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BEFORE THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION -------------------------------------------------------------- x : IN RE FACEBOOK, INC. IPO : SECURITIES & DERIVATIVE LITIGATION : -------------------------------------------------------------- x DEFENDANTS’  BRIEF  IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO TRANSFER ACTIONS TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1407 FOR COORDINATED AND/OR CONSOLIDATED PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP Richard D. Bernstein (rbernstein@willkie.com) Tariq Mundiya (tmundiya@willkie.com) Todd G. Cosenza (tcosenza@willkie.com) Sameer Advani (sadvani@willkie.com) 787 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10019 Telephone: (212) 728-8000 Facsimile: (212) 728-8111 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP Andrew B. Clubok (aclubok@kirkland.com) Brant W. Bishop, P.C. (bbishop@kirkland.com) 601 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 446-4836 Facsimile: (212) 446-4900 Thomas D. Yannucci (tyannucci@kirkland.com) Susan E. Engel (seengel@kirkland.com) 655 15th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 879-5000 Facsimile: (202) 879-5200

MDL NO. ____

Attorneys for Defendants Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl K. Sandberg, David A. Ebersman, David M. Spillane, Marc L. Andreessen, Erskine B. Bowles, James W. Breyer, Donald E. Graham, Reed Hastings, and Peter A. Thiel DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP James P. Rouhandeh (rouhandeh@davispolk.com) Charles S. Duggan (charles.duggan@davispolk.com) Andrew Ditchfield (andrew.ditchfield@davispolk.com) 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 Telephone: (212) 450-4000 Facsimile: (212) 701-5800 Attorneys for Defendants Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and Goldman, Sachs & Co.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................5 A. B. Factual Background .................................................................................................5 Litigation Related To The IPO ..............................................................................10

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................12 I. II. THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE DISTRICT. ...........................12 THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. .....................................................................................................................14 A. B. C. Transfer To The Southern District Of New York Will Best Facilitate Efficient Discovery In The Actions. ......................................................14 Transfer To The Southern District Of New York Will Ensure Consistent Rulings On Critical Issues....................................................................17 The Southern District Of New York Has Distinct Strengths For Handling Complex Multidistrict Securities Litigation. .........................................18

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page

City of Omaha, Neb. Civilian Emps.’  Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., No. 11-2575, 2012 WL 1624022 (2d Cir. May 10, 2012) .................................................17 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) ...........................................................................................................14 In  re  Adelphia  Commc’ns  Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2003)...............................................................................18 In re AOL Time Warner Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2002)...............................................................................12 In re Bank of Am. Corp., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (J.P.M.L. 2009)...............................................................................18 In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. Foreign Exchange Transactions Litig., MDL No. 2335, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53533 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 16, 2012) ........................13 In re The Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2008)...............................................................................12 In re Cygnus Telecomm. Tech., LLC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2001)...............................................................................13 In re Fannie Mae Sec. & ERISA Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2009)...............................................................................18 In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (Freddie Mac) Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2009).........................................................................12, 18 In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1384 (J.P.M.L. 2002)...............................................................................18 In re IPO Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2003)...............................................................................18 In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (J.P.M.L. 2004)...................................................................12, 13, 14 In re Mun. Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1386 (J.P.M.L. 2008).........................................................................16, 18 In re Res. Exploration, Inc. Sec. Litig., 483 F. Supp. 817 (J.P.M.L. 1980)......................................................................................14

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In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2009).........................................................................11, 12 In  re  Revlon  Inc.  S’holders  Litig., 990 A.2d 940 (Del. Ch. 2010)............................................................................................12 In  re  Superior  Offshore  Int’l,  Inc.  Sec.  Litig., Civ. A. No. 08-0687, 2010 WL 2305742 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2010) ..................................17 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2002)...................................................................12, 15, 18 In re Xerox Corp. Sec. Litig., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2002)...............................................................................13 N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali Series 2006-QO1 Trust, No. 11-1683, 2012 WL 1481519 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2012) .................................................17 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................13 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) ...........................................................................................................18 Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) .......................................................................................................................12 Other Authorities David A. Westenberg, Initial Public Offerings: A Practical Guide to Going Public, (PLI Sept. 2011) ...................................................................................................................5 Charles J. Johnson, Jr. & Joseph McLaughlin, Corporate Finance and the Securities Laws, (4th ed. 2011 Supp.) .............................................................................................................9 Manual of Complex Litigation (4th ed.) ........................................................................................19 Securities Offering Reform, S.E.C. Release No. 33-8591, Release No. 34-52056, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005).....................................................................................8

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Defendants Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook” or  the  “Company”), Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl K. Sandberg, David A. Ebersman, David M. Spillane, Marc L. Andreessen, Erskine B. Bowles, James W. Breyer, Donald E. Graham, Reed Hastings, Peter A. Thiel (collectively, the “Facebook  Defendants”), and the three lead underwriter defendants  (collectively,  the  “Lead Underwriter  Defendants”)1 respectfully submit this brief in support of their motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407 the actions set forth in the Schedule of Actions2 (the  “Actions”)  to the Southern District of New York for consolidated and/or coordinated pretrial proceedings. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT More than 40 lawsuits in various federal and state courts have been filed in the last three weeks concerning  Facebook’s  May  18,  2012  initial  public  offering  (the  “IPO”). This multiplicity of proceedings makes this the quintessential case for centralized MDL treatment. All of the factors enunciated by this Panel overwhelmingly point to the Southern District of New York as the most appropriate, convenient, and efficient forum to centralize pretrial proceedings in the civil litigation concerning the IPO.
1

The three Lead Underwriter Defendants are: Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and Goldman, Sachs & Co. The other underwriters, who are jointly represented with the Lead Underwriter Defendants and are named as defendants in various combinations in certain of the Actions, concur in this motion to transfer. Those other underwriter defendants are: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., Allen & Company LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Blaylock Robert Van LLC, BMO Capital Markets Corp., C.L. King & Associates, Inc., Cabrera Capital Markets, LLC, CastleOak Securities, L.P., Cowen and Company, LLC., E*TRADE Securities LLC, Itaú BBA USA Securities, Inc., Lazard Capital Markets LLC, Lebenthal & Co., LLC, Loop Capital Markets LLC, M.R. Beal & Company, Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc., Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc., Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., Pacific Crest Securities LLC, Piper Jaffray & Co., Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Samuel A. Ramirez & Co., Inc., Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., The Williams Capital Group, L.P., and William Blair & Company, L.L.C. (together with the Lead Underwriter Defendants,  the  “Underwriter  Defendants”).
2

Submitted concurrently herewith is a Schedule of Actions that includes the information required by Rule 6.1(b)(ii) of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

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Within days of the IPO, shareholder class action and derivative lawsuits were filed in the Southern District of New York, the Northern District of California, and California State court, against Facebook, its directors, certain of its officers, and the Underwriter Defendants.3 These lawsuits purport to challenge certain disclosures  in  advance  of  Facebook’s   IPO. In particular, on May 9, 2012, Facebook publicly disclosed in writing that, based on early data in the second quarter, the trend had continued of the growth in daily average Facebook users outpacing growth in the number of ads  delivered  to  its  users.    Facebook’s  May  9  disclosure   identified certain product decisions and the increased usage of mobile devices as likely causes for this continued trend – risk factors that Facebook had also disclosed in its initial Registration Statement and Prospectus on February 1, 2012, and all amendments. Facebook’s  May  9  disclosure  and final effective prospectus were widely reported and analyzed in the media in the week leading up to its May 18 IPO. Facebook also followed customary practice in having follow-up  conversations  with  the  underwriters’  analysts  about  the   May 9 disclosure and about Facebook’s  forward-looking projections. According to the plaintiffs, certain of these analysts then discussed their forward-looking forecasts with certain institutional investors. Over 30 copy-cat securities and derivative lawsuits against all (or some combination of)  the  Facebook  and  Underwriter  Defendants  now  assert  the  theory  that  Facebook’s   conversations  with  the  underwriters’  analysts  and  the  analysts’  subsequent conversations with certain  investors  create  liability  under  federal  securities  laws  (the  “1933  Act  Lawsuits”).    The   plaintiffs allege that after the May 18 IPO date, Facebook’s  stock  price  declined when the public

3

The Facebook and Underwriter Defendants vigorously dispute the claims against them. The facts set forth in this motion are based on allegations in the complaints, press articles, and counsel’s  understanding.    Consistent  with  Section  4.15  of  the  Multidistrict Litigation Manual, we do not burden the Panel with fact witness affidavits at this time, but reserve the right to provide such affidavits in the event any respondent disputes pertinent facts. -2-

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allegedly first learned about these prior discussions. Investors have also sued NASDAQ, the  stock  exchange  on  which  Facebook’s   shares are listed. Six putative class actions were filed in the Southern District of New York (the “NASDAQ  Lawsuits”)  against NASDAQ Stock Market LLC and its affiliates (collectively, “NASDAQ”)  alleging that technical problems and other trading-related errors affecting Facebook’s stock – which NASDAQ has subsequently admitted – created market uncertainty and caused investor losses. (See Jenny Strasburg, et al., Nasdaq CEO Offers Facebook Apology, WALL ST. J., A1 (June 7, 2012) (“Nasdaq’s chief executive said he and other exchange officials ‘owe  the  industry  an  apology’ for the technical problems  that  marred  Facebook  Inc.’s highly anticipated stock offering last month …‘[c]learly  we  didn't  succeed  here,’  Mr.  Greifeld  said  in his  office  at  Nasdaq’s  MarketSite  in  New  York’s  Times  Square.”) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. R).) Thus, both the 1933 Act Lawsuits and the NASDAQ Lawsuits seek recovery on behalf of overlapping putative classes of investors for overlapping losses. Because of overlapping issues, centralization of the 1933 Act Lawsuits and the NASDAQ  Lawsuits  (collectively,  the  “Facebook  IPO  Actions”)  is  warranted.    As  demonstrated   below, the Southern District of New York is the most appropriate and convenient forum to oversee these coordinated and/or consolidated proceedings. First, the events challenged in the Facebook IPO Actions occurred largely in New York.4 The 1933 Act Lawsuits, for example, focus on alleged conversations with the underwriters’  analysts  and  the  analysts’  subsequent  revisions and discussions of their forwardlooking forecasts. Most analysts received and processed Facebook’s  forward-looking

4

The Facebook and Underwriter Defendants believe that the 1933 Act Lawsuits should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. This motion nevertheless addresses, as this Panel traditionally does, what discovery would occur if the complaints are not dismissed. -3-

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projections, and made their own forecasts, predominantly in New York, where they are located. According to the complaints, the analysts also allegedly orally shared their forecasts with certain institutional investors, also located predominantly in New York or nearby. Likewise, the NASDAQ Lawsuits focus on New York conduct. Thus, in all of the Facebook IPO Actions, witnesses and documents located largely in New York would be the focus of discovery. Second, centralization of all Facebook IPO Actions should also occur in the Southern District of New York because it is the sole federal forum where plaintiffs have brought the NASDAQ Lawsuits. The 1933 Act Lawsuits and the NASDAQ Lawsuits raise overlapping issues, such as causation and class certification. The plaintiffs in the NASDAQ Lawsuits contend that investor losses  were  caused  by  NASDAQ’s  trading  errors. In contrast, plaintiffs in the 1933 Act Lawsuits contend that the Facebook and Underwriter Defendants caused investor losses. Coordination of all Facebook IPO Actions in the Southern District of New York is the best way both to streamline discovery and to eliminate the risk of inconsistent rulings on potentially critical issues. Third, most plaintiffs have selected the Southern District of New York as the more appropriate forum. Twenty-two of the 26 Facebook IPO Actions pending in federal court are in the Southern District of New York. In particular, 16 of the 20 federal court 1933 Act Lawsuits were commenced in the Southern District. In addition, all six of the federal court NASDAQ Lawsuits have been commenced in the Southern District, along with the only action asserting claims against certain of the underwriters under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the  “1934  Act  Lawsuit”)  and the only derivative action commenced in federal court. Fourth, the Southern District of New York has the resources and experience to manage multi-party, multi-district securities litigation. For all of these reasons, this Panel should

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order (i) transfer to the Southern District of New York of all 1933 Act Lawsuits filed in other federal courts; and (ii) pretrial consolidation and/or coordination in the Southern District of New York of the 1933 Act Lawsuits, the NASDAQ Lawsuits, and the 1934 Act Lawsuit. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On February 1, 2012, Facebook filed its initial registration statement in connection with the IPO on Form S-1 (the  “S-1”). (Cosenza Decl. ¶ 3.) The IPO was underwritten by a syndicate of 33 financial institutions. (See supra, at n.1) Twenty-three of those 33 underwriters have their U.S. headquarters in New York, including all three of the Lead Underwriter Defendants – Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and Goldman, Sachs & Co. In contrast, only two of the 33 underwriters are headquartered in California. New York is thus where most analyst witnesses are located and a very significant part of the underwriting activity occurred. As part of the process leading up to the IPO, Facebook had meetings with analysts employed by the Underwriter Defendants. As is customary and as the media coverage reflected, Facebook discussed certain forward-looking projections with the analysts. (See David A. Westenberg, Initial Public Offerings: A Practical Guide to Going Public, § 19:7.2[B] (PLI Sept. 2011) (analyst pre-IPO  diligence  includes  “discussions with management concerning the company’s  financial  model”  so  that  analysts  can  “develop  earnings  forecasts”) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. A); see also Kayla Tausche, Facebook to Hold Additional IPO Briefing with Analysts in April: Sources, CNBC.com, (March  21,  2012)  (“Holding  [analysts]  discussions  before  an  IPO  is   a commonplace practice that often touches on forward-looking information for the purposes of allowing sell-side  analysts  to  build  research  models.”)  (Cosenza  Decl.,  Ex.  B).)

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Beginning on May 7, 2012, presentations for potential investors, known as the roadshow, kicked off in New York. (Jessica Guynn, Mark Zuckerberg kicks off Facebook roadshow to pitch IPO, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. C).) The opening session, held at the Sheraton Hotel in New York City, was  attended  by  “[h]undreds of institutional investors.”    (Id.) As the roadshow continued, meetings on five more days occurred in New York. (Cosenza Decl. ¶ 6.) On May 9, 2012, Facebook filed an amendment to the S-1, along with  a  “free   writing”  prospectus (the  “May  9  Amendment”), which disclosed, inter alia, that the trend of Facebook’s  daily average user growth outpacing growth in the number of ads delivered had continued during the start of the second quarter of 2012. (Twining Compl. ¶ 71; Cosenza Decl. ¶ 7.) The May 9 Amendment ascribed that trend to the increased usage of Facebook on mobile devices, in which display advertising was limited at the time, as well as certain product changes that affected the volume of advertising that could be displayed. (Twining Compl. ¶ 71.) The May 9 Amendment also warned about the negative impact of the  trend  on  the  Company’s   revenues and financial results. (Id.) As is customary, and like the original S-1, the May 9 Amendment did not include forward-looking projections. The May 9 Amendment received prompt and extensive media coverage. Reports in many journals focused on the additional warning concerning the negative impact of increased mobile usage of Facebook on the  Company’s  revenues. (See, e.g., VentureBeat.com, Facebook warns potential investors that mobile is an even bigger risk than originally disclosed, WASH. POST (May 10, 2012) (Facebook “amended  its  prospectus  to  warn  potential  investors  that mobile is an even bigger risk than originally disclosed . . .The revised mobile warning seems especially pertinent  after  Facebook  reported  a  disappointing  first  quarter.”) (emphasis added) (Cosenza

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Decl., Ex. D); April Dembosky, Facebook admits to mobile weakness, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 9, 2012) (“Facebook  said  the  migration  of  its  users  to  mobile  platforms  is  compromising  its  ability   to make money from them, according to additions the company made to its IPO regulatory filing on Wednesday. . . .The new information echoes a common refrain from Facebook executives, both historically, and recently, in the company’s  IPO  road  show  video.”) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. E).)5 Plaintiffs allege that, on or about May 9, 2012, Facebook also called analysts employed by the underwriters concerning revised forward-looking projections. (Alexander Compl. ¶ 21; Braun Compl. ¶ 39; Roffe Compl. ¶ 25; Lightman Compl. ¶ 73; Reichenbaum Compl. ¶ 29.) Of the 21 analysts who were allegedly called, 14 were based in the New York area. (Cosenza Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs also allege that certain of the analysts revised their forecasts as a result of the discussions with Facebook and provided those lower revenue forecasts orally “to  certain  preferred  investors” but not to plaintiffs. (Braun Compl. ¶¶ 38, 40; Roffe Compl.

5

See also Shayndi Rice, Facebook Reveals Vulnerability in Mobile, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2012) (“But  Facebook  acknowledged  that  it  has  limited  ads  on  its  mobile  site,  so  that  user  growth   hasn’t  led to an increase in ad revenue. . . . [Facebook] has warned that as more people use Facebook on mobile phones rather than  personal  computers,  that  trend  ‘may  negatively  affect’   financial  results.”)  (Cosenza  Decl.,  Ex.  F);;  Nick  Bilton,  Facebook Says, Lower Your Expectations About Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (May  9,  2012)  (“The  company  also  warned  that  if   Facebook users continued to gain access to the social network on mobile devices, instead of computers,  and  if  Facebook  was  ‘unable  to  successfully  implement  monetization  strategies  for   our  mobile  users,’  the  company’s  revenue  growth  could  be  harmed.”)  (Cosenza  Decl.,  Ex.  G);;   Steven Russolillo, Facebook Bull Shows Cautious Side, WALL ST. J. (May  11,  2012)  (“[I]n  a   filing  on  Wednesday,  Facebook  offered  a  word  of  caution  about  advertising  revenue,”  and,  as  a   result, Ken Sena, a tech analyst at Evercore Partners,  “[r]educ[ed]  his  valuation range by $10 billion. . . . Sena also cut his full-year  revenue  estimate  by  6%,  ‘given  the  company’s  comments   around the potential for near term impact from accelerated mobile transition.’”)  (emphasis   added) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. H); Josh Constine, Facebook Amends IPO S-1 to Admit Advertising Biz Hurt by Increasing Shift to Mobile,  TechCrunch  (May  9,  2012)  (“Specifically,  Facebook  is   warning investors that daily active user count is rising faster than the number of ads the site is showing, which it predicts  will  lead  to  a  lower  average  revenue  per  user.”)  (Cosenza  Decl.,  Ex.   I). -7-

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¶ 26; Twining Compl. ¶ 74; Lazard Compl. ¶ 71.) Plaintiffs rely heavily on post-IPO articles as sources for their allegations, but they ignore that what Facebook and the Underwriter Defendants allegedly did both followed customary practices and did not violate any rules. (See Lightman Compl. ¶ 73.) Indeed, as one article put it, it is “industry  convention”  in  IPOs  that:    (1)  Forward-looking “estimates are usually developed through close collaboration between the underwriters’ research analysts and company management.” (2)  “These estimates are conveyed verbally to institutional investors who are considering  investing  in  the  IPO.”    (3)  “Importantly, these estimates are not published anywhere.”    (BUSINESS INSIDER (May 22, 2012) (emphasis in original) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. J).) This article, cited extensively by the plaintiffs, in arguing against this customary practice, also states that “[t]he SEC needs to change the rules here.”    (Id.) As  recently  as  2005,  however,  the  SEC  declined  to  amend  the  rules  to  “require projections or other forward-looking information to be included in initial public offering registration statements.”    70  Fed.  Reg.  44,722, 44,739 (Aug. 3, 2005). The SEC added:    “Oral communications of an issuer made in connection with a registered offering after the registration statement is filed will continue not to be subject to any filing or public disclosure requirements. . . . [W]e continue to believe that subjecting oral communications that occur in connection with a registered offering in a capital formation transaction to a public disclosure requirement could adversely affect the capital formation process.”    Id. at 44,760. Likewise, Regulation FD does not apply to “an  oral  communication  made  in  connection  with  the  registered  securities  offering after the  filing  of  the  registration  statement  for  the  offering  under  the  Securities  Act.”   Id.6

6

Indeed,  a  leading  treatise  states  that  “[i]n  the  case  of  IPOs,  .  .  .  issuers  generally  refuse  to   include  projections  in  the  prospectus,”  but  “because  Regulation  FD  does  not  apply to IPO candidates,”  analysts  are  permitted  “to  have  access  to  the  issuer’s  internal  projections.”  (Charles -8-

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Moreover, in this IPO, contemporaneous media coverage reflected the substance of the alleged oral communications. For example, on May 9, 2012, a media report stated: “BREAKING NEWS: Facebook Admits Mobile Shift Damaging Business Faster Than Expected In New SEC Filing; Will Miss Q2 Projections.” PRIVCO (May 9, 2012) (emphasis added) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. N). Indeed, many of the 1933 Act Lawsuit complaints quote an article admitting that before the May 18 IPO, “scattered reports appeared that Facebook had reduced the earnings guidance it was giving research analysts.”    (See, e.g., Alexander Compl. ¶ 21 (quoting BUSINESS INSIDER (May 19, 2012)).) On Friday, May 18, 2012, Facebook shares debuted on the NASDAQ stock exchange. As has been widely reported in the press, the commencement of trading in Facebook shares was  delayed  as  a  result  of  problems  with  NASDAQ’s  software  systems, which impaired the orderly execution of trades and price levels. (See, e.g., Rodrigo Campos & John McCrank, INSIGHT-Minute By Minute, Nasdaq Chaos Engulfed Facebook IPO, REUTERS (May 25, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. O).) Press reports suggest that additional NASDAQ trading errors “spurr[ed]  a  cascade  of  selling” that made  “it  look  as  if  investors  suddenly  were  turning  against   Facebook”  and  caused  some  hedge  funds  to  “sell their  entire  positions  because  of  the  confusion.”     (See Jenny Strasburg, et al., Nasdaq CEO Lost Touch Amid Facebook Chaos, WALL ST. J., A1 J. Johnson, Jr. & Joseph McLaughlin, Corporate Finance and the Securities Laws, § 3.04[D] (4th ed. 2011 Supp.) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. K).) The treatise  also  notes  the  practice  of  “lead   underwriter[s]  orally  providing  projections  to  investors  at  road  show  presentations.”    (Id.; see also Kayla Tausche & Jesse Bergman, What Ignited the Facebook-Analyst Fallout?, CNBC.com, (May 24, 2012) (noting that analysts  can  “be  privy  to  selective  financial  information  regarding   earnings guidance in order to begin building models with full-year  forecasts” and that they are “typically”  permitted  to  orally  “disclose this information to potential IPO investors”) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. L); Evelyn Rusli, et al., Questions  of  Fair  Play  Arise  in  Facebook’s  IPO  Process, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2012)  (“As is typical in the I.P.O. process, research analysts at Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and other firms contacted certain clients to discuss their revised expectations, while other big investors called on the banks to get their new take.”)  (Cosenza   Decl., Ex. M).) -9-

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(June 11, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. P).) The  head  of  NASDAQ’s  trading  operations  reportedly   responded  with  “‘shock and awe’ over  a  mess  out  of  his  control.”    (Id.) On Sunday May 20, 2012, NASDAQ reportedly advised that investors who lost money as a result of certain May 18 trading errors may be eligible for compensation if they sold their shares at a loss and submitted a claim by noon on Monday, May 21, 2012. (See John Melloy, How  Facebook’s  Stock  Selloff Nearly Turned Into a Run, CNBC.com (May 22, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. Q).) Commentators have stated that NASDAQ’s  announcement caused a rash of stock sales that again drove down the price of Facebook shares. (Id. (“Facebook’s  stock   dropped like a stone at the open Monday, as that alert caused investors to sell shares so they could file a claim with the Nasdaq . . . by sending that deadline out, the Nasdaq may have inadvertently caused a domino effect beyond its control.”).)7 B. Litigation Related To The IPO Beginning on May 22, 2012, numerous shareholder actions were filed against the Facebook Defendants, the Underwriter Defendants, and NASDAQ relating to the IPO. There are currently 23 such actions pending in the Southern District of New York, four actions pending in the Northern District of California, and 12 actions pending in the Superior Court of California, San Mateo County. All of the Facebook IPO Actions are based largely on the same factual allegations, as discussed above. The legal theories advanced in the Facebook IPO Actions fall
7

On June 6, 2012, NASDAQ announced that it had established a fund to compensate investors who had suffered losses as a result of its trading errors. (See Jenny Strasburg, et al., Nasdaq CEO Offers Facebook Apology, WALL ST. J., A1 (June 7, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. R); see also Herbert Lash, Nasdaq’s  Facebook  move  ‘too  limited’- Ex-SEC chief Pitt, CNBC.com (June 6, 2012) (quoting  former  SEC  Chairman  Harvey  Pitt:    “Nasdaq’s failure to live up to its selfregulatory  responsibilities  was  ‘a  blunder  of  major  proportions,’”  which  “‘will  likely  be  the   subject  of  sharp  criticism  from  the  SEC,’  and  ‘will  hurt  Nasdaq  in  its  effort  to  corral additional listings  and  garner  more  U.S.  IPOs’”) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. S).) - 10 -

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into four related categories and address the common issue of the cause of the decline in Facebook’s  stock  price: 1. The largest category by far is the 28 actions asserting 1933 Act securities law claims.8 These actions allege that although Facebook publicly announced that its growth in users had continued to outpace the number of ads displayed on its site, Facebook allegedly had non-public discussions with  the  underwriters’  analysts  about  the  same  trend,  and  certain  analysts   allegedly had non-public discussions about their revised earnings forecasts with  “preferred  investors.” (See supra, at 7-9.)9 Six putative class actions were brought in the Southern District of New York (and one in Florida state court) on behalf of Facebook investors alleging that NASDAQ’s  errors  caused  them  to  suffer  losses  by purchasing at excessive prices and being precluded from selling at higher prices. (See, e.g., Amin Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) One putative class action lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of New York against the Lead Underwriter Defendants alleging that those defendants sold Facebook shares in connection with the IPO while allegedly in possession of material undisclosed information in violation of Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (See Corneck Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.) Four lawsuits  styled  as  “derivative”  actions  assert  claims  against  certain  of   Facebook’s  directors  and  officers  that  derive  from  Facebook’s  alleged   violations of the 1933 Act in connection with the IPO. (See, e.g., Childs Compl. ¶¶ 60-62, 75.)

2.

3.

4.

8

Nine of the 1933 Act class actions were filed in the Superior Court of California, San Mateo County. The Facebook and Underwriter Defendants intend to remove all the San Mateo County actions to the Northern District of California and seek a stay pending a ruling from the Panel on the centralization motion. Any motions to remand should be addressed by the transferee court following an order of transfer by this Panel. See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (ordering  transfer  and  holding  that  “plaintiff can present its motion for remand to state court to the transferee  judge”).  
9

On June 6, 2012, an investor filed a petition in the Western District of Texas seeking leave to “perpetuate  testimony”  for  a  potential  1933 Act lawsuit. (See Rentea v. Facebook, Inc., Civ. No. A-12-MC-492-LY (W.D. Tex. filed June 6, 2012).) On June 13, 2012, that petition was denied and the case was closed. - 11 -

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ARGUMENT Section 1407 requires transfer when: (i) actions have “one  or  more  common   questions  of  fact;;”  and (ii) transfer will “promote  the  just  and  efficient  conduct”  of  the  action  and   further “the  convenience  of  parties  and  witnesses.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). Under these criteria, (i) all Facebook IPO Actions should be centralized in one district, and (ii) that district should be the Southern District of New York. I. THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE DISTRICT. All Facebook IPO Actions substantially arise from a common nucleus of facts concerning the IPO and the decline in the price of Facebook shares following its May 18, 2012 trading debut. The Panel routinely transfers and consolidates for pre-trial purposes securities and derivative actions that involve common questions of fact.10 Here, the 1933 Act Lawsuits are all copy-cats of each other. So are the NASDAQ Lawsuits. Importantly, there are critical common issues between all 1933 Act Lawsuits and all
10

See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2009); In re Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Freddie Mac) Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2009); In re The Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008); In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d, 1359, 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2004); In re AOL Time Warner Sec. Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2002); In re WorldCom., Inc.  Sec.  &  “ERISA”  Litig., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2002). Those Facebook IPO Actions that have been styled as “derivative lawsuits” should initially be coordinated with the other Facebook IPO Actions. Their putative derivative claims are predicated on the same facts and alleged violations of the 1933 Act. See In re Reserve Fund, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (“Whether  the  actions  are  brought  by  Primary  Fund  holders  seeking   relief under various federal securities laws . . . or a shareholder suing derivatively . . . all actions can be expected to focus on a significant number of common events, defendants and/or witnesses.”);;  In re WorldCom., 226 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (transferring to a single judge 39 cases brought  by  “securities  holders  seeking  relief under the federal securities laws [and] shareholders suing derivatively  on  behalf  of  WorldCom”).    The  Facebook  Defendants reserve the right to file, at an appropriate time, a motion to dismiss the derivative actions for improper venue, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), based on Facebook’s  Restated  Certificate  of  Incorporation, which provides that the Delaware Court of Chancery is the exclusive forum for any action purportedly brought on behalf of Facebook (which is incorporated in Delaware). See In re Revlon  Inc.  S’holders  Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing 8 Del C. § 102(b)(1)). - 12 -

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NASDAQ Lawsuits. Each set of actions shares common, overlapping causation issues. In the 1933 Act Lawsuits, plaintiffs allege that conduct of Facebook and the Underwriter Defendants caused investor losses. (See, e.g., Lightman Compl. ¶ 90; Eannarino Compl. ¶ 71.) In contrast, the plaintiffs in the NASDAQ Lawsuits contend that NASDAQ caused investor losses. (See, e.g., Amin Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.) The common, overlapping causation issues are pertinent to both the merits and class certification in each set of actions. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187-90 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying class certification because individual causation issues would predominate where  investors’  losses were related to trading errors). The presence of common issues is confirmed by the fact that in the Southern District of New York, Judge Sweet is already the judge in fourteen 1933 Act Lawsuits and five NASDAQ Lawsuits. (See Schedule of Actions.)11 Centralizing all Facebook IPO Actions in one district is essential to “avoid   duplication of discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings and conserve the resources of the parties,  their  counsel  and  the  judiciary.”    In re Xerox Corp. Sec. Litig., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1382, 1383 (J.P.M.L. 2002); accord In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (coordinating  and  transferring  class  actions  and  derivative  suits  in  part  to  “prevent  inconsistent  or   repetitive pretrial rulings”);; In re Cygnus Telecomm. Tech., LLC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2001) (same). Motions to dismiss, to compel discovery, for class certification, and for summary judgment will all address overlapping issues. That the plaintiffs in the 1933 Act Lawsuits and the NASDAQ Lawsuits attribute alleged losses of overlapping investor classes to
11

Given the common factual issues, it is irrelevant that the NASDAQ Lawsuits assert claims under state law and against different defendants. See, e.g., In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. Foreign Exchange Transactions Litig., MDL No. 2335, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53533, at *3 (J.P.M.L.  Apr.  16,  2012)  (“Where common factual issues exist, however, the presence of different legal theories among the subject actions is not a bar to centralization.”);;  id. at *4 (ordering  transfer  “even  where  the  cast  of  defendants  varies  from  action  to  action”). - 13 -

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inconsistent causes is but one example.12 Achieving a consistent resolution of such issues strongly supports centralization. See In re Res. Exploration, Inc. Sec. Litig., 483 F. Supp. 817, 821-22 (J.P.M.L. 1980) (transferring eight actions in three districts to the Southern District of New York where six of the actions were purportedly brought on behalf of overlapping classes of plaintiffs because  “[i]t  is  desirable  to  have  a  single  judge  oversee  the  class  actions  issues”). II. THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. A. Transfer To The Southern District Of New York Will Best Facilitate Efficient Discovery In The Actions. The Panel regularly transfers actions to a single jurisdiction to avoid “duplication   of  discovery.”    See, e.g., In re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1361. Here, assuming, as this Panel customarily does, that the Facebook IPO Actions would survive dismissal motions, there are at least two reasons why the best forum to avoid duplicative discovery is the Southern District of New York. First, any discovery concerning the common causation issues in both the 1933 Act Lawsuits and the NASDAQ Lawsuits would focus on New York witnesses and documents. Numerous events at issue occurred in New York: Trading errors caused by NASDAQ throughout  the  first  day  of  the  IPO;;  the  market’s  reaction  to  the  uncertainty created by those errors;;  NASDAQ’s  announcement  of  a  claims  submission  deadline  at  noon  on  the  second  trading   day (May 21) that reportedly sparked a selloff of Facebook shares; alleged efforts by one of the lead underwriters to stabilize the share price after  NASDAQ’s  errors;;  the  public  apology  and
12

Causation is a defense in the 1933 Act Lawsuits regardless of whether the NASDAQ trading errors give rise to an investor claim against NASDAQ. Loss causation is a defense whenever a factor other than defendants’ alleged misstatements caused a loss, even if that factor is inactionable. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (“lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific  facts,  conditions,  or  other  events”). - 14 -

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admissions issued  by  NASDAQ’s  CEO;;  and NASDAQ’s  offer  of  compensation  to investors who suffered losses. (See, e.g., Jenny Strasburg & Jacob Bunge, Social  Network’s  Debut  on  Nasdaq   Disrupted by Technical Glitches, Trader Confusion, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. T); Nadia Damouni & Olivia Oran, Morgan Stanley made big bet on Facebook, REUTERS, (May 18, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. U); Rodrigo Campos & John McCrank, INSIGHT-Minute By Minute, Nasdaq Chaos Engulfed Facebook IPO, REUTERS (May 25, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. O); John Melloy, How  Facebook’s  Stock  Selloff Nearly Turned Into a Run, CNBC.com (May 22, 2012) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. Q).) It is personnel at NASDAQ and the Underwriter Defendants located in New York that will be witnesses about trading errors caused by NASDAQ and their effects on Facebook’s share price. For  example,  NASDAQ’s  pertinent  officials  for  technology  and  trading  operations   are located in New York. (See Jenny Strasburg, et al., Nasdaq CEO Lost Touch Amid Facebook Chaos, WALL ST. J., A1 (June 11, 2012) (describing involvement of “technology  officials  in   Nasdaq’s  headquarters  in  lower  Manhattan”)  (Cosenza  Decl.,  Ex.  P). NASDAQ’s  “mea  culpa”   was delivered by NASDAQ’s CEO “in his office  at  Nasdaq’s  MarketSite  in  New  York’s  Times   Square.” (Jenny Strasburg, et al., Nasdaq CEO Offers Facebook Apology, WALL ST. J., A1 (June 7, 2012) (emphasis added) (Cosenza Decl., Ex. R).) Thus, the Southern District of New York is the best forum to minimize both duplicative discovery and inconvenience for the most witnesses. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d at 1355 (actions transferred to the Southern District of New York where many documents and witnesses would be located). Second, discovery in the Southern District of New York would be much more efficient for the alleged conversations that form the heart of the plaintiffs’  unprecedented theory asserted in the 1933 Act Lawsuits that it is improper for analysts to discuss their forecasts with

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“preferred”  investors. See In re Mun. Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1386, 1387-88 (J.P.M.L.  2008)  (Southern  District  of  New  York  chosen  because  “[t]he  alleged  wrongful   activities are intimately connected to the New York financial markets [and] many of the defendants  are  headquartered  in  New  York  City”).    Although Facebook is headquartered and its executives reside in California, these 1933 Act Lawsuits are very different from typical claims that an issuer kept information hidden within the company. Rather, here, the 1933 Act complaints allege that revised forward-looking projections were provided orally by Facebook to the  underwriters’  analysts after  Facebook’s  May  9  Amendment. (See, e.g., Alexander Compl. ¶ 21; Braun Compl. ¶ 39; Roffe Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs further allege that, as a result, certain of the  underwriters’  analysts  lowered  their  forecasts  for  Facebook’s  future  revenues  and  earnings   (see, e.g., Lazard Compl. ¶¶ 67, 70), and then discussed their revised forecasts with institutional investor clients (see, e.g., Braun Compl. ¶ 40; Roffe Compl. ¶ 26; Twining Compl. ¶ 74). In particular, each of the four complaints filed in the Northern District of California makes express and prominent allegations of what plaintiffs call “selective  dissemination.”    (See Chang Compl. ¶ 2; Spatz Compl. ¶ 5; Gregory Compl. ¶ 7; Offner Compl. ¶¶ 33, 36.) Discovery into these alleged discussions – if the cases survive dismissal – would in large part be focused on events, witnesses, and documents in New York. The Lead Underwriter Defendants are all headquartered in New York, and decisions regarding allocation of shares in the IPO were made by personnel who work in New York. (See Snodgrass Decl. ¶ 35, 8.) Important decisions about the IPO relating to price and size of the Facebook offering were made in consultation with personnel who work in New York. (Snodgrass Decl. ¶ 7.) Most of the pertinent analysts are based in New York. (Cosenza Decl. ¶ 8; Snodgrass Decl. ¶ 6.) And many

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communications with investors, including the IPO roadshow, originated or took place in or around New York. (Cosenza Decl. ¶ 6; Snodgrass Decl. ¶ 5.) The New York-focused knowledge, conversations, actions, and customary practices of the Underwriter Defendants, analysts, investors, and financial media are both central to all  1933  Act  plaintiffs’  allegations and provide potential defenses. See, e.g., City of Omaha, Nebraska Civilian Emps.’  Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., No. 11-2575, 2012 WL 1624022, at *3 (2d Cir. May 10, 2012) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal where allegedly omitted information was a matter of public knowledge, including through “expectations  of  analysts”). Moreover, that New York-focused knowledge and activity is also relevant to whether individualized inquiries about issues such as investor awareness would preclude class certification under Rule 23. See New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali Series 2006-QO1 Trust, No. 11-1683, 2012 WL 1481519, at *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2012) (summary order) (affirming denial of class certification where “knowledge  defenses  would  require  extensive  individual  proceedings”); In re Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. A. No. 08-0687, 2010 WL 2305742, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2010) (denying class certification when allegedly misrepresented facts could be “widespread   knowledge,”  including  from analyst reports and information presented to investors during IPO roadshow). The New York-focused core of all 1933 Act Lawsuits thus further supports centralization in the Southern District of New York. B. Transfer To The Southern District Of New York Will Ensure Consistent Rulings On Critical Issues. Consolidation in the Southern District of New York is the best way to achieve consistency. First, only the Southern District has the full panoply of cases with their overlapping issues: sixteen 1933 Act Lawsuits (including the only derivative suit filed in federal court), six NASDAQ Lawsuits, and the 1934 Act Lawsuit. In contrast, the Northern District of California

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has only four 1933 Act Lawsuits, and none of the others. Second, when circumstances warrant, as here, the Panel has ordered centralization in the Southern District of New York of cases involving IPOs, 1933 Act claims, or underwriter defendants, even though the issuer was from another state.13 In such cases, centralization in the Southern District fosters certainty and predictability that encourages issuers to choose the major U.S. exchanges (the NYSE and NASDAQ) – which are located in New York – rather  than  “shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.”    Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008). The Southern District should be the forum for centralizing the Facebook IPO Actions as they challenge the largest New York-based IPO in years, make allegations against New York-focused conduct of Facebook, the Underwriter Defendants, and NASDAQ, and seek retroactively to change established practices and rules for IPOs conducted on New York exchanges. (See supra, at 7-9, 16-17.) C. The Southern District Of New York Has Distinct Strengths For Handling Complex Multidistrict Securities Litigation. The Panel has recognized that the Southern District of New York has both unique expertise in and resources to manage multi-district securities litigations. See, e.g., In re IPO Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2003); In  re  Adelphia  Commc’ns. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2003). The  Southern  District’s  recent adoption of a “Pilot  Project   Regarding Case Management  Techniques  for  Complex  Civil  Cases” has enhanced these distinct

See, e.g., In  re  Adelphia  Commc’ns  Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (Pennsylvania) ; In re WorldCom, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (Mississippi); In re Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (Virginia); In re Bank of Am. Corp., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (North Carolina); In re Fannie Mae Sec. & ERISA Litig., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (District of Columbia); In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1384 (J.P.M.L. 2002) (New Jersey); In re Mun. Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1386 (issuers from multiple states other than New York).
13

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strengths. See Judicial Improvements Comm., U.S. Dist. Ct. S. Dist. N.Y., Pilot Project Regarding Case Management Techniques For Complex Civil Cases (2011).14 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Panel order (i) transfer to the Southern District of New York of all 1933 Act Lawsuits filed in other federal courts; and (ii) pretrial consolidation and/or coordination in the Southern District of New York of the 1933 Act Lawsuits, the NASDAQ Lawsuits, and the 1934 Act Lawsuit.

14

As demonstrated above, the Southern District of New York is the most efficient forum for centralization of all Facebook IPO Actions. Nonetheless, centralization somewhere is better than no centralization. Accordingly, we note the Panel has authority to centralize all Facebook IPO Actions, including the NASDAQ Lawsuits in which the movants are not parties, in another district if the Southern District of New York is not chosen. See Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed.) § 20.131 n.646. - 19 -

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Dated: June 15, 2012 New York, New York Respectfully submitted, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP Richard D. Bernstein (rbernstein@willkie.com) Tariq Mundiya (tmundiya@willkie.com) Todd G. Cosenza (tcosenza@willkie.com) Sameer Advani (sadvani@willkie.com) 787 Seventh Avenue New York, New York 10019 Telephone: (212) 728-8000 Facsimile: (212) 728-8111 KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP s/ Andrew B. Clubok Andrew B. Clubok (aclubok@kirkland.com) Brant W. Bishop, P.C. (bbishop@kirkland.com) 601 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022 Telephone: (212) 446-4836 Facsimile: (212) 446-4900 Thomas D. Yannucci (tyannucci@kirkland.com) Susan E. Engel (seengel@kirkland.com) 655 15th Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 879-5000 Facsimile: (202) 879-5200

Attorneys for Defendants Facebook, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl K. Sandberg, David A. Ebersman, David M. Spillane, Marc L. Andreessen, Erskine B. Bowles, James W. Breyer, Donald E. Graham, Reed Hastings, and Peter A. Thiel DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP s/ James P. Rouhandeh (electronic signature w/ permission) James P. Rouhandeh (rouhandeh@davispolk.com) Charles S. Duggan (charles.duggan@davispolk.com) Andrew Ditchfield (andrew.ditchfield@davispolk.com) 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 Telephone: (212) 450-4000 Facsimile: (212) 701-5800 Attorneys for Defendants Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and Goldman, Sachs & Co.

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