Aff Navy

NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 1
Nuclear Navy Index

Nuclear Navy Aff-Wey, Crowe, Jeremiah
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Inherency: Oil Spikes...........................................................................................................................................................................23
Inherency: Oil Spikes...........................................................................................................................................................................24
Inherency: Oil Shocks .........................................................................................................................................................................25
Inherency: No Nuclear Power..............................................................................................................................................................26
Inherency: Navy=no investment..........................................................................................................................................................27
2AC Impact-Ext...................................................................................................................................................................................28
2AC Impact--ext...................................................................................................................................................................................29
2AC Add-On: Rail Guns .....................................................................................................................................................................30
2AC Add-on: Rail Guns.......................................................................................................................................................................31
2AC Add-on: Blackouts.......................................................................................................................................................................32
2AC Add-On: Blackout........................................................................................................................................................................33
2AC Add-on: Pollution .......................................................................................................................................................................34
Hegemony Impacts...............................................................................................................................................................................36
Hegemony: Global War........................................................................................................................................................................37
Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................................................38
Hegemony Good .................................................................................................................................................................................39
Hegemony Good..................................................................................................................................................................................40
Dependency kills readiness..................................................................................................................................................................41
Dependency Kills readiness.................................................................................................................................................................43
Dependency Solvency..........................................................................................................................................................................45
Impact: Sea power................................................................................................................................................................................46
Impact: Sea Power................................................................................................................................................................................47
Impact: Global Stability/Power War....................................................................................................................................................48
1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................49
1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................50
1AC Module: china..............................................................................................................................................................................51
Northwestern University Debate Society 1

National Debate Tournament Champions
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
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1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................52

1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................53
1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................54
China will surpass U.S. Navy before 2015..........................................................................................................................................55
1AC Module: Humanitarian Operations..............................................................................................................................................56
Soft Power i/l........................................................................................................................................................................................59
Soft power Impacts..............................................................................................................................................................................60
Soft Power Impact................................................................................................................................................................................61
Soft Power Impact................................................................................................................................................................................62
Adv: Arctic...........................................................................................................................................................................................63
Icebreakers – Russia winning, U.S. needs...........................................................................................................................................64
Russians Taking Arctic.........................................................................................................................................................................65
Russia/US Competition in Arctic.........................................................................................................................................................66
Russian Navy-modernization...............................................................................................................................................................67
Russian Oil Dominance Bad................................................................................................................................................................68
Arctic Cold War Now...........................................................................................................................................................................69
Russia Module - Russians Taking Arctic.............................................................................................................................................70
A2: Law of the Sea Treaty checks........................................................................................................................................................71
1AC Module Shipping Industry ..........................................................................................................................................................72
1AC Module: Shipping Industry .........................................................................................................................................................73
1AC Module: Shipping Industry..........................................................................................................................................................75
Navy Key to Shipbuilding....................................................................................................................................................................78
Shipbuilding Will Go International......................................................................................................................................................79
Navy key to Shipbuilding.....................................................................................................................................................................80
Shipbuilding Will Collapse..................................................................................................................................................................81
Shipbuilding Key to Global Stability...................................................................................................................................................82
Navy Key to Shipbuilding....................................................................................................................................................................83
Navy Investment Solves Shipbuilding.................................................................................................................................................84
Investment Solves Shipbuilding...........................................................................................................................................................85
International Trade Impact...................................................................................................................................................................86
International Trade Impact...................................................................................................................................................................87
U.S. Competition..................................................................................................................................................................................88
Solvency: Navy Investment.................................................................................................................................................................89
Solvency: Congressional Funding........................................................................................................................................................90
Solvency: Procument...........................................................................................................................................................................91
Solvency: Procumbent.........................................................................................................................................................................92
Stable Industry=Nuclear Navy.............................................................................................................................................................93
SOLVENCY – Advanced Procurement...............................................................................................................................................94
Naval Budget Cuts Inevitable/No New Funding=Cuts........................................................................................................................95
No Funding...........................................................................................................................................................................................96
Dependency Solvency..........................................................................................................................................................................97
Solvency: Nuclear Navy solves dependence........................................................................................................................................98
Solvency: Leadership...........................................................................................................................................................................99
A2: Economy/speding........................................................................................................................................................................100
A2: economy/spending.......................................................................................................................................................................101
A2: all there turns...............................................................................................................................................................................101
A2: Troops or draft CP.......................................................................................................................................................................102
A2: Oil DA.........................................................................................................................................................................................104
A2: Oil Da..........................................................................................................................................................................................105

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A2: Oil DA.........................................................................................................................................................................................106

A2: Cap and Trade.............................................................................................................................................................................107
Politics Links: Plan=Bipartisan..........................................................................................................................................................108
Politics-Plan unpopular......................................................................................................................................................................109
Politics-Plan popular..........................................................................................................................................................................110
Military Spending unpopular..............................................................................................................................................................111
McCain Supports Plan........................................................................................................................................................................112
Obama Supports maritime power projection.....................................................................................................................................113
Obama Supports Nuclear Power........................................................................................................................................................114
A2: T-renewable energy and substantial............................................................................................................................................115
T-Alternative Energy..........................................................................................................................................................................116
T-Alternative Energy..........................................................................................................................................................................117
T - Not Alternate.................................................................................................................................................................................118
Arctic Dominance Not Key................................................................................................................................................................119
Arctic Dominance Not Key................................................................................................................................................................120
Russia Won’t Attack...........................................................................................................................................................................121
Nuclear Navy is costly.......................................................................................................................................................................122
Japan Da.............................................................................................................................................................................................123
1AC
Observation 1: Inherency
Despite its benefits the Navy is not serious about investing in Nuclear Powered fleet
Fein, 1/18/2008 (Geof, “Navy Needs Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships Given Future Needs, Lawmaker Assert” Lexis
Nexis, accessed 7/15/08-e.wey)
It makes no sense for the Navy to continue building conventionally powered surface ships given future power demands and the
potential for an oil producing nation to impact America's fuel imports, according to Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) Taylor, chairman
of the House Armed Service Committee Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, made his remarks at last week's
Surface Navy Association (SNA) symposium, and several days before the Navy delivered its report on alternative propulsion for

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surface and amphibious ships to Congress. He now has a copy of the "official use only" report in hand, a spokeswoman for Taylor
told Defense Daily. If the Navy is going to build ships that will last 30 years, why not build them so that they have all the power to
do those things that will be required 30 years from now, Taylor told attendees at the annual SNA event. Taylor said it was a
mistake to make the Navy's next generation destroyer, DDG-1000, conventionally powered. "The next generation destroyer is
going to be a magnificent ship with one exception, it is conventionally powered," he said. "How many times does our nation have
to go through this yo-yo of energy dependency before we get down to what Adm. [Hyman] Rickover tried to teach this nation in
the early 1960s, that nuclear is the way to go." If the Navy started to move toward nuclear propulsion for surface ships, that first
ship probably wouldn't hit the fleet for another 13 years, he said. "If we started today, if I could convince my colleagues in the
House and Senate that this is the way to go, [you are] probably looking [at] the first ship [being built] in 2020," Taylor said. "[It's]
probably too late to change DD(X), but it is certainly time to change CG(X). And if we don't do it right now we will probably miss
another whole generation of ships. Then [we are] talking [about] 2030, 2040, before we'd get that chance. Now is the time." CG(X)
is the Navy's next generation cruiser. The Navy is looking to begin acquisition of the ship early in the next decade. The idea of
using nuclear power on CG(X) is not addressed in the Navy's report on alternative propulsion methods, Delores Etter, the Navy's
chief acquisition official, told reporters during an impromptu briefing at SNA. "But we are doing an [Analysis of Alternatives] for
CG(X), and nuclear [propulsion] is clearly one of the ones we are looking at very closely," she said. Taylor, along with Rep.
Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), have been leading advocates for moving the Navy's surface fleet away from oil and toward nuclear
propulsion. Taylor questioned why the country puts itself in a position where other countries can stop the flow of oil to America.
"Today about 60 percent of our oil comes from overseas. It makes incredible sense that we should not allow ourselves to continue
[down that path]." "We have no choice but conventionally-powered Humvees, we have no choice but conventionally-powered
planes, but we do have a choice when it comes to ships, and the choice we ought to be making as a nation is for nuclear power," he
added. While almost all of the Navy's aircraft carrier fleet operate on nuclear power, shouldn't the carrier's escort ships also have
the same capability, Taylor asked. Continuing to build conventionally-powered ships puts the Navy at risk, he noted. For example,
oilers that replenish the fleet would become prime targets "The Chinese would first go after the oilers. It would dry up the
destroyers, dry up the cruisers," Taylor said. "If we know that is a vulnerability, why do we allow that vulnerability to exist?
And, Terrorism, natural disasters, and political embargos makes oil shocks inevitable
Gregory Lengyel, Jan 2008 (“The Walker Papers”, Lexis Nexis, accessed 7/15/08-e.wey)
Instability and hostility towards the United States characterizes most of the oil-producing world. An oil-supply crisis
no longer can be dismissed as a low-probability event. Hostile governments and terrorist organizations are well aware
of America’s and her allies’ vulnerability and could use the oil supply as a strategic weapon to attack the United States.
Oil-supply disruptions to the United States could happen in several ways, occurring singularly or combined. These
include disruptions in world production by natural disaster, politically motivated embargo, terrorist attack on
production and transmission infrastructure, or closure of world oil transit choke points. Any longterm disruption in oil
supply to the United States is a national security issue that is unacceptable to the US government. However, most of
these scenarios assume a major worldwide upheaval or political and other major changes in the primary oil production
regions of the world. These scenarios also go beyond the scope of this paper.
1AC
Observation 2: Advantages
Advantage 1: Naval Readiness
U.S. Naval dependence on fossil fuels will compound the effects of Oil spikes and destroy U.S. Naval
mobility
Bonner, Kit, April 2008 ( "ARE NUCLEAR-POWERED SURFACE WARSHIPS AGAIN IN THE NAVY'S
FUTURE?"). Sea Classics. Apr 2008. FindArticles.com. 18 Jul. 2008.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4442/is_200804/ai_n25137564-e.wey)
Before the Navy agrees to build any more "gold plated" ships, it must determine what the current and prospective threats to
national defense are as well as our allies. Then, ships can tie huilt to meet these threats. Of course, there will always be the "blue

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water" Navy that could emerge from almost any comer in the work! that the United States might have to fight, In that respect, the
Navy must not forget to have a credible force to defend the nation against such a Navy. It is an awesome responsibility to maintain
a modem Navy that is not tm expensive to deal with petty issues, yet at the same time be able to fight a powerful force put forward
by a belligerent nation. As along as fossil fuels or oil stands at its current price of almost $100 per barrel, the US Navy must
develop ships that utilize nuclear power or another source of energy. If not, the cost to go to sea will eventually he prohibitive.
And, without a respected Navy, the United States will smn find itself as a second- or third-rate nation. Not tomorrow, or next year,
but within a very few years.
1AC
Naval mobility is critical to preventing instability, resource wars, arctic security, proliferation, global
conflict and keeping open lanes of shipping
Admiral Jacob L. Shuford,2008 (“A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR
21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER”, Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina,
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/cmsi/documents/Collins%20Erickson%20Goldstein%20Murray_Chinese%20Evaluations
%20of%20the%20USN%20Submarine%20Force_NWCRW08.pdf, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey)

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The world economy is tightly interconnected. Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade has more than quadrupled: 90% of
world trade and two-thirds of its petroleumare transported by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the
lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the modern distribution systemthat relies on free transit
through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Expansion of the global systemhas increased the prosperity of many nations. Yet
their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources andcapital with other economic powers, transnational
corporations and international organizations.Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled
with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural
resources—potentially resulting in conflict. Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development,
resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of
the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system.
While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and
natural resources. Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of
conflict.Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and
execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt
governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing
demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are
contributors to conflict. Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with
unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their
actions, often designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional
conflict. Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors
to challenge maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology
will pose a range of threats to theUnited States and its partners.Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber
systems can be equally, if not more, disruptive than kinetic weapons. The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few
hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities,many of which exist in already unstable parts of the
world, has the potential to create significant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through
catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability,
and regional crises. Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantagedpopulations will be ever
more painfully aware and less tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in
despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit this social instability. These conditions combine to create an
uncertain future and cause us to think anew about how we view seapower.No one nation has the resources required to provide
safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.
1AC
And, U.S. naval mobility is critical to world wide U.S. power projection and hegemony
Globalsecurity.org, 2006(“maritime power projection”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/maritime-power-
projection.htm, accessed 717/08-e.wey)
The US Navy Strategic Planning Guidance focuses on two overarching strategic concepts — Forward Presence and Knowledge
Superiority—and three operational concepts — Battlespace Control, Battlespace Attack, and Battlespace Sustainment — by which
Maritime Power Projection is achieved. Maritime power projection is power projection in and from the maritime environment,
including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces
from approaching within enemy weapons' range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by

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amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. The foundation of maritime power
projection is robust and credible naval expeditionary forces present forward where vital interests—economic, political, and
military—are most concentrated. They provide a security framework that complements other instruments of national power to
build stability and favorably shape regions of interest. In cooperation with friends and allies, forward-deployed forces discourage
challenges to shared interests. Through combat-credible forward presence—including that of strategic nuclear forces—naval forces
deter aggression. Through engagement, critical partnerships are developed and interoperability enhanced with allies and potential
coalition naval, air, and ground forces. Combat-ready naval forces provide both a unique understanding of an emerging crisis and
the means for timely, and when necessary, independent response. Should combat operations by joint and coalition forces be
required to resol ve conflict, the early, sustained response of combat-credible naval expeditionary forces will have shaped the
battlespace to the advantage of US forces. Knowledge superiority is the second key enabler that underpins maritime power
projection. Through exploitation of technology and parallel improvements in organization and processes, naval forces will achieve
an unprecedented awareness and understanding of the future battlespace. Information, however, will not improve awareness unless
it is provided real-time as the knowledge required by commanders to make timely and informed decisions. Improvements in
information technology, matched by an agile and adaptive command organization, will provide dispersed and highly mobile naval
forces dramatically enhanced knowledge of the battlespace. The resultant acceleration of our decision-making process will place
us inside an adversary's engagement timeline. US combat credibility in the information age will depend as much on speed of
command as on weapon or platform. Networked operations will improve operational tempo and provide the knowledge to
maneuver or produce effects to effectively "lock out" a foe's intended actions and overcome his anti-access strategy. Three
components of maritime combat power are the ways we exploit the capabilities of our naval forces. These ways are: battlespace
control, battlespace attack, and battlespace sustainment. The battlespace—determined by our widely dispersed, networked forces
and their organic and joint sensor and weapon reach—is the only appropriate dimension in which to consider the boundaries of
control, attack, and sustainment. Naval expeditionary forces must be able to operate seamlessly throughout the battlespace,
transitioning smoothly from peacetime presence or other expeditionary operations to large scale forcible-entry operations as
volatile political factors may dictate.
1AC
A nuclear navy is critical to U.S. hegemony-unparalleled flexibility, higher payload capacity, energy
independence all act force multipliers
Jack Spencer and Baker Spring, 2007 (“Expanding the nuclear navy”,
Jack Spencer is a Research Fellow, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Baker Springs is a F.M. \
Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/bakerspring.cfm, accessed 7/18/07-e.wey)

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Congress is debating whether future naval ships should include nuclear propulsion. The House version of the Defense
Authorization Act of 2008 calls for all future major combatant vessels to be powered by an integrated nuclear power and
propulsion system; the Senate version does not. While Congress must be careful in dictating how America's armed forces are
resourced, it also has a constitutional mandate "to provide and maintain a Navy." Although nuclear-powered ships have higher
upfront costs, their many advantages make a larger nuclear navy critical for protecting national security interests in the 21st
century. As the defense authorization bill is debated, Members of the House and Senate should consider the following features of
nuclear propulsion: A nuclear surface ship brings optimum capability to bear. A recent study by the Navy found the nuclear option
to be superior to conventional fuels in terms of surge ability, moving from one theater to another, and staying on station. Admiral
Kirkland Donald, director of the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, said in recent congressional testimony, "Without the
encumbrances of fuel supply logistics, our nuclear-powered warships can get to areas of interest quicker, ready to enter the fight,
and stay on station longer then their fossil-fueled counterparts." The high density of nuclear power, i.e., the amount of volume
required to store a given amount of energy, frees storage capacity for high value/high impact assets such as jet fuel, small craft,
remote-operated and autonomous vehicles, and weapons. When compared to its conventional counterpart, a nuclear aircraft carrier
can carry twice the amount of aircraft fuel, 30 percent more weapons, and 300,000 cubic feet of additional space (which would be
taken up by air intakes and exhaust trunks in gas turbine-powered carriers). This means that ships can get to station faster and
deliver more impact, which will be critical to future missions. This energy supply is also necessary for new, power-intensive
weapons systems like rail-guns and directed-energy weapons as well as for the powerful radar that the Navy envisions. Only a
nuclear ship can change its mission and respond to a crisis in real-time. On September 11, 2001, the USS Enterprise--then on its
way home from deployment--responded to news of the terrorist attacks by rerouting and entering the Afghan theater. The armed
forces have acknowledged the vulnerability that comes from being too dependent on foreign oil. Delores Etter,Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, said in recent congressional testimony, "[We] take seriously the strategic
implications of increased fossil fuel independence." The Navy's use of nuclear propulsion for submarines and aircraft carriers
already saves 11 million barrels of oil annually. Using nuclear propulsion for all future major surface combatants will make the
Navy more energy independent. U.S. forces are becoming more vulnerable as other nations become more technologically and
tactically sophisticated. Expanding America's nuclear navy is critical to staying a step ahead of the enemy. A nuclear ship has no
exhaust stack, decreasing its visibility to enemy detection; it requires no fuel supply line, assuring its ability to maneuver over long
distances; and it produces large amounts of electricity, allowing it to power massive radars and new hi-tech weaponry. Though
effective, modern aircraft carriers still depend on less capable fossil-fueled counterparts in the battle group. Increasing the number
of nuclear surface ships would increase the capability of U.S. naval forces to operate both independently and as part of a battle-
group. Policymakers have taken for granted the United States' superiority on the seas for many years. This has led to a decline in
America's overall naval force structure and opened the door for foreign navies to potentially control critical blue-water regions.
Expanding the nuclear navy will allow the United States to maintain its maritime superiority well into the 21st century.
1AC
U.S. leadership is critical to preventing nuclear war
Kagan, 07 - senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of
History”, 7/19, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html)
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order
with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all
other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations.
Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to
international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively
stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the
principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world,
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therefore. It stands
in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world
that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-
American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity,
it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this
historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid
bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of
nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several
large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is
tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what
they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is passé; hence their now two-
decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than
less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile,
which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more
traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also
driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with
each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political
component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China"
and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past.
Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national
resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward
enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and
enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional
great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security
from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint
today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor
in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather
than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in
competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles
religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United
States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in
what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral
authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many
Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle
East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often
oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation
of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on
the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back
across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until
recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton
years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it
is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia,
and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are
loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons,
they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want
to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be
nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system.
Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American
predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its
influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in
the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and
destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars
between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing
a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it
even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to
markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world,
however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on
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<Continued no text deleted>
the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that
is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union,
that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany.
Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States
could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing
the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the
world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not
the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War
ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order,
with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is

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doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the
Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China
world's great powers.
and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to
intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other
Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter
what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional
dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on
the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the
dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene --
even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially
forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility
of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible
even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this
could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under
unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of
a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open
to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more
"even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security
became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence
in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle
East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic
fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American
predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A
diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by
both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is
doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't
changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the
United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the
future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should
imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
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Incentives for a nuclear navy will solve dependence on foreign oil and make U.S. naval ships less
vulnerable to attack
Michael Fabey, 2007 (“Lawmaker calls for more nuclear-powered Navy ships”, ` lexis nexis,
accessed 7/17/08-e.wey)
Congress and the Navy need to make the service's carrier escort ships nuclear powered and should consider offering incentives to
make it possible for more shipyards to build the vessels, U.S. Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.) said Jan. 10. "We have a choice and the
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ships should be nuclear powered," Taylor said during a keynote address at the Surface Navy Association Nineteenth National
Symposium. "Carriers have it. Why not escort ships?" he said. Conventionally powered escort ships have held up carrier battle
groups, he said It takes special approvals and training to build nuclear-powered ships. Currently only two U.S. yards build nuclear-
powered ships - Northrop Grumman Newport News and General Dynamics Electric Boat. Taylor said other yards, including those
in his home state, have not asked for the work or the resources to develop the capability. But Taylor said he would try to offer
incentives for other yards to get the proper approvals, including: the work itself, government-furnished equipment and some Title
XI funding. Having nuclear powered ships would cut down on U.S. dependence on foreign fuel supplies, Taylor said. He added
that it would also make the U.S. Navy fleet less vulnerable. The Chinese or other potential enemies would target Navy fueling
ships to curtail operations. With nuclear generators, the impact of such attacks would be minimized, he said.
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Advantage 2: Arctic dominance
Attempts to purchase a nuclear ice breakers is being blocked by high cost of nuclear power
Ronald O’Rourke February 26, 2008
[Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, RL34391]
Opponents of building new Coast Guard polar icebreakers with nuclear power might argue the following: -Although nuclear power
provides operational advantages in terms of unrefueled cruising endurance, conventional power has proven sufficient for
performing U.S. polar icebreaker missions. Russia’s requirements for its icebreakers differ from U.S. requirements for its
icebreakers, so Russia’s decision to build some of its icebreakers with nuclear power does not necessarily imply that the United

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States should do the same. -Based on data in a 2006 Navy report to Congress on nuclear power for Navy surface ships, building a
U.S. icebreaker with nuclear power rather than conventional power might increase its procurement cost by several hundred million
dollars.27 That additional cost might not loom very large for a Navy surface combatant that might cost $2 billion to $3 billion even
when conventionally powered, but it might increase by as much as twothirds the procurement cost of an icebreaker that might
otherwise cost $800 million to $925 million to procure. In a situation of constrained budget resources, such an increase in
procurement cost could easily result in the procurement of one replacement icebreaker rather than two. A single icebreaker, even
one with nuclear power, might not be enough to meet future U.S. needs
Russian Ice breakers are far superior to that of the United States, resulting in Russian maritime
dominance over the arctic and its mass amount of oil
7/17/08(“U.S. experts say Russia 'is winning the Arctic race'”, http://en.rian.ru/world/20080717/114197224.html,
WASHINGTON, July 17 (RIA Novosti) - A top U.S. Coast Guard official has told lawmakers that Russia is getting ahead of the
United States in the "Arctic race" and the current U.S. administration must urgently revise its approach to Arctic exploration.
"I'm concerned we are watching our nation's ice-breaking capabilities decline," Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen told
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on Wednesday. "It's imperative to obtain the current validating capabilities
so our polar operations can be met," he said. The Coast Guard chief said Russia had finally put to sea last year the largest
icebreaker in its polar fleet - the 50 Years of Victory - which has been under construction since 1989 and guarantees Russia
easy access to the vast natural resources in the Arctic region. Allen said Russia is the only other country, besides the United States,
with polar ice breaking capabilities, but the Russian fleet is in far better shape, with "seven to eight" nuclear-powered polar ice
breakers. The U.S. Coast Guard's medium- and Polar-class ice breaking fleet consists of the cutters Healy, Polar Sea and Polar
Star. Healy, which was commissioned in 2000, is the newest of the ships and is primarily designed for scientific research in the
Arctic. The Polar Star and Polar Sea, both commissioned in the 1970s, are due for a major overhaul and need millions of dollars in
maintenance and repairs to stay operational in the future. Speaking at the same hearings, Mead Treadwell, chair of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission, supported Allen's assessment of the situation. "In the 20th century, the advent of aircraft, missiles, and
missile defense made the Arctic region a major venue for projection of power and a frontier for protecting the security of North
America, Asia and Europe," he said. "Polar-class icebreakers are the largest and most capable of ice-going ships. Indeed, an
accessible Arctic Ocean also means new or expanded routes for the U.S. military sealift to move assets from one part of the world
to another. The Commission believes polar icebreakers are an essential maritime component to guarantee that this U.S. polar
mobility exists," Treadwell said. Meanwhile, Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom will take over responsibility in August
for Russia's nuclear icebreaker fleet, which currently consists of six operational nuclear icebreakers. Experts said Russia would
need six to 10 nuclear-powered icebreakers over the next 20 years, as demand for them is expected to grow with the development
of the Arctic shelf and increased traffic along the Northern Sea route. Rosatom has already announced that Russia will allocate
800 million rubles ($33.9 million) for the maintenance of nuclear icebreakers in 2008 and the first new-generation nuclear
icebreaker will be built in Russia by 2015. Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in
2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge last summer - to back Russian claims to the region. The area is believed to contain vast oil and
gas reserves and other mineral riches, likely to become accessible in future decades due to man-made global warming. Russia said
it would submit documentary evidence to the UN of the external boundaries along the Russian Federation's territorial shelf in
2009. Under international law, the five Arctic Circle countries - the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia - each currently
have a 322-kilometer (200-mile) economic zone in the Arctic Ocean.
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Russian control of the arctic allows them to dictate the world oil market collapsing the U.S. and world
economic sector
Asia Times, 2006 (“The New World Oil Order, Part 1: Russia attacks the West's Achilles' heel”,
http://www.stwr.org/land-energy-water/the-new-world-oil-order-part-1-russia-attacks-the-wests-achilles-heel.html,
All this is at the impending incalculable expense of the West. What is increasingly at stake is secure US access to global
energy resources - strategic US energy security - because the West's traditional control respecting those global resources is
seriously faltering in the face of the compelling strategies undertaken by Russia and its global partners. The US giant is
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increasingly at risk as it faces what is gradually but now more widely being recognized as Russia's clever exploitation of US
foreign energy dependency and the hemorrhaging of its all-important economic-geopolitical capital: its traditional global energy
leadership and dominance via its onetime virtually all-pervasive oil majors. US Senator Richard Lugar, who recently labeled
Russia an "adversarial regime" that increasingly uses its growing energy dominance as a powerful geopolitical weapon, has
warned of economic "catastrophe" for the United States, notwithstanding its status as a superpower. Consequently, informed and
reasoned leaders such as Lugar increasingly see the US in energy-based jeopardy. Such leaders clearly do not put blind trust in the
conventional wisdom that keeps insisting the US giant has no Achilles' heel and is virtually immune to the efforts on the part of
comparatively smaller powers such as Russia and its partners to undermine the current US global position of supremacy. Backing
up the mounting concerns of such leaders as Lugar, as reported on October 1 by The Guardian Unlimited, widely respected energy
economist Professor Peter Odell, who was an adviser to Tony Benn, the British energy minister in the late 1970s, and who has
since worked for a host of different foreign governments, said he was not being alarmist or controversial when he recently warned
that the West was at imminent risk of losing access to global energy resources as a result of Russia's global oil grab. Odell warned
that at any time Russian and Chinese state-owned oil companies, backed by certain rich members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries who are closely aligned with the two, could make hostile takeover bids for key Western oil majors such as
BP-Shell, ExxonMobil and/or Chevron, thereby gutting what little remains of the Western oil majors' control over the global
markets and thereby further threatening US access to strategic resources. Odell warned that the Western oil majors were already
losing their leadership of the global oil system, had now been reduced to controlling a mere 9% or 10% of the world's reserves, and
were unable to win new production rights or even hold on to those granted by current PSAs (production-sharing agreements).
Recent developments regarding Russia's Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects, in which the position of the Western oil majors is
being threatened, illustrate the ominous trend that is accelerating worldwide. To rock the US colossus forcefully out of its position
of global dominance and credibly threaten to inflict economic and geopolitical "catastrophe" on the West, Russia and its strategic
partners need not exceed, nor individually even remotely match, US economic, political or military strength in a conventional
head-to-head contest of might. Instead, they need only to exert effectively their mounting energy-based strengths against US
vulnerabilities in that same sphere, not in a conventional head-on confrontation but instead by going after the Achilles' heel by
employing a clever asymmetrical end-run strategy around the US. This targets the foundations of the current US-dominated liberal
global oil-market order, a strategy that leaves the US giant with significantly reduced secure access to, and control over, global
strategic resources. Once that goal is accomplished, without ever a conventional confrontation with the US giant, then the US
economy can be effectively and powerfully held hostage to the political and economic aspirations of Russia/
The clear insinuation is that any talk of an energy-based economic checkmate of the West is merely hyperbole and sensationalism.
But these arguments are already in the process of collapsing under their own weight in the face of an entirely new array of
mounting trends and developments that constitute an impending and grave threat to the strategic energy security of the West. In its
recent report "National Security Consequences of US Oil Dependency", the US Council on Foreign Relations disagrees with such
reassuring conventional wisdom and the myths and assumptions associated with it. It warns that the US faces increasingly potent,
negative political, economic and geopolitical consequences arising from its dependence on foreign energy resources. The report
laments that the US is "insufficiently aware of its vulnerability" because its leaders and people have come to rely on reassuring
myths and assumptions that do not square with the facts. To understand why the conventional wisdom on this issue has become
severely faulted and how Russia and its partners are already ominously succeeding in altering the fundamentals of the current US-
dominated global oil-market order, it is first necessary to understand how the current oil markets work and how they have evolved
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over the past three decades since the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. Changing the world's oil markets In the era leading up to the embargo of 1973-74, crude-oil
pricing and delivery were handled quite differently than now. That era featured the rigid, bilateral
long-term supply contract resulting in considerably less global oil-market supply liquidity than now. It was an era when exporting states tended to conclude
agreements individually with consumer states (usually through their national and multinational oil
companies) over the price and delivery of crude oil. Such contracts could be concluded for terms of one or two decades or even more. In that era of rigid bilateral
oil contracts, the oil market was much less open and dynamic, and far less able to adjust to supply disruptions, than it is now. Oil tended to be "locked up" within
the long-term supply contracts, thus significantly limiting supply liquidity, or fungibility, of oil. The structure of the global oil market was neither designed nor
implemented with a focus on the key requirement of high liquidity because, prior to the 1973-74 Arab embargo, no one envisaged the now-obvious key requirement
for the market to adjust rapidly and naturally to a cutoff of oil to one or more importing nations resulting from a targeted embargo or a supply disruption. Naturally,
in that era it was in the interest of any individual exporting state to conclude a sufficient number of rigid bilateral long-term contracts with importing states so as to
have most or all of its exportable oil accounted for and sold virtually at the time it was pumped out of the ground. That being the usual case, if an exporting state or
group of states for some reason either failed or refused to honor their commitment of deliveries to a particular consumer state, then that embargoed state found it
necessary to meet the emergency by trying to acquire replacement crude-oil supplies from elsewhere, usually from third-party traders and/or by arranging with
other buyers for their tankers to be diverted from their original destinations. That ad hoc process involved many additional, intolerable risks, time delays, and much
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more complicated logistics and higher costs, all of which were entirely unacceptable over a period of anything more than the very short term. The old oil-market
order did not naturally facilitate a compensating for such a supply disruption, and the effort to make it compensate was cumbersome and its risks were
unacceptable. Additionally, the psychological effects of an embargo greatly magnified its literal effects, leading to panic buying by
consumers, resulting shortages, higher prices and ripple effects throughout the economy. That helps explain why the US could be
effectively targeted in 1973-74 by the Arabs. Though that targeting was not nearly perfect, it was sufficient to inflict much of the
intended pain. As the months wore on, the US could not afford to continue to rely on the intolerable and significantly less secure
ad hoc logistics it was forced to resort to in its effort to replace the oil that the Arab nations were refusing to ship. Recently
declassified British government documents from that time reveal that both the US and Britain were actively planning for a seizure
of Middle East oilfields, illustrating how intolerable the combined physical and psychological effects of the embargo were. Of
note is the ominous fact that at that time the US imported only about 36% of its oil, whereas now it imports nearly 60%, making it
far more vulnerable to the energy weapon if Russia and its partners only partially succeed in changing the current liberal global oil
order so as to revive even a partial level of effectiveness of a targeted embargo. US and Britain create a liberalized market In the
aftermath of the 1973-74 crisis, events and the markets themselves gradually evolved to alter radically the nature of the global oil
market, thereby dramatically increasing crude oil's former comparatively low degree of fungibility. This means that as long as the
current US-backed liberal oil market is globally adhered to, if a group of exporting nations attempts another targeted embargo, oil
from other exporters could be rapidly and naturally exchanged or substituted to replace the lost oil. The global market has evolved
from rigidity to dynamism, and from low to very high liquidity. Over time, the US had come up with an ingenious idea that
impacted directly on the issue. Through deregulation and the creation of oil-futures contracts and spot oil markets in New York and
London, the old foundations and the market dominance of the rigid, bilateral long-term supply contracts was undermined in favor
of much shorter-term contracts. Extremely liquid oil-futures contracts ("paper oil") that looked forward only a few months to a
few years at most and that could be freely and openly bought and sold on a daily basis on the new exchanges replaced the
traditional, rigid, discrete long-term supply contracts negotiated directly between exporting and importing states. The global oil-
market order was becoming tremendously liberalized, open and highly liquid under US leadership and control. The new oil
exchanges created in the early 1980s provided a way for speculators to profit from the buying and selling of "paper oil" as well as
for exporters and importers to sell, buy and arrange for physical delivery of oil. The spot exchanges also facilitated the factoring in
of a much wider range of market forces in real time in determining the daily global price of oil. Oil-export startups, those
attempting to establish themselves as oil exporters, favored the spot markets as opposed to the rigid long-term supply contracts
because, with their limited track record and credibility, they had a hard time successfully negotiating long-term contracts.
However, they could sell on the spot markets by undercutting the price of the more established exporters and get a foothold. Thus
the new arrangement encouraged a flourishing of new exporters and a global supply that very comfortably outpaced global
demand. By the mid- to late 1980s, the new oil-market arrangements in New York (and later in London) had been firmly
established and were enjoying phenomenal success. While some exporters refused to drop entirely the traditional rigid bilateral
long-term supply contracts in favor of the spot markets, up until today most oil is marketed on the exchanges. Oil-futures contracts
are freely bought and sold on the exchanges and oil for physical delivery is bought comparatively "at the last hour" on the spot
market, where delivery to the importing nation is then arranged.
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Economic collapse leads to nuclear war and totalitarian regimes
Cook 6/14/07 - Writer, Consultant, and Retired Federal Analyst – U.S. Treasury Department
[Richard C., "It's Official: The Crash of the U.S. Economy has begun," Global Research,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5964]
Times of economic crisis produce international tension and politicians tend to go to war rather than face the economic music. The
classic example is the worldwide depression of the 1930s leading to World War II. Conditions in the coming years could be as bad
as they were then. We could have a really big war if the U.S. decides once and for all to haul off and let China, or whomever, have
it in the chops. If they don't want our dollars or our debt any more, how about a few nukes? Maybe we'll finally have a revolution
either from the right or the center involving martial law, suspension of the Bill of Rights, etc., combined with some kind of military
or forced-labor dictatorship. We're halfway there anyway. Forget about a revolution from the left. They wouldn't want to make
anyone mad at them for being too radical.
And, Only nuclear ice breakers made in the USA can check Russian influence.

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A fourth potential policy option for Congress, if it is determined that one or more new ships should be built, is whether those ships
should be nuclear-powered, as are 7 of Russia’s 20 polar or Baltic icebreakers.25 Some interest has been expressed in Congress in
using nuclear power on a wider array of U.S. Navy surface ships in the future, and Section 1012 of the FY2008 defense
authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) makes it U.S. policy to build certain future classes of U.S. Navy surface combatants
with nuclear power unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification to Congress that using nuclear power for a given new
ship class is not in the national interest. The issue of nuclear power for U.S. Navy surface ships is discussed in detail in another
CRS report.26 Advocates of building new Coast Guard polar icebreakers with nuclear power might argue the following:
-Nuclear power would provide the icebreakers with operational
advantages in terms of virtually unlimited cruising endurance at any
speed. Such endurance could permit the ships, for example, to make
high-speed sprints from one polar region to the other, so as to
respond to sudden contingencies, without needing to stop or slow
down along the way to be refueled. These operational advantages
are one reason why Russia has built some of its polar icebreakers
with nuclear power.
- If oil costs in the future remain relatively high, and if the icebreakers
consume significant total amounts of energy over their 30-year lives
to perform their missions, then much or perhaps even all of the
additional procurement cost of nuclear power could be offset over
the ships lives by avoided fossil-fuel costs.
- Building icebreakers with nuclear power could improve economies
of scale in the production of nuclear propulsion components for U.S.
Navy nuclear-powered ships, reducing the costs of those Navy ships,
further offsetting, from a national standpoint, the additional
procurement cost of nuclear power for the icebreakers.
Due to the additional up-front costs and increased operational

capabilities of building a ship with nuclear power, building U.S.
nuclear-powered icebreakers could send a strong signal to Russia or
other countries of U.S. commitment to defending its polar interests,
particularly in the Arctic.
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Building nuclear powered surface ships will allow for the construction of nuclear powered ice breakers
- Building icebreakers with nuclear power could improve economies of scale in the production of nuclear propulsion components
for U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships, reducing the costs of those Navy ships, further offsetting, from a national standpoint, the
additional procurement cost of nuclear power for the icebreakers. Increasing construction of nuclear ships and submarines yields
significant cost reductions. For example, increased workloads could save the Navy 5 percent to 9 percent on propulsion plant
component costs. Building two Virginia-class submarines annually would result in approximately $200 million in savings per
submarine. Adding a nuclear cruiser every two years to the workload would reduce the price of other nuclear ship power plants by
about 7 percent. This equates to savings of approximately $115 million for each aircraft carrier and $35 million for each
submarine.

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And, Arctic dominance will allow the U.S. to drill for oil in the region
New York Times, 2/12/08 (“Arctic Melt Yields Hints of Bigger U.S. Seabed Claim”,
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/arctic-melt-yields-hints-of-bigger-us-seabed-claim/, accessed 7/18/08)
On the one hand, the dramatic shortening of the deep-frozen season on the North Slope of Alaska — when the tundra is firm
enough to drive on — has made it harder for oil companies to send out their seismic survey teams to seek new petroleum deposits.
(Some environmentalists have noted that this is a rare instance when global warming seems to have worried oil companies.) On the
other, however, the big recent summer retreats of the floating sea ice on the Arctic Ocean have created new opportunities, not just
to chart possible shipping routes, but to expand surveys of the seabed that might someday lead to deep-ocean Arctic oil and gas
drilling. Yesterday, the Commerce Department and University of New Hampshire released the details of last summer’s sonar
survey of the sea floor off the Alaskan coast, which was able to push nearly 200 miles farther out toward the North Pole than it had
in previous years because of the extraordinary ice retreat of 2007. The expansion of open water was “good for mapping, sad for the
Arctic,” said Larry Mayer, the University of New Hampshire oceanographer who led the project. The survey disclosed clusters of
ridges and lumps protruding from the deep sea floor well beyond a well-charted extension of the continental shelf called the
Chukchi Cap. (Matt Wald and I disclosed the initial results last fall.) Of scientific interest, the charting found scour marks on the
seabed 1,300 feet deep from a time when enormous masses of ice must have scraped by. But the strategic and economic
implications are garnering the most attention.
1AC
Thus we advocate the following plan:
The United States federal government should fund the procurement of nuclear powered vessels for the
United States Navy.

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1AC
Observation 3: Solvency
The navy’s instable procurement strategy disincentives the naval shipbuilding industry in nuclear
energy – plan reinstalls credibility
Donald 2005 (Kirkland H. Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces. June 15, 2005. CQ
Congressional Testimony.“Future of Nuclear Submarine Fleet”. Lexis.)
Aside from the premium for flexibility, there is an inevitable cost that comes witha small, dedicated, predominantly sole- source
and sole-customer component industrial base. As the Navy buys fewer components than planned, the cost of those remaining
components must bear the full burden of the contractors' fixed overhead-each unit becomes more expensive. In addition, changes
in quantity of components ordered tend to create churn-churn that we have to pay for, both in real dollars and in credibility with
our vendors. For example, we have paid, and continue to pay, our sole-source suppliers a substantial premium for the many times
the Navy has decided to delay component procurements in order to redirect funding for near-term needs. Specifically, we would
save about $70M per year, or about 8 percent, on VIRGINIA reactor plant components just in overhead if we were buying two
shipsets instead of just one. Further, since 1995, the start date for a two-per-year VIRGINIA- class submarine build rate has
changed seven times. Each time a date moves to the right, we lose credibility with suppliers whose business consists largely of
Navy orders, and in turn, this erodes their willingness to make investments for greater efficiency in the future. Further, there are
the instances where our vendors have made substantial investment in specialized machine tools only to have them under-utilized in
the absence of anticipated orders.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 18
1AC
Government funding of a nuclear surface fleet will revitalize the naval shipbuilding industry allowing
for effective production of nuclear vessels
Roxana Tiron, 6/11/08 (“Rep. Taylor pushes nuclear power for more Navy ships”, http://thehill.com/the-executive/rep.-
taylor-pushes-nuclear-power-for-more-navy-ships-2008-06-11.html, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey)
The conflict over expanding nuclear propulsion First surfaced last year. At the time, conferees sparred over the House requirement
to make next-generation surface combatants, such as cruisers, atomic-powered unless the Navy asserted that such a propulsion
system was not in the “national interest.” The Senate conceded to the House position in the end. This year, Taylor wants to expand
nuclear propulsion to large amphibious ships, which carry helicopters, landing craft and other equipment used in shore assaults.
The latest push is likely to continue to engender strong opposition, but Taylor said he is determined to press his case in
conference. “It is my intention to fight until the end,” he told The Hill in an interview. Taylor said he plans to start visiting
senators to explain and defend his rationale for requiring more nuclear-powered ships. He believes that skyrocketing oil prices help
make his case. If oil stays at $138 a barrel or goes even higher, constantly having to refuel ships will become an untenable
proposition, Taylor argued. A ship that runs on nuclear power, however, does not need to be refueled for three decades. “Our
carriers can go from here to there for 30 years without having to fuel, but the ships who protect the [aircraft] carriers … have to
refuel every five to six days,” Taylor said. Cruisers, destroyers and amphibious ships are part of carrier groups. Those ships are
deployed together with an aircraft carrier. In contrast to conventional propulsion, nuclear power also provides unlimited range and
enough energy to fuel powerful new radars and directed-energy weapons, Taylor said. But even Taylor admits that his proposition
faces obstacles beyond a reluctant Senate. Out of six remaining U.S. shipyards, only two are nuclear-certified: Northrop
Grumman’s Newport News, Va., facility, and General Dynamics’ Electric Boat in Groton, Conn. The remaining four work with
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Nuclear Navy Aff 19
conventionally powered ships. It would take years to modify a non-nuclear yard, even if the Navy was fully onboard with Taylor’s
proposal. Workers would need time to adjust as well. It takes up to eight years to become a nuclear-qualified welder, for example.
Receiving a nuclear license could also be tough because of more stringent environmental regulations, industry sources said. The
cost of outfitting ships with nuclear propulsion is mostly upfront, raising the costs of building the ship. Nuclear-powered vessels
are estimated to cost around $800 million more than conventionally powered ships. Navy officials are concerned about that added
cost at a time when they are already struggling to grow the fleet. Although high oil prices make the switch to nuclear power more
attractive, some officials question whether prices will stay that high. “The industrial base is in a very fragile state because of years
of historically low rates of ship production for our Navy,” said Cindy Brown, the president of the American Shipbuilding
Association. “The focus of Congress and the American people needs to be on rebuilding the fleet and increasing the rate of ship
production to 12 ships a year. The debate on what should power our ships should not distract from this fundamental challenge
facing America today.” Brown said that the industry has yet to determine what impact moving to a nuclear-only cruiser fleet would
have on the U.S. industrial base. Shipbuilders Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics — the two U.S shipbuilders that sell
only to the Navy — are starting to look into which ship components can be built in a conventional yard while the propulsion
systems are being built at one of the two nuclear yards. The fully constructed ship would have to be delivered from the nuclear-
qualified shipyard. Conceivably, switching to nuclear-powered propulsion could mean layoffs at some shipbuilding sites. One of
the yards that could suffer is Northrop Grumman Ingalls, which is in Taylor’s district. Ultimately, sources said the shipbuilding
industry could be completely altered. The industry has started investigating the effects of the requirements in the fiscal 2008
defense authorization bill. It is not clear how many ships would be affected by Taylor’s nuclear propulsion proposals. The Navy is
planning to buy about 19 new cruisers, known as CG(X). Taylor is also proposing to build nuclear versions of the current DDG-51
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Some shipyards, such as Electric Boat, view the changes as possible business opportunities. “If
the Navy and the Congress decide that they want to develop nuclear power in any platform, we would be interested in talking to
them about potential business,” said Robert Hamilton, an Electric Boat spokesman. “We have extensive experience in the design
of nuclear ships.” Taylor said that he ultimately is seeking a generational switch in thinking. “There is always going to be some
heartburn in industry” when it comes to change, he said. “It’s human nature to resist change. “The ones that want to be part of the
future would have to make this investment, and they will be better yards for it,” Taylor said.
1AC
Companies will invest in a nuclear navy if congress provides the necessary funding for successful
technology – empirically proven.
Jack Spencer, 11/ 15/2007
[Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
“Competitive Nuclear Energy Investment: Avoiding Past Policy Mistake”,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2086.cfm]
The peaceful use of the atom, it was claimed, was the answer to future energy woes because it would produce electricity that,
among other advantages, was "too cheap to meter."[2] The U.S. Navy's desire to expand nuclear propulsion in its fleet also heavily
influenced growth in the private sector. Although direct subsidies, such as rapid tax amortization and funding for reactor
construction, stopped in the late 1960s, entities within Congress and the executive branch continued to promote nuclear power with
indirect support, such as market guarantees and access to technology.[3]
Private investment followed Washington's lead. In cooperation with the federal government, the private sector expanded capacity
and capabilities and developed the necessary technology. Public policy effectively harnessed the power of the private sector to
advance national objectives. The result was the emergence of a world-class nuclear industry.
However, the nuclear industry's success was due largely to public policy designed to promote its growth. Although the industry
grew, it became overly dependent on government. This left it vulnerable to shifts in public policy. When policy shifted toward
outright opposition as the activist community convinced America's political left that nuclear power was dangerous, the industry
predictably failed as investors cut their losses and moved capital to opportunities that were perceived as less threatened by
increasing regulatory volatility.
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Nuclear Navy Aff 20
Anti-nuclear activists understood that they could kill the industry by turning public opinion--and therefore a democratic
government--against nuclear power. This process began in the early 1970s. Although other factors such as rising interest rates,
recession, and economic chaos caused by the oil crisis contributed to the nuclear industry's deterioration, the growing regulatory
burden was paramount.
Michael Fabey, 2007 (“Lawmaker calls for more nuclear-powered Navy ships”, lexis nexis,
groups, he said. Nuclear power inevitable Taylor termed nuclear power inevitable for future Navy ship operations and called the
failure to make the next generation destroyers nuclear powered a "mistake." It takes special approvals and training to build
nuclear-powered ships. Currently only two U.S. yards build nuclear-powered ships - Northrop Grumman Newport News and
General Dynamics Electric Boat. Taylor said other yards, including those in his home state, have not asked for the work or the
resources to develop the capability. But Taylor said he would try to offer incentives for other yards to get the proper approvals,
including: the work itself, government-furnished equipment and some Title XI funding. Having nuclear powered ships would cut
down on U.S. dependence on foreign fuel supplies, Taylor said. He added that it would also make the U.S. Navy fleet less
vulnerable. The Chinese or other potential enemies would target Navy fueling ships to curtail operations. With nuclear generators,
the impact of such attacks would be minimized, he said
1AC
Industry-Navy relationship vital for the creation of a nuclear powered fleet
Fein 2007(Geoff. May 2, 2007. Defense Daily. “Navy-Industry Partnership is Critical To Building Future Fleet, CNO
Says”. Lexis.)
The Navy is facing a number of challenges as it tries to build its fleet for the future,however, the service won't reach its goals
without the shipbuilding industry as a critical partner,according to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
The triad of Congress, industry and the Navy is
vital
to the success of acquisition
, CNO Adm. Mike Mullen told attendees at
the Government Executive leadership breakfast in Washington, D.C., yesterday.
"A strategic partnership with industry.
..is really critical,"
he said. "Moving forward together is really
critical. Otherwise, we won't be able to build ships."
Since the Navy's decision last month to terminate Lockheed Martin's [LMT] second Littoral Combat Ship (LCS3) and to push for Fixed Price
Incentive contracts, some shipbuilders have voiced concern over the direction the Navy's acquisition efforts are heading.
Navy Secretary Donald Winter saidin April that he recognizesthe Navy will have to take a more proactive stance when it comes to
oversight and management of programs and with contracting(Defense Daily, April 4).
Winter reiterated his message to industry representatives at the annual Navy League SeaAirSpace expo. Mullen said yesterday that Winter's remarks were
absolutely on target.
"Winter has a pretty deep background in this kind of thing and I trust him based on my watching him lead this effort and go through what he did," Mullen told
Defense Daily in a interview following the breakfast.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 21
industry plays a
Mullen made it clear that vital
role.

"I am very consistent on my message for a strategic partnership. We can't do it without them," he said.
"We have to figure out the right way to do it with them. It's my view that in LCS there was mutual responsibility for the problems
that we had and we have to get that right for the future."
The Navy is going to have to work its way through the right processes to contain cost and deliver capability,he added.
"I have been doing shipbuilding since 1995...1996, and there isn't an easy answer, and I understand that," Mullen said. "But if we don't figure out a way to
get this right, we really jeopardize the future of the Navy.That's what I believe.
"We have to get cost out, control requirements, and [we have got] to control cost. I am committed to that," he added. "I am committed to put
money in and keep it in and not have people take it."
But Mullen acknowledged that he is probably off $7 billion to $10 billion a year, on the procurement side, to move forward and build the Navy the
country needs.
He acknowledged to attendees that it is going to take a few years, maybe the entirety of his term as CNO, to get stability into the shipbuilding
program and drive cost out to reach a 313ship fleet. "Building a fleet for the future is the most daunting challenge."
1AC
The navy will only fund nuclear powered ships if they have the necessary equipment with the
difference in cost for diesel and nuclear ships to incentivize the Navy to adopt nuclear ships.
Galrahn November 5, 2007
[“Looking at a Nuclear Navy”, Professional Navy Centric Blog, http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2007/11/looking-at-
nuclear-navy.html]
One of the major items of discussion in the FY08 budget is the amendment by the House for a new requirement of all new large
surface combatants to have nuclear power in the future. House and Senate negotiators on the fiscal 2008 defense authorization bill
are at odds over a provision in the House-passed measure that would require the Navy to make its future fleet of surface
combatants nuclear powered.
The Navy is building nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines, but the House language would establish that it is the "policy of the
United States" to use nuclear power for all major vessels, including destroyers and cruisers. House Armed Services Seapower
Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss., and ranking member Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., have long urged the Navy to use
nuclear power on its large ships to save long-term fuel costs. In a brief interview Tuesday, Taylor stressed that nuclear power
would ultimately improve the Navy's effectiveness, safety and mobility by allowing ships to go long stretches at sea without
having to refuel. The first ships that would be affected by the provision would be the 19 CG(X) cruisers the Navy plans to buy
between fiscal 2011 and fiscal 2023. The provision also would affect the DDG(X), which the Navy will not start buying until the
mid-2020s to replace its current fleet of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Heritage Foundation produced a point by point memo
today in support of this action. I'm not sure what I think of this yet, either Rep. Taylor is a visionary or he is trying to sink the fleet,
but there really isn't a third way to look at this proposal. My skepticism is a result of years of working with government. In
particular, in regards to technology, it would be accurate to say it is damn near impossible to come up with too many examples
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Nuclear Navy Aff 22
where government actually takes into account cost of ownership, and is willing to spend money up front with a result of savings
down the line with any intention of actually not taking money away down the line for some other new pet project.
My concern lies in the reality that the Navy isn't a pet project, and if Congress truly intends to capitalize on long term savings, then
Congress needs to establish special budgets that protects the Navy from being raided later because of capital investments today.
Taylor is backed by a study, available in summery by this CRS report.
Section 130 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163of January 6, 2006), which called for such a study
(see Appendix). The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following:
In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional
power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.— For a small surface combatant, the procurement-
cost increase was about $600 million.— For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000
metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.— For an amphibious ship, the
increase was about $800 million. Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered
ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account. A ship’s operational tempo and
resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and
resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and
the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost. - The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even
cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:— $210 per barrel
to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;— $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and—
$210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo,
and the higher dollar figure is for a low ship operating tempo. Put into perspective, since June when this report was discussed in
Congress, without doing a thing the price of oil has gone up from ~$65 to ~$95+. That is a net cost increase of around 4 billion
dollars in oil costs annually for the DoD. The problem is the study identifies the best savings for medium-size combatants defined
as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons. Besides logistics ships, the only ships that fall
into this category are LHAs and LPDs, not destroyers or cruisers as targeted by the resolution passed in the House. However, as
the Heritage summery identifies, there are net savings for each nuclear reactor produced, somewhere around $35 million in savings
per submarine for example.
I don't know, it is an interesting debate and there are certainly valid reasons to think the House has it right in promoting this idea.
However, considering the cost issues the Navy is facing in shipbuilding, if Congress is serious about taking this type of action the
only realistic approach I see is to create a special fund that is protected from being raided, and focuses only on funding nuclear
propulsion for new ships and doesn't count as funds against the Navy shipbuilding budget.
1AC
Accelerating procurement solves the creation of the nuclear naval ships such as the CG(X)
O’Rourke, 10/8/07 (Ronald, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division,
“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress”,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, accessed 7/17/08-e.wey)
The Navy is planning to procure a new kind of cruiser called the CG(X) as the replacement for its 22 remaining Ticonderoga (CG-
47) class Aegis cruisers. Navy plans call for the CG(X) to be equipped with a new radar that, compared to the Aegis system’s SPY-
1 radar, is more powerful and thus more capable for supporting ballistic missile defense operations. As part of its FY2006-FY2011
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted to Congress in February 2005, the Navy accelerated the planned start of CG(X)
procurement from FY2018 to FY2011. The Navy wants to procure a total of 19 CG(X)s between FY2011 and FY2023. If procured
on that schedule, the ships might enter service between 2017 and 2029.In light of PLA TBM modernization efforts, including the
possibility of TBMs equipped with MaRVs capable of hitting moving ships at sea, one issue is whether it would be feasible to
accelerate planned CG(X) procurement. Given the time needed to develop the CG(X)’s new radar, it might not be possible to
accelerate the procurement of the first CG(X) from FY2011 to an earlier year. Once CG(X) procurement were to begin, however, it
might be possible to accelerate the procurement dates of later ships in the program, so as to get more of the ships in service sooner.
In light of the CG(X)’s potential procurement cost, accelerating procurement of CG(X)s to earlier years would, in a situation of a
constrained Navy budget, leave less funding available in those years for meeting other Navy needs.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 23
Inherency: Oil Spikes

Oil spikes will spike by 2020
Hornitshek, 2/17/06 (“WAR WITHOUT OIL: A CATALYST FOR TRUE TRANSFORMATION”,
http://www.nps.edu/cebrowski/Docs/sustainability/other%20articles/War%20Without%20Oil.pdf,accessed 7/20/08)
Conservation and efficiency can provide immediate returns, but the total impact will not be sufficient to eliminate (foreign)
petroleum dependence. Because full-scale transition to the “new energy” will take at least 40 years to complete, and many professionals predict Hubbert’s
Peak will occur by 2020, bridge energy sources are necessary to maintain combat capability. Bridging
energy sources are those energies and fuels other than petroleum which are available or can be made available in sufficient
quantity in the near term to supply necessary energy needs until a revolutionary energy is deployed;
examples include natural gas; synthetic fuels from oil shale, tar sand, or coal liquification; nuclear power; possibly methane hydrates; and
renewables like biofuels, solar, wind, and geothermal power.

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Inherency: Oil Spikes

The U.S. oil supply is highly vulnerable to random spikes
Gregory Lengyel, Jan 2008 (“The Walker Papers”, Lexis Nexis, accessed 7/15/08)
Additionally, if a catastrophe shuts down world oil flow, our government will ensure the DOD has priority access to domestic oil production and the 700–1,000
million barrels of oil in the strategic petroleum reserve. However, scenarios of supply disruptions to DOD installations through the US
oil and gas transmission pipeline system or to deployed operational forces through fuel logistics distribution networks
are not completely far fetched. Almost one-half million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline serve the United
States. These pipelines are integral to the US energy supply and have vital links to such other critical infrastructure as
power plants, airports, and military installations. The pipeline networks are widespread, running through remote and
densely populated regions, and are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Roughly 160,000 miles of pipeline carry
more than 75 percent of the nation’s crude oil and around 60 percent of its refined petroleum products. The US natural
gas pipeline network consists of about 210,000 miles of pipeline for field gathering and transmission nationwide.3
Pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist attack with firearms, explosives, or other physical means. Some also
may be vulnerable to cyberattack on computer control systems or vulnerable to an attack on the electric grid supplying
power to them. Oil and gas pipelines have been targeted extensively by terrorists outside and within the United States.
Rebels have targeted one oil pipeline in Colombia more than 600 times since 1995. In 1996, London police foiled a plot by the

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Nuclear Navy Aff 25
Irish Republican Army to bomb gas pipelines and other utilities. Since
9/11, federal warnings about al-Qaedahave specifically
mentioned pipelines as possible targets. The 800-mile-long Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), which runs from Alaska’s
North Slope oil fields to the marine terminal in Valdez, Alaska, delivers nearly 17 percent of US domestic oil production. The TAPS already has been targeted
numerous times, and in January 2006, federal authorities acknowledged a detailed posting on a Web site purportedly linked to al-Qaeda that
encouraged attacks on US pipelines, especially TAPS, using weapons or explosives.4 Deployed operational forces are
particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Fuel is delivered by convoy to Iraq from Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey. In
FY 2006, more than 156 million gallons of fuel were delivered to US/coalition forces in western Iraq. In the north,
more than 103 million gallons of fuel were delivered through Turkey, utilizing 17,802 trucks that, if positioned end to
end, would stretch from Washington, DC, to Wilmington, Delaware.5 In July 2006, US Marine Corps major general Richard Zilmer,
commander of the multinational force in western Iraq, submitted a priority request for a self-sustainable energy solution to reduce the number of fuel logistics
convoys in Iraq that were increasingly vulnerable to attack (fig. 3).6
Inherency: Oil Shocks

Oil shocks are coming now
The New York Times, 6/20/08 (“Driving Less, Americans Finally React to Sting of Gas Prices, A Study Says,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/business/19gas.html?scp=7&sq=oil%20shocks&st=cse, accessed 7/21/08)
The last time gasoline consumption declined for a prolonged period was during the oil shocks in the late 1970s and early
1980s, when annual United States consumption declined by 12 percent. Fast-rising oil prices, a deep recession and improved fuel
efficiency standards drove down demand for gasoline. The same situation is beginning to emerge today, according to the
report, and basic home economics explains the trends. Since the 1980s, demand for gasoline has climbed fairly steadily, except in late 1990 and
1991 because of a sharp price increase related to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and a recession. That is because spending on gasoline became a smaller percentage of
family income, especially through the 1990s. Americans spent about 4.5 percent of their after-tax income on transportation fuels in 1981, according to Global
Insight, a forecasting firm. As gasoline prices dropped and family incomes rose, that percentage dropped to 1.9 percent in 1998. Today, it is back to 4 percent or
more. The national price for unleaded gasoline would need to average $4.23 a gallon “to create the same economic pain
as in 1981,” the Cambridge Energy report said. “Once unthinkable, such a level is now within view.” On Wednesday,
gasoline averaged nearly $4.08 a gallon.

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Inherency: No Nuclear Power
Budget constraints and fears of tradeoff will prevent the Navy from developing a All-Nuclear fleet
Bruno, 1/17/08 (Michael, “Bartlett prevails in writing nuclear Navy into policy law”, Lexis Nexis, accessed 7/15/08)
This year, the Congress has clearly established it is the policy of the United States to utilize nuclear propulsion for major naval
combatants," Bartlett said Dec. 12 on the House floor. He said it is a vital step to secure national and energy security. "Nuclear
propulsion for naval ships is the right thing to do from economic, combat effectiveness, homeland defense and energy policy
perspectives," Bartlett asserted. Bartlett and Taylor maintain that without congressional pressure, budgetary constraints would
"forever" prevent the Navy pursuing such a "farsighted" change. The sea service is strapped for money to fund an already
precarious long-term shipbuilding plan and widely investing in nuclear power was a luxury it could not afford. Taylor reminded
colleagues that U.S. naval forces count just five oilers in the Pacific, making them prime targets for adversaries. "We could waste
no further time because these investments must begin to be made next year for the CG(X) next-generation cruiser," according to
Bartlett. Conferees in the report accompanying the annual defense bill said they recognize that a milestone decision for CG(X),
where the Navy seeks authorization and appropriations for long-lead time nuclear components for ships two years before full
authorization and appropriation for construction, is only months away. Under current near-term budget plans, which even some in
the Navy apparently doubt, the Navy plans to award the construction contract for CG(X) in FY '11, according to the report

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Inherency: Navy=no investment

Current naval budgets are insufficient to build a nuclear powered fleet
Navytimes, 3/12/08 (“Nuclear-powered DDG? Lawmakers, Navy differ”,
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/03/defense_nuclear_destroyer_031008/, accesed 7/20/08-e.wey)
Could a nuclear-powered version of the venerable Arleigh Burke DDG 51-class destroyer become the next missile cruiser for the
Navy? That’s the vision of at least one influential congressman. Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss., chairman of the seapower
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, said Thursday he is seeking to add money to the 2009 request to fund an
effort to build a nuclear-powered warship that would supplant construction of the DDG 1000 destroyers. The new ship would be a
slightly larger version of the 9,200-ton DDG 51s, powered by one nuclear reactor of the type developed for the new Gerald R.
Ford CVN 78-class aircraft carriers. Taylor said he would end the DDG 1000 Zumwalt class at the two ships already ordered and
cancel plans to build a total of seven of the ships. “I’m more frustrated than most with the slow pace of rebuilding the fleet,”
Taylor said. “The answer [from the Navy] always is, ‘We’re studying it.’ So we’re going to turn the equation around a little bit.”
The Navy is working to design a new CG(X) cruiser based on the 16,000-ton DDG 1000 tumblehome hull, but Taylor said he
doesn’t see the need for that effort. “Rather than all this fooling around with a new hull design, the 51 hull has been a great hull.
Everyone likes it. So if it works at that size, we want to make the calculations to grow it big enough to carry that power plant,” he
said Taylor said he doesn’t see the need for the stealthy, tumblehome hull form of the DDG 1000s. Although Navy leaders speak
confidently of the hull’s properties, lingering doubts about the ship’s stability persist among a number of engineers and naval
architects. The conventional, flared hull of the DDG 51 is more seaworthy and, Taylor said, stealth isn’t that important for the
cruiser. “We know that stealth is not an issue,” he said. “The radars are going to be so powerful that there’s no way on earth you

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Nuclear Navy Aff 28
can make that ship stealthy.” Taylor also is one of a number of lawmakers displaying less than full confidence in the DDG 1000
program. “A lot of us have concerns about building the seven ships for the 1000,” he said. the same day, Duncan Hunter, R-Calif.,
ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed doubts in the DDG 1000 program. At the committee’s Navy
posture hearing, Hunter rhetorically asked whether it was “prudent to buy destroyers that cost over $3 billion and more likely $5
billion apiece while we shut down stable, more affordable production lines.” The Navy is asking for $3 billion in the 2009 budget
request to fund construction of the third ship of the class. Contracts for the first two were issued in February, and although the
Navy continues to express confidence in its stated $3.3 billion price tag for each of the first two ships, outside analysts are
unanimous in forecasting higher costs that range to $5 billion and beyond. Taylor has joined previous subcommittee chairman Rep.
Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., as a vocal champion of nuclear power for surface ships. Since assuming chairmanship of the seapower
subcommittee in early 2007, Taylor has vigorously urged the CG(X) cruisers to be nuclear-powered. The Navy is not enthusiastic
about going to nuclear power for its surface warships. A variety of factors are at work, including the increased costs of
procurement, the cost of training and retaining nuclear personnel and the involvement of the Naval Reactors community in the
surface warship realm. Not surprisingly, the Navy’s top leaders balked at Taylor’s suggestion of a nuclear Burke. “There’s a
significant challenge in and of itself of going nuclear on any surface combatant,” Navy Secretary Donald Winter told reporters
following the hearing. “To be able to do that within fiscal constraints on an existing platform that was never designed to
accommodate a nuclear reactor further complicates the matter. Never say never — I’m sure there’s somebody someplace who will
figure out how to do it. The question is, does that wind up being a cost-effective solution?” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary
Roughead, who, as a commander, commissioned the second Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, doubted a reactor could be placed in
the DDG 51 hull. “I built one, crawled all through it,” Roughead told reporters. “I’m not a marine engineer, but to put a nuclear
power plant in that hull, even if you scale it up — I question whether you can do it.” The Navy plans to buy the first CG(X) cruiser
in 2011 and build 19. An analysis of alternatives is being conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses to determine the hull form
and other characteristics for the ships, which are set to replace current CG 47 Ticonderoga-class Aegis missile cruisers. Service
leaders want the cruiser to adopt the tumblehome hull form of the DDG 1000, but the AoA, expected to be ready last fall, is not yet
complete. Congressional sources are expressing frustration at the delays in the CG(X) study. “They are delaying the AoA, trying to
defer it until after the mark,” said one congressional source, referring to defense bill markups that will come later this year.
However, Roughead and Winter said the delay is due to an extra effort to work through issues associated with the new cruiser and
because Roughead came into the program after the study’s inception. “The secretary can point to me, the new guy on the block,”
said Roughead, who took office at the end of September. “I asked a lot of questions. And my folks have been going back and forth
with me on some of the things that I think are important.” Winter expressed approval of the increased effort. “It’s exactly what
we’ve been looking for in terms of restructuring the acquisition process,” he said. “I think it is far more important to get those
answers before we move forward than it is to adhere to any previously constructed timeline.” But clearly, Taylor is tired of waiting
for the study.“Rather than sit around and wait on them, we’re going to say do it this way,” he said.
2AC Impact-Ext.
1. Cross apply Shulford 2008—U.S. Naval dominance is critical to check proliferation, world wide
stability, terrorism, free trade, maintaining democracy and preventing economic collapse.
____. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CAUSES EXTINCTION
Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis,
SURVIVAL, Fall,2002, p. 87-90
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-
outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand.
Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the
late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more
polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or
even whole nations.

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___.
TERRORISM RISKS EXTINCTION
Yonah Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, 2003

[The Washington Times, "Terrorism myths and realities," 8/28]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international
community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of
civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or
irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on
September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating
blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the
Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago,
are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through
the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries
affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons,
including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal
definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the
exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary
terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The
internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism
[e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and
global security concerns.
2AC Impact--ext.
___. Democracy solves nuclear and biological warfare, genocide and environmental destruction
Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p.
http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html //
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears
increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the
weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The
experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic
governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten
one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better
and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own
citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

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___. FREE TRADE PREVENTS NUCLEAR WAR.

Copley News Service, December 1, 1999
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war.
The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the
World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in
groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way,
our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global
economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War
protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia
about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as
Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people
and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135
WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As
long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they
have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important.
As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the
goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational
corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's
not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a
growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other
companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their
livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for
everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of
the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those
who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
2AC Add-On: Rail Guns
Nuclear powered ships are needed to power rail guns which are key to future power projection.
[“Electromagnetic Rail Gun (EMRG)”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/emrg.htm]
Electric drives on future US Navy ships will make possible significant advances in ship design, fuel efficiency, and numerous
shipboard systems, including innovative weapon systems. One such weapon system is the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG),
which uses electricity, rather than chemical propellants, to launch projectiles at long-range targets. The EMRG is one in a family of
the Office of Naval Research’s Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs). An INP is characterized by high-risk, high-payoff
technologies. If successful, an INP will lead to significant advances in Navy or Marine Corps capabilities.
The launcher (barrel) contains a pair of metal conducting rails embedded in a structure made of composite materials. Very strong
opposing magnetic fields are generated within the launcher by a high current pulse that flows through the rails and a bridging
armature positioned behind the projectile when the rail gun is fired. These fields create a propulsive force that accelerates the
armature and projectile out of the barrel. The GPS-guided projectile will exit the launcher at approximately 2500 meters/second.
On the way to its target, the projectile would leave the Earth’s atmosphere, making it less susceptible to jamming or interception,
and minimizing interference with friendly aircraft upon re-entry into airspace.
When operational, the EMRG will provide high-volume, precise, and time-critical fires in all-weather conditions. The goal of the
Office of Naval Research rail gun project is to develop and smoothly transition prototype system that can deliver fires with high
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accuracy and lethality at distances greater than 200 nautical miles. The rounds will contain little or no high explosive material.
Instead, they will inflict damage bway of high-velocity impact. With no explosives or propellants, the logistics of supporting the
weapon will be simplified and crew and shsafety will be enhanced.
Railguns provide a capability for sustained, offensive power projection, complementary to missiles and tactical aircraft. Railguns
may be a cost-effective solution to the Marine Corps Naval Surface Warfare Support future assault requirements for expeditionary
maneuver warfare because of their unique capability to simultaneously satisfy three key warfighting objectives: (1) extremely long
ranges; (2) short time-of-flight; and (3) high lethality (energy-on-target).
2AC Add-on: Rail Guns

Rail guns free up tactical aviation thus further US power projection.
David Adams April 2003
[“Naval Rail Guns are Revolutionary”, Lieutenant Commander in the US Navy, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute]

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2AC Add-on: Blackouts

Unstable power grid will result in inevitable blackout which collapse the U.S. economy
Nahigian 2008 (Kenneth R. June, 30 2008. “The Smart Alternative: Securing and Strengthening Our Nations Valuable
Electrical Grid”. The Reform Institute. http://www.reforminstitute.org/uploads/publications/Smart_Grid_Final.pdf)
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The electrical power system in the United States entails over 16,924 electric generating units with more than 1,075 Gigawatts of
generating capacity1 involving more than 300,000 miles of transmission lines 2 and 500,000 miles of distribution lines.3 But the
deficiencies of this current electrical grid are inherent in its design. Electrical energy is ordinarily consumed immediately
subsequent to its generation as it historically has been difficult and inefficient to store for prolonged periods. Having an unequal
supply and demand of generated energy creates the potential of overburdening and causing extensive damage to the system. To
counter-act this deficiency, the electrical grid is designed to disconnect at first sign of an electrical imbalance. When the generator
disconnects it results in an electrical outage – or blackout.
Despite being designed to mitigate damage caused to the system and its users, electric delivery interruptions and the ensuing
periods before power restoration threaten our national security as our defense capabilities are disabled, our economy is weakened,
and the lives of Americans who depend on energy for basic needs – including heating and cooling, as well as emergency services –
are placed in peril.
The electrical grid as we know it was installed at a time when the current massive consumer demand could not have been foreseen.
The dramatic increase in the number of new and larger homes, rising urbanization, and the widespread adoption of digital
technology and other energy-thirsty devices has overloaded our electrical delivery system and driven up costs as utilities search for
new sources of energy to meet demand.
The electric gridis further burdened by public policies inhibiting the increase in domestic energy production.
The most significant corollary to our increased dependence on the electrical grid is the increased consequences of power
fluctuations. Power fluctuations, which were once merely an inconvenience, now are a major grid vulnerability that threatens our
Nation’s security and cost tens of billions of dollars in lost commerce each year. Should the electrical grid become a deliberate
target of a terrorist attack, a casualty of a natural disaster, or simply malfunction, an overloading of the system would create a
ripple effect that could bring our economy to a standstill,jeopardize our national security and possibly cost lives.
ECONOMIC DECLINE CAUSES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR

Walter Russell, Mead, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY,
Summer, 1992, p. 30
The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to
their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy.
They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can
work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new
period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of
people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's.
2AC Add-On: Blackout

A nuclear powered naval ship would be able to provide power until the grid is restored
O’Rourke 2008 (Ronald. May 22, “Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background. Issues. And Options for
Congress”.Specialist in Naval Affairs.http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33946.pdf
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Another potential advantage of nuclear power postulated by some observers isthat a nuclear-powered ship can use its
reactor to provide electrical power for useashore for extended periods of time, particularly to help localities that
areexperiencing brownouts during peak use periods or whose access to electrical powerfrom the grid has been
disrupted by a significant natural disaster or terrorist attack.
The Navy has stated that the CG(X) is to have a total power-generating capacity ofabout 80 megawatts (MW). Some
portion of that would be needed to operate thereactor plant itself and other essential equipment aboard the ship.
Much of the restmight be available for transfer off the ship. For purposes of comparison, a typicalU.S.
commercial power plant might have a capacity of 300 MW to 1000 MW. Asingle megawatt can be enough to meet
the needs of several hundred U.S. homes,depending on the region of the country and other factors.28
2AC Add-on: Pollution

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60,000 die annually from commercial shipping pollution – it will be 84,000 by 2012.
Corbett et al 2007 (James J. Corbett, James J. Winebrake, Erin H. Green, Prasad Kasibhatla, VeronikaEyring, and Axel
Lauer. “Mortality from Ship Emissions: A Global Assessment”. Environmental Science and Technology Vol. 41. No 27.
http://pubs.acs.org/cgibin/sample.cgi/esthag/2007/41/i24/pdf/es071686z.pdf?isMac=275512)
Epidemiological studies consistently link ambient concentrationsof particulate matter (PM) to negative health impacts,including
asthma, heart attacks, hospital admissions, andpremature mortality. We model ambient PM concentrationsfrom oceangoing ships
using two geospatial emissions inventoriesand two global aerosol models. We estimate global andregional mortalities by applying
ambient PM increases due toships to cardiopulmonary and lung cancer concentration-risk functions and population models. Our
results indicate thatshipping-related PM emissions are responsible for approximately60,000 cardiopulmonary and lung cancer
deaths annually, withmost deaths occurring near coastlines in Europe, East Asia,and South Asia. Under current regulation and with
the expectedgrowth in shipping activity, we estimate that annual mortalitiescould increase by 40% by 2012.
A nuclear commercial fleet solves.
Adams 2008. (Rod. April 12. “Bunker Busting How To Clean Up Shipping” In comments section.
http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/04/10/bunkerbustinghowtocleanupshipping/. Rod graduated with distinction
from the US Naval Academy in 1981 with a BS in English. He was accepted into nuclear power training. He served a junior officer
on board USS Stonewall Jackson and as Engineer Officer on board USS Von Steuben. He also earned an MS in Systems Technology
(Command, Control and Communications) from the Naval Postgraduate School.)
There is a well proven way to propel large, fast ships across the ocean without producing any air pollution at all. Emission free
aircraft carriers, submarines and ice breakers are all in operation today, but there have also been a couple of demonstration
commercial ships - the NS Savannah and the German ore carrier named Otto Hahn - that have used this remarkable power source.
I am referring to uranium fission, the reliable heat source that provides massive power without releasing noxious and climate
changing gases to the environment.
With a shift of commercial shipping towards nuclear power, there would be less pollution, lower fuel costs, and more petroleum
available for trucks and personal automobiles.
As proven by aircraft carriers, nuclear power also provides the opportunity for even very long range shipping to be done at higher
speeds with greater productivity. The power source requires an increased initial capital investment, but the operating costs are
much lower, especially for large, high speed ships that have high operating tempos. At sea, there is no such thing as the option to
burn cheap coal or use wind or solar power.

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Hegemony Impacts
US HEGEMONY KEY TO PEACE, LIBERTY, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
Bradley A. Thayer, Professor Defense & Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 2006, The National Interest,
November/December, p. Lexis
THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain
or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything
we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human
rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system
can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of
history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse.
Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just
as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what
those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes
many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership
reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a
number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and
Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are
not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power
wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of
liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring
2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps
maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced.
This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more
likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as
well as for advancing the interests of the United States CONTINUES Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has
been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network
characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The
economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit,
particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-
being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the
size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.
Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the
World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that
the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic
policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one
of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking
primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe.
The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations
since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it
serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster,
earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need.

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Hegemony: Global War

RETRENCHMENT FROM US PRIMACY DISASTROUS – INCREASES WARS AND INSTABILITY
But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound
strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United
States and its allies the benefits of primacy.
MAINTENANCE OF US HEGEMONY VITAL TO GLOBAL STABILITY
A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American
global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and
monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the
United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a
strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment
will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what
role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats.
Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that
the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests
and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and
emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the
strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the
conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy
based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far
from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States
itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has
noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace
and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its
enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the
United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. This is not an advantage that should be relinquished
lightly.

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Hegemony Good
Loss of leadership causes multiple nuclear wars, systemic global instability, and magnifies all impacts
Niall Ferguson, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October
2004 (“A World Without Power” – Foreign Policy) http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html
So whatis left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age
experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an
altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is
bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are
known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two
decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves
off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The
reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic
stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would
inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew,
Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the
breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined
previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age
would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become
the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners,
while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions,
beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would
seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly
work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there?
For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from
global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering
in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be
multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would
benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

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Hegemony Good
A GLOBAL LEADER IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT ENVIRONMENTAL AND
CIVILIZATIONAL COLLAPSE
Vaclav Smil, Distinguished Professor, University of Manitoba, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 31(4):
“The Next 50 Years: Unfolding Trends, “605–643 (DECEMBER 2005), p. 640
The absence of a globally influential power in a world dominated by forces of globalization would be akin to the retreat of Roman
power that stood behind the centuries of coherent civilization extending from Mauritania to Mesopotamia: a chaotic, long-lasting
fragmentation that would be inimical to economic progress and greatly exacerbate many of today’s worrisome social and
environmental trends. About 2 billion people already live in countries that are in danger of collapse, and there are no
convincing signs that the number of failing and nearly failed states will diminish in the future (Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace
2005). A century ago a failure, or chronic dysfunction, of a smallish (and particularly a landlocked) state would have been a
relatively inconsequential matter in global terms. In today’s interconnected world such developments command universal attention
and prompt costly military and humanitarian intervention: prominent recent examples include Afghani stan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Were a number of such state failures to take place
simultaneously in a world without any dominant power, who would step in to defuse the most threatening ones? As Niall
Ferguson has warned, “Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be
apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-
new world disorder” .

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 40
Hegemony Good
U.S. leadership is critical to preventing nuclear war and maintaining global security
Zalmay Khalilzad, Rand Corporation, The Washington Quarterly 1995
What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather
than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western
and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia,
Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the
region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its
preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S.
withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S.
withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of
Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to
balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by
Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear
power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task
forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united
Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major
wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated
by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United
States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a
power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more
catastrophic than the last.
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought
regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To
preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that
dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have
vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing
nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination
because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined,
increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia,
Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid
involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe
would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S.
investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of
necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear
weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much
more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this
happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.<continued…> Under the third option, the
United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future.
On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which
the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive
to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively
with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,
U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold
or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global
stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 41
Dependency kills readiness

FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCE UNDERMINES HEGEMONY
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI
Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentago\n, April 2007
(http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%
20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
Over the past several decades, the United States has become increasingly reliant on imported energy, primarily from petroleum.
The Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts that U.S. dependence on petroleum imports will increase to 68 percent by 2025.
DoD, the largest U.S. consumer of energy, also relies on foreign supplies of crude oil and the finished transportation fuels (such as
military jet fuel) that are derived from it. Fuel represents more than half of the DoD logistics tonnage and more than 70 percent of
the tonnage required to put the U.S. Army into position for battle.1 The Navy uses millions of gallons of fuel every day to operate
around the globe, and the Air Force—the largest DoD consumer of fuel— uses even more. DoD’s heavy operational dependence
on traditional fuel sources creates a number of decidedly negative effects: DoD shares the nation’s reliance on foreign energy
sources, which effectively forces the country to rely on potential adversaries to maintain its economy and national security.2
DoD’s energy dependence exposes the department to price volatility, forcing it to consume unplanned resources that could be used
to recapitalize an aging force structure and infrastructure. The availability of traditional energy supplies beyond 25 years is
difficult to project. Because of the 8- to 20-year time frame of future operational concepts and a similarly long, or longer, capital
asset replacement cycle for DoD platforms, DoD must begin now to address its uncertain energy future. The United States bears
many costs associated with the stability of the global oil market and infrastructure. The cost of securing Persian Gulf sources alone
comes to $44.4 billion annually.3 DoD receives little support from other consuming nations to perform this mission although they
share in the benefits due to the global nature of the oil market. In this environment of uncertainty about the availability of
traditional fuel sources at a reasonable cost, DoD is facing increasing energy demand and support requirements that it must meet if
it is to achieve its broader strategic goals— notably, establishment of a more mobile and agile force. However, recent
technological advances in energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies offer a unique opportunity for DoD to make
progress toward reconciling its strategic goals with its energy requirements through reduced consumption of fuel— especially
foreign fuel. To capitalize on this opportunity, DoD needs to implement an energy strategy that encompasses the development of
innovative new concepts and capabilities to reduce energy dependence while maintaining or increasing overall warfighting
effectiveness.
FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCE UNDERMINES FORWARD DEPLOYMENT AND CAUSES

COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND INDIA
Thomas D. Crowley, et. al., President, L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., “Transforming the Way DOD Looks at Energy,” LMI
Research Institute Report Commissioned by the Pentagon, April 2007
(http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_404_FT602T1_Transforming%20the%20Way%20DoD%20Looks%20at%
20Energy_Final%20Report.pdf)
Today, the United States is the superpower. Yet, the scramble to secure access to oil continues while the availability of easily
recoverable oil diminishes, putting the United States into increasing competition with other oil importers, most notably, the rapidly
emerging economies of India and China.1 As the U.S. government’s energy security strategy evolves, the U.S. military, which is
highly dependent on oil to fuel the engines of its overwhelming operational superiority, must develop a long-term strategy to deal
with the changing energy environment.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 42

Fuel dependence undermines warfighting -- the plan solves
Lovins et al 2004 (Amory Lovins, cofounder and CEO of Rocky Mountain Institute, former advisor to the U.S. Departments of
Energy and Defense, Winning the Oil End Game, pg. 221)
As the rest of the federal government leads, follows, or gets out of the way, there's one part of the government that is trained,
prepared, and obliged to lead: the Department of Defense. We showed on pp. 84-93 why DoD absolutely requires superefficient
land, sea, and air platforms to fulfill its national-security mission. To be sure, as a byproduct of platform efficiency, DoD will also
greatly enhance its warfighting capability and trim probably tens of billions of dollars per year off its overstressed budgets; but the
most important result will be the Pentagon's ability to deploy and sustain agile, effective forces. The more the military can be
relieved of the duty to protect oil, the safer will be our troops, our nation, and the world. And the military's spearheading of
lightweighting and other efficiency technologies will greatly hasten the day it will be relieved of this unnecessary mission. Right
now, the Pentagon's requirements-writing, design, and procurement of military platforms place a modest rhetorical priority but a
low actual priority on fuel efficiency. The Defense Science Board (DSB) task force's report of 31 January 2001 set out the needed
reforms. It was briefed to the full DSB in May 2001, released mid-August 2001, and concurred with by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
24 August 2001.883 Eighteen days after that came 9/11, which diverted attention from any further action. Decisive adoption is
now overdue. Fortunately, there are growing signs, chiefly within the Services, of interest in shifting in-house and contractor
design professionals toward integrative, whole-system thinking that can "tunnel through the cost barrier" to radical energy
efficiency at lower capital COSt.884 The main missing ingredient is turning efficiency aspirations into actual requirements and
acquisitions. Leadership to do so must come from the Secretary of Defense.
Fossil fuel use undermines combat effectiveness -- slows down troops on the battlefield and exposes
the military to vulnerabilities
CNA, 2007 [CNA Corporation, a non profit organization that has been conducting independent research on issues of public concern for over
60 years, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”,
http://securityandclimate.cna.org/report/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate%20Change.pdf]
“Seventy percent of the tonnage on the battlefield is fuel,” he said. “That’s an amazing number.
Between fuel and water, it’s almost everything we take to the battlefield. Food and ammo are really quite small in
comparison. “Delivering that fuel requires secure lines of communication,” Gen. Farrell said. “If you have bases
nearby, you may be able to deliver it with much less risk, but that’s a supply line issue. And we see in Iraq how
dangerous it can be to transport fuel. “The military should be interested in fuel economy on the battlefield,” he said.
“It’s a readiness issue. If you can move your men and materiel more quickly, if you have less tonnage but the same
level of protection and firepower, you’re more efficient on the battlefield. That’s a life and death issue.” Gen. Farrell
talked about the challenge of focusing on long-term issues. “Climate change is not something people can recognize,”
he said. “In geologic times, it’s quick. But in human terms, it’s still very slow. It’s hard to get all of us to do something
about it. And that leads me to believe we should deal with other things that are a problem today but that also get us to
the heart of climate change. That’s where I get to the issue of smart energy choices. “Focus on conservation and on
energy sources that aren’t based in carbon. Move toward a hydrogen economy, in part because you know it will
ultimately give you efficiency and, yes, profit.
When you pursue these things, you build alliances along the way. That’s safety. It’s a benefit we see right now.”

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 43
Dependency Kills readiness

Fossil fuel use exposes the military to attacks, undermining warfighting
Mark Clayton Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, Christian Science Monitor [News Paper] September 7, 2006, In the
Iraqi war zone, US Army calls for 'green' power [Lexis]
Memo to Pentagon brass from the top United States commander in western Iraq: Renewable energy - solar and wind-
power generators - urgently needed to help win the fight. Send soon. Calling for more energy in the middle of oil-rich
Iraq might sound odd to some. But not to Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, whose deputies on July 25 sent the
Pentagon a "Priority 1" request for "a self-sustainable energy solution" including "solar panels and wind turbines." The
memo may be the first time a frontline commander has called for renewable-energy backup in battle. Indeed, it
underscores the urgency: Without renewable power, US forces "will remain unnecessarily exposed" and will "continue
to accrue preventable ... serious and grave casualties," the memo says. Apparently, the brass is heeding that call. The
US Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF), which speeds frontline requests, is "expected soon" to begin welcoming
proposals from companies to build and ship to Iraq 183 frontline renewable-energy power stations, an REF spokesman
confirms. The stations would use a mix of solar and wind power to augment diesel generators at US outposts, the
spokesman says. Despite desert temperatures, the hot "thermal signature" of a diesel generator can call enemy
attention to US outposts, experts say. With convoys still vulnerable to ambush, the fewer missions needed to
resupply outposts with JP-8 fuel to run power generators - among the Army's biggest fuel guzzlers - the better, the
memo says. "By reducing the need for [petroleum] at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistics
convoys on the road, thereby reducing the danger to our marines, soldiers, and sailors," reads the unclassified memo
posted on the website InsideDefense.com, a defense industry publication that first reported its existence last month.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 44

Military dependence on oil will destroy U.S. military readiness
Boston Globe, May 1, 2007(“Pentagon study says oil reliance strains military Urges development of alternative
fuels”, Lexis Nexis, accessed 7/15/08)
WASHINGTON - A new study ordered by the Pentagon warns that the rising cost and dwindling supply of oil - the lifeblood of
fighter jets, warships, and tanks - will make the US military's ability to respond to hot spots around the world "unsustainable in the
long term." The study, produced by a defense consulting firm, concludes that all four branches of the military must "fundamentally
transform" their assumptions about energy, including taking immediate steps toward fielding weapons systems and aircraft that run
on alternative and renewable fuels. It is "imperative" that the Department of Defense "apply new energy technologies that address
alternative supply sources and efficient consumption across all aspects of military operations," according to the report, which was
provided to the Globe. Weaning the military from fossil fuels quickly, however, would be a herculean task - especially because the
bulk of the US arsenal, the world's most advanced, is dependent on fossil fuels and many of those military systems have been
designed to remain in service for at least several decades. Moving to alternative energy sources on a large scale would "challenge
some of the department's most deeply held assumptions, interests, and processes," the report acknowledges. But Pentagon advisers
believe the military's growing consumption of fossil fuels - an increasingly expensive and scarce commodity - leaves Pentagon
leaders with little choice but to break with the past as soon as possible. Compared with World War II, according to the report, the
military in Iraq and Afghanistan is using 16 times more fuel per soldier.“We have to wake up," said Milton R. Copulos, National
Defense Council Foundation president and an authority on the military's energy needs. "We are at the edge of a precipice and we
have one foot over the edge. The only way to avoid going over is to move forward and move forward aggressively with initiatives
to develop alternative fuels. Just cutting back won't work." The Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation and Resources, which is
responsible for addressing future security challenges, commissioned LMI, a government-consulting firm, to produce the report.
Called "Transforming the Way DoD Looks at Energy," the study is intended as a potential and closed many of its former bases in
Asia and Europe. The Pentagon's strategic planning has placed a premium on being able to deploy forces quickly around the world
from bases in the United States. The National Defense Strategy, which lays out the Pentagon's anticipated missions, calls for an
increased US military presence around the globe to be able to combat international terrorist blueprint for a new military energy
strategy and includes a detailed survey of potential alternatives to oil - including synthetic fuels, renewable biofuels, ethanol, and
biodiesel fuel as well as solar and wind power, among many others. The military is considered a technology leader and how it
decides to meet future energy needs could influence broader national efforts to reduce dependence on foreign oil. The report adds a
powerful voice to the growing chorus warning that, as oil supplies dwindle during the next half-century, US reliance on fossil fuels
poses a serious risk to national security. "The Pentagon's efforts in this area would have a huge impact on the rest of the country,"
Copulos said. The Department of Defense is the largest single energy consumer in the country. The Air Force spends about $5
billion a year on fuel, mostly to support flight operations. The Navy and Army are close behind. Of all the cargo the military
transports, more than half consists of fuel. About 80 percent of all material transported on the battlefield is fuel. The military's
energy consumption has steadily grown as its arsenal has become more mechanized and as US forces have had to travel farther
distances. In World War II, the United States consumed about a gallon of fuel per soldier per day, according to the report. In the
1990-91 Persian Gulf War, about 4 gallons of fuel per soldier was consumed per day. In 2006, the US operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan burned about 16 gallons of fuel per soldier on average per day, almost twice as much as the year before. Higher fuel
consumption is a consequence of the US military's changing posture in recent years. During the Cold War, US forces were
deployed at numerous bases across the world; since then, the United States has downsized its force groups and respond to
humanitarian and security crises. But aviation fuel consumption for example, has increased 6 percent over the last decade. And the
report predicts that trend will continue. "The US military will have to be even more energy intense, locate in more regions of the
world, employ new technologies, and manage a more complex logistics system," according to the report. "Simply put, more miles
will be traveled, both by combat units and the supply units that sustain them, which will result in increased energy consumption."
The costs of relying on oil to power the military are consuming an increasing share of the military's budget, the report asserts.
Energy costs have doubled since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, it says, and the cost of conducting operations could become
so expensive in the future that the military will not be able to pay for some of its new weapon systems. Ensuring access to
dwindling oil supplies also carries a big price tag. The United States, relying largely on military patrols, spends an average of $44
billion per year safeguarding oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. And the United States is often dependent on some of the same
countries that pose the greatest threats to US interests. Achieving an energy transformation at the Department of Defense "will
require the commitment, personal involvement, and leadership of the secretary of defense and his key subordinates," the report
says
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 45
Dependency Solvency
the impact of such attacks would be minimized, he said.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 46
Impact: Sea power

Exapnsion of U.S. naval sea power will keep the world’s sea lanes open and maintain global peace and
security
%20of%20the%20USN%20Submarine%20Force_NWCRW08.pdf, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey\\)
The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations. Our Nation’s
interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information,
law, people and governance. We prosper because of this system of exchange among nations, yet recognize it is vulnerable to a
range of disruptions that can produce cascading and harmful effects far fromtheir sources.Major power war, regional conflict,
terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity. The
oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are landlocked. Because the maritime domain—the world’s
oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90% of the world’s trade, it
carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make
neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our
shores. Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era in which they are
unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace. Our challenge is to apply seapower in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even
as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust.While defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war
remain the indisputable ends of seapower, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 47
Impact: Sea Power

U.S. naval mobility is critical to defending the homeland and responding to conflicts ranging from
small regional instabilities to massive wars from such as the dragon or the bear
The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for
responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the GlobalMaritime Partnership initiative), send powerful
messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States
seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens fromdirect attack and to
advance our interests around the world.As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S.
maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade,
finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility
inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are our commitment to
security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the
combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint
or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute
to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and
prevent ormitigate disruptions and crises.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 48
Impact: Global Stability/Power War

The gradual decline of the Navy will leave a vacuum culminating in major power competition and
global war. A strong navy ensures global stability even through a land defeat.
Robert D. Kaplan November 2007
[Atlantic Monthly, national correspondent for The Atlantic, is the Class of 1960 Distinguished Visiting Professor in National
Security at the U.S. Naval Academy, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200711/america-decline/3]
“Regular wars” between major states could be as frequent in the 21st century as they were in the 20th. In his 2005 book, Another
Bloody Century, the British scholar Colin Gray, a professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of
Reading, explains convincingly that these future wars will not require any “manifestation of insanity by political leaders,” nor even
an “aberration from normal statecraft,” but may come about merely because of what Thucydides recognized as “fear, honour, and
interest.” Wars between the United States and a Sino-Russian axis or between the United States and a coalition of rogue states are
just two of the scenarios Gray imagines.
Are we prepared to fight these wars? Our Army and Marine Corps together constitute the most battle- hardened regular land force
in the world. But it has been a long time since our Navy has truly fought another navy, or our Air Force another air force. In the
future they could be tested to the same extent that the Army and Marine Corps have been. The current catchphrase is boots on the
ground; in the future it could be hulls in the water.
Democracy and supremacy undermine the tragic sense required for long-range planning. A “peaceful, gain- loving nation” like the
United States “is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days,” warned
Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1890, a time when—although the Panama Canal was soon to be built and World War I lay
just over the horizon—America was still preoccupied with land-based westward expansion (Wounded Knee, the last battle of the
Indian Wars, was fought that year). Mahan notwithstanding, too few strategists at the time were thinking seriously about sea
power. Today we are similarly obsessed with dirty land wars, and our 300-ship Navy is roughly half the size it was in the mid-
1980s.
A great navy is like oxygen: You notice it only when it is gone. But the strength of a nation’s sea presence, more than any other
indicator, has throughout history often been the best barometer of that nation’s power and prospects. “Those far-distant storm-
beaten ships upon which [Napoleon’s] Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world,” Mahan wrote,
describing how the British Royal Navy had checked Napoleon’s ambitions. In our day, carrier strike groups, floating in
international waters only a few miles off enemy territory, require no visas or exit strategies. Despite the quagmire of Iraq, we
remain the greatest outside power in the Middle East because of our ability to project destructive fire from warships in the Indian
Ocean and its tributary waters such as the Persian Gulf. Our sea power allows us to lose a limited war on land without
catastrophic consequences. The Navy, together with the Air Force, constitutes our insurance policy. The Navy also plays a crucial
role as the bus driver for most of the Army’s equipment, whenever the Army deploys overseas.
Army units can’t forward-deploy anywhere in significant numbers without a national debate. Not so the Navy. Forget the cliché
about the essence of the Navy being tradition; I’ve spent enough time with junior officers and enlisted sailors on Pacific
deployments to know that the essence of our Navy is operations: disaster relief, tracking Chinese subs, guarding sea-lanes, and so
forth. American sailors don’t care what the mission is, as long as there is one, and the farther forward the better. The seminal event
for the U.S. Navy was John Paul Jones’s interdiction of the British during the Revolutionary War—which occurred off Yorkshire,
on the other side of the Atlantic. During the quasi-war that President John Adams waged against France from 1798 to 1800, U.S.
warships protected American merchant vessels off what is today Indonesia. American warships operated off North Africa in the
First Barbary War of 1801 to 1805. The War of 1812 found the Navy as far down the globe as the coast of Brazil and as far up as
the North Cape of Scandinavia. Peter Swartz, an expert at the Center for Naval Analyses, observes that because operating
thousands of miles from home ports is so ingrained in U.S. naval tradition, no one thinks it odd that even the Coast Guard has
ships in service from Greenland to South America.
Great navies help preserve international stability. When the British navy began to decline, the vacuum it left behind helped
engender the competition among major powers that led to World War I. After the U.S. Navy was forced to depart Subic Bay in the
Philippines in 1992, piracy quintupled in the Southeast Asian archipelago—which includes one of the world’s busiest waterways,
the Strait of Malacca. In an age when 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea, and 95 percent of our imports and exports
from outside North America do the same (even as that trade volume is set to double by 2020), and when 75 percent of the world’s
population is clustered within 200 miles of the sea, the relative decline of our Navy is a big, dangerous fact to which our elites
appear blind.
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 49
1AC Module: China

Observation ___: Taiwan
China taking steps to modernize their brown water navy into a blue water force capable of attacking
and holding Taiwan,
David Lague, 2006 (“China airs ambitions to beef up navy power;
A strong message intended for Taiwan”, lexis nexis, accessed 7/17/08-e.wey)
The Chinese president, Hu Jintao, has called on top military commanders to build a powerful navy, the state media reported
Thursday as China continues to spend heavily on a modern, blue-water fleet. In a speech to navy officers attending a Communist
Party meeting Wednesday, Hu said China was an important maritime nation and the navy should be ready to protect the country's
interests ''at any time,'' according to reports of his comments carried on the front pages of major newspapers ''We should endeavor
to build a powerful people's navy that can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and a new period," Hu was quoted as
saying, accompanied by photographs of him wearing military-style green. "In the process of protecting the nation's authority and
security and maintaining our maritime rights, the navy's role is very important. It is a glorious task." Hu is also chairman of the
Central Military Commission, which makes him commander-in-chief of China's armed forces. Hu's call for a strong navy is further
evidence that the mainland's top military planners believe this will help safeguard what China sees as its sovereignty over Taiwan,
a self-governing island that Beijing regards as a renegade province, and counter the growing naval power of other Asian countries,
including Japan and India. His comments also reinforce the views of senior Chinese military officers who argue that China needs a
navy that can deploy far from the country's coastline to protect its huge maritime trade, including crucial imports of oil and raw
materials. ''There is a certain inevitability about China's rise as a major maritime power," said Sam Bateman, a maritime security
expert at Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies. "The threats that China faces these days are largely maritime
threats." Hu's speech also suggested that as a civilian and career Communist Party official, he was continuing efforts to consolidate
his leadership over the country's 2.3 million-strong military. In the early decades of Communist rule, China's navy was little more
than a coastal defense force with obsolete ships and weapons. But, after double-digit increases in annual defense outlays over
much of the past 15 years, most analysts believe China is on track to become a major naval power. Over that period, Beijing has
spent heavily on potent surface ships, submarines and weapons from Russia. And it has continued to use its booming commercial
shipbuilding industry as a springboard for developing homegrown warship designs. Naval analysts believe a top priority for
China's navy is to counter any U.S. intervention in the event of conflict between the mainland and Taiwan. Although China still
lags far behind the United States in overall naval power, experts say that Beijing's military planners are attempting to build a navy
that could dominate a limited area around Taiwan for a long enough period, while its other forces overwhelmed the island's
defenses. China has a fleet of more than 50 submarines, including modern Russian and domestic designs, that could pose a major
threat to U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups. These submarines are armed with advanced Russian torpedoes and anti-ship missiles.
The Chinese Navy also has more than 20 major surface warships in its fleet. China remains relatively backward in naval aviation,
particularly in comparison to the United States, which has 12 aircraft-carrier battle groups. But in any conflict over Taiwan this
would be at least partly offset by China's land-based strike aircraft, which could operate over the nearby island and surrounding
waters. In the longer term, some experts believe that China will add aircraft carriers to its fleet to protect its merchant shipping on
distant sea lanes. While the Chinese government has continued to boost defense spending, there is evidence that Hu is attempting
to increase accountability and fight corruption in the ranks as he consolidates his grip over the military. In September, the Central
Military Commission took the unusual step of publicly announcing the punishment of senior air force officers held responsible for
\\the June crash of a military transport aircraft that killed all 40 personnel on board.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 50
1AC Module: China

Credible evidence points to a Chinese strike on Taiwan by the end of this year
Association for Asian Resources, 2005(“China to attack Taiwan by 2008”,
http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2146.html, accessed 7/21/08)
The US Department of Defense believes China might attack Taiwan in 2006 or 2008, Vice Minister of National Defense Tsai
Ming-hsien said yesterday. "The US has solid intelligence on China and China is likely to have a better air force and navy than
Taiwan after 2006, so the US made such a judgment," he said. Tsai made the statement when asked about China's military threat
during a question and answer session at the legislature's National Defense Committee. "If China provokes us and makes the first
move to attack Taiwan, our military will certainly strike back. Our targets will include Chinese military facilities and the sources of
the attack. The Three Gorges Dam, however, will not be a target," Tsai said. The emphasis on the Three Gorges Dam came after
details of the US Department of Defense's annual report to Congress on China's military power were released. The report said that,
should Taiwan come under attack, "proponents of strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible
threats to China's urban population or high-value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter Chinese military coercion."
Tsai denied that the US Department of Defense had highlighted the Three Gorges Dam as a possible target, saying it was reported
only in a US military magazine. Local media reports also stated that Minister of National Defense Lee Jye said two days ago that
Taiwan was capable of retaliating against targets in China, including the Three Gorges Dam. Lee reportedly made the statement
while discussing NT$610 billion-worth of arms purchases with legislators. Lee's remark was relayed by a legislator who was at the
meeting The Ministry of National Defense issued a statement yesterday denying that Lee specifically highlighted the Three Gorges
Dam as a target. It was also reported yesterday that Lee said he would resign if the legislature refused to grant the budget for the
purchase of diesel-powered submarines, worth more than NT$400 billion. Opposition legislators dismissed the threat to resign as a
political stunt. "Minister Lee Jye said he would resign if the legislature doesn't grant the budget," said People First Party Legislator
Chin Huei-chu, a convener of the National Defense Committee. "It is easy to see that talk about a possible Chinese attack on
Taiwan is an attempt to push the budget through." DPP Legislator Lee Wen-chung defended the US report. "The US Department of
Defense is not dealing with politics, but military affairs," Lee said. "The US reckons that the military balance between Taiwan and
China will be tipped between 2005 and 2010. Taiwan will lose its advantage and that may tempt China into starting a war."
Conflict over Taiwan will escalate uncontrollably to US-China nuclear war

Betts and Christensen 01 – Adjunct Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at Council on Foreign Relations; and Professor of Politics and
International Affairs at Princeton University [Richard K. and Thomas J., “China: getting the questions right,” National Interest, Winter 2000/2001, LN]
The possibility of war with China over Taiwan is arguably the most dangerous threat that U.S. security policy faces in the coming decade. No
other flashpoint is more likely to bring the United States into combat with a major power, and no other contingency compels Washington to respond with such
ambiguous commitment. U.S. policy regarding the defense of Taiwan is uncertain, and thus so is the understanding in Beijing and Taipei -- and in Washington -- over how strongly the United States might react in
Because Taiwan is more independent than either Washington or Beijing might prefer, neither great power can fully
different circumstances.
control developments that might ignite a crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation.
Traditional questions about Chinese intentions and capabilities miss the mark in analyzing the likelihood of war and the probable course war would take. A PRC attack on a Taiwan following the pursuit of formal
independence from the Chinese nation would be viewed (quite sincerely) in Beijing as purely defensive, to preserve generally recognized territorial sovereignty. Many outside China would view the attack as a sign of
belligerence. But military activity against an independence-minded Taiwan might have little relevance to Beijing's behavior on other issues, even for other sovereignty disputes such as those over the Senkaku or Spratly
Islands. The niceties of balance of power calculations could prove relatively unimportant in determining whether China would use force over Taiwan and whether it would do so effectively. U.S. efforts to create a stable
balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. Moreover, such efforts would miss the major point of cross-strait strategic interaction. China's military
strategy in a conflict over Taiwan would likely be to punish and coerce rather than to control, tasks for which its military may be able to use force to great effect. The PLA's ability to mount a Normandy-style assault on
the island is not the toughest question. Geography (the water barrier), together with U.S. supplies, would provide powerful means to Taiwan for blocking such an invasion, even without direct U.S. combat involvement.
A greater challenge would be a blockade by the PRC, which has a large number of submarines and mines. Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and its dependence on international trade and investment enhance the
potential effect of blockades -- or coercive campaigns involving ballistic and cruise missiles -- even if the military impact would be modest. The PRC might thus be able to damage severely the island's economy
regardless of the number of F-16s, AWACS aircraft and theater missile defense batteries the island can bring to bear. Moreover, to break a blockade by sweeping the seas would likely require a direct attack on Chinese
it would be up to Washington to decide to fire the first shots against a nuclear-armed
vessels. If Chinese forces had not already targeted U.S. ships by that point,
country that was attempting to regain limited control of what it believes is its own territory. Some think that the United States should give Taiwan military
assistance or defend it directly even in the extreme case that it openly declares legal independence. Many assume that the United States could deter an attack from the mainland and that, if worse came to worst, the
United States would prevail in a war should deterrence fail. These assumptions, unfortunately, are suspect. Before being deterred, Beijing would have to weigh the costs of inaction against action. The perceived cost of
inaction against Taiwanese independence is very high. No leader can count on survival if labeled the next Li Hongzhang, the diplomat who ceded Taiwan to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Many in Beijing
believe that the United States lacks the national will to pursue a war against China to save Taiwan. If the prospect of casualties did not deter the United States from intervening, the reasoning goes, even low levels of
casualties would frighten it into early withdrawal. Following this logic, China need not defeat the U.S. military in wartime or close the gap in military power in peacetime. Rather, the strategic requirement is much
lower: to put a number of American soldiers, sailors and airmen at risk. It is dangerous that so many Chinese seem to subscribe to this "Somalia analogy." Washington would probably not be deterred by fears of
casualties if it decided that Taiwan was being bullied without serious provocation, any more than it was deterred from attacking Iraq in 1991 by high pre-war casualty estimates. Nor is it likely that, once the United
it is hard to
States had made the momentous decision to gear up for combat against a power like China, it would quit easily after suffering a small number of casualties. Thinking over the long term, however,
imagine how the United States could "win" a war to preserve Taiwan's independence against a resolute China. Too many analyses inside the Beltway
stop at the operational level of analysis, assuming that tactical victories answer the strategic question. Sinking the Chinese navy and defeating an invasion attempt against the island would not be the end of the story.
Unless the U.S. Air Force were to mount a massive and sustained assault against mainland targets, the PRC would maintain the capability to disrupt commerce, squeeze Taiwan, and keep U.S. personnel at risk. As one
American naval officer put it, as a nation much larger than Iraq or Yugoslavia, "China is a cruise missile sponge." This will be doubly true once China builds more road-mobile, solid-fuel missiles and learns better ways

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Nuclear Navy Aff 51
1AC Module: china

(continued no text deleted)
strikes against the mainland would involve huge risks. Recall that for three years, while Chinese forces were killing U.S. soldiers in Korea, the
to hide its military assets. Moreover,
China
Truman administration refrained from carrying combat to the mainland for fear of a wider war -- and this at a time when China had no nuclear weapons and its Soviet allies had fewer than China now has.
maintains the capacity to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear missiles, and to strike U.S. bases in the region with both
conventional and nuclear missiles.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 52
1AC Module: China

US-China nuclear war will destroy the planet
Straits Times – 2000 [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]
a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into
would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the
national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale
possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US
forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were
to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the
existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the
Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own
nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US
Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal
account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which
there is little hope of winning a war
could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy
major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a
review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International
military leaders considered the use
Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said
of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that
come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon
over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.
And, only a long standing naval response force can deter China from invading Taiwan
O’Rourke, 10/8/07 (Ronald, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “China
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress”,
In the scenario of a short-duration conflict, on-station and early-arriving U.S. Navy forces could be of particular value,
while later-arriving U.S. Navy forces might be of less value, at least in preventing initial success by PLA forces. On-
Station Forces. Given the difficulty of knowing with certainty when a Taiwan Strait crisis or conflict might occur,
having forces on-station at the start of the crisis or conflict is a goal that would most reliably be met by maintaining a
standing forward deployment of U.S. Navy forces in the area.
U.S. Naval flexibility is critical to respond to a attack on Taiwan by China

“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for
Congress”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, accessed 2/4/07-e.wey)
Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration
conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval
and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime
anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term
goals of China’s naval modernization include asserting China’s regional military leadership and protecting China’s maritime
territorial, economic, and energy interests. China’s naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy
capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in
the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could
place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China’s maritime anti-access
forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons. China’s naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress
concerning the role of China in Department of Defense and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the
Navy; forward homeporting in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW platforms; Navy missile
defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening.Adv: China
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 53
1AC Module: China

Nuclear power provides the necessary flexibility and mobility for the U.S. Navy to respond to hot spots
such as the Taiwan Straight
Bartlett, 4/1/07(Rep. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-Md.), the ranking GOP member of the House Armed Services Seapower
and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, “CG(X) Needs Nuclear Power”, lexis, accessed 7/15/08-e.wey)
The case is in hand--if only the Navy will act this year--to choose nuclear propulsion for the next-generation cruiser, the CG(X).
Specifying an integrated nuclear powerplant would reduce the Navy's dependence on fossil fuels. A nuclear CG(X) makes sense
because of an impending peak and subsequent decline in oil production during the ship's life, the strategic danger of relying upon
imported oil, and the need to reduce competition--or conflict--over oil with major consuming nations like China. If the Navy
chooses oil-based power, it will increase an already unacceptably high risk that a disruption in supply will threaten America's
national and economic security. A Mar. 1 hearing by the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) reviewed the Navy's Fiscal 2006 "Report to Congress on Alternate Propulsion Methods for Surface
Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships." This study provides evidence of the comparative benefits in operational flexibility
and warfighting capability of a nuclear CG(X). With nuclear power, the CG(X) would not be restricted by the refueling supply
chain. It also would achieve greater power generation for future weapons and other systems. The study concludes that the break-
even cost for nuclear power compared with oil for the CG(X) would be between $70 and $225 per barrel. The report found that the
most significant drivers for fuel consumption and life-cycle costs are power-generation needs and the missions and operations
tempo of platforms. These warfighting factors support a nuclear CG(X). As the director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program,
Adm. Kirkland Donald, testified, "Nuclear propulsion gives our warships virtually unlimited endurance at high speed, worldwide
mobility and unmatched flexibility." He noted that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS
Enterprise, then en route home after a six-month deployment, reversed course and arrived within striking distance of Afghanistan
in less than 11 hr. with no need for a pre-positioned logistics train. A 50% reduction in manning and 30% reduction in maintenance
requirements for the nuclear propulsion plant of the next-generation Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers have reduced life-cycle
costs and increased the tactical advantages of nuclear propulsion compared with fossil fuels. An additional $600-million up-front
acquisition cost for nuclear propulsion poses a significant and short-sighted budgetary bias for the Navy to choose an oil-based
propulsion system. Oil has averaged near $60 a barrel for more than two years and spiked to the $70 per barrel break-even range
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. What will the price of a barrel of oil be when the CG(X) is deployed between 2020 and 2050? A
new Government Accountability Office report, prepared at my request, found most experts predict there will be a peak and
subsequent decline in world oil production between now and 2040. The peak is not the end of oil, but rather the end of cheap oil.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects non-OPEC countries will peak in production in 2010. IEA estimates post-peak
world production declines in the range of 5-12% annually. Its 2005 report, "Oil Shockwave: The National Commission on Energy
Policy and Securing America's Future Energy," estimated that a sustained 4% global shortfall in daily oil supply would raise oil
prices above $160 per barrel. That is well within the cost-savings range of $70-225 per barrel for a nuclear CG(X). I recently led a
HASC delegation to China. China is planning for an oil peak in 2012 and a post-oil future. China is aggressively building a blue-
water navy and acquiring oil assets around the world. The country's decisions make sense as insurance in a future of declining oil
supplies dominated by resource nationalism..

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 54
1AC Module: China

Enhance U.S. Naval power will deter a major power war between countries such as China
Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers.
Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power
war.While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be
actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces— our lethality, global reach,
speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of
deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against
aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability
to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore,makes our maritime
forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it
provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can
concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 55
China will surpass U.S. Navy before 2015

A lack of modernization will cause China’s navy to surpass the U.S. navy by 2015.
Fred Conroy June 2008
[American Shipbuilder - Volume 14, Issue 2, “House and Senate Do Not Increase the Naval Shipbuilding Budget”, Vice
President of the Government Business Unit of Dresser-Rand, http://www.usships.org/content/view/280/9/]
Over the past few months several reports and articles have noted the continued growth in the size and capabilities of the navies of
both China and Russia. The Defense Department’s (DOD) annual report highlights China’s rapid military build-up and China’s
continued refusal to disclose the purpose behind its comprehensive military modernization. Despite the continued lack of
transparency, China continues to devote considerable resources to expanding its naval fleet. According to the DOD report:
China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world. The country is developing and testing offensive missiles and
working on methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. An emphasis has been placed on anti-ship cruise missiles, capable of
striking ships at sea from great distances. China’s fleet is estimated to include 74 surface combatant ships, 57 attack class
submarines, and 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships. Between its indigenous ship production and acquisition of ships from
Russia, the country has added ten new classes of ships over the past ten years. China continues an active research and development
program in support of an aircraft carrier, and could start construction by the end of this decade. It currently possesses the ability to
surge production of its submarine and amphibious ship platforms. While China continues to rely on foreign suppliers for many of
its technologies, it is steadily developing the ability to domestically produce its naval systems and components. Through
acquisition of dual use technologies, obtaining military technologies via legal transactions with countries such as Russia, or
espionage of American and European classified defense technology, China will not only possess the largest naval fleet by 2015, but
also have a fleet that can match the capabilities of the United States fleet.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 56
1AC Module: Humanitarian Operations

Observation___: U.S. humanitarian operations
The aftermath of natural disasters are far more deadly than the acts of nature them selves
CDC, 2007(“Epidemics after Natural Disasters”, http://www.cdc.gov/Ncidod/eid/13/1/1.htm, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey)
The relationship between natural disasters and communicable diseases is frequently misconstrued. The risk for outbreaks is often
presumed to be very high in the chaos that follows natural disasters, a fear likely derived from a perceived association between
dead bodies and epidemics. However, the risk factors for outbreaks after disasters are associated primarily with population
displacement. The availability of safe water and sanitation facilities, the degree of crowding, the underlying health status of the
population, and the availability of healthcare services all interact within the context of the local disease ecology to influence the
risk for communicable diseases and death in the affected population. We outline the risk factors for outbreaks after a disaster,
review the communicable diseases likely to be important, and establish priorities to address communicable diseases in disaster
settings. Natural disasters are catastrophic events with atmospheric, geologic, and hydrologic origins. Disasters include
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, floods, and drought. Natural disasters can have rapid or slow onset, with
serious health, social, and economic consequences. During the past 2 decades, natural disasters have killed millions of people,
adversely affected the lives of at least 1 billion more people, and resulted in substantial economic damages (1). Developing
countries are disproportionately affected because they may lack resources, infrastructure, and disaster-preparedness systems.
Deaths associated with natural disasters, particularly rapid-onset disasters, are overwhelmingly due to blunt trauma, crush-related
injuries, or drowning. Deaths from communicable diseases after natural disasters are less common. Dead Bodies and Disease The
sudden presence of large numbers of dead bodies in the disaster-affected area may heighten concerns of disease outbreaks (2),
despite the absence of evidence that dead bodies pose a risk for epidemics after natural disasters (3). When death is directly due to
the natural disaster, human remains do not pose a risk for outbreaks (4). Dead bodies only pose health risks in a few situations that
require specific precautions, such as deaths from cholera (5) or hemorrhagic fevers (6). Recommendations for management of dead
bodies are summarized in the Table. Despite these facts, the risk for outbreaks after disasters is frequently exaggerated by both
health officials and the media. Imminent threats of epidemics remain a recurring theme of media reports from areas recently
affected by disasters, despite attempts to dispel these myths (2,3,7). Displacement: Primary Concern The risk for communicable
disease transmission after disasters is associated primarily with the size and characteristics of the population displaced, specifically
the proximity of safe water and functioning latrines, the nutritional status of the displaced population, the level of immunity to
vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles, and the access to healthcare services (8). Outbreaks are less frequently reported in
disaster-affected populations than in conflict-affected populations, where two thirds of deaths may be from communicable diseases
(9). Malnutrition increases the risk for death from communicable diseases and is more common in conflict-affected populations,
particularly if their displacement is related to long-term conflict (10). Although outbreaks after flooding (11) have been better
documented than those after earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or tsunamis (12), natural disasters (regardless of type) that do not
result in population displacement are rarely associated with outbreaks (8). Historically, the large-scale displacement of populations
as a result of natural disasters is not common (8), which likely contributes to the low risk for outbreaks overall and to the
variability in risk among disasters of different types. Risk Factors for Communicable Disease Transmission Responding effectively
to the needs of the disaster-affected population requires an accurate communicable disease risk assessment. The efficient use of
humanitarian funds depends on implementing priority interventions on the basis of this risk assessment. A systematic and
comprehensive evaluation should identify 1) endemic and epidemic diseases that are common in the affected area; 2) living
conditions of the affected population, including number, size, location, and density of settlements; 3) availability of safe water and
adequate sanitation facilities; 4) underlying nutritional status and immunization coverage among the population; and 5) degree of
access to healthcare and to effective case management. The following types of communicable diseases have been associated with
populations displaced by natural disasters. These diseases should be considered when postdisaster risk assessments are performed.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 57

The Navy is vital part to U.S. humanitarian disaster relief
America.gov, 2/15/08(“Humanitarian Aid Key Component of Navy’s New Maritime Strategy”,
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/February/20080214110541sjhtrop0.588772.html, accessed 7/20/08-
e.wey)
The Navy has been primed to respond to disaster, provide relief aid and conduct humanitarian missions whenever and wherever
called, the new element of the strategy is that it will be offered proactively instead of only when needed. Consequently, the Navy
anticipates sending out one of these kinds of ships annually. It has been more than 20 years since the Navy revamped its strategy,
and this latest version emphasizes the need for conducting confidence- and security-building measures with and among nations
through collective maritime endeavors against common threats such as piracy, smuggling, terrorism and weapons proliferation. A
key component must be multilateral “cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain.” The new strategy embraces
the reality that not only does a major war have the potential to threaten security and prosperity, but so do irregular or persistent
regional conflicts, spasms of terrorism, recurrent natural disaster and lawlessness. There is new emphasis on preventing wars and
building partnerships because, as the document states, the United States and its partners are “competing for global influence in an
era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or ... at peace.”
U.S. Naval humanitarian missions cast a positive light on the U.S. military and increase soft power
The Baltimore Sun, 5/20/08 (“Embracing new role: The nation should support the U.S. military as it takes the lead in
global disaster response”, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/871, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey)
Quietly, and perhaps without fully realizing it, the U.S. military has begun embracing a new, wide-ranging international role that
will compel it to intervene in many countries throughout the world. Yet this is a role that virtually every country would support and
one that should be widely embraced here as well: the role of global first responder. Myanmar military government's shocking and
disastrous refusal of international assistance in the wake of the recent devastating cyclone has masked one broader positive
development - the surprising speed at which aid, especially on the part of the U.S., was offered. In contrast to the initially hesitant
U.S. response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (characterized as "stingy" by U.N. Undersecretary-General Jan England), this
time, first lady Laura Bush set a decisive tone, saying that the U.S. was prepared to send massive assistance immediately. This
willingness reflects not just a good-natured desire to help but also a realization that dealing with international disasters has become
a national security priority. In some ways, this is an odd development. Responding to natural disasters has never been a core
mission of the U.S. military. It rarely drives procurement decisions or strategic thinking, and responses to disaster situations have
tended to be ad hoc. Yet this is changing. As the Center for Naval Analysis concluded, "Climate change threatens to add new
hostile and stressing factors." As large-scale disasters grow more common, so too will U.S. military involvement in these types of
missions. The eventual U.S. response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was a pivotal event. After the tsunami, 15,000 troops, a carrier
task force and a Marine expeditionary force deployed to the region, with the U.S. Navy effectively setting up a "sea base" off the
coast of Indonesia. This flotilla of ships enabled supplies to be transported to the coastline, where ports and roads were all but
washed away. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, commented, "We literally built a city at sea for no other
purpose than to serve the needs of other people." Only the U.S. military had the ability to conduct such an operation. While
Indonesia still is a long way from completely recovering, the American response made a tremendous difference. And our assistance
did not go unnoticed. A Pew Survey found that 80 percent of the citizens of the world's largest Muslim-majority country had a
more favorable opinion of the United States after our response. What worked abroad was also employed at home: In the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Navy set up a base at sea in which to assist New Orleans. That same year, in the wake of a major
earthquake in Pakistan, U.S. assistance was quickly sent, and Pakistani television showed American helicopters ferrying aid to
remote mountainous villages and American medics helping the injured. And in November, the man in charge of the military's
response to Hurricane Katrina, Adm. Timothy Keating, now the head of U.S. Pacific Command, sent a Marine
Expeditionary Unit to assist Bangladesh in its recovery from a devastating cyclone. Admiral Keating noted that he worked with the
Bangladeshi government before the storm had even hit. The Navy is so pleased with its performance in these missions that it
introduced new recruiting commercials highlighting its role in disaster recovery. Some may see the mantle of global first responder
as a distraction from "hard" security concerns. But engaging in these operations promotes U.S. interests. First, such missions act to
maintain precious stability. After the 2004 tsunami, there was a real danger that chaos, even unrest, would spread beyond the
disaster zones. Our response not only saved lives but also helped stabilize the area. Second, it improves the image of the U.S.

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Responding to disasters demonstrates to the world the goodwill of the American people and can serve to improve our standing in
world opinion, as it has in Indonesia. As Admiral Mullen explained, the tsunami intervention showed another side of "American
power that wasn't perceived as frightening, monolithic or arrogant." Third, such missions help cast our global military posture in a
better light. Countries will be more accepting of a U.S. military presence in their neighborhood if they know that our military will
be there to help if disaster strikes. Adopting this role also enables the U.S. to build closer relationships with countries, as in
Bangladesh, where joint preparations helped avert an even worse disaster and improved our relations. Finally, responding to
natural disasters is the price of being the world's largest superpower. As the guarantor of global security, the U.S. is looked to not
just for its ability to deter threats but also for its ability to help when countries are in need. Responding to disasters should
therefore not be seen as a burden on the U.S. military, but should be embraced as an opportunity.
SOFT POWER NECESSARY TO PREVENT DISEASE, TERRORISM, AND WMD

Joseph Nye, Harvard, US MILITARY PRIMACY IS FACT - SO, NOW, WORK ON 'SOFT POWER' OF
PERSUASION, April 29, 2004, p,
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/nye_soft_power_csm_042904.htm
Soft power co-opts people rather than coerces them. It rests on the ability to set the agenda or
shape the preferences of others. It is a mistake to discount soft power as just a question of image, public
relations, and ephemeral popularity. It is a form of power - a means of pursuing national interests. When America
discounts the importance of its attractiveness to other countries, it pays a price. When US policies
lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further
reduce its leverage. The manner with which the US went into Iraq undercut American soft power. That did not
prevent the success of the four-week military campaign, but it made others less willing to help in the reconstruction of
Iraq and made the American occupation more costly in the hard-power resources of blood and treasure. Because of its
leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the US probably will remain the
world's single most powerful country well into the 21st century. But not all the important types of power
come from the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting desired outcomes, but
transnational issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, international crime, and
terrorism cannot be resolved by military force alone. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with
these issues, where military power alone simply cannot produce success, and can even be counterproductive.
America's success in coping with the new transnational threats of terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction will depend on a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing
a better balance of hard and soft power in foreign policy.
And, only U.S. naval flexibility can solve humanitarian operations

At the end of 2004, the world was witness to an event that no one could have foreseen. Even more startling than the shock of the
Indian Ocean tsunami itself was the scale of its impact. But the very suddenness and speed with which the tsunami struck gave a
glimpse of how valuable it is to posture our forces for uncertainty. Had the tsunami occurred in 1985, at the height of the Cold War,
it is difficult to imagine that the United States could have surged the forces and logistical support needed to deliver food and water
to the areas of the eastern Indian Ocean that were the hardest hit. It is even more difficult to imagine that the United States could
have depended on an extensive network of partner nations to assist us in exercising our global responsibility to act. Only through
the transformation of the U.S. military’s capabilities and the growing flexibility of our overseas posture was the United States able
to respond as quickly and effectively as it did during this crisis. The security environment at the start of the twenty-first century is
perhaps the most uncertain it has been in our nation’s history. This chapter focuses on the strategic realities that are driving the

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transformation of the American global defense posture to contend with that uncertainty, and the resultant changes the Department
of Defense is working to bring about in our relationships and partnership capabilities around the world.
Soft Power i/l

Navy humanitarian operations are critical to maintaing U.S. soft power
Bnet, 2007"United States Navy Organization and Missions". Sea Power. Jan 2007. FindArticles.com. 21 Jul. 2008.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3738/is_200701/ai_n18736771
With forces fully committed to global warfighting and stability operations in fiscal year 2007, Adm. Mike Mullen, chief of naval
operations (CNO), has called for the development of a new maritime strategy. He told an international audience at the Naval War
College in Newport, R.I., in June that the Navy "must redefine sea power for this new era and explain how we will operate
differently, train differently, educate differently and balance our forces differently." Mullen's new vision for the Navy, together
with its joint force and coalition panners, is to contribute to global security by leveraging the inherent powers of forward-deployed
naval forces: to influence, anticipate and flexibly respond, and reinforce alliances. Driven by the engine of economic
globalization, the Navy's traditional mission of ensuring the freedom of the seas has never been more relevant, the CNO told his
Asian counterparts during a July conference in Indonesia. Each day, more than $1.3 billion in goods, 95 percent of the United
States' foreign trade, moves through the nation's 361 major ports. More than 90 percent of overall global trade moves by sea,
through a world merchant-shipping network. Naval forces can, and must, play a central role in ensuring the free and flexible
passage of this volume of trade, and reinforce worldwide economic interdependency. An advocate of the controversial "1,000-Ship
Navy" concept, Mullen has called for a cooperative approach to naval operations through "sincere cooperation, snared capabilities
and seamless connectivity." The 1,000-Ship Navy does not refer to a literal fleet, but rather to the concept of an integrated, global
partnership of fleets around the world cooperating to achieve mutual goals. Under the rubrics of "Global Maritime Partnerships"
and the "Global Fleet Concept," terms of art favored by senior Navy officials, such as Vice Adm. John G. Morgan Jr., deputy CNO
for Information, Plans and Strategy, the key to global partnering is building trust in the maritime environment and "making the
ocean surface as transparent as possible. ... Transparency yields security," Morgan said during a National Defense Industrial
Association conference in October 2006 in Arlington, Va. Interoperability is a key prerequisite to Mullen's vision, with capabilities
in the U.S. fleet shifting toward flexible, modular platforms and mission systems that may share information with allied units.
Envision the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and its changeable mission packages - for focused operations in mine warfare,
antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare - as a model for the kind of flexibility todays Navy requires. As the first of this new
class of ships, Freedom, was launched in September, the Navy has demonstrated its commitment to operations in the littoral - the
coastal regions proximate to more than 85 percent of the global population, and through which passes 100 percent of the world's
seaborne trade. LCS 1, with its sister ships, is designed for scalable operations enabling the U.S. fleet to build international
cooperation and interoperability. Acquiring platforms and mission systems that have the flexibility to integrate and interoperate
with the hardware of more or less sophisticated allies is only part of the vision. "[Interoperability] is not about selling equipment
or systems," Morgan said. "It is about building trust through relationships. ... The global fleet concept is about soft power." The
Navy has deployed its soft power assets, such as the 1,000-bed hospital ship USNS Mercy, in support of humanitarian operations,
including tsunami disaster relief in Southeast Asia. The submarine tender USS Emory S. Land was deployed to the Gulf of Guinea
to conduct exercises and foster better relations with West African sea services. The Navy is evaluating a new concept - called
Global Fleet Stations - to provide persistent presence built around a forward-deployed shallow-draft command ship and one or
more small surface vessels, such as a riverine squadron. The stations would combine sea basing and adaptive force packaging,
using a spectrum of interagency assets and partner with those of host nations, extending positive influence - through humanitarian
aid, military and interagency exercises and operational support, law enforcement and other activities.

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Soft power Impacts

Alternative energy overcomes alternate causalities to soft power
Friedman, Two-Time Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the NYT, 2007
[Thomas, “The Power of Green”, International Herald Tribune, originally in the The New York Times Magazine,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/15/opinion/web-0415edgreen-full.php, April 15]
Equally important, presidential candidates need to help Americans understand that green is not about cutting back. It's
about creating a new cornucopia of abundance for the next generation by inventing a whole new industry. It's about
getting our best brains out of hedge funds and into innovations that will not only give us the clean-power industrial
assets to preserve our American dream but also give us the technologies that billions of others need to realize their own
dreams without destroying the planet. It's about making America safer by breaking our addiction to a fuel that is
powering regimes deeply hostile to our values. And, finally, it's about making America the global environmental
leader, instead of laggard, which as Schwarzenegger argues would "create a very powerful side product." Those who
dislike America because of Iraq, he explained, would at least be able to say, "Well, I don't like them for the war, but I
do like them because they show such unbelievable leadership not just with their blue jeans and hamburgers but with
the environment. People will love us for that. That's not existing right now." In sum, as John Hennessy, the president of
Stanford, taught me: Confronting this climate-energy issue is the epitome of what John Gardner, the founder of
Common Cause, once described as "a series of great opportunities disguised as insoluble problems." Am I optimistic? I
want to be. But I am also old-fashioned. I don't believe the world will effectively address the climate-energy challenge
without America, its president, its government, its industry, its markets and its people all leading the parade. Green has
to become part of America's DNA. We're getting there. Green has hit Main Street it's now more than a hobby but it's
still less than a new way of life.
SOFT POWER IS THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE TERRORISM

Joseph Nye, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Why 'Soft Power' Matters in Fighting Terrorism,”
Washington Post, 3-30-2004 (http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=1259&paper=1483)
As we wend our way deeper into the struggle with terrorism, we are discovering that there are many things beyond U.S. control. The United
States alone cannot hunt down every suspected al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can we launch a war whenever we
wish without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation we need to win the peace. The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations
-- Islam vs. the West -- but rather a civil war within Islamic civilization between extremists who use violence to enforce their vision and a
moderate majority who want such things as jobs, education, health care and dignity as they practice their faith. We will not win unless the
moderates win. Our soft power will never attract Osama bin Laden and the extremists. We need hard power to deal with them. But soft power
will play a crucial role in our ability to attract the moderates and deny the extremists new recruits. With the end of the Cold War, Americans
became more interested in budget savings than in investing in our soft power. Even after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, a bipartisan advisory group
reported that the United States spent a paltry $150 million on public diplomacy in Muslim countries in 2002. The combined cost of the State
Department's public diplomacy programs and all our international broadcasting that year was just over a billion dollars -- about the same amount
spent by Britain or France, countries one-fifth our size. It is also equal to one-quarter of 1 percent of the military budget. No one would suggest
that we spend as much to launch ideas as to launch bombs, but it does seem odd that we spend 400 times as much on hard power as on soft
power. If we spent just 1 percent of the military budget, it would mean quadrupling our spending on soft power. If the United States is going to
win the struggle against terrorism, our leaders are going to have to learn to better combine soft and hard power into "smart power," as we did in
the Cold War. We have done it before; we can do it again.

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Soft Power Impact

TERRORISM CAUSES EXTINCTION
Yonah Alexander prof and dir of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, Washington Times, 8-28-2003
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international
community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of
civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or
irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September
11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center
of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of
1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each
suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire
arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal
nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the
manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the
religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by
terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new
scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of
current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological,
nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

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Soft Power Impact

SOFT POWER IS KEY TO OVERALL HEGEMONY
Sloan and Borchert ‘03
(Stanley Sloan is founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and a Visiting Scholar at Middlebury College, Heiko Borchert heads
SCPA, a political and business consulting firm in Switzerland, “Europe, U.S. Must Rebalance Soft, Hard Power,” Defense News, 9-15-2003
http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Soft,%20hard%20power.html)
Mastering 21st century security challenges obviously will require the effective use of military power to deal with tyrants like
Saddam Hussein and terrorists like Osama bin Laden. It is good news that U.S.-European military cooperation has quietly
expanded to global levels, with NATO taking on missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. But most of the struggle against terrorism and
instability will require deployment of soft power as effectively as the United Stats used its hard power in Iraq. Soft power is a
nation’s ability to influence events based on cultural attraction, ideology and international institutions, about which Joe Nye, a
Harvard professor who was a high-ranking defense official during President Bill Clinton’s administration, has written so
eloquently. Soft power can help legitimize hard power. Hard power is essential to win wars, and often to give credibility to
strategic choices, but soft power is vital to win and preserve the peace.

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Adv: Arctic
The Russian navy is utilizing there naval dominance to take claim to the arctic
BBC, 6/13/08 (“West watches as Russia boosts military in Arctic”, lexis nexis, accessed 7/18/08.e-wey)
Russia has raised the stakes in the international scramble for the Arctic by announcing it will boost its military presence in the
region to protect its "national interests". The defence ministry said naval vessels would be sent to the Arctic Ocean, which is
believed to be home to 25 per cent of the world's untapped energy resources, as part of a summer training zone. Gen. Vladimir
Shamanov, the head of the combat training directorate, said Russia had "highly trained military units" prepared for Arctic warfare.
He revealed that Russia would expand its naval presence in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as part of a strategy to flex the
country's growing military might on the world stage. "The summer training program envisions the increased presence of the
Russian navy not only in the Atlantic but also in the Arctic and the Pacific," Gen. Shamanov said. "We are also planning to
increase the operational radius of the Northern Fleet's submarines." The West has become increasingly concerned by Russia's
determination to flex its military muscle in international waters and airspace. Disquiet over the Kremlin's intent in the Arctic is
likely to grow still further after Gen. Shamanov, a prominent military hawk who was accused of war crimes in Chechnya,
suggested the focus of Russia's military strategy would shift towards "protecting national interests" in the Arctic. Russia had the
capability, he said, to defend its claim to roughly half the Arctic Ocean - including the North Pole.
"We have a number of highly professional military units in the Leningrad, Siberian and Far Eastern military districts which are
specifically trained for combat in the Arctic regions," he said. Russian assertiveness in the sensitive region was on display again
on Wednesday when NATO jets shadowed two Russian bombers, designed for anti-submarine warfare, on a reconnaissance
mission close to the North Pole. While the Kremlin attracted international criticism after a titanium Russian flag was planted on
the seabed underneath the North Pole last year, other countries with an Arctic shoreline have been accused of playing an equally
aggressive role in militarising the region. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper last year ordered military ships to the Arctic
amid growing tensions with both the US and Russia over competing territorial claims in the region. Russia, the US and Canada
have also announced plans to build nuclear icebreakers to defend their Arctic interests. US naval vessels and British nuclear
submarines held joint war games in the Arctic Ocean last year, arousing suspicion in Moscow. The five nations with Arctic Ocean
coastlines - Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark and Norway - all have sometimes overlapping claims to Arctic territory that exceeds
maritime borders fixed by international law. A UN commission has been established to study the legitimacy of the claims. The
issue has taken on added urgency as global warming causes the ice in the Arctic to melt, thereby raising the realistic prospect of
harnessing the ocean's energy treasure trove for the first time. Russia, already the world's biggest energy producer, has the longest
coastline of the Arctic nations and therefore has filed the biggest claim.

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Icebreakers – Russia winning, U.S. needs

Russia is winning the war for the arctic. The U.S. needs to obtain nuclear icebreakers in order to
compete.
Novostl 2008 (RIA. July 17. 2008. “U.S. experts say Russia ‘is winning the Arctic race’”.
http://www.sott.net/articles/show/162198-U-S-experts-say-Russia-is-winning-the-Arctic-race
A top U.S. Coast Guard official has told lawmakers that Russia is getting ahead of the United States in the "Arctic race" and the
current U.S. administration must urgently revise its approach to Arctic exploration. "I'm concerned we are watching our
nation's ice-breaking capabilities decline," Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Thad Allen told the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee on Wednesday."It's imperative to obtain the current validating capabilities so our polar operations can be
met," he said.The Coast Guard chief said Russia had finally put to sea last year the largest icebreaker in its polar fleet - the 50
Years of Victory- which has been under construction since 1989 and guarantees Russia easy access to the vast natural resources in
the Arctic region.Allen said Russia is the only other country, besides the United States, with polar ice breaking capabilities, but the
Russian fleet is in far better shape, with "seven to eight" nuclear-powered polar ice breakers.The U.S. Coast Guard's medium- and
Polar-class ice breaking fleet consists of the cutters Healy, Polar Sea and Polar Star.Healy, which was commissioned in 2000, is
the newest of the ships and is primarily designed for scientific research in the Arctic.The Polar Star and Polar Sea, both
commissioned in the 1970s, are due for a major overhaul and need millions of dollars in maintenance and repairs to stay
operational in the future.Speaking at the same hearings, Mead Treadwell, chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, supported
Allen's assessment of the situation."In the 20th century, the advent of aircraft, missiles, and missile defense made the Arctic region
a major venue for projection of power and a frontier for protecting the security of North America, Asia and Europe," he
said."Polar-class icebreakers are the largest and most capable of ice-going ships. Indeed, an accessible Arctic Ocean also means
new or expanded routes for the U.S. military sealift to move assets from one part of the world to another. The Commission believes
polar icebreakers are an essential maritime component to guarantee that this U.S. polar mobility exists," Treadwell
said.Meanwhile, Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom will take over responsibility in August for Russia's nuclear icebreaker
fleet, which currently consists of six operational nuclear icebreakers.Experts said Russia would need six to 10 nuclear-powered
icebreakers over the next 20 years, as demand for them is expected to grow with the development of the Arctic shelf and increased
traffic along the Northern Sea route.Rosatom has already announced that Russia will allocate 800 million rubles ($33.9 million) for
the maintenance of nuclear icebreakers in 2008 and the first new-generation nuclear icebreaker will be built in Russia by
2015.Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge last
summer - to back Russian claims to the region.The area is believed to contain vast oil and gas reserves and other mineral riches,
likely to become accessible in future decades due to man-made global warming.Russia said it would submit documentary evidence
to the UN of the external boundaries along the Russian Federation's territorial shelf in 2009.Under international law, the five Arctic
Circle countries - the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia - each currently have a 322-kilometer (200-mile) economic
zone in the Arctic Ocean.

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Russians Taking Arctic

The Ruskies are building up their shipbuilding industry and fleets to develop the Arctic shelf before
other countries.
Maxim Krans 25/ 06/ 2007
[“New Russian tanker company to develop Arctic”, RIA Novosti political commentator,
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070625/67766237.html]
Production will soon begin at hydrocarbon deposits on the Russian Arctic shelf and will lead to tougher competition among tanker
companies. The new Russian tanker giant will mostly operate in the Arctic, because oil and gas production in that region is
expected to total 17% and 21%, respectively, of nationwide output by 2020.
The Russian Industry and Energy Ministry said 55 offshore oil and gas platforms, 85 specialized transport vessels and 140
auxiliary ships would have to be built in the next 20 years in order to develop Arctic deposits. It would be imprudent to allow
foreign companies to operate on this lucrative market. Therefore, as a first step, Sovkomflot and Novoship have each ordered
about 20 new tankers and gas carriers displacing almost 2 million metric tons of deadweight.
In early June, both companies submitted a joint design for Arctic shuttle tankers intended to transport oil from the Prirazlomnoye
deposit in the Barents Sea. The keel of the first shuttle tanker was laid a week later in an impressive setting at St. Petersburg's
Admiralty Shipyard, one of the old Russian shipbuilding companies. It thus appears that Russia can minimize foreign involvement
in developing its hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf.
Energy giant Gazprom, which owns the Shtokman gas condensate deposit in the Barents Sea and other similar projects; Sevmash,
Russia's largest shipyard, in Severodvinsk, northern Russia, which makes nuclear-powered submarines, oil and gas platforms and
tankers; the Murmansk shipping company, which operates a unique ice-breaker fleet and has its own terminals in Arctic ports; and
pipeline monopoly Transneft, now building an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific coast and contemplating another one
along the Barents Sea coast, will jointly develop the Arctic deposits.
Frank said the Sovkomflot-Novoship merger would make it possible to more effectively support ambitious projects on the Russian
continental shelf involving both liquefied natural gas and pipeline development.
President Putin has set a number of objectives for Russian ship-owners in the last few months. The new corporation will have to
support the national shipbuilding industry and place most of its orders with struggling Russian companies.
Until now, Russian shipyards operated below capacity, because it was cheaper to order ships from foreign companies, which have
the most advanced equipment and technologies. Novoship, for one, does not have a single Russian-made vessel.
In May 2007, Putin told a conference in Murmansk that the Russian merchant marine must start flying the national flag once again.
Out of the 1,500 ships controlled by Moscow, only 170 fly the Russian flag and therefore pay taxes. Sovkomflot has not registered
any large ships in Russia, while only six Novoship vessels are registered domestically.

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Russia/US Competition in Arctic

The US is competing with Russia over oil in the Arctic region.
The issue for Congress that is addressed in this report is whether to approve or modify the Coast Guard’s plans for modernizing its
polar icebreakers. Congressional decisions on this issue could affect the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, Coast
Guard funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The issue of polar icebreaker modernization comes at a
time of -increased interest and activities in polar regions, particularly the Arctic, due to melting of Arctic ice; -emerging debates
over Arctic sovereignty and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Arctic; !-concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability to perform
all of its various missions within available resources; and -concerns for the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.Regarding the first
two items above, many observers anticipate that the melting
of Arctic ice in coming years will open up potentially important sea transportation routes through the Arctic and make it possible to
explore for oil and gas resourcesunder the Arctic seabed. Emerging debates over Arctic sovereignty and EEZs in the
Arctic stem to a large degree from these anticipated developments. Russia, Canada,
Denmark, and the United States in the last few years, and particularly since the
summer of 2007, have been taking various actions to either assert their claims
regarding Arctic sovereignty and EEZs, or to gather evidence to support potential
claims.3
The missions of U.S. polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:
-conducting and supporting scientific research in both the Arctic and
Antarctic;
- defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by maintaining a presence
in the region;
- defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic
interests relating to the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north
of Alaska;
- monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the
United States; and
- conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and
rescue, law enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in
Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters northe of Alaska.
The mission of conducting and supporting scientific research includes, among

other things, an important annual mission to break through the Antarctic ice so as to
resupply McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the
shore of MucMurdo Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf.
Although polar ice is melting due to climate change, observers generally expect
this development will not eliminate mission demands for U.S. polar icebreakers, and
in some respects might increase them. Even with the melting of polar ice, there are
still significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions. Melting of polar ice could lead
in coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship
operations, as well as increased oil and gas exploration, in and through the polar
regions — activities that could require increased levels of support from polar
icebreakers. Changing ice conditions in Antarctic waters have made the McMurdo
resupply mission more challenging since 2000.5

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Russian Navy-modernization
Russia is scaling up its military to dominate foreign seas and project its military power.
Fred Conroy June 2008
[American Shipbuilder - Volume 14, Issue 2, “House and Senate Do Not Increase the Naval Shipbuilding Budget”, Vice
President of the Government Business Unit of Dresser-Rand, http://www.usships.org/content/view/280/9/]
Though not equaling the explosive build-up of the Chinese, Russia has publicly committed to making the recapitalization of its
naval fleet a priority. Last year, Inside the Navy reported an announcement by Russia’s government to devote $60 billion, or
roughly 25% of its state rearmament rebuilding program, to its Navy. The country has stated its intent to increase warship
production by 50% by 2010. The first of Russia’s new nuclear ballistic missile submarines is scheduled to join the fleet later this
year. This new submarine class will become the core of Russia’s modern submarine fleet. In April, Russia’s Navy Commander and
Chief, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky expressed the country’s plan to build 5-6 full deck, nuclear powered aircraft carriers, capable
of carrying 30-40 aircraft. The country currently has only one operational aircraft carrier. Though the carriers are not presently
included in the State Arms Program, construction is reportedly slated to begin between 2012 and 2013.
In an April 17th Forbes.com article, Russia’s “Blue Water” doctrine states a desire for active domination of foreign seas and the
use of battle groups as a means of projecting both military and political power globally. One of the roles of its new Navy will be to
“provide security for vessels traveling in the new arctic shipping routes.” Like China, Russia has been cultivating relationships
along shipping routes to the Middle East and with other oil producing countries. In addition to investing in the port infrastructures
in Syria, Russia has been developing stronger ties with Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. Russia is also reported to have entered into a
contract with Venezuela to build Kilo-class diesel submarines for that country.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 68
Russian Oil Dominance Bad

Russia Module - Russian Oil Dominance=SuperpowerRussian control of the Arctic oil will result in
their reemergence as a super power.
Alex Shoumatoff May 2008
[“The Arctic Oil Rush”, staff writer at The New Yorker magazine, a founding contributing editor of Outside magazine and Condé
Nast Traveler, and is a senior contributing editor to Vanity Fair magazine,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/05/arctic_oil200805]
According to an obscure clause in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos)—also called the Law of the
Sea Treaty, or lost, by its critics—if you can prove that your continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nautical miles that signatory
states with coastlines are automatically entitled to, you have sovereign rights to its oil, gas, and minerals. The Russians’ Arctic
claim hinges on an underwater formation called the Lomonosov Ridge, which runs 1,240 miles from Siberia through the North
Pole nearly to the juncture of Ellesmere Island (Canada’s northernmost point) and Greenland, and which Russia says is an
extension of its shelf. Actually, it is claiming only half of the ridge—the half on its side of the pole. This has the rest of the world
nervous. Much of Europe depends on Russia’s natural gas, and the Kremlin has already turned the faucet off once, on Ukraine, and
threatened to do the same to Belarus. If it starts tapping the Arctic deposits, Russia will be back as a superpower and may become
the world’s dominant energy supplier. There would then be a Fifth Russian Empire, presided over by the increasingly autocratic
Putin, who has sidestepped the presidential two-term limit by making himself prime minister.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 69
Arctic Cold War Now

Russia is mobilizing its Northern Fleet to the Arctic in attempt to claim the Arctic oil.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. August 6, 2007
[“Russia's Race for the Arctic”, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1582.cfm]
Today's Russian rhetoric is reminiscent of the triumphant totalitarianism of the 1930s and the mindset of the Cold War. The leader
of the Arctic expedition, Artur Chilingarov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma, proclaimed, "The Arctic is ours and we should
manifest our presence." Russia's Arctic and Antarctic Institute declared, "This is like placing a flag on the moon"--conveniently
forgetting that the U.S. never claimed the moon as its territory. Andrei Kokoshin, chair of a parliamentary committee on the ex-
Soviet region, said that Russia "will have to actively defend its interests in the Arctic" and called for the reinforcement of Russia's
Northern Fleet and border guard units, as well as building airfields to "ensure full control." Vladimir Putin weighed in during a
speech on a Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker earlier this year, urging greater efforts to secure Russia's "strategic, economic,
scientific and defense interests" in the Arctic.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 70
Russia Module - Russians Taking Arctic

Russia is rushing into the Arctic to claim its oil.
Maxim Krans 25/ 06/ 2007
[“New Russian tanker company to develop Arctic”, RIA Novosti political commentator,
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070625/67766237.html]
Production will soon begin at hydrocarbon deposits on the Russian Arctic shelf and will lead to tougher competition among tanker
companies. The new Russian tanker giant will mostly operate in the Arctic, because oil and gas production in that region is
expected to total 17% and 21%, respectively, of nationwide output by 2020.
The Russian Industry and Energy Ministry said 55 offshore oil and gas platforms, 85 specialized transport vessels and 140
auxiliary ships would have to be built in the next 20 years in order to develop Arctic deposits. It would be imprudent to allow
foreign companies to operate on this lucrative market. Therefore, as a first step, Sovkomflot and Novoship have each ordered
about 20 new tankers and gas carriers displacing almost 2 million metric tons of deadweight.
In early June, both companies submitted a joint design for Arctic shuttle tankers intended to transport oil from the Prirazlomnoye
deposit in the Barents Sea. The keel of the first shuttle tanker was laid a week later in an impressive setting at St. Petersburg's
Admiralty Shipyard, one of the old Russian shipbuilding companies. It thus appears that Russia can minimize foreign involvement
in developing its hydrocarbon deposits on the Arctic shelf.
Energy giant Gazprom, which owns the Shtokman gas condensate deposit in the Barents Sea and other similar projects; Sevmash,
Russia's largest shipyard, in Severodvinsk, northern Russia, which makes nuclear-powered submarines, oil and gas platforms and
tankers; the Murmansk shipping company, which operates a unique ice-breaker fleet and has its own terminals in Arctic ports; and
pipeline monopoly Transneft, now building an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific coast and contemplating another one
along the Barents Sea coast, will jointly develop the Arctic deposits.
Frank said the Sovkomflot-Novoship merger would make it possible to more effectively support ambitious projects on the Russian
continental shelf involving both liquefied natural gas and pipeline development.
President Putin has set a number of objectives for Russian ship-owners in the last few months. The new corporation will have to
support the national shipbuilding industry and place most of its orders with struggling Russian companies.
Until now, Russian shipyards operated below capacity, because it was cheaper to order ships from foreign companies, which have
the most advanced equipment and technologies. Novoship, for one, does not have a single Russian-made vessel.
In May 2007, Putin told a conference in Murmansk that the Russian merchant marine must start flying the national flag once again.
Out of the 1,500 ships controlled by Moscow, only 170 fly the Russian flag and therefore pay taxes. Sovkomflot has not registered
any large ships in Russia, while only six Novoship vessels are registered domestically.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 71
A2: Law of the Sea Treaty checks

Control over Arctic resources will be determined by military presence, not by international law.
ERIC POSNER August 3, 2007
[professor of law at the University of Chicago, is co-author of "The Limits of International Law, “The New Race for the
Arctic”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118610915886687045.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries]
Melting polar ice and the high cost of energy are creating a new battleground at the top of the world. Yesterday a Russian mini-sub
released a capsule containing a Russian flag onto the seabed at the North Pole. This was the climax of a research expedition whose
purpose is to support Russia's claim to what could be billions of tons of oil and gas reserves in an area of the Arctic twice the size
of France. Russia has already been setting up new military and civilian posts, such as in the Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa archipelago in
the northeastern Barents Sea.
Meanwhile, Canada has reasserted its claim over the melting Northwest Passage, a portion of the Arctic Ocean linking the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. Its recent announcement that it will build patrol vessels in order to establish sovereignty over the passage had
a belligerent tone uncharacteristic of our peaceful neighbor.
The United States has long resisted both claims. The international legal arguments are esoteric, but boiled down they amount to
this: Russia's claim is based on the principle that a coastal nation controls the mineral resources of its continental shelf, and the as-
yet unproved assertion, which the U.S. disputes, that the continental shelf abutting Russian territory extends deep into the Arctic.
Canada argues that the straits composing the Northwest Passage amount to inland seas, and therefore are subject to Canadian
sovereignty, just as the U.S. controls Lake Michigan. The U.S. replies that these straits are part of the high seas, and thus anyone
can enter them without obtaining Canada's consent.
Power, not international law, will settle the issue. Indeed, international law recognizes this fact by making title dependent on a
nation's ability to exert control over an area. That is why Russia is sending ships into the Arctic, and why Canada is saying that it
will patrol the Northwest Passage. As long as such expressions of power are credible, other nations, disadvantaged by distance,
will generally acquiesce and sovereignty will be extended accordingly.
Russia's expression of power is credible; Canada's is not. Canada cannot prevent other countries from sending ships up the
Northwest Passage, as the U.S. has demonstrated from time to time for just this purpose. The melting of the Northwest Passage
will significantly shorten the sea route between oceans, as well as open up access to energy resources. The U.S. does not want
Canada to reap all the benefits of control of the passage, but this is a side show. The real threat is the Russian bear, not the
Canadian beaver.
The world is divided into two types of space: areas controlled by states and areas that are uncontrolled. Oceans are mostly
uncontrolled, with the significant exception of territorial seas, where states have been able to exert some control with naval
resources. International law has long recognized states' control over their coastal seas (which extend about 12 miles), which means
they can block and regulate foreign shipping in those areas. The high seas, however, are free to all.
The major naval powers have always advanced the principle of freedom of the seas for the simple reason that their naval forces
dominate them. But "commons" are subject to overexploitation, and overfishing has been the predictable consequence of
uncontrolled oceans. Predictable and unavoidable: If no one can control the oceans, then the problem cannot be solved by giving a
country nominal title to them.
Where a state can exert control, it is best for it to do so, because this avoids the commons problem. It is in the world's interest for
Canada to control the Northwest Passage, even if it will profit and has the formal power to keep the rest of the world out. Canada
has an interest in protecting the passage and exploiting its resources, which the rest of the world can purchase. But given its
military weakness, Canada cannot have this control without the support of the U.S.
Russia's claims present a different case. It is re-emerging as a global troublemaker, and its claims are far more ambitious than
Canada's. At some point, Russia, the U.S. and other countries will carve up the Arctic into mutually exclusive economic zones.
Russia is positioning itself to take the lion's share. Russia has major advantages over Canada and the U.S. in the battle over the
Arctic. Control over the seas is determined by two things: power and propinquity. With respect to the Arctic, Russia has both. The
U.S. has power but not, for the most part, propinquity; Canada has propinquity but not power. As long as the U.S. and Canada are
at loggerheads over the Northwest Passage, they will have trouble resisting Russia's claims to the rest of the Arctic.
If the U.S. supports Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage, in return for some sort of guarantee of U.S. military and civilian
access, the two countries will strengthen their position vis-à-vis Russia. As the world heats up, the two countries need to prepare
themselves for the re-emergence of old rivalries, and in the battle over control of the Arctic, the U.S. and Canada are natural allies

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Nuclear Navy Aff 72
1AC Module Shipping Industry

Nuclear navy would modernize the ship-building industry.
Tiron 2008.(Roxana Tiron. June 08, 2008. “Rep. Taylor pushes nuclear power for more Navy ships”. The Hill. Prior to
joining The Hill in 2005, Tiron was the assistant editor of National Defense magazine in Arlington, Va. Before working at
National Defense magazine, Tiron was a fellow at the Washington Center for Politics and Journalism in Washington,
D.C. and worked for CNN's Inside Politics and World View.)
Out of six remaining U.S. shipyards, only two are nuclear-certified:Northrop Grumman’s Newport News, Va., facility, and
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat in Groton, Conn. The remaining four work with conventionally powered ships.It would take
years to modify a non-nuclear yard, even if the Navy was fully onboard with Taylor’s proposal. Workers would need time to adjust
as well. It takes up to eight years to become a nuclear-qualified welder, for example Receiving a nuclear license could also be
tough because of more stringent environmental regulations, industry sources said. The cost of outfitting ships with nuclear
propulsion is mostly upfront, raising the costs of building the ship. Nuclear-powered vessels are estimated to cost around $800
million more than conventionally powered ships.Navy officials are concerned about that added cost at a time when they are
already struggling to grow the fleet.Although high oil prices make the switch to nuclear power more attractive, some officials
question whether prices will stay that high “The industrial base is in a very fragile state because of years of historically low
rates of ship production for our Navy,” said Cindy Brown, the president of the American Shipbuilding Association.
“The focus of Congress and the American people needs to be on rebuilding the fleet and increasing the rate of ship
production to 12 ships a year. Thedebate on what should power our ships should not distract from this fundamental challenge
facing America today.” Brown said that the industry has yet to determine what impact moving to a nuclear-only cruiser fleet
would have on the U.S. industrial base. Shipbuilders Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics — the two U.S shipbuilders that
sell only to the Navy — are starting to look into which ship components can be built in a conventional yard while the propulsion
systems are being built at one of the two nuclear yards. The fully constructed ship would have to be delivered from the nuclear-
qualified shipyard. Conceivably, switching to nuclear-powered propulsion could mean layoffs at some shipbuilding sites. One of
the yards that could suffer is Northrop Grumman Ingalls, which is in Taylor’s district. Ultimately, sources saidthe shipbuilding
industry could be completely altered.The industry has started investigating the effects of the requirements in the fiscal 2008
defense authorization bill. It is not clear how many ships would be affected by Taylor’s nuclear propulsion proposals. The Navy is
planning to buy about 19 new cruisers, known as CG(X). Taylor is also proposing to build nuclear versions of the current DDG-51
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Some shipyards, such as Electric Boat, view the changes as possible business
opportunities. “If the Navy and the Congress decide that they want to develop nuclear power in any platform,we would be
interested in talking to them about potential business,” said Robert Hamilton, an Electric Boat spokesman.“We have
extensive experience in the design of nuclear ships.” Taylor said thathe ultimately is seeking a generational switch in thinking.
“There is always going to be some heartburn in industry” when it comes to change, he said. “It’s human nature to resist
change. “The ones that want to be part of the future would have to make this investment, and they will be better yards
for it,” Taylor said.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 73
1AC Module: Shipping Industry
The U.S. naval industrial base has become dependent on other nations and cooperation’s for
inadequate military supplies that could be cut at any time – eroding the navy’s power – a strong
domestic industry-navy relationship key.
Ronis 2003 (Sheila R. August. “Erosion of U.S. Industrial Base Is Troubling”. National Defense.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2003/Aug/Erosion.htmSheila Ronis, Ph.D., is president of The University
Group Inc., in Birmingham, Mich.)
The U.S. industrial base is eroding, and this situation has enormous national security implications. It has made the United States so
dependent on foreign countries for critical components and systems that it may have lost its ability to control its supply chains.
The United States is becoming dependent on countries such as China, India, Russia, France and Germany for critical weapons
technology. It's conceivable that one of these governments could tell its local suppliers not to sell critical components to the United
States because they do not agree with U.S. foreign policy.
The federal government, and in particular, the Department of Defense, does not manage the country's industrial base as a "system."
U.S. government agencies are fiefdoms that rarely compare notes to see how their collective policies might affect a company or an
industry.Interagency cooperation is an essential element of what needs to change in the future.
A Defense Department report entitled "Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap," recommended the department consider "viewing the industrial base
as being composed of operational effects-based sectors that support transformational war-fighting. … Organizing its decision processes to optimize operational
effects—not programs, platforms or weapons systems."
This report makes sensible arguments, but more needs to be done.
U.S. corporations increasingly act as large social systems with a global focus. But ask the CEOs of the Fortune 500 to describe the
issues on their minds and, more than likely, national security or the disintegration of the U.S. industrial base would not be among
them.Many global corporations do not believe they owe allegiance to any stakeholder except their stockholders, and sometimes,
their customers.
This attitude has not changed since the end of the Cold War—not even since 9/11.A new vision of national security is needed that includes
cooperation between government and industry.
National security requires a healthy market-based economy, with a strong industrial base of globally competitive industries
continuously improving quality and productivity.
The United States cannot sustain the kind of growth it has enjoyed for the last several decades if the industrial base steadily erodes.
Increasingly, a number of U.S. companies in specific industries find it impossible to compete in world markets.This is of particular
concern for the industrial base that supplies the U.S. military.
According to U.S. Census Bureau data from 1992 to 1996, the domestic market share of military and civilian aircraft combined (traditionally an American
manufacturing powerhouse) dropped from 88.5 percent to 86.6 percent. Aircraft engines and engine parts suffered a steeper decline—from 70.9 percent to 63.2
percent. And domestic producers' share of the non-engine aircraft parts market plummeted all the way from 80.5 percent to 68.5 percent, said industrial base expert
Alan Tonelson of the U.S. Business and Industry Council, quoting census data.
Much of the high-value American industry experienced the same deterioration from 1992 to 1996, according to Tonelson.
Domestic market share for relays and industrial controls dropped from 81.1 percent to 75.1 percent, for computer storage devices from 39.3 percent to 31.9 percent,
for analytical instruments from 78.5 percent to 75.6 percent, for metal-cutting machine tools from 55.2 percent to 47.9 percent, for specialized industrial machinery
from 85.2 percent to 82.7 percent, for pharmaceuticals from 95.7 percent to 93.1 percent and for industrial inorganic chemicals from 68.2 percent to 60 percent.
Data for the 1997-2001 period shows further weakening in domestic manufacturing. But the rate of deterioration was rarely faster than from 1992 to 1996, as the
weak-dollar advocates have been claiming. Precise comparisons between these periods are difficult because in 1997, the government changed a key system for
classifying industries. Nonetheless, 1997-2001 data for 80 out of 90 industries show market share losses during these years, Tonelson said.
Of note to the military defense sector, from 1997-2001, civilian jetliners fell from an 84.7 percent domestic market share down to 73.9 percent; aircraft engines and
engine parts, from 60 percent to 50.7 percent, and non-engine aircraft parts, from 68.9 percent to 64.6 percent.
Falling domestic market share during the late 1990s afflicted many other core industrial sectors as well.
Market share for domestic producers of relays and industrial controls dropped from 70 percent to 60.5 percent, metal-cutting machine tools from 41.5 percent to 37
percent, ball and roller bearings from 77.4 percent to 75.8 percent, mechanical power transmission equipment from 75.1 percent to 72 percent, turbines and turbine
generator sets from 74.4 to 57.7 percent, pharmaceuticals from 90.5 to 85.9 percent, and plastics and resins from 88.9 percent to 85.4 percent,Tonelson said.
Globalization and the intense pressure applied by Wall Street to U.S. companies encourages indiscriminant cost cutting, a measure that frequently works in the
short term, but often creates losses in the long term.
The "better, faster, cheaper" mentality sometimes sacrifices long-term gains by forcing a company to outsource work to low-wage
countries in the near term. These decisions can come back to haunt a company. This is especially the case when the work acquired
is of inferior quality, or the accessibility of an essential item can be put in jeopardy. In many cases, the United States is unable to
manufacture critical military equipment. This situation is not officially documented and monitored, but it needs to be.
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 74
The United States does not have control over foreign shipping.Enemies can easily disrupt the economy just by sinking ships that
feed the industrial base and consumer culture. The United States is vulnerable because of its dependence on foreign parts, services
and fuel to maintain economic growth, not to mention military capability.
Global purchasing organizations in industry and the military are not sufficiently looking at the risks of potential disruption of
supply lines. They tend to be rewarded for getting commodities less expensively, and nothing else.
In a global economy, the rules of engagement are different.Just look at the results of the brief longshoremen's strike last year on the
West Coast and the billions of dollars it cost the nation.
The Defense Department's Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) program, monitors spare part
shortages regardless of cause.
DMSMS is the loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers of critical items and raw materials due to production
discontinuance. DMSMS can be caused by rapid changes in item or material technology, uneconomical production requirements,
foreign source competition, federal environmental or safety requirements, and limited availability or increasing cost of items and raw materials used in the
manufacturing process.
The problem is further complicated by a reduction in the industrial base dedicated to production of military equipment.In fact, the
Defense Department now accounts for less than one-half of 1 percent of total microelectronic component sales. In addition, aging fleets of ships and aircraft have
lost their original supplier-base of constituent mechanical, hydraulic and other components.
The DMSMS database is an example of how badly the industrial base is deteriorating.
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces at National Defense University has an industry studies program that annually examines 20 industries representing key
components of national security. ICAF's work has chronicled the deterioration in industries such as advanced manufacturing and shipping.
ManufacturingWhen government R&D investment in an industry deteriorates, it is only a matter of time before an industry is in
trouble. Manufacturing R&D by the federal government is declining.
According to Manufacturing News, "in the mid 1990s, the government was spending $1.5 billion on manufacturing related R&D, including such programs as
Technologies Enabling Agile Manufacturing at the Energy Department and $500 million in electronics manufacturing programs at DARPA. Both of those programs
have been discontinued."
In the same article, Dick Engwall, the 2002 recipient of the multi-association "Individual Manufacturing Excellence Award," said he is "concerned about the
military's desire to abandon programs related to materials, processes and affordability."
Shipbuilding and RepairIn May 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, in
partnership with the Carderock Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, completed a three-year national security assessment
of the U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry. Some of the findings were disconcerting.
According to the study, employment in the industry has "dropped sharply since the early 1980s, when total private employment
was close to 180,000 workers. Survey estimates indicated that employment would decline to about 83,500 in 2000."In addition,
"orders for U.S. warships have declined 60 percent during the 10 years since the end of the Cold War."
Young people no longer view working in a shipyard as a viable way to make a living. Consequently, according to DOC, "survey
responses indicate that labor shortages have reduced profits, impacted construction costs, and delayed project completion for most
shipyards."
According to the study, the basis for U.S. ship-building superiority has been the research and development expertise that currently
resides in Navy's laboratories, acquisition commands, and certain shipbuilders and universities. "Collectively, these organizations
have conceived and designed most of the state-of-the-art hull, mechanical, electrical, power projection, air defense and undersea
warfare capabilities that are operational today. With reduced research and development budgets, some of that capability now is
becoming fragmented."
Thi\s situation also exists in other industries, such as machine tools, the high performance explosives and explosive components industry, cartridge and propellant
actuated device sector and welding. nd

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy Aff 75

An increase in shipbuilding production would increase the U.S. flag fleet of commercial ships – They
arekey to our economy.
Sea power 2002 (“Seapower/ Maritime.” Jan 2002. Official magazine of the Navy League of the United States, Sea Power
provides news and analysis of the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and Merchant Marines. Findarticles.com)
As of April 2001, the U.S.-flag cargo-- carrying merchant fleet included 264 self-propelled oceangoing vessels (1,000 gross tons
and over) as well as 70 Great Lakes vessels including integrated tug barges. It also consisted of over 37,000 other cargo ships,
tugs, barges, passenger ships, and other vessels in domestic waterborne trade. The United States ranked 12th in the world in the
deadweight tonnage of its operational oceangoing commercial ships. The U.S.-flag share of America's seaborne foreign trade
carried decreased in 2000 to 2.6 percent (from 3.0 percent in 1999). The U.S.-flag percentage of liner trade decreased from 8.8
percent to 8.4 percent in the same period.
Even though the number of U.S.-flag oceangoing ships has declined in recent years, the productivity of the fleet has improved
substantially. The average capacity of liner vessels in the U.S.-flag fleet today is over 34,000 deadweight tons (dwt). Fleet
productivity also has been enhanced by the development of state-of-the-art intermodal systems that provide seamless, door-to-
door, just-in-time transportation worldwide. These advances also have been applied to the movement of military shipments and
have resulted in significantly improved coordination and speed in delivery of Department of Defense (DOD) cargoes.
Commercial shipping continues to be critical to the well-being of the U.S. economy for both economic and defense reasons, as
recent events have repeatedly emphasized. Recent bilateral negotiations led by MARAD, and buttressed by Federal Maritime
Commission investigations, have sought to open shipping markets in Japan, China, and Brazil and to ensure nondiscriminatory
treatment of U.S. carriers, shippers, and consumers. These negotiations were possible only because the United States has a
merchant fleet of its own. The same is true of the new U.S. maritime agreement with Russia, signed by Secretary of Transportation
Norman Y. Mineta and his Russian counterpart in June 2001.Because of higher U.S. construction, maintenance, environmental, and
safety standards, it almost always costs more to operate U.S.flag vessels than it does to operate foreignflag ships. There is limited
direct U.S. government assistance to help support a minimal liner fleet.
Since 1904 the Congress has enacted a series of socalled "cargopreference laws" to provide the economic incentive to shipowners
to maintain their U.S. registry.When the government provides a benefit to help American industry export U.S.made products, it
establishes a "quid pro quo" requiring a certain portion of the exports to be carried on U.S.flag vessels,when such vessels are
available at fair and reasonable rates. Two or more industries therefore are assisted at the same time. Cargopreference laws
generate about $950 million per year of basecargo revenue for U.S.flag vessels. The government recaptures a portion of the added
cost through taxes on the total gross revenue and on the taxes generated as that total gross revenue flows through the
American economy. Without the combination of the limited direct subsidy discussed below and the cargopreference laws, the
already diminished U.S.flag foreign trade fleet would disappear entirely.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 76

A U.S. flagged fleet is key to the economy
Seapower 2002 (“Seapower/ Maritime.” Jan 2002. Official magazine of the Navy League of the United States, Sea Power
provides news and analysis of the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and Merchant Marines. Findarticles.com”
U.S. economic security also benefits from the participation of the U.S.- flag fleet in the movement of U.S. international trade
Without a U.S.-flag fleet, the United States, the largest consumer market in the world, as well as thousands of U.S. importers and
exporters, would become entirely dependent on foreign entities for transportation. The presence of a privately owned U.S.-flag
fleet provides an alternative to foreign-flag carriers, some of which are government-owned or -controlled or have close affiliations
with firms in their own countries that compete with U.S. businesses.
A Strong U.S. Commercial fleet key ensure economic stability

American Roll-On Roll-Off Carrier 2008. (May 8, 2008. www.arrcnet.comAmerican Roll-on Roll-off Carrier (ARC) is the
leading U.S. Ro-Ro carrier operating liner services in the U.S.-International trades. ARC provides port-to-port and end-to-end
transport of heavy vehicles, helicopters and other equipment for the U.S. government and its various agencies.)
The importance of maintaining a commercially viable and militarily-useful U.S. Flag fleet cannot be underestimated- it not only
provides a vital economic link to the globalized economy, but a crucial security resource that enables the federal government to
utilize the carriers' services and if necessary, take the ships and the crews in time of national emergency.During Gulf War I, the
Department of Defense came face-to-face with the reality that it cann
\ot and should not rely on foreign-flagged and foreign-crewed vessels, as numerous foreign flag commercial vessels refused to
enter the warzone. In an after-action government-industry study, it was recognized that DoD needs the proper mix of U.S.- flagged
and U.S.-crewed commercial ships in addition to its "organic", or DoD-owned, assets, in order to fully and effectively carry out its
mission. As mentioned by Ebeling, "there is, and should always be, a strong, core organic fleet which manages the surge phase of a
contingency- but there is not sufficient organic capability to provide long term sustainment sealift without the industry's
contribution." This recognition helped bring about the creation of the Maritime Security Program, which continues to provide vital
U.S. Flag sealift and intermodal capability to this day, crewed by the nation's "fifth service", the loyal U.S. citizen Merchant
Marine, such as AMO and SIU, many of whom were in attendance at the May 8th ceremony, as were a number of merchant
mariner trainees from the Paul Hall Center.

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Strong U.S. economy key to world economy.Dependencyon U.S. markets is key to heg, avoiding U.S.-
Sino war, and stability in Russia.
Mead 2004 (Walter Russell Mead. 2004. “America’s Sticky Power”. FP Archive. Questia.com.)
In both of those cases, the stock of debt was purchased by the rich and the powerful, who then acquired an interest in the stability
of the government that guaranteed the value of the debt. Wealthy Englishmen opposed the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne
because they feared it would undermine the value of their holdings in the Bank of England. Likewise, the propertied elites of the
13 colonies came to support the stability and strength of the new U.S. Constitution because the value of their bonds rose and fell
with the strength of the national government.
Similarly, in the last 60 years,as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States--government and private bonds,
direct and portfolio private investments--more and more of them have acquired an interest in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-
led system.A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States.
Without their best customer, countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every
country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt becomes a strength, not a
weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they need its market and own its securities.Of course,
pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other
countries' faith by maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the Philistines, a
collapsing U.S. economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world.That is sticky power with a
vengeance.
THE SUM OF ALL POWERS?
The United States' global economic might is therefore not simply, to use Nye's formulations, hard power that compels others or
soft power that attracts the rest of the world. Certainly,the U.S. economic system provides the United States with the prosperity
needed to underwrite its security strategy, but it also encourages other countries to accept U.S. leadership. U.S. economic might is
sticky power.
How will sticky power help the United States address today's challenges? One pressing need is to ensure that Iraq's economic
reconstruction integrates the nation more firmly in the global economy.Countries with open economies develop powerful trade-
oriented businesses; the leaders of these businesses can promote economic policies that respect property rights, democracy, and the
rule of law. Such leaders also lobby governments to avoid the isolation that characterized Iraq and Libya under economic
sanctions. And looking beyond Iraq, the allure of access to Western capital and global markets is one of the few forces protecting
the rule of law from even further erosion in Russia.
China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain
wealth that could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some
analysts in both China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the
reigning U.S. power.
Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the global
economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3 trillion.
By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming
increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the
United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities.
Sticky power works both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an
increasingly hard time breaking off commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual
dependence is probably good for both sides. Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper
now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.-Chinese conflict is less likely to occur.
Sticky power, then, is important to U.S. hegemony for two reasons: It helps prevent war;and, if war comes, it helps the United
States win. But to exercise power in the real world, the pieces must go back together. Sharp, sticky, and soft power work together
to sustain U.S. hegemony. Today, even as the United States' sharp and sticky power reach unprecedented levels, the rise of anti-
Americanism reflects a crisis in U.S. soft power that challenges fundamental assumptions and relationships in the U.S. system.
Resolving the tension so that the different forms of power reinforce one another is one of the principal challenges facing U.S.
foreign policy in 2004 and beyond.

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Navy Key to Shipbuilding

Unpredictable funding is killing the shipbuilding industry.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, March 2002
[“Shipbuilding Sector Remains Uncompetitive”, the ICAF faculty is composed of military officers from all five Services and
civilian academics who are experts in their fields, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2002/Mar/Shipbuilding.htm]
The Navy acquisition budget for the past eight years has been insufficient to meet fleet replacement schedules. The build rate
needs to double (to 12 ships per year) to sustain fleet size at 305 vessels.
The same situation, however, can be seen in a different light. A Navy report sent to Congress in June 2000 showed that
construction rates within the 2001- 2005 period (average 7.8 ships per year), combined with a similar rate through about 2012, can
sustain between 305-315 ships. This report also shows that rates of 10-12 ships per year will be needed between 2013 and 2026 to
sustain a 301 to 315-ship fleet.
The Deepwater acquisition program of the U.S. Coast Guard is scheduled to begin production in 2003. It could include as many as
40 new vessels and service life extensions of others, representing significant work for the industry.
Budget efficiencies can be achieved with stable, high rates of production using multiyear procurement appropriations.
Excess Capacity—Worldwide shipbuilding prices are at historically low levels. Attempts to strike a balance between excess
capacity and preservation of the industrial base will be the focal point of discussion should a new round of base realignment and
closures (BRAC) be authorized by Congress.
Funding spikes—Unsteady and unpredictable government procurement practices are forcing shipyards to compete based on short-
term initiatives. Funding uncertainty creates an unsteady work environment that causes skilled labor to seek employment in other
industries.
Aging workforce—The current nationwide average age of shipyard production workers is 42.1 years, maritime professionals 43.5
years and administrative workers 45.1 years. This trend indicates that the shipbuilding industry is quickly reaching a crisis
situation, as replacements are not readily available.
International dimension—The downturn in commercial shipbuilding orders and a dwindling U.S. Navy fleet have led to significant
reductions in the shipbuilding industry workforce. The pressure to further reduce the workforce through mergers and downsizing
of the shipyards is being mounted in the hope that the industry will adopt policies that would make it competitive.
This approach may not yield the desired results without considering the requirements of the international customers. Because of
this posture, the policy of restrictions on technology transfer to potential customers is implemented with the negative effect of
driving such customers to European and Asian shipyards, where the technologies are made available to them. The restrictions on
this type of technology transfer are inconsistent with globalization trends.

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Shipbuilding Will Go International

The US shipping industry will look to international markets without a increase in Navy orders.
Technology transfer regulations will be relaxed to attract customers.
The downturn in commercial shipbuilding orders and a dwindling U.S. Navy fleet have led to significant reductions in the
shipbuilding industry workforce. The pressure to further reduce the workforce through mergers and downsizing of the shipyards is
being mounted in the hope that the industry will adopt policies that would make it competitive.
This approach may not yield the desired results without considering the requirements of the international customers. Because of
this posture, the policy of restrictions on technology transfer to potential customers is implemented with the negative effect of
driving such customers to European and Asian shipyards, where the technologies are made available to them. The restrictions on
this type of technology transfer are inconsistent with globalization trends.
The options available to the U.S. shipbuilding industry include taking advantage of opportunities available in emerging markets,
such as in Africa, to engage the excess design and construction expertise, and relaxing restrictions on technology transfer in order
to attract foreign acquisitions. In addition, U.S. ship designers would have to consider giving some attention to designs that meet
foreign requirements rather than focusing on meeting U.S. requirements for which there will be no customers outside the United
States.

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Navy key to Shipbuilding

The shipbuilding industry is completely dependent upon Navy funding.
After 30 years of overcapacity, the international commercial shipbuilding industry is booming in response to burgeoning global
trade. The number of large, oceangoing vessels being delivered globally each year has been growing at greater than 6 percent per
year and topped the 1000 mark for the first time in 2006 (Teel, p. 4). International shipyards have extensive backlogs for orders of
new ships, and vessel prices have risen sharply over the last several years. Unfortunately, the U.S. industry is not part of the boom
in construction of large oceangoing vessels. At its peak, the U.S. shipbuilding industry was as vibrant and active as any other part
of our wartime industrial base, and even as recently as the 1970s the U.S. easily produced at least 20 large oceangoing ships a year
(Marine Board, 1996). The U.S. is no longer internationally competitive in commercial shipbuilding and relies on government
protectionist legislation to survive.

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Shipbuilding Will Collapse

Without an increase in procurement, the shipbuilding industry will collapse.
While most observers agree that the USG does not procure enough vessels to justify maintaining six major shipyards, the
cost/quantity paradox is compounded by the desire to maintain a U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. With the withering away of the
commercial shipbuilding industry in the U.S., naval shipbuilding now represents over 90 percent of annual domestic production in
terms of value (Teel, 2007, p. 5). However, according to several noted industry experts, the best the shipbuilding industry can hope
for is “three or four new major combatant hulls and a few support ships a year — for six shipyards that have the physical capacity
to build 40 ships a year” (Chao, et al, 2006). The industry warns that “persistently low and unstable rates of naval ship production”
could have dire implications on the shipbuilding industrial base (Brown, 20 March 2007, p. 2).

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Shipbuilding Key to Global Stability

A weak shipbuilding industry threatens global stability.
The shipbuilding industry is critical to both national security and global stability. The U.S. industry, however, is not globally
competitive in the production of large oceangoing vessels and depends on government procurement and a protected domestic
market to remain viable. The limited commercial market, combined with a decline in Navy shipbuilding, has resulted in excess
production capacity, underutilized larger shipyards and high vessel costs. The combination of high vessel costs and limited
budgets, in turn, threatens the Navy’s ability to meet its stated goal of a 313-ship fleet by 2020. There are no easy solutions to the
dilemma, but there are a number of steps the U.S. Government (USG) can take to bolster this critical component of the defense
industrial base.

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Navy Key to Shipbuilding

The shipbuilding industry needs financial incentives to continue investment and development.
Capital investment within the shipyards was another challenge discussed during our industry visits. Many of the shipyards were
excited to share with us the many new facilities and equipment procured using funding from private or government sources. Such
capital investments are important and necessary to improve efficiencies and ultimately reduce the cost of the ships being built.
With low volume and uncertain ship procurement, shipyards also pointed out the difficulty in justifying additional capital
investment projects, as the business case analyses did not meet internal investment criteria. During testimony before the 2007
House Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, numerous speakers praised the Virginia Class submarine’s CAPEX
program, as a step to enhance shipyard production efficiency. The American Shipbuilding Association President asked for
legislation to “require the Navy to expand the use of “special incentive” fees in all Navy shipbuilding contracts for the purpose of
investing in facilities and process improvements where the business case is made that the investment will result in a favorable
return to the Navy” (Brown, 2007, p. 3). The challenge becomes how future shipbuilding capital investments should be funded.

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Navy Investment Solves Shipbuilding

The Navy needs to use block buy procurement processes to stabilize orders and protect the shipping
industry.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces Spring 2007
[“Shipbuilding Industry: Final Report”, the ICAF faculty is composed of military officers from all five Services and civilian
academics who are experts in their fields, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/industry/reports/2007/index.htm]
A common theme from observers of the industry is the need to stabilize the demand for naval vessels. The current volatility of
demand from one year to the next leads to increased costs and makes it difficult to maintain our production and design workforce
across seams, gaps, ramp-ups and ramp-downs between programs.
Coordinate purchases across the “whole of government” to stabilize USG ship procurement. Although the Navy is the largest USG
customer for ships, the Coast Guard, the Army, the National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and possibly other agencies also purchase ships. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is a good move
towards stabilizing demand; a USG 30-year shipbuilding plan would be a better one.
Stability in ship construction can be enhanced, and concerns about the feasibility of a surge capability can be mitigated with a
thorough examination of the Navy’s process for the disposition of decommissioned ships.
Improve Acquisition Processes

Government shipbuilding requires a greater emphasis on stability, foresight and intellect longevity in order to improve ship
acquisition processes and reducing ship construction costs.
The Navy and the Congress should shift to longer-term funding policies to stabilize shipbuilding budgets, using “multi-year” and
“block-buy” procurement processes.

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Investment Solves Shipbuilding

Investing in a nuclear navy would spark a revival in the nuclear shipping industry.
Jack Spencer and Baker Spring November 5, 2007
[Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby
Research Fellow in National Security Policy for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation., “The Advantages of Expanding the Nuclear Navy”,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/homelanddefense/wm1693.cfm
Some have erroneously argued that America's industrial base is inadequate to support a nuclear cruiser. Additional nuclear
shipbuilding can not only be absorbed by the current industrial base but also will allow it to work more efficiently. That said,
Congress could consider the option of expanding the infrastructure at a later date by licensing additional nuclear production
facilities and shipyards should further expansion be necessary.
America's shipyards are not operating at full capacity. Depending on the vendor, product, and service, the industrial base is
currently operating at an average capacity of approximately 65 percent. Additionally, Navy leaders have testified that without
further investments, their training infrastructure is adequate to handle the influx of additional personnel necessary to support an
expansion of nuclear power.
Construction of additional ships would not be limited to the nuclear shipbuilding yards. Modules could be produced throughout the
country and assembled at nuclear-certified yards. Another alternative might be to build the ship in a non-nuclear yard and then
transport it to a nuclear yard where the reactor can be installed. The work would be spread throughout the aircraft carrier and
submarine industrial bases. Today, the aircraft carrier industrial base consists of more than 2,000 companies in 47 states. Likewise,
the submarine industrial base consists of more than 4,000 companies in 47 states.

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International Trade Impact

Rise in fuel prices will make countries refuse to ship long distances – closing up and trading closer to
home – globalization will soon reverse and international trade will die.
Scoffield 2008(Heather. May 5, 2008. “High oil prices will hurt trade, report says”. Globeandmail.com.
http://forum.globalhousepricecrash.com/index.php?showtopic=32389)
OTTAWA —The rising price of oil is making international trade of heavy cargo prohibitively expensive, and acting as an incentive
for importers to find productssuch as steelcloser to home, new research by CIBC World Markets shows.
For heavy products, rising shipping costs are eroding the lowwage advantage of China over North America, say chief economist Jeff Rubin and senior
economist Benjamin Tal.
If oil prices continue to rise, the soaring cost of global transport will act like a major tariff barrier and lead to a substantial
slow down in international trade, they argue.
“Globalization is reversible,” they state.
High fuel costs are expected to have a dramatic impact on trade patterns, as businesses look for supplies closer to home
Related ArticlesRecent
Oil prices steady above $133 Oil prices just don't bite like they used to British truckers protest high fuel prices Oil prices changing consumer spending Oil passed
$133 (U.S.) a barrel on Monday, and Mr. Rubin forecasts the price will average $106 this year, $130 next year, $150 in 2010 and $225 by 2012.
These days, the cost of oil is the equivalent of imposing a tariff rate of about nine per cent on goods coming into the United States. At $150 a barrel, transport costs
act like a tariff of 11 per cent. And at $200, all the trade liberalization efforts of the past 30 years are reversed, Mr. Rubin said.
Oil prices now account for about half of total freight costs, and for the past three years, for every $1 increase in world oil, there has been a corresponding one per
cent increase in transport costs.
“Unless that container is chock full of diamonds, its shipping costs have suddenly inflated the cost of whatever is inside,” Mr. Rubin said. “And those inflated costs
get passed onto the Consumer Price Index when you buy that good at your local retailer. As oil prices keep rising, pretty soon those transport costs start cancelling
out the East Asian wage advantage.”
Persistently high oil prices will also cause many commuters to consider moving to the city, reversing the allure of the suburbs, he said. And it could also force a
change in eating habits, as foreign food becomes too expensive to ship.
“It means forget about that 50mile commute from Cooksville to Toronto, and also forget about that avocado salad in January.”
More fundamentally, thesoaring oil price will prompt a major rethinking of how production is organized, Mr. Rubin argues, and could
even lead to a revival of North American manufacturing.
Already, U.S. imports of Chinese steel are declining dramatically, while domestic production is rising at rates not seen for years,
they say.
China's steel exports to the United States are falling at a 20percent annual pace, while U.S. domestic production has risen by 10
per cent in the past year. That makes sense, the economists say, because Chinese steel producers need to import iron ore from the likes of Australia and Brazil,
then turn it into steel and then pay huge and rising freight costs to send the hotrolled steel to the United States.
Regional trade looks much cheaper in comparison, they say.
As oil prices continue to climb, shipments of furniture, footwear and machinery and equipment are likely to meet the same fate, the economists say.
“In a world of tripledigit oil prices,distance costs money,” they say in a paper released Tuesday.“And while trade liberalization and technology
may have flattened the world, rising transport prices will once again make it rounder.”
At first glance, such developments may seem to favour a renaissance of the moribund steel mills and boarded up furniture plants of Canada. But high oil prices
won't eliminate importers' search for cheap labour. Instead, they're eyeing Mexico.
“Instead of finding cheap labour halfway around the world, the key will be to find the cheapest labour force within reasonable shipping distance to your market,”
CIBC says.
“In that type of world, look for Mexico's maquiladora plants to get another chance at bat when it comes to supplying the North American market. In a world where
oil will soon cost over $200 per barrel, Mexico's proximity to the rest of North America gives its costs a huge advantage.”
While high oil prices will require major reorganization of global supply chains, the bigger danger comes in the form of inflationary
pressure,Mr. Rubin warns.
“If you're a steel buyer, your costs are going up regardless of whether you are sourcing it from China or Pittsburgh,” he says, saying the same dynamic applies to
Hamilton.

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Soon, the United Steelworkers of America will want a piece of that higher price, and wages that have been kept flat for years because of labour competition from
Asia will begin to rise.
He doesn't necessarily see a return to the doubledigit inflation of the early 1980s, but figures the central banks in the United States and eventually Canada will have
to begin raising rates dramatically in order to confront inflation running at around 3.5 or 4 per cent annual pace. Canada's target is two per cent a year.
International Trade Impact

Loss of international trade ensures war and conflict.
Weede 2004(Erich Weede. “The Diffusion of Prosperity and Peace of Globalization”. The Independent Institute. The Independent
Review Volume 9 Number 2. Fall 2002. Erich Weede is professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, German)
Although neither “realist” theorizing about interstate politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) nor critical treatments of
globalization (Gray 1998; Kapstein 1999) recognize it,a strong and beneficial link exists between globalization and the avoidance
of war.In my view, the economic benefits of globalization and free trade are much less important than the international security
benefits.The quantitative literature (summarized by Weede 1996, chap. 8, and 2000, chap. 11) comes fairly close to general
agreement on the following four propositions from economics, political sociology, and international relations.
First, democracies rarely fight each other (Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001). This finding does not necessarily imply that
democracies fight fewer wars than do other regimes. It is even compatible with the view widely shared until recently that the risk
of war between democracies and autocracies might be even higher than the risk of war between autocracies. I agree with critics of
the democratic peace that we do not yet understand fully why democracies rarely fight each other and whether normative or
institutional characteristics of democracies matter most. Explaining the democratic peace between Western democracies as “an
imperial peace based on American power” (Rosato 2003, 599) is not justified, however. Admittedly, I held this view thirty years
ago (Weede 1975). Then I explained peace among U.S. allies by their common ties or even by their subordination to the United
States. Later, however, I discovered that autocratic U.S. allies, in contrast to democratic U.S. allies, fought each other or against
democratic U.S. allies, as the football war in Central America and the Falklands War illustrate. Thus, I became a convert to the
democratic-peace proposition. John Oneal, in unpublished analyses carried out in Bonn in 2003, found that although the
democratic-peace proposition consistently calls the imperial-peace proposition into question, controlling for an imperial peace
does not subvert the democratic-peace proposition.
Second, prosperity, or high income per capita, promotes democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset 1994; Przeworski et
al. 2000; Boix and Stokes 2003; Rajapatirana 2004).
Third, export orientation in poor countries and open markets in rich countries(that is, trade between rich and poor countries)
promote growth and prosperity where they are needed most, in poor countries (Greenaway and Nam 1988; Dollar 1992; Edwards
1998; Lindert and Williamson 2001, 37; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Rajapatirana 2004).
Fourth, bilateral trade reduces the risk of war between dyads ofnations (Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001).
As to why trade contributes to the prevention of war, two ideas come to mind. First, war is likely to disrupt trade. The higher the
level of trade in a pair (dyad) of nations is, the greater the costs of trade disruption are likely to be. Second, commerce might
contribute to the establishment or maintenance of moral capital(Ratnapala 2003),which has a civilizing and pacifying effect on
citizens and statesmen.In the context of this article, however, answering the question of why trade affects conflict-proneness or
providing the answer with some microfoundation is less important than establishing the effect itself in empirical research.
Although some writers have questioned or even rejected the “peace by trade” proposition, their criticisms are not convincing.
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) raised the serious technical issue of time dependence in the time-series cross-section data, but
Russett and Oneal (2001; see also Oneal 2003 and Oneal and Russett 2003b) responded to the objections raised against their earlier
work and demonstrated that those objections do not affect their substantive conclusions. For a while, Hegre’s (2000) study seemed
to necessitate a qualification of the “peace by trade” proposition. He found that the pacifying effect of trade is stronger among
developed countries than among less-developed countries. More recently, however, Mousseau, Hegre, and Oneal corrected this
earlier finding and reported: “Whereas economically important trade has important pacifying benefits for all dyads, the conflict-
reducing effect of democracy is conditional on states’ economic development” (2003, 300). Gelpi and Grieco (2003) suggested
another qualification. In their view, trade no longer pacifies relations between autocratic states. According to Mansfield and
Pevehouse (2003), another modification of the “peace by trade” proposition might be required.The institutional setting, such as
preferential trade agreements, matters. It is even conceivable that otherforms of economic interdependence, such as cross-border

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investments, exercise some pacifying impact. Foreign direct investment (FDI) certainlypromotes prosperity, growth, and
democracy (de Soysa and Oneal 1999; de Soysa 2003), but the conceivable pacifying impact of FDI still lacks sufficient empirical
investigation.
U.S. Competition
Building nuclear commercial ships would make the U.S. competitive again in shipbuilding.
Atomic Insight 1995 (Volume 1, Issue 2. “Letter from the Editor”. May 1995.
http://www.atomicinsights.com/jul95/letter_Jul95.html. Atomic think group)
Nuclear engines could be providing clean, reliable and essentially unlimited power for some of the thousands of commercial ships
visiting our shores every year. With the right kind of foresight, many of those ships could be manufactured here in the United
States and crewed by U. S. citizens. Their low fuel costs and high speed capabilities could keep them competitive, even against
ships paying low wages.
Guarded Knowledge
Former Navy nukes represent a potential core body of expertise to develop a commercial nuclear ship operating industry.
Unfortunately, this kind of defense conversion is not even being discussed. It is a waste of a valuable resource.
There are thousands of highly trained men (so far, essentially all Navy nukes are men) who have left the Navy's nuclear power
program whose many years worth of training and experience are not being used to their full advantage. Part of the reason that there
is little discussion about commercial nuclear engines for ships is that there are few unemployed ex-nukes with the motivation to
question the status quo. Some have been able to land jobs in the shrinking civilian nuclear power industry. Other have used the
experience and formal training they received in steam plant operation, thermodynamics and electronics to earn jobs in
conventional power plants.
Many of my former colleagues, however, have entered into totally unrelated occupations. I know two ex-nukes who are now
medical doctors, other friends are in the financial community, some are lawyers, salesmen, teachers, and industrial engineers.
Nukes are generally resourceful, smart and flexible. The Navy has actively discouraged nukes from directly applying their
knowledge. In the Navy program, even the Second Law of Thermodynamics is marked with a Confidential label in training
textbooks. This official discouragement of commercial applications of nuclear technology dates to Admiral Rickover's thirty years
as the head of the program. Apparently, the Admiral believed that the only way for nuclear power to be beneficial was for him to
control it.
Time to Move On
The Navy needs to understand that the Cold War is over, that commercial nuclear power is a reality encompassing over 400 power
plants in the world using the same physical principles as their ship engines and that Admiral Rickover died more than a decade
ago.
The United States has ignored
the potential of nuclear powered engines for commercial ship propulsion for more than twenty years.

It is shortsighted for our country to squander such a huge and expensively developed advantage over competitors without even any
honest discussion. This issue of AEI is devoted to firing the first salvo in a much needed debate.

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Solvency: Navy Investment

Navy investment is key to the development of a nuclear powered fleet
Fabey, 5/4/07(Michael, “Navy should consider alternate ship power – report”, Lexis Nexis, accessed 7/15/08-e.wey)
A Naval Sea Systems command report recommends the service take a look at nuclear or mixed power plants for other ships to
allay growing fuel demands. "The Navy should consider ship options with nuclear power and combined plant architectures (e.g.,
diesels combined with gas turbine boost) in studies for future surface combatants and amphibious warfare ships," said the report,
"U.S. Navy Report: Alternative Propulsion Methods for Surface Combatants and Amphibious Warfare Ships," released May 3.
"Nuclear propulsion systems are technically feasible for small and medium combatants and for amphibious ships using existing
reactor designs," the report said. "The scope of this study did not include costs or time required to modify the nuclear surface ship
construction capability. Likewise, this study did not include beneficial impacts to the nuclear industrial base from increased
surface ship workload." 'Significantly higher power' Nuclear propulsion options provide operational advantages in surge to theater
and time on station for all variants studied, the report said. "These operational advantages are even more pronounced for scenarios
of high energy demand over long durations in tactical situations (e.g., high-power radars, high speeds, and electric weapons and
sensors). Trends in ship weapons and sensors toward significantly higher power and energy demands will further highlight these
advantages." Size doesn't matter - as much - when making these types of considerations, according to the report. "Mission and
operating requirements drive the need for particular power and propulsion system architectures, not ship displacement," the report
said. "For instance, it was found that ships with constant, high demands for energy may benefit from nuclear power, whereas ships
with constant low demands for energy may be more suitable with combined diesel and gas turbine plants with hybrid power
transmission systems (such as a single shaft with a secondary propulsion unit)." The report also makes other recommendations. For
example, the Navy should continue to invest in RDT&E efforts to improve affordability, power density and efficiencies of
technologies for naval ship power generation (e.g., fuel cells), power distribution, propulsion transmissions, and technologies to
reduce hull drag. Also, the report says, the Navy should invest in RDT&E for propulsors that provide improved efficiency and
increased longitudinal segregation. "The Navy should continue to use the methods and processes developed for this study in
analysis for future ships to evaluate the operational effectiveness of propulsion and power systems. Future studies should include
quantifiable analyses of ship vulnerability, sustainability, and timeliness that can be evaluated against acquisition and LCC. This is
especially critical where emerging commercial energy and propulsion technologies are being considered for warship applications."

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Nuclear Navy Aff 90
Solvency: Congressional Funding

The navy will only fund nuclear powered ships if they have the necessary equipment with the
difference in cost for diesel and nuclear ships to incentivize the Navy to adopt nuclear ships.
Galrahn November 5, 2007
[“Looking at a Nuclear Navy”, Professional Navy Centric Blog, http://informationdissemination.blogspot.com/2007/11/looking-at-
nuclear-navy.html]
One of the major items of discussion in the FY08 budget is the amendment by the House for a new requirement of all new large
surface combatants to have nuclear power in the future. House and Senate negotiators on the fiscal 2008 defense authorization bill
are at odds over a provision in the House-passed measure that would require the Navy to make its future fleet of surface
combatants nuclear powered.
The Navy is building nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines, but the House language would establish that it is the "policy of the
United States" to use nuclear power for all major vessels, including destroyers and cruisers. House Armed Services Seapower
Subcommittee Chairman Gene Taylor, D-Miss., and ranking member Roscoe Bartlett, R-Md., have long urged the Navy to use
nuclear power on its large ships to save long-term fuel costs. In a brief interview Tuesday, Taylor stressed that nuclear power
would ultimately improve the Navy's effectiveness, safety and mobility by allowing ships to go long stretches at sea without
having to refuel. The first ships that would be affected by the provision would be the 19 CG(X) cruisers the Navy plans to buy
between fiscal 2011 and fiscal 2023. The provision also would affect the DDG(X), which the Navy will not start buying until the
mid-2020s to replace its current fleet of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Heritage Foundation produced a point by point memo
today in support of this action. I'm not sure what I think of this yet, either Rep. Taylor is a visionary or he is trying to sink the fleet,
but there really isn't a third way to look at this proposal. My skepticism is a result of years of working with government. In
particular, in regards to technology, it would be accurate to say it is damn near impossible to come up with too many examples
where government actually takes into account cost of ownership, and is willing to spend money up front with a result of savings
down the line with any intention of actually not taking money away down the line for some other new pet project.
My concern lies in the reality that the Navy isn't a pet project, and if Congress truly intends to capitalize on long term savings, then
Congress needs to establish special budgets that protects the Navy from being raided later because of capital investments today.
Taylor is backed by a study, available in summery by this CRS report.
Section 130 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163of January 6, 2006), which called for such a study
(see Appendix). The study reached a number of conclusions, including the following:
In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional
power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.— For a small surface combatant, the procurement-
cost increase was about $600 million.— For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000
metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.— For an amphibious ship, the
increase was about $800 million. Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered
ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account. A ship’s operational tempo and
resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and
resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and
the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost. - The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even
cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:— $210 per barrel
to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;— $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and—
$210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo,
and the higher dollar figure is for a low ship operating tempo. Put into perspective, since June when this report was discussed in
Congress, without doing a thing the price of oil has gone up from ~$65 to ~$95+. That is a net cost increase of around 4 billion
dollars in oil costs annually for the DoD. The problem is the study identifies the best savings for medium-size combatants defined
as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons. Besides logistics ships, the only ships that fall
into this category are LHAs and LPDs, not destroyers or cruisers as targeted by the resolution passed in the House. However, as
the Heritage summery identifies, there are net savings for each nuclear reactor produced, somewhere around $35 million in savings

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Nuclear Navy Aff 91
per submarine for example.
I don't know, it is an interesting debate and there are certainly valid reasons to think the House has it right in promoting this idea.
However, considering the cost issues the Navy is facing in shipbuilding, if Congress is serious about taking this type of action the
only realistic approach I see is to create a special fund that is protected from being raided, and focuses only on funding nuclear
propulsion for new ships and doesn't count as funds against the Navy shipbuilding budget.
Solvency: Procument
Accelerating procurement solves the creation of the nuclear naval ships such as the CG(X)
“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress”,
The Navy is planning to procure a new kind of cruiser called the CG(X) as the replacement for its 22 remaining Ticonderoga (CG-
47) class Aegis cruisers. Navy plans call for the CG(X) to be equipped with a new radar that, compared to the Aegis system’s SPY-
1 radar, is more powerful and thus more capable for supporting ballistic missile defense operations. As part of its FY2006-FY2011
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) submitted to Congress in February 2005, the Navy accelerated the planned start of CG(X)
procurement from FY2018 to FY2011. The Navy wants to procure a total of 19 CG(X)s between FY2011 and FY2023. If procured
on that schedule, the ships might enter service between 2017 and 2029.In light of PLA TBM modernization efforts, including the
possibility of TBMs equipped with MaRVs capable of hitting moving ships at sea, one issue is whether it would be feasible to
accelerate planned CG(X) procurement. Given the time needed to develop the CG(X)’s new radar, it might not be possible to
accelerate the procurement of the first CG(X) from FY2011 to an earlier year. Once CG(X) procurement were to begin, however, it
might be possible to accelerate the procurement dates of later ships in the program, so as to get more of the ships in service sooner.
In light of the CG(X)’s potential procurement cost, accelerating procurement of CG(X)s to earlier years would, in a situation of a
constrained Navy budget, leave less funding available in those years for meeting other Navy needs.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 92
Solvency: Procumbent
Fears of operational tradeoff and aircraft carrier reduction has prevented the Navy from investing in a
all nuclear fleet
O’Rourke, 5/22/08 (“Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships”
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Updated May 22, 2008 Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, lexis nexis, accessed 7/17/08)-e.wey
In addition to nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear-powered carriers, the Navy in the past built and operated
nine nuclear-powered cruisers (CGNs). The nine ships, which are shown in Table 2, include three one-of-a-kind designs (CGNs 9,
25, and 35) followed by the two-ship California (CGN-36) class and the four-ship Virginia (CGN-38) class. The nuclear-powered
cruisers shown in Table 2 were procured to provide nuclear-powered escorts for the Navy’s nuclear-powered carriers. Procurement
of nuclear-powered cruisers was halted after FY1975 largely due to a desire to constrain the procurement costs of future cruisers.
In deciding in the late 1970s on the design for the new cruiser that would carry the Aegis defense system, two nuclear-powered
Aegis-equipped options — a 17,200-ton nuclear-powered strike cruiser (CSGN) and a 12,100-ton derivative of the CGN-38 class
design — were rejected in favor of a third option of placing the Aegis system onto the smaller, conventionally powered hull
originally developed for the Spruance (DD-963) class destroyer. The CSGN was estimated to have a procurement cost twice that of
the DD-963-based option, while the CGN-42 was estimated to have a procurement cost 30%-50% greater than that of the DD-963-
based option. The DD-963-based option became the 9,500-ton Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruiser. The first Aegis cruiser
was procured inFY1978.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 93
Stable Industry=Nuclear Navy

Companies will invest in a nuclear navy if congress provides the necessary funding for successful
technology – empirically proven.
Jack Spencer, 11/ 15/2007
[Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation,
“Competitive Nuclear Energy Investment: Avoiding Past Policy Mistake”,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2086.cfm]
The peaceful use of the atom, it was claimed, was the answer to future energy woes because it would produce electricity that,
among other advantages, was "too cheap to meter."[2] The U.S. Navy's desire to expand nuclear propulsion in its fleet also heavily
influenced growth in the private sector. Although direct subsidies, such as rapid tax amortization and funding for reactor
construction, stopped in the late 1960s, entities within Congress and the executive branch continued to promote nuclear power with
indirect support, such as market guarantees and access to technology.[3]
Private investment followed Washington's lead. In cooperation with the federal government, the private sector expanded capacity
and capabilities and developed the necessary technology. Public policy effectively harnessed the power of the private sector to
advance national objectives. The result was the emergence of a world-class nuclear industry.
However, the nuclear industry's success was due largely to public policy designed to promote its growth. Although the industry
grew, it became overly dependent on government. This left it vulnerable to shifts in public policy. When policy shifted toward
outright opposition as the activist community convinced America's political left that nuclear power was dangerous, the industry
predictably failed as investors cut their losses and moved capital to opportunities that were perceived as less threatened by
increasing regulatory volatility.
Anti-nuclear activists understood that they could kill the industry by turning public opinion--and therefore a democratic
government--against nuclear power. This process began in the early 1970s. Although other factors such as rising interest rates,
recession, and economic chaos caused by the oil crisis contributed to the nuclear industry's deterioration, the growing regulatory
burden was paramount.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 94
SOLVENCY – Advanced Procurement

The navy’s instable procurement strategy disincentives the naval shipbuilding industry in nuclear
energy – plan reinstalls credibility
Donald 2005 (Kirkland H. Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces. June 15, 2005. CQ
Congressional Testimony.“Future of Nuclear Submarine Fleet”. Lexis.)
Aside from the premium for flexibility, there is an inevitable cost that comes witha small, dedicated, predominantly sole- source
and sole-customer component industrial base. As the Navy buys fewer components than planned, the cost of those remaining
components must bear the full burden of the contractors' fixed overhead-each unit becomes more expensive. In addition, changes
in quantity of components ordered tend to create churn-churn that we have to pay for, both in real dollars and in credibility with
our vendors. For example, we have paid, and continue to pay, our sole-source suppliers a substantial premium for the many times
the Navy has decided to delay component procurements in order to redirect funding for near-term needs. Specifically, we would
save about $70M per year, or about 8 percent, on VIRGINIA reactor plant components just in overhead if we were buying two
shipsets instead of just one. Further, since 1995, the start date for a two-per-year VIRGINIA- class submarine build rate has
changed seven times. Each time a date moves to the right, we lose credibility with suppliers whose business consists largely of
Navy orders, and in turn, this erodes their willingness to make investments for greater efficiency in the future. Further, there are
the instances where our vendors have made substantial investment in specialized machine tools only to have them under-utilized in
the absence of anticipated orders.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 95
Naval Budget Cuts Inevitable/No New Funding=Cuts

Overly optimistic costs estimates for shipbuilding will result in cuts from other naval programs further
down the line.
Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco January 23, 2008
[Defense: FY2008 Authorization
and Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division]
(5) The Navy’s ability to sustain a fleet of the current size within realistically foreseeable budgets may especially problematic.
After years of criticism from Members of Congress who contended that the Navy was buying too few ships to replace vessels
being retired, the service released in February a long-range shipbuilding plan that would fall just short of the Navy’s current goal
of maintaining a fleet of 313 ships. But the plan assumes that the Defense Department, which bought seven ships in FY2007 and is
requesting the same number in FY2008, would buy between 11 and 13 ships in each of the following five years. The plan assumes
that amount appropriated for new ship construction would rise from a requested $12.5 billion in FY2008 to $17.5 billion inFY2013
(in current-year dollars).11 Considering the fiscal demands likely to put downward pressure on future defense budgets, funding the
Navy’s plan may be challenging. But even if the Navy got the annual shipbuilding budgets it plans to request, it might not be able
to buy all the ships it plans as quickly as it plans to do so, because of escalating costs and delays in some of the new types of ships
slated to comprise the future fleet. In the past, Navy cost and schedule forecasts later proven to be overly optimistic have led to
long-range shipbuilding plans that promised increases in shipbuilding budgets in the “out-years” that have not been realized.
Unachievable shipbuilding plans may discourage the Navy and Congress from weighing potential tradeoffs between, on the one
hand, construction of promising new designs and, on the other hand, building additional ships of types already in service and
upgrading existing vessels.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 96
No Funding
Funding for nuclear reactors is offset by cutting funding for other ships.
Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco January 23, 2008
[Defense: FY2008 Authorization
and Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division]
The committee also added to the bill $588 million to buy a nuclear propulsion
system to be used in a Virginia-class attack submarine funded in some future budget.
The committee expressed the hope that this addition would help the Navy achieve its
long-standing goal of buying two subs per year.
The bill would provide, as requested, $1.8 billion for a submarine, $2.7 billion
to continue work on a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the cost of which is being
spread across several years, and all but $30 million of the $1.8 billion requested to
continue building the first two of a new class of destroyers, designated DDG-1000.
The Committee’s additions to the shipbuilding budget request were partly offset
by funding only one of the three requested Littoral Combat Ships, a reduction of
$571 million, and by providing $76 million of the $210 million requested in the
Army’s budget for a small, high-speed troop transport vessel.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 97
Dependency Solvency
Nuclear navy solves naval oil tendency dependency
O’Rourke, 5/22/08 (“Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships”
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress Updated May 22, 2008 Ronald O’Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, lexis nexis, accessed 7/17/08)-e.wey
Future Oil Prices. Views on potential future oil prices vary.24 Some supporters of using nuclear power for the CG(X) and other
future Navy surface ships, such as Representatives Gene Taylor and Roscoe Bartlett, the chairman and ranking member,
respectively, of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, believe that oil in
coming decades may become increasingly expensive, or that guaranteed access to oil may become more problematic, and that this
is a central reason for making the CG(X) or other future Navy surface ships nuclear-powered.25 Ship Operating Tempo. A ship’s
average lifetime operating tempo can be affected by the number of wars, crises, and other contingency operations that it
participates in over its lifetime, because such events can involve operating tempos that are higher than those of “normal” day-to-
day operations. Ship operating tempo can also be affected by the size of the Navy. The lower the number of ships in the Navy, for
example, the higher the operating tempo each a ship might be required to sustain for the fleet to accomplish a given set of missions

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Nuclear Navy Aff 98
Solvency: Nuclear Navy solves dependence

the impact of such attacks would be minimized, he said.

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Nuclear Navy Aff 99
Solvency: Leadership
A green navy is key to power projection, demonstrating environmental leadership,

and gets modeled by other militaries.
Cardarelli, Former colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Plans and Operations at the Near East South Asia Center For
Strategic Studies, 2002 [Rosaline, “Maintaining A Trained and Ready Army From An Environmental Perspective”,
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404598&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, April 9]
Environmental protection must be viewed as an integral part of environmental security as it
relates to national security. The United States must be aware and sensitive to the possibility
that environmental issues or degradation may threaten our interests in regions of strategic
importance. The ability to sustain readiness depends on our capabilities abroad and power
projection platforms in friendly countries. As such, environmental protection can be translated
into military forces being directly involved because they actively demonstrate leadership at
the national and internal level when conducting of their mission. Facets of the environment
such as air, land and water usage are critical for military training, missions and personnel well
being. Additionally, this sets the stage for other militaries of the world to support and promote
an environmentally sustainable behavior and to practice good stewardship in a democratic
environment when political, social, economic instability and conflict can be directly influenced
by environmental protection.

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A2: Economy/speding
Rising oil prices makes the cost for a nuclear fleet cost effective
Jack Spencer is a Research Fellow, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Baker Springs is a
F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/bakerspring.cfm, accessed 7/18/07)
The Navy recently did a cost analysis of nuclear ships versus conventionally powered ships. Delores Etter on March 1 said:
[M]edium surface combatants [like cruisers], with their anticipated high-combat system energy demands, th[e] break-even point is
between $70 and $225 per barrel [of oil]. This indicates that nuclear power should be considered for near-term applications for
those ships. At the time of that statement, the price of a barrel of crude oil was about $65; oil is currently trading at nearly $100 per
barrel. The Navy pegged the cost premium for a nuclear cruiser at between zero to 10 percent with the oil price at $74.15. That
premium would obviously be much lower with today's prices. Given that every $10 hike in the price of oil costs the Department of
Defense $1.3 billion, policymakers must consider nuclear propulsion for future ships. Furthermore, the Navy's cost comparisons
do not even consider the savings that would result from additional volume going through under-utilized shipbuilding infrastructure.

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A2: economy/spending
Building a nuclear navy will actually decrease cost and for every ship built the cost reduces
Jack Jack Spencer and Baker Spring, 2007 (“Expanding the nuclear navy”,
Jack Spencer is a Research Fellow, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Baker Springs is a F.M.
Increasing construction of nuclear ships and submarines yields significant cost reductions. For example, increased workloads could
save the Navy 5 percent to 9 percent on propulsion plant component costs. Building two Virginia-class submarines annually would
result in approximately $200 million in savings per submarine. Adding a nuclear cruiser every two years to the workload would
reduce the price of other nuclear ship power plants by about 7 percent. This equates to savings of approximately $115 million for
each aircraft carrier and $35 million for each submarine. Furthermore, the cost of a nuclear ship includes its life-cycle costs. While
nuclear ships can cost more up front, policymakers should consider lifetime costs, which include operations and maintenance, fuel,
and decommissioning. Cost-comparison studies have not considered many of the costs unique to fossil-fueled ships, such as the
cost of protecting fuel supply lines, which the Navy will protect as primary combat ships or the environmental costs of emissions.
A2: all there turns

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No risk of a turn nuclear power-The navy has been operating nuclear ships for years does not require
new infrastructure or hurt the environment and is no indication of nuclear arms
Jack Spencer is a Research Fellow, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Baker Springs is a F.M.
‘Despite multiple official studies and numerous hours of congressional testimony, specific misunderstandings continue to persist
about nuclear propulsion. The following facts address these misperceptions: Nuclear propulsion is not an indication of nuclear wea
pons. According to Ron O'Rourke, an analyst for the Congressional Research Service, "A military ship's use of nuclear power is
not an indication of whether it carries nuclear weapons--a nuclear-powered military ship can lack nuclear weapons, and a
conventionally powered military ship can be armed with nuclear weapons." A shipyard does not have to be nuclear-certified to co
ntribute to nuclear ship construction. According to Vice Admiral Sullivan, "[You could] build modules of this ship in different
yards and put it together in a nuclear-certified yard..., and we do that today with the Virginia Class." Today, approximately 6,000
companies in 47 states contribute to nuclear shipbuilding. The United States has ample experience in nuclear shipbuilding. The
United States has built and operated nine nuclear-powered cruisers, 10 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and nearly 200 nuclear-
powered submarines. The Navy's Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has trained more than 100,000 officers and technicians.
Nuclear power is safe. The Navy operates 103 reactor plants in 81 nuclear-powered ships, the NR-1 submarine, and four training
and test reactors. Over more than half a century, the Navy has operated for over 5,800 reactor years and steamed over 136 million
miles without accident or radioactive release. Foreign countries welcome America's nuclear ships into their ports. U.S. nuclear-
powered ships are welcomed into more than 150 ports in more than 50 countries. Other countries have nuclear navies. Russia,
China, the United Kingdom, and France all maintain nuclear ships. Other countries, such as India, are seeking the capability.
A2: Troops or draft CP

Quality not quantity-More troops does not translate to military effectiveness rather-efficiency, stealth
and leathality translate into successful military forces

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Our sense of the new strategic landscape—and the opportunities opened up by emerging technologies—has led to a new way of
measuring military effectiveness. Numbers of troops and weapon platforms are no longer the key metrics. Rather, military
effectiveness is now a matter of capabilities—speed, stealth, reach, knowledge, precision, and lethality. Thus, our defense planning
should place less emphasis on numbers of forward forces than upon capabilities and desired effects that can be achieved rapidly.
Transformation also calls for increased effectiveness and efficiency.Within the Defense Department, it has strengthened jointness
among military services through joint presence policy, as well as smarter business practices for managing the day-to-day workings
of the institution. At the interagency level, it has improved transparency and generated new approaches to problem solving.
Transformation has also strengthened momentum for changing the relationship between the department and its people, by keeping
faith with their expectations of quality of life in a time of increased operational tempo.

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A2: Oil DA
The Navy is key to protecting our nations oil supply.
African Oil Journal 06-15-2007
[“U.S. Navy to Protect Oil Interests Along African Coast”, http://www.africanoiljournal.com/06-15-
2007_US_navy_to_protect_oil_interests_along_african_coast.htm]
The United States is boosting its naval presence along the West African coast to combat terrorism, illegal migration and drug
trafficking and to secure U.S. oil interests, senior naval and coastguard officials said.
Amid concerns that weak government control in some West African states has made the region fertile for drug cartels, people
smugglers and Islamist groups, the U.S. Navy Command in Europe has focused its activities southward.
“The clear majority of shipping coming into the United States is coming off the coast of West Africa into the Gulf of Mexico,”
Vice-Admiral John Stufflebeem, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet based in the Mediterranean, said.
“So we are interested in this (region) from a security perspective from our own homeland, and ... in commerce and quite frankly,
oil is one part of it,” he added. The Gulf of Guinea, which includes oil producers like Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria, is
central to U.S. efforts to reduce dependency on Middle Eastern exports. It currently supplies around 15 per cent of U.S. oil
consumption, and that is forecast to rise to 25 per cent by 2015, although resource-hungry China is also looking to corner oil
supply from the region, notably in Angola.
To reflect the growing strategic importance of Africa, the U.S. military will launch a separate Africa Command (AFRICOM) in
October, to be based in Germany for its first year but likely to move to the continent thereafter. “One of the things that will make
the Africa Command somewhat unique is that there are going to be more U.S. agencies involved,” said Vice-Admiral Brian
Peterman, U.S. Coastguard commander for the Atlantic. “The State Department will play a big part in it, so will Customs and
Immigration. It will work on not just military issues but all issues of U.S. interests in Africa.”
In a joint naval and coastguard initiative, the two vice-admirals were touring six West African countries -Mauritania, Senegal,
Benin, Togo, Sao Tome and Gabon - to build maritime cooperation ahead of the year-long trial deployment of a U.S. Navy vessel
to the region in October.
The amphibious ship, capable of carrying training teams and smaller boats, will act as a mobile base along the coast, in a test of a
global naval project dubbed Global Fleet Station, to expand the U.S. maritime presence for a reasonably low cost. The
commanders were also encouraging local governments to adopt an electronic tagging system for ships, known as Automatic
Identification Systems (AIS), as a cheap means of tracking shipping in their waters aimed at tackling smuggling and piracy.
“When we talk to major corporations like oil companies or insurance companies ..., there is a growing concern about the safety and
security of their enterprises,” Stufflebeem said, singling out Nigeria, the world’s third worst nation for piracy.
“There is a growing intersection of illegal activities that cross over into terrorism. Terrorists are using illegal activities to raise
money,” said Stufflebeem, citing diamond trading in Africa and drug trafficking from South America.
Stufflebeem said the AIS initiative should be complemented with a network of radar stations, such as the $18 million site being
built by the U.S. Government for Sao Tome. However, he played down speculation of a U.S. naval base on the archipelago: “We
are not looking for a permanent presence.”
With hundreds of illegal West African migrants arriving in Spain’s Canary Islands in recent weeks, despite European Union patrols
along the coast of Senegal and Mauritania, Stufflebeem said the United States was committed to stemming the tide.

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A2: Oil Da
No link most of the militaries oil does not come from the middle east
EAW, Environmentalists Against War, 2003 [“How Fuel-efficient Is the Pentagon? Military’s Oil Addiction,”
September 10 http://envirosagainstwar.org/know/read.php?itemid=593]
The Defense Fuel Supply Center is the world’s biggest customer for refined crude oil. The DFSC purchases three-fourths of the
military’s oil products from within North America. While only five percent of the Pentagon’s purchases actually come directly
from the Middle East, one of the military’s most trusted suppliers had been the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (the ninth
largest foreign supplier of US military oil).

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A2: Oil DA
Non Unique- Cap and trade legislation makes the impact inevitable
Inevitable cap & trade legislation
Murray, BusinessGreen, 6/9/08 [James, “Despite Senate defeat, US cap-and-trade hailed as ‘inevitable,’”
http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2218557/despite-senate-defeat-cap-trade]
Despite the defeat in the Senate last week of the Lieberman-Warner Bill, US legislation imposing binding emission caps look
likely to be adopted next year after both Barack Obama and John McCain signalled they would have supported the proposed
climate bill. Neither presidential candidate cast votes on the Climate Security Act, but both said they would have voted in favour
raising the prospect of the proposals being revived when the next president takes office in January 2009. McCain had indicated
previously that he would oppose the bill, citing inadequate incentives for nuclear power. However, he said in a statement that
despite reservations he would have supported the bill. "I believe this legislation needs to be debated, amended, improved and
ultimately enacted," he said. "That does not mean I believe the pending bill is perfect, and in fact, it is far from it." The bill was
defeated after 48 senators voted in favour and 36 against, leaving the bill 12 votes short of the 60 required to ensure it progressed.
A further six Senators wrote letters indicating they would have voted in favour, had they been available. Despite the defeat,
supporters of the legislation hailed the move as a huge step forward in attempts to curb US emissions. Democrat Senator Barbara
Boxer, who helped shepherd the bill, said that the vote underlined changing US attitudes to global warming, noting that when
climate change legislation was last voted on in 2005 it got only 38 votes. She added that supporters of the bill would now begin
work on a "roadmap" for the next president that could see an amended version of the legislation adopted as early as next year.
Under the legislation, carbon emissions from 87 per cent of US power stations, oil refineries and other carbon intensive operations
would have been included in a cap-and-trade scheme designed to cut US emissions by around 67 per cent by 2050. Critics of the
bill, including President Bush who said he would veto the legislation, argued that it would damage the US economy. But
supporters of the bill, including the Ceres coalition institutional investors and a group of leading US energy firms, claimed the
package of measures would help create jobs and provide the legislative framework for building a low carbon economy.
Environmentalists hailed the vote as a "turning point" in the US debate on global warming. Lexi Shultz, deputy director of the
Climate Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, said that the bill had gained such momentum that legislation capping
emissions was now " inevitable". "More senators than ever before supported moving forward on climate solutions, including
senators who voiced opposition to global warming bills in the past," she said. "Americans are demanding global warming
solutions. It's a shame they will have to wait another year. But our country will have another global warming debate in 2009 with a
new Congress and president. Putting a cap on global warming pollution is inevitable."

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
A2: Cap and Trade

Cap destroys U.S. economy
Ben Lieberman, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, National Review Online, 9-28
(http://energy.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NjA4NTJkN2JkY2JlMjIxZmNmYzRmOTdmNTM1YzE4NmE=)
The reason Kyoto Protocol signatories are not reducing their emissions is that doing so is proving to be prohibitively costly. These nations are
learning the hard way what the Bush administration has understood all along — that attempts to rapidly force down the fossil-fuel use that
provides the backbone of modern economies will be very expensive. As costs enter into the debate, they could well prove to be a game changer.
While inundating the public with scary stories about global warming’s effects, the proponents of cap-and-trade have thus far said little about the
costs of combating the threat—and for good reasons. Their agenda would inflict serious and noticeable economic pain long before it would have
even a modest impact on the earth’s future temperature. Kyoto’s provisions, if fully implemented, would have cost Americans hundreds of
billions of dollars annually from higher energy prices, but would, according to proponents, avert only 0.07 degrees Celsius of global warming by
2050.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Politics Links: Plan=Bipartisan

Nuclear power has attracted bipartisan support
Roxana Tiron, 6/11/08 (“Rep. Taylor pushes nuclear power for more Navy ships”, http://thehill.com/the-executive/rep.-
taylor-pushes-nuclear-power-for-more-navy-ships-2008-06-11.html, accessed 7/20/08-e.wey)
Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower subcommittee, has been leading the charge to
compel the Navy to fuel its next-generation cruisers, large amphibious ships and destroyers with nuclear power. Only submarines
and aircraft carriers now operate by nuclear propulsion. Taylor has attracted bipartisan support for his idea in the House, including
the key endorsement of Armed Services Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.). But the Mississippi Democrat is expected to face
continued resistance from senators who believe the Navy cannot afford the switch.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Politics-Plan unpopular
Nuclear drives are unpopular because of their cost.
Navy Times, Mar 2, 2008
[“Congress eyes Navy shipbuilding programs”, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/02/navy_shipbuildinghearing_022808/]
Congressional scrutiny of the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding programs is likely to continue to be sharp, if the new budget season’s first
two naval hearings are any indication.
On Wednesday, House Appropriations Defense subcommittee chairman Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., signaled a possible lack of
support for the new Zumwalt class DDG 1000 destroyer program when he asked about the effects of delaying the 2009 ship in
favor of more auxiliary cargo ships. Murtha later said he’d like to examine cutting short the planned buy of seven Zumwalts and
moving up acquisition of the follow-on CG(X) cruiser, now scheduled to begin in 2011.
As he did last year, Murtha also declared his intention to buy the Navy 10 ships this year rather than the seven the service is asking
for. Construction of an additional, tenth, ship of the San Antonio LPD 17 class also is a goal, he said.
Cost growth, Murtha cautioned, remains a serious issue for the service’s 313-ship fleet plan.
That concern was echoed Thursday during the Senate Armed Service Committee’s posture hearing on the Navy Department’s
$149.3 billion 2009 budget request. Chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., reiterated his apprehensions about “cost problems in the
shipbuilding arena, most notably with the Littoral Combat Ship program.”

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Politics-Plan popular
The Defense Authorization Act made an all nuclear navy the official policy of the United States.
Ronald O’Rourke May 22, 2008
[Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” , RL33946]
Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services

Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use of nuclear power to a wider
array of Navy surface ships, starting with the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser, the first
of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2011. Section 1012 of the FY2008
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) makes it
U.S. policy to construct the major combatant ships of the Navy, including the CG(X),
with integrated nuclear power systems, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a
notification to Congress that the inclusion of an integrated nuclear power system in
a given class of ship is not in the national interest. The Navy has studied nuclear
power as a design option for the CG(X), but has not yet announced whether it would
prefer to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship. Procurement of a nuclear powered
CG(X) in FY2011 would, under normal budgeting practices, involve
funding the ship’s long-leadtime nuclear-propulsion components in FY2009

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Military Spending unpopular

Military spending unpopular -- the only priority is ground force in Iraq -- everything else is just
perceived as trading off with that
Frost & Sullivan, research firm, 2008 [Published as a news service by IHS, “U.S. DoD to Procure Additional Equipment to
Maintain, Improve Defense Capability,” Feb 5 http://aero-defense.ihs.com/news/2008/frost-dod-equipment.htm]
Air transport, tanker, fighter aircraft and some classes of ships nearing the end of their life cycle will also likely require
investments. Analysts said the expansion of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps will necessitate a greater budget allocation for
equipment procurement. "The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for the creation of 117 regular Army, 106 National
Guard and 58 Reserve modular brigades," said Curran. "This would require an Army end-strength of 482,400 active and 533,000
reserve troops in 2011, while the addition of Marine Corps Special Operations Command will ensure that the Marine Corps
increases to 175,000 active and 39,000 reserve." With the 2008 U.S. presidential election looming, it appears a point of debate
among candidates will be the siphoning of funds from naval and air assets to the ground forces, analysts said. "Though air and
naval weapons systems usually enjoy bipartisan support due to the large number of jobs generated, the need to keep the Army and
Marines well-equipped has deferred new air and naval weapons programs," said Curran. "However, the government will continue
to focus on anti-terrorism operations with an emphasis on command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and special operations capabilities."

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
McCain Supports Plan

McCain supports the plan – he is in favor of nuclear power
NPR 7/21 (National Public Radio. “Nuclear Power A Thorny Issue For Canadites”.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92690120)
Nuclear power doesn't usually make for an applause line in a stump speech, but it has come up on the campaign trail. Both Sens.
BarackObama and John McCain see it as a way to combat climate change, though they've sometimes chosen their words with care.
Of the two, McCain is the most comfortable with the topic. As a Navy pilot, he landed on aircraft carriers, which today are
essentially floating nuclear-powered cities. McCain calls nuclear "one of the cleanest, safest and most reliable energy sources on
Earth."
"If we want to arrest global warming, then nuclear energy is a powerful, powerful ally in that cause," he said in a May speech.
McCain's enthusiasm for nuclear has put him in unusual territory for a Republican: He's been praising the French, who generate 80
percent of their power from nuclear.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Obama Supports maritime power projection

Obama supports plan – he wants to increase maritime power projection.
Dreyfuss 7/1 2008 (Robert. July 1. 2008. “Obama’s Evolving Foreign Policy”. The Nation. Foreign Affairs.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080721/dreyfuss. Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor, is an investigative journalist in
Alexandria, Virginia, specializing in politics and national security.)
In his Chicago speech last year Obama called for the creation of "a twenty-first-century military to stay on the offensive, from
Djibouti to Kandahar." In several areas, Obama has made it clear that he looks forward to bolstering America'scapabilities to
intervene worldwide. He has called for spending significant new money to add unmanned aerial vehicles to the Air Force, boost
electronic warfare capabilities and build more C-17 cargo planes and KC-X refueling aircraft to enhance America's "future ability
to extend its global power." Obama also plans to "recapitalize our naval forces" so America can patrol ocean "choke points" to
protect oil supplies, and he wants to fund new ships that can "patrol and protect the 'brown' waters of river systems [overseas] and
the 'green' waters close to our shores."

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Obama Supports Nuclear Power

Obama supports plan – he thinks nuclear energy is viable
Reuters 6/20 (“Obama: Nuclear power worth considering, not panacea”. CarenBohan. 2008.
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN2034620420080620)
CHICAGO (Reuters) - U.S. Democratic presidential candidate BarackObama said on Friday nuclear power was "not a panacea"
for U.S. energy woes but it is worth investigating its further development.
During a meeting with U.S. governors, Obama noted that nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases and therefore the United
States should consider investing research dollars into whether nuclear waste can be stored safely for its reuse.
But he said, "I don't think that nuclear power is a panacea."

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
A2: T-renewable energy and substantial

We meet your definition of substantial and alternative energy
Global Power Report, September 20, 2007(“Senate considers bill to require DOD to source 25% of energy needs from
renewables by 2025”, lexis nexis, accessed 7/17/08-e.wey)
The 25% requirement would codify a binding goal that DOE currently has to derive 9% of its electricity by renewable sources by
2025. The 25% provision was spearheaded by Representative Robert Andrews, a New Jersey Democrat, who added it to the
defense authorization bill that the House passed in May. Andrews said then that his amendment "would generate a $15 billion
market in the purchase of electricity generated by renewable fuels." The defense bill that the Senate is debating this week also
includes other energy-related provisions, including nuclear-related programs run by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear
Security Administration.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
T-Alternative Energy
Nuclear power is alternative energy
BBC, 2007(“Thai PM says nuclear power needed to country's energy supply”, lexis nexis, accessed 7/15/08-e.wey)
Nuclear power is an alternative source of energy which is clean and does not affect the environment," he told a meeting of the
Defence Council College. But the premier acknowledged the need for careful handling of the system and the radioactive waste.
Thailand is a net importer of energy. It gets 90 per cent of its oil and gas requirements from other countries, mainly in the Middle
East. The annual cost is about 900 billion baht, or about 15 per cent of gross domestic product.
A nuclear navy would be a transition to alternative energy.

Suzanne Yohannan April 20, 2006
[“DoD Broadens Energy Efficiency Focus”, Editor of Defense Environment Alert,
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,94739,00.html]
Meanwhile, Bartlett, who chairs the House Armed Services projection forces subcommittee, is urging Navy officials to consider
moving toward an all-nuclear Navy as a way to address rising oil prices and foreign oil dependence.
In his opening statement at an April 6 subcommittee hearing, Bartlett stressed that given the price of crude oil, a nuclear version of
a large-deck amphibious ship is now more cost-efficient than a fossil-fuel version, when comparing lifecycle costs. Bartlett is a
major advocate of DOD transitioning to alternative energy sources and adopting more energy-efficient measures to meet its energy
needs, calling it at an earlier hearing "the challenge of the future."
Under the direction of Congress, the Navy is analyzing alternative propulsion systems for its vessels, including nuclear, fossil fuels
and other forms of energy, Navy officials said in written testimony at the April hearing. The study “will consider technologies such
as nuclear power, gas turbines, diesels, fuel cells, mechanical drive, electrical drive, various types of propellers and podded
propulsor systems, as well as other innovative concepts,” according to the testimony, from Rear Adm. Stephen Johnson, Navy
director of undersea technology, and three other high-ranking naval officers.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
T-Alternative Energy
We meet: Nuclear power is a form of alternative energy
Claire Bowles, 7/11/08 (“Rising fuel costs could lead to nuclear-powered ships”,
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-06/ns-rfc061108.php, accessed 7/17/08-e.wey)
The new bill represents an escalation of recent efforts to get the navy to use more nuclear fuel. The rising cost of oil means it is
getting close to the point at which it will be more economic for the navy to use nuclear power, says Representative Roscoe Bartlett,
a Maryland Republican, who backs the proposed measures. "A 2007 study by the navy on alternative energy for ship propulsion
indicated that the break-even price for nuclear propulsion for amphibious ships was an oil price of $178 dollars per barrel. We're
now creeping up to that number - oil hit a new record of $133 a barrel today," he said in a statement on 21 May.
Even with the new policy emphasizing nuclear ships, oil is still considered the conventional fuel for
ships.
Ronald O’Rourke May 22, 2008
[Specialist in Naval Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships:
Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” , RL33946]
Some Members of Congress, particularly on the House Armed Services Committee, have expressed interest in expanding the use
of nuclear power to a wider array of Navy surface ships, starting with the Navy’s planned CG(X) cruiser, the first
of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2011. Section 1012 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181
of January 28, 2008) makes it U.S. policy to construct the major combatant ships of the Navy, including the CG(X), with
integrated nuclear power systems, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a notification to Congress that the inclusion of an
integrated nuclear power system in a given class of ship is not in the national interest. The Navy has studied nuclear power as a
design option for the CG(X), but has not yet announced whether it would prefer to build the CG(X) as a nuclear-powered ship.
Procurement of a nuclear powered CG(X) in FY2011 would, under normal budgeting practices, involve funding the ship’s long-
leadtime nuclear-propulsion components in FY2009. A 2006 Navy study concluded the following, among other things: ! In
constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional
power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost. ! The total life-cycle cost of a nuclear-powered
medium-size surface combatant would equal that of a convetionally powered mediumsizessurface combatant if the cost of crude
oil averages $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel over the life of the ship. - Nuclear-power should be considered for near-term
applications for medium-size surface combatants. - Compared to conventionally powered ships, nuclear-powered ships have
advantages in terms of both time needed to surge to a distant theater of operation for a contingency, and in terms of operational
presence (time on station) in the theater of operation

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
T - Not Alternate
A. It’s US policy for all major combatant ships to be nuclear-powered.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
[(Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c110:7:./temp/~c110eVtS5r::)]
SEC. 1012. POLICY RELATING TO MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF THE STRIKE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
NAVY.
(a) Integrated Nuclear Power Systems- It is the policy of the United States to construct the major combatant vessels of the strike
forces of the United States Navy, including all new classes of such vessels, with integrated nuclear power systems.
(b) Requirement To Request Nuclear Vessels- If a request is submitted to Congress in the budget for a fiscal year for construction
of a new class of major combatant vessel for the strike forces of the United States, the request shall be for such a vessel with an
integrated nuclear power system, unless the Secretary of Defense submits with the request a notification to Congress that the
inclusion of an integrated nuclear power system in such vessel is not in the national interest.
(c) Definitions- In this section:
(1) MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF THE STRIKE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY- The term `major
combatant vessels of the strike forces of the United States Navy' means the following:
(A) Submarines.
(B) Aircraft carriers.
(C) Cruisers, battleships, or other large surface combatants whose primary mission includes protection of carrier strike groups,
expeditionary strike groups, and vessels comprising a sea base.
(2) INTEGRATED NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM- The term `integrated nuclear power system' means a ship engineering system
that uses a naval nuclear reactor as its energy source and generates sufficient electric energy to provide power to the ship's
electrical loads, including its combat systems and propulsion motors.
(3) BUDGET- The term `budget' means the budget that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
B. Alternative means: employing or following nontraditional or unconventional ideas, methods, etc.; existing outside the
establishment: an alternative newspaper; alternative lifestyles.
American Heritage Dictionary 2006
And energy is: A source of usable power, such as petroleum or coal.

American Heritage Dictionary 2006
C. Standards

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Arctic Dominance Not Key

Ownership of Arctic resources will be decided by international law; military dominance is irrelevant.
New York Times August 12, 2007
[“The Great Arctic Oil Rush”, editorial, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/opinion/12sun2.html]
Russia and Canada are not alone in the great Arctic oil race. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and the United States also have a
deep interest in the matter.
One thing is clear. To the extent that ownership can be determined, it will not be decided by photo-ops or even by planting flags
(the Russians’ is made of corrosion-resistant titanium) in the seabed. It will be decided by geologists, lawyers and diplomats.
Under international law, nations have rights to resources that lie up to 200 miles off their shores. The rest is regarded as
international waters, subject to negotiation under the Law of the Sea. A nation can claim territory beyond the 200-mile limit, but
only if it can prove that the seabed is a physical extension of its continental shelf.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Arctic Dominance Not Key

Even Russia admits that control over the Arctic will be granted over geological evidence, not presence.
Mary King August 10, 2007
[“Global War-ing. Russian Style.”, professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University for Peace.,
http://www.environmentalgraffiti.com/business/global-war-ing-russian-style/188]
A week ago, Russian explorers laid claim to the mineral wealth of the Arctic by planting their country’s flag on the seabed beneath
the North Pole, in a move described as “heroic” by Robert Nigmatulin, head of Russia’s Institute of Oceanic Studies.
However, Russian experts have conceded that this symbolic claim must be decided by the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, provided scientists are able to determine whether the continental shelf extends to the area under the pole: “These
rock formations are going to be the only solid proof of Russia’s claim”, Nigmatulin commented from Moscow. “Only after that
will it be appropriate to raise the legal issues about the claims of neighbouring states to that ground.” Drilling deep enough into the
seabed to assess the continental shelf will not be possible until at least 2013.

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NHSI 2008 Seniors
Russia Won’t Attack

Russia’s military is outdated and deteriorated. A military attack would be senseless and risks backfiring.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. August 6, 2007
[“Russia's Race for the Arctic”, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1582.cfm]
While currently it is these air “shows” that attract the most attention, traditionally it has
been naval activity that constituted the main content of strategic confrontation in the North and
generated the most acute risks. Moscow appears keen to expand this activity, as was demonstrated by the missile launch by the
strategic submarine K-84 Ekaterinburg from under the ice in the
North Pole region on 9 September 2006 [27]. There is, however, a severe limitation to this
ambition: the fleet of SSBNs has shrunk and is badly deteriorated, as was seen by the double
failure to launch SLBMs during the presidential exercises in February 2004 [28]. The arrival
of the new generation of submarines (the Borey-class) has been delayed by the setbacks in
constructing the lead SSBN Yury Dolgoruky (started in Severodvinsk in 1996) and even more by
the failures in testing the new Bulava SSBN. The latest Bulava test on June 28 was, according
to some sources, only partly successful, but Admiral Vladimir Masorin, Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy, nevertheless confidently asserted that the production of these missiles would begin in
2008 and the test on maximum flight length would be conducted from the newly-launched Yury
Dolgoruky [29]. The prospect of launching a faulty strategic missile from an untested nuclear
submarine resembles indeed a game of Russian roulette [30].
Overall, the all-too-apparent weaknesses in Russia’s strategic posture make it senseless
to consider re-launching a military brinkmanship in the North, in which Moscow would hardly
be able to impress its potential competitors (which are still called “partners” in Putin-speak)
but would definitely expose itself to risks of technical disasters comparable to the K-141 Kursk
catastrophe in August 2000, not to mention plenty of alarmist commentary in the Western media.
The demonstrative application of such unreliable and self-damaging instruments appears to go
against Putin’s proclaimed adherence to the policy of pragmatism, but it does fit into his ambition
to forge a new Russian state.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Nuclear Navy is costly

A nuclear navy is needless and costs way too much money
Glass 2008 (Jon W. Glass. January 26, 2008. “The future may bring more Navy shipbuilding work to Newport News”. The
Virginain-Port. http://hamptonroads.com/2008/01/future-may-bring-more-navy-shipbuilding-work-newport-news)
During the late 1960s and '70s, the Newport News yard built six nuclear-powered cruisers, all now decommissioned. Besides
aircraft carriers, those cruisers, plus three built by other yards, were the Navy's only other nuclear surface vessels. The Pentagon
ended the program in the mid-1970s because the ships were too expensive, said Norman Polmar, a naval analyst and author.
A critic of reintroducing nuclear surface ships to the fleet, Polmar called it a needless expense. Aside from higher construction
costs, he said, the Navy would pay more to crew the vessels with nuclear engineers and have to deal with extra disposal costs when
the ships are retired.
"If you add up all three of those, any accountant would say, 'Hey, stay with the conventional,' " Polmar said.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Japan Da
Turn: Plan decreases naval dominance – it forces homeporting in Japan.
O’Rourke 2006 (Ronald O’Rourke. July 26, 2006. “Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil Use – Background for
Congress”. O’Rourke is a specialist in National Defense. http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/metacrs9419:1)
Shifting largedeck amphibious assault ships or large surface combatants fromfossilfuel propulsion to nuclearpropulsion might make them
potentially lesswelcome in the ports of countries with strong antinuclear sentiments. The Navyworks to minimize this issue in connection with its
CVNs and SSNs, and these shipsmake calls at numerous foreign ports each year. Given their occasional need for access to nuclearqualified
maintenance facilities, shifting largedeck amphibiousassault ships or large surface combatants from fossilfuel propulsion to nuclearpropulsion
might reduce the number of potentially suitable locations for forwardhomeporting the ships, should the Navy decide that forward homeporting them
wouldbe desirable for purposes of shortening transit times to and from operating areas. TheNavy plans to homeport the George Washington (CVN
73) at Yokosuka, Japan, theNavy’s principal forward homeporting location, in 2008. In light of this decision,Yokosuka might be suitable as a
potential forward homeporting location for nuclearpowered amphibious assault ships or surface combatants.
A nuclear navy in Japan would hurt U.S. –Japan alliance and pose a security threat to Japan.
The Japan Times Online 2006 (Kiroku Hanai. Feb. 27, 2006. “Nuclear carrier unwelcome”.The Japan
Time Online.http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20060227kh.html)
The U.S. Navy recently announced a decisionto deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at
Yokosuka Naval Base in Kanagawa Prefecture, dismaying residents of the area. Following the
decision -- made in conjunction with the reorganization of U.S. forces in Japan -- the mayor of
Yokosuka, the prefectural governor and other local officials urged the U.S. government to continue
keeping a conventionally powered carrier at the base.
As Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi attaches great importance to the Japan-U.S.defense alliance,
Japanese people are watching closely which side he will favor -- the United States or Japanese
local-government authorities.
In 1966 the submarine Snook became the first U.S. nuclear-powered warship to visit Yokosuka. In
1973 the conventionally powered aircraft carrier Midway visited Yokosuka, touching off Japanese
opposition against moves to deploy the carrier there. Authorities on both sides tried to allay
Japanese concerns by promising that the carrier would remain in Yokosuka for only a few years.
The promise was broken as Yokosuka became a carrier home port.
The Kitty Hawk, currently based at Yokosuka, is a third-generation conventionally powered U.S.
carrier. Last October the U.S. Navy announced plans to retire it in 2008 and replace it with a
nuclear-powered carrier, later identified as the George Washington.
Candidate carriers that the navy had initially planned to assign to Yokosuka included the Harry S.
Truman, but it gave up the idea reportedly because the name invoked memories of the U.S.
president who ordered the atomic bombings in Japan. Apparently U.S. military authorities are quite
aware of Japanese "nuclear allergies." So it is hard to understand why they decided to deploy a
nuclear-powered carrier.
The U.S. Navy says that, compared with their conventional counterparts, nuclear-powered carriers
have much higher capabilities and can conduct combat and noncombat operations twice as long,
thanks to improved storage of jet fuel and arms. It insists that nuclear-powered carriers are safe.
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NHSI 2008 Seniors
But according to a citizens' group in Yokosuka, a 1998 report published by the U.S. General
Accounting Office denied the technical superiority of nuclear-powered carriers over conventional
ones. It said nuclear-powered carriers needed more time for repairs, limiting the time available for
forward deployment. The report noted that nuclear-powered carriers might need less time for rapid
development but that a task fleet led by a nuclear-powered carrier would require about the same
time as one led by a conventional carrier, simply because the nuclear-powered carriers are
accompanied by conventionally powered ships.
The citizens' group argues that the nuclear reactor on a warship is much more dangerous than a
land-based power reactor for the following reasons: (1) Reactor design on a warship is difficult due
to limited space, and (2) a reactor powered by highly enriched uranium, and situated close to an
explosives depot, could suffer serious damage in a marine accident.
U.S. nuclear-powered warships have been involved in several accidents; two submarines have
sunk. In 1999 the nuclear-powered carrier Stennis almost caused a major disaster when it ran
aground in San Diego Bay, close to its home port, damaging its coolant-circulation pump and
halting its two reactors. (In Japan, the nuclear-powered ship Mutsu was later scrapped after it
developed a radiation leak in 1974.)
Yokosuka city authorities have been conducting annual disaster-prevention drills for possible
accidents involving nuclear-powered warships, and have compiled a manual on the subject. The
U.S. Navy, however, has refused to provide information about warship designs and operations,
citing the need for military secrecy and sticking to its mythical position that nuclear-powered ships
are not susceptible to serious accidents. Lacking specific data for forecasting potential damage,
the city is having trouble making contingency plans.
The nuclear-powered carrier to be deployed at Yokosuka is likely to stay there for up to six months
at a time, using repair facilities that may be vulnerable to radiation leakage.
In 1988, W. Jackson Davis, professor of biology at the University of California, conducted an
environmental assessment of possible damage from an accident involving a nuclear-powered
submarine at Yokosuka. The study found that people within a 100-km radius of the accident site,
including Tokyo and all of Kanagawa Prefecture, would be affected. Deaths from exposure to
radiation itself and from genetic damage would amount to 100,000 a year.In an accident involving
a nuclear-powered carrier, whose thermal output is nine times larger than that of a nuclear
submarine, the toll would be much higher.
The reactor on a nuclear-powered carrier is comparable to a land-based reactor. Yet Tokyo Electric
Power Co. has built its nuclear power stations in Fukushima and Niigata prefectures, avoiding
Tokyo and neighboring areas.
If U.S. authorities remain reluctant to help Japanese authorities in disaster-prevention efforts, such
as by providing data on reactor design and operation, and to permit safety checks by Japanese
authorities, protests by local citizens against deployment of a nuclear-powered carrier are likely to
strengthen. Such concerns are justified.
The U.S. is the only country that deploys a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan's surrounding areas.
For a strictly defensive national security policy, Japan does not need aircraft carriers, nuclear-
powered or otherwise. Excessive military power will only invite hostility from neighboring countries
and be counterproductive to Japan's defense. It will also contravene the spirit of Japan's three
nonnuclear principles: the ban on the production, possession or introduction of nuclear arms.

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors
Among U.S. allies, Japan is said to be the only country that provides a home port for U.S. warships.
To protect the safety of Tokyo Bay and the lives of citizens in the metropolitan region, the Japanese
government should demand that the U.S. Navy rescind its decision to deploy a nuclear-powered
carrier at Yokosuka.
Strong alliance solves North Korea aggression, regional conflicts, Chinese integration, Taiwan, and Japanese militarism
Osius, numerous IR degrees from Harvard and Johns Hopkins, 2002 p. xv
(Ted, The US Japan Security Alliance)
Although the United States and Japan clearly want a stronger alliance, they have yet to decide how to accomplish that
shared goal. To strengthen security ties over the next decade, both coun tries must explain why the alliance matters. For an
alliance to succeed, its members' interests do not need to be identical, but they must overlap sufficiently. Chapters 1 through
5 of this volume focus on the purpose of the security alliance and maintain that U.S. and Japanese interests coincide
enough not only to sustain that alliance, but also to warrant strengthening, enhancing, and promoting it. The alliance
remains relevant in today's rapidly changing Northeast Asian security context for five reasons. First, it provides for the
defense of Japan and, in so doing, reas sures Japan's neighbors that there will be no return to the militarism of the 1930s and

1940s. Second, the alliance helps deter North Korean aggression. Third, it helps prevent crossstrait tensions from boiling
over into hostilities. Fourth, although their security alliance is not aimed at China, the United States and Japan can iden tify

shared interests and coordinate policies to affect the choices China makes. Together, they can help bring China into interna
tional security, economic, and environmental institutions, because a stable, prosperous China integrated into the world
community is preferable to a weak, divided, and fearful China. Fifth, the alliance helps the United States and Japan manage
potential regional conflicts, involving Russia, Indonesia, or other Asian nations. Indeed, America's bilateral alliances
provide a basis for an Asiawide security architecture that can begin to build trust where little exists . Advancing a
multilateral security frameworkone that includes China and, perhaps in the long run, North Koreawill build confidence
and prevent American overcommitment in the region. Although the alliance demonstrably serves U.S. and Japanese in
terests, other Asian countries will also benefit from efforts to maintain and strengthen it. As in Europe a

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958
NHSI 2008 Seniors

2005 – 2003 – 2002 – 1999 – 1998 – 1995 – 1994 – 1980 – 1978 – 1973 – 1966 – 1959 – 1958

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NHSI 2008 Seniors

Nuclear Navy Aff 1

Nuclear Navy Index

Northwestern University Debate Society 1

1AC Module: China.............................................................................................................................................................................52

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A2: Oil DA.........................................................................................................................................................................................106

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Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, RL34391]

Due to the additional up-front costs and increased operational

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Inherency: Oil Spikes

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Inherency: Oil Spikes

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Inherency: Oil Shocks

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Inherency: No Nuclear Power

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Inherency: Navy=no investment

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____. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CAUSES EXTINCTION

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Yonah Alexander, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director, 2003

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___. FREE TRADE PREVENTS NUCLEAR WAR.

2AC Add-On: Rail Guns

2AC Add-on: Rail Guns

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2AC Add-on: Blackouts

ECONOMIC DECLINE CAUSES GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR

2AC Add-On: Blackout

2AC Add-on: Pollution

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Hegemony: Global War

MAINTENANCE OF US HEGEMONY VITAL TO GLOBAL STABILITY

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Dependency kills readiness

FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCE UNDERMINES FORWARD DEPLOYMENT AND CAUSES

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Dependency kills readiness

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Dependency Kills readiness

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Dependency kills readiness

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Impact: Sea power