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Hegemony - Scholars

Hegemony - Scholars

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Published by: AffNeg.Com on Jan 08, 2009
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First, it is crucial that the United States maintain leadership in Space to deter conflicts and
prevent other count
Dolman, Everett C. "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1
Winter, 2K5

Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms
race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons
are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing
capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has
no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the
capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a
minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors
to try. On the other hand, should the US reject
the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not
to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other
words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is
most likely if the US follows its counsel.

Second, this leads to global nuclear war.
Hitchens 2K3

(Theresa, Editor of Defense News, Director of Center for Defense Information, Former director of British American
Security Information Council -think tank based in Washington and London. October 2.
The negative consequences of a space arms race are hard to exaggerate, given the inherent offense-
dominant nature of space warfare.
Space weapons, like anything else on orbit, are inherently vulnerable
and, therefore, best exploited as first-strike weapons. Thus, as Michael Krepon and Chris Clary argue in their
monograph, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance,” the hair-trigger postures of the nuclear competition
between the United States and Russia during the Cold War would be elevated to the “ultimate high ground”
of space. Furthermore, any conflict involving ASAT use is likely to highly escalatory, in particular among
nuclear weapons states, as the objective of an attacker would be to eliminate the other side’s
capabilities to respond either in kind or on the ground by taking out satellites providing surveillance,
communications and targeting.
Indeed, U.S. Air Force officials participating in space wargames have
discovered that war in space rapidly deteriorates into all-out nuclear war, precisely because it quickly
becomes impossible to know if the other side has gone nuclear. Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted
one gamer as saying simply: “[If] I don’t know what’s going on, I have no choice but to hit everything,
using everything I have.”
This should not be surprising to anyone – the United States and the Soviet
Union found this out very early in the Cold War, and thus took measures to ensure transparency, such
as placing emphasis on early warning radars, developing the “hotline” and pledging to non-
interference with national technical means of verification under arms control treaties.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008


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