THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, DR. VICTOR B.

ENRIGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent G.R. No. 162015 March 6, 2006
Facts Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. On January 1, 1992, Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties.

On July 20, 1992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantels original franchise. The amendatory law (Rep. Act No. 7633) contained the following tax provision: It is undisputed that within the territorial boundary of Quezon City, Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities. In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC.

On March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines," envisaged to level the playing field among telecommunications companies, took effect. On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount of P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantels properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002. Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent.

Issue 1. Whether or not Bayantels real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative franchise; and 2. Whether or not Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial court. Held I. The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place, .the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress." Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.

II Petitions for prohibition are governed by the provision of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. With the reality that Bayantels real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002. Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe:7 xxx. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. xxx.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), Petitioner, vs PROVINCIAL ASSESOR OF SOUTH COTABATO, PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF SOUTH COTABATO, MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF TUPI, SOUTH COTABATO, and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF TUPI, SOUTH COTABATO, Respondents. G.R. No. 144486 April 13, 2005
Facts In 1957, Republic Act No. 2036 (RA 2036) granted RCPI a fifty-year franchise. On 10 June 1985, the municipal treasurer of Tupi, South Cotabato assessed RCPI real property taxes from 1981 to 1985. The municipal treasurer demanded that RCPI pay P166,810 as real property tax on its radio station building in Barangay Kablon, as well as on its machinery shed, radio relay station tower and its accessories, and generating sets. RCPI protested the assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). RCPI claimed that all its assessed properties are personal properties and thus exempt from the real property tax. Assuming that the assessed properties are real property, they are still exempt from real property taxes. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 464 (PD 464) states that to be taxable, the machinery should be attached to the real estate and essential for manufacturing, commercial, mining, industrial, or agricultural purposes. RCPI claimed that the assessed properties are not used for manufacturing, commercial, mining, industrial, or agricultural purposes. Besides, the assessed properties are attached to a building on a lot not owned by RCPI. RCPI also pointed out that its franchise exempts RCPI from paying any and all taxes of any kind, nature or description in exchange for its payment of tax equal to one and one-half per cent on all gross receipts from the business conducted under its franchise. RCPI further claimed that any deviation from its franchise would violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the Constitution. Finally, RCPI stated that the value of the properties assessed has depreciated since their acquisition in the 1960s. The Provincial Assessor of South Cotabato (provincial assessor) opposed RCPIs claims on all points. The provincial assessor insisted that the assessed properties are subject to the real property tax. The CBAA held that RCPIs liability for the franchise tax does not exempt RCPI from the real property tax. Under RCPIs franchise, only personal properties such as radio equipment, machinery and spare parts are exempt from customs duties, tariffs and other taxes. The CBAA ruled that RCPI was liable for the real property tax on the assessed properties. RCPI could also not invoke the non-impairment of contract clause since no legal right of RCPI was violated. Issues 1. Whether or not RCPIs tower, relay station building and machinery shed are tax exempt;

Held As found by the appellate court, RCPIs radio relay station tower, radio station building, and machinery shed are real properties and are thus subject to the real property tax. Section 14 of RA 2036, as amended by RA 4054, states that in consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted and any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the grantee shall pay the same taxes as are now or may hereafter be required by law from other individuals, co-partnerships, private, public or quasi-public associations, corporations or joint stock companies, on real estate, buildings and other personal property. The clear language of Section 14 states that RCPI shall pay the real estate tax.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (formerly Globe Mckay Cable and Radio Corporation), Respondents. x-----------------------------x GLOBE TELECOM, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 147324 May 25, 2004
Facts For several years prior to 1991, Globe Mckay Cable and Radio Corporation, now Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe), had been engaged in the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for the military bases of the United States of America (US) in Clark Air Base, Angeles, Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point, Zambales. The said communication facilities were installed and configured for the exclusive use of the US Defense Communications Agency (USDCA), and for security reasons, were operated only by its personnel or those of American companies contracted by it to operate said facilities. The USDCA contracted with said American companies, and the latter, in turn, contracted with Globe for the use of the communication facilities. Globe, on the other hand, contracted with local service providers such as the On May 7, 1991 Philcomsat & Globe entered into an agreement whereby Philcomsat obliged itself to establish, operate & provide an IBS standard B earth station for the exclusive use of US defense communications Agency (USDCA). The term was for 60 months or 5 yrs In turn, Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals. At the execution of the agreement, both parties knew that military Bases Agreement was to expire in 1991. Subsequently, Philcomsat installed the earth station & USDCA made use of the same. The senate passed a resolution expressing its decision not to concur in the ratification of the treaty of friendship. So the RP-US Military bases Agreement terminate it on Dec. 31, 1992. Globe notified Philcomsat its instruction to discontinue effective Nov. 8, 1992, in view of the withdrawal of US military personnel. Philcomsat sent a reply to pay the stipulated rentals even after Globe shall have discontinued the use of earth station after Nov. 8 1992. After the US military force left Subic, Philcomsat sent a letter demanding payment. However, Globe refused to heed Philcomsat s demand because the termination of the US military bases agreement constitute force majeure and said event exempted it from paying rentals.

Issue 1. Whether or not the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement constitutes force majeure which would exempt Globe from complying with its obligation to pay rentals under its Agreement with Philcomsat? 2. Whether or not Globe is liable to pay rentals under the Agreement for the month of December 1992?

Held: I. In order that Globe may be exempt from non-compliance with its obligation to pay rentals under Section 8, the concurrence of the following elements must be established: a. the event must be independent of the human will; b. the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and c. the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the term of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement when the same expired in 1991, because the prerogative to ratify the treaty extending the life thereof belonged to the Senate. Resolution No. 141 of the Philippine Senate and the Note Verbale of the Philippine Government to the US Government are acts, direction or request of the Government of the Philippines and circumstances beyond the control of the defendant. The formal order from Cdr. Walter Corliss of the USN, the letter notification from ATT and the complete withdrawal of all the military forces and personnel from Cubi Point in the yearend 1992 are also acts and circumstances beyond the control of the defendant. Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure, refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but inevitable. II. The US military forces and personnel completely withdrew from Cubi Point only on 31 December 1992. Thus, until that date, the USDCA had control over the earth station and had the option of using the same. Furthermore, Philcomsat could not have removed or rendered ineffective said communication facility until after 31 December 1992 because Cubi Point was accessible only to US naval personnel up to that time. Hence, Globe is liable for payment of rentals until December 1992.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), Respondent G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003 x---------------------------------------------------------x GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents. G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003

Facts The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.2 Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Trial Court ruled against NTC issued a temporary restraining order. Issue

1. Whether or not petitioners should have exhausted administrative remedies before it filed the case in court. 2. Whether or not NTC have jurisdiction over the issues pertaining to the memoranda. Held I In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,20 it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

II. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-62000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances.

GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications, respondents. COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent G.R. No. 126496 April 30, 1997

Facts On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service. Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service 4. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994. On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application 6 praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network

Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice. The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTel's evidence. Written opposition and other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel's application were Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office. On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the aforementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation. Issue 1. Whether or not the decision of the NTC Chairman alone is sufficient to have a valid resolution or decision; 2. Whether or not the respondent court have in its jurisdiction to declare null and void Memorandum Circulars of NTC; 3. Whether or not public respondent is an indispensable party; 4. Whether or not Mandamus is proper against public respondent; 5. Held

I.
The Supreme Court declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

II It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
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institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.

III The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors' cause could not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission.

IV When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body, and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent BellTel's application for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application. This is understandable since every commissioner of the threeman NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTel's application and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTel's case. Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the consideration of private respondent BellTel's application for provisional authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since December, 1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals' order for the NTC to sit and meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel's application for a provisional authority, attains deep significance.

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PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM, INC., (EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]), respondents. G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990
Facts On 22 June 1958, RA 2090 was enacted granting Felix Alberto & Co. (later ETCI) a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications. On 13 May 1987, ETCI filed an application with the NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate, etc. a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. On 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDTs opposition and declared RA 2090 should be liberally construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service as part of services of the franchise. On 12 December 1988, NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service initially in Metro Manila subject to the terms and conditions set forth in its order, including an interconnection agreement to be entered with PLDT. PLDT filed a motion to set aside order which was denied by the NTC on 8 May 1989. PLDT challenged the 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 NTC orders before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

Issues 1 Whether the provisional authority was properly granted; 2 Whether ETCIs franchise includes operation of cellular mobile telephone system (CMTS); 3 Whether PLDT can refuse interconnection with ETCI.

Held I. The provisional authority granted by the NTC (which is the regulatory agency of the National Government over all telecommunications entities) has a definite expiry period of 18 months unless sooner renewed; may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC; covers one of four phases; limited to Metro Manila only; and does not authorize the installation and operation of an alphanumeric paging system. It was further issued after due hearing, with PLDT attending and granted after a prima facie showing that ETCI had the necessary legal, financial and technical capabilities; and that public interest, convenience and necessity so demanded. Provisional authority would be meaningless if the grantee were not allowed to operate, as its lifetime is limited and may be revoked by the NTC at any time in accordance with law.

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II. The NTC construed the technical term radiotelephony liberally as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. The construction given by an administrative agency possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience and deserves great weight and respect. It can only be set aside by judicial intervention on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. III. The NTC merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunication networks when it decreed interconnection. PLDT cannot refuse interconnection as such is mandated under RA 6949 or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989. What interconnection seeks to accomplish is to enable the system to reach out to the greatest number of people possible in line with governmental policies. With the broader reach, public interest and convenience will be better served. Public need, public interest, and the common good are the decisive, if not the ultimate, considerations. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must yield. The NTC order does not deprive PLDT due process as it allows the parties themselves to discuss and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose.

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Dr. Serafin Samson, Plaintiff Vs Globe Telecommunication, INC.,Defendant CA-G.R. CV No. 71986 July 31, 2007
Facts Dr. Serafin Samson alleges that defendants cellular phone transmission tower is constructed near or about 5 meters from the perimeter fence of his subdivision, known as 4-J Subdivision located at San Pedro II, Magalang Pampanga. The construction of said tower obstructed, defeated, violated and impaired his constitutional rights against deprivation of the use of his property without due process of law because his property had become worthless and nobody is willing to buy and live in said subdivision as they are afraid the transmission tower will collapse due to its proximity. Petitioner avers that defendant violated the recommendation of Radiation Health Bureau of the Department of Health which requires that if the height of the antenna is 50 meters, the distance from the base of the antenna to the perimeter fence shall also be 50 meters. The transmission tower will endanger the health and safety of the residents thereat because of the radiation which has been determined to cause cancer. Residents near the transmission have strongly opposed the construction of the tower due to radiation effects which will adversely affect their health. And despite repeated demands defendant just ignored it. Trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the ground that petitioners claim lack legal basis, and thus dismissed.

Issues Whether or not petitioner have a right to be protect to avail of a preliminary injunction.

Held It is clear that petitioner does not have the right that he claims and asked to be protected. It is admitted by the parties both petitioner and respondent that the cellular transmission tower of defendant(Globe) has already been erected and therefore existing. What petitioner prays is to enjoin or restrain defendant from doing further construction works. It is well settled that injunction should be dismissed when it appears in the trial or otherwise that the acts to restrain which the action begun have been accomplished or full executed or when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened. Nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited because the acts sought to be restrained had already been performed or consummated, a fait accompli. Injunction operates only upon unperformed and unexecuted acts.

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Evangeline Aala, Manuel Maranan, Ramon Uy Lim, Jose Uy Jr, Ignacio Patal, Remedios Tamani, Excelsior Dangilan, Dr. Domingo Remigio, Roger Bagalay, Bert Villalobos, Zaldy Pascual and Marlyn Castillo, Plaintiffs vs Globe Telecoms, Inc., Defendant CA- G.R. CV No. 78049 November 2, 2005

Facts Petitioners are the principal, teachers and students of the Solano National High School(SNHS) located at Barangay Quirino, Solano Nueva Vizcaya. They are permanent residents of said barangay except for the teachers and students of SNHS who are considered transients to said barangay where the Base Transceiver Station or cell site antenna tower of Globe is being constructed. On May 20, 2002, Globe immediately, surreptitiously and suspiciously started to construct the BTS on a four hundred(400) square meter lot, which is not in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations. Before construction, several permits are required such as clearance, certifications and consent from DENR, ATO, NTC, Barangay, Mayors Office, DPWH, DOH, HLURB, EMB. However, Globe pushed thru with the construction of the BTS which is on-going without the required permits. On November 10, 2001, petitioners seasonably registered their protest and opposition to the construction of the cell site antenna, on grounds of security and safety concerns and it being a health hazards. Petitioners prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the trial court, however the latter ruled in favor of the private respondent.

Issue Whether or not an injunction is available to the petitioner as a remedy for their claim.

Held Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
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Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until termination of the action without court issuing a final injunction.

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