sec. 6, p 4; Letter, Combat Inf, Bull. ;fl3, Hq EUSAK, 13 Mar ,51r PIR &lo, Hq EUSAK, 26 Aug 51, PIR #In, Hq X Corps,
Tactics," ATIS Research Supp, ,496, MI sect 0* GHQ FECp Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA), Special Planning Staff, G2, GHQFEC, Seco 6, j Handbook (N&A), and Doct,," Special Planning Staff, G2 GHQ

124, "North Korean Defensive

1258 Order of Battle FEC, sec. 6.

I'

126. "En. Tact.,

Tech.,

Hq IX Corps,

pp 38-79. document Operations," GHQ FEC, enemy

12'7, :A "Chan Tung" No. 5& (file ref'.), translatedcaptured enemy ,MI seco, ATIS, GHQ FEC, 2 Jun 51; "Intro. to Exp, in Def. by MI Sect,, ATIS, Hq 12th CCF Army, 8 Apr 51s translated 14 May 51; Batch #I770 p 'An !&trod, to Prev, Combat Exp.," by 164th MISD, 20 Ott document dtd912 Sop 51 B translated Combat 113. Bull. #lYp Hq EUSAK, 8 Jul 511

51;

-

I 2.

UNCLASSIFIED

: UNCLASSIFIED

,

128.

Combat Inf, Bull. $7, Hcl E&AK, 8 Ii4ay 51; Cozl,bat Bull. #-lo, Hq I Corps, 11 Aug 51; 1st %rine Div., PIR #ll5, 16 Feb 51; PIR ,#266, Hq 2nd Inf. Div., 22 Jul 51; Combat Inf. Bull. #l, Hq X Corps; En. Tact. Bull. j/6, Hq X Corps; En. Tact. Bull. #'b Hq X Corps; Annex $2 to PIR ,f 155, Hq IX Corps: PIR #!$5, Hq EUSAK, 31 Aug 51; PIR #2,!@, Hq I Corps; EUSAK Armor Bull., Hq EUSAK, 7 Ott 51; Interview with Capt. Allen R. Scullen, Armor Operations, Armor Section , EUSAK, 2'7 Ott 51; "Handbook on AT Tactics," NK Defense Dept., 1951," translated by 164th MISD. .::xtracts from Translations of Enemy Documents, TR0223, G2 R&A, Hq EUSAK, "Use of Bangalore .Tcrpedoes by CCF," G2 Section, Hq EUSAK, 6 Fob 51; "A Study of, Past AT Experiences," Hq 19th CCF Army Group, 3 Aug 51, Batch $586, 164th MISD, 2 Ott 51; Chinese document "Primary Conclusion of 9th Army's Battle Experience at UNSAN," 66th CCF Army Group, published in late Ott 50 after 1st Cav. Div. action; "A Study of AT Tactics," Batch #822, translated by 164th MISD, 9 May 510 Translation of Enemy Document, Batch $20, Item $27, G2 Yncmy Docur&& Section, Hq ROKA; Combat Bulletin fi0, Hq I Corps, 11 Aug 51; "Chiang Chiang Issue No. 126,” dl;d 25 Feb 51, issuing authority unknown, translated by 164th MISD; "Battle Order No. UO238, Supreme Hq in Pyon;yang," 30 Dee 50; Translation of daptured Enemy Document, G2 Sect., Hq EUSAK; Combat Notes #& Hq IX Corps, 8 Rug 51; "Reference Materials for Small AT Teamss" Iiq 26th CCF Army, 10 Mar 51, Batch #j'fl, Item /A, translated by 164th MISD; "Organization of AT Units v,rithin the Infantry," Distriot, CCF Military Training Sect,, Hq Northeast Military 30 Vkr 510 Batch #l580, translated by 1614th'MISD; "Intro. to Exp. in Def, Operations,' Hq 12th CCF Army, 8 Apr 51, translated by MI Sect., ATIS, G2 Sect*, GHQ FEC, 14 May 51. ATIS Resocrch
Tactics,"

13.

130.

Supplement, Issue &6, "North Korean Defensive GHQ FEC; Interview with Lt. Cal. M.L. Fallwell, G2 R&A, Hq EUSAK; G2 PIR #454, Hq EUSAK, 9 Ott 51; H2 9th CCF Army Group, "Antiaircraft Firing with HMG and Rifle," by 164th MISD, 2 May 51. 10 Mar 51, Batch #737, Item ;#5, translated
%I Seot.,

-

131.

"Reduction of Fortified Hq EUSAK, undated.

Positions,"

Training

Directive

(DRAFT),

,

132. "Field

UNCLASSIFIED

Trip Observations of 25th Div. CP and 27th Regt. CP," 1st Lt Jack Engle, Memo Slip, G3 Training, Hq EUSAK, 2'7 J$n 51; Combat Bulletin #$, Hq 25th Inf. Div., 22 Sep 51; Combat Notes &, Hq IX Corps, 27 Sep 51; Combat Bulletin &?, Hq 3rd Inf. Div., 4 Feb 51; Interview with 1st Lt Thomas L. Heath, S3, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Inf. Regt; "Forward Observer Tactics, Techniques, ' Hq 3rd Inf.. Div., undated; Memo, "Methods of and Procedures," Assault CCF Bunkers," G3 Sect., EUSAK, 2 Dee 51. 140

133.

"!&nployment of*Tanks in Assault on Bunkers and Fortified Positions,'
Letter, 8th Army Armor Sect., 12 Ott 51; Report of Armor,
Army Field Foroes Observer Team No. 5; Combat
Representative, Bulletin $2, Hq 3rd. Inf, Div., 4 Feb 51.
"Reduction of Fortified Positions," Training Directive (DRAFT),
Hq EUSAK, undated; Letter, G3 Soot,, Hq 24th Inf, Div,, undated;
"Field Trip Observations of 25th Div, CP and 27th Regt. CP,"
1st Lt Jack Engle, Memo Slip; G3 Training, Hq EUSAK, 27 Jun 51.
and Maintenance.Report of Tank, %!$3E8, w/Mine
Exploder Attachment (FLAIL)"; Hq 3rd Inf. Div., Office of Ordnance
27 sop 51; Interview with Capt. Allen R, Scullen,
Officer, Set nR4con Dailey,"
Operations, Armor Section, Hq ZJSAK; Interview 8th Historical Detachment, April 1951.

134.

1350 "Operational

1360 Order of Battle

Handbook (-A), Speofal Planning Staff, G2 Sect,,
GHQ FEC, Sect. 6, p 3; "North Korean Potential," Researoh Supple-
ment, Issue #3, Copy #21, Interrogation Reports, ATIS, GHQ FEC.
pp 30 60 Sect. II, Hq EUSAK, 13 Jul 506 A!ar 51, fiq

1370 Ibid,
1380 1390

War Diary,

Command Report, G3 Sect.,

Hq EUSAK, l-31

1406 %morandum, - .-

"Liaison Visit to X Corps," G3 Training Division, WSAK, 26 Jan 51; Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA), Special Planning Staff, G2 Sect,, GHQ FEC, Sec. 6, pp 3-h.

14-l 0 PIR #300, Hq EUSAK, 8 May 51; PIR #l87, Hq X Corps; Enemy Tactics Bulletin #6, Hq X Corps, undated; Report of Army Command and General Staff School Representative, Cal. Willicm S. Bodner, Army Field Forces &server Team $3. I
.

142.

PIR -#+61, Hq EUSAK, 16 Ott 51; PIR #300, Hq EUSAK, 8 -May 518

$6, Hq X Corps, 1430 PIR #187, Hq X Corps; Enemy Taotics Bulletin undated3 PIR ,f;1299, Hq YTJSAK, 26 Feb 513 PIR $300, Hq 'EUSAK, 8 May 51; PIR a61 o Hq YJSAK, 16 Nov 51,

UtQ

PIR #300, Hq EUSAK, 8 ?Jay 51; PIR i/187, Hq X Tactics Bulletin ,#6, Hq X Corps, Hq X Corps; Enemy Tactics Bulletin Bulletin

Corps; Enemy &, Hq X Corps.

145m PIR $87,

14.6. PIR //365$ Hq X Corps; Enemy Tactics PIR #300s Hq SUSAK, 8 Ilay 51.

$6, Hq X Corps;

* UNCLASSFIED

147 "Report
l

of Army Command and General Staff Sohool Representative," Cal, William S. Bodner, Army Field Forces Observer Team -#5.

148,

Ibidg PIR j&,83', Hq X Corps; ,Enemy Tactics Bulletin $6, Hq X Corps; 'Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Accomodations," Hq National,Polioe, Republic of Korea, Office of the Director, 10 Jan 51; ."Security for Logistical Support " AG 600-96 KGOT, Hq EUSAK, 1 WIar 51, Units in the Field, "Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Aocomodations,"‘
Hq National Police, Republic of Korea, Offioe of the Director,
Francis Hill, 8th U.S. Army
10 Jan 51; "Conference with,Colonel Civil Assistance Officer, "!tol. William S. Bodner, Army Field
Foroes Observation Team ,$j.

150.

'Overall Plan on Civilian Refugee Evacuation and Their Accomodations," Hq National Police, Republic,of Korea, Office of the Dire&or, 10 Jan 51. Tech., and Doct.off Hq IX Corps, p 43: Order of Battle,
Annex #l, War Diary, Hq EUSAK, 19 Aug 9; "North Korean Potential,"
Research Supplement, Issue #3, Copy $21, Interrogation Reports*
ATIS, MI Sect., G2, GHQ FTC; Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA),
Special Planning Staff, G2 Sect., GHQ FEC, Sec. 5, pp l-4.
Planning Staff, G2 Sect.,
Annex #l, War Diary,

151. "En. Tact.,

152. Order of Battle

Handbook (NKPA), Special GHQ FEC, Sec. 5# pp l-4; Order of Battle Hq EWSAK,19 Aug F.

1539 Order of 'Battle Annex #l, i"?ar Diary, Hq EUSAK, 19 Aug 50;
PIR -j&24, Hq EUSAK, 13‘Nov 509 PIR j&6, Hq IX Corps, 11 Nov 'j0;
Intelligence Summary jB85, CINCFE, 11 Nov 9.
154. Order of Battle
Handbook (NKPA), Special Planning Staff, G2 Sect.,
GHQ FEC, Sec. 6, p 1; Interview with Colonel William R. Hamby,
Advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Korean National Government,
214 Oot 51~ "En, Tact., Tech,; and Doct.," Hq IX Corps, p &.
Tact,, Tech., and Doct.," Hq IX Corps, p 43.

155. %n,
Tactics

156, "En. TaGto, Tech,, and Docts,"
and Activities,

Hq IX Corps, p ,!A3 "Enemy Guerrilla
11PIR ,‘fGs3, Hq EUSAK, 18 Ott 51.
Hq IX Corps, pp 4.4-46; PIR #$63,
with Col. Wm. R. Hamby.

157. "En. Tact., 158. '*En. Tact.,

Tech., and Doct.,n Hq EUSAK, 18 Ott 51; Interview

Tech., and Doct.," Hq IX Corps, p &; PIR f/(463, Hq
with Col. Wm. R. Hamby.
EUSAK, 18 Ott 51; Interview Lt. Col. Warren K. Bennett, undated, 63
Training files, Hq EUSAK; "Technical Information on Armor,n!
Letter, Armor Section,

159. Observer Report,

UNCLASSIFIED

160, War Diary, War Diary, Star Diary; 161. Interview

G3 Section,
G3 Se&ion, G3 Seotion, with

Hq EUSAK, 210001-212‘400 Jul F; Hq EUSAK, 0~00014&&00 Aw 503 Hq EU$AK, llpOOl-l&&O0 act fjo.

Capt. Owen Carroll,

G3 Operations,

KMAG, 24 Ott of Owen

51. 162. Interview 163e Interview
Carroll. with Cal. Wm, R, Hamby, Advisor Home Affairs, Korean National Government, with with Col. Wm. R. Hamby; Interview Cal, Qfm..k, Hamby. to the Ministry 24 Ott 51. with Capt.

164. Interview 165. Daily

Report for EUSAK Diary'for 15 Jan 51, Office, Coordinator, Protection of Lines of Communication, Rear Area, Hq EUSAK; Observer Report, Lt. Col. Warren K. Bennett, undated, G3 lVaini.ng Files, Hq EUSAK; Daily Report for EUSAK Diary for 13-14 Jan 51, Office Coordinator, Protection of Lines of Communication, Rear Area, Hq EUSAK; Interview with Cal. Wm. R. Hamby.

UNCLASSlFlED

ANNEXA

TIE92CAL lEONNAISSANC~ F FORMATIONS

JI

-At

SMGX ASST.SQD. SMGX SYGX \I/ RIFLEX
/
/

/

LDR.

JI

\

X

X
r(
lk \ . 1 ,.

SOD. LDA.

X RIFLE

x SMG \ \

RECONNOITERINS

AN AREA

when reoonnoitering an prea, the squad 1ePder first seleots the most prominent terrain feature and rends three to four men to reoonnoiter this spot. In-the above 6+toh the arsiatant squad leader is sent tith three men to Hill A, which was domed the most Important. upon erriving et Hill A and determining it to be olear of enq, a signal is sent to the aquad leader-at XI In the event eqamy ir enoountered in vicinity of Bill A, one member reports this to the rquad loader while the balanoe of the group remains to continue observation. enemy are dlaoovered on or in close proximitv of Hill A, the squad leeder If dispatoher a three-man teem to reoonnoiter area C, while he hireelf proceed8 to area B with two men. The three group8 ore slven a specific time Qot$ment Upon cornletion of the Asrion, in whioh to ocaaplete their reconnaiseanoe. es& term rclleainr in ito rempectfve seotor to @wait signel from the squad leader to mow to B, the point of rendezvous. upon receipt of a signa.1, either rlsual or audible, the two flank teams oonverge on the center bq a route close Alter assembling, the entire squad return6 to its parent to the river bank. unit along the approaoh route.

no

UNCLASSIFIED

UN

t

rYhen reoonnoitering a mountain , a squad size unit is normally employed. Upon reaching the foothill, two ranbsrs of the pstrol tske up positiona eo a6 to obrerve alone both sides of the meas. of the The remainder moves up the side in single file. upon repohing a patrol gradually point just belnw the center of the crest, thq turn ninety degree8 and move in single file to the ore&. If the mountein is clear of hostile troops, a &rvl is made to the two men ported et the foot If further reconnaissance is needed/the patrol to proceed to the top. unit usin? the route of apurosch. oontinuer on or returns to its perent

146

UNCLASSlFlED
--

SQUAD LEAOER - _

)(

SM 0

II
niasign. a -b-u

UN
NOT TO SCALE

MOUNTAINS men moving through mountains, to avoid defiles, a- patrol ordina ilv 8 lits into two sections. Cqntrol of the split patrol rests with the y quad ,&eder Control is exei8ndCsEi6tent Oqusd.kwder, eaoh of whom leeds .a column. If nsoessary oised betwoeh the files by 8 system of prearranged signals. to movw through a defile, a three-man point may be sent fifteen.t.0 trentyIf the point receives fire from the fin meters ahead of the mein body. or withadjacent hlllslden, the main bo4y either ..q# ushes through the defile . and the importance of the draws, depending on the emount of &HI r 0-d

147

UNCLASSlF\ED

.

UNCLASSIFIED '

SW6 x RIFLE SM6 X X SW 6we X SOO. LOR. x

x SY6 X RIFLE x SMO

RIFLE X SY6 x 1

UN
OPEN TERRAIN THE ASSISTANT SOUAO LEADER PLACES
HIMSELF WITH EITHER FLANK COLUMN.
AT THE HEAO OR SRINOINO UP THE REAR,
OEPENOINO UPON THE SlTUATiON.

---------------------------------------------

RIFLE

x

P\

1

A
RIFLE x +

NOT TO SCALE

WOODED

AREA

The formation used when moving e petrol through a wooded mm is in naerly The denall l speots similar to that employed when crorring open ternin. l ity of the woods diatmttes ths division of the patrol into two or three Control. also dependent upon the dmriw of the arm), conriotr oolumnr. of whirtlo rignalr and 1iChted match signels.

UNCLASSIFED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

CCF

SMALL

UNIT

FDRMATIDNS

A.

SQUAD

LEADERS

LEFT 0

TRIANGLE: 0 LOR) I

x (SO0 0 0

0
0 0 0 0

I
0 I 36-64 P&ES

42 - 46

PACES l -------

.
-----------v-----B 6. SOUAD LEAOERS

l

Rl6HT

TRIAN6l.E: 0 0 0 T

X (SOD LDR)

0 0

0
0 42-46

0 I
0 4 FACES

3S-64

PACES

-----------s-----m--

C. REAR

TRlANBLE: 26- 32 0-o X(S6D

PACES
WR) o

0

0

0 0

J

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7-6 -8 XtSaO LDRI

--m--------w------E. LEFT
0
0
x mo uxu”
0
0
0

STAIR TEAM:

0
0 7-6 ---------------F. WIOE FRONT: 0 0 000 0 XtS6D LDRI 000 7-6
-------------w-----

-
0
---

PACES INWRVAL

WS

BETWEEN

MEN

6.

RI6HT

TRlAN6LE: 0 0 0 X (SQO LOW 0 0 0

\
-----------v------H. iEFT TRIM;

0 0

O

0 0 D x 0 0 0

O ‘sp LDRI 0

UNCLtWFlED

I. FROM TRIANGLE 0 0 X 0 0 0 (SO0 LDR) 0 0 0 0

--------------------------------J.
REAR 0 0 0 TRIANGLE 0 td 0 LDR) 0 0 0

0

_

lJNCLASSIF/ED .

UNCLASSIFIED

&erheed

CCTPT

i:n

rp31~:

’ ’

^:’

1 ,-et lo:

trench.

::

e?lols

trmch

at

CW3329R.

” . * I, .;

,Y

!’

1.56

c z f,

2 c’-;, I “-

” .

Commwication 52-10, Koree,

trench Ath 1:250,000.)

overhead

cover

CSP93OP3.

hap

NJ

.

APi Bunker ~r250,000.)

on top

of

ridp

at

CSPpPii05.

&ap

NJ 52-10,

Korea,

C’

I,
: .; !.i <,; : ji ,._...

ANNEXD

AERIALPHOTOGRAPHS

i63

.a.rr~ws)

aerial photograph showing elab,orate antitar& The hill used by Comnmist Tomes in Korea. the two roads was co-ered w?.th lrany well-ccmcuflzged trenches. Oblique 165

<itches (see mass Between bunkers and

Dl9943

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