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UC Davis Undergraduate Human Rights Journal
UC Davis Undergraduate Human Rights Journal

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MAKING THE CASE

:
HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL AT UC DAVIS
A cross-disciplinary Undergraduate journal encouraging students to make a case about human rights issues

MAKING THE CASE:
HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL AT UC DAVIS Volume 1, issue 2. June 2012
Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor Non-fiction Editors Rachel Pevsner Joe Nijmeh Hannah Tigerschiold Mana Azarmi Rudy Sanchez Katherine Gee Jazmin Sheppard Nehorai Gold Nich Malone Riha Pathak Dr. Keith Watenpaugh

Fiction Editors Poetry Editor Art/Photo Editor Assistant Editor Advisor

and Special Thanks to The Davis California Sunrise Rotary Club

Printed By Reprographics Cover Art By Jina Li Dishman We acquire first North American publication rights. All rights revert to the author after publication, though we request acknowledgement of first appearance in this journal. Publication costs for this journal were underwritten by a generous grant from The Davis California Sunrise Rotary Club

   

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LETTERS FROM THE EDITORS
Dear Readers, Staring at a blank page trying to come up with something witty or exuberant or even slightly intriguing to say is very intimidating, especially when you know that there is an entire journal of riveting pieces right behind you. I am especially proud of this, the second issue of Human Rights Journal here at UC Davis. We had many, many quality submissions in a variety of mediums (essays, fiction, creative nonfiction, poetry, photography, music, interviews, etc.) with contributors from a variety of majors (Political Science, History, International Relations, Psychology, Asian American Studies, Art, Music, English, Middle East South Asia Studies, Comparative Literature, Womyn and Gender Studies, etc.). This, combined with the hard work of many people, has produced a terrific journal that will surprise you, entertain you, inform you and make you question what you know. It is my hope that this journal entices readers into conversations about humanity’s place in history, in the current world, in the future; about human rights issues on our own campus and beyond. I would like to thank the contributors: Much kudos for your fabulous work! We are indebted to you for your contribution to the journal. Thank you for your tremendous backbone in allowing us to read and critique your work. I would like to thank my fellow members of the editorial board: I greatly appreciate your hard work and quick responses (not to mention your endurance for long meetings and frantic text messages). Thank you for supporting each other and pushing forward to the completion of this project. I would like to thank the Davis Sunrise Rotary Club: your generous financial funding and moral support fuel this journal and keep it running!   iii  

I would like to thank, especially, Dr. Keith Watenpaugh: it is your enthusiasm for human rights and for education that has brought us all together to create this journal. Most of us have the great fortune of knowing you, and those who do not should take one of your classes immediately. This journal (literally) would not be here without you. And, of course, I would like to thank you, readers, because this journal is fulfilling its purpose by being in your hands and, more than anything else, I hope you enjoy it. It is my honor to present to you the second issue of Making the Case: Human Rights Journal at UC Davis. Sincerely, Rachel Pevsner Editor-in-chief

 

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Dear Readers: The purpose of this journal is to bring to light some of the struggles that real people are facing all over the world. Yet the topic of human rights is so vast that we couldn’t possibly discuss it all. So instead we count on current UC Davis students to submit the problems that they find most compelling and we put together a collection of their best work. All the work in this journal is created by UC Davis students to captivate and educate our readers. As a current UC Davis student, I considered myself to be an educated individual, but while working on this journal I learned a lot about Human Rights. Now that I know all this information I am compelled to share it. We cannot close our eyes or look away from the suffering that is being inflicted against so many men, women, and children. We have the resources and the power to stop these injustices. We have a responsibility to educate ourselves about the struggles of the world – before we can solve the issues plaguing humanity, we must first know what they are. To help put this journal together has been a great honor. I am proud of this terrific issue, the awesome student editorial board, and all of the readers who chose to learn more about Human Rights. Together we can and will make a difference. Sincerely, Joe Nijmeh Managing Editor

 

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INTERDISCIPLINARY MINOR IN HUMAN RIGHTS
at UC Davis
This fall has been the first quarter that UC Davis has offered its newest minor. Now students interested in taking a cross disciplinary approach to the many issues facing human rights, can do so with the context of the human rights minor. The goal of such a program is to educate students about the issues and impact of human rights violations. It is a phenomenal way for students to apply their theories about human rights in an academic setting. This program is unlike other programs offered in that it allows students to foster and develop critical thinking skills about some very real and difficult issues in the world today. Creator and director of the Human Rights Initiative, Dr. Keith Watenpaugh, a professor in the Religious Studies Department, is currently serving as the advisor to the program. Students wishing to learn more, participate in research, or start their own work within the field should contact him or visit http://humanrightsminor.ucdavis.edu/.

Presenting the new

 

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CONTRIBUTORS
Phoebe Bierly International Relations Geneva Brooks International Relations Amarpreet Everest Music Susanna Haubner Political Science Sarah M. Hernández Womyn and Gender Studies & Comparative Literature Michael Hoye Political Science Eric Keng Asian American Studies Jeffrey Lagman Art Studio & Art History Helen Min History & Middle East South Asia Studies Rachel Pevsner English Chelsea Sachau Political Science & History Laila Soudi Psychology Hannah Tigerschiold International Relations Michelle Vieira English & Psychology

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chelsea Sachau Michelle Vieira Geneva Brooks Eric Keng Susanna Haubner Phoebe Bierly Jeffrey Lagman Laila Soudi Rachel Pevsner Michael Hoye Sarah M. Hernández Helen Min Hannah Tigershiold 1 10 12 21 27 29 38 40 41 43 52 53 62 Interview with Azra Bajramovic Reclamation, Declamation Barriers to Resistance in Rwanda and the Holocaust Captain’s Log: Warrior’s Loss Exploitation, Destination, USA Genocide Denial and the Stolen Generations Homeless Semiotics Incessant Incarceration Make a Tent Examining the Success of the International Criminal Court Slutty Hickeys Techniques of Genocide in Cambodia How Has Amnesty International Transformed Grassroots Human Rights Advocacy? Prejudice . . . Can You Spell It?

Amarpreet Everest

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Interview with Azra Bajramovic
Chelsea Sachau Azra Bajramovic is a Bosnian refugee. She came to the US in 1994 and has a husband and two children. She currently works at Opening Doors, Inc., a refugee resettlement agency in Sacramento. Chelsea Sachau, the interviewer and a UC Davis student, works with her at Opening Doors, Inc. and requested an interview for a class research paper. The following is a transcript of their interview. CS: As a child, were you aware of the differences that later you were persecuted for? In other words, did you know what “Muslim,” “Serb,” and “Croat” meant? AB: Yes, I did know back then. You know, as a child I knew that there was a difference [because] where I come from you can tell who is which religion by the name. My parents never really taught me to hate anyone else because they were not Muslim, but they would remind me constantly “you’re not going to marry Orthodox or Christians, you’re going to look for the one of our kind.” And I always thought as a little girl, when I grow up, when it gets time for me to get married, that probably by then people won’t even talk about it because it would be equal. And I was wrong, I was completely wrong. CS: It went the opposite direction? AB: Oh my god yes. CS: So when you were growing up it was essentially coexistence but still somewhat separated when it came to ‘who’s who’? AB: Yeah pretty much so, yes, yes. CS: What was life like before the intense persecution and acts of genocide began? And please address both overall during your childhood and immediately before it [the genocide]. AB: [sigh] I mean I can tell you we were all living happy together. President Tito […] he was strong enough to keep us together as brothers and sisters, you know where no one is allowed to say which religions we were. Pretty much […a] dictator. But not really [as] strong as some of the bad ones. In a smart way, you know, he was able to keep us all down and more controlled. CS: So would you say he was beloved? AB: Yes, yeah. And ever since he died back in 1979, things started going downhill. And then I realized that all this hate was there but were not showing because they were afraid. I was very young then, I was seven years old, and then as time passed by I mean things were just going as I told you downhill. People were just talking more about their religion, who they hate openly, all that stuff, how 1    

they were going to hurt each other and all that stuff, which is not really… fun. And right before the war, before it happened, I mean I can tell you this, not everyone was the same. We had really good family friends that happened to be Orthodox. And the guy called my father, his good friend, and said ‘something bad will happen in this town and I will not have the power to protect you or your family.’ So he didn’t really tell my father what was going to happen but he asked my dad to take our family to a safe place. CS: And how old were you when he warned about that? AB: I was 18. Madly in love with my husband back then. And since, I was afraid, as I mentioned we were in love we had two options: either to get married and go through all that craziness together or go our separate ways and God knows if we would ever meet up. CS: There’s so much uncertainty, I would imagine. AB: Exactly. So back in 1991, we decided to get married. CS: So you already started to address this, but can you give me some examples of ways in which people coexisted or in which they were separated? Obviously they went to different churches and religious places of worship, but in society, in workplaces, in things like that, was it basically coexistence? AB: It wasn’t really visible that much until early 1990s when we started getting, well when everyone wants some type of democracy, everyone wants to have their own religious groups, that type of stuff. But, when we had elections in our country and people start promoting different groups, you know I think that’s when everything starts heating up, I should say almost boiling. And exYugoslavia used to have 8 republics and then back in early 1990s some of them wanted to separate after the fall of the Soviet Union and our army wasn’t really allowing them to do that so they started attacking them, and of course by doing that, killing the innocent people. Especially in Slovenia, that’s the first country that separated, and it wasn’t really that terrible or bad damage, but Croatia paid a high price of course then Bosnia paid the highest price. I don’t know if you know but back in Srebrenica they killed more than 8,000 men, including the boys and young men, within a few days. CS: Was there a definitive, tangible point when you realized how badly the situation was or was it just a gradual process of realization? AB: Okay, 1991 I decided to get married. And I went to live with husband and I wasn’t with my parents anymore. I went and lived in a different part of the town. In 1992, in early spring, I had my son, Harris, in April and when he was a month and a half old, in May, I came to visit my parents and I went to the city to get 2    

something, I was having coffee with friends and when I was ready to go back home I noticed the city was pretty much blocked. A lot of people like soldiers were all over the town and they were capturing all the Muslim men and putting them in jail. I wasn’t sure what was happening and I thought that it would be over before the next day, I was always thinking that there was some kind of confusion and you know someone hadn’t thought this through very well and that things will change. So I came back home and of course I was crying and terrified, telling my family what I just saw. And then I heard other people from our neighborhood start talking about it shortly after I came home. CS: And you were only 19? AB: Back then, yes. So we were in our front yard. Where I come, the front yard plays a big role. The neighbors meet there, that’s where we have coffee, you know we all knew each other. We were having a cup of coffee all together, and were trying to figure out what was happening we were not sure. And then there was some sort of hill not far from my house. It had a beautiful forest that you could see from my house and some of the men figured out what was happening in town, since they hadn’t been captured, they decided to go up the hill and hide themselves like the kids would do. They figured that if they weren’t down in their homes then nobody could touch them. Even though they didn’t do anything wrong, they didn’t have any guns or anything at all, it was just the fact that they were a different religion they were the enemy immediately. And I’ll never forget that moment when all of a sudden the shooting started. They spotted them [the Muslim males] going up the hill and they sent the army to get them. So some of them were killed there, some of them were captured and taken to the prison. CS: Where was your husband? AB: He was up there as well but he was lucky enough that – well, he wasn’t really captured. So that evening and the next day, I remember all the crying and screaming of the women who could see that they were beating them up, it wasn’t really that far away. So the way to find out if your family member who was up there was killed or was down in prison was to go down to the police and check and see if they recorded him as deceased or someone they captured. CS: So they would allow the Muslim women to go in and check on the men? AB: To bring them food otherwise they wouldn’t have gotten anything to eat. CS: But they didn’t do anything against the Muslim women at that point? 3    

AB: No, not at that point. I mean, a lot of verbal taunts but nothing else. CS: Why, from your perspective, did being Muslim start to matter so much? AB: Let me tell you something. Where I came from, you’re probably familiar that back when World War One started that it started down in Sarajevo, and so pretty much every 50 – 70 years there is some sort of terrible thing that will happen down in that part of the Balkans. That is the main reason why after we escaped we decided that we don’t want to go back and live there anymore. We figured it might happen again and we don’t want our kids to go through the same things we went through. CS: Did you escape immediately after the hill incident? AB: No. No I was there for a good couple of months because Harris was four months old when I left. [pause] Terrible, just terrible. […] You know, you watch movies [about the conflict] and you get goosebumps because it’s all played up because it’s a movie that’s purposefully done so it can touch you, touch your feelings – CS: But it doesn’t come close to anything to anything that you actually went through? AB: No! There is no such a thing, believe me. CS: Yes, I just can’t even imagine. What was the biggest way in which life changed for you because of the genocide? Obviously it changed your whole world, but what is the biggest, most poignant way? AB: Oh my god, yeah. Well, not being with my family, being apart from my siblings and my mom. CS: Were you ever reunited? AB: As a visitor, I’ll go over there and visit and they’ll come here but that’s pretty much it. What is two or three weeks for a few years [of not seeing each other]? Even though there are, thank God, phones and internet and cards but that’s different, it’s different. And I think that thanks to that war, they’ve been ripped off, I’ve been ripped off– I’m the only one who is here – and I just feel that there is a hole that nothing, just nothing that can fill that. CS: And so even though you know you would never want to go live there again because of what it could mean for your kids and the future, the 50 – 70 years idea, you still have to live with that hole for the rest of your life. AB: Pretty much. And I can tell you that I don’t think that in the town where I grew up that there are any Muslims that live there now. CS: So your parents fled as well? 4    

AB: Oh yeah, no one, none of my friends stayed. Some of my friends were killed; some of my friends are in parts of Europe, some of them here in the States. CS: And where did your parents go to? AB: Sweden. They’re in Scandinavia and other parts of Europe. I was in Austria when I escaped but I couldn’t stay. I was there for a year and a half and every five or six months we would have to renew our visa and when time came for us to renew the visa so we could stay there we never knew if they would allow us to stay there for another few months or whether we would have to go back to Bosnia. At that point, we didn’t have a place to go back. Basically we would be refugees in our own country. And one more thing I want to share with you is that we never went back to our hometown. CS: Too painful? AB: Yes. And it’s not just because of what I tell you. There is much more that my father-in-law went through, what my mother-in-law went through. Their house was burned and she was there [to see it]. A lot of things happened. They made my husband’s father burn down a couple of houses, a number of houses. They made him do that. They were beating him up while my husband was watching. So we went back to Bosnia a number of times but we never went back to that city because the people that did that to us, those socalled soldiers, they’re still free. You know they’re heroes for their country, for their people. And my husband has said there’s no way if he sees someone that did something bad to us that he doesn’t think he would be able to control himself and something bad might happen. So we figure it will be safer not to go back. CS: So this all brings me to the next question. When and how did you escape? AB: It’s a long story. I remember very well. It was September 27, 1992 when I came into Austria. But before that I was in Macedonia for three months. The situation was terrible. Harris was a baby and he was getting sick and there were no medications. We were sharing a room with 20 – 25 people; we didn’t have a place where we could shower, or do the laundry, or eat. I mean, everything we had were just some savings that we took with us and someone stole that from us. And it was hard because we had to go separate ways from our families; otherwise we would become suspicious. CS: So did you have to pretend you were not Muslim? AB: Yeah my husband had to put the uniform on and pretend he was one of those soldiers and he paid big money to someone who would take him over the border. CS: Did he go first and then you followed? 5    

AB: Yeah he went first. And I remember having the first conversation with him after he left and he mentioned that it’s unbelievable that 25 km away life is normal. Girls are in swimsuits, it was summertime. He couldn’t believe his eyes. People weren’t even aware or maybe they were aware but it wasn’t really happening to them so they didn’t care. Just passing that border into Montenegro it was completely different. And then through Montenegro into Macedonia. But it wasn’t really easy because Macedonia was full, they weren’t expecting refugees so they sent me back with my child. When I escaped, someone gave me contact information of some family in Macedonia and that I could stay with them. They knew them; I don’t know somehow they knew this family that I never had really met. So I stayed with them for couple of weeks with Harris. Some complete strangers who accepted me. One morning I decided I was going to go to Macedonia and meet up with my husband. And when I was entering the bus, I don’t know my mom was there and what a coincidence. And then on the border of Macedonia they realized we were refugees and they sent us back. And we were there, on that border, for a couple days. I mean, we were in no man’s land; no one wanted us at that point. Harris was teeny baby and I didn’t have diapers, there were no Huggies, no Pampers, back then. No milk. Oh my god, so much. People started, I’m never going to forget, someone offered us some money and we were just like “why?” we didn’t really realize what was happening to us. CS: Earlier you said that your family friend had encouraged your family to escape because something bad was going to happen. And did you not listen? AB: No we didn’t, no. We didn’t really want to leave. C’mon if someone did this to you, would you really just pack up and leave? CS: And it’s also because you don’t think someone is going to such horrible things. AB: You know what happened to my parents? This guy came from a different city. He was a soldier and he had a piece of paper in his hands and of course, a big gun, lots of bombs and bullets around him. And he came into my house and asked who does this house belong to? He came into my parents’ house, which was just built before the war. And my mom and my dad were building and working on it. It’s not like here, you don’t get a complete house and you pay off the loan for it. You work on it for years. They had been working on it since I remember, since I’ve existed. You know, we all worked on it. And I remember my mother, she said “oh it belongs to…” and she mentioned my dad’s first and last name and the guy just took the piece of paper and wrote down his name on it. And 6    

said “from tomorrow on this house belongs to me and I don’t want care where you’re going to go, where you’re going to take your family.” So rough. They were forced to leave. Everything was in there. You know what? Don’t feel bad. We consider ourselves lucky; we are alive. There is always worse. CS: Yeah, I understand. It’s just sometimes hard to comprehend all of that. AB: Especially because, look this is an ideal place to raise your kids. You grew up here Chelsea. America was never in a war here. They always go someplace else and fight. But you’re fortunate that you’ve never experienced anything like that. You’re so protected. CS: Yeah, I come across people like you, like our clients, like many other people that I’ve met and I am reminded of just how incredibly blessed I am. AB: And even now, after all these years, I came here to America in 1994. There are a lot of things I love about this country. But I am never going to feel that I am a complete American. Even though as soon as we got here we did everything right; I mean, we took the citizenship test, we are paying taxes, we work hard for everything that we have, but its just I feel like with one leg I am standing here and with the other leg I am standing down in Bosnia. CS: Is it because you have this incredible thing that is not going to go away and you walk around with something that most other people don’t have to walk around with? AB: Yes, I have to. I don’t have an option not to. CS: How would you compare your life now to the life you had in Bosnia before the genocide? And then the life you had during the genocide? I presume they were very different. AB: Pretty much so. Back then I was much happier. You see where I came from, Bosnia, or ex-Yugoslavia, was a very small country compared to the United States. So I was used to having all the relatives and everyone nearby. All my uncles, and aunts, everyone was pretty much nearby. Just imagine having my kids – I mean I personally don’t have anyone here except my husband and my kids. No blood relatives. My husband has his mom and some close relatives but just imagine that my kids will never experience that. Their life will be very different than mine just because they won’t have the chance to have an aunt or an uncle or all those people that can show them love besides me. CS: So, basically what I’m hearing is that even if there were these differences that were sometimes felt between you and your neighbors, you were happier there because at least you were with family? 7    

AB: Definitely. You know I have other happiness here. We work, we have enough money, and thank God we have accomplished a lot so far compared to when we started. You see these families that have just arrived through our agency have nothing and I came here just like them a few years ago. I didn’t have anything except a couple [pieces of] luggage of used clothes that I collected in Austria before I came here. And then, we worked hard to get – I am not saying that we are rich, because to me when someone says they are rich it doesn’t mean they have to be rich money-wise, there are other things that are more important for me personally. And its hard for me to raise my kids here because all this is new to me. There is a lot of things that I don’t know and I don’t even have an idea about what my kids are facing out there. It’s you know, if you don’t know something, it’s hard to fight back, you know what I mean? For ten years I was having bad dreams about the war, nightmares. I remember, pretty much each dream started with us trying to escape, my husband would save us somehow but he would die, he would get killed and I would wake up crying in the middle of the night. And also when Harris, my oldest child, started going out, all that fear was passed to worrying about Harris and about what could possibly happen to him here. And he doesn’t have relatives to protect him, which when I was growing up back then I was in a small city where everyone knows each other and everyone will watch out for me if I do something wrong or something bad happened to me, but here, people are just strangers to each other. I barely know my neighbors. I grew up in a completely different environment where if I had sent my kids out into the city at night I wouldn’t have had to worry about something bad happening to them because I would have known that if something goes wrong there would have been people out there to protect my kids. But here… I am not saying that there are bad people just out here because there are some great people in this country but look at this. When I was growing up, my mom’s only worry was for me not to get pregnant. But here, look what is here. There is marijuana, there are zillion types of drugs that I don’t even know they even exist. And then I realized that there is so much out there that I don’t even know if it exists. CS: You have two children, one of whom was very young and probably doesn’t remember the events during the genocide and the other who wasn’t born until you came to the US. Do you talk about it with them? If so, how do you explain it? If you don’t discuss it, why? AB: We definitely talk about it, most definitely. And both of them are very much patriotic. They think they’re Bosnians, even though 8    

Hanna [her daughter] was born here. Harris has a huge Bosnian flag on his wall and I am going to tell you this, even though we came here because of this terrible war, even though we were forced to leave we never really taught him to hate anyone but thanks to this technology, he found things out through the internet that I would probably never want him to know. And when he was maybe 12 or 13 that’s when he started having his own opinion about the war and about why we came here and about who did this to us. CS: So before he formed his own opinion, what did you tell him about why you came here? AB: I told him in a nice way so that he wouldn’t hate and in a way that a ten or eight year old would understand. Hanna pretty much picks up whatever Harris says and thinks because that’s her older brother and to her whatever he does is just perfect, most of the times. They’re pretty close. CS: Did your experiences in Bosnia affect how you look at humanity as a whole? Did it give you a new understanding about life and the other human beings you share this world with? AB: What do you think? Most definitely. Look at what I’m doing. I’m finally able to do something I really like and I’m finally able to help people who went through pretty similar things as I did in the early 1990s. And I’m really, really happy that I can do this. CS: Do you see it as a healing process for you as well or just you understand them and want to help them? AB: Not really a healing process, just that I want to help them. CS: So when I learn about these genocides, human rights, I love learning about it because I don’t understand how people, how something gets to that point. I hope other people have a hard time understanding it too because it means these horrible actions are unfathomable. But when I learn about it I hear people say that people are good but turn bad or that people are just bad. What does it make you think about humans overall? AB: Oh I still believe in people. Most definitely. There’s always those bad ones that are trying to do something. For me, even though I went through war and saw a lot of bad things that got under my skin, I saw a bad side of humanity, I still believe in people and I don’t believe they want to hurt others. [pause] I don’t know why. They still didn’t kill that part in me. CS: You still have your faith in people? AB: Oh most definitely.

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Reclamation, Declamation
Michelle Vieira I have sat at this kitchen table and heard voices Many voices Not in my head, somewhere deeper and A place I can’t always touch. My soul? My heart? Something stirring within me. Reclamation, Declamation. Wounds I never knew existed. Questioning everything. Myself. My History. My Knowledge. Where have I learned what I know? Reclamation, Declamation. Do I know these words? Colonization. Rape. Violence. Oppression. Stolen children. Boarding schools. Language. Native. Memory. Words that have taken me on a journey. Words that tunnel into me. Words. Reclamation, declamation. They don’t seem strong enough, My words. I wish I could Paint, Draw, Scream, Rage, Cry—feel more, feel less. Imprinted on my tongue or in the lining of something Inside me, I carry words. (or do words carry me?) Stories, hopes, fears, a million lives and more. More, more, more. Reclamation, declamation. Where do I go Now? So much purpose, so much fear. I raise my voice, if only now. Because I can. Because I must, because Even if my voice wavers, It does not break. Activism. Resistance. Decolonization. Community. Healing. Redefinition. Memory. 10    

Words in their own voices. Reclamation, declamation. I can’t tell you all I feel. All I see and hear and the many things that Go Unnoticed. I can only speak. No silence. No silence. No silence. Reclamation, declamation. Voices that tell us stories. Voices that guide us. Voices that tell us about life And death. And everything in between. I think I hear those voices. And I think they hear me. Reclamation, declamation.

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Barriers to Resistance in Rwanda and the Holocaust
Geneva Brooks While the Second World War saw the formation of partisan resistance movements across Europe, direct resistance to the genocide of European Jews was less common. In the aftermath of the war, many Europeans wondered why there was so little resistance not only from the victims of the Holocaust, but also from the perpetrators. The answer is that for both victims and perpetrators, Nazi tactics systemically and purposefully prevented resistance. Nazi officials used bureaucratic measures to ensure cooperation from the men of the Einzatsgruppen, working to eliminate both personal responsibility and feelings of compassion from the act of genocide. For the victims, resistance was stymied by the immense violence against them, as well as the uncertainty and lies propagated by the Nazis. In Rwanda, the lack of technology involved in the genocide changed the methods by which resistance was obstructed. With distance from the victims an impossibility and mass participation a necessity for the perpetrators, coercion became a heavily relied upon tactic in assuring cooperation. Acts of violence against victims in many cases were even more brutal than those committed during the Holocaust, again due to the stark differences in killing technique. The short duration of the Rwandan genocide also had profound affects on the uncertainty and fear felt by targeted Rwandans, making organized resistance incredibly difficult. While the specific techniques used to block resistance differed, the intentions of the Nazis and the Interahamwe in Rwanda were clear across victims and perpetrators. For the victims of the Holocaust, the lack of information available made the prospect of resistance nearly impossible. The Nazis employed systematic use of euphemism, as well as outright lies, in order to deceive their victims. Jews were told they were to be “resettled” and gas chambers were labeled “Bathing and inhalation rooms.” Train stations at death camps were made to look as normal as possible, and victims were assured their valuables would be returned to them.1 The testimony of Otto Ohlendorf at Nuremburg on January 3, 1946, provides evidence of the purpose of these lies. Asked about the transportation of Jews to the place of execution, he explains that they were moved in “trucks, always only as many as could be executed immediately. In this way it was attempted to keep the span of time from the moment in which the                                                                                                                          
Noakes, J. and G. Pridham. Nazism 1919-1945 Volume 3: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. 1148, 1153,1154.
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victims knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual execution as short as possible.”2 Deception created a situation in which the false hope of survival reduced the incentive for resistance among the victims as well as drastically reducing the time in which resistance was possible. Similarly, German forces used the principle of “divide and rule” in order to further convince their victims of their security. The Nazis promised exemption to various groups in order to maintain order before sending these same groups to concentration camps and execution sites. In Notes From the Warsaw Ghetto, Emanuel Ringelblum describes the deliberate deception of the population: [The Germans] promised the Law and Order Service that they and the members of their families, even uncles, mothers-in-law, brothers-in-law, would be secure. Afterward, they reassured certain trades of their priority over other trades. Afterward, one shop was promised priority over another. Afterward, women and children in the shops themselves became dispensable—afterward, poor workers as compared with good workers. Better shops were opposed to poorer shops—red stamps—continually contracting the circle, continually deceiving, declaring that the resettlement operation was over, in order to prevent a revolt.3 This strategy is echoed in the minutes of a meeting of youth resistance movement Dror in the Bialystok Ghetto. In the discussion of plans amidst the uncertainty of an impending Nazi action, a speaker identified as Shmulik broaches the subject of German deceit: “All our experience teaches us that we can’t trust the Germans, despite all their assurances that the workshops will be protected, that only the unemployed will be sent away, and so on. Only by deception and dupe did they succeed in driving thousands of Jews to the slaughter.”4 It is clear from these accounts that the Nazi strategy of deception constituted a significant and purposeful barrier to resistance among the victims of the Holocaust. For Rwandans, the ever-present fear of violence was not a new phenomenon. Peter Uvin, in “Reading the Rwandan Genocide,” argues that in the years leading up to 1994, violence and                                                                                                                          
Ohlendorf, Otto. “Testimony of Otto Ohlendorf at Nuremburg.” Witness to the Holocaust. Ed. Michael Berenbaum. 127.   3 Ringelblum, Emanuel. “Excerpts from Emanuel Ringblum’s Notes From the Warsaw Ghetto.” Witness to the Holocaust. Ed. Michael Berenbaum. 229. 4 Shmulik. “Resistance: The Ordeal of Desperation.” A Holocaust Reader. Ed. Lucy S. Dawidowicz. 353.
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fear were already becoming a constant for Rwandan Tutsis. He writes, “All Tutsi […] Every single person living in Rwanda knew about the climate of terror, racism, and violence that reigned in the country. Each person also knew that it was promoted by the government and targeted at all Tutsi.”5 This climate of terror was magnified with the onset of genocide in 1994, creating a situation in which the fear of the unknown kept the possibility for active and organized resistance low. Like the Nazis, Rwandan génocidaires also utilized deception to prevent resistance. Philip Gourevitch provides an example in his book We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families. He writes, “In Nyarubuye, when Tutsis asked the Hutu Power mayor how they might be spared, he suggested that they seek sanctuary at the church. They did, and a few days later the mayor came to kill them.”6 Like Jewish victims of the Holocaust, Rwandan Tutsi lacked even the basic information necessary to resist. As with the Nazis, this lack of information was purposeful and effective, and was intended to prevent the victims from enacting any kind of planned escape or resistance. Uvin discusses the role of deception as a component of the speed at which the genocide in Rwanda took place, noting the barriers that this placed on international intervention. Uvin cites Alan Kuperman’s critique of the notion that the West could have intervened to prevent the genocide, explaining Kuperman’s argument “that because of intentional deception by the genocide’s perpetrators, incomplete reporting by Western sources, and the difficulty of separating […] the resumption of the civil war and the genocide—it took weeks for the international community to even realize genocide was underway.”7 While direct deception of the victims of the Holocaust was widespread, the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide instead worked to deceive the international community while committing murders as quickly as possible in order to prevent international intervention. Uvin notes that “most of the killings took place early on and tapered off thereafter,” and mentions that an op-ed in the Washington Post calling for international action was written “almost two weeks into the genocide and at a time when tens if not hundreds of thousands had                                                                                                                          
Uvin, Peter. “Reading the Rwandan Genocide.” International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001). 91. 6 Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed With Our Families. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. New York, USA. 1998. 18. 7 Uvin, Peter. “Reading the Rwandan Genocide.” 90.
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already been killed.”8 The brutal efficiency of the Rwandan genocide, coupled with the deception of those outside Rwanda who might have intervened, provided a significant barrier to the possibility of organized resistance both within Rwanda and by the international community. In Nazi occupied Europe, the sheer physical violence of German soldiers against their victims diminished the capacity of the victims to fight back. Faced with the prospect of death at any moment, victims had to contend with constant terror and a sense of the futility of action, both of which forestalled attempts at resistance. Ringelblum recalls “[t]he shooting on the spot of those who tried to escape through holes in the Wall at night” in the Warsaw Ghetto.9 An account of the liquidation of a similar ghetto in Byelorussia by David Ehof, head of the local Russian Security Police, tells a similar story: “Anyone who offered resistance was shot on the spot on my orders—in the square, in the houses, on the trip to the place of execution—or they were beaten half to death.”10 As Ringelblum concludes, “We have seen the confirmation of the psychological law that the slave who is completely repressed cannot resist.”11 In an atmosphere of complete and violent repression, resistance was unimaginable for most. For Rwandans, the brutality of the 1994 genocide was constant. The majority of the killing in Rwanda was done in close contact with machetes, while others were killed at close range with bullets or improvised weapons. The result of these tactics was that victims were often rendered too weak or injured to resist, and many had already accepted the inevitability of death, hoping only to be killed at home, or by less violent means.12 Even in Bisesero, perhaps the only site of mass Tutsi resistance in Rwanda,13 the brutality of the attack still left tens of thousands dead. Manase, a survivor, recounts: “And they did not kill simply. When we were weak, they saved bullets and killed us with bamboo spears. They cut Achilles tendons and necks, but not completely, and then they left the victims to spend a long time crying until they died.”14 In many                                                                                                                          
8 9

Uvin, Peter. “Reading the Rwandan Genocide.” 90.   Ringelblum, Emanuel. “Excerpts.” 226. 10 Ehof, David. Text from: Nazism 1919-1945. Ed. J. Noakes, G. Pridham. 1099. 11 Ringelblum, Emanuel. “Excerpts.” 228. 12 Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 22. 13 Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 30. 14 Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 31.  

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cases, victims chose to suffer a less violent death in exchange for a lack of resistance. Nowhere was the brutality of the Rwandan genocide felt more acutely than among Rwanda’s female population. Shattered Lives, a report on the Rwandan genocide by Human Rights Watch/Africa and Human Rights Watch Women’s, details the sexual violence faced by Rwandan women, noting that “testimonies from survivors confirm that rape was extremely widespread and that thousands of women were individually raped, gang-raped, raped with objects such as sharpened sticks or gun barrels, held in sexual slavery […] or sexually mutilated.”15 The report suggests that rape was used in Rwanda as a tool of genocide not only to subdue and degrade individual women, but also to dehumanize and terrorize the larger community.16 The rape of Rwandan women during the 1994 genocide served not only to dehumanize the Tutsi population as a whole, but also to degrade and discourage the community in order to preclude acts of resistance. While rape certainly occurred during the Holocaust, Rochelle Saidel, co-author of Sexual Violence Against Jewish Women During the Holocaust, notes that Nazi racial purity laws may have “kept rape from being part of the official genocidal policy, a fact that distinguishes the Holocaust from what unfolded in places like Rwanda.”17 The systematic rape of Rwandan women served to eradicate communal strength and thus the ability to resist genocide. As for the perpetrators of these genocides, compliance was ensured no less purposefully than in the case of the victims. The means by which resistance was stifled, however, were different both from those used against victims and across instances of genocide. One of the most important factors in reducing resistance among men tasked with carrying out the Holocaust was the denial of personal responsibility. In his testimony at Nuremburg, Otto Ohlendorf notes that Himmler “assembled the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos… and pointed out that the leaders and men who were taking part in the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the execution of this order. The responsibility was his, alone, and the Führer’s.”18 Great pains were taken to ensure that officers did not bear the responsibility of moral thought, but                                                                                                                          
Human Rights Watch. Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath. 1996. 1. 16 Human Rights Watch. Shattered Lives. 1. 17 Ravitz, Jessica. “Silence Lifted: The untold stories of rape during the Holocaust.” CNN. June 24, 2011. 5.   18 Ohlendorf, Otto. “Testimony.” Witness to the Holocaust. 125.
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merely carried out the orders of a superior. Ohlendorf explains this strategy: On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and men should be able to carry out the executions in a military manner acting on orders and should not have to make a decision on their own; […] it seemed intolerable to me that individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to kill a large number of people on their own decision.19 The denial of personal responsibility and the emphasis on following orders rather than making decisions allowed the perpetrators to compartmentalize their actions from any moral or ethical thought, which greatly decreased the incidence of resistance among the men tasked with carrying out these orders. In Nazi Germany, the imperative to follow orders even replaced the rule of law. Known as the Führerprinzip, or leadership principle, this system changed the definition of legal action to simply a question of whether or not one followed orders appropriately. This is clear in Ohlendorf’s reaction to questions about his own thoughts with in carrying out liquidation orders, as well as his reaction to questions of the legality of these orders. With regard to his own moral objection, Ohlendorf remarks that he carried them out nonetheless, because he found it “inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state.” Even more telling is his reaction to the issue of legality. He states: “I do not understand your question; since the order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality could not arise in the minds of these individuals, for they had sworn obedience to the people who issued the orders.”20 The bureaucratic nature in which the liquidation of the Jews was carried out reduced each man to no more than a cog in the Nazi machine of destruction. Between the elimination of the responsibility to thought or judgment, and the requirement to follow orders above the rule of law, resistance on the part of the perpetrators was systematically and effectively minimized. This same denial of personal responsibility can also be found in the Rwandan genocide, although through the use of different tactics. Whereas the Nazis relied on orders and a chain of command to separate perpetrators from their actions, Rwandan leaders relied on mass participation in the killing to distribute culpability and avoid implication. Gourevitch explains that while                                                                                                                          
19 20

Ohlendorf, Otto. “Testimony.” Witness to the Holocaust. 129. Ohlendorf, Otto. “Testimony.” Witness to the Holocaust. 135.  

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the Holocaust implemented a high degree of technology in the destruction of European Jewry, it was the Germans, not the machinery, who did the killing. Rwanda’s Hutu Power leaders understood this perfectly […] The people were the weapon, and that meant everybody: the entire Hutu population had to kill the entire Tutsi population. In addition to ensuring obvious numerical advantages, this arrangement eliminated any questions of accountability which might arise.21 Though the tactics of the Nazis and the Hutu Power groups differed, both methods served to remove the perpetrators from the responsibility of their actions in order to reduce resistance to carrying out genocidal orders. Rwandan génocidaires were also inundated with propaganda from radio and newspaper sources calling the Tutsi “devils” and “cockroaches” and urging Hutu to avoid all friendly contact with Tutsis.22 This propaganda was used to dehumanize the Tutsi and lessen the moral implications of killing them. The purposeful denial of compassion toward the victims of the Holocaust constituted a similar tactic for ensuring the compliance of the Einzatsgruppen. Nazi propaganda vilified and dehumanized the Jews, and the men who carried out liquidation orders were taught to stifle any sympathetic feelings they might feel toward their victims. Jews were portrayed as an existential threat to the German populace, unworthy of any amount of compassion. The use of alcohol was prevalent in order to numb the compassionate emotions of men tasked with carrying out exterminations. David Ehof elaborates in his account of the liquidation of the ghetto in Borissov: For two days and two nights [the men] were placed under the influence of alcohol and ideologically prepared to inflict atrocities on innocent people… In order to stimulate a hatred of the Jews among those present, I tried to justify the Nazi policy of exterminating the Jews in my speech and urged the policemen not to express any feelings of compassion and humanity towards either the adult Jews or the children.23 In denying sympathetic or empathetic emotions, as well as the ability to take personal responsibility for their actions, the Nazis                                                                                                                          
Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 96. Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 87, 88, 94.   23 Ehof, David. Text from: Nazism 1919-1945. Ed. J. Noakes, G. Pridham. 1098.
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systematically reduced the possibility for resistance among the ranks of perpetrators. This denial of compassion further allowed perpetrators to compartmentalize their actions from thought and to function as a simply part of the whole, rather than as an autonomous actor. While coercion was, to some extent, a factor during the Holocaust, the scale of participation on the part of perpetrators in Rwanda necessitated the use of coercion in many if not most cases. Because of this mass participation, Hutus who did not take part were often accused of being Tutsi sympathizers or otherwise antagonistic to the Hutu cause and could be killed along with Tutsis. Gourevitch notes the role of the radio in ensuring participation, including “the ratcheting up of the suggestive message of us against them to the categorically compelling kill or be killed.”24 Accounts from perpetrators, such as the ones gathered in Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide detail chilling episodes in which Hutus were forced to kill Tutsi, sometimes even family members. An excerpt from the account of a Hutu farmer reads as follows: When I arrived, the burgomaster said, ‘You have brought food for the Tutsis. So that you do not begin again, you take a machete and you have to decapitate your brother.’ I refused. The burgomaster asked the reservist to force me to decapitate my brother and said if I refused the reservist would kill me. The reservist took me and gave me a machete. He put a gun behind my head and said ‘If you do not cut, I will fire.’ So I cut. That is my crime.25 Susan Cook argues in Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives that “perpetrators’ accounts suggest that it was not so much a politicized form of fear of future Tutsi control that motivated ordinary Hutu to kill, but rather well-structured, already entrenched mechanisms of coercion.”26 The omnipresent force of coercion among perpetrators served as a systematic and purposeful barrier to resistance. The obstacles to resistance for the victims and the perpetrators of both the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide differed in important ways. For the victims, resistance was obstructed by lies and uncertainty, as well as the sheer level of
Gourevitch, Philip. We Wish to Inform You. 95.   Lyons, Robert and Scott Straus. Intimate Enemies: Images and Voices from the Rwandan Genocide. Brooklyn, NY. 2006. 41. 26 Cook, Susan. Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives. Transaction Publishers. 2006. 170.  
24 25

                                                                                                                         

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violence inflicted upon them. In Nazi Germany, this meant the use of euphemism and beatings. For Rwandans, it meant the uncertainty of safety in any place and the intentional deception of the international community. The systematic use of rape as a weapon of genocide further intensified the incapacitating force used against victims. For the perpetrators, compliance was assured by the denial of personal responsibility and compassion. Both Nazis and Hutus were taught to think of their victims as less than human, and responsibility for killings was either spread around or pushed up the chain of command. Coercion became an important factor in assuring the compliance of reluctant Hutu génocidaires. Although these barriers took somewhat different forms, the impediments to resistance for both victim and perpetrator across the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide shared a common thread in their decisive and systematic nature. Nazi Germany and Hutu-dominated Rwanda both created obstacles to resistance in a purposeful and calculated attempt to drive down the incidence of resistance among both victims and perpetrators.

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Captain’s Log: Warrior’s Loss
Eric Y. Keng This short story was written as a final assignment for the Human Rights of Star Trek Course. It is based on the Star Trek Television franchise. For those of you unfamiliar with Star Trek, the Federation and Klingon Empires are two major powers that were once Cold War Rivals that ended up as important Allies. However the cultural differences between the two powers have always been the source of much tension and distrust. This story is an exploration into the problems which arise when we have to choose between parts of a society we identify with versus the parts of society we have good relations with. “Computer, access Enterprise Log database concerning the Klingon Dissident Incident.” “There are 345 logs made during the Klingon Dissident Incident.” “How many logs were made by Captain Jean-Luc Picard during the Dissident Incident?” “Captain Picard made Eight Captain’s Logs, Three Personal.” “Display all Captain’s logs created during the Dissident Incident.” Captain’s Log Stardate 56851.8 The assassination of Chancellor Martok has disrupted the long peace the Klingon Empire has enjoyed since the conclusion of the Dominion War. The murder of a superior in order to usurp his position is a well-known Klingon custom. The disruption has occurred over the unknown circumstances of Martok’s death. Such mystery has left a vacuum of power within the already increasing instability plaguing the Klingon Empire. Worf, as sworn brother to Martok, has taken up temporary leadership of the Klingon Government and has requested Starfleet assistance in the investigation of this high profile murder. As the situation on the Klingon home world Qo’noS continues to grow more complicated, the Chancellor’s death has prompted many minority groups, previously unheard of in Klingon society, to voice their dissatisfaction with Klingon society in general. Several dissident organizations and liberal governors have begun to openly challenge the warrior-dominant and conservative nature of the Klingon Empire by demanding equality. Worf seeing the growing problem at hand has begun a series of reforms to several institutions in order to placate some of the demands made by the Dissident movement. These reforms have been met with much resistance from the High 21    

Council and the majority of Klingon leaders. Hopefully as our investigation begins we may shed some light upon the death of Martok and bring some stability to the Klingon Empire. Unfortunately, due to the dishonorable nature of Martok’s death I doubt that this matter is purely an internal one. End Log Captain’s Log Stardate 56853.7 As our investigation continues, we have learned of the increasing tension between the growing dissident faction and the conservative majority. Worf, as leader of the Klingon Empire, has called for Starfleet to mediate negotiations between this vocal minority and the High Council. The Klingon Defense Force (KDF) has begun to mobilize various units across Klingon Space in order to deal with the growing unrest. In the midst of all of this I am unsure how much longer the Federation can continue to remain neutral. The ongoing mystery surrounding Martok’s death has only exacerbated the situation. Taking into account Klingon culture’s promotion of publically declaring responsibility for political murders, and in many cases rewarding acts of murder, the continued mystery over Martok’s death only serves to inflame the High Council. All of this has created an environment in which the High Council has become more wiling in their moves against the dissidents, and the dissident groups more brazen to take action against the government. The situation has grown so tense that in order to properly represent the Federation I am forced to call Starfleet Command and request an official diplomatic envoy be dispatched. Worf sees the possibility for true change for Klingon society. While I have hope in Worf’s optimism, the growing concern still centers around finding out who was responsible for Chancellor Martok’s murder and to what ends? End Log Captain’s Log Stardate 56854.8 An extreme dissident group calling themselves the Klingon Teaching Association (KTA) has claimed responsibility for the murder of Chancellor Martok. The KTA cited Martok’s continual promotion of the warrior class above all others as their justification for the murder. This revelation along with the continued growth of the Dissident movement has ignited the situation in both the High Council and on the streets of Qo’noS. Evidence gathered by the Enterprise supports the claim the KTA has made, linking a man loosely affiliated with the Dissident movement and the KTA as the 22    

one who poisoned Martok. Further investigation shows that the poison used in the murder is a rare form of hemlock only available on Earth. This revelation has led the High Council to demand an investigation to the Federation’s involvement with the murder of Chancellor Martok. In response to the many acts of violence levied by both Government forces and Conservative Klingon warriors, the Dissident movement has grown to open rebellion with riots and armed skirmishes exploding across the planet. Worf has called an emergency meeting of the High Council, and placed loyal KDF officers into key positions across the Empire to prevent open war across the Empire. Starfleet Command has requested that the Enterprise remain at full alert during our continued stay at Qo’noS transferring all diplomatic personnel from the Federation Embassy on Qo’noS onboard. As continuing updates appear, I am fearful that relations between the Federation and the Klingon Empire may deteriorate. End Log Captain’s Log Stardate 56855.1 Worf has brought in Emperor Kahless to broker peace between the High Council and the growing Dissident movement. It is my hope that a strong central figure in Klingon society will bridge the gap between the two groups. Teachers, lawyers, philosophers and artists all around Qo’noS have come together to form the Dissident League. Led by Ch’Pok the Lawyer, the League demands positive changes with the religious, political and military leaders that control the High Council. While extreme dissident groups like the KTA continue to call for violence and active revolution on Qo’noS, the creation of the Dissident League has given many the hope of reaching a peaceful resolution. The Dissident movement across the Klingon Empire has met with relative success. Reports indicate that several Klingon colonies, on the border with the Federation, have been overthrown and Dissident leaders have effectively replaced their colonial governments. These successes on the border planets have led to increased tension between the Dissidents and the High Council all across the Empire. Starfleet Command has sent the USS Titan to escort Federation representatives to Qo’noS. Hopefully the added external pressure will aid Worf in maintaining peace between the factions. End Log Captain’s Log Supplemental Stardate 56855.2 23    

The attack on Emperor Kahless by the KTA has broken the fragile peace on Qo’noS. Open riots have sparked all over the planet. Conservative elements of the High Council have taken control in Emperor Kahless’s place and KDF forces have been deployed across the Klingon Empire to put an end to the Dissident movement. Worf has been removed from his position as Interim Chancellor and the increased tension between the Federation and Klingon Empire has become a diplomatic incident. All Federation citizens have been expelled from the Klingon Empire; Captain Riker will oversee the evacuation of Federation citizens while the Enterprise remains in orbit of Qo’noS to oversee Federation interests. Worf, while no longer in charge of the Empire, remains the voice of reason and moderation in the High Council. However, with the growing conflict between the Dissident movement and the conservative elements in the High Council, I fear war is coming. End Log Captain’s Log Stardate 56856.3 As I feared, with the open revolt of many colonies within the Empire, the High Council has ordered the complete eradication of all members of the Dissident movement. KDF forces have already raided schools, universities and other institutions wiping out organizers, volunteers and whole families. Many Dissident members have fled on board to the Enterprise. The Klingon Fleet, under the control of the High Council, has destroyed a number of Dissident occupied colonies and worlds. The destruction entails the mass murder of all inhabitants as an example to all who resist the Empire. Remnants of the Dissident league have fled the Empire, scattering across the quadrant, with a growing number of diaspora communities appearing on Earth, Vulcan, Argos II and several other worlds. The leaders of the Dissident movement, including Ch’Pok the Lawyer, onboard the Enterprise have requested asylum. The continued mobilization of the KDF across the Empire has managed to heavily weaken the Dissident movement. Nonetheless, several colonies have managed to repel KDF advances and have established their independence from the Klingon Empire. However, as the KDF continues to mobilize, the chances of survival for these new governments is slim. The majority of the warrior class has sided with the High Council, and the majority of Dissident forces outside of Qo’noS have been wiped out. This destruction includes families as well as several civilian populations. The number is not small. End Log 24    

Captain’s Log Stardate 56856.8 The High Council has demanded the Enterprise hand over Ch’Pok the Lawyer and all other dissidents currently onboard our ship. The Federation Diplomatic Envoy has arrived bringing news that there is a call for intervention concerning the civilian population in the Federation Council. The Human, Telerite and Bolian representatives have pushed forward a vote to send a Starfleet task force into Klingon space in order to aid in the escape of Dissident members from the Klingon Empire. While popular support for this measure is growing, the representatives of Vulcan and Andoria have vetoed, stating that interfering in the local affairs of the Klingon Empire violates the Prime Directive. The Federation Envoy continues to negotiate with Worf and the rest of the High Council. Worf has been the only voice in preventing the Klingon Empire from declaring war on the Federation and attacking the Enterprise. Nevertheless the KDF has placed seven Negh’var class battlecruisers around us. Starfleet has sent a taskforce of six starships to the Federation-Klingon border. I have called a meeting of the entire senior staff of the Enterprise, as well as Worf in order to weigh our options. As relations between the Klingon Empire and the Federation worsen I fear other great powers might take the opportunity to change the balance of power in this quadrant into their favor. Increased Romulan and Orion activity has been seen along the Klingon border. That combined with renewed sightings of Dominion vessels near the Bajoran Wormhole makes it imperative that we resolve the issues between the Dissidents and the High Council quickly. I await orders from Starfleet Command on the fate of the refugees that we already have onboard. End Log Captain’s Log Stardate 56857.2 Starfleet has ordered the refugees be returned to Qo’noS to be judged by the High Council for treason. As the Dissident movement is eradicated one star system at a time by the KDF, the stability of the Empire grows ever more certain. Extremist elements like the KTA have been wiped out through orbital bombardment: the civilian losses currently number in the billions. The few communities of Dissidents that have left the Empire are now organizing within the Federation. They are calling for all planets to recognize what has happened within the Klingon Empire. Worf, unwilling to be exiled from his home again, has given his support 25    

to and formed a new moderate faction within the High Council. Moderates and Conservatives within the High Council have both denounced the Dissident movement, and have begun to repair the destruction and death brought upon by the incident in the name of reconciliation. Despite orders I will not hand over any of the Dissident members currently aboard the Enterprise because it would surely mean their deaths. Ch’Pok the Lawyer, unwilling to leave, has accepted his death in typical Klingon fashion: head on. I have set course for Argos III, where the new Dissident Klingon Colony has been formed. Not willing to start a war with the Federation, the High Council at Worf’s advisement has ordered the KDF fleet surrounding the Enterprise to allow us to leave. However the High Council has filed diplomatic protest against us, further straining the relationship between the Klingon Empire and the Federation. I leave now with my conscious clear, worried that the murky future that now exists between once firm allies. “Computer, access official Klingon records. List estimated number of civilian causalities from the Dissident Incident.” “Official Klingon records state no civilian causalities.” “Federation records?” “Federation records hold over 3 billion civilian causalities.” “Computer, how many of the 3 billion civilian causalities counted in the Federation records are directly connected to the Dissident movement?” “Federation records indicate that only 1 million of the recorded 3 billion civilian causalities have direct connection to the Klingon Dissident movement.” “How many were indirectly connected?” “Federation records hold only 910 million recorded civilian causalities were indirectly connected to the Dissident movement.” “So many dead. Did we do enough?” “That is not a valid question.”

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Exploitation Destination, USA
Susanna Haubner The United States has been a land of hope for many people from oppressed and poor countries. They believe the United States is a land of plenty, where people are free from tyranny and treated with a certain standard of civility. When they reach the beautiful beaches of Saipan and the Northern Mariana Islands, they find something more akin to a nightmare. In this United States commonwealth, there are some of the most underhanded and profitable factories in the garment business. These factories are leased out by familiar brand names such as Ralph Lauren, Ann Taylor and The Gap. These factories are incredibly profitable due to the legal agreements made when these islands became a commonwealth of the United States. They took on all the laws of the United States except for two very important laws. The first was the Fair Labor Standards Act, which meant these islands didn’t have to follow United States minimum wage, but could create their own. The second group of laws they did not take on were the majority of provisions from the Immigration and Nationality Act; which meant the islands could import thousands of illegal immigrants to work in factories without having to issue them any sort of legal right to be there. This created many problems, such as the exploitation of foreign immigrant workers through low wages, poor working conditions, unfair treatment and no legal way to claim back pay. These problems have stemmed off to create even larger, more heinous repercussions such as poor women being forced to abort pregnancies because of the fear that they might be fired. A lot of these same poor women have been forced into the sex industry, which unregulated has been blossoming in these islands. In mainland USA these problems are nowhere near as severe because of the labor laws and rules set up to prevent worker exploitation, so how is it that commonwealth was able to get away with atrocities Americans frown upon? The cover-up that politicians such as Jack Abramoff and Tom DeLay were able to orchestrate: through manipulation of legislation, bribery and misleading information about the islands. Some of these politicians were lobbyist or beneficiaries of the billion dollar industry in Saipan. These politicians time and again have thwarted legislation that would have improved working conditions in these islands. They also organized trips and sent out press releases in order to show how wonderful Saipan and the Northern Mariana Islands 27    

were doing. For example: the time when Tom DeLay referred to the islands as, “a shining light for what is happening in the Republican Party, and you represent everything that is good about what we’re trying to do in America, in leading the world in the free-market system ” (Clarren). Many of these same promoters of the islands’ “wonderful free-market” system are republican moralists who, according to their beliefs, should be horrified at the effects this industry has had upon abortion rates and the number of women in the sex industry. Not everyone is standing by and allowing this to happen. The court system has taken a few steps towards stopping these heinous crimes and increasing the standard of living. The court system has ruled on many cases concerning the islands and is usually in favor of not only workers rights, but labeling items made in these islands as “Made in (insert name of island), USA.” Not all politicians involved are corrupt either; many have tried to pass different labor rights laws; since 1995 many different congressman have sponsored or written legislation to raise minimum wage, end the immigration exception and protect basic worker rights. Although much of this legislation never passed it shows that many are aware and are trying to make a positive difference. Armed with this knowledge, consumers can boycott garments made in these types of conditions. American citizens should be especially upset with this information since this is happening in what is, technically, a part of their country. Now that certain factories put “Made in Saipan (USA)” and “Made in Northern Marianas (USA),” many concerned humanitarians can make sure not to purchase such goods. Disseminating the information about this issue is the first step in helping the problem; letting people know about major human rights violations within United States territory can be the first step in changing it. Just because a tag says “Made in the USA” doesn’t mean it comes with all the labor protections and high quality we expect. You should research the brands you buy and make sure that the consumer choice you make is the right one. Information is power to change the world and make it a better place.
Works Cited Clarren, Rebecca. "Ms. Magazine | Paradise Lost." Ms. Magazine Online | More Than A Magazine - A Movement. Ms. Magazine, 2006. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.msmagazine.com/spring2006/paradise_full.asp>.

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Genocide Denial and the Stolen Generations
Phoebe Bierly Since the Bringing Them Home report was published in 1997, a debate—often referred to as a “history war”—has raged in Australia over whether the forcible removal of thousands of Aboriginal children from their families from the 19th to the mid20th century, can be regarded as genocide (Muldoon 191; Aboriginal). There are valid legal arguments that the Stolen Generations may not constitute genocide under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, but this paper is not concerned with this side of the genocide debate (Krygier 95). Rather, this essay focuses on genocide denial that stems from a different urge than the desire to ensure the proper application of international law. This genocide denial has been carried out through the disputation of facts, the deployment of the Holocaust as an archetypal model of genocide, and disputes over the perpetrators’ intentions, but, in reality, this denial is not about the components of genocide or historical accountability. It is, at its core, a battle for the right to shape historical memory, and, ultimately, Australia’s national identity, political legitimacy, and current trajectory (Levi). The subjugation of the Indigenous peoples of Australia has a long history, beginning with the British colonial period when approximately 20,000 Aborigines were massacred or killed in violent conflicts with settlers. This period marked the beginning of the ideal of “White Australia.” The solution to the “Aboriginal question,” it was decided, was absorption of the “half-caste” (mixed race) Aboriginal population into the white population (In Denial). In the nineteenth century, the conviction arose that “full-blood” Aborigines would die out, but the integrity of White Australia would continue to be threatened by contamination from the “halfcaste” Aboriginal population. The Perth Sunday Times asserted that Australia’s “half –caste problem…must be tackled boldly and immediately. The greatest danger, experts agree, is that three races will develop in Australia: white, black and the pathetic sinister third race which is neither.” Writes Robert Manne, “To perceive a group of human beings as a ‘problem’ is, of course, to hanker after a ‘solution’” (In Denial). Consequently, with regards to its Aboriginal population, Australia began to exhibit all the characteristics of “the modern ‘gardening’ state, viewing the society it rules as an object of designing, cultivating and weed-poisoning” (Bauman 13). It was felt that the Aboriginal problem could be solved, and White 29    

Australia could be kept pure through severing “half-caste” children’s ties to their families and native cultures and assimilating them within white Australian society (In Denial). The government camouflaged its true intentions with claims that these children were being removed from their families due to neglect or abuse (Whitewash 6). Thousands of children and families were affected by these policies, which continued into the twentieth century (In Denial). Despite the copious documentation of such abuses, historical narratives were, for a long time, dominated by what the anthropologist W.E.H. Stanner referred to as the “Great Australian Silence” about Aboriginal dispossession. Stanner described this silence as “a view from a window which has been carefully placed to exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape” (Whitewash 1). Australian colonial history had long been portrayed as peaceful, a “happy contrast” to the bloody settlement of Africa and the Americas (Reynolds 136). Australian historians glorified the “noble frontiersman” and portrayed the hard work he did in settling the nation as “peaceful, heroic and wholly admirable” (126-7). Within this grand historical narrative, Aboriginal dispossession was regarded as simply “a melancholy footnote” (Whitewash 1). This silence was gradually breached by the work of revisionist historians, beginning in the 1970’s (Muldoon 187). These historians began a dialogue about Australia’s treatment of its Aboriginal population that conflicted with many conservative Australians’ long-held convictions. Finally in 1997 the Bringing Them Home report, containing the results of the federal government’s inquiry into the child removals, was published. Within this report was the assertion that the Commonwealth government and the governments of some of the individual Australian states were guilty of genocide with regards to the practice of child removal (Manne Settler, 217). The Bringing Them Home report brought knowledge of the Stolen Generations to a much wider audience within Australia, shocking the public’s conscience; “I am sure I am not the only one to have had the sensation of waking up to find myself in an Australia I barely recognise [sic],” commented one writer (Schaffer 109). The report itself requested that Australia “listens [sic] with an open heart and mind to the stories of what has happened in the past and, having listened and understood, commit itself to reconciliation.” The stage seemed set for national programs of restorative justice and reconciliation (Schaffer 107). However, not everyone was moved by the contents of the Bringing Them Home report, particularly its assertion that the 30    

forcible removal of children from their families was a genocidal act. Many Australian conservative thinkers regarded Bringing Them Home as “a beat-up that appealed to the ‘moral vanity’ of a leftwing intelligentsia who constituted a ‘moral mafia’ and who wanted to decry the legacy of Australian history” (Craven V). The publication of Bringing Them Home, thus, served as a catalyst for the long-simmering conflict between liberal and conservative Australian intellectuals and politicians over the nature of Australian historical memory (Revisionism 352). This conflict would come to be called the “history wars”: a struggle portrayed as being waged between the “Three Cheers” historians who focused on a patriotic portrayal of history and the “Black Armband” historians, who were seen as emphasizing only the reprehensible moments of Australian history (Levi 127). Thanks to Bringing Them Home, the central issue in the history wars was whether or not genocide had been committed (Levi 130). The first blow in the history wars was struck by Quadrant, a right-wing magazine, which began publishing articles aimed at discrediting the report (In Denial V). One of the most prominent and influential agents of denial was an academic by the name of Keith Windschuttle, who would ultimately become the editor of Quadrant (Mark); in 2002, Windschuttle wrote an article for Quadrant questioning the existence of settler massacres of Aborigines (Whitewash 6). Windschuttle would go on to publish an entire book on this topic, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, that the conservative government under Prime Minister John Howard-which was profoundly against “black armband” history and disinclined to issue an apology to the Aboriginal population--found enormously appealing (Revisionism 336; Levi 130). Slowly the practice of genocide denial, with regards to the Stolen Generations and Aboriginal history as a whole, developed. Australian intellectuals’ critiques of genocide claims frequently rest upon the disputation of facts, a strategy that is a fairly common tactic in genocide denial. Windschuttle exemplified this strategy when he wrote in 2008 that, “the problem with the Bringing Them Home report is not its logic, but its facts” (Don’t). Windschuttle, and conservative historians like him, set out to disprove and discredit historians they regarded as revisionist through quibbles over historical documentation. Write Krygier and van Krieken, “Windschuttle regards ‘orthodox’ historians of these matters much as a somewhat obsessed ferret might regard rabbits: as nothing but prey. He hunts for incompetence, sloppiness, ideologically driven falsehood and fantasy, and reckons he finds them everywhere” (Whitewash 81). Denialists, writes Moses, “claim 31    

that a factual statement can be authenticated as true only if backed up by a circumscribed category of documents” (Revisionism 353). Moses cites an example of this from the lexicon of Holocaust denial: one man has alleged that because one cannot definitively identify the holes in the roof of the gas chambers through which the poison entered the chamber, the entire history of the use of gas chambers in the Holocaust is called into question: “no holes, no holocaust” (Moses 354). From this perspective, all slightly ambiguous or unsubstantiated historical details become grounds for disproving the existence of the entire phenomenon. So, when Aboriginal activist Lowitja O’Donoghue said that she didn’t regard herself as “stolen” but rather “removed” because her mother allowed her to be taken, conservatives seized on this as discrediting the entire history of the Stolen Generations (Schaffer 111). To a certain extent, the Australian government has also exhibited a similar fixation with evidence by creating an environment where Stolen Generation survivors seeking redress must make their claims in court, where documentary evidence is essential; such trials have typically failed due to lack of substantial evidence (Muldoon 189). This conflict over historical proof has proved very effective for the conservatives in that it has distracted the nation from the more relevant issues raised by the Bringing Them Home report (Muldoon 189). Some of this denial also hinges upon the conviction that those carrying out child removal policies did so out of the best intentions (Manne). Such people refuse to look beyond the government’s rhetoric about rampant child abuse amongst Aboriginal populations to see the more malevolent rationale of preserving the sanctity of White Australia. After all, the removal of children had historically been portrayed as motivated by “good intentions”; the government claimed, at the time, that leaving halfcaste children on the Reserves “to grow up in comparative idleness, and in the midst of more or less vicious surroundings would be, to say the least, an injustice to the children themselves, and a positive menace to the State” (Manne Denial 11). Such intentionalist arguments have been commonly deployed by former colonial powers, and tend to constitute a refusal to look beyond the horrors committed in the past because they were committed in the service of a grand “civilizing” mission (Moses 24). Australian Conservatives also have a very complicated relationship with anything that in some way relates Aboriginal history to the Holocaust. Some take great issue with comparisons made between Australia’s treatment of the Aborigines and the Holocaust. Levi sees those who disavow all comparisons between the two as using the Holocaust “to make the memory of the local 32    

history tolerable, by making whatever violence there may be in the Australian past appear relatively benign. The “normal” civilizing violence of colonial settlement is spoken of in the same breath as the “unique” transgressions of the Nazis, but only to say “whatever we are, we are not that” (Levi 137); consequently such people feel that no possible comparison can be made between the violence that took place in Australia and the mass atrocities of the Holocaust. However, a great many more conservative Australians embrace comparison, believing that the elements of the Holocaust that Aboriginal history lacks disqualify it from consideration as genocide (135). This denial has also been shaped by some material concerns, particularly fears about having to make significant concessions to the Aboriginal population. John Howard’s government likely feared having to pay reparations, return land, and change the structure of Aboriginal representation within the state (Chappell). When the atrocities committed against the Aboriginal population were defined as genocide, calls for such changes began to proliferate among the public (Schaffer 111). As such, denying the existence of such a genocidal history performed real political work. “If the desire is to forestall the emergence of Aboriginal nationalism, then the way to do it is to rob indigenous communities of anything in their past that might nurture pride and self-confidence,” concludes Reynolds (Terra 135). The reason the question of genocide has proven so contentious is because it is inextricably intertwined with Australia’s founding, and, as such, poses serious implications for Australian national identity and political legitimacy. Even Windschuttle acknowledges this fact, writing: “the debate over Aboriginal history goes far beyond its ostensible subject: it is about the character of the nation and, ultimately, the caliber of the civilization Britain brought to these shores in 1788” (Krygier 82). Modern states often exhibit a garden-state-esque attitude with regards to the sculpting of national history, seeking to weed and prune the national narrative until it takes on a form that creates “the sense of a unified nation grounded in a shared past” (Muldoon 185). Australia, like most modern states, has “structured the past as a nationalist narrative to serve the present” (Lake 162). The historical narrative about the “noble frontiersman” and Australia’s peaceful colonial legacy, which was taught in most Australian schools, served as a unifying myth, and a basis for a national collective ethos. So, when it was revealed that these “noble frontiersmen” may in fact have been “ethnic cleansers, even genocidal killers…the positive myth of 33    

origin [was] at once the negative one,” and history began to pose serious problems for the nation (Levi 138). The potential for disproval of the founding myth of national identity is deeply unsettling for a modern nation. When the national origin story is discredited the nation experiences a “process of disruption and pluralisation in which different versions of the national story—invasion vs. settlement, development vs. exploitation—struggle for recognition” (Muldoon 182). The history wars are centered on this struggle for recognition. Furthermore, in some ways, admission of genocidal responsibility has the potential to go far more profoundly to the core of Australian national identity than to that of Germany itself” because the country’s foundation “can be seen as inextricable from racism, from overt attempts to construct one nation out of one people” (Levi 138). Adds historian Dirk Moses: “in the Australian case, the very existence of the nation state and the nationalised [sic] subject is predicated on the dispossession, expulsion, and where necessary, extermination of the Indigenous peoples. (Levi 138). Thus, writes Muldoon, “As Ernst Renan noted in this famous essay of 1887: “What is a nation?” there is a very real sense in which nation building requires “getting one’s history wrong” (Muldoon 187). The tendency to particularize the Holocaust as the definition of genocide adds further urgency to genocide accusations’ implications for the modern state (Chappell 125). The real question the disintegration of the Australian origin myth begins to pose, Levi argues, “is not “Did we commit genocide?” but “Are we like the Nazis?” (Levi 139). Historian Inga Clendinnen gave voice to this questioning when she wrote, “when I see the word ‘genocide’ I still see Gypsies and Jews being herded into trains, into pits, into ravines” (Levi 140). The perception of the Holocaust as the archetypal genocide means that, for many Australians, any use of the word “genocide’ seems to accuse them of the mass murder of millions of people, and is thus an association that frequently elicits emotional denials. Thus, the Holocaust as an archetype has consistently posed serious problems for rational discussions of genocide culpability. In 2007 Paul Rudd was elected Prime Minister, and he wasted little time in issuing an apology to the Stolen Generations. “For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry,” he said. These words were 34    

poignant and something many people had waited a long time to hear. But, unfortunately, the apology concealed the fact that not much had really changed in the state’s relationship to Aboriginal history. Rudd did not once use the word “genocide” in this statement, nor did he commit to any serious reconciliatory policies. His apology has been employed in some historical narratives as a moment of closure, an end to this long legacy of abuse, but key reforms or gestures of reconciliation towards the Aboriginal population have not followed; Aboriginal Australians continue to face serious challenges within Australia (Chappell 140). Australia’s ongoing racial problems have lent this debate over national history added significance. Much of the contention around the Stolen Generations stems from the way modern states seek to mobilize history to serve the present; writes Krygier “the imagined past is being treated as a crucial part of the present, and it is that present-past that is the focus and explanation for the passions these past events still manage to inspire” (Krygier 82-3). Modern states desire a coherent historical narrative that seems to follow a consistent, linear path from the past to the present; but if it is the case that Australia’s previous dealings with racial minorities have been morally reprehensible, then this calls into question Australia’s current behavior towards minorities and whether or not the nation still subscribes to the White Australia ideal, something which the state does not particularly want discussed (Levi). Australia is still grappling with serious race problems with regards to the Aboriginal population, including the deaths of Aborigines in police custody (Chappell). Additionally, the international community has alleged that Australia has engaged in egregious violations of human rights in its long-term imprisonment of asylum seekers in camps, where many of them commit suicide. Writes Levi, “While the conditions under which many Australian Aborigines live continue to be deplorable, it is arguably the legacy of the White Australia Policy as manifest in this nation’s current treatment of refugees and asylum seekers that raises most distressingly the specter of Holocaust memory” (Levi 149). Any serious discussion of past human rights abuses in Australia raises the specter of these new abuses, and thus adds even more fervor to the denial of genocide. Writes Robert Manne, “Historical denialism is a morally terrible matter. By refusing to acknowledge the suffering of the victims it becomes for them and their families a second sickening blow, a revival of the original offence” (Cruelty 3). While denying the severity of the offenses against the Stolen Generations remains socially acceptable, it is unlikely that the Australian government 35    

will feel compelled to put serious effort into initiating programs of reconciliation and righting racial inequality and prejudice within the nation. “Denial,” writes Israel Charny, “is a virus,” which “we must fight” if we wish to help the victims of genocide and prevent future genocides (Charny). Unfortunately, this problem is in no way exclusive to Australia. The denial of genocides committed under the banner of “civilization” by colonial powers continues to be widespread and much more socially acceptable than the denial of non-colonial genocides (Moses 24). Australia is not alone in having to come to terms with information that has the potential to reshape its identity—many other postcolonial nations, including the United States and Canada, have a history of forcibly transferring native children from their families in order to assimilate them within white society, and to this day these nations remain inclined to omit such facts from their national history (Krauss; McBeth). The case of the Stolen Generations makes it clear that if postcolonial nations are to come to terms with their own legacies of genocide and institute the necessary reforms and reconciliatory systems, they must adopt a more nuanced view of genocide, which recognizes that atrocities do not have to resemble the Holocaust in order to constitute genocide or be explicitly articulated as intended to destroy a people, and must examine scholarship with a critical eye, rather than simply believing the historians’ whose work adheres most closely to the historical narrative they would like their nation to have.
Works Cited Bauman, Zygmunt. Modernity and the Holocaust. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. Chappell, Louise, John Chesterman and Lisa Hill. The Politics of Human Rights in Australia. China: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Charny, Israel W. “The Psychological Satisfaction of Denials of the Holocaust or Other Genocides by Non-Extremists or Bigots, and Even by Known Scholars.” The Idea Journal 6.1 (2001) <http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=27>. Krauss, Clifford. “80,000 Native Canadians to Be Compensated for School Abuse.” The New York Times. 27 April 2006. 20 March 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/27/world/americas/27canada.html?_r=1>. Krygier, Martin and Robert van Krieken. “The Character of the Nation.” Whitewash: on Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Ed. Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003. 81-108. Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. USA: Oxford University Press, 1996. Lake, Marilyn. “History and the Nation.” Whitewash: on Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Ed. Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003. 160-173.

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Levi, Neil. “’No Sensible Comparison’? The Place of the Holocaust in Australia’s History Wars.” History and Memory 19.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 124-156 Manne, Robert. “A Battle of Philosophies.” Australian Quarterly 70.5 (Sept-Oct 1998): 42-5 Manne, Robert. “Aboriginal Child Removal and the Question of Genocide, 1900-1940.” Genocide and Settler Society. Ed. A. Dirk Moses. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004. 217-243. Manne, Robert. “In Denial: The Stolen Generations and the Right.” The Quarterly Essay 1 (2001) Manne, Robert. “Introduction.” Whitewash: on Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Ed. Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003. 1-16. Manne, Robert. “The cruelty of denial.” The Age 9 Sept. 2006 <http://www.theage.com.au/news/robert-manne /thecrueltyofdenial/2006/09/08/1157222325367.html>. Mark, David. “Rudd calls for end to ‘history wars’.” ABC News 28 Aug. 2009 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-08-27/rudd-calls-for-end-to-historywars/1408032>. McBeth, Sally J. “Indian Boarding Schools and Ethnic Identity: An Example From the Southern Plains Tribes of Oklahoma.” The Plains Anthropologist 28.100 (1983): 119-128. McCarthy, Thomas. “Coming to Terms With Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery.” Political Theory 32.6 (Dec. 2004): 750-772 Moses, A. Dirk. “Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History.” Genocide and Settler Society. Ed. A. Dirk Moses. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004. 3-48. Moses, A. Dirk. “Revisionism and Denial.” Whitewash: on Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Ed. Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003. 337-370. Muldoon, Paul. “Reconciliation and Political Legitimacy: The Old Australia and the New South Africa.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 49 (2003): 182-196. Reynolds, Henry. “Terra Nullius Reborn.” Whitewash: on Keith Windschuttle’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History. Ed. Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2003. 109-138. Reynolds, Henry. Why weren’t we told? Australia: Penguin Books, 2000. Schaffer, Kay and Sidonie Smith. Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition.USA: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Windschuttle, Keith. “Don’t let facts spoil the day.” The Australian 9 Feb. 2008 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/opinion/dont-let-facts-spoilthe-day/story-e6frgcko-1111115509643>. Windschuttle, Keith. The Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Volume One. Australia: Macleay Press, 2002.

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Homeless Semiotics
 

Jeffrey Lagman

 

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Incessant Incarnation  

Laila Soudi

Approximately 50 miles north of the capital of Jordan lays Irbid refugee camp. There, a haunting, familiar outcry is heard on a daily basis. The resonating shrieking is recognized by all neighbors as that of Mohammad, a 22-year-old with a severe and debilitating case of mental retardation. Fifteen years ago, in an unrestrained, impetuous episode that ultimately determined his fate, Mohammad left his house and began to vandalize and destroy everything in sight. Today, as a result of his belligerent disposition, he is not allowed to set foot outside of his house. He is incarcerated in his own home. For the security and well-being of all those around him, Mohammad is chained. In his own room, a sturdy, steel chain tenaciously holds him to the ground. His mobility is limited, and his social interaction with other people is almost nonexistent. In a desperate attempt to alleviate his pain, Mohammad’s mother has futilely reached out to numerous mental health institutions across the nation. She has not had any luck, however, for her son “is simply way too violent.”

 

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Make a Tent  

Rachel Pevsner

On November 18, 2011 UC Davis police officers, in a legally questionable situation, pepper-sprayed peaceful protestors with pepper spray that was of a much higher grade than authorized for police use. On November 21, 2011 thousands of people gathered in the quad as a response to the “Pepper Spray Incident”—these photographs present the memorial of signs, wire tents, and flowers made by those gatherers. For more information, please see: http://reynosoreport.ucdavis.edu/reynoso-report.pdf

 

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Examining the Success of the International Criminal Court
Michael Hoye The 20th century saw an unprecedented amount of bloodshed. This time period was home to two world wars, numerous human rights abuses, and the rise of genocide. Throughout the entire century, genocide took place in the Ottoman Empire, Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and various other places. This time period also saw an increased awareness of the responsibilities of the international community in maintaining peace. The U.N. led this effort, first with the establishment of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide(CPPG) (1948) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), then through the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR). These efforts at defining the international community’s responsibilities in implementing justice have most recently presented themselves in the creation of the International Criminal Court(ICC) on July 1, 2002. In order to have a true understanding of the ICC it is necessary to know how former international tribunals, such as the ICTY, and the ICTR, were used to punish these crimes and how they influenced the functions, and led to the creation of the ICC. Since its creation, the ICC has become a successful tool in implementing international justice by bringing charges against numerous individuals guilty of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or War Crimes. Its ability to deter and prevent these acts has, however, been called into question. Similarly, its role in implementing a true process of Peace and Reconciliation has been non-existent. This paper employs as primary evidence the records of the ICC, as well as secondary material on international law and peacemaking. In order to understand the distinct role the ICC is currently playing in the world, it is necessary to understand both the similarities and differences the ICC has with individual criminal tribunals, like the ICTY, and the ICTR. For one, all of these international institutions are meant to intervene in to a state’s affairs when that state’s domestic judicial system cannot correctly   43    

perform its functions. This was the case during and in the aftermath of the multiple conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, and after the bloodshed that was the Rwandan Genocide. Similarly these institutions, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC all punish the same types of crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Established in May 1993, the ICTY was created in order to punish those responsible for the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The court was established by Resolution 827, passed by the U.N. Security Council and was intended to try four different crimes: grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity (www.icty.org). In order to punish these crimes the court can give up to a life sentence. As of July 20, 2011, after the arrest of Goran Hadzic, all 161 of those indicted by the court had been arrested (www.icty.org). His trial, and a few others will be handed over to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on July 1, 2013 along with all of the ICTY’s other functions (www.icty.org). The ICTR was established by the U.N. Security Council through resolution 955 in November 1994, and was mandated to punish those responsible for the Rwandan Genocide (www.unictr.org/). Based out of Arusha, Tanzania, it was not established as a permanent institution. According to the U.N. Security Council, it was supposed to complete its investigations by 2004, complete all trial activities by 2008, and complete all work in 2012 (www.unictr.org/). These goals have been deemed unrealistic, and any work that still needs to be done will be transferred to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals by 2014. Since its creation the ICTR has carried out 69 trials and convicted 42 people (www.unictr.org/). 5 more trials are in session, while 1 person is accused and still in detention awaiting trial (www.unictr.org/). There are still 9 individuals at large (www.unictr.org/). The establishment of the ICTY in 1993 and of the ICTR in 1994 marked a first in human history. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials and the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, which were international only in that they were carried out by the various   44    

victors of WWII, the ICTY and the ICTR marked the first time in history that “an international prosecutor’s office investigated international war crimes.” (Shinoda, 2001, p.3) These tribunals had immense power. Backed by the U.N.’s Security Council, these tribunals had a “universally binding power,” in regards to specific individuals, and all member states of the U.N. were required to follow these tribunals’ decisions (Shinoda, 2001, p.4). Another success of these individual tribunals is that they removed the dispensing of justice from a political process (www.icty.org). This gave the tribunals a good chance of success in that they could target, without fear of reprisal, even the most powerful political and military leaders guilty of Genocide and other crimes. This lack of impunity allowed for the first indictment of a sitting head of state, Slobodan Milosevich, by the ICTY, for war crimes (www.icty.org). The ICTY and the ICTR had immense success in implementing justice. In the former Yugoslavia, all those indicted have been sentenced, cleared of charges, or are in the process of appearing in court. Over 160 people have been charged with various crimes (www.icty.org). In Rwanda, nine individuals are still at large, although many of them are believed to be dead. Of those detained, only one person is still awaiting trial and there are still only five other trials that are still in progress (www.unictr.org/). In terms of implementing international justice and punishing those responsible, both of these tribunals have been very successful. Despite these successes, these tribunals have done little in actually deterring and preventing genocide. These courts, while powerful, only hold jurisdiction in those countries mandated by the U.N., meaning they have no power to target other perpetrators of these crimes in other states. At most, the establishment of these courts helped to further the idea that genocide and other international crimes will be punished in the aftermath. This precedent, however, can only do so much for deterrence. Similarly, neither of these tribunals has played much into the process of Peace and Reconciliation in either the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda. The ICTY and ICTR, which are international, are not geared towards reconciliation, as that process is mainly an internal, domestic affair (Barria, Roper 2005 p. 363).   45    

Because these courts were located away from the sites of genocide many victims felt that justice was not properly handled. In Rwanda, this was dealt with through the implementation of local Gacaca courts. These courts, mandatory for those accused of taking part in the genocide, were an effective way for Rwandan communities to air out any grievances or existing tensions still present. Unlike proceedings at the ICTR, these trials encouraged the participation of all community members, and placed uncovering the truth above the true exercise of justice (The Guardian). Much to the chagrin of survivors, it is also in these domestic courts that victim’s compensation has been dealt with, as neither the ICTY nor the ICTR take on this task. Building off of the success of the ICTY and the ICTR, and off of international treaties dating as far back as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, the international community, by the late 1990’s, was working hard at creating an international criminal court system intended to try the most heinous crimes. This hard work manifested itself in 1998, through the Rome Statute, the treaty that governs the functions of the International Criminal Court. The ICC became functional on July 1, 2001, after 60 countries ratified the Rome Statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). It is the first permanent, treaty-based international court in world history. It is an independent organization meaning it is not controlled by any individual state, or by the U.N. It has jurisdiction over Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and, in the near future, the Crime of Aggression (The Rome Statute). The ICC and its prosecutor can investigate crimes only if a member state refers them to the court, if the crimes are referred to the court by the U.N. security council, or if the Prosecutor wishes to initiate an investigation into one of the ICC’s member states (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). The ICC consists of five main offices: The Presidency, Judicial Divisions, The Office of the Prosecutor, The Registry, and various other offices. The Presidency is responsible for all administrative functions of the court, except for all functions involving the Office of the Prosecutor (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). The current President is Sang-Hyun Song. The Judicial Division is divided into three divisions; the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial   46    

Division, and the Appeals Division. These divisions handle all of the trials of those accused and indicted (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). The Office of the Prosecutor is responsible for issuing indictments, for conducting investigations, and for prosecuting those indicted (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). The current Prosecutor is Luis MorenoOcampo, of Argentina. The Registry handles all of the non-judicial aspects of administration and servicing the court (http://www.icccpi.int/). The Registry works under the office of the President. After these four main offices, there are numerous, some-what autonomous offices. These include the Office of Public Counseling for Victims and the Office of Public Counsel for Defense. The Registry handles these offices’ administration, but they operate autonomously in all other functions. Since its creation, the ICC has opened 14 cases in seven different countries. In December of 2003 Prosecutor MorenoOcampo decided to refer Uganda to the ICC in response to alleged human rights abuses. The case The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, was announced in July of 2004, and included four arrest warrants for those listed in the case (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). The ICC’s next case was in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Again Prosecutor MorenoOcampo decided to investigate, and referred the country in April 2004. Announced in June 2004 (making these the first actual cases begun by the ICC), the ICC began four investigations in the DRC: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui; and The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana. Two later cases were also opened in the DRC in January and November of 2009 (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). After this, in June 2005, the Office of the Prosecutor began an investigation into abuses in the Darfur region of Sudan and started four cases, after being referred to the nation by the U.N. Security Council in March of 2005 (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). Around this same time (January 2005), abuses in the Central Africa Republic were referred to the ICC by the CAR’s government and here the Prosecutor opened up one case (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). In 2010 the Pre-Trial Division allowed for two cases in Kenya to investigate post-electoral violence (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). A   47    

year later, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo issued three arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi (now deceased), Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, all who were complicit in the killing of protestors in Libya and stand accused of crimes against humanity (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). After this, the most recent case that the ICC has begun to oversee is The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire, which began with the issuing of an arrest warrant for Laurent Gbagbo on November 30, 2011 (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). In addition to these cases and investigations, the Office of the Prosecutor is currently conducting examinations into a number of situations in Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Palestine, Honduras, Korea and Nigeria (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). Despite the fact that no final verdict has been handed down in any case, the ICC has already had a tremendous amount of success in terms of international justice. As of March 2, 2012 the court has indicted 28 people, issued arrests warrants for 19 people, summoned nine more, and currently have 10 people detained on trial (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). Through these actions alone, the ICC has shown that it is willing and able to go after those who commit Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes. Recognizing these crimes, and targeting those who are guilty of them is crucial towards ending the impunity of those perpetrators (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). Much like the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC has been willing to target head of states, such as Omar alBashir, the president of Sudan, and Muammar Ghaddafi, the former leader of Libya. The ability of the ICC to do this makes it crucial towards implementing true justice in punishing international crimes. One of the main arguments against the ICC is that it’s jurisdiction is not actually universal. It can only issue investigations and bring indictments against individuals under its jurisdiction, unless the U.N. Security Council refers a case to the court. This argument is rapidly diminishing as more and more states ratify the Rome Statute. As of February 1, 2012 120 states have ratified the statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). This is up from 60 states in 2002. Currently, 33 states from Africa, 18 from Asia-Pacific, 18 from Eastern Europe, 25 from Western Europe and North America, and 26 states from Latin America have ratified the Rome Statute   48    

(http://www.icc-cpi.int/). This means in the last ten years, the jurisdiction of the court has doubled. This has greatly increased its ability to target perpetrators of human rights abuses, which is made evident by the ever-increasing amount of cases the ICC is taking on. Missing from these however, are some of the worlds most powerful nations including the United States, Russia, China, and India. Despite the absence of these nations, however, the power and breadth of the ICC has continued to grow. It is almost impossible to measure the effect the ICC has played on deterring human rights abuses. For one, the court has only been around for a decade. This means any long-term affects of the court have yet to manifest them self in the actions of world leaders. Secondly, there is no true way to tell if genocide has been prevented. It is possible to pinpoint similar, somewhat universal signs that tend to lead to genocide. However if these signs appear in a situation that is not followed by genocide or human rights abuses there is no sure way of knowing whether the ICC played a role in deterring those abuses. Unlike with the creation of the temporary ICTY and the ICTR, the permanency of the ICC meant the formation of an institution that could investigate international crimes while they were happening or even beginning. Indicting crimes such as genocide or war crimes while they are occurring can be effective at stopping these actions by bringing recognition to both the victims and the perpetrators. Certainly the ICC’s indictment against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi helped to legitimize the international aiding of the rebels fighting against him. This is one of the ICC’s most important tools in deterring these international crimes; it can serve to recognize claims of human rights abuses and legitimize international responses to these abuses, helping to prematurely end them and punish those responsible. However, this rule is not absolute. For instance, the International Community has done very little to physically stop or prevent human rights abuses in Darfur, where its sitting president, Omar al-Bashir was indicted for genocide in 2008. One of the successes of the ICC has been its ability of the court to protect and provide support for victims and witnesses, and to provide an outlet for victims’ compensation (Blattmann,   49    

Bowman 2008, p714). Under the ICC’s rules, victims and witnesses have an opportunity to participate in the trials of those accused. The ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for Victims helps to ensure that all victims who wish to participate in the courts proceedings have a legal representative (Blattmann, Bowman 2008, p714). In addition to this, the court may award reparations to victims. These reparations are paid through either an order of the court in which the perpetrator of a crime is made to pay, or through a Trust Fund, set up by the court, that is meant to support in a humanitarian capacity (http://www.icc-cpi.int/). These functions of the ICC do not help to support a Peace and Reconciliation process. The ICC’s use of victim’s compensation, and it’s rejection of the use of amnesty is not geared towards helping a society get over the trauma of genocide. Both of these functions can disturb a recovering society. Victim’s compensation serves to disrupt the lives of those who committed crimes (for better or for worse). In the aftermath of genocide, this can further feelings of anger between the various groups. Also amnesty has historically been used to allow perpetrators of human rights abuses to come clean about their actions in an effort for victims to understand what happened and why it happened. With granted amnesty, these perpetrators can tell the truth without fear of jail time or punishment. By not allowing amnesty, the ICC can make it difficult for communities to move forward. These functions, allowing victim’s compensation, and not granting amnesty play well into the main focus of the ICC, which is justice, and both of these actions serve that purpose well. The creation of the ICC has forever changed the way justice is dealt internationally. For the first time in human history just about any individual can be indicted for human rights abuses. As the ICC’s jurisdiction grows, and more countries ratify the Rome Statute, its power to indict individuals will only grow. Yet despite the courts ability to expand international justice, its ability to deter Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, or War Crimes is not absolute, and has not shown itself in the short amount of time the court has been around. Again, while the establishment of these courts has helped to further the notion that human rights abuses will be punished it has not necessarily lent itself to the idea that   50    

these acts will be stopped. Similarly, certain aspects of the ICC’s justice, such as a refusal to grant amnesty, and the use of victim’s compensation, stand against what is needed to implement a true Peace and Reconciliation process. Despite these limitations, the ICC is still a very successful tool in applying international justice. These powers will only grow as the international community begins to accept its responsibility in punishing and preventing human rights abuses.
Works Cited Barria, Lilian A., and Steven D. Roper. "How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR." The International Journal of Human Rights 9.3 (2005): 349-68. Print. Blattmann, Rene, and Kirsten Bowman. "Achievements and Problems of the International Criminal Court: A View From Within." Journal of International Criminal Justice 6.4 (2008): 711-30. Print. "ICTY - TPIY :." International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Web. 02 Mar. 2012. <http://www.icty.org/>. The International Criminal Court. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Home>. "International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - UNICTR Home." International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Web. 01 Mar. 2012. <http://www.unictr.org/Home/tabid/36/Default.aspx>. Khaleeli, Homa. "Rwanda's Community Courts: A Unique Experiment in Justice." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 01 Oct. 2010. Web. 01 Mar. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/rwanda-gacaca-courts>. Shinoda, Hideaki. "Peace-building by the Rule of Law: An Examination in the Form of International Tribunals." The International Journal of Peace Studies (2001). Web. 28 Feb. 2012. <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol7_1/Shinoda.htm>.

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Slutty Hickeys
Sarah M. Hernández My boigina wears black fishnets ripped with extra holes, short shorts, and doc marten steel-toe boots and will occasionally wear a blood red dick. He teases his hair, wears red lipstick & a septum ring, and liberates his boibies from socially constructed restraints. His boxers like to take a lil’ peek outside of his short shorts as giggles expel from his tasty lips complimenting his curly mustache. He likes to feature those flirty curves that lie on his chest and my boigina REFUSES to cover his LOVER-marks with scarves and make up. Too many times people have called me a chingona, fatass, desgraziada, skank, skonka, bitch, prostituta, and SLUT... And my response to that is “Aren’t you fuckin’ tired? Tired of dressing in ways that ‘benefit’ the rest or ‘protect’ you when in fact it’s oppressing you?”... I was tired. So,... I pulled a radical red lipstick out of my abuelita’s cabinet and grabbed my favorite pair of fishnets and a pressed my red painted fingers against my boigina’s dick and I fucking SCREAMED... It was time. I wanted to be that SLUT. That skonka that mi papi warned me about. I have short shaggy curly hair and I wear short shorts and black fishnets porque yo puedo, fucker. I do that shit because I can. It took me forever to feel empowered enough to call myself a slut. So don’t feed me this shit that I provoke and seduce people to attack me. STOP TELLING ME TO COMB MY HAIR, STOP TELLING ME TO WEAR LONG DRESSES, STOP TELLING ME TO BE CAREFUL. I dress the way I do for me and ONLY me. My gender expression is a product of my political body to say FUCK YOU to every fucker in society. So next time people look at my hickeyhandled neck with disgust, I’ll vulgarly growl at them and bite them... but I’ll ask first because consent is soooo fuckin’ hot.

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Techniques of Genocide in Cambodia
Helen Min In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Analysis, Proposals for Redress, Raphael Lemkin identified eight techniques of genocide in various fields: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.1 By 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a much-reduced version of Lemkin’s proposal in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPG), defining genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” In contrast to Lemkin’s original text, the General Assembly excluded many aspects of political, social, cultural, economic, religious, and moral techniques attributed to genocide in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Analysis, Proposals for Redress. On August 15, 1979, the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal held a trial on the legality of the genocide crime of the Pol Pot-leng Sary clique in Phnom Penh.2 Although the violence of the Pol Pot regime could be identified as genocide under the techniques outlined by Lemkin, the international legal system contested the crime for its strong political nature. However, the court determined the Cambodian atrocity to be genocide by asserting that “the Peking reactionaries were the invidious instigators of [the criminal] plan.”3 The categorization of the crimes under Lemkin’s proposed techniques of genocide revealed the magnitude of Khmer Rogue’s acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. Pol Pot first established his power in Cambodia by launching a new political order. Lemkin observed that the German administration obliterated “every reminder of former national character” in order to assert their political plan for a pure Arian nation.4 Likewise, the CPK Center sought political purity and dominance beginning in the 1960’s by “assassinating Party figures assumed to be too close to Vietnam’s Communists.”5 By the early 1970’s, even before taking power at the national level, the Center’s purges incorporated organized “disappearances of nearly 900                                                                                                                          
Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. New York: H. Fertig, 1973. Print. p. 79-95. <http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/AxisRule1944-2.htm#Techniques>. 2 Fawthrop, Tom, and Helen Jarvis. Getting Away with Genocide?: Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. London: Pluto Press, 2004. Print. p. 44. 3 Fawthrop, p. 46. 4 Lemkin, p.79-95 5 Totten, Samuel, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny. Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. p. 342
1

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Hanoi-trained Khmer Communists.”6 Thus, Pol Pot gradually gained totalitarian authority over the population by replacing former leaders with people loyal to the Center. In various Zones, party-endorsed leaders replaced dissident administrators while other political leaders mysteriously disappeared. By 1975, the Pol Pot regime seized power in provinces throughout Cambodia.7 Pol Pot sought to establish his authority by first purging the country of the previous political agendas. In order to carry out his personal agenda for the nation, he crushed political opponents, voices of dissent, and any hint of former authority. Though citizens initially welcomed the new party with expectations of renewed happiness and peace, the political purges swiftly defeated their hopes as it set the foundation for the regime to carry out insane acts of violence to maintain totalitarian power. In addition to the obliteration of the former political order, the CPK Center consolidated authority through suppression of the intelligentsia. As a social technique of genocide, Lemkin argued that the occupant will endeavor to “weaken the national, spiritual resources” by destructing local law and courts, and focusing their attacks on the educated.8 The Pol Pot regime viewed intellectuals as people of a naturally corrupted class who exploited others. Thus, the authorities closely monitored their every move and brainwashed the general population to do likewise. Gradually, the intellectual community’s potential to organize public rebellions became an existential threat to the regime’s power. Showing any sign of intellectual proficiency capacity soon became severely dangerous. Those who accidentally slipped words in English and French mysteriously disappeared the next day.9 At Prek Kak, former teachers, civil servants, office clerks, and a large number of students were “all in one day, killed with axes on boats that had taken them out into the middle of a river.”10 The Pol Pot officials took even more as prisoners. In one cell alone, officials, teachers, factory workers, electricians, and innocent people remained imprisoned from accusations of being “agents of the CIA or KGB or some such organization.”11 Not only did the educated class in Cambodia suffer from inhumane treatment, but also, “around 600                                                                                                                          
Totten, p. 342 Pol, Pot, Sary Ieng, Nike H. J. De, John B. Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson. Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. Print. p. 75 8 Lemkin, p.79-95 9 Pol, p. 298 10 Pol, p. 297 11 Pol, p. 78
7 6

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students and civil servants returned from abroad, tricked by the propaganda and were killed.”12 The Pol Pot regime heavily suppressed and killed many members of the intelligentsia in order to maintain dominance. The new government’s hatred toward the intellectually privileged escalated as the fear of the intelligentsias’ ability to challenge the authority of the regime surged. In order to retain control, the Khmer Rogue erased the community of educated from the Cambodian society. Moreover, the authorities of the Cambodian genocide used strict cultural controls to maintain power. Lemkin described the cultural technique of genocide as the “rigid control of all cultural activities” and the forbiddance of using the local language in order to dampen the expression of national spirit.13 Within the first few days of Cambodia becoming the Democratic Kampuchea, “all cities were evacuated, hospitals cleared, schools closed, factories emptied, money abolished, monasteries shut, libraries scattered… freedom of the press, of movement, of worship, of organization, and of association, and of discussion all completely disappeared.”14 The new government even destroyed all avenues of Khemer traditional “religious celebrations, traditional festivals, artistic performances, and demonstrations of Khmer traditional art.”15 As a result, the opportunities for education among the children under the fascist government remained nonexistent. The transformation of schools into warehouses, the burning of books, and the destruction of University facilities and schools condemned youth to illiteracy.16 At the National Library, young troops from the Southwest Zone carried out “stacks of what they called “imperialist” books, [threw] them into the street, and [burned] them.”17 With such rigid controls over every aspect of the people’s livelihood, Cambodia became both internally and externally sealed off. Not only did the CPK Center enact rules to repress cultural aspects, but also placed tight controls on the media to prevent international intervention. Banning foreign languages, expelling embassies and press agencies, monitoring television programs, confiscating radios, and suppressing mail and telephones18 all allowed the Khmer Rogue to subjugate a population without information. Through the harsh                                                                                                                          
12

13
14

Pol, p. 79

Lemkin, p.79-95

Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. Print. p. 8 15 Pol, p. 296 16 Pol, 85 17 Kiernan, p. 9 18 Totten, p. 342

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suppression of cultural traditions and the containment of media, the Pol Pot authorities maintained strict controls over the Cambodian people. Additionally, the Khemer Rogue government brought severe economic turmoil upon the population to distract them from questioning the regime’s power. Lemkin’s economic technique of genocide argued that the occupant created a condition of “a daily fight literally for bread and for physical survival [to] handicap thinking in both general and national terms.”19 The government under Pol Pot sought to create an agricultural society to combat Westernization introduced by the French colonialists. The regime despised the financially elite class of the previous state and thus sought to forcefully create a society of equality. Early in their rise to power in 1975, “ten wealthy, prominent people disappeared.”20 Under the banner of equality, the quality of life for the average Cambodian became stripped down to the harshest conditions. Everyday, people of all backgrounds worked extensive hours in the fields with very little rationed food. In one village, a survivor remembered, “every day we ate banana trunks cooked with a Kampuchean sauce, and lacking nutritional value.”21 The undernourished workers suppressed by extraneous working hours left the population to the mercy of the Khmer Rogue authorities. In order to survive and receive the meager daily portions of food, the citizens had to do everything the leaders demanded. By the end of each day, and after long months of continuous repression, the citizens became too weak to consider rebellion against the authorities. The Pol Pot government retained tremendous power over the weak population by controlling the economic provisions for every individual. Furthermore, in order to validate the power and legitimacy of the Khmer fascist regime, the government implemented a policy of strict separation between genders to maximize the workforce and the production in Cambodia. In occupied countries, Lemkin observed that “a policy of depopulation [was] pursued” as a biological technique of genocide.22 In the initial excursions, families remained as one unit; soon, however, the authorities sought to exploit the working potential of the masses by separating families. Mr. Proum Doch Boranann elaborated on this transition in his interview on May 28, 1979: “I was sent to work far from home. I                                                                                                                          
19 20

Lemkin, p.79-95 Kiernan, p. 188 21 Pol, 76. 22 Lemkin, p.79-95

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saw my family only after 20 or 30 days of work in distant regions. Other families underwent the same separation.”23 Through separation, the Pol Pot authorities limited free time and increased labor so that workers might spend less time socializing or taking care of one another. The regime also viewed pregnancy unfavorably because women contributed tremendously to agricultural production. Any request for maternity leave perceived to be asked too early led “to substantial reduction of the woman’s daily food ration.”24 Through such reductions in food, the Khmer Rogue guaranteed work from even expectant mothers and increased the risk for miscarriage. Even if the officials permitted pregnant women to go to the hospital, the circumstances for pregnancy proved dire since the hospital offered no special diet, affection, or comfort. Rather, they further alienated the husbands from their wives, making them work in remote places and allowing them to see each other only once every two or three months. In addition, “relations between men and women, or between young men and young women, were strictly forbidden.”25 Pol Pot even prohibited certain marriages and organized forced weddings between beautiful girls and ugly or crippled soldiers. Frequently, the regime drove soon-tobe wives to cooperation or suicide by threatening to harm her family if she did not comply with the marriage.26 By separating the families from one another and controlling the relationships between men and women, Pol Pot gained the ability to control the size of the population and elicit obedience. Most evidently, the CPK Center used physical controls like starvation, endangering of health, and mass killing to dehumanize the subject population. Lemkin pointed to “physical debilitation and even annihilation of national groups in occupied countries” as a technique of genocide.27 Workers from various villages were taken to different districts to work in labor camps and mass farms for very little food. A Mr. Ung Pech, a heavy construction machine engineer was taken to Prey Nop district to work as a farmer; in a witness statement on January 25, 1979, he remembered, “each of us was given 300 grams of rice a day. We had to make rice soup to calm the stomach.”28 The small portions of food vastly weakened the subject population both physically and mentally. Without the vigor of the body and mind, the people could not muster up the                                                                                                                          
23 24

Pol, p. 84 Pol, p. 292 25 Pol, p. 307 26 Pol, p. 296 27 Lemkin, p.79-95 28 Pol, p. 75

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capacity to organize rebellion against the fascist government. On the rare occasion that meat became available, it was reserved for authorities. 29 If anyone expressed desire for more food, made food in secret, or stole food from the regime’s farms, the Pol Pot authorities punished them for violating the collective spirit of the government. Physical weakness brought by starvation gave remarkable leverage to the Khmer Rogue over the working population. In addition, the Pol Pot clique jeopardized the health of the subjugated citizens in order to limit opportunities for uprising. The regime herded citizens of all backgrounds to the rural districts to farm. Like many others, Mr. Ung Pech lamented, “I was forced to work hard day and night, from 6:00 am to 11:00 pm, without rest, except a short break for soup.”30 In order for the regime to accomplish the goal of making “a marvelous leap forward”, they subjugated the whole population into forced labor. Through the strenuous and vigorous work schedule, the authorities deprived people of free time, ensured limited risk of uprising, and killed many through labor conditions. Those who did not comply with the demands of labor were severely punished or killed. The regime further justified their killing actions with the slogan, “keeping them alive, one gets nothing; killing them, one loses nothing.”31 Even hospitals under the Pol Pot regime were merely locations to carry out massacres of the Khmer population. Empirical medicine, also known as national medicine, replaced scientific medicine: doctors administered medication without diagnosis, physicians without training and even children performed surgical operations, and experimentation ran rampant. Those who refused to comply with the national medical procedures were charged with instigation of rebellion against the Khmer Revolution. In fact, medical buildings acted as purging facilities “aimed at eliminating those physically unfit for the hard work of agricultural production.”32 The dangerous extent of labor and the elimination of scientifically based medical care tremendously built up the government’s power by limiting the physical strength and number of the population. Direct massacres also occurred in various fashion and in all facets of society to demonstrate the power of the Khmer Rogue. Following the initial purges of the regime’s rise to power, the killings continued to grow in dramatic quantities through torture,                                                                                                                          
29 30

Pol, p. 84. Pol, p. 75 31 Touk Ka Min Cham Nenh, Dak Chenh Ka Min Khat Nike, p. 295 32 Pol, p. 295

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and outright mass killings. Authorities brought hundreds of innocent people to prison, interrogated them, and then killed them.33 In the years 1977-1978 “the rate of killings more than doubled. Over twenty new people were killed in the village, and hundreds in the subdistrict.”34 Combined with the hundreds of other villages and subdistricts throughout Cambodia, the numbers of deaths soared rapidly. In his interview, Mr. Proum Duch Boranann explained, “the Pol Pot people had dug pits, and they led my parents and the other villagers and beat them with iron bars or stabbed them with knives.”35 The ability to kill such large quantities of innocent members point blank revealed the brutality and insanity of the Pol Pot regime. Mass killings allowed the government to strike fear into the population while simultaneously decreasing the number of citizens in need of monitoring and feeding. Although the massacres effectively gave the Khmer Rogue power to threaten Cambodians, it also revealed the paranoia of Pol Pot and his leaders. The Khmer Rogue severely attacked the religious community in order to consolidate power exclusively to the government. In areas where “religion play[ed] an important role in national life… the occupant has tried to disrupt these national and religious influences,” according to Lemkin’s religious technique of genocide.36 Under the authority of Pol Pot, there was to be “only one religion – Khmer religion” or “no religion at all.” 37 In a special five day meeting on May 20, 1975, immediately after the Khmer Rogue established national authority, Pol Pot made eight points about the political plan of the Center. The fourth point emphasizes, “defrock all Buddhist monks and put them to work growing rice.”38 This point explicitly reveals the regime’s intent to humiliate the religious leaders by forcing them into labor and production like the others. Additionally, not only did the regime humiliate the Buddhist monks, but it also destroyed temples and sacred statues of Buddha. In many occasions, “the Wat Phnom temples were to be destroyed and replaced by [Pol Pot’s] statue, which would resemble the statue of Mao Tse Tung in China.”39 Pol Pot’s militia-men and spies taunted those who worshipped Buddha in secret by destroying Buddha’s statue in their presence and quoting the                                                                                                                          
33 34

Pol, p. 79 Kiernan, p. 204 35 Pol, p. 84 36 Lemkin, p.79-95 37 Kiernan, p. 269 38 Kiernan, p. 55 39 Pol, p. 81

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slogans of Pol Pot: “Pray to god and you’ll see if he gives you something to eat or not. Pray to Angkar and you’ll see whether you are given food to eat or not.”40 Not only did the regime repress the practices of Buddhists, but it also severely put down other religious practices. By mid-1974, “at least 300 Khmer Moslems [had] been arrested... Most of the arrested persons were prominent Moslem villagers and religious leaders, especially Koranic teachers.”41 Through the severe repression and purging of religious organizations and leaders, the Pol Pot government sought to gain the sole authority and respect from the people. Pol Pot not only wanted to purge Cambodia of religions but desired to present himself as the god figure. Lastly, in the Cambodian genocide, the moral debasement of the culture also aided the growth of the fascist government’s power. According to Lemkin’s moral technique of genocide, “the occupant attempt[ed] to create an atmosphere of moral debasement” in order to weaken potential resistance from the occupied population. The introduction of distracting moral debauchery in Cambodia did not emerge through the proliferation of cheap individual pleasure as it did in Germany under the Nazis. However, a culture of distrust ran rampant among the new society under the Khmer Rogue. Pol Pot aimed to consolidate all of the state’s power beneath/under himself by lodging division and dissention between the Khmer citizens. All gatherings became forbidden and conversations were no longer private. Those in authority heavily encouraged renunciation with rewards. Adults and children alike practiced denunciation and spied on one another.42 The culture of distrust generated more adverse feelings for other citizens and also sowed panic and division, further suppressing the potential for an uprising that could only derive from unity. The distrust for one another successfully gave Pol Pot authority because division encouraged the population to look to the government as the one source of trust. The Khmer Rogue used various techniques of genocide to secure power over the vast Cambodian population. The legality of genocide in Cambodia is contested by those who consider the atrocities as political, social, economic, religious, and moral crimes against humanity, rather than as acts of genocide. However, the systematic and expansive nature of the criminal acts reveals the regime’s intent for genocide. Moreover, the regime’s strategic                                                                                                                          
40 41

Pol, p. 294 Kiernan, p. 261 42 Pol, 292

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violence targeting ethnical, racial and religious groups reveal the genocidal nature of the massacre of Cambodia in 1975.

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How Has Amnesty International Transformed Grassroots Human Rights Advocacy?
Hannah Tigerschiold The Chinese proverb, “It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness” was adopted by the human rights NGO Amnesty International, and immortalized by their iconic logo of a burning candle surrounded by barbed wire. It signifies the essence of the organization’s mission, and since its inception in 1961, human rights have gone from being a little understood concept to a primary aim in modern international society to which virtually all states pay lip service. Amnesty’s name and is synonymous with human rights worldwide1 and it is argued that they have written the language of human rights we see today.2 Amnesty’s history helps shed light on its unique development and begins to explain how the simple idea of one man, Peter Benenson, grew to become a Nobel prize winning organization with staggering membership and unbelievable successes. Amnesty International has transformed the way in which grassroots human rights advocacy is conducted, creating transnational information and advocacy networks, and achieved “genuinely universal”3 appeal. This is not to say that Amnesty is without struggle and failure, but it has made an indelible mark that cannot be undone. Amnesty celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2011, and exists in a radically different international environment from that of its conception. Today the big question is what is Amnesty’s place in future human rights advocacy? Do the methods it pioneered retain value in modern times and, in an age of “new rights advocacy,” will the expansion of their mandate to include economic, social and cultural rights prove successful? It is timely to reexamine the roots, development and achievements of this organization to analyze its historical impact and the future of grassroots human rights advocacy. It makes sense to begin with the “idea” of Amnesty. No part of this organization’s work can be detached from this initial
1 George J. Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, and Peter H. Juviler, Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe, (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press).p.27 2 Egon Larsen, A Flame in Barbed Wire : The Story of Amnesty International, (London: Muller, 1978).p.144 3 Tom Buchanan, ''The Truth Will Set You Free': The Making of Amnesty International', Journal of Contemporary History, 37 (2002). p.595

                                                                                                               

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vision, and much of their strength still stems from this simple yet effective strategy. Benenson’s article, published in The Observer, on the 28th of May 1961 entitled “The Forgotten Prisoners,” marked the modest launch of the “Appeal for Amnesty, 1961.” 4 It “provoked a remarkable response”5 and was published in newspapers worldwide. The article, defending two young men who had been arrested in Portugal for making a toast to liberty, marked the first of what came to be termed the World’s “Prisoners of Conscience,” and within a few weeks the potential for a permanent international voluntary organization became clear. By 1962 the formal title of Amnesty International has been adopted, and within the space of just two years “one of the most successful voluntary campaigning organizations of the postwar era had been conceived, born and grown to a degree of institutional maturity.”6 AI’s message was a beacon of new ideals for the general population, caught in stagnant cold war politics, and very soon a mass voluntary base materialized through its unique framework of local chapters.7 Despite its somewhat inappropriate name, the fundamental mantra of Amnesty has always been, as Voltaire first expressed, “I may hate your opinions but I would defend, to the last minute, your right to express those opinions as long as it was peaceful”8 Membership of Amnesty International could be “profoundly empowering;”9 Amnesty’s “mobilization of shame” inspired both the activist and victim.10 Benenson wrote early on, in a private letter, that he saw the “whole purpose of Amnesty,” was to give man “a sense of belonging to something much greater than himself, of being a small part of the entire human race.”11 Through this Amnesty came to be “the third person” in the world; the shared

                                                                                                               
Winston p.25 Buchanan.p.575 6 Ibid.p.576 7 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia : Human Rights in History, (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap, 2010). p.130 8 BBC, ''Amnesty! When They Are All Free'', in Storyville, (U.K: BBC, 2011). approx 7:30 9 Buchanan. p.592 10 Moyn. p.131 and Julie Mertus and Jeffrey W. Helsing, Human Rights and Conflict : Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace ; [Bristol : University Presses Marketing, distributor], 2006). P.76 and Robert F. Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame : A World View of Human Rights, (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2001). 11 AIA, A1, Benenson to Baker, 9 August 1961
5 4

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wavelength of members made for a voice that could not be ignored.12 A key goal of Amnesty was to create an “awakened and vigilant world consciousness,” and this is certainly an area in which there was resounding success.13 From inception, the emphasis of Amnesty was on “the fact of political imprisonment for a belief rather than the cause for which the prisoner was imprisoned.”14 It transcended ideological differences15 and allowed people, in a Cold War world, to escape polarized thinking and express concern for those who are suffering simply because they are suffering.16 In many ways Amnesty’s attraction grew from its distinctness from traditional politics, and its break with conventional forms of protest. The choice of Amnesty to focus on Civil and Political rights was not without due thought or reason. Now, and even more at the time of its inception, social, economic and cultural rights were controversial. In this sense it was a pertinent choice to maintain a focus of civil and political rights, it preserved Amnesty’s position as a third party and escaped claims that it was biased in any way. It also represented a pragmatic choice, as the growing organization needed to prioritize to be effective and sustainable. The invention, and adoption, of prisoners of conscience created personal connections between conscientious citizens worldwide. Groups developed personal bonds to their prisoner, despite often only being provided with the information from an action report. When scaled up this strategy allowed for the adoption of hundreds of thousands of political prisoners, each with a loyal support base somewhere in the world. The association of struggle with individual cases, which could be followed through to fruition; the prisoner’s “existential suffering gave Amnesty its fuel.”17 This focus on the humanity of the individual victim, that is

                                                                                                               
Morton E. Winston, 'Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights Ngos, Amnesty International', in Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance, ed. by Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). 13 AIA, Benenson to Peggy Crane, December 1961 14 Buchanan. p.579 15 Paul J. Nelson and Ellen Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy : Changing Strategies of Development and Human Rights Ngos, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press ; Bristol : University Presses Marketing [distributor], 2008).p.47 16 AIA, A1, Eric Baker, letter to The Guardian, 13 September 1961 17 Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame : Understanding Amnesty International, (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press ; Bristol : University Presses Marketing [distributor], 2006).p.71-2
12

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considered commonplace in modern human rights advocacy, was pioneered by Amnesty; they recognized that a person was not just a number, and could be made real. 18 Reports from prisoners of conscience are testimony to the fact that they not only made them “ten times stronger,” but that they also worked in improving the conditions for prisoners.19 This is in a large part due to Amnesty’s ability to capitalize on the fact that “governments are very much like individuals in the sense that they like to be liked.”20 Although Amnesty was always careful not to claim victories, Martin Ennals remarked that “the coincidence rate between the cases which were taken up and the people released is simply high.”21 The choice of writing letters as the main form of protest and action proved highly effective. One only had to be literate to take action, and every single letter held the same value no matter its author. As Amnesty’s handbook declares, “everyone who joins Amnesty International is a valuable participant in the most important struggle of our time.”22 This meant that an individual could play a tangible part in the human rights struggle and enact real change, in stark contract to human rights advocacy of the early twentieth century.23 Amnesty’s success rests on its belief in the “potentiality of the person,”24 enabling Human rights to go from being the pursuit of lawyers and policy makers to the actions of individuals from a huge range of backgrounds and ages with the same-shared commitment to human rights. This simple method, which requires limited resources and can be very simply rolled out to multiple groups, revolutionized human rights advocacy. Amnesty’s campaign was “as appeal to the lay people rather than working within the confines of a profession;” by being open to the public, it allowed the lawyers to be “democratically over-ridden.”25

                                                                                                               
Ibid.p.223 BBC. And Maria T. Baldwin, Amnesty International and U.S. Foreign Policy : Human Rights Campaigns in Guatemala, the United States, and China, (El Paso: LFB Scholarly Pub. LLC, 2009).p.14 20 Martin Ennals on BBC. 21 Ennals in William Korey, Ngos and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights : "A Curious Grapevine", (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). p.165 22 Marie Staunton and Sally Fenn, The Amnesty International Handbook, US ed., 1st ed. edn (Claremont, CA: Hunter House, 1991).p.ix 23 Hopgood. p.7 24 Conor Gearty, Professor Human Rights Law, London School of Economics in BBC. At 57:00 25 Buchanan. p.583
19 18

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Amnesty’s strategy undoubtedly derived much success from its simplicity26 and its profound understanding of the importance of symbolic gestures.27 Part of their success certainly lay in their ability to internationalize what were essentially domestic problems. Creating truly international advocacy networks meant that countries could no longer hide from their human rights crimes, and, in an increasingly globalized world, the speed of information sharing enabled international networks to form.28 The Urgent Action network pioneered by Amnesty with new technologies allowed information to be processed and distributed globally with unprecedented ease. The simple fact that human rights violations gained a global stage represented a transformation in grassroots advocacy and enabled international pressure to become an increasingly important actor. Today global information sharing and networks are just assumed but Amnesty was one of the first NGOs to use new networks to actively promote and protect human rights, allowing it to tower above all other human rights organizations.29 In combination with its global membership, this technology allowed Amnesty to react to urgent developments because there was always some office in the world open and ready to react. Through this Amnesty pioneered transnational advocacy networks and blurred traditional boundaries between international and domestic arenas.30 “Amnesty International has become an authority of human rights issues around the world;”31 achieving this moral authority was, at least in part, due to their standards of impartiality and lack of political affiliation. The “Threes Network” emphasized the
26 Jean H. Quataert, Advocating Dignity : Human Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics, (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).p.87 27 Moyn. p.130 28 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience : Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms, (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). 29 Moyn. P.46 30 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders : Advocacy Networks in International Politics, (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press, 1998). p.199 31 Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, and Hans Peter Schmitz, 'Advocacy Organizations, Networks, and the Firm Analogy', in Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action, ed. by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).p.229

                                                                                                               

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organizations impartiality with each Amnesty International group adopting three prisoners from contrasting geographical and political areas (usually the East, the West and the Global South.)32 In addition the policy that no country office would work on human rights abuses within their own borders, helped preserve the neutrality of the organization and protect its members from potential attacks from within their state. In fact “rather than removing it from the debate, Amnesty’s disinterestedness enhanced its influence.”33 Financially, its refusal to accept funds from any government sources has been crucial in the maintenance of this apolitical position, and set it apart from all other European human rights NGOs34 Amnesty pioneered new fundraising methods and has always been able to remain self-sufficient; it consciously set itself apart from all other organizations and broke new ground. 35 The moral authority of Amnesty is arguably more powerful than any political authority it lacks, enabling it to become an “ethical megaphone” for victims of human rights abuse worldwide.36 This moral authority is able to have a far greater appeal, legitimacy and longevity over time and space than any political allegiance. Amnesty embraced the idea of bearing witness,37 and by positioning itself as a moral compass Amnesty portrayed itself as at the forefront of policy making, change and standard-setting.38 Although never entirely able to escape accusations of political affiliation or cultural bias from some critics, by and large this has given Amnesty International real power in the international system, with few doubting its position as an actor. However, this moral authority was heavily dependent on accuracy and credibility, therefore Amnesty has always placed a premium on gathering accurate information before taking action or leveling charges against human rights violators.39 Amnesty is not limited like many institutions and, although its reputation is a great asset, it

                                                                                                               
Amnesty International, 'Who We Are - History'. http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history 33 Clark.p.19 34 Korey.p.170 35 Clark.p.15 36 Conor Gearty, Professor Human Rights Law, London School of Economics in BBC. 29:00 37 Hopgood.p.14 38 Clark.p.129 39 Baldwin.p.26
32

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has been able to report on situations and suspected human rights abuses without the same lengthy process of information corroboration and verification that has plagued much of human rights reporting. Its networks can never match the great news networks but it is also able to access areas that no others can and compile reports without the same government resistance that many others in the field experience. This information gathering and speedy publication has been key in the development of modern grassroots human rights advocacy. Presentation of the “truth” that has been key in this transformation, and the “info-pressure”40 Amnesty pioneered is now employed by numerous human rights NGOs.41 It was, in part, these meticulously maintained standards that facilitated the creation of the Amnesty brand. The organization transformed itself into something highly marketable, to the extent that it is now possible to own an Amnesty International Visa card. 42 Utilization of the media has fueled the growth of the Amnesty name, brand and identity and, although this is a common strategy of charities and NGO today, it should be remembered that Amnesty paved the way.43 They publicized the gap between international human rights principles and practices, and framed the task as an urgent public undertaking, something that no one else had done before.44 Amnesty recognized that their growth and popularity amongst the general public really required publicity where the general publics were watching. This meant moving away from highly prestigious academic circles and instead moving towards mass publishing that has the potential to reach the large audiences they needed and desired. Amnesty became a religion to many of its members.45 Not that it ever portrayed itself as such at all, rather that it created “a kind of secular religiosity born of collective action, sacrifice and suffering.”46

40 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights : From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 2004).p.246 41 Clark.p.3 42 Hopgood. 43 Buchanan.p.596 44 Clark.p.4 45 Hopgood.p.71 46 Ibid.p.216

                                                                                                               

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Amnesty’s unique position made it able to act in ways the UN could not; while the UN puts the interests of member-states first, Amnesty is able to prioritize the individual.47 Although it could never match the real power of big organizations it was also not limited in the same ways. In this sense the lobbying power of this organization was unrivaled for many years and it represented the global consciousness of the world in ways that inherently political institutions like the United Nations and the European Union simply could not. The information gathering efforts of NGOs like AI are now so important that UN is dependent on this flow of information for it to function.48 Through increasing integration into the international legal and non-governmental machinery for protecting human rights, Amnesty gained consultative status at the Council of Europe in 1965 and has representatives at the UN.49 Amnesty was a key contributor to the UN Declaration and Convention against Torture and can also played a role in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Rome Statute in 1998, something it campaigned tirelessly for and many thought would never materialize.50 Many argue that the power of human rights depends on its institutionalization into world politics, a challenging and slow process.51 There is no doubt that Amnesty was a key actor in enacting this transformation, and building the modern international social structure of human rights norms and institutions52 Yet another morph of Amnesty was its role as the educator. It was, and still is, for many the definitive place to gain a human rights education and may of its “graduates” have gone on to shape the human rights field in other organizations.53 Not only is this proof of the perception of Amnesty at the forefront of human rights
47 Ramesh Thakur, 'Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations', Journal of Peace Research, 31 (1994).p.147 48 Claude Emerson Welch, Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).p.5 49 Buchanan. p.596 50 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, '‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice', International Relations, 18 (2004).p.19 51 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights : International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). p.17 52 Ibid.p.21 53 Baldwin.p.30

                                                                                                               

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discussion, its sheer number of graduates have gone on to coconstruct the growing field of human rights. Amnesty has been a key participant in the creation of the human rights norms we recognize today;54 it cannot be separated from the development of modern human rights advocacy and it is nigh impossible to imagine the human rights field without Amnesty in it.55 While highly democratic and setting aspirational standards of equality and fairness in its structure, it is sometimes weakened by its own strengths. This level of democracy can make it slow to react, it much spend time making decisions that other organizations can simply bypass. In the modern age there is grave uncertainly on how Amnesty can face the new century and a radically different stage to the one it entered in the 1960s. By the twenty first century, Amnesty not only had “competition,” from organization like Human Rights Watch amongst others, but also the pressure to expand its outlook was increasing. In response the organization once more took on the debate on economic, cultural and social rights and in 2001 they announced an expansion of their mandate, becoming a “full spectrum” rights organization.56 This represented the first significant change in their historic mandate since its founding in 1961; it seemed their historic stance was indefensible in the face of demands from the membership and other partnered organizations.57 Amnesty wanted to end claims that it was a “white middle class organization,” and gain “relevance in developing countries.”58 In the 2005 Annual Report, ESC rights were fully embraced with poverty recognized as “perhaps the gravest threat to human rights and collective security,” and in 2008 Amnesty launched its “Demand Dignity” campaign on ESC rights.59 It is testament to the significance of Amnesty International in human rights advocacy that Nelson argues “the significance of this mission change cannot be overstated.”60 Amnesty remains the

                                                                                                               
Clark.p.5 Ibid.p.125 56 Nelson and Dorsey. p.64 57 Ibid.p.67 58 Daniel P. L. Chong, Freedom from Poverty : Ngos and Human Rights Praxis, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).p.39 59 Nelson and Dorsey.p.68 60 Ibid.p.70
55 54

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historic “gatekeeper” of human rights “AI’s endorsement profoundly increases the visibility and legitimacy of ESC approaches.”61 However this has reawakened old divisions amongst the membership. Stephen Hopgood compares the views of the “reformers” and what he calls “the keepers of the flame.”62 Reformers argue that Amnesty created “an effective but ultimately limiting sphere,”63 with its focus on civil and political rights and “must adapt”64 or risk being overtaken by its competition forever. Meanwhile the shadows of the founders are long and many retain a loyal commitment to the original narrow mandate focused on civil and political rights. 65 They argue that Amnesty must protect its precious “symbolic power,” which if altered, “risks fracturing the umbilical link to the source of moral authority”66 it was founded upon. Some have argued that in an attempt to appease the membership Amnesty’s new mandate is rather a “messy compromise,”67 that will not strengthen the organization as it moves into the future. This is a debate over pragmatism or protection, either way “Amnesty’s future in a globalized world means making the most of its most lucrative commodity, its reputation, as a brand.”68 This new rights advocacy is not chartered territory for Amnesty and is something they have not pioneered. Big NGOs such as Oxfam and Save the Children are experienced in ECR rights, and have been establishing themselves in this niche for some time.69 Increasingly it is being asked what Amnesty’s place is now and into the future and whether Amnesty has aged and should be understood as “old.”70 As it has evolved Amnesty has brought

                                                                                                               
Chong.p.32 Hopgood.p.11 63 Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories : How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action, (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2001). P.112 64 Hopgood.p.221 65 Claude E. Welch, 'Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch a Comparison', in Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance, ed. by Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).p.91 66 Hopgood.p.10 67 Chong.p.33 68 Hopgood.p.20 69 Nelson and Dorsey. 70 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements, (London: Pluto Press, 2009). P.154
62 61

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the same strategies of naming and shaming with it. 71 In the modern world it is not clear that these strategies are effective as they once were, if so Gearty questions what Amnesty’s place in the future evolution of human rights advocacy can be.72 If it is true, as Hopgood argues, that “there is nothing evident about the meaning of human rights at all,” that they are made, not discovered and they get meaning through practice,73 then without a doubt Amnesty International has written human rights history since 1961. It is not hard to find those that will attest to the significance of Amnesty as “one of the most important advocacy groups of the human rights movement,”74 giving human rights legitimacy that has proved to be a firm foundation. In fact so pervasive is the language of human rights today, that it is very hard to imagine a world when this was not the case.75 In fifty years Amnesty International has gone from being named “one of the larger lunacies of our time,”76 to an organization of over one million members in 150 countries who are the “conscience of the world.”77 Although certainly not alone in the field of human rights, “Amnesty International invented grassroots human rights advocacy, and through it drove public awareness of human rights generally.”78 Today Amnesty may seem just one among the many NGOs but “Amnesty’s combination of a public international membership and transnational activism is unique.”79 What everyone does now, Amnesty did first, pioneering grassroots populist advocacy over the elite route. Amnesty has shown remarkable resilience and ability to adapt over time, and even though its mission is no longer as clearly defined as it once was, nor
71 Constructing Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003).p.44 72 Conor Gearty, Professor Human Rights Law, LSE in BBC. At 35:00 73 Hopgood. p.215 74 Clifford Bob, 'The Market for Human Rights', in Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action, ed. by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).p.145 75 Quataert.p.150 76 Jonathan Power, Like Water on Stone : The Story of Amnesty International, (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2001).p.xi 77 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights : Visions Seen, 2nd ed. edn (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). p.291 78 Moyn.p.129 79 Clark..p.9

                                                                                                               

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is its position on human rights unique, its brand continues to instill loyalty and ever increasing membership. The optimism that Amnesty was founded allows it to remain a beacon of hope to people across the world; without it there would be no grassroots human rights advocacy.
Bibliography 1 George J. Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat, and Peter H. Juviler, Non-State Actors in the Human Rights Universe (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. 2 Maria T. Baldwin, Amnesty International and U.S. Foreign Policy : Human Rights Campaigns in Guatemala, the United States, and China (El Paso: LFB Scholarly Pub. LLC, 2009). 3 BBC, ''Amnesty! When They Are All Free'', in Storyville (U.K: BBC, 2011). 4 Clifford Bob, 'The Market for Human Rights', in Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action, ed. by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 5 Tom Buchanan, ''The Truth Will Set You Free': The Making of Amnesty International', Journal of Contemporary History, 37 (2002), 575-97. 6 Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories : How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University Press, 2001). 7 Daniel P. L. Chong, Freedom from Poverty : Ngos and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). 8 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience : Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). 9 Constructing Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). 10 Robert F. Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame : A World View of Human Rights (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2001). 11 Tim Dunne, and Nicholas J. Wheeler, '‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice', International Relations, 18 (2004), 9-23. 12 Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame : Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press ; Bristol : University Presses Marketing [distributor], 2006). 13 Amnesty International, 'Who We Are - History' <http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history> [Accessed 29/02/2012. 14 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights : From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 2004). 15 Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders : Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y. ; London: Cornell University Press, 1998). 16 William Korey, Ngos and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights : "A Curious Grapevine" (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). 17 Egon Larsen, A Flame in Barbed Wire : The Story of Amnesty International (London: Muller, 1978). 18 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights : Visions Seen. 2nd ed. edn (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).

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19 Jesse D. Lecy, George E. Mitchell, and Hans Peter Schmitz, 'Advocacy Organizations, Networks, and the Firm Analogy', in Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action, ed. by Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 20 Julie Mertus, and Jeffrey W. Helsing, Human Rights and Conflict : Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace ; [Bristol : University Presses Marketing, distributor], 2006). 21 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia : Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap, 2010). 22 Paul J. Nelson, and Ellen Dorsey, New Rights Advocacy : Changing Strategies of Development and Human Rights Ngos (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press ; Bristol : University Presses Marketing [distributor], 2008). 23 Jonathan Power, Like Water on Stone : The Story of Amnesty International (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2001). 24 Jean H. Quataert, Advocating Dignity : Human Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 25 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights : International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 26 Neil Stammers, Human Rights and Social Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2009). 27 Marie Staunton, and Sally Fenn, The Amnesty International Handbook. US ed., 1st ed. edn (Claremont, CA: Hunter House, 1991). 28 Ramesh Thakur, 'Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations', Journal of Peace Research, 31 (1994), 143-60. 29 Claude E. Welch, 'Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch a Comparison', in Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance, ed. by Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). 30 Claude Emerson Welch, Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 31 Morton E. Winston, 'Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights Ngos, Amnesty International', in Ngos and Human Rights : Promise and Performance, ed. by Claude E. Welch (Philadelphia ; [Great Britain]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

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Prejudice...Can You Spell It?
Amarpreet Everest I was inspired to write this piece after an incident in Disneyland. There was a dispute at the theme park train station, and a woman was cursing very loudly. Since my little sister and cousins were present, my brother asked the lady very politely to realize there were children present and to not use profanity. She looked at my brother with his beard and turban, cursed at him, and told him to go back to his own country. My brother was born in America and is an American citizen... Going home that night, I reflected why this woman would say such a statement, especially in America - the land of immigrants and the land of freedom. I realized her hostility, her prejudice, stemmed from ignorance. My next question was how is one to solve this problem? Well, one solution to erase prejudice is to introduce knowledge. Thus the concept of my piece was developed. I took the words "ignorance," "prejudice," "jealousy," and "knowledge" and translated the letters to numbers: A=1, B=2, C=3 etc. Thus the numbers for "ignorance" are "9-7-14-15-1-14-3-5." I then set 0 equal to the musical note C and translated the numbers into notes (0=C, 1=C#/Db, 2=D, 3=D#/Eb, 4=E, 5=F, 6=F#/Gb, 7=G, 8=G#/Ab, 9=A, 10=A#/Bb, 11=B, 12=C, 13=C#/Db, etc). Thus "9-7-14-15-1-14-3-5" became "A-GD-Eb-F#-C#-D-D#-F." Continuing with the concept of the piece, I picked three instruments and gave them different word themes and different approaches to realize these themes. The tenor sax and the guitar take the theme straightforward, a literal translation. The piano notes, however, are symmetrical around its word themes. The guitar begins the piece with "ignorance." The piano enters later with "prejudice" and the tenor sax immediately starts with "jealousy." The piece continues until "knowledge" replaces "jealousy". With the sound of "knowledge," "ignorance" and "prejudice" become fragmented, disappear, and eventually are replaced with knowledge. Prejudice and its associations are thus overtaken by knowledge.

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EDITORIAL
The Human Rights Journal is published biannually, with calls for submissions of all genres/print mediums across all departments and programs. Submissions are evaluated for quality and creativity.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
Stories, essays, papers, art, photography, poetry, etc. that address human rights (can be created in or out of class). Only one piece or series will be selected per person. • • • • Prose: 3,500 word limit and up to two pieces per submission Poetry: up to five per submission Art/photography: up to five per submission Other: Just submit it!

PLEASE INCLUDE • • • • • Name Title of piece/series Major Contact information Recommended: Explanatory blurb for fiction, poetry, photos, art, etc.

TO SUBMIT: humanrightsjournalucd@gmail.com

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