Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Accidents are Inevitable for Several Reasons: Complexity, Human Error, and Compromise
West by Northwest 2004 “Nuclear Power Kills,”
http://westbynorthwest.org/summerlate00/stan/1NPkills.shtml
Throughout history technological devices have failed, unexpectedly, even catastrophically. Part of the engineering learning process has resulted
from the study of operating failures. Accidents are "normal," in spite of the knowledge and skill that have gone into their
avoidance. Failures are inevitable for several reasons: complexity, human fallibility, and the compromises required
to get on with the job. Structural materials are subject to random failure.The nuclear reactor substitutes for the
combustion boiler used in a conventional power plant. It uses a new source of heat from "fission" of uranium or
plutonium. Nuclear power plants are complicated and dangerous beyond all previous experience. They can fail by
nuclear, chemical or mechanical means. They are designed, built and operated by fallible human beings, some of
whom may be malicious. Structural materials in reactors are weakened, warped, and embrittled by the intense radiation to which they are
subjected. Reactors have failed, and will fail in the future.
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***IFR Bad***
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Terrorism 1nc
Commercial use of plutonium are gifts to terrorist and rogue states
SFTT (Soldiers for the Truth) 2001 “Playing with Plutonium, http://www.sftt.org/article10022002c.html
Well, here we go again. Under a deal signed between the U.S. and Russia during the Clinton years, and continued by the Bush Administration,
all sorts of new plans for plutonium are afoot. The original aim was to get rid of plutonium from the decommissioned arsenals of the Cold War
by using it up as fuel in nuclear reactors . But that brings us right back to the risk of theft along the way. To feed today's reactors, which
are geared for uranium, plutonium must first be fabricated into mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX. That means shipping it in
weapons-ready form to MOX fabrication plants, then dispersing it among the reactors themselves. Even after it is blended into MOX
fuel, plutonium is still relatively easy to separate out. The amounts involved here are staggering, with the U.S. and Russia each
pledging to run through 34 metric tons of plutonium, enough to make thousands of bombs. The whole process would take at least 20 years. We
are somehow supposed to believe that even in Russia -- not famous for top-flight inventory control -- nothing would go astray. Nor would this
come cheap. Neither Russia nor the U.S. has facilities for turning plutonium into commercial fuel. So to show the Russians we're serious, the
Bush Energy Department has ordered up a MOX plant to be built in South Carolina, over the protests of Governor Jim Hodges, with plans to
haul the plutonium-based fuel to reactors in North Carolina. Russia, pleading a shortage of funds, is looking to the U.S. for billions of dollars in
subsidies to build its own MOX plant and possibly a fast-breeder reactor run on almost pure plutonium. Like all bad ideas, this one is also
getting worse. With the old taboo on commercial use of plutonium now gone, creative bureaucracies are proposing a
whole new generation of plutonium-based reactors. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has been talking up the idea, and none
other than National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice -- too young, perhaps, to recall the 1970s debate -- enthused recently to the Financial
Times about the vision of helping Russia develop a generation of fast-breeder (plutonium-fueled) reactors. It's problem enough for the
world that a number of nations still engage in commercial reprocessing of plutonium, including France, Britain,
India and Japan. These programs have been struggling due to high costs. The sooner they're gone, the better
.Commercial use of plutonium is a gift to the world's terrorists and rogue states. It would be folly for the U.S. to
head any further down this path, and it is twice as nuts to even think of subsidizing Russia for any such project
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IFRs are not Prolif Resistant They are Perfect Weapons for Terrorists
Arjun Makhijani, Hisham Zerriffi & Annie Makhijani March/April 2001 “Magical Thinking: Another Go
at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
As noted, all transmutation schemes require the reprocessing of transuranic radionuclides. Proponents of accelerator-driven
transmutation argue that pyroprocessing yields plutonium mixed with other actinides, which would make it
unattractive for use in weapons. This is true. Nonetheless, pyroprocessed plutonium would still be usable in
weapons—and it would be entirely satisfactory to a terrorist group that was not fussy about predicting the exact
yield of a bomb or about subjecting workers to health hazards during the manufacture of weapons. Moreover, although
pyroprocessing is often labeled “proliferation resistant,” it is a far more compact technology than conventional chemical reprocessing, and
therefore more readily hidden. Finally, the separation of isotopes such as neptunium 237 and americium 241 would also increase proliferation
risks because both can be used to make nuclear weapons.
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Terrorism Impact
Another significant terrorist attack on the U.S. will cause indiscriminate U.S. retaliation
against Islamic nations, leading to world war
Nicole Schwartz-Morgan (Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada)
October 10 2001 “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm
The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic
sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion
in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the
language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted."
But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the
sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named
in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of
an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where
racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an
isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless
ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward
the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent
sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if
epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles
indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how
profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan
by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.
A nuclear terrorist attack would cause the US to kill 100 million in 24 hours
Jonathan Schell November 26 2001 “Letter from Ground Zero: Niceties; terrorism in the United States? The
Nation,
Visions of American cities blown to kingdom come have reminded many of America’s own very large arsenal of
nuclear weapons. Might it be useful in the circumstances? Some commentators think it will be. We are riot condemned merely to be the
victims of mass destruction, they point out; we can be the perpetrators of it as well. I was alerted to one of’ these proposals by an une,cpected
source--the New York Post’s gossip colurnnist Liz Smith. She wished to commend an article in Time magazine by Charles Krautliartimer. who,
she noted with approval, wanted the United States to wage ‘total war” against its new enemies. “Have we told Iraq. the Saudis and Pal~stan.”
she asked, that “if there is a nuclear attack...by anyone, we will hold them accountable because they have harbored and created these terrorists.’
We could wipe these countries off the map. and they should be very afraid of that.” Krauthanirner lived up to Smith’s billing. The gush
Administration’s policy of trying to avoid civilian casualties might have to go by the board. he thought. In the “total war” he wanted, the
distinction was a “nicety” that the United States could no longer afford. Krauthanimer had only one country--Iraq--slated for annihilation. In
the Gulf War. he claimed, the Administration of Bush Senior had warned President Saddam Hussein that if he used biological or chemical
weapons he would be met with weapons that would “wipe Iraq off the face of the earth.” Krauthammer wanted to know whether we were still
ready to do this in the event of a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon on our soil. “If we are not prepared to wage total war we risk disaster on a
scale we have never seen and can barely imagine,” he wrote. Another commentator, The New Republic’s Easterbrook, had an entire region--the
Islamic Middle East--ti his sights. At the end of an appearance on Greenfield at Large on CNN, he announced that he wanted to leave his
audience “with one message.” It was that “the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim
peoples of the world in addition to...people of the United States and Western Europe. because if an atomic warhead
goes off in Washington--say. in the current environment or anything like it--in the twenty-four hours that followed,
a hundred million Muslims would die as US nuclear bombs rained down on eve conceivable military target in a
dozen Muslim countries.”
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History Proves that IFRs are More Prone to Accidents then Other Reactors
Global News Wire September 22 2003
Even as India lays a bigger bet on its fast breeder programme, many advanced countries have lost interest in the technology. The reasons are
not difficult to comprehend. The fast breeder was once considered the best energy source to meet growing electricity demand and to help
conserve uranium resources. But energy demand has not grown as expected and conserving uranium is no longer a priority. More important
factors that go against the fast breeder are its failure to be cost competitive with thermal nuclear reactors and the
availability of cheaper alternative energy sources. The liquid sodium coolant, which burns on contact with air or
water, presents a technical challenge. Accidents caused by liquid sodium leakage at the Monju reactor in Japan and
the Superphenix in France swayed public opinion against the technology. Further, the United States, gripped by a fear
of reprocessed plutonium falling into wrong hands, turned down the technology. India therefore needs to tread carefully,
testing and refining its expertise in the challenging technology, and ensuring cost competitiveness.
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Japan proves that ifrs are faulty and lead to tons of plutonium vulnerable to theft
Japan Economic Newswire, January 27 2003
The reactor started supplying electricity in August 1995. It was operating at 40% capacity when the sodium coolant leak
occurred in December the same year, sparking a fire. Its operator tried to cover up the accident and submitted a
falsified report. The Monju is an experimental reactor designated by the government as a prototype for future reactor models that would play
a key part in the national nuclear fuel recycling policy, under which plutonium will be produced through spent-fuel reprocessing. It was named
after a bodhisattva symbolizing control of powerful monsters through wisdom.The government disburses about 10 billion yen annually to
maintain the reactor, and has spent roughly 90 billion yen over the seven years since operations were suspended.It spent a total of 780 billion yen
on the Monju project, including 580 billion yen to building the reactor, according to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology.The ministry estimates that by 2020, total expenditures will hit 1 trillion yen, and projects 180 billion yen in revenue from selling
power generated by the reactor.If the reactor were to be scrapped, it would cost 170 billion yen, according to a ministry estimate.By burning
plutonium-uranium mixed oxide, fast-breeder reactors like Monju are supposed to be able to produce more plutonium than they consume.The
Monju reactor, though shut down, still contains about 1.4 tons of plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear
warheads.
Impure plutonium in IFR is more radioactive making it more likely for nuclear weapons
Arjun Makhijani, Hisham Zerriffi & Annie Makhijani March/April 2001 “Magical Thinking: Another Go
at Transmutation” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01/ma01makhijani.html
Further, with some fast-reactor designs, it might be possible to attach a reprocessing plant to the reactor. This would greatly reduce the
transportation and storage requirements associated with the multiple reprocessing passes the fuel would have to make for a large fraction of
long-lived radionuclides to be transmuted. Finally, such reactors could accept relatively impure nuclear fuels, which in
theory reduces proliferation concerns. In contrast to the situation with “weapon-grade” plutonium 239, it is more
difficult to make bombs if the plutonium is contaminated with significant amounts of uranium and americium 241.
Bombs made from contaminated plutonium would be unpredictable in yield. The fabrication process would also be
more dangerous because contaminated plutonium is more intensely radioactive than weapon-grade plutonium, thus
making proliferation less likely in theory. But neither the unpredictable yields nor the greater health risks facing
workers would be likely to deter those intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
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***Warming***
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Nuclear power emits greenhouse gases. And takes too long to build.
Beyondnuclear.org, 2006 “The Nuclear Power Danger” Beyond Nuclear
http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
Nuclear power cannot address climate change. Greenhouse gases are emitted throughout the nuclear fuel chain,
from the mining of the necessary fuel - uranium - to its enrichment, transportation and the construction of nuclear
plants. Nuclear plants take too long to build - up to a dozen years or more. The planet is already in crisis with experts
pointing to rapid climate change already underway and less than ten years left to pre-empt disaster. There is no time to wait
for nuclear plant construction.
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***Proliferation***
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Proliferation 1nc
Expanding nuclear power increases risks of proliferation
Mark Winfield (Director Environmental Governance The Pembina Institute) Alison Jamison (Senior Project
Manager) Rich Wong (Eco-Efficiency Analyst) and Paulina Czajkowski (Eco-Efficiency Analyst) December
2006 Nuclear Power in Canada: An Explanation of Risks, Impacts, and Sustainability,
http://pubs.pembina.org/reports/Nuclear_web.pdf
Nuclear energy’s shared origins with nuclear weapons programs raises the potential for -- and reality of -- links between technologies and
materials used for energy production and for nuclear weapons development. Concerns about these connections have grown in the
past few years as a result of nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan. Any large-scale expansion
of reliance on nuclear energy would carry significant risks of the proliferation of materials and technologies that
could be applied to weapons development. India’s 1974 nuclear bomb test, a project developed in part using
Canadian-supplied technology and uranium, demonstrated this problem clearly.
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