PROBLEMS ACCELERATING

OF PRODUCTION WAR II

AIRCRAFT

DURING WORLD

A REPORT BY TOM LILLEY PEARSO;\! llUNT ]. KEITII BUTTERS FRANK F. GrL.~ORE PAlJL F. LAWLEH.

r

DIVISION OF RESEARCH

:19

:9./'f2
_J

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION HARVARD UNIVERSITY

EXHIBIT 4. Horsepower of Engines Delivered: 13 Plants Producing Principal Models
(Including Spares)

Mi//'-ons of Itorsepower

50

~ ~

4 0 t-----+------+----t-------~-+~~--~

o

/940

/941

/842

1943

/944

....."

-...c N8IJleS of plants

1'I<ltted from data appearing in Table 15, Appendix C. shown indicate the month in which they first delivered an engine.

9

Engine Production by Models Eight principal models of engines were used to power combat and large transport aircraft during World War II.000 423.6 45.ciable deliveries of fighters other than the above three models occurred in November 1941.7 POUNPS OF CoMBAT AND LARGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ACCEPTED* 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 'Total 17. duced. had not been in use at all prior to 1940. the Curtiss .6% 275.. Before Pearl Harbor there were particularly acute shortages of the four-engine bombers and high-altitude Army fighters which were later to play such a vital role in winning the war. production was large in 1941 in comparison with most of the other types.2 124.000 46. most of these EXHIBIT 5..20 'and the Lockheed Hudson were produced in substantial quantities in 1940 and 1941.700 62. The Army took steps in 1940 to obtain satisfactory high-altitude fighters. however.277. .. 1940 (see Exhibit 8). Most of the production prior to Pearl Harbor was concentrated on four of these models..0 91.7 32. Neither of the two Army fighters was designed for high. zation period included: 2 See Appendix C for a detailed statistical record of produc ..330 25.7% 5.and the I. Two of these models. The Wright R. each of which was in production in mid . The four models introduced later in the mobili .40 and the Bell P~39. when III of the new models were delivered.4 12.3 HORSEPOWER OF LARGE MILITARY DELIVEREDt 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total 15.000 326.938 176. An allowance for spares is included. the Grumman F4F.838. craft. Wright Field. ~nginl'~ data compiled from ('(tmpan~r sources and Aircraft Resources Control OIIice..8 17. Deliveries of transports to the services were negligible prior to Pearl Harbor because the services were concentrating all their efforts on obtaining combat aircraft and' trainers .2 43.. models were not of the types or of the advanced designs which proved essential for victory.0% 204. Measures of Annual Output of Airframes and Engines.0% 198.4 33..064 9. Source: Airframe data compiled from unpublished data furnished by the Statistical Control OIIiee.1820 and Pratt &: Whitney R·1830.544 80.855.136.20 .582 57.593.0% ENGINES .24.254.196. light bombers such as the Douglas A. 2600 had been service-tested for only a few months.400 930. Wright P. 1940-1944 Percentage of Five~Year Total. Report 15. and the CUrtiss ..3 56.. the SBD.. but none of these models was produced in significant quantities prior to Pearl Harbor.000 1. 11)010-1944 I Yeats Totals I Percentage ..650 or more cubic inch displacement.and 1941 aircraft production record are apparent. At the time of Pearl Harbor.723. Exhibit 6 shows the time spans between the acceptances of the 5th.. the SOOth.engine bomber group..4O. ' t Deliveries from 18 plants producing engine models of 1.I710. In the fighter class.6% 4. had been thoroughly service-tested for several years prior to 1940 in airline service and in military air. mostly early versions of the Boeing B..3 155.300 595. In June 1940 only three major models were in production for the services. altitude performance. centrated primarily on the Douglas' dive bomber. As shown in Exhibit 7.' centra ted on two Army fighters.3 14. port aircraft produced in the years 1940-1944. and onone Navy carrier-based model.400 1. In the two . the Allison V.042. the Douglas A..000 airplanes.1 29. Air Technical Service Command. The majority of the 19 models were not produced in a volume of 1.1 These models carried the major burden of American air warfare.800 0. only two of the models had been produced in a volume of over 1.5 32.000 171.789.9 100.I See Appendix C for total production of each of these models.000 983. output was con.. The first appre . the Wright R. and two-engine bombers and transports.000 233." Single-engine bomber production was con. 10 .. tion of one.5% 174.117... .OOOth airplane of each of these models.9 40. 26i.0 100.6 100.9% 3.0% 265.17 and Consolidated B.458 1.4 50. Nineteen major models constituted about 87% of the total number of all combat and large trans. while the fourth model. but few medium bombers were pro .176. Increase over preceding Year NUMBER OF CoMBAT AND LARGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ACCEPTED 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total 3.605. even for this model deliveries' in 1940 and 1941 totaled only 395.5 • Poundages shown are for complete airframes only and do not include spare l'arts produced. The total production of four-engine bombers in 1940 and 1941 was 380 airplanes (see Exhibit 7). While certain models were produced in quantity during the pre-Pearl-Harbor period. Totals of two of these plante include the output of trainer engines.000 until the second half of 1942. Wright P..

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.831 1.. 1939-1944* :\liIitary Designation 1939 1940 1941 194~ 19~3 19# Originator of Design FOUR EARLYMODELS Wright .969 3....615 5.804 59.. .982 7.... Source: Complied from unpublished data furnished bv the Statistical Control Office.561 22.519 1.. Three Models FIVE LATE MAJOR MODELS Lockheed North American Republic Chance Vought Grumman Subtotal..164 11......y Designation 19..... ....618 4..179 Four Early Models ..352 9. ...715 232.....464 45..792 163 .470 7. P.... Three Models ...395 6... I 4... the version of the F4F produced b~' the Eastern Aircraft Division oi General :Motors Corporation........323 82...... Rolls-Royce (British) ..51 P-47 F4Ut F6F 1 I 2 738 1.014 20..792 26...733 45 9 5 1...014 Total. Wright .541 23........428 2.176 176.259 22.537 10.. . .970 P~38 P..417 t Includes 'Includes acceptances of the F:\I.256 1.353 4.251 406 68 19. ....0 19U 19.... Consolidated Boeing Subtotal.. Corp.. EXHIBIT 8. 17 8 25 9..710 4.. ""right Field..•.164 3 2....... 2... ..579 39 2..3 Originator of Design THREE MAJOR MODELS Boeing .. ..402 24....... Pratt & Whitney ....380 6.904 71...932 1..833 264 10.nts producing each of the models.753 2.....441 7...726 15. ..449 917 41.......1710t 2. All other models shown are air cooled engines.....065 5. 53 7 144 169 313 6 319 1... Grumman Subtotal.. 12 ... All Principal Models ....272 3....989 4.. ALL OrHER MODELS Total Four-EngineBombers ....149 8. and Brewster Aeronautical § Includes . Report 15..742 2. Four Later Models .293 2.112 21... Number of Acceptances of Major Models of Four-Engine Bombers and Fight¢rs..016 t Liquid • Includes deliveries from all plants producing each of the models..547 13. Subtotal. I .. R.246 926 324 3...861 4..064 135..002 1.2800 V-1650t R-2000 R...084 1. .214 92 9... .. 3 5 .•....637 346 575 4.......412 1.2600 V........ Scurcet Company data and Aircraft Resources Control Office.593 6..655 18.140 29...334 60 .623 15...056 1.729 3. .116 14.. Inc...... 1940-1944* Milit . Pratt & Whitney ......199 65.497 1.289 2.... Allison .479 634 532 178 10 2.130 6.925 1. cooled engines. Five Models ALL OrHER MODELS Total Fighters . Wright ..060 29..... .191 149..165 32.947 1.643 1...39 F4F* 778 13 106 897 2. .EXHIBIT 7.717 35..258 4..186 6...496 207 138 1 3.565 91..ocel/lances from 8Hvl......840 7..... R-1820 R..161 16.........485 130 9....600 11..032 302 16. Air Technical Service Command...1830 R. 1 61 FIGHTERS THREE EARlS MAJOR MODELS Curtiss-Wright Bell..... . ..4O P. . Deliveries of Aircraft Engines by Principal Military Models. acceptances of the FG and FSA versions of the F4U produced hy Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company..854 1.179 5.. . '" Subtotal..356 38.925 22...475 72 24.3350 4...011 2 FOUR LATER MODELS Pratt & Whitney ...

13\ The Pratt & Whitney R~2000. Even though there was little production of certain types during those years. The Rolls-Royce Merlin. The R-3350 was developed primarily to power the Boeing B-29. total output in 1941 was only about one-tenth the output of the peak year. The R~2800 was used on a number of important Army and Navy models induding the Republic PA7. and in the case of engines far exceeding. By late 1942 quantity production of most of the models which later were instrumental in winning air supremacy had started.S generally similar to the R-1830 but developed greater horsepower. Thus. and was not pro. In mid~1940 the only American liquid-cooled engine. developed and proved in combat in England. had just been brought into production and was not considered a proved combat engine. induding the two wartime models with the highest horse- power ratings. The vast production peak of the program was achieved in 1944. duced in large volume. :2) The Rolls-Royce V~1650. that of the home plants. It would be a serious error to infer.l'ilO.(1) The Pratt & Whitney R~2800 and the Wright R~3350. 1944. the Grumman F6F. A breakdown of the totals reveals that most of the aircraft models used in large quantities during the war and several new engine models were not produced in significant quantities until after Pearl Harbor. that the years 1940 and 1941 were wasted. were not produced quantity until after Pearl Harbor. their output equaling. the total 1941 production of combat and large transport aircraft and engines expanded more than three-fold over the 1940 level. however. the Allison V. Nevertheless. several important engine models. in appreciable ***** In summary. 13 . By 1943 virtually all the new wartime plants were in volume production. and the Martin B~26. the C-54. It was used primarily in the Douglas transport. the preparations made were instrumental in getting under way the volume output of the war-winning years. This engine 1Iid. was put in production in this country by the Packard Motor Car Company to assure that England and the United States would have a proved liquid-cooled engine in production here. Use of this engine later made possible a great improvement in the altitude performance of several Army fighters. Both of these models developed greater horsepower than any of the previously used models.

.... May Sept.... .C9G V. 29's..3420 and the R. and Grumman F6F was design 47 work initiated after June 1940. Dec.. were made in existing models through... 1943 1941 1941 1943 1941 1942 1943 1942 7~ 2% 1% 3U 1U 1 2%: ~ t Classified t Estimated.. Wright ..3350 engine. Feb. . June Sept....B R. Pratt & Whitney . and the designershad much work to do in incorporating the latest engineering practices. Oct. 29 33S0.. JanMar. Oct.... The experience with the Wright R... May May July Aug. Readiness for Production The World War II aircraft production program was delayed ...not used in combat.4360 Mar Dec. Jan. many of them very Important.... program needed the R. May Jan.... * * 1930 1935 1936 1936 1937 1939 1940 . 1 The eight major engine models used in combat during the war include the Y. Wright . Source: Company Records. of Y. as a major revision because of inadequacy of engineering data furnished to the company.. Dec....... zation began. Packard .. Feb....Historical information regarding 1he basic design of this model is not shown in Exhibit 11. May 1942 1939 1940 1940 1941 1942+ 1942 1942 April June Oct........ Oct... Nov........ The Y. illustrates another point..A R·2000 R...... . While 17 of the 19 major airframe models were being developed by mid.1820 Y. .. 2600...... were.... In the engine field.not because of a lack of experi ......... These models were being flown before V...2600. Later..2600......1830. Feb. but the basic design of almost all major models was started before mobili .BA R. Pratt & Whitney.1820 (C9HC) R..2800......3350.. but because an insufficient number of these models were at the advanced stage of development necessary for production. NEW BASIC DESIGNS Pratt & Whitney .. Pratt & Whitney . Mar. but they were not used in combat to any appreciable extent...C Y-1650t R...._ between Sta..... Allison .. one month after the same company began the design of the R. also a Grumman model..2800.. May April * * 1932 1936 1938 1937 1937 1940 1941 Feb.. out the years 1940-1945...1710 R.. June Mar..Dates of Start of Design.... when the B. 1935 1938 1940 1940 1940 1941 1941 1942 Jan....2600.. and First Acceptances: All-Major Engine Models (Basic designs and major revisions) Military Design Work Started Experimental Engine Fi rs t Run Originator of Design Designation I I Filth Engine Accepted Approximal:l<No... development was shelved in favor of the R .. Basic designs for these models 'were made during such an early period that dates were not considered significant here..EXHIBIT 11..BA R...... Initial design work on this type began in January 1936... Nov.J Day. Pratt & Whitney .... &-1830 R. Wright ..47 was designed under pressure beginning in July 1940 in response to the urgent request of the Army for a satisfactory high-altitude fighter........ Packard .. The P. Only for the Republic P .A Y. Such an experience clearly illustrates the fact that a basic design must be followed by continuing developmental work if it is to be available for military use on short notice... Aug. Pratt & Whitney .. the only major new models for which design work was begun after June 1940 were the Pratt & Whitney R4360 and several jet engines..... Nov.. shown in &hibit 11..... First Run.. mental models.. * * 1940 1938 1943 1939 1940 1941 1943 10 2%: 7 3~ 3 3 3 MAJOR REVISIONS OF DESIGN Wright . ·...1650TwoStage Aug. Pratt & Whitney ............ R..BB R.. Changes... Nov..2800..194O...... but die original design work was begun in Great Britain well llefore January 1939..3350... Allison .. Dec. Aug...1650...3420 R... This record is a dramatic illustration of the importance of developing in peacetime the weapons that are to be used during war.... Wright ..... used in the B.. engineering work on 10 of the 19 major combat and large transport aircraft and all eight of the major engine types reaching combat was inaugurated by January 1939. Mar.rt of DeSign and Fifth Acceptance . Jan. The F6F superseded the F4F... but because of lack of interest on the part of the services..4360. the original design had become obsolescent.1 Design work on seven of the remaining nine aircraft models was commenced in 1939 and in the early months of 1940... Mar. even a comparatively long war... Wright .... manufacturing experience was 17 . The military type test was passed in January 1938.

18 . . . . and one Navy observation model.. put into production somewhat more quickly than earlier models. Even then. high-altitude fighters.' The production records of 1940 and 1941 reflect the limited choice of fully developed models available. . five B--29's were delivered by July 1943. . The cost in terms of wasted resources and human energy was high. in June 1944.36)* Hudson OS2U ~:ig Fighter Light Bomber Observation ~~:~~~~~r . . or medium bombers of the B.308 939 579 7. . Chance Vought .::::::::: : . . . Wright Field. . . hence long production and service experience was available on the basic C47 type. since delivery of five airplanes or engines is no assurance whatever that a model is ready for tactical use. 1941 output of over 500 airplanes were two lowaltitude fighters.available on only four models.. . . While the more recently developed models were. .2600.. 5 Models.434 1. . _ .. For instance.212 1. . The production of fairly large numbers of four different engines in 1940 and 1941 indicates a somewhat better situation in the engine field. on the average. the task was accomplished only by pouring unlimited funds and man .. ~~~~s: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .hours into the B--29 program. the [)C. the tremendous task of developing urgently needed airframes and engine models had to be undertaken currently with preparations for volume manufacture.26 class. . It was a retarding factor in the development of all models with potential outputs well over the 1. . . . was not sold to the services in any significant numbers until 1941. Brewster . The lack of interest on the part of the services in large engines was also exemplified by the previously lOne of the four models. . had.795 499 471 430 417 395 2. . tity of output more rapidly than could otherwise have been done. . .. . Air Technical Service Command.':'.22 and A. . . . but the wartime telescoping of developmental and production proc. One of the most important single elements. . was not developed primarily at the request of the services but rather because of the need for it in large commercial flying boats. but the B--29 was not used in combat until 11 months later. Grand Total. . .937 11. MODELSWITHPRODUCfIONOF 300 TO 500 Martin . 5 Models . Combat Aircraft TOTAL . .25 and B. Consolidated Douglas ~ A. P. As shown in Exhibit 12. 1940 and 1941 Originator of Design Customary Designation Type of Aircraft Total Acceptanceo MODELSWITHPRODUCfIONOVER500 Curtiss. the only models with a combined 1940~ . . the larger R. mentioned history of the R. . .. The commercial version. . .3350. . . .535 1. .944 Subtotal.000 horse. the indicated saving in time was not great in most instances. it also emphasized the importance of such work during the war as well." 2The last columns of Exhibits 10 and 11 show the approximate elapsed time between the beginning of desi~ work on major models and the acceptance of the fifth airplane and engine. . . been produced for commercial airlines ever since 1936. . . the production record clearly indicates that wartime short cuts by no means eliminated the sizable time lags needed to perfect combat aircraft and engmes. Source: Compiled from unpublished data furnished liy the Statistical Control Office. . . however. . .. . . .Wright . Actually. . . The fourth model. . . .000 horsepower level. Accelerated Development During the War If World War II experience confirmed the necessity for continuing research and development before the war. two light bombers. . . . . however.. many factors contributed to the relatively small production achieved before Pearl Harbor. 3. however. . As later sections will explain.. . . .30 F2A F4F PBY. .3. • The P-SG was a predecessor of the P-40 dev. the Douglas transport whose military versions were usually designated as the C47 or C53.40 (and P. that three of these models were rated only at the 1. power level because of the previous importance given this level by the services.. esses made it possible to obtain quality and quan . Nevertheless. . . Subtotal. . . was that few tactically useful combat models were developed to a stage where they could be put into immediate production. Given a late start. . . The ten models produced in excess of 300 airplanes did not include any fourengine bombers. . .. . It is important to recognize. .5 SBD Light Bomber Fighter Fighter Patrol Bomber Dive Bomber Grumman . the time required to develop effective combat aircraft and engines is longer than Exhibits 10 and 11 indicate. MODELS WITH PRODUcnON LESSTHAN300. . . about four years after design work was initiated. .loped previously by Curtiss-Wright. . EXHIBIT 12~ Total Acceptances of Combat Aircraft by Models in the Two Years. Lockheed.

Although new designs were solicited. industry as well as government had to create vast new organizations and.000 horsepower V. Later.SECTION IV CONVERSION TO WARTIME When wartime mobilization was begun in 1940. promised great things in short periods. amid constant confusion and time pressures. Chapter 6. Conclusions. At government . Before discussing technical methods of manufacture. problems involved in the change-over to wartime production techniques will be discussed. Although the early 1940 expansion seemed large at the time. but the needs of the war had changed and it was not pushed. A brief summary of the over-all conclusions of this Section. in East Hartford. An analysis of the significance of certain aspects of production organization. Analysis of the conversion to wartime production techniques will be divided into the following six chapters: Chapter 1. a decision was made to encourage.. Two of them. Production processes. Connecticut. Chapter 5. but none delivered a new engine in the periods allotted. in Paterson. ooled c 32 . Chapter 2. but they gave invaluable preliminary experience with the problems of planning expansion... to revolutionize methods of operation. and the Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation. The] inappropriateness of job shop designs for linej production proces~es. Allison's liquid. the development of military engine designs by other nonaircraft companies. it looks small in retrospect. Chapter 3. None of these early expansions took the plants far in the direction of the line production methods that were ultimately used. expansion in the later periods followed the broad outline of the original decisions. tion began. they furnished the machine tool makers with greater knowledge of the product and its production characteristics. spite changes in detail. Each was expanding its plant as a result of French and British orders. certain companies. The Allison Division of the General Motors Corporation. first for engines and then for airframes. .industry conferences held in Washington in 1940. to be followed in the next section by analysis of the broader problems of providing the over-all company management to administer all phases of the wartime industrial task. the engine companies. including automobile engine builders. Airframe production problems. production know-how. For engines of military size. and they brought some new suppliers into relationship with . With respect to this endeavor. The nature CHAPTER 1: THE WARTIME PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES of the processes used in the production of-airframes and engines and the radical changes made in these processes during the war. and manufacturing information to rapid acceleration of production.. the govern. New Jersey. was carrying out the final production engineering on its 1. j PRODUCTION PROGRAMS The decisions made in Washington during the latter half of 1940. Engine production problems. Chapter 4.. The wartime production programs. just after the wartime mobiliza. based on the size of orders foreseeable at the time. De. had been aircraft engine makers for a period of years. A description of the types of companies selected by the government to produce airframes and engines during' the war. set the basic pattern for the entire wartime expansion of the aircraft industry. long a builder of aircraft engines "on special order. one company did deliver a promising engine. the Wright Aeronautical Corporation. ment decided that the production effort should be concentrated on proven engine models. this meant the products of Wright and Pratt & Whitney. In this section. An analysis of the same factors discussed in Chapter -I but handled separately because of the differences in the product and in the source of the production processes used. Product design problems. The Manufacturing Plan for Engines Early in 1940 there were three producers of engines suitable for military combat use. It also had under way a plant expansion. the production programs resulting from these government decisions will be reviewed.I710 engine based on an anticipated low rate of output.

The Wright management preferred to handle all the final assembly work itself. whose foreseeable expansion at the time W25 the least of the three. The only other licensee for Wright aircraft engines ever named was the Dodge Division of the Chrysler Corporation.-hen licensees were named. Concurrently. and the Jacobs Aircraft Engine Company. It became clear in mid. which proposed a further expansion at Cincinnati in order to avoid making the same engine in two plants. liquid-cooled engine urgently desired . Wright retained for itself gear making. but hesitated to give to any other company the whole responsibility for producing a Wright engine. and "'-right.erded would greatly exceed the expansions then '. was chosen. This company preferred to use licensees. ultimately Chevrolet. together with assembly and testing. New Jersey. After some discussion. This decision was made over the objection of Wright. ~.2800 engine was licensed to Ford in August 1940 and the R-1830 to Buick in October 1940.. The Pratt & Whitney management offered to license its designs. Continental Motors. the Allison engine was i-rflemented with the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine. Pratt & Whitney. with its three smaller "feeder plants.l«agine had passed its type test." it produced a peak output which was third largest in the industry. The Pratt & Whitney R. Wright itself made further expansions at Cincinnati and Paterson. Nash. each produced one or more Pratt & Whitney models as licensees. to be known as "cooperating companies. t arugh-altitude. in each instance these principles were modified to meet the wishes of company Jnanagements. and magnesium casting . although it cooperated fully later . although in 1942 it was required to assume the responsibility for a branch plant in Kansas City because no satisfactory licensees were available. cylinder making. In connection with this plant Wright proposed to use five major subcontractors.. The problem was complicated at Wright and Pratt & Whitney by the necessity of making early deliveries of trainer engines as well as the combat engines considered herein. In November 1940 Mr. in addition to Ford and Buick.ia..1940 that the volumes . In addition. although the company had suggested Philadelphia. . Pratt & Whitney expanded its East Hartford plant until. In June 1941. upon finding the Wright management firm in its preference to accept the responsibility for final assembly of its engines. Eaton Manufacturing Company (propeller shafts). the need for R-2600 engines increased. its assignment was changed to the production of Wright R-1820 engines for the B-17 program." for the production of major subassemblies. the government authorized the company to build a large branch plant to make R-2600 engines but required that the plant be located in the inland area. Consequently. whereas the two plants with larger peak outputs were new plants special. The contrasting policies of Pratt & Whitney and Wright are reflected by the following figures summarizing production. The pneral principles decided on were to disperse enters of production and to bring into the program al. but it was not yet b Jroven and had not been developed for high.:side companies with a demonstrated competence in volume production involving similar processes. izing on one or two models. Hudson Motor Car Company (pistons and rocker 33 arms). Otis Elevator Company (crankcases).the British Purchasing Commission. These were: the Ohio Crankshaft Company (crankshafts). and Graham-Paige Motors Corporation (master and articulated connecting rods).. Certain other pro. I t was prepared to increase its subcontracting greatly. Knudsen's office brought the Studebaker Corporation into the R-2600 production program on a licensee basis.n to handle the expansion in or near its home ~nt in 'Indianapolis and to draw in men from ether General Motors divisions as managerial help might be needed.the processes which it considered the most difficult. from 1940 through 1944: . duction processes. Other licensees entered from time to time. Both within the government and in aiu5try strong differences of opinion developed as to the proper program for expansion. obtained approval of its J. a suburb of Cincinnati. ~wrtheless.aer way at Allison. The government asked Studebaker to make this change instead of Wright because Studebaker was considered more able to change course in midstream. in horsepower. fa:ude work. Shortly after this plan was formulated. Lockland. It believed that there were definite limits to its ability to handle greatly increased manufacturing cornmitments and preferred to turn over the volume production of established models to others. The production pattern for Pratt & Whitney engines was quite different. were also retained. and built a second large branch plant at Wood-Ridge. This plant manufactured a diversified group of models. Continental Motors Corporation manufactured the Wright Whirlwind engine for use in tanks. before Studebaker produced any R-2600 engines. Allison.

Licensees of: Pratt & Whitney Wright Total ~ Outout.557 11..056 31..265 19. . " - . ..0 0.16.".S: 16.196 30.849 326. '"': 1:2. .723 .. . '7 ... .lov. ..012 95._ __.. .~ 14.1 21•• 0~t 17. ..365 18..956 2.risht ..~ 3 1{' 4 2 .976 64 Wright. . . .334 of Total . ... 97. by Years . .) 468.212 141.158 983. . was The results of the engine production plan are probably one of the causes of the greater expansion shown in Exhibit 16.2/~ 17. 15.080 3.e.. . .228 466.. .594 7. Pratt & Whitney's experience in 1942.6% 14..:. .... is classed as *These plants had one or more "feeder" plants Ln nsnr-by cities.0% . The relative increase in the adrninis... be 339.951 162.5 11..6ftO 41..o 36..260 7.. ... Perhaps the most emphatic in the use of Pratt & Whitney engines.---------100.4 55. most informed observers have concluded limited. however.8% q.. ... Principal Engine Plants..723 7.C 38.642 20. that the use of licensees was a wise choice (see when it was given the Kansas City branch.071 40.3% 14. Total Horsepower Delivered. 36..:"'l: 30.083 1 Licensee Plants 298. rJf. . 7.096 28. Sources: Companydata and itircrnft..278 376. .500 6. 3 1 2 1* 13 1.J 171.. ..042 Horsepower Delivered.789 by Years 35.976 26. . 0.. ~~O4 6...n.7fo 4.. .6 1. 7..298 2 ftl.2% l~? 7 51.998 29 management upon current production problems. ~ --.184 298.5 43. . .346 4.206 47.081 61..»: 24. ._:. .4 100. .ance for spare parts deli ver-ed. _Jj]_ 757 61 ts..163 108. 1 1 Wright 108. . .605 10.963 15.0 1.. Resources Control Oi"fice..0% 38. one reason that the Pratt & Whitney to point out that 48S6 of a five-year total horse..l. and the development of the Wright R~33S0 was delayed by the concentration of the Wright 133...222 100% used only to the extent that satisfactory licensees Looking at this history with the benefit of were available. .278 32% EXHIBIT 16..206 101. 34 .855 539 ~ q :: 51.982 43...147 22. ..' 1939-1944 (Thousands of Horsepower) - I... and the over the responsibility for other models or plants. . and the supply was definitely hindsight. ..680 2ft.083 1:2:2.. Report 15.1 35% Branch Plants.055 70. --wo 46.248 100(/.evidence of this limitation. Amount % - Pre-War Allison Pratt & V:hitney Wright Total Branch ~t & Whitney 'l:rigtt f Total Licensee!' Packarri 1 1. consequent dilution of Wright management..3 47.... .392 7. In the peak Includes Wood-Ridge plant.972 . R~2800 displaced the Wright R~2600 in the C~46 power output (1940-1944) was produced by transport model was to relieve the pressure on licensee plants which were in production only a few months more than three years. . The licensee arrangement could....610 ..498 25.ianufacturer No 01". iLLe I". It is confirmed by the trative burden of the Wright company was far instances of refusal on the part of licensees to take greater than that of Pratt & Whitney.Iy maniiied dur-i.. . Plants 1938 1939 1940 Years 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total Five-Yea!' Period mO-l'11.273 53. 4.196 105..661 111. . 1 Includes an a.099 38.ood-Ridge plant branch because it •• as separ-at. For way of stating the importance of the licensees is example.222 118. .1% 1.39 96. 6. .. - Pr-e-v iar Total Branc h Total Licen see Total % of Total Five-Year Out out .950 247. 208 166....106 22.. most of tllP time it was in production. is Section V).279 ..-! 0.868 45.334 1..503 423.Pratt & Whitney Prewar Plants 162.5 58.406 155.4% 33.315 50 3.018 74.315 Percentage ._ ..

of the five-year output.361 123.702 35.Inglewood ToTAL 9. 17.485 35.669 9.272 11.14e 3.~3 6l:~~~ 24.'.372 4.Oklahoma City !.6)5 19.e29 accepted in.7Sg 243. ~lve-yea.027 6.534 35..ishad 3. It is significant.686 123.177 28.057 48.642 24..570 9.765 44.355 32. LOlli B .lisville .JOR liElY PLANTS ALL MAJOR PLAlITS ALL 0= PLAA"TS .613 27 19 4 28 MID-WEST Ford .494 2.40.Kansas City North American .271 27.763 18 12 21 32 15 20 16 26 13 ~ ~ 2.656 55.019.3altic:.Bu.660 24.951 .999 381.059 31 3 8 1m.013 -~ 11.211 4.038 l().f!"alo Chance vour-ht .5 180. the three home plants accounted for 38t.l' .N.238 ~:OTE l.790 2b .Evansville 1.ALL PLAh'TS 23.I' PLANTS CO}.668 20. while branch plants accounted for only I-F~..903 239 5..l.296 2. .701 3.E FW:T.613 819.627 19.364 pounda-'.31S 514 1.seattle Canso lidated-Vul toe . 1940-1944 Total _.9.913 70. by Plants: (In thousands of pounds.i~Gr.909 25.076 13.2 - NON-AlliCRAl!'T .183 IThe ok ant s ar-e r-anked Aircraft Compiled Field.':ID-'.il Segundo Lockheed "B II . Run Goodye<'l. .santa Monica Dcu~l as .047 20.214 73.089 38.ge2 1.057 43.977 10 25 6 9 u.04i5 1.294 1.715 11.1!L 44..Lind. ~.Be t npage Martin .259 36. .. In contrast.U'T 1.:A.910 14.257 lY.376 4.952 95..798 35.i:AST OOAST Bell ..ale 1~1 1?4 4.10TE Bell ccr-t t e s . GRAlW TOTAL 654. they delivered almost 60% of the horsepower output.YEST Curti S~ - st.J0" FiIL-19l() PI.630 915..479 4.040 572 10.'AGED TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL I.Renton DoU?las .352 7.652 10.Dallas "E" 'TOTaL !..912 37.~~ 4.860 27.165 184.:IT.107 19.722 6.:PA!IY lW~A&~D i~ H01:E PLAKT.Dallas "A" North American .en .757 34. iTright unpub Lf shed f1.568 9.017 V-AJOR li"W PL • .989 83.llille.stratford Curtiss .arrt a !:AJOR PR2-19l() PLAlrrs 1_9_44 19l()-1944 ~ _ .127 166 '1'0.402 3.016 13.431 ~:§6a 507 3.074 67.930 30 2 1 !.817 1.A. 2Ea_stern Source: ntvt s.334 9.'\Az~ 001.5 .r 194('-1944.''RO~~HOi..767 96. .iST COAST Boe t ne .335 2O.241 51.728 llo.Columbus .Akron 10TAL ~WOR ~iI PL. Air Technical Service ColTJ!1anc!.222 10.lGJ>D UST OOAST Eastern2 Easterr. the ~ ~ 961.Long Beach Lockheed "A" .P Ail Y -'.d. that the home EXHIBIT plants produced all but a negligible quantity of the military engines delivered before Pearl Harbor.IRc. 'by the Statistical Control Office. however.162 4.313 63.:A.ore Republic .Wichi ta #2 Consolidated-Vultee ..033 136 5.057 2.F<"J'!f.e on the of basis of the total ~ 275.112 660 _ ~ 81.1"5 .ffalo Gr'umrnan .668 139.180 28.315 17 . 02 76.~. 2 1.Bur'bank North Alnericar. .723 333 53 1.419 64 Curtiss Republic 5.319 30..755 52.>'T OOMPAliY !.o Dow-Las .995.3'8 353.195 ~!AJOB. despite the fact that the licensee and branch plant program was originally set up in 1940.AlrlCR.2bO 6..Trenton 83 20 557 5.595 _6660 ~ 31.661 ___!_"lli_ 199..}28 13.Al~AG:::J) .B\:. Pounds of Airframe Accepted.'.184 96 .839.752 6.LOl.Ooaha North American .111 -----Z.185 28._--------------2.2ge 29.453 394..610 156 003 1.u.Burbank .TS COUPAL.:. ..iEST Bo eLn.553 19.Atl""t" EASTZRN 34 257 192 6.121 period.!art in . \1~5T OOAsT Bee Ins.AlITS 156.Td Sa Doug Las .Fort Worth Dou.1l0M !lOME PLANT.655 635.482 ~ 10.San Diego Douglas .241 67.041 24.659 239.6ge 39.NTS NON-AIRCRJ.985 26.277 46. spares excluded) 1940 ____ ~19_~_2 1_9_4_3 Fl.629 1:~.111 7.003 9.423 25.877 597.898 164 7. 1944.year.i PLA:"4~S . l~.639 19.:MOR liE'.rcne from General data Motors Cor-po r-a t Lon . MI:J-".ll21 l.~ica.359 29 .~4s 50.

and fuselage. it is those used in making airframes. sheet.that intro. Consequently.to as experimental tooling. can be positioned satisfactorily without intricate These changes were. dies.' As the volume of is entirely different from assembling machined production increased during the war. many of which are alike. In assembly. machining of parts which presents the chief If plaster is then filled in between the templates difficulty.. Assembling the sheet-metalparts of an airframe temporary jigs and other tools.. Engine manufacturing processes are generally necessary to resort to the laying out of templates similar to those of the metal-cutting industries. Mating surfaces are characteristically suitable for higher production 'through better large enough and parts are rigid enough so that they location of control points and greater accessibility. templates are cut <lut of the steel sheets.. many changes parts into a product.. laid out There are about 1. If "female" has about 13. it is the sections passed through the structure. there are few such mating surfaces except engineering data into tooling still followed the at major joints such as the joint between wings general pattern outlined above." This technique has Most of the parts are shaped and finished by the been adapted largely from the "lofts" of the ship.400 individual designs of parts. The assembly these contours are cut out of sheet steel as templates of engines is a relatively simple problem compared and assembled in the same relationship as the with airframe assembly. In peacetime machining of certain parts. and almost all calling for working it is possible to develop a jig within which the 1 Other airframe tooling. variations to meet holding devices. The basic dimensions and reference points of sioned drawings.the needs of increased volume. first experimental units of a new model were tooling used for machining forgings). and fixtures for the is a skeleton representation of the structure itself. the desired structure can be assembled. parts are interchangeable. and machine shops almost to the exclusion at uniform spacing in both horizontal and vertical of such airframe problems as handling and forming planes so that a series of contours results. jigs. When sheets and making large structures. especially tooling used in. in effect. and assembly can usually strengthened through the use of heavy steel take place by simply putting the parts together members. moving parts. The translation of facture. which was which tools can be made. 38 . products requires processes quite different from In order' to reproduce in physical form the curved surfaces designed into the airplane on paper. when set. building industry where somewhat similar problems Thus the problems of engine manufacture are are encountered. strength sometimes followed. In the case of airframe manu. For engines. simplified by the removal of unnecessary without the necessity of fitting or postassembly portions of the template detail. foun.000 pieces. worked down to the outside contours fitted parts in a high-output aircraft engine is an accurate plaster "mock-up" is obtained from given by consideration of the R~2800.reciprocating engines designed to produce their duces into the production of airframes elements rated output in a minimum of space and with a minimum weight.The problem is one of building large. on metal sheets by means of a process known as "lofting" or "master layout. the result design of tools. ordinary dirnen. It is the determination of the contours common characteristics of being multicylinder. and rendered more machining. metal frequently satisfactory for the small orders which structures to close tolerances of weight. and were commonly referred and curvature. passing sections through a portion of the airplane dries. was jigs built up in this fashion for the assembly of the closely allied to the tooling used much simpler and more in other industries (e. Temporary assembly in designing machined parts are such that many jigs were broken down into smaller sections.the setting of jig-locating points in positions so that parts can be assembled properly . Some conception of the multitude of closely and.removal of metal from partially formed blanks. of building in the middle-size range at the end of the war and a mold surrounding the contour. as above. are not sufficient guides for building the specialized airframe tooling are established by this type of transition from engineering data into necessary tooling. . The manufacture of such that are peculiar to the industry. and locating points in the form of wood most of them moving parts or in contact with or steel blocks are fastened in the proper positions. "Loft lines" are obtained by associated with processes calling for forges. suitable for the metal cutting industry.g. A related method consists. however. The tolerances established were made in these tools. numerous large and frequently flexible parts must be held in proper Engines relationship to each other as they are riveted The aircraft engines of World War II had the together.

. This loss is an indirect but inevitable result of the military necessity to get maximum reliability and maximum performance in combat. a significant percentage of parts is rejected after final assembly. The number of operations is greatly increased. facture is far more difficult an undertaking than the manufacture of most articles used ·in volume during peacetime. thus wasting all the man-hours that have been expended to make the parts and to assemble them into engines.900 parts.." If a part is replaced.. weighing 231 pounds.. trasted with the very different processes in use when production reached its peak in 1944. weighing 4% pounds.33 (1. and has "locator points" so that the goal of equal tension on each stud can be reached by measuring its stretch in tenths of thousandths of an inch. and 5. under conditions of volume production. 4. 1940 Job Shops Although they dealt with very different opera. the engine is put back into a test cell for a "final run. One further result of the requirement of precision is the large proportion of manufacturing effort that is consumed by rejections." Following this test.. compared with such mass production industries as the automobile industry. frames." production men imply that parts are not interchangeable and hence a certain amount of finishing work is required in assembly 39 . mobile engine is accomplished by a brief "run in. It required a revolutionary approach to the basic methods of production. fully assembled. tions." parts were produced in "lots" (or "batches").to close-tolerances and extremely high finish. of which about 800 are individually designed. Although the production tech. Any defective part is replaced and the engine reassembled on the 1 The T. Such rejections occur at all the stages in the manufacturing process. Minute scratches in the finish of a part cause rejections because the high stress in operation may bring a failure. Thus. engine parts and the assembly of the engine. Wartime Changes in Production Processes The processes used in manufacturing any product depend not only on the product itself but also on the volume of output. The vast increase in air. In Chapters 3. For instance. This is the "green run. engines as well as airframes are complex products.stud that serves to hold together such parts as crankcase sections is especially designed for weight saving. Such examples emphasize the generally recognized fact that aircraft engines require very high standards of quality in manufacturing processes. is connected to a bank of delicate measuring devices in a test cell and run for a period of hours on a schedule of outputs which taxes its capacities to the full. much in the way that a scratch on a sheet of glass enables it to be "cut" as desired. frame and engine output between 1940 and 1944 required far more than a mere duplication of the processes and tooling used in the earlier year. . Even the lowly. requires but 25 operations and 30 inspections. niques used by the mass production industries can be more readily adapted to engines than to air..' The desire to achieve maximum performance with minimum weight accounts for some of the pre. the method of producing airframes and engines in 1940 will first be con. even after the experimental stage has been passed and regular production has gone on for some time. cision that is called for in the manufacture of. The number of parts in a turbine type of engine of simiIar power would be between those in the reciprocating and in the jet engines. It is not alone a question of great care in conducting production operations. the problems encountered in this change. the differences between aircraft engines and such products as automobile engines are sufficiently great so that the production methods of the automobile and other similar industries had to be substantially modified before they could be used in engine manufacture. "final" assembly line. Some gears are ground so that under load conditions they will bend into the desired shape. cale demand for their output. a "penalty run" is required." "Handmade" Products .. and the plant was a "job shop. The testing of a completed auto . even after assembly.40).Furthermore. their manu. a jet engine of about twice the power." By contrast an aircraft engine as it leaves the so-called "green" assembly line. and. What is not generally recognized is the extent of the resulting difference in manufacturing methods. the fork connecting rod of one of the military aircraft engines.. s Their products were "handmade. requires 90 operations to machine the forging to final dimensions and surface finish. has about 6. In order to make this analysis easier to follow. as a result. One hundred inspections take place. A conventional connecting rod for an automotive engine. Even if its green run is perfect in all respects. the airframe and engine builders of 1940 were similar in that their processes were adjusted to the existing small. and inspections become more frequent and more severe. the engine is almost completely torn down and each part is inspected. ver will o be analyzed in some detail.By using the term "handmade. in summary.

The fact that most of Two other large committees of this type were the production engineering job had to be done organized in connection with the B. The negative was then projected through at the outset of the manufacturing program and the same camera on sensitized metal sheets to was patterned largely after the B.1940 parts control files were set up. The B. changes in the B. but close tion control organizations were either weak or non' control had to wait until accurate parts lists and existent and had to be developed after the mid. needed for war volumes. Control over drawings and templates was factory degree. and there were no worked on its own problems. World War II airframe production on the original template. In some cases. and other types of material for various gram.24 liaison committee was not experimental tooling and other purposes. In this chapter the production problems of the engine manufacturers are discussed under the headings of production know-how (where the 52 . The principal differences arose from the nature of the products and the peacetime experience of the companies producing them. up-to-date represents an important step forward and adequate manufacturing information. the industry quickly found ways of speeding the flow of informa.17 committee.17 and B. made up of representatives of the Such development was unnecessary for normal Boeing. Engineering and tooling subcommittees the pressure of necessity. wide planned standardization of techniques or important sources of such know-how outside the airframe companies. introducing a change is to make the correction * * * In summary. Blue. and Vega (Lockheed) companies. Only the changed portion is photographed and then reproduced on a small experience underscores the importance to producpiece of very thin sheet steel which can be cut out tion acceleration of sound production organizations and fastened to outstanding copies of the templates.29 com. The nucleus of men possessing the required know-how was small. and those who did fore.which to gamble on adequate preparations. in 1940. peacetime business. The first of these was the "BDV" of incentive during the years preceding the war. none of these factors existed to a satisin ability to control manufacturing information.24 committee was costly. established until the program was further developed prints could be reproduced to any desired scale than it had been when the B. The B. reproduce accurate. Each company go-ahead. The second method of attacking manufacturing and reproducing manufacturing information under information problems was aimed at making possible conditions of rapid acceleration were inadequate an effective flow of information between cooperat.created the new organizations and procedures tion between companies.24 and B. but once it was an original template can now be reproduced quickly established many manufacturing information proband accurately. Under mation. heavy steel. during the critical early months of the S. that steps would have to be taken to insure the production know-how. Most men in the armed It was organized in order to provide coordination services and in industry did not foresee the scope for the joint manufacture of the B. Through the use of such techniques.negative. although the fundamental prerequisites for line production were similar in both industries. the Air Corps organized several intercompany developed in 1940 was due primarily to the lack committees. however. CHAPTER 5: ENGINE PRODUCTION PROBLEMS The production problems encountered by the engine manufacturers differed substantially from those of the airframe producers.in most airframe companies in 1940. Most tool engineering and producstrengthened as rapidly as possible. specialized airframe production know-how. and manufacturing informaavailability of adequate manufacturing informa.29 committee was established wartime acceleration of aircraft production. ing manufacturers. mittees were organized. the first step in lems were quickly settled. Procedures for controlling nomenclature took place during the war. and little industry. was to provide an organized means of maintaining see the need usually did not possess the funds with a satisfactory interchange of manufacturing infor. Committee.29 after 1940 was a major factor in limiting the programs. Use was made of this reproduction coordinate the flow of manufacturing information process to produce full-size templates on plywood. Recognizing early in the war The fact that the production organizations. 17. Yet. One purpose of the wartime expansion. that are strong in tool engineering and production This method of keeping outstanding templates control.-tion of the airframe manufacturers were not further tion. The delay in establishing by means of this technique.29 pro. full-size prints of the original This committee was quite successful in helping to template. Douglas.

the operation procedure that was designed for 1. One licensee sum.000 a month. Wright's operating procedure and tooling were adequate for our purpose. In developing process plans suitable to wartime needs. Utilization of New Production Processes In spite of the rich background of production know-how brought to bear on the engine program. In the case of the cylinder head. The production techniques in use at the home plants of the prewar engine manufacturers were extensively utilized by the production engineers of licensee and branch plants. substantial changes in process planning and production techniques had to be made before wartime levels of output could be achieved.differences were greatest). production organization. Successful castings could be made. The assistance was greatest in the plants of the licensees and major subcontractors. For example. in engine production. marized the situation. The third producer had such men at important levels in the production engineering departments. Know-How of Other Manufacturers The output of engines was also greatly accelerated by the contributions of the production engineers of the metal cutting industries. an organization that understood the importance of production engineering and that knew how to use it. since the differences required only the resetting of tools for different dimensions. untried processes. but only with large amounts of rejections and a process that required new plaster molds for each casting. and the tool and die makers. in addition. as follows: We found that on some pieces whieh were standard on all engines built by Wright. Existing demands were high enough to call for some use of volume processes. But as our schedules increased. a number of manufacturing problems were solved only by developing new. Indeed. particularly the automobile builders. Existing Manufacturing Processes In the engine plants in 1940. and manufacturing information. Also. and (3) production processes not previously developed in peacetime. however. thereby saving much time. To a much greater degree the processes in use in 1940 were suitable to wartime production needs. the machine tool companies.line engine companies also drew on this know-how in planning the tooling of their shops. Two of the three prewar pro' ducers gave top production engineering responsibility to such a man. They were useful in the beginning of the job. both Packard and Allison found inadequate the existing methods of casting the intricate aluminum cylinder heads and cylinder blocks of their liquid. some parts were being made with production techniques that without significant change were suitable for use in producing much greater quantities. All three sources made substantial contributions. cooled engines. and therefore manufactured in large volumes. Nevertheless. the contributions made by the licensees and major subcontractors in their own plants were so significant that the old. Foreign orders had greatly expanded engine production. They did so through the work of consultants and the engineers of machine tool companies and by the addition to their staffs of men with experience in volume production in other industries. changed tooling for high production rendered them obsolete to a large extent. panies contributed a fund of proved processes to transfer to the new product and. as distinct from airframe manufacture. Pending the development of better . Moreover. duction. Production Know-How The wartime expansion of engine production did not require such radical changes in production techniques as did the expansion in airframe pro. The effectiveness of this source of know-how was far greater in the engine programs than in airframe production because of the greater similarity of engine production to the peacetime processes of the metal cutting industries. the large number of identical parts in a single engine facilitated the use of volume processes. Many of the most lasting production bottlenecks arose from the need for new processes. many processes were basically the same for similar parts of different engine models. as follows: 53 Operation sheets furnished by Pratt & Whitney were accurate and complete. One such piece was the cylinder barrel. (2) the know-how of other industries. the engine builders utilized (1) existing manufacturing processes.000 a month was wholly inadequate for the production of 20. These com. in spite of this greater carry' over of existing manufacturing processes. Evidence of this kind makes it clear that the prewar engine companies made invaluable contributions to the tooling up work of all engine plants. Another company indicated that its early program had gained impetus from the licensor.

This is done by a special high production tooling and line production plans "Sixway Horizontal and Angular Id-Statlon Auto. shift day.. and I vertical mill with rotary table... war job out ." Whether The types of new processes used in the late war such plants were converted from other produc . were influenced by the variety of At the first loading... were also influenced by the over. and also capital investment. and drill.From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the essential elements of process planning were ultimately provided in all the major wartime plants. At the end of the war.. found to be undesirable since it spread jobs out These would occupy 278 more square feet.. the engine availability of tools. Each plant had its own individuality. but the details were varied to suit the particular circumstances of each individual organization.. all balanced plan for line production at war quantities. In general." which caused many problems in production planning and control. Variations in Process Planning at Individual Plants Production 2 This statement ignores the many minor variations in product... there would be 5 radial drills. so-called "dash numbers. special.. volume methods from their inception. semifinish bore the and maintained a more definite departmental 7 mounting pads.. evolution through the elimination of "bugs" (often purpose tooling than did the process plans at a source of delay) and the development of improved the prewar plants. they made use of special. High Machine Tools. and these functional lines to a greater extent than in drill 4 holes in each of 2 breather pads. designed for specific operations on duction of engine parts and helped keep the specific parts. lined for the plant. The plants of licensees and techniques. The process plans made in the various plants were Process Planning a Continuing Problem conditioned by such factors as their layout. it is a process of constant and branch plants made much more use of special.. 15. years can be pictured by a specific example which tion to engines or were designed for such work contrasts low.. Consequenrty. but of a Wright engine.. Pratt & Whitney experimented and requires 17. the background of the pro. tooling previously used. the tooling up of a In particular. major engine model. They were further influenced and bores 14 intake ports and 7 mounting pads.. duced more than two at anyone time. Functional organization was suitable for machine just described occupies 956 square feet these plants. Wright Aeronautical Corporation. this machine rough faces models scheduled. Despite differing process plans.' a plant designed for large volumes of one or two In conjunction with a similar machine. the process plans at the licensee plant is never completed. 54 ... purpose machines saved space. hours. Layout and supervision followed ing pads. hours per three .. of producing a part. by the background of the men and the type of and rough bores 3 holes in the oil sump pad. on the says: other hand. drill 7 holes in the oil sump pad.6 more man . Such specialization was I radial tapper. matic Indexing Machine... the prewar plants man . Finally.. These came more and more to use machine tools.were used throughout. volume with high. hours per three . and the skill of workers. degree known to production engineers at the ing of radial holes in a supercharger front section time. none provolumes. the models. a crankcase sump pad. using general.. after great effort. the skills of supervisory personnel.. how was that they shortened the facturers were highly specialized by engine model.as tooling. entirely new foundry techniques were developed. finish bore 3 holes in the oil organization by type of process (e. time needed to jump the gap from small to large Some of them produced but one model. the From the three sources just described. a welding process was developed to enable the use of castings formerly rejected. their tooling management problem within the bounds of feasi-: was almost as inappropriate for a return to a bility. drill 2 holes in each of the 7 mount .. and over the plant in such a way that they did not fit require 121. p. The great contribution of the above the branch plants operated by the prewar manu . sources of know. makers were able to design rapidly the volume duction engineers. 1 methods. department). pamphlet. these This same machine is also used to semifinish face home plants used more general. facing. As the war experience shows.. unsuccessfully at East Hartford with a plan which In contrast. these techniques were used later by all engine builders in making large aluminum and magnesium castings... purpose machines to divided the plant into separate sections for each finish the part." of which the company The organizations of the prewar plants..... They processes which were needed for an efficient. shift day. undated.g....4 man ..... purpose tooling and bore the 14 intake ports. as well savings simplified the attainment of volume pro.. The operations selected are purpose tools and tooling almost to the ultimate the rough and semifinish boring..

the situation can be summarized In the words of one of the licensees who stated: . and other data describing the part. Only one of the licensee companies. ing in all its phases. . who had grown up under job shop conditions. Allison. Thus. trnm were their existing management organizations that knew how to carry out production engineer. adopted some of the engine manufacturers' practices as a permanent part of its own operations. Allison shareddirectl~ in this contribution. Although there are differences of opinion. these men tended to complicate their OIro"ll problems. It had a high degree of success with this policy and has. however. . All the engine builders had in 1940 at least the beginnings of the necessary relationships.period of small volumes and changing models as it was in the plants of the licensees. In the home plants. Dodge was not always furnished drawings which reflected the latest engineering changes. although at the cost of some time and occasional clerical errors. effective management organizations were also developed. In the case of the R. most of whom had had the experience of previously working together in one of the Ceneral Motors divisions. to have difficulty in under. Manufacturing Information The third major component necessary for conversion to line production was adequate manu' 55 facturing information. One of the problems particularly commented on by these companies was the difficulty of persuading foremen and other supervisors. In general. Pratt & Whitney. But no sequence of opera. since they felt that the paperwork systems that were being set up were unnecessary. to accept the engineering discipline that large-scale production engineering required. the practice was to include in a drawing all necessary dimensions. In the branch plants under Pratt & Whitney and Wright. The accepted practices for part drawings in the engine i~dustry caused automotive men.3350 engine. of far greater importance that information be available for transfer to licensees or branch plants if these organizations are to be asked to make a product. but rather it reflected poor follow-up and the intense pressure to get a newly developed engine into production. no matter ho~ cunningly designed. For some time these men continued to "carry under their hats" changes which had been introduced inoo the process or even into the design of parts. The practice of the engine makers was to combine some of this descriptive material with the description of manufacturing processes on the operation sheet. The characteristics which must be possessed by such an organization were discussed at length in the preceding section on airframes. although all the information could be found. Production engineering departments were built lip with personnel from the home plants and were augmented by men with experience in volume production industries. . The basic information for the manufacture of an engine is found in part and assembly drawings. tions to produce a particular part. unwittingly. the Studebaker Corpora. most of the licensees redrew a large number of the drawings which were furnished them in order to simplify. will fit into all the other~ In a plant without an over-all plan and the orgamzation of people that makes and applies such a plan. in fact. accustomed to different kinds of drawings. In spite of the fact that the part drawings were generally satisfactory. indications of finish. but only after a process of trial-and-error similar to that described for the airframe manufacturers.the 'Work of their foremen and others in the shop. adopted the policy of learning to use the drawings furnished by the engine manufacturers. of course. Even within a plant there must be a large amount of manufacturing inforrnation available on paper when volume production is required. Probably the greatest contributions of the licensee companies to the engine production pro. all the licensees had some difficulty in interpreting the drawings furnished by the engine manufacturers. • Production Organization The process plans and tooling problems discussed above were of great importance in the engine production program. These drawings should be accompanied by opera' tion sheets that describe the manufacturing process and indicate the machine tools and tooling to be used. Thus. tion. This condition was not caused by inaccurate drawings. and Wright successfully developed large manufacturing organizations. It is. for the General Motors orgamzation provided the Allison division with a strong 'm:e of men. standing them. The Packard Motor Car Company found itself in the unenviable position of being asked to make an engine which had incomplete and inadequate drawings. although not quite so promptI!. it appears that engine manufacturers were given drawings which were reasonably satisfactory with two possible exceptions. In the automotive industry. In so doing they obtained drawings that satisfied their shop practice.

like the airframe builders. Unfortunately. the needs of the prewar industry required them. since substantial portions of engines were normally acquired from vendors. tions. When licensing arrangements were undertaken. Finally. An enormous gap had to be filled at the outset. as necessary. First. production organizations. although other manufacturing information was not as ready for use in a wartime program. though their first visit was not so long. the inadequacy of formal manufacturing informaCHAPTER tion was overcome to some extent by the visits of groups of licensee personnel to the plants of the licensors. thereby providing a constantly available information service. Several important reasons help to account for the general superiority of part and assembly drawings in the engine companies over those of the airframe manufacturers. In the case of Chevrolet.Drawings and specifications were accurate and complete.operation sheets. As in the development of manufacturing opera.lack of ability to convert quickly from job shop to line production methods sprang from the fact that line production methods . however. this made it possible . for they could be remembered in the shop. Whenever the engine to be licensed was already in production. mented. 6: CONCLUSIONS The aircraft industry in general was not ready for the production job with which it was so suddenly confronted in 1940. No mention has been made of the requirement of the Army and Navy that drawings be supplied for each part purchased by them.were less adequate than the drawings. Also. and parts lists . and more must be done on the drawing boards. Bills of materials and parts lists were often incomplete and inaccurate because the errors which they contained were not large enough to cause wasteful purchasing when it was scaled for a small quantity of engines. The metal cutting industries contributed know-how from their peacetime processes. The methods used by the Pratt & Whitney and Wright organizations to satisfy this need were quite different. All other licensees also gained much by similar visits. had to develop production know-how. Each of these three prerequisites. Both Pratt & Whitney and Wright had licensed engines to foreign manufacturers and had had experience with the transfer of information at that time. accurate drawings had to be made available to them. The key element of this state 56 of unpreparedness . the process of transferring information about a product from one plant to another was a con' tinuous task. to make part prints with only minor changes to fit our shop practice. Both Pratt & Whitney and Wright gave the men sent by the licensees every opportunity to study the job. and manufacturing information.. bills of materials. groups of production men went to the licensor plant and observed the manufacturing processes used there. It could be supple. Interchange. This arrangement was also supplemented by visits and other communications. Pratt & Whitney arranged for each licensee to have a "Resident Engineer" at the East Hartford plant. The licensees and major subcontractors contributed production organizations that had worked on problems of similar magnitude. The prewar engine makers furnished reasonably satisfactory part and assembly drawings. less can be left to men in the shop. all to a degree that was far removed from the peacetime needs of the industry. The Wright Corporation arranged for teletype circuits with each licensee. *** In summary. those generally used in the machining industries. Under such conditions. The needs of the peacetime engine manufacturers could be satisfied in many cases by such phrases as "lap to fit" or "make like sample.." Minor changes were not reflected in the paperwork. by other means such as trips by engineers from one plant to another. was somewhat easier for the engine builders to obtain. but a continuing flow of questions and answers always remained for which provision had to be made. Gauging and inspection standards were very poorly expressed. the other essential paper records of the engine builders . ability is a more critical matter when moving surfaces are involved and when parts are needed by the hundreds or thousands. Little care had been taken to consider the possibility of war volume and the need for transferring information to other plants. tool drawings. the production and assembly planning teams stayed in East Hartford until their basic processes were fully written up. engine drawings conformed to a more established set of practices. This requirement was treated so casually by both the services and the manufacturers that its effect was merely to give a false impression. the engine makers.

. and too few understood what would be required. expansion... and (4) introducing an unnecessarily large number of schedule changes.. particularly with reference to tool engineering.were neither needed nor could they be afforded under peacetime conditions. and up . It. which was the essential prerequisite for the rates of production ultimately required to win World War II. The government contributed to the delays in the change-over to line production methods by (I) failing to plan carefully the introduction of design changes. accurate. ences between models. how and background in the use of line production techniques. (3) setting the initial production goals of individual manufacturers at levels far below those ultimately required... was delayed by (I) products that were not suitably designed for line production methods. . (3) the lack of enough men possessing both aircraft production know . The industry was not prepared because no one in authority in industry or government foresaw the production assignment.had not been recog... (2) the absence of production organization structures that could provide a better basis for . nized that inability to change over quickly to line production techniques was a potential wartime bottleneck. Conversion from job shop to line production methods. to-date descriptions of the product and of current manufacturing methods.. which failed to provide com. (2) not reducing the number of minor differ. and (4) inadequate methods of handling manufacturing information. plete.

Dolo. General M.13 -15-17-19 -21-23"'29 '''31!2O IIor. July Aug..b.366 1. ... Dole. fotal -.~2 1. Sept.TABLE 16. Report spartr.064 ·2. Aug. lIov. reb. ~ ~ I5 175 11 243 312 --29l.101 1. 7. Sept. Jun. oct..900 1.514 2 2 1 ____L 5 3 3 3 31 5 6 2 2 1944 hb.. Sept.lgur&S for 1940 and 19ttl e).'30 1. Nov.071 1943 Jan.c)torsCorp. !rotal 1942 Jan. Apr. Later figure..39-45-47. -27-35.~12 ~ 25.101 2. Engines~nd HOfsepowc::r Deliverc::..Dcl'D!U"C (ooo) _.700 1.551 1.868 2..Jt9 ·C-Jl.. 1941.7 ~~1J.175 2.clude Source: COI!1P""Y Control 1'1.37S 1.021 2..1710 -51-53-55-57 ~6J-65 -7H5-77-19-S1-133 -85-87 -89-91-9795 -99-101-103-105-101 -1~i~~ig~~5 19110Jan. Iiov. 103 .179 1.925 2.936 1.58( Apr.101 2.020 2. Dole..151 1.2.. from Aircraft R. 15. liar.706 1.546 1.parts.1 3 liar..160 1.260 191 'otal 1941 Jan.191 1. July Allg. liar. through Offico..301 1.971 1. 3 7 7 7 14 30 " 13 32 SO B II g oct... 1. .008 2.4. reb.039 1.2Q!_ 21. 1.y Apr.149 11'11 J\II1.oepower Spare j.702 1.001 ·2. 1107 J1m. Feb. Total 1t~~ 1. J..32 1. Dole.073 13 21! 'total _. Sept. Apr. • J1mB July Mg. 1.4" 1. I'OV'.156 2. 11 _ga_ 20.d Allison Division. JllJI8 • Apr. 1. 1 1.612 2. oct.190 2 11 oct. July Iiov.J.eowe .203 1. liar.101 1..105 2. Oct. Dec. July Sept.569 1. . '. liar.I!_ 112 17 t}. 2 __z.084 1.2 1.. 1Ie..

. _lL 2 1..611 621 5..155 m 639 "'" 517 r.!L 457 ~~ J06 49' 400 1'16 '39 100 1. • . 1....079 68 218 "'" --..1!D8 1. 22!> 200 2)7 )58 ~ ~ 491 251 192 --.. <>61 229 . J".62) '<5 _. Jul.. July ..J6 BJ o- "" ~ -. Engines and Horsepower Delivered Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division. 1n"ol~ed.T{Jl 2 1 _--1..L 1l....005 1. l::r. . Oct....913 2.1... .. .-6)-90 :~~6 . ~ 5'.. IIDglae ••• re COWl~d ..."..100 1}6 190 175 '9} 'll' '" 5'> 51 .-'!!!5. "or.r~..188 "76 361 524 m 1 1 7"" Il51 '. . 6.".792 1. ~ l.rq . ---R.. r:mgOl 941 921 905 "'9 I!OO ~ 5'>6 e • ~ 1 1..395 ~:t~ 1l. P-14360 t.. JUly -.-!-H ...-131tO '-9~ If:c.1 1 1 1 --."".1.6 1 2 1 272c 29" 336 32" ~ I ~ ..4 99 ~ 125 l!1l 1115 199 226 i~ 166 "" ~ . "..._ 2.. 1....016 _.5 - --'== ~ _.10 '9" m 167 161 ."...."'9 106 94 •• 26s 2Tl 179 16 J8 140 26S 211 :!J9 _m. 97 10. IW. 2.. 1.&1 A... ~ Na:'.. ...irerai"t Retl)<lI'Cl!I...621 1.. .~ ~:r. "'- -I. Do. -. F.- _JIL 2.. -900-90c -SlIA-92 -ee -c~ -0jC T- . . 16.. 111)"'..6)6 275 318 200 m )l'.120 ...605 1 ~ 1..109.)1' 1. -1-2_t> -~ll -13-15 17-35-39 $1.chldl_ Spare Part.1" 1... J 16 _llI!L 'l'otal ~~J_. 50".~~ 971 e 1157 ~.>" . 1. .. --"11 9.041 J.00 1)1 101 160 111 112 92 J2 "610 ~' 12 1') !72 79l Ol" 1. ) Sept. J60 -10-11-13-15 "..J9!L 1..... 871 911 2.. _<'!L 1... ~ a 2 --"11 ~ 1 2 1 . Apr. _. 1)9 9' 148 227 '" 22!> 29} 2J 11J "to1 19lf1..L.lao tlle plat 1 --6- __ ~ "'5 m ~:m -.&e Sillgle -8-"-10 -':~~ -101-65 -2:2::l1-~ 1 -0 S\ . e ~ Slap -18-1.. 151 711) "' _Jit 1.152 ~::U '.. ....78...25. ___L _...101 2.119 1. 215 261 1!1l lt9 " . J.. -t-U-9-9'I' $"_'11 .... In &llQeral... "'01 ou.lao... I.!l5 1.rDl~ th ... . 100 22) Kar. Feb.527 1..b..1069 1 1 1 -J:i .3GD 21) . 860 952 81' se :z§ 179 109 5 __ .~.95J ~ pW'pO . 111 ~ n Go re i~ tfJ19' ~~ .341 1 1.409 ___L :t~ ... I.202 1.: .f!)rmat. -- SemrC$: . --J- . "0.d 1n tbue Office..ll.1294fD )90 --. :10.. J=.792 75 245 237 -..359 Tot&! .. SlIpt. 50 ...41u ~" 5'>7 10" 816 8)' .73) tctab .61 95 ...696 1... reb.- ~ 921 -L!!2l.. Oct.000 1. 7J 5'> J' "'" 10} 1~ 97 96 101. 255 !Ill 9 ____zU..691 ". ..."' '.01..827 11.... 1. -. ~ 1.i 110 -"'l- __JQ§_ J" "... Sept. '~ 111 ~ .561 1. ". '''''....m 11. 1l'Icl'lll!. United Aircraft Corporation East Hartford and Feeder Plants --R-.~ ~r. Cobtt'ol _.. 1. 226 "'9 -" ~ 286 .5". eftC1I'Ie. 10.. . "1 56' )10 325 166 266 Jln 168 )50 215 J50 261 J64 250 901 999 96. :~1!2:~ -6. 8~ -l2-1ti-20 .. e. . - ---- .l:et'I fl'o.11«1.'1. . July oct.. .}t?1 1."57 1. . (000) ss .192 231 l~Ju. 000..600 1.941 ~.0g6 1. !Ill 525 J64 269· 1•..19'5 ~:~~ ·.121 1... ~ ~ ~ '" 54 s 514 "10 IJ 5'02 5'>4 51"! _Zi_ 6."".. > I 1 1..'" 25'> ~ 179 )"9 24.sr.....". Foell.. :~5-~". J_. ... ..m ~.pr. -9" ..t n.. . 112 1Dc 1).303 1.100 1...m _. 5 4 ...B21 1. ~ Go 18 67 7J ..' '" 015 .617 ~..926- 900 _$. Oot. .. .525 1.... .1 . _. ' Total 191t4 J&!J..1168 1..- ..07_ . 6JC --'!I!!. oc •.. I'." 2 '" 1 1 lJ7 102 112 17' .~~ -SB. ." 245 _Jl!!l.)62 '. 212 1 " --. 2.ioll eol1c.::. ...261 1.. "' 161 '" 161 1..llJ. To1.'. Report 15....21--21-31 • R-2SDO -II -0 !'Iro St. 15 ill loco loco 282 J59 J58 ~ 26 100 5 '1 ~~ ~ 515 ~ 520 ~ ~ 6. 175 ..500 ." 1115 .JIlL 3. _GiL 7.2'11 .=~~ 1-2110 It.."".L 1 252 . -29-55 ...... 3 5 1... kept ~ aa ) ) 640 5100 535 79' ". Apt. 60. 11 11 JJ 17 1 25J 1J9 9' 119 123 170 --..0311!' 1.""' ~ '. 21 • !I'D _iI!lP__ 3.1'" :J 799 532 189 51" --2 -- - -~....cOl)uoting t'lIcol'ds. .155 99 109 lOB . g' 10 . JJo •• .._ --- -_..... Oct.reepceoer lr.. In & ""17 tQfl UllJt!I.Io9..1 i:~ ~ 17.~ J81 99" -.O~ "'" ~ J8 11 50 22 ~Z . Do. for ezper1JDeutal 104 .s1 1 1 I 99' 156 1 49' .016 1..911 '51 J1! 356 J!Il .. So:pt..._ ~..0s) ~ ~~~ ~ '''1 281 ) )59 . TABLE 17. Jul..~ '.L12J_ 10.. J=...521 ~:.. - .539 1.2 . 5 1. 1.Jt 'J 75 96 7.. 212 1l! 10) 1 . .. -C~-CI5G "- ---- -B-2000-W -1-)-7 -11 -SCG 1933 1939 01_. 49 • 22!> --. J=.p.~ 68D 1'" 825 lID) 80S --i1 1 • a --"3" 1 2 1 1 1 . i'eb.52} J57 "25 "5 '25 '25 4D5 }91 262 140 162 1111 J_ J"'...1 1 1 1 103 90 16 65 lID ~ 210 27_ 23' J'" J57 . u: 1.l!2 2.. ..- 194..IICe.'»1 .Jli_ 1. 12> 5)1 48J 420 4g4 1110 325 265 100 102 19" __ 69 lfi_ 3.~1 210 1 ___L no '" m 210 60 60 "1 ---1Q1_ 1.. "".Sll) I!OO 20...001 • 132 156 III JC2 •• 5 .

6'14 2.038 "" m ~ . Paterson '-3350 -B-IO-lll- Plant! )brUo$po*Cr -30-75 -c<JI -50-71 -C3(I -03(1100 -5<-57-79 -01-8'-<5 -89 -'Io--4oJ!-S.~...651 1. J.. !--------- 1---- r.166 1. J..!SCl ----.'5(... Doo.. ""T.9L 2!..!J)2 m 2}" 2~2 ""G."" ~..b...76.-18"20 Dl:TJ"I'. . J.r...33" 42 =- -ii. JIo> i..2 10. 1941f Jan. oct.20' 32! 50 Go 66 66 96 16. Engines and Horsepower Delivered._---------_. Hortepour ...s lOT OM'.1. 1J!l .h!7e. 'OT.~ ~= 29 1.. lli 7~ '37 ____J5§_ 5. 55 ~~ ~ ~ ~ 305 71" S ---i- if4' .t.. 19~ .177 7..9116 ~:~ 571 824 541 571 33· 2"5 ~ _L 2 8 20 _."51 1.T1:l.L JJ. ."" ~ 60" 011.~ 211 146 212 205 211 Z1 6. ~~ 3S2 259 99 70 .~=b.. SO ~ 1'16 122 159 170 155 183 ~fZ "'1 566 ~ 667 Sep\:.al 2 2 15 19 63 05 35 29 2} 392 _5a."r_ J= Ju1. "b.. Oct...- .J5L 1.e Sources: p1A%lt ~'!'td 1Io!"p&t'aUly.o _ . ~~ Jul.al m 168 143 153 92 101 c-----------2 3 3 9 5 2 2 2 --2.e. 108 1~ 146 91 ~_1_ 5 __1..--·-760 ll-375 Total lJtc1'J.. 554 "Z9 138 562 "'. 163 z6 29 • • 4 59 177 122 105 195 215 184 225 215 1'otal l~ln J'&n..217 3.012 .415 2. lI..790 2. ~ .. JvlT ...dlng Spare Fuh (000) z ~~ J 3 9 1333' .r --. re~. .!!!l.~~ i~i.67 1... -. Jun.024 '195 298 ~~ !II> 4 17 _ _5__ 10 17 . -JIIJl. Jl..?054 -1~...t. ------r----.Campazll" re-=~rd •• .. iec _l~~ 19. JtLn.~~:!~~n!~!~!:: .- " SO 59 19 10 --.? 10 116 1...§6:kF::... 137 2J" 293 201 ss 5" '* _.19-21-35 -37-3') 2 2 ·llA - -16-17--4) . 1.. Sop'. 4.96.Iif 1." reb.e --.~i:e. 59} so.e. Doe.t.~~ 610 63· 579 S"" 600 ~~ G51 T.i<6 103 37 1 654 676 657 675 611 644 637 6<1 ~ ue 1)Z P.F.. I. _. . Jun.r cee.."Jg..513 ~~ 5 1 m ~ ~ 113 63) 603 643 5'" <"" 112 1 7 6 ~ ISO 15' 1'T! izt . Total -11-19-21 Jew. lav. """ .~-· .. --2----2 1 1 29 16 20 1. " 10 II ~_J_ '~ 1J -.'!.157 1.359 " 371 ~ l.. -. 776 )"7 8S4 971.1 234 293 "'7 51 '5 lii .527 J.rtXId-Rld.$03 19" 199 23' 21. 'l'o .."'" 2..TABLE 18.115 2. ~ -zy- l. '..202--.J.=~~~~_=_ l.:! ~~~:t~~it!~~~R!. 2.906 2.. Jul~ 00'. __ 3.. . ""'.z5 339 566 503 I..m 1. Rov.gd plaL"'.925 I~}! 415 26 29 • I.6 55 ._ 118 1. -----------------11-lSZO 0-2600 ~--·--·-·---------------__=C90c--·----:<9.ii~~· o~~.093 2.67 524 ----llL 7... Wright Aeronautical ..r- _A. 9~ 239 293 2J5 16) 2J2 255 ZS9 _J'..552 '<54 "'" I..359 331 ____J5§_ 5.719 2.Jli. 2. --56-560 --60-0"--71 --56'~-62-66 -07-')7::'''''' -)0-7OG -G.----.713 2. 9. .z..721 167 ~:§lr ~:~ 2.~. Doc.lJ:ED PlUoa 1ti 1942 -ifst· I!>' 204 150 _rt. 11.o~~~~~~lCo:~!!1:~.150 1..)46 250 252 295 )11 -223 lS2 105 ---39 1 1 ~j3 __ J4 211.2!0 1.9~ 43e !n.5"7 2.II._ 1.. 1. cee ..:- 3£5 )43 342 ...694 5 l~ w.212 _..'ept.5S5 1. ". . .656 734 750 731 '24 1. ~ 616 d~§ 3'3 326 ~ 615 6lIS ~ ""S ~ 94 4 r..9)1_ 6.&~ ""5 '" g lC ~ 2.p-<.rte1 (2) 105 . Do c. .25 527 582 555 l. War. • 1~ 21 ~ 6.i9'l_ 2. act. 'l 6 9 ----121 117 212 101 201 1116 206 197 _.0< . Jan...~:1:!!~an~~~~:e~~g. ~ S Z2 "-. Sltpt. .s7 ~ 555 9 1 122 107 160 96 77 2.201 2.7::4 2. fotal -5-13-1' .7 6< 3? si JS 59 _ 3" 56.r 7 1~ _1_EJ. . Jul..l4 SSl --"'R 6. Jan.. J..63 _!.35.33" '195 29" ~ ~:~~ 2.~ (1) ~~d~rL1:.5.393 503 378 ---. 3 . 205 105 116 139 103 141 219 1~2 " 7 .y A""..00) ...7"7 01.s 1.'un.--~~~.~12 527 10 11 5S2 s 1 1.)06 2. .. Oct..ar.072 ...'79 1. GaV. &. Totel JO 05 41 26 1. 1. July ""01 191to -..76) 1. 60.- 66 66 96 16. reb. '1Qo~-R1d. -..684 ~~ _ -3.. !ot&1 ...z) a~ 654 616 675 611 644 637 7..lli__ __ 1.=:.068 2. -13-16 -8-10-12: .. --.-. "91 4}2 1~ 164 .1 __ 1.t..ID.50· 91" 1. Jo"_ Do e..c --<9"" -74 19)5 Corp.2 ~ 73~ 711 )34 S09 1'o'O! 1343 Jan. 1'o. "" 58 58 ----.s7 )71 .

. Nov. engines are counted as invoiced. engines included in these totals were kept in the plant for experimental purposes.274 7. In a very few instances. Sept. Engines and Horsepower Delivered.744 -- 19 75 104 203 391 699 726 575 692 1. M'ay Oct. Aril Mar.(' Single Stage ·14·2~·~~W·34·34W·28·5i·81 Horsepower including Spare Parts (000) 1943 Dec. Pratt & Whitney. June July Aug.097 1. Kansas City Plant R·~OO. eb.081 Note: In general. Dec. Total -_ 9 28 30 80 154 301 305 225 260 427 450 475 ---" 2.226 1. Source: Company accounting records. Total -- 1 1 --2 2 1944 ~an.TABLE 19.

~~n_e'~J~en~~ (RC-391) POWer PIMnt Branch.018 715 5.462 3.719 2.870 1.292 2.393 2.589 3 1. 25 G. 1944 Jan.912 5.531 4.9g6 _ _L_~ .9S1 1.177 94 9l:· ----1 1 8 5 29 54 215 245 2 10 705 58S 684 1.767 4._--.l Sept.1 -~&443 57 23 138 6 12 22 17 45 135 6 12 22 17 45 1:35 -_::~Qg11':}3 57 23 1)8 1 177 4..256 1.5J.J.714 . --.707 ~.014 3.989 3..911 25..232 2. 1'~7~ 1.-.055 365 16.596 ____l_ 1 •. SS?t.610 .:!t.-----~.17~ 58 1.-. ioI~ J=e July Aug. ~!.l~_ 1. La~' Ju.8~ 2.269 1..792 4. hlar • Apr.0 _!_.6so .v.575 2.._Q. -----.693 2.- ---- R-2600 -14-15 -lIB T:lt".50 1.396 2.037 3..459 1.962 1.018 557 ___ IU_ 8.. F'3~..-~757 642 793 ~95 I.0 37 29 77 230 .:J:'L 21.214 20.013 715 .293 2.y June J-J.. Engines and Horsepower Delivered Wright Aeronautical Corp.595 -.553 1.----_ --.961 1. A~~ Air Forces Materiel COQ~ar.692 2.767 2. ~rov.702 2. Total 1943 Jan.362 2..Company records.:. Nov. L 2"~. Liar.------------HorslJpower .961 1. Dec.08g 3'g99 5.957 1. 1J!L 38..!'l.--_ .]1+ Aug. Oct.11 Aug. 1. Dec.943 2. Se'. Feb.. Cincinnati Plant - .051 1. 32 1.492 1.2 1.4a 1.-------_.810 l.941 --~1.908 2. May June JulyAug. 107 . iri&.213 1.03a 2.2.7~ 2.. Apr. Nov.097 __ It.012 <!.002 346 73 168 639 892 720 1.1 2. Apr.)82 ._-- - 1J1n -Jl. Ma.!!.557 June 1. Oct.612 1. -8-12-13 ~__ ::s9:::ll ___ R-3350-llA -57 . Production Section. HQrsepower including --- - Spare Parts (000) -20-22 _ Feb.Llt.2 2 1.. Total -"._-.558 1._- 53.292 1.174 5.065 1.567 939 e ~r.....608 1942 Ja. 1:396 1.. Total _g_. hi:.~_ 1_ ? 5._.452 2.~9 ._------.-.d.870 46} _?._Q1. Apr.l'._gS_9_ _ 177 459 709 SS8 684 1.. Se~t.._1.42 _ (2) (1) Engine Units . Oct.98 1. Sources.ly . Oct.TABLE 20. Fe1:-. __ . Dec.)0 14 2..l -- _. Dec.230 ..613 3. -BA. Tota.

. Mar.200 1. Sept. Mar.\-00(1 ·C4G-C8G Single Stage -75 ·COO R·~-9 Horsepower including Spare Part.244 . Oct. (000) 1943 ~an.560 2..563 --- --24.605 4. Mar.930 5.400 1. Oct. . ~ Oct. Nov.002 4. Sept.128 Sources: (I) Engine 1. -. Oct.700 1. supplied by Paterson plant.146 3. Dec. Nov. Dec.704 2.230 4.225 1.--13.745 2.144 974 1.337 1.624 1.799 3. Dec. Nov.150 3.246 2.1 Jan.020 1.299 2.902 3.43-43'\-66 -65.594 --""~ 501 551 530 407 650 792 880 1. Buick Division.309 1944 ~an. 15.500 1. Licensee of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft R-I8!lO ·DA 19-18·19-~1 't!J·~A·3S 351·3511. --30.549 2. Nov.079 1. eb.250 2.099 3. Mar.800 1.100 3. General Motors Corporation..000 1.100 2.-3511 !I1-n·51-59 --"--~"'-·DB Horsepower including Spurt' Purts (000) 1I-H-4:l Tutal Single Stage . ~ril ay June July Aug.828 2.493 4.200 1.t 100 engines . Nov.004 11261 2. eb.278 2. Mar.200 1.240 1.866 3.000 1.700 2. Wood-Ridge Plant ---R·:J!l. ~~l June July Aug.. Sept.227 -.684 3.800 2.200 None de.501 2.306 1.967 3. A '1 June July Aug.Pratt Wbitney record s. • Fi.341 1.985 3. April May June July Aug.'iO TABLE 22.100 2.188 39 5.848 11.TABLE 21. Dec.000 3..127 1..395 440 610 616 700 750 879 1. livered before 1945 None de. Sou"".700 --- 39. Company reeords. livered before 1945 --- 3 528 743 776 935 1.077 1. Engines and Horsepower Delivered Wright Aeronautical Corp.757 3.127 1.nit. Total - -5. Dec.031 3.. Oct. Total --8. Sept. eb.Aircraft Besoure es Control Ollit-e.974 3. Engines and Horsepower Delivered. Feb.341 1.792 3. Total -- 7* 14· 9· 20· 13· 22· 32· 101 169 230 253 870 283 331 360 381 330 415 452 501 551 529 405 650 - 2 3 1 6 8 5 7 8 4 2 2 1 2 -- 7· 14· 9· 20· 13* 22* 32· 101 170 232 256 876 291 336 367 389 334 417 454 --- 55 55 73 31 65 41 67 104 312 499 736 810 1942 Jan. Feb. Report a.636 1.052 3.357 1.189 1. ~ril ay June July Aug. (it) Horsepower ..544 2. Total 194. mbled from part. Sept.201 1.799 2.800 --40. Total 1944 ~an.

...... Single Stage -57-73-71 -8S Horsepower including Spare Parts (000) 1942 April ..210 -- 1 25 56 101 144 327 --- 4.............. Total .......002 2....572 640 650 550 601 597 311 303 300 304 296 581 533 --- 811 928 954 1.601 2............ Aug..... General Motors Corporation... --- 21.024 II ... Oct ....367 1..544 --- -_- 5. ...122 3....646 1943 ~an ...051 2....666 27. Oct . Oct .....600 2......... Total . Feb.........551 1..522 So""". --- 550 297 233 371 832 902 1..298 2..... Aug.....TABLE 23. July . April ........290 2.060 1. ay .. Whitney reeo rds...095 1. July ..600 2. 4 21 183 325 773 683 722 812 510 --- -~- 25 25 4.....378 4.... Nov ..........601 2..900 3.. Pratt .601 2.515 1. ....603 2. Aug ....... Report U.355 1....493 3...313 1....950 2... Mar ..151 3....605 3...... ..447 1.734 3.....414 2.036 11.......103 2.060 2................. Nov ..726 2...~· -92 Tutul R-iSOO·(... Dec ..124 3.809 2.842 2.. Total ......722 2..191 1.......292 1.--- Engines and Horsepower Delivered.......300 1.931 3.770 1..102 1.......094 1.....004 2..192 1.. Control Office........895 4..255 820 518 --- 261 631 721 724 683 907 1.700 2. Sept ..... Dec ........ Aircraft Rt-sou.......844 2.153 2... Sept ........058 --- 5 25 219 389 963 707 900 1. Licensee of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft R-IR:JO -C4(....361 2....416 1... June .300 1...648 37.......401 1..708 1944 Jan ...........996 1.. July . Sept ............051 --35.681 2..291 1.. May .110 3....151 3.. Mar .......877 4... (It) lIoroepa_r.....060 1.. ~ril... Chevrolet Division.449 2.060 23.. .948 3.. 51 4 3..246 5..033 --- 4 21 183 325 773 510 683 722 837 4..601 2... Nov ......001 1.....-CSG Single St Uh'(~ -43-4:1A-65A-67 -C3G Single StuJ..: (I) Engine Units.. May .170 1... June .. June ........ Dec .... eb .

392* 1. Engines and Horsepower Delivered. TABLE 25.259 --- 20.552 2. Total 1942 Jan. Sept.052 1.728 1944 Jan.904 36 63 150 46a 526 530 570 572 640 672 691 798 546 651 818 908 1. Mar. Mar.692 700 701 758 800 850 850 575 825 800 800 800 800 I --- 50 20 110 166 212 316 452 600 686 652 1. Report 15.. Dec. Dec..097 1. (1) En&:ine Units. Feb. Dec. Sept.. Report 15. Nov.072 2. (~) Horsepower: (a) October. April May June July Aug. Pratt & "Ohitney accounting records. Sept. Mar .Aircraft Resources Control Office. Nov.527 2.828 1.24<) 4.664 1.163 4.196 -- R-3SW·BA -2S·23A-57 1944 • 'I'he actual total of the monthly figures shown for 1942 is 13. (000) --- 24.259 13.324 2. .507 2..5 24. Sept. Mar.519 2. 9. 1944.114 14.187 110 Source: Aircraft Resources Control Office. Oct.796 3. Pratt & Whitneyrerord.704 14. ~ril ay June July Aug.150 2.990 5.198 1.419 2.695 5. April May June July Aug. Sources. April May June July Aug.053 35 80 205 343 505 842 1.575 2.359 2. 194~. Oct.219 31.337 1. (b) February.460 1.65 Horsepower including Spare Parts (000) ·A Single Stage ·~1·i7-SI·43-51-59 -63-71-75-79 ·B including Spare Parts (000) Horsepower 1941 Oct.. Feb.Januarv.999 4. Nov. Nov.250 5.584 2.984 4.911 3.658 Jan. Feb. Total 15 31 82 136 205 344 507 659 809 957 1.721 1.961 2. Total 1944 Jan.209 1. Feb.023 4. Chrysler Corporation. ('l) Horsepower. < Jan. Pratt & "hltney records . This revision was not obtained.TABLE Engines and Horsepower Delivered Ford Motor Company Licensee of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft R·2800 Single Stage . Dec. 19~~. Dec.514 56. Sources: (I) Engme Units.123 1. through .350 2.628 1.903 5.048 1.568 2.765 1.266 2.133 2. Total 1943 Jan. 1941.143 5.771. Report 15. The figure 14. Licensee of Wright Aeronautical Corporation Horsepower including Spare Part..896 1.079 1. Feb.870 1. Total _262 229 238 225 1 99 162 -- 2 2 -- 2 202 335 539 1942 Dec. Total -~- -- -- .867 2. through December. Mar.140 3.464 1.820 2.562 2. Nov.304 3. Nov. Sept.8-8W·I0·10W.161 1.147 1.091 1.289 1. Sept. Total --- 6 6 --- 12 12 1943 -- 692 -5. Oct.711 776 770 1.660 4. .S9~ is used here and in the summaries appearing as Exhibits 4 and 16 of the report as this total was published in the vear-cnd summary h. Feb.229 6. April May June July Aug. Mar. Engines and Horsepower Delivered. Oct.063 1.598 1.389 1. Report 15.018 1. Dec. April May June July Aug. Dec. Oct.317 1.628 1. Dodge Division.839 TABLE 26.' Aircraft Resources Control Office. monthly published figures.057 1. Total 24 --- 55 83 106 158 226 300 325 303 501 600 11 -- 2.224 1. Nov. Aircraft Resources Control Office.880 1.015 1.015 4.241 1.595 1. indicating 3 later revision of the.571 1.794 1.472 1. Nash-Kelvinator Licensee of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft R·~800B Two Stage . Oct.

.425 2.249 1.457 2.266 2.300 2.212 1. Aril May June July Aug. Licensee of Wright Aeronautical Corporation Horsepower including Spare Part.084 2. -- 7. Total 1944 Jan. Oct. Ltd.056 12.503 109 149 333 505 602 702 801 800 800 800 800 850 7. Studebaker Corporation. Report 15.178 3.068 1. Nov. Total 1944 Jan.798 -- 954 859 1.522 1.4.216 2.675 3.573 3.160 2.540 --- 1.406 -- * Figures for 1941 exclude spare parts.008 1.153 3.747 3. Total 1943 Jan. Source: Aircraft Resources Control Office. Mar. Mar. Feb.355 3. Packard Motor Car Company Licensee of Rolls-Royce.298 2.684 2.040 1. Dec. Engines and Horsepower Delivered. Dec. Nov.854 1.767 2.051 6.069 2.292 610 631 780 860 522 1. April May June July Aug. Dec. Feb. Total including Spare Parts" (000) Horsepower --- 4 7 35 168 387 600 804 1.499 1.269 1.618 38.128 1. Dec.290 1. Nov.476 1.849 1.449 3. Nov. Oct.140 1.560 3.677 2. Total 1943 Jan.381 2. April May June July Aug.006 1.920 --- 3. Oct.220 1.198 2. Total -- 4 5 10 26 45 -- 5 7 14 35 61 8.209 1. Mar.110 3. Sept.608 1. (000) TABLE 28. Nov.314 2.314 2. Feb.645 3.206 3.52 2.581 3. Dec.195 3 I I --- 2. Total 1942 Jan.149 3.732 2.221 3.661 2. Sept.387 2.011 1.268 1.763 Source: Aircraft Resources Control Office.366 1. Mar.322 --34. ~ril ay June July Aug..002 2.265 -- 4 1 5 11.045 753 1. Feb.000 2.792 20.729 1.092 2.066 2.016 1.662 2. Oct.528 428 132 18 -- -- 16 56 184 371 475 450 547 689 1 I 2.577 1941 Sept. Sept. Sept. Mar.142 964 1. Nov.322 3.479 2. April May June July Aug. Feb.390 1.222 1.68-69 V-1650 -3-7 R-1820 -G200-65-97 1942 Jan.184 3. Report 15.508 2.163 3.578 4.066 1.300 2.340 3. Sept. Oct.125 1.891 3. Sept. Nov.409 3.203 1.217 2.58 -- 39.172 -- 142 237 537 819 930 1.801 2. Dec. Dec.262 1.171 15.403 1.248 1.002 1.313 27. Oct. Mar.TABLE 27.519 3. Feb.970 2. Single Stage Merlin -~8-29-31-S3 -38-2~4-225·266P V-1650 -1-5-17 Two Stage Merlin .304 23.246 Z. Oct. Engines and Horsepower Delivered.5.091 --- 5 9 42 251 528 830 1.114 811 737 .231 3.089 3.251 850 864 615 607 1.017 1.508 1. ~ril ay June July Aug.182 858 2.378 3.056 1.

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