The Brain Drain: Causes, Effects and Remedies

THE BRAIN DRAIN:
CAUSES, EFFECTS AND REMEDIES

Henry Kyambalesa is currently an adjunct professor in the Col-
lege for Professional Studies’ MBA program at Regis University in
Denver, an Independent Business and Management Researcher and
Consultant, and the Founder and President of Agenda for Change
(AfC) party in Zambia.
Abstract
African countries continually lose a significant number of trained

nationals, who decide to emigrate and live abroad in search of
higher incomes and a better standard of living, among a host of
other reasons. Between 1974 and 1985, for example, an average of
12,146 technical and professional personnel per year (computed
from data collected by Logan1) were admitted to the United States
from various countries in Africa. Between 1993 and 1995, the
United States admitted 32,317 of the continent’s skilled human re-
sources.2 And, according to the World Bank Group,3 nearly 70,000
qualified Africans leave their home countries every year to work in
industrialized nations.
Clearly, this is a significant loss to a continent that is in dire
need of skilled professionals to facilitate and expedite the process
of socio-economic development. Without large pools of such pro-
fessionals, African countries are not likely to attain meaningful
levels of economic growth, development and competitiveness.
In this discussion, an attempt is made to discern the causes, ad-
verse effects and positive side of the emigration of Africa’s tech-
nical and professional personnel, and to suggest viable ways and
means of addressing the cancerous problem.
1
Logan, B.I., “The Reverse Transfer of Technology from Sub-Saharan Africa
to the United States,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 25/Num-
ber 4, December 1987.
2
See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fact Book: Summary of
Recent Immigration Data, August 1995, p. 14, and January 1997; and Kyam-
balesa, Henry, Socio-Economic Challenges: The African Context (Trenton, NJ:
Africa World Press, Inc., 2004), p. 48.
3
See Allen, Ahkiah, “Medical Migration Drains Africa,” Washington Week,
www.pbs.org/weta/washingtonweek/, May 12, 2005.
Page 1 of 61
BRAIN DRAIN: A DEFINITION
The term “brain drain” may be defined broadly as the migration of

trained and talented individuals from one institution, or from one
country or part of a country, to another in search of better working
conditions, a higher quality of life and/or a less hostile environ-
ment. Such migration may, according to the Scientific and Industri-
al Research and Development Center (SIRDC),4 take any of the
following forms:
1) “Primary external brain drain,” which occurs when trained

and skilled human resources leave their country to go and work
in developed countries;
2) “Secondary external brain drain,” which occurs when

trained and skilled human resources leave the African Union—
or any other less-developed region of the world—to work in
other parts of the developing world; or
3) “Internal brain drain,” which occurs when trained and

skilled human resources are not employed in the fields of their
expertise in their own country, or when such human resources
move from the public sector to the private sector or within a
sector of a particular country.
In this paper, the discourse is about the “primary external brain

drain” and the “secondary external brain drain” to the exclusion of
the “internal brain drain.”
CAUSES OF THE EXODUS
There are many factors obtaining in countries which are affected

by the brain drain that have contributed to the exodus of skilled tal-
ent; following is a survey of some of the salient factors, that is:
poor conditions of service, human rights abuses, misplacement of
trained personnel, disregard for local talent, scarcity of jobs, lim-
ited access to education, poor healthcare services, a high level of
crime, and the fear of losing valued relationships developed in host
countries.
4
Adapted from Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center
(SIRDC), “An Analysis of the Cause and Effect of the Brain Drain in Zimbab-
we,” www.queensu.ca/, July 31, 2008.
Page 2 of 61
Considered from the standpoint of the origin of trained and
skilled emigrants, the foregoing causes may be referred to as the
“push factors” of professional flight. The inverses of the causes are
essentially the “pull factors” from the point of view of emigrants’
host countries.
Poor Conditions of Service
Poor conditions of service in migrants’ home countries are, by and

large, a major reason why African researchers and professionals
have decided to “vote with their feet” so to speak. In Senegal, for
example, a study conducted by the Independent Union of Higher
Education for Teachers has found that a university lecturer earns
between US$246.00 and US$261.50 per month, while a senior pro-
fessor at the top of the pay scale earns around US$923.00; their
counterparts who emigrate to Europe or North America, on the oth-
er hand, earn between three to five times more.5
In the Republic of Zimbabwe, a massive staff exodus is repor-
ted to have “hit the crisis-ridden Zimbabwe Mining Development
Corporation (ZMDC) … with a number of senior managers having
left the organization citing low remuneration.”6 At the University
of Zimbabwe, most faculties have continued to experience a mass
exodus of professionals due to unsatisfactory remuneration and
poor conditions of service.7
In 2004, the reported lecturer vacancy rates at the University
were as follows: (a) the Faculty of Medicine: 51.3 percent; (b) the
Faculty of Science: 43 percent; (c) the Department of Veterinary
Sciences: 36 percent; (d) the Faculty of Education: 35 percent; and
(e) the Faculty of Engineering: 34.6 percent.8
Human Rights Abuses
Human rights abuses or violations in Africa take many forms, in-

cluding genocide, slavery, torture, mass disappearances of indi-
viduals, denial of freedom of speech, and repudiation of freedom
of the press.9 The following assessment of human rights abuses and
5
Faye, Abdou, “Education: Europe, North America Tapping Africa’s ‘Brain
Reservoir’,” Inter Press Service News Agency: http://www.ipsnews.net/-africa/,
December 27, 2003.
6
The Financial Gazette, “Massive Staff Exodus Hits ZMDC,” October 14-20,
2004, p. C5.
7
The Sunday Mail (Zimbabwe), “Shortage of Lecturers at UZ Persists Un-
abated,” October 24, 2004, p. 5.
8
Ibid.
9
Derechos Human Rights, “Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa,”
http://www.derechos.org/, October 25, 2008.
Page 3 of 61
violations on the continent by the BBC (British Broadcasting Cor-
poration) is perhaps in order at this juncture:10
1) Widespread torture and ill-treatment of suspects in Burundi,

Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe;
2) Women and girls raped and sexually abused by perpetrators

from different parties to conflicts in the Central African Repub-
lic, Ivory Coast, the Sudan, and Uganda;
3) Recruitment of child soldiers as combatants and sex slaves

in Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and the Sudan; and
4) Malicious prosecution, arbitrary arrest and excessive force

against demonstrations as tools of political oppression in
Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe.
According to Whande,11 gross human rights abuses and govern-

ment cruelty on citizens in countries like Zimbabwe have com-
pelled a lot of locally trained experts to migrate to less-hostile
countries. And he has the following question for the Zimbabwean
government and its sympathizers: “Zimbabwe used to produce ex-
port-quality professionals to serve it. But today, where are our doc-
tors, nurses, teachers, farmers, and pharmacists?”12
Misplacement of Talent
Misplacement of human resources has contributed to what Logan13

has preferred to characterize as the “reverse transfer of
technology”—that is, the migration of professionals from Africa to
industrialized countries where they were trained. Many technical
and professional personnel have decided to move to other countries
upon finding that the rewards of their labor in native countries are
generally measured on the basis of political patronage rather than
excellence,14 and that corruption, nepotism, tribalism, and other
10
See BBC News, “Amnesty Deplores African Rights Record,” http://news.b-
bc.co.uk/, May 26, 2004.
11
Whande, Tanonoka J., “Time Running Out for Dictators,” Zimbabwe Inde-
pendent, October 15, 2004, p. 13.
12
Ibid.
13
See Logan, B.I., “The Reverse Transfer of Technology from Sub-Saharan
Africa to the United States,” pp. 597-612.
14
Zambia Daily Mail, “Zambia’s Economic Malaise: Workers Lack Incent-
ives,” June 4, 1988, p. 4.
Page 4 of 61
similar forms of behavior have permeated every level of organiza-
tional life.15
Here is a good example: “It is not always about the money. Of-
ten it is also about mental sanity. I am from Suriname and it is a
daily challenge to handle the enormous stupidity around me, espe-
cially in government circles, where the only qualification one
needs to get top management jobs is fierce loyalty to an ethnic
leader.”16
In Zambia, Valentine Kayope, quoted in Ollawa,17 has also con-
tributed to the debate on this issue: “It is not uncommon to observe
that only those civil servants who can count on the strong backing
of powerful ethnic politicians have the chance of upward mobility
in the public service.”
Disregard for Local Talent
The unfortunate and common tendency among local and national

governments in African countries to scout for expatriate scientists,
technologists and consultants from industrialized nations has made
indigenous experts to feel disregarded and have become less creat-
ive as a result. As Ayittey has observed,18 African leaders tend to
have “more faith in expatriates and foreign systems than in their
own African peoples.”
In Ghana, for instance, when the country’s military government
embarked on a program of participatory democracy in 1987, it
sought the services of a Bulgarian expert; and between 1986 and
1988, the government recruited 265 foreign consultants, whose
fees and expenses amounted to 34 percent of the total compensa-
tion it paid to 200,000 of its indigenous employees.19
And while consultancy fees paid to expatriate personnel ranged
between US$3,000 and US$5,000 per month, those paid to local
personnel with equivalent or higher qualifications and experience
were between US$80 and US$200 per month.20 Moreover, expatri-
ates were accorded furnished residential accommodation, office ac-
15
Woldring, K., “Survey of Recent Inquiries and their Results,” in Woldring,
K., editor, Beyond Political Independence: Zambia’s Development Predicament
in the 1980s (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1984), p. 187.
16
Anonymous, in Hennessey, Matthew, “Who’s to Blame for Brain Drain?”
Global Envision, www.globalenvision.org/, July 26, 2007.
17
Ollawa, P.E., Participatory Democracy in Zambia: The Political Economy
of National Development (Elm Court, Great Britain: Arthur H. Stockwell Lim-
ited, 1979), p. 388.
18
Ayittey, George B.N., Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992), p. 111.
19
Ayittey, George B.N., ibid, pp. 111-112.
20
Ayittey, George B.N., ibid, p. 112.
Page 5 of 61
commodation, logistics support, a vehicle, and the best hotel ac-
commodation while travelling.21
In the Republic of Zambia, the late President Levy Mwanawasa
branded citizens who had migrated to other countries as failures
during an official opening of a leadership workshop for Cabinet
ministers, Deputy Ministers and Permanent Secretaries in February
200422—a typical bashing of emigrants without making any effort
to find out why they actually found it necessary to vote with their
feet, so to speak.
In Malawi, during the leadership of the late Dr. Hastings
Kamuzu Banda, the Kamuzu Academy and Kamuzu Hospital did
not hire black teachers and doctors because, according to Dr.
Banda,23 black people were not talented enough to fill such posi-
tions.
The late Lameck Goma of Zambia, quoted by Neelamegham,24
has attributed African government leaders’ indiscriminate faith in
expatriate personnel to the colonial legacy; he has alleged that the
colonial experience has distorted Africa’s image of herself and her
ideas about other continents, and that this distortion has tended to
linger on long after the attainment of political independence, ren-
dering the conquered mind to continue to have blind faith in the
supposed superiority of personnel from the former metropolitan
and allied countries.
The common feeling among some officials in Western donor
countries, though, seems to be that less-developed countries actu-
ally lack competent people to provide sound leadership in com-
merce, industry and government. The following words of an un-
named aid official quoted by Timberlake25 is indicative of this: “In
a sense, we’re talking about ... sending smart white boys in to tell
them how to run their countries.”
This feeling is perhaps engendered and/or reinforced by the un-
warranted preference of some government leaders for foreign ex-
perts, particularly those leaders who have explicitly, or at least by
implication, claimed that indigenous experts—locally trained or
otherwise—are half-baked. The following excerpt about the senti-
21
Ayittey, George B.N., ibid.
22
Mambwe, Kennedy, “Careless Levy Angers Zambians Abroad,” Lusaka In-
formation Dispatch, www.dispatch.co.zm, November 14, 2004.
23
See Ayittey, George, B.N., op. cit., p. 111.
24
Neelamegham, S., “Localization of Professional Training in Management
and Accountancy: The Zambian Experience,” Zambia Journal of Business,
Volume 1/Number 1, April 1982, p. 10.
25
Timberlake, L., Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental
Bankruptcy (Philadelphia, USA: New Society Publishers, 1986), p. 199.
Page 6 of 61
ments of a Zambian government official will perhaps corroborate
what is implied here:26
“A member of the Central Committee has called for an urgent

rehabilitation and improvement in the standards of Zambian
engineering if local economic development is to make any
headway ... [he] said the standard of local engineers is so atro-
ciously poor that very few ... can measure to the definition of
what an engineer or technician should be able to do.”
But if this state of affairs is actually true, it is certainly govern-

ment leaders who are to blame for not having initially devoted ad-
equate financial, material, and other pertinent resources to the
training of citizens who have the potential to excel in their chosen
fields of endeavor. It should be common knowledge that no prac-
tically meaningful training in any field of endeavor can possibly be
expected in the face of inadequate resources and training facilities.
Moreover, it should be obvious that trainers of pronounced
caliber are necessary in the provision of sound and practically use-
ful training, but are such people willing to be hired and retained to
work in an environment that does not provide sufficient incentives
and training facilities?
In August 2008, the Zambian Vice-President then, Rupiah
Banda, was quoted as having said that “an unskilled population
placed a severe strain on public social services.”27 But who is
really to blame for the presence of unskilled citizens in Zambia—
and in other African countries, as a matter of fact?
Scarcity of Jobs
High interest rates and income taxes in the typical African country
have, among other factors, adversely affected investment in new
enterprises, and have consequently hampered the creation of jobs
for streams of graduates from local colleges and universities. And
governments cannot absorb many locally trained citizens due to
lack of financial resources. The Republic of Zambia provides a
good example in this regard:
1) According to an article published in the Times of Zambia in

July 2004 (reproduced by the Lusaka Information Dispatch28),
26
The Times of Zambia, “Zambian Engineers Lack Vital Spark,” April 17,
1989, p. 6.
27
Kapekele, Mutale, “Rupiah Links Poor Livelihood to Unskilled Populace,”
The Post: www.postzambia.com/, August 12, 2008.
28
Lusaka Information Dispatch, “Look Elsewhere for Jobs, Teachers Told,”
www.dispatch.co.zm/, July 2004.
Page 7 of 61
about 9,000 trained teachers were roaming the streets—unem-
ployed—as they anxiously awaited their postings by the coun-
try’s Ministry of Education. A comment about the plight of the
affected teachers by the then Labor and Social Security Deputy
Minister, Chile Ng’uni, revealed that the government could not
hire them to work in public schools because it did not have
money to pay them!
In spite of most Zambian schools having been understaffed,
the country’s education minister then, Andrew Mulenga, an-
nounced several months later that only about 1,000 out of
7,000 needed teachers would be employed by January 2005
through financial assistance rendered by the Netherlands.29
2) In November 2008, Wesley Ngwenya30 made the following

observation concerning the scarcity of jobs in Zambia: “I had
been gone to the United States for nine years and during that
time had never come back home. I experienced reverse ‘culture
shock’ from the dilapidated infrastructure around the [capital]
city to the many people standing around street corners with
nothing to do. It was then it really hit home in my mind on how
real and high unemployment rate was in my country.
The next day after arriving I went straight to work—apply-
ing for a job at various businesses and both government and
non-governmental organizations where I thought my education
and experience would be taken advantage of. I have never been
offered a job to this day although I was able to attend a few in-
terviews. I must mention here that at my last count I had ap-
plied to roughly 260 places over a period of a year and half.”
Limited Access to Education
Formal education in industrialized nations is, by and large, both

free and of high quality. In much of the African Union, on the con-
trary, education is of pitifully low quality, and is not widely access-
ible due to cost-sharing arrangements which most families cannot
match without sacrificing some of their basic necessities of life.
Emigration to wealthy nations, therefore, assures African migrants
access to free and high-quality formal education for their children
and/or young dependants.
Poor Healthcare Services
29
Banda, Joseph, “Only 1,000 Teachers Will Be Employed—Mulenga,” The
Post, www.post.co.zm/, December 7, 2004.
30
See Ngwenya, Wesley, “Should Zambians in Diaspora Come Back?” Lu-
saka Times: http://www.lusakatimes.com/, November 20, 2008.
Page 8 of 61
Cost-sharing arrangements in the dispensation of public healthcare
services in much of contemporary Africa has made such services
less accessible to low-income families. Overall, access to life-sav-
ing healthcare is seriously hampered by inadequate, dilapidated
and antiquated healthcare facilities. Thus, the availability of high-
quality services and modern facilities in the healthcare sectors of
developed countries is an important variable in African emigrants’
reluctance to return to their native countries.
A High Level of Crime
Unprecedented and widespread poverty and unemployment in the

African Union have made burglars, thieves and robbers on the con-
tinent more daring. This, as the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime has concluded, has “contribute[d] to the emigration of
skilled labor.”31 Besides, African migrants who are resident in af-
fluent countries, where there is generally greater safety and secur-
ity, are fearful of becoming obvious targets of perpetrators of such
crimes upon returning to their countries of origin.
To digress somewhat, failure to address the high incidence of
crime has also contributed to lower inflows of investment capital
needed by African countries to bolster socio-economic develop-
ment.
Valued Foreign Relationships
It is not unusual for indigenous Africans who reside in foreign

countries to develop serious professional, marital and/or other
kinds of relationships with citizens of host countries. Such relation-
ships are inevitably and earnestly considered in emigrants’ decision
to return to their native countries. Moreover, involvement by some
African emigrants in medical, mortgage and/or retirement schemes
in foreign countries has been a major consideration in making the
decision to return to their native countries during their active work-
ing lives.
THE ADVERSE EFFECTS
In less than two decades, the African continent has, according to

the Ethiopia-based United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (UNECA), lost a third of its skilled professional personnel
31
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Crime and Development in
Africa,” http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/, Number 3, 2005.
Page 9 of 61
through emigration and has had to replace them with over 100,000
expatriates at an annual cost of US$4 billion.32
With respect to healthcare professionals, a study conducted by
BioMed Central Health Services Research has estimated the eco-
nomic losses incurred by African countries as a result of emigra-
tion of one doctor to be about US$517,931 and that of one nurse to
be around US$338,868.33 There are, however, other losses that are
not captured in the education-costing methodology, such as the fol-
lowing:34
1) Loss of Health Services: Healthcare professionals contribute

to health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment,
and rehabilitation. Thus, the emigration of such professionals
exacerbates the human resource shortages in national and dis-
trict health systems and reduces the capability of such systems
to perform their core functions.
2) Loss of Supervisors: Practicing doctors and senior nurses

normally play major roles in supervising staff in peripheral fa-
cilities in any given country that serve the majority of popula-
tions—such as health centers, dispensaries and health posts.
Thus, when such doctors and nurses emigrate, the supervisory
capabilities of a country’s healthcare system are diminished,
contributing to a further weakening of the capacities of the
healthcare system to provide quality services to patients.
3) Loss of Mentors for Trainees: In any given country, practi-

cing doctors and senior nurses train and counsel new healthcare
employees and students on internship. The emigration of such
professionals, therefore, can have a negative inter-generational
effect on the process of health-related human capital creation in
a country.
4) Loss of Public Health Researchers: Many of a country’s spe-

cialized doctors and nurses who may decide to migrate to other
countries are often among the very few active researchers in
local healthcare institutions. Therefore, emigration of such
32
See Faye, Abdou, “Education: Europe, North America Tapping Africa’s
‘Brain Reservoir’,” op. cit., and Mutume, Gumisai, “Reversing Africa’s Brain
Drain: New Initiatives Tap Skills of African Experts,” Zambia Daily Mail,
www.daily-mail.co.zm/, July 25, 2003.
33
Kirigia, Joses M., Gbary, Akpa R., Muthuri, Lenity K., Nyoni, Jennifer, and
Seddoh, Anthony, “The Cost of Health Professionals’ Brain Drain in Kenya,”
BioMed Central Health Services Research, July 17, 2006.
34
Excerpted and adapted from Kirigia, Joses M., Gbary, Akpa R., Muthuri,
Lenity K., Nyoni, Jennifer, and Seddoh, Anthony, ibid.
Page 10 of 61
people can stifle innovation and invention in finding solutions
to persistent local public-health problems like cancer,
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.
5) Loss of Role Models for Children: Doctors and nurses are

often viewed by children in communities where they work as
examples to be imitated and emulated. Emigration of such
people, therefore, not only robs children of positive role mod-
els, it also negatively affects their dreams and aspirations and,
hence, the number of children aspiring to become healthcare
professionals in their adult lives.
6) Loss of Potential Entrepreneurs: By virtue of their education

and earnings, doctors and nurses often set up healthcare-related
and/or non-healthcare business entities—such as private clin-
ics, pharmacies, hospitals, retail outlets for groceries, or whole-
sale shops. Emigration of such people, therefore, undermines
the growth of entrepreneurship in affected countries and com-
munities, and diminishes prospects for economic growth and
development. And
7) Loss of Domestic Jobs: Doctors and nurses usually provide

employment opportunities for housekeepers, gardeners and se-
curity guards at their places of residence. Thus, emigration of
such people usually results in loss of employment opportunities
and incomes for domestic workers and their families.
Let us now consider a few examples of the dire effects associ-

ated with the exodus of skilled and trained nationals on the follow-
ing African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, South Africa, the
Sudan, and Zambia.
Ethiopia:
The migration of highly trained professionals from Ethiopia to
other countries has, according to Meera Sethi of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), caused a “massive brain drain,
[and] economic and technical stagnation and regression” in the
country.35 In his contention, the emigration from the country has,
by and large, been prompted by the following factors:
(a) A mismatch between the professional personnel involved

and the local demand for them;
35
See Eskinder, Michael, “Ethiopia the Most Affected By Brain Drain in
Africa,” The Daily Monitor (Addis Ababa), www.allAfrica.com/, November 8,
2002.
Page 11 of 61
(b) Lengthy recruitment processes—which usually take at least
three to six months;
(c) Poor working conditions and low salaries;
(d) Limited or no opportunities to pursue advanced studies or
vocational training; and
(e) Rampant human rights abuses or violations.36
Malawi:
The exodus of health workers and professionals out of Malawi’s
civil service, as the Project Appraisal Document of the World Bank
Health Sector Support Project has noted,37 started in early 2000 and
was precipitated largely by the erosion of salaries, although there
are other systemic underlying causes such as poor working condi-
tions, and lack of drugs and medical supplies which health workers
and professionals needed to work with. Figures for nurses and mid-
wives who have been leaving the country and seeking validation of
certificates are running at just over 100 per year.
In 2002, of the 103 who left, 83 went to the United Kingdom,
with the remainder divided between the United States, New Zeal-
and, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana. In 2003, 108 nurses
and midwives left, with 90 going to the United Kingdom. Recent
reports in June 2006 suggest that this migration pattern has contin-
ued to outstrip the country’s current annual training rate of around
60 nurses per year.
Senegal:
According to the Independent Union of Higher Education for
Teachers,38 more than 105 Senegalese lecturers and researchers
emigrated, mainly to the United States and French colleges and
universities, during the early 2000s. Inevitably, this resulted in an
erosion of the quality of education, training and research in the
country.
South Africa:
According to the South African Network of Skills Abroad
(SANSA), as reported by Mutume,39 the University of Cape
Town’s graduates in medicine, engineering, commerce, and educa-
tion have migrated to Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the
36
Adapted from Eskinder, Michael, ibid.
37
Record, Richard and Mohiddin, Abdu, “An Economic Perspective on
Malawi’s Medical ‘Brain Drain’,” Globalization and Health, www.globaliza-
tionandhealth.com/, December 18, 2006.
38
Faye, Abdou, “Education: Europe, North America Tapping Africa’s `Brain
Reservoir’,” op. cit.
39
Mutume, Gumisai, “Reversing Africa’s Brain Drain: New Initiatives Tap
Skills of African Experts,” op. cit.
Page 12 of 61
United States, and other developed countries—causing an acute
shortage of skills in these fields. With respect to healthcare person-
nel, South Africa is one of the countries in Africa that are most af-
fected by the brain drain; it loses over 50 percent of its healthcare
professionals every year.40 As a result, the country is forced to re-
cruit expensive foreign expertise to replace the trained natives who
decide to migrate to foreign countries.
The Sudan:
The migration (by the end of 1979) of about 29 percent of the
academic staff of the University of Khartoum, about 50 percent of
engineers of the country’s major institutions, and 60 percent of
medical doctors has had very serious consequences on research
and development (R&D) activities and the growth of science and
technology in the country.41 The quality of education in the country
is also adversely affected by the migration of teachers to the neigh-
boring gulf countries for better pay and living conditions.42
Zambia:
Out of 600 physicians trained in Zambia’s medical school
between 1978 and 1999, only 50 are still working within the coun-
try.43 And at the Copperbelt University (CBU) in the country’s
Copperbelt region, administrators have expressed fear that the in-
stitution risks losing international recognition because of deterior-
ating standards caused by a marked shortage of academic and seni-
or administrative staff; according to the minutes of a meeting con-
vened by the CBU Council in December 1998, the institution had
been adversely affected by the brain drain resulting mainly from
poor conditions of service.44
In August 2008, Zambians were shocked by their government’s
decision to award hefty increments in the compensation packages
of 23 Ministers, at least 32 Deputy Ministers, 158 Members of Par-
liament, and a host of senior government officials45—barely a week
after government’s failure to meet the demands of unionized em-
40
See Schnidman, Amy, “The Global Effects of the Brain Drain on Health
Care Systems,” Georgetown Journal of Health Sciences, Volume 3 /Number 1,
March 15, 2006.
41
Sardar, Z., Science and Technology in the Middle East: A Guide to Issues,
Organizations and Institutions (London: Longman, 1982), p. 12.
42
El-Kogali, Safaa, “Sudan at the Crossroads,” a paper presented at The Fletch-
er School: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/, March 12, 2004.
43
See Clifton, Eli, “HIV/AIDS: Medical ‘Brain Drain’ Worsens Africa’s
Crisis,” Inter Press Service News Agency: www.ipsnews.net/, August 30, 2004.
44
Times of Zambia, “Staff Crisis Haunts CBU”: www.zamnet.zm/zamnet/,
January 12, 1999.
45
Kabwela, Chansa, “Cabinet Offers Itself Salary Increments,” The Post, Au-
gust 1, 2008.
Page 13 of 61
ployees at the University of Zambia for improved conditions of
service, which led to an abrupt closure of the institution following
a go-slow by the employees.46
THE POSITIVE SIDE
One would perhaps do well to cite some of the salient benefits as-
sociated with the flight of professionals from the African continent.
In Ghana, citizens working abroad are accounting for the fourth
largest source of foreign currency after cocoa, gold and tourism.47
The foreign currency remittances to the country have become more
significant than development aid, which is normally delivered with
a lot of conditions attached.48
And, according to Easterly and Nyarko,49 family members left
behind by emigrants are likely to derive indirect utility from the
greater well-being of the emigrants, and if the emigration includes
an entire family, the family would generally be better off. Besides,
the exposure of emigrants to outside ideas is itself an engine of
growth, because having a significant portion of the population in
foreign countries means that individuals who are resident in the
emigrants’ native countries would benefit from information flows
through visits, the Internet or telephone discussions with the emig-
rants.50
Moreover, some of the professionals who may initially emigrate
often return to their home countries with new skills and ideas to
help develop the economies of their respective countries.51
Further, emigrants generally work in diverse socio-economic
settings where they interact with people from different cultural,
ethnic and/or religious backgrounds. This is potentially benign for
emigrants’ native countries where ethnic or religion-based conflicts
are common as it is likely to make the emigrants less bigoted upon
their return to their countries and contribute to the harmonization
of relations among cultural, religious and ethnic groupings.
46
“University of Zambia Closed,” Times of Zambia, August 1, 2008; Kachali,
Lambwe, “MPs Vote to Increase Their Salaries,” The Post: http://docs.google.-
com/, November 20, 2008; and Mulenga, Kasuba, “Ministers Revise Pay Rise,”
Zambia Daily Mail: http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/, November 20, 2008.
47
ZAMNET, “The Positive Side of Brain Drain,” www.zamnet.zm/, April 15,
2005.
48
ZAMNET, ibid.
49
Easterly, William and Nyarko, Yaw, “Is the Brain Drain Good for Africa?”
in Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution: www.brook-
ings.edu/, Working Paper 19 / March 2008, p. 3.
50
Easterly, William and Nyarko, Yaw, ibid., p. 25.
51
Easterly, William and Nyarko, Yaw, ibid.
Page 14 of 61
Additionally, unhindered migration of a country’s citizens is a
reflection of its observance of Article 13 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights adopted in 948 by the United Nations Gener-
al Assembly, which provides for the following: (a) everyone has
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each country; and (b) everyone has the right to leave any coun-
try, including his or her own, and to return to his or her country.52
For governments and private institutions that hire trained per-
sonnel from other countries, professional flight is a benign phe-
nomenon; it makes it possible for them to benefit from the know-
ledge and skills of people whose training they did not finance.
They reap where they did not sow, so to speak!
REDRESSING THE BRAIN DRAIN
There are many ways in which countries affected by the exodus of

their native professionals can address the problem. Following is a
survey of some of the viable ways and means by which a country
can stem the exodus of its skilled nationals; that is, creation of a
conducive socio-economic environment for citizens, respect for
human rights, stamping out corruption, peace and stability, adop-
tion of Logan’s prescriptions, provision of low-interest loans, ad-
option of the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) proposal, the
African Brain Gain initiative, the Direct Expatriate Nationals In-
vestment (DENI) proposal, the African Union (AU) and Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) framework, and involve-
ment in the Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals (RQAN)
program.
A Conducive Environment
Unless the factors that initially lead to migration are redressed, the
exodus of skilled Africans will continue to haunt governments and
employer-organizations on the African continent. As Mutume53 has
observed, migrants who are resident in affluent nations are dis-
suaded from returning to their home countries by the economic and
political crises that have bedeviled the continent—including failing
economies, high rates of unemployment, human rights abuses,
armed conflicts, and inadequate social services.
52
See Carter, B.E. and Trimble, P.R., International Law: Selected Documents
(Boston, MA, 1995), pp. 381-86; Lipset, S.M., editor, The Encyclopedia of
Democracy, Volume II (Washington, DC, 1995), pp. 573-78; and numerous oth-
er sources.
53
Skills of African Experts,” op. cit.
Page 15 of 61
Apparently, these factors are among some of the discernible
considerations that have continued to compel contemporary
Africa’s indigenous professionals currently working within the
continent not to be completely oblivious about the prospect of
leaving their native countries.
It is, therefore, essential for African leaders to foster job cre-
ation, private investment, savings, and consumption through at-
tractive incentives and lower taxes and interest rates. And, to para-
phrase Rohey Wadda of Gambia’s Strategy for Poverty Alleviation
Coordinating Office (quoted by Mutume54), it is essential for Afric-
an governments to create socio-economic settings that are free
from politically motivated harassment and persecution, and to ac-
commodate dissent and criticism. In this direction, it would be ne-
cessary to adhere to the dictates of good governance, elements of
which are discussed in a nutshell below.
Elements of Good Governance:

Essentially, good governance requires a country’s leaders and
their government to adopt the following elements cited by United
Nations Development Program:55
1) Accountability: Availability of a mechanism for ensuring

that individuals are directly and fully liable for the outcomes of
their decisions and actions, and the appropriation of resources
assigned to them;
2) Transparency: Public access to information about the state,

its decision-making mechanisms, and its current and contem-
plated projects and programs—except for state secrets and mat-
ters relating to public officials’ right to privacy;
3) Rule of Law: The existence of non-discriminatory laws and

law enforcement organs of the government that are efficient,
impartial, independent, and legitimate; and
4) Citizen Participation: Availability of channels and mechan-

isms through which the citizenry and non-governmental institu-
tions can—directly or through representation—have an influ-
ence on governmental decision-making processes and the beha-
vior and actions of public officials.
54
Mutume, Gumisai, ibid.
55
United Nations Development Program, “Addressing Corruption through
Democratic Government,” http://www.undp.org.vn/, November 2, 2005.
Page 16 of 61
In this endeavor, Amoako56 has recommended the creation of a
nation-state which has the following attributes: the state as a polit-
ical order, the state as a system of laws, the state as the embodi-
ment of the nation, and the state as the property of the people. For
lack of an orthodox term, let us provisionally refer to such a na-
tion-state as “the propitious state” to distinguish it from the follow-
ing kinds of nation-states identified in the literature as being char-
acteristic of countries on the African continent:57
1) The Patrimonial State: A nation-state in which government

leaders treat the state as their own piece of property;
2) The Predatory State: A nation-state in which government of-

ficials look upon the citizenry as prey for their rapacious greed;
3) The Shadow State: A nation-state that is generally character-

ized by informal political networks and a shadow economy
punctuated by illegal activities;
4) The Collapsed State: A nation-state in which common

people are generally left to their own devices while govern-
ment officials revel in conspicuous, state-financed luxury; and
5) The Repressive State: A nation-state where leaders impose

sufficient repression to keep their opponents weak and main-
tain their own power, while adhering to enough democratic
formalities that they might just pass themselves off as demo-
crats.
A Smaller Government:
An improvement in the conditions of service of civil servants,
public officials and other citizens who are on the payroll of a coun-
try’s government can also play an important role in curtailing the
number of citizens who decide to migrate to other countries. Such
an improvement can easily be made if a country’s leaders can cre-
ate a smaller national government in order to save financial and
material resources for this purpose.
56
Amoako, Kingsley Y., “Governance for a Progressing Africa: Opening
Statement at the Second Africa Governance Forum,” http://www.uneca.org/, Ac-
cra, Ghana, June 25, 1998.
57
Amoako, Kingsley Y., ibid., and Kyambalesa, Henry, “The 27th Ordinary
Summit of SADC,” a paper prepared as a Press Release for Heads of State and
Government, First Ladies, Ministers, the Executive Secretary, the Deputy Exec-
utive Secretary, the Chief Director, Heads of Delegations, and Delegates who at-
tended the 27th Ordinary Summit of the Southern African Development Com-
munity (SADC) in Lusaka, Zambia between August 10 and 18, 2007.
Page 17 of 61
The creation of a smaller government may, for example, require
a country’s leaders to abolish top-level sinecures in their national
government and to merge government ministries or agencies which
have similar functions. Let us consider how this can be accom-
plished using the executive branch of the Zambian national gov-
ernment as an example.
In November 2008, newly elected President Rupiah Banda con-
stituted a Cabinet with the following ministerial portfolios, many
of which had two Deputy Ministerial sinecures:
1. Minister of Justice;
2. Minister of Defence;
3. Minister of Finance and National Planning;
4. Minister of Home Affairs;
5. Minister of Health;
6. Minister of Foreign Affairs;
7. Minister of Agriculture (Veterinary, Livestock and Fisher-
ies);
8. Minister of Agriculture (Cooperatives);
9. Minister of Local Government and Housing;
10. Minister of Gender and Development;
11. Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry;
12. Minister of Communication and Transport;
13. Minister of Community Development and Social Services;
14. Minister of Education;
15. Minister of Energy and Water Development;
16. Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services;
17. Minister of Labor and Social Security;
18. Minister of Lands;
19. Minister of Mines and Mineral Development;
20. Minister of Science, Technology and Vocational Training;
21. Minister of Sport, Youth and Child Development;
22. Minister of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources;
and
23. Minister of Works and Supply.
For a country with only 11.5 million people, such a Cabinet is

perhaps highly bloated. As such, it could suggestively be reduced
to the following Cabinet-level positions:
1) Education, Training and Sport: To be directly responsible for

advising and representing the Republican president on matters
and issues relating to the following: general and tertiary educa-
tion; vocational training; the training of teachers; adult literacy
programs; sporting programs in all government-funded educa-
Page 18 of 61
tional and training institutions; and matters concerning remu-
neration for educators, trainers and researchers.
2) Public Health and Sanitation: To be directly responsible for

and issues relating to medical care, medical research, child
health and development, family planning, disease control and
prevention, food safety (local and imported foodstuff), drug
safety (local and imported medicines), safety of herbal medi-
cines, public health education, public health inspections, and
remuneration for public health personnel.
3) Agriculture and Food Security: To be directly responsible for

and issues pertaining to agricultural development, long-term
food security, agricultural incentives, agribusinesses, agricul-
tural research centers, irrigation schemes, and the food require-
ments of unemployed citizens and disadvantaged children.
4) Finance and Revenue: To be directly responsible for ad-

vising and representing the Republican president on financial
matters and monetary issues; the stock market, national debt
management and external debt resolution; management of gov-
ernment-owned enterprises; and revenue generation through
taxation, customs and excise duties, service fees or charges,
and postal services.
5) Commerce and Industry: To be directly responsible for ad-

vising and representing the Republican president on matters
and issues concerning trade and industrialization, tourism, min-
ing, business and investment promotion, imports and exports,
trade relations, registration of foreign companies, and research
and development (R&D) support to local manufacturers.
6) Defence and Security: To be directly responsible for ad-

vising and representing the Republican president on matters
and issues concerning the following: national defence and se-
curity (including matters and issues relating to the training,
equipment, and remuneration for defence and security per-
sonnel); and fire-arm control and registration.
7) Works, Supply and Transport: To be directly responsible for

and issues relating to the following: utilization and man-
agement of nationally owned pieces of land; provision and
Page 19 of 61
maintenance of vital infrastructure nationwide, including an ef-
ficient and inter-modal network of ground and air transporta-
tion; development of “malleable” stretches of the Kafue, Zam-
bezi, Luangwa, and other sizable perennial rivers for water
transportation; procurement and distribution of government su-
pplies; and construction, renovation and maintenance of gove-
rnment facilities and properties.
8) Justice, Prisons and Immigration: To be directly responsible

for advising and representing the Republican president on legal
matters, the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms, admin-
istration of the Zambia Prison Service, legal aid, title deeds, na-
tional registration, passports and immigration, citizenship and
naturalization, work permits, treaties and agreements with oth-
er countries, intellectual property rights, and remuneration for
judicial personnel and support staff.
9) Culture and Community Services: To be directly responsible

for advising and representing the Republican president on is-
sues and matters relating to the following: preservation of our
national treasures (including national monuments, museums,
historical sites, and cherished cultural and family values); pro-
motion of traditional music and culture-related crafts; national
unity and patriotism; religious harmony; national ceremonies
and festivals; and issues relating to women, children, disabled
citizens, and retirees and the aged.
10) Foreign Affairs: To be directly responsible for advising and

representing the Republican president on issues and matters
concerning foreign political relations; consular affairs and ser-
vices; profiles of foreign countries; services and vital infor-
mation to Zambians in, or travelling to, foreign countries; and
publicizing of Zambian society abroad.
The functions of the Executive branch of the national govern-

ment would, of course, need to be complemented by the work of a
few autonomous government agencies, such as the Zambia Reven-
ue Authority, Anti-Corruption Commission, Electoral Commission
of Zambia, Environmental Council of Zambia, Human Rights
Commission, Central Supply and Tender Board, Drug Enforcement
Agency, Zambia Development Agency, and the National Science
and Technology Council. Ideally, such agencies need to be admin-
istered by a lean ensemble of technocrats.
This structure of the executive branch of the government
provides for localized police units to be administered by elected
Page 20 of 61
Provincial Governors. Civil servants in government ministries that
would be abolished or merged would need to be encouraged to
seek early retirement with full benefits, while professional and
skilled civil servants would need to be re-deployed in the new gov-
ernment ministries or agencies.
For example, professional and skilled civil servants in the cur-
rent ministries of Science and Technology and Sports and Youth
Development would be re-deployed in the contemplated Ministry
of Education, Training and Sport. Those in the ministries of Mines
and Mineral Development and Tourism, Environment and Natural
Resources would be re-deployed in the new Ministry of Commerce
and Industry. And so forth.
A lot of money, government buildings, office furniture, and
automobiles, houses, telephones, cell phones, water and electricity
allowances, and fuel allowances for officials would be saved by re-
ducing the number of Cabinet Ministers and Permanent Secretaries
by thirteen positions, and by abolishing the positions of forty-three
Deputy Ministers.
The amounts to be saved per year through savings on salaries,
special allowances and utility allowances paid to Cabinet Minis-
ters, Deputy Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are calculated
below, using data mainly from the Ministerial and Parliamentary
Offices (Emoluments) (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 2008.
Expenditure Per Government Official:
Cabinet Minister:
Salary: Special Allowance: Utility:
K75,117,124 + 26,382,673 + 26,680,000 = K128,179,797
Deputy Minister:
K70,953,196 + 24,107,904 + 26,680,000 = K121,741,090
Permanent Secretary:
K102,866,638 - - = K102,866,638
By reducing the size of its executive branch of the national gov-

ernment from twenty-three to ten ministers and ten Permanent Sec-
retaries, Zambia would make the following savings:
13 Ministers x K128,179,797 = K1,666,337,361

43 Deputy Ministers x K121,741,090 = K5,194,866,870
13 Permanent Secretaries x K102,866,638 = K1,337,266,294
Page 21 of 61
--------------------
K8,198,470,525
It is important to note in passing that the size of a country’s

government can have a significant effect on the level of its eco-
nomic growth. As Barro,58 Gwartney et al,59 Smith,60 and the World
Bank61 have found, there is a correlation between an expansion in
the size of a government (reflected by an increase in its expendit-
ures) and a decline in private investment and economic growth. In
a study designed to examine the impact of an expansion in the size
of a country’s government on economic growth, for example,
Gwartney et al62 have found that:
1) An excessively large national government can have a negat-

ive effect on economic growth. Grossman,63 among other re-
searchers, has found a similar correlation in his study of the
U.S. government: “there [is] … indeed a negative relationship
between growth in government and the rate of economic
growth.”
2) As a government grows in size, it crowds out investment,

leads to a decline in productivity growth and contributes to a
slowdown in the growth rate of its real gross domestic product
(GDP). Similarly, Smith64 has found that “economies with large
public sectors grow more slowly and suffer high rates of unem-
ployment than those where this is not the case.”
3) An increase of 10 percentage points in government expendit-

ure as a share of a country’s GDP is associated with a decline
of approximately 1 percentage point in the growth rate of real
GDP. Barro65 has also found that a 1 percentage point rise in
the share of government consumption in GDP is associated
with a 0.14 percentage point retardation in the rate of growth of
58
Barro, Robert J., “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross Section Em-
pirical Study,” MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
59
Gwartney, James et al, “The Size and Functions of Government and Eco-
nomic Growth,” http://www.house.gov/, April 1998.
60
Smith, David, “The Effects of Public Spending and Taxes on Economic
Growth,” http://www.iea.org.uk/, May 19, 2004.
61
World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? (Washington, DC: The
World Bank, 2000).
62
Gwartney, James et al., op. cit.
63
Grossman, Philip, “Government and Economic Growth: A Non-Linear Re-
lationship,” Public Choice 56 (1988), pp. 193-200.
64
Smith, David, op. cit.
65
Barro, Robert J., op. cit.
Page 22 of 61
real GDP per head of population. Folster and Henrekson66 have
found a similar correlation. And
4) From 1980 to 1995, the world’s 5 fastest-growing economies

—that is, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong—had total government expenditures averaging 20.1% of
GDP, and was less than half the average of Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Similarly, in a study focused on the growth of public expendit-

ure in industrialized countries between 1870 and 1996, Tanzi and
Schuknecht67 have found that countries with relatively small gov-
ernments can perform “as well or even better than their counter-
parts with relatively big governments.” In Middleton’s words, a
“smaller, better-focused government is better able to deliver than is
big government.”68
Peden and Bradley,69 using U.S. data for the period 1949-1985
to examine the effect of the size of government on economic out-
put and productivity, have also concluded that the “level of govern-
ment activity in the economy has a negative effect on both the eco-
nomic base and the economic growth rate growth.”
Vital Social Investments:

The creation of a smaller government can also make it possible
for a country to make greater and sustained investments in educa-
tion, healthcare, food security, and crime-fighting, which can ulti-
mately make the socio-economic settings in countries that are ad-
versely affected by the brain drain even more conducive to both
migrant and non-migrant nationals. A brief discussion of such in-
vestments follows.
1) Education: It is essential for a country’s government to abol-

ish examination fees and Grades 7 and 9 elimination examina-
tions, and to provide for free education through Grade 12 at
least. In 1917, a philosopher by the name Alfred North White-
66
Folster, Stefan and Henrekson, Magnus, “Growth Effects of Government
Expenditure and Taxation in Rich Countries,” European Economic Review 45
(2001), pp. 1501-1520.
67
Tanzi, Vito and Schuknecht, Ludger, Public Spending in the 20th Century:
A Global Perspective (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
68
Middleton, Roger, “Book Reviews: Public Spending in the 20th Century: A
Global Perspective” by Tanzi, Vito and Schuknecht, Ludger: http://www.eh.net/,
October 2000.
69
Peden, Edgar and Bradley, Michael, “Government Size, Productivity, and
Economic Growth: The Post-War Experience,” Public Choice 61 (1989), pp.
229-45.
Page 23 of 61
head warned about the ill-fated destiny of a society which does
not make meaningful investments in its people’s education that
is perhaps truer today than it was during his time: “In the con-
ditions of modern life, the rule is absolute ... [a nation] which
does not value [education] ... is doomed.”
It should be obvious, therefore, that accessible and high-
quality education can be said to be the most important invest-
ment a country can make in its people. As experience has
taught us, it is not possible for any society to succeed in the
pursuit of other human endeavors without adequate pools of
enlightened citizens.
To promote scholarship and academic excellence in educa-
tion and training, high-school graduates who would obtain a
Division 1 would need to be automatically awarded scholar-
ships upon being accepted at any local college or university.
All other high-school graduates and working men and women
wishing to pursue further studies should be granted with low-
interest loans upon being accepted into classroom-based or cor-
respondence-based study programs offered locally.
Loan recipients who would graduate with “Distinction”
should be excused of 75% of their debt obligations, while those
who would graduate with “Merit” should be absolved of 50%
of their debt obligations. And all citizens who would graduate
from local colleges or universities with “Distinction” should be
automatically awarded scholarships to pursue higher education-
al or training programs at local educational institutions or in
foreign countries.
Besides, it is essential to provide for the establishment of
computer laboratories at educational and training institutions
nationwide, and for eventual connection of computers to the In-
ternet. The need to equip the youth with the computer skills
they need in order to compete successfully in the modern so-
cio-economic system cannot perhaps be overemphasized.
In all, there is a need for government leaders to make a sus-
tained effort to cater for the basic needs of educational systems
in their respective countries. Some of the basic needs are the
following: (i) schools and classrooms that are adequately
equipped for both teaching and learning; (ii) qualified, self-mo-
tivated and well-paid teachers or lecturers in every classroom;
and (iii) competent school administrators on competitive condi-
tions of service, and adequate office supplies and fixtures.
2) Healthcare: African countries need to seriously consider the

prospect of providing free life-saving healthcare to all their cit-
izens. And, among a host of other healthcare needs and expect-
Page 24 of 61
ations of their people, they need to wage a vicious and relent-
less war against HIV/AIDS, malaria, cholera, diarrhea, cancer,
tuberculosis, whooping cough, and other deadly diseases.
3) Food Security: According to the resolutions of the World

Food Summit held in Italy in November 1996, food security
“exists when all people, at all times, have physical and eco-
nomic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life.” African countries need to strive to attain such a
state of affairs through government-financed irrigation dams
and canals, cattle re-stocking and disease control, provision for
a fertilizer subsidy, and zero sales or value-added tax on agri-
cultural inputs and raw food.
There is also a need to promote food canning, efficient mar-
keting of agricultural produce, agribusiness, and agricultural
schemes by municipalities, the civil police, the prison service,
the defence forces, and educational and training institutions in
a deliberate effort to attain food security and self-sufficiency.
4) Crime-Fighting: Every family and business in the African

Union today is directly or indirectly affected by robberies,
burglaries, vandalism, and other senseless crimes. There is
clearly a pressing need for African leaders to address the high
incidence of crime in their countries. Among other initiatives,
they need to allocate adequate financial and material resources
to police units in order to enhance their capabilities in terms of
communications, transportation, crime-fighting gadgets and
equipment, and security cameras for installation in town cen-
ters and on major roads and streets.
They need to do so in order to make it possible for police
officers to discharge the following duties more effectively: (a)
protection of life and property; (b) preservation of peace, and
prevention of crime; (c) detection and apprehension of law
breakers; (d) enforcement of laws and ordinances; (e) safe-
guarding the rights and freedoms of members of society; and
(f) developing sound police-community relations.
The fight against crime certainly involves more—much,
much more—than just rounding up alleged criminals and/or
handing out stiff punishment. Among other things, it is of the
utmost importance to address the factors that induce criminal
activity. Although habitual criminals cannot be easily reformed,
creation of adequate jobs by stimulating supply and demand
through lower taxes and interest rates can greatly reduce the
number of citizens who are disposed to engage in criminal
Page 25 of 61
activities for the purpose of obtaining financial and/or material
resources in order to meet their basic needs. As an age-old
maxim teaches us, “An idle mind is the devil’s workshop.”
Respect for Human Rights
In December 1948, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly ad-

opted and proclaimed what is referred to as the “Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights,” which stipulates the rights and freedoms
of all individuals worldwide. According to the Declaration, all hu-
man beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and have
the rights and freedoms summarized below,70 which all African
countries need to honor in order to forestall the potential for human
rights abuses.
1) Personal, Civic and Political Rights: These include the right

to life, liberty, privacy, and security of person; freedom from
slavery and torture; the right to legal personality; freedom from
arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile; the right to due process,
legal defense, and a fair trial; the right to freedom of movement
and to seek asylum from persecution; the right to a nationality;
the right to marry and found a family; the right to own property
and not to be deprived of it except by due process of law; the
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the right
to freedom of both opinion and expression; and the right to
peaceful assembly, association, and political participation.
2) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: These include the

right to work, to choose one’s employment, to equal pay for
equal work,71 to a just wage and to supplemental social secur-
ity, to participation in unions,72 to rest and leisure, to an ad-
equate standard of living, to an education, and to participation
70
For a full text of the thirty articles in which these universal human rights
and freedoms are stipulated, see the following sources, among others: Carter,
B.E. and Trimble, P.R., op. cit.; Gorman, R.F. and Milhakanin, E.S., Historical
Dictionary of Human Rights and Humanitarian Organizations (Lanham, MD,
1997), Appendix 1; Lawson, E., Encyclopedia of Human Rights, Second Edition
(Washington, DC, 1996), pp. 1551-53; Lipset, S.M., editor, op.cit.
71
In reality, the term “equal pay for equal work” is at best a misnomer used to
imply “equitable remuneration.” Ordinarily, employees who perform the same
chores in any given organization tend to earn disparate, but fair, wages or salar-
ies due to competence-based and/or periodic increments in their earnings,
among a host of other factors.
72
The right to participate in unions is often flouted in countries like the
United States where some employer-organizations have a formal “non-union
policy” forbidding employees from forming or joining labor unions. Besides,
trade unionism and labor laws are, by and large, restrained in “maquiladoras” or
export processing zones (EPZs).
Page 26 of 61
in the activities of the communities of which one is a constitu-
ent part.
The “civil rights” of individuals in particular countries reflect

and/or amplify the rights and freedoms of individuals that are en-
shrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights. They may include the following:
the right to equal protection by the law; the right to vote; freedom
of religion and worship; freedom of speech; freedom of the press;
the right to privacy; freedom of assembly and association; and
freedom from slavery and any other cruel, unsavory and dehuman-
izing forms of treatment.
The Declaration, however, acknowledges that each and every
country’s ability to honor some of the foregoing rights and
freedoms depends on its resources and government structure. And,
as stipulated in Article 29 [2] of the Declaration, every individual
is subject to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others, and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order, and the general socio-economic welfare of a
democratic society.
It is tempting to advocate the inclusion of a few additional
rights to the International Bill of Human Rights which the archi-
tects of the Bill might not have deemed to be worthy of considera-
tion as universal human rights during their time; these are: (a) the
right to life-saving healthcare; (b) the right to unadulterated air,
water, and surroundings; and (c) the right to consumer-related pro-
tection.
Stamping out Corruption
While corruption occurs in all countries worldwide in varying de-

grees, the adverse effects of the scourge on fragile economies in
Africa are perhaps more profound, particularly due to the fact that
it has actually compounded the problems of economically belea-
guered countries on the continent—countries that are overwhelmed
by a catalogue of other bottlenecks to sustainable socio-economic
development, including poor leadership, economic mismanage-
ment, bloated national governments, and the debt burden.73
These bottlenecks—together with corruption—have diminished
the ability of countries in Africa to harness their abundant natural
and human resources to meet the basic needs, expectations and as-
73
See Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. and Kyambalesa, Henry, Problems Facing
Contemporary Africa and Viable Strategies for Redress (Lewiston, New York:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), passim.
Page 27 of 61
pirations of the common people. The consequences of such a state
of affairs are as conspicuous as they are mind-boggling—including
pervasive and unprecedented poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy,
unemployment, disadvantaged children, moral decay, and crime
and lawlessness. As such, corruption contributes to the worsening
of some of the brain drain’s “push factors.”
The remainder of this sub-section is devoted to a brief survey of
the following: the nature and classification of corruption, the
causes and effects of the scourge, and preventive measures.
What Is Corruption?
The term “corruption” has been defined in many different ways.
In a descriptive study by Houngnikpo and Kyambalesa,74 for ex-
ample, it is defined in consonance with a definition provided by
Nye75 to refer to behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a
public role because of private interests and pecuniary or status
gains, including behavior that violates rules against the exercise of
certain types of private-regarding influence—such as bribery,
nepotism, and misappropriation of public resources.
Amoako,76 on the other hand, has described the scourge simply
as “the antithesis of accountability and transparency.” To pundit
Mauro,77 the term “corruption” represents “the abuse of public of-
fice for private gain.” According to J. Macrae—cited by Husted78
and Shenkar and Luo79—the term refers to an “exchange between
two partners (the ‘demander’ and the ‘supplier’) which … has an
influence on the allocation of resources either immediately or in
the future, and … involves the use or abuse of public or collective
responsibility for private ends.”
To facilitate the enactment and/or enforcement of anti-corrup-
tion legislation, countries affected by the scourge have tended to
classify corrupt practices in two or more categories. In Tanzania,
for example, a Commission of Inquiry against Corruption estab-
lished by President Benjamin Mkapa in 1996 identified two forms
74
Houngnikpo, Mathurin C. and Kyambalesa, Henry, ibid., pp. 9-12.
75
Nye, J.S., “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis,” American Political Science Review, Volume 61/Number 2, 1967, p.
419.
76
Statement at the Second Africa Governance Forum,” http://www.uneca.org/, Ac-
cra, Ghana, June 25, 1998.
77
Mauro, Paolo, “Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further
Research,” World Bank articles, http://www.worldbank.org/, March 1, 1998.
78
Husted, B.W., “Wealth, Culture and Corruption,” Journal of International
Business Studies, Volume 30/Number 2, 1999, p. 340.
79
Shenkar, Oded and Luo, Yadong, International Business (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), p. 498.
Page 28 of 61
of corruption occurring in the country—that is, “petty corruption”
and “grand corruption.”80
1) Petty Corruption: This form of corruption includes the unscru-

pulous practices of those who receive bribes because of their low
incomes and standard of living. Such practices can be said to be
common in the socio-economic settings of countries where person-
al incomes cannot, by and large, meet the basic needs of house-
holds. The following are specific examples of such practices:81
(a) Educational Settings: Corruption is demanded and given

during the registration of children in schools, to enable pu-
pils pass examinations, to enable students obtain placement
in secondary schools or colleges, to effect a transfer from
one school to another, or to be afforded the opportunity to
repeat a class. Moreover teachers give bribes in order to be
promoted, to be transferred or to be given placements in
preferred schools.
(b) Law Enforcement: Police officers receive bribes to protect
criminals, to arrest innocent people and threaten to take
them to court on tramped-up charges in a deliberate effort
to solicit for bribes, while traffic officers accept bribes from
motorists who violate traffic rules and regulations.
(c) Passports and Immigration: Immigration officers seek or
accept bribes to issue passports and visas, or residence per-
mits to undeserving foreigners.
(d) Employment and Staffing: Personnel officers receive bribes
during the recruitment of workers, or they demand bribes
from junior officers so that they can promote them, assign
them responsibilities, send them for training or to attend
seminars, and/or allow them to take duty trips.
(e) The News Media: Reporters in media institutions accept
bribes in order to publish or not to publish information
which glorifies or destroys the reputations of certain indi-
viduals, groups of individuals, or institutions.
Petty corruption, according to Dike,82 “occurs in the public ad-

ministration or the implementation end of politics” and may altern-
80
Mupuchi, Speedwell, “Corruption Is Now Endemic in Zambia—Prof.
Chanda,” The Post, August 24, 2005, and United Republic of Tanzania, “Causes
of Corruption in Tanzania,” http://www.tanzania.go.tz/, August 14, 2005.
81
Excerpted from United Republic of Tanzania, “Causes of Corruption in Tan-
zania,” http://www.tanzania.go.tz/, August 14, 2005.
82
Dike, Victor E., “Corruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective
Control,” Africa Economic Analysis, www.AfricaEconomicAnalysis.org/, Feb-
ruary 18, 2004.
Page 29 of 61
ately be designated as “bureaucratic corruption” or “corruption of
need.”
2) Grand Corruption: This form of corruption encompasses the ir-

regular practices of people—such as high-level public servants or
government leaders—whose earnings and pieces of property are
adequate to meet their basic needs. Such people get involved in
corrupt practices mainly due to greed and/or the desire to accumu-
late wealth or gain political power. As such, grand corruption has
also been designated as “corruption of greed” in the literature.83
Examples of the various schemes and tactics used in this respect
include the following:84
(a) Decision Makers: Acceptance of bribes in order to breach

tender rules and regulations, grant tax exemptions to un-
deserving persons or organizations, or conclude construc-
tion contracts with private companies without due regard
for the national interest. And
(b) Parliamentary Candidates: Bribing of voters in order to
gain support and votes during elections, or offering of
bribes to reporters or media institutions in order to secure a
positive profile. In general, interferences in the conduct of
free and fair elections, or “electoral corruption,” may also
include promises of employment, coercion, intimidation,
and other election-related malpractices.85
There are some forms of corruption which do not involve a de-

liberate exchange of benefits between two or more conspirators;
rather, the perpetrator unscrupulously gains access to the financial
and/or material resources of unsuspecting individuals or institu-
tions. Such forms of corruption include fraud, embezzlement, and
extortion.86 Favoritism in general, and nepotism in particular, can
also be said to be forms of corruption.87
Causes and Effects:

83
See Dike, Victor E., ibid.
84
Excerpted from United Republic of Tanzania, ibid.
85
Dike, Victor E., op. cit.
86
See Dike, Victor E., ibid.
87
See Chanda, Alfred W., “National Integrity Systems: TI Country Study Re-
port—Zambia 2003,” http://www.transparency.org/, 2003; Dike, Victor E., “Cor-
ruption in Nigeria: A New Paradigm for Effective Control,” Africa Economic
Analysis, www.AfricaEconomicAnalysis.org/, February 18, 2004; Aman-
Palestine, The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity—Aman, “Transparency
Palestine,” http://www.aman-palestine.org/, September 27, 2005; and Kpundeh,
Sahr J., “Political Will in Fighting Corruption,” Chapter 6: http://magnet.un-
dp.org/, August 17, 2005.
Page 30 of 61
Corruption is caused by a diversity of factors, including poor
governance, political instability, regular reshuffles of government
leaders, a weak legislative system, a weak judicial system, bureau-
cratic red tape, inadequate compensation, greed and moral defi-
ciency among employees and national leaders, and lack of profes-
sional counsel for employees and government officials.88
By and large, rampant corrupt practices, as the Nigeria First or-
ganization has observed, “not only stultify development as re-
sources are diverted or reduced, but also imbue governance with
inefficiency and increased costs.”89 Besides, corruption can subvert
political processes in a country, endanger economic stability, un-
dermine honest enterprise, and erode the country’s moral fiber.90
In the remainder of this part of the discussion, let us consider
the specific effects of corruption on economic growth and public
expenditure, and the impacts of the scourge on economic units, hu-
man rights and a country’s national image.
1) Impact on Economic Growth: In Mauro’s contention,91 a high

level of corruption in a country’s public institutions is equivalent to
a large increase in marginal tax rates, and can lead to a sharp re-
duction in foreign direct investment in the country involved. He
has identified the following as potential consequences of corrup-
tion on economic growth in a country:92
(a) Lowering of incentives to invest for both local and foreign

investors, because it has the same effect as a tax, and in fact
operates as a tax;93
(b) Distortion of the dispensation of public services in a coun-
try in favor of people who have the wherewithal to bribe
public officials and/or civil servants;
(c) Inducement of public officials and civil servants to engage
in self-remunerating activities rather than socially product-
ive activities;
(d) Lowering of the quality of public infrastructure due to the
awarding of construction projects to less-competent, bribe-
giving bidders; and
88
For a detailed discussion of these causes of corruption, see Kyambalesa,
Henry, “Corruption: Causes, Effects and Deterrents,” Africa Insight, www.ai.or-
g.za/, Volume 36/Number 2, June 2006, pp. 102-122.
89
See Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, “The ICPC: Anti-Corrup-
tion Crusade,” http://www.nigeriafirst.org/, February 21, 2003.
90
Sid-Ahmed, 2004.
91
Mauro, Paolo, “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and
Government Expenditure,” IMF Working Paper No. 96/98, 1996.
92
Mauro, Paolo (1998), op. cit.
93
Tanzi, Vito, “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope,
and Cures,” IMF Staff Papers, Volume 45 / Number 4, December 1998.
Page 31 of 61
(e) Diversion of public resources to less important tasks, pro-
jects and/or programs simply because of their potential to
facilitate the extraction of high-value or hard-to-detect
bribes.
Amoako,94 too, has offered a useful explanation of how corrup-

tion can thwart efforts aimed at raising the welfare of a country’s
people: “By reducing the amount of public resources for develop-
ment, it limits economic growth, discourages private investment
and savings, and impedes the efficient use of government revenues
and development assistance.”
Peter Eigen—the founder of Transparency International (TI)—
has also provided an assessment of the pervasive impact of corrup-
tion on a country’s socio-economic system: “Corruption in large-
scale public projects is a daunting obstacle to sustainable develop-
ment, and results in a major loss of public funds needed for educa-
tion, healthcare and poverty reduction, both in developed and de-
veloping countries.”95
In May 1999, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) cited some of the other socio-economic ills
associated with the phenomenon of corruption in Resolution (99) 5
as follows: “[Corruption] … represents a major threat to the rule of
law, democracy, human rights, [and] fairness and social justice;
hinders economic development; [and] endangers the stability of
democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society.”
2) Effect on Public Expenditure: Corruption, as Tanzi96 has main-

tained, can reduce public revenue and inflate public spending in a
country and, as such, can contribute to a build-up of a country’s
budget deficits and make it difficult for the country’s government
to generate a fiscal policy that is less burdensome to tax payers.
Besides, one cannot rule out the potential for male civil servants in
a corruption-ridden country, for example, to seek to cohabit with
female clients—a situation which can contribute to the erosion of
public morals, as well as exacerbate the spread of infectious sexu-
ally transmitted diseases (STDs).
3) Effects on Economic Units: With respect to economic units,

USAID and the Institute of International Economics have pin-
pointed the unsavory effects of corruption on their internal man-
agement practices, and the risks and systemic effects associated
94
Amoako, Kingsley Y., op. cit.
95
See Transparency International, “Corruption Research—Chapter 11: Global
Corruption Barometer 2003,” Global Corruption Report 2003, http://www.glob-
alcorruptionreport.org/, June 1, 2004.
96
Tanzi, Vito, op. cit.
Page 32 of 61
with the specter.97 A brief description of the risks and effects in-
volved follows.
(a) Deferring to corruption can shape the mode of internal

management. Jeremy Pope98 of Transparency International
has summed up the effect of a company’s involvement in
corruption on its internal modus operandi: “Corruption
boomerangs on the practitioner because once you establish
a methodology in which your sales staffs are trained in off-
the-books accounts, non-accountable funds, and breaking
the laws of countries with impunity, you create a situation
where you have unaccounted-for money. You import an
ethic of corruption into your own organization.”
(b) In countries where laws are clearly defined and strictly en-
forced, unscrupulous business practices can expose a com-
pany to civil damages, criminal sanctions, legal fees, and/or
impaired reputation.
(c) The scourge of corruption can consume a significant
amount of business entities’ time and resources that would
otherwise be devoted to innovation and quality improve-
ment in commerce and industry. As such, it can adversely
affect business entities’ ability to compete efficiently and
effectively in the global marketplace.
According to Daniel Kaufmann of the World Bank Institute,99

corruption creates “an environment of uncertainty, inflates the op-
erating costs of economic units and reduces their profit margins,
and takes a toll in terms of time.”
4) Violation of Human Rights: There are many ways in which cor-

rupt practices can lead to a violation of some societal members’
rights, such as the following:100
(a) By diverting necessities of life—such as food, clean water,

health care, and education and training—from the poor and
making them available to the rich on the basis of individu-
als’ ability to pay; and
97
See USAID, “Corruption and the Private Sector: Why Would Businesses
Fight against Corruption and How?” http://www.usaid.gov/, March 19, 2005;
and Institute of International Economics (IIE), “Corruption and the Private Sec-
tor: Why Should Businesses Fight against Corruption and How?”:
http://www.iie.com/, 2001.
98
Institute of International Economics (IIE), ibid.
99
See Institute of International Economics (IIE), ibid.
100
See Green, Penny and Ward, Tony, State Crime: Governments, Violence
and Corruption (Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2004), p. 18.
Page 33 of 61
(b) By denying individuals (through vote-buying, sponsorship
of ruffians to harass members of opposition political
parties, and the use of any other undemocratic means) the
right to free and fair participation in the political process.
5) Tarnished National Image: Being rated or perceived as a country

with a high level of corruption can adversely affect a country’s
ability to develop sound bilateral and multilateral relations with
other countries. It can, for example, have negative consequences
on diplomatic and economic relations” which a country may seek
to pursue with other sovereign states.101
For a country that is in dire need of foreign aid, debt relief,
and/or technical assistance, a high level of corruption can prompt
donor and creditor nations to be less forthcoming. Besides, the
country’s citizens are likely to encounter problems in obtaining
travel visas, and/or securing jobs or business contracts abroad.
And, as Transparency International has noted, “extensive research
shows that foreign investment is lower in countries perceived to be
corrupt.”102
6) Potential Benefits: In spite of the baleful and ubiquitous nature

of corruption, some scholars, as Wei103 has noted, consider the
scourge as a beneficial phenomenon. It is, for example, argued that
bribes can actually function as grease “that can speed [up] … the
wheels of commerce.”104
Another example of the potential benefits of corruption involves
what is referred to as “state capture”—that is, the extent to which
firms make illicit and non-transparent private payments to public
officials in order to influence the generation of laws, rules, regula-
tions, or decrees by government institutions.105 In this regard, state
capture generates “substantial gains to the firm both in terms of
performance and improved security of property rights, but only in
the capture economy.”106
Besides, in circumstances where wealthy people bribe poorly
paid employees in order to secure preferential treatment in gaining
101
ACID (Anti-Corruption Internet Database—Nigeria), “Consequences of
Corruption,” http://www.antigraft.org/acid/, July 13, 2005 and August 17, 2005.
102
Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Per-
ceptions Index 2005,” http://www.transparency.org/, November 29, 2005.
103
Wei, Shang-Jin, “Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial
Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?” unpublished workshop paper,
http://www.nber.org/, June 29-July 1, 1998.
104
See Wei, Shang-Jin, ibid.
105
Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint and Kaufmann, Daniel, “Seize the State,
Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition,” The
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, September 2000.
106
Hellman, Joel S., Jones, Geraint and Kaufmann, Daniel, ibid.
Page 34 of 61
access to goods or services, the bribes involved can facilitate the
distribution of income to such employees.
But while one may think of many examples in which some
firms or individuals are made better off either by paying a bribe or
the opportunity to pay a bribe, the overall effect of corruption on
economic development, as Wei107 has noted, is negative.
Preventive Measures:
Corruption is, of course, not an insurmountable phenomenon; it
can actually be brought under control through governmental and
private initiatives. Let us consider some of the many ways in which
the scourge can be contained at the national, international and indi-
vidual levels, and the options available to executives of a transna-
tional company whose operations are conducted in a host country
where bribery of public officials is endemic—especially countries
that are listed annually in Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index.108
The following are also tendered in the discussion as important
considerations in a country’s fight against corruption in institution-
al settings: “differential pricing” and the design of facilities used in
the delivery of certain kinds of services.
1) The National Context: Let us first consider remedial actions that

can be taken at the national level in an effort to combat corruption
in public and private institutions in order to create a corruption-free
environment for good governance and sustainable socio-economic
development—that is, good governance, sustained political will,
zero tolerance, streamlining of cumbersome bureaucratic proced-
ures, provision of adequate remuneration to civil servants and pub-
lic officials, compulsory ethics education, and, among other meas-
ures, provision for an anti-graft hotline.
(a) Good Governance: Governance characterized by the ele-

ments of accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and
citizen participation in governmental decision-making is es-
sential in a country’s quest to abate the incidence of corrup-
tion.109 (A bird’s-eye view of what each of the four ele-
107
Wei, Shang-Jin, op. cit.
108
For example, see Transparency International, op. cit.
109
See Whitehead, Martin, “Fighting Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Can
We Win the War?” PriceWaterHouseCoopers: http://www.pwc.com/, December
25, 2005; Kututwa, Noel, “African Anti-Corruption Commitments: A Review of
Eight NEPAD Countries,” African Human Security Initiative—Paper 7: www.a-
fricanreview.com/, January 2005; and Wolf, Thomas and Gurgen, Emine, “Im-
proving Governance and Fighting Corruption in the Baltic and CIS Countries,”
Economic Issues, Number 21, http://www.imf.org/, July 2000.
Page 35 of 61
ments of good governance represents cited here is presen-
ted elsewhere in this discussion.)
With respect to flagrantly corrupt government regimes,
concerted pressure by donor countries, regional govern-
ments, and multilateral institutions—including the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the
World Trade Organization (WTO)—can prompt such re-
gimes to adopt the principles of good governance.
Besides, concrete support by the international com-
munity in the fight against corruption, as Kaufmann110 has
observed, can bolster the pursuit of government reforms
that are likely to lead to improvements in governance. Such
support may include the provision of advisory services, as
well as financial and material resources, to facilitate public-
education efforts, training programs in accounting and
auditing, reorganization of customs institutions, develop-
ment of transparent and effective treasury departments, and
government procurement mechanisms.111
(b) Sustained Political Will: The baleful nature of corruption

has made it inevitable for countries to create anti-corruption
agencies, or any semblance thereof, and charge them with
the responsibility of preventing, investigating, and prosec-
uting cases of alleged corruption in both public and private
institutions. Such an effort, however, requires national lead-
ership that is genuinely and perpetually committed to the
improvement of the operational efficiency and effective-
ness of complementary government agencies created for
the purpose of abating corrupt practices in both the private
and the public sectors through greater autonomy, non-
politicization, and adequate financial and logistical support
to the agencies.
Such commitment is essential if the agencies are to suc-
ceed in preventing corruption, and in assisting public and
private institutions in revising their methods of work and
procedures to remove or reduce opportunities that may fa-
cilitate corrupt practices.
The creation of an anti-corruption agency is, however,
not likely to facilitate the fight against corruption in any
meaningful way in the absence of sustained political will.
In the typical African country, unfortunately, political com-
mitment in the fight against corruption has tended to be
110
Kaufmann, Daniel, “Corruption: The Key Facts,” Foreign Policy, Summer
1997.
111
See Kaufmann, Daniel (1997), ibid.
Page 36 of 61
limited to efforts aimed at exposing the alleged misdeeds of
a selected number of individuals who served in previous
government regimes.112
In passing, one would perhaps do well to pinpoint the
conditions (cited by USAID113) that can contribute to an
anti-corruption agency’s success in the fight against corrup-
tion. Firstly, the existence of intra-agency conditions, which
include genuine independence from political influences,
freedom to investigate corruption-related complaints
without limitations, adequate staffing and remuneration,
well-funded staff training and development program, ac-
countability to the general public and all branches of the
state apparatus, and effective national integrity reviews
(conducted under the aegis of Transparency International)
aimed at discerning the causes of corruption and evaluating
the potential of the existing institutional framework to curb
the scourge.
Secondly, the existence of exogenous conditions, such
as sustained political stability, good governance, and evid-
ence that anti-corruption efforts result in national gains
rather than losses.
According to USAID,114 the absence of such internal and
external conditions can dispose an anti-corruption agency
or commission to serious weaknesses, including the possib-
ility of being used to serve as window dressing for donors
and other international observers by otherwise uncommit-
ted leaders, or to distract energy from long-term and more
important reforms needed to stem the incidence of corrup-
tion.
Besides, an anti-corruption commission or agency can
very easily and inevitably become a mere tool for harassing
political opponents and critics by an insecure or incompet-
ent government regime if such conditions are lacking.115
(c) Zero Tolerance: Each and every government leader should

be expected to serve the citizenry in a diligent, impartial
and honest manner. Any slight deviation from this respons-
ibility by any leader should attract serious and immediate
112
See Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Center (U4), “Conventions Over-
view: African Union,” http://www.u4.no/, October 27, 2004.
113
USAID, “Corruption and the Private Sector: Why Would Businesses Fight
against Corruption and How?” http://www.usaid.gov/, March 19, 2005, p. 17.
114
USAID (2005), ibid.
115
See USAID (2005), ibid, and Williams, Robert and Doig, Alan, “African
Anti-Corruption Commissions: Report 1,” http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/,
November 19, 2005.
Page 37 of 61
disciplinary action by Parliament, the executive President
or Prime Minister, or the Chief Justice—no excuses, and no
exceptions!
Unfortunately, most African leaders, as African parlia-
mentary delegates to the Pan-African Parliament confer-
ence held in Zambia in August 2005 have observed, are
seen on television preaching against corruption even when
they do not actually believe in the fight itself.116
(d) Red Tape and Rewards: To reduce corrupt practices in both

the public and private sectors, national governments and
business leaders need to identify and streamline cumber-
some bureaucratic procedures, as well as provide adequate
remuneration for both blue-collar and white-collar employ-
ees.
(e) Compulsory Ethics Education: A country’s national gov-

ernment needs to compel educational and training institu-
tions to provide basic ethics education by incorporating a
topic on ethical and professional conduct in selected core
subjects or courses. Such a measure is certainly in the pub-
lic interest because “to educate a [person] ... in mind and
not in morals,” as the late Theodore Roosevelt of the
United States once warned, “is to educate a menace to soci-
ety.”117
Representatives of the government, the business sector
and civil society in South Africa, for example, have recog-
nized the need for such an initiative: “Ethics training must
form a critical part of the ethics and awareness program of
all sectors [in the fight against corruption], including incor-
poration in the school curricula.”118
(f) Anti-Graft Hotline: The fight against corruption should

also include the initiation of a hotline through which mem-
bers of organizations and the general public can anonym-
ously or otherwise report observed cases of corrupt prac-
tices. The hotline, which should preferably fall under the
aegis of a country’s anti-corruption agency(ies), needs to be
116
See Sustainable Development International, “African Parliaments Have
Resolved to Tie African Leaders to Fighting Corruption,”
http://www.sustdev.org/, August 14, 2005.
117
Platt, Suzy, editor, Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations from
the Library of Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), p.
99.
118
National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), “Resolutions of the 2nd Nation-
al Anti-Corruption Summit,” http://www.info.gov.za/, March 23, 2005.
Page 38 of 61
widely publicized through the mass media, public notice
boards, and bulletin boards at places of work.
In this connection, it is also important to introduce
pieces of legislation designed to protect whistleblowers in
institutional settings. In South Africa, for example, repres-
entatives of the government, participants at a National Anti-
Corruption Summit convened in March 2005 resolved to
“encourage whistle-blowing and reporting in all sectors,
and … [initiate] measures [designed] to protect all persons
from victimization where they expose corrupt and unethical
practices.”119
Moreover, it is essential to establish a mechanism for in-
vestigating reported cases of corruption. The guiding prin-
ciple in this regard should be to treat individuals under in-
vestigation as being innocent until a verdict of guilt is ulti-
mately established against them by an independent, impar-
tial, and legitimate court.
(g) Distribution of Relief Supplies: There is a need for a gov-

ernment to create an autonomous agency to handle the dis-
tribution of relief food, cash and other supplies to com-
munities affected by floods, droughts and other kinds of
disasters in order to reduce politically clutched distribution
of such supplies. This can, for example, reduce the poten-
tial for selective distribution of relief food, particularly in
countries like Zimbabwe, where food has often been used
to gain political leverage by the ruling political party during
elections.120
National disaster management units, for example, need
to be autonomous in order for them to perform their duties
without any political meddling or manipulation. And gov-
ernment programs designed to provide monetary assistance
to the needy also need to be managed by autonomous agen-
cies, such as the Social Cash Transfer Scheme in Zambia,
which is a component of the Public Welfare Assistance
Scheme administered through the Ministry of Community
Development and Social Services.121
119
National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), ibid.
120
Dixon, Robyn, “Corruption Fuels Hunger in Zimbabwe,” Los Angeles
Times, December 9, 2007.
121
Kamboni, K.S., “The Social Cash Transfer in Zambia,” a paper presented
at the Basic Income Congress in Berlin, October 26, 2008; and Namwenda,
Henry, “Zambian politics!—RB Did Not Donate Food,” http://hapanda.tigblo-
g.org/, September 16, 2008.
Page 39 of 61
There are a number of other practical measures—paraphrased
from measures suggested by Tiihonen122 and Hodess123—that can
be taken at the national level by African governments in their quest
to stem corrupt practices by business executives, public officials
and civil servants; they are as follows:
(a) Passage of strict pieces of legislation designed to prevent

conflicts of interest in institutional settings;124
(b) Limitation of recourse to immunity by public officials and
business leaders and their organizations;
(c) Collaboration with other sovereign states in generating
rules for extraditing alleged fugitive perpetrators of corrupt
practices and other crimes to each other for prosecution;
(d) Initiation of inter-governmental mechanisms for repatriat-
ing stolen public resources to countries of origin; and
(e) Fostering the development of a free press to facilitate the
exposure of unscrupulous activities in institutional settings.
The SADC Protocol against Corruption has stipulated similar

preventive measures; they include the following:125 generation of
strict codes of conduct for public officials, ensuring transparency
in public procurement of goods and services, easy access to public
information by the citizenry and other relevant stakeholders, pro-
tection of whistle blowers of corrupt activities, establishment of in-
dependent and adequately financed anti-corruption agencies, initi-
ation of systems of accountability and controls, and the use of pub-
lic education and awareness as a means of eliciting zero tolerance
for corruption.
With respect to easy access to public information (or “freedom
of information”), countries that have enacted pieces of legislation
guaranteeing greater access to public information are, according to
David Banisar of the United Kingdom’s Freedom of Information
and International Privacy Program,126 “more efficient and less vul-
122
Tiihonen, Seppo, “Central Government Corruption in Historical Perspect-
ive,” in Tiihonen, Seppo, editor, The History of Corruption in Central Govern-
ment (Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2003), p 4.
123
Hodess, Robin, “Part One: Political Corruption,” http://www.globalcorrup-
tionreport.org/, July 1, 2004, pp. 12and 17.
124
For example, through “regulation of post public-sector employment” to
provide for a ‘cooling off’ period in order to prevent potential conflicts of in-
terest (see National Anti-Corruption Forum, 2005).
125
See Matsheza, Phil, “SADC Protocol against Corruption: Making It
Work,” Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa: http://www.sahrit.org/, October
9, 2001.
126
See Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity,
“Activists Say Freedom of Information Aids in the Fight [against] Corruption,”
http://www.ivforumglobal.org.br/, June 9, 2005.
Page 40 of 61
nerable to corruption.” He has, for example, attributed the success
of Finland, Norway and Sweden in the fight against the scourge to
laws guaranteeing access to public information adopted by the
three countries.127
2) The International Level: At the international level, a number of

intergovernmental instruments have been developed to combat cor-
ruption across national and/or regional borders, including the fol-
lowing:
(a) The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combat-

ing Corruption adopted in Maputo, Mozambique, on July
11, 2003 to provide a regional consensus on African coun-
tries’ obligations with respect to corrupt practices—particu-
larly in the areas of prevention, criminalization, internation-
al cooperation, and asset recovery;128
(b) The SADC Protocol against Corruption, designed to: (i)
promote the development of anti-corruption mechanisms at
the national level; (ii) promote cooperation in the fight
against corruption by national governments; and (iii) har-
monize anti-corruption national legislation in the region;129
(c) The Accra Declaration on Collaboration against Corruption
assented to in 2001 by members of the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS);
(d) The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption initi-
ated by the Organization of American States (OAS) in
March 1996 to provide for criminal and non-criminal meas-
ures for preventing and repressing domestic and transna-
tional corruption;
(e) The General Assembly Resolutions on Corruption gener-
ated by the United Nations in May and December 1996 to
provide for criminal and non-criminal measures for pre-
venting and repressing domestic and transnational corrup-
tion;
(f) The Convention on the Fight Against Corruption initiated
by the European Union in May 1997 to facilitate the crim-
inalization of active bribery of European Union public offi-
cials;
(g) The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Transactions, initiated in
127
See Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity,
ibid.
128
Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Center (U4), op. cit.; and “Measuring
Success in Five African Anti-Corruption Commissions,” http://www.u4.no/, July
—October, 2004.
129
See Matsheza, Phil, op. cit.
Page 41 of 61
November 1997 by the OECD, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and the Slovak Republic to oversee the criminalization of
active bribery of foreign public officials in international
business transactions, and corruption within multilateral
and bilateral donor organizations;
(h) The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption initiated by
the Council of Europe in November 1998 to oversee the
criminalization of domestic and transnational corruption;130
(i) The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises de-
signed to provide principles and standards of good business
practices consistent with applicable laws;131 and
(j) The United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption,
which, as Transparency International has noted,132 seeks to:
(i) accelerate the retrieval of stolen funds by affected mem-
ber-countries; (ii) push financial institutions worldwide to
take action against money laundering; (iii) enable law-en-
forcement agencies in member-countries to pursue foreign
companies and individuals that have engaged in corrupt
activities in their countries; and (iv) prohibit the bribing of
foreign public officials by cross-border business operat-
ors.133
3) The Individual Level: At the personal level, a high sense of mor-

als and self-respect can enable a civil servant or public official, for
example, to overcome the temptation of engaging in corrupt prac-
tices. Such a high sense of morals and self-respect may be a cul-
mination of an individual’s belief in God. Mr. Bill Barnard, a
former U.S. political commentator has somewhat postulated the
potential of divine intervention in a genuine believer’s conduct:
“religion is the anchor of morality.”134
4) Transnational Companies: Given the dour effects of corruption

on economic units discussed elsewhere in this treatise, transnation-
al companies need to avoid making investments in countries where
bribing of public officials is a normal feature in business-govern-
ment relations. In the remainder of this section, let us consider the
130
Institute of International Economics (IIE), “Corruption and the Private
Sector: Why Should Businesses Fight against Corruption and How?”:
http://www.iie.com/, 2001.
131
See Shenkar, Oded and Luo, Yadong, op. cit., pp. 510-513.
132
Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Per-
ceptions Index 2005,” http://www.transparency.org/, November 29, 2005.
133
A comprehensive listing of other important global, inter-governmental and
sectoral anti-corruption initiatives is provided by the United Nations’ Global
Compact (2003).
134
See Kyambalesa, Henry, Business Innovation and Competitiveness in the
Developing World (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1993), p. 115.
Page 42 of 61
options available to the managerial personnel of a transnational
company whose operations are already conducted in a host country
where bribery of public officials is a normal practice.
In dealing with the situation, its managers have the following
honorable options suggested by the Institute of International Eco-
nomics:135
(a) A Concerted Effort: Collaboration with both local and for-

eign managers in the country in denouncing and eschewing
bribes of any kind;
(b) Dialogue with the Government: Active participation in the
initiation of a coalition of managers, local business associ-
ations and chambers of commerce and industry designed to
influence the host government to combat the bribery of
public officials; or
(c) Withdrawal from the Country: Implore the parent company
to shift its operations from the country to a bribery-free
country, especially if none of the preceding options is ten-
able.
Moreover, transnational companies need to guard against what

the World Bank Group136 has referred to as “state capture”—that is,
a situation that obtains when a powerful corporation exerts undue
influence (often through illicit means) on its host country’s state in-
stitutions, laws, regulations, and/or policies.
5) Differential Pricing: For certain services, differential pricing can

enable a company or government agency to forestall the potential
for bribery. Let us consider a few examples of such services and
the nature of differential pricing that can be applied in this en-
deavor:
(a) Postal Services: Preferably, allocation of commercial or

private “postal boxes,” or provision of “bag services,”
should be made on demand upon renter’s payment of ap-
plicable fees and deposits for keys and/or locks. A postal
facility that may not have adequate boxes or bags to be al-
located on demand can, for example, charge a “regular” fee
for applications to be fulfilled within 15-30 days, and a fee
135
Sector: Why Should Businesses Fight against Corruption and How?”:
http://www.iie.com/, 2001; also see Kyambalesa, Henry, Socio-Economic Chal-
lenges: The African Context (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2004), p. 89.
136
The World Bank Group, “Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with
World Bank Institute Global Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann,”
http://web.worldbank.org/, April 2005.
Page 43 of 61
for “expedited” allocation to be made between 7 and 14
days.
(b) Telephone Services: Charges for connection of “land-
based” telephone services to households and businesses
may be differentiated as follows: a higher fee for expedited
connections made within 7 days in areas where telecommu-
nications infrastructure already exists, and a lower fee for
connections made between 8 and 14 days in such areas.
Connections to households and businesses in areas without
telecommunications infrastructure can, for example, attract
the lower fee and be guaranteed between 30 to 60 days.
(c) Public Utilities: Charges for water, natural gas and/or elec-
tricity connections to residential quarters and business
premises may be determined as in the case of telephone ser-
vices. To digress somewhat, the potential for corruption in
public utilities like water, natural gas and electricity com-
panies, as the World Bank137 has noted, is high due to the
monopolistic nature of the industries in which the compan-
ies are operated. Inevitably, corruption in such companies
can result in high utility costs and poor service delivery—a
situation which, among other factors, can dissuade private
investors from investing in a country’s economy.
In passing, “differential pricing” can enable providers of essen-

tial goods and/or services to collect revenue that would otherwise
be fetched by unscrupulous employees from impatient customers
with the wherewithal to bribe such employees. Moreover, formally
instituted differential pricing can forestall the possibility of cliques
of employees to generate time-consuming and frustrating bureau-
cratic procedures intended for no other purpose than to extract
“grease money” from potential bribers.138
6) The Delivery of Services: In the provision of certain services—

such as outpatient health care, immigration services, the issuance
of passports, and the processing of various kinds of licences—the
design and use of multiple and partially enclosed or open service
points can greatly reduce opportunities for bribery, especially if a
numbering system is employed whereby a client picks up a number
on arrival at a service facility and is served by the next available
service provider or representative.
137
World Bank, “Poverty Reduction and Social Policy Unit: Africa Region—
Support to the Government of Malawi’s Anti-Corruption Program,”
http://www1.worldbank.org/, November 1998.
138
See Green, Penny and Ward, Tony, op. cit.
Page 44 of 61
Peace and Stability139
It is not possible for any country to attain meaningful socio-eco-

nomic development that would provide a satisfactory standard of
living for would-be emigrants in the absence of sustained peace
and stability. This should be obvious because the war effort dis-
rupts productive socio-economic activities, and diverts essential re-
sources away from the pursuit of a country’s goals and aspirations.
Unfortunately, attempts at curbing conflicts among countries
and/or segments of a country’s people tend to have less or no im-
pact on outbreaks of war. Thus, conflicts have continued to be one
of the major “push factors” for African emigrants, besides the
heavy losses of property and human life which have often been oc-
casioned by such conflicts—including the devastating losses of hu-
man life in Ethiopia (1984-85), Sudan (1987-88), Somalia (1991-
92), Rwanda (1994),140 and the woeful experiences of war-ravaged
countries like Angola, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon each and every political, tribal
and military leader in the African Union to be mindful of the need
to find ways and means of forestalling war and instability. Among
other things, there is a need for political leaders and their constitu-
ents to embrace the following elements of democratic governance:
accountability, transparency, adequate checks and balances, a free
press, respect for the rule of law, a viable mechanism for peace-
fully replacing incompetent leaders, and respect for human
rights.141
Moreover, there is a need for serious consideration of ethnic
and other interests in the distribution of power, educational facilit-
ies, health services, and so forth.
Logan’s Prescriptions
139
This section has benefited greatly from an informal discussion with Dr.
Mathurin C. Houngnikpo at the University of Denver concerning the issue of
“peace, stability and socio-economic development.”
140
Prendergast, J., Hope and Crisis in Africa (Washington, DC: Inter-Agency
Group and Center of Concern, 1996), pp. 3-4.
141
Annan, K., The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace
and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary General to the
United Nations Security Council (New York: United Nations, 1998), p. 3. Also
see Hyden, G. and Bratton, M., editors, Governance and Politics in Africa
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992).
Page 45 of 61
To stem the exodus of trained nationals to foreign countries, Afric-
an governments need to consider such initiatives as the following,
which are adapted from remedial measures suggested by Logan:142
1) Proper human resource planning so that suitable jobs can be

reserved for professional and technical personnel undergoing
training locally and abroad;
2) Initiation of employment procedures designed to ensure that

trained nationals have a fair chance of competing with expatri-
ates for high-level positions;
3) Engaging in more active recruitment of qualified nationals

living abroad, whose decision not to return home might have
been partly precipitated by the cost of transportation and/or the
uncertainties associated with finding a worthwhile job in the
home country;
4) Seeking international collaboration in research funding as a

means of improving local researchers’ remuneration; and
5) Requiring nationals sponsored by local institutions to sign

an enforceable contract obliging them to pay back the costs of
their education and/or training if they decide not to work for
the sponsor for a prescribed number of years upon completion
of studies or training.
Low-Interest Loans
The effort to stem the exodus of trained nationals to foreign coun-

tries may also require a country’s national and local governments
to grant low-interest loans to professionals based in foreign coun-
tries so that they can return to the country to start and manage their
own business undertakings. Such loans also need to be extended to
locally based professionals to lure them from migrating to foreign
countries for employment.
There are, in fact, other benefits which can accrue from pursu-
ing such an initiative. According to the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, a growing body of empirical evidence
supports the widely held view that small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) are instrumental to socio-economic development;143
142
Logan, B.I., “The Reverse Transfer of Technology from Sub-Saharan
Africa to the United States,” op. cit., pp. 611-612.
143
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, “Financial Policies for
Strengthening SMEs Through Microcredit and Credit Guarantee Schemes,”
http://www.unece.org, April 1997; also see Acs, Z.J. et al, editors, Entrepreneur-
Page 46 of 61
they can, as such, play an enormous role in improving the socio-
economic welfare of a lot of people in a country.
For example, they can collectively function as a vehicle through
which a country’s government can economically empower its
people by enabling them to participate actively and directly in their
country’s commercial and industrial activities.
There are, of course, other ways in which SMEs can positively
contribute to the improvement of the socio-economic well-being of
a country’s people, such as the following:
1) Alternative Employment: They can create employment op-

portunities for talented citizens and family members who can-
not find jobs in large business establishments.
2) Economic Empowerment: They can function as a vehicle

through which the government can economically empower the
people by enabling them to participate actively and directly in
their country’s commercial and industrial activities.
3) Income Distribution: They can facilitate the generation of

wealth for all sectors of the national economy and thereby re-
duce existing income disparities; as such, they can make a pos-
itive contribution to the evolvement of an egalitarian society.
4) Goods and Services: They can contribute to the improve-

ment of the social and economic welfare of people in their host
communities through the provision of various kinds of needed
goods and services.
5) Economic Backbone: They can function as the backbone of

Zambia’s economy if they are mainly operated by citizens, as
they would be both indigenous and permanent, as Sardanis144
has maintained.
The PHR Proposal
With respect to the exodus of nurses and medical doctors, a Physi-

cians for Human Rights (PHR) report—cited by Clifton145—has
proposed the following measures for governments to consider in
their quest to address the exodus of such personnel:
ship, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
144
Sardanis, Andrew, Africa, Another Side of the Coin—Northern Rhodesia’s
Final Years and Zambia’s Nationhood (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2003).
145
Clifton, Eli, “HIV/AIDS: Medical ‘Brain Drain’ Worsens Africa’s Crisis,”
op. cit.
Page 47 of 61
1) A sharp increase in investment in rural healthcare infrastruc-
ture;
2) Provision of incentives designed to induce healthcare profes-

sionals to accept assignments in, and/or postings to, under-
served regions of a country; and
3) Reorientation of training and recruitment practices to in-

crease the number of new healthcare professionals who are
likely to work in rural areas.
It is important for African governments to include these meas-

ures in their healthcare policies and programs if they are to meet
the World Health Organization’s (WTO) minimum standards of
100 nurses and 20 physicians per 100,000 people.146
Africa’s Brain Gain
A new initiative referred to as “Africa’s Brain Gain” has been

mooted to promote the generation of jobs on the continent for
trained natives who are currently living abroad, and to make em-
ployment information available by means of an online bulletin
board of employment opportunities in Africa through which skilled
indigenous Africans living overseas can register as candidates for
jobs with multinational corporations, African governments and de-
velopment agencies that support the continent’s development
agenda.147
The objective of Africa’s Brain Gain is to facilitate the return of
native talents to Africa by enabling Africans worldwide to share
their expertise through participation in projects in their home coun-
tries, making it possible for those who desire to return to the con-
tinent to take up jobs and consultancies to do so; and to pool finan-
cial and material resources together to undertake investment pro-
jects in their home countries.148
The DENI Approach
An approach proposed by the U.S.-Africa Business Council in 1994

would have played an important role in encouraging some of the
146
See Physicians for Human Rights, An Action Plan to Prevent Brain Drain:
Building Equitable Health Systems in Africa—A Report (Boston, Massachusetts:
Physicians for Human Rights, June 2004), p. 2.
147
Mambwe, Kennedy, “Africa Acts against Brain Drain,” Lusaka Informa-
tion Dispatch, www.dispatc.co.zm/, September 7, 2004.
148
Mambwe, Kennedy, ibid.
Page 48 of 61
professionals in foreign countries to return to their native countries.
The proposal, which is referred to as DENI (acronym for Direct Ex-
patriate Nationals Investment),149 is aimed at reducing bilateral debt
by means of selling a debtor country’s debts to its nationals abroad
at heavy discounts to a dollar (payable in the local currencies of the
foreign countries in which the nationals reside), for which the buyer
would get a dollar-denominated debt instrument bearing the original
amount of the debt bought from the United States Treasury Depart-
ment.
The buyer would then take the debt instrument to his or her coun-
try, where the country’s government would credit him or her with
the local-currency equivalent of the amount on the debt instrument
for investment in any state or parastatal company that is earmarked
for privatization.
However, DENI has a number of weaknesses which diminish its
potential to contribute meaningfully to the resolution of the debt
crisis,150 and to encourage professionals to return to their home
countries. First, some debtor nations have too few of their citizens
who are resident abroad to constitute a worthwhile market for their
external debts. Second, a significant number of debtor nations’ cit-
izens who are abroad is composed of students and “economic
refugees” who generally have no funds to invest.
Third, the prospect that those who left their countries for political
or other reasons to live and/or work in industrialized nations will be
enticed to return home by DENI is very slim; the reasons which
prompted such people to leave their home countries would generally
override their patriotism and/or “attractiveness” of investment pro-
spects provided by DENI. Fourth, the requirement that DENI debt
instruments are only good for investment in companies hitherto
owned by debtor-country governments may be homely to those who
have a preference for self-employment or owning shares in a com-
pany not previously owned by a government.
Moreover, the fact that the debt instruments involved cannot be
converted to cash to prevent governments from printing money to
pay holders of debt instruments is a serious disincentive to those
prospective debt buyers who do not have surplus funds for use in the
event of unexpected personal or family problems.
The IOM/AU Partnership
149
For details concerning this debt-reduction proposal, see Davies, D., “A Ma-
gic Model,” West Africa, Number 4005, July 4-10, 1994, pp. 1178-80, and West
Africa, “Give Magic ‘Formula’ a Chance,” Number 4005, July 4-10, 1994, pp.
1166-67.
150
See Kyambalesa, Henry, Socio-Economic Challenges: The African Con-
text, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
Page 49 of 61
A partnership developed between the African Union (AU) and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) framework for tech-
nical cooperation and assistance to African governments on a broad
range of migration issues.151 Among other areas, the two institutions
agreed to undertake joint activities in capacity building and the re-
turn of skilled African nationals to their countries of origin to mitig-
ate the negative effects of the brain drain on the African continent.
African countries which have a genuine desire to seek the return
of skilled nationals who are based in the Diaspora have sought
membership in the AU/IOM partnership.
The RQAN Program
Some African governments have entered into bilateral and/or multi-

lateral arrangements with various international agencies for assist-
ance in building their national capacities through such arrangements
as the Return and Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals
(RQAN) program. The RQAN Program has run through three four-
year phases.152 The first pilot phase began in 1983 and was
sponsored by the U.S. government and the European Union. During
this phase, the program helped to return 503 qualified nationals to
Kenya, Somalia and Zimbabwe.
Phase II of the RQAN program, financed by the European Com-
mission within the context of the Lomé-ACP Conventions,153 facilit-
ated the return of 619 professionals to six participating countries:
Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Phase III
returned 887 to Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone
and Mozambique in addition to the six countries of phase II.154
The RQAN program is now complete. The examination carried
out in 2000 by over 20 African States led to the formulation of novel
and pragmatic approaches to the mobility of skills and which were
translated into the foundation of the Migration for Development in
Africa (MIDA) program.
MIDA is a program for mobilizing the skills and financial re-
sources of Africans in the Diaspora for development in Africa. In
this regard, IOM is working in partnership with regional bodies such
as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East Afric-
an Cooperation (EAC), and the League of Arab States (LAS). Initi-
151
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center (SIRDC), op.
cit.
152
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center (SIRDC), ibid.
153
“ACP” refers to former British colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific.
154
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center (SIRDC), op.
cit.
Page 50 of 61
atives such as MIDSA and the Dakar Declaration provide a strong
framework for MIDA program development.155
Other Considerations
There are many other important policy initiatives which countries

that are affected by the exodus of trained personnel need to con-
sider in their quest to address the problem. Such initiatives may in-
clude the following:156
1) Restrictive policies aimed at delaying emigration—such as

by adding extra years to medical students’ training, requiring
doctors and other professionals to stay on for a number of years
to ‘pay back’ what they ‘owe’ to society, or to incorporate the
delay within the training period, thus ensuring that certification
follows rather than precedes a spell of public service;
2) Tax proposals requiring native professionals trained through

the public treasury to pay a certain percentage of their incomes
earned abroad to their home-country governments; and/or
3) Entering into international agreements that would require

developed countries’ governments not to recruit skilled people
from contracting less-developed countries.
Another approach would be for countries affected by the brain

drain to initiate international agreements requiring employers in
foreign countries who may hire professionals trained through pub-
lic resources to reimburse the home governments for financial and
material resources committed to the training of the professionals.
Other approaches designed to mitigate the exodus of profes-
sionals may include the following: (a) introduction of retention al-
lowances for skilled personnel on government payroll; (b) provi-
sion for research grants for academic staff in government-suppor-
ted educational institutions; (c) provision for car-ownership and
home-ownership schemes; and/or (d) upward salary adjustments.157
A SUMMING UP
155
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Center (SIRDC), ibid.
156
Adapted from Mutume, Gumisai, “Reversing Africa’s Brain Drain: New
Initiatives Tap Skills of African Experts,” op. cit., and Cohen, Robin, “Brain
Drain Migration,” www.queensu.ca/, July 24, 2008.
157
Adapted from Ng’andwe, Talent, “Zambia: Government Announces Steps
to Plug the Brain Drain,” http://allafrica.com/, November 26, 2007.
Page 51 of 61
An attempt is made in this article to discern the causes, concomit-
ant effects and the positive side of the exodus of skilled and profes-
sional personnel, and viable ways and means of addressing the
problem.
The brain drain is, no doubt, one of the major constraints on
contemporary Africa’s quest for heightened socio-economic devel-
opment. African leaders who are committed to the finding of viable
solutions to the exodus of skilled citizens are, therefore, more
likely to facilitate and expedite the process of socio-economic de-
velopment in their countries. This article is mainly intended for
such leaders.
In conclusion, a proactive strategy for redressing the brain drain
by African leaders is needed, because prevention of the exodus of
professional personnel is actually better than cure, so to speak.
Such a strategy would require leaders to pursue initiatives designed
to prevent the exodus of professionals rather than waste resources
on bolstering the return of indigenous talent.
Such initiatives may include the following: (a) making im-
provements in education, healthcare, food security, and crime-
fighting; (b) adherence to the dictates of good governance; (c) in-
troduction of restrictive policies aimed at delaying emigration; (d)
introduction of retention allowances for skilled personnel on gov-
ernment payroll; (e) provision for research grants for academic
staff in government-supported educational institutions; (f) provi-
sion for car-ownership and home-ownership schemes; and/or (g)
upward salary adjustments.158
There is a very slim chance for emigrants to be induced to re-
turn to their native countries during their active working lives.
Here is why: it would not be easy for them to shirk the profession-
al, marital and/or other kinds of relationships developed with cit-
izens of host nations. Moreover, emigrants’ involvement in medic-
al, mortgage and/or retirement schemes in foreign countries can be
a major consideration in making the decision to return to their nat-
ive countries during their active working lives.
Besides, the inconvenience which the return to one’s home
country may cause on school-going children and/or dependants can
have an important bearing on one’s decision in this regard. <<<
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The Brain Drain: Causes, Effects and Remedies

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THE BRAIN DRAIN:

CAUSES, EFFECTS AND REMEDIES

African countries continually lose a significant number of trained

The term “brain drain” may be defined broadly as the migration of

1) “Primary external brain drain,” which occurs when trained

2) “Secondary external brain drain,” which occurs when

3) “Internal brain drain,” which occurs when trained and

In this paper, the discourse is about the “primary external brain

CAUSES OF THE EXODUS

There are many factors obtaining in countries which are affected

Poor Conditions of Service

Poor conditions of service in migrants’ home countries are, by and

Human Rights Abuses

Human rights abuses or violations in Africa take many forms, in-

1) Widespread torture and ill-treatment of suspects in Burundi,

2) Women and girls raped and sexually abused by perpetrators

3) Recruitment of child soldiers as combatants and sex slaves

4) Malicious prosecution, arbitrary arrest and excessive force

According to Whande,11 gross human rights abuses and govern-

Misplacement of human resources has contributed to what Logan13

Disregard for Local Talent

The unfortunate and common tendency among local and national

“A member of the Central Committee has called for an urgent

But if this state of affairs is actually true, it is certainly govern-

1) According to an article published in the Times of Zambia in

2) In November 2008, Wesley Ngwenya30 made the following

Limited Access to Education

Formal education in industrialized nations is, by and large, both

Poor Healthcare Services

A High Level of Crime

Unprecedented and widespread poverty and unemployment in the

Valued Foreign Relationships

It is not unusual for indigenous Africans who reside in foreign

THE ADVERSE EFFECTS

In less than two decades, the African continent has, according to

1) Loss of Health Services: Healthcare professionals contribute

2) Loss of Supervisors: Practicing doctors and senior nurses

3) Loss of Mentors for Trainees: In any given country, practi-

4) Loss of Public Health Researchers: Many of a country’s spe-

5) Loss of Role Models for Children: Doctors and nurses are

6) Loss of Potential Entrepreneurs: By virtue of their education

7) Loss of Domestic Jobs: Doctors and nurses usually provide

Let us now consider a few examples of the dire effects associ-

(a) A mismatch between the professional personnel involved

THE POSITIVE SIDE

REDRESSING THE BRAIN DRAIN

There are many ways in which countries affected by the exodus of

Elements of Good Governance:

1) Accountability: Availability of a mechanism for ensuring

2) Transparency: Public access to information about the state,

3) Rule of Law: The existence of non-discriminatory laws and

4) Citizen Participation: Availability of channels and mechan-

1) The Patrimonial State: A nation-state in which government

2) The Predatory State: A nation-state in which government of-

3) The Shadow State: A nation-state that is generally character-

4) The Collapsed State: A nation-state in which common

5) The Repressive State: A nation-state where leaders impose

For a country with only 11.5 million people, such a Cabinet is

1) Education, Training and Sport: To be directly responsible for

2) Public Health and Sanitation: To be directly responsible for

3) Agriculture and Food Security: To be directly responsible for

4) Finance and Revenue: To be directly responsible for ad-

5) Commerce and Industry: To be directly responsible for ad-