Cafe Aff

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CAFE
CAFE.......................................................................................................1
FYI (Not Super Important).......................................................................2
Read Me (Much More Important)............................................................3
1AC 1/14.................................................................................................4
1AC 2/14.................................................................................................5
1AC 3/14.................................................................................................6
1AC 4/14.................................................................................................8
1AC 5/14.................................................................................................9
1AC 6/14...............................................................................................10
1AC 7/14...............................................................................................11
1AC 8/14...............................................................................................12
1AC 9/14...............................................................................................14
1AC 10/14.............................................................................................15
1AC 11/14.............................................................................................17
1AC 12/14.............................................................................................18
1AC 13/14.............................................................................................19
1AC 14/14.............................................................................................20
2AC Case Explanation..........................................................................21
2AC – If You Have to Describe Implementation.....................................22
AT Specific Vehicle Low Mileage Good Turns.........................................24
Agent (NHTSA).....................................................................................25
2AC OSPEC...........................................................................................26
2AC T – ‘Incentives’..............................................................................28
2AC Ban CAFE CP 1/2...........................................................................29
2AC Ban CAFE CP 2/2...........................................................................30
2AC States CP.......................................................................................32
2AC Gas Tax CP 1/2..............................................................................33
2AC Gas Tax CP 2/2..............................................................................34
Politics – Plan Popular...........................................................................36
Case 1NC 1/..........................................................................................37
Case 1NC 2/..........................................................................................39
Gas Tax CP 1NC 1/2..............................................................................40
Gas Tax 1NC CP 2/2..............................................................................41
Gas Tax CP 2NC Overview....................................................................42
Gas Tax 2NC CP Solves / Case Solvo Turn.............................................43
............................................................................................................43
CP Solves Oil Shocks............................................................................44
AT Artificially Competitive / Perm Out of Ban.......................................45
come on, come on, sign up, come on, this one’s nothing like vietnam
except for the bullets, except for the bombs, except for the youth that’s gone
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FYI (Not Super Important)
Collantes suggests reading his “decision-making flowchart” to

understand the debate. Here it is:
Who likes and who doesn’t like the plan? Collantes with his charts
again:
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Read Me (Much More Important)
This aff is not really ready to run. It needs more work. The reason is
because the mechanism I’ve been exploring for changing CAFE is a
little convoluted, and it takes time.
Why is the aff so convoluted? Well, it would be a lot more

straightforward to just raise CAFE standards, but that aff seems
next to impossible to win with. The counterplan in this file, for
example, is basically game over against an aff that raises standards.
Plus, the DOT is raising the standards now anyways, that aff
wouldn’t really even be inherent (which is not as flashy and
winnable as slicy-dicy counterplans, but the point remains – large
structural problems with the aff).
So, I wanted to find a way to alter the CAFE act that didn’t involve
raising standards, so the current standards raises could be used as
DA non-uniques. This means that the aff is much more strategic, but
also more convoluted and requires more work to maintain.
Is that tradeoff worth it? Your decision. But I’m almost positive some
teams will read CAFE this year, so at least the neg business in here
should be real good for you.
If you do decide you want to read this aff, you should track down
Michigan State University’s cites for their version, which should be
on the free and open college cite wiki somewhere. Since I figured
you would be able to do that yourselves, I haven’t made any effort
to locate their cites, I’ve only done original stuff.
By the way, I haven’t included any net benefits for the CP in here
except the case stuff – I figure you should have plenty of econ and
politics files to work from, the arguments are straightforward.
P.S. The ethanol advantage is that changing the way we make

ethanol is good, which is why the Bader card works with the aff
despite the fact that it’s just ethanol bad (he clearly assumes the
squo – the card above Bader explains a distinction between tech and
non-tech methods of production.
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1AC 1/14
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration

Administrator should increase alternative energy incentives in the
United States by amending the Corporate Average Fuel Economy-
Alternative Motor Fuel Act program to create fuel-economy credits
granted to owners of flex-fuel vehicles. The credits should be
related to the proportion of fuel dispensing stations in states where
the vehicles are deployed offering high ethanol blends.
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1AC 2/14
Contention I is Comrade Napoleon –
Increases in Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards are
inevitable – the 07 bill hiked it, and the DOT is going to raise it
further to 31.5 MPG
Jerome, Wired, ‘8
(Marty April 22, “Fed Poised to Accelerate CAFE Standard”

http://blog.wired.com/cars/2008/04/feds-poised-to.html
The ink is barely dry on the new CAFE standard, yet the Department of Transportation
is expected to announce today that it is accelerating the timetable for the new
mileage standard. No doubt, the auto industry will kick up a fair amount of fuss.
The proposed regulation would require the industry to meet a target of 31.5 mpg by
2015. In effect, it would force automakers to speed up their development of lighter,
more fuel efficient cars and trucks. The current law requires automakers to meet an
average 35 mpg between 2011 and 2020. The new regulation means that car makers
would have to meet more than half of that savings in the first half of the phase-in
period.
Environmental groups have long maintained that improvements made in the early
stages will add up significantly over time. The Union of Concerned Scientists has
been particularly vocal about the benefits of moving quickly on the new standard.
The question unanswered is whether the auto industry will challenge the new
regulation in court.
Also note that the Alternative Motor Fuels Act is tied to CAFE
Collantes, Science and International Affairs at Harvard Belfer Center,
‘8
(Gustavo, “Biofuels and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Program: The Statute,
Policy Issues, and Alternatives,” May)
Specifically, Congress, through AMFA, endeavored to induce manufacturers to deploy

vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels by providing for special treatment
of such vehicles under the CAFE program. Automobile fuel economy regulation is
codified in Chapter 329, Title 49 of the United States Code. AMFA resulted in
amendments to this chapter related to alternative fuels. As codified in 49 U.S.C.
§32905, the fuel economy of a vehicle powered by alternative fuel is based on the
notion of “fuel content of the alternative fuel”: a legislatively-established petroleum-
fuel equivalence of alternative fuels. Reflecting Congress’s awareness of the lower
per-gallon mileage that alternative fuels generally yield relative to gasoline, Section
32905 establishes that, for the purpose of measuring fuel economy, one gallon of
alternative fuel is equivalent of 0.15 gallons of petroleum fuel. Thus, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to estimate the fuel
economy of a vehicle running on alternative fuel by dividing the actual miles per
gallon by 0.15.3 This way, not only would CAFE not hinder the commercialization of
alternative-fuel vehicles, but also deploying such vehicles would help manufacturers
meet their CAFE requirements. Further, AMFA prohibits the Department of
Transportation (DoT) to use the fuel economy obtained through the alternative-fuel
capability of vehicles to estimate the maximum feasible fuel-economy standard. To
determine the maximum feasible average fuel economy level, the DoT Secretary “(1)
may not consider the fuel economy of dedicated automobiles [automobiles that
operate only on alternative fuel]; and (2) shall consider dual fuel automobiles to be
operated only on gasoline or diesel fuel” (49 U.S.C. §32902).
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Contention II: All ethanols are born equal, but some ethanols are
more equal than others
First, CAFE-AMFA successfully jumpstarts flex-fuel vehicle
development, but the lack of incentives tied to fuel is a structural
problem that prevents effective alternative fuel use and
development
‘8
Ultimately, the raison d’être of government intervention is to provide a societal

benefit. When Congress took it upon itself to amend the CAFE program to provide for
special treatment of alternative-fuel-capable vehicles, its primary intent was to lure
manufacturers into deploying such vehicles. In this respect, the legislative initiative
has been relatively successful. The domestic car companies have taken advantage of
the incentives introduced by AMFA and traded flex-fuel vehicles for some average
fuel economy—a strategy not only allowed by the statute but also contemplated by
Congress when it passed the Act in 1988. In light of this, the alternative-fuel
provisions do not strictly constitute a loophole in the CAFE program. Congressional
intent on passing AMFA, however, rested on the premise that once a reasonable
supply of alternative-fuel vehicles developed, a demand for alternative fuels would
ensue. The latter effect was observed to a very limited extent. Therefore, all in all,
the AMFA amendments cannot be considered a success. More importantly, as it will
be discussed in this section, they cannot be expected to be any more successful
than they have so far been, if they maintain their current structure. Though well-
intentioned and pioneering, AMFA took a unidimensional approach to solve a
multidimensional problem. AMFA could have been more successful had the chicken-
and-egg problem actually been the main obstacle to the market diffusion of
alternative fuels. The main obstacles have been, however: a- The relatively low
value proposition that flex-fuel vehicles running on ethanol blends could offer to
consumers, vis-à-vis the mainstream vehicle-fuel system; b- The lack of a policy
mechanism to internalize the external costs of gasoline relative to alternative fuels.
In fact, the chicken-and-egg problem arises only when the relative value proposition
of a new product to any sizeable segment of the consumer population is low—
otherwise, market forces would spontaneously become active in deploying both the
product and the supporting technology. Of course, there may be a role for
government even when market forces act spontaneously, if the new product brings
about higher societal benefits than the mainstream competitor. Areas of government
participation may include permitting, development of codes and standards,
consumer education, and oversight of various possible forms of market failures,
including the internalization of externalities. 29 Starting from an incomplete
understanding of the relevant mechanisms of technology innovation, AMFA provided
incentives for the vehicle manufacturer, but ignored the consumer and the fuel
provider. The importance of systemic approaches to technology policy was not well
understood in the time when AMFA was first adopted. It was with the California Low
Emission Vehicle and Clean Fuels program, adopted in 1990, that technology
innovation and energy paradigm shift started to be approached by addressing both
vehicle and fuel. It took a few more years to learn, predominantly through the policy
process of the California Zero Emission Vehicle program, that the value proposition to
the consumer is also critical (Collantes, 2006b). The revision of the CAFE program in
2007, by leaving the structure AMFA provisions unaltered, failed to incorporate any of
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these lessons. One more structural deficiency characterizes the AMFA program. On
establishing the CAFE program, Congress provided guidelines but gave DoT the
ultimate authority to determine whether to revise the fuel economy standards. For
the AMFA provision, however, Congress adopted an entirely different philosophy—it
prescribed the methodology and only left to the regulatory agency the decision of
whether or not to extend the program for an additional four-year period. This
unfortunate choice can be singled out as the main cause for the conflictive nature of
the related policy debate— many stakeholders found themselves with the difficult
choice between an ill-designed policy to pursue a noble policy goal and no policy at
all.
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1AC 4/14
Subpoint A is production methods

Ethanol production will boom now, but plants will continue to use
outdated methods alternatefuelsworld.com, ‘7
(4/29 “Ethanol Fuel Markets” Dan Sweeney Online)
Earlier we announced the imminent arrival of a book length report on the explosive
market for ethanol fuel and fuel additives. On Tuesday, May 1, the report will be
issued by Visant Strategies, www.visantstrategies.com, (631) 893-3028.
The report examines the roots of the current ethanol boom and chronicles the frenzy
of plant construction activity currently underway. In it I project a very optimistic
growth scenario for the industry with a near doubling of capacity occurring within five
years from now and ultimately as much as a ten fold increase overall.
I also examine in detail the relative merits of the various feedstocks for ethanol
production as well as all of the major production methods, both established and
experimental.
This study is not a hype based forecast nor is it a species of Green advocacy. Instead I
have attempted to determine the likeliest outcomes for the ethanol fuel business and
the best business opportunities within it. And ethanol is a business, a big business,
and one in which there will be winners and losers. The winners will be those who can
produce ethanol cheaply and the losers will be those who are not cost competitive.
It’s strictly a commodity market.
Right now almost all of the major manufacturers and most of the major investors are
betting against new production technologies and new feedstocks. Practically all
plants under construction around the world are of more or less traditional design.
Only a handful utilize innovative techniques. And little wonder. Almost all plants are
constructed by a few large plant engineering firms specializing in this area, and since
none has actual experience in building or operating plants based on the newer
techniques, their ability to quote projects utilizing such techniques with any degree of
precision is rather limited. And since only one cellulosic ethanol plant is in
commercial operation, the operational economics of the newer techniques are still
mostly conjectural. Would you invest tens of millions of dollars in an unproven
technology when failure would mean total loss and no possibility of selling the
production equipment for anything other than scrap metal? Of course not, and
neither would most equity investors.
So why not trial the new technologies on a smaller scale? That’s precisely what the
process innovation companies are trying to do, but you can’t operate the plants
profitably since economies of scale are everything in ethanol production irrespective
of the processing technology. That best you can do is to establish proof of concept,
and most investors want to get in after proof of concept is completed not before.
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Better production methods solve the problems with corn ethanol in

the squo – more carbon efficiency relative to gasoline
‘8
Different ethanol production pathways have nontrivially-variant impacts in terms of

natural resources consumption (e.g. land and water), ecosystems conservation, and
carbon emissions. The magnitude of such impacts will certainly be correlated, though
not necessary linearly, to production levels. Any biofuel policy that overlooks these
concepts and generalizes every gallon of ethanol under one single nominal umbrella
—for example, “corn ethanol”—is inherently flawed. It is well known that the well-to-
tank (WTT) carbon intensity of a gallon of ethanol can vary significantly depending
on the feedstock (e.g. Tilman et al., 2006). There has been less discussion, however,
about the potential variance in WTT carbon intensity of ethanol produced from the
same feedstock. Land- use change, farming practices, energy supply to the
biorefinery, and ethanol distribution infrastructure and logistics are all variables
affecting the carbon footprint of a given gallon of ethanol (or any biofuel, for that
matter) available at the pump. Important to the climate impacts of farming
practices are the strategies adopted for land fertilization. Variables within such
strategies include the amount of nitrogen fertilizer used (typically, 2 percent of the
nitrogen in the fertilizer ends up as nitrogen in nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas) and
whether corn stover is left to decompose in the field after harvesting. Choices in
terms of energy sources and technologies used in ethanol production may have even
more significant implications for climate policy. Currently, most biorefineries in the
United States use natural gas boilers, with a small minority of plants operating coal
boilers. A concern repeatedly raised by producers during my visits to biorefineries in
the Midwest, was the rise and fluctuation of natural gas prices and their impacts on
production costs. To address this question, producers are considering—for existing
and projected plants—strategies ranging from gasification of corn biomass, to
capturing and use of cattle manure biogas, to installing wind turbines, to shifting to
coal- fired boilers. Wang et al. (2007) find that corn ethanol produced in a modern plant fueled by
natural gas may reduce lifecycle carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions by 28 percent relative to
gasoline. If the same plant was coal-fired, however, the ethanol produced may result in a 3 percent
increase in lifecycle CO2e emissions relative to gasoline. Using GREET, the same model used by Wang et
al. (2007), my analysis of the effect of reliance on coal, instead of natural gas, to power ethanol production
yields the results shown in Figure 2. I estimate that if all ethanol production is supported by coal instead of
natural gas, E85 flex-fuel vehicles emissions are 435 gCO2e/mile, versus 455 gCO2e/mile for
conventional gasoline vehicles. The scenario of complete reliance on coal for ethanol production results in
18 percent more CO2e emissions relative to a scenario of complete reliance on natural gas. As ethanol is
blended in gasoline as an oxidant and octane enhancer, the way it is produced will have an effect on the
lifecycle carbon content of retail gasoline too. Though barely noticeable, the extremes of the gasoline
vehicle curve in Figure 2 differ by 2 gCO2e/mile. Lifecycle emission estimates are dependent on
assumptions about myriad factors, such as per-acre corn yield, biorefinery efficiency, allocation of carbon
credits to byproducts (e.g. distiller’s dried grain with solubles), ratio of dry-mill plants to wet-mill plants,
and many others. The slight difference between the results in Figure 2 and those in Wang et al. (2007) can
be explained by variations in the initial assumptions, and is a reminder that assessment of lifecycle
estimates necessitates of an understanding of the underlying assumptions.
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Increasing support for ethanol production key to production

innovation
Governor’s Ethanol Coalition, ‘5
(April, “Ethanol from Biomass” http://www.ethanol-gec.org/GEC_biomass_rept_4-12-
05.pdf)
While the ethanol industry is growing rapidly and on target to produce roughly 5
billion gallons a year by 2007 and can meet the 8 billion gallon goal by 2012 with
encouragement, production significantly above that amount may impact corn
prices and livestock feed costs. Therefore, to ensure an increasing share of the
nation’s transportation fuel needs are met with ethanol the Coalition be- lieves that
the industry should be aided in establishing additional sources of production that
include the use of lower-value, higher- availability biomass feedstocks so that the
nation can meet and even exceed this 10 percent long-term goal. The use of
ethanol, particularly biomass-derived ethanol, can produce significant savings in
carbon dioxide emissions. This approach offers a no regrets policy that reduces the
potential future risks associated with climate change and has the added benefit of
economic development. In fact, ethanol’s power to bring economic growth to small
farms, agricultural cooperatives, and larger agribusiness concerns is already being
realized in some rural areas of the nation. Continuing the growth trend through the
production of biomass-derived ethanol can make current production more efficient
and diversify feedstocks to include such sources as corn stover, wood waste,
municipal solid waste, and grasses–offering the potential for ethanol production in
every region of the nation.
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This solves every ethanol bad argument, put your turns away
Glasgow and Hansen, Rocky Mountain Institute, ‘5
(Nathan and Lena, Researchers/Consultants, “Setting the Record Straight on Ethanol”
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/reinsider/story?id=38601)
Biofuels, and specifically ethanol, have been the subject of a great deal of criticism in
recent months by detractors claiming that more energy is required to produce
ethanol than is available in the final product, that it is too expensive, and that it
produces negligible carbon reductions. These critiques are simply not accurate.
State-of-the-art technologies have been competently forecasted-even proven in the
market-to produce ethanol that is far more cost-effective and less energy-intensive
than gasoline. We'll explore why, and why the critics have gotten it wrong. When we say biofuels, we mean liquid fuels made from
biomass-chiefly biodiesel and ethanol, which can be substituted for diesel fuel or for gasoline, respectively. The technology used to produce
biodiesel is well understood, although its biomass feedstocks are limited and production today is fairly expensive. We will instead focus on
Ethanol, which can be substituted for or blended
ethanol, which we believe has significantly greater potential.
with gasoline, has traditionally been produced from either corn or sugarcane
feedstocks. In fact, Brazil currently meets more than 25 percent of its gasoline demand with ethanol made from sugarcane. (The sugar
is so cheap that the resulting ethanol sells in New York for $1.10 a gallon-with about 81 percent the energy content of a gallon of gasoline-after
paying a 100 percent duty, illegal under WTO rules, to protect U.S. corn farmers. Undeterred, the Brazilians are merrily expanding their ethanol
exports to Asia.) Even gasoline in the United States contains, on average, 2 percent ethanol (used as a substitute for MTBE to oxygenate fuel).
American ethanol is almost exclusively made from the kernels of corn, accounting for about 7 percent of the corn crop. But
conventional processes and feedstocks used to make ethanol are not feasible in the
United States on a large scale for three reasons: they're not cost-competitive with long-run gasoline prices without
subsidies, they compete with food crops for land, and they have only marginally positive energy balances. Happily, in addition
to starch-based feedstocks, ethanol can be produced from "cellulosic" feedstocks,
including biomass wastes, fast-growing hays like switchgrass, and short-rotation
woody crops like poplar. While not cost-competitive today, already observed
advances in technology lead us to believe that in the next few years, ethanol made
from these crops will become cost-competitive, won't compete with food for cropland,
and will have a sizeable positive energy balance. Indeed, because these crops are
expected to have big biomass yields (~10-15 dry tons/acre, up from the current ~5
dry tons/acre), much less land will be required than conventionally thought. Further,
cellulosic ethanol will typically have twice the ethanol yield of corn-based ethanol, at
lower capital cost, with far better net energy yield. A common complaint about
ethanol is that the quantity of feedstocks is limited and land used to grow feedstocks
could be put to better use. For cellulosic feedstocks, the situation is quite the
contrary. Cellulosic feedstocks are plentiful: for example, municipal and agricultural
wastes can be used to create ethanol, with the positive side-effect of reducing the
quantity of waste we must dispose of. Using waste to produce fuel has the clear benefit of a virtually free feedstock,
and because energy is generally expended to create the product, not the waste, this type of ethanol obviously has a positive energy balance.
Not quite as obvious is to what extent dedicated energy crops can be used to produce ethanol. We believe the answer is straightforward.
Research by Oak Ridge National Laboratory shows that dedicated energy crops can be grown without competing with food crops because they
can be grown in marginal areas unsuited for food crop production, or on about 17 million acres of Conservation Reserve Program land that is
currently being withheld from agricultural use. Cellulosic crops have additional environmental benefits for several reasons. First, because
crops like switchgrass are deep-rooted perennials, growing them actually prevents soil erosion and restores degraded land. For this same
reason, cellulosic crops also have significantly lower carbon emissions. While corn-based ethanol reduces carbon emissions by about 20
percent below gasoline, cellulosic ethanol is predicted to be carbon-neutral, or possibly even net-carbon-negative. We can't remember how
we've been asked the question: "But doesn't ethanol require more energy to
many times
produce than it contains?" The simple answer is no-most scientific studies, especially
those in recent years reflecting modern techniques, do not support this concern.
These studies have shown that ethanol has a higher energy content than the fossil
energy used in its production. Some studies that contend that ethanol is a net energy
loser include (incorrectly) the energy of the sun used to grow a feedstock in ethanol's
energy balance, which misses the fundamental point that the sun's energy is free.
Furthermore, because crops like switchgrass are perennials, they are not replanted and cultivated every year, avoiding farm-equipment
energy. Indeed, if polycultured to imitate the prairies where they grow naturally, they should require no fertilizer, irrigation, or pesticides either.
So, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, for every one unit of energy available at the fuel pump, 1.23 units of fossil energy are used to
produce gasoline, 0.74 of fossil energy are used to produce corn-based ethanol, and only 0.2 units of fossil energy are used to produce
Critics further discount cellulosic ethanol by ignoring the recent
cellulosic ethanol.
advancements of next-generation ethanol conversion technologies. A recent example
that has received significant attention is David Pimentel's March 2005 paper in
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Natural Resources Research, which argues that ethanol production from cellulosic
feedstocks requires more fossil energy to produce than the energy contained in the
final product. However, Pimentel bases his analysis on only one technology used to
produce ethanol, ignoring two other developing technologies. His chosen conversion technology, acid
hydrolosis, is the least efficient of the three. A superior option, thermal gasification, converts biomass into a synthesis gas composed of
carbon oxides and hydrogen. The gas is then converted into ethanol via either a biological process using microorganisms or a catalytic
(GLASGOW AND HANSEN CONTINUE BELOW)

1AC 8/14
(GLASGOW AND HANSEN CONTINUE, NO TEXT OMMITTED)
reactor. Both of these processes show good potential for increased energy yields and reduced costs by using cellulosic feedstocks. This
conversion technology is currently being tested in pilot plants in Arkansas and Colorado. Still better, enzymatic reduction hydrolosis already
shows promise in the marketplace. Such firms as Iogen and Novozymes have been developing enzymes, and "smart bugs," that can turn
biomass such as corn residues (leaves, stalks, and cobs) into sugars that can then be converted into ethanol. Historically, the biggest cost
component of this technology was the creation of enzymes. Earlier this year, though, in combination with the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory, Novozymes announced a 30-fold reduction in the cost of enzyme production in laboratory trials. Expected benefits from this
process include low energy requirements, high efficiency, and mild process conditions. A pilot plant exists in Ontario and another is planned in
Hawai'i. The first commercial-scale enzymatic reduction hydrolosis plant is scheduled to be built and operational by Iogen within two years,
No matter which of these conversion technologies
producing ethanol at a targeted cost of $1.30 per gallon.
ultimately wins, it is clear that cost-effective and efficient ethanol production from
cellulose is on the horizon-which is good news for the United States, where mobility
consumes seven of every ten barrels of oil we use. Our voracious appetite for that oil
comes at a cost-we have to buy it, we have to deal with the pollution that comes
from using it, and, because 12 percent of our oil comes from the Middle East, we
have to defend it. Because mobility consumes 70 percent of the oil we use, mostly by burning gasoline, it's the first place to look
for a solution. Our recent publication Winning the Oil Endgame (www.oilendgame.com) shows that the critical first step to reducing our oil
consumption is tripled automobile efficiency-which can improve safety, maintain or improve performance and comfort, and repay its extra cost
(if any) within two years at today's U.S. gasoline prices. But there's no reason to stop there. Using biofuels instead of gasoline to power our
cars has the potential to displace 3.7 million barrels per day of crude oil-that's a fifth of our forecasted consumption in 2025, after more
efficient use. In fact, an 85/15 percent blend of ethanol/gasoline in the tank of RMI's designed 66-mpg SUV would result in the vehicle getting
, focusing on the nexus of
~320 mpg per gallon of fossil fuel burned (because the majority of fuel burned is ethanol). Clearly
the agriculture and energy value chains will create huge opportunities for business
and huge wins for our country. The critics simply have it wrong.
Status quo ethanol production will cause environmental devastation,

soil erosion, and food shortages across the globe – changing to more
technological methods is key
Bader, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 8
(Hans, 4/15, “As Food Riots Continue, Finance Ministers Criticize Ethanol Subsidies”,
http://www.openmarket.org/2008/04/15/as-food-riots-continue-finance-ministers-
criticize-ethanol-subsidies/)
Ethanol and biofuels have been wrongly depicted by politicians like Al Gore as
a solution to global warming. But in reality, subsidized ethanol production
gravely harms the environment, and also causes starvation, high food prices, and
rioting.
“The diversion of food crops to biofuel production was a significant factor contributing
to global food prices rocketing by 83% in the last year, and causing violent conflicts
in Haiti and other parts of the world,” reports African Energy News. ”Food riots have
also taken place in Egypt, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Indonesia, Mauritania, Madagascar and the Philippines in the past month“ (and
in Pakistan and Mexico, too).
Unable to afford food, hungry Haitians are now eating “cookies made of dirt,
vegetable oil, and salt.”
“International Monetary Fund (IMF) President Dominique Strauss-Kahn has warned
that hundreds of thousands of people will face starvation if food prices keep rising.”
Millions of poor people in the Third World now risk being evicted from their homes
and becoming homeless as vast tracts of land are converted to produce ethanol and
other biofuels.
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Finance ministers and central bankers are now calling for an end to ethanol subsidies
and other “biofuel policies adopted recently in the West.” South African finance
minister Trevor Manuel called such subsidies “criminal.” Earlier, the Indian Finance
Minister Chidambaram noted that “in a world where there is hunger and poverty,
there is no policy justification for diverting food crops towards bio-fuels. Converting
food into fuel is neither good policy for the poor nor for the environment.”
Ethanol subsidies do not result in reduced greenhouse gas emissions, but they do
result in soil erosion, deforestation, and other environmental damage.
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Environmental degradation risks extinction

Warner, International Politics at Foreign Policy at American U,
94, August, Politics and Life Sciences, , p 177
Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which
species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants
and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure
which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary
ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late
to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S.
National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this
magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will
escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with
our collective future as the stakes.
Hunger causes 36 million deaths a year systemically, and massive

poverty
Narula, Faculty Director Center for Human Rights and Global Justice
‘6
(Smita, Asst. Prof.Clinical Law & Faculty Director Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice@ NYU, “The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable
UnderInternational Law,” 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 691, LN//)
Almost sixty percent of annual deaths worldwide - roughly 36 million - are a direct or
indirect result of hunger and nutritional deficiencies. n17 More than 840 million
people worldwide are malnourished. n18 Over ninety-five percent live in the
developing world. n19153 million of them are children under the age of five. n20
Hunger is both a cause and consequence of poverty. Hungry workers [*699] produce
less and therefore earn less. In turn, theirpoverty exacerbates their hunger. n21
Malnourishment is also the largestsingle contributor to disease. Undernourished
mothers give birth tounderweight children who are more susceptible to diseases that
lead to theirpremature deaths. n22 Children who are sick and hungry also do poorly
inschool. n23 As a result they are more likely to end up as unskilledlaborers, who do
not earn enough to feed themselves or their families. The cycleof poverty, disease,
and hunger continues.
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Poverty is superbad
Gilligan, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, 96
(James professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, and a member of the
Academic Advisory Council of the National Campaign Against Youth Violence. Violence:
Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes.. P. 191-196)
The deadliest form of violence is poverty. You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons
and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcible and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that
characterizes their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s
observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their violent
behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves
from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these
institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence in our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far
Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin
from being the main causes of most violent deaths.
with a look at the structural violence in this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what
we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant
from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint. By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death, and disability suffered
by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above
them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a
I
product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God.
am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-
natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of
individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide,
soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from
behavioral violence in at least three major respects. *The lethal effects of structural
violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides,
executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time.
*Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts;
independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose
decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. *Structural
violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or
violent) causes.
[Continued… (9 Paragraphs Later…)]

The finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock
attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the
nation that had come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest
discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life
expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed
During the past decade, the
to the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected.
discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and
alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare
with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of
deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military
and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and
civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-
1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam
war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot
begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other
words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative
poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period.
This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating,
thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of
every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of
behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from
homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two
forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is
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moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.
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1AC 11/14
Subpoint B is oil dependence –

Ethanol solves it
Ethanol Promotion and Information Council, Updated ‘8
(“Energy Independence, Original date of authorship unknown,
http://www.drivingethanol.org/ethanol_facts/why_dependence_foreign.aspx)
Ethanol fuels America

Sure, ethanol is great for your car and better for the environment. But when you
choose ethanol, you're also doing your part to lessen our dependence on oil. The less
oil we use, the less we have to worry about the stability and intentions of other
countries when it comes to our nation's fuel supply. Right now, ethanol production
replaces gasoline that would require the use of 600,000 barrels of oil a day.
So Ethanol Is Essential In The Struggle To Reduce Our Dependence On Oil.
The United States currently imports about 37 million gallons of gasoline each day.
Since 1970, Americans increased gasoline consumption from 12 billion gallons of fuel
per year to more than 160 billion gallons of fuel per year. Ethanol is helping address
the need for renewable fuel options - so someday we won't have to worry about other
countries holding the keys to our nation's critical fuel supply.
Oil dependence jacks Middle East stability and makes peace

impossible
Teal, Associated Content, ‘8
(Allan, Mar 24, “Why Oil Affects Middle East Conflict”
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/672777/why_oil_affects_middle_east_policy.
html?cat=75)
Oil gives Middle East nations huge influence in world affairs. Countries can restrict
the amount of oil that they will buy if a nation makes them angry. We see this when
the United States and her allies placed an embargo on Iranian oil. However, this has
not made a reduction in demand for Iranian oil. It just changed the customers
standing in line.
When world stock markets sniff the possibility that oil may not flow as freely as the
world wants and needs, it sends them into a nosedive. This keeps prices high and
Middle East coffers full. With this glut of cash, these nations are positioned to finance
political actions at home and abroad.
They can help channel cash to candidates who they believe will help further their
causes. Even with restrictions for foreign contributions, United States presidential
candidates manage to get money funneled through to their cash reserves. This buys
influence on foreign policy decisions.
You can often see this in action when political leaders seem to waffle on whether to
support our allies in the region or push an agenda of appeasement for Middle East oil
suppliers. Many times the effort is to get nations to push Israel into concessions of
land and power. These concessions help the enemies of Israel while straining
relations between Israel and her allies.
The cash from these huge oil sales is used to arm Middle East nations with state-of-
the-art arsenals of ships, jets, and artillery. Spending a few billion here or there
seems like small change to these oil rich lands. They are also able to help arm
various terrorists organizations that serve their political purposes. These can either
undermine Israel or work to weaken her allies. In some cases, they simply wear down
the resolve of these nations to stay on task of trying to build stability in the region.
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Causes nuclear escalation and global conflict

Steinbach Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee ‘2
(John, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee + Centre for Research on Globalization,
"Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace,"
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region
in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament
negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war
break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the
Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be
a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue
is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and
before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli
nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish
satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy.
(43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed
at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very
least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically
lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if
the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S.
complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East
conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)
Secureenergy.org ‘6/’5
(“Oil Dependence: A Threat to U.S. Economic & National Security”
http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/Briefing-OilDependence.pdf)
A National Imperative Oil dependence endangers U.S. economic and national

security. In addition to hundreds of billions of dollars each year in direct costs, oil
dependence feeds the growth of Islamist terrorism; provides vast amounts of money
to unstable, undemocratic governments; increases the likelihood of international con-
flict; puts American troops in harm’s way; and exposes Americans to the risk of
severe economic disloca- tion. For example: Terrorism Al Qaeda has targeted and
continues to target oil infrastructure as a way of “bleeding” the U.S. economy.
Along the oil supply and distribution chain, numerous chokepoints are vulnerable to
attack. Shipping lanes are of particular concern: > Roughly 90 percent of Middle
East oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz (17 mbd), Bab el Mandeb (3.0
mbd), or the Suez Canal/Sumed pipeline (3.8 mbd)—passageways with limited
alternatives.10 > Another 11.7 mbd pass through the Strait of Malacca and 3.1 mbd
through the Turkish Straits. > Each of these passageways is vulnerable to accidents,
piracy, or terrorism, and the effects of a major attack at one of these points could
devastate the global economy. Some oil-rich families fund terrorist groups, and the
Saudi government has spent tens of billions of dollars over the last three decades
spreading Wahhabism—an intolerant ideology that lays the groundwork for a broad
doctrine of hatred, especially against the West.
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Impact is human survival

Alexander, Director of Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, 3
(Yonah, “Terrorism myths and realities,” Washington Times, 8-28-03, p. lexis)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again
illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to
understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very
survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere
tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on
September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the
center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993
and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack
at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why
are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new
terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's
expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of
Unlike their historical
terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.
counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in
terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The
internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we
have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological,
nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and
global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best
practices" strategy can be developed[e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is that terrorism can be greatly reduced,
if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed. The conventional illusion is
that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by "freedom
fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred"
violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of
fundamental human rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic
Jihad] and secular entities [such as Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish
settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only
opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a
government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment,
funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-
enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge. Clearly, if this perception continues to
prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage further terrorist attacks. In
sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been demonstrated to be an
effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron
commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who
was directly responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations.
it behooves
Similarly, the U.S. military operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus,
those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message
communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940:
"Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road
may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
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1AC 14/14
Contention III is I’m Out of Animal Farm References
The plan’s incentive is an effective way to increase FFV and
alternative fuel deployment – overcome structural issues with CAFE-
AMFA
‘8
Insofar as the AMFA provisions constitute the only incentives that automobile
manufacturers have to deploy alternative fuel-capable vehicles, and with the supply
of biofuels on the rise, there seems to be, in principle, a strong argument to keep (a
form of) them in place. Two overarching questions remain on the way of warranting
the AMFA provisions: a- What is the expected impact of flex-fuel vehicles on energy
security? b- Is the current incentive scheme adequate, and if not, how to revise it?
This section is concerned with addressing these questions. Figure 13 shows a
proposed logic sequence to assess whether to keep, eliminate, or revise the AMFA
provisions. The sequence starts with questions related to energy security and they
were broadly addressed above. Assuming positive answers to all the energy security
questions, the question of whether incentives are necessary for the market
introduction of FFV seems to follow naturally. It is widely accepted that incentives of
some type are desirable. The population of FFV has grown dramatically since the
adoption of AMFA. In addition to AMFA, factors that determined such growth include
the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 and Executive Order 13149. EPAct 1992
requires that in FY 2000 and beyond, 75% of light-duty vehicles (defined as vehicles
under 8,500 lbs GVWR) acquired by Federal agencies must be flex-fuel. EPAct also
sets requirements on acquisitions of alternative-fuel vehicles by state agencies and
fuel providers that operate at least 50 light-duty vehicles. E.O. 13149, “Greening the
Government through Federal Fleet and Transportation Efficiency”, signed by
President Clinton on April 21, 2000, requires Federal agencies to develop strategies to
reduce their annual consumption of petroleum by 20% by the end of FY 2005, relative
to their consumption in FY 1999. Federal agencies’ 2000 purchases of AFVs totaled
7,949, bringing their AFVs inventory to 55,260—14% of the total in-use AFV
population in 2000 (U.S. DoE, 2000). Therefore, much of the increased demand for
alternative-fuel vehicles has been driven not by direct consumer interest but by
government incentives of various forms.
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2AC Case Explanation
The plan sounds complicated because it’s technical, but all it really
does is create incentives in the CAFE act for high ethanol gas
stations to change the way the US produces ethanol - ethanol is
inevitable, but supporting the process allows better technological
innovations that make it more efficient and environmentally friendly
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2AC – If You Have to Describe Implementation
Here’s a bunch of implementation information about the program

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No Date
(“CAFE Overview – Frequently Asked Questions
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/CARS/rules/CAFE/overview.htm)
How is the actual Average Fuel Economy reported by manufacturers to the

Government? Manufacturers are required to submit three reports: 1) Pre-model year;
2) Mid-model year; and 3) Final Report. The pre- and mid-model year reports are
submitted to NHTSA, while the final report is submitted to and validated by the EPA.
Who classifies vehicles for the purposes of CAFE and how is it done? Authority to
establish vehicle classifications for the purposes of calculating CAFE was delegated to
NHTSA. Specifically, the definitions are as follows:1) Passenger Car – any 4-wheel
vehicle not designed for off-road use that is manufactured primarily for use in
transporting 10 people or less.2) Truck – a 4-wheel vehicle which is designed for off-
road operation (has 4-wheel drive or is more than 6,000 lbs. GVWR and has physical
features consistent with those of a truck); or which is designed to perform at least
one of the following functions: (1) transport more than 10 people; (2) provide
temporary living quarters; (3) transport property in an open bed; (4) permit greater
cargo-carrying capacity than passenger-carrying volume; or (5) can be converted to
an open bed vehicle by removal of rear seats to form a flat continuous floor with the
use of simple tools.
Are import vehicles treated the same as domestics when it comes to CAFE? The rules
are different for passenger cars and trucks. There is a statutory “two-fleet rule” for
passenger cars. Manufacturers’ domestic and import fleets must separately meet the
27.5 mpg CAFE standard. For passenger cars, a vehicle, irrespective of who makes it,
is considered as part of the “domestic fleet” if 75% or more of the cost of the content
is either U.S. or Canadian in origin. If not, it is considered an import. Beginning in
1980, light trucks were administratively subjected to a similar two-fleet rule.
However, given changes in market conditions (the “captive import” sector of the fleet
had become insignificant), NHTSA eliminated the two-fleet rule for light trucks
beginning with MY 1996. Therefore, there are no fleet distinctions, and trucks are
simply counted and CAFE calculated as one distinct fleet of a given manufacturer.
How are alternative fuel vehicles treated under CAFE? The CAFE law provides for
special treatment of vehicle fuel economy calculations for dedicated alternative fuel
vehicles and dual-fuel vehicles. The fuel economy of a dedicated alternative fuel
vehicle is determined by dividing its fuel economy in equivalent miles per gallon of
gasoline or diesel fuel by 0.15. Thus a 15 mpg dedicated alternative fuel vehicle
would be rated as 100 mpg. For dual-fuel vehicles (vehicles that can use the
alternative fuel and gasoline or diesel interchangeably), the rating is the average of
the fuel economy on gasoline or diesel and the fuel economy on the alternative fuel
vehicle divided by .15. For example, this calculation procedure turns a dual fuel
vehicle that averages 25 mpg on gasoline or diesel with the above 100 mpg
alternative fuel to attain the 40 mpg value for CAFE purposes. Several limitations are
established for CAFE credits for dual fuel vehicles. For MYs 1993-2004, the maximum
CAFE increase attributable to dual fueled vehicles in a manufacturer’s passenger car
or light truck fleet is 1.2 mpg. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) directed the
Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the EPA Administrator and the
Secretary of Energy, to conduct a study and submit a report to Congress evaluating
the success of the policy decision to offer CAFE credit calculation incentives for dual-
fuel and gaseous dual-fuel vehicles. The report was transmitted to Congress in March
2002.The statutory language also requires that the Department of Transportation
either extend the incentive program for dual-fuel vehicles beyond MY 2004 for up to
four more years with a maximum allowable increase in average fuel economy for a
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manufacturer of 0.9 miles per gallon; or issue a Federal Register notice that justifies
termination of the incentive program. In March 2002, NHTSA issued an NPRM
proposing to extend the availability of the CAFE credit incentive for dual-fueled
vehicles for four years, through the end of the 2008 model year. A final rule will be
issued in 2003.
Are any vehicles exempted from CAFE standards?Light trucks that exceed 8,500 lbs
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) do not have to comply with CAFE standards.
These vehicles include pickup trucks, sport utility vehicles and large vans. A study
prepared for the Department of Energy, in February 2002, by the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory found that 521,000 trucks with GVWR from 8,500 to 10,000 lbs were sold
in calendar year 1999. The vast majority (82%) of these trucks are pickups and a
significant number (24%) were diesel. At the end of 1999, there were 5.8 million of
these trucks on the road accounting for 8% of the annual miles driven by light trucks,
and 9% of light truck fuel use.
How is a manufacturer’s CAFE determined for a given model year?A manufacturer’s
CAFE is the fleet wide average fuel economy. Separate CAFE calculations are made
for up to three potential fleets: domestic passenger cars, imported passenger cars
and light trucks. The averaging method used is referred to as a “harmonic mean”.
The regulatory language describes the calculation as: “the number of passenger
automobiles manufactured by the manufacturer in a model year; divided by the sum
of the fractions obtained by dividing the number of passenger automobiles of each
model manufactured by the manufacturer in that model year by the fuel economy
measured for that model.” The numerical example below illustrates the process.
Assume that a hypothetical manufacturer produces four light truck models in 2004,
where MPG means miles per gallon and GVWR means gross vehicle weight rating
measured in lbs:
Model MPG GVWR Production Volume
Vehicle A 22 3000 130,000
Vehicle B 20 3500 120,000
Vehicle C 16 4000 100,000
Vehicle D 10 8900 40,000
Because the Vehicle D exceeds 8,500 GVWR, it is excluded from the calculation.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s light truck CAFE is calculated as:=Average Light Truck
Fleet Fuel Economy The 2004 model year light truck CAFE standard is 20.7 mpg
therefore the manufacturer is not in compliance.
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AT Specific Vehicle Low Mileage Good Turns
No link – don’t alter CAFE mileage standards
No link – credits mean those manufacturers can keep making them if

they have to
Manufacturers can earn CAFE “credits” to offset deficiencies in their CAFE

performances. Specifically, when the average fuel economy of either the passenger
car or light truck fleet for a particular model year exceeds the established standard,
the manufacturer earns credits. The amount of credit a manufacturer earns is
determined by multiplying the tenths of a mile per gallon that the manufacturer
exceeded the CAFE standard in that model year by the amount of vehicles they
manufactured in that model year. These credits can be applied to any three
consecutive model years immediately prior to or subsequent to the model year in
which the credits are earned. The credits earned and applied to the model years prior
to the model year for which the credits are earned are termed “carry back” credits,
while those applied to model years subsequent to the model year in which the credits
are earned are known as “carry forward” credits. Failure to exercise carry forward
credits within the three years immediately following the year in which they are
earned will result in the forfeiture of those credits. Credits cannot be passed between
manufacturers or between fleets, e.g., from domestic passenger cars to light trucks.
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Agent (NHTSA)
NHTSA Administrator is legally designated to do everything with

regards to CAFE
The Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to establish CAFE standards
to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
NHTSA is responsible for establishing and amending the CAFE standards;
promulgating regulations concerning CAFE procedures, definitions and reports;
considering petitions for exemption from standards for low volume manufacturers
and establishing unique standards for them; enforcing fuel economy standards and
regulations; responding to petitions concerning domestic production by foreign
manufacturers and all other aspects of CAFE, including the classification of vehicle
lines as either cars or trucks; collecting, recording and cataloging Pre- and Mid-model
year reports; adjudicating carry back credit plans; and providing program incentives
such as credits for alternative fueled vehicle lines.
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2AC OSPEC
1. We meet – DoD is an agent of the federal government
2. Counterinterpretation – ‘the’ means we can specify an actor

Chambers Dictionary 98 (p 1718)
the: demonstrative adjective – used to refer to a unique person or

thing
.
3. Specification is better
a. key to solvency debates – agents take actions, not monolithic

government – specific solvency claims key to inform productive
activism and education on Africa policy
b. their interpretation incentivizes agent PICs – uniquely bad for

debate – create artificial ground outside the resolution – inculcates
political docility by refusing to engage the merits of a policy
question
4. Substantive links off of plan action solve the impact – we have to

defend an increase in public health assistance – agent just generates
better solvency debates
5. We meet - Individual agency actions are still considered “federal

government” actions
Words and Phrases 04 (Cummulative Supplementary Pamphlet,

v. 16A, p. 42)
N.D.Ga. 1986. Action against the Postal Service, although an independent

establishment of the executive branch of the federal government, is an action against
the “Federal Government” for purposes of rule that plaintiff in action against
government has right to jury trial only where right is one of terms of government’s
consent to be sued; declining to follow Algernon Blair Industrial Contractors, Inc. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 552 F.Supp. 972 (M.D.Ala.). 39 U.S.C.A. 201; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 7.—Griffin v. U.S. Postal Service, 635 F.Supp. 190.—Jury 12(1.2).
6. We have evidence justifying our agent – NHTSA Administrator is

legally designated to do everything with regards to CAFE – this
means even if we said USFG, normal means for implementation is
the actor we specified
The Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to establish CAFE standards
to the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).
NHTSA is responsible for establishing and amending the CAFE standards;
promulgating regulations concerning CAFE procedures, definitions and reports;
considering petitions for exemption from standards for low volume manufacturers
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and establishing unique standards for them; enforcing fuel economy standards and
regulations; responding to petitions concerning domestic production by foreign
manufacturers and all other aspects of CAFE, including the classification of vehicle
lines as either cars or trucks; collecting, recording and cataloging Pre- and Mid-model
year reports; adjudicating carry back credit plans; and providing program incentives
such as credits for alternative fueled vehicle lines.
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2AC T – ‘Incentives’
We meet –
a. CAFE standards carry a negative incentive for compliance
The penalty for failing to meet CAFE standards recently increased from $5.00 to
$5.50 per tenth of a mile per gallon for each tenth under the target value times the
total volume of those vehicles manufactured for a given model year. Since 1983,
manufacturers have paid more than $500 million in civil penalties. Most European
manufacturers regularly pay CAFE civil penalties ranging from less than $1 million to
more than $20 million annually. Asian and domestic manufacturers have never paid a
civil penalty. For MY 2002, five passenger car fleets including BMW, DaimlerChrysler
import, Fiat, Lotus, and Porsche are projected to fail to meet 27.5 mpg passenger car
CAFE standard. In addition, two light truck fleets including BMW and Volkswagen will
likely fail to meet the light truck CAFE standard of 20.7 mpg. Final Reports for MY
2002 provided by the EPA to NHTSA in mid-calendar year of 2003 may adjust these
projections favorably.
b. the plan creates new incentives in the CAFE program that are
positive – tax breaks tied to ethanol
c. ethanol is alternative energy

EQC Study Report 4
(September, “Hydrogen, Wind, Biodiesal, and Ethanol: Alternative Energy Sources to
Fuel Montana’s Future?” http://www.aeromt.org/PDFs/2004energyreport.pdf)
Members of the EQC at the beginning of the 2003-04 legislative interim expressed an
interest in studying the selected alternative energy sources. The stated rationale was
that given Montana's current energy situation, it is important to evaluate alternative
energy resources like biodiesel, hydrogen, wind, and ethanol to help diversify
Montana's energy options. The full EQC unanimously incorporated this expressed
interest into the Council's interim work plan. At the June 2003 EQC meeting, the
Council appointed a six- person subcommittee to investigate alternative energy
resources. The Council allocated .10 FTE (270 hours) of staff resources to this
subcommittee.
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2AC Ban CAFE CP 1/2
Our interpretation is that ‘Ban’ counterplans out of inevitability

claims without specific solvency advocates are illegitimate –
a. their functionally utopian – no one serious proposes them,
political possibilities involve reforming programs in certain ways –
this means reform literature is relevant, informative, and politically
useful to debate about – there’s zero educational value to debates
regarding made up proposals that will never be considered
b. unpredictable – solvency advocates are key to determine the ban
counterplans we cut offense against – predictability of counterplans
is key to aff debatability, if the neg doesn’t need a solvency
advocate they can just object-fiat out of our advantages and win
every debate
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2AC Ban CAFE CP 2/2
2. all your CAFE bad turns use faulty analysis – no connection

between the act and your claims, means you can’t solve your offense
Gerard and Lave, Center for Study and Improvement and Regulation
at CMU, ‘3
(David and Lester, “The Economics of CAFE Reconsidered: A Response to CAFE Critics
and A Case for Fuel Economy Standards http://aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpAo.pdf)
The points made by these critics are important, but they imply policies quite different
from those drawn. Specifically, the costs of market distortions and the external costs
stem from
the failure of current gas prices to reflect the full social costs of gasoline
consumption. Lutter and
Kravitz (2003), for example, argue that, at the margin, there are external costs of
10.4 cents per
mile associated with additional crashes (7.8 cents), congestion (2.4 cents), and
pollution (0.2
cents).5 If so, gasoline is under-priced dramatically, insurance markets are inefficient,
and
congestion policy needs fundamental reform. The authors do not explore the role of
the CAFE
program in generating these costs, nor do they offer any policy prescription for
mitigating them.
Given that the current realized fleet average fuel economy is 17 miles per gallon
MPG),6 a
corrective Pigouvian tax increase of about $1.75 per gallon would be needed to
internalize these
externalities.
Implementing a corrective tax would lower the critics’ cost estimates markedly. The
market distortions exist because, at current gasoline prices, consumers place a low
priority on
fuel economy. Higher gasoline prices would reduce these distortions by reducing
driving and the
associated externalities and by leading consumers to demand vehicles with greater
fuel economy.
Thus, we conclude that the recent criticisms are not as much an indictment of the
CAFE program
as a vivid illustration of the failure of current transportation policy to internalize
enormous
external costs.
3. CAFE key to solve the case – consumer regulation alone sends

mixed signals and can’t solve oil dependency
at CMU, ‘3
The CAFE program has the potential to provide a useful signal to automakers
concerning what they will have to achieve in future years, giving them time to
perform the needed research and development and build the needed plant and
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equipment. CAFE keeps automakers' attention on fuel economy, getting them to
figure out how to squeeze each tiny increment of fuel economy out of their vehicles.
Consumer desires for greater fuel economy would have the same effect, but signals
from buyers are scrambled by the range of consumers with differing desires.
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2AC States CP
1. 50 state fiat is a voting issue –
a. no distinction between 50 states or 50 countries – if the negative
can pick a group of political bodies and fiat all of them, it justifies
any multi-actor fiat – its impossible to generate offense against
functionally utopian counterplans that have every actor in the world
except the USFG concur – kills debate and affirmative ground, makes
the activity meaningless
b. our interpretation is that the negative can fiat one alternate
agent from the aff – solves the warrants to 50 state fiat good, they
can read a similar counterplan if they find an agent that can compel
multi-state action – our interpretation preserves aff ground and
forces good neg research
c. pre-empt – federalism is not a warrant for the counterplan’s
theoretical legitimacy – even if evidence is written in context of
energy policy and federalism there’s plenty of debateable topic
ground aside from federalism – literature is secondary to
functionality of debate for determining theoretical concerns
2. Perm – do both – the fed and the states can simultaneously

enforce regulations
And, it
Buzbee, Prof of Law @ Emory, ‘6
(William, 2/1, “Contextual Environmental Federalism”
http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/envtllaw/issues/vol14/1/v14_n1_buzbee.pdf )
Environmental policy analysts sometimes make broad claims about federal and state
environmental roles based on isolated, anecdotal examples. This essay suggests
that policy analysts should seek to distinguish events that are the result of particular
historical opportunities and context, from propensities and incentives that are more
stable and predictable under current forms of environmental federalism. Greater
attention should be paid to the array of regulatory actors and regulatory modalities.
Activity by one actor in one modality does not necessarily reveal much about “the
state’s” proclivities. This essay suggests that recent state enforcement activism
proves little about inherent state environmentalism, but instead reflects political
opportunities created by a shift on the federal level towards a more anti-
environmental position. Rather than seeing recent state actions as providing
support for the elimination or reduction of the federal environmental role, this essay
argues that these recent state actions reveal once again the benefits of regulatory
overlap, cooperative federalism structures, and redundant enforcement
mechanisms. These aspects of the American system of environmental federalism
reduce the risk of regulatory underkill that can result from failures to address
environmental ills, as well as failures adequately to fund, implement and enforce
written laws and regulations.1
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2AC Gas Tax CP 1/2
1. Perm – do the plan and establish the gas usage tax

Solves the case at net benefit best
at CMU, ‘3
After examining the arguments against CAFE, we discuss the economic arguments for
the program. First, most vehicle lines have a range of fuel economies where the
lifetime cost of vehicle ownership are roughly constant (NAS, 2002). That is,
technology exists to improve fuel economy at some up-front cost, and this cost will
be paid back in fuel savings over the lifetime of the vehicle. Current market
outcomes provide vehicles with lower up-front costs, though social preferences
would tend to favor vehicles with greater fuel economy. Second, most analysts
assume that private agents employ discount rates that are far higher than
reasonable social discount rates for fuel conservation. As a result of this discrepancy,
market outcomes systematically under-provide fuel efficiency. A combination of
higher gasoline taxes and modifications of the CAFE program would be superior to
either instrument on its own.
2. More evidence – combing social progrmas like CAFE and higher

gas costs is the only way to solve our oil advantage
at CMU, ‘3
High gasoline prices from 1975 through the early 1980s provided consumers with the
incentive to purchase more fuel-economic vehicles. Gas prices fell dramatically in the
1980s, leading consumers to emphasize performance features such as power, size,
styling, and safety over fuel economy. Persistently low gasoline prices send
consumers a signal that contradicts social conservation objectives. Automakers must
simultaneously satisfy the CAFE standards and consumer demands for larger, high-
performance vehicles.
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2AC Gas Tax CP 2/2
3. Saving the best for last – this evidence is offense for the perm
over the counterplan and it’s even better than your hot shit CP 1NC
evidence
at CMU, ‘3
There is a spirited debate among CAFE proponents and opponents concerning

whether consumers are rational in choosing fuel economy for their vehicles. Many
CAFE proponents argue that consumers select a vehicle based on a variety of
performance characteristics, but have difficulty assessing whether benefits of added
fuel efficiency are worth the costs. In contrast, CAFE opponents, including many
economists, argue that information is readily available and that consumers are
capable of evaluating whether the higher vehicle price is worth the gasoline savings.
Although assuming consumer rationality makes the CAFE debate less interesting, we
argue that CAFE is justified even for rational, well-informed consumers, since there
are social benefits of fuel conservation that private decision makers do not
internalize. We do not argue that CAFE is necessarily the best instrument for
achieving conservation objectives, but we judge that a combination of gas taxes and
CAFE will be superior to gas taxes alone. Lifetime Costs A series of studies have
found that the total cost of owning a vehicle over its lifetime is about the same for
vehicles across a range of fuel economies. Subsequent studies have confirmed this
conclusion by determining the range of fuel economies where the lifetime savings in
gasoline would pay for the higher manufacturing cost of making a more fuel
economic vehicle that had the same performance. NAS (2002) finds that fuel
efficiency improvements are cost-effective for current technology, since the higher
sticker price would be off-set by fuel savings over the lifetime of the vehicle. The
implication of this finding is that the current market conditions lead to equilibrium
where vehicles are at the low end of the feasible fuel economy range. Greene (1998)
estimates that the lifetime cost of owning a subcompact car vary by less than $100
for cars that got between 30 and 40 miles per gallon.16 While consumers should be
indifferent between vehicles in this range, a number of empirical studies suggest that
consumers prefer lower up-front costs to lower operating costs. This suggests that
consumers will purchase at the low end of the fuel economy range. Since a 40 mpg
car would use 1,250 fewer gallons of gasoline over its 150,000 mile lifetime, society
strongly prefers vehicles that will consume less gasoline. Green’s calculation
suggests that requiring the 40 mpg car would save gasoline at a cost of less than 8
cents per gallon. Note that higher fuel prices will not solve this problem, but only
raise the minimum end of the range. Table 3 presents the NAS (2002) estimates of
break-even levels across different market segments. The numbers suggest both that
a large range exists where lifetime vehicle ownership costs are constant, and that
there is room for significant improvements in fuel economy across every market
segment. Consumers are assumed to have a discount rate of 12% and gasoline prices
are $1.50. The most striking numbers are that the biggest potential fuel savings
come from the market segments that currently have the worst fuel efficiency. The
lower-bound estimate for large cars is that a 4.2-MPG improvement is possible while
keeping lifetime ownership costs approximately constant. Such an improvement
would save 882 gallons of gasoline over the life of the vehicle. Similarly, for the large
SUV segment, the lower-bound estimate is an improvement from 17.2 MPG to 23.2
MPG – a 28% increase, resulting in fuel savings of 2477 gallons of gasoline over the
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vehicle lifetime. Social Versus Private Willingness to Pay for Conservation
Crandall (1992) recognized that differences in social and private discount rates are a
potential justification for minimum fuel efficiency standards. High discount rates lead
consumers to choose lower levels of fuel efficiency than society would choose with its
lower discount rate. If the divergence were small, the effect might be neglected.
However, CAFE critics assert that consumers have high discount rates. For example,
Kleit (2002) assumes that consumers discount at a rate of 20% for new vehicle
purchases, and Lutter and Kravitz (2003) argue that NHTSA should employ discount
rates of seven to 10%, or even higher, to reflect consumer discount rates in
evaluating the program benefits. Given Kleit’s assumption of a 20% discount rate for
consumer purchases, he calculates that the average vehicle is driven 55,000
discounted miles. A consumer would be willing to pay $275 for a two-MPG
improvement in fuel economy (a half-cent per mile cost decrease). Using a 7%
discount rate, society would see the vehicle as going nearly 100,000 discounted
miles, implying that the fuel sayings is worth $500. Thus society would value the fuel
savings at $225 more than the rational consumer for the same fuel-economy
improvement. Thus, the assumptions underlying recent criticisms imply that even if
there were no external costs, market outcomes would under-provide fuel economy.
Figure 5 illustrates the differences by contrasting the willingness to pay for a three-
mile per gallon increase in fuel economy using a private discount rate of 20 percent
and a social discount rate of four percent. We choose the four percent rate because
this is closer to typical social discount rates (and it is also the discount rate that Kleit
uses to analyze effects of gasoline savings). Assuming a fuel price of $1.50, the social
WTP for an increase from 22 to 25 MPG is approximately $400 more than private
WTP. Moreover, the divergence in WTP is highest for vehicles that get the poorest fuel
economy. For example, the adjusted average fuel economy for a large SUV is 17.2
MPG. Figure 5 shows that society would be willing to pay almost $660 more for fuel
economy improvements than the rational consumer. The significant divergence
between public and private discount rates creates a social inefficiency that could be
internalized either by a fuel tax increase that offsets the externality, by a CAFE
standard that is derived from the social discount rate, or by some other market
intervention. Justifying fuel economy standards on the basis of a divergence of social
and private discount rates opens the door to regulation of air conditioners, furnaces,
light bulbs, and any number of products that have tradeoff between up-front costs
and operating costs. We observe that the federal government has intervened in each
of these markets to regulate the efficiency of the units, prohibit units of lower
efficiency, or at least to inform consumers of the savings from the more efficient
units. As emphasized above, we do not view CAFE alone as an efficient mechanism
for internalizing social costs. We do note that CAFE opponents draw the wrong
implication for the large divergence in consumer versus social discount rates that
they assume. If new car consumers have discount rates that are much higher than
the social discount rate for fuel conservation, then consumers will choose vehicles
with too little fuel economy, resulting in a benefit to a market intervention to correct
the problem.
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Politics – Plan Popular
at CMU, ‘3
In 1975 Congress established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards as a

means to conserve petroleum and to reduce U.S. reliance on imported oil. The
program continues to enjoy solid public support as a means to conserve fuel,
enhance domestic petroleum security, reduce air pollution, and curb greenhouse gas
emissions. Many economists and free-market proponents argue that the CAFE
program has a host of direct and indirect costs that overwhelm its conservation
benefits.
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Case 1NC 1/
1. Cafe standards jack car prices and lead to more fuel consumption
– turns case
Galt, Economics graduate from U Chicago, 3
(Jane, March 03, “Cafe Standards”
http://www.janegalt.net/blog/archives/004002.html)
Kevin Drum asks a good question: WHY ARE SUVs SO EXPENSIVE?....So I watched 60
Minutes tonight, and in the segment on SUVs I heard once again about how the profit
margin on these vehicles is anywhere from $5,000 to $10,000 or more. This
compares with ordinary cars, which we are lead to believe are practically sold at a
loss. I've heard this so many times that it must be true, but what's the explanation
for this? The same companies compete in both the car and the SUV market, so
shouldn't competitive pressures force the profit margins to similar points? Isn't that
how this whole free market thing is supposed to work? Can anybody out there who
works for a car company explain this? I believe I can, in two words: CAFE standards.
CAFE stands for Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency. And what that means is that
rather than setting a baseline below which no car can fall, the regulators examine the
average efficiency of the entire fleet in order to see whether they're making their
target. There are several current ways to make cars more fuel efficient: 1) You can make the engine
smaller. This makes the car hard to get up hills, reduces its carrying capacity, and decreases its safety,
since averting accidents sometimes requires the ability to accelerate quickly. 2) You can make the car
lighter without reducing its size. This is very hard and very expensive to do, and it makes the car much
less safe, because less metal around you to absorb the kinetic energy of an impact means that that energy
gets absorbed by you. Advocates like to argue that this is only because other people are driving heavy,
inefficient SUVs, but this is a canard: lightening the car makes it less safe even in an accident with a car of
similar weight. The problem is the velocity, not the weight of the other car. 3) You can make the car
smaller. Americans don't like small cars, and they're also less safe. Compact and sub-compact cars are, as
SUV-critic Gregg Easterbrook points out, death traps. However, they have the advantage of being cheaper
to make than light big cars. 4) You can get creative with the design. The Honda Insight combines all teh
abovementioned: it's smaller (two seater with no luggage space!), lighter, underpowered. It also has an
innovative engine design. However, I've heard estimates that Honda's losing 20K on every model it sells
(no one seems to know the true figure, as Honda and Toyota are very tight with their figures on their
hybrids). Basically, what it boils down to is that in order to get cars to consume less fuel, you
have to sacrifice features that Americans like, like size, power, and safety. You can't
just decree that everyone only make tiny underpowered cars, because that would not
only focus the ire of the people on Washington instead of automakers; it would create
problems for people who genuinely need the features you're eliminating, because for
example they live on a ranch in Wyoming. So the regulators set an average (and also,
I believe, a low floor), and told the automakers to figure it out. Well, they've got the
same problem that Washington does -- no one wants to buy a death trap with no
luggage space. So they make small cars and sell them to people who wouldn't be
able to afford a more powerful one. Flexible people who don't mind cramming eleven
people in a Geo from New York to Maine. People without a lot of stuff to put in the
trunk. People who don't care about safety because they think they're immortal. Your
kids, in other words. The only problem with kids is that they can't afford cars. So the
automakers lower the price to the point where a kid with a modest after-school job
can make the payments. Now we begin to see the perverse logic of fiat solutions.
Have we lowered the total output of carbon emissions here? No, we've raised them,
because in order to placate the customers who don't want less power & room, the
automakers have increased the number of cars they sell. Now kids who would
otherwise be riding the schoolbus are zooming around until all hours, merrily spewing
carbon dioxide as they go. The fact that they consume less gas than a family sedan
doesn't really matter, because in a lot of cases they're consuming gas that wouldn't
have been consumed at all, as those of us who made it through high school without
cars can attest that we were not given unlimited access to the family minivan to
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gallivant around the highways with. (Actually, my family had a brown 1976 Chrysler
Cordoba, and I was probably the only child in America who was offered the
opportunity to borrow the car and refused it. It was not only radically uncool; parking
it was like trying to parallel park the Love Boat.) Anyway, in order to make up the
money they're losing on the compact and sub-compact market, the automakers jack
up the rates on the rest of us. Especially in the most price-insensitive part of the
market: the SUV owners, who have proven that they're sufficiently oblivious to cost
that they're willing to buy a car that costs $50 to fill the tank.
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Case 1NC 2/
2. CAFE standards deck the environment, cause oil dependence, and

hurt the economy
Coon, Heritage Foundation, 1
(Charli, E. July 11, “Why the Government’s CAFE standards for fuel efficiency should
be repealed, not increased
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/BG1458.cfm)
Congress may soon decide to increase the standards for fuel economy imposed on
manufacturers of vehicles sold in the United States. 1 This would be a mistake.
In 1975, Congress reacted to the 1973 oil embargo imposed by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by establishing the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Program as part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. The goal
of the program was to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil and consumption of
gasoline. Advocates also hoped it would improve air quality. But the evidence shows
that it has failed to meet its goals; worse, it has had unintended consequences that
increase the risk of injury to Americans. Instead of perpetuating such a program,
Congress should consider repealing the CAFE standards and finding new market-
based solutions to reduce high gasoline consumption and rising prices.
There is significant pressure on Members of Congress, however, not only to continue
this failed program, but also to raise fuel efficiency standards even higher. The
current CAFE standards require auto manufacturers selling in the United States to
meet certain fuel economy levels for their fleets of new cars and light trucks (pickups,
minivans, and sport utility vehicles, or SUVs). The standard for passenger cars is
currently 27.5 miles per gallon; for light trucks, it is 20.7 mpg. 2
Manufacturers face stiff fines for failing to meet these standards based on the total
number of vehicles in each class sold, but compliance is taken out of their hands. The
government measures compliance by calculating a sales-weighted mean of the fuel
economies for the fleets of new cars and light trucks a manufacturer sells each year,
and it measures domestically produced and imported vehicles separately.
Clearly, the CAFE program has failed to accomplish its purposes. Oil imports have not
decreased. In fact, they have increased from about 35 percent of supply in the mid-
1970s to 52 percent today. Likewise, consumption has not decreased. As fuel
efficiency improves, consumers have generally increased their driving, offsetting
nearly all the gains in fuel efficiency. 3 Not only has the CAFE program failed to meet
its goals; it has had tragic even if unintended consequences. As vehicles were being
made lighter to achieve more miles per gallon and meet the standards, the number
of fatalities from crashes rose. 4
Politicians should stop distorting the marketplace with unwise policies and convoluted
regulations and allow the market to respond to consumer demand for passenger
vehicles. In addition to free-market considerations, there are other compelling
reasons to reject the CAFE standards. For example:
CAFE standards endanger human lives;
CAFE standards fail to reduce consumption; and
CAFE standards do not improve the environment.
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Gas Tax CP 1NC 1/2
The United States federal government should tax the usage of

gasoline at a level reflecting the costs to the United States federal
government of obtaining gasoline. The United States federal
government should also rescind all Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards.
Solves the entirety of the case – net benefits are econ, politics, and
solvency
Hamilton, UCSD Prof of Economics, 7
(James, March 3, “Cafe Standards”
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2007/03/cafe_standards.html)
Featuring prominently in the new energy plan from President Bush is a call for
changes in the corporate average fuel efficiency (CAFE) standards that the
Administration claims could reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 5% over the next
10 years. Here are some of the reasons I'm not thrilled by that suggestion.
CAFE standards are based on the premise that auto manufacturers and consumers
are making inappropriate decisions about the kind of vehicles that get produced. The
clearest way to motivate this from an economic perspective would be to suggest that
there are costs to using gasoline beyond those paid directly by consumers, such as a
geopolitical cost when the U.S. relies on imported oil or possible consequences for
the world climate. But if that is the motivation, an economically more efficient way to
accomplish the objective would be to tax the gasoline use itself so that the after-tax
price paid by consumers completely reflects whatever these true costs are deemed
to be. This has the benefits of providing an incentive not just to purchase more fuel-
efficient cars, but also to encourage more fuel conservation in the use of the existing
fleet through such measures as driving slower, driving less, or getting more of the
existing mileage from the more fuel-efficient vehicles. And it allows consumers and
firms the maximum flexibility to figure out how to do this in the least disruptive way.
When you force consumers to buy something other than their first choice, the
consequences may not be quite what the policy-maker originally envisioned. One
example sometimes given is the shift to SUVs. Because the initial CAFE standards
were different for "light trucks" as opposed to "cars", one way Detroit responded to
CAFE was to create a new supersized vehicle that in practice is used the way a
"passenger car" used to be, but that wasn't similarly regulated. A second example of
a possible unintended consequence of tightening CAFE is that if American cars no
longer have the characteristics sought by consumers, they will buy more imports.
There is an interesting new study of this by Mark Jacobsen, an economics Ph.D.
student at Stanford whom we're trying to persuade to join our faculty at UCSD.
Jacobsen notes that auto producers generally fall into one of three groups, as
exemplified by Toyota, Ford, and BMW in the diagram below. The fleet of a Japanese
producer like Toyota usually has an average fuel economy that is higher than the
existing CAFE standard, meaning that a modest increase in the standard would not
affect them directly. European producers like BMW fail to meet existing CAFE
standards, and choose to just pay the fine that is required for any company that fails
to comply. The third group is the U.S. producers like Ford, who feel that violating the
CAFE standards would expose them to unwanted publicity, litigation, or further
undesirable legislation, and therefore stay just inside the standard. It is thus the U.S.
auto producers who do the adjusting when CAFE standards are tightened.
Jacobsen builds a detailed model of the American new and used car market based on
the choices consumers make between different kinds of cars. His simulations suggest
that one consequence of tightening CAFE standards is an increase in the number of
LMDIT 2008 Chase
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imported cars and a decrease in the fuel efficiency of those cars. Essentially the
European producers have an advantage over the American producers in being more
willing to flaunt their violation of the CAFE standards, and the Japanese producers
have the advantage of selling enough compact vehicles to be allowed to expand less-
efficient models such as the Acura. Thus, people who like bigger cars end up buying
more of them from the importers when the standards are tightened.
(HAMILTON CONTINUES BELOW)
Gas Tax 1NC CP 2/2
(HAMILTON CONTINUES, NO TEXT OMITTED)
Overall, Jacobsen estimates that a one-mile-per-gallon increase in the required

average corporate fuel efficiency would increase the average fuel-efficiency of all
new cars sold by 2.5%. However, since most of the older cars would still be on the
road, Jacobsen estimates that during the first year, total U.S. gasoline consumption
would decline by only 0.8%. He estimates the costs of this 1 mpg tightening of CAFE
would be $20 billion in the first year, with these first-year costs shared about equally
between U.S. consumers and producers. For comparison, Jacobsen claims that a
gasoline tax could accomplish the same first-year effect at an efficiency cost of
significantly less than $1 billion.
Over time, the fuel savings from tightening CAFE would of course increase, but even
after 10 years, Jacobsen concludes that that a gasoline tax could accomplish the
same thing at 1/6 the cost.
Although it is hard to motivate CAFE from sound economic principles, somehow it has
political staying power. The public evidently sees the costs associated with CAFE as
borne by "somebody else" whereas they know they pay the gasoline taxes
themselves. But here's another possible proposal that might be suggested by
Jacobsen's research. Why not start decrying the fact that some of those foreign
companies are failing to comply with our existing CAFE standards, and claim that
what we need to do is get more serious about enforcing these, and raise the payment
required per vehicle of any company that fails to meet the standards? In practice, this
would amount to either raising the tax on BMWs, or forcing the European importers to
sell some more fuel-efficient vehicles. Ford and GM would be spared, as long as they
continue to stay within the existing standards.
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Gas Tax CP 2NC Overview
Our Hamilton evidence is game over – counterplan creates a new gas

tax on usage instead of purchase, Hamilton says the government will
set the tax at the level required to accurately reflect the cost of
obtaining gas – solves the case, creates incentives to buy more fuel
efficient cars – companies have an incentive to produce more fuel
efficient vehicles without CAFE regulations – also, consumers want
to use existing vehicles more efficiently, counterplan solves better
Hamilton isolates three net benefits –
a. 2AC concedes Hamilton’s solvency turn to the aff and the perm –
raising CAFE standards creates an incentive for foreign automakers
to flaunt noncompliance and reduce fuel efficiency – people who
want big cars will import them from overseas – turns solvency, total
fuel efficiency goes down
b. economy – CAFE has unintended costs dealing with forcing a non-
voluntary transition and cumbersome regulations – in the first year
alone, the CP costs 19 billion dollars less than the plan, even after
ten years the cost of the CP costs 1/6 of what the plan does – total
savings are massive – plan links harder to the spending da
c. politics – CAFE is popular with consumers, they see the costs as
paid by ‘someone else’ – however, the counterplan is unpopular
because consumers have to pay the tax themselves – cp doesn’t link
to the bush bad disad
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Gas Tax 2NC CP Solves / Case Solvo Turn
Economists conclude neg – CAFE is expensive and creates more fuel

usage, CP solves
at CMU, ‘3
More recently, there have been concerns that fuel-economy improvements increase
the external costs associated with driving. Because CAFE reduces marginal driving
costs and encourages more driving, there are costs associated with the CAFE-
induced vehicle miles traveled. An average point estimate is that a 10 percent
increase in fuel economy (or decrease in fuel prices) leads to a two percent increase
in driving (Greene, Kahn, and Gibson, 1999). The “take-back” or “rebound” effect
cuts into the conservation benefits of improved fuel economy. Moreover, because
there are significant externalities associated with driving, e.g., crashes, congestion,
and pollution, any additional driving generates enormous social costs. The rebound
effect has figured prominently in recent attacks on the CAFE program. Figure 4
illustrates the private and social benefits and costs of fuel economy improvements
and the rebound effect. Fuel economy improvements reduce the price of driving
($/mi) from P0 to P1, inducing a movement along the demand curve and vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) increase from VMT0 to VMT1. The private benefit of the
improvement is represented by the trapezoid bounded by P0, P1, and the demand
curve (VMT1 * ∆P – 0.5*∆P*∆VMT). Assuming that the performance and size of the
vehicle are unchanged, there will be an additional manufacturing cost to increase
fuel economy. Thus, the net private benefit is the trapezoid less these up-front
capital costs. With per-mile external costs, S, the CAFE-induced social costs from the
additional VMT are S * ∆VMT. Economists generally support gasoline tax increases as
the most efficient means for increasing fuel economy. The intuition is
straightforward. First, CAFE standards apply only to new vehicles and therefore the
effects are introduced over fifteen or more years. Second, fuel efficiency increases
reduce per-mile fuel costs, thus encouraging more driving. In contrast, fuel taxes
both encourage consumers to drive less now, and demand more fuel-efficient
vehicles in the future. The cost estimates are also difficult to argue with: Gasoline
taxes achieve the same fuel conservation levels at costs that are seven to 10 times
less than those of the CAFE program (Crandall, 1992).
LMDIT 2008 Chase
CAFE 44/45
CP Solves Oil Shocks
MacKenzie, Union of Concerned Scientists Vehicles Engineer, ‘6

(Donald, April 29, “Cutting Oil Dependence”
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/fuel_economy/fuel-economy-the-single-most-
effective-step-for-cutting-oil-depedence.html)
Increasing fuel economy is by far the best tool we have for cutting our oil
dependence. It will deliver fast results. It has been proven to work from experience—
we roughly doubled the fuel economy of our cars between the 1970s and the late
1980s. We can do this right now. The technology needed to increase the average fuel
economy of our cars and trucks to 40 miles per gallon (mpg) has already been
developed, but for the most part is collecting dust on automakers' shelves. If we
increased fuel economy to 40 mpg over 10 years, then within 15 years we would
have saved more oil than we would ever get out of the Arctic Wildlife Refuge over its
entire 40-50 year life. And the savings from better fuel economy would keep on
growing indefinitely, while the oil wells would dry up.
LMDIT 2008 Chase
CAFE 45/45
AT Artificially Competitive / Perm Out of Ban
It’s not artificially competitive – banning generates uniqueness for

our turns, but Hamilton creates competition between the new gas
tax and the CAFE standards – that’s the link differentiation 2NC
overview above

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LMDIT 2008 Chase

Collantes suggests reading his “decision-making flowchart” to

Why is the aff so convoluted? Well, it would be a lot more

P.S. The ethanol advantage is that changing the way we make

The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration

(Marty April 22, “Fed Poised to Accelerate CAFE Standard”

Specifically, Congress, through AMFA, endeavored to induce manufacturers to deploy

Ultimately, the raison d’être of government intervention is to provide a societal

Subpoint A is production methods

Better production methods solve the problems with corn ethanol in

Different ethanol production pathways have nontrivially-variant impacts in terms of

Increasing support for ethanol production key to production

(GLASGOW AND HANSEN CONTINUE BELOW)

Status quo ethanol production will cause environmental devastation,

Environmental degradation risks extinction

Hunger causes 36 million deaths a year systemically, and massive

[Continued… (9 Paragraphs Later…)]

Subpoint B is oil dependence –

Ethanol fuels America

Oil dependence jacks Middle East stability and makes peace

Causes nuclear escalation and global conflict

A National Imperative Oil dependence endangers U.S. economic and national

Impact is human survival

Here’s a bunch of implementation information about the program

How is the actual Average Fuel Economy reported by manufacturers to the

No link – don’t alter CAFE mileage standards

No link – credits mean those manufacturers can keep making them if

Manufacturers can earn CAFE “credits” to offset deficiencies in their CAFE

NHTSA Administrator is legally designated to do everything with

1. We meet – DoD is an agent of the federal government

2. Counterinterpretation – ‘the’ means we can specify an actor

the: demonstrative adjective – used to refer to a unique person or

a. key to solvency debates – agents take actions, not monolithic

b. their interpretation incentivizes agent PICs – uniquely bad for

4. Substantive links off of plan action solve the impact – we have to

5. We meet - Individual agency actions are still considered “federal

Words and Phrases 04 (Cummulative Supplementary Pamphlet,

N.D.Ga. 1986. Action against the Postal Service, although an independent

6. We have evidence justifying our agent – NHTSA Administrator is

c. ethanol is alternative energy

Our interpretation is that ‘Ban’ counterplans out of inevitability

2. all your CAFE bad turns use faulty analysis – no connection

3. CAFE key to solve the case – consumer regulation alone sends

2. Perm – do both – the fed and the states can simultaneously

1. Perm – do the plan and establish the gas usage tax

2. More evidence – combing social progrmas like CAFE and higher

There is a spirited debate among CAFE proponents and opponents concerning

In 1975 Congress established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards as a

2. CAFE standards deck the environment, cause oil dependence, and

The United States federal government should tax the usage of

(HAMILTON CONTINUES BELOW)

Gas Tax 1NC CP 2/2

(HAMILTON CONTINUES, NO TEXT OMITTED)

Overall, Jacobsen estimates that a one-mile-per-gallon increase in the required

Our Hamilton evidence is game over – counterplan creates a new gas

Economists conclude neg – CAFE is expensive and creates more fuel

MacKenzie, Union of Concerned Scientists Vehicles Engineer, ‘6

It’s not artificially competitive – banning generates uniqueness for

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