Neg Nukes Ifr

UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Negative
Starter Pack
Integral Fast Reactor Negative

***Nuclear Power Bad***.............................................................................................................................................2
Nuclear Power Bad: 1nc.................................................................................................................................................3
Nuclear Power Bad: Environment..................................................................................................................................4
Nuclear Power Bad: Radiation........................................................................................................................................5
Nuclear Power Bad: Warming.........................................................................................................................................6
Nuclear Power Bad: Safety.............................................................................................................................................7
Nuclear Power Bad: Meltdowns.....................................................................................................................................8
Nuclear Power Bad: Containment ..................................................................................................................................9
Nuclear Power Bad: Accidents.....................................................................................................................................10
***IFR Bad***.............................................................................................................................................................11
IFR Proliferation 1nc....................................................................................................................................................12
IFR Bad: Proliferation...................................................................................................................................................13
Terrorism 1nc................................................................................................................................................................14
IFR Bad: Terrorism.......................................................................................................................................................15
Terrorism Impact...........................................................................................................................................................16
IFR Bad: Relations........................................................................................................................................................17
IFR Bad: Research Flawed...........................................................................................................................................18
IFR Bad: Waste.............................................................................................................................................................19
IFR Bad: Containment..................................................................................................................................................20
IFR Bad: Security..........................................................................................................................................................21
IFR Bad: Accidents.......................................................................................................................................................22
IFR Bad: Accidents.......................................................................................................................................................23
IFR Bad: Nuclear Meltdown.........................................................................................................................................24
IFR Bad: Transportation................................................................................................................................................25
IFR Bad: Terrorist Theft................................................................................................................................................26
IFR Bad: Faulty Tech....................................................................................................................................................27
IFR Bad: Not Market Competitive................................................................................................................................28
IFR Bad: Too Expensive...............................................................................................................................................29
IFR Bad: Not Modeled Due to Price.............................................................................................................................30
IFR Bad: Transition.......................................................................................................................................................31
A2: IFR Can’t Be Used for Nuclear Weapons..............................................................................................................32
***Warming***............................................................................................................................................................33
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Timeframe..........................................................................................................34
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Plant Building.....................................................................................................35
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Use Fossil Fuels.................................................................................................36
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming..............................................................................................................................37
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Transportation.....................................................................................................38
***Proliferation***......................................................................................................................................................39
Proliferation 1nc............................................................................................................................................................40
Nuclear Power = Proliferation......................................................................................................................................41
IFR Cause Proliferation................................................................................................................................................42
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***Nuclear Power Bad***
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Nuclear Power Bad: 1nc

Nuclear Power is Declining
Nuclear power uses and investment will decrease in future
Carbon Control News 7/7/2008 “Activists make new economic case against nuclear's climate benefits”, lexis
Nevertheless, the IEA paper notes that "competitive costs and CO2 mitigation potential are not the only precondition for nuclear power's
expansion." In fact, if waste management and proliferation concerns are not adequately addressed, "nuclear power is unlikely to
expand and its share in electricity generation might be dropping in the future."
Reviving Nuclear Power would kill millions

Helen Caldicott, “Nuclear Madness- What Can you Do?,” M.D., 1994, pg. 155
So now we face a situation where new, untested, potentially unsafe reactors may be built over the next thirty-five
years, with even fewer licensing safeguards than in the past—at a time when nuclear waste pollutes the earth, and
millions are destined to die of radiation-induced disease; all following a theory fabricated by the nuclear
priesthood supposedly to mitigate the greenhouse effect—which, in fact, nuclear power cannot
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Nuclear Power Bad: Environment

A Nuclear accident would be devastating to the environment
During their long testimony, these men claimed, among other things, that the defects and deficiencies in just the
design of nuclear reactors alone created severe safety hazards, and that the combined deficiencies “in the design,
construction, and operation of nuclear power plants makes a nuclear power plant accident, in our opinion, a certain
event. The only question is when and where.” Since that time, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl have melted
down, with the strong possibility of more meltdowns to come. What makes an accident in a nuclear power station
uniquely dangerous is the potential release into the environment of highly poisonous radioactive elements that can
contaminate large areas of land and make them uninhabitable for thousands of years. What makes an accident
seem inevitable is the human factor. The most advanced plant is still at the mercy of the fallible human beings who
design, build, and operate it. Millions of parts are needed to construct a nuclear reactor, and each must be made,
assembled, and operated with little room for error. Remember also that the controlled chain reaction in a reactor is
just a silent bomb waiting to melt down or to spread its toxic waste within the natural environmental systems for
the rest of time.
Loss of large environments risk extinction

David N. Diner (Judge Advocate General’s Corps of US Army) 1994 Military Law Review, Lexis
No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death --
extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a single-minded
determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass
extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, and new species replaced the
old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, humans live
off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails,
and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to
find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many
direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the
environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional
ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value.
-- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of
basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of
the [*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept
that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not
most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations
could affect a directly useful species negatively. In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on
it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4.
Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction
has progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of
species, and within species by reducing the number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. Biologically diverse
ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These
ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress.
. . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched
circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially
simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading
Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected
if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined
affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of
disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging
closer to the abyss.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Radiation

Radiation from Nuclear waste sites causes gruesome deaths
Helen Caldicott, “Nuclear Madness- What Can you Do?,” M.D., 1994, pg. 35-37
Radiation is insidious, because it cannot be detected by the senses. We are not biologically equipped to feel its
power, or see, hear, touch, or smell it. Yet gamma radiation can penetrate our bodies if we are exposed to
radioactive substances. Beta particles can pass through the skin to damage living cells, although, like alpha
particles, which are unable to penetrate this barrier, their most serious and irreparable damage is done when we
ingest food or water—or inhale air—contaminated with particles of radioactive matter.Radiation harms us by
ionizing—that is, altering the electric charge of—the atoms and molecules composing our body cells. Whether the
effects of this ionizing are manifest within hours or over a period of years usually depends on the amount of
exposure, measured in terms of rem (roentgen equivalent man) units. Nevertheless, even the smallest dose
(measured in millirems) can affect us, for the effects of radiation are cumulative. If we receive several small
amounts of radiation over time, the long-term biological effect (cancer, leukemia, genetic injury) is almost
certainly similar to receiving a large dose all at once.A very high dose of ionizing radiation (say, of three thousand
reins or more) causes acute encephalopathic syndrome— an effect scientists sought when they designed a “neutron
bomb” to be used against invading forces. The explosion of such a bomb will leave buildings intact (although they
may remain radioactive for years); what is destroyed is the human brain and nervous tissue. Within forty-eight
hours of exposure the brain cells will swell and enlarge, producing increased pressure inside the skull. Confusion,
delerium, stupor, psychosis, ataxia (the loss of neurological control of the muscles), and fever result; there follows
a period of lucidity, then sudden death.A dose of six hundred reins or more produces acute radiation sickness.
Thousands of Japanese A-bomb victims died from this sickness within two weeks of the bomb explosions in 1945.
Such exposure to radiation kills all actively dividing cells in the body: hair falls out, skin is sloughed off in big
ulcers, vomiting and diarrhea occur; and then, as the white blood cells and platelets die, victims expire of infection
and/or massive hemorrhage.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Warming

Nuclear waste facilities emit dangerous amount of greenhouse gases and radioactive waste
One of its arguments is that no greenhouse gases are produced at nuclear reactors. But the truth is that the main
global warming gas, carbon dioxide, is emitted at each step of the nuclear fuel chain, from uranium mining,
milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, construction of the reactor, transportation and storage of radioactive waste,
and decommissioning of old reactors. So nuclear power adds to greenhouse warming as well as to radioactive
pollution.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Safety

Even “safe” nuclear plants are dangerous
Karen McMillan, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, Georgetown International Environmental Law
Review, Summer 2001
Even power plants with relatively safe designs have safety challenges that require continuous oversight and
upkeep. The continuous challenges for nuclear power plants include the following: adequate management, "aging
problems, obsolescence of component/equipment, safety upgrading, life extension, [and] periodic safety
reassessment." Employees and managers need to be trained and re-trained to ensure they are not running plants
with unnecessary risk. Therefore, even relatively safe initial plant designs could become dangerous if there were
poor operational safety, safety culture, management, or failure to update safety standards. Examples of power
plants with relatively safely-designed plants that have operated dangerously include the Cooper and Millstone
power plants in the United States. The Cooper plant was perilous because it had "equipment and performance
failures," and it was "operating outside of its design basis." The Millstone plant was unsafe because it "operated
outside of its NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]-approved design basis" and had inadequate management.
Therefore, even power plants with relatively safe designs can be unsafe if they are mismanaged or not supervised.
The international nuclear safety regime needs to be capable of preventing unsafe operation due to mismanagement
or lack of supervision. A stronger safety regime could minimize the risk of mismanagement or lack of supervision.
It could do so through better detection mechanisms, such as increased inspection and peer review. It could also do
so by better enforcement mechanisms like negative incentives to come into compliance.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Meltdowns

Premature Aging of Reactors Make Nuclear Meltdowns Inevitable
Paul Gunter, NIRS, SAFETY PROBLEMS WITH PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS IN THE UNITED
STATES March, 1996, http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/pwrfact.htm
The NRC has issued numerous warnings about steam generator deterioration. Commissioner Kenneth Rogers described this scenario as "a
loaded gun, an accident waiting to happen." However, current NRC requirements for inspecting steam generator tubes are inadequate to detect unsafe conditions developing in nuclear power
The NRC admits that neither itself nor the industry are able to predict how fast cracks in tubes can grow,
plants.
noting that in the duration of one 18-month operational cycle a reactor can experience a hundred-fold increase in
cracked tubes. Early in 1993, the NRC publicly identified 15 U.S. reactors where the pressure vessels had become
so weakened by radiation as to call into question their continued operation. The agency said that the component
was aging much faster than the manufacturers had anticipated. Caused by neutron bombardment from the reactor fuel core, "embrittlement " is the
loss of ductility or the metal's ability to expand and contract to withstand stress under rapid cooling and pressurization. The initiation of the Emergency Core Cooling System could then place
such stresses on an embrittled reactor vessel resulting in a phenomenon not unlike pouring cold water into a baked wine glass---resulting in the complete loss of integrity of the component.
This is known as Pressurized Thermal Shock or the severe overcooling of the reactor vessel. This event can cascade out of other accidents such as instrumentation failure, small-break loss of
coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture
Meltdowns risk extinction

Harvey Wasserman (senior advisor to Greenpeace and Nuclear Information and Resource Service) 2002
"America's Nuclear Terrorist Threat To Itself", http://www.newhumanist.com/nuclear.html
The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. So are the
hellish levels of radioactivity. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl, which ran only four years
before it exploded. Some believe the WTC jets could have collapsed or breached either of the Indian Point containment domes. But at very least the massive impact and intense jet fuel fire
would destroy the human ability to control the plants' functions. Vital cooling systems, backup power generators and communications networks would crumble. Indeed, Indian Point Unit One
was shut because activists warned that its lack of an emergency core cooling system made it an unacceptable risk. The government ultimately agreed. But today terrorist attacks could destroy
those same critical cooling and control systems that are vital to not only the Unit Two and Three reactor cores, but to the spent fuel pools that sit on site. The assault would not require a large
jet. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a wide range of easily deployed small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck
bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the operating work force. Dozens of US reactors have repeatedly failed even modest security tests over the years. Even heightened
the
wartime standards cannot guarantee protection of the vast, supremely sensitive controls required for reactor safety. Without continous monitoring and guaranteed water flow,
thousands of tons of radioactive rods in the cores and the thousands more stored in those fragile pools would
rapidly melt into super-hot radioactive balls of lava that would burn into the ground and the water table and,
ultimately, the Hudson. Indeed, a jetcrash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three
infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking
water they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing winds from
the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New York City and east into
Westchester and Long Island. But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds ultimately shifted around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas with the devastating
poisons released by the on-going fiery torrent. At Indian Point, thousands of square miles would have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created or imagined, depositing relentless
Virtually all
genetic poisons that would kill forever. In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores more, infants and small children would quickly die en masse.
pregnant women would spontaneously abort, or ultimately give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly
sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple
organ failure, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinance, sterility and impotence, asthma,
blindness, and more would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not millions. A terrible metallic taste would
afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New England, a ghoulish curse similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Then
Nagaskai, by those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and Nevada, and by victims caught in the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.
comes the abominable wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names
will have to be invented, and new dimensions of agony will beg description. Indeed, those who survived the initial wave of radiation
would envy those who did not. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Bridges and highways would become killing fields for those
attempting to escape to destinations that would soon enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At
Chernobyl, pilots flying helicopters that dropped boron on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions would be a sure ticket to death. Their utility would be doubtful as the
molten cores rage uncontrolled for days, weeks and years, spewing ever more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees were forced through Chernobyl's seething
remains in a futile attempt to clean it up. They are dying in droves. Who would now volunteer for such an American task force? The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the vast
Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and into the jetstream, surging through the west coast of the United States within ten days, carrying across our northern tier, circling
radioactive clouds from Indian Point would enshroud New York, New Jersey, New England, and carry
the globe, then coming back again. The
deep into the Atlantic and up into Canada and across to Europe and around the globe again and again. The
immediate damage would render thousands of the world's most populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable. All
five boroughs of New York City would be an apocalyptic wasteland .The World Trade Center would be rendered as unusable and even more lethal by a jet
crash at Indian Point than it was by the direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in human
capital would be forever lost. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water and plant life have been hopelessly
irradiated, natural eco-systems on which human and all other life depends would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed, Spiritually, psychologically, financially, ecologically, our nation
There
would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere forty miles near New York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this.
are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse now operating in the United States. They generate just 18% of America's
electricity, just 8% of our total energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of time with no appreciable impact on life in New York.
Already an extremely expensive source of electricity, the cost of attempting to defend these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the competitive scale.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Containment

It is Impossible to Contain Nuclear Power for An Extended Period of Time
Harry Braun (Editor in Chief) 2003 The Bush Hydrogen Initiative:THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY,
Phoenix Project, http://www.phoenixproject.net/releases/bushh2init.htm
Radioactive wastes are particularly nasty because they are invisible to our senses, they have been shown be
virtually impossible to contain for very long, because they soon make the container radioactive. If water is present,
the radioactive isotopes spread even faster, like a drop of red dye placed into water. Radioactive particles
indiscriminately attack humans and other animals on a fundamental molecular level. The effect on living tissue is
horrific, as the radioactive particles fundamentally destroy the complex molecular structure of living organisms.
The passage of such particles leaves the city of the cell in ruins. Their entry hole is small, but their exit hole is
spectacular. While the industry likes to mention the certain wastes that will need to be isolated from the natural
environment for 10,000 years, they never mention radioactive isotopes such as Neptunium 237 or Cesium 135,
which must be isolated for over 20 million years. And who is responsible for paying for storing these wastes for
such incomprehensible amounts of time? It will not be the nuclear industry, but the American taxpayers for
thousands of centuries into the future. The nuclear wastes that are now being stored (outside the containment
structures) are rapidly filling up the swimming pools that were not intended for long-term storage. This is because
no state wants to become the permanent home of a nuclear waste deathcamp - and for good reason.
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Nuclear Power Bad: Accidents

Transitioning to Nuclear Power Make Accidents Like Chernobyls Inevitable
West by Northwest 2004 “Nuclear Power Kills,”
http://westbynorthwest.org/summerlate00/stan/1NPkills.shtml
Overconfidence in the Challenger space mission killed its crew and an unsuspecting school teacher. When an airplane wing fails or an Amtrak
train falls through a bridge, a hundred passengers may die. The spilled chemicals from a plant like Bhopal kill thousands. A
reactor failure near a large city could kill millions of unsuspecting school children and their parents and teachers,
and leave a vast area uninhabitable for more than a thousand generations. A saboteur might love the damage he
could inflict by blowing up a reactor, or spreading stolen plutonium as an aerosol. Experience and common sense
show that building reactors contributes to the earth a legacy of violent radioactive contamination for a time far
longer than previous human history, whether the reactors succeed or fail.American reactor enthusiasts like to claim
that their reactors cannot fail as did Chernobyl. Only a monstrous ego, or naiveté, persuades a nuclear designer that
accident-free operation of his particular reactor is assured. As reactor accidents continue around the World, there
are bound to be "Chernobyls" in other countries, perhaps with worse consequences for larger populations. We cannot
afford to continue the learning process with accidents to reactors, risking radioactive spills more catastrophic than we have witnessed so far
Even "successful" reactors are intolerable. We as a society cannot afford, even if we knew how, the cleanup of the radioactive products from
those reactors which come "successfully" to the end of their poison-generating lives. Nuclear power, with its lethal radioactive
poisons, pollutes "forever", in new, more insidious, more intransigent ways than any other form of energy.
Reactors are costly and serve no legitimate purpose.The present generation of nuclear reactors was achieved by the consumption
of large amounts of fossil fuels. The energy which could be obtained in the future by a new generation of such reactors
would not greatly extend the energy of fossil fuels. Successful breeder reactors would considerably extend the
supply of energy available from nuclear fuels, but the breeder has proved to be the most dangerously unstable of
all reactors. Because I am interested in the welfare of the people on the earth, including my own children and grandchildren and their
progeny, I am compelled to conclude not only that we shouldn't allow any more reactors to be built but also should rapidly phase out current
ones. Life is too complicated and too sacred to trust to the vested corporate-government nuclear interests. The "experts" have misled us. As
ordinary people we have enough knowledge to take back the power to control nuclear reactors.
Accidents are Inevitable for Several Reasons: Complexity, Human Error, and Compromise
West by Northwest 2004 “Nuclear Power Kills,”
http://westbynorthwest.org/summerlate00/stan/1NPkills.shtml
Throughout history technological devices have failed, unexpectedly, even catastrophically. Part of the engineering learning process has resulted
from the study of operating failures. Accidents are "normal," in spite of the knowledge and skill that have gone into their
avoidance. Failures are inevitable for several reasons: complexity, human fallibility, and the compromises required
to get on with the job. Structural materials are subject to random failure.The nuclear reactor substitutes for the
combustion boiler used in a conventional power plant. It uses a new source of heat from "fission" of uranium or
plutonium. Nuclear power plants are complicated and dangerous beyond all previous experience. They can fail by
nuclear, chemical or mechanical means. They are designed, built and operated by fallible human beings, some of
whom may be malicious. Structural materials in reactors are weakened, warped, and embrittled by the intense radiation to which they are
subjected. Reactors have failed, and will fail in the future.
Overtime Accidents will Occur in Nuclear Power Plants

Harry Braun (Editor in Chief) 2003 The Bush Hydrogen Initiative:THE GOOD, THE BAD & THE UGLY,
Phoenix Project, http://www.phoenixproject.net/releases/bushh2init.htm
An even more immediate concern is that the Bush Administration has quietly re-licensed old nuclear plants that would have otherwise been
decommissioned. There are important reasons to decommission nuclear plants as soon as possible, because the longer a
nuclear plant operates, the more radioactive it becomes. All of the internal components become increasingly
radioactive, and after years of operation, significant amounts of corrosion and even radioactive dust accumulates in
critical areas of reactor systems where humans are unable to go and service. According to a confidential report that was leaked
to The New York Times (November 20, 2002), the highly secretive nuclear industry's internal oversight group has warned
utilities that "a focus on production over safety had endangered an Ohio reactor and could be a broader problem
around the nation." The corrosion at the Ohio reactor, which was discovered by accident last March, had eaten away 70 pounds of steel,
leaving less than an inch before the reactor vessel would have failed. Even the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
raised the issue that deregulation has effectively allowed owners of nuclear power plants to keep reactors when they
should have been shut down for maintenance. Given this trend, it is only a question of time before a catastrophe
occurs.
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***IFR Bad***
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IFR Proliferation 1nc

IFR’s Allow Non-Nuclear States and Terrorist Groups Access to Nuclear Material
Increasing the Risk of Prolif
Arjun Makhijani (President, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research) May 17 2001 “Pyroprocessing in
the Bush plan,” http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/background/ieerpyroprocessing5172001.txt
“Pyroprocessing is the tail that seems set to resurrect the IFR breeder reactor dog,” said Dr. Arjun Makhijani, president of
the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), in Takoma Park, Maryland, which has published many studies on nuclear-related
technologies. “Breeder reactors were consigned to oblivion in times past because of their potential for creating huge
amounts of plutonium, the proliferation dangers that they posed, their high costs, and their safety vulnerabilities.
They should not be revived. Proponents of pyroprocessing, who seem to have convinced the White House energy panel, claim that it is
“proliferation-resistant” because the impure plutonium that results will not be used to make nuclear weapons. “It is
true that countries that have nuclear weapons already would not use impure plutonium from pyroprocessing for
building bombs,” said Dr. Makhijani, “but those who lack the materials would not hesitate to use it. Non-nuclear states
that may want nuclear weapons and terrorist groups would be the main customers for this impure plutonium, if this
technology spreads.”
Implementation of IFR Systems Would Increase the Risk of International Proliferation

Risks
Arjun Makhijani, Hisham Zerriffi & Annie Makhijani , March/April 2001 “Magical Thinking: Another
Go at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
Proponents claim that transmutation—once developed and refined— will help solve the nuclear waste problem. Transmutation has even been
described by Los Alamos as the solution to the proliferation problem. Neither claim is likely to prove out. Rather, a close look suggests that
transmutation research in the field has been driven by political forces intent on propping up the nuclear power enterprise. A great deal of work
and money—perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars—would be needed to fully develop and build the types of reactors needed for
transmutation. These “fast neutron” machines would include subcritical reactors driven by neutron-producing proton
accelerators, as well as fast-neutron “plutonium burner” reactors—varieties of breeder reactors first conceived
during the Manhattan Project. Transmutation was intensively investigated in the 1980s and looked at again in the
mid-1990s, and found wanting. It was an inefficient way to address problems in nuclear waste management; it was
too expensive; and it presented serious proliferation concerns. Although a 1996 study by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences supported research on “selected topics” related to transmutation, it concluded that “None of the S&T [separation
and transmutation] system concepts reviewed eliminates the need for a geologic repository.” Regarding proliferation, the study said:
“Widespread implementation of S&T systems could raise concerns of international proliferation risks . . . and
require the United States to change its policy against reprocessing.” Indeed, the study concluded that “Proliferation risks
would generally be greater with widespread implementation of S&T systems in the many nations using nuclear
power.” Finally, the study’s support of limited research was in the context of further developing nuclear power, which it described as
“possible applications of s&t as part of more efficient use of fissionable resources,” and for laboratory experiments relating to potential
reduction in repository space requirements for nuclear waste.
Proliferation threatens extinction

Stuart Taylor (Senior Writer with the National Journal and editor at Newsweek) September 16 2002 Legal Times
The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go
nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist
government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat.
[Continues…] Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-
weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question
from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal
organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents
and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid such a grim future, he
suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an
unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those necessary to deter nuclear attack by
others.
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IFR Bad: Proliferation

Pyropocessing will lead to proliferation
Arjun Makhijani, Hisham Zerriffi & Annie Makhijani March/April 2001 “Magical Thinking: Another Go
at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
As noted, all transmutation schemes require the reprocessing of transuranic radionuclides. Proponents of accelerator-driven
transmutation argue that pyroprocessing yields plutonium mixed with other actinides, which would make it
unattractive for use in weapons. This is true. Nonetheless, pyroprocessed plutonium would still be usable in
weapons—and it would be entirely satisfactory to a terrorist group that was not fussy about predicting the exact
yield of a bomb or about subjecting workers to health hazards during the manufacture of weapons. Moreover, although
pyroprocessing is often labeled “proliferation resistant,” it is a far more compact technology than conventional chemical reprocessing, and
therefore more readily hidden. Finally, the separation of isotopes such as neptunium 237 and americium 241 would also
increase proliferation risks because both can be used to make nuclear weapons.
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Terrorism 1nc
Commercial use of plutonium are gifts to terrorist and rogue states
SFTT (Soldiers for the Truth) 2001 “Playing with Plutonium, http://www.sftt.org/article10022002c.html
Well, here we go again. Under a deal signed between the U.S. and Russia during the Clinton years, and continued by the Bush Administration,
all sorts of new plans for plutonium are afoot. The original aim was to get rid of plutonium from the decommissioned arsenals of the Cold War
by using it up as fuel in nuclear reactors . But that brings us right back to the risk of theft along the way. To feed today's reactors, which
are geared for uranium, plutonium must first be fabricated into mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX. That means shipping it in
weapons-ready form to MOX fabrication plants, then dispersing it among the reactors themselves. Even after it is blended into MOX
fuel, plutonium is still relatively easy to separate out. The amounts involved here are staggering, with the U.S. and Russia each
pledging to run through 34 metric tons of plutonium, enough to make thousands of bombs. The whole process would take at least 20 years. We
are somehow supposed to believe that even in Russia -- not famous for top-flight inventory control -- nothing would go astray. Nor would this
come cheap. Neither Russia nor the U.S. has facilities for turning plutonium into commercial fuel. So to show the Russians we're serious, the
Bush Energy Department has ordered up a MOX plant to be built in South Carolina, over the protests of Governor Jim Hodges, with plans to
haul the plutonium-based fuel to reactors in North Carolina. Russia, pleading a shortage of funds, is looking to the U.S. for billions of dollars in
subsidies to build its own MOX plant and possibly a fast-breeder reactor run on almost pure plutonium. Like all bad ideas, this one is also
getting worse. With the old taboo on commercial use of plutonium now gone, creative bureaucracies are proposing a
whole new generation of plutonium-based reactors. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has been talking up the idea, and none
other than National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice -- too young, perhaps, to recall the 1970s debate -- enthused recently to the Financial
Times about the vision of helping Russia develop a generation of fast-breeder (plutonium-fueled) reactors. It's problem enough for the
world that a number of nations still engage in commercial reprocessing of plutonium, including France, Britain,
India and Japan. These programs have been struggling due to high costs. The sooner they're gone, the better
.Commercial use of plutonium is a gift to the world's terrorists and rogue states. It would be folly for the U.S. to
head any further down this path, and it is twice as nuts to even think of subsidizing Russia for any such project
Terrorism causes a nuclear attack and extinction

Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2002
Even the experts among us, Foggy Bottom wonks and think-tank philosophers, had dared to dream of a world free of the damoclean sword of
mutual assured destruction. "The simple truth is that people simply forgot about nuclear danger for about a decade, and there were some pretty
good reasons for doing so. I had a feeling like that myself," says Jonathan Schell, whose hair-raising tome, "The Fate of the Earth" (Knopf,
1982 ), helped fuel the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s. But in the bleak months since Sept. 11, the phantom menace of
nuclear catastrophe has come back with a vengeance--stalking our imaginations, confounding our leaders, confronting us with a
host of atomic terrors hitherto barely imagined: hijacked airliners rammed down the throats of nuclear power
plants; "dirty bombs" spraying lethal radiation and rendering huge swaths of cities uninhabitable for years to come.
Looming over these lesser catastrophes is the threat of an actual nuclear weapons attack. After the lull of the '90s, we're
learning to start worrying and fear The Bomb all over again. Only now America must face the possibility of dealing with more than just one
or two mega-adversaries capable of sending our entire country up in a mushroom cloud. Now we're conjuring up visions of a
suitcase bomb detonated at Times Square, a 10-kiloton dose of megadeath delivered in a truck to downtown Los
Angeles or Chicago. Or a regional conflict, like the present one pitting India against nuclear rival Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir
territory, escalating into global Armageddon. On the one hand, we're being confronted anew with the sublime terror of
extinction; on the other, with the banality and ridiculousness of a threat to our lives and our civilization from something that may be lurking
in a briefcase, a pair of Hush Puppies or, as in the new Hollywood blockbuster "The Sum of All Fears," a cigarette-vending machine.
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IFR Bad: Terrorism

IFRs Just Give Terrorist More Opportunties to Obtain Plutonium
Ron Winslow (Staff reporter of The Wall Street Journal) December 1 1998 NEW BREEDER REACTOR MAY
OPERATE MORE, The Wall Street Journal, http://www.fortfreedom.org/p16.htm,
The Argonne reactor faces enormous political and technological obstacles before it reaches commercial operation. As a breeder reactor,
it produces significant amounts of plutonium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. Critics are certain to argue that the
reactor will tempt U.S. energy officials to use the technology for military purposes, and that its wide
commercial adoption would increase opportunities for terrorists to obtain plutonium.
IFRs are not Prolif Resistant They are Perfect Weapons for Terrorists
As noted, all transmutation schemes require the reprocessing of transuranic radionuclides. Proponents of accelerator-driven
transmutation argue that pyroprocessing yields plutonium mixed with other actinides, which would make it
unattractive for use in weapons. This is true. Nonetheless, pyroprocessed plutonium would still be usable in
weapons—and it would be entirely satisfactory to a terrorist group that was not fussy about predicting the exact
yield of a bomb or about subjecting workers to health hazards during the manufacture of weapons. Moreover, although
pyroprocessing is often labeled “proliferation resistant,” it is a far more compact technology than conventional chemical reprocessing, and
therefore more readily hidden. Finally, the separation of isotopes such as neptunium 237 and americium 241 would also increase proliferation
risks because both can be used to make nuclear weapons.
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Terrorism Impact
Another significant terrorist attack on the U.S. will cause indiscriminate U.S. retaliation
against Islamic nations, leading to world war
Nicole Schwartz-Morgan (Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada)
October 10 2001 “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm
The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic
sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion
in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the
language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted."
But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the
sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named
in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of
an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where
racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an
isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless
ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward
the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent
sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if
epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles
indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how
profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan
by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.
A nuclear terrorist attack would cause the US to kill 100 million in 24 hours
Jonathan Schell November 26 2001 “Letter from Ground Zero: Niceties; terrorism in the United States? The
Nation,
Visions of American cities blown to kingdom come have reminded many of America’s own very large arsenal of
nuclear weapons. Might it be useful in the circumstances? Some commentators think it will be. We are riot condemned merely to be the
victims of mass destruction, they point out; we can be the perpetrators of it as well. I was alerted to one of’ these proposals by an une,cpected
source--the New York Post’s gossip colurnnist Liz Smith. She wished to commend an article in Time magazine by Charles Krautliartimer. who,
she noted with approval, wanted the United States to wage ‘total war” against its new enemies. “Have we told Iraq. the Saudis and Pal~stan.”
she asked, that “if there is a nuclear attack...by anyone, we will hold them accountable because they have harbored and created these terrorists.’
We could wipe these countries off the map. and they should be very afraid of that.” Krauthanirner lived up to Smith’s billing. The gush
Administration’s policy of trying to avoid civilian casualties might have to go by the board. he thought. In the “total war” he wanted, the
distinction was a “nicety” that the United States could no longer afford. Krauthanimer had only one country--Iraq--slated for annihilation. In
the Gulf War. he claimed, the Administration of Bush Senior had warned President Saddam Hussein that if he used biological or chemical
weapons he would be met with weapons that would “wipe Iraq off the face of the earth.” Krauthammer wanted to know whether we were still
ready to do this in the event of a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon on our soil. “If we are not prepared to wage total war we risk disaster on a
scale we have never seen and can barely imagine,” he wrote. Another commentator, The New Republic’s Easterbrook, had an entire region--the
Islamic Middle East--ti his sights. At the end of an appearance on Greenfield at Large on CNN, he announced that he wanted to leave his
audience “with one message.” It was that “the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim
peoples of the world in addition to...people of the United States and Western Europe. because if an atomic warhead
goes off in Washington--say. in the current environment or anything like it--in the twenty-four hours that followed,
a hundred million Muslims would die as US nuclear bombs rained down on eve conceivable military target in a
dozen Muslim countries.”
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IFR Bad: Relations

The development of IFR’s will lead to inspection nightmares destroying our relations with
other countries
Arjun Makhijani (President, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research) May 17 2001 “Pyroprocessing in
the Bush plan” http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/background/ieerpyroprocessing5172001.txt
Pyroprocessing of IFR could greatly aggravate the problems of inspection of nuclear facilities and create disputes
over the sharing of civilian nuclear technology. “Many countries will want this technology, if the United States
promotes it as proliferation-resistant, and that could become a fertile source of international political disputes and
inspection nightmares,” said Dr. Makhijani. “It’s best to end development of pyroprocessing.” Nuclear weapons states are obliged, under
Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to share civilian nuclear technologies, he further noted.
Japan Empirically Proves that IFR Destroys Relations

Asiaweek October 22 1999 “Damage Control: To salvage its nuclear-energy plans, Japan needs urgent reforms”
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/99/1022/ed_tokaimura.html
Almost every other country has abandoned breeder-reactor technology. One reason: it both needs and creates
plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear weapons. The technology is also uneconomical, as uranium is plentiful and
relatively cheap. Japan's breeder program is near a standstill already. The Monju plant has been closed since its 1995 debacle. And the Joyu
facility, intended destination of the Tokaimura fuel, has lost its supply source for the moment. Tokyo's energy planners have argued
that Japan's lack of resources obliges them to look beyond the current uranium glut and take a long-term view. Now,
that may no longer be politically feasible. Japan should also abandon its controversial program to burn MOX fuels.
(Mixed-oxide combines plutonium recovered from already burned nuclear fuel with uranium to stretch out supplies.) The scheme has
already ruffled relations with Asian neighbors, who are not happy about having the stuff shipped from Europe to
Japan through their waters; they are also uneasy that Japan, in a few years, will possess more plutonium than any
other country. Japanese commercial utilities, always sensitive to public opinion, may abandon the program anyway. Fresh impetus to do so
may come from reports that British nuclear suppliers allegedly bypassed procedures and falsified data on MOX fuel pellets destined for Japan.
Tokyo may need to reorder its energy-research priorities as well. At present, 60% of the research-and-development budget goes into nuclear
power. A portion of that money should be diverted toward alternative energy sources and conservation. The remaining funds could be used to
develop newer nuclear-plant technologies - such as high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors - that are known to be safer than conventional light-
water generators. Among other benefits, that would help keep Japan's many capable nuclear technicians employed. Such a revamp is the best, if
not the only, way to save Asia's most advanced nuclear-power program
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IFR Bad: Research Flawed

IFR research is driven by political forces intent on propping up the nuclear power
enterprise
Proponents claim that transmutation—once developed and refined— will help solve the nuclear waste problem.
Transmutation has even been described by Los Alamos as the solution to the proliferation problem. Neither claim
is likely to prove out. Rather, a close look suggests that transmutation research in the field has been driven by
political forces intent on propping up the nuclear power enterprise. A great deal of work and money—perhaps hundreds of
billions of dollars—would be needed to fully develop and build the types of reactors needed for transmutation. These “fast neutron” machines
would include subcritical reactors driven by neutron-producing proton accelerators, as well as fast-neutron “plutonium burner” reactors—
varieties of breeder reactors first conceived during the Manhattan Project. Transmutation was intensively investigated in the 1980s and looked
at again in the mid-1990s, and found wanting. It was an inefficient way to address problems in nuclear waste management; it was too
expensive; and it presented serious proliferation concerns
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IFR Bad: Waste

There is no way to safely dispose of the remaining wastes IFR’s leave behind
Praful Bidwai (India Keeping Alive a dying Breeder) December 2004 Daily Times
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-9-2003_pg4_13
And what of IFR wastes? There’s no known method even to safely store, leave alone dispose of IFRs, nuclear wastes, some
with long half-lives like thousands or millions of years. They present an unacceptable environmental risk, besides
imposing a huge decommissioning expense.The PFBR is thus a rotten bargain from all angles. Its safety problems acquire an
especially menacing dimension given the DAE’s appalling record. This was recently highlighted by huge radioactive overexposures at the
Kalpakkam reprocessing plant.Other DAE facilities too have performed badly: including Tarapur, where 350 workers were overexposed;
Narora, which saw a serious fire; Rawatbhata, where operators work without protective gear under tritium concentrations hundreds of times
higher than permissible; and in Jadugoda, where uranium miners breathe radioactive dust and where it’s blown by storms into people’s kitchens
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IFR Bad: Containment

India proves there is no where to safely store IFR
Praful Bidwai December 2004 India Keeping Alive a dying Breeder, Daily Times,
And what of PFBR wastes? There’s no known method even to safely store, leave alone dispose of, nuclear wastes, some
with long half-lives like thousands or millions of years. They present an unacceptable environmental risk, besides
imposing a huge decommissioning expense.The PFBR is thus a rotten bargain from all angles. Its safety problems acquire an
especially menacing dimension given the DAE’s appalling record. This was recently highlighted by huge radioactive
overexposures at the Kalpakkam reprocessing plant. Other DAE facilities too have performed badly: including Tarapur,
where 350 workers were overexposed; Narora, which saw a serious fire; Rawatbhata, where operators work without protective gear
under tritium concentrations hundreds of times higher than permissible; and in Jadugoda, where uranium miners breathe radioactive dust and
where it’s blown by storms into people’s kitchens
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IFR Bad: Security

IFR have safety problems which lead to a nuclear nightmare
David Lochbaum May 8 2001 UCS testimony on nuclear power before the Clean Air, Wetlands, Private
Property, and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Safety of old and new nuclear reactors
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/page.cfm?pageID=191
The pebble-bed reactor is rumored to be competitive with other energy technologies. It appears from a preliminary design review that the
proposed reactor achieves its economic advantages by replacing the steel-lined, reinforced-concrete containment structures used for our
existing nuclear plants with a far less robust enclosure building. The NRC's own Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards characterized this
as "a major safety trade-off."The safety problem with the proposed "containment-lite" pebble-bed reactor design is
compounded by the existing security weaknesses. Imagine the consequences from a fertilizer truck bomb
detonated next to a "containment-lite" reactor with millions of curies of lethal radioactivity to contaminate the
environment for many decades. That would truly be a nuclear nightmare.
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IFR Bad: Accidents

Japan and Europe prove that IFR’s are prone to accidents
The DAE’s experience with breeding is confined to the Fast-Breeder Test Reactor (capacity, a puny 14 MW-electrical). The experience is
unhappy. The PFBR means suddenly scaling it up 40 times! The FBTR went critical in 1985, 13 years after construction began — and
immediately ran into a thicket of problems, which have slashed its maximum power-capacity to one-fourth the original! The story of the
sputtering, accident-prone, molten sodium-spewing FBTR is common to small fast-breeders globally. The larger reactors’ record is worse. Of
the world’s total of 11 such reactors (bigger than 100 MW-thermal), one (in Germany) was never operated, and eight of the remaining ten lie
shut!The most abysmal failure is the world’s most spectacular, celebrated fast-breeder, the European-conglomerate-
run Superphenix. This 1250-MW, $ 6 billion giant was supposed to establish breeder technology commercially — once and for all. It
went critical in 1985. Then followed countless accidents, especially leaks of sodium, which explodes on contact
with air or moisture. Superphenix was repeatedly de-rated and slowed down. After it leaked 20 tonnes of sodium, it was
finally abandoned in 1998. It ran for only 278 days in these 13 years! All countries, barring Russia, have scrapped fast-
breeders or put them on the backburner, including once-enthusiastic Japan where the Monju disgorged 3 tonnes of
sodium in 1995 (and the plant manager committed suicide).
IFRs are at the highest risk of the most volatile accidents

Fast-breeders concentrate enormous amounts of energy in small volumes. They typically contain 2-5 tonnes of
plutonium/enriched-uranium — hundreds of critical masses, each enough for a bomb. Their super-hot cores must be
cooled by molten metal, with a high probability of pumps and seals failing.Fast-breeders are extremely hazardous.
Core damage and meltdown entails catastrophic explosions. They pose bad routine problems too. The plutonium they burn is 30,000 times
more radioactive than uranium-235. This needs special care in fuel-fabrication. The fire and sodium-leak hazards are grave.
Separating plutonium to feed breeders poses serious hazards. So dirty and costly is this business that the world’s
only two large-scale commercial reprocessing plants are uneconomical. (One of them, at Windscale/Sellafield, in Britain, is
being phased out).
History Proves that IFRs are More Prone to Accidents then Other Reactors
Global News Wire September 22 2003
Even as India lays a bigger bet on its fast breeder programme, many advanced countries have lost interest in the technology. The reasons are
not difficult to comprehend. The fast breeder was once considered the best energy source to meet growing electricity demand and to help
conserve uranium resources. But energy demand has not grown as expected and conserving uranium is no longer a priority. More important
factors that go against the fast breeder are its failure to be cost competitive with thermal nuclear reactors and the
availability of cheaper alternative energy sources. The liquid sodium coolant, which burns on contact with air or
water, presents a technical challenge. Accidents caused by liquid sodium leakage at the Monju reactor in Japan and
the Superphenix in France swayed public opinion against the technology. Further, the United States, gripped by a fear
of reprocessed plutonium falling into wrong hands, turned down the technology. India therefore needs to tread carefully,
testing and refining its expertise in the challenging technology, and ensuring cost competitiveness.
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IFR Bad: Accidents

IFR accidents are likely and will lead to huge public health impacts
Indian Express September 7 2004 “A fast breeder of danger,”
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=54569
All of this means that breeder reactors are not an economical way of generating electricity. Breeder reactors are also dangerous.
Unlike water moderated thermal reactors, breeder reactors, depending on the design details, can actually explode, though
with a yield much smaller than that of a nuclear weapon. And because it uses plutonium based fuel, the public
health impacts of a full-scale (beyond design basis) accident are worse.
One important source of potential accidents at the PFBR is the liquid sodium used to remove the heat generated.
Since sodium is opaque, burns on contact with air, and reacts violently with water, designing reactors and their maintenance to take these
properties into account has made them costly to build and maintain. It also makes them susceptible to serious fires and long
shutdowns due to leaks.
Japan empirically proves that IFR are not accident proof

CNIC (Citizens Nuclear Information Center) 2003 Major Victory to Blow Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy:
the ground-breaking ruling on the Monju fast breeder reactor,
http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit93/nit93articles/nit93monju.html
The construction cost of Monju has reached about 600 billion yen (about $5 billion) and each year 10 billion yen (about
$83 million) is setaside for maintenance after the accident. It is also expected that about 20 billion yen will be spent for the plant modification.
Paying tax money into the problem-plagued FBR means nothing but 'throwing good money after bad.' Moreover, restarting Monju, which is
capable of producing weapon-grade highly purified plutonium, would heighten international tensions over the development of nuclear
weapons. As the ruling pointed out, the history of FBR development in many other states shows that the FBR has
been plagued with many technical problems which have prevented its commercialization. Therefore, many countries
have abandoned research and development activities associate with it. The ruling certainly denied the peril of the FBR's immature technology
and the government's safety review that approved such immature and perilous technology. The government, including the METI, the Agency
for Nuclear and Industrial Safety (ANIS), Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Development Institute (JNC) should honestly admit the legitimacy of
the High Court ruling and should immediately abandon the wasteful research and development of the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor. We
earnestly demand that the government abandon plutonium utilization policy. Also, it should immediately prepare for the decommission of the
Monju.
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IFR Bad: Nuclear Meltdown

Japan empirically proves that a nuclear meltdown is inevitable in the world of IFR’s
Asahi News Service January 28 2003, lexis
In an unprecedented decision that could throw the nation's nuclear power policy into disarray, a high court ruled Jan. 27 that safety standards
are inadequate at the prototype fast breeder-reactor Monju in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture. In siding with residents and their
long-running suit, the court hammered another nail in the coffin of the mothballed nuclear facility that has been off-line since 1995.In handing
down the decision, Presiding Judge Kazuo Kawasaki of the Kanazawa branch of the Nagoya High Court said, "With current equipment,
there can be no denying the specific danger of radioactive materials leaking to the external environment in the
event of a sodium leak." The ruling, the first time a court has decided in favor of residents seeking to overturn construction approval of
nuclear reactors or an injunction on the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, is a severe blow to the government.The Fukui residents
filed their first suit in 1985. In December 1995, a sodium leak at the Monju reactor shut down operations.The likelihood of getting Monju up
and running was already dim, and Monday's ruling can only make matters worse for the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC),
which oversees the reactor.While the central government is expected to appeal Monday's decision to the Supreme Court, the future of the
nation's nuclear power policy appears murky.Atsuko Toyama, minister of science and technology, expressed disappointment at the court's
decision."As a nation lacking in energy resources, it is important for Japan to establish fast breeder-reactor nuclear cycle technology to
maintain a stable long-term supply of energy," she said. "Monju is a core facility for research and development in that area and its importance
will not change at all."Judge Kawasaki, however, faulted the central government for failing to install an adequate safety inspection
system."There are errors and defects in the safety inspection regime that cannot be overlooked," he said.More ominously, he said the Monju
reactor had the potential for a reactor core meltdown. Monday's decision overturned a March 2000 decision by the Fukui District
Court which ruled against the plaintiffs. Major points of contention in the high court case centered around nuclear reactor safety inspections.
Issues considered included the 1995 sodium leak; the possibility of a major accident, for example, pipes bursting simultaneously within the
steam generator; and the ability of the reactor to withstand seismic activity.The plaintiffs argued that original safety inspection standards were
illegal because they did not envision a possible hydrogen explosion caused by leaking sodium. In this scenario, the sodium would eat through
the 6-millimeter thick steel flooring starting a chemical reaction with the concrete underneath.To bolster their case, the plaintiffs cited a
government application, filed after the district court ruling, for improvements to the reactor.Proposed design changes included equipment to
quickly drain leaking sodium as well as measures to prevent pipes carrying heated sodium from bursting simultaneously.
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IFR Bad: Transportation

IFR’s increase the probability of a transportation accident
at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
The increased radiological risk of handling fuel that has been repeatedly irradiated—inherent in transmutation schemes—is a matter for serious
concern. And the increased transportation of high-level waste required under a number of transmutation schemes
would increase the probability of a transportation accident with possible serious consequences.Historically,
reprocessing has led to large discharges of radioactive wastes into the environment. Several European countries are
currently demanding that Britain and France stop discharging chemical reprocessing wastes into European waters. Because it seems impossible
to stop the discharges, many European countries are now demanding an end to commercial reprocessing.
IFRs Require an Increase in Transportation Which Increases the Risk of Theft

Greenpeace October 14 2002 “Russian Weapons Plutonium To Be Shipped To Europe”
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0210/S00107.htm
The “Western Option” plan is being pushed by a little known organization, which calls itself the Nuclear
Disarmament Forum AG (NDF). It proposes to build a plant to produce plutonium fuel or mixed uranium-plutonium oxide
(MOX) in Russia, ship the fuel from Murmansk via the Norwegian Sea to nuclear reactors in Western Europe and transport the irradiated
nuclear waste spent fuel back to Siberia where it would be stored awaiting either reprocessing the plutonium or final geologic disposal. The
plan will be promoted at a ceremony in the Swiss City of Zug, on October 12th. “This proposal combines the worst of two bad
ideas being touted by the nuclear industry: construction of a plutonium fuel factory in Russia and shipment of the
fuel, from which weapons grade plutonium can be easily removed. It presents an unacceptable proliferation risk;
the plutonium should instead be treated as nuclear waste.” said Tom Clements, Greenpeace International nuclear
campaigner.
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IFR Bad: Terrorist Theft

Japan proves that IFR’s are faulty and lead to tons of plutonium vulnerable to theft
Japan Economic Newswire, January 27 2003
The reactor started supplying electricity in August 1995. It was operating at 40% capacity when the sodium coolant leak
occurred in December the same year, sparking a fire. Its operator tried to cover up the accident and submitted a
falsified report. The Monju is an experimental reactor designated by the government as a prototype for future reactor models that would
play a key part in the national nuclear fuel recycling policy, under which plutonium will be produced through spent-fuel reprocessing. It was
named after a bodhisattva symbolizing control of powerful monsters through wisdom.The government disburses about 10 billion yen annually
to maintain the reactor, and has spent roughly 90 billion yen over the seven years since operations were suspended.It spent a total of 780 billion
yen on the Monju project, including 580 billion yen to building the reactor, according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology.The ministry estimates that by 2020, total expenditures will hit 1 trillion yen, and projects 180 billion yen in revenue from
selling power generated by the reactor.If the reactor were to be scrapped, it would cost 170 billion yen, according to a ministry estimate.By
burning plutonium-uranium mixed oxide, fast-breeder reactors like Monju are supposed to be able to produce more plutonium than they
consume.The Monju reactor, though shut down, still contains about 1.4 tons of plutonium, which can be used to
make nuclear warheads.
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IFR Bad: Faulty Tech

France empirically proves that IFR’s are not reliable and faulty
In fact, transmutation is the first of three methods of nuclear waste management being investigated under the 1991 law. The other two are
storage and disposal. The French envisage using all three methods. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, France’s
breeder reactor program was in deep trouble. A host of operating and technical difficulties had plagued its
showcase project—the Superphénix, by far the world’s largest breeder reactor. Failing to get the reactor to run for
extended periods at anywhere near its rated capacity, the French nuclear establishment faced a crisis. The Superphénix
program had been the principal long-term justification for spent-fuel reprocessing. Unlike conventional light-water reactors that use
a once-through fuel cycle, breeders are designed to operate with plutonium fuel. This requires that plutonium be
separated from spent uranium fuel. The plutonium is then fabricated into fresh fuel and fed back into the reactor.
Meanwhile, France’s fallback position—separating plutonium from spent fuel so that it could be used in mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel in conventional light-water reactors—turned out to be far more expensive than anticipated. Contrary to
expectations, ordinary low-enriched uranium fuel has remained cheap, making traditional once-through fuel use relatively attractive. By the
late 1980s, Electricité de France, France’s nationalized electric utility, was reluctant to continue its money-losing reprocessing contracts. It
might have bowed out, except that it did not want a major public debate about the economics of nuclear power.
IFR’s Were Scrapped by the US Because They Weren’t Reliable

A similar situation emerged in the United States with cancellation of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), the last hope
of the U.S. nuclear establishment for keeping breeder reactor and reprocessing technology alive.
(The IFR design combined power production and reprocessing in a single facility, hence the name. The specific electrolytic reprocessing
technology used for this reactor is variously called pyroprocessing, electro-refining, or electrometallurgical processing.) The IFR project
was killed in 1994 by the Clinton administration as an unneeded energy technology research project. But
pyroprocessing survived the cut as a “waste management” technology and became part of a research program based at Argonne National
Laboratory-West in Idaho. The technology was also used in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s proposal for using accelerator-driven subcritical
reactors for transmutation. Japan’s situation is not unlike that of France, except that it has far less to show for comparable expenditures on its
plutonium program. Its demonstration breeder reactor, Monju, which cost more than $5 billion, suffered a sodium leak and fire in 1995, less
than two years after the reactor went critical. It has been shutdown since then. Japan’s reprocessing program has been plagued with technical
problems and high costs. There was a fire at a waste facility at its demonstration reprocessing plant in 1997. Meanwhile, the full-scale
Rokkasho reprocessing plant, still under construction with a start-up date of 2005, is now estimated to cost about $20 billion. The cost is so
large that its builders cannot hope to ever operate it on a commercially competitive basis. In short, we believe it is no accident that
transmutation of high-level waste has found champions in those parts of the nuclear establishment most attached to reprocessing and breeder
reactors. Transmutation programs would revive hopes for reprocessing in all three countries, and they would provide hundreds of billions of
dollars for subsidized reactors.
History Empirically Proves that IFRs are Unsafe

Transmutation would require enormous expenditures on research, development, and implementation of new
reactor technologies—subcritical reactors driven by proton accelerators—or the use of breeder reactors. After five
decades of effort, breeders still face a host of technical hurdles. Of the 11 medium and large breeder reactors that
have been built worldwide, one did not open, one remains closed because of an accident, five are permanently shut
(one because of a partial meltdown), one will soon close, and one is on standby. Only two breeders—a relatively small reactor in
Japan and the Russian BN-600, which has used primarily uranium fuel (rather than the plutonium fuel breeders were conceived for)—are
expected to continue operating beyond a few years. While accelerator-driven reactors have been described as “inherently safe,” that is
misleading. For proposed accelerator-based systems, the ability to shut off the neutron source and the fact that the reactor ordinarily would be
subcritical would provide a margin of safety. On the other hand, these systems would rely strongly on the ability to shut off the neutron source
in an emergency. Like any other human system, that shut-off system could fail. Also, it may be necessary to ensure that the external neutron
source is not operating at full power when fresh fuel is in the reactor. If not, the reactor could go supercritical.
27
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IFR Bad: Not Market Competitive

IFRs performance characteristics are highly speculative and wouldn’t be able to compete
in the market
David Lochbaum May 8 2001 UCS testimony on nuclear power before the Clean Air, Wetlands, Private
Property, and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Safety of old and new nuclear reactors
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/page.cfm?pageID=191
Cost projections by the nuclear industry must be taken with a grain of salt, if not an entire salt shaker. According to the US Department
of Energy, the actual construction costs for 75 nuclear power plants started between 1966 and 1977 were more than
three times higher than their estimated costs. Thus, claims that the projected costs of electricity from a proposed
pebble-bed reactor are competitive with the actual costs of electricity from operating renewable energy technologies
must be viewed with skepticism. It cannot be overemphasized that a facility like the proposed pebble-bed modular reactor has
never been constructed or operated in the world. Consequently, its expected performance characteristics are highly speculative. It
would not be prudent at this time to place undue reliance on a risky technology with unproven safety performance.
Nuclear experiments belong in the laboratory, not within the US electricity marketplace
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IFR Bad: Too Expensive

Even if IFRs Run Effectively They Cost 100x More then Normal Reactors
Fast-breeders generally cost 50 to 100 per cent more to build than normal reactors, and at least twice more to run
(when they do). At the DAE’s Rs 3,494 crore capital-cost (overruns are notoriously predictable), PFBR power will cost Rs 6 to 10 a unit —
the same as Enron’s gold-plated electricity!
Japan empirically proves that IFRs costs are excessively high

Japan Economic Newswire January 27 2003
The reactor started supplying electricity in August 1995. It was operating at 40% capacity when the sodium coolant leak occurred in December
the same year, sparking a fire. Its operator tried to cover up the accident and submitted a falsified report.The Monju is an experimental
reactor designated by the government as a prototype for future reactor models that would play a key part in the
national nuclear fuel recycling policy, under which plutonium will be produced through spent-fuel reprocessing. It
was named after a bodhisattva symbolizing control of powerful monsters through wisdom .The government disburses about 10
billion yen annually to maintain the reactor, and has spent roughly 90 billion yen over the seven years since
operations were suspended.It spent a total of 780 billion yen on the Monju project, including 580 billion yen to
building the reactor, according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.The ministry estimates that
by 2020, total expenditures will hit 1 trillion yen, and projects 180 billion yen in revenue from selling power
generated by the reactor.If the reactor were to be scrapped, it would cost 170 billion yen, according to a ministry
estimate. By burning plutonium-uranium mixed oxide, fast-breeder reactors like Monju are supposed to be able to produce more plutonium
than they consume. The Monju reactor, though shut down, still contains about 1.4 tons of plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear
warheads.
IFRs are expensive and not an economical way of generating electricity

Indian Express Septer 7 2004 “A fast breeder of danger,”
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=54569
The cost of electricity from breeders is increased by the composition of their fuel — a mixture of plutonium and uranium. Plutonium
is
about 30,000 times more radioactive than the fissile element used in heavy water reactors, uranium-235. Therefore
expensive safety precautions are required during fuel fabrication. Just the fabrication cost for plutonium based fuel
is many times the total cost of uranium fuel. Add to this the massive costs of reprocessing spent fuel and
recovering plutonium. The PFBR needs about two tonnes of plutonium just to become operational. All of this
means that breeder reactors are not an economical way of generating electricity. Breeder reactors are also dangerous.
Unlike water moderated thermal reactors, breeder reactors, depending on the design details, can actually explode, though with a yield much
smaller than that of a nuclear weapon. And because it uses plutonium based fuel, the public health impacts of a full-scale (beyond design basis)
accident are worse.
IFR Plants are Expensive and Uneconomical

Fast-breeders concentrate enormous amounts of energy in small volumes. They typically contain 2-5 tonnes of
plutonium/enriched-uranium — hundreds of critical masses, each enough for a bomb. Their super-hot cores must be
cooled by molten metal, with a high probability of pumps and seals failing.Fast-breeders are extremely hazardous.
Core damage and meltdown entails catastrophic explosions. They pose bad routine problems too. The plutonium they burn is 30,000 times
more radioactive than uranium-235. This needs special care in fuel-fabrication. The fire and sodium-leak hazards are grave.
Separating plutonium to feed breeders poses serious hazards. So dirty and costly is this business that the world’s
only two large-scale commercial reprocessing plants are uneconomical. (One of them, at Windscale/Sellafield, in Britain, is
being phased out).
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Starter Pack
IFR Bad: Not Modeled Due to Price

Due to past failures IFR wouldn’t be competitive against thermal nuclear reactors in the
international market
Global News Wire September 22, 2003
Even as India lays a bigger bet on its fast breeder programme, many advanced countries have lost interest in the
technology. The reasons are not difficult to comprehend. The fast breeder was once considered the best energy source to meet growing
electricity demand and to help conserve uranium resources. But energy demand has not grown as expected and conserving
uranium is no longer a priority. More important factors that go against the fast breeder are its failure to be cost
competitive with thermal nuclear reactors and the availability of cheaper alternative energy sources. The liquid sodium
coolant, which burns on contact with air or water, presents a technical challenge. Accidents caused by liquid sodium leakage at the Monju
reactor in Japan and the Superphenix in France swayed public opinion against the technology. Further, the United States, gripped by a fear of
reprocessed plutonium falling into wrong hands, turned down the technology. India therefore needs to tread carefully, testing and refining its
expertise in the challenging technology, and ensuring cost competitiveness.
Japan and france prove that nuclear power isn’t competitive

at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ,www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
Meanwhile, Japan and France, which had pinned their hopes on breeder reactors and a “plutonium economy,” have
instead faced mounting technical problems and soaring costs. Breeders could make somewhat more fuel than they
consume, but the reality is that the cost of ordinary uranium fuel used in “once-through” light-water reactors has
been so low that breeders simply cannot compete. Despite more than $20 billion (in 1999 dollars) spent on building breeders
worldwide over five decades, and billions more trying to operate them, the technology is plagued by technical problems. To proponents of
nuclear power, transmutation offers a glimmer of hope. Although the problems with transmutation are well known
within the nuclear establishment, interest in the idea grew in the 1990s in France, the United States, and Japan.
Collectively, these countries have about half the world’s nuclear power reactors.
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Starter Pack
IFR Bad: Transition

It would take at least 20 years for the us to transition to IFRs
SFTT (Soldiers for the Truth) 2001 “Playing with Plutonium, http://www.sftt.org/article10022002c.html
Well, here we go again. Under a deal signed between the U.S. and Russia during the Clinton years, and continued by the Bush Administration,
all sorts of new plans for plutonium are afoot. The original aim was to get rid of plutonium from the decommissioned arsenals of the Cold War
by using it up as fuel in nuclear reactors .But that brings us right back to the risk of theft along the way. To feed today's reactors, which
are geared for uranium, plutonium must first be fabricated into mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX. That means shipping it in
weapons-ready form to MOX fabrication plants, then dispersing it among the reactors themselves. Even after it is
blended into MOX fuel, plutonium is still relatively easy to separate out. The amounts involved here are
staggering, with the U.S. and Russia each pledging to run through 34 metric tons of plutonium, enough to make
thousands of bombs. The whole process would take at least 20 years. We are somehow supposed to believe that even in Russia
-- not famous for top-flight inventory control -- nothing would go astray. Nor would this come cheap. Neither Russia nor the U.S. has facilities
for turning plutonium into commercial fuel. So to show the Russians we're serious, the Bush Energy Department has ordered up a MOX plant
to be built in South Carolina, over the protests of Governor Jim Hodges, with plans to haul the plutonium-based fuel to reactors in North
Carolina. Russia, pleading a shortage of funds, is looking to the U.S. for billions of dollars in subsidies to build its own MOX plant and
possibly a fast-breeder reactor run on almost pure plutonium. Like all bad ideas, this one is also getting worse
31
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A2: IFR Can’t Be Used for Nuclear Weapons

IFR materials can still be used for nuclear weapon use
Richard Barrans Jr., Ph.D., Integral Fast Reactor Department of Energy, 2004,
http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/phy99/phy99xx7.htm
The actual waste from IFR would be useless for making weapons. However, IFR fuel must be removed periodically to be
reprocessed, to take out the waste materials that interfere with the nuclear reaction. (IFR consumes much more of the fuel
before these wastes cause a problem than conventional reactors can.) This spent fuel could, in principle, be further processed to
isolate the fissile materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon.
Japan proves that ifrs are faulty and lead to tons of plutonium vulnerable to theft
Japan Economic Newswire, January 27 2003
The reactor started supplying electricity in August 1995. It was operating at 40% capacity when the sodium coolant leak
occurred in December the same year, sparking a fire. Its operator tried to cover up the accident and submitted a
falsified report. The Monju is an experimental reactor designated by the government as a prototype for future reactor models that would play
a key part in the national nuclear fuel recycling policy, under which plutonium will be produced through spent-fuel reprocessing. It was named
after a bodhisattva symbolizing control of powerful monsters through wisdom.The government disburses about 10 billion yen annually to
maintain the reactor, and has spent roughly 90 billion yen over the seven years since operations were suspended.It spent a total of 780 billion yen
on the Monju project, including 580 billion yen to building the reactor, according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology.The ministry estimates that by 2020, total expenditures will hit 1 trillion yen, and projects 180 billion yen in revenue from selling
power generated by the reactor.If the reactor were to be scrapped, it would cost 170 billion yen, according to a ministry estimate.By burning
plutonium-uranium mixed oxide, fast-breeder reactors like Monju are supposed to be able to produce more plutonium than they consume.The
Monju reactor, though shut down, still contains about 1.4 tons of plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear
warheads.
Impure plutonium in IFR is more radioactive making it more likely for nuclear weapons
at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
Further, with some fast-reactor designs, it might be possible to attach a reprocessing plant to the reactor. This would greatly reduce the
transportation and storage requirements associated with the multiple reprocessing passes the fuel would have to make for a large fraction of
long-lived radionuclides to be transmuted. Finally, such reactors could accept relatively impure nuclear fuels, which in
theory reduces proliferation concerns. In contrast to the situation with “weapon-grade” plutonium 239, it is more
difficult to make bombs if the plutonium is contaminated with significant amounts of uranium and americium 241.
Bombs made from contaminated plutonium would be unpredictable in yield. The fabrication process would also be
more dangerous because contaminated plutonium is more intensely radioactive than weapon-grade plutonium, thus
making proliferation less likely in theory. But neither the unpredictable yields nor the greater health risks facing
workers would be likely to deter those intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
32
Starter Pack
***Warming***
33
Starter Pack
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Timeframe

Nuclear power can’t solve climate change, the timeframe’s too long
Charles Ferguson (Fellow for Science and Technology) Aprile 18 2007 CFR
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13125/nuclear_power_will_not_play_major_nearterm_role_in_countering_climate_c
hange_concludes_new_council_report.html
Nuclear energy is unlikely to play a major role in the coming decades in countering the harmful effects of climate
change or in strengthening energy security, concludes a new Council Special Report authored by Charles D. Ferguson, Council fellow for
science and technology. To significantly combat climate change in the near term, the “nuclear industry would have to
expand at such a rapid rate as to pose serious concerns for how the industry would ensure an adequate supply of
reasonably inexpensive reactor-grade construction materials, well-trained technicians, and rigorous safety and
security measures,” says the report. There are currently 103 nuclear reactors operating in the United States. Even
with twenty-year extensions of their planned lifespan, all existing reactors will likely need to be decommissioned by the
middle of the century. To replace them, the United States would have to build a new reactor every four to five
months over the next forty years. “However, based on the past thirty years, in which reactor orders and
construction ground to a halt, this replacement rate faces daunting challenges. For this reason alone, nuclear energy is not a
major part of the solution to U.S. energy insecurity for at least the next fifty years,” says the report, Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and
Risks. Ferguson also argues against the United States increasing funding and subsidies for nuclear energy. While it is true that nuclear
energy emits fewer greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the conventional wisdom “oversells the contribution
nuclear energy can make to reduce global warming and strengthen energy security while downplaying the dangers
associated with this energy source,” he says. The report further warns that “the United States and its partners face the daunting
challenge of preventing the diversion of nuclear explosive materials into weapons programs and controlling the spread of potentially dangerous
nuclear fuel-making technologies and materials.” Nuclear waste is a particular cause for concern. “If nuclear power production expands
substantially in the coming decades, the amount of waste requiring safe and secure disposal will also significantly increase,” says Ferguson,
noting that “no country has begun to store waste from commercial power plants in permanent repositories.”
Nuclear power emits greenhouse gases. And takes too long to build.
Beyondnuclear.org, 2006 “The Nuclear Power Danger” Beyond Nuclear
http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
Nuclear power cannot address climate change. Greenhouse gases are emitted throughout the nuclear fuel chain,
from the mining of the necessary fuel - uranium - to its enrichment, transportation and the construction of nuclear
plants. Nuclear plants take too long to build - up to a dozen years or more. The planet is already in crisis with experts
pointing to rapid climate change already underway and less than ten years left to pre-empt disaster. There is no time to wait
for nuclear plant construction.
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Starter Pack
Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Plant Building

It will take too long to build all the new plants.
Nuclear Monitor 2005 “Nuclear Power: No solution to climate Change” NIRS/WISE
International. http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nukesclimatechangereport.pdf
To reduce the emissions of the public energy sector according to the targets of the Kyoto Protocol, 72
new medium sized nuclear
plants would be required in the 15 current European nations. These would have to be built before the end of the
first commitment period: 2008- 2012. Leaving aside the huge costs this would involve, it is unlikely that it is technically
feasible to build so many new plants in such a short time, given that only 15 new reactors have been built in the
last 20 years. In the U.S, as many as 1,000 new reactors would be required-- none have been successfully ordered
since 1973.
Plant building delays prevent fast climate action

Jessie Carr and Dulce Fernandez (staff of Nuclear information and resource center) 2008 False Promises,
http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
Currently, around 440 nuclear power stations provide approximately five percent of the global primary energy mix. Even
if the number of
reactors was doubled, nuclear energy’s contribution to the primary energy mix would not have a large enough
impact to warrant the associated expense. A 2003 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the future of nuclear power
determined that approximately 1500 new nuclear reactors would have to be constructed worldwide by mid-century for
nuclear power to have even a modest impact on the reduction of GHG’s.18 A similar study concluded that a GHG emission
reduction of 20 percent could be accomplished by 2100 if all projected coal power were displaced by 4900 GW of nuclear energy.19 Likewise,
the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research estimates that it would be necessary to build some 2,000 nuclear power
plants of 1,000 MW each in the next few decades for nuclear power to make a substantial reduction in CO2
emissions.20 In the UK, the government’s advisory panel, the Sustainable Development Commission, found that if the country’s existing
nuclear capacity were doubled, it would only yield an eight percent cut in CO2 emissions by 2035, and none before 2010. Indeed, the
Commission concluded that the risks associated with nuclear power greatly outweigh its minimal contribution to reducing CO2 emissions.21
Therefore, expert analyses all agree that nuclear power would require an infeasible schedule, as new reactors would have
to come online every few weeks for the next fifty years to have even a modest impact on GHG emissions—new
nuclear reactors cannot be built fast. enough to address climate change. Indeed, outside of Russia, whose capacity is perhaps
one reactor per year, there currently is only a single forging factory worldwide capable of producing reactor pressure vessels—and this
Japanese factory can produce only 12 vessels per year at maximum capacity. To be able to build sufficient reactors to make a difference in
emissions would first require construction of large new forging factories—an expensive and financially risky endeavor and one that further
delays the nuclear industry’s physical ability to build reactors. Thus, a fundamental flaw in the argument that nuclear power can mitigate global
climate change is that the technology simply takes too long to deploy. Moreover, in an age of terrorism, the large number of
reactors necessary for nuclear power to meaningfully address climate change would only exacerbate proliferation risks and the perils of a
nuclear accident or attack.
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Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Use Fossil Fuels

Nuclear power uses fossil fuels in production process.
Karen Charman (editor of the journal Capitalism Nature Socialism) May/June 2006 World Watch, “Brave
Nuclear World? the Planet Is Warming, and Proponents of Nuclear Power Say They've Got the Answer. Are Nuclear
Plants the Climate Cavalry? First of Two Parts.”
A growing chorus of nuclear advocates, government officials, international bureaucrats, academics, economists, and journalists is calling for
nuclear power to save us from devastating climate change. Nuclear reactors do not emit carbon dioxide (C[O.sub.2]) and other
greenhouse gases when they split atoms to create electricity. But it's inaccurate to say that nuclear power is
"carbon-free"--on a cradle-to-grave basis, no currently available energy source is. (Even wind turbines are guilty by
association: the aluminum from which they are built is often smelted using coal-fired electricity.) In the case of nuclear power, fossil fuel
energy is used in the rest of the nuclear fuel chain--the mining, milling, and enriching of uranium for use as fuel in
reactors, the building of nuclear plants (especially the cement), the decommissioning of the plants, the construction
of storage facilities, and the transportation and storage of the waste. In fact, the gaseous diffusion uranium
enrichment plant at Paducah, Kentucky, is one of the single biggest consumers of dirty coal-fired electricity in the
country.
Nuclear power increases Green House Gas emissions.

Helen Caldicott April 15 2005 “Nuclear Power is the Problem, Not a Solution”, The Australian,
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0415-23.htm
In the US, where much of the world's uranium is enriched, including Australia's, the enrichment facility at
Paducah, Kentucky, requires the electrical output of two 1000-megawatt coal-fired plants, which emit large
quantities of carbon dioxide, the gas responsible for 50per cent of global warming. Also, this enrichment facility
and another at Portsmouth, Ohio, release from leaky pipes 93per cent of the chlorofluorocarbon gas emitted yearly
in the US. The production and release of CFC gas is now banned internationally by the Montreal Protocol because
it is the main culprit responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion. But CFC is also a global warmer, 10,000 to
20,000 times more potent than carbon dioxide. In fact, the nuclear fuel cycle utilises large quantities of fossil fuel at
all of its stages - the mining and milling of uranium, the construction of the nuclear reactor and cooling towers,
robotic decommissioning of the intensely radioactive reactor at the end of its 20 to 40-year operating lifetime, and
transportation and long-term storage of massive quantities of radioactive waste. In summary, nuclear power
produces, according to a 2004 study by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith, only three times fewer greenhouse gases
than modern natural-gas power stations.
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Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming

Nuclear Energy doesn’t solve global warming.
Jim Riccio (Nuclear policy analyst for Greenpeace) 2007 “Nuclear Power:A Bad Reaction”
http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/2007/05/nuclear_power_a.html
The unproven assertion that atomic energy can solve global warming has helped further the collective amnesia about the past
business failures of nuclear energy. In February, 1985, Forbes magazine declared that “[t]he failure of the U.S. nuclear
power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental scale. The
utility industry has already invested $125 billion in nuclear power, with an additional $140 billion to come before
the decade is out, and only the blind, or the biased, can now think that most of the money has been well spent.”
Nonetheless, more than 20 years later, the very biased are indeed trying to keep us blind to the fact that nuclear energy is still a money
pit that can have little or no impact on oil consumption or our ability to abate catastrophic climate change.
Last month, the Oxford Research Group found that contrary to industry claims, nuclear power does not qualify as a carbon-free technology and
cannot be promoted as an environmental panacea (see BusinessWeek.com, 3/26/07, “New Debate Over Nuclear Option”). Nuclear
scientists at MIT also have acknowledged that nuclear is “arguably a CO2-emitting energy source” and that the Bush
Administration scheme for spreading nuclear power around the planet constitutes “a goofy idea.”
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Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Transportation

Nuclear Power won’t solve transportation emissions.
Jessie Carr and Dulce Fernande (staff of Nuclear information and resource center) 2008
http://www.nirs.org/falsepromises.pdf
The nuclear industry claims that nuclear power is the only energy source that can effectively replace fossil fuels. But, building
new
nuclear facilities does nothing to address the transportation sector, which is responsible for a large part of GHG
emissions. For example, electricity generation in the US is responsible for only 40 percent of the country’s total CO2
emissions.25 Likewise, transportation is the primary sector responsible for global oil consumption (corresponding to
more than half of the oil consumed worldwide everyday), generating a full 40 percent of global CO2 emissions. As
oil accounts for only seven percent of worldwide electricity generation, the transportation sector is a major source of GHGs and
would not be affected by any changes in nuclear power generating capacity.26
No Solvency- France proves emissions will still increase.

Nuclear Monitor Feb 2005 “Nuclear Power: No solution to climate Change” NIRS/WISE International,
http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nukesclimatechangereport.pdf
In 2003 France generated 75% of its electricity in nuclear power plants. The nuclear industry likes to use France as a shining
example of the advantages of nuclear power. However, France's greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 were still increasing,
largely because it has lost control of energy consumption in other sectors, e.g. transport. Furthermore, studies of
future energy scenarios carried out by the French Government Central Planning Agency show no evident correlation between
CO2 emissions and nuclear power. In fact the scenario with the lowest emissions was not the one with the greatest use of nuclear
power, but the one in which the growth in demand was minimised (Boisson, 1998 & Charpin et al., 2000). In another study, a comparison
was made between the results of investments in wind energy and the same amount of investment in nuclear energy.
The results were clearly favorable for wind energy. With the same investment much more energy could be generated with wind.
Moreover, with investments in wind energy more new jobs were generated than with investments in nuclear energy (Bonduelle & Levevre,
2003).
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Starter Pack
***Proliferation***
39
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Proliferation 1nc
Expanding nuclear power increases risks of proliferation
Mark Winfield (Director Environmental Governance The Pembina Institute) Alison Jamison (Senior Project
Manager) Rich Wong (Eco-Efficiency Analyst) and Paulina Czajkowski (Eco-Efficiency Analyst) December
2006 Nuclear Power in Canada: An Explanation of Risks, Impacts, and Sustainability,
http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/Nuclear_web.pdf
Nuclear energy’s shared origins with nuclear weapons programs raises the potential for -- and reality of -- links between technologies and
materials used for energy production and for nuclear weapons development. Concerns about these connections have grown in the
past few years as a result of nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan. Any large-scale expansion
of reliance on nuclear energy would carry significant risks of the proliferation of materials and technologies that
could be applied to weapons development. India’s 1974 nuclear bomb test, a project developed in part using
Canadian-supplied technology and uranium, demonstrated this problem clearly.
Proliferation risk ectinction

James D. Miller (professor of economics at Smith College) January 23 2002 NATIONAL REVIEW,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-miller012302.shtml
The U.S. should use whatever means necessary to stop our enemies from gaining the ability to kill millions of us.
We should demand that countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea make no attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We should
further insist on the right to make surprise inspections of these countries to insure that they are complying with our proliferation policy. What if
these nations refuse our demands? If they refuse we should destroy their industrial capacity and capture their leaders. True, the world's cultural
elites would be shocked and appalled if we took preventive military action against countries that are currently doing us no harm. What is truly
shocking, however, is that America is doing almost nothing while countries that have expressed hatred for us are building weapons of mass
destruction. France and Britain allowed Nazi Germany's military power to grow until Hitler was strong enough to take Paris. America
seems to be doing little while many of our foes acquire the strength to destroy U.S. cities. We can't rely upon
deterrence to prevent an atomic powered dictator from striking at us. Remember, the Nazi's killed millions of Jews even
though the Holocaust took resources away from their war effort. As September 11th also shows, there exist evil men in the world who would
gladly sacrifice all other goals for the opportunity to commit mass murder. The U.S. should take not even the slightest
unnecessary chance that some dictator, perhaps a dying Saddam Hussein, would be willing to give up his life for the
opportunity to hit America with nuclear missiles. Once a dictator has the ability to hit a U.S., or perhaps even a
European city, with atomic weapons it will be too late for America to pressure him to give up his weapons. His
ability to hurt us will effectively put him beyond our military reach. Our conventional forces might even be made impotent by a nuclear-armed
foe. Had Iraq possessed atomic weapons, for example, we would probably have been unwilling to expel them from Kuwait. What about the
rights of those countries I have proposed threatening? America should not even pretend to care about the rights of dictators. In
the 21st century the only leaders whom we should recognize as legitimate are those who were democratically elected. The U.S. should
reinterpret international law to give no rights to tyrants, not even the right to exist. We should have an ethically based foreign policy towards
democratic countries. With dictatorships, however, we should be entirely Machiavellian; we should deal with them based upon what is in our
own best interests. It's obviously in our self-interest to prevent as many dictators as possible from acquiring the means
to destroy us. We shouldn't demand that China abandon her nuclear weapons. This is not because China has proved herself worthy to have
the means of mass annihilation, but rather because her existing stockpile of atomic missiles would make it too costly for us to threaten China.
It's too late to stop the Chinese from gaining the ability to decimate us, but for the next ten years or so it is not too late to stop some of our other
rivals. If it's politically impossible for America to use military force against currently non-hostile dictators then we should use trade sanctions to
punish nations who don't agree to our proliferation policy. Normal trade sanctions, however, do not provide the punishing power necessary to
induce dictators to abandon their arms. If we simply don't trade with a nation other countries will sell them the goods that we used to provide.
To make trade sanctions an effective weapon the U.S. needs to deploy secondary boycotts. America should create a treaty, the signatories of
which would agree to: • only trade with countries which have signed the treaty, and • not trade with any country which violates our policy on
weapons proliferation. Believe that if only the U.S. and, say, Germany initially signed this treaty then nearly every other country would be
forced to do so. For example, if France did not sign, they would be unable to trade with the U.S. or Germany. This would obviously be
intolerable to France. Once the U.S., Germany and France adopted the treaty every European nation would have to sign or face a total
economic collapse. The more countries which sign the treaty, the greater the pressure on other countries to sign. Once most every country has
signed, any country which violated America's policy on weapons proliferation would face almost a complete economic boycott. Under this
approach, the U.S. and Germany alone could use our economic power to dictate the enforcement mechanism of a treaty designed to protect
against Armageddon. Even the short-term survival of humanity is in doubt. The greatest threat of extinction surely
comes from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. America should refocus her foreign policy to
prioritize protecting us all from atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.
40
Starter Pack
Nuclear Power = Proliferation

Countries will use commercial nuclear as an excuse for a program and it causes high risk of
war.
NEIS (Nuclear Energy Information Service) Aug. 7 2006 http://www.neis.org/literature/Brochures/weapcon.htm)
If one were to imagine for a moment that commercial nuclear power no longer existed, it would be obvious that the only use a country would
then have for its uranium mining, milling, fuel fabrication and reactors would be to produce nuclear weapons. But because commercial
nuclear power does exist, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a country is using its reactors for research, or for
weapons production. It is precisely this ambiguity which makes the proliferation of nuclear weapons from so-
called "peaceful research" a certainty, and the proliferation of commercial nuclear reactors worldwide a Trojan
Horse for nuclear weapons production. Since World War II there have been several instances where countries have
pieced together nuclear weapons from the fuel from "peaceful research reactors." France, China, and India have
done so. Recently, it was feared that Iraq and North Korea would do likewise, a prospect which was lessened only through the direct threat or
actual use of military intervention as an option. Examination of the list of countries currently building or desiring "peaceful" nuclear reactors
and the leaders of those nations does not inspire confidence for curtailing nuclear proliferation, either. It is not just having nuclear weapons
which is a threat to peace. In some instances the mere possession or attempted construction of research reactors and
commercial nuclear plants has been enough to bring on the threat of war. This "provocation" was enough to justify the Israeli
bombing of Iraq's French-built Osirik reactor in 1981, and was one of the alleged reasons for the Gulf War in 1991. The mere inkling that
your neighbor might have the capability to make nuclear weapons suddenly becomes the justification for "pre-
emptive strikes," and perhaps even full- fledged warfare. To be sure there are international agreements and agencies set up to
monitor the use of nuclear reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency is such an entity. However, not all countries have signed
agreements allowing inspections by the IAEA. The IAEA itself admitted that even if inspections were allowed, it would not be able to tell if a
country was using its commercial reactors to produce weapons. It takes about 15 pounds of plutonium-239 or uranium-235 to
fashion a crude nuclear device. The technology to enrich the isotopes is available for about one million dollars. It is
clearly possible that terrorists could acquire both the isotopes and the technology needed to enrich them. This possibility has surfaced in the
news since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent revelation of a thriving "black market" in such materials. But even the
most technically advanced nations cannot keep track of their materials and technology. In an inventory taken between
October, 1980, and March, 1981, the U.S. government could not account for about 55 pounds of plutonium and 159 pounds
of uranium from its weapons facilities. The explanation given for this Missing material was "accounting error" and that the materials
were "stuck in the piping."1
41
Starter Pack
IFR Cause Proliferation

Breed Reactors massively increase the chance of nuclear terrorism by making plutonium
available; proliferation and alternative energy debates are inseperable
Scott Shackelford (PhD Candidate) August 2006 Cambridge, Issues in Political Economy
With worldwide nuclear energy use on the increase especially in the developing world where security precautions are more lax, experts at the
United Nations have cited three primary growing security threats related to this area. Among them, theft by terrorists of weapons-
grade plutonium stripped out from radioactive waste during reprocessing; an attack on a nuclear installation or
transport convoy; and, as suspected with Iran and North Korea, an attempt by countries developing a nuclear
power sector to build weapons with the same technology. “If you have more nuclear material in the world, you
have a higher proliferation risk—it's a truism,” said Alan McDonald, a nuclear expert at the IEA (Bennhold 2004). Yet,
with demand for electricity increasing across the globe, he added, nuclear energy remains important despite the risks. It has always been true
that nuclear technology can be used to make weapons as well as electricity, and one of the main ways that it does this are through breeder
reactors. So-called ‘breeders’ were invented in the 1970’s to make reprocessing nuclear waste a 700 year problem instead of a million-year
waste impasse. However, the process was found to be hazardous and was boycotted in the US for a number of base
environmental and security concerns. Specifically, the processes involved taking the spent nuclear fuel of Uranium 238,
a fissionable material with only roughly half of its energy production capacity spent, and through a refining process changing it in
to Plutonium 239 (Brabsen 2005). This new material is then used to power a different type of reactor, thus creating a full-loop and
eliminating the need to store nuclear waste. Of course, when commercial nuclear power plants are engineering large
amounts of plutonium, there are nuclear weapon proliferation concerns that arise. “Let us not forget that plutonium
is the chief ingredient for basic nuclear weapons, and thus countries involved in making it in mass quantities could
intentionally or inadvertently lead to the spread of this technology,” said Brabsen (Brabsen, 2005). Perhaps the
greatest worry circulating in national defense departments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
Brussels is the development of nuclear weapons on the back of civilian energy programs. This dilemma goes to the heart
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), of which the International Atomic Energy Agency is the guardian. The Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force 35 years ago and has been successful at defying predictions that today there would be
as many as 50 nuclear-weapon states in the world. With 188 countries signing up, it is the most universally supported international treaty in
history. In addition to nuclear disarmament, the treaty also controls the proliferation of nuclear material and at the same time obliges nuclear
powers to offer nuclear technology to other countries for electricity generation. Given the grave perils that nuclear proliferation poses for all
states, the NPT has been a true cornerstone of global security (M2, 2005). On the contrary, as one senior diplomat at NATO put it:
“You cannot artificially separate the civilian from the military aspect -- everyone here is aware of that. As such,
you also cannot separate the debate on nuclear proliferation from the debate on alternative sources of energy,”
(Bennhold, 2004). To exemplify the dangers involved in nuclear proliferation, China and Pakistan signed a joint contract to supply a reactor
pressure vessel for the second phase of the Chashma Nuclear Power Station in Pakistan. China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation Deputy
General Manager Huang Guojun said Pakistan had pledged that technology would be used solely for peaceful purposes with no transferal to a
third parties. Though, he also admitted that “It is difficult to ignore the fact that nuclear technology has benefits in addition to its primary
function of electricity generation,” (Mihailescu, 2004). Thus, although there is a growing recognition as to the dangers of
non-proliferation, there could also be a willingness on the part of several countries to fully exploit their burgeoning
nuclear programs. Of course, in addition to non-proliferation concerns, with an increasing number of nuclear
power plants in the world the problem of nuclear waste also takes on a new and pressing dimension. Some 600,000
tons of depleted uranium sits outside in aging steel cylinders at the two inactive uranium enrichment plants at Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and Portsmouth, Ohio, and the still active plant at Paducah, Kentucky. Every year some 2,000 pounds of radioactive material
is added to this total, most of which is dangerously radioactive radium-226 derived from spent fuel rods.
42

Neg Nukes Ifr

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UMKC SDI 2008 IFR Negative

Integral Fast Reactor Negative

***Nuclear Power Bad***

Nuclear Power Bad: 1nc

Reviving Nuclear Power would kill millions

Nuclear Power Bad: Environment

Loss of large environments risk extinction

Nuclear Power Bad: Radiation

Nuclear Power Bad: Warming

Nuclear Power Bad: Safety

Nuclear Power Bad: Meltdowns

Meltdowns risk extinction

Nuclear Power Bad: Containment

Nuclear Power Bad: Accidents

Overtime Accidents will Occur in Nuclear Power Plants

IFR Proliferation 1nc

Implementation of IFR Systems Would Increase the Risk of International Proliferation

Proliferation threatens extinction

IFR Bad: Proliferation

Terrorism causes a nuclear attack and extinction

IFR Bad: Terrorism

IFR Bad: Relations

Japan Empirically Proves that IFR Destroys Relations

IFR Bad: Research Flawed

IFR Bad: Waste

IFR Bad: Containment

IFR Bad: Security

IFR Bad: Accidents

IFRs are at the highest risk of the most volatile accidents

IFR Bad: Accidents

Japan empirically proves that IFR are not accident proof

IFR Bad: Nuclear Meltdown

IFR Bad: Transportation

IFRs Require an Increase in Transportation Which Increases the Risk of Theft

IFR Bad: Terrorist Theft

IFR Bad: Faulty Tech

IFR’s Were Scrapped by the US Because They Weren’t Reliable

History Empirically Proves that IFRs are Unsafe

IFR Bad: Not Market Competitive

IFR Bad: Too Expensive

Japan empirically proves that IFRs costs are excessively high

IFRs are expensive and not an economical way of generating electricity

IFR Plants are Expensive and Uneconomical

IFR Bad: Not Modeled Due to Price

Japan and france prove that nuclear power isn’t competitive

IFR Bad: Transition

A2: IFR Can’t Be Used for Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Timeframe

Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Plant Building

Plant building delays prevent fast climate action

Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Use Fossil Fuels

Nuclear power increases Green House Gas emissions.

Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming

Nuclear Power Not Solve Warming: Transportation

No Solvency- France proves emissions will still increase.

Proliferation risk ectinction

Nuclear Power = Proliferation

IFR Cause Proliferation

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Nuclear Power Bad