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Advanced Level March 2012

Advanced Level March 2012

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  • Table of Contents
  • The New Foundation Brief
  • Key Organizational Changes
  • Hierarchical Sections
  • Hierarchical Evidence
  • Definitions
  • Topic Analysis
  • Defend Your Source
  • Author Index
  • Organization Index
  • Laying the Foundation
  • The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations
  • U.S. Interests
  • U.S. Aid Levels
  • Pakistan’s Nuclear Issue
  • Pro Evidence
  • General
  • A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence:
  • Pakistan Has Different Objectives
  • Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat
  • Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists
  • Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists
  • Support for the Haqqani Network
  • Allegations of Aiding Taliban
  • Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan
  • Inability To Find Bin Laden
  • Aid Creates Perverse Incentives
  • Military Uncooperative
  • U.S. Must Force Change
  • Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid
  • Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided
  • Aid Hurts Democracy
  • Pakistan’s Military Too Powerful
  • Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful
  • Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible
  • Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan
  • Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help
  • Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly
  • Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program
  • Military Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency
  • Aid Has Yielded Poor, Often Negative, Results
  • India Should Be Our Priority
  • Our Alliance With Pakistan Hurts/Prevents Our Alliance With India
  • Suspending Aid Doesn’t Mean No Help
  • Pakistan Apparently Does Not Need the Aid
  • Con Evidence
  • More Engagement, Not Less
  • Suspending All Aid Would Worsen the Situation
  • Consistency is Essential
  • Cutting Aid Failed Last Time
  • Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
  • Security Concerns
  • Pakistan Too Important to Lose
  • Pakistan’s Importance to Afghanistan
  • Pakistan Necessary to Stopping Terrorism
  • Aid to the Military Remains Essential
  • Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential
  • Education Aid Is Critical
  • Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics
  • Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most
  • Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse
  • Ties to China
  • Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence
  • Ties With Iran
  • Ties With Saudi Arabia
  • Pro Counters
  • Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated
  • Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible
  • Afghan Supply Lines Don’t Depend on Pakistan
  • Suspension Will Not Cause Gov. Collapse
  • Conditionality Not the Answer
  • Humanitarian Aid Not Effective
  • Con Counters
  • China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely
  • Military Aid is Productive
  • Pakistani Military Not To Blame
  • Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban
  • Conditional Aid Would Succeed
  • Contentions
  • Pro Contentions
  • Con Contentions

Foundation Briefs

Advanced Level March Brief

Resolved: The United States should suspend all assistance to Pakistan.

March 2012

Table of Contents

Table of Contents
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 1 The New Foundation Brief ................................................................................................................................. 4 Key Organizational Changes .............................................................................................................................. 5 Hierarchical Sections ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Hierarchical Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 5 Definitions............................................................................................................................................................... 6 Topic Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 Defend Your Source ............................................................................................................................................... 9 Author Index ..................................................................................................................................................... 10 Organization Index ........................................................................................................................................... 11 Laying the Foundation .......................................................................................................................................... 13 The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations .................................................................................................. 13 U.S. Interests ..................................................................................................................................................... 13 U.S. Aid Levels ................................................................................................................................................. 14 Pakistan’s Nuclear Issue ................................................................................................................................... 14 Pro Evidence ......................................................................................................................................................... 15 General .............................................................................................................................................................. 16 A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence: ............................................................................. 16 Pakistan Has Different Objectives .................................................................................................................... 18 Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat .................................................................................................. 19 Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists ........................................................................................................... 20 Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists ........................................................................................... 25 Support for the Haqqani Network ..................................................................................................................... 27 Allegations of Aiding Taliban .......................................................................................................................... 29 Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 31 Inability To Find Bin Laden ............................................................................................................................. 32 Aid Creates Perverse Incentives ....................................................................................................................... 34 foundationbriefs.com Page 1 of 114

March 2012 Table of Contents Military Uncooperative ..................................................................................................................................... 36 U.S. Must Force Change ................................................................................................................................... 37 Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid ................................................................................................................ 39 Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided ................................................................................................... 40 Aid Hurts Democracy ................................................................................................................................... 40 Pakistan’s Military Too Powerful ..................................................................................................................... 41 Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful .......................................... 43 Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible .......................................................................... 45 Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan ................................................................................................................................... 46 Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help .......................................................................................... 47 Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly ...................................................................................................................... 48 Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program ................................................................................................................. 51 Military Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency ................................................................................................ 52 Aid Has Yielded Poor, Often Negative, Results ............................................................................................... 53 India Should Be Our Priority ............................................................................................................................ 54 Our Alliance With Pakistan Hurts/Prevents Our Alliance With India ......................................................... 55 Suspending Aid Doesn’t Mean No Help .......................................................................................................... 58 Pakistan Apparently Does Not Need the Aid ................................................................................................... 60 Con Evidence ........................................................................................................................................................ 61 General .............................................................................................................................................................. 62 More Engagement, Not Less ............................................................................................................................ 64 Suspending All Aid Would Worsen the Situation ............................................................................................ 65 Consistency is Essential .................................................................................................................................... 66 Cutting Aid Failed Last Time ........................................................................................................................... 68 Risk of Nuclear Proliferation ............................................................................................................................ 69 Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................................. 73 Pakistan Too Important to Lose ........................................................................................................................ 74 Pakistan’s Importance to Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 75 Pakistan Necessary to Stopping Terrorism ....................................................................................................... 77


Page 2 of 114

...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 89 Ties With Iran ........................................................... 103 Con Counters ............................................ 95 Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 100 Suspension Will Not Cause Gov......... 78 Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential .....................................................................................................................................................................com Page 3 of 114 ...................................................................................................................................................... 83 Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics ............................................................. 113 foundationbriefs.............................................................................................. 111 Con Contentions .................................. 88 Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence ................................................... 96 Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible ................. 84 Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most .................... 104 China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely ............................... 101 Conditionality Not the Answer ........... 105 Military Aid is Productive ........................................................................................................................................ Collapse ............................................ 90 Ties With Saudi Arabia..................................... 87 Ties to China .......................... 102 Humanitarian Aid Not Effective ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 109 Contentions ................................................................................................................................ 86 Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse ....................................................................................................................................................... 110 Pro Contentions........................................................................................March 2012 Table of Contents Aid to the Military Remains Essential ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 93 Pro Counters.............................................................. 99 Afghan Supply Lines Don’t Depend on Pakistan ............................................................................................ 106 Pakistani Military Not To Blame .......................................... 107 Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban ....................................................................................................... 79 Education Aid Is Critical ............... 108 Conditional Aid Would Succeed ...................................................................................................................................

e. better analysis and a broader scope.com and let us know what you think—good or bad. and even where to look for sections of analysis. With unique analysis on how to lay the conditions for victory. Framework Often times. Topic Analysis This is a general reflection on the resolution. Strategy Sections Foundation Briefs is committed to making sure you understand the evidence provided to you. and a picture of where we see the debate headed. challenges you will face while debating. foundationbriefs. After all. We will never simply throw quotes at you and hope you can understand what we are trying to imply. we realize that there is nothing as credible as being able to tell the judge exactly who the author is and what he or she does or why your judge should listen to the organization being quoted. They are listed below with a brief explanation of what is packed into each section and why we made the transition.e the New York Times or CNN). Defend Your Source Sometimes just telling a judge the source of your information doesn’t quite convey its validity. Redesigning the brief required the introduction of new and exciting sections.March 2012 The New Foundation Brief The New Foundation Brief Here at Foundation Briefs. Foundation Briefs provides you with this information for each and every author and organization we quote unless it is a source we know is credible and everyone has heard of (i. we will set you up for such a feat. Having debated countless rounds. you are the debater and we are simply here to support you. It will provide to you an impression of the topic at hand. what rhetoric will please the judge and which counterarguments to be prepared for. the section in the brief regarding alQaeda) there will appear a small section of original Foundation Briefs analysis to tell you how we see the evidence being used. With this section. why evidence appears in the order it does.com Page 4 of 114 . That is where the Strategy Section comes in. we came into the 2011-12 season determined to completely reimagine our brief and make it even easier to use while introducing more content. We are always looking to improve and cannot do so without your help and guidance. the most important part of the debate is to actually win before the debate begins. At the beginning of all major sections (i. We encourage you to read through the following pages carefully so that you know how everything is structured. So email us at fdbriefs@gmail. Just look for the red text below the source to tell you what to look up in the Defend Your Source Section. you will be guaranteed to begin battle already with an advantage.

com Page 5 of 114 . we have done the same with organizational features. the Counter Evidence Section will come at the end of the brief. you will see such evidence in the first few sources of each section. it just might not be ideal to put in your time-constrained ~1 minute contentions. all of the evidence in each Foundation Brief will be broken down into sections. See below to understand our reasons. They too are listed below so you know exactly how to find what you are looking for. there is no questioning how important a piece of evidence is or how we think it should be used—every single piece of evidence is where it is for a reason. Following the core will be the Supporting Evidence Section. Hierarchical Evidence Arguably the most important change we made to our organization is that evidence is now organized from most to least important. These essential sources of each section are considered the Core Evidence Section. Finally. The most crucial arguments will come first. With the new Foundation Brief.March 2012 The New Foundation Brief Key Organizational Changes Just as we introduced a number of key sections to revolutionize our brief. foundationbriefs. It is our intention that these sections will serve as excellent foundations for contentions throughout the month. This means that if you only want the most crucial sources and the most relevant ideas. which will give you greater understanding and further nuance to the argument—don’t ignore this section! Evidence in this section is still very important. Hierarchical Sections As with last season. Important note: Webpages and online articles that are long and continuous will always be cited as page one (1). Although these sections were a feature of our briefs last year. what you will want to include in your contentions. we have renewed our commitment to making sure that the most relevant sections come first.

Princeton University foundationbriefs. . US Department of Defense 2005 the activity of contributing to the fulfillment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose . and security assistance. duty. or function to cause to stop temporarily to set aside or make temporarily inoperative to defer to a later time on specified conditions . or correctness indicating a desirable or expected state .March 2012 Definitions Definitions Should used to indicate obligation. US assistance takes three forms--development assistance.com Page 6 of 114 . or judgement) .Oxford English Dictionary Suspend temporarily prevent from continuing or being in force or effect defer or delay (an action. office.Merriam-Webster Dictionary Assistance Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. event. humanitarian assistance.Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.Oxford English Dictionary to debar temporarily especially from a privilege.

By affirming this resolution. This is so crucial to the Pro side because the argument becomes not about abandoning Pakistan. These are two very different things. Pakistan has shut off supply lines to Afghanistan and the United States is threatening to withhold military funding. Additionally. Moreover. The United States is becoming increasingly willing to publicly state that the Pakistani military is actively supporting terrorism—the exact opposite of what nearly $20 billion in U. The Pro side will attempt to argue that relations are currently strained to the point that only drastic action will push relations back on track. What is important though is not whether the United States is justified in suspending assistance. such ideal cooperation now seems increasingly wishful thinking the separate aspirations and identities of the two nations clash. but whether it should. Since then.S. forces and Pakistani soldiers left 24 Pakistanis dead after confusion between the two forces lead to a firefight. They can do this while still acknowledging the imperfect nature of assistance. debaters will quickly come to realize that the United States is. relations have deteriorated as one crisis after another pushes diplomacy to collapse. 2011 incident between U. not to spend large amounts of foundationbriefs. The United States relies on Pakistan to combat terrorism within Pakistan’s own borders as well as Afghanistan. First.com Page 7 of 114 . the United States killed Osama bin Laden deep within Pakistan’s borders. we are debating the suspension of assistance. Therefore. and in fact supports certain terror networks. In May 2011. Thus.S. This has greatly damaged relations. In looking at the resolution. This resolution attempts to address this growing tension and explore the best route for the United States to pursue with Pakistan. but instead more about trying to encourage Pakistan to modify its behavior. it is advisable for both sides. aid over the last decade has tried to encourage it to do. This is quite a burden of proof for the Pro side and makes the resolution much more about the theory of diplomacy than about targeted programs we ought to reevaluate. at the very least. but their relationship has been strenuous and in the last year incredibly fragile. but Pro especially. justified in withdrawing its assistance to Pakistan. After reviewing the evidence.March 2012 Topic Analysis Topic Analysis For over a decade now. the United States would make a very strong statement (which the Pro will argue is necessary). the Pro will need to clearly outline the goals it hopes to achieve in suspending assistance. However. the Con will be able to make convincing arguments that suspending assistance will only make matters worse. There is strong evidence that Pakistan neglects counter terrorism efforts. Indeed. These two nations refer to each other as allies publicly. the resolution is dealing with all assistance. While Pakistan has not been an outstanding ally. a November 26. raising questions as to Pakistan’s knowledge of the Al-Qaeda leader but also enraging Pakistanis for violating their nation’s sovereignty. This implies that withholding aid is temporary. there are a few key terms that shape the debate in important ways. many experts on the Middle East believe that a long-term solution to peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without Pakistan’s help. Pakistan has been elevated to top importance in the United States’ foreign policy priorities.

Pakistan sees an unstable Afghanistan. The United States does not have much choice in its alliance with Pakistan. and we wish you luck in your debates. and a good relationship with the Taliban. as vital to Pakistani security. This seems to be one of the more interesting topics of the year. this is not likely to happen beyond defeating militants that pose direct threats to the Pakistani military and government. would like Pakistan to focus its military efforts on counter terrorism. policy objectives. the deep historical rivalry with India will continue to be the emphasis of Pakistan’s military strategy. interests.S. but rather as a necessity to combat terrorism and one that is primarily kept intact through financial assistance. Much of U.S. assistance also contributes to the legitimate effort from Pakistan to fight militants in its own border and has led to the capture or killing of high level Al-Qaeda operatives. The Pro must highlight these deep differences and conclude that such differences are too big a gap to bridge. In reality.S. the Con must argue that despite these differences.S. foundationbriefs.S. Instead. The Con will not try to portray the alliance as perfect. The general direction that the Pro will take is explaining the truly fundamental differences in Pakistan and U. U. policy objectives. Aid to Pakistan simply cannot persuade Pakistan to abandon their longstanding objectives. policy dealing with Pakistan is very wishful and essentially ignores harsh realities in the hope that somehow Pakistan will help the United States.com Page 8 of 114 . On the Con it will be hard to ignore these assertions. assistance to Pakistan still remains the best strategy to achieve U. While Pakistan supports some terrorist organizations. and providing robust assistance allows the United States to better monitor Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and carry out its own counter terrorism operations. However. Additionally. no matter how much the U.March 2012 Topic Analysis time listing the faults of Pakistan but instead focusing on the causal link between suspending assistance and better achieving U.S.

com Page 9 of 114 .Defend Your Source foundationbriefs.

Prior to becoming the President of CGD.March 2012 Author Index Author Index Nancy Birdsall Nancy Birdsall is the founding president of the Center for Global Development (CGD) in Washington. and Pakistan to better understand the other’s interests and priorities.com Page 10 of 114 .S. Birdsall served for three years as Senior Associate and Director of the Economic Reform Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. of which Keller was the executive editor from July 2003 until September 2011. as well as on the reform of the international financial institutions. Bill Keller Bill Keller is a writer for the The New York Times. She co-founded CGD in November 2001. and South Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations. Her work at Carnegie focused on issues of globalization and inequality. Daniel Markey Senior Fellow for India. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan. DC. Moeed Yusuf Moeed W. Pakistan. foundationbriefs. and former executive vice-president of the Inter-American Development Bank. USA. and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country. Yusuf will be engaged in expanding USIP’s work on Pakistan to cover aspects that remain critical for the U. Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at the United States Institute of Peace Center in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention and is responsible for managing the Institute’s Pakistan program. Sumit Ganguly Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations and is a Professor of Political Science at Indiana University in Bloomington.

One of Washington's oldest think tanks. The CTC’s distinguished scholars. After 50 years. international network of experts. environmental and resource issues. regional stability. governance.March 2012 Organization Index Organization Index Belfer Center The Belfer Center is the hub of the Harvard Kennedy School's research. foreign policy. the Combating Terrorism Center serves as an important national resource that rigorously studies the terrorist threat and provides policy-relevant research while moving the boundaries of academic knowledge. D. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative process — from the early considerations that precede bill drafting. in the United States. Brookings conducts research and education in the social sciences. and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration. through committee hearings and floor debate. foundationbriefs. Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington. Center for Strategic and International Studies Since 1962. and training in international security affairs. metropolitan policy.S. and access to senior U. primarily in economics.C.com Page 11 of 114 . teaching. CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Situated at the nexus of theory and practice. It is one of the most respected such think-tanks in the world having been founded in 1916. and science and technology policy. and global economy and development. Congressional Research Service The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency activities. CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. government leadership set it apart from any other like enterprise.

The Heritage Foundation Founded in 1973. traditional American values. nonpartisan membership organization. and publisher. private foundations.March 2012 Organization Index Council on Foreign Relations The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent. international organizations. The organization has long since expanded to working with other governments. Rand Corporation RAND Corporation is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to the United States armed forces by Douglas Aircraft Company. and public service on law and policy challenges related to national and international security. and a strong national defense. RAND aims for interdisciplinary and quantitative problem solving. Rand has been in business since 1948 and currently is comprised of over 1. graduate-level education. Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs.S. The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise. It is currently financed by the U. INSCT The Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) at Syracuse University provides cutting-edge interdisciplinary research. government and private endowment corporations including the healthcare industry. universities and private individuals. Foreign Affairs Since its founding in 1922.com Page 12 of 114 . individual freedom. foreign policy and international affairs through the free exchange of ideas. and commercial organizations on a host of non-defense issues. think tank. a non-profit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improving the understanding of U. limited government. It is published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).700 employees from all around the world.S. foundationbriefs.

drug smuggling. Web. airstrike in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan. 1 Feb. Web. 2012.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan>.S. Claire.guardian.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.fas. 10 Feb. 2012. 6 February.Pakistan-U.S. "Civilian assistance to Pakistan continues and has not been interrupted since the tragic November 26 incident. 2012. The Obama administration has announced it will withhold more than one-third of all military assistance to Pakistan . Alan. 2012. “Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. 10 Feb. 11 July 2011. (Pg. Relations. http://www.including a payment of $300m for counterinsurgency programmes. 2009. foundationbriefs.S. Congressional Research Service. military dictatorship. U.com/2012-01-21/asia/world_asia_uspakistan-aid_1_civilian-aid-american-drone-strikes-islamabad?_s=PM:ASIA>. Rep. international terrorism." Provost. Web.cnn. The withheld aid includes funding for military equipment and reimbursements for selected Pakistani security expenditures .co. 2012. 21 Jan.fas.” Terrorist bombings and other militant attacks have become a near-daily scourge in 2008." CNN. Interests Kronstadt K.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. http://www." The Guardian. Web.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. Relations between the two countries have worsened since the U.S.com Page 13 of 114 . 2009. 1 Feb. Congressional Research Service. "Sixty Years of US Aid to Pakistan: Get the Data.S. Relations.an aid envelope worth some $800m (£498m).March 2012 Laying the Foundation Laying the Foundation The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations Kronstadt K.Pakistan-U. U. Rep. 1) "Civilian Aid to Pakistan Continues despite Growing Tensions. <http://www.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. and above all. Alan. All of the nightmares of the twenty-first century come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation. <http://articles. 6 February. Says.

March 2012 Laying the Foundation A stable.S. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads. Afghan stability. <http://www. and economic development. 2009.fas.com Page 14 of 114 .org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.Pakistan-U. 30 Nov. 0) U. 2012. Islamabad is producing fissile material. Paul K. (Pg.. Congressional Research Service.1 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Alan.pdf>. 2012. prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U. and deploying additional delivery vehicle. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.S. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues. 0) Pakistan’s Nuclear Issue Kerr. 1 Feb. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. including about $3.S. democratic. Aid Levels Kronstadt K. Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U. democratization and human rights protection. Web. 2011. Congressional Research Service. Web. Rep. Rep. U. although it could be larger.7 billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. 6 February. foundationbriefs. interests.S. and Mary Beth Nikitin.3 billion in overt assistance since 2001. (Pg. the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions. aid. obtaining more than $5. adding to related production facilities. http://www.S. Relations. 1 Feb.fas. Pakistan also has received about $6.

Pro Evidence foundationbriefs.com Page 15 of 114 .

however. ISAF. differing objectives the inability to find Bin Laden. Web.that may have future strategic utility in reestablishing Pakistan’s sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies. A significant resulting uptick in terrorist violence has been accompanied by a gradual perversion of the Pakistani social fabric. (Pg. we provide you with evidence that the United States would be justified in suspending Pakistan’s aid based on a number of factors such as support of terrorists. Next. There are many other movements and tensions that feed violence and extremism in Pakistan. ii) There are tremendous shortfalls in the Pakistani government’s capacity and willingness to provide for its citizens in ways that discourage a rising tide of violence and separatist movements. Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of crossborder sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants. (Pg.March 2012 Pro: General General A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence: The Pro evidence is broken up into two primary sections that appear in the most logical order possible. <http://csis. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in Pakistani and US relations. 5 May 2011. and that prolong the fighting and cause serious US. While this distinction is minimal semantically. ii) Pakistani military operations too have not been ideal from the US context. and those – like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban -. but that it in fact should. Stability. that Al Qa’ida and the Taliban are only part of the story. and which grow out of a government that has consistently failed to meet the needs of Pakistan’s people over a period of decades. It also is helping to strengthen extremists who ultimately may become an active threat to Pakistan. Pakistan: Violence vs. Center for Strategic and International Studies. and complicating the prospects for future US aid. iii) As senior US officials and officers have made all too clear – along with some Afghan counterparts – this means some elements of the Pakistani governance and forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the United States and Afghanistan. (Pg. iii) foundationbriefs. 8 Feb.com Page 16 of 114 . Evidence to support the fact that the US should suspend aid include things such as “ Aid Provides Perverse Incentives” etc. Vira. (Pg. First.pdf>. These failures interact with a growing wave of Sunni-Deobandi radicalization that manifests in anti-state violence and sectarian intolerance. intimidating secularism at the expense of militant Islam. Varun. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. it is essential. and Afghan casualties. and Anthony Cordesman.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. The selective counterinsurgency approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani interests. evidence is provided to prove that the US is not only justified in suspending aid. This assessment shows. 2012. Rep.

Libya. The country is the world's worst nuclear proliferator. Moreover. Although Islamabad has attacked those terrorist groups. they refuse to give the United States permission to conduct commando raids in Pakistan.S. Alan. Jan/Feb2012. that the army does not fully control the intelligence agencies. swearing that they will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. 2012. and that the these intelligence agencies have lost their ability to rein in the very militant groups they helped to create. Meanwhile. Congressional Research Service. but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam. in short. the process of democratization there. Indians. that attack coalition troops and Afghan officials or conspire against India. that target its institutions. they publicly exaggerate the resulting civilian deaths. and a significant segment of the populace has viewed years of U. and Hezb-i-Islami. for example. 2009. Web.Pakistan-U. (3) foundationbriefs. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an impediment to. Afghans. (2-3) Washington's current strategy toward Islamabad. 6 February. Relations. such as the Haqqani network. is not working. Web. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. although many Pakistani officials privately support the drone program. Rep. Q. Vol. Underlying the anti-American sentiment is a pervasive. and North Korea through the A.S. having sold technology to Iran. efforts to deal with those groups. (Pg. 1 Feb. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. 91 Issue 1.com Page 17 of 114 . There exist widely-held suspicions among foreign governments and independent analysts alike that Islamabad’s civilian government does not fully control the army.March 2012 Pro: General Kronstadt K. anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan.S. such as al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.” Foreign Affairs. Khan network. Stephen. 2) Krasner. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. and others. the Afghan Taliban. it actively supports others. rather than facilitator of. Any gains the United States has bought with its aid and engagement have come at an extremely high price and have been more than offset by Pakistan's nuclear proliferation and its support for the groups that attack Americans. Pakistan also hampers U.

Jan/Feb2012. an American scholar of the region who is listened to in both academia and government. Bill. Rep. Vali Nasr says. Stephen. Center for Strategic and International Studies. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Afghanistan. “Everything about this vision is dangerous to Pakistan. and its prickly relationship with the United States to achieve this objective.com Page 18 of 114 . Its policies are a fully rational response to the conception of the country's national interest held by its leaders. it has become increasingly apparent that Pakistan has a fundamentally different set of strategic priorities from the US. and Varun Vira. Central Asia and Pakistan. a fact that US experts have privately recognized since long before 9/11. <http://csis. He quickly agreed to the American demands and delivered on many of them.org/files/publication/110914_Iran_Ch_9_AfPakCentAsia. “was sort of a Hollywood suspension of disbelief. A decade into the war. India. 2011. Vol. The Bush-Musharraf relationship. Pakistan's fundamental goal is to defend itself against its rival. the accommodation with the Taliban was never fully curtailed. saw the folly of defying an American ultimatum. As a result.” (7) Krasner.” Foreign Affairs.” Nasr says. 2012. it was an ally in the war on terror and it subscribed to our agenda for Afghanistan.pdf>. Pakistan continues to focus on the Indian threat. Pakistan’s military ruler at the time. 2011. Web. Web. “The only time period between 1947 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that Pakistanis have felt secure about Afghanistan is during the Taliban period. 91 Issue 1. (Pg. says Vali Nasr. Musharraf was a convenient person who created a myth that we subscribed to — basically that Pakistan was on the same page with us. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. "The Pakistanis Have a Point. “Talking Tough to Pakistan.March 2012 Pro: Different Objectives Pakistan Has Different Objectives Fitzgerald. What America had in mind for Afghanistan was antithetical to Pakistan’s self-interest. and sees it as a temporary actor that will again abandon the region in 2014 – if not before. and it spread its bets. 8) Keller. though. terrorism." The New York Times. Still. there is a much more straightforward explanation for Pakistan's behavior. Pervez Musharraf. especially those in the military. 12 Sept. In practice. 10 Feb. Web. does not trust the US. (4) foundationbriefs. Pakistan is perceived to continue maneuvering independently to secure its interests in a post-American Afghanistan. Now the Bush administration would attempt to supplant the Taliban with a strong independent government in Kabul and a muscular military.” from 1996 to 2001. Islamabad deliberately uses nuclear proliferation and deterrence. Erin. 14 Dec. however. Pakistan knew America’s mission in Afghanistan would end.

2011. General Kayani’s worry. too. nor the SPD itself. This has been an impressive accomplishment. and on foiling other American espionage methods. Pakistan's leaders could hardly resist pressure from Washington to cooperate. After 9/11. as expressed to General Kidwai after Abbottabad. was focused on the United States. According to sources in Pakistan.March 2012 Pro: Different Objectives Pakistan's double game with the United States has been effective. There is evidence to suggest that neither the Pakistani army. the Pakistani military assumes (correctly) that the U. So Islamabad decided to have things both ways: cooperating with Washington enough to make itself useful but obstructing the coalition's plans enough to make it nearly impossible to end the Afghan insurgency." The Atlantic. Web. "The Ally From Hell. General Kidwai assured General Kayani that the counterintelligence branch of the SPD remained focused on rooting out American and Indian spies from the Pakistani nuclear weapons complex. General Kayani believes that the U. which they believed gave Pakistan strategic depth against India. The Pakistani air force drills its pilots in ways of intercepting American spy planes. (4) Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat Goldberg. (4-5) foundationbriefs. In their conversations. But they were also loath to lose influence with the insurgents in Afghanistan.S.S. indeed. has developed the technical means to stage simultaneous raids on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.com Page 19 of 114 .S. considers jihadism the most immediate threat to the security of its nuclear weapons. Dec. devotes many resources to aerial and satellite surveillance of its nuclear sites. Jeffrey. has designs on the Pakistani nuclear program. and that the Abbottabad raid suggested that the U. and Marc Ambinder.

Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups. http://www. "The Ally From Hell. The relationship has survived as long as it has only because both countries have chosen to pretend to believe the lies they tell each other. there are foundationbriefs. partner. Pakistan-U.S. 2011.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. By nearly all accounts. persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U. the relationship between the two countries has been shot through with rage. 2012.com Page 20 of 114 . this support continues. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis. for more than 20 years about its support for terrorist organizations. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns about Islamabad’s ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani territory. Alan.S. and pretense for years. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U. Jeffrey. to date. and they continue to place the bulk of blame on the United States. Top U. and Marc Ambinder.S.March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists Kronstadt K. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship. 1 Feb.S.S. Rep. 3) Goldberg. Congressional Research Service. albeit selectively. 0) Still. Dec. maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. have been abundant. there are few signs that Pakistan’s current civilian leaders are willing and able to seriously address the outcomes of their country’s security policies and move them in the direction of moderation. resentment. Even in internal discussions these leaders continue to shirk responsibility for increased rates of extremism there. Pakistan’s lies. forces in Afghanistan. aid both in FY2011 and in the post-9/11 period. Web.S. that “rogue elements” within the ISI are responsible for the acts of terrorism against India and U.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. 21 October.S. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U. (Pg.fas. decision makers. Web. Relations. against the evidence. This perspective—apparently widespread among the Pakistani public.S. Most American officials are at this late stage convinced that there are no “rogue elements” of any size or importance in the ISI." The Atlantic. The Pakistani government has willfully misled the U. 2011. as well—arguably omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist militancy in the region (including the provision of vital support to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime throughout most of the 1990s). and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U. (Pg.S. and it willfully misleads the American government when it asserts. in particular. While the hostility and distrust have increased of late.

March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists only the ISI and the ISI assets that the ISI (with increasing implausibility) denies having. (The ISI’s S Wing, the branch of the service that runs anti-India activities, among other things, is said to have a very potent “alumni association,” in the words of Stephen P. Cohen, a leading American scholar of Pakistan based at the Brookings Institution.) A particular challenge the ISI poses is that while it funds and protects various jihadist groups, these groups often pick their own targets and the timing of their attacks. The ISI has worked for years against American interests—not only against American interests in Afghanistan, but against the American interest in defeating particular jihadist networks, even while it was also working with the Americans against other jihadist organizations. (6) The past two U.S. National Intelligence Estimates on Pakistan —which represent the consensus views of America’s 16 spy agencies—concluded with a high degree of certainty that Pakistani support for jihadist groups has increased over the past several years. (7) The ISI also helps foment anti-Americanism inside Pakistan. American and Pakistani sources allege that the ISI pays journalists in the Pakistani press, most of which is moderately to virulently anti-American, to write articles hostile to the United States. An American visitor to Pakistan can easily see that a particular narrative has been embedded in the country’s collective psyche. This narrative holds that the U.S. favors India, punishes Pakistan unjustifiably, and periodically abandons Pakistan when American policy makers feel the country is not useful. “America is a disgrace because it turns on its friends when it has no use for them,” says General Aslam Beg, a retired chief of staff of the Pakistani army, in an efficient summation of the dominant Pakistani narrative. A Pew poll taken after the Abbottabad raid found that 69 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S. as “more of an enemy”; only 6 percent see the U.S. as “more of a partner.” (7) Sympathy for jihadist-oriented groups among at least some Pakistani military men has been acknowledged for years, even inside Pakistan; recently a brigadier, Ali Khan, was arrested for allegedly maintaining contact with a banned extremist organization. While we were reporting this story, militants invaded a major Pakistani naval base near Karachi, blowing up two P-3C Orion surveillance planes and killing at least 10 people on the base. Pakistani security forces required 15 hours to regain control of the base. Experts believe that nuclear weapon components were stored nearby. In a series of interviews, several Pakistani officials told The Atlantic that investigators believe the militants had help inside the base. A retired Pakistani general with intelligence experience says, “Different aspects of the military and security services have different levels of sympathy for the extremists. The navy is high in sympathy.” (8) The U.S. government has lied to itself, and to its citizens, about the nature and actions of successive Pakistani governments. Pakistani behavior over the past 20 years has rendered the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism effectively meaningless. The U.S. currently names four countries as state sponsors of terror: Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. American civilian and military officials have for years made the case, publicly and privately, that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism—yet it has never been listed as such. In the last 12 months of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, for example, Secretary of State James Baker wrote a letter to the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, accusing Pakistan of supporting Muslim terrorists in foundationbriefs.com Page 21 of 114

March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists Indian-administered Kashmir, as well as Sikh terrorists operating inside India. “We have information indicating that [the ISI] and others intend to continue to provide material support to groups that have engaged in terrorism,” the letter read. At this same time, a talking-points memo read to Pakistani leaders by Nicholas Platt, who was then the American ambassador to Pakistan, asserted, “Our information is certain.” The memo went on: “Please consider the serious consequences [to] our relationship if this support continues. If this situation persists, the Secretary of State may find himself required by law to place Pakistan on the state sponsors of terrorism list.” The Baker threat caused a crisis inside the Pakistani government. In his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Husain Haqqani, the current Pakistani ambassador to Washington, writes that Javed Nasir, who was the ISI chief during this episode, told Prime Minister Sharif, “We have been covering our tracks so far and will cover them even better in the future.” The crisis was resolved, temporarily, when Nasir was removed as ISI chief the following year. (8-9) In 2008 Mike McConnell, who was then President Bush’s director of national intelligence, confronted the ISI chief, General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, with evidence that the ISI was tipping off jihadists so that they could escape in advance of American attacks against them. According to sources familiar with the conversation, McConnell accused Pakistan of not doing everything it could to rein in the Pakistani Taliban; he asserted that American intelligence had concluded that most Pakistani assets were still deployed against India. “How dare you tell me how our forces are deployed?,” Pasha said to McConnell. McConnell then provided Pasha with evidence to back up his assertion. (10) Lashkare-Taiba, like other groups supported and protected by the Pakistani government, does not have a perfect record of complying with ISI instructions, according to a Pakistani source familiar with the relationship. Even though Lashkar cells maintain contact with ISI officers, they operate according to their own desires and schedules. “The ISI funds them and protects them, but doesn’t always control their choice of targets and timing,” the Pakistani source says. (16)


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Vira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman. Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 May 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>.
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan’s political leadership has shown far too little courage in the face of radical extremism, often choosing appeasement, over principle. The silence in the aftermath of the assassinations of two prominent liberal lawmakers - Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minorities Minister – has been deafening and has allowed the intimidation of all but the most courageous of progressive politicians and activists. Few government officials attended the funerals,81and some such as Interior Minister Rehman Malik have publicly sided with the religious right, including Malik‟s declaration that, “I will shoot a blasphemer myself.” In the aftermath of the assassination too, it now appears that the Minorities Ministry post that Bhatti headed will be abolished, in another blow against religious minorities. Even before their assassinations, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and another legislator Sherry Rehman, were some of the only supporters of reform. They were afforded virtually no support from their own parties, and today, Sherry Rehman, the last still alive, remains bunkered down in her Karachi home and has since withdrawn her amendment proposal. Many politicians have chosen to pander to radical Islamist extremists, or the criminal underworld for political advantage. President Musharraf recently labeled Nawaz Sharif a “closet Taliban,” in reference to his Islamist leanings, a perception shared in some circles in Washington. The Sharifs in Punjab for example have links to various Sunni Islamist groups, which have influence in their voting districts

Bajoria, Jayshree. "A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan." Interview by Daniel Markey. Council on Foreign Relations. 26 Sept. 2011. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. From a Pakistani point of view, it's very clear to them that this doesn't end with Haqqani, which is part of the reason for their reluctance. Pakistanis ask me, "Look if we cede ground on one group, you'll be coming at us again on another." Where does this end? And why does the United States, from their perspective, get to define who the threats are? So it makes them skeptical about what we're actually up to. The problem is within the Pakistani security establishment, that they continue to believe that arming and working--actively and passively--with various militant groups serves their purposes. And they continue not to believe that these groups are necessarily dangerous to Pakistan or counterproductive to regional security. (1)


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 foundationbriefs. Ahmed Shuja Pasha. The United States has for years tried to work with top Pakistani officials to stop such actions.S. Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Lt. they found them abandoned. officials suspect the ISI of tipping off the extremists (1)   The evidence above is a robust account of the various state activities that suggest Pakistan is an active participant (or a willing blind eye) in terrorism. Marc Grossman.March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists "Pakistan Suspected of Tipping off Insurgents.S. head of the Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency. The reasons for supporting terror networks are clear: Pakistan does not see all terrorists as fundamentally dangerous. U." United Press International. The information was shared in a "trustbuilding" campaign after the Osama bin Laden killing. and CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell gave overhead surveillance video and other information on the guerrilla locations in mid-May to Pakistani army chief Gen. but when Pakistani troops raided the sites in North and South Waziristan June 4. particularly against India and to destabilize Afghanistan.com Page 24 of 114 . Web. This is because the U. it seeks to turn some to its own advantage. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 11 June 2011. officials told The Washington Post. but has thus far failed. Continuing assistance will only perpetuate this problem. U. Instead. Suspending assistance would be an effective step in communicating for the first time that the United States will not tolerate a lenient policy on terrorism. has no credibility in its threats—it has so far only used words.S.

11) The circumstances of OBL’s death brought renewed and intensive focus on purported ISI links with Islamist extremism. 2011. 21 October. 12) After the OBL raid. Islamabad also asked for further reductions in the U. 2012. to many independent observers. Such access was subsequently granted.S.S.fas. Pakistan-U. This led U.S. As discussed below.S. 1 Feb. responsible for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai in which some 165 people were killed. (Pg. Rep.S. recent attention has focused on ISI links with the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network of Afghan insurgents.S. only to have Pakistani army units find the sites abandoned by the time they arrived.S.S.March 2012 Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists Kronstadt K. officials repeated the accusations after militants fled two other bomb-making facilities. Pakistani officials regularly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI are cooperating with militants or extremists.com Page 25 of 114 . officials that sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that elements of the ISI continue to support them.S. Such evidence notably included instances in which the CIA alerted Islamabad about the existence of two bomb making facilities in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pressure was increased to allow American investigators access to bin Laden’s three widows in Pakistani custody. officials reportedly believe such disclosures were being made deliberately by the ISI to demonstrate its leverage and to express anger at U.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. (Pg. a Pakistani newspaper seen as close to the country’s military and intelligence services published the purported name of the CIA’s Islamabad station chief. The ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups. Alan. Congressional Research Service.” Still. six Americans among them. Following the May 1 raid. There appears to be ongoing conviction among U. a charge called “totally false and malicious” by the Pakistani military. military footprint and moved to close three joint “intelligence fusion cells” only recently established in Quetta and Peshawar. including the Lashkar-e-Taiba. This was the second time in six months that the top covert American operative in Pakistan had been publically named. these officials reportedly believed that Pakistan’s insistence on gaining permission from local tribal elders before entering the area allowed militants to escape. evidence of collusion between Pakistani officials and Afghan insurgents. The top U. However. 12) foundationbriefs. Pakistan’s security services increasingly appear to be penetrated by Islamist extremists. and U. One week after OBL’s death.” The Obama Administration reportedly pressed Pakistan to reveal the identities of senior ISI operatives as part of the investigation into how OBL was able to find refuge inside Pakistan for five years. http://www. Web. which declared that some of the intelligence provided “proved to be incorrect. Pakistan sought to crack down on its own citizens who were found to be working with the CIA. policies.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. U. military officer called the cuts “very significant. the ISI leadership was confronted more frequently—and more publically—with U. officials to assume that the targets had been tipped off about upcoming raids. Relations. (Pg.

March 2012 Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists Krasner. In July 2011. 91 Issue 1. Jan/Feb2012. Navy seals raided Osama bin Laden's compound near the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy. told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Web.com Page 26 of 114 . and we all know that. Vol. Clinton noted that the Obama administration intended to "push the Pakistanis very hard. the CIA blamed Pakistan's ISI for aiding the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. Stephen. Admiral James Winnefeld." And in an October press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.S. "Pakistan is a very. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. very difficult partner. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. two months after U. vicechair of the Joint Chiefs.” Foreign Affairs." (2) foundationbriefs." adding. "they can either be helping or hindering. In 2008.

saying.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. is commonly identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U. 2011. (Pg. acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.S. Alan. Adm. Meanwhile.. DC.S. jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. Mullen called on Gen.S. Pakistan-U. (Pg. The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin. accusing the ISI of using the Haqqanis to conduct a “proxy war” in Afghanistan. The Haqqani network. government statement on Pakistani malfeasance of the post-2001 era. based in the FATA.com Page 27 of 114 . saying their forces are already stretched too thin.S. officials dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents’ weakness. Apparently unsatisfied with his counterpart’s response. Congressional Research Service. (Pg. Although U.S. the government of Pakistan... and Afghan officials concluded the Embassy attackers were members of the Haqqani network. Mullen issued the strongest and most direct U. Then.S. We also have credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations. Relations. 20) U. The well planned and executed assault sparked a 20-hour-long gunbattle and left 16 Afghans dead.fas. requests that the Pakistani military launch operations against the Haqqanis’ North Waziristan haven.. 1 Feb. They have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic wellbeing. Secretary Panetta issued what was taken by many to be an ultimatum to Pakistan when he told reporters that the United States would “take whatever steps are necessary to protect our forces” in Afghanistan from future attacks by the Haqqanis.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan. and most especially the Pakistan army and ISI. With ISI support. and began ramping up rhetorical pressure to previously unseen levels. as well as the assault on our embassy.-Pakistan relations. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively changed the nature of U. 2012. Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that [September 13] truck bomb attack.March 2012 Pro: Support for Haqqani Network Support for the Haqqani Network Kronstadt K. for one. five police officers and at least six children among them. they’ve eroded their internal security and their position in the region. Rep. Web. 20) But it was a September 13 attack on the U.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. http://www.. 20-21) foundationbriefs. By exporting violence.S. Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and longstanding U. during September 22 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 21 October. Mullen returned to Washington. Days after the raid. Kayani to again press for Pakistani military action against Haqqani bases.S. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistan’s inaction is the country’s decadeslong relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in the army and ISI that his group represents perhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtun-based influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan. the ability of militants to undertake a complex raid in the heart of Kabul’s most protected area was seen by many as a clear blow to a narrative which has Afghanistan becoming more secure.. In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy.

S. then chairman of the U. and to fund." The Atlantic. Jan/Feb2012. the network had been responsible for a June attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info.com Page 28 of 114 . Web. made his last official appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 2011. and the Haqqani network kills American soldiers.S. On September 22. So: the U. doesn’t target the factories located on Pakistani territory that produce the improvised explosive devices deployed by the Taliban against American troops inside Afghanistan. “Talking Tough to Pakistan.S.S. 91 Issue 1. (1) Goldberg. a September truck-bomb attack in Wardak Province that wounded 77 U.” Foreign Affairs.S. In his speech. "is.March 2012 Pro: Support for Haqqani Network Krasner. the same senior Obama-administration official said: “What we want to do. Vol. a goal that calls for continuing to cooperate with. soldiers. the ISI funds the Haqqani network. Stephen. a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency [ISI]." The Haqqani network. (17) foundationbriefs. When asked why the U. is not lose progress on the core goal” of defeating al-Qaeda. in many ways. and a September attack on the U. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mullen continued. funds the ISI. Admiral Mike Mullen. soldiers. the ISI. Dec. Jeffrey.S. and Marc Ambinder. he bluntly criticized Pakistan. Web. above all else. embassy in Kabul. he said. "The Ally From Hell. telling the committee that "extremist organizations serving as proxies for the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U. 2011." In 2011 alone.

March 2012 Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban Allegations of Aiding Taliban Sommerville. With increasing pressure being heaped on Pakistan. It claims the insurgents remain defiant and have wide support among Afghans." BBC News. The leak of this report comes at a particularly sensitive time. Web. They control everything. The report . In effect. public support here for formally ending co-operation with the West simply grows. It notes: "Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly. such as Nasiruddin Haqqani.something Islamabad of course strenuously denies. maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad.000 captured Taliban." it said. The Taliban are Islamabad." Our correspondent says the report seems to suggest that the Taliban feel trapped by ISI control and fear they will never escape its influence. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. 2012.is based on material from 27. And the Taliban's second in command. Quentin. Pakistan is finding it harder to convince outsiders it is not helping the Afghan Taliban and giving safe haven to its leaders. It quotes a senior al-Qaeda detainee as saying: "Pakistan knows everything. Our correspondent says the report fully exposes for the first time the relationship between Pakistan's ISI intelligence service and the Taliban. following a Nato attack in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed.com Page 29 of 114 . was captured in a raid on a madrassa near Karachi nearly two years ago. foundationbriefs. The BBC's Quentin Sommerville in Kabul says the document is painful reading for international forces and the Afghan government. "Pakistan Dismisses Nato Report on Afghan Taliban Links.State of the Taliban . 2 Feb. Pakistan is already blocking the supply route to coalition forces in Afghanistan. The report says the Taliban are helped by Pakistani security services. the accusation is that Pakistan is betting on the insurgents being the strongest power in Afghanistan and most likely ally once Nato leaves .000 interrogations with more than 4. 2010. 1 Feb. al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters and civilians. I can't [expletive] on a tree in Kunar without them watching." It says Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders. "Senior Taliban representatives. The Taliban are not Islam.

2011. which it believes fits into its vital interests. according to the intelligence historian Matthew Aid. "The Ally From Hell. were being given financial assistance by the ISI (which of course receives substantial financial assistance from the United States).   foundationbriefs. This is a security strategy that Pakistan has employed for a long time. North Waziristan—to conduct attacks against Afghan government. This fits in with the historical approach that Pakistan previously took." The Atlantic. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is imminent. and Indian targets. soldiers in Afghanistan.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan. Jeffrey. who documents the dysfunctional relationship between the ISI and the CIA in his forthcoming book. the U. According to a secret 2006 U. and Marc Ambinder. Intel Wars.” A 2008 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the ISI was providing “intelligence and financial support to insurgent groups—especially the Jalaluddin Haqqani network out of Miram Shah.S. Dec. Moreover. had reliable intelligence indicating that Jalaluddin Haqqani and another pro-Taliban Afghan warlord. such support from Pakistan is in the hope that future results are the same. Thus.S. Pakistan funds these groups so that it an have influence and some sway over the situation. and that Afghanistan will quickly become a violent region once again. Web. [International Security Assistance Force]. Pakistan supported the Taliban when they were in power because the Taliban were able to limit violence on the Pakistan border. (9)   Pakistan provides assistance to the Haqqani network and to the Taliban in Western Pakistan.S. interests in the region—Afghanistan’s stability is a top priority. this deeply held interest by Pakistan shows that assistance is unlikely to change Pakistan’s long-term goals and the money is only being used to eventually kill U. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Assistance must be withheld because this evidence shows that Pakistan is working to undermine U. As such.March 2012 Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban Goldberg.com Page 30 of 114 . “Available evidence strongly suggests that [the ISI] maintains an active and ongoing relationship with certain elements of the Taliban.” By late 2006.S. They do this to destabilize Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that U.

are the most potent defenders of their interests in Afghanistan (6) foundationbriefs. 2011. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are at a new nadir. (Pg. Rep. They also criticize Islamabad for its alleged failure to cooperate in the related investigation. Pakistani leaders obsess about what they view as the existential threat posed by nuclear-armed India. Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the assassination. Alan. Most recently. Jeffrey.) Many of Pakistan’s leaders have long believed that the Taliban. 2012. Afghan High Peace Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his Kabul home by a suicide bomber. and Marc Ambinder. and Taliban-like groups. a country that is now a strategic ally of the United States. very few figures in the highest ranks of the American and Pakistani governments suffer from the illusion that their countries are anything but adversaries. 19-20) Goldberg. (Pg.com Page 31 of 114 . (Pg.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. it seems. 18) In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents. Relations. saying the attacker was Pakistani and the attack had been planned in Quetta.S. Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011. Ambassador to Afghanistan has suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul for reconciliation talks. Public pronouncements to the contrary. Afghan officials suspect the ISI played a role in the murder. 2011. the U. Afghan intelligence officials claimed to have halted a plot to assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culprits—an Egyptian and a Bangladeshi—were based in the FATA and affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the Haqqanis. saying insurgent leaders inside Pakistan are not sufficiently independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own. in October. http://www. On September 20. Web.March 2012 Pro: Negative Impact on Afghanistan Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan Kronstadt K. Pakistan’s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. Dec." The Atlantic.fas. "The Ally From Hell. (Pervez Musharraf said the same thing during an interview in Washington. the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network leading among these. Afghan President Karzai has echoed these complaints. dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks.S. whose national-security interests clash radically and. He asks that Pakistan support the process by allowing those willing to talk to be given the opportunity to do so. Pakistan-U. 1 Feb. 21 October. but the Afghan president has continued to accuse Pakistan of “using terrorism” as official policy. permanently. Congressional Research Service. Afghan officials still openly accuse Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Web. 18-19) At the time of this writing. Pakistani policy makers The Atlantic interviewed in Islamabad and Rawalpindi this summer uniformly believe that India is bent on drawing Afghanistan into an alliance against Pakistan.

public demonstrations took a bellicose. Relations.S. 7-8) foundationbriefs. in a compound one-half mile from the country’s premier military academy. after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officials—both civilian and military—that most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive. 2011.launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Congressional Research Service. Web. or the country’s military and intelligence services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al Qaeda leaders. Alan. Rep. 6) Parliament subsequently issued a strong condemnation of the U. The news of OBL’s whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential complicity in his refuge.S. 21 October. raid and again called for a halt to U. Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad. The location and circumstances of OBL’s death exacerbated Washington’s long-held doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism. For a wide array of observers. and brought calls to curtail U. told reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system” in Pakistan. just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1).S. 2012. John Brennan. Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow.March 2012 Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden Inability To Find Bin Laden Kronstadt K. It also threatened to close land lines of communication through Pakistan that are vital to supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan. (Pg. On May 1. Meanwhile. Pakistan-U. assistance to Pakistan. In either case.com Page 32 of 114 . 1 Feb. (Pg. President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor.S. anti-American cast.

since it showed the armed forces to be either complicit in harboring bin Laden or so incompetent that they could not find him under their own noses. interrogations of bin Laden's three wives for more than a week. Jan/Feb2012. Rather than embrace the move. raid before a special session of parliament. Web. those Pakistanis polled had among the lowest favorability ratings of the United States: 17 percent. But Pakistan could easily have saved face by publicly depicting the operation as a cooperative venture. Pakistani officials reacted with fury. A case in point was the raid that killed bin Laden. In a 2010 Pew survey of 21 countries.S.S. The police arrested a group of Pakistani citizens who were suspected of having helped the United States collect intelligence prior to the operation and delayed U. and 55 percent thought it was a bad thing that he had died. head of the ISI. condemned the U.com Page 33 of 114 . 91 Issue 1. “Talking Tough to Pakistan.March 2012 Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden Krasner. Stephen. and the government passed a resolution pledging to revisit its relationship with the United States. Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. (3) foundationbriefs. public opinion there remains adamantly antiAmerican. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Of course. another Pew survey found that 63 percent of the population disapproved of the raid that killed bin Laden. the operation was embarrassing for the Pakistani military. (3) The fact that Pakistan distanced itself from the raid speaks to another major problem in the relationship: despite the billions of dollars the United States has given Pakistan. The next year. Vol.” Foreign Affairs.

"Foreign Aid. 16 Feb.S. Or Foreign Hindrance. 22 Feb.” Yusuf. Perverse Incentives." Defence Against Terrorism Review 2. the US lost goodwill with the Pakistani masses as it was largely seen as having contributed to the sustainability of a dictatorship. and disincentives to development. Moeed. Web. "Rational Institutional Design. <http://www. Observed Tate Watkins of the Mercatus Center: “Systematic foreign aid creates opportunities for corruption.html>. Web. Parvez Musharraf as their point man." Forbes.forbes. the graft that counterterrorism aid brings outweighs the political cost of some continuing violence. (iii) do it ourselves. aid. Islamabad has been doing just enough to keep the money flowing but not enough to kill the golden goose. in large part. (ii) buyout Pakistan. Second. Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info.rand. and (v) ensure that Pakistan’s tensions with India remain in check. 2011. First. Did Pakistan ever seriously intend to stop al Qaeda and the Taliban from using its territory as a sanctuary? Bandow.org/commentary/2011/05/03/WP. the overwhelming focus on ‘coalition foundationbriefs. (iv) emphasize the seriousness of the threat faced by Pakistan itself.S.1 (2009): 15-30. Please see author index for bio. cultures of dependency. Web.com/sites/dougbandow/2011/02/22/foreign-aid-or-foreignhindrance/>. The evidence is mounting that Pakistan was complicit in sheltering bin Laden. David. in the process undermining the mainstream democratic forces in the country. 2012. Pakistan's meal-ticket to billions of dollars in U. <http://www. policy towards Pakistan has entailed a six-pronged approach: (i) coerce Pakistan." RAND Corporation. (19) The buy-out approach had two negative spin-offs. "The World after Bin Laden. Pakistan will not decisively defeat them. and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Post-9/11. 2012. making it extremely difficult to turn off the flow. Alejandro Quiro Flores and Alastair Smith of New York University charged that “The aid dynamic is similar to that of Pakistan’s war against insurgents: as long as the United States is willing to pay Pakistan ever more to eradicate extremists. 10 Feb. the Bush administration used the Pakistani ruler cum Army Chief. This is no longer tenable.” Aid incentives are all wrong. He was. Doug. 3 May 2011.com Page 34 of 114 . The post-9/11 U. The problems run deep.March 2012 Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives Aid Creates Perverse Incentives Aaron. The aid faucet misaligns incentives between donors and recipients.11 In the final outcome.

March 2012 Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives support funds’ as reimbursement for Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror meant that US aid was doing little to alleviate the economic plight of the Pakistani masses. (20) In fact, the Pakistani establishment was equally adept at realizing the client-based nature of the relationship and internalized the aid as little more than direct reimbursement for the costs of fighting the War. In a text book example of perverse incentives, the transactional nature of the arrangement had in fact created an incentive for Pakistan to prolong the effort as much as possible; the longer Pakistan remained involved in tactical operations, the higher the reimbursements would be. (23) The incentive structure laid out by the US to goad Pakistan into aligning its strategies with American goals needs an urgent overhaul. Indeed, such is the level of perverseness of the framework that a rational actor model would predict maximum Pakistani gains if it were to choose a policy option somewhere between impressing upon the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the Obama administration while the US is still in a position of relative weakness to actively supporting the Taliban in increasing the misery of Coalition troops in Afghanistan in the hope that it would lead to their forced withdrawal. (26)


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Pro: Military Uncooperative

Military Uncooperative
Vira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman. Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 May 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>.
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Despite these bonds, the Army’s limited cooperation with the American in Afghanistan has reflected significant problems. The initial operations in the FATA were widely interpreted in the ranks as subservience to the US, which caused deep consternation. Low willingness to fight fellow Muslims led to several humiliating incidents, including the surrender of over 200 soldiers to a small group of militants in September 2007. Similarly earlier operations in 2004 led to desertions amongst the paramilitary Frontier Corps, and helicopter pilots refused to bomb targets. Some soldiers found themselves dishonored in their local communities, which is not surprising given the fact that the army and the militants recruit from the same areas, particularly in the Punjab. Lieven points to this trend as one of the most dangerous, pointing out that when men from a high-status institution such as the army have trouble finding suitable brides, it points to a significant change in its perceived role in society.


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Pro: US Must Force Change

U.S. Must Force Change
Curtis, Lisa. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies." The Heritage Foundation. 12 May 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/after-bin-laden-bringingchange-to-pakistan-counterterrorism-policies>.
Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. The onus is now on Pakistan to demonstrate that it is willing to work more closely with the U.S. to target other terrorists sheltered within its borders and to cooperate more fully with the U.S. goal of stabilizing Afghanistan. Without a change in perspective from Pakistan’s security establishment on these crucial issues, the relationship would seem to be poised for failure. Simply maintaining the status quo is no longer feasible. Pakistan’s decision to side with the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 was halfhearted. This became clear to the world when bin Laden was killed in a Pakistani garrison city 10 days ago. Pakistan must decide whether it will finally throw its full weight into the fight against global terrorism. The outcome of its decision will determine the future of relations with the U.S. as well as Pakistan’s regional strategic position and standing among civilized nations.

Krasner, Stephen. “Talking Tough to Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1. Web.
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Washington's tactic--criticism coupled with continued assistance-- has not been effectual. Threats and censure go unheeded in Pakistan because Islamabad's leaders do not fear the United States. This is because the United States has so often demonstrated a fear of Pakistan, believing that although Pakistan's policies have been unhelpful, they could get much worse. Washington seems to have concluded that if it actually disengaged and as a result Islamabad halted all its cooperation in Afghanistan, then U.S. counterinsurgency efforts there would be doomed. Even more problematic, the thinking goes, without external support, the already shaky Pakistani state would falter. A total collapse could precipitate a radical Islamist takeover, worsening Pakistani relations with the U.S.-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan and escalating tensions, perhaps even precipitating a nuclear war, between Pakistan and India. (2) Despite Pakistan's ongoing problematic behavior, however, aid has continued to flow. Clinton even certified in March 2011 that Pakistan had made a "sustained commitment" to combating terrorist groups. Actions such as this have undermined American credibility when it comes to pressuring Pakistan to live up to its side of the bargain. The United States has shown that the sticks that come with its carrots are hollow. (5) The only way the United States can actually get what it wants out of Pakistan is to make credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. demands and offer rewards only in return for cooperative actions foundationbriefs.com Page 37 of 114

-Pakistan relations will go anywhere but downhill. The Indonesian path would lead to increased economic growth. and strengthening U. Please see author index for bio. But today's threats are already more serious than those of the past because they have been made in public -. (1) foundationbriefs. ties with India. Active isolation would include. Web. there's precious little evidence to suggest that the trajectory of the U. "The Gloves Come Off. continuing and possibly escalating U. Since it would not directly threaten the military's position.S. as well.and because Congress has already signaled that it will make assistance to Pakistan conditional upon action against the Haqqani network. declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. in addition. If there is already a realistic chance that this relationship will rupture and that the benefits of bilateral cooperation will eventually be lost. Daniel. active isolation. (5) A combination of credible threats and future promises offers the best hope of convincing Islamabad that it would be better off cooperating with the United States. And even if Islamabad's cooperation is not forthcoming. Washington believes it has relatively little to lose in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan…U. military and civilian.S. 2011. Indeed. support from the United States and Europe. Tough talk alone is not about to sway the generals in Islamabad. In essence. Malign neglect would mean ending all U.S. initiating cross-border special operations raids. if necessary.com Page 38 of 114 ." Foreign Policy Magazine. for Washington's coercion to work. S. they see little reason to expect that relations with Islamabad are likely to improve.March 2012 Pro: US Must Force Change taken. why not press Pakistan now while Washington still enjoys some positive leverage and before relations hit rock bottom? Of course. two large Islamic states that have chosen very different paths. and a stronger economic and social foundation for a more robust democracy at some point in the future. It could be either a pariah state surrounded by hostile neighbors and with dim economic prospects or a country with access to international markets. 23 Sept. (7) Markey. Pakistan would be offered a choice between the situation of Iran and that of Indonesia.S. U.S. strengthened civil-society groups. drone strikes. officials should tell their Pakistani counterparts in no uncertain terms that they must start playing ball or face malign neglect at best and. imposing sanctions. the Indonesian model should appeal to both pillars of the Pakistani state. and some possibility of detente with its neighbors. assistance. officials peer into the future. severing intelligence cooperation. and pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support. an empowered middle class. the United States is better off treating Pakistan as a hostile power than continuing to spend and get nothing in return. it has to be credible.

-Pakistan Ties. then it would make little difference if that assistance were revoked. Economically. support is much larger in magnitude. U. Dec. and some of the other Gulf states. isolates countries it considers sponsors of terrorism. suspending the assistance will send a clear message to Pakistan and will allow them to experience what it is like without our aid. China.S. Web. allies--whether it be direct aid to Pakistan. U.S.com . for its part. or the IMF's support--the United States plays a major role. military equipment more. Jeffrey. Pakistan's army has some Japanese SUVs and once they bought some Ukrainian tanks. loans to Pakistan.S. Nor can Pakistan’s military afford to lose its access to American weapons systems. But my understanding is that even if you add the total amount of aid or support that Pakistan gets from Saudi Arabia. which is the most significant help that Pakistan is receiving. because they do indeed derive much benefit from our assistance. if Pakistan did not receive or heavily rely on our assistance. but otherwise the United States is the prime military supplier. Pakistan. Council on Foreign Relations. Therefore. Web. (1)   These points are important in creating the idea of a credible threat when suspending assistance. The European Union also follows the United States' lead when it comes to aid or support for Pakistan. "A Low in Cycle of U. and to the trainers attached to them. 23 May 2011. "The Ally From Hell. Pakistan cannot afford to be isolated by America in the way the U. This will push them back under our influence and motivate Pakistan to better carry out U. and Marc Ambinder. However.S. can afford to lose neither America’s direct financial support. support to Pakistan is crucial in so many different ways: help with getting rid of the debt burden. Hassan. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.S. supporting the Pakistani military. and now for the past two or three years the economic.March 2012 Pro: Pakistan Heavily Dependent on Aid Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid Goldberg.and disaster-relief aid packages to Pakistan. but they love the U. (18) Abbas. Page 39 of 114 foundationbriefs. For example." Interview by Bernard Gwertzman. the amount of investment by the U. nor the help America provides with international lending agencies.S." The Atlantic. and U. and Pakistan has been getting some support from Saudi Arabia as well.S. If you look at the balance sheet of Pakistan's economy. policy objectives. 2011. The Pakistani military loves China. they will not want it to stop.S.

Christine.S. Aid Hurts Democracy Putnam. One likely reason is that aid itself corrupts and corrodes. foundationbriefs. "Should U. Foreign aid lessens the requirement for a government to forge a bond with its citizens by raising revenue and redistributing those funds as services. "A Better Bargain for Aid to Pakistan. feudal landlords and other well-connected tax evaders. 9 Feb. Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. 2012. The massive infusion of foreign aid has also allowed Pakistan to avoid having to choose between guns and butter. 17 May 2011. <http://www. 30 May 2009.5 million pay taxes.cfr.S. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.March 2012 Pro: Aid is Flawed and Should Be Avoided Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided Fair." RAND Corporation. 11 Feb. Web. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations.rand.org/commentary/2009/05/30/WP.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>.even from recalcitrant politicians. savvy business executives. 2012. Such a social contract is fundamental to Pakistan's emergence as a robust democracy that provides for its people. military aid to Pakistan has been detrimental for the country's democratic potential. But successive Pakistani governments have successfully wagered that chronic instability and the imminent dangers of terrorism and nuclear black-marketeering would leave the world with no choice but to bail them out. Many Pakistanis believe U. regardless of their failures. Some estimates suggest that of 180 million Pakistanis. fewer than 1. Such choices define the democratic process. Pakistan should be encouraged to reform its tax code and commit to collecting what is owed -. Web. Candace.html>.com Page 40 of 114 . <http://www.

Pakistan’s army has a state. appointed army officials to key civilian positions including agriculture. 2012. Similarly. These significant burdens on the economy are exercised without any transparency. and Anthony Cordesman. 2) Each previous period of military rule further weakened civilian institutions. Hours after PM Gilani issued a decree ordering the ISI to be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. incontestable line entry for their annual demands (Pg. Upon his election. It severely limited Zardari’s attempts to exercise greater control over security institutions such as the ISI. and in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Pakistan: Violence vs. military rulers have often staffed civilian institutions with military officers to ensure control. it has ruled Pakistan for over half its existence and has never yet allowed a civilian government to complete its term. with its power largely untouched despite the rise of a new civilian government.5 percent of all budget outlays for the period.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. and refused to reduce the nuclear-alert status as a goodwill gesture to reduce tensions with India. Varun. Web. 8 Feb. its preeminence is also widely regarded to have greatly restricted the growth of democratic institutions as well as ensured that the narrow interests of military elites drive foreign and security policy. <http://csis. his government was forced to rescind the order after the Army signaled its displeasure.pdf>. It acts as the primary guarantor of Pakistan’s stability and remains the country’s most powerful institution. While Zia is often seen as the symbol of a destructive military intervention. Many analysts continue to believe that the Army is the glue holding Pakistan together – without which Pakistan would disintegrate into anarchy.March 2012 Pro: Pakistan’s Military is Too Powerful Pakistan’s Military Too Powerful Vira. foundationbriefs. 5 May 2011. Musharraf introduced quotas for military representation in the civil service. and conditioned political elites to maximize rents during their brief tenures instead of focusing on governance. most notably in all levers of security and foreign policy. The Army similarly rebuffed Zardari’s offer to send the ISI to India to collaborate with the Mumbai investigation. Stability. 1) The armed forces seem to have de facto control of key budgetary allocations. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2008 marked the first year where the armed forces broke down their annual requirements. the Zardari government made improving relations with India a central strategy. and created army monitoring teams for oversight and evaluation purposes. Despite some positive moves to limit the army’s role in civilian governance and politics.com Page 41 of 114 . education and medicine. an effort the army sharply undercut. Rep. instead of submitting a single. However. it continues to have primacy in many sectors of decision-making. and its defense expenditure in FY 2010-2011 officially made up as much as 13. (Pg. The Army has primacy in Pakistan. as during the Musharraf-era when the bureaucracy was heavily militarized. Various analysts have paraphrased Voltaire to declare that while many states have an army. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info.

March 2012 Pro: Pakistan’s Military is Too Powerful An embassy cable released by Wikileaks dated one day before the Mumbai attacks. no democratically elected Pakistani civilian government has yet served out its full term. Web. In over 60 years of independence. (Pg. This history underlines the challenges facing President Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led incumbent government. also noted that Kayani was the sole obstacle preventing an Indo-Pakistan deal on Kashmir. a US economic assistance package. and Anthony Cordesman. Rep. 8 Feb. 2012. including setting the agenda. <http://csis. The Army also played a key role shaping talks with the US in Islamabad in March 2010. foundationbriefs.com Page 42 of 114 . Varun.” The army also publicly campaigned against the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Stability. claiming that “Zardari and Singh were ready. It also helps explain the deep damage that has been wreaked upon civilian institutions by repeated periods of military rule. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan: Violence vs. Center for Strategic and International Studies. and presiding over meetings with federal secretaries. and any US-supported democratization strategy. because it felt the bill had conditions hostile to its interests that were tied to the flow of US aid.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. and there was text on paper. and been replaced by another. summoning heads of civilian institutions to Army headquarters to discuss details. 7) Vira.pdf>. 5 May 2011.

officials from both nations say. officials point to a report by the agency’s Office of the Inspector General that highlighted the difficulties of operating effective. U. much of it delivered through the civilian government. the plan has resulted in bitterness and a sense of broken promises. Last month.A. The first two years of a $750 million development program begun in the tribal areas in 2008 were plagued by allegations of corruption and the foundationbriefs. Pakistan should turn down the aid package. Pakistanis see the aid as a crude attempt to buy friendship and an effort to alleviate antipathy toward United States drone attacks against militants in the tribal areas. The aid program promoted by Senator John Kerry. said that if America did not stop the drones.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/02pakistan. 1 May 2011. Shahbaz Sharif.com Page 43 of 114 . After nearly a decade of military rule in Pakistan — the military has run Pakistan for about half of its six decades — the threeyear-old civilian government is deeply unpopular. <http://www. promised Pakistan $7. Jane. constricted by layers of their own rules. health care and other services are almost nonexistent. The economy is failing.html?_r=1>. Education. But the Americans have run into problems of corruption and incompetence on the civilian side. undermining a fundamental goal of the United States in Pakistan. "US Aid Plan for Pakistan Is Foundering." The New York Times.5 million of the first $1. A multibillion-dollar aid plan that the Obama administration hoped would win over Pakistanis and buttress the weak civilian government is foundering because Washington’s fears of Pakistani corruption and incompetence has slowed disbursal of the money. chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. even hostile.nytimes.S. But so inadequate is Pakistan’s civilian bureaucracy and so rife are United States fears of corruption in the government that American officials. In a scathing report. Pakistani public and government. Instead of polishing the tarnished image of America with a suspicious. 2012.D. have struggled to find safe places to actually invest the money available.5 billion over five years.5 billion of the five-year program had been disbursed by last December.March 2012 Pro: Lack of Civilian Governance Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful Perlez.I. Web. the Government Accountability Office said that only $179. having failed to provide a better life for Pakistanis. while civilian leaders from the landed and industrialist classes pay hardly any taxes. 10 Feb. the chief minister of Punjab. corruption-free projects in Pakistan.

who has watched the school program closely. leaving a devastated economy and hundreds of schools destroyed. said Ziauddin Yousafzai. Of 115 schools that the aid agency promised to rebuild. Only 53 percent of the planned projects had been carried out.com Page 44 of 114 .March 2012 Pro: Lack of Civilian Governance limitations of sending Americans to such a dangerous area. none have been completed. the principal of a private school. Another big goal for the $1. where the Pakistani Army fought the Taliban two years ago. the assessment said. foundationbriefs.5 billion was to reconstruct schools in the Swat Valley.

pdf>. civilian and coalition support. <http://csis. as well as making the success of economic and military aid uncertain. a poll by the Pew Research Center last June found that 68% of Pakistanis saw the United States more as an enemy. Since 2002. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan has also been fueled by anger over the U. Belfer Center: Harvard University.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. has given Pakistan approximately $18 billion in military. while only 6% considered it a friend. Says. 10 Feb.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. U. In some parts. told CNN.S. and Anthony Cordesman. Pakistan’s leverage in dissuading American pressure is further increased by the fact that the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan This creates major problems for both the US and Pakistan in finding some practical way to create a truly effective strategic relationship. Web. and sharply restricting the future ability for the US to transform its role from one of constant pressure on Pakistan to that of a real strategic Partner. 2012. Despite the massive U. <http://belfercenter. vi) foundationbriefs. 2012.harvard. aid program. July 2009. In these cases. Stability. the U. 8 Feb. 5 May 2011. Pakistan: Violence vs. 2012. Some aid agencies have found it counterproductive to reveal that the development programs are funded by the United States. Rep. 2012. the United States is unpopular. Mark Stroh. Ibrahim. (Pg. Web.pdf>. <http://articles. Varun. a State Department official in Islamabad. Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. 21 Jan. 8 Feb.S.com/2012-01-21/asia/world_asia_uspakistan-aid_1_civilian-aid-american-drone-strikes-islamabad?_s=PM:ASIA>. they are administered anonymously. raid that killed Osama bin Laden at a compound in Pakistan last May. (Pg.S.March 2012 Pro: Anti-Americanism Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible "Civilian Aid to Pakistan Continues despite Growing Tensions." CNN.cnn.S. 16) Vira.ksg. Web.com Page 45 of 114 . and continued American drone strikes on targets in the nation. Rep.

Pakistan: Violence vs. particularly when entrenched corruptions and inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system provide diminishing returns to investments. (Pg. Web. (Pg. 5 May 2011. Varun. has no bearing on the number of educated graduates if the schools lack capable teachers.March 2012 Pro: Aid Cannot Solve Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan Vira. Rep.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.com Page 46 of 114 . better curriculums and more relevance to the labor market. Simply building schools in the tribal regions for example. 8 Feb. 2012. and should reorient focus away from quantity to quality. Only Pakistan can save Pakistan. This can never happen as long as its leadership elite pursues policies where their definition of “victory” really means defeat.pdf>. Money alone is no guarantee of success. and Anthony Cordesman. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Center for Strategic and International Studies. v) The fundamental realties of Pakistan’s external relations are all too similar to those of its internal problems. Developing a focused set of metrics to accurately capture progress will be essential. Stability. <http://csis. vi) foundationbriefs.

harvard. (Pg. The challenges of providing development aid there are considerable. The FATA is a remote area with a forbidding landscape. over which the Pakistani state does not exert full sovereignty and the rule of Pakistani law is not enforced. There are minimal traditional state structures. 16) foundationbriefs. What is more likely… is that the system of patronage used to maintain political authority will also co-opt the development funds provided to the tribal areas. (Pg. on the border with Afghanistan.. However. Azeem. July 2009. There have been concerns that this aid does not constitute an investment in Pakistan..March 2012 Pro: Moderate Levels Insufficient Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help Ibrahim. 2012. the money may not alleviate poverty in the tribal areas in any meaningful way. 16) Partly for this reason.com Page 47 of 114 . much of the money which was intended to help Pakistan actually ends up in the contractors’ countries. Although a few residents may benefit from the assistance. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info.ksg.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. <http://belfercenter. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. for this reason. 8 Feb. Rep. most aid agencies rely on contractors to implement the building projects.. The region which has been the focus for Islamist extremists is the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Power is concentrated in the hands of leaders of the most powerful tribes. The Center for Strategic and International Studies concludes that “the process of building schools and opening health clinics is unlikely to produce development in any broad sense. Belfer Center: Harvard University. Web. only some of whom are members of the Jirga.pdf>.

it seems that Pakistan’s military and security services have for many years been a black hole for U.62 percent—on support and other aircraft.” with several wearing World War I–era pith helmets and carrying barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with “just 10 rounds of ammunition each”. Examples include F-16s. funds to further U. and an air defense radar system costing $200 million. institutional. many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment such as sufficient ammunition. and 10 percent on advanced weapons systems The United States provided $1. over a quarter—26. and shoes. Rep. military officials that the United States had provided $8 million worth of Cobra parts over the previous six months. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption.com Page 48 of 114 . Aid to Pakistan—U. after eight years of funding. Pakistan bought much conventional military equipment. Azeem. <http://belfercenter.harvard.ksg. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf himself complained that Pakistan’s helicopters needed more U. armored vests. spare parts and support. Web.S. and about $30 million for Pakistani road-building for which there is no such evidence either.S. Fifty-five million dollars was provided for helicopter maintenance for the entire national helicopter fleet which was not performed. officials ignored clear evidence that the military was not using U. Over half of the total funds—54.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption Frontier Corps units poorly equipped.S.March 2012 Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly Ibrahim.S. Sadly. foundationbriefs. officials visiting the FATA found Pakistani 6U. funds. $15 million for the Pakistani army to build bunkers for which there is no evidence that they exist. U.S. with only $300 million reaching the Army in the financial year ending 2008.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. Belfer Center: Harvard University. The result is that.S. Many of the incentives for Pakistani army corruption are longstanding.9 percent—were spent on fighter aircraft and weapons. “The great majority” of the Coalition Support Funds given by the United States to reimburse Pakistan for counterterrorism operations was reportedly diverted to the Ministry of Finance.S. anti-ship and antimissile defense systems. aircraft-mounted armaments. For many years.pdf>. 2012. This is evidence of corruption at the highest level.5 million to reimburse Pakistan for damage to Navy vehicles which had not been used in combat. despite reports from U. and remain in place today The Pakistani military did not use most of the funds for the agreed objective of fighting terror. one reporting that he saw members of the Corps “standing… in the snow in sandals. U. Pakistan continued to receive around $80 million per month for military operations during ceasefire periods when troops were in their barracks.S. At one point. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. They have enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of Pakistani institutions and the country’s ability to fight its extremist enemies and provided already kleptocratic institutions with further incentives for corruption. July 2009. despite the fact that the terrorists in the FATA have no air attack capability. 8 Feb. foreign policy objectives.

because it is given so rapidly and with less oversight. Amanullah Kariapper. that many civil society groups organized their own efforts.March 2012 Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly Pakistani counterterrorism failed until 2009. 11 Feb. take measures to prevent and mitigate disasters and provide relief if they happen. foundationbriefs. when the Pakistani army did launch an effective operation in Malakand in mid-2009. Indeed. During the years 2001 to mid-2009. How then can we expect them to use aid given to generally improve the lives of citizens? In the months that followed. and. As the scale of a natural disaster increases. Emergency assistance is perhaps particularly vulnerable. Web. of the $6. therefore. "Pakistan's Flood of Cash. Unfortunately. al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA. feel no need to provide relief. but it is not unique. In contrast. Tellingly. significant parts of the FATA were under Taliban control. not U. this creates perverse incentives for the recipient nondemocratic governments. corrupt. a software engineer who marshaled students to collect aid and set up a camp for the homeless in southern Punjab. According to some estimates.6 billion in military aid the United States gave Pakistan between 2002 and 2008. Democratic leaders are highly sensitive to disaster-related causalities and. Pakistan has been given $1. 2010. disaster-related deaths have little effect on the tenure of autocratic leaders. the international community has not. aid. the government is all too ready to divert relief funds to this cause.com Page 49 of 114 .7 billion in emergency assistance. in turn. Aid provides just such funds. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. 2012. Pakistan will not decisively defeat them. Autocratic governments’ disregard for public welfare is exacerbated by international relief assistance. the international community provides them with more aid. Alejandro. who. "We don't donate to the government.S. and Alastair Smith." Although local organizations have tried to limit the opportunities for government graft. only $500 million ever made it to the military. and biased. The United Nations' Financial Tracking Service reports that. As we argued in "Disaster Politics" in July democratic states are better at protecting their citizens from the effects of natural disasters than autocratic governments because leaders need the support of citizens to stay in office. 2010. it was primarily in response to public pressure within Pakistan. 28 Nov. as of November 1. said." Foreign Affairs. because we know it's mainly a way for government officials to make money. the aid dynamic is similar to that of Pakistan’s war against insurgents: as long as the United States is willing to pay Pakistan ever more to eradicate extremists. Flores. which depend on buying off the support of influential individuals to stay in power. government relief was so ineffectual. the graft that counterterrorism aid brings outweighs the political cost of some continuing violence. and according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. Pakistan’s failure is due in part to its political institutions. as the citizens of Pakistan are aware. The argument here is that Pakistan was unable to use aid given for the explicit purpose of flood relief. That is about $83 per affected person and 20 times more per person than was given for comparable flooding in relatively poorer Benin.

it could set up an international escrow account that would be accessible to Pakistan's government only if problems remain fixed. nondemocratic governments destroy an important source of income if they effectively protect people from disasters or end insurgencies. much of which is subsequently stolen.com Page 50 of 114 . But under an escrow plan. Instead.March 2012 Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly The United States needs to radically change the way it distributes aid to change nondemocracies’ calculations. for example. In normal circumstances. funds could be withheld should insurgencies resume or natural disasters cause excess damage. In Pakistan. foundationbriefs. the United States should stop providing ongoing aid.

Web. This must stop. Belfer Center: Harvard University. having recently added to its supply of such nuclear material and expanded its plutonium separation capabilities.harvard. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. (Pg. 2012. it is likely that U.com Page 51 of 114 . Pakistan is an obstacle to this goal.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. July 2009.ksg.March 2012 Pro: Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program Ibrahim. 8 Feb.pdf>.S. President Obama has set a goal of enacting a global cutoff of the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. Rep. and given the reports of military corruption. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. <http://belfercenter. Given that Pakistan has had consistent budgetary issues and a low-tax base. aid has itself funded this expansion in part. 27) foundationbriefs. This would mean that the United States would be funding an obstacle to its own stated policy of reducing the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. Azeem.

"Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces. policymakers. military directly training FC [Frontier Corps] troops.com Page 52 of 114 . (1) RAND's Fair says the Pakistani army is wary of the U. no generalized foreign training is required. Christine Fair: "Pakistan's army does not want to become a counterinsurgency force. says the RAND Corporation's C. This reflects an overarching problem for U.S. 14 Feb. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States and an expert on the Pakistani military. Jayshree. (1) foundationbriefs. Given the Pashtun separatist demands and historical problems the Pakistani state has had with the tribal region.March 2012 Pro: Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency Military Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency Bajoria.S. Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani said the country had developed a full range of counterinsurgency training facilities for low-intensity conflicts." he said. "[E]xcept for very specialized weapons and equipment and [advanced] technology. says the army hasn't made the decision yet to become a counterinsurgency force and instead only seeks better equipment from the United States for what it calls fighting a "low intensity" conflict. 2012. 18 June 2009. as FC was historically used to train the Taliban." Council on Foreign Relations. Web. Those troops operating in North West Frontier Province and the tribal areas are largely Pashtun recruited from the region. Fair says the Pakistani army is "hesitant to let the Frontier Corps become more efficient." Shuja Nawaz." There are also questions of loyalty.

Pakistan is less secure both regionally and internally. aka the Quetta shura.harvard. The Afghan Taliban have not yet been the targets of effective Pakistani military action. on aggregate. located in the Pakistani city of Quetta. and 3. the high levels of corruption within the Pakistani military and security services means that in practice. largesse could not—it persuaded the Pakistani military to take counterterrorism seriously. Pakistani deaths from terrorist violence have skyrocketed. prevent them from using the areas in northwest Pakistan as a safe haven. Belfer Center: Harvard University. Rep. They are understandably demoralized.S. and most Pakistanis—74 percent—do not support action against Taliban and al Qaeda militants. However.599 in 2007. 24) foundationbriefs. 23-24)          The hope was that after September 11. Despite over $12 billion towards these aims. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. According to RAND analyst Christine Fair.S. none have been achieved. (Pg. Anti-Americanism remains high. 8 Feb.  The new military commitment to counterterrorism in mid-2009 came in response to public pressure within Pakistan. 2012. “Pakistan has not launched massive offensives against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan.com Page 53 of 114 . Pakistan would clear terrorists from within its own borders. (Pg. Results Ibrahim. Often Negative. July 2009. the Taliban leadership council. remains unmolested and free to act. aid. and help to bring the al Qaeda leaders to justice. Pakistan’s economy has not benefited from the budget support. Pakistan did not remand one high-value Taliban asset until the summer of 2007—and then only did so reluctantly and after sustained pressure from Washington.pdf>. the Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. it is not clear that Pakistan. al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA.S. A poll in 2008 found that over half of Pakistanis hold the United States responsible for recent violence in Pakistan.March 2012 Pro: Poor Results Aid Has Yielded Poor. foreign policy objectives between 2001 and 2008. 24) Nearly two thousand Pakistani troops have died fighting terrorist militants.S. Azeem. Islamist extremism in Pakistan has risen. only an IMF loan in late 2008 prevented it from collapsing.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. (Pg. Web. There were 189 in 2003. 648 in 2005. Notably. Public pressure achieved what eight years of U. <http://belfercenter. 2001. Far from having reduced.” Despite the billions of U. not U.ksg. supported or hindered U. aid for the purpose. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info.

Yet New Delhi also sees the writing on the wall. and reflects India's recognition that it needs to demonstrate a degree of flexibility as the U. and that Afghanistan might But as the U. Even its substantial diplomatic presence within the country has been subject to routine Pakistani diplomatic barrages and. That. withdrawal approaches to ensure that its interests are not wholly ignored.March 2012 Pro: India India Should Be Our Priority Ganguly. India is popular in Afghanistan. Sumit.and not just due to the radical movement's long-standing ties to Pakistan. could redirect the collective wrath of various jihadi organizations from internecine conflict and focus it on India. they are concerned that a Taliban-dominated regime would forge links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other jihadi groups in Central Asia. It has the world's fifth-largest aid program there. they argue.com Page 54 of 114 . In mid-June this year. Above all. 2012. thereby adversely affecting India's quest for access to energy resources and markets in the region. in all likelihood. Please see Author Index for bio. military drawdown has begun. 19 July 2011. India has been unable to place any viable security contingent in Afghanistan and has also shied away from training the Afghan army. This concession was far from trivial. despite its past mistakes during the Soviet invasion and occupation of the country.S." Foreign Policy. Some astute New Delhibased analysts also worry that a resurgent Taliban may actually help broker a peace agreement between the Pakistani regime and Pakistani domestic terrorist groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.foreignpolicy. These fears are far from chimerical. India fears that a reconstituted Taliban regime would allow a host of anti-Indian terrorist groups. that Pakistan not wield a disproportionate influence on any future government.com/articles/2011/07/19/afghanistan_is_now_indias_problem>. Finally.5 billion in developmental assistance. at least one Pakistan-linked foundationbriefs. having committed $1. 6 Feb. it is far from clear that India will be able to maintain its current profile in the country. <http://www. India has made these investments in the country because its policymakers are keen on ensuring that a radical Islamist regime does not return to the country. According to an ABC poll conducted in December 2008 and January 2009. India's past experiences with the Taliban regime provide much basis for serious anxieties -.S. to find sanctuaries and training grounds in Afghanistan. India is a significant player in Afghanistan. Thanks to Pakistani intransigence (with America's acquiescence). most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba. there is growing apprehension in New Delhi that India's investments may be at risk. and more specifically Indian-controlled Kashmir. It has played a key role in reconstruction and has developed training programs for Afghan civil servants and police. Yet without security. "Afghanistan Is Now India's Problem. Web. India dropped its previously unyielding opposition to any form of reconciliation with the Taliban when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested that India would be open to any form of reconciliation that is Afghan-led.

Kabul’s floundering efforts to find rapprochement with the Taliban may be behind Karzai’s decision to link Afghanistan more closely to India. 2011. The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. 21 October.” Yet 2008 saw significant deterioration in Pakistan-India relations. A bilateral “Composite Dialogue” reengaged in 2004 realized some modest. Alan.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. that killed some 165 civilians and left the peace process largely moribund. (Pg.S. Kronstadt K. in October 2009. http://www. conflict over water resources has emerged as another exacerbating factor in the bilateral relationship.S. Despite these pressures. Pakistan-U. Our Alliance With Pakistan Hurts/Prevents Our Alliance With India Kronstadt K. and 1971—and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked more than six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. Relations.fas. Pakistan-U. 1965. India. Rep. the fact that India is signing strategic frameworks and providing assistance to train and equip the Afghan security force is reason enough to consider India a top ally in the effort to rebuild and secure Afghanistan. and the Sir Creek remain unresolved. Web. and some unprecedented trade and people-to-people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). When Afghan President Karzai made a long-planned trip to New Delhi in early October and inked a new “strategic framework” with India—Kabul’s first such 21st century agreement with any country—Pakistan’s fears of strategic encirclement became more acute.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. The dialogue is meant to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues. Three full-scale wars—in 1947-1948. but still meaningful successes. http://www. Relations.March 2012 Pro: India attack on its embassy in Kabul. militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. to the satisfaction of both sides. India will not easily walk away from Afghanistan. (Pg. India has stuck to its guns in the country and has continued with its developmental activities. 21 October. Congressional Research Service. 2011. the Siachen Glacier. including a formal cease-fire along the entire shared frontier.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. especially following the large-scale November terrorist attack on Mumbai. Congressional Research Service. Rep. 1 Feb. 2012. 29) foundationbriefs. 1 Feb. 30) Simply put. More broadly. 2012. Alan. Web. especially in light of the Afghanistan’s acceptance of future Indian assistance in training and equipping its security forces. including Jammu and Kashmir.com Page 55 of 114 . Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. In 2010.

which was evidently not in line with stated U. Under this scenario.ksg. over half of the money—54. But it could not be expected that Pakistan would be so open about this. (Pg. Korb said “the vast majority of our foreign military financing (FMF) has gone toward the purchase of major weapons systems such as F-16 fighters and other aircraft. foreign policy aims for which it was allocated. This mindset coexists with a tendency for the military to underestimate the danger from Islamist terrorism and for some members of the security services to sympathize with extreme Islamist groups.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. report argued that the Pakistani army still “lacks modern night vision devices to monitor the border and helicopters to carry troops rapidly and engage a mobile militant force. In the event.62 percent—on support and other aircraft. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. anti-ship and antimissile defense systems. 2012. aircraft-mounted armaments. over a quarter—26. Web. 21) foundationbriefs.S. anti-ship. and an air defense radar costing $200 million. (Pg. It could furthermore not be expected that Pakistan would procure so much conventional equipment with limited use against terrorists.March 2012 Pro: India Ibrahim. 21) Security assistance money is often justified to Congress as providing weapons that play a critical role in the War on Terror. 8 Feb.S. after billions of dollars supplying the Pakistani army with equipment to be used for counterterrorism since 2002. Belfer Center: Harvard University. Pakistan has regarded India as its main security threat.com Page 56 of 114 . In 2009. 21) Many of these seem to be of dubious use. policy aims. Lawrence J. funds on weapons for use against India. For six decades.harvard.pdf>.S. The Pakistani military services have traditionally been both trained to fight a conventional war and conditioned to see India as their main threat.” (Pg. <http://belfercenter.S. and antimissile capabilities.9 percent—was spent on fighter aircraft and weapons.” It is clear that Pakistan is not using the majority of U. a U. it was perhaps to be expected that the Pakistani military might have sought to spend U. and 10 percent on advanced weapons systems. In his testimony to the Senate investigating committee. Azeem.S. July 2009. Rep. such as F-16s. despite the fact that the terrorists in the FATA have no air attack capability. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. money to fight terrorism or advance the U.

and the growing risk of militant proxies operating autonomously cannot be discounted. (Pg. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. 5 May 2011.S. and has resulted in deteriorating US-Pakistani relations. Many Kashmiri militant groups have splintered. iv) The end result is that a concern with self-defense. Rep. "We may not like that or accept that but it is a fact from the Pakistani perspective. particularly to divert Pakistani military attention away from the tribal areas. These include maritime patrol aircraft. that Islamabad is using this aid to bolster conventional capabilities against India while paying insufficient attention to counterinsurgency capacity. For example. Haqqani network. and other movements to ensure its influence over the future of Afghanistan and to limit any threat of Pashtun independence movements. Jayshree." Council on Foreign Relations. 18 June 2009." (1) foundationbriefs. Cross-border violence into Afghanistan is a major irritant. security assistance." says CFR's Markey. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. anti-armor missiles. upgrade kits for F-16 combat aircraft. <http://csis. 8 Feb. This plays out in Afghanistan in the form of a competition for influence over the Afghan government where Pakistan attempts to use its ties to the Afghan Taliban. It is the reality behind the rhetoric of “ally” and “strategic partner” that has led to constant tension with the US. and secured on both sides by nuclear weapons. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Varun. the Indo-Pakistani border is one of the most tense on the planet. surveillance radar. and tensions with Afghanistan and the US. Some experts argue equipment like F-16s may not be directly relevant to the fight against terrorism but must be provided to Pakistan because they have become connected to the Pakistani military's capacity to trust the U. iv) Similarly. they waste so many critical resources in the name of security that they have become a threat to the state and the future of the Pakistani people. and selfpropelled howitzers. 2012. Web. as in south Punjab. Cross-border violence into India can greatly escalate the prospects of large-scale war. diverts massive amounts of resources and security forces away from far more serious internal problems and threats. "of the nearly $1. 2012. (Pg." notes Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service. Pakistan’s current policies not only feed a major arms race with India. Web. military. (Pg. iv) The end result is a fundamentally different perception of Pakistan’s national interest from the US focus on Afghan security and stability. and Anthony Cordesman. (Pg.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>. Pakistan: Violence vs.March 2012 Pro: India Vira. "Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces. and a threat from India. Stability.com Page 57 of 114 . "We ignore that fact at our own peril. more than half has been used by Islamabad to purchase weapons of limited use in the context of counterterrorism. Pakistan’s focus on the challenge from India affects virtually every aspect of its external relations.S. This gets to the heart of a major criticism of Pakistan's use of U. iv) Bajoria. 14 Feb.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing provided to Pakistan from FY2002-FY2008.

especially following massive flood damage to Pakistan’s cotton crop. Alan. Along with Pakistani leaders. Web. the Obama Administration has continued to support congressional passage of a bill to establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in western Pakistan that could facilitate development in Pakistan’s poor tribal regions. the textile sector directly employs 3. would boost their country’s exports by $5 billion annually.com Page 58 of 114 . 21 October. especially from the key textile sector. With the security situation deterring foreign investors. Pakistan-U. which currently average 17% on cotton apparel. exports. Congressional Research Service.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. 1 Feb. may be key to any future Pakistani recovery.S. perhaps to include textile manufacture. 2011. 2012. Islamabad has continued to press Washington and European capitals for reduced tariffs on textile exports.March 2012 Pro: Other Ways to Help Suspending Aid Doesn’t Mean No Help Kronstadt K. Pakistani officials and business leaders estimate that abolishing American tariffs. 32) foundationbriefs. Rep. Relations.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.fas.5 million Pakistanis and accounts for 40% of urban factory jobs. (Pg. http://www. A key aspiration for Pakistani leaders is to acquire better access to Western markets. By some accounts.

Our policymakers have had difficulty deciding how best to get political mileage and effectively spread aid. Despite our efforts. The United States should decrease barriers of trade while suspending its current assistance to send a strong message to Pakistan. "Should U. and trade policy is the way to achieve this. a huge potential exists to greatly fortify the foundation of the Pakistani economy and help the average citizen prosper. Withholding assistance in this strategy would thus encourage reform in the government while still changing public opinion in a positive manner. Candace. when trying to trade with the United States. A good case can also be made that the United States could accomplish more with trade concessions than with financial aid. while discouraging a hugely unpopular government rife with corruption.March 2012 Pro: Other Ways to Help Putnam. American aid to date has engendered far more resentment and suspicion in Pakistan than it has public appreciation. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. especially in its textile industry. 2012. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. 17 May 2011. Threatening to end the assistance might be the kind of shock treatment Pakistan needs to bring about the level of domestic revenue-extraction policies that would make the country less dependent on foreign assistance.S. At the same time. 9 Feb. Currently. Much of it is lost to corruption or spent on ineffective programs. Web.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>.   Much of the evidence so far in the brief has demonstrated that Pakistan mishandles monetary assistance.  foundationbriefs. That message would be one of promoting the average Pakistani citizen who wants a better life through hard work.cfr.com Page 59 of 114 . <http://www. Pakistan faces huge tariffs. Having legitimate economic opportunity is a major deterrent of terrorism.

11 July 2011. but according to Ayesha Siddiqa. General Abbas's statement might be a stretch.March 2012 Pro: Pakistan Does Not Need the Aid Pakistan Apparently Does Not Need the Aid Ahmed. 10 Feb.csmonitor.” the symbolism of the cut is likely to outweigh the operational significance. "Pakistan Says It Doesn't Need US Military Aid. Analysts call the cuts the strongest indicator yet of the deteriorating nature of the relationship between the two countries and say it could cause the Pakistani military to retreat to a more hostile anti-US position. has conducted successful military operations using its own resources without any external support whatsoever. Gen. 2012.com Page 60 of 114 . He added that the Army had not received any official correspondence from the US on the matter.” Army spokesman Maj. told the AFP. despite the fact that the cut would account for roughly 40 percent of the $2 billion in military assistance America gives Pakistan annually. foundationbriefs. Web." The Christian Science Monitor. as well as at present.com/World/AsiaSouth-Central/2011/0711/Pakistan-says-it-doesn-t-need-US-military-aid>. <http://www. "The Army in the past. military analyst and author of “Military Inc. Pakistan’s Army said Monday that a US military aid cut worth some $800 million won’t affect its ability to conduct combat operations. Athar Abbas. Issam.

Con Evidence foundationbriefs.com Page 61 of 114 .

"Should U. It has helped capture some senior al Qaeda officials. Web.S. “Its economy has failed. the private sector. longer-term worry is that the Pakistani state itself could implode. "The Ally From Hell. 2012. its politics have failed. 2011. and government most inclined to initiate political reforms and long-term economic growth. It has permitted the United States to launch drone strikes from bases in Baluchistan. 9 Feb. There are no good options. Candace.” Foreign Affairs. <http://www. But to now abruptly reduce assistance to Pakistan would jeopardize American military forces in Afghanistan and weaken the Pakistani army's capacity to confront those domestically ensconced terrorist groups that threaten us both. Jan/Feb2012. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.cfr.S. While assistance to the military must continue.March 2012 Con: General General Krasner. could go missing.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. American aid should.S. including Khalid Sheik Mohammed. Our programs need to resource those areas of civil society. Jeffrey. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. the 9/11 mastermind.” (11-12) Putnam. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. or a warhead. American strategists like [Brookings Institution Stephen] Cohen argue that the U. Vol. The first is that an unstable and friendless Pakistan would be more apt to take precipitous action against India. It could also leave us less confident about the disposition of Pakistan's nuclear assets. A revised U. The U. must maintain its association with a nuclear Pakistan over the long term for three main reasons. aid policy should aim at empowering those groups and institutions most inclined to recognize that Pakistan's real security threats lie within--from its extremists and the country's unmet social and economic problems. foundationbriefs. That way.-Pakistani relationship has produced a few modest successes. (2) Goldberg. Stephen. the third. Web. democratic Pakistan. ending it can lay the basis for a more genuine strategic relationship rather than be seen as punishing Pakistan. Dec.” Cohen said. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. then. Web. Pakistan has generally allowed NATO to transport supplies through its territory to Afghanistan." The Atlantic.S.com Page 62 of 114 . 17 May 2011. and Marc Ambinder. 91 Issue 1. “One of the negative changes we’ve seen is that Pakistan is losing its coherence as a state. it should be more conditioned to prevent bad behavior and increase opportunities for a greater civilian role in directing foreign policy. and its army either fails or looks the other way. the second is that nuclear material. be an investment and stimulus aimed toward realizing a more self-reliant.

rand. including placing U.S. Pakistan's generals probably benefit from the assistance more than they claim. <http://www." RAND Corporation. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. The true mettle of policymakers is whether they can effectively deal with today's threats despite their disagreements and conflict over recent events. It makes little sense to abandon Pakistan and cut off all financial assistance. It worries me about going too far in shutting down opportunities for assistance to Pakistan." Council on Foreign Relations. Daniel. 11 July 2011. Seth. that Pakistan's generals can hardly appear to bow before U. If we can see that. like supporting Pakistani efforts to stabilize Baluchistan and defeat insurgents there. pressure. (1) Markey.org/commentary/2011/05/10/NYT.html. Council on Foreign Relations. and they require substantive cooperation. Today. focusing instead on economic and humanitarian aid. But decreasing security assistance is not likely to terminate the relationship. foundationbriefs. Web. (1) Jones. conditionality--if narrowly targeted--makes sense. 12 Feb. 2011. "A Tougher U. And antiAmerican sentiment in Pakistan is so intense at the moment. Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info.S.html>. to target Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. then we can begin to really turn the tide in this relationship.S. Web. There are inherent risks in this strategy. they will be sorely disappointed. cutting U. "How Cuts Affect U. So if Obama administration officials believe that assistance cuts and public rebukes offer enough leverage to coerce a Pakistani about-face. There is a range of other options. Web. the threats to Pakistan and the United States are serious and real. Washington can provide some carrots.S. 10 May 2011. security assistance into an escrow account until cooperation improves. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. but they can also do without it. "Focus on Economic Aid to Pakistan. Jayshree. But if you turn off assistance and you don't maintain the prospect that you might turn it back on again--if you begin to put into place a whole array of obstacles to future engagement--then the Pakistanis will have even less reason to believe that some brighter future is possible for them. including within the ranks of the army.com Page 63 of 114 . But America could reduce part of its security assistance. which could cause further deterioration in U.S. I would like to see the credible threat provoke a shift on Pakistan's part. military assistance will not force Pakistan to reassess its strategic posture. 26 Sept.S.S. But it may need sticks as well. Alone.-Pakistan Ties.-Pakistani cooperation. Tack on Pakistan.March 2012 Con: General Bajoria." Interview by Daniel Markey. 2012. which has waxed and waned over the decades. which would make it even harder for the U. [Aid] suspensions are smart.

not less. Jeffrey. 2011. Still. 8) Goldberg. Dec. Web. Not Less More Engagement. assistance to Pakistan. we must. especially while American troops in Afghanistan depend on supplies trucked through Pakistan.com Page 64 of 114 . Pakistan-U. Not Less Kronstadt K.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.S. Rep. "The Ally From Hell.S.fas.” (17-18) foundationbriefs. instead. “A flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan is better than disengagement. argued before the Senate Armed Services Committee just prior to his retirement that the U. Few policy makers believe that cutting aid to Islamabad is practical." The Atlantic. who has been disillusioned by the behavior of Pakistan’s ruling generals. 2012. and Marc Ambinder. Web. 2011.” he said. 1 Feb. must not give up on its relationship with Pakistan.March 2012 Con: More Engagement. http://www. (Pg. Even Admiral Mullen. senior Members tended to take a more measured view. Figures from both major parties expressed disbelief at Pakistan’s allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight and accountability for future U. with the House Speaker voicing the opinion that circumstances called for “more engagement [with Pakistan]. 21 October. “Now is not the time to disengage from Pakistan. Congressional Research Service.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. Relations.S. Alan. reframe our relationship. Such sentiments tracked well with the view of many independent observers that— despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrust—the United States has had no good options other than continuing to engage Pakistan in what many analysts have described as “a bad marriage.

Independent Task Force Report No. and spare parts for American-made weapons and vehicles. Samuel Berger. coercion and containment of Pakistan could accelerate dangerous economic. The fact that Osama bin Laden hid in Pakistan for five years demonstrates that Pakistan's military was either complicit or incompetent. 17 May 2011.cfr. must avoid abrupt action like stopping all aid. if insufficient. Richard. <http://www. intelligence officials from the country. and social trends inside Pakistan. 2012. It could also expel U. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. interests in the region. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations.S. access to valuable information that helps the CIA track terrorists. The U.S.S.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. officials were forced to operate from neighboring countries. political.S. but another abrupt cut in U. At the same time. governments were at odds. 9 Feb. Web. (46) foundationbriefs. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies.S. Containing the terrorist threat from Pakistan would be challenging if the Pakistani and U. Pakistan’s military would suffer from the loss of U. Candace. were to cut aid to Pakistan and prevail on the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to do the same. which would come at a steep price to U. If the U. aid will only endanger security cooperation that has been effective. Pakistan’s fragile political and economic stability would be undermined by greater tensions with the United States. intelligence sharing were reduced.S. Putnam. Lisa. it has the potential to get even worse. U. 9 Feb. "Should U. The U. In general. Pakistan could react by cutting off NATO supply lines that run through Pakistan to coalition troops in Afghanistan. the Pakistani economy would teeter on the brink of collapse.com Page 65 of 114 . Armitage.March 2012 Con: Suspending Aid Worse Suspending All Aid Would Worsen the Situation Curtis. 65.S.S. technology.S. U. The chance of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal falling into terrorist hands. 12 May 2011. also has a broader interest in maintaining steady relations with Pakistan and encouraging stability in the nuclear-armed nation of 180 million that sits at the crossroads of the Middle East and South and Central Asia. and U. and Daniel Markey.S. 2012. Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. would increase in the context of a deteriorating political and economic situation. assistance and restricted access to training." The Heritage Foundation. Either prospect is deeply troubling.S. Web. NATO’s presence in Afghanistan would be jeopardized without a secure logistics route through Pakistan. Americans must recognize that as frustrating and difficult as Pakistan’s situation may be today. in making America safer.S. thus denying the U. while currently remote. Council on Foreign Relations. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>.

S. Now.S. U. 2011. is squeezing off much of the financial aid that is supposed to be the lubricant in our alliance. angry about terrorist sanctuaries. Abdul Hafeez Shaikh. so did the assistance. 17 May 2011. the terror-war friend.March 2012 Con: Consistency is Essential Consistency is Essential Putnam. He worked his way. policy objectives. he said. After showing me his impressive art collection. Pakistan has paid a heavy price for supporting the U. Keller. "The Pakistanis Have a Point. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. “As soon as the wars ended. Congress.S.” the minister said.com Page 66 of 114 . Shaikh flopped on a sofa and ran through the roll call of American infidelity. the Soviet-Afghan-war friend. mistakes also contributed to the current situation. "Should U.-led "war on terror" since 9/11--both in terms of facing a brutal backlash from a variety of militant and terrorist groups as well as a negative impact on its economy. The sense of being discarded is so recent. 14 Dec. Please see Author Index for bio. decade by decade. at this hour will be immoral and damaging for U. While Pakistan itself played a major role in its drift toward extremism. Therefore. Last but not least. especially development aid. Web. 9 Feb.” (6) foundationbriefs. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. 2012.cfr. “Pakistan was the cold-war friend. Candace.S. to the war on terror. cutting off aid. Bill.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. Web. Pakistan is tasked by the Americans with simultaneously helping to kill terrorists and — the newest twist — using its influence to bring them to the bargaining table. “Pakistan the afterthought” was the theme very late one night when I visited the home of Pakistan’s finance minister. <http://www." The New York Times. meanwhile.

In some cases.aspx/>. "U. predictable and substantial to have an impact.S. debt relief (write-offs on bad commercial loans that would not have been repaid anyway).March 2012 Con: Consistency is Essential Kharas. The U. has periodically announced large aid packages for Pakistan and aid commitments have been high. Web. but went straight to U. Pakistan has seen little cash for development projects from the United States. or about $1. pledges were never translated into actual projects or were left unimplemented and later simply cancelled or forgotten. The second point is that economic development assistance must be reliable. contractors to execute programs designed by the United States.S. Currently. amounted to $204 million.com Page 67 of 114 . At that time. assistance has benefited them significantly over the last 40 years." Brookings Institution.S. In fact. Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. development assistance helped build roads. In 2008. power stations and a vibrant agricultural economy. 2010.10 per Pakistani. 8 Feb. <http://www. foundationbriefs. the actual programmable cash-flow from the U. 25 Aug. food and humanitarian assistance (not designed for long-term development purposes). Homi. Small wonder that very few Pakistanis believe that U. development assistance to Pakistan has been minimal since the large aid programs of the 1960s and early 1970s (the hey-day of the U. This meant that more money was being paid from the Pakistan budget to the United States Treasury than vice-versa in these years.S.S.-Pakistan relationship). U. Since then. 2012.S.S.edu/opinions/2010/0825_pakistan_aid_kharas. U. the actual net disbursement of programmable money for development projects in Pakistan by the U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Time for a New Approach. aid to Pakistan displays none of these characteristics.brookings. to Pakistan— gross aid disbursements excluding technical cooperation (where no money flows to Pakistan).S. In other instances. the money never went to Pakistan or Pakistanis. the last year of fully reported data. albeit very volatile as shown in the chart below (see the red line). and interest and principal repayments on past aid— was negative for almost 25 years between 1975 and 2000 (see the blue line).S. But actual U.

demands across the United States are growing for Washington to cut off aid to Pakistan. and Daniel Markey. Candace. Web.cfr. As relations with the United States deteriorated. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. and New Delhi.S. We funneled millions through Pakistan to oust the Soviets from Kabul. 2010. Richard. as reflected in Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities. 17 May 2011.com Page 68 of 114 . 9 Feb. Khan's nuclear proliferation racket boomed when both states were going through a difficult bilateral phase. 2012. Pakistan pursued ties with the Taliban--part of its "strategic depth" initiative to counter India and bring "stability" to Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. This track record. and when faced with far more concerted. Samuel Berger. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. this time around. with such a heavy U. military presence in Afghanistan dependent on Pakistani logistical support. U. Afghan Jihad era. we did that in the 1990s. pressures. Today. Kabul. with disastrous results.S. Pakistan’s leaders successfully parried Washington’s pressures to take actions that were perceived to be unacceptable on national security or domestic political grounds. complete with disastrous global proliferation. Washington can coercively manipulate Pakistan’s orientation toward the Lashkar-e-Taiba.Q. top-down U. Cutting off aid to Pakistan proved especially detrimental in the post-1980s. 65. (70) foundationbriefs. America has cut off aid before. seems unwise.S. history reminds us of the dangers of walking away.March 2012 Con: Cutting Aid Failed Last Time Cutting Aid Failed Last Time Putnam. To hold out the expectation that. the Afghan Taliban. "Should U. After 9/11. provides a cautionary tale of Washington’s ability to successfully manipulate carrots and sticks. However. It also continued an aggressive nuclear program too. As tensions escalate between the two countries. <http://www. its protection of unconventional military options to influence Afghanistan’s future. when the possibilities of leveraging unwelcome choices on Pakistan’s decision-makers were far better than at present. we came back with primarily military aid and demands they fight the Taliban. Deeply concerned about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program. the Pakistani people distrust us as a fair-weather friend that supports military dictators. The rising generation of Pakistani generals.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. remains wary of cooperation just when we need them to help us defeat al-Qaeda. In past crises. Council on Foreign Relations. barred under sanctions from U.S. the internal situation in Afghanistan went from bad to worse and A. Armitage.S. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. Web. During the 1990s. and its policies to keep India off-balance. but we later cut all assistance for twelve years under nuclear-related sanctions. training.

com Page 69 of 114 .. and technologies continues to be a top-tier U. moves to engage civil nuclear cooperation with rival India. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. an expert on nuclear weapons who directs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. Pakistan would be an obvious place for a jihadist organization to seek a nuclear weapon or fissile material: it is the only Muslim-majority state. The proposed deal poses a dilemma for the Obama Administration. Web. <http://www. 5 July 2010. 2011. and many jihadist organizations are headquartered there already. Ariel.” says Graham Allison. Web. and Marc Ambinder. Rep. Web. its central government is of limited competence and has serious trouble projecting its authority into many corners of its territory (on occasion it has difficulty maintaining order even in the country’s largest city. The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Congressional Research Service. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues. perhaps in response to recent U. Some observers fear that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists or used by elements in the Pakistani government. which they take foundationbriefs. 2012. Jeffrey.March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Kerr. 30 Nov. The first is “a terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon. 30-31) Goldberg. recent reports indicate that Pakistan is rapidly growing its nuclear weapons arsenal.pdf>. "The Ally From Hell. 2011. This comes at a time that China is planning to build two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan in apparent violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. there is ongoing concern that Pakistan’s nuclear know-how or technologies remain prone to leakage." The Atlantic.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.S.S. 2012. and Mary Beth Nikitin. concern. to have successfully developed nuclear weapons. materials. <http://www.org/foreign-relations/pakistan-iranforeign-relations>. Paul K. Chronic political instability in Pakistan and Islamabad’s military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have raised concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.fas. 10 Feb.irantracker. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. (Pg.S. "Pakistan-Iran Foreign Relations. Pakistan’s military and security services are infiltrated by an unknown number of jihadist sympathizers. out of the 50 or so in the world. Karachi). (Pg. “There are three threats. Moreover. which the Obama Administration wants to see join major international nonproliferation regimes. 1) Farrar-Wellman. officials believe Pakistan’s nuclear security is much improved in recent years. which has requested that Beijing justify the plan and seeks its approval through international fora. Dec. Pakistan has in the recent past been a source of serious illicit proliferation to aspiring weapons states. 1 Feb. While most analysts and U. especially as Islamist militants have expanded their geographic influence there." IranTracker.

the Pakistanis have begun using this lowsecurity method to transfer not merely the “de-mated” component nuclear parts but “mated” nuclear weapons.March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Mumbai or New York for a nuclear 9/11. intelligence official. in preventing nuclear war and preventing terrorists from gaining access to a nuclear weapon. well-defended convoys. not only is Pakistan building these devices. According to both Pakistani and American sources. has said. but that’s about it. The third is a takeover of nuclear weapons by a militant group during a period of instability or splintering of the state. What this means. the Pakistanis have provoked anxiety inside the Pentagon by increasing the pace of these movements. vans with a modest security profile are sometimes the preferred conveyance. Embassy in Islamabad. We have to work with them on nuclear security and have meaningful technical exchanges on best practices. Western nuclear experts have feared that Pakistan is building small. and Lashkar-e-Taiba (which conducted the devastating terror attacks on Mumbai three years ago that killed nearly 200 civilians).” General James Jones. General Jones issued a “no comment. In other words. (When asked by the authors of this article about his statement. exactly how many weapons they have. in the regular flow of traffic. the Pakistani government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable to theft by jihadists simply to hide them from the United States. in civilian-style vehicles without noticeable defenses.” says Toby Dalton.S. And Pakistani and American sources say that since the raid on Abbottabad.com Page 70 of 114 . This has to continue. And instead of moving nuclear material in armored. and these are not issues we can solve unilaterally. nuclear bombs capable of destroying entire cities are transported in delivery vans on congested and dangerous roads.” (2) Nuclear-weapons components are sometimes moved by helicopter and sometimes moved over roads. the Haqqani network. (5) But nuclear experts issue a cautionary note: it is not clear that American intelligence can identify the locations of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. including al-Qaeda. President Obama’s first nationalsecurity adviser. is this: In a country that is home to the harshest variants of Muslim fundamentalism. And according to a senior U. The second is a transfer of a nuclear weapon to a state like Iran. it is also now moving them over roads. “tactical” nuclear weapons for quick deployment on the battlefield. In fact.S. in essence.”) Another American former official with nuclear expertise says. the country that funds much of its military budget. on any given day. particularly after the Abbottabad raid.” foundationbriefs. “We don’t even know.” (15) “South Asia remains the most dangerous nuclear-confrontation zone in the world. and to the headquarters of the organizations that espouse these extremist ideologies. “We share a common goal with Pakistan. “Anyone who tells you that they know where all of Pakistan’s nukes are is lying to you. We can get within plus or minus 10. the deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Department of Energy representative at the U. the SPD prefers to move material by subterfuge. according to a source who heard him say it.

Safeguarding 100 weapons is a significantly greater challenge than safeguarding 50 weapons because strategic and operational realities require that those weapons are dispersed and that dispersal locations are adapted to the complex requirements of safely and securely storing nuclear weapons in various degrees of operational readiness. The U. Gregory. 10 Feb. <http://www.[15] foundationbriefs. Web. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. Shaun. to those who transport and safeguard the weapons in storage and would deploy the weapons in crises.cfr. some element of the Pakistani nuclear weapons production. must also be able to receive information from the ISI about al-Qaeda. though arguably more serious. from those involved in the manufacture of fissile material. or knowledge of. given that nuclear weapons and delivery systems demand construction and other visible physical necessities (such as road widening. Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety.S. and bunker construction).usma.[3] As Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal grows in the years ahead. maintenance. 17 May 2011. Please see The Combating Terrorism Center in the Organization Index for more info. for its own security. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Web.com Page 71 of 114 .S. Candace. As many as 70. will simply not find a way out of Afghanistan if Pakistan becomes an open enemy. it is simply not possible that the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can remain unknown to terrorists in perpetuity. storage. "Should U. assembly and maintenance. challenge of ensuring the physical security of an ever increasing number of nuclear assets. Combating Terrorism Center. 1 June 2011.edu/posts/terrorist-tactics-in-pakistan-threaten-nuclearweapons-safety>. 2012. even if such information is provided sporadically. <http://www. 2012. unusual levels of security. Aside from the intricate politics of international arms control.ctc.March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation The United States must.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. through those engaging in nuclear weapons design.[4] That number will also rise steadily as the size of the nuclear arsenal grows. Rep. Closing terrorist safe-havens and keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands requires sustained Pakistani action. the steady rise in the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal presents the rather more prosaic. This is not a simple matter. these challenges will multiply. (18) Putnam.000 people in Pakistan reportedly have access to. 9 Feb. and deployment cycle. And the U. In this context. and given that the growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will significantly expand the construction of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the number of individuals with nuclear-related roles. keep watch over Pakistan’s nuclear program—and that’s more easily done if we remain engaged with the Pakistani government.S.

more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off. 2009. Indeed. 2011. which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons cycle. the U. through potentially destroying by explosions nuclear weapons or materials and the creation of a radiological hazard.[17] The fact that this image is available online. Federation of American Scientists published the first open source satellite imagery of a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor airbase outside Karachi. that they had knowledge of the location of intruder detection cameras that they were able to bypass. foundationbriefs. only about 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor. Early reports suggest that between six and ten terrorists stormed the high security base from several entry points. The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists. and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises. argues strongly that knowledge of the location of at least some nuclear weapons storage and other related facilities has reached terrorists in Pakistan. the satellite image shows three potential storage bunkers linked by looping roads. the odds that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons security will eventually be compromised continue to rise. to the possibility of the theft of nuclear weapons components or materials for subsequent terrorist use. Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistan’s military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG. a major terrorist attack targeted the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi. and as the nuclear weapons security challenges thereby steadily multiply. the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U. particularly in transit. As the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons inexorably continues to rise. It took the base security and additional Pakistan Army rangers and commandos more than 18 hours to end the siege.[16] Within its perimeter walls. even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets. and that the unusual configuration of the base is clear. Such an assault would also critically undermine Pakistan’s reassurances about the security of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the weapons cycle. and that they penetrated deep inside the base before using rocket-propelled grenades. explosives and small-arms to destroy several aircraft and take hostages.com Page 72 of 114 . A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities. from video broadcasts with the attention of the world’s media.March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation As evidence of this. on May 22-23. on August 28.S. At least 13 people were killed. is no longer an implausible event. As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows.

-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their hangar.com Page 73 of 114 . The attack.S. Web. and also brought into question the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials. The militants were able to destroy two U. Relations. Pakistan-U. (Pg. 1 Feb. Rep. Congressional Research Service.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.fas. the Mehran Naval Station near Karachi. Alan. 8) foundationbriefs. which the Pakistani Taliban claimed was taken in revenge for the killing of bin Laden.S. On May 22. 2011. was the second major embarrassment of the month for the beleaguered Pakistani military.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. http://www. two other militants are believed to have escaped before Pakistani commandos regained control of the base. which seemed at a loss to explain how such a damaging breach could occur. 2012. The ability of a handful of attackers to wreak such havoc left the security services open to scathing criticism from the generally pro-military Pakistani media. 21 October. Ten security personnel and four militants were killed in the ensuing 16-hour-long gun battle. a team of heavily armed militants penetrated security barriers and stormed Pakistan’s premier naval base.March 2012 Con: Security Concerns Security Concerns Kronstadt K.

Cross border sanctuaries -. (Pg.remain significant havens for Taliban insurgents. (Pg. or the needs of its people. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major objectives. and the Afghan government need every bit of military. Pakistan is a pivotal regional player. It has the potential to be either a major disruptive force or a major source of stability. <http://csis. and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations.com Page 74 of 114 . whose problems affect the security of other countries in the region. Even limited Pakistani intelligence support is crucial in providing them with an understanding of militant dynamics. and helping constrain Iran’s bid for Middle Eastern hegemony. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 8 Feb. and Anthony Cordesman. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. its allies in ISAF. (Pg. and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia – a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia.which are tolerated by at least some elements of the Pakistani security establishment -. the US.March 2012 Con: Pakistan Too Important Pakistan Too Important to Lose Vira. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving. vi-vii) At present. Stability. They are also dependent on a logistic tail that keeps them reliant on a transit route through Pakistan. Varun. Pakistan seems to be on a downward course. in assisting in the peaceful rise of India. and counterterrorism cooperation from Pakistan they can get. At the same time. 2012. US options are limited. Rep. It is playing a form of the “great game” which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. 5 May 2011. Pakistan: Violence vs. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shi’ite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. vi-vii) foundationbriefs. in assisting end to violence in Afghanistan. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info.pdf>. Web. and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence. and that of the United States. (Pg. vi-vii) This presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict. However. vi-vii) At the same time. it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states.

fas.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. forces depends on an Afghan political solution that Pakistan will influence. is paying six times as much to send war supplies to troops in Afghanistan through alternate routes after Pakistan’s punitive decision in November to close border crossings to NATO convoys. <http://www. 8 Feb. We cannot fight in Afghanistan without the 80 percent of fuel and dry goods shipped through Pakistan. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. The U. foundationbriefs. Islamabad shut down two key Pakistan border crossings after a U.S. 1 Feb. A responsible withdrawal of U. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations.S. 2012. (Pg. Relations. Costs Soar for New War Supply Routes. "Should U. Web. 18) Putnam. and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and Kabul.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. 2011. Web.S. That is $87 million more per month than when the cargo moved through Pakistan.S. 2012. Alan. http://www.cfr. Congressional Research Service. Pakistan-U.com Page 75 of 114 .com/news/2012/01/ap-us-costs-soar-for-new-warsupply-routes-011912/>. "U. the Associated Press has learned. 17 May 2011.S. 9 Feb. Rep. 19 Jan.S. Candace.March 2012 Con: Importance to Afghanistan Pakistan’s Importance to Afghanistan Kronstadt K." Navy Times. Web. Pentagon figures provided to the AP show it is now costing about $104 million per month to send the supplies through a longer northern route. It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan. and it is unclear when the crossings might reopen.navytimes. airstrike killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers in late November. 2012. 21 October. 2012.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. <http://www.

com Page 76 of 114 .March 2012 Con: Importance to Afghanistan  The previous two sections speak to one of the most important issues in this resolution—Pakistan’s regional importance. foundationbriefs. American cannot expect to lose Pakistan but win the War in Afghanistan or the War on Terror in general. but the poorly-secured border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is truly the epicenter of the world’s remaining terror networks. If Pakistan drops from the fight against these groups. Simply put.   Given the time and money that the United States has put into the War on Terror. losing it at this stage is undoubtedly the biggest impact in the round. Not only is Pakistan essential from a logistics standpoint. the War in Afghanistan will have been in vain as the groups we worked so hard to expel from Kabul and Kandahar will simply take up residence in the FATAs.

com Page 77 of 114 . 2008. they tend to get killed. and ultimately try to return ownership of their tribal area. as compared to the approximately 500 U. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. The Pakistan Army has been trained to patrol the Indian border. and more than 1.S. Keller. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations.cfr. Closing terrorist safe-havens and keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands requires sustained Pakistani action.S. Rep. and shared intelligence about suspected terrorists. Roughly 4. The War on Terror in the Afghan/Pakistan border region must be placed increasingly on Pakistan to be truly effective. foundationbriefs." The New York Times. Pakistan doesn’t push harder in large part because it can’t. the U. David. Pakistan's Nuclear Defense Ambitions and US Relations.S. (9) Anderson. 2011. and Heather Maki. Candace.March 2012 Con: Necessary to Stopping Terrorism Pakistan Necessary to Stopping Terrorism Putnam. allowed the U. <http://www. When they go up against a ruthless outfit like the Haqqanis. 9 Feb. casualties in Operation Enduring Freedom. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. forces use of two Pakistani airfields.S. This will require continuous dialogue and (again) military/economic assistance.200 of them have already sacrificed their lives in counterterrorism operations. Web. Over 85. They have comparatively crude weaponry. They have worked with the FBI to capture suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives who fled into northern Pakistan and in some cases. committed its own troops to hunt down Al Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Rams Binalshibh to disperse further into Pakistan where their surroundings are less congenial to their extremist ideologies. These collective efforts and results have now made Islamabad a target for terrorist activities from multiple groups. Bill. Violence in the tribal areas must be addressed through dialogue and military means before economic means can ultimately work. However. Web. must assist Pakistan in winning over the hearts and minds of Pakistanis and FATA tribal leaders.000 Pakistani troops are currently deployed along the Afghan-Pakistan border. not to battle hardened insurgents. "The Pakistanis Have a Point. Capacity-building programs for the provincial governments and greater coordination and integration of the various security forces in the tribal areas must be implemented.000 Pakistani troops have died in these border wars — more than the number of all the allied soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Americans who know the area well concede that. Pakistan’s effort in the War on Terror is vital. Web. Pakistan has granted overflight rights. for all our complaints. 14 Dec. 17 May 2011. 2012.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. "Should U.

March 2012 Con: Aid to Military is Essential Aid to the Military Remains Essential Anderson.S.S. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.S. Although troubled by corruption and ethnic. should significantly increase current military assistance to the Frontier Corps above the levels proposed by U.55 The U. Rep.”54 The relationship between the military and Pakistan’s population is vital to maintaining a moderate Islamic state. respected. and the military is cognizant of this fact.com Page 78 of 114 .56 In other words. Pakistan’s military is one of the most important. the United States can help by refocusing its military assistance to Pakistan on equipment and training for counterinsurgency—not additional supplies of supersonic strike aircraft. and oftentimes the “only effectively functioning institution in the country. Web. Pakistan's Nuclear Defense Ambitions and US Relations. and Heather Maki. should focus on building Pakistan’s capacity to fight this insurgency and bridging the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan. emphasizing Pakistan’s sovereign responsibility to combat threats to international peace and security within its borders. foundationbriefs. 2008. The U. Pakistan’s military still reliably operates in the national interest. Special Operations Command to train and arm tribal leaders to fight Al-Qaeda and Taliban— and provide a $750 million aid package for improving law enforcement and local security capacity along the border area over the next five years. The insurgents’ attempts to exploit situations to cause conflict between the two elements could cause real damage to Pakistan’s stability. David. sectarian and linguistic divisions.

" The United States is a major provider of aid to Pakistan. since October 2009. 9 Feb. 10 Feb. "Civilian assistance to Pakistan continues and has not been interrupted since the tragic November 26 incident. the U. Web. civilian assistance to be an important component of that relationship and believe it can help Pakistan become a more prosperous.com/2012-01-21/asia/world_asia_uspakistan-aid_1_civilian-aid-american-drone-strikes-islamabad?_s=PM:ASIA>. Says. Curtis. foundationbriefs. State Department said. despite tensions between the two nations. the statement said. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies. but Pakistanis complain that there is little to show for it." CNN. "We consider bilateral U. is not a fickle partner and is genuinely committed to a prosperous and stable Pakistan.org/research/reports/2011/05/after-bin-laden-bringingchange-to-pakistan-counterterrorism-policies>.S.S.S. has provided more than $6 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan over the past nine years.S. which serves the national interests of both the United States and Pakistan." State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in a statement Friday in response to a question about aid. and democratic state. and has doled out a total $2. <http://articles. should allow the civilian aid to flow. airstrike in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan.March 2012 Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential "Civilian Aid to Pakistan Continues despite Growing Tensions. <http://www. Web. 2012. Lisa. Continuing civilian aid programs demonstrates that the U. even if the military/intelligence relationship between the two countries is fraying.S. albeit with improved accountability standards and sharpened monitoring mechanisms.heritage. mutually respectful relationship with Pakistan" and will continue to provide civilian aid. 2012. U. stable. On the other hand. 12 May 2011. The United States is committed to "a strong.cnn.com Page 79 of 114 . including about $550 million in emergency humanitarian assistance. 2012." The Heritage Foundation.S.2 billion in civilian assistance.S. the U. About $855 million of that was in the 2011 fiscal year. not including emergency humanitarian aid. The U. Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. 21 Jan. Relations between the two countries have worsened since the U.

65.S. Web. and a much higher percentage of it is economic rather than security related: 45 percent in 2010 as opposed to 24 percent in 2008. Pakistan's population of 180 million will double in less than three decades--meaning every social.cfr. total assistance has increased by 48 percent. Under the Obama administration. educational. the United States must admit that Pakistan will never give up the Taliban and will continue to divert U. The harsh reality is that Pakistan is too strategically important. Web. and too dangerous a situation. On the security front. The one significant policy change since 2008 has been the retargeting of aid to civilians. This can strengthen deserving partners and show that the United States is not complicit in corruption or in siphoning U. health. (5) Putnam. Web. Any military engagement that assumes otherwise is a fool's errand. 2010. which committed $7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years. (53) foundationbriefs. Independent Task Force Report No. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. and environmental issue will only increase. Samuel Berger.S. 2012. See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. and education--especially girls' education. U.” Foreign Affairs.March 2012 Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential Krasner. Richard. The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. the United States should encourage more effective governance by funneling a portion of its assistance through government ministries and local government agencies that demonstrate transparency and efficiency. conditioned disbursements on Pakistan's behavior. aid to foreign contractors.S. Council on Foreign Relations. Vol. For instance. and Daniel Markey. It behooves the United States to remain involved in the areas that can make the most difference. Stephen. for the United States to ignore. energy. Candace. particularly economic reform. Jan/Feb2012. Armitage. it is particularly important for the United States to offer assistance and training for local civilian institutions. 17 May 2011.com Page 80 of 114 . <http://www. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. At its current fertility rate. Limited administrative capacity in these areas threatens to jeopardize hard-fought military victories. 9 Feb. economic. (53) In areas of Pakistan where security forces have recently cleared the Taliban and other militant groups. including cooperation on counter-terrorism and the holding of democratic elections. 91 Issue 1.S. military aid to its eastern border with India rather than its western border to fight the Taliban. Washington should target support to partners and institutions that share common goals.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>. "Should U.

S. Wren Elhai.org/commentary/2007/03/18/SDUT. and Molly Kinder.html>. In May 2009. 18 Mar. the World Bank and Df ID have programs in Punjab and Sindh provinces that are delivering results. Development investments. (33) Jones.41 Additional resources for these programs from the United States could produce significant benefits. aid program can seed investments in people.html. Rep. such investments do take time and persistence to yield a return. the Obama administration announced a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” President Obama pledged significant increases in civilian efforts in both countries and declared supporting “a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan” and a “stable constitutional government” to be central objectives of U. Approach to Development in Pakistan. and John Gordon. The risks associated with an aid program are serious but small compared to the risks of military engagement overseas and counterterrorism at home. policy. 2012. stunningly sensible addition to the United States’ portfolio of risk-reducing measures in Pakistan. an independent group that features prominent members from Pakistan’s government and civil society. and programs that have the potential to pay off over the long term. institutions. Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. now better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. Seth. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak.5 billion over five years (4) Support for Pakistan’s development is a low-cost. Currently. and international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the foundationbriefs. we suggest that the United States be much more open to cofinancing projects with other bilateral and multilateral donors. U.S. and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. like preventive health care. Development does not happen overnight and often happens in fits and starts. "Flagging Ally: Pakistan's Lapses Are Hurting the War on Terror. In the education sector. 5 Feb. <http://www. the legislation authorized a tripling of economic assistance to Pakistan to a total of $7. June 2011. In March of 2009. Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar and Representative Howard Berman introduced the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act. Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U. are less expensive and far less risky than dealing with emergencies later. However. Web.S." RAND Corporation. with no need for USAID to duplicate work others have already done well. for example.1 Congress endorsed this new approach. It is also a root cause of extremism. Explaining that a “campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone. (10) To pay for things that are working well. Web. Signed into law in October 2009. the U. 2007.March 2012 Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential Birdsall.rand. Done well. Nancy. The development gap in Pakistan's Pashtun areas needs to be addressed.com Page 81 of 114 . Center for Global Development. The United States has partnered with Df ID to advance the work of the Pakistan Education Task Force.S. It should seize this opportunity to further the movement for education reform by putting significant resources into the special fund the task force has created to fund innovations in education. Please see Author Index for bio.

foundationbriefs. But this strategy is a half-measure. not just Afghanistan. U. and other international assistance need to be directed toward Pakistan's tribal areas.S.March 2012 Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential Afghan side of the border.com Page 82 of 114 .

One in 10 of the world’s primary school-age children who are not in school live in Pakistan. 2012. Only 23 percent of Pakistan’s youth are enrolled in secondary school.com Page 83 of 114 .aspx/ Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. At the current rate. the province of Balochistan will only be able to enroll all its children in school by the year 2100." Brookings Institution.brookings. With half the country under the age of 17. http://www. 18 Apr. "Pakistan Does Have an Education Crisis Despite Questions About Mortenson’s Three Cups of Tea. Web. foundationbriefs. 2011. making Pakistan one of the top two countries in the world with the largest numbers of out of school children. Rebecca. 16 Feb.edu/opinions/2011/0418_pakistan_education_winthrop. this poor state of education is a significant economic and security liability.March 2012 Con: Aid for Education is Critical Education Aid Is Critical Winthrop. Increasing access to quality education is likely to reduce Pakistan’s risk of conflict as cross-country estimates show that increasing educational attainment is strongly correlated with conflict risk reduction.

services: 36. and Pakistan’s population is projected to grow to 335 million.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.1. demographics are a key issue. in spite of extensive exportation of labor to regions like the Middle East.6% (2005 estimate). 31) foundationbriefs. making it one of the world’s most populous countries. 5 May 2011.000 males and 2.105. and 66 percent is under 30. 2012. Some 6. Pakistan’s population has made massive increase since 1950. As Figure 1.8% of Pakistanis have a secondary education. At least 24% of the entire population (and probably now closer to 30%) is at or below the poverty line. Web. The CIA estimates that Pakistan’s mean age is only around 21 years of age. Rep.pdf>. (Pg. and is more than four times larger in 2010 than it was then.000 females will reach the age where they will enter the labor force in 2010. It has an unusually high percentage working in very low productivity agriculture and service jobs (agriculture: 43%. Pakistan is one of the only countries in the world where the number of illiterates is rising. governance. Center for Strategic and International Studies. and under and disguised unemployment almost certainly raise this figure closer to 30% in terms of meaningful productivity gain.8% of the total population -. Like most of the developing world. Pakistan: Violence vs.March 2012 Con: Demographic Challenge Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics Vira.3%. 30) Pakistan cannot begin to address its economic and social needs – as well as move solidly towards political stability . and that some 2. It rate of population has slowed. Stability. These various political and religious tensions are only part of the forces shaping modern Pakistan and its future. (Pg. Other estimates indicate that half of its population of over 187 million is under 20 years of age. (Pg.com Page 84 of 114 .2 and it is clear just how much the need to create jobs and acceptable careers. but its population is still estimated to nearly double Between 2000 and 2030. 30) The CIA also estimates that the present Pakistani labor force is around 55. and social conditions for youth is critical Pakistan’s stability. (Pg. 29) Pakistan youth is also shown in Figure 1.238. and the wealthiest 10% of the population is responsible for some 27% of all domestic consumption versus less than 4% for the poorest 10%. <http://csis. industry: 20.a relatively low number for so large a population. 30) Direct unemployment is at least 15%. and Anthony Cordesman. 8 Feb. (Pg.8 million of its children are out of school and only 16. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. shows. Varun.until it first addresses the dire state of the existing educational sector.

Doing so will exacerbate the perception that we are fair-weather friends and that we truly do not care for the Pakistani people. uneducated and out of work. These are the primary conditions that breed discontent and extremism throughout the Arab World. This is a dangerous idea to lend credibility to especially given the already high levels of anti-Americanism. the demographics of Pakistan suggest that now is the wrong time to walk away from Pakistan. As such.com Page 85 of 114 . Pakistan is at a critical period in its history. An astonishing number of Pakistanis are young.  foundationbriefs.March 2012 Con: Demographic Challenge  As the evidence in this section point out.

then why have them?” Popular opinion in Pakistan is overwhelmingly in favor of less US involvement in the region and the Army may now be tempted to reassess its key partnerships. “Historically. this will guarantee that things will deteriorate more [for the economy]. foundationbriefs. adds Siddiqa. 11 July 2011. "Pakistan Says It Doesn't Need US Military Aid. 2012. Issam. 10 Feb.” The cuts could also have a harmful impact on Pakistan’s democracy. Web. a political analyst and Assistant Editor at Dawn. at the very time US aid is flowing. “The Army will dig in its heels. according to Saeed Shafqat. and they will cut them a check. It’s going to call up the Finance Ministry and ask them to cut a check." The Christian Science Monitor. <http://www. Director of the Centre for Public Policy and Governance at the Foreman Christian College University in Lahore. Cyril Almeida. If they are not bringing in money.March 2012 Con: Would Hurt Civilian Government Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most Ahmed.com/World/AsiaSouth-Central/2011/0711/Pakistan-says-it-doesn-t-need-US-military-aid>. which will be financed by the State Bank or loans from private sector. Pakistan’s leading English daily. [foreign aid] is one of the reasons why political governments have been tolerated [by the military] in the first place.com Page 86 of 114 .csmonitor. says the cuts could harm Pakistan’s civilian government more than the military. Perversely.

Cameron Munter. This leads some analysts to encourage fullthroated U. Web. 1 Feb. support for Pakistan’s civilian authorities as the only viable means of reducing conflict both inside Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors.S. Pakistan-U.-Pakistan successes can be achieved only “with a strong partner in Pakistan’s democratically elected government. 3) foundationbriefs. this means Pakistan will continue to tolerate safe havens for “friendly” militant groups regardless of U. is among those who has in the past insisted that Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U. aid levels or more overt threats.” (Pg. If true.S. Congressional Research Service.March 2012 Con: Military Control Would Be Worse Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse Kronstadt K.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. By many accounts. 21 October. http://www. 2011. Alan. The current U. Rep.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.fas. Developments in 2011 have for many analysts only validated a preexisting view that Pakistani behavior is unlikely to change given the long-held geostrategic perspectives of decision makers there. Relations. 2012.com Page 87 of 114 .S. Pakistan’s apparently schizophrenic foreign policy behavior is a direct outcome of the Pakistan military’s perceived strategic interests.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.S.

S. and other areas. 1 Feb.S. 27) As U. Beijing intends to build two new civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan in what would be an apparent violation of international guidelines. heavy machinery. (Pg. upon returning from the same trip.March 2012 Con: Ties to China Ties to China Kronstadt K. manufacturing.-Pakistan acrimony in the wake of OBL’s death appears to have increased Pakistan’s reliance on China as a key international ally. Special Forces in the OBL raid would be examined by Chinese officials. Alan. Chinese companies and workers are now pervasive in the Pakistani economy.-Pakistan ties appear to deteriorate. Beijing apparently did express interest in examining the wreckage and. http://www. 21 October. many observers see Islamabad becoming more reliant than ever on its friendship with Beijing.fas. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Web.S. 27) foundationbriefs. military technology. Prime Minister Gilani’s May travel to China elicited no major new embrace from Beijing. and it agreed to expedite delivery to Pakistan of 50 JF-17 fighter jets equipped with upgraded avionics (Islamabad is also negotiating with Beijing for the purchase of six new submarines for as much as $3 billion in what would be the largest-ever bilateral defense purchase).S. Pakistan-U. Relations.-India ties deepen and U.” Pakistani and Chinese businesses also signed contracts worth some $15 billion covering cooperation in oil and gas. (Pg. There were concerns among some in Congress and independent analysts that wreckage from a previously unseen “stealth” helicopter used by U. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s December 2010 visit to Islamabad. ISI Director Pasha was dispatched to Beijing with the apparent aim of assuaging China. intelligence sources reportedly believe that Chinese military engineers were. potentially providing them with valuable intelligence on secret U. This added to the nearly $20 billion worth of government-to-government agreements reached.S. Rep.S. claimed that the Chinese would assume control of the deep-water port at Gwadar that it had helped to build and. U. Congressional Research Service. U. further.S. custody. Pakistani leaders have become notably more and perhaps overly effusive in their expressions of closeness with China in 2011. but the Chinese government did insist that the West “must respect” Pakistan’s sovereignty. 27) Pakistan appeared to react quickly and with purpose in August when Beijing publically blamed Islamist militants trained in Pakistan for terrorist activities in China’s western Xinjiang province. given access to the wreckage before it was returned to U.S.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. that Beijing would convert the port for military use. in fact. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed having no knowledge of the purported plans. mining. 2011.com Page 88 of 114 . space technology. (Pg. 2012. despite Pakistani assurances that no Chinese officials had been given access to it. The Islamabad government suffered some embarrassment when its defense minister. the governments signed 12 Memoranda of Understanding covering a broad range of cooperative efforts and designated 2011 as the “Year of ChinaPakistan Friendship.

Yousuf Raza Gilani. deeper than the oceans. power in South Asia.” (15) foundationbriefs. 2011. as a way to undercut U. Pakistan’s prime minister. In a recent statement quite obviously meant for American ears. Jeffrey. Pakistan’s military chiefs are aware that America’s military has developed plans for an emergency nucleardisablement operation in their country. and they have periodically threatened to ally themselves with China." The Atlantic. and Marc Ambinder. and sweeter than honey. "The Ally From Hell.com Page 89 of 114 . Web.S.March 2012 Con: Ties to China Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence Goldberg. stronger than steel. described the Pakistani-Chinese relationship as “higher than the mountains. Dec.

the two sides formally concluded the $7. Over the past several years.[23] On June 13.org/foreign-relations/pakistan-iranforeign-relations>. Mirza reiterated her earlier remarks and assured him that Pakistan supports Iran's independence and progress in all the areas. 2012. "Pakistan-Iran Foreign Relations. “the capital cost for the Pakistan section is estimated at 1. Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mashallah Shakeri spoke before the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry.[18] In May 2009. 10 Feb. <http://www. history.. especially in utilizing peaceful nuclear energy. Iran agreed to finance a robust energy project that would allow Pakistan to import 1."[10] In a separate meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.000 megawatts of electricity to overcome its power shortage.March 2012 Con: Ties to Iran Ties With Iran Farrar-Wellman. and added that extremism and terrorism is a common threat to the stability and progress of the entire region. Iran intends to supply the 1. 5 July 2010. Islamabad has increasingly turned to Tehran to supply Pakistan’s growing energy needs. 2010. consists of running a 100kilometer electric line to help augment the 40 megawatts of electricity Pakistan already receives daily from Iran. Pakistani National Assembly Speaker Fahmida Mirza said that “Pakistan is against any kinds of sanctions against Iran and believes that Iran's nuclear disputes should be resolved peacefully and through dialogue. new sanctions on Iran can impact Pakistan. ensures gas supplies to Pakistan for a period of 25 years.[9] In a February 2010 meeting with her Iranian counterpart. In April 2010.65 billion dollars…[and] the first gas flow is targeted by end 2014” with Iran completing the project ahead of schedule. In August 2008. Since 2005.”[24] According to a previous Pakistani Petroleum Ministry statement in May 2010. foundationbriefs." IranTracker..000 megawatts to Pakistan at a discounted rate. and culture. The deal. According to the envoy. Pakistan has increasingly called for peaceful reconciliation on the international nuclear standoff. Iran and Pakistan signed a purchase agreement stipulating that Iran will initially transfer 30 million cubic meters of gas to Pakistan per day. Web. Ariel. stressing Iran’s commitment to economic relations with Pakistan. She also highlighted IranianPakistani commonalities in religion.[17] The project.irantracker.5 billion agreement over the objections of US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke. a $60 million endeavor. despite increasing concern from the UN and Washington.com Page 90 of 114 . with the volume eventually increasing to 60 million. who cautioned that although the “US understands that Pakistan faces [a] major energy crisis. to which India was not a party.

In particular.March 2012 Con: Ties to Iran Fitzgerald. Tentative talks on the pipeline began in 1994. totaling $278 million for the year. the US has opposed the proposed construction of a 2. "Iran-Pakistan Relations and Their Effect on Afghanistan and the U. Pakistani policymakers know that an intimate Iran-Pakistan relationship is a major concern for Washington.S.. 2011. new sanctions on Iran can impact Pakistan. however. Isaac. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Afghanistan. unstable and violent Afghanistan. $7. and Varun Vira. For these individuals Afghanistan can bleed the United States and undermine its prestige in the world. As things stand. reaching $279 million. 10 Feb.[10] In the context of Afghanistan. The US favors the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline instead. foundationbriefs. 12) Kfir. In 2009. These actors – the Pakistani ISI and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. both Pakistan and Iran have vested interest in the country Although Pakistan and Iran would benefit from a stable Afghanistan – and politicians from both sides have sought to aid in the process – powerful stakeholders within Iran and Pakistan want a weak. particularly in the energy sector. Iranian non-oil exports to Pakistan increased by 11 percent. who cautioned that although the ―US understands that Pakistan faces [a] major energy crisis. Iranian-US competition has impacted on these growing energy ties. Please see INSCT in the Organization Index for more info. Iran and Pakistan signed a purchase agreement stipulating that Iran would initially transfer 30 million cubic meters of gas to Pakistan per day. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. (Pg. 2012.com Page 91 of 114 .100 km of the IPI pipeline on Iranian soil had now been completed. Web. Pakistan and Iran have growing trade ties.5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI) that would pump gas from Iran‘s South Pars field to Pakistan and India. tense political relations between India and Pakistan– as well as significant US pressure – have frustrated realization of the project to date.” – see an unstable Afghanistan as the way to undermine U. and reported that 1. as better relations may lead Pakistan to share its nuclear technology with Iran. designated in 2007 by President Bush as “specially designated global terrorists. Similarly.[9] From a realpolitik perspective. In May 2009. Cooperation regarding energy has increased since the 1990s and has helped provide the foundation for a bilateral trade network between Iran and Pakistan. with the volume eventually increasing to 60 million. 2011.600-kilometer.. Erin.000 of the 1. South Asian foreign policy goals. Central Asia and Pakistan. as doing so may simply compel Pakistan to search for alternate means of raising money. although instability in Afghanistan and tensions between India and Pakistan continue to be crucial obstacles. Rep. 25 Oct. 12 Feb.S. Web. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2012. Pakistan increased its non-oil exports to Iran by 80 percent. 12 Sept." Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT). Pakistan. playing the Iranian card may encourage Congress to think twice before it cuts US aid to Pakistan. The deal was concluded over the objections of US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke. making Afghanistan a proxy for those actors that see the United States as the enemy.

he added. Iran and Pakistan have bolstered their relations in political. economic and cultural fields and no obstacle can prevent the two nations from promoting the amicable relations. foundationbriefs.html>. 8 Feb. the director of the Federation of Pakistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) Senator Haji Ghulam Ali downplayed the Western sanctions against Iran and said such restrictions against Iran would not affect the growing relations between Tehran and Islamabad.ir/detail/225385.com Page 92 of 114 . 7 Feb. the Pakistani official emphasized. Iran and Pakistan are determined to increase the value of bilateral trade to five billion dollars within the next 2-3 years. Pakistan is an independent country and will not permit foreign powers to sway the country’s decisions. 2012.presstv. which are based on goodwill and mutual respect.March 2012 Con: Ties to Iran "Pakistan Says Sanctions Cannot Affect Tehran-Islamabad Ties." Press TV. <http://www. Bashir said on Sunday. Meanwhile. particularly in trade and economic fields. Web. 2012.

The close ties continue between the militaries today. 2012. It considerably cushioned the subsequent US and EU sanctions on Pakistan.000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom. denied the stories. In turn Pakistan has provided military aid and expertise to the Kingdom for decades. now increasingly obsolete. The Saudi oil commitment was a key to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ’s decision to proceed with testing. in May 1998 when Pakistan was deciding whether to respond to India’s test of five nuclear weapons. 2011. Pakistani air Force pilots flew rSaF Lightnings that repulsed a communist South Yemeni incursion into the Kingdom’s southern border in 1969. Some reports allege the rSaF keeps a couple of aircraft permanently deployed in Pakistan to be able to deliver the bomb to riyadh on short notice if the King asks for them. In the Seventies and eighties. It would also make sense for rSaF and Pakistani pilots to jointly train for their use. Both countries. 15 Feb. Saudi arabia’s Chinese-made intermediate range missiles. Saudi and Pakistani troops held joint training manoeuvres in Pakistan. Web. foundationbriefs. For example.000 barrels of free oil per day to help it cope with the economic sanctions that might be triggered by the Pakistani counter test. Much of the Pakistani madrassa educational system is Saudi-funded by private donors connected to the Kingdom’s powerful Wahhabi clerical establishment. then Crown Prince abdallah visited Pakistan for a state visit. This fall. are also widely assumed to be a possible delivery system for Pakistani warheads in a crisis. the royal family has soured on the President. of course. Dec. The Brookings Institute. Saudi and other forces faced Iraq in the north. Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. It is impossible to know if these reports have any veracity but the idea makes sense. Several experts reported after the trip that a secret agreement was concluded that would ensure Pakistan would provide Saudi arabia with nuclear technology and a bomb if Saudi arabia felt threatened by a third party nuclear programme in the future. some in a brigadesized combat force called the Khaled bin Walid brigade stationed near the Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi border.com Page 93 of 114 .March 2012 Con: Ties to Saudi Arabia Ties With Saudi Arabia Riedel. Official aid is matched by large investments from Saudi princes and from religious institutions. a Pakistani brigade guarded the Kingdom’s southern flank against Yemen while most of the American. Despite President Obama’s efforts to build ties with the Saudis. Rep. 20) In October 2003. up to 15. More frequent exercises would help assure riyadh that it can count on Islamabad in a crisis and that any deal is for real. especially in Bahrain Pakistan has received more aid from Saudi Arabia than any country outside the Arab world since the Sixties. the Saudis promised 50. It began with help to the royal Saudi Air Force to maintain and pilot its first jet fighters in the Sixties. (Pg. it is likely the two have practiced the deployment of Pakistani warheads to Saudi Arabia for use with Saudi delivery systems. Bruce. They believe he has promised but not delivered on the Israeli-Palestinian process and done too little to counter Iran.assuming an agreement exists. during the first Gulf war in 1991.

com Page 94 of 114 . the changce that Pakistan will give Saudi Arabia a nuclear weapon—although slim—is greatly increased by a decision to suspend aid and alienate Pakistan. Simply put.  foundationbriefs.March 2012 Con: Ties to Saudi Arabia  Given the history of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sharing military information in exchange for energy and trade channels. This is all the more true given the current tension over Iran’s nuclear program and Saudi Arabia’s understandable fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. it seems that pushing Islamabad away from Washington and towards Riyadh is the last think one would want to do.

com Page 95 of 114 .Pro Counters foundationbriefs.

There’s no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue.” (Pg. officials have also conveyed confidence in the security of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. since India has both a first.S. Finally. that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard. National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 30 Nov. efforts to help tighten Pakistan's command-and-control systems have been hampered by mutual distrust. forces to help secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. “Talking Tough to Pakistan.S.com Page 96 of 114 . previous U. 91 Issue 1. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those. Jan/Feb2012. 2) As noted.March 2012 Pro Counters: Risk Overstated Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated Kerr.S. stated November 8. <http://www.” Foreign Affairs. 18) Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U. 2009. Web. and they’ve put a lot of resources into trying to make sure that their nuclear facilities and materials and weapons are well secured. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. assistance in this area. hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 2009.S. (Pg. Meanwhile. Gary Samore. adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with US officials. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues. Stephen. too. 2012. and there’s no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control” (Pg. 2009. 1 Feb.S. More recently. 19) Krasner. Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Any new such efforts would be. General Petraeus stated on May 10.. Paul K. a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson. 16) More recently.” Pakistan will never “allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities. and Mary Beth Nikitin. that “[w]ith respect to the—the nuclear weapons and—and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate. other U. Rep. Congressional Research Service. interview that the United States is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Vol. 2010. Web.pdf>. explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.fas. stated in an April 2011 interview that “The Pakistani government takes the nuclear security threat very seriously.and a second-strike foundationbriefs. responding to a report detailing alleged U. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21. More recently.” Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14. 2011.” (Pg. talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons.” the spokesperson said.

and we are prepared to try to deal with it. Jeffrey. and Marc Ambinder. would be seizing control of—or at least disabling—the entire Pakistani nuclear arsenal in the event of a jihadist coup. In any case. a complete nuclear weapon far more difficult. Their area of operation includes the former Soviet states. Condoleezza Rice. perspective. or other catastrophic event. of course. (6) Goldberg. the U.S. who are trained to deal with nuclear weapons that have fallen into the wrong hands. “We have noted this problem. In times of relative quiet between Pakistan and India (the country that would be the target of a Pakistani nuclear attack). From a U. even if things did escalate. JSOC “has units and aircraft and parachutes on alert in the region for nuclear issues. Those preparations have been extensive. most of them Navy SEALs and Army explosive-ordnance-disposal specialists. Where it was headed. who was then President Bush’s national-security adviser. there is no reason to think that malign neglect or active isolation would make Pakistan's behavior or problems any worse.S. (14) Much more challenging than capturing and disabling a loose nuke or two. could do--good relations or not.” Rice said. Dec. where there is a large amount of loose fissile material.” as one former senior Special foundationbriefs. The United States Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) maintains rotating deployments of specially trained units in the region. Pakistani leaders have argued forcefully that the country’s nuclear weapons are secure. Hugh Shelton. or launching. Pakistan would not likely strike India first in the event of a crisis. however. (2) during Senate hearings for her confirmation as secretary of state in 2005. In his memoir. Seizing or remotely disabling a weapon of mass destruction is what’s known in military jargon as a “render-safe mission”—and render-safe missions have evidently been successfully pulled off by JSOC in the past. civil war. "The Ally From Hell.com Page 97 of 114 . While I cannot get into the tactical elements or operational details of this mission." The Atlantic. then. although with a higher potential for U. Pakistani officials claim that their weapons are “de-mated”—meaning that the warheads are kept separate from their fissile cores and their delivery systems. This makes stealing.” says a military official who was involved in supporting these technicians. the response would be small and contained — Abbottabad redux. According to military and intelligence sources.S.March 2012 Pro Counters: Risk Overstated capability. He wrote: It was a very time-sensitive mission in which a specific SEAL Team Six component was called into action. Web. what I can say is that our guys were able to “immobilize” the weapon system in a special way without leaving any trace. there is not much that the United States. Pakistan. any response to a Pakistani nuclear crisis would involve something along the following lines: If a single weapon or a small amount of nuclear material were to go missing. and. was asked by Senator John Kerry what would happen to Pakistan’s nukes in the event of an Islamic coup in Islamabad. or anyone else. 2011. recalls an incident from the 1990s in which the CIA told the Special Operations Command that a ship had left North Korea with what Shelton describes as “an illegal weapon” on board. and regularly inserts units and equipment for prep. This “disablement campaign. didn’t know. who chaired the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001. casualties.

JSOC has also built mock Pashtun villages. however. According to the former senior Special Operations planner. so SEALs and Delta Force operatives can practice there. and then to find. at a training facility on the East Coast. using extremely sensitive radiological detection devices that can pick up trace amounts of nuclear material and help Special Operations locate the precise spot where the fissile material is stored. These teams are trained to engage in what the military delicately calls “sensitive site exploitation operations on nuclear sites”—meaning that they can destroy a nuclear weapon without setting it off. they have also been quietly pre-positioning the necessary equipment in the region. secure. (14-15) According to American sources. troops would evacuate quickly— because the final stage of the plan involves precision missile strikes on nuclear bunkers. using special “hard and deeply buried target” munitions. and easier to move around. reached an understanding that. would be the most taxing. At the same time American military and intelligence forces have been training in the U. evacuate—or.S. (15) foundationbriefs. rappelling down from helicopters. a mated nuclear warhead can be deactivated when its trigger mechanism is disabled—and so both the Army teams and JSOC units train extensively on the types of trigger mechanisms that Pakistani weapons are thought to use.S. if that’s not possible. and parachuting out of airplanes.. According to some scenarios developed by American war planners. forces would rush into the country. after as many weapons as possible were disabled and as much fissile material as possible was secured. so they could begin securing known or suspected nuclear-storage sites. Generally.S. most dangerous of any special mission that JSOC could find itself tasked with… JSOC would take the lead. accompanied by civilian experts.com Page 98 of 114 .S for such a disablement campaign. and has been training for such an operation for years. than long-range missiles. JSOC units’ first tasks might be to disable tactical nuclear weapons—because those are more easily mated. China would raise no objections. U. whose Nuclear Disablement Teams would accompany Special Operations detachments or Marine companies into the country.S. Delta Force and SEAL Team Six squadrons practice “Deep Underground Shelter” penetrations. would likely mobilize the Army’s 20th Support Command. China has. complete with hidden mock nuclearstorage depots. to “render safe”—any live weapons. crossing borders. in secret talks with the U. In a larger disablement campaign. At the Nevada National Security Site. the U.March 2012 Pro Counters: Risk Overstated Operations planner calls it. JSOC forces are trained to breach the inner perimeters of nuclear installations. U. In the event of a coup. northwest of Las Vegas. should America decide to send forces into Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons.

since it is the military—not the civilian leadership—that controls Pakistan’s policies toward the Afghan Taliban.S. Other Members of Congress have noted more credibly that strengthening Pakistan’s democratic institutions and civilian authorities offers the best chance to develop a functional. <http://www. Lisa.heritage. 2012. however.org/research/reports/2011/05/after-bin-laden-bringingchange-to-pakistan-counterterrorism-policies>. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies. Haqqani network. Web. but not military. foundationbriefs. Some U. all of which have links to al-Qaeda. Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. This makes little sense. 12 May 2011. 9 Feb." The Heritage Foundation.March 2012 Pro Counters: Cut Both Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible Curtis. mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorist organization.com Page 99 of 114 . aid to Pakistan. congressional officials have called for cutting civilian.

The basic objective of that force would necessarily be counterterrorism. Without Pakistan.March 2012 Pro Counters: Supply Lines Afghan Supply Lines Don’t Depend on Pakistan Krasner.” Foreign Affairs. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. Counterterrorism is less personnel. through Russia and Central Asia. Given the Obama administrations current plans to withdraw 24. but not one as big as the current one of 131. (6) foundationbriefs.and resourceintensive because it aims only to prevent the country from becoming a haven for Islamist extremists. Stephen. 91 Issue 1. not counterinsurgency. Nearly 60 percent of the NATO supplies sent into Afghanistan are already routed through the north. with many more to follow. not to transform it into a well-functioning democracy.com Page 100 of 114 . military is hoping to increase that number to 75 percent. such a strategy is already inescapable. the coalition could still support a substantial force in Afghanistan. troops by the summer of 2012.S.000 troops.000 U. Jan/Feb2012. The U. Vol. Web.S. therefore. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info.

Vol. Moreover. Pakistanis. won only seven out of 340 seats in the National Assembly. for example. not Americans.March 2012 Pro Counters: No Collapse Suspension Will Not Cause Gov.Amal. government by radical Islamists has not proved to be a popular choice among Pakistanis. In a 2011 Pew poll of Pakistanis. as it did in the Swat Valley and the district of Buner in 2009. 91 Issue 1. It is worth remembering that Pakistan has already proved itself able to take out the terrorist networks that threaten its own institutions. a radical Islamist takeover. investments in the civilian state and the economy. Web. 79 percent of respondents said that the military was having a good influence on the country's direction. Washington must shed its fear that its withdrawal of aid or open antagonism could lead to the Pakistani state's collapse. the Pakistani military will remain the most respected institution in the country. have not led to their improvement or to gains in stability. have always determined their political future. (6) foundationbriefs. the country's current power centers have a strong interest in maintaining control and so will do whatever they can to keep it—whatever Washington's policy is. Even substantial U. “Talking Tough to Pakistan. Jan/Feb2012.S.” Foreign Affairs. Stephen. Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. the Muttahida Majlise. As for the possibility of an Islamist takeover.com Page 101 of 114 . Collapse Krasner. or nuclear war. In the last general election. a coalition of Islamist parties. compared with 20 percent who said that the national government was. aid to Pakistan. With or without U.S.

money. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption.” Second. Rep.pdf>. 8 Feb. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.ksg. <http://belfercenter.March 2012 Pro Counters: Not The Answer Conditionality Not the Answer Ibrahim. it would leave Pakistan confident that it could fail to meet these conditions and still be a recipient of U. irrespective of the severity of divergence in national priorities or policies. 26) foundationbriefs.” (Pg. First. There is “little chance that Pakistan will acquiesce to the stated demands. Azeem.” She argues that this would have a doubly negative effect.S. which puts the United States in an awkward position of having to execute waiver authority to continue funding Pakistan if needed. Belfer Center: Harvard University. 2012. Web.harvard.com Page 102 of 114 . because “Pakistan remains ever confident that Washington cannot cut off a partner as important as Pakistan. it would continue the “well-worn cycle of the United States bending its commitment to its own laws to accommodate the importance of dealing with Pakistan. July 2009.

Especially in sectors where serious flaws in public administration are the binding constraints to success. Two years later.S. make it too easy for Pakistan’s own policymakers to put off tough decisions. and Molly Kinder.com Page 103 of 114 . In fact. Rather. to wait until critical policy questions are resolved. amounting to a significant percentage of local economic activity in targeted districts. it would be better to backload the bulk of this extraordinary aid investment. Approach to Development in Pakistan. To the extent that the aid program can affect public opinion in Pakistan.S.37 That amount of spending in an environment not conducive to close oversight encourages corruption (as was observed last year in one of USAID’s largest contracts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and the erosion of local institutions. Such spending crowds out more effective projects. Web.S. Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that the sorts of aid deployed as part of counterinsurgency doctrine often enrich local elites while creating resentment among those who are not lucky enough to reap the benefits. Observers in Pakistan and in Washington identify the same set of weaknesses in its design and implementation. reports of aid money going to waste can only further sour perceptions of the United States. we believe that the pure act of delaying disbursement in certain sectors will benefit both the Pakistani reform process and the ultimate effectiveness of U. This caution is most advisable in sectors where the United States has committed to disbursing its aid funding primarily through government channels. June 2011. development program in Pakistan is not yet on course. the aid program has not yet delivered. carrying the implication that donors are using the threat of withholding aid as a stick to force their desired outcomes in Pakistani political debates. trade and investment policy to spur growth and create jobs in Pakistan. spending limited aid resources on programs or projects that are not likely to be effective or sustainable has an opportunity cost. Wren Elhai. we are highly cognizant of the fact that aid does not buy leverage over domestic policies— even if that were its aim. the U. the United States’ desire to make quick progress (including on the diplomatic and security fronts)—and the perception that American aid has produced few visible benefits in the past two years— creates strong pressure for hasty disbursement. That is especially a risk in the most insecure regions of Pakistan. Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.Berman aid package not be disbursed immediately. we recommend that much of the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar. aid. There has been little serious attention paid to the potential for U. No one is sure what the United States is trying to accomplish in the development space. by plugging fiscal and other holes in the short run for Pakistan. That is not the intent of our proposal. aid spending can. While aid has not been shown to buy goodwill (studies in Afghanistan found “overwhelmingly negative” perceptions of aid among the Afghan people36).March 2012 Pro Counters: Humanitarian Not Effective Humanitarian Aid Not Effective Birdsall. Meanwhile. (32) foundationbriefs. Nancy. no one is even sure what the United States is doing. (30-31) For these reasons.S. it represents a flood of cash. First. Second. That pressure must be resisted. Indiscriminate aid spending can do harm in at least three ways. Third. Rep. (4) Unfortunately and inevitably. So-called conditionality in aid spending is an extremely sensitive subject. Because of a debilitating lack of transparency in the aid program. Center for Global Development. aid can directly fuel corruption and create new flashpoints for conflict.

Con Counters foundationbriefs.com Page 104 of 114 .

2012. should Pakistan slide into Iran's camp. Rep. Congressional Research Service. 21 October.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498. Pakistan will make an about-face rather than find itself in camp with the Irans of the world. in terms of military or other assistance. Tack on Pakistan. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. China isn't in a position to provide some of the higher technology that the United States has provided. 27) Bajoria. (Pg.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. relationship break down. nor has it shown any desire to replace Washington as Islamabad’s primary foreign benefactor. But the current situation is also not good from a U. My sense. 2011. Council on Foreign Relations. incapable of helping Pakistan in some very important ways. Web.fas. Pakistan has been pretty clear.-Pakistani rift. Iran is even more inadequate.S. perspective.S. Yet Beijing’s willingness to take Islamabad more fully under its wings appears limited. They reached out to China to fill in whatever gaps. 2011. Jayshree. It therefore is only a partial means to fill that gap that the United States would leave behind. which suffers from a poor road network and geographical isolation. The Chinese government reportedly is unlikely to place itself in the middle of any U. Alan. though. or firm up its relationship with China at our expense. China doesn't make a practice of providing the scale or type of assistance that the United States has provided." Interview by Daniel Markey.S. http://www. 26 Sept. 1 Feb. Pakistan-U. and this is certainly true after the bin Laden raid.com Page 105 of 114 . So the hope is that by placing pressure on Pakistan now. is that China is reluctant to fill those gaps. Relations.March 2012 Con Counters: No China Alliance China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely Kronstadt K. that they see China as their closest international partner.S. Web. this would be a direction that the United States would think is troubling. "A Tougher U. might be left should the U. Of course. (1) foundationbriefs.S. The hesitation is rooted at least partly in China’s concerns about the rise of Islamist extremism in Pakistan and some disappointment with progress in developing the Gwadar port. Pakistan doesn't want to be a rogue state.

March 2012 Con Counters: Military Aid Productive Military Aid is Productive Bajoria. he explains. In reality. vehicles for medical help. this means only "one police station for every 133 square miles of some of the world's most dangerous terrain. In 2008. Web. (1) The police force in Pakistan is also hugely underresourced. In 2009.000-member police force mans 217 police stations. including lacking adequate number of personnel. 2012." The U. which analysts attribute to the force's poor training and equipment. Abbas points out that in the North West Frontier Province. 14 Feb. Pakistan received $75 million for establishing training centers. and communications equipment to improve the FC's surveillance capabilities. raising twelve new Frontier Corps units. and supporting so-called Border Coordination Centers that allow the Pakistani army to share intelligence and coordinate with the Frontier Corps. the 55. "Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces. Jayshree. the United States will provide $25 million for things such as soldier equipment.S.1 million (1) foundationbriefs. The United States has been working to reform the force with Pakistan's cooperation. The force has suffered significant casualties fighting militants." Council on Foreign Relations. Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. 18 June 2009.com Page 106 of 114 . embassy in Islamabad announced its plan to provide police equipment to the province worth $4. Frontier Corps (FC): This federal paramilitary force of eighty thousand troops has been heavily involved in military actions in the tribal belt since 2003.

and Anthony Cordesman. Stability. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies. driven by the population’s disenchantment with its civilian rulers foundationbriefs. 2012. 5 May 2011. Web. See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info.pdf>.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan. however. It responded to a failing and dysfunctional civil governments and politics. and took power with extensive popular support. 8 Feb. The military. <http://csis.March 2012 Con Counters: Military Not To Blame Pakistani Military Not To Blame Vira. cannot fully be blamed for many of its past actions. Varun. Pakistan: Violence vs.com Page 107 of 114 .

including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan as "infidel. must focus on helping sustain the Pakistani momentum against the Taliban by supporting them through military assistance as well as generous economic and humanitarian aid that helps resettle and rebuild the lives of those civilians displaced by the fighting. A recent combination of events.-Pakistan Relations. 8 July 2009. The Pakistan government says its military has killed more than 1. During my recent visit to Afghanistan. "While external threats continue to exist. Please see The Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info.600 militants in the past eight weeks in the Swat operation. pressure. From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U. also has stepped up its drone missile strikes in the region in the last two weeks. the Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in mid-April. On April 24.S. Pakistani jets last week bombed suspected militant hideouts in North Waziristan." The U. Lisa." The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani policy toward the militants and was followed by aggressive military operations that have ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. There has been a significant change in the Pakistan military's attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest part of the country in the past ten weeks. The fact that both anti-Pakistan and pro-Pakistan militants reside in the tribal areas highlights the complexities of partnering effectively with Pakistan to defeat the terrorists as well as the fluidity of the situation as Pakistani leaders increasingly recognize the gravity of the threat posed by the various terrorist groups to the stability of the Pakistani state. foundationbriefs.[1] COAS General Kayani said last Friday that. apparently with the support of Pakistani intelligence." has begun to change the Pakistani public's attitude toward the Taliban and given the army the public support it requires to fight them militarily. where militants had killed at least 30 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush on an army convoy the week before. under both Pakistani public and U. Web. it is the internal threat to Pakistan that needs immediate attention.com Page 108 of 114 . several NATO commanders expressed the view that Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas are beginning to pay dividends in terms of reducing the flow of militants and weapons into Afghanistan. More than 60 were killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan two weeks ago that apparently missed Baitullah Mehsud by a matter of hours.S. The Heritage Foundation. Just one week after Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so.S. This demonstrates that a strategy of coaxing the Pakistanis to do more against the terrorist threat in the tribal areas while continuing to support the country through economic and military assistance may be working.March 2012 Con Counters: Pakistan is Fighting Taliban Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban Curtis. the Pakistan army deployed paramilitary troops to the region and Chief of army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani sent a warning to the militants that the army would not allow them to "impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan. The U.S. Rep.

policy towards Pakistan.S. For too long. Web. However. and significant parts of the FATA have come under Taliban control.S. estimates that 70 percent of the funds have been spent illegitimately. Objections to attaching conditions to how any future U. funding is used must be seen in the light of a dependent country which has begun to view aid with minimal conditionality as an entitlement. Islamist extremism in Pakistan has risen. al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA (according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate). when it became clear that the Obama administration was more open to the idea of conditionality than its predecessor had been and that future aid may be withheld. Pakistan is less secure both regionally and internally. <http://belfercenter. aid consisted of cash transfers to the Pakistani government. the threat of conditions seems to have encouraged the Pakistani military to act against the militants. Pakistani deaths from terrorist violence have skyrocketed. Rep.harvard. Conversely. that need not constitute micromanagement. ending the peace deal negotiated between Islamic cleric Sufi Mohammed and the local government in North West Frontier Province. The United States neither has access to records of how these funds are spent nor has the right to ask for such records. aims such as countering militants and extremist curricula can only be achieved if Pakistan cooperates. After eight years and $12 billion in aid.com . too many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment.ksg.S. Regarding the argument that Congress is trying to micromanage U. a large proportion of U. In spring 2009.S. Pakistan did not launch significant offensives against the Taliban in Pakistan. and the military establishment’s record of corruption. Azeem. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. thanks to both Pakistani government truces with Islamists and Taliban military advances. while providing conditions which are too specific would indeed be counterproductive. These became Pakistani sovereign funds and thus were beyond U. given high-profile incidences of corruption such as the majority of the money intended for military use being diverted to the Ministry of Finance. (Pg.March 2012 Con Counters: Conditional Aid Conditional Aid Would Succeed Ibrahim. During the George W.S. This is the status quo to which the Pakistani government has become accustomed.  Aid without conditionality has not worked.pdf>. the lack of conditions and weak agreements on how the aid was to be used resulted in its being perceived as a blank check. Bush administration. the status quo itself is inadequate.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009. July 2009. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruptionoffensives against Pakistani Taliban militants in and around the Swat Valley in May 2009. This in turn meant that it was ineffective in countering terrorism. Belfer Center: Harvard University. Between 2001 and 2009. the negative reaction which any conditionality would engender is a response to the change in this status quo. 2012. oversight. It would be irrational to offer Pakistan aid for a specific purpose without insisting that it be used for that purpose. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. To a large extent. 27) Page 109 of 114    foundationbriefs. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. the military launched U. 8 Feb.

Contentions foundationbriefs.com Page 110 of 114 .

Aid only fuels this objective. Contention Two: Assistance is misused and misallocated.S.com Page 111 of 114 . lost to corruption. “the U. threatened and criticized Pakistan heavily for its links to terrorism. corruption in Pakistan makes assistance largely ineffective.March 2012 Pro Contentions Pro Contentions Contention One: Pakistan actively supports terrorists. but after years nothing has changed. It is time to end assistance and stop this backwards logic that costs American lives. foundationbriefs. funds the ISI [Pakistan’s version of the CIA].S. Pakistan actively supports terrorist networks. Instead of combatting terrorism. Suspending aid would send a message to Pakistan that it needed to readjust its priorities and clean up its government. mainly because directors of the program could not find credible places in Pakistan to use to the money. it has an incentive to ensure that problem remains unsolved so that the money keeps flowing. in private. Having control of groups that might eventually control Afghanistan after U. Pakistan spends our assistance on fighter jets that have no use in the war on terror and are pointed towards India. Moreover.5 million of the first $1. Furthermore. That’s because support for terrorism is a fundamental security strategy for Pakistan. As scholar Christine Fare notes. perverse incentives only perpetuate this problem. the ISI funds the Haqqani network. the Pakistani government is relying on the United States to manage its people. and blaming us when things don’t work out. It was too risky that it would be lost to corrupt officials. and the Haqqani network kills American soldiers. Finally.” Instead. Such a social contract is fundamental to Pakistan's emergence as a robust democracy that provides for its people. As The Atlantic Magazine points out. financial assistance greatly hinders the ability of a government to be independent.” Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen called the Haqqani an arm of the Pakistan government. Because Pakistan only receives money due to its terrorist problem. Assistance should only be given to countries where goals are clearly attached and achieved. A report by the Government Accountability Office found that only $179. and misspent. The United States has. much of it military assistance ot combat terrorism. Pakistan’s use of assistance has largely been ineffective. One such network is the Haqqani network which operates in Western Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan. “Foreign aid lessens the requirement for a government to forge a bond with its citizens by raising revenue and redistributing those funds as services. withdrawal is vital to Pakistan’s perceived security interests.5 billion of a new aid program had been spent. Despite giving over $20 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the last decade. most of the military assistance given to Pakistan is diverted to counter its rival India. First.

S.S. support to Pakistan is crucial in so many different ways: help with getting rid of the debt burden. Indeed. the United States can push Pakistan in the right direction and eliminate terrorist threats before they get out of hand. Pakistan has been accustomed to U. for too long the United States has tried words of encouragement and words of criticism. officials criticizing them for lack of action. before terrorist networks get so strong that they truly endanger Pakistan’s existence. but then never really experiencing any true consequences.” Pakistan can only go so long without our assistance. supporting the Pakistani military. “U.com Page 112 of 114 .and disaster-relief aid packages to Pakistan. but neither has been enough to change Pakistan’s behavior. foundationbriefs. suspension of assistance would be successful because. they will better align with U. By sending a clear message now. and now for the past two or three years the economic. as the Council on Foreign Relations notes. Suspending all assistance to Pakistan would show that the United States is credible—it is willing to apply pressure in order to secure itself from terrorist threats.March 2012 Pro Contentions Contention Three: The United States must exercise credible leverage to achieve its goals. policy objectives after the suspension. The time for action has arrived.S.

” Not only is providing aid and assistance to promote education and development essential to preventing extremism from taking root.com Page 113 of 114 . while only 6% consider it a friend. As the Associated Press noted in January of this year. Beyond simply \ making the war in Afghanistan more difficult to fight. “The development gap in Pakistan's Pashtun areas needs to be addressed. foundationbriefs. Indeed. the consistent exchange of information as well as the ability to conduct drone strikes and surveillance is invaluable to the war effort.March 2012 Con Contentions Con Contentions Contention One: Pakistan is Too Important Regionally To Disengage First and foremost. As the Pew Research center found. suspending aid to Pakistan would also significantly increase the likelihood of terrorists being able to seek refuge in Pakistan. Moreover. the US is forced to pay 6 times more for transportation via the northern route as a result of Pakistan closing its border. beyond 2014 Pakistan will truly dictate how Afghanistan fares. The United States cannot simply walk away from the people of Pakistan. the demographics of Pakistan are truly frightening. For all of these reasons. ill-educated and susceptible to anti-American propaganda and rhetoric. “68% of Pakistanis see the United States more as an enemy. while the United States continues to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan. This opinion is growing within all classes of society and is making anti-Americanism increasingly rampant. Indeed. but the US must also realize that many in Pakistan are coming to see the United States as a fair-weather friend who cannot be relied upon. with over half of the population under 17 years of age and the majority of people living well below the poverty line. simply disengaging is simply not reasonable. Contention Two: Humanitarian aid is crucial for Pakistan. To do so would not only be immoral but it would also give rise to a whole new generation of Pakistanis who are poor. the importance of Pakistan to the effort in Afghanistan is paramount. As Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation notes. Pakistan is important for everything from supply routes to border security.” This perception is dangerous and can only be reversed by engaging the population. While the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is currently far from perfect. It is also a root cause of extremism.

Clearly. foundationbriefs. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes. With the United States’ aid out of the picture. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are poorly secured.com Page 114 of 114 . complete with disastrous global proliferation. Pakistan immediately turned to the Taliban. and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises. cutting aid to Pakistan gets us nowhere.March 2012 Contention Three: The alternative is worse. It also continued an aggressive nuclear program too. When the United States cut aid to Pakistan over the nuclear program in the 90s. For one.” Evidence exists to suggest that cutting aid this time would be no different. over 70. driving Pakistan further away by cutting aid is not the right thing to do given the huge risk for proliferation—either by design or by accident. New Islamabad allies range from Iran to Saudi Arabia –both of whom have expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Next Pakistan has already established significant international ties that could make cutting aid even worse this time around. Pakistan pursued ties with the Taliban--part of its "strategic depth" initiative to counter India and bring "stability" to Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. “As relations with the United States deteriorated.” Indeed. the security of Pakistan’s nukes deteriorates quickly. the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Reports from the Brookings Institute even argue that plans already exist to share weaponry with the Saudis.000 people already have some degree of access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and terrorists have already proven capable of infiltrating even Pakistan’s most secure military bases. As the Combating Terrorism Center notes. Con Contentions As history has shown us. “As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows.

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